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The Actors of International System and the New Transatlanticism:
A Study for US-EU Relations with a Special Emphasis on Foreign and Security Policy

Ph.D. Thesis

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ÖZ

Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması, çok-kutuplu ve karşılıklı-bağımlı bir dünyanın oluşmaya başlaması ve siyasi-ekonomik faktörlerin önem kazanması, uluslararası arenada yeni bir transatlantik temel yaratmıştır. Buna bağlı olarak, bu çalışmanın amacının, sözkonusu transatlantik temel üzerinde, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Avrupa Birliği arasındaki dış politika ve güvenlik ilişkilerinin incelenmesi olduğu söylenebilir.

Uluslararası ilişkilerin doğasını değiştiren küreselleşme süreci ve buna bağlı olarak gelişen küresel değişim, siyasi düzeyde yeni gruplaşmaların oluşumuna zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu çerçevede, küresel aktörler olan ABD ile AB, kurdukları ortaklık etrafında uluslararası güvenliği sağlayacak bir denge için çalışmaktadırlar. Bu bağlamda, ABD ile AB arasındaki yoğun işbirliği, transatlantik düzeydeki bu ortaklığı dünya çapına yaymak için vazgeçilmez görülmektedir.

Böylece, Atlantiğin her iki tarafi da ortak hayati çıkarları etrafında hareket etmeye devam edecek ve aynı zamanda karşılarına çıkacak olan sorunlarla da beraber mücadele edeceklerdir. Nitekim, uluslararası sorunların çok çeşitli ve karmaşık yapısı, ne ABD'ye , ne de AB'ye tek başlarına hareket ederek çözüm bulmaları konusuna olanak tanımamaktadır.Buna göre, önümüzdeki yıllar, her iki tarafin da hem işbirliğini devam ettirmelerini hem de daha geniş bir transatlantik ortaklık için çalışmalarını gerektirecektir.

Benzer biçimde, nispeten yeni oluşumlar olarak kabul edilebilecek olan "Transatlantik Deklarasyonu" ve "Yeni Transatlantik Gündem", sözkonusu ortaklık sürecine katkıda bulunacak ve belki de, 21. yüzyılda dünya siyaset ve ticaretinin merkezi olabilecek bir "Avrupa-Amerika" bloğu fikrine de temel teşkil etmiş olacaktır.

ABSTRAKT

The dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the onset of a multipolar and interdependent world; and growing the importance of politico-economic factors have created a new transatlantic base for international arena. The goal of this study, therefore, is to explain the foreign and security relations between the United States of America and the European Union on the transatlantic base.

Globalization process and global transformation which change the nature of international relations imply the emergence of a new configuration of politics. Within this framework, the United States of America and the European Union, as global actors, promote stability on the transatlantic base, around a broad partnership, which leads to the management of international security. In that context, therefore, increased peace and security through intense US-European cooperation is a sine qua non for extending transatlantic comity into the rest of the world.

Therefore, the two sides of the Atlantic continue to share enduring vital interests and face a common set of challenges. These challenges, in particular, are so many and diverse that neither the US nor the EU can adequately address these regional and global concerns alone. Thus, protecting shared interests and managing common threats in the years ahead will necessitate not only continued cooperation but also a broader and more comprehensive transatlantic partnership than in the past.

Moreover, relatively new formations, such as "Transatlantic Declaration" and the "New Transatlantic Agenda" will contribute to the partnership process that may lead to a idea of a "Euromerican" bloc, capable of acting as the center of world politics and world trade in the twenty-first century.

List of Abbreviations

CAP	:	Common Agricultural Policy
CDP	:	Common Defense Policy
CEE	:	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	:	Central and Eastern European Countries
CESDP	:	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTFs	:	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSCE	:	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAPC	:	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	:	European Community
ECB	:	European Central Bank
ECMM	:	European Community Monitoring Mission
ECSC	:	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	:	European Defense Community
EEC	:	European Economic Community
EFP	:	European Foreign Policy
EMP	:	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EMU	:	European Monetary Union
EPC	:	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	:	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	:	European Union
FOFA	:	Follow-on-Forces Attack
FRG	:	Federal Republic of Germany
FSU	:	Former Soviet Union
G-24	:	Inter-Governmental Group of Twenty-Four
G-7	:	Group of Seven
G-8	:	Group of Eight
GAC	:	General Affairs Council
GATT	:	General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
IBRD	:	World Bank Group

IEPG	:	Independent European Program Group
IFOR	:	NATO-led Implementation Force
IGC	:	Inter-Governmental Conference
IGOs	:	Inter-Governmental Organizations
ILEA	:	International Law Enforcement Academy
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
INF	:	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IR	:	International Relations
ITA	:	Information Technology Agreement
KEDO	:	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LIBERTAD	:	Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
MC	:	Military Committee
MEPP	:	Middle East Peace Process
MRAs	:	Mutual Recognition Agreements
MS	:	Military Staff
NACC	:	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIS	:	New Independent States
NSD	:	New Security Dilemma
NTA	:	New Transatlantic Agenda
OAS	:	Organization of American States
OECD	:	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	:	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	:	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P-5	:	Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
PfP	:	Partnership for Peace
PJC	:	Permanent Joint Council
PLO	:	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM	:	Prime Minister
PSC	:	Political and Security Committee
QMV	:	Qualified Majority Voting
REDWG	:	Regional Economic Development Working Group
SEA	:	Single European Act

SFOR	:	NATO-led Stabilization Force
TABD	:	Transatlantic Business Dialogue
TAFTA	:	Transatlantic Free Trade Area
TEP	:	Transatlantic Economic Partnership
TEU	:	Treaty on European Union
TSD	:	Traditional Security Dilemma
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNESCO	:	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA	:	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	:	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNPROFOR	:	United Nations Protective Force
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
US	:	United States
USA	:	United States of America
USSR	:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	:	Western European Union
WMD	:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPE	:	World Political Economy
WTO	:	World Trade Organization

Introduction

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have been scene to very important events in terms of international relations. In fact, the 1990s have witnessed significant developments and crucial changes. During this period, state system and its indispensable part, sovereignty principle, have begun to been discussed and non-state actors have started to be examined deeply. Regional formations have gained importance and the principle of globalization became a prominent notion in the hands of the scholars of international relations.

In this framework, relations between the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) gained a higher level of dimension on transatlantic basis. Besides, Transatlantic Declaration and New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) have consolidated this relationship in international arena. Therefore, in it is very important turning point of history of international politics, it must be very useful, or rather required to examine the transatlantic relationship in terms of its foreign policy and security relations.

Therefore, this study examines the transatlantic relations, in terms of its political dimension. The study tries to explain the issues of both the United States (US) and the EU and tries to mold them on the transatlantic base. In doing this, the detailed information on historical past of the both sides, except some historical information of European political, economic and social development, and detailed machinery of organizations and institutions have been ignored and rather focused on the main points instead.

This study tries to explain the importance of globalization, international actors, and new transatlanticism in the current international arena signifying a rapidly changing and developing process. The thesis, therefore, put forward the hypothesis that new transatlantic relationship that is the political relations between the US and EU, have contributed to development of peace and security of the world and ease the tensions and conflicting situations worldwide. Therefore, this assumption can be able to deem of useful contribution to the academic studies of international relations (IR), and can be improved by further studies in the future.

The thesis is consisted of ten chapters and a conclusion, together with a bibliography at the end. In this study, both primary and secondary sources are used and quoting and especially paraphrasing techniques are applied.

Since theory and other indirectly related subjects, such as euro-dollar relations, are not the core objectives of the study, these issues and their sources have added to footnotes where necessary in text, and thus, left to the reader for further researching.

The first chapter is about a new international system that gives the basic difference between the cold-war international system and the post-cold war system. It explains the proliferation of international institutions and put forward the features of new international society. The chapter also emphasizes the main developments such as the revolution in sovereignty principle.

The second chapter is on international actors and the principle of globalization. In this chapter, some headings are; the basic points of international actors; explanation on global society; the importance of globalization; the causes of global approach and global transformation.

The third chapter emphasizes European system and the European Union in international arena. This chapter deals with emergence of the European system, European Union as system, EU as a global actor and European foreign policy.

The fourth chapter explains the European security. The chapter explains the security agenda of the EU, important aspects for security in Europe – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-EU relations. One another subject is the parallel enlargement of NATO and the EU and its effects to transatlantic security.

The fifth chapter is on the American system in international arena. It deals with the US foreign policy in the 20th century and the changing policy to the USA as an internationalist. Moreover, the chapter explains the reasons of this change and its importance to transatlantic relations. The chapter also mentions America's new partnership perspective within the international system.

The sixth chapter deals with transatlantic security as a whole. The chapter begins with the changing international arena and continues with the factors of the emergence of a transatlantic security community. The chapter broadly mentions the reasons of tensions and successful examples for easing these tensions.

The seventh chapter emphasizes transatlantic relations between the US and the EU. This chapter mainly discusses the partnership between the two sides, the domestic situation of the transatlantic relations, the relations in the 1990 and the future. One another topic of this chapter is the euro-dollar relations between the two sides, and its effects to international relations.

The chapter eight is all about NATO. The chapter deals with the main point of NATO in the late 1990s, and its successes in Bosnia and Kosovo, with its effects to European security. It also explains the enlargement process and the relations with the Central and Eastern European countries. The importance of NATO and its contribution to transatlantic security is another subject from this chapter.

The last chapter deals with new transatlanticism. This chapter focuses on a new transatlantic approach, and its effects on transatlantic partnership. It also emphasizes Transatlantic Declaration and New Transatlantic Agenda in terms of transatlantic development.

Chapter 1: New International System

1.1. International System and the United Nations as a Sub-System

1.1.1. International System

The international system is the set of relationships among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Some such rules are explicit, some implicit. They include who is considered a member of the system, what rights and responsibilities the members have, and what kinds of actions and responses normally occur between states[1].

To David Singer, there is a distinction between the international system level and the national system level. He asserts that the international system level being the most comprehensive of the levels available, encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the system and its environment. To him, this level of analysis[2] permits scholars to examine international relations in the whole. In that context, therefore, there are four basic system levels[3]. The first level, the *intra-national system* is important because the communication between the international system and its sub-systems flows only partially through the governmental structures of the nation states. The level of analysis is useful for the study of the process of international integration. The intra-national system can be divided into three major sub-systems (the political, economic, and socio-cultural). The second level, *the nation state system* is the institutionalized level of the intra-national system. It constitutes the operational membership of the international system in which the role of the members states is preponderant in the setting of objectives, in the decision-making process and in the allocation of resources to the international organization system.

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[1] Goldstein, S. Joshua. International Relations, Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994, pp. 7,8

[2] A level of analysis is a perspective on International Relations based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggests possible explanations to "why" questions. The "lowest" levels focus on small, disaggregated units like individual people, while the "highest levels focus on macro processes like global trends. Therefore, it can be mentioned four levels. The *individual* level of analysis concerns the perceptions, choices, and actions of individual human beings. That is to say, great leaders influence the course of history, as do individual citizens, thinkers, and voters. The *domestic* (or "state", or "societal") level of analysis concerns the aggregations of individuals within states that influence state actions in the international arena. Such aggregations include interest groups, political organizations, and government agencies. The *inter-state* (or "international" or "systemic") level of analysis concerns the influence of the international system upon outcomes. This level of analysis therefore focuses on the interactions of states themselves, without regard to their internal makeup or the particular individuals who lead them. The *global* level of analysis seeks to explain international outcomes in terms of global trends and forces that transcend the interactions of states themselves. See, Goldstein ***op. cit.***, p. 12

[3] Elmandjra Mahdi. The United Nations System and Analysis, Archon Books, 1973, p. 19

The third level, the *international organization system*, is relatively a recent phenomenon in the history of international relations. The first international organizations were technical in nature and had very specific and limited regulatory functions. The appearence of political and more global organization emerged after the First World World with the creation of the League of Nations whose Covenant entered into force in January 1920. The international organization system has been divided into two major sub-sytems. The first sub-system, the *inter-governmental organization system* can be divided into three parts – the United Nations (UN) system, the regional and sub-regional system, and the system of military pacts. The weight of the UN system is due to the comprehensive scope and the universal character of its objectives and the quasi-universality of its membership. The importance of regional sub-sysytems is reflected in their formal recognition by the UN system particularly in matters which pertain to the election of members of governing organs and where regional representation has a political significance and has more recently even acquired a legal status. The second sub-sytem, the *international non-governmental organization system*, weights and influences within the international organization system and on the international system is very difficult to assess. This system can be thought as information processors since their basic characteristics lies in the link it provides between the international organization system and the intra-national system.

The fourth level, the *international level*, is conceived as a global system which encompasses all the communications which take place between its sub-systems and their units and which have a bearing on the behavior of these sub-systems and units at the international level. The subdivision of the international system into three sub-systems – the political, economic, and socio-cultural are helpful for the determination of boundaries without which no analytical enterprise can be undertaken. The political sub-system may be thought of as the one directly concerned with the decision-making process, the economic sub-system can be seen as one which determines the tactical and short-term goals of the system, and the socio-cultural sub-system may be thought of as performing the strategic task of setting the values, norms and long-term objectives and finalities of the system. Potentially the socio-cultural sub-system is the most powerful agent of change and innovation because it is the level where one can observe the most significant transformations such as the impact of science and technology, the evolution of social structures, cultural development and the mutation of values[4].

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[4] ***Ibid***, pp. 20-26

1.1.2. The Functions of the United Nations System

The United Nations system – as a sub-system – has a universal character. Therefore, it is a valuable example for beginning to analyze the so-called global politics. The UN system which covers two broad areas such as peace and general welfare, has the following sequential purposive functions.

- *International Communication and Cooperation* : It represents the basic prerequisite for any form of international cooperation and the most elementary purposive function which the international organization system performs for the international system. The constitutions of almost all of the organizations of the UN system highlight the role of informational and international communication as a prereqisite for international cooperation.

- *International Regulation and Setting of International Norms and Standards* : The broad purposive function which is englobed within this heading has two dimensions. The first one is "mechanistic" in that it has to do with the mechanics whereby the UN system attempts to perform as a "regulator" of the international system. The first dimension is essentially a "mechanical" and "technical" one because it does not involve socio-cultural values and does not, therefore, directly affect the "normative" behavior of the system. The second dimension is basically "value oriented" since it aims at the establishment of international and universally accepted "norms" or pattern of behavior.

- *General Welfare and aid to Development* : Paragraph 3, article1 of the UN article formulates the purpose of general welfare as: "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". The concept of "general welfare" was subdivided into two areas: (a) the normative activites concerning human rights, colonization and racial discrimination which were of universal application and which interested directly the whole membership of the system; and (b) the new programs dealing with technical assistance and pre-investment which were limited to the developing countries and which became to be known as "development programs".

• *Redistribution of Resources, Influence and Power* : Redistribution is a primordial purposive function in any social or political system. The UN system has contributed to an important redistribution which took place within the international system after the Second World War – decolonization. This process has led to a legal and formal redistribution of national sovereignties which was not elsewhere automatically accompanied by an equivalent redistribution of political power, economic resources, social welfare and cultural emancipation.

• *Transformation and Social Change* : Since the end of the Second World War, the international system has undergone important quantitative and qualitative transformations. The UN system has survived to these changes and in so doing has met the test of "adaptation".

• *International Integration* : One of the major conversions of the modern state system is that in several areas it has to rely on international integration in order to safeguard national integration. It is a question of complementarity, not one of competition and struggle between "national sovereignty" and a "supra-national" order. It is not a quest for a "world government" but a pursuit in favor of governments more conscious – in the interest of their own people – of the planetary dimension of the problems of modern society which require international responsibility and world-wide solidarity. International integration intertwines with national integration and with national disintegration. The decolonization process, e.g., has led to a partial form of political disintegration at the level of some nation-states, but has called for an effort of international cooperation and integration to assist the economic and social national integration of other member states.

• *Peace* : Peace is the justification of all the other purposes and the raison d'etre of the whole system. The purpose of the UN is summed up in paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Charter: "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and the removal of threats of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace". Peace, as the most basic purpose, is a

common characteristic of the constitutions of most of the organizations belonging to the UN system with a very few exceptions[5].

These functions can be considered as contributing to the purpose of the system only if their output, through the process of international organization, emerges as something more than an addition of the respective purposes of the basic components of the system. All of the above seven purposive functions are relevant, with a varying degree, to the behavior of each of the organizations which make up the UN system.

"Peace" is dependent upon "transformation", "integration" and "redistribution"; that "transformation" and "integration" are dependent upon "redistribution"; that the latter can only come about through "regulation" and "general welfare" which must in turn rely on "international communication and cooperation".

1.2. Post-Cold War Period

The end of the Cold War has given way to an "ambiguous" new order. Sidney Verba has produced a list of changes in the international system. He begins with changes in the distribution of power. According to him, the bipolar system has become either uni-polar or multi-polar, depending on which criteria are used, reflecting shifts in the power resources of major states. He also notes a series of additional developments such as the easing of great-power confrontation; the adoption of democratic forms of government in many more states; the strengthening of some supranational institutions; the renegotiation of some national frontiers; claims for statehood by new entities; the demands by international actors that states adhere to international human rights standards[6].

In the post-Cold War period, from the mid-1980s onwards, there has been a strengthening of incentives to politicize. In terms of the forces operating on European Communities (EC) policies, it is clear that the removal of Cold War divisions and the growth of linkages in the world political economy led to a major playing out of sector logics that has given new

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[5] ***Ibid***, pp. 282-318

[6] Fawn, Rick and Jeremy Larkins (Editors). International Society after the Cold War Anarchy and Order Reconsidered. Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, p. 19

political meaning to competition policies, to transport policies and to transnational production structures.

The use of enlargement as foreign policy or the production of networks of partnership and cooperation lends weight not to the emergence of Common Foreign and Security Policy, but rather to the politicization of external political-economic relations. At the same time, attention to some established areas such as relations with the Lomé countries reduced.

Finally, there have been enormous systemic pressures and opportunities to politics arising from the dissolving of the Cold War divisions and from the partial retreat of the superpowers and particularly the United States. At the same time, pressures to build longer-term management structures between the EU and major partners have led to innovations such as the Transatlantic Action Plan and similar arrangements with Canada and Japan. In these, the role of the EC as an agent is crucial, not only because of mandates from governments but also because of its links with the business community, for example in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)[7].

The end of the Cold War brought enormous changes to the security environment in Europe. The result was a period of confusion as governments attempted to assess the ramifications of events and reconfigure their country's military posture. It is particularly true for the United States military presence on the European continent[8].

A feeling of crisis emerged in transatlantic relations with the ending of the Cold War. The underlying question was whether the system that had provided security for the last 40 years would be capable of transformation or whether there is a shift to a new framework[9].

It was clear that a re-balancing of the relationship was necessary but that this would depended both on the path of development that the Europeans chose, as well as the role that the US wished to fulfill.

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[7] Peterson, John and Helene Sjursen. A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. Routledge, 1998, p. 91

[8] Monar, Jörg (Editor). The New Transatlantic Agenda and the Future of EU-US Relations. Kluwer Law International Ltd., London, The Hague, Boston, 1998, p. 19

[9] Landau, Alice and Richard G. Whitman (Editors). Rethinking the European Union, Institutions, Interests and Identities. Macmillan Press Ltd. (Great Britain), St. Martin's Press, Inc. (USA), 1997 p. 25

1.2.1. The Core of Security after the Cold War

In the post-Cold War period, the key to national security should lie in the ability of states to create favorable prerequisites for normal functioning of society in conditions where the number of non-military crises is on the rise. Real security of mankind will only grow if states set aside more funds, material and human resources for the protection of the biosphere, comprehensive development of power engineering, rational demographic policy, food production, combating diseases and natural calamities rather than for the manufacturing of more arms. Addressing the United Nations Science and Technology and their Implications for Peace and Security conference, Yasushi Akashi, United Nations Secretary General deputy for disarmament at that time, said:

> "We need a broader, more comprehensive concept of security to cover not only military security as such but also economic well-being, ecological and even cultural security. It is obvious that poverty and degradation of the environment in many parts of the planet sustain each other in threatening proportions and creates conditions for greater instability and tensions between states. Therefore, we must find a way to make these problems an integral part of our global dialogue on security problems in the next few years"[10].

Many political scientists speak of means and methods, international norms and mechanisms that will be able to guarantee for the entire world community multi-component security that they sometimes term "global security". A very important precondition for stronger world security consists in the development in the interests of the world community as a whole, which would rule out the attainment by some countries of their national interests at the expense of similar interests of the others. Space technology, in that sense, gains a particular importance on a global scale[11].

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[10] Khozin, G. "Outer Space and International Security". International Affairs, A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 1, 2000, p. 87

[11] *Ibid*, p. 88

There are six most significant components of the comprehensive security concept - political, military, economic, humanitarian, ecological and informational - generally recognized at the end of the 1990s[12].

Political security presumes the conduct by states of such an international policy line that takes the utmost account of humankind's interests. Conflicts and differences that arise are to be resolved only by peaceful means. Clearly, political security can only be safeguarding if respect is shown for national sovereignty and if all states pool efforts to guarantee socio-economic progress of humankind. The ongoing and irreversible arms limitation and disarmament process, broader cooperation with more and more states in settling conflicts and keeping peace, contribute to political security while benefiting the other components of comprehensive security.

Economic security calls for purposeful and systematic joint activities of all states comprising the world community to create economic relations and world-economy links that would take account of the vital interests of individual states and humankind as a whole. As integration processes in individual states and major regions gain momentum, the world community is increasingly operating as a single economic organism. The departure from discrimination principles in foreign trade and economic cooperation, the renunciation of sanctions and linkages with regard to individual countries and entire regions increases the viability of the world economy and promotes transition to more efficient ways of using natural resources that take into account the interests of future generations. Space technology has already been performing functions in the sphere of planning and control of economic programs and projects of various sizes. It, in fact, provides those involved in these projects and programs with reliable and timely information on the state of national economies, the situation on world markets of commodities and services, the situation on money markets, the rates of exchange, and so on.

Humanitarian security boils down to promoting the dissemination everywhere of the ideas of peace and disarmament, exchange of information between nations, the preserving of and adding to humankind's cultural heritage. Alongside the efforts to eradicate genocide, apartheid, the ideas of racial exclusiveness, humanitarian security is paying increasing

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[12] ***Ibid***

attention to safeguarding the right of the individual to live in peace and in a healthy environment. The consolidation of humanitarian security will foster on the planet a moral and psychological climate of a single family of peoples responsible for the Earth's present and future.

Ecological security is one of the latest elements of comprehensive security. The planet's nature is not only the physical environment where humanity came into being and where it is developing, not only the quarry or resources for material production, an object of aesthetic attitudes of man but it is primarily the basis of life in all the variety of its forms. The recognition of the fact is reason for the inclusion of ecological security in the system of comprehensive security. A disruption of the natural environment's integrity, a reduction in the number of the biosphere's components harm the natural conditions of human society's development, disrupt the integrity of the entire system of international relations. Finally, *Information security* has referred to of late as a new component of comprehensive security. It implies the extent to which the vital interests of society and the state protected[13].

1.2.2. New Areas for Post-Cold War International Security

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) experts, who analyze the possible use of space systems in consolidating international security, serve to the interests of military confrontation in outer space and on earth to a smaller extent. They have tackled to fulfill a new and rather productive function of consolidating international stability safeguarding comprehensive security of individual states and the entire world community. Keeping tabs on the planet's biosphere, settling conflicts and peace keeping suggest the term "positive security" to describe the ability of states to identify and eradicate traditional sources of conflicts, direct their efforts to the prevention of all threats to stability and security[14]. Indeed, one of the possible important outcomes of the 20th century is the radical change in humanity's attitude to war as a sociopolitical phenomenon.

1.3. International Society (Society of States)

[13] ***Ibid***, pp. 89,90
[14] ***Ibid***, pp. 83-87

The study of international relations focused on the exploration of the legal and ethical principles around which, then, 'society of states' was organized. Philosophers such as Rousseau and Kant, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, represented very different views on the role of the state in international relations and the possibility of establishing a viable peace. Whilst Rousseau stressed the competitive nature of interstate relations and the danger of war, Kant argued that a world of states established on the basis of responsible authorities could eliminate the resort to war and violence. On the whole, until the nineteenth century, the development of thinking about international problems proceeded within fairly well understood and accepted limits[15].

Hedley Bull, who has suggested five institutions - diplomacy, the balance of power[16], international law, war and the management role of the Great Powers - argues that the modern international system contains not just elements of struggle and competition between states, but also elements of cooperation and regulated intercourse. He, therefore, speaks of the emergence of a 'society of states'. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, society of states of Europe was arranged by both diplomacy and periodic wars. A guiding principle was the balance of power. According to this belief (Congress of Vienna), no one state dominates the European continent and that was the premise upon which the Concert of Europe (between the Powers) operated[17].

The nature of the relationship of people to their governments was changing. The role of the state could no longer be limited to constitutional prohibitions of the restriction of liberty. Rather it now needs to be concerned with developing the bases for effective liberty to exercised by all, through measures to ensure social and economic equality - the state in short was becoming a service state[18].

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[15] Hocking, Brian and Michael Smith. World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd. Edition, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheat, 1995 p. 18

[16] Waltz's method of simply counting the number of great powers yields indeterminate predictions about alliance choices in multi-polarity asserts that rational states may choose either to ride free on the balancing efforts of others, or they may in opposite fashion tie themselves unconditionally to their vulnerable allies. Randall Schweller, by the simple method of considering not only the number of poles but also their relative size, makes the predictions of balance-of-power theory more determinate. See; Snyder, Jack and Robert Jervis (Editors). Coping with Complexity in the International System. Westview Press, 1993, p. 5

Also, for more information about the work of Kenneth Waltz on the theoretical discourse of international relations as a study: See; Bronstone, Adam. European Security into the 21st Century, Beyond Traditional Theories of International Relations, Ashgate, 2000, pp. 15-45

[17] Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 19

[18] Lond, David. Towards a New Liberal Internationalism, The International Theory of J.A. Hobson. Cambridge University Press, 1996 p. 185

International Society is a theory of a social construct that is the arrangements of members in an international grouping. Logically, it is therefore rooted in the broader concerns of sociology. Martin Shaw argues that the International Society approach attempts to describe the consensual tendencies within the international system in terms of the development of international society. He submits the concept of international society to a critical socio-political analysis and argues that trends towards normative integration in inter-state relations are better understood as components of the general trend towards globalization[19].

International Society perspective opens with a discussion of the complex relationship between international society and international system. This leads on to a consideration of the broad macro-historical agenda relevant to International Society.

Bull wrote that "a *system of states* (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave as parts of a whole". However, " a *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions"[20].

The distinctive nature of international theory is expressed by two conditions: when the theorist seeks to establish whether or not relations of familiarity might exist between insiders and outsiders or when he/she aims to construct systematically a theory of what these shared characteristics imply for the structure of political life. The availability of such a language is by no means a universal and unsurprising aspect of social experience; it is the outcome of a complex process of social development whose origins and subsequent history deserve a prominent place in the sociology of inter-societal life[21].

The institutions of International Society have been exposed to new dynamics in the Post-Cold War world. Martin Wight and Adam Watson suggest that empire-like concentric circles characterise the emerging post-Cold War European economic, political and security

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[19] Fawn, ***op. cit.***, p. 17
[20] ***Ibid***, p. 10
[21] Linklater, Andrew. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. 2nd. Edition, Macmillan, 1990 p. 12

structures. Security, at least in Europe, is provided by ways and institutions that cannot be accounted for by the traditonal categories and vocabularies of security systems[22].

There is a cohesion of common norms, rules and values in contemporary international society. To Chris Brown it seems that liberalism in one form or another is likely to be the dominant political ideology for the foreseeable future.

Buzan has suggested that an understanding of how international societies develop from international systems can be illustrated drawing upon Tonnies's distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *geselleschaft* societies. *Gemeinschaft* (civilizational)societies are seen as organic and traditional with bonds of common sentiment, experince and identity, whereas *geselleschaft* (functional) societies are viewed as contractual and constructed consciously by an act will. *Gemeinschaft* international societies occur where the units in an international system exhibit a significant degree of cultural unity or common identity. Alternatively, *geselleschaft* international societies arise where the mutual self-interest of avoiding anarchy forces units to construct an international order. Contemporary international society is, in these terms, a hybrid as it originally arose from the *gemeinschaft* international society that developed in Europe and expanded globally by means of imperialism, but also partly reflects a *geselleschaft* process in that the different cultures within today's global international society have managed to come to terms with each other[23].

There are two tentative conclusions on this issue. First, International Society offers substantial insights of international relations in a world searching for the appropriate concepts and theories with which to render it understandable. Second, adherents of International Society must continue to recognize and engage with the radical changes, both theoretical and practical, and currently engulf the discipline of International Relations if it is to continue to play a central and significant role in it[24].

1.3.1. Interactions of Trans-Boundary Societies

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[22] Fawn, ***op. cit.***, p. 20
[23] ***Ibid***, pp. 10,11
[24] ***Ibid***, pp. 20,21

Boundaries around people matter morally compare to the boundaries around territories. Territorial boundaries are merely useful devices for "matching" one person to one protector. Citizenship is merely a device for fixing special responsibility in some agent for discharging general duty vis-à-vis each particular person[25].

Related with trans-boundary relations, the problems of the environment have seen as global. "Only One Earth" was the motto of the 1972 Stockholm Conference founding the United Nations Environmental Program.

What is striking about the environmental crisis as it is currently understood is how genuinely global it is, in contrast to traditional environmental problems. The problems at the forefront of present environmentalist discussions are problems like the degradation of the ozone layer and the "greenhouse effect." These problems are not just problems for each nation, taken one by one and simply cannot be resolved by isolated actions of individual nations as well[26].

1.3.2. Mutual Benefit and Assigned Responsibility Society Models

Within mutual-benefit-society logic, it would be permissible to impose sacrifices on some people now, so that they themselves might benefit in the future. It may even be permissible to impose sacrifices on some now, so that others will benefit, either now or in the future. If national boundaries are supposed to think to circumscribe mutual-benefit societies, then the broad pattern of duties toward compatriots and foreigners, respectively, becomes perfectly comprehensible. The point of a mutual benefit society is to produce positive benefits for those who are party to it. Mutual-benefit-society logic should require that people's benefits from the society be strictly proportional to the contributions they have made toward the production of those benefits[27].

As far as national boundaries perform much the same function, the duties that states have vis-à-vis their own citizens are not in any deep sense special. At root, they are merely the general duties that everyone has toward everyone else worldwide.

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[25] Goodin, E. Robert. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1995
[26] ***Ibid***, p. 307
[27] ***Ibid***, p. 277,278

On the model of the assigned responsibility, special responsibilities assigned as an administrative device for discharging general duties more efficiently. If that is the aim, then states should assign agents capable of discharging them effectively; and that, in turn, means that sufficient resources ought to give to every such state agent to allow for the effective discharge of those responsibilities[28].

1.4. Perspectives on New International Relations

The proliferation of new groupings and organizations is active in the international arena. Such an approach must start with the fact that states themselves have multiplied and diversified that is the United Nations at its foundation in 1946 had about 50 members but now has close to 200[29].

In addition to the new variety of states, however, there are often less familiar features on the international landscape, which pose particular problems for a state-centric interpretation of world politics. Twentieth century and especially the post-1945 era, has seen the 'explosion' of international organizations and associations led by the UN 'family'. The number of inter-governmental bodies in the world arena has advanced well beyond 300, while less formal and more diverse non-governmental bodies have created in thousands.

Alongside these developments, there has been a vast expansion in numbers of economic groupings. The category that has attracted most attention is that of multinational business enterprises, usually known as multinational corporations. It is also important to note that, in the field of military security, there has been proliferation of groups that often posed dramatic challenges to establish states or governments through terrorism or insurgency. Finally, and particularly during the 1980s, the proliferation of groups pursuing objectives in the humanitarian or the ecological spheres has had a major impact in the system[30].

In that context, according to Williams, the notion of "international relations"[31] seems obsolete in the face of an apparent trend in which more and more of the interactions that sustain world

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[28] ***Ibid***, p. 286
[29] Hocking, ***op. cit.***, p. 83
[30] ***Ibid***, p. 84
[31] The field of International Relations concerns the relationships among the world's national governments. These connect with other actors such as the United Nations, multinational corporations, and individuals; with other social relationships such as economics, culture, and domestic politics; and with geographical and historical influences. See; Goldstein, ***op. cit.*** p.1

politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations or states. Therefore, a new term needed, one that denotes the presence of new structures and processes while at the same time allowing for still further structural developments. A suitable label would be post-international politics[32].

1.4.1. The Forthcoming Developments of the International System: Solidarity and Globalization

The third millennium is the millennium of solidarity. People of the new millennium become directly involved in relations between states and regions[33]. Since the Church has been significant importance so far in especially European policy, it is worth first to give idea of the papacy for the new international system. Therefore, the message of the Holy See[34] is a strategy of peace based on four main components. First, it is the renunciation of war. War cannot be a proper means of resolving controversial questions between states. When the war in the Gulf was in progress in 1991, Pope John Paul described the war as an "unpardonable adventure". The second main component of the papal strategy of peace is the promotion of effective disarmament. Vatican morally supports the transition to real disarmament that would eventually lead to the destruction of weapons. The third component is the establishment of a world order based on international law. The fourth component is about the technical aspects of international cooperation. The Holy See strictly abides by international law and is confident that it can secure freedoms of the individual and peoples. The Holy See, therefore, proceeds in its activities from the pacta sunt servanda[35] principle and contributes in every way to humanitarian law[36].

Since globalization is the primary evolutionary phenomenon, challenge and opportunity of current time, raises the extremely important questions of the type, role, structure, strength and resources of the international system[37]. There is no doubt that the present political and

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[32] Williams, Howard. International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory. Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, p. 152
[33] Tauran, Jean-Louis. "The Third Millennium is a Millennium of Solidarity". International Affairs, A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 3, 2000, p. 55
[34] The papacy or papal court is associated with the pope in the government of the Roman Catholic Church at the Vatican.
[35] Translates as "treaties are to be served/carried out" and means that agreements between states are binding.
[36] Tauran, ***op. cit.***, pp. 56,57
[37] Muller, Robert. "Globalization: The Next Development of the International System". World Futures, The Journal of General Evolution. (Special Issue: Globalization and the Future of the Nation-State) (Ervin Laszlo (Editor), Nicola Grause (Guest Editor)), Volume 53, Number 2, 1999, p. 173

economic systems are no longer appropriate so, there must be new ways so the suggestions are as follows:

•*To hold a world conference on proper earth government through the free market system.* Since business was the first to globalize itself world-wide, far beyond governments, and since corporations are now ruling the world, there should be given them the opportunity, even request them to assess their full responsibility for the future of all humanity, all living species and of the earth itself.

•*To ensure a proper earth government through a second generation UN for the 21st century.* Since the UN is the only world-wide, universal organization at present available, governments should ask themselves if a better way would not be to consider a second generation UN upgraded by a true quantum jump into a proper Earth preserving and human well-being and justice ensuring organization of the planet.

• *A new Philadelphia World Convention for the creation of the United States of the World.* The star-performance of the American States in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 200 years ago which put an end to a similar political chaos in North America between numerous, sovereign independent states at the time, should be repeated. Such a Convention of all nations would review the state of world democracy and would have to add to the system of balance-of-powers the dominant power of business. "Philadelphia II" is a project of US Senator Mike Gravel who proposes a convention for the writing of a charter for a Global Constitution.

• *A world conference of all world federalist and world government associations and movements, to propose a federal constitution and system for the earth.* World humanitarians should sponsor a World Conference or other ways to come up with a world constitution for the 21st century.

• *A world conference for the creation of a world union on the pattern of the European Union.* The world has recently witnessed another political miracle, similar to the American miracle in Philadelphia that is the miracle of Strasbourg, the birth of the European Union, which has finally put an end to the members' antagonisms and wars, decided to cooperate and have abolished the borders between them.

• *A world conference of the planet's five continents for an earth government through continental unions and a world union.* The continental approach to a world union remains an important avenue. One could conceive five continental unions. The European Union, an American, an African, an Asian, and an Australian Union. The common political system of the five continents then can constitute a World Union as a super-structure.

• *A world conference on earth and human government through new bio-political modes patterned on examples from nature.* A very approach to the organization of humanity and its proper relations with the earth and nature is to follow the biological models offered by the formation and admirable functioning of numerous colonies of cells, bacteria and living species observable in nature and now well studies. This is a tremendously advanced science opens up the most interesting and promising vistas. A bio-political science can be developed on its basis. It would offer a political revolution of the Earth political system and science.

•*A World Conference on proper earth government through what the world's religions have in common in terms of universal, global spirituality and worldwide human experience.* Humanity has reached a point when people must consider their human presence, past, present and future on this particular planet in the universe[38].

1.4.2. The Need for a Change in Values of Human Life

Scientists were becoming more optimistic since of the birth of a global consciousness that makes the humans aware of their mistakes and problems and helps to solve them by changing course and adapting to evolutionary requirements. The new theory is that on any planet having life in the cosmos species evolves to a point of gaining a total knowledge of the planet it lives on. As Leibniz said at the time of birth of the exact sciences that "Humanity will now be busy dissecting and analyzing reality for hundreds of years, but the time will come when it will be lost in so much detail and findings that will have to acquire again a total, global view of reality[39]."

[38] ***Ibid***, pp. 174-179
[39] ***Ibid***, p.182

1.4.3. Democracy and International Institutions

International institutions not only increase system effectiveness or output legitimacy, but are also a normatively sensible response to the problems for democracy that are caused by globalization[40].

In democratic terms, international institutions are a sensible response to the problems facing democracy in times of societal denationalization as they help to redress the incompatible between social and political spaces. The current major problem for modern democracy is not political but societal denationalization which undermines the normative dignity of political borders by increasing political externalities in integrated markets, and by reducing the autonomy of nation-states.

Without a nation and sufficient cultural homogeneity there seems to be no basis for a democratic majority decision. Where there is no sufficiently stable national identity, it is better to give precedence to bargaining and "consociation"[41] procedures rather than majority decisions[42].

Only by deconstructing the all-embracing term demos[43] can it be established what element of a demos is required for what component of democracy and the validity of the statements of skeptic tested as the following way:

Rights: The members of a society acknowledge each other as autonomous individuals, each with a right to personal self-fulfillment. In this sense, civil liberty rights, including the right to physical integrity and the right to participate in will-formation and decision-making processes, have embodied in any democratic political community. The acknowledgment of each other as autonomous individuals, each with a right to personal self-fulfillment, which is

[40] Zürn, Michael. "Democratic Governance, Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions". European Journal of International Relations. Volume 6, Number 2, June 2000, p. 184

[41] Consociationalism is useful in that it presents an outcome of the integration process and allows the identification of aspects in the current situation seen as tending towards that outcome. It emphasizes the political relationship between leaders and the led, and the way in which the interests of the former may depart from those of the latter during the process; see Taylor, Paul. The European Union in the 1990s. Oxford University Press, p. 79

[42] Zürn, *op. cit.*, p. 192

[43] "People" in the Ancient Greece.

the fundamental principle of any democratic political community, thus seems to cross national borders in denationalization societies at least to some extent.

Trust: The members of a society accept that once an obligation has entered into, it must comply with, and they believe that all other members accept this as well. In sum, one may argue against the skeptics that political trust is today not restricted to the national and the intergovernmental sphere, but has also entered the transnational sphere. However, further empirical studies need to get a more precise picture.

Public spirit: Members of a society show a sense of collective identity if their preferences as individuals include a concern for the goodness of the collective. In its weak form, such a sense of collective identity is a precondition for public deliberations about the right solution for the community as a whole.

Public discourse: Public spirit can transform into public discourse if most of the members affected by the decision have a capacity to communicate publicly. The participation of expert communities and the direct addresses of regulations in deliberative issue networks becomes possible because they are public spirited and they possess the capacities and resources to communicate with each other in arenas beyond the nation-state.

Solidarity: In its stronger form, a collective sense of identity provides the basis for (re)-distributive processes within a political community. Solidarity is the willingness of individuals to give up things they value for the sake of the collectivity, and the acceptance of re-distributive policies is the best indicator for this[44].

In sum, the institutional suggestions can improve democratic legitimacy without downgrading the effectiveness of social policies. Although the skeptics' focus on the social prerequisites for democracy is useful, the emphasis on the complexities and dynamics in the relationship between political institutions and social attitudes facilitates a vision of democracy beyond the nation-state through institutional reform[45].

[44] Zürn, *op. cit.* pp. 196-199
[45] *Ibid*, p. 210

Related with this, there are three points. The first is that it is not international institutions as such, but the change in contextual conditions, that is, the transformation from a national to a post-national constellation, that is causing the "democratic deficit" in the first place. Second, a society is not bound to be national. While it is true that democracy in the post-national constellation requires both adequate international institutions and certain social prerequisites, the presence of the latter varies considerably according to different components of the demos and according to sector and space. Third, democratic institutions are not only dependent on social prerequisites they are also a generative source for them[46].

Ultimately, democratic governance beyond the nation-state is based on a political and moral vision of reflective self-regulation by self-governing individuals and organizations, which are prepared to forgo their own rational interests if there are good universalistic reasons for public interest-oriented behavior.

1.4.4. Changes in the Sovereignty Principle of International Affairs

The position of sovereignty as the defining concept of international society has altered during the 1990s. The nature of threats to international peace and security, and so to states in the international system, has been changed as well. Apart from the two complementary strands that define international order, the third is the right to self-defense[47].

Events in the 1990s transformed an international system that had evolved over a period of more than three centuries to ensure the security of states. That system has established on the basis that states qualified through sovereignty.

The one decisive change in the sovereignty principle since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was the move from a divine to a national basis. Under the former, the source of the right to sovereignty was the God and the authority this donated on the principle[48].

The "will of the people" became the driving force behind conceptions of sovereignty with the American and French Revolutions. It came to been compounded with the doctrine of "self-

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[46] ***Ibid***, p. 212
[47] Gow, James. "A Revolution in International Affairs?" Security Dialogue. Volume 31, Number 3, September 2000, p. 293
[48] ***Ibid***, p. 295

determination" during the 19th century in a process that concluded with the full implementation of this doctrine at the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919. The source of sovereignty had moved from the royal to the republican[49].

In this context, the external aspect of sovereignty did not change essentially from the Peace of Westphalia until the end of the 20th century. The principle upon which sovereignty based had changed in this time, but the international implications remained the same. In the 1990s, this changed in a revolutionary manner. While the notions of domestic jurisdiction and non-interference were not entirely removing the sanctity that they had held as matters of principle was undone. Sovereignty was internationalizing[50].

The basic rule of international society has been expanded and at the same time, the notions of domestic jurisdiction and non-interference have become conditional. This revolution in the condition of sovereignty has underscored by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's declaration that there can no longer be "sovereign impunity." The internationalization of sovereignty means the international accountability of sovereign states for grossly abusive exercise of sovereign rights[51].

Sovereignty remains essential to defining international order - but the exercise of sovereign rights within domestic jurisdiction must not disturb that order, either physically or normatively. The purpose of the sovereignty arrangement was always to limit war, or to protect the order on which the state system depended. Order would have maintained by non-intervention within the boundaries of another sovereign. This was the basic rule upon which international society came into being and, after 1945, substantially codified. In the 1990s, this began to change[52].

The Peace of Westphalia established the principle of mutual respect between sovereign princes in the sphere of religion. The culmination of this came in the UN era with the provisions of the UN charter for limiting the scope for the use of force. The UN Charter reinforced this international system. The primary purpose of the UN was the maintenance of

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[49] ***Ibid***, p. 296
[50] ***Ibid***
[51] ***Ibid***, p. 297
[52] ***Ibid***

international peace and security. It is possible to override the prescriptions of non-interference and domestic jurisdiction in the interests of international peace and security.

This is a formal limitation on state sovereignty. However, by the 1990s state-against-state war effectively eliminated. The reality appears to be that the central problem of war and order throughout history almost eradicated. In recognition of it, a new approach to peace and security have adopted by the Council[53].

The United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) altered the definition of international peace and security as confirmed the shift in attitudes towards ending the absolute protection provided by sovereignty. The old issue of international peace and security was no longer the real threat. The real threats stemmed from a variety of other sources internal to and beyond the borders of states.

By redefining the notion of threat to international peace and security, the UNSC had revolved the governing principle that protected states and the order upon which they depended. The old notion, underpinned by sovereignty, had been to protect the state against interference within its domestic jurisdiction and to maintain order by taking measures to stop external action against states that disturbed the peace. Now the needs has to be became opposed. The critical challenge for peace and security has come to be protecting the order upon which states mostly depend from the repercussions of events inside the borders of problem states. The priority is the need to prevent internal disturbance from infecting the international body an affecting the majority of states that depend on the order[54].

The radical changes in the sovereignty principle and the governing notion for the protection of international order imply a third revolution. According to the UNSC's 1992 conceptual shift, if the meaning of threat to international peace and security has had to expand, then it follows that the definition of threat to a country needs commensurate expansion. A situation that can identify as a threat to international security also constitutes a threat to the individual and common security of states. As much as states might have needed the right to self-defense against external armed attack in the past, in the 21st century they may need it to protect themselves from disorder and disruption emerging from within some other states.

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[53] ***Ibid***, p. 299
[54] ***Ibid***, p. 300

The Kosovo campaign of 1999 was an act of self-defense, although NATO did not claim that this was the case. However, the Alliance's strategic position and credibility were on the line, its status and future as a unique military-political arrangement was at stake and the values that was formed to embody and to protect was challenged. Article 51 gives authority for self-defense in the event of an "armed attack", there are two reasons to consider that this may be inapt. The first of these involves noting that there are precedents for an extended concept of self-defense, including cases where there was no direct, armed or physical threat. The case of the US invasion of Panama falls into this category, while the concepts of extended and pre-emptive self-defense have cited by the USA and Israel in other cases. The second involves an extension of reasoning that is if the understanding of the term "threat" related to international peace and security has expanded in its scope, it is hard to see why the same extension might not one invoked for the concept of self-defense[55].

A redefinition of defense is necessary to accommodate the altered structure of international order and to keep pace with changes in the interpretation of international peace and security. This is important to all states in international society and especially to Western countries, particularly the members of NATO[56].

The need for stability characterizes the international system broadly that is vital for most states, and certainly for the Western democracies, to preserve stability. Their interdependent physical, political, economic and normative well being relies on this. The role of defense is to assist in the management of stability.

The necessary redefinition of defense, commensurate with that made by the UNSC regarding the scope of threats to international peace and security, should approach with a degree of auction. First, in the early 1990s the majority of commentators and actors were slow to accept that circumstances had changed and regarded the various actions authorized by the UNSC as being contraventions of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, if the implications of an expanded concept of threats to international peace and security is an enlarged notion of self-defense, then, it might be better to have an internationally agreed normative template to acknowledge this. Thirdly, in a new era, accompanied by uncertainty, for each responsible

[55] ***Ibid***, p. 301
[56] ***Ibid***, p. 302

and well-being leader there may well be an unscrupulous and malign counterpart willing to exploit an expanded definition of self-defense or mischievous purposes – as, e.g., Adolf Hitler used another concept, self-determination, in the 1930s. Finally, an embrace of an expanded concept of self-defense by NATO would have not be received well in Moscow, which might well see this logic when applied to Russian threats against Afghanistan, but might also see it as potentially threatening in other cases, perhaps such as Chechnya[57].

[57] ***Ibid***, p. 303

Chapter 2: International Actors and Globalization

2.1. The Process of Globalization and International Actors (Non-State Actors)

The process of globalization has been changing the nature of international relations in a number of significant ways. First, it is deepening the interconnections and transactions between actors across continents, and between different issue-areas. Second, it has stimulated the proliferation of international actors. There are now a growing number of important international exchanges above and below the level of the traditional nation-state, including trans-governmental linkages, transnational exchanges, inter-governmental regimes and supranational organizations. This has created an increasingly multi-layered international system, in which different societies and communities around the world connected with multiple channels such as interstate, trans-governmental, transnational. Third, globalization has generated a much more dialectical interaction between domestic and international policy[58].

A global transformation implies the emergence of a new epoch or configuration of global politics. In fact, key institutional aspects of historical reality are in mutation, e.g. forms of state, market and civil society and local, national, regional, and global context of political economy. It also relates to changes in the way the world perceived, understood and experienced - called a shift in the ontology of world order[59].

As to state and international actor, the state is still a major participant in the arena, generating influential actions and attracting attention. The state system, in consequence still remains the most powerful set of organizing forces and activities, but it is not the only significant cluster of networks. Also, the state has been joined by a range of other actors, some of them taking advantage of perceived insufficiencies in states themselves, and there has been a consequential diffusion of activity and influence within the arena[60].

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[58] Norgaard, Ole, Thomas Pedersen and Nikolaj Petersen (Editors). The European Community in World Politics. Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1993, p. 27
[59] Gill, Stephen and James H. Mittelman (Editors). Innovation and Transformation in International Studies. Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 6
[60] Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 92

Participation of international actors in world politics can be continuous, purposeful and positive or temporary and almost 'accidental' in nature. Sometimes the pressure of events or circumstances can make participants out of the most unlikely groups or individuals. In general, it is important to know that, while some actors will participate over a wide range of activities and with a considerable degree of regularity and persistence, the 'stage appearances' of others will be impermanent[61].

At each level of participation and concern, a specific "mix" of actors will be involved in many levels, and there is a general agreement on a number of major areas as the most relevant levels of participation[62].

According to the first major area, many actors are essentially *sub-national.* They operate within domestic societies with their attention and efforts primarily confined by national or even local affairs, yet they can produce political effects either directly or indirectly outside their own societies. These reflect the activities of sub-national groups and organizations, and spill over into the world arena and have political impacts there.

Second, some actors are *transnational,* relying on organized linkages between groups operating within two or more national societies. Importantly, these transnational actors do not necessarily controlled by any one national government. These relationships will involve participants from a variety of national societies, organizationally linked for specific purposes. The relationships, although they may well affect or attract the attention of governments, will not be channeled through them.

Third, there are actors that rely upon their status as parts or agents of national governments - in other words, *government* actors, defined by their roles and concerns within the governmental structure. These networks reflect the quality of 'government as an arena', and can strongly condition the actions of governments that of political interactions within them. An extension of this type of network is the *trans-governmental network* consisting of links between the agents of different national governments and leading to interactions that can influence political leadership at the national level.

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[61] ***Ibid,*** p. 86
[62] ***Ibid***

Fourth, there are those actors that rely for their existence on *inter-governmental* linkages or agreements - a class which includes many international organization and institutions, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). These would be the networks most easily recognized by state-centric analyzes, since they correspond to the alignments and institutions of the state system. Ranging from formal alliances and organizations to informal alignments, they will involve governmental leaders and those who claim to represent national needs or interests.

Finally, and most exceptionally, there are bodies that wholly or partly operate at the *supranational* level, that is to say a level to which states and national governments are essentially subordinate[63]. These relationships are mainly concentrated in the EU where these networks accompanied by a strong growth of transnational and trans-governmental networks[64].

2.1.1. Mixed Actor System

The basic notion of a system of mixed actors requires a situation in which several qualitatively different types of actor interact in the absence of any settled pattern of dominance - submission (or hierarchical) relationships. In a 'mixed actor' system, the state remains an important participant; but the role of the state has become problematical rather than obvious. A further dimension has added to the 'mixed actor' view of the arena by the logical conclusion that the system is also one of mixed relationships - a conclusion encapsulated in the idea of 'complex interdependence'[65]. According to this view of international relationships, the central pillars of a state-centric approach have become questionable[66].

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[63] ***Ibid***, p. 87
[64] Hocking, ***op. cit.***, p. 89
[65] When complex interdependence exists, military force is not used and, although it may be used vis-à-vis outside countries. Interdependence affects the interactions between actors, and there is scope for both harmony and disharmony between them. As for transatlantic relations, e.g., North America and Europe are one another's most important partners. The reasons for this mutual dependency (interdependency) are both obvious and complex. They range from the historic ties that have bound the two regions since long before the creation of the European Community (EC) to the simple fact that each is the other's largest overseas trading partner. However, they also embrace the security dimension. Neither can afford to ignore the other., see, Piening, Christopher. Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1997, p. 93
[66] Hocking, ***op. cit.***, p. 91

Among the most important issues raised by the explosive growth of non-state actors in the global arena is the question of loyalty[67].

There has been almost geometric growth in the number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) since the end of the Second World War. The number of IGOs has increased eightfold, while the number of NGOs has increased to almost seven hundred times its 1945 count. Another major reason for the proliferation of multinational and international organizations is the increasing inability of the nation-state system to provide security.

2.1.2. The Future of the Non-State Actors

One vision of the future sees the world as truly a single complex system, with interrelated problems that be solved by ever better cooperation across increasingly unimportant national borders. In this kind of future, the sovereignty of the nation-state would continue to erode, while transnational or even supranational organizations, would ultimately replace these outmoded structures. A second vision of the future postulates enlarged influence for the current world powers (e.g., The United States, Russia, China, and the European Union) so that they can maintain peace and stability for the immediate future. A third way to the future could well integrate these two views. Nation-states will endure and will continue to be the most important international actors, but a vast array of transnational and non-governmental organizations will supplement them to deal with the political, economic, and military baggage that accompanies world politics[68].

At this stage, there are two major conclusions. First, not all international actors are states - and, indeed, in certain areas the states are likely to be peripheral to events. Second, the diversity of actors within the international system implies a corresponding diversity of networks involving various combinations or groupings, and thus a new complexity of stratification and structure[69].

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[67] Minix, A. Dean and Sandra M. Hawley. Global Politics. West/Wadsworth, 1998, p. 120
[68] ***Ibid***, p. 122,123
[69] ***Ibid***, p. 123

2.2. The Stages and Forces of Globalization

The process of internationalization or globalization is as part of a continuum that started approximately two hundred years ago. The first 115 years saw the predominance of Great Britain, progressively challenged by the US, Germany, France and Japan up to the Second World War. The end of that war marked the beginning of an American hegemony[70].

Beginning with the First World War, the globalization process underwent a pause. According to some historians, however, this was actually a break, not a pause. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to consider the outbreak of the First World War as the end of a first stage of globalization. After the end of the Second World War, it took at least three decades that a significant turnaround has generated, at least in Europe, in the role and the size of the state in the economy. In fact, trade liberalization, followed by the liberalization of current account payments that reopened the door to internationalization and revived the process of economic and financial integration[71].

Globalization would not have been possible without major technological breakthroughs. In fact, in the current phase of globalization, the fall in costs of information transmission has been much steeper than the reduction in transportation costs while the opposite took place during the previous one that is transportation costs fell more than those relating to communication. This has made for a high degree of communication pervasiveness, thus reinforcing the globalization trend and making it less liable to reversal[72].

An additional distinction between the first and second stages of globalization arises from its change in nature over time. Clear differences have traced between today's globalization and that which prevailed until 1914. According to Scholte, there are three ways of conceiving of globalization. The first is in terms of relations beyond borders (cross-border), the second in terms of relations opening borders (open-border); and the third in terms of relations spanning borders (trans-border). In the last case, the borders are neither crossed not opened, but simply

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[70] Sarcinelli, Mario. "Globalization after Seattle", The International Spectator, A Quarterly Journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Volume 35, Number 2, April-June 2000, p. 58
[71] ***Ibid***
[72] ***Ibid***, p. 59

transcended. In fact, according to the third concept of globalization, Scholte writes that global relations "are not links at a distance across territory, but circumstances without distance and relatively disconnected from a particular location." The process of globalization which predominated until the outbreak of the First World War was mainly of the first type, that is, it brought into contact two different world or regimes, and perhaps to some extent of the second type, at least until it was possible to travel throughout Europe without a passport. The Schengen accords or those for international transportation of goods open borders for people who fulfill certain prerequisites. Finally, to support the thesis that the second stage of globalization is different from the first one, there is now the widespread presence of integrating agents such as transnational corporations or multinationals. According to a reasonable evaluation, two-thirds of world trade has generated by multinational corporations[73].

After having highlighted the differences between the two phases of globalization, it may be useful to stress what both have in common that is rapid technological progress, steady liberalization processes and political trends favorable to private initiative and entrepreneurship.

International trade as a factor or growth and structural change is the negative experience between the two wars and the positive one in the postwar period forcefully indicate that the growth of international trade has been one of the engines of the globalizing economy. Sufficient to point out that while world production quadrupled between 1951 and 1997, the total export of goods of all countries increased 17 times. In the decade thereafter and up to the mid-eighties, the growth in productivity and production in industrialized countries dropped considerably, as did international trade. This period was marked by such episodes as the demise of the system of fixed exchange rates established at Bretton Woods and the beginning of the developing countries was to introduce non-tariff barriers to trade, at least this is the explanation commonly given for the drop in the export growth rate that occurred in this period[74].

From the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, there was another acceleration in the growth of international trade. This was brought on by a change in the strategy of many of them from a

[73] ***Ibid***, pp. 59,60
[74] ***Ibid***

growth model based on import substitution to one oriented much more towards the opening up of markets, the development of exports, and the inflow of capital, which in turn brought technology and managerial skills. The developing countries increased their share of world manufacturing production that took a leading role in satisfying international demand for goods with their exports, and increased their imports, thereby contributing to upholding the international economy. As a consequence of progress in technology and the internationalization of production, manufactured goods are not only more complex today than they were in the past, but can now also be broken down into an increasing number of components and stages[75].

Another feature that has characterized the last years is the increasing internationalizing of services, not only because of their greater involvement in production processes but also because of outsourcing. Technological innovations have brought change not only to production methods, but also to trade itself, both domestic and international, but above al the latter; electronic commerce is a new way of doing business between producers and consumers and between producers and producers. If the pace of globalization, measured in terms of trade, seems to have accelerated in the nineties the increase was even greater in finance, with huge movements of funds and capital, trans-border mergers, interconnections and stock market links[76].

The preceding factors have had a number of results. First, they have led governments to dedicate greater attention to the problems caused by increasing integration. Second, they have driven civil society, represented by non-government organizations (NGOs), trade unions and various movements, to demonstrate in Seattle, Davos and Washington; and third, they have brought the political world to advocate the need for an extension to the international level of certain rules and behaviors which have long taken root within states, at least the more developed ones[77].

2.3. Historical Transformation of Human Society

[75] ***Ibid***, p.61- 63
[76] ***Ibid***, p. 64-66
[77] ***Ibid***, p. 68

International relations can be seen as the prime example of a field which is global, in that its raison d'etre[78] to deal with relationships beyond the national level. The challenge to international relations is to move beyond the misplaced abstraction of state relations from the global whole.

For the first time since human beings inhabited this earth, it is possible to describe comprehensive networks of social relationships that include all people. There are not just some global connections but the clear outlines of a global society[79]. There is a global economic system, with production and markets coordinated on a world scale; elements of a global culture and worldwide networks of communication; globally vibrant political ideas and the possibility of coordinated political action[80].

One of the principal ways in which one can identify a global society is by the development of global crises, which are environmental. They are especially political - manifested in a unique turbulence of inter-state relations and instability of state structures. Global crises matter not merely because of their widespread harmful effects to human beings, they are important too because it is through such crises that one can identify global society and the development of its institutions. Socio-economic, environmental and even political crises arise from a complex network of causes in worldwide social relations[81].

2.3.1. The World as a Single Society

Society is the totality or complex of social relations. Since social relations of all kinds are increasingly global, and all forms of social relations everywhere in the world bound into global networks, society in this sense is necessarily global. Historically, society must have viewed as a limited exception in which a certain human group temporarily becomes isolated from others.

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[78] Reason of state is the justification for any action on the ground that the interests of the state require it. It means that there may be reasons for acting that simply over-ride all other considerations of a legal or moral kind.
[79] For conflict resolution in global society: See; Burton John. Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 261-268
[80] Shaw, Martin. Global Society and International Relations (Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives). Polity Press, 1994, p. 3
[81] *Ibid*

The idea of national society is new in the present situation, most clearly since the end of the Cold War, is that, although the idea of discrete national societies retains much resonance, its absolute supremacy among the ideas of society can no longer hold. This may seem a paradoxical assertion, since the strongest tendency of the years since 1989 has been the reassertion of nationalism. The new nationalisms arise from the disintegration of nation-state and national societies. They reflect both historic pluralism and multi-ethnicity and new patterns formed as a reason of recent migration and cultural change. The idea of a national society in the old sense has thus declined as the ideas of a global society and of various more local forms of social identity have grown[82].

2.3.2. Integration Process in a Global Society

For some theorists, a society is characterized by normative consensus, reflected in commonly accepted institutions while for others, formed by existence of networks of relationships, with mutual expectations. Immanuel Wallerstein's "world system"[83] approach analyzes the world in terms of the development of global capitalism, in which the division between economic, political and social relationships is seen as artificial. For Wallerstein, globalization is the development of a unified world-system dominated by the socio-economic relationship of capitalism. In Anthony Giddens's view, modern society is dominated by knowledge-based abstract systems which coordinate human activity, and which enable as well as constrain individual action and choice. For Giddens the globalization of abstract systems creates opportunities for individuals, as well as crises in which they have constantly to remake their own lives and identities[84].

Global society does not possess either common beliefs and values or common and accepted institutions, to even the problematic extent to which these have attributed to national or tribal societies. World society seems likely in the near future to remain divided between highly differentiated segments. Roland Robertson suggests that the diffusion of nationalism has seen as part of the process of globalization. In his account, the standardization of the nation as the basis for society and state was a facet of the early stages of globalization. Conflict sharpens

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[82] Within the term of global society, human behavior and basic human needs attract attention as a link between biology and the international system. For more information on this issue: See; Burton John (Editor). Conflict: Human Needs Theory, Macmillan, 1990, pp. 60-81

[83] For "long cycles" in politics which is related with the world system: See; Olson, C. William and A.J.R. Groom. International Relations Then and Now, Origins and Trends in Interpretation. Harper Collins Academic, 1991, p. 226-242

[84] Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 8

awareness of mutual dependence and promotes the development of common responses and institutions for regulation, which in turn involve cultures of cooperation[85].

2.3.3. Global Culture, Institutions and Civil Society

The ideas of a global economy, global markets and a global socio-economic system are commonplace and already recognized in social science areas such as international political economy, which bridges economics and international relations. With globalization economic, cultural and political relations develop rapidly independently of the relations between states. Individuals and groups within society begin to develop relationships with international institutions, mediated through cultural forms and institutions of civil society that have developed beyond the national context. In this sense, even the concept of civil society has to be, and can be, extended to the global level[86].

Global society is more complete and self-sufficient than just about any other society that has been envisaged as the largest existing and the largest possible, framework or context of social relations, but not necessarily the immediately defining context of all social relations. Globalization is the way in which social relations become definitive by especially global contexts. Global society exists in the sense that global relationships are sufficiently strong and established defined as the largest context of social relationships as a whole. The form of global society is a standing censure to any simple functionalism, since any attempt to identify institutions with functional prerequisites will immediately founder of the institutional complexity and diversity of global social arrangements and the unevenness of globalization.

Global society is best understood as a diverse social universe in which the unifying forces of modern production, markets, communications, culture and political modernization interact with many global, regional, national and local segmentations and differentiations. Global society should be understood not as a social system but as a field of social relations in which many specific systems have formed - some of them genuinely global, some are starting to be global, and others still restricted to national or local contexts. The economic system of global society is the global market, coordinating an enormously complex division of labor in the production and exchange of commodities. The political system of global society is basically

[85] *Ibid*, p. 13
[86] *Ibid*, p. 14

that of the competitive international system of states, coordinating an equally complex diversity of national-state politics[87].

Global crises play a crucial role in forging the global consciousness that represents the awakening of a global civil society. Global civil society is coming into existence in an interdependent relationship with the state system, and especially with the developing international state institutions. Global civil society thus constitutes a source of constant pressures on the state system, although its development is in turn very much dependent on developments in the state system. The development of global civil society raises the issue of how far global principles of identity are now becoming important.

2.3.4. Energy and Global Society

According to Ivanov, the ongoing process of globalization in the present-day world increases the impact of economic factors on the entire system of international relations. He points out that oil and gas can be considered as an effective foreign policy weapon and an efficient vehicle of promoting mutually beneficial international cooperation in developing fuel and energy resources, enhancing the effectiveness of their use, and expanding to new and promising energy markets[88]. In a similar way, Togrul Bagirov[89] has stressed that oil and gas is a powerful foreign policy weapon, an instrument of economic pressure, and at the same time a major incentive[90].

2.3.5. Culture of Peace

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace:

> "Emphasizing the linkage between peace and development and the need for a culture of peace that can lead, through education, science and communication, to the respect of all human rights and the promotion of democracy, tolerance, dialogue,

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[87] ***Ibid***, p. 19,20
[88] Ivanov, I. "Addresses to the Readers of the Special Issue of International Affairs on Russia's Oil and Gas Strategy for the 21st. Century". International Affairs, A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 2, 2000, pp. 1,2
[89] Executive Vice President of the Moscow International Petroleum Club
[90] Ivanov, ***op. cit.***, p. 10

reconciliation, and solidarity, as well as to the international cooperation and economic development, and thus to the sustainable human development. [91]"

In fact, the UN General Assembly has just proclaimed the fist decade of the millennium to be that of the "International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World (2001-2010)."

Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury of Bangladesh said "as we struggle to address a multitude of problems that transcend borders, a culture of peace and harmony as opposed war, violence, and conflict could provide the foundation for a meaningful alliance for global action."[92]

It was in June 1989 that the idea of a culture of peace was first elaborated in a government milieu at the International Congress of Peace in the Minds of Men, held at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire. Also United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was urged there by the Congress to "construct a new vision of peace by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights, and equality between women and men". In fact, the culture of peace is not only an aim or an ultimate goal of achievement but also a comprehensive process of long-term action to construct the defenses of peace in the minds of women and men. A culture of peace means changing value systems, attitudes, and behavior[93].

2.3.6. Interdependence in Business Sector and Globalization

With greater degrees of interdependence in a globalizing world, the inter-connections between social movements are becoming more apparent. Leaders of social movements are thinking more about how to work together to bring about change on a global level that will have implications on the local level. According to Raymond C. Offenheiser, President of Oxfam America, "there are more opportunities today than twenty years ago, because the linkages between actors on different levels is now richer and denser, and technology has enabled a new

[91] Wadlow, Rene. "The Year 2000: A World Focus upon a Culture of Peace". International Peace Research Newsletter, Volume 37, Number 1, March 1999, p. 53
[92] ***Ibid***, p. 54
[93] ***Ibid***

set of relationships to evolve that was unthinkable twenty years ago"[94]. Offenheiser stresses that;

> "I think we have realized that there isn't much basis to the idea that armed struggle is the path for achieving radical social change today. Instead, we need to be savvy and professional, with a sound understanding of the institutions and systems that we are working to change". He adds; "I don't think alliance building is a new concept. The anti-slavery movement of the 19th century was a global movement that united all sorts of organizations and church groups into coalitions and alliances. So there is nothing new there. I think what is the greater degree of participation with citizen groups that were probably unreachable in earlier so-called global movements. So the alliances idea is not now new, but the technologies available to carry it out are different."

He concludes that;

> "Today, we are tackling issues that are related to global economic governance. Not that we have given up our concerns for political and civil rights, but our sense is that globalization has created more kinds of challenges, and therefore our work demands new skills, new vision, new interactions with institutions we have not historically worked with, and new methodologies to work at global, regional and national levels."[95]

2.4. Globalization of the World Economy

Globalization is an objective process with many positive sides that has come to stay. It makes it easier for the states to cooperate in the field of economy, stimulate economic growth, pushes forward and adds a wider scope to exchange of high technologies in the economic, scientific, technological, and intellectual spheres which promotes progress throughout the world[96].

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[94] Offenheiser, Raymond. "Development in An Era of Globalization: An Interview with Raymond C. Offenheiser, President of Oxfam America". The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), Volume 24-2, Fall 2000, pp. 99,100

[95] ***Ibid***, p. 105,109

[96] Stukalo, A and T. Avdeeva. "Globalization of the World Economy". International Affairs. A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 4, 2000, p. 60

The talk of the day is the so-called *new economy* taking shape in the world's leaders based on the revolution in information technologies. The discussion of the *revolution in information technologies* is very sharp, especially of the problem of the growing digital divide between individual countries' access to the latest information achievements and between social groups on their domestic scene. *The Third Way of conceptions* is close to the new economy idea. In fact this is a new political philosophy for the contemporary world that looks for the best possible balance between the market, state and society. It blends traditional liberal orientations with the European social-democratic ideas. According to them, the states should invest more and more into human capital by bringing more money to science and education. The *new world order* remains in the center of attention. It has a clear economic dimension to it including the need to reform the Bretton Woods institutions, a new round of multisided trade talks, integration of the developing countries into world economy[97].

The industrialized powers - including the Group of Eight (G-8), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (IBRD) - have been actively discussing the *"development" problems* with the emphasis on finance in exchange for good governance, the rule of law, economic reforms, transparency, democratic elections, human rights, and ecological standards. *"Sustainable development"* is closely associated with the "development" problem range, a balanced approach to socioeconomic development, protection of favorable environment and of the natural resources. *Coherence* is important in the globalization context for economic, financial, and social policies on the national and international levels. *Social aspects of globalization* receive much more attention than before which means that it should be oriented to a much greater degree on man's varied needs and requirements, that its negative effects on people should be minimized as the "human face" of globalization means[98].

Four contending perspectives explain the rapid pace of international market integration in recent decades. The first claims that what is witnessed today is, in fact, nothing new because current levels of market integration are only returning to those in the last great era of economic internationalization at the turn of the 20th century[99].

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[97] ***Ibid***, p. 61
[98] ***Ibid***, p. 63
[99] Garrett, Geoffrey. "The Cause of Globalization". Comparative Political Studies. Volume 33, Numbers 6-7, August-September 2000, p. 942

The second perspective, technological determinism contends that the shrinkage of time and space has been so dramatic and pervasive that there is essentially nothing that can be done to stop it. According to this view, technological changes have pushed international economic activity, and governments have been largely irrelevant. Thus, policy liberalization should be understood as governments' acknowledging the futility of trying to resist globalization, rather than acting as a prime mover behind market integration.

The third big picture perspective on globalization takes a more moderate view of the effects of technological change. Most mainstream economists believe that the potential efficiency gains from international integration have increased as a reason of technological progress in recent decades. From this perspective, governments can still insulate their countries from external market forces if they so choose. However, the "increased opportunity costs of closure" have become sufficiently large to tip the balance in favor of the liberalization of foreign economic policy in country after country. The final big picture perspective on globalization also accepts the critical role of government policy, but argues that the phenomenon is essentially a political construct that does not improve the economic condition of society as a whole[100].

The case for a technologically determined view of globalization is strongest with respect to international finance. There is a credible argument that since the onset of the information technology revolution there is essentially nothing governments can do to stop global financial flows. On such a view, there is no mystery to the increasing national-level moves to capital account liberalization in the 1990s[101].

Increasing opportunity costs of closure have driven globalization is most persuasive with respect to the multi-nationalization of production and least persuasive for international financial integration. Trade occupies an intermediate place because although the static gains from trade liberalization are well known, it is less clear whether trade is good for growth.

The central analytic problem one faces when trying to understand the causes of globalization is to untangle the interrelation among three important phenomena: rapid technological change, mushrooming cross-border economic activity, and a rising of initiatives to liberalize foreign economic policies at the national, regional, and global levels. Technological changes lowering

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[100] ***Ibid***, p. 943
[101] ***Ibid***, p. 960

the costs of moving goods have been the primary exogenous stimulus behind contemporary globalization. There are three different pathways between this stimulus and market integration[102].

First, technological determinism provides a close explanation for the integration of international financial markets. The information technology revolution has rendered capital controls much less effective than ever before. The desire of multinational firms to expand their international activities has grown as the costs of moving goods and information have decreased. The multi-nationalization of production, however, would not have been possible without governments' removing barriers to foreign ownership of domestic assets. Moreover, trade liberalization has not been technologically determined - governments can and still imposes policy restrictions on cross-border trade in goods and services. Moreover, though the one-time gains of freer trade are obvious, whether this also beneficial for or harmful to economic growth in the longer run is debatable. It is likely that political factors have played a larger role in trade liberalization than in the other facets of market integration[103].

Second, levels of development have an impact on the propensity for international market integration. Wealthier countries are more likely to be open to and integrated into global markets, probably because more of their citizens are likely to benefit from this.

Third, there is little support in the cross-national evidence that democratization is conducive to market integration. As others have noted, democracy has ambiguous and balancing effects on economic policy choice, including international openness. On the one hand, democracy makes leaders more accountable to their citizens, which would promote openness to the extent that market integration is welfare improving. On the other hand, however, democracy empowers distributional coalitions with interests in resisting market liberalization. Finally, there is some evidence that traditional indicators of the balance of political power within countries have affected their openness to the international economy[104].

International financial integration is essentially an irresistible force. The multi-nationalization of production is likely to be welfare improving for most countries. Governments can still

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[102] ***Ibid***, p. 976
[103] ***Ibid***, p. 977
[104] ***Ibid***, p. 977

restrict trade if they want to. Trade liberalization may be welfare enhancing, but the benefits are likely to be smaller than those associated with the multi-nationalization of production. In turn, freer trade has distributional implications for different segments of domestic society, to which governments may seek to respond with policies of domestic redistribution[105].

2.5. The UN Millennium Summit and Globalization

The UN's 50th anniversary, in September 1995 was sending a clear signal: A new world era was coming - an era of US leadership and the emergence of new forces on the world arena. The 50th session was an encapsulation of the new politico - economic situation in the world[106].

The 15th session of the UN General assembly, in 1960 brought forth an ideology of anti-colonialism with a large part of the world community emerging from colonial domination to embark down the path of independent development that brought about the "Third World". Anti-colonialist ideology shaped many aspects of international life, politics, economic development, and public consciousness. It spanned at least a couple of decades, until the time when colonialism effectively eradicated and these countries had to redefine their status with respect to one of the world power centers. In 1995, at the jubilee 50th session of the UN General Assembly, world leaders came up with an ideology marking the end of global confrontation between the two systems, advancing basic principles of a new world order which could open the way to a new setup in the world[107].

The third meeting of world leaders in September 2000 has marked a new world ideology: globalization. This ideology was a keynote of the report presented by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The report contains a highly relevant passage: "Our post-war institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a global world. Responding effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge for world leaders today". Globalization is a natural process. Just as in any natural process, someone loses and someone gains as a result, but evolution follows the mainstream course no matter what. A network of interdependent financial, economic, information, and other links have enveloped the planet[108].

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[105] ***Ibid***, p. 978
[106] Piadyshev, Boris. "The UN Millennium Summit" . International Affairs, A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 6, 2000, p. 20
[107] ***Ibid***, p. 23
[108] ***Ibid***, p. 24

2.6. Structurational Approach

Globalization has been analyzed through a systemic attempt to situate it within clearly defined processes of structuration. Structure and agency are mutually constituted in an ongoing process that paradoxically both (a) hardens but yet fractures structures and (b) constrains but yet empowers agents, in a reciprocal, interactive process over time. A structurational approach postulates the significance of two independent variables, structure and agency, unevenly interacting in an ongoing historical process[109].

The process of structure-agent interaction revolves around two dimensions. The first is the character of the structural context of action – in particular, whether structural constraints are tight or loose, i.e., whether or not material conditions, and/or socially and historically embedded practices strongly limit actors' room for maneuver in a quasi-coercive manner. The second involves the orientations of individual or group actors themselves, i.e., whether actors are structure-bound or transformational - i.e., whether they are not only in possession of adequate material resources to pursue effective strategies of change but also strategically aware of the existence of alternative possibilities and motivated enough to try to effect change.

Globalization is neither linear nor uni-dimensional; rather it is multi-layered, asymmetric mixture of international, transnational, domestic and local processes the interaction of which increasingly generate multiple equilibrium. Therefore, the myriad structural variables that are involved in the globalization process do not merely constrain actors but also provide them with expanded opportunities for exercising advantage within that process, feeding back into shaping globalization itself. Globalization constitutes an increasingly loose structural pattern, and presents strategically situated actors with a complex range of opportunities and constraints that can be manipulated in different ways. The most significant impact of globalization is in the day-to-day transformation of state intervention and of state-business-labor relations challenging different "national models" of capitalism[110]..

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[109] Cerny, G. Philip. "Political Agency in a Globalizing World: Toward a Structural Approach". European Journal of International Relations. Volume 6, Number 4, December 2000. p. 438

[110] *Ibid*, p. 439

The dominant image of trans-nationationalization and globalization today remains that of economic and business globalization. Economic agents increasingly shape a range of key outcomes in terms of the allocation of both resources and values. On the one hand, neo-liberal ideology[111] presents such developments as inevitable. Should transnational social movements prove peripheral and should political entrepreneurs and state actors continue to be involved as direct or indirect promoters and enforces of economic globalization, then governance structures in the 21st century international system will be likely to reflect the priorities of international capital in a more instrumental way[112].

2.7. Anti-Globalist Approach

In the postwar period, there has been an ironic reversal of attitudes toward globalization. Rich-country politicians embraced globalization in the decades following the Second World War, forging the liberal international economic order. By contrast, poor countries walked away from it, treating it as a peril rather than an opportunity. Today, however, policymakers in poor countries are busily abandoning autarkic attitudes while rich-country lobbies and responsive politicians are reinventing for themselves the very fears that the now-chastened policymakers in poor countries consider to have been disastrous for their well-being[113].

The energy that drives the anti-globalist campaigns stems from four different types of fallacies: *The Fallacy of Aggregation*: Mickethwait and Wooldridge's account describes how globalization raises many diverse issues, including culture, national identity, and economic organization. *The Fallacy of Misassigned Blame*: The anti-globalists also make the mistake of attributing to globalization the scaring of other faces. To take the most telling example, many workers and unions fear that the deterioration, then stagnation, of unskilled worker's real wages in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted from trade and foreign investment. That would appear to be another black mark against globalization. Most of the empirical work of the last

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[111] Neoliberalism emphasizes the role of international regimes in helping states to realize common interests. In doing so, neoliberals portray states as rational egoists who care only for their own gains. International politics is not the realm of pure conflict. Often cooperation would make all participants better off, but it is hard to achieve owing to the pervasive uncertainty that characterizes international life. Neoliberals argue that regimes help states to cooperate for mutual benefit by reducing uncertainty and informational asymmetries. See, Hasenclever Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. "Integrating Theories of International Regimes". Review of International Studies. Volume 26, Number 1, January 2000, p.7
Also, for neoliberal world order, see; Rupert Mark, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 38, 1995, pp. 39-58

[112] Cerny, ***op. cit.***, p. 457

[113] Bhagwati, Jagdish. "Globalization in Your Face, A New Book Humanizes Global Capitalism" (Book Review). Foreign Affairs. July/August 2000, p. 136

decade suggests that trade with the poor countries has not produced paupers in the midst. Recent work suggests that trade may have moderated, rather than accentuated, the decline in real wages that other factors such as unskilled-labor-saving technical changes were forcing. This tendency to blame globalization for the evils of the world that are attributable to other causes is evident all too often. *The Fallacy of the Wrong Question*: Some critics ask the wrong question. Globalization has led to greater income inequality. However, even if such a causal relationship can be established they do not explain why should it matter, given that inequality's consequences will differ hugely across countries, from negative to positive effects. *The Fallacy of Inappropriate Solutions*: Compounding these errors is the fallacy of inappropriate solutions to globalization's alleged problems[114].

[114] ***Ibid***

Chapter 3: European System and the European Union in International Arena

3.1. Emergence of the European System

The European polity developed a particular type of state system after the fall of Rome so that capitalism gave way to the maintenance of the new economic system. The dynamism unleashed by early modern Europe depended upon the logics of economics and politics. This pattern initially owed most to political competition, given that the level of economic interchange was small. In this whole area, Immanuel Wallerstein's more econometric view of early modern Europe illegitimately reads back into the past the economic interdependence of a much later world. The fall of Rome, then, contributed to the creation of a European multi-polar system[115].

In Christian Europe, cultural identity was more extensive than the political order. Latin Christendom held together an extensive space until approximately 1100. Ideology at this time did not reflect so much as create society that is the church provided norms, and through the declaration of peace of god, managed to limit violence as well[116].

In fact, the creation of the European system rests on complex events. The extensive powers of the church, for instance, had long been in confusion as the result of the slow emergence of states whose importance encouraged by the Latin Christian church. One way in which the lack of extensive powers of religion is most strikingly demonstrated is by the fact that the Reformation, together with the century of religious wars that made not a jot of difference of Europe's map.

Further, the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries witness practices held to be, associated with Westphalia. Thus, diplomacy is first established in Northern Italy in the fifteenth century that is its practices, notably freedom of worship for diplomatic staff, rapidly spread throughout Europe. More obviously and importantly, Francis I's alliance with the Ottoman Empire in order to counter the hegemonic thrust of Charles V is the purest example of balance of power politics imaginable. Moreover , it slowly began to become apparent that states based on national territories had the greater chance of increasing power. If the collapse of non-

[115] Hall, A. John. International Orders. Polity Press, 1996, pp. 33-35
[116] *Ibid*, p. 47

territorial Burgundy in 1477 was a first sign that the future world eventually belong to national states. Many more ought to have been able to recognize the writing on the wall from 1555, the year in which a first round of inter-state conflict mixing dynastic rivalries with religious loyalties was ended at the Peace of Augsburg[117].

War became slowly but surely more lethal after the fifteenth century was in three particular conditions. The first factor was the increasing tempo of the European arms race. This mechanism was at work in Europe roughly from 1200 when the multistate character of Europe began to crystallize. The widespread use of gunpowder in the fifteenth century increased the cost of war, both because cities required Italian defences and armies needed to stay much longer in the field in order to conduct successful sieges. Military revolution was also important in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Secondly, it is indeed the case that were given an edge because of the superimposition of religious upon dynastic conflict. The intensity of the conflict of these years resulted from the breakdown of social homogeneity. Thirdly, in most of the early modern period, the level of violence was especially high, because states were so weak - or, in another words, because key aristocratic subjects were so powerful. Such aristocrats, thus, were still part of a transnational European society. Accordingly, they had no vital loyalty to their particular state, and were prepared to call in outside powers against it. The consequences of these conditions was the Thirty Years War which was a European-wide, riddled with complexity. The war was so extraordinarily brutal that the population of Central Europe may well have been halved through malnutrition, the deliberate slaughter of civilians, and emigration. Absolute exhaustion eventually made peace talks necessary[118].

The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, therefore, marks a watershed. One relevant point to note is that new ideas emerged as the result of the long crisis of the seventeenth century. There was a certain ideological benefit to stalemate, to the discovery that neither side could dominate the other. In the late seventeenth century a series of thinkers began to develop the concept of toleration, thereafter, a major, self-conscious element of European civil society[119].

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[117] ***Ibid***, p. 50
[118] ***Ibid***, pp. 50-52
[119] ***Ibid***, p. 53

As for the importance of sovereignty, states were held to rule over particular territories, within whose borders they could do as they wished without occasioning intervention. If this was to codify the pre-existing fact that the hierarchy and extensiveness of papacy and Holy Roman Empire had long gone, to reiterate that religion was a matter internal to states, this should not be interpreted as saying that they conceived of everything in modern terms. There was still a long way to go before the 500 units of sovereignty extant in Europe in 1500 dropped to the 25 present in 1975[120].

The desire to round out meaningful territorial boundaries was a continuing source of conflict, and there were new struggles over colonial possessions. Most important of all, it is possible to detect the balance of power working in something like its purest form.

In this period, balancing became an art and an aim in itself rather than the result of a naturalistic mechanism, the matter of prudential wisdom outlined by Hume in his celebrated 1752 essay on he subject. Perhaps its greatest moment was seen in the diplomatic revolution of 1756 that is Britain drops its alliance with Austria in favor of Prussia, whilst France abandons Prussia to ally itself with Austria. The beautiful symmetry of this reflects the fact that this takes place within an international society sharing realist norms that is no state is blamed for realignments. More importantly, the realignment makes sense in terms of balance of power theory. Indeed, Prussia ought to have switched alliances because Austria was weakening at the time that the strenght and threat of France was increasing . At this moment the combination of rational states and upper-class solidarity gave Europe an international order whose moderation was admired by contemporaries as much as it has been by later realist scholars[121].

The theory of social evolution stresses that normality consists in adapting to circumstances, with change most likely to come from the ill-adapted, so unstable that they occasionally invent something new. This general view should underlie any account of the rise of the West that is a failure to adapt, to create a high civilization as patterned and successful as those of the Orient, led to the creation of a new form of society whose power proved to be so great that world history since has consisted in trying either to adopt it or adapt to it.

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[120] ***Ibid***, pp. 52,53
[121] ***Ibid***, p. 54

The most obvious fact about a state system is that it leads to a high degree of rivalry. This can be seen in European history most spectacularly in the history of art. The invasion of Italy by the French in 1492 spread the styles of the Italian Renaissance around Europe. In fact, this imitation was not at all confined to artistic matters. The fundamental mechanism at work was that of military competition. A revolution in military technology had to be adopted very quickly by neighboring states. Such new technologies had to be paid for, and no state could afford to ignore economic practices which could be translated into military advantage[122].

Specifically, North Italian cities gained their autonomy as the result of a power vacuum between pope and emperor, such that they were able, as is often the case in Third World countries today, to get the best for themselves by opportunistically chopping and changing their allegiance.

One other uniqueness of the West is the role that parliaments played in its history: Indeed so unique has this role been that German historians have considered the *Standestaat*, the representation of the three functional estates, church, noble, and burgher, to be a particular stage in world history. It is quite clear that the prominence of such assemblies owes a great deal to the church. Since it owned so much land, it was as jealous as any noble of the powers of the crown to tax. Hence it generalized two tags of canon law - "no taxation without representation" and "what touches all, must be approved by all"- and these became crucial to these estates[123].

The balance of power that triumphed after Westphalia depended not just on the calculating abilities and skills of statesmen within a shared social world, but also on key agrarian baselines which limited developments, both economic and military. Within this homogeneous and relatively static social world, there is something to be said for entirely contradiction of the famous thesis of John Nef, that is, there is definite sense in arguing that state competition positively aided human progress. Competition between states within a larger cultural frame brought Europe dynamism and development - but destruction too [124].

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[122] ***Ibid***
[123] ***Ibid***, p. 58
[124] ***Ibid***, p. 60

One way of highlighting the change is to note the eighteenth-century revolution in political theory. The central paradigm of much Western political theory to that point had taken for granted that history moved in cycles, with the corruption endemic to urban, commercial, and civilized life sure eventually to lead to the fall of every great state. A key element in this viewpoint, was that virtue was derived from simplicity, whether of an independent peasantry or of barbarians whose harsh existence bred in them military virtues[125].

State competition variously between Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and Britain encouraged a search for security. European state competition, rather than capitalism per se, encouraged the building of empires. It is worth stressing, in all this, that European economic development was not in any sense economically dependent upon its peripheries. Bluntly, the European impact on the rest of the world was both brutal and devastating[126].

Capitalism has proved able to ally itself all too easily with authoritarian rule. Still, there is truth to the notion that the first emergence of capitalism went hand in hand with relatively soft political rule. European states tended to be rather more organic and cooperative internally than were the more predatory states of other civilizations. This in turn was partly caused by that multipolar character of the European system that made it madness to be too brutal to sections of the population given that their skills, should they move, might significantly enrich the enemy neighbors[127].

The European polity differed from the agrarian empires of China and Rome in providing a larger frame, of Christianity and the market, within which states had to move and find their way.

Eighteenth-century order had nothing to do with any concert of powers; nor was it based on economic interdependence or on liberal principles. Further, the events of this period seem almost irrelevant for hegemonic stability theory. Perhaps that is not quite so that is hegemonic stability theory has the merit of placing states and markets at the center of its attention, and thereby of making it clear that realism worked within a relatively economically static world.

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[125] ***Ibid***, p. 62
[126] ***Ibid***, p. 63
[127] ***Ibid***, p. 65

Yet if fundamental economic change was to challenge realism, so too was the entry of the people onto the political stage.

3.2. The International System of Europe

The international system of Europe is an institutional environment based on a common, liberal political culture. In fact, the Western international community is based on liberal political values and norms; the beliefs in liberal human rights are the fundamental beliefs and practices that constitute the community[128].

In the domestic realm, the liberal principles of social and political order - societal pluralism, the rule of law and democracy as well as private property, market-based economy and the welfare state are derived from these liberal human rights. In the international realm, liberal values and norms are embodied in the institutions of peaceful conflict management and multi-lateral collaboration. The democratic peace has its roots in the domestic norms of liberal democratic states. These norms demand that political conflicts be managed and resolved without violence and based on constitutional procedures. In time, liberal democracies develop "pluralistic security communities" in which states neither expect, nor prepare for, organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes[129].

According to the other basic norm, multilateral collaboration is defined as a common institutional form that "coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct". For two reasons, international socialization is of basic importance to the liberal community. First, the liberal order is not simply an international order but spans the international-domestic divide. Liberal statehood is an indispensable condition of community membership. The second reason is the embedding of liberal norms in the domestic decision-making system that is necessary for the reproduction of the liberal international order. Without internalization, a security community cannot develop[130].

3.2.1. International Organizations and International Socialization

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[128] Schimmelfenning, Frank. "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment". European Journal of International Relations. Volume 6, Number 1, March 2000, pp. 119,120
[129] ***Ibid***, p. 121
[130] ***Ibid***

Over time, the Western community of liberal states has become institutionalized. NATO, EU and Council of Europe refer to the constitutive values and norms of the Western community in their constitutive treaties and define the promotion and protection of liberal democracy, the democratic peace and multilateral collaboration as their basic purpose.

Consequently, community membership has been formalized, so that, first the member states have committed the community organizations with the task of international socialization. Most of the programs and funds for the promotion of liberal norms are coordinated and managed by the community organizations. Second, all community organizations have laid down specific conditions that an aspiring state must fulfill before accession. These conditions comprise both adherence to the community values and the ability to contribute to the functional tasks of the organization. Third, accession is subject to a formal procedure including unanimous agreement of the member states and, in the case of EU and NATO, ratification by their national parliaments. Finally, the community organizations have established different grades of association with outside states. They reach from simple contractual relations and consultation procedures to full membership[131].

3.2.2. The Past History of Socialization

In the Cold War era, international politics of Europe was shaped by the inter-systemic conflict between liberalism and communism, a fundamental conflict of values in which both "camps" claimed universal validity and exclusive legitimacy for their own political values and sought to gain normative dominance by establishing their system of rule as the international standard. After the collapse of communism, the Western international community was in a position to establish its liberal values and norms as the only internationally recognized principles of legitimate statehood and state conduct in Europe[132]. The symbolic cornerstone was the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, in which the European governments declared that "we undertake to build, consolidate, strengthen democracy as the

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[131] ***Ibid***, p. 122

[132] It would be not surprising to think of changing the Westphalian society because technological innovations expand economies of scale and make existing social systems more complex. Complexity and scale create incentives for agents to collaborate. Changing conditions spur actors to reinforce or resist the changes and/or to devise new arrangements. For example, multinational corporations increasingly cooperate internationally to establish rules for behavior and institutional support because governments and international organizations are unwilling and unable to administer global commerce. See; Burch, Kurt. "Changing the Rules: Reconceiving Change in the Westphalian System". International Studies Review. (Special Issue), (James A. Caporaso (Editor)), Volume 2, Issue 2, Summer 2000, p. 199

only system of government for our nations" and that "full respect" for human rights" "is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe"[133].

Indeed, the constitution of a society is a precondition for the development of a democracy. Without a society, there is no democracy. The very possibility of constituting such a demos depends on the interplay between supranational and national politics and, hence, it is endogenous to European politics[134].

3.3. Institutionalism and European Integration

The analysis of institutionalism has tuned into the mainstream approach in political science. For the last ten years, there has been a proliferation of studies on the relative power of institutional actors, and examinations of the complexities of bargaining between actors from different levels[135].

According to Hall and Taylor, there are three versions of neo-institutionalism, namely rationalist, historical and sociological that have a prominent explanation for the study of European integration. Therefore, the basic premise of neo-institutional analysis is that institutions affect outcomes.

Rationalist scholars see institutions as "long-lived equilibrium patterns of rational behavior" and realized outcomes in a strategic game that "society plays". At the outer extreme, institutions constitute human identity and behavior. From this perspective, "all problems are common; all solutions socially constructed and reified; all expectations common and hegemonic"[136].

The normative aspect of new institutionalism is evident that institutions are not necessarily the product of neutral bargaining or efficient historical evolution. They have ideas built into them, which then influence the chances of agents.

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[133] ***Ibid***, p. 123

[134] Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. "The Political Basis of Support for European Integration". European Union Politics. Volume 1, Number 2, June 2000, pp. 166-168

[135] Aspinwall, D. Mark and Gerald Schneider. "Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration". European Journal of Political Research. (Hans Keman and Peter Mair (Editors)), Volume 38, Number 1, August 2000.

[136] ***Ibid***

Historical institutionalism stresses the role of prior commitments and institutional and policy stickiness in the process of European integration; and does not predict movement toward or away from integration; rather it predicts that agency rationality, strategic bargaining, and preference formation are conditioned by institutional context.

Sociological institutionalism has also contributed important insights to European integration studies and there seems to have been a genuine explosion in recent years in the number of scholars taking a broadly sociological or constructivist approach to this subject. Sociological institutionalism in European studies has begun to make invasions in the theoretical landscape once dominated by variants of inter-governmental and supranational.

One interesting issue raised by the sociological institutional approach is how these distinct national cultural settings change as liberalism and competitive practices gain legitimacy more widely. From the sociological institutional perspectives, integration depends crucially on cultural and cognitive variation, and consequently the impact of values, beliefs, and identities on actors' responses to integrate challenges.

Consequently, a methodological convergence will only become likely under the two conditions. First, applied rationalists have to give in to the historical and sociological institutional demand for empirical precision. Without a meaningful referent in reality, any hypothesis remains, to quote David Singer, an "insight without evidence". Second, non-rational choice research should also acknowledge that models, be they rational or non-rational, are indispensable method to derive hypotheses. From all perspectives, the future of institutionalism in integration studies thus looks daunting[137].

3.4. European Union as a System

The focus upon systems theory in the area of international relations in the past twenty years has been upon Waltz's approach towards system theory. Modeling the reality of the Cold War, theories of the international system were simple, parsimonious and static[138].

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[137] ***Ibid***
[138] Landau, ***op. cit.***, p. 44

The European Union, as an open system shaped by a multitude of systems and units (such as the Member States or sub-state actors) and coupled in varying conditional ways, at each time depending on the arrangements of its parts. European Union as an open system receives inputs from and formulates outputs to the environment. While the member states of the European Union form an integral part of the system, they are at the same time in close interaction with their societies and the international system as well.

There are four features of the system to which Europe as part of it. The first refers to organization. The world polity or its sub-systems could be perceived as a disorganized where the number of variables is large and behavior is erratic and unknown. The second feature is the dynamics of interaction. The European Union as an interactive (sub)-system displays both supranational and inter-governmental dynamics. It is for this reason that dynamic of the European foreign policy (sub)-system revolves around an identity of interests rather than one single identity. The European Union consists of two sets of identities that the corporate identity of the Commission, and the interests of the states that come to bargain for specific measures.

Third, it is important to consider the cohesiveness of the system. With a strong sense of an all-encompassing European identity, the more cohesive the system is the more effectively it can react to the international system. The cohesiveness will also affect the stability of a system that is the tighter the sub-systems are interlinked in their specific interests, the greater the impact of significant actions of one component (or actor) on other components, and the greater the chance for a system change. The prerequisite is the existence of an identity of interests that may be general enough to achieve support with an articulated body of values related to the political identity. Fourth, the European (sub)-system increasingly decentralizes when decisions taken by one sub-system or component are not followed by the system as a whole. A systems goal is stability depending on the level of analysis, by the virtues and the aspirations of the individual and the organizing structures of the (sub)-system and the international system[139].

[139] *Ibid*

Foundation of the international system is the principle of sovereignty. Member States in the European Union, who aimed to protect their sovereignty in the Cold War era by establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), now share their sovereignty in institutions.

The sub-system's variable works with three sets of dynamics. First, when the Member States come to represent interests individually; second, in the way in which they evaluate the expectation of others; and third, how the institutionalized level develops norms on the basis of these expectations[140].

3.4.1. From the Europe of Versailles to the Europe of Yalta

The key feature of the Westphalian states system was the existence of legally sovereign states functioning without a higher source of legitimate political authority. The European balance of power was shaken by the rise of a unified Germany created the contemporary "German Problem"[141]. That problem was so intense that gave to the two world wars of the twentieth century. The existence of a unified Germany has thus been a crucial factor determining the nature and dynamics of European international relations[142].

The Second World War once again led to a profound reshaping of Europe. Although there was no formal peace settlement, the foundations for a new postwar order were laid at a series of summit meetings between the wartime allies. The most famous of these was the Yalta summit of 4-11 February 1945. The 'Europe of Yalta' provides a well-used form of political shorthand to postwar European order. There were two prominent characteristics of the "Europe of Yalta". The first was the decisive role of the superpowers in European affairs and the creation of two military-political alliance systems (NATO on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact on the other). The second was the division of Germany, nuclear deterrence and the existence of a small group of neutral and non-aligned countries[143].

This structure of power relations defined European international relations for four decades. It was an arrangement that brought stability and order to Europe, but at a cost of the threat of

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[140] ***Ibid***, p. 47
[141] The problem was how to integrate the economic strength and military potential of a unified German state, situated at the very heart of the European continent.
[142] Landau, ***op. cit.*** p. 19
[143] ***Ibid***, p. 20

nuclear weapons. However, the existence of the Cold War security system was also to provide the context for a process of profound and far-reaching transformation in European international relations - the emergence in Western Europe and the wider transatlantic area of "pluralistic security community'[144].

3.4.2. Different Approaches in the European System

It is clear that in new Europe, old problems continue to persist in the study of international relations. It appears that the approaches to the European Union in the international environment are shaped by organization of international environment itself and its constituent units (the Member States and the Commission) and possession of power in the international system. Western Europe cannot consider itself a 'power' in the international system unless it creates a defense identity free from reliance upon the military resources of the United States.

Regimes are most likely to be established in areas where joint action is anticipated to produce better results than uncoordinated individual actions and that the EU was an example of this form of cooperation. The EU has viewed as an experiment in the pooling of sovereignty rather than the repository of its transference.

The notion has also advanced that the EU was intermediate between a regime and a federation. Federalism implies the ability to characterize the decision-making processes of the EU. In the federalist account of the expectation is for the formulation of the EU as a single actor in international relations with powers to conduct foreign affairs solely refer to one level of the state. In the regime theory explanation, the location and role of the state is not a matter of semantics, but rather is central to the theoretical rationale. There is no obstacle to considering whether the EU constitutes a 'federation, but this is ontologically not comparative to regime theory in the consideration of foreign policy[145].

Finally, a crucial variable is the frequency of *political crisis* in Europe. One of the most salient features of the EU as an external actor is the way in which its provisions for foreign policy-making by consensus break down in a crisis[146].

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[144] ***Ibid***, p. 21
[145] ***Ibid***, p. 60
[146] Peterson, ***op. cit.***, p. 13

3.4.3. Globalization and a New Great Transformation

Globalization means that the "world becomes smaller each and every day turning into a global village." People and places throughout the world have linked to each other. There exists a growth in mutual relations of dependence and a condensation of interactions between an ever-growing numbers of agents. In these context multinationals become transnational "global" organizations[147].

The world, divided into separate national states, is yielding to a transnational and multicultural global society. This new society is still organized, however, according to the principle of separate national states. Members of transnational communities cannot escape from the power of the nation-state as they try to create and maintain a collective identity[148].

The new situation is sometimes referred to as "a new great transformation." This is illustrated by the interrelated transition to a restructured and open family, to a globalized post-industrial network society driven by new technology, to the new urban duality, to the new distribution of political power in which the national state yielding sovereignty to local units, NGOs, and supranational associations, as well as to the coexistence and blending of different cultures[149].

3.5. European Foreign Policy

The cooperation in European foreign policy is taking place within the European Union as an institution that possesses both supranational and inter-governmental characteristics. Thus, the levels are not thrown into one construct; rather they will be viewed as operating in a causal relationship[150].

The lack of any systematic assessment capability at Union level directed toward the concept of defining important common interests and properly geared to the decision-making process which has first confined CFSP to limited joint action and makes the selection of subjects for

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[147] Dijkstra Steven, Karin Geuijen and Arie de Ruijter. "Multiculturalism and Social Integration in Europe". International Political Science Review. Volume 22, Number 1, January 2001, p. 57
[148] *Ibid*, p. 60
[149] *Ibid*, p. 61
[150] Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 40

joint action look haphazard. It also precludes well-prepared substantive discussion about long-term implications of foreign policy options. Finally, it prevents the emergence of a pro-active, rather than re-active, foreign policy (preventive diplomacy rather than crisis management) [151]:

Europe certainly no longer holds much of the initiative in international politics, and its own enlargement policy is an example of allowing outsiders to dictate the EU's own agenda, policy and pace of implementation. However, the EU is still an important part of the overlapping institutionalism which increasingly characterizes modern international relations, and which is helping to stabilize and pacify them. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnerships for Peace (PfP), and the Western European Union (WEU) 'family', however much concerned with military issues are definitely at the 'framework' end of the spectrum[152].

The divergence of expectations from capabilities is a human tendency that occurs more easily in a massive regional organization that struggles to act as an effective unit. European foreign policy suffers from a structural tendency to divergence because the EU employs a discourse which is global, liberal-meliorate and teleological, while suffering simultaneously from political and resource-generating systems which are largely 'stuck'. Moreover, the external environment continues to generate huge demands from states whose perception of vulnerability leads them to rush towards any 'safe harbor' that may be open to them.

At the start of the 1990s, it was generally accepted that the European Community/Union would be in the forefront of creating a new European order that it would extend its 'zone of civility' either by offering membership or offering association to the rest of Europe. It was assumed that the EU, as the central focus of a new European order, would be capable of developing the vision and exercising the leadership needed to construct this new order[153].

In short, the EU had failed to develop a coherent foreign policy for managing the new European order, in marked contrast to the United States that the Union once aspired to replace in the European order. To develop a foreign policy, as opposed to the present collection of multi-faceted external relationships, the Union needed to find ways of directing, managing

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[151] Regelsberger, Elfriede, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (Editors) Foreign Policy of the EU from EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 329
[152] Peterson, ***op. cit.***, p. 37
[153] ***Ibid***, p. 47

and coordinating its external relationships in the pursuit of identifiable and legitimized interests. A European foreign policy could only be achieved by creating central institutions within the European Union capable of identifying, selecting and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimized as being in the European interest. However, this could only be achieved by the establishment of a European state and hence a European government[154].

3.6. European Union as a Global Actor

3.6.1. EU as a Global Actor in the World Political Economy

In some respects, it might seem contradictory to present the EU as a strategic actor. After all, if one focuses on networking, reflexivity and 'soft power', then the traditional view of the strategic actor as monolithic, possessing a unified set of preferences and capable of producing unified action hardly seems to describe the EU. However, rather than focusing on these rather rigid requirements it makes more sense to talk in terms of collective action and strategic impact on the world arena. By looking at this set of features, therefore, the EU seems to operate as an agent within a variety of global structures The four forces shape the position of the EU as a strategic actor, that is; sector logic, institutional legitimacy, multi-mode policy-making, and principles of multilateral and reciprocity[155].

The first, *sector logic,* recognizes that there are large parts of the world political economy (WPE) that can be differentiated in terms of the structure of sectors, the rules of the game operating within those sectors and the kinds of outcomes that are produced within them. As the EU is both part of and a participant in the WPE, sector logic is in a sense both internal and external to the EC/EU. A defining feature of this logic is the existence of specific combinations of participation, interests and interaction in, for example, international trade relations, monetary relations and information and communications technologies.

Second, *institutional legitimacy* has both an internal manifestation, among EU institutions and members, and an external dimension, in the world political economy. Partly it reflects specific contribution including those attached to membership in global institutions such as the World

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[154] ***Ibid***
[155] Peterson, ***op. cit.***, p. 80

Trade Organization (WTO), but it also reflects the growth of expertise, information and attachments that make a certain set of institutions. The EC as agent of the EU reflects such processes in many areas of activity.

Third, there is the prevalence of *multi-mode policy-making.* This pattern of policy-making is characteristic of action within the world political economy, with national and regional authorities coming into contact both with each other and with the broader global context. Multi-mode policy-making pervades all areas, of EU activity, and can be discerned in its external economic policies no less than elsewhere. The result is three conceptually distinct modes of policy production: *'Community policy-making'*, *'Union policy-making'* and *'Negotiated order'*, which are clearly often intermingled in the handling of complex policy issues. As a result, in external policymaking, the EU can be seen as part of the 'institutionalization' of diversity' discerned by Philippe Schmitter in which procedural developments such as the spread of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) can have much broader political resonance.

Finally, there are the principles of *multilateralism and reciprocity* within the world political economy. The EU not only subscribes to these principles but also sustains them through its participation in the 'multilateral system' clustered around the WTO and other international bodies. But the practices of multilateralism and reciprocity are not simply expressed in formal institutions; they are also built into the foundations of the EU through the emergence and development of the reflexive and multi-perspective qualities. Policy-makers are faced with the need to respond both to formal rules, such as those of the WTO, and to powerful informal sets of values, such as those expressed in notions of 'Atlanticism' which surround the conduct of EC-US relations. Both of these types of forces felt on a transnational basis, for example in the negotiations about the allocation of transatlantic air routes during the mid-1990s. Fundamentally, the EU constructed on the principles of multilateralism and reciprocity[156].

In fact, the 'true world' of EU foreign policy has found more plausibly in the world political economy and its European expressions than in the development of 'high politics'. As a result, a combination of formal treaty provisions and inter-institutional agreements has characterized the policy context at the EU level. For the longer term, the 1990-1 Inter-Governmental

[156] ***Ibid***, p. 81

Conference (IGC) on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) may well prove far more significant for EU foreign policies than was the IGC on Political Union.

3.6.2. EU as a Strategic Actor in the Foreign Policy and Security

In terms of security problems, in the way of enlargement to include the states of Eastern Europe have affected the role of the EU in international arena. First, there is the old problem of Germany; second, there was the need to develop a security identity for Europe; and third, there was the question of the security architecture of Europe and Eurasia. Under each of these headings, the arguments were largely in favor of keeping the European Union smaller for the near future that is to deepen first and then widen[157].

As regards the first issue, there was no reason to suppose that the problems of French security - with regards to Germany - would get any less after German unification in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union. The increase in the potential power of Germany after unification increased the potential threat to France. Moreover, the prospect of a stronger Germany in a looser framework comprising both East and West Europe was likely to rekindle memories of earlier periods, such as the interwar period. The point concerned not just the issue of expansion but also more specifically the question of expansion to include this particular group of states which had traditionally been a focus of any expansionist or hegemonic German government that happened to come along[158].

The problem of security with regard to Germany was not just a French problem that is any problem for French security in the 1990s was also a problem for the security of other European states. Fortunately, the Germans went along with this view, especially as it linked up with their idea that political union was also a necessary precondition of monetary union.

With regard to the second issue was of crucial importance. First was the context of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy that in the Maastricht Treaty had reached the point for the first time of proposing a common defense policy in the near future, though without much enthusiasm. 'The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common

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[157] Taylor, ***op. cit.***, p. 116
[158] ***Ibid***, p. 117

defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.' There was evidence of a willingness to put the presentation of the partnership ahead of the short-term pursuit of separate interests.

As the nature of the mutual obligation contained in the Maastricht Treaty the member states declared their support for the Principle of a common foreign policy in the kind of ringing terms that would have been unthinkable in the early 1970s at the time of the first steps towards the harmonization of foreign policy

Third, the end of the cold war raises several fundamental issues concerning European security. First, what is to be the function of NATO following the demise of the Soviet threat? Second, can the European Union develop its own defense capability, either distinct from, or in partnership with, the Atlantic alliance? Third, how should members of NATO and of the Western European Union respond to requests for membership by former communist countries? Fourth, to what extent should the European Union assume a 'trouble-shooter' role in relation to the ethnic and border disputes resulting from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe?

There are two ways in which a security system appropriate to a post-Cold War environment might be built that is existing institutions can be adapted to suit new conditions, or new 'purpose-built' organizations can be created. In the security field, there has been a tendency to make use of existing institutions, in particular NATO, the Western European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), formerly known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This *ad hoc* approach has meant that security policy currently involves a complex web of institutions with overlapping functions and memberships[159].

To Andreotti, West is going through a transition period. To him, the EU with the EC as its core is in a state of flux and actively discussed is the question of bringing the number of the EU members from 15 to 28, or even 30. He notes that, everything should be given careful consideration because with 15 members the EU now is a rather complex mechanism difficult to control. The enlargement of the EU is supposed to entail changes in the EU current rules

[159] Jones, A. Robert. The Politics and Economics of the European Union, An Introductory Text. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1996, p. 265

because this is going to be an even more complex mechanism with 30 countries as members[160].

Countries of East Europe design a certain model that would help to work for the benefit of peace. The EU should cooperate with Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States as to rule out a stalemate between the countries, as happened before political motives.

[160] Andreotti, Giulio. "A Transition Period for the West". International Affairs. A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. Volume 46, Number 3, 2000, p. 51

Chapter 4: European Security and the European Union

4.1. Institutional Change and a European Security and Defense Identity

The end of the Cold War and the invalidation of the Yalta agreement initiated institutional change in the European security issue. The emerging form and content of the post-Yalta European security order is codetermined by the interaction of national interests and international institutional constraints, the main of which are located in NATO and the European Union[161].

The junction of the joint enlargement of NATO and the EU into central Europe combined with the European effort to form a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which provides some insight into the problems facing the major Western powers in fashioning both a mutually acceptable and an adequate institutional response to the problem of European security.

The gradual integration of the EU, especially with the introduction of a single currency, European Monetary Union, and the steady enlargement of the EU brings security and defense into the range of EU activities. Moreover, this coincidence with the changing nature of security policy, in which non-military aspects are growing in capacity, feels it has a "natural" advantage.

The problem of constructing an effective ESDI within NATO and the EU reveals five themes that touch upon the larger problem of expanding the post-war security institutions into the post-Yalta environment. First, the prospect of enlargement has brought to the fore a number of issues within both NATO and the EU that have been festering within each institution. Tensions within NATO have emerged with the end of the Cold War. Each institution faces a difficult task of internal and external adaptation to enlargement[162].

A second problem regarding enlargement is the continuing force and vitality of the nation state in the European security space. The evolution of the alliance demonstrates that the

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[161] Kirchner, Emil and James Sperling. "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a European Security and Defense Identity". Contemporary Security Policy. Volume 21, Number 1, April 2000, p. 23

[162] *Ibid*, p. 24

"national" rather than "collective" interest continues to dominate the calculation of cost and benefit in assessing risks posed by and responses to common security threats. The divergence of national interests has generated the demand for the development of an ESDI to enable the Europeans to act independently of the United States when faced with a second-order security threat.

The third theme arising from the double expansion of NATO and the EU is the importance of institutions. The realist position reduces international politics to the unmediated interaction of national interests and power. This refers institutions at best to cipher for imposing the preferences of the major powers.

Fourth, the intersection of the EU and NATO created by the emerging ESDI suggests that the boundary conditions for enhanced cooperation in security affairs are present.

Structural contexts, which refer to the level of amity and enmity in the international system, determine the extent to which collective identities may emerge and the extent to which states are compelled to fall back on self-interested calculations of interest. In the present European geopolitical space, the relationships between states are marked by amity rather than enmity. Systemic processes measure the level of interdependence and convergence of domestic values within a specific geopolitical area. The convergence of domestic values within Europe has been a core objective of the Western powers; in fact, economic and political support is contingent upon the successful transition to the market and democracy for all European states, including Russia.

Interdependence measured by trade and capital flows has also risen between the two halves of Europe although it is asymmetrical. Strategic practice focuses attention on how "an evolution of cooperation might lead to an evolution of community". Sustained cooperation between states within an issue area or across a linked set of issue areas contributes to a greater empathy for the interests and constraints facing each state individually; and it can also lead over time to a change in how states identify their individual interests. The practice of cooperation slowly transforms identity and interest from the "I" of the egoist state to the "We" of community[163].

[163] ***Ibid***, p. 27

The fifth problem attending the double enlargement of Europe is the imbalance between the supply and demand for access to the EU and NATO. The problem is a mismatch between the willingness to supply membership to NATO and the EU.

The content of these themes provide the context for understanding the evolution of ESDI and the future relationships among the WEU, NATO and the EU[164].

4.2. Security and Defense Policy of the EU

The EU is important for European security at three levels. In that context, the EU has the following roles:

- The primary function of keeping the core intact, ensuring there is one center rather than several in Western Europe;

- Silent disciplining power on "the near abroad"; the magnetism working already in East Central Europe;

- A potential role as a direct inventor in specific conflicts.

These three functions follow a quasi-geographical pattern of concentric circles. The first is about the core itself the second is about the close outsiders and the third about those peripheral actors that circle around this center at larger distance, geographically and politically. The two first are non-military, the third probably largely military; the two first are primarily structural and pre-emptive[165].

The expression "European security" has always been ambiguous. Did it refer to the security of the states in Europe, or was it really Europe's security? In the first instance, it would be a variation of "international security" which usually means only stability and a general fulfillment of the security aim of the units, i.e. "regional international security", whereas the

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[164] ***Ibid***, p. 28

[165] Kelstrup Morten and Michael C. Williams (Editors). International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, Power, Security and Community. Routledge, 2000, pp. 260,261

second would make for "euro-national security". There is no easy way to document this, but there seems to be a trend towards using increasingly the expression in the sense where it refers to the security of Europe as more than the sum of its parts[166].

Until recently, the consensus has been that the EU member states lack the political will to cooperate in developing a genuine CFSP and, a Common Defense policy (CDP)[167]. Recent events challenge that consensus. The issues surrounding the political will to develop EU defense and security policy that can be subdivided into three parts or levels. First, there is the need for a decision to actually develop and articulate a true CFSP and CDP. Second, at the next level down, there is the political will to define common interests, and from these form common policies. Finally, there is the political will to take the action in support of the stated interests and policies[168].

The development of an EU security and defense policy with the associated military capabilities, was given major boost by the;

> "Joint Declaration on European Defense" issued at the Anglo-French Summit in St. Malo in December 1998. This declaration urged the full and rapid implementation of the CFSP provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy"[169].

The German and French positions reiterated at the Franco-German Summit in Toulouse at the end of May 1999. The final declaration on defense and security reaffirmed:

> Their "...determination to put their full weight behind the effort to secure for the European Union the necessary autonomous assets it needs to be able to decide and act in the face of crises. It is becoming apparent that the lead taken by the UK to push for

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[166] ***Ibid***, p. 279

[167] John Roper offers useful definition of both "common defense policy" and "common defense" and suggests appropriate linkages between them. A common defense policy (CDP) is defined as "a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member states of the EU". A CDP should also set out, a "conceptual framework to provide some coherence for the development of a common defense", to include ways in which "human, equipment and financial resources for military action will be developed", together with "operational aspects of the organization of armed forces, their training and the conduct of military operations. See, White Brian. Understanding European Foreign Policy, Palgrave, 2001, p. 144

[168] Shepherd, J. K. Alistair. "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?". European Security. Volume 9, Number 2, Summer 2000, p. 14

[169] ***Ibid***

progress on the practical level of European security cooperation that is taken up by several of its most influential EU partners"[170].

At the Cologne European Summit in June 1999, the momentum was maintained with even the potential problems associated with the neutral states within the EU appearing to have overcome. All EU member states adopted the "Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Defense" that defines the scope and objectives of such a security and defense policy. The heads of state government decided, inter alia, on:

- Regular as well as ad hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC), including defense ministers (became effective in the autumn of 1999)

- A permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)

- An EU Military Committee making recommendations to the PSC, along with EU Military Staff, including a Situation Center

- Transfer of WEU assets to the EU, according to modalities that would be set before the end of 2000[171]

The first significant step taken in providing the EU with the necessary assets occurred at last year's NATO Summit in Washington of 24 April 1999 states that NATO would make its assets and capabilities available to the EU for "...operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance"[172].

The urgent need for improved military capabilities highlighted at the Washington Summit was reiterated in July 1999 with the release of the Anglo-Italian "Joint Declaration Launching the European Defense Capabilities Initiative". The declaration suggested a new practical and tangible approach to improving military capabilities. The approach suggests a "...timetable to achieve: European wide goals for enhanced military capabilities to undertake crisis management including peacemaking and national capability objectives to achieve the

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[170] ***Ibid***, p. 15
[171] Heisbourg François, "European Defence: Making it Work", Chaillot Papers 42, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, September 2000, pp. 5-7
[172] Shepherd, ***op. cit.***, p. 16

European aim". This appears to be an attempt to set definitive targets and objectives aimed at improving the armed forces of the EU member states, both in order to contribute better to NATO and to create the option of autonomous EU action.

December 1999's Helsinki European Council summit that produced the most significant step yet taken by the EU, in deciding on the necessary military assets for an EU security and defense policy. It took further by:

- Deciding to establish on an interim basis with effect from 1 March 2000, the various institutions agreed upon in Cologne (PSC, Military Committee, Military Staff)

- Setting a "headline goal" whereby the EU member states would, by 2003, generate forces capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg Tasks, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50.000-60.000 persons). These forces should be self-sustaining with the necessary command and control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other combat sources and additionally, as appropriate naval and air elements[173]

It is worth stressing that the objectives of the current push for European security cooperation are based on intergovernmental cooperation and are focused on member state capabilities being pooled when necessary, not on the idea of a single European Army. This is both a pragmatic and politically sensible choice for the near future. The European states cannot afford to alienate the US by duplicating NATO roles and capabilities. The technological, numerical and financial disparity between the US and European militaries is vast and many roles played by the US will continue to be vital to EU member states for at least 20 years.

However, improving EU capabilities to match the Petersberg Tasks is vital in balancing some of the military and financial burden between the US and Europe that is becoming an irritating issue for many in the US Congress. The evidence of the recent events illustrates that many of the leading military powers in the EU do have the political will to develop a security and defense policy for the EU[174].

[173] Heisbourg, ***op. cit.***, pp. 5-7
[174] Shepherd, ***op. cit.***, p. 17

4.3. The Security Agenda of the EU and Common Foreign and Security Policy

A new topology of power relations is emerging in the continent as new states appear and long-established relationships across Europe adjust to the end of the bipolar divide. Not only have the structures of European power relationships been altered, the dynamics of European international relations have also changed which is reflected in the radically new security agenda in Europe[175].

In terms of transatlantic relations, one outstanding difficulty is to work closely together to promote stability in Europe that would otherwise undermine the possibility for comprehensive joint action in international arena. From this point of view, Europe's first preoccupation is the promotion of stability on the continent. If Europe is seriously unstable, there will be little or no chance that the allies will be prepared over the longer term to look beyond Europe to a broad partnership with the United States to lead in the management of global international security and political economy. Therefore, increased peace and security in Europe through intense US-European cooperation is a sine qua non[176] for further extending those benign European conditions and successful transatlantic amity into the rest of the world, especially the greater Middle East and East Asia[177].

4.3.1. Common Foreign and Security Policy

In 1969, an EC heads of government meeting in The Hague requested EC foreign ministers to consider ways of enhancing cooperation between member states in the field of foreign policy. Then, European Political Cooperation (EPC) established in 1970 without a treaty basis. EPC was a framework for concerted action by EC countries in the field of foreign policy, involving inter-governmental communication, consultations and mutually agreed common action. It was a limited step towards a common foreign policy rather than a great leap forward. The system developed in an *ad hoc*[178] way and operated outside the EC's institutional structures and legislative processes, based on consensus between governments. There was no voting and its

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[175] Landau, ***op. cit.***, p. 15
[176] A Latin phrase, meaning, a necessary condition; what cannot be done without.
[177] Blackwill, D. Robert. The Future of Transatlantic Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, p. 17
[178] A Latin phrase means, for a particular purpose.

provisions were non-binding. Nor did it cover military aspects of security. In order to enhance policy continuity, a 'troika' arrangement has operated since 1974, by which the last, current and next holders of the Council presidency consult with each other on foreign policy matters[179].

The entry into force of the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) gave EPC a small but permanent secretariat to better implement its operations and provide institutional memory, strengthened the hand of the Council presidency in political cooperation, and included the economic and political aspects of security in EPC deliberations[180].

EPC was given recognition in Title III of the SEA, which stated that member states would endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy. The Treaty led to the formation of a small EPC Secretariat. EPC led to the adoption of common positions on many issues, including major foreign policy questions concerning the Middle East, Eastern Europe and South Africa.

Operationalization of the culture of foreign policy cooperation comes at a unique confluence of historical developments. First, the foreign policy behavior of democratic states guided by common values and principles, so there is a philosophical basis for cooperation. Second, foreign policy cooperation is built on time-tested pillars as an economic partnership based on complex interdependence and the world's most successful political-military alliance. Third, pragmatic necessity drives foreign policy cooperation in the 1990s. The world's problems are too big for any one state to handle in the absence of hegemony. The logic of cooperation[181], which gave rise to EPC, has begun to spill over into the trans-Atlantic arena[182].

As this culture deepens, it will reasonable for the EU and the United States to develop a foreign policy partnership. Although the EU and the United States are developing partnerships with other states (e.g., Russia), few partnerships between major powers share the historical resonance found in the EU-US relationship. However, prospects for EU-US partnership hinge on how well the EU develops CFSP and ESDI.

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[179] Jones, ***op. cit.***, p. 262
[180] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 306
[181] According to functionalists cooperation can become a habit. They argue that cooperation can "spill over" from one set of issues to others, producing greater international harmony and even greater integration across national boundaries. See, Minix, ***op. cit.***, p. 120
[182] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 315

CFSP failed in internal EU philosophical debates over decision-making, institutional division of labor, budgets, and semantics. It is also captive to the crisis associated with other aspects of European integration during the period of the ratification of the TEU in 1993 and the next Inter-governmental Conference on Political Union in 1996. In the end, there is no certainty that the member governments will find the political will necessary to allow political cooperation to graduate from EPC to CFSP.

CFSP faces many hurdles ahead, yet there have always been uncertainties associated with the various stages of European integration. As the quest for CFSP is as old as the EU itself, it will not be easily snuffed out by the crisis of the day. The United States needs the EU to succeed in developing common foreign and security policies that will enable it to act in the void of power created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the absence of US hegemony[183].

Proponents of the EC argued that it would remain a dimensional actor until it gained foreign and defense responsibilities. No serious attempt since the Fouchet Plan had been undertaken to move the EC into the sphere of security policy cooperation despite official reports that had advocated such a development[184].

In November 1981 German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and his Italian counterpart Colombo, proposed that EPC should be extended to include security and defense issues. Expanding the competencies of the EC into defense raised the sensitive issue for many European countries of a potential rival military organization to NATO. As under EPC, CFSP is based on inter-governmental cooperation and lies outside the Community framework. The main differences between EPC and CFSP are that CFSP covers defense issues and strengthen the Union's commitment to the development of *joint action* in foreign and security policy[185].

The first of the two means is generally the same as under EPC – "systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy" - through systematic information and consultation; the adoption by the Council by unanimity of common positions 'whenever it deems it necessary'; and coordination of action in international organizations and

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[183] ***Ibid***, p. 316
[184] Rees, G. Wyn. The Western European Union at the Crossroads, Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration. Westview Press, 1998
[185] ***Ibid***

conferences. The second introduces some novelties. In this case, the Union is to proceed 'by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common'. This is to entail decision by the Council by unanimity,' on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action'[186].

CFSP decisions are not part of Community law, and all major decisions will continue to be reached by unanimity. However, there is now a much clearer obligation in the text to comply with a common position, once adopted: 'Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions'. Likewise, 'Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity[187].

In two other respects, the CFSP marks a more significant break with EPC. First, the *potential scope* expanded to include defense issues. EPC had been limited to 'foreign policy matters of general interest'. All military or defense-related issues were specifically excluded, the relevant text of the Single European Act only stating that the Member States were 'ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security'. Under the Maastricht Treaty, however, CFSP is to cover 'all areas of foreign and security policy'." However, the potential significance of including defense issues is matched by the striking caution with which the prospect of common *defense* is presented: 'The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense"[188].

Second, under EPC the Twelve as such could not actually *do* anything. The Treaty provides for the possibility of Union action to achieve CFSP objectives in two ways. One such mechanism has already mentioned, since it constitutes one of the 'bridges' between the Community and the inter-governmental pillars that is the provision for economic sanctions in new Article 228a.

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[186] Laursen, Finn and Sophie Vanhoonacker (Editors). The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future Implications. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 37
[187] ***Ibid***, p. 38
[188] ***Ibid***

For a variety of reasons both Conservative and Labor leaderships have favored continuation of NATO and opposed a security system based on the EC. A European pillar within a restructured Atlantic alliance reorganized based on a new and balanced division of tasks and responsibilities with the United States, emphasizing not accepting a defense identity for the European Community. The best assurances for European security lie in the existing relations with the countries of North America.

Common foreign and security policy is the framework which must enable the Union to fulfill the hopes born at the end of the cold war and the new challenges generated by the upheavals on the international scene, with the resultant instability in areas bordering the Union. The aim of the common foreign and security policy is to enable the Union to speak with a single voice and to act effectively in the service of its interests and those of the international community in general[189].

Foreign and security policy covers all aspects of security. European security will, in particular, be directed at reducing risks and uncertainties which might endanger the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union and its Member States, their democratic character, their economic stability and the stability of neighboring regions. In this context, the Western European Union will shortly implement the various provisions embodied in the Treaty and the statement on the WEU[190].

The CFSP will have developed gradually and pragmatically according to the importance of the interests common to all Member States; the European Council asks the Council, as a matter of priority, to define the conditions and procedures for joint action undertaken.

CFSP in the mid-1990s is more an objective than a reality. The quest for CFSP is as old as the EU itself; it draws on the *acquis communautaire* of the European Community and the *acquis politique* of European Political Cooperation. Foreign policy differences in the new framework of EU-US political relations do not occur at the expense of consultations and cooperation in seeking the means to achieve common objectives[191].

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[189] ***Ibid***, p. 466
[190] ***Ibid***
[191] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 298

The 1996 Inter-governmental Conference offers an opportunity to assess and improve CFSP procedures; but it will also produce the risk that some member states may try to re-nationalize CFSP by pushing it onto an even more inter-governmental track.

CFSP is the constituent element of the Political Union concept, which, together with Economic and Monetary Union, form the European Union. As the twin brother of the Community's external economic relations, CFSP should enable the Union to put its full economic and political weight to bear on international affairs. The notion of the Union's global action under Article C of the Treaty, combining the potential of economic development, political, and security instruments of external action, is the clearest constitutional expression of this concept. It puts the Council presidency and the Commission into the driving seat of more coherent and comprehensive European Union external action[192].

> "As previously existing threats cede place to new risks, economic questions increasingly come to the foreground, next to the more traditional security questions. Successful cooperation in both areas of at least a limitation of possibly damaging confrontation, will therefore be of crucial importance for the coming years"[193].

As to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems, the threats are medium or long term in nature; in the short term, the main problem for Western security is the risk of inter-ethnic tension in Eastern Europe generating widespread violence and disruption.

There are three essential themes on CFSP. The first is the *'capabilities - expectations' gap.* To what extent did the transition from European Political Cooperation to CFSP raise expectations of the EU that it simply is incapable of fulfilling? The second is the nature of the EU's *foreign policy process.* How has the CFSP altered EU decision-making on external policy questions and with what effects? The third is the EU's *external role.* What are the main determinants of the EU's ability to wield its influence as an international actor'?[194]

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[192] ***Ibid***, p. 324
[193] Latter, Richard. The Future of Transatlantic Relations. May 1993, Wilton Park Paper 71, 1993, p. 1
[194] Peterson, ***op. cit.***, p. 4

The debate about recasting the EU's security role did not reach a conclusive end game at the 1997 Amsterdam summit.

Since the rather high-minded days of the early 1990s, it has become clear that a truly independent 'European Security and Defense Identity' would be enormously expensive, requiring an investment of between 4-7 per cent of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over a period of years. Thus, the CFSP will not have backed by a defense capability either soon or easily but, the Amsterdam Treaty's commitment to 'foster closer institutional relations' with the WEU[195].

4.3.2. The Contributions of the Treaties to the CFSP

4.3.2.1. Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union was the result of an unconvincing compromise between economic and monetary integration and inter-governmental cooperation in foreign policy and home affairs. Yet the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including it is still to be defined common defense component, is one of the essential innovations of the new Treaty meant to justify the ambitious label of "European Union"[196].

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) reinforced the pillar structure of the European construction by confirming the continued existence of inter-governmental procedures for the CFSP. The newly established Union would remain complex as far as its international identity was concerned. The TEU reflected the belief that a European foreign policy could not have built upon the CFSP alone, but could arise only if consistency ensured across the three pillars. As in the Single European Act, the Council and the Commission made responsible for ensuring such consistency[197].

The external policy roles of two Union institutions with different cultures and outlooks - the Council and the Commission - developed in parallel and in competition with one another. The

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[195] ***Ibid***, p. 9
[196] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 332
[197] Peterson, ***op. cit.***, p. 51

net impact of Maastricht was to make the identification and pursuit of a coherent Union foreign policy even more difficult than it was before.

Modified inter-governmentalism in the special form of consociation, was, therefore, the most persuasive image of the European Union in the mid-1990s that it was a tightly managed community of states, among which the conventional conditions of sovereignty altered.

4.3.2.2. Amsterdam Treaty

The Inter-governmental Conference of 1996-97, which ended at the Amsterdam Summit, has made nothing like the progress which those who looked towards a 'Maastricht II' expected. The IGC has had to fall back on further pottering with the EU's existing system, particularly in the area of foreign policy, where the post-Amsterdam dispositions seem likely to make no discernible difference to the everyday conduct of diplomacy[198].

There is no doubt that the Amsterdam Treaty's most important institutional innovations in pillar II are the creation of the post of 'High Representative of the CFSP' and the establishment of the planning and early warning unit under his or her responsibility.

In the struggle for control of Union external policy, the winner of this current round seems likely to be the Council and its Secretariat. The Amsterdam Treaty suggests that Member States is less convinced than ever about their ability to run the CFSP via the rotating presidency of the Council. Their solution is to expand and strengthen the Brussels-based machinery that is responsible for the CFSP, but to try to contain this expansion and strengthening within the Council structure.

What has originally conceived is an internal policy-developing exercise, notably with regard to the CFSP, that has overshadowed by the twin pressures of the single currency and enlargement[199].

4.3.3. The Machinery of the CFSP

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[198] ***Ibid***, p. 22
[199] ***Ibid***, p. 69

The CFSP machinery that emerged from EPC is slow and cumbersome. At the apex is the European Council that may or may not provide guidelines for the CFSP during its six-monthly meetings. Given the unanimity rule in CFSP it only takes one participant to disagree with a phrase and a paper can be blocked that does not occur frequently but inevitably it becomes more and more difficult to arrive at a consensus with more and more players involved[200].

Reform of the CFSP was one of the main reasons for holding the 1996-97 IGC in the first place. On the other hand, the outcome at Amsterdam was extremely modest, and in any event experience suggests that appropriate structures and procedures alone will not be enough to ensure a coherent and effective foreign and security policy.

The goal must be to encourage a deeper awareness among Member States of the interests they share as EU members and the benefits of acting jointly. CFSP players on all levels will slowly have to learn to overcome the 'traditions and emotions' of foreign policy described by the Commission's first President, Walter Hallstein, and to look at themselves not only as national representatives but as participants in a common enterprise that is the shaping of a genuinely European foreign and security policy[201].

It is unrealistic to expect a truly common foreign and security policy to emerge quickly. The CFSP may so far extend to a relatively modest number of issues and actions, but it still touches on the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty. It is important to regard the CFSP as a process in which the Member States gradually pursue their external interests together rather than separately. It may be wrong to even call what the EU has achieved thus for a 'common' foreign policy. At the same time, in its external relations policy, Europe has never been more united than it is today.

Because the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy remains so limited, most of the serious discussion of defense and security matters among EU members takes place within the context of NATO, despite the different but overlapping memberships of the two organizations. Consequently, much of the discussion of the post-1989 security environment in

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[200] ***Ibid***, p. 65
[201] ***Ibid***, p. 76

both the EU and CEE concerns the future of NATO and its process of enlargement, which is determining the security aspects of EU enlargement in advance[202].

The Treaty of Maastricht also set the goal of a common foreign and security policy for the European Union. At Maastricht, it said that the common security policy " might in time lead to a common defense". The goal was only to discuss general security matters within the European Union. Until now, the Western European Union (WEU) was the only European forum where this could be done[203].

As for "collective defense", engagements and guarantees will have to be reassessed over time, as the EU, WEU, and possibly NATO prepare for future enlargements. However, even more compelling priorities have arisen with regard to new sub-regional or diffuse threats to European security and stability; wars, tensions, and massive socioeconomic disarray rage close to the Union's borders, calling for common responses[204] that are not forthcoming, due to the insufficient development of a European Security and Defense Identity.

Political determination is needed to deal with these and other closely related issues, such as the need to avoid or reduce duplication of resources in the defense field, through the establishment of rational and complementary defense collaboration. All those issues are referred by the TEU to the future IGC, but only modest collaborative steps are being taken in preparation, including establishing closer relations within the "security triangle" (EU, WEU, and NATO). The success or the failure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will decide the future course of European unification that is the capacity of the Union to further enlarge into Central and Southern Europe[205].

4.3.4. The Weaknesses and Defects of CFSP

4.3.4.1. Weaknesses of CFSP

[202] Grabble, Heather and Kirsty Hughes. Enlarging the EU Eastwards. Chatham House Papers, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 109
[203] Steiner, Jürg. European Democracies. 4rd. Edition, An Imprint of Addison Wesley, Longman, Inc., 1998, p. 350
[204] Threat assessment, conflict prevention, crisis management, and intervention where needed.
[205] Regelsberger, *op. cit.*, p. 333

CFSP does not allow for the conclusion that the credibility gap between the ambition of the vocabulary and the reality of practical policy has been reduced by any sizable degree. Although CFSP can build on the major achievements of the European Communities' external relations and those of EPC, foreign policy has not become more unified and security policy has not even entered its initial stage, as outlined in Article J.4. This is particularly irritating on the eve of enlargement of the EU, since the introduction of CFSP was part of the indispensable prior deepening[206].

The change of vocabulary from the more modest EPC to the more ambitious CFSP has not modified basic weaknesses. Apart from the built-in limits of any inter-governmental framework based on consensus, CFSP has neither improved visibility nor continuity of the Union's global external action.

Joint action without sufficient genuine foreign policy content either tends to be limited or simply to provide a CFSP label to what would be possible to achieve with Community instruments with limited value. On the other hand, joint action to achieve maximum impact needs to be part of a global action of the Union in all fields of external policies. In fact, in many cases where joint action will be required, all three pillars of the TEU might be concerned, including the field of security policy.

The efficiency of CFSP action, however, will depend primarily on the ability of the member states to spell out clearly their common interests. Starting with the need to define the Union's role in its area of geographic proximity, that is the rest of Europe and the Mediterranean region.

4.3.4.2. Defects of CFSP

The CFSP has been three fundamental defects. The first is a lack of *identity.* It is plausible to suggest that a 'common' foreign policy cannot exist as long as there is no 'European Public'.

A second problem is one of *interests.* Even if the EU's identity crisis of the late 1990s was only temporary, there remained 'little evidence ' that the European identity that began to

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[206] ***Ibid,*** p. 326

emerge in the 1980s was based on any particularly strong notion of. . . identifiable European interest(s)'. If such interests ever existed, they were far more likely to exist in a Cold War context, when it was relatively easy to narrow differences between national policies *vis-à-vis* the Soviet bloc. The new foreign policy challenges of a post-Cold War world - particularly in the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa - invite far more diversity in terms of national interests among the EU member states.

The third defect - its weak *institutions* - has dominated both academic analysis and diplomatic energies, even if it is less important or fundamental than the first two defects. The negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, which gave birth to the CFSP, produced a number of compromises that manifest themselves in awkward or unworkable. Most subsequent analyses linked the CFSP's 'weak institutionalization and marginal policy output'[207].

The CFSP's institutional weakness is best appreciated by comparing the Maastricht Treaty's provisions for foreign policy with those set out for Economic and Monetary Union. As Michael E. Smith has noted, 'where EMU involves a clearly-defined goal, criteria to achieve it, a timetable for changes, sanctions for defectors, and a new central institution with a firm mandate for its operations the CFSP lacks all of these"[208].

Consequently, a few lessons should be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, the EU needs to develop the political will to identify and pursue common objectives. Second, full use should be made of all the instruments available to the Union - namely, by developing a more coordinated and global approach to external actions. Even though the pillars structure of the TEU represents a weakness in terms of efficiency, there is much scope for improvement in this respect, even under the present framework. Third, structural flaws in the decision-making, exposed by the first year of operation of CFSP, should be outfitted as appropriate, either in advance or in the framework of the next IGC. This concerns the need to create mechanisms to define common interests and plan possible responses in advance of crises erupting (planning and analysis capacity), as well as the need to overcome the continuing adherence to the

[207] *Ibid*, p. 4
[208] *Ibid*, p. 7

unanimity principle and to ensure more consistency in the executive and representation functions[209].

4.4. Western European Union

The WEU's origins in the Brussels Treaty of 'Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense' (March 1948), concluded between Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (UK), when the main concern of its signatories was the prospect of German rearmament.

The exercise of the military responsibility of the Treaty transferred to NATO in 1949. The Treaty was modified by the Paris agreements of October 1954, which enabled Germany and Italy to join. The Paris agreements introduced the 'Western European Union' title and referred to the promotion of European integration as a WEU goal. Between 1954 and 1973, the WEU helped to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the Atlantic alliance. It also played a role in Franco-German *approchement,* through the arbitration of the Saar issue[210].

The entry into force of the modified Brussels Treaty was also the beginning of a period during which WEU played a relatively minor role, in comparison to NATO and the emerging European institutions. Many of the broad-based provisions overlapped with those of other international institutions and during these years, it lost some of its functions, with the notable exception of its armaments control activities.

In 1970, the "Davignon" report marked the beginning of European Political Cooperation. That cooperation related to foreign policy and its purpose was to on major international policy problems. EPC could not be extended beyond the economic aspects of security issues.

There was a slowing down of activities of WEU between 1973 and 1984. However, the potential of the WEU to play a more important role in European security was recognized in various proposals for 'deeper' European integration that emerged in the early 1980s. The US

[209] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 332
[210] Jones, ***op. cit.***, p. 267

decision in 1983 to launch the 'Star Wars'[211] program without consulting Europe encouraged EU countries to consider the need for a stronger European dimension to European security.

The 1980s was a period in which tensions between East and West increased to the extent of precipitating a 'Second Cold War'. By revitalizing the WEU, the European states appeared to be investing faith in a small and unproven organization whilst signaling a lack of confidence in the Atlantic Alliance. Traditional notions of alliance theory would suggest that the Europeans should have remained wedded to the existing NATO structure, under American leadership, in such a time of external danger, rather than experimenting with alternatives.

There was a complex array of factors led to the revitalization of the WEU. Tensions in US-European relations and the progress in European integration provided the necessary motivation. The reinvigoration of the WEU was an attempt to address the concerns over transatlantic burden sharing. With countries such as the UK and Germany within the WEU, any policy that threatened to harm the linkage with the United States was inconceivable.

An extraordinary meeting of WEU was convened in Rome on 26-27 October 1984, which was marked of the founding text of WEU's reactivation: the "Rome Declaration". Work on the definition of a European Security Identity and the gradual harmonization of its members' defense policies were among the stated objectives.

After Gorbatchev came power in 1985, new possibilities arose for nuclear and conventional disarmament between the two blocs, which will transform the basis of European Defense and Security. The negotiations between the US and the USSR on the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces highlighted the need for even closer European consultation on defense. Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister (PM) of France, suggested that WEU should define a common position on security matters to guide its policy in the changing international arena. The result was the Hague Platform of 1987 which set out the WEU's future program, based around giving European integration a security dimension and reinforcing the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance.

[211] The UN nickname for the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI). The system backed by President Reagan in 1983 for defending America against nuclear attack by using laser-beam weapons orbiting in space to shoot down Soviet missiles with nuclear-generated blasts. Later President Clinton cancelled it in 1993.

In the early 1990s, the Western institutions that had been shaped by the Cold war faced the challenge of adapting to a very new environment. New security architecture capable of embracing the whole continent and based on transparency and cooperation had to be devised. France and Germany advocated deepening European integration and developing a common foreign and security policy in the European Communities. The 1990 London NATO Summit welcomed these developments and supported the enhanced role of Europeans within the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout 1991, officials prepared the adaptation of the EC, NATO and WEU to the new strategy environment. In November 1991, the NATO Summit in Rome reaffirmed the Alliance's role in the new Europe. In December 1991, the Treaty on European Union and the parallel WEU Maastricht Declaration were the basis for WEU-EU relations in the period 1991-1997.

The declaration on the role of the WEU agreed at Maastricht viewed the WEU as both strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance and as the defense component of the future European Union. A commonly used metaphor is that the WEU is a 'hinge' linking the US and Europe, through complementarities rather than rivalry with NATO.

At Maastricht, member states outside the WEU were invited to join or become observers, although there is no obligation to join. In June 1992, the foreign and defense ministers of WEU member states, meeting in Bonn, issued the 'Petersberg Declaration (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) which set out the guidelines for the WEU's future development. It pledged support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the CSCE (now OSCE) and the UN Security Council[212].

The next major step came at the Atlantic Alliance Summit of January 1994. The NATO countries' Heads of State and Government gave their full support for the development of the European Security and Defense Identity. In June 1996, the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Berlin; then the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels made important advances in the process of NATO adaptation and WEU-NATO relations. Ministers approve in particular the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the elaboration of multinational European

[212] Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 267,268

command arrangements for WEU-led operations and the conduct of military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.

In 1997, with the conclusion of the Amsterdam treaty revising the Treaty on the EU, WEU was drawn closer to the EU. WEU's role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability was confirmed, the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the EU Treaty and the possibility of the integration of WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide was mentioned.

In 1998, a new debate was launched on European Defense and Security. At St. Malo, in December 1998, France and UK adopted a joint Declaration stated that:

> "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage (...). To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises (...). In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military actions, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations; sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU"[213].

At the Washington Summit, in April 1999, NATO acknowledged the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, confirmed its willingness to build on existing WEU-NATO mechanisms in the creation of a direct NATO-EU relationship. NATO, then, declared its readiness to "define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance".

At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the EU committed itself to ensuring that it has at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments needed to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks ("Petersberg Tasks").

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[213] Rutten, Maartje (complied by). "From St. Malo to Nice, European Defence: Case Documents", Chaillot Papers 47, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, May 2001, pp. 8,9

The WEU Luxembourg Ministerial meeting in November 1999 reaffirmed its readiness to allow EU Council bodies direct access to the expertise of the WEU's operational structures. The meeting also saw the completion of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis management operations undertaken as part of the informal reflection on European security and defense launched at the Rome Ministerial meeting in November 1998.

At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU agreed on a common European headline goal and on new political and military bodies to be set up within the Council:

- Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

- New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategies direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework[214].

Meeting at Marseille on 13 November 2000, WEU Ministers drew the following consequences for the Organization from ongoing developments:

- WEU would be handing over its crisis management responsibilities to the EU

- WEU's residual functions and structures would be in place by 1 July 2001 at the latest. They would enable the Member States to fulfill the commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly those arising from Articles V and IX.

- The WEU Military Staff would cease its activities.

- The WEU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU Satellite Center would remain under WEU responsibility until the EU provided itself in 2002 with its own institute for security studies and its own satellite center to be set up in the form of agencies.

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[214] *Ibid*, p. 82

• The WEU/EU and WEU/NATO routine consultation mechanisms would be suspended.

• The Demining Assistance Mission to Crotia (WEUDAM) would be continued, under the responsibility of Sweden and in the WEU framework, until its present mandate expired.

• The police mission in Albania (MAPE) would be taken over in due course by the EU

• WEU would wind up its activities in the framework of the dialogues developed with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean partners. It was intended that these activities would be taken up within the existing framework of political dialogue between the EU and the countries concerned.

• The Transatlantic Forum would be brought to an end. The institute for security Studies was entrusted with undertaking activities similar to those conducted until then within the transatlantic Forum.

• WEAG would continue to carry out its functions of cooperation in the armament field.[215]

Three theses tend to predict that all European organizations concerned directly or indirectly with security will gain in both authority and legitimacy. Redundancy theory predicts that efficiency in the attainment of some common objective that is best attained by having several organizations attempt to achieve the same outcome. If one fails, the others will take up the slack. Having more than one organization dedicated to doing the same job is a kind of insurance policy[216].

4.5. In the Framework of Transatlantic Relations The Parallel Processes of the Enlargement of NATO and the European Union

Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War bipolarity, a new security order is emerging in Europe. The key to the reshaping of European order is the

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[215] See for detailed measures, ***Ibid***, pp. 147-150

[216] Haas, B. Ernst. "Organization Theory: Remedy for Europe's Organizational Cacophony?". Contemporary Security Policy. Volume 21, Number 2, August 2000, p. 83

institutional enlargement of NATO and the EU. The December 1994 NATO summit in Brussels declared "the enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies of the East" [217].

The key problem is that there is no long-term vision guiding the dual enlargement process. Enlargement is proceeding on gradually, ad hoc and pragmatic basis. This is exacerbating the difficulties generated by the divergent membership of the two organizations. The "phased enlargement" process has exposed some antinomies of European security. First, it has exposed the tensions between European integration and the transatlantic alliance, which are reflected in the difficulties in forging a coherent European Defense and Security Identity. The decoupling of NATO and EU enlargement threatens to generate uncertainty over security guarantees, along with disputes over the legitimate source of decision-making and political authority within the Euro-Atlantic community. Second, it has exposed the dilemmas between preserving a cooperative security relationship with Russia, and enlarging the Euro-Atlantic community into East-Central Europe and beyond[218].

4.5.1. The Enlargement of NATO

NATO has responded well to the end of the Cold War. It has overseen:

- A major reduction in military forces,
- Extended the "hand of friendship" to former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Created new forums for security consultation and dialogue,
- Began the process of redefining its role and strategy;
- Forged a new partnership with Russia and Ukraine;

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[217] Hyde-Price, Adrian. "The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of European Order". Contemporary Security Policy. Volume 21, Number 3, December 2000, p. 139

[218] ***Ibid***, p. 140

- Embarked on the potentially high-risk policy of enlargement to the East; and

- Sought to impose peace on the troubled Balkans[219].

NATO's Eastern enlargement will generate a major dilemma, above all for the United States of America. Enlargement has already institutionalized a permanent US presence East of the Oder-Neisse line, bringing a new dimension to transatlantic relations. The problem for the USA, which enlargement highlights, is that whereas the USA has vital economic and political interests in Western Europe, this region faces no significant threats. By contrast, America's interests in Central and Eastern Europe are limited, but this region faces some important security problems.

NATO has introduced Membership Action Plans to provide some guidance and encouragement for applicant countries, but no commitment to future enlargement has been made. The key problem facing NATO is that there is no clear strategic rationale guiding its enlargement policy. The 1995 Study on Enlargement stated that new members should strengthen the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance, but failed to offer any concrete criteria by which this could be measured.

NATO has number of different roles. First, it offers collective territorial defense guarantees. Second, it institutionalizes a permanent US security presence in Western Europe, and provides the institutional core of the transatlantic relationship. Third, it has created a multilateral system of defense cooperation designed to prevent conflict through institutional integration and avoid the re-nationalization of defense policy. Fourth, it institutionalizes a community of values based around human rights, democracy, etc. Finally, it facilitates practical military cooperation for contingency operations such as the Gulf, peace operations such as Bosnia and campaigns such as the aerial bombardment of Serbia in March 1999[220].

A key problem facing NATO today is that the relative importance of its five key roles is changing. At the same time, NATO means different things to different member states. For the Americans in particular, NATO's utility stems from its use as an instrument of multilateral crisis management and power projection in defense of "common interests". The problem with

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[219] ***Ibid***, p. 141
[220] ***Ibid***, p. 145

this is that the USA has global interests, while most European NATO members, have more limited regional interests.

NATO can play an important role in shaping new forms of security governance in Europe. The key to this is an enhancement of the PfP program along with effective utilization of the Combined Joint Task Forces, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The enhancement of the PfP program can facilitate functional military cooperation, and help build greater trust an understanding between armed forces in Europe. The PJC, the centerpiece of the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, provides a mechanism for institutionalizing dialogue with Russia. Finally, the EAPC provides a forum for wider security discussions between NATO and its Partners[221].

The public explanation for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining NATO is continuing fear of Russia entertained by these new members, no matter how irrational. A final reason often heard is that these want to be "a part of Europe" after weakened for 45 years in someone else's embrace[222].

Germany had an interest in pushing Europe's military border as far East as possible. The US had a real interest in shoring up democracy in the East and in creating a favorable setting for free-market capitalism. Some members of Congress and other "triumphalists"[223] no doubt saw in an expanded NATO a confirmation of the West's victory over communism and consolidating of its gains.

4.5.2. The Enlargement of the European Union

The EU helps ensure its continued stability and cohesion. It does this by helping to reduce the friction generated by the interaction of sovereign states in international society. It also provides a means of balancing institutionalized cooperation and multilateral integration with continuing national diversity and the heterogeneity of political communities in Europe. In other words, it facilitated a balance between European unity and diversity.

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[221] ***Ibid***, p. 147
[222] Haas, ***op. cit.***, p. 85
[223] "Triumphalism" means excessive praise over the victories of one's own party, country, etc.

The EU has helped foster a more peaceful and stable peace order in postwar Western Europe in five main ways. First, it provided an institutional framework for post-war reconciliation – especially although not between France and Germany. Second, multilateral integration has helped change EU member states' perception of their interests and preferences. Third, the EU has helped change the process of collective identity formation in Western Europe. Fourth, in the 1980s, the EU helped the process of democratization in Southern Europe, thereby helping to lay the foundations for building a stable peace in Southern Europe. Finally, the EU exercises a "presence" in the international system as a "civilian power". It is widely seen as embodying a community of stable and prosperous democracies, cooperating peacefully in multilateral institutions. It therefore, provides an important role model and pole of attraction for many in Central and Eastern Europe[224].

The central dilemma facing the EU is how to enlarge to the East, whilst preserving the benefits of existing forms of multilateral cooperation and integration. The problem is that enlargement will necessitate fundamental changes in the key policies and decision-making procedures of the Union. To begin with, it will force fundamental changes in the two key policies of the EU - Common Agricultural policy (CAP) and the structural funds. Second, it will also precipitate changes in EU decision-making procedures and structures. Third, enlargement threatens to unravel the complex pattern of package deals and compromises within the EU. Finally, in an enlarged EU, new coalitions of states may emerge.

Enlargement means the end of the post-war West European form of multilateral cooperation, and the birth of a new form of European integration. Post-war Western Europe has been transformed by a process of "deep integration" involves both formal integration and informal integration. This integration process is a "deep integration" because it involves a significant pooling of sovereignty and the development of a system of multi-level governance[225].

A new model of integration is required, one more appropriate to the changed political, economic and geopolitical circumstances of post-Cold war Europe. This new model of integration for an enlarged EU will probably involve some form of "flexibility" or

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[224] Hyde-Price, *op. cit.*, p. 149

[225] The world polity can be considered as the global configuration of governance. It means that the enforceable rules, the rule-making and rule-implementing processes and institutions, should relied on around the world for regulating human behavior hat includes not only the prevailing configuration of governance but also efforts directed toward changing the prevailing configuration. See, Brown, Seyom. International Relations in a Changing Global System, Toward a Theory of the World Polity. Westview Press, 1992, p. 167

"differentiated integration". This is the only way to overcome the dilemmas of widening versus deepening, and to continue the integration process in a geographically larger and more diverse Union[226].

The EU needs to develop a dual-track strategy. First, member states need to push forward with the enlargement process, even in the face of opposing from some sectional interests. Only in this way can the EU fulfill its historic post-Cold War mission. Second, the EU must forge new forms of multilateral cooperation with countries in the wider pan-Europe excluded from the integration process[227].

The two enlargements are being driven by different constellations of interests and concerns. NATO enlargement has proceeded far faster than EU enlargement – largely because it is much easier to enlarge a military-political alliance than a system of multi-level governance, but also because of a lack of political resolve and common commitment amongst EU members.

4.5.2.1. The Eastward Enlargement of the EU and Problems

Central and Eastern European countries have had to transform their constitutional structures and establish functioning democratic institutions while also creating market economies in previously centralized states with little private ownership. They are simultaneously redefining nationhood and creating independent statehood[228].

The EU candidates have still obstacles on the way to integration. The first set of difficulties is technical ones. The EU provides a massive and detailed legal framework as well as demanding that its members should have a functioning market economy and democratic institutions. The second set of difficulties relates to the damaging legacies of communism that is distorted managerial, administrative and political procedures in all areas of politics, the economy and society. They need to unwind and unravel most aspects of their everyday life,

[226] Hyde-Price, *op. cit.* p. 153
[227] ***Ibid***
[228] Henderson, Karen. "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement". International Politics, A Journal of Transnational Issues and Global Problems. Volume 37, Number 1, March 2000, p. 1

which were almost hopelessly twisted communism. Consequently, the issue of EU enlargement presents a fascinating clash of political agendas[229].

4.5.2.2. The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe

The EU exerts a significant degree of political influence on its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). First, The EU embodies the "idea" of Europe for many in the new democracies, and is the focus of their "return" to Europe. Second, it has generated a "new national myth" in many of the new democracies, which is altering the process of identity formation. Third, the "conditionality" of EU aid has helped reinforce the democratization process and respect for human rights. Fourth, the EU has become the major trading partner for the new democracies of the East-Central Europe. Finally, the EU-sponsored "Pact of Stability" in 1993 has helped diffuse some of the minority and border disputes that worry the post-communist East and can be considered "a fairly successful enterprise"[230].

EU enlargement will strengthen the foundations of European order and facilitate the development of a stable peace in the wider Europe. Second, integrating the new democracies of CEE into the EU will reinforce the "new nationalist myth" in the region, and help diffuse "European values" throughout the wider Europe. It will also help the consolidation of democratic government in the region and stimulate further economic development. It will provide a multilateral context for German economic power and political influence in *Mitteleuropa*, reassuring both the East-Central Europeans and Germany's Western partners[231].

As far as the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC's) view on enlargement is concerned, there are five points: First, the applicants are motivated by the idea of the "return to Europe." The states of Central Europe, particularly regard themselves as rejoining rather than joining the West. For new states, EU membership is also treated as confirmation that the country is accepted as a partner equal to more firmly established states. Second, it is felt that EU membership will bring economic advantages. Two of the EU's four freedoms (free movement of goods and free movement of persons) will open EU markets to the area's exports and eventually allow its citizens to seek work where that wish. Moreover, there will

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[229] ***Ibid***, pp. 2,3
[230] Hyde-Price, ***op. cit.***, p. 149
[231] ***Ibid***, p. 150

be opportunities for obtaining financial subsidies for agriculture and structural funds. Third, the EU is perceived to bring security guarantees, which are second best only to NATO membership for states outside that organization. Fourth, EU membership allows participation in the decision-making of the major force in Europe, which is not available from trade agreements alone. Fifth, is the improvement in social standards, safety standards, and a general increase in bureaucratic competencies, and rights for all, necessary for EU membership[232].

As for the EU Member States' views on enlargement, the first argument is the moral imperative that it is the West's duty to assist those who suffered communism for forty years and then overthrew. By Eastward enlargement of the EU, a "whole" Europe is once again created. The second argument is economic and signifies that enlargement means larger markets. The third argument is that a stable Europe is a safe Europe, and that only anchoring the new democracies within the EU and helping them prosper will safeguard lasting peace in Europe. The final argument is that a united Europe will be an economically strong one able to compete against the United States and the Far East[233].

According to the EU Member States' opposing views on enlargement, the first is about cost. The fifth wave of enlargement does not bring in any state that will be a major net contributor to the EU budget. Second reservation is also economic that is the fear that the labor market will be flooded by cheap labor. A third problem is presented by the issues of justice and home affairs, and fears that the penetration of the EU area by organized crime and illegal immigration networks would increase as CEECs form the outer borders of the EU. The fourth challenge is that the sheer number of CEEC applicant, together with Cyprus and Malta, increases the danger of gridlock in the EU's consensual decision-making procedures, and also makes the restructuring of EU institutions imperative. The fifth problem is the fear that stains of the communist culture of corruption may undermine before enlargement. The sixth is that enlargement risks creating a new "iron curtain" in Europe. East European states not being considered for EU membership might pose a security risk on the periphery of EU/Europe. The last reservation relates to the democratic deficit in the current EU[234].

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[232] Henderson, ***op. cit.***, p. 8
[233] ***Ibid***, p. 9
[234] ***Ibid***, pp. 9,10

Moreover, democratization in Central and Eastern Europe is not separate from larger supranational political and economic reforms in Europe; and the citizens of these newly democratizing countries are aware of this connection and can exert considerable constraints on it. Their favorable attitudes toward domestic political and market reforms are essential for their continued support for integration[235].

4.5.3. Enlargement Processes and Transatlantic Relations

A major unresolved question that the dual enlargement process highlights is the future role of the USA in European affairs[236].

The first wave of NATO's Eastern enlargement has strengthened the "Atlanticist" identity of the East-Central Europeans, particularly Poland, thereby bringing a new element to transatlantic relations. The Kosovo campaign has further demonstrated America's leading role in European security, and reinforced NATO's predominance in the European security architecture.

The dilemmas between European integration and the transatlantic alliance are evident from the difficulties surrounding the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). The task of building a more coherent European pillar within the transatlantic alliance has been on the policy agenda since the early 1960s. With the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the NATO Brussels Summit in 1994, the construction of ESDI has been accorded greater importance[237].

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 failed to clarify the relationship between the EU and WEU. Over recent years there have been some encouraging signs of movement towards a new consensus albeit uneven rapprochement with NATO and the British Labor government's willingness to engage more constructively with he European integration process. The Franco-

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[235] The support for European integration in Central and Eastern (CEE) applicant countries is influenced by a combination of both utilitarian and political value factors. The research provides new insights to utilitarian models by expanding their explanatory capacity beyond conventional economic variables. The strongest utilitarian factors shaping attitudes are not based on measures of specific industry economic benefit. See, Cichowski, A. Rachel. "Western Dreams, Eastern Realities: Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe". Comparative Political Studies. Volume 33, Number 10, December 2000, p. 1273.
For utilitarianism: See; Lyons, David (Editor). Mill's Utilitarianism, Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997, p. 39; and Crisp, Roger. Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge Philosophy Guide Books, 1997, p. 70

[236] Hyde-Price, ***op. cit.***, p. 156

[237] ***Ibid***, p. 157

British St. Malo summit in December 1998 was particularly significant in this respect, and made possible the EU's commitment at the Cologne and Helsinki summits in 1999 to the creation of an autonomous CESDP capability. Nonetheless, formidable problems remain. First, the CJTF concept is proving difficult to operationally. Second, the headline goal of creating a 60.000-strong European rapid reaction corps will be costly, and there are few indications of a political willingness to make the necessary funding available. Third, decision-making procedures for the employment of this rapid reaction corps still need to be clarified. Fourth, the Americans have insisted that the CESDP should avoid duplicating command inevitable if the EU is to develop the capacity for autonomous action. Finally, there are considerable differences between EU member states over what constitutes their "common" foreign and security interests, which will make it difficult to reach a "common" European policy[238].

The key to building a durable and lasting peace order in Europe lies in a deeper process of societal convergence and integration, involving networks of transnational trust, cooperation and integration. In Karl Deutsch's terms, it involves the emergence of a "sense of community" or "we-feeling" based on trust, mutual consideration, communication and responsiveness[239].

The key to the enlargement of the transatlantic pluralistic security community eastwards is not simply institutional enlargement, but a process of convergence and integration between culturally distinct societies, political communities and value systems across the former East-West divide.

The danger is that enlarging the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community to include a more economically and socially diverse group of states could erode the sense of shared identity and common interests that four decades of multilateral cooperation has fostered. This dilemma will not be easy to resolve.

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[238] ***Ibid***, p. 158
[239] ***Ibid***

4.6. Common European Security and Defense Policy and a New Transatlantic Military Balance

At the EU's Helsinki summit on 10-11 December 1999, European leaders took a critical step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed up by credible military force[240].

Two events stimulated European governments to rethink their commitments to defining a common European defense policy and capability. The first was the change in the British government in 1997. The Labor government of Prime Minister Tony Blair[241] was determined to demonstrate the UK's central role in Europe and took the initiative on restructuring European defense cooperation partly to compensate for Britain's self chosen exclusion from other major European projects. The second was the Kosovo air war, which underlined that the USA had superior intelligence, surveillance, and search assets, plentiful precision-guided munitions, massive-air and sealift resources, modern communications, and solid logistics. The Kosovo experience demonstrated that the European states still could not back up economic and diplomatic prowess with military means. The Kosovo crisis has done more for the development of Europe's defense identity than the decade of post-Maastricht deliberations on the EU's CFSP and its ensuing CDP[242].

European Council meeting in Pörtschach, Austria (24-25 October 1998) represented the first careful step of EU member-states toward establishing a European crisis management capability backed up by a more effective military infrastructure. This debate on European defense gained in momentum with the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo on 3-4 December 1998, where both governments issued a "Joint Declaration on European Defense."

Although much remained vague at Saint-Malo, it is difficult to overstate the historic significance of this intensification of France-British security cooperation. PM Blair adopted

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[240] Van Ham, Peter. "Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship". Security Dialogue. Volume 31, Number 2, June 2000, p. 215

[241] In Pörtschch (October 1998), Blair has mentioned the requirement of being accepted a sui generis European defense policy in case of supplying some definite conditions. The autonomous political and military capacity in Europe has been persistently defended in St. Malo Summit (December 1998) where the development of the EU capacity in terms of decision-making and defensive structures analyzed. In Köln Summit (June 1999), the EU made the decision constituting institutional framework in deciding political decisions in security and defense issues. In Helsinki Summit (December 1999), the Council stated its decisions. See; Okman, Cengiz. "Bitmeyen Senfoni, Değişim", Karizma, Mayıs-Haziran 2001, pp. 103-120

[242] Van Ham, *op. cit.*, p. 216

the French view that a more sound European defense capability would not undermine the transatlantic relationship, but would, quite on the contrary, keep the Atlantic Alliance relevant and the USA involved in the management of European security.

4.6.1. The Kosovo Experience

The war over Kosovo became a turning point in the European understanding of what the EU/WEU should be able to do in the complex fields of crisis prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, and war fighting[243].

This main lesson of Kosovo has stimulated a rethinking of European defense cooperation, not as a way to undermine NATO but to provide the EU with the military means to back up its diplomatic efforts. No European country is today calling for a European army, but most calls for a clear European vocation to establish a partnership with the USA based on more balanced military capabilities and shared political leadership.

NATO was also prepared to make "the necessary arrangement" to give the EU access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, as well as to ensure access to NATO's planning capabilities. However, despite the rhetoric of transatlantic cooperation, considerable controversy remained over the exact meaning of "autonomous action", "ready access", and the "presumption of availability" of NATO assets. At the EU's summit in Cologne (3-4 June 1999), European governments, for the first time, committed themselves to a common European defense policy. By doing this, they declared that the Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. To achieve this goal, EU leaders saw the need to strengthen European capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control, which implies efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces as well as strengthen the industrial and technological defense base. EU member-states also prepared the political ground to arrange the appropriate decision-making mechanisms for crisis management and to secure political control and strategic direction of future EU-led military operations[244].

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[243] *Ibid*, p. 217
[244] *Ibid*, p. 218

4.6.2. Modalities of Europe's Common Defense

The decisions made at the EU's Helsinki summit of December 1999, outlined Europe's future defense structure that was decided but many important questions were left open. EU leaders agreed to add military muscle to Europe's significant economic and financial impact by setting up new permanent political and military bodies within the EU Council that is a standing Political and Security Committee that will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP. During a military crisis, this committee will exercise political and strategic direction of the operation (under the authority of the EU Council); a Military Committee (MC) composed of EU member-states' chiefs of defense or their military representatives. MC will give military advise and make recommendations to the PSC; and a military Staff (MS) to provide the EU Council with military expertise and support to the CESDP. The MS will perform early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for the EU's conflict prevention and crisis management ("Petersberg") tasks[245].

The main aim is that EU states should have enough forces at hand to form an army corps which should be a sufficient until in terms of logistics, intelligence, and communications and should be ready for use in time of need for tasks in which the USA and/or NATO decide not to involve themselves. Following the Helsinki summit, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott states "there should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it."[246].

Although the Helsinki decisions look impressive on paper, it is clear that the EU's military infrastructure will remain rather modest and nowhere near the size of the NATO military staff. It will be difficult to foresee a serious European CESDP without the acquisition of better defense technology and better trained and deployable troops, or without the setting up of at least some parallel military structure.

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[245] Petersberg tasks include military action be it forceful (as in peace establishment) or peaceful (as in peacekeeping). But these tasks do not actually cover national defense in the traditional sense of ensuring, using military means, the territorial integrity and the political independence of a state in the face of a military threat, nor do they cover collective defense. See; Heisbourg, ***op. cit.***, p. 2

[246] Van Ham, ***op. cit.***, p. 218

It is on this point that Europe's harsh political reality could start to overtake the strategy laid out Helsinki since it seems evident that EU member-states at present do not wish to allocate sufficient money to buy first-class, home-grown defense systems gathering equipment, precision-guided weapons, and electronic warfare capabilities to search and rescue forces. Although Europe spends 60 percent of what the USA does on defense, the Kosovo war exposed Europe's main and acute weakness; despite having two million people in uniform, NATO's European members could hardly prepare 40.000 troops in time to fight a regional war. Most European troops are designed to repel a Soviet ground attack rather than a rapid deployment of troops to nearby crises.

For the time being, the likelihood of autonomous, EU-led military operations is remote. For a number of years to come, any European-led military operation will still be highly dependent upon NATO command structures, as well as on US intelligence and logistics. It is therefore difficult to foresee how the US would mount old serious operation without at least the consent of the US.

For the time being, Europe's CESDP is bound to have limited, regional ambitions. The EU-debate focuses on "Petersberg" missions and not on territorial or collective defense, and therefore does not touch upon Article V of WEU's founding treaty. Europe's military strategic planning will therefore focus upon regional concerns and not yet adopt a global scope[247].

4.6.3. European Defense Cooperation

According to Hoon, the fundamental structures of cooperation are planning, training, and command and control arrangements. He argues that "what we are doing through the EU will complement this action". There are three main reasons for saying so. First, there is a clear imbalance in capabilities between the Europeans and the United States. This has grown over the last decade. Kosovo was a wake-up call. Both the US and NATO strongly support increased efforts by Europe to respond to this challenge. Second, the EU is actively involved in crises but it has lacked hit. In security matters, especially in a real crisis, political weight reflects military weight. The third reason is that additional political will and momentum for

[247] *Ibid*, 222-225

Europe to improve its capabilities has best generated through NATO and the EU. The multi-dimensional nature of security issues demands a coordinated political response[248].

[248] Hoon, Geoff. "European Defense Cooperation". Survey of Current Affairs. Volume 30, Number 12, December 2000, pp. 374,375

Chapter 5: American System in International Arena

5.1. The Development of the US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century

For historians of American foreign relations the twentieth century begins with the Spanish-American War of 1898, but the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 registered the opening of a new era on American foreign policy. There were essentially three possibilities in the minds of contemporaries though the second and third tended to blur into one another. First, neutrality towards the belligerents, irrespective of the merits of their particular cases declared war-aims. Second, intervention would be alignment with the major Allied Powers of Britain, France and Russia against the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Third, military abstention from the conflict strengthened American armed forces, while from such a disinterested position advancing the cause of negotiation to end the conflict, with international sanctions as the ultimate method for compliance[249].

The Spanish-American War and American entry into the First World War framed the first two Great Debates of the twentieth century. The earlier occasion highlighted the relationships both between the means and goals and between the domestic and foreign causes and consequences of territorial expansion, particularly the question of the terms of American participation in the complex Eurasian alliance system. The legacy of that debate appeared after 1914, when the twin issues were whether the United States should or even could stay aloof from the latest European war; and whether or not the United States intervened to create a new international order. The next Great Debate would provide uncertain answers to all of these questions through the controversy over American membership of the League of Nations[250].

The League of Nations and especially American rejection of membership, dominates the history of American foreign relations between the first and second world wars. There were certain unchangeable propositions. First, the margins of rejection by the Senate were narrow. Secondly, the defeat was a result of the constitutional requirements that treaties approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Third, both the proponents and the fully opponents of American membership combined to defeat the compromises offered by way of reservations to secure

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[249] Dunne, Michael. "US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: From World Power to Global Hegemony". International Affairs. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Volume 76, Number 1, January 2000, p. 31
[250] *Ibid*, p. 32

senatorial approval of the Treaty of Versailles, the first part of which contained the Covenant of the League of Nations[251].

It is worth to note that the convergence of the new Truman and Monroe Doctrines confirm the comparable melding of the unilateral and multilateral ideologies. The Monroe Doctrine premised on the physical or geographical separation of the globe, which had its political counterpart in the ideological differences between the latter-day *ancien regime*[252] of the Holy Alliance and the republican American Union. Geopolitical premise of the Truman Doctrine was the indivisibility of the world. Americans, however, did not formally substitute the latter political principle for the former that is the new doctrine added to the existing rule. Thus, the key question left unresolved during the Great Debate over American entry into the First World War and membership of the League of Nations answered. The United States was indeed affected by events beyond the hemisphere; but, rather than "extend" the Monroe Doctrine to the world, it would extend the logic of the Doctrine to define American "peace and happiness" as dependent upon favorable conditions throughout the whole world[253].

The Cold war becomes much more comprehensive if the normal way of viewing events, that is, the image of an embattled, defensive United States threatened by interfering material and ideological forces, as intervened and it is seen the decades-long American policy of "containment" as the defensive aspect of the dynamic strategy of global expansion.

In the post-Cold War period, whether the forms of legitimating for American action in the world appear to change their names by a kind of political and cultural poll, their basic identity will continue. Thus, "humanitarian intervention" and "democracy promotion" and "globalization" in the early 1990s, will be terms coined in the ideological, which means historical, character of this century's most powerful state, the United States of America[254].

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[251] ***Ibid***

[252] The term has to come to be used to describe the type of rule prevalent in Europe before the French Revolution and its ideas. It depended on the alliance between "throne and altar". The church legitimized the monarchs and supported their law enforcement with its proclamation of moral standards and the necessity of obedience to temporal authority.

[253] Dunne, ***op. cit.***, p. 36

[254] ***Ibid***, p. 40

Stanley Hofman explains, in the post-war era, International Relations was established as an independent field of enquiry with political realism as its dominant theoretical paradigm. Hoffman indicates it was the rise of the US as the sole Western superpower, and the desire and need to explain this rise and the foreign policy actions of the US that drove the academic community to develop an interest in the study of International Relations. See, Bronstone, Adam. European Union-United States Security Relations, Transatlantic Tensions and the Theory of International Relations. MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997, p. 4

5.2. Changes in International Relations and American Internationalism

States fundamentally change their long-held ideas toward international affairs. According to constructivists who have most systematically studied the collective nature of ideas, there are two directions of change. One group highlights process or new socialization and a second group stresses the importance of agents in remaking ideas[255].

Ideational change has two ideal stages. First, social actors must combine that the old ideational structure is inadequate, thus causing its collapse. Second, actors must consolidate some new replacement set of ideas, least they return to the old orthodoxy simply as a default mechanism. Change in collective ideas is much more likely to occur under three conditions. First, when events generate consequences that deviate from social expectations, second, when the consequences are undesirable, and third, when a socially viable replacement idea exists[256].

The First World War produced very little change in Americans' commitment to political-military unilateralism, whereas Second World War led to a dramatic transformation. Before and after the First World War, the debate favored more unilateralist ideas. During Second World War, this measure took a qualitative leap toward high levels of support for internationalism and remained there after the war[257].

It is important to explain the shift from one stable set of collective views about managing major power relations to another. The influence of the ideational structure deliberation takes place. The structure is a critical piece in understanding how enduring social ideas can radically transform.

5.2.1. The Logic of Change

Change requires collective action, or perhaps more accurately, "collective ideation". The formation of social ideas implies the potential for coordination even collective action, problems. These problems are apparent in the two stages that together constitute ideational change. The *first stage* involves the collapse of the reigning consensus. Social actors must

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[255] Legro, W. Jeffrey. "Whence American Internationalism". International Organization. Volume 54, Number 2, Spring 2000, p. 254
[256] *Ibid*
[257] *Ibid*, p. 258

agree on the inadequacy of the old orthodoxy and the need to replace. Therefore, the first stage - collapse - seems to be shaped by the synergism of two factors. First, the fit between social expectations and events, and second, whether experience is socially desirable. Social episteme generate expectations about consequences should result if societies follow or deviate from their prescriptions. The *second stage*, consolidation of a new dominant episteme, can also encounter similar cooperation problems. Although a collapse may occur in the current orthodoxy, failure to reach a consensus on a replacement could still prohibit transformation[258].

Ideational change has examined as a product of collapse and consolidation. Situations involving the combination of unmet expectations and undesired consequences are likely to facilitate collapse, whereas those where expectations are fulfilled and/or desired consequences occur favor ideational reproduction. Consolidation of a new structure is enhanced by the existence of a prominent viable oppositional idea, the prescriptions of which seem to correlate with socially desired results[259].

Change and continuity varied with the mix of expectations, consequences, and oppositional episteme. Expectations refer to what societies anticipate based on the norms of the dominant episteme and the justification for the chosen course of action. For example, if the dominant episteme prescribes a certain action and action has taken on that basis, societies will anticipate socially desirable results. Consequences have assessed according to social interpretations of events. One cannot objectively impose a generic standard for what is seen as negative or positive consequences for a particular society because such a judgment depends on the lens and aims of the society itself. One society's "loss" is another society's victory. Assessments of expectations and consequences can be separated from outcomes in chronological casual terms. Finally, the number and social viability of oppositional episteme is evident in the public debates over the particular issue - in this case international involvement and institutional commitments in the two different episodes. These debates indicate what prominent alternative ideas exist in public discourse and debates[260].

5.2.2. The Transformation of the USA

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[258] *Ibid*
[259] *Ibid*, p. 266
[260] *Ibid*, p. 267

The events that led to the Second World War resulted in the transformation of the dominant American ideas about effective foreign policy. Ideational dynamics played a critical role in this transformation. As the Second World War took shape in the late 1930s, Americans stick to their unilateralist approach in the face of a serious of events with negative consequences that strongly contradicted the traditional collective ideas with negative consequences that strongly contradicted the traditional collective ideas and confirmed an alternative set. This context enabled those groups and individuals seeking change to unite effectively. The result was the transformation of American ideas about appropriate foreign policy in the midst of the Second World War[261].

The United States did not commit to European security after First World War because no country posed a clear threat. After the Second World War, in contrast, the intentions and power of the Soviet Union demanded US engagement.

Good arguments exist that environmental incentives for an American commitment to Europe were different after the Second World War than after the First World War. However, there is also good suggesting that a decisive qualitative break along the dimensions of power, threat, and technology occurred in the First World War. The relevance of an epistemic dynamic to American ideational continuity in this period is apparent in a simple counterfactual: had Americans after the First World War thought about their security in the same way they did after the Second World War, they would have responded very differently to the power, threat, and technology conditions present at that time. Hence, those conditions alone do not explain Americans' ideational stasis and change[262].

Another argument about the American shift emphasizes not interest groups, but domestic social purpose. John G. Ruggie has argued that the United States' adoption of multilateralism reflected its founding principles as a community open to all[263].

The transformation of American beliefs during the Second World War, suggests the relevance of paying attention to collective ideas about appropriate action even in explanations of ideational transformation. The point is not that collective ideas by themselves determine the

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[261] ***Ibid***, p. 271
[262] ***Ibid***, p. 279
[263] ***Ibid***

likelihood and direction of change and that power, threat, technology, interest groups, and social purpose are unimportant. Rather, ideational structures matters even in its own transformation, often in conjunction with other factors.

US has examined both ideational change and continuity in a variety of issue areas in different countries. The framework adds to the insights in three ways. First, it disaggregates collective ideation issues at stake. Second, it provides a varying logic of expectations and consequences that in some instances reinforces continuity, in others change. Third, it addresses the role of ideational structure in the emergence of new dominant ideas[264].

Related to the subject, in international relations, direct implications have a number of different analytical traditions. The first is the prominent grand-strategy approach that depicts states as rational actors correctly perceiving the environment and responding to maximize security. Second, the analysis illustrates the importance of focusing on the collective nature of ideas, thus pointing to a missing element in studies that highlight the cognitive traits of individuals or the instrumental agency of social actors. Third, the approach attempts to address a gap in the ongoing work of constructivist scholars who seek to understand the influence of collective ideas, beliefs, norms, and identity in world politics[265].

Another general constructivist approach to change has focused on process, be it trough structurationist logic or Habermasian communicative action analysis. In the structurationist account, structure and agency are "mutually constituted or co-determined entities" that is interaction among agents both produce and reproduces those entities. Finally, in contemporary international relations, the argument directs the attention of ideational collapse and consolidation in ongoing cases of potential transformation[266].

According to these circumstances, that could signal the onset of the next revolution in American ideas about foreign policy and the transformation of the internationalist position that has guided the United States in world politics for over fifty years.

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[264] ***Ibid***, p. 281
[265] ***Ibid***
[266] ***Ibid***, p. 284

5.3. The United States of America in Transatlantic Relations

Postwar Western institutions have been established with the assistance of the USA, which, in its role as a benign hegemony, has not only provided the impetus to cooperate, but has also helped the formulation of regime roles and guarded against breaches of these rules. Robert Keohane has suggested that institutions will be more easily created in 'dense policy spaces', since ad hoc arrangements in such areas are likely to interfere with one another unless they are based upon a common set of rules and principles[267].

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 marked the beginning of US withdrawal from responsibility for global leadership; the unilateral decision by the Nixon administration to pull the United States off the gold standard also emphasized to many Europeans the US unwillingness to take position Europe's into account. EC economies were rapidly catching up with that of the United States, and the EC was trading less with the United States and more with Eastern Europe. The revival of the European antinuclear movement in the 1980s further strained US-EC relations[268].

This matters a great deal because the United States retains vital and important national interests vis-ã-vis Europe at large. Therefore, the US national interests vis-à-vis Europe can be summed up as the following:

- To prevent a hostile hegemony from again threatening European peace and security;

- To ensure that there is no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into or from Europe;

- To help ensure the safety and security of the Russian nuclear arsenal;

- To interact economically with Europe in ways that increase US wealth and prosperity;

- To support the continuation of European integration consistent with American interests;

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[267] Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 33
[268] McCormick, John. The European Union, Politics and Policies. Westview Press, 1996, p. 289

- To export democracy, prosperity, and stability eastward on the continent;

- To do what is possible to continue to support democratic institutions and market practices in Russia

Most fundamental of all, to ensure that never again do the major powers of Western Europe return to the tragic rivalries of the past[269].

These US national interests are for the most part not seriously threatened. The demise of the Soviet Union and the current relative weakness of Russia meant that the emergence of a hostile hegemonic threat to Europe appears quite unlikely for at least 5 to 20 years at the earliest[270].

The United States was for many years the dominant partner in its relationship with Europe. Certainly, Europe was in no position in the immediate aftermath of World War II to go it alone without US help. By the 1950s, the United States and the new European Community were very much in a patron-client relationship. However, at the same time, US support and encouragement for European cooperation and unity became a major catalyst for integration. The United States was keen to see a high degree of economic cooperation among European nations so as to enable them to make the most effective use of Marshall Plan aid[271].

Further, The United States (along with Britain) was the first country to accredit a diplomatic representative to the European Coal and Steel Community, and in 1956 established a separate mission to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Indeed some observers believe that the high level of US support for early efforts at European political integration may even have been counterproductive, contributing to the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954 to receive the endorsement of the French National Assembly.

Despite the collapse of the EDC project, the successful negotiation and conclusion of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty rekindled US interest. The United States,

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[269] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, p. 18
[270] ***Ibid***, p. 19
[271] Piening, ***op. cit.***, p. 95

Kennedy said, regarded a strong and united Europe not as a rival but as a partner. Such a Europe, he went on,

> "Will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas" [272].

The United States, Kennedy said, saw Europe as "a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality." It was up to the Europeans "to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible. Kennedy's Euro-enthusiasm was motivated not least by his desire to have a solid, strong, and reliable partner to stand by the United States in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. To this end he encouraged British prime minister Harold Macmillan to apply for UK membership in the Community, which he saw as essential if the new Europe was to be Atlantic-oriented and a true ally of the United States. This was not to be, and President de Gaulle's veto of the British application in 1963 signaled the beginning of a decade in which EC-US relations stagnated, indeed in which the European integration process itself seemed to mark time, largely in the face of Gaullist insistence on more inter-governmental and less supra-national in Europe. US involvement in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon's efforts to forge new relationships with the Soviet Union and China, and the internal polarization of US society symbolized by the events of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 and later the Watergate scandal, all conspired to shift the US agenda away from Europe[273].

But the early 1970s saw a series of dramatic changes. The UK was finally admitted to the EC. The Vietnam War ended. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the resulting oil crisis presented Europe and the United States with a common problem. Changes in leadership on both sides of the Atlantic provided fresh views on questions of common concern that is in the United States President Gerald Ford replaced Nixon, and in Europe Harold Wilson took over from Edward Heath, Valery Giscard & Estaing from Georges Pompidou, and Helmut Schmidt from Willy Brandt. Moreover, Japan emerged onto the world scene as a major economic player present-

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[272] ***Ibid***, p. 95
[273] ***Ibid.***

ing challenges to both the United States and the EC. However, the resurgence of the European integration process after the stagnation of the 1960s, coupled with the greater economic power of the EC made Europe for the first time a key player in the international arena. The United States began to find itself dealing with a partner that was starting to assume the characteristics of an integrated entity and not merely a collection of states cooperating with one another in the EC.

The EC's legal responsibilities for trade matters and its growing body of harmonized laws meant that the United States had no choice but to take it seriously - often as competitor as well as partner.

This relatively benign external situation has permitted most Americans, including the political class, to center their attention on the many challenges that confront US society that is the state of the economy, education, crime, drug abuse, health care, and welfare reform[274].

Every opinion poll shows that US citizens, like their European counterparts, want their government to concentrate primarily on the nation's domestic problems. This does not mean, however, that there is a new wave of isolationism on this side of the Atlantic[275]. The US public recognizes that American interests have entwined with the international system, particularly with regard to the country's economic prosperity. It is noteworthy that despite the end of the Soviet threat and changing demographic patterns in the United States, the percentage of Americans today who believe that the United States should maintain or increase its commitment to NATO is a strong 64 percent, compared with 70 percent in 1986. The US citizens do appear to be willing to support in principle a leading US diplomatic and military stance in the world. (Polling suggests that 73 percent of Americans believe that the United States will play a greater international role in the next ten years than it does at present)[276].

The US public seems willing to allow its government to engage in the world as long as it does not get into trouble in regions or on issues that are not vital to the United States.

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[274] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, p. 14

[275] According to Acheson's realist view, the United States could not afford to return to isolationist ways in the postwar world. The US had to recognize its positions as the preeminent industrial and military power in the world and act accordingly to protect its interests. See, Rosenthal, H. Joel. Righteous Realists; Political Realism, Responsible Power and American Culture in the Nuclear Age. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London; 1991, pp. 8-31

[276] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, pp. 14,15

The general lack of curiosity about events abroad on the part of the US public produces a situation in which special interest groups and one-issue lobbies have more influence on US foreign policy than ever before. Most of these groups, whether they concentrate on human rights, abortion, environmental matters, or the concerns of various ethnic Diasporas have no particular connection to the Atlantic relationship. (Business lobbies with a transatlantic perspective are an important exception to this trend.)

Thus, when inevitable disputes arise across the Atlantic on individual issues, the interest groups are often likely to have more influence in Congress than for transatlantic solidarity on behalf of broader regional and global purposes. This, in part, explains the inclination of some in Congress to want to punish the allies through sanctions when they do not agree with the direction of US policy[277].

These domestic factors, as well as a sustained US difficulty in dealing with the new geo-political situation, led to a problem of inconstancy in American policy. The allies can hardly be expected to back US policies if they are not sure such policies will be in place tomorrow or the next day. There is thus a worry in European capitals that on any particular issue, Washington may well change its mind overnight and, without consultation, leave the allies in the lurch or retreat because of domestic scandal from its international leadership responsibilities, at least for a time.

In virtually the same moment, there exits an American frustration that its transcendent power does not seem to mean that it can get its way quickly in the world, or sometimes at all. This US frustration occasionally leads to unilateral American action that, while in certain instances the only realistic US recourse, generally makes it more difficult for European governments to support the United States even when they agree. In the long run, it is this temptation in Washington to act without the allies that will cause the most difficulties from the US side in the transatlantic relationship.

These domestic preoccupations on the two sides of the Atlantic, along with the adjustment of their traditional working democracies to globalization and its effects, do not make US-European cooperation easy. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples in recent years of

[277] *Ibid*, p. 16

successful transatlantic collaboration on behalf of common interests and international peace and security[278].

From the US perspective, Europe's post-Maastricht Common Foreign and Security Policy offers the prospect of a full partnership and a more equitable sharing of the burdens, financial and political, of international power. Similarly, the EU has financed over 60 percent of all aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

More importantly, the association and partnership agreements that the Union has concluded with almost all its Eastern neighbors offers them access not just to EU loans and aid but to its markets, its know-how, and its technology in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries, to membership in the Union itself[279].

For the United States, EU action in this area makes a significant contribution to the stability of the region and thus serves US interests and saves US tax dollars. The same is increasingly applicable to the strategically vital Mediterranean, where Europe has committed itself (most recently at the November 1995 Barcelona conference) to help build and maintain economic and political stability[280].

Indeed, 1970s have been important for creating EPC within the European Community, and the US response to this establishment. Before 1970, the EC states had no mechanism to formulate common foreign policy positions. Yet by the 1970s, internal integration had made headway, the outside world was making demands on the EC to act externally, and the EC states were ready to enter into political cooperation. Moreover, the birth of EPC in 1970 marked the beginning of a new phase of EU-US relations - an explicitly political one[281].

In the 1980s, the United States continued to battle with a more assertive EPC. The United States defected EPC for a weak response to the Iranian hostage crisis and for slow responses to support US sanctions against both Poland (for the imposition of martial law) and the Soviet Union (for its support of Polish martial law).

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[278] ***Ibid***, p. 17
[279] Piening, ***op. cit.***, p. 101
[280] ***Ibid***, p. 102
[281] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 303

EPC's Venice Declaration shocked The United States, which called for a Palestinian homeland and Palestinian participation in the peace process, a move that contradicted US diplomatic efforts. The United States opposed participation of EC members in the scheme to build a Soviet natural gas pipeline by imposing an embargo on construction equipment exports, and the EC opposed the extraterritorial reach of US law when the Reagan administration sought to apply its embargo to US subsidiaries in Europe. EPC opposed US support for the repressive regime in El Salvador (in its war against leftist rebels) and US support for the right-wing rebels battling to overthrow the democratically elected government in Nicaragua. The United States opposed the EPC-backed Contadora peace process, where EPC condemned human rights violations by the US-hacked Pinochet government in Chile; and opposed US support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon[282].

EC governments opposed the US bombing raid on Libya, a raid the United States maintained was in retaliation for Libyan complicity in acts of international terrorism. The United States was disappointed in EPCs uninterested response to its concerns over Libya just before its decision to take military action. Discord continued over US problems with EPC's operation itself - its variable leadership, slow responses to crises, difficulty in keeping to unified stances, and lack of institutionalization.

The United States played a catalytic role in EPC's early development simply by being the hegemony against which the Europeans could rebel, from which they could seek independence, and over which they could rally internal support for foreign policy cooperation. EPC members were driven, in part, by the need to develop common foreign policy positions that reflected indigenous or self-styled European interests. EPC was a declaration of EC independence from the United States. The United States responded adversely to any EPC position that conflicted with its policies. EPC would not defeat to US pressures and the United States was eventually forced first to accept EPC as a fait accompli[283] and then to work with EPC which also would eventually develop along lines more acceptable to the United States, but that would not happen until the 1990s[284].

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[282] ***Ibid.***
[283] A thing that has been done and is past arguing against or altering.
[284] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 305

Indeed, all was not fractious during the period of hegemonic decline. What is significant about the hegemonic decline period is that the two had to adjust to their new relative roles in the world. There was no formalized EPC-US consultative framework during the 1970s and much of the 1980s: Political relations developed in a careless fashion and those consultations that occurred, were not linked to explicit policy objectives.

At times, the US clearly prefers an EU which remains a 'second division power', as illustrated by American tactics in Open Skies negotiations on landing rights and exclusive US control over negotiations leading to the Dayton peace accord for Bosnia. Even as the EU and its Member States contributed more than half of all public and private finance invested in Eastern and Central Europe, western policy towards Russia and the Ukraine, as well as NATO enlargement, was primarily defined by Washington[285].

The interaction between the two was crucial, as unilateral on the part of Member States undermined European solidarity in Bosnia, and states like China or Iran played on the CFSP's loose inter-governmentalism to weaken the collective EU resolve. In general, the international context did not encourage either outsiders or negotiators in the 1996-7 IGC to believe that Europe was on the verge of becoming a major power. The United States and NATO were clearly still central to European security, and NATO enlargement subordinated EU enlargement as the process of main interest to the countries of central and Eastern Europe[286].

The United States has deep stakes in the outcome of the inter-governmental conference that began in Turin in March 1996. If the EU can make pragmatic adjustments in Pillar II, the CFSP such as increasing the opportunity of qualified majority voting, improving forward planning and analysis, organizing itself vis-à-vis the outside world, and easing strains among the Commission, Council, and Parliament over foreign policy responsibilities and resources, then the EU will be more likely to implement the Joint Action Plan. In short, the United States needs the EU to be a more effective international actor[287].

5.4. The Viewpoint of the USA on Europe

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[285] Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 13
[286] *Ibid*, p. 22
[287] Laurent, Pierre-Henri and Marc Maresceau (Editors). The State of the European Union, Deepening and Widening, Vol 4, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1998, p. 314

President Kennedy's "Declaration of Interdependence"[288] between Europe and the United States deserves recalling as the high point of American idealized vision for "our European friends to go forward in creating the more perfect union which will someday make this concrete Atlantic partnership possible"[289].

The Paulskirche speech (1963) of the President Kennedy intended to be the formal high point of his aim. It was certainly visionary enough for the occasion:

> "The Atlantic Community will not soon become a single overarching super-state. But practical steps towards stronger common purpose are well within our means. As we widen our common effort in defense, and our threefold cooperation in economics (in trade, development and monetary policies), we shall inevitably strengthen our political ties as well. Just as your current efforts for unity in Europe will produce a stronger voice in the dialog between us, so in America our current battle for the liberty and prosperity of all our citizens can only deepen the meaning of our common historic purposes. In the far future, there may be a great new union for us all"[290].

Kennedy's acceptance of European and Atlantic integration has survived to the present day, despite repeated strains over the dollar, trade, Israel, sanctions, the Balkans, and US strategic policies. The 1990s were a critical decade because the Soviet collapse removed the glue that has bound the NATO alliance together. The decade opened amid recurrent American concerns that the new single market would create a "Fortress Europe", and that the US would face serious commercial challenges from both Japan and Europe. Moreover, the 1990s saw the EU nations agree to establish a common currency that would challenge the traditional primacy of the US dollar, and to develop common foreign and security policies that carried the obvious risk of institutional disagreement with the American ally[291].

The 1990s also saw clear signs of a defecting divergence of strategic interest between Europe and the United States. Critical for Europe, the wars of the Yugoslav succession were of marginal interest to the United States, until Britain and France demanded US military support

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[288] John F. Kennedy's aim of a mutually beneficial Atlantic partnership "between the new union emerging in Europe and the old American union".
[289] Walker, Martin. "Variable Geography: America's Mental Maps of a Greater Europe". International Affairs. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Volume 76, Number 3, July 2000, p. 459
[290] ***Ibid***
[291] ***Ibid***, p. 460

to cover the threatened withdrawal of their battered peacekeeping troops. Europe's inability to end or even contain the conflict twice forced a return to the traditional reliance on the United States, both to stabilize the Bosnian war in 1995 and the lead the Kosovo air campaign of 1999[292].

In the Autumn of 1998, it should be noted, as for the European defense, that; the shape of the discussion on European defense was changed by Blair's decision to make a major push for a European Union role in defense. Blair first tried out his ideas at an EU summit in Pörtschach, in December 1998, and then reaffirmed in the North Atlantic Assembly's annual session in Edinburgh. Blair bemoaned the fact that Europe's ability for autonomous military action was so limited, and called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe an equal partner in the transatlantic alliance.

On the one hand, The US believed that it still could trust the UK not to do anything that would hurt the Alliance, and Blair claimed that his goal was to strengthen NATO by improving Europe's ability to share security burdens in the 21st century. On the other hand, Blair's initiative sounded "too French" to skeptics, and even those who were hopeful were concerned about the political motive for Blair's initiative[293].

Any doubts about the nature of the Blair initiative were removed when Blair met with President Chirac at St. Malo in early December 1998. The declaration, (ESDI) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act "autonomously", should NATO not decided to act, in some future scenario requiring military action. (pp. 14,15)

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), adopted at the Washington summit, was designed to stimulate European defense efforts to help them catch up with the US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). From the European perspective, it clearly demonstrated Europe's military dependence on the US, and the need to get together to do something about it.

The Washington summit communiqué, and the Strategic Concept for NATO agreed at the meeting, reflected transatlantic agreement that European defense capabilities needed a serious

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[292] ***Ibid***

[293] Sloan, R. Stanley. "The United States and European Defense", Chaillot Papers 39, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 2000, pp. 14,15

boost, and that it had to be done in ways consistent with the US "three D's". However, in the course of the year, although the St. Malo accord was endorsed by all EU members at meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999), there were growing rumbles and signs of dissatisfaction on the American side.

In Helsinki, the members declared their determination "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". They noted that the process "will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army".

The US hopes that ESDP:

- Will relieve the United States of some defense burdens in Europe;

- Will provide additional capabilities for responses to security concerns beyond Europe;

- Will enhance European appreciation of new threats to security including those emanating from the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), "traditional" terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and ethnic/racial/religious conflicts;

- Will diminish European resentment of US dominance in the Alliance;

- Will remove the final barriers to French reintegration into NATO's command structure

- Will force European neutral states to acknowledge their responsibility for security and remove barriers to their making fully-fledged contributions, including acceptance of NAO membership;

- Will strengthen NATO

There is concern in the United States that ESDP:

- Will produce rhetoric, promises and institutions but no additional capabilities;

- Will lead European nations to duplicate NATO (US) systems rather than rely on the United States to make such systems available to them when needed, as earlier agreed;

- Will defeat the purpose of NATO's efforts throughout the 1990s to build a European Security and Defense Identity within he framework of the Alliance;

- Will create artificial divisions and distinctions among NATO Allies, undermining NATO's political cohesion;

- Will lead some EU officials to pressure candidates for EU membership to support EU "line" in the EU/NATO relationship;

- Will become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to differentiate its foreign policies from that of the United States;

- Will be used by some European countries for joining forces with Russia and China in working against "US hegemony";

- Will place new roadblocks in NATO's way by strengthening European resistance to NATO actions that are not blessed by a UN mandate;

- Will include a European "regional" perspective on security, spreading a minimalist security perspective from certain EU states to the entire membership;

- Will lead resources and political energy to be spent on enhancing the credibility of the EU's military efforts while allowing real security needs to go uncovered;

- Will convince US leaders and members of Congress that the United States is no longer needed or wanted as a security partner in Europe;

- Will increase transatlantic trade and industrial tensions by supporting development of a "fortress Europe" mentality in defense procurement;

• Will steal away Europe's best military and diplomatic officials to work on developing European-level institutions, diminishing the quality of those assigned to NATO positions and tasks[294].

The 1990s ended with NATO, American influence in Europe, American support for Europe's continued integration, and the hopeful American rhetoric of partnership.

The European summit at Helsinki in December 1999 saw a striking double success for American diplomacy. First, diligent lobbying from the Clinton administration combined with strong congressional pressure to ensure that the Common European Security and Defense Policy neither duplicated NATO nor threatened to undermine it. The Helsinki summit agreed "NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. In a second success for US diplomacy, the summit agreed: "Turkey is a candidate State destines to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States". These two features of the Helsinki summit testified to the continuing influence which the United states can apply to European affairs, while also illuminating the nature and extent of the kind of Europe the United States wishes to see.

The incidental blending of the many voices in Washington with the various routes to Europe offered by NATO, the EU, the OSCE and Council of Europe, guided US leaders into a serious of "mental maps" which offered different definitions of what "Europe" might be[295].

In that context, there is a *security map*, rooted in the NATO core, but reaching out through PfP to Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Russia and the former Soviet states of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

There is an *economic map*, which is rooted in the EU, but reaches out to the East in a serious of waves. But this economic map was troubled by the persistent trade disputes between the United States and the EU, which irritated Clinton administration officials to the point at which serious warnings were issued. In April 1999 the Under-Secretary of State for economic affairs, Stuart Eizenstadt said

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[294] ***Ibid***, pp. 40-47
[295] Walker, ***op. cit.***, p. 466

"Today, the emphasis in American thinking is slowly shifting from what the US can do for Europe, to what the US can do with Europe to promote our common interests. America looks to Europe for a partner. In the eyes of some Americans, European eyes remain so focused upon the process of creating a more united Europe that they miss the dangers and opportunities growing around them ...Squabbles in the huge US-EU economic relationship are inevitable – since we are both economic partners and competitors. However, in the absence of a shared vision of our global role in preserving prosperity, special interests are likely to drive us into a serious of confrontation that will erode the basis of economic security for all our citizens".

There is a *cultural map*, most clearly expressed through the Council of Europe, which requires a minimum standard of human rights and democratic freedoms from its members, and an acceptance of the rule of law, and in particular the acceptance of the verdicts of its associated European Court of Human Rights.

There is a *religious map*, which some influential leaders like Helmut Kohl and commentators like Zbigniew Bzrezinski take very seriously. Chancellor Kohl referred to Europe as "a Christian club", and Mr. Bzrezinski told the BBC in April 1998 "I would say that in the next twenty years or so Europe is going to stop with the outer boundaries of what might be called the Petrine Europe, the Europe of Rome, in effect, on the polish-Russian border". Finally, there is an Islamic Europe, includes Turkey, as a NATO member and important part of the security map, and also part of the economic map after signing the 1995 Customs Agreement with the EU. Islamic Europe also includes Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the Clinton administration, and pace Bzrezinski, the priority was to ensure that religions did not get in the way. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State stressed: "Our strategy of integration must not recognize any fundamental divide among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic parts of Europe. That kind of thinking fuelled the war in the former Yugoslavia and it must have no place in the Europe we are building".

There is also a *geographic map*, whose lack of precision has been plain in de Gaulle's grand statement about "a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals".

Finally, there is a *political map* defined by the choices made by the various governments of Eastern Europe, and the amounts of political energy and capital they are prepared to devote to turning their choices into reality[296].

It is open question whether these various mental maps of the new and future Europe can be combined into a clear and coherent policy. As Ron Asmus, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, noted in Stockholm in November 1999:

> "For decades, the US has concentrated on the task of what we can do for Europe, in essence to "fix" Europe through, for example, the Marshall Plan, deterring Soviet power through NATO, and supporting European integration. Today, we don't really see ourselves as being in Europe to "fix" Europe. The US sees itself as being in Europe as part of a partnership and the questions is, what can we do with Europe?... Though the US is the sole remaining superpower in the world, we don't want to go it alone"[297].

Thus, the overall American mental map of Europe is becoming clear. It extends to all of the European former Warsaw states, including Romania and Bulgaria. It certainly includes Turkey. It also includes three Baltic States and Albania. It can include Ukraine and even Russia, if they behave themselves and put themselves on the economic, cultural and political maps through reform. The same goes for Serbia, since the association of the US and the EU through the stability Pact for the Balkans explicitly holds out the eventual prospects of EU and NATO membership to the states of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, as Zbigniew Bzrezinski has suggested, that could eventually lead to the inclusion of Georgia and Armenia on the far shores of the Black Sea, and bringing Europe's frontiers to the Caspian.

Such a Greater Europe, stretching from the Atlantic to he Black Sea, possibly the Caspian, and even including Russia, would finally fulfill James Baker's phase "from Vancouver to Vladivostok".

5.5. US Foreign Policy into the 21st Century

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[296] ***Ibid***, pp. 466-469
[297] ***Ibid***, p. 470

National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger pointed to six "key strategic objectives" that will underpin US policy which are directly quoted from him as follows:

• *Undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe*: Three key challenges; the first is deciding which countries to admit. Second challenge is bolstering the security and confidence of countries not in the first wave. The third challenge is the most hotly debated: How do we heal the scars of Europe's past without creating new wounds?

• *A stable, integrated Asia-Pacific community*: There are three immediate challenges. First, "we must deepen our partnership with Japan by strengthening even more our security alliance, enhancing our diplomatic cooperation, and continuing market-opening initiatives that have helped create a 41 percent surge in our exports since 1993. Second, we must continue to work closely with our ally South Korea to reduce tensions on the Cold War's last frontier. Third, we must deepen our strategic dialogue with China. A China that evolves as a power that is stable, more open politically and economically and non-aggressive militarily is profoundly in our interest".

• *Decisive force for peace*: "We must balance interest and risk, achievability and cost, clarity of mission and support from others in what ultimately is an exercise in prudent judgment. We must be prepared to engage when important interests and values are at stake and we can make a difference".

• *Meeting the new transnational security threats*: "There are times when we must and we will act alone [in dealing with terrorists, international criminals, drug traffickers, and rogue regimes]. Our fight against these forces that often cut across nations compels us to seek the advantages of collective action. That is why we are working to build international coalitions to take on these new challenges - arms control agreements that ban chemical weapons, greater international law enforcement cooperation against drug traffickers and criminal cartels, intelligence sharing to root out corruption, and a more concerted strategy against terror".

• *A new, open trading system*: "Protectionism simply isn't an option in today's global economic arena".

• *Maintaining strong military and diplomatic capabilities*: "That is an indispensable investment in our peace and security"[298].

As for Defense and Military Policy of the USA, In 1999, the US military had 1.380.000 troops, a budget of some $ 279 billion, and featured 10 active Army and three active Marine Corps divisions, about 20 active and reserve air wings, and 11 active aircraft carriers. Ten years before the picture was strangely similar. The US military had slightly over two million troops. With a budget of $382.5 billion, it had 18 active Army and 3 active Marine Corps divisions, 36 active and reserve air wings, and 14 carriers. The Pentagon made some changes in the interim and the American military presence in Europe shrank to a third of its late - Cold War size - down to roughly 100.000 troops. Some organizations disappeared while others expanded in size and influence[299]. The resulting strategy should have certain components such as: defense against weapons of mass destruction, conventional dominance, short-term contingencies, and peace maintenance.

5.6. The American Perspective on New Transatlantic Partnership

The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) highlights many areas in which the United States and the European Union were already working together. However, its greater importance lies in its promise, in its potential in that which is "capable of being". The promise, the potential, of the NTA lies in broadening the focus of EU-US relations from mostly economic and trade consultation to an ambitious and broad-ranging action agenda both visionary in its reach and practical in its approach. It is an effort to meet the challenge and promise of the post-Cold War world and to turn that into a better world not just for Americans and Europeans, but also for all the world's citizens. The NTA is a keystone in the post-Cold War European security architecture. The opportunities and the challenges are great, and the US is confident that they can meet them together[300].

The NTA, signed in December 1995, makes a truly significant step forward from the 1990 Declaration on US-EC Relations. The NTA envisions a partnership between the US and the EU that goes beyond the realm of trade and economics. The NTA, for the first time, engages

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[298] ***Ibid***
[299] Cohen, A. Eliot. "Defending America in the Twenty-first Century". Foreign Affairs. November/December 2000, p. 40
[300] Monar, ***op. cit.***, p. 3

the EU as a political partner as well and foresees the potential for the US and the EU to work as equal political partners on a vast array of foreign policy and diplomatic fronts with shared-responsibilities. In addition, the NTA identifies progress in humanitarian and development assistance, in the range of other economic and social areas, and in the exchange of people and ideas[301].

The NTA testifies to US support for the EU and deepening commitment to remain engaged in Europe's security. One of the key accomplishments of NTA implementation has been the launching of a health task force to work with multilateral organizations, national governments to build a global early warning and response network to combat deadly communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus. In the joint fight against crime and drug trafficking, it is nearing the conclusion of a chemical precursor agreement that would prevent illicit shipments of chemicals used in the manufacture of illegal drugs. A top priority in the environmental field is the joint establishment of a network of environmental centers in the Ukraine, Russia, and other Newly Independent States (NIS). These are but a few of the steps that have already taken to face these global challenges[302]. In addition to these accomplishments, progress in trade relationship opened new avenues for the exchange of people and ideas. The NTA is a long-range effort, and will take time to realize its goals.

As the EU conducts its Inter-governmental Conference, the US is watching closely to see how the EU will deal with its particular challenges of enlargement, improving Common Foreign and Security Policy, and handling Third Pillar issues.

The outcome of the IGC has a profound effect on the extent to which the promise of the NTA, of the EU as an equal political partner, and its decisions are, of course, EU internal affairs, and the US stands ready to support and work with whatever mechanisms emerge from that process. For the NTA to reach its full potential, the EU, through whatever process it selects, will have to be able to operate efficiently and quickly in the sort of crisis, that is becoming the hallmark of the post-Cold War world[303].

5.7. Promoting Peace and Stability, and Democracy in the World

[301] ***Ibid***, p. 4
[302] ***Ibid***, p. 5
[303] ***Ibid***

There will be an effective EU-US partnership in long-range situations, particularly humanitarian and development assistance. Together, it has seen political resolve in Bosnia, in the Middle East, in Rwanda and Burundi, and elsewhere. All of these efforts bring greater security to the region and the world. The US supports the EU's efforts to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The evolution and development of the CFSP can make the EU a more effective political partner of the US in promoting the common goals of peace and prosperity, democracy and development. It is up to the EU to decide how this can accomplish through its IGC[304].

The US needs to consult fully with the EU in areas where joint action exists. It is needed to work with the EU to develop joint responses to crises. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there have been worked together efficiently on military security. The US needs to develop a fuller appreciation of how it could be worked with and complement EU efforts in a range of areas. The EU's ambitious and imaginative Mediterranean Initiative, as one example, offers new approaches and new possibilities that merit the support. It must be remembered, however, that this political dimension to the EU-US relationship is a new development. It takes time and experience to develop new ways of working together[305].

A major challenge the US and the EU face over the next five years is to ensure the survival of democratic governments and values throughout Europe and to bring the Central and Eastern European countries progressively into the fold. The progressive enlargement of both NATO and the EU are essential elements in this process. Both processes are essential steps in strengthening the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and in building a unified Europe.

The US and the EU are working effectively together. These include assistance to Russia and the NIS. Regular consultation ensures that respective programs complement each other. The EU has taken an active role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), especially through the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) and through its aid to the Palestinians. The US and the EU worked hard together to ensure the success of the Palestinian elections. The US recognizes and values EU efforts in Central and Eastern Europe, in the NIS,

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[304] ***Ibid***, p. 6
[305] ***Ibid***

in the Middle East, the EU's initial support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the significant contribution of the EU's Mediterranean Initiative. All of these efforts contribute to the safety and security of the world[306].

In the near future, it is intended to intensify cooperation. The US looks forward to greater EU participation in, and support for KEDO. It is hoped that the EU will approve a significant, annual contribution. KEDO's success would prevent nuclear proliferation in North-East Asia, and enhance regional peace and stability[307].

The US and the EU have made some progress on environmental issues. The USA wants to cooperate with the EU in fighting crime in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of this effort, it is hoped to formalize, in the near future, full EU participation in the Budapest International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) which is making a valuable contribution in democratic institution building in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS. As with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Third Pillar decision-making structure is a topic of the IGC. The results of those deliberations will affect the extent to which that is able, together, to fulfill the goals of the NTA[308].

[306] ***Ibid***, p. 7
[307] ***Ibid***
[308] ***Ibid***, pp. 7,8

Chapter 6: Transatlantic Security

6.1. The Changing International Arena

It would be pleasing for several reasons to believe that the world scene was being redrawn. It might be assumed that it stands on the threshold of a new, more peaceful and prosperous age as well as, free of the patterns that have resulted in centuries of conflicts. Hence the enthusiasm of those who saw in President George Bush's vision of a "new world order" developed during1990 and 1991 the prospect of an era in which the conflicts of the Cold War would be replaced by cooperation[309].

The end of the Cold War marked major transitions in regional conflicts - e.g., in Southern Africa and the Middle East - in some instances changing their character substantially. But to assume that these developments represent a break with the historical legacy of international relations as they have developed over the centuries can lead to errors of judgment that have become only too obvious as events have unfurled[310].

Obviously, it would be equally misleading to assume that nothing ever changes, that the phases of world politics are simply restatements of the old and familiar. Reality lies at some point between these two limitations. Moreover, It is the tension between the old and the new which is one of the themes of the exploration of world politics.

6.1.1. Redefining and Comprehensive Security

Contemporary forces have tended to ensure that the military dimension of security is balanced by other, non-military factors that impinge on the survival of political communities. This is a different proposition that implies that because military security may be relatively less significant, the concern with national security itself is diminishing[311].

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[309] Hacking, Brian and Michael Smith. World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. 2nd. Edition, Prentice Hall/Harverster Wheatsheaf; 1995, p. 29
[310] *Ibid*, p. 3
[311] *Ibid*, p. 147

There are two key elements in the processes surrounding the redefinition of security – "the nature of the issues involved" and "the means by which security is sought". The security implications of the issues are indicative of the broadening security agenda. The threat to the West's oil supplies, for instance, produced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price rises of the 1970s elevated "oil security" to the top of national concern. Although terrorism may be contained as a direct threat, governments have to be alert and to devote considerable resources to ensure that it does not assume such dimensions as might undermine social and political systems[312].

In both cases, these added security dimensions have an internal as well as an external facet. Unlike the more traditional military aspects of security, which focus on external threats, many current issues touching on national security emphasize the growing linkages between the domestic and international realms. Enhanced economic expectations on the part of national populations that cannot be met from within a state's own resources may create demands on governments that can produce internal instability and thus increase insecurity.
The revised edition of security: ... a threat to national security is an action that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state. It also threatens to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.

Historically states have sought to attain their objectives in two ways that is by utilizing their own resources and through collective action. It seems that fewer of the issues on the international agenda can be dealt with by states acting independently from one another. This is also true of the "traditional", military, dimension of security. After the Second World War, developments in weapons technology and the economic structures were factors in the creation of the Cold War coalition, represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact[313].

In the non-military sphere, problems relating to management of the earth's resources and to global warming, e.g., can only be dealt with on a collective basis. This does not mean that collective initiatives will be forthcoming or that individual action by governments is irrelevant to the management of the contemporary agenda. It rather means that the pattern of interactions

[312] ***Ibid***
[313] ***Ibid***, p. 148

between the actors influencing and influenced by that agenda is more varied than in earlier periods.

The logical consequences of this set of developments is the need to pursue a comprehensive security policy that takes account of both the range of issues involved and the means available for securing national interests.

Where security moves out of the realm of external military threat, a consensus in favor of government action is to be far harder to sustain where the economic interests of domestic constituencies are concerned. Expanding foreign aid programs might be a perfectly rational demand in a broader security policy but is far less likely to be seen as such within the community at large. For instance, it has been suggested that, early 1970s, the threat to US oil supplies constituted a more danger than any military threat from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Yet, public attitudes impeded the adoption of measures intended to lessen the threat to energy security such as imposing a tax on petrol to reduce consumption. Security has always involved judgments regarding the need to make sacrifices in certain areas to diverge a perceived threat; in contemporary world politics these judgments are likely to be the subject of far greater political controversy and will be much more difficult to make[314].

6.1.2. Factors of the Emergence of a Transatlantic Security Community

The start of the search for a more inclusive theorization of transatlantic security relations may come from William Cromwell in his work *The United States and the European Pillar*. Cromwell, in his work attempts to challange "the traditional American assumption, embodied in the concept of Atlantic partnership, that a more closely knit Western Europe would view its interests on global issues in essentially similar terms as the United States.

The first two aspects of Cromwell's examination of contemporary EU-US relations are that these relations affected by events external to the relationship and changes in the institutional environment in which both actors operate. Third, Cromwell asserts that the politico-economic relationship between these actors is as important as the security dimension, especially in the wake of the completion of the Single European Market. Aspects of 'realist' thought and hints

[314] ***Ibid***, p. 149

of liberal institutionalism and regime analysis perspective are apparent in the above theorization, illustrating Cromwell's move away from a strict and very traditional understanding of International Relations

Cromwell mentions two factors that may affect the calculation of interests on the part of West European countries. The first factor may be the role played by and assigned to 'indigenous forces' in the stimulating of change in a given area of the world rather 'external' forces. According to the second factor, the general attitude and approach taken by Western Europe towards Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular the Russian Federation, are also a differing factor in the determination of foreign policy[315].

The emergence of a transatlantic security community in the postwar period is a significant development. Five prominent factors are important as contributed to the development of the emergence of the transatlantic security:

- *Informal Integration*: The thickening of networks of economic and social exchange, the emergence of a common market, the spread of complex interdependence and the impact of globalization on the region have all produced the economic and social preconditions for peaceful cooperation.

- *Formal Integration:* The creation of structures of institutionalized negotiation, compromise and cooperation help facilitate and channel the processes of informal integration. One of the most important institutions in this respect is the European Union as well as NATO and the WEU in the security sphere. The existence of multilateral organizations such as the EU and NATO, for example, provides an indispensable framework for integrating Germany into the European states' system. The EU in particular provides a historic solution to the age-old 'German Problem' in that it provides an institutional mechanism for restricting Germany's immense creativity and enterprise to broader European concerns. Through Western Europe's institutional ensemble, therefore, Thomas Mann's dream of a 'European Germany' rather than a 'German Europe' has become a reality.

[315] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 238,239

• *Stable Liberal Democracies and Social Market Economies:* There is a growing consensus in the academic and policy-making community that democracies do not fight wars with each other. The spread and consolidation of democracy in the transatlantic area is a factor of major import in the emergence of a pluralistic security community. At the same time, the consolidation of democratic policies is possible only in the absence of major social cleavages. In this respect, the creation of social market economies has been particularly beneficial for the health of liberal democracies in Western Europe.

• *An External Threat:* Cooperation within any group is greatly facilitated if that group shares a common perception of a significant external threat. In the Cold War years, the existence of a perceived Soviet threat provided a major impulse to cooperation between states within the transatlantic community. It forced West European states to develop new forms of partnership and cooperation, and provided the impetus for integrating Germany into both NATO and the EEC.

• *The US Pacifier:* In postwar Western Europe, the USA has played the role of a benign hegemony. It provided Marshall Aid to the Europeans on the understanding that they buried traditional animosities and cooperated together. As the Dutch scholar Ernst H. van der Beugel observed, from 'the moment of the launching of the Marshall Plan, it became apparent that European integration was a major objective of American foreign policy... It pursued this aim primarily within the framework of its stand against communist aggression.' Since then, the USA has often been able to play both a mediating role and to provide leadership in a way that would be impossible for any of the West European Great Powers[316].

6.1.3. Eastward Expansion of Transatlantic Security

Extending the influence of the transatlantic security community eastwards has a number of dimensions:

• *Informal integration.* Informal integration will develop as the economies of the region as transformed and opened up to the forces of globalization, technological change and deepening economic exchanges.

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[316] Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 25

• *Formal integration.* It is widely recognized that the 'new Europe' will be built up on the base of a series of overlapping and interlocking institutions. This formal integration is important because by providing a clear legal and institutional framework, informal integration processes can be facilitated.

• *Security guarantees.* Foreign investment in, and trade deals with, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will suffer if major doubts about the stability and security of the region stay. The countries of Eastern Europe are seeking either firm security guarantee from NATO and the WEU or membership in these alliances. NATO has proved reticent in meeting these requests from its former Warsaw Pact enemies, but has sought to strengthen security relationships in the continent by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and, more recently, the 'Partnerships for Peace' program.

• *Democratization.* Given the tendency of liberal democracies not to wage wars on other liberal democracies, strengthening democratic institutions and attitudes is of vital importance for European security. Common values and principles are also an important feature of a security community, as Deutsch stressed[317].

Ursula Oswald advocates a more comprehensive concept of "security", including what she calls "human security." Among the advantages of "security issues" may be that important issues are given a ring of urgency. Among the drawbacks of such "scuritization" may be the risk that the more restrictive "debating rules" are copied from the debate about "traditional" national security to, e.g., that about the environment; and the risk that the armed forces may appropriate the problems for lack of "traditional" missions[318].

6.1.4. Transatlantic Cooperation/Competition

The future of transatlantic agreements and competition is affected by the ambiguity of those in charge of industrial and defense policies on both sides of the Atlantic. European governments tend to prohibit American penetration on the ground that their industries have to

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[317] ***Ibid***, pp. 30,31

[318] Moeller, Bjoern. "New Security Concepts?". International Peace Research Newsletter, Volume 37, Number 3, September 1999, p. 19

be strengthened. The US government would like to move in a transatlantic perspective; but does nothing to eliminate the barriers to national markets and favors the dominance of American companies in cooperation agreements, creating obstacles to technology transfer, and promotes their entry into markets where the Europeans are weak[319].

Relations between the US and Europe in the defense field continue to hesitate between a policy of cooperation and a policy of competition. The dividing line between the two options is very complex, even though European countries seems to have been particularly careful in recent years to favor continental programs if even a minimum of strategic autonomy was at stake. It must have underlined that Europe rived by the same old doubt. Indeed, these two factors have always been among most countries' motives for participating in single programs[320].

There are trends for a more autonomous defense. First is the changing nature of Europe's security problems. In the Cold War, the greatest threat to Europe was obvious and external. Today, Europe's security problems are much more domestic - ethnic neighborhood warfare, running of terrorized populations, gangsterism, drug trafficking and large-scale criminality in general. A second major trend pushing Europe toward more autonomous defense is the growing divergence of transatlantic strategic interests, particularly in regions on the edge of Europe. The differences stem mostly from geography. For Europe, a more autonomous collective foreign security and defense policy seems a precondition for a more autonomous Russian policy. A third major trend is America's increasing preoccupation with Asian security. Whereas Europe seems capable of taking primary responsibility for its own security problems, there seems no real alternative for containing a rapidly rising China other than a reaffirmation of the US's role as Asia's security manager. A fourth trend is the evolution of Europe as a political and economic superpower, a development symbolized rather dramatically by the euro, makes it more and more anomalous that the Europeans should depend so completely on America for security. A fifth trend is the evolution of the American political system itself. Totally, this evolution does not give comfort to those expecting the US

[319] Nones, Michele. "A Test Bed for Enhanced Cooperation: The European Defense Industry". The International Spectator, A Quarterly Journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Volume 35, Number 3, September 2000, p. 31
[320] *Ibid*, p. 32

to produce a coherent, consistent long-term foreign policy, sensitive to the needs of its allies[321].

6.2. The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and the Dynamics of International Security Orders in the Global Era

Divisibility and defection are commonly used concepts in the international cooperation literature on a wide range of issues. When benefits are highly divisible in an ideal-type collective action problem, a wide range of actors acting autonomously can gain those benefits through spontaneous action or with some sort of minimal, even informal agreement on rules of the game, as in an ideal-type neoclassical market; they need not depend upon the existence of hierarchical governance institutions to reap those benefits[322].

This means that where benefits are divisible, the system could either be pluralistic and self-regulating or relatively unstable and centrifugal. On the other hand, where benefits are non-divisible, one would expect the same sort of criteria to come into play as with public goods and specific assets. Benefits can only be gained if a wide range of actors can be brought on board.

In other words, where benefits are highly non-divisible and where temptations to defect are high, the system could be chaotic and negative-sum, requiring top-down authoritative imposition to prevent "free-riding" on any agreements. But where temptations to defect are low, the result would be more likely to involve a form of leadership, in which "major players at the center of the issue agree to central rules to which peripheral players sign on with minimal political pressures[323].

6.2.1. Divisibility and Defection in the Two Security Dilemmas

Increasing divisibility of benefits can be seen to comprise at least four dimensions. The first of these is economic globalization, which implies the possibility of positive-sum material

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[321] Calleo, P. David. "The US Post-Imperial Presidency and Transatlantic Relations". The International Spectator, A Quarterly Journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Volume 35, Number 3, September 2000, pp. 70-72
[322] Cerny, G. Philip. "The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era". Review of International Studies. Volume 26, Number 4, October 2000, p. 626
[323] *Ibid*, p. 627

gains as a much less costly and less potentially counterproductive alternative type of benefits to war and to wasteful, defense expenditures. The second is the death of ideology, first proclaimed by Daniel Bell in the 1960s and then revived by Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s. The third involves both social multiculturalism and cultural postmodernism, in which there is a core condition for the underpinning of the Traditional Security Dilemma (TSD). Thus, the common imagination from below of a common national-state identity and consciousness have been eroded by demands for cultural or other forms of autonomy, by the rejection of grand narratives and by the crosscutting media linkages of the "global village". The fourth is the emergence of new forms of transnational governance - public, private and mixed - and of forms of policy-making that cut across states and national territories[324].

6.2.2. Dimensions of Divisibility and the New Security Dilemma: Economic Globalization

Economic globalization fundamentally challenges the parameters of fused national security culture by disaggregating the economic benefits of industrial and financial development, dramatically increasing the divisibility of benefits. This shifts has been taking place at several levels interact with each other.

The increased divisibility in the contemporary international political economy has had two sorts of effects on the security environment. In the first place, it has attenuated the link between the state and industrial development that was at the heart of the late 19th and the 20th century intensification of the TSD. On the one hand, war can no longer be waged profitably by industrial states, and mass publics know this too. By the same token, social as well as economic losses are more evident; while political actors, economic elites and military leaderships are less convinced that war plays an effective regulatory role, as evidenced by the role of the Vietnam Syndrome in the US and American awareness of failures in Beirut, Somalia and other places in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, the dependence of industry on military and government contracts, while still great for some sectors, is crucial for far fewer industries[325].

[324] *Ibid*, p. 633
[325] *Ibid*, p. 635

In the second, economic globalization has created alternative possibilities for divisible benefits to arise through trading relationships, boundary-crossing production structures and the like.

6.2.3. The End of the Ideologies

Ideological conflict played a crucial role in generating non-divisible benefits in the TSD, especially, in its later instances. Indeed, universalistic ideologies invested state actions in both domestic and international arenas with identification with a higher mission, thus fusing national solidarity with moral righteousness. It is primarily at this level that the benefits of cooperation and the dangers of defection internalized by both elites and mass publics, first through the fight against Nazism and Fascism, and later in the conflict between Communism and anti-Communism[326].

At the periphery of the Cold War system, ideological stances tended either to be mere supplements for potential defectors playing the two sides against each other, or else were compounded with local cultural elements to give them indigenous cultural legitimacy and coherence.

6.2.4. Multiculturalism and Post-Modernism

Cultural nationalism has been eroded as the result of the increasing divisibility of cultural benefits in the contemporary world. The emergence of a cultural "global village" would seem to imply convergence and therefore greater non-divisibility. Cultural benefits, rather than being confined to the territorial cage of the nation-state, are necessarily both particularistic and global at the same time. More holism paradoxically leads to a greater divisibility of cultural benefits[327].

Multiculturalism acts as a serious constraint to the rather different holism of the sate in the state system and the TSD. In the New Security Dilemma (NSD), in contrast, the greater divisibility of benefits means that "cultural security" is disjoined from the imperatives of the nation-state and the states system.

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[326] ***Ibid***, p. 636
[327] ***Ibid***, p. 639

6.2.5. Transnational Governance

International regimes were essentially interstate regimes, not "transnational" regimes. Although such regimes went beyond simple interstate interaction of a self-help kind by saving on transaction costs in terms of cooperation among states, they still reinforced the states system by buying off potential defectors. Interstate regimes constitute a key precursor of transnational[328] governance structures and processes and are still part of this wider universe. Today there has been a proliferation of such structures and processes, from the public to the private, and from the formal to the informal.

As a conclusion, in today's globalizing world, there is no external threat to the system as a whole that might galvanize a hierarchical response to engender the emergence of a real "global governance". Moreover, there is no prospect of an autonomous and powerful collective vision to transform such a world into a new transnational res publica[329].

Thus, if the international order is to be transformed into a more authoritative global system, capable of effectively pursuing genuinely collective, public values on a global level, then the sources of that transformation must come from within its newer, transnational structures. Only complex interdependence can generate complex solutions. However, at this stage the promise of such a transformation is weak and its form little more than another potential source of uncertainty. Therefore, the New Security Dilemma, in which the growing divisibility of benefits interacts with more and more complex temptations to defect, especially from below, is likely to prove a more sound model of the international system for the near future[330].

6.3. Transatlantic Tensions, Challenges and Resolutions

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[328] The mid 1970s were witness to a challenge to the tenets of realism within International Relations as the concern with states, maintaining a separation between domestic and international politics and the primary importance of issues of power and peace. This challenge mainly guided by theory of pluralism. Two themes gained prominence in the pluralistic literature. One of them was trans-nationalism, which asserts that there are actors in addition to states that play a central role in international affairs. The other theme challenged the realist distinction between the domestic and the international on the ground that the domestic power of the state can be sustained only through international economic cooperation and political assumption in the sense of its role as representing economic interests. See, Landau, ***op. cit.***, p. 25

[329] Cerny, ***op. cit.***, 438-457

[330] ***Ibid***

The first of these reasons is the impact of détente on both sets of actors - the United States and Western Europe. Simply put, the institutions of the alliance, principally NATO, were unprepared and ill suited to act as vehicles for reform and reconciliation between East and West. This inability to perform certain tasks pushed some of the allies to question these institutions and their basic assumptions.

A second set of factors revolved around the contradiction between the global and regional interests of the various allies. This tension stems from the position of the United States as a world superpower conflicting with that of the West European states as former empires and present day middle rank powers. The global perspective of the former appears to be at odds with the perceived regionalism of the latter.

The other factors are concerned with problems associated with the sphere of the politico-economic relationship between the allies - the relative decline of the United States in this and other spheres of influence, obviously conforming by the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe. Global roles were changing, but the institutions and responsibilities of the various actors were not[331].

The United States and Europe are the only conceivable global partners for each other in seeking to shape the international system in positive ways into the 21st century. Without America, Europe will tend to retreat into a continental fortress mentality or into sustained passivity as threats from beyond the continent progressively build and then intrude into the interests and daily lives of the allies.

Without Europe, the United States will likely alternate between brief and usually ineffective spasms of unilateralism interspersed with occasional temptations to withdraw substantially from messy international life.

A growing transatlantic partnership consistent with the regional and global challenges of the 21st century will protect the vital and important interests of both the United States and Europe, and thus the basic welfare of their citizens. As Henry Kissinger has put it, "On both sides of the Atlantic, the next phase of our foreign policy will require restoration of some of the

[331] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 45,46

dedication, attitudes and convictions of common destiny that brought us to this point - though, of course, under totally new conditions"[332].

The broad challenge the US-European partnership faces in the period ahead is threefold:

• To persuade others around the world in post-Cold War conditions to abide by internationally accepted norms and patterns of behavior and the rules of the international institutions that embody them;

• To deal with the emerging new power centers of which China and India are the most prominent;

• To meet the current serious threats to Western interests, especially in the Middle East, when these threats often seem to ordinary citizens more remote, abstract, and complex than during the Cold War[333].

6.4. Non-European Problem Areas for Transatlantic Relations

In the Cold War period, NATO and transatlantic relationships were threatened by developments such as the Korean War, Indochina, the Suez Crisis, Lebanon, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, the 1973 Middle East War and oil crisis, and Libya in the 1980s. At that period, the Soviet challenge was immediate in Europe and provided needed glue to the alliance although these crises took place far from Europe. The US and its European allies often worked at cross-purposes. Their tendency to disagree on what to do in other parts of the globe inevitably affected allied ability to cooperate inside of Europe[334].

In the post-Cold War era, the first major challenge was Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and, for the most part, the transatlantic relationship displayed a high degree of unity and utility. The overall pattern was one of the collaboration among the US, Great Britain, and France of the UN Security Council during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict.

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[332] Blackwille, *op. cit.*, p. 3
[333] *Ibid*, p. 1
[334] Haas, N. Richard (Editor). Transatlantic Tensions, The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 1

The breakup of Yugoslavia presented a different kind of challenge - more a source of transatlantic friction than a successful experience. In Europe but "out-of-area" from NATO's perspective, Bosnia was a venue where for years the US and Europe was unable to concert either diplomacy or the use of military force. In 1998, a similar pattern unfolded in Kosovo. In this case, both Americans and Europeans were slow to react to the large-scale repression and aggression, directed against the mostly Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo[335].

After the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the reduced threat to European security does not mean the absence of stakes. To the contrary, how the US and the countries of Europe work with one another beyond Europe matters in at least three important ways. First, a good deal hangs in the balance. Four of the five countries[336] – Iran, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria are major energy exporters. Three pose major challenges to global efforts aiming to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All five offer substantial markets or European and US exports. Second, the US and Europe are potential partners in shaping the post-Cold War world. Their ability to cooperate will have a major impact on whether the emerging era of International Relations turns out to be one that is more or less violent, prosperous, and democratic. Third, disagreements on particular out-of-area issues will affect the ability of Americans and Europeans to cooperate on other issues, regardless of their venue. Thus, differences over the best approach to one conflict can frustrate cooperation in another if patterns of unilateralism prevail[337].

Five prominent non-European challenges to US-European relations after the Cold War: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria. How the two poles of the transatlantic relationship manage these issues will influence not only the evolution of these countries but also emerge the ability of the US and Europe to act together in the post-Cold War world.

Cuba is the problem country for nearly four decades. For most European governments, Cuba constitutes a normal country, whereas for the US, it is anything but normal given its location, history, and role in domestic American politics. Thus, this perceptual gap has led to fundamental policy differences - differences that would have remained manageable except for the American decision to introduce secondary sanctions, as part of the Cuban Liberty and

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[335] ***Ibid***, p. 2
[336] The so-called countries are, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria
[337] Haas, ***op. cit.***, p. 3

Democratic (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, or Helms-Burton Act, against those European individuals and firms doing business with expropriated property.

As to Iran, differences exist over how much of a threat it poses and over how best to deal with Iran. Europeans have favored engagement. Until recently, the US bias was for sanctions. Also, transatlantic policy differences have been exacerbated by the American threat to impose secondary sanctions against these non-American firms investing in Iran's energy sector.

As to Iraq, the US and the governments of Europe have agreed over how to deal with Iraq ever since Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait. Time, however, has taken its toll, and the strain between the US and France in particular is increasing, in large part over the desirability and necessity of maintaining comprehensive sanctions and over how best to bring about Iraqi compliance with its international obligations.

Libya resembles both the Iraq and Iran cases. Libyan terrorism provided inspiration for considerable common policy; explicit UN Security Council backing further facilitated transatlantic cooperation. However, transatlantic cooperation has weakened with the passage of time. Some European governments argue that the current policy – political and economic isolation of Libya – risks bringing about worse political leadership in that country. Like Iran, Europeans strongly reject secondary American sanctions instituted to discourage investment in Libya's energy sector.

Nigeria is a special case. It has been a less actual source of disagreement between Americans and Europeans than a potential one. The both sides need to determine how best to promote a democratic transition in Nigeria. As a result, Nigeria brings to the surface basic questions common to all five of these cases and to those that might emerge in the future[338].

Analyzing these five case studies highlights additional factors. For instance, Americans are prone to act unilaterally without formal authorization. Europeans see greater benefit in versions of multilateralism that emphasize standing institutions and international law. The US tends to be quick to resort to confrontational instruments, such as economic sanctions or cruise missiles whereas the European preference is for diplomacy and engagement (This

[338] *Ibid*, pp. 4,5

pattern is particularly pronounced when energy-related interests are at stake, something that may reflect Europe's greater dependence on the energy sources of problem states). For reasons of history, culture, and domestic politics, American foreign policy tends to be more influenced by values than that of most European countries – especially commercial ones. All of these differences create a backdrop for caricature that is a European view of US foreign policy as heavy handed and dominated by domestic politics, an American view of European foreign policy as a moral and dominated by a search for profit[339].

As for the easing of these tensions, it is significant to overview the case studies again[340]. In the case of Cuba, implementation of the understanding of May 18, 1998[341] should remove the friction stemming from secondary sanctions. Also, a more concerted policy is necessary on how to promote what most people on both sides of the Atlantic agree is the right goal, namely, a peaceful transition to a more liberal and market-oriented Cuba. Some meeting in the middle may be required. The US might choose to lift its embargo, and Europe might engage Cuba in a conditional fashion. Adoption of common set investment guidelines to promote human rights and fair employment practices is one possibility that should be explored. Another possibility would be for Europe and the US to agree to a common road map for Cuba that lays out the details under which sanctions lifted as particular reforms occur.

Iran is a second case in which the May 18 understanding between the US and the EU removed some of the animosity deriving from secondary sanctions. In this case, the package consisted of European agreement to implement tighter control over selective high-technology exports to Iran in exchange for a US waiver of its objections to European investment in Iran's energy sector. The complete disappearance of friction stemming from secondary sanctions will depend on amending existing legislation and on whether and how Congress decides to implement the May 1998 understanding.

Iran, at the same time, poses an actual threat to the US and European interests. Iran's ambitions in the realm of weapons of mass destruction are particularly troubling, as is its record of sponsoring terrorism and subversion. It is thus, difficult to justify a stance of

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[339] ***Ibid***, p. 228
[340] ***Ibid***, pp. 228-233
[341] By which the EU agreed to drop its challenge in the WTO and curtail subsidies of European firms that are "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba in exchange for the US rescinding its threats to deny Europeans physical access to the US and to take them to court in the US over such investments.

unconditional engagement. Instead, a conditional approach may be warranted to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions. A related alternative would be for Europe to adopt a version of US sanctions that would then be withdrawn only as Iran met negotiated criteria in such realms as terrorism, human rights, and nuclear weapons.

In Iraq case, Europe, or more accurately France, appears anxious to reduce or eliminate economic sanctions against Iraq in order to bring about its rapid reintegration – whereas the US is raising the requirements for a lifting of sanctions. Behind this divergence lie not only commercial calculations but also a different assessment of both the humanitarian impact of sanctions and of the actual and potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

In this case, an argument exists for some compromise on both sides. The US would be wise to reconsider its decision to link any lifting of sanctions to Iraqi compliance with all Security Council resolutions rather than to its behavior in regards to weapons of mass destruction as is stipulated in UN Security Resolution 687.

Iraq's misery is a direct result of the regime's refusal to meet its international obligations and its unwillingness to help itself of the humanitarian relief offered, preferring instead to increase hardships as a device to build international opposition to the sanctions.

A reasonable policy is one that would follow Resolution 687, allowing Iraq to resume exports once it fulfilled all of its obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction.

As to Libya, there has been a consensus among the US, Great Britain, and France that Libya must comply with UN Security Council resolutions stipulating its obligations in the realm of terrorism. But there have been problems all the same, stemming mostly from American secondary sanctions and from a view that isolating Qaddafi risks bringing someone worse into power- akin to what is seen in Sudan.

The May 18 understanding that eased tensions over Cuba and Iran also applied to Libya, although implementation remains at issue.

The US may want to use covert action or military force to respond to any such developments, courses of action that are unlikely to find much support in Europe. Although the best that may

be hoped for, is a return to the status quo existing before the passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, consultations among the US and Italy, Great Britain, and France about how to deal with such occasions are clearly in order.

Although Nigeria has not been a serious source of transatlantic tensions, its future is uncertain. Indeed, it has the potential to become a failed state that would pose a threat not simply to itself but much of Africa. Nigeria thus represents a challenge for Americans and Europeans how best to promote desirable political and economic reform in a country of economic and political importance to both Africa and the West but one that has known considerable repression, corruption, and instability.

Thus, some transatlantic understanding on a road map for Nigeria would seem possible and worth exploring. Such a road map would tie the provision of non-humanitarian assistance debt rescheduling and new investment, and contacts with Nigerian political and military figures to steps that would bring about a more open political and economic order, a further release of political prisoners, and economic reform that curtails corruption.

Consultations are critical for both sides of the Atlantic, and many consultative mechanisms already exist - including a multitude of bilateral channels in Washington and European capitals. Among them; various US-EU forums ranging from an annual summit to more frequent foreign policy-oriented meetings among responsible officials, NATO, the Group of Eight (G-8), and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or P-5[342].

NATO remains the most important transatlantic venue for discussing traditional matter, of security. The inevitable result is a high degree of "forum shopping" for promoting support of economic sanctions the broadest possible participation is desirable.

One change that contributes a great deal to calming transatlantic tensions would be an American decision to eliminate secondary sanctions. Much of the recent strain between Americans and Europeans stems from the US resort to secondary sanctions. Agreements announced in May 1998 appear to reflect a good deal of progress in regards to Iran, Libya, and Cuba.

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[342] Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 235

However, reducing or even eliminating secondary sanctions while removing a significant source of friction from transatlantic ties, will in itself contribute little to better common policy toward problem states? This requires greater harmonizing of US and European policy – and greater compromise by both sides[343].

The US needs to further restriction in its enthusiasm for primary sanctions. This should be done on its merits and not simply to facilitate better relations with Europe. Recent history suggests that sanctions often cannot accomplish tasks set out for them and have unintended and often undesirable consequences extending beyond the forfeiture of economic gain, including strengthening authoritarian regimes and causing humanitarian hardship. The path to improving relations across the Atlantic requires the brokering of a new understanding between the White House and Congress.

The Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) also bears on transatlantic behavior toward problem countries. It is not simply that the US stewardship of the peace process affects Arab willingness to work with the US against Iraq and Libya; it also affects European views of American leadership. European respect for American foreign policy falls off when the US seems to follow a moral double standard by not asking that Israel do its fair share to contribute to peace with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbors[344].

Increased Western effectiveness in the world and improved transatlantic relations also requires changes in European thinking and behavior. Europe should resist the temptation to oppose the US for the sake of asserting European independence and identity at a time when the US is the world's dominant power. Nor should Europeans insist of formal UN Security Council authorization as a prerequisite for common action toward a problem state. Such a requirement would provide Russia and China a veto over US and European action. Legitimacy must stem in the first instance from the objectives of the policy and how implemented[345].

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[343] ***Ibid***
[344] ***Ibid***, p. 236
[345] ***Ibid***

A more serious problem in Europe comes what appears to be little more than blind faith in the effectiveness of engagement. Antipathy toward sanctions is deep and wide. There is also a general reluctance to deploy military force outside Europe. However, it may not be the desired approach when normal economic interaction risks strengthening the hand of irresponsible leaders and providing them the means to seriously threaten the US and European interests. The "critical dialogue" with Iran is a case in point, as the lack of European willingness to introduce penalties into Europe's relations with Iran removed what interest Iran had in moderating its behavior. Easing sanctions against Iraq in the absence of full Iraqi compliance with its obligations to eliminate all of its weapons of mass destruction would constitute a major error. The same should apply to Libya in regards to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction[346].

Policies of conditional engagement make the most sense in dealing with difficult or problem states that pose a threat others. Sanctions and incentives should be manipulated depending on the behavior of the target state.

In some cases and despite intense consultations, the US and Europe may not be able to agree on the best way to deal with a problem state. The correct response for the US in such situations is not to introduce secondary sanctions against European holdouts, something that would not resolve the matter and could introduce a new set of problems. The US should do more to make its arguments public to persuade public opinion in Europe as a means of influence governments.

Europeans should know that repeated unwillingness on their part to join the US in what appear to be fair and reasonable approaches toward problem states is shortsighted and dangerous in two ways; first, a lack of a common policy risks allowing certain dangerous actors to increase their capacity to threaten important European and American interests. Second, a pattern of European refusal to support important foreign policy initiatives supported by the US executive branch and Congress will lead to a growing American alienation from Europe[347].

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[346] ***Ibid***, p. 237
[347] ***Ibid***, p. 238

6.5. Middle East Peace Process: An Example of Transatlantic Security Partnership and Advantages of Complementarity

Generally, US-European differences over the Middle East have to be characterized as differences of priorities and approach, rather than differences of purpose or vital interests. EU states are not always in full agreement about their policies towards the region, and the US is no unitary actor either. For Europe as well as for the US, relations with one another are much more important than either side's relations with the Middle East; and neither Washington nor Brussels would sacrifice transatlantic cooperation for its relations with any of its partners in the region[348].

From the European side, two different lines of thinking have been behind the quest for a role in the peace process. The first line, featuring a realist world view, basically holds that after the end of bipolarity there is room for more actors, even in regions such as the Middle East that previously were mainly arenas of superpower contest. Europe should not accept an American monopoly in the region; rather, it should advance its own geopolitical and economic interests and naturally play a political part in the search for Arab-Israeli peace. The second line of reasoning reflects what called the common denominator of EU policies, and expresses the thinking of Brussels, that is, the European bureaucracy and parliament. It focuses on the economic, cultural, political and security interdependencies between the EU and the regional actors in the peace process, which are seen as part of a broader Mediterranean region. The Barcelona Process clearly reflects this linkage between the Middle East peace process and Europe's interest in building a safer Euro-Mediterranean regional environment[349].

The US response to the European quest for a larger and more political role in the peace process, as well as to the concept of complementarities has not been positive. Americans do not deny that Europe has a stake in the region, but there exist serious doubts that Europe would actually be capable of exercising a political or diplomatic function. In the eyes of many US policymakers and advisors, Europe has neither the instruments for such a role, nor the right, constructive approach[350].

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[348] Perthes, Volker. "The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European Policies towards the Middle East Peace Process". The International Spectator, A Quarterly Journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Volume 35, Number 2, April-June 2000, p. 41

[349] ***Ibid***, p. 43

[350] ***Ibid***, p. 46

As for the US and European priorities, Europe and the US have indeed different approaches to the Middle East and to the peace process. This is rather of different priorities, and it is also a matter of geography and interdependencies as well as polity structures and respective capabilities. Both Americans and Europeans define their interests in the region with respect to a wider Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern-Mediterranean area rather than to just Israel and its neighbors. The key US interests basically comprise the security and well-being of Israel, the free flow of oil, the security of friendly Arab states and regimes and, more recently, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Europeans do not deny the importance of any of those US interests. Their main concern is regional stability – a central concept to European thinking in regard to the region that is absent from the US list of priorities. Also, "peace in the Middle East" has been defined as a "vital" interest of the EU. While oil security and the limitation of weapons proliferation are matters of interest, European policymakers are less concerned about these issues than their American counterparts are[351].

As concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process per se, Europe and the US are in the agreement both on the need to reach a peaceful settlement and on the legal principles on which such a settlement should be based, namely UN Security Council Resolutions 242[352] and 338, that is, the land-for-peace principle. A remarkable difference remains between the American and the European positions that is in the US list of priorities, the security and well-being of Israel feature as a prime interest, separate from but consistent with the interest in Arab-Israeli peace. European policy statements, in contrast, focus on the need for comprehensive peace and security, including the legitimate rights of the Palestinians rather than on the concerns of Israel[353].

Generally, both European and US policies towards the region are based on national or, respectively, European interests.

According to the structural backgrounds of different approaches, the US is a single state, and it is uniquely capable of projecting military power into region and threatening the use of force

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[351] ***Ibid***, pp. 47,48

[352] Passed by the UNSC on November 22, 1967, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories they captured from Egypt (Sinai), Jordan (West Bank and East Jerusalem), and Syria (Golan Heights) in the 1967 war, and for the right of all nations in the Middle East to live in peace in secure and recognized borders.

[353] Perthes, ***op. cit.***, p. 48

if deemed necessary. The EU, in contrast, is still a union of sovereign states that all have their own respective interests and biases and do not always act coherently.

Other structural features that bear on US and European capabilities and their respective ability to influence the course of events in the Middle East may favor the European side. Among them are the dependence of US foreign policies on electoral cycles and the four-year presidential term. Moreover, inter-agency differences tend to have a negative effect on the ability of the administration to follow through on its agenda. Congress likes to interfere with Middle East policies, including special legislation that may complicate or even construct US embassy in the region[354].

In contrast, changes of government in EU member states, the semi-annual change of the EU presidency or even the appointment of a new EU Commission are hardly noticeable in terms of Europe's policies towards the region. The European Parliament and national parliaments in EU countries tend to accentuate these policies, with a particular concern for human rights issues, rather than counterbalance or obstruct them. As a result, European policies towards the Middle East mostly have a long-term perspective, rather than connected to electoral cycles[355].

Compared to Europe, US foreign policy-making is highly personalized, with the US president being the prime mover and decision-maker. This also reflects on the way the US and Europe conduct their policies towards the region.

At the same time, it appears that US officials and policy-makers pay little attention to structural developments and socio-political dynamics in the regions or to regional links between Middle Eastern states and societies. Europeans, in contrast, seem to have a better understanding of regional dynamics and the sensitivities of local actors. Reflecting the institutional architecture of Europe, the EU, with all its complexities, also has an inbuilt tendency towards multilateralism[356].

Given these differences of polity structure and comparative capabilities, Europe would never be able to impose on the regional parties anything like the Madrid peace conference – an

[354] ***Ibid***, p. 50
[355] ***Ibid***, p. 51
[356] ***Ibid***

understanding that required the US's intensive high-level diplomatic engagement and a certain degree of pressure on regional leaders. At the same time, it would be unthinkable for any US administration to establish support and maintain such a complex multilateral, multidimensional and multi-level process as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

6.5.1. Comparative Advantages of the US and EU

A constructive competition of ideas and instruments whereby the comparative advantages of either side's approaches and capabilities are used to advance the peace process. First, the US will have to remain the main regional power broker. US efforts should therefore concentrate on high-level diplomacy, especially in facilitating and mediating bilateral negotiations as well as giving regional leaders the final push they may need to make a deal. Europe will generally have to concentrate on less visible, but no less politically important contributions to achieving and stabilizing peace in the Middle East. The EU should be put in charge of reviving the multilateral peace talks. The EU should continue to sponsor and support other multilateral activities, particularly in the fields of economic and security cooperation that are not necessarily linked to the peace process but have a positive bearing on it. Second, regarding the bilateral Arab-Israeli tracks, US leadership is not in question, and will not be questioned by Europe provided Washington does not abandon its responsibilities. European contributions will generally be on the somewhat lesser diplomatic levels, and often with lower profile. Third, Europe and European institutions should remain active organizers of second tracks. Fourth, Europe has an important role in institution building. This applies to regional frameworks, such as, among other things, establishment of REDWG as a regional institution with a permanent secretariat in Amman, or the development of institutions that have emanated from the Barcelona process. It also applies to institution building in the Palestinian territories. While Europe should have a leading role in this field, the issue is not only a European concern. Neither should it excluded US involvement, nor Euro-American or Euro-American-Middle Eastern cooperation. Finally, there could be a limited military peacekeeping role, if an where the regional parties so wish[357].

Generally, rather than only demand a political role in the peace process, Europe will have to perform, and earn it.

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[357] *Ibid*, pp. 54-56

US policymakers will have to acknowledge that the European contribution is essential enough to necessitate regular consultations and coordination – rather than only information or briefing sessions by the Americans for their European colleagues. Under the New Transatlantic Agenda, the EU and the US have endorsed continued cooperation of the Special Envoys to the peace process. In some cases, joint US-European approaches and actions will be needed.

Both Europeans and Americans have to be aware that their influence on events in the Middle East is limited. Ultimately, the regional actors are in charge that is external actors can assist in peace efforts, they can help stabilize the region and grant political and economic support, but they cannot make peace on behalf of Israelis and Arabs.

6.5.2. The Transatlantic Security Partnership: EU-US Coordination on MEPP

Almost everything that happens in the world today is of interest to the European Union and the United States. Both are global players in political and economic terms. Both have a broadly similar set of' values, belief in democratic terms, human rights and market economies. Both have a common interest in confronting the same global challenges[358].

Among the major problem areas around the world in which both actors present[359], a key one is the Middle East and its Peace Process. Links between Europe and this region are not new. There is a long history of interaction and mutual influence in a variety of fields, including culture and politics, a history of complementarities, at times of confrontation.

Since the basic frame of the transatlantic relationship took shape with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the end of World War II, the overall political context in the Euro-Mediterranean and Middle East regions has changed fundamentally. To name the two most important factors:

- The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the nature of the situation in the Middle East.

[358] Monar, ***op. cit.***, p. 33
[359] Such as Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 through to 1980, the imposition of martial law in Poland and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Pipeline from late 1981 through to the end of 1982.

• The development of the EU in recent years made it possible for Europe to respond as never before to the challenges in the area and to become the full and equal partner of the US that President Kennedy had sought at the beginning of the 1960s[360].

European states have been different to the MEPP. Some have strong historical links to Palestine and the Holy Places, further developed and embodied in agreements reached with the Ottoman Empire. Others had colonial presence or participated in the Peace Conferences that shaped the new situation in the Middle East after the World War I. Some acquired specific international responsibilities in the area, as did the British with the Mandate on Palestine[361].

Over the years a wide range of consultation mechanisms have grown up to foster dialogue between the EC-EU and the US and to meet the different needs of cooperation which have been of considerable use in cooperation on the MEPP. These contacts formalized in the 1990 "Transatlantic Declaration", which started from a number of shared objectives and provided for:

• Bi-annual consultations between the President of the Council, the Commission and the US.

• Bi-annual consultations between the Foreign Ministers (at that time still in the European Political Co-operation framework), the Commission and the US Secretary of State.

• Ad-hoc consultations between the Foreign Minister of the Presidency, or the Troika and the US Secretary of State.

• Bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US government at sub-Cabinet level.

• Briefings by the Presidency to US representatives on European political co-operation meetings at Ministerial level.

[360] Monar, *op. cit.*, p. 34
[361] *Ibid*, p. 35

• In addition many Troika contacts at political director and expert level as well as contacts and briefings between the respective diplomatic Representatives in various capitals[362].

The Mediterranean and the Middle East have been for a long time among the important issues of the transatlantic relationship. After the crisis following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (2 August 1990) transatlantic coordination helped to set up the international coalition to face the consequences of that challenge, that led to the so-called Gulf War in January-February. After its end, this cooperation was also instrumental to set into motion a revival of the MEPP that finally led to the completely new approach of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 based on the double frame of bilateral and multilateral venues. The EU gave constant support during this period and developed by the US, integrating the EU economic contributions as the major donor into the priorities and orientations primarily defined by the US. The Madrid Conference created the effort leading to the shared goal of a peace. The framework was complex and delicate, and developed by the key agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. When the launching of the MEPP took place, Europe was not the main actor.

The MEPP further developed in the Israeli-Palestinian track with the "Oslo Agreement" (1993) and the signing in Washington of the "Interim Agreement" (28 September 1995), with the EU attending and signing it as special witness. An important role played by the EU in the preparation, coordination and observation of the elections for the Palestinian Council. The Oslo Agreement introduced, through mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as partners in the bilateral negotiations, a sense of at least formal equality, but this has to be nurtured by both parties and must be morally and politically bolstered externally.

The "Renewed Mediterranean Policy" of the EU was approved in December 1990, including a financial cooperation up to 4.405 billion ECU for the period 1992-96 meant that an increase of 150 per cent over the previous period[363]

The "Barcelona Declaration" (28 November 1995) established a global partnership between the EU and its 12 Mediterranean associates. It states that "this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of

[362] ***Ibid***, p.37, 38
[363] ***Ibid***

peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute success". Following shortly after the Barcelona, the "New Transatlantic Agenda" of 3 December 1995 included the following paragraph regarding the Middle East Peace Process:

> "We reaffirm our commitment to the achievement of a just lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We will build on the recent successes in the Peace Process including the bold steps taken by Jordan and Israel, through concerted efforts to support agreements already concluded and to expand the circle of peace. Noting the important milestone reached with the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement. That will play an active role at the Conference for Economic Assistance to the Palestinians, will support the Palestinian elections and will work ambitiously to improve the access we both give to products from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We will encourage and support the regional parties in implementing the conclusions of the Amman Summit. We will also continue our efforts to promote peace between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. We will actively seek the dismantling of the Arab boycott of Israel"[364].

The European Council of Florence (21-22 June 1996) in its Declaration on the Middle East had strongly reaffirmed:

> "That peace in the Middle East region is a fundamental interest of the European Union. The Peace Process is the only path to security and peace for Israel, the Palestinians and the neighboring states. The European Union remains dedicated to supporting it. Alongside the Co-operation Sponsors, the European Union's aim is that Israel and its neighbors may live within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. Moreover, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians shall be respected"[365].

The EU-US "open channel" of consultations was activated with a meeting in Washington (26 July 1996). In this meeting due attention was given to the importance of a well functioning transatlantic relationship to the MEPP which had been the cause of some misunderstandings in the previous months and of a renewed European feeling of frustration at what frequently seemed to be a unilateral and excluding attitude of Washington towards the EU.

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[364] ***Ibid***, p. 40
[365] ***Ibid***, p. 42

The Dublin European Council (5 October 1996) took particular interest in the situation of the MEPP, believing that it was time for the EU to enhance its own role with an active and concrete contribution. Alongside the other partners of the region, to promote the re-launching of the Peace Process, as the regional parties had demanded, reaffirming what had been said in Florence and again in the Declaration of 1 October, that peace in the Middle East is a fundamental interest of the EU.

The Conclusions of the Presidency at the Amsterdam European Council (16-17 June 1997) included in Annex III a "Call of the European Union in favor of Peace in the Middle East" which reaffirmed all the basic elements of the EU's position on the MEPP.

At the Cardiff European Council on 15-16 June 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union underlined the need to show courage and vision in the search for peace. It was based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the principles agreed at Madrid and Oslo, including full implementation of existing commitments under the Israeli/Palestinian Interim Agreements and the Hebron Protocol[366].

With regard to the cooperation in the Arab world and the Mediterranean, and especially in relation to cooperation for development, it is essential that the action of the EU and the US in these areas be parallel, or complementary, but never opposed or competing.

6.6. Resolving Transatlantic Tensions and Achievements of Recent Events for EU-US Relations

The successful contribution of transatlantic partnership on tensions can be summarized as the following:

- Ejected Iraq from Kuwait;

- Stopped the killing in Bosnia;

[366] *Ibid*, p. 45

• Projected stability and democracy eastward through the enlargement of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary;

• Intensified a parallel stabilizing enlargement process within the European Union;

• Made extraordinary progress in Northern Ireland;

• Managed security relations with Russia, at least this far, without a serious blowup;

• Produced a new burst of transatlantic mergers, acquisitions, and investments and led the struggle to open up further the international trading system[367].

There are several reasons why the mutual relationship has not failed so far. American and European vital and important interests are largely identical and so perceived by governments, dominant elites, and publics. Both sides of the Atlantic recognize that:

• They have vital or important interests in slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction;

• Avoiding the emergence of a hostile hegemony in Europe;

• Moving steadily toward a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous, and at peace;

• Maintaining the secure supply of imported energy at reasonable prices;

• Further opening up the transatlantic and global economic systems;

• Preventing the catastrophic collapse of international finance, trade, and ecological regimes[368].

[367] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, p. 2
[368] ***Ibid***, p. 10

In no instances do the United States and Europe have conflicting vital external interests. In addition, the two sides of the Atlantic share history, cultural affinity, and moral values that make the transatlantic partnership unique in the world.

The general health of US-EU relations as 1997 began was good, but the long-term diagnosis in the security dimension requires a steady diet of confidence-building measures to ensure that civil societies outside of the commercial world stay healthily engaged. Despite the potential for damaging to political relations over US legislation, concerning Cuba, Iran, and Libya, foreign policy cooperation is likely to continue to mature.

In security, NATO passed through very difficult times in the early 1990s. The success of the Dayton peace accords and of NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) will have a heavy impact on NATO's future and thus on US-EU relations, given the latter's dependence on the former[369].

[369] Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 314

Chapter 7: Transatlantic Relations and Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America

7.1. Transatlantic Relations between the European Union and the United States of America

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe since the end of the Second World War marked by numerous great achievements. From this vantage point the similarities and shared assumptions concerning world order between these allies might appear to overshadow the differences and divergences that exist between them.

The European Community's role as an economic actor in world affairs is not in doubt. However, in the field of security studies there is some doubt as to the competence of the European Community. Academics such as Paul Taylor and, to a lesser extent, Christopher Hill question the politico-security nature of the EC in world affairs before examining the actual policies of this entity. Consequently, the literature on security issues has been either too broad or narrow that is broad with respect to the countries included in findings presented; narrow in that security issues have been perceived as non-EC matters, and therefore not subject to the same scrutiny and analysis[370].

In the theoretical basis, the intention of the examination of EC-US relations is to contribute to the existing literature the hegemonic position of the Realist paradigm within this field of research[371]. This contribution will be accomplished through two means. The first will be through an assessment of the dominant Realist 'conventional wisdom' in International Relations and the specific fields of European political cooperation and transatlantic studies. The second will be through a multi-case analysis of EC-US relations in the specific area of security studies[372].

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[370] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, p. 2

[371] Today, the International Relations field is explained by three general explanations: realism, pluralism and structuralism. Among these approaches, realism is the foremost theory in explaining transatlantic relations and as Carpenter stresses, realism is needed on both sides of the Atlantic. See, Carpenter, Ted Gallen. "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?". The Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 23, Number 3, September 2000., pp. 24,25

[372] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, p. 3

EU's external relations can be hard to distinguish from one another. An exception deserves to be made in the case of Europe's relations with the United States, which can be relatively easily divided into the political on the one hand, and the economic or commercial on the other. The EU collectively has always been sheltered under the US security umbrella, independently of the fact that most of its members were also members of NATO and the United States has always expected broad support for its foreign policies from its allies[373].

Pre-1970 and the advent of EPC, there was simply no machinery to permit consultation or coordination of EC member states' positions in the foreign policy field. After EPC, however, the EC became able to express collective opinions, and meetings between the two became regular events. Eventually, an institutional framework for consultation on all matters (including foreign policy) was established by the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration so that today clearly defined mechanisms exist to allow detailed consultation to take place and, where possible, positions to be coordinated[374].

Both sides agree that a framework is required for regular and intensive consultation. They will make full use of and further strengthen existing procedures, including those established by the President of the European Council and the President of the United States on 27th February 1990, namely:

- Bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on the one side, the President of the Commission, and on the other side, the President of the United States;

- Consultations between the European Community Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately on either side of the Atlantic;

- Ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika and the US Secretary of State;

- Bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US Government at Cabinet level;

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[373] Piening, *op. cit.*, p. 96
[374] *Ibid*, pp. 96,97

- Briefings, as currently exist, by the Presidency to US Representatives on European Political Cooperation meetings at the Ministerial level.

Both sides are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures for consultation so as to reflect the evolution of the European Community and of its relationship with the United States[375].

These mechanisms are mentioned in the EC-US declaration but include as well the contacts pursued by the two sides' diplomatic representations in Washington, D.C., and Brussels. They also include regular biannual meetings (which began as long ago as 1972) between members of the European Parliament's standing delegation for relations with the United States and members of a corresponding delegation of the House of Representatives. The pace of all these meetings has accelerated over the years. Under the Reagan administration, even the biannual Commission-administration meetings were reduced to an annual schedule, resuming their old pattern only in 1990 along with the other changes instituted by the Transatlantic Declaration[376].

The longest-standing series of regular political contacts between the United States and the EU are those between the European Parliament and the US Congress. Almost without interruption, these meetings have happened twice a year since 1972, making a total of well over forty by the mid-1990s.

The agendas for the meetings generally cover a range of political and economic issues of interest to the two sides. Although the European Parliament had no real competency in the field of external relations until the Single European Act came into force in 1987, delegations kept discussing the most sensitive matters with their US partners, from the details of individual trade disputes to the high politics of disarmament, burden sharing, or policy toward the Middle East, Cuba, or South Africa.

Foreign policy, long a difficult subject for discussion between the EC and the United States even after the advent of EPC, was always a central theme for frank debate between European and US parliamentarians in the context of their meetings.

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[375] ***Ibid***, p. 97
[376] ***Ibid***, p. 98

The overall number and intensity of political contacts between the United States and the EU have grown over the years and have never been as great as they are today. As US hegemony has declined and European influence in the transatlantic relationship grown, the need to concert has become all the more important for both sides.

Until 1970 and the introduction of European Political Cooperation, there were no disputes between the United States and the EC per se. Disagreements were with individual member state governments, such as with Paris over French withdrawal from NATO's command structure or with various other European governments over their failure to support US policy and actions in Vietnam. However, once EPC came into being, disagreements became possible between the United States and the collective policy of the Community.

At the end of the 1970s, the United States expected stronger reactions from the Europeans in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The European responses to these events dictated by the need to find whatever level of agreement was possible among nine member states, all of which still had their own foreign policy interests and priorities. For the United States, however, the early hopes that EPC would provide it with a real foreign policy partner were frustrated[377].

The situation was complex throughout most of the 1980s. While the cooperation between the two sides over the invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands helped to persuade the Argentineans that their case was hopeless on a diplomatic as well as a military level, Europe's growing interest in Latin America as a whole often brought it into conflict with US policy in the area[378].

Other events also saw the two sides of the Atlantic in frank disagreement. One example was the Soviet gas pipeline affair. Numerous European countries stood to benefit from an extension of the Siberian pipeline to Western Europe, and European companies were anxious to participate in building it. The United States opposed the plan and went so far as to extend its embargo on the USSR to European subsidiaries of US firms and to other European companies that had licenses to use US technology. This led to a concerted protest by the EC.

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[377] ***Ibid***, p. 100
[378] ***Ibid***

Another example was the failure of EPC in 1986 to adopt a strong policy in support of US measures aimed at isolating Libya in retaliation for the latter's alleged involvement in a series of terrorist attacks. In the absence of what it regarded as a firm European response, Washington decided to bomb targets in Libya. However, both the French and Spanish governments denied the United States use of air bases on their territory and it had to launch its raid from Britain, whose government, under Margaret Thatcher, adopted a traditionally supportive approach.

These examples provoke three observations. First, in relations between the United States and Europe, non-trade foreign policy issues have arisen and continue to arise in ways that are not usually the case in Europe's links with other regions or countries, namely, in sectors that have global political and/or security implications. Second, US interests and policy can be prejudiced by strong European positions that do not accord with its own. Third, *the failure* of Europe to reach joint positions on critical issues can be just as injurious to US foreign policy outcomes as a common policy that is not supportive of the US line. The United States, in short, is best served by a united European position on foreign policy issues that accords with its own. While this may sound axiomatic, it is at the same time a measure of how important the EU has become as a foreign policy actor in its own right, even for the world's leading power. Probably the best single example of this was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The net result was a genuinely international operation rather than just a US action, and the provision of the necessary legitimacy to the liberation of Kuwait and the later sanctions against the Iraqi dictatorship[379].

From the European perspective, there was a host of concerns about the direction in which US policy was moving. At core was the age-old European dilemma about the trustworthiness of the US security guarantee during a period of renewed East-West hostility. The Europeans were anxious about the reliability of the US nuclear guarantee and the deployment of new Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) became a test of America's good faith. However, at the same time, the Europeans were fearful about being dragged into a conflict by an overly bellicose administration.

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[379] ***Ibid***, pp. 100,101

European countries responded to transatlantic tensions in different ways. Largely, the British and French responses were predictable. The Thatcher government remained committed to preserving a close relationship with Washington. In contrast, France regarded the Atlantic relationship as in need of an overhaul. It was suspicious of the American policy of confrontation and held the view that the US was exaggerating the Soviet threat in order to reassert its hegemonic control over its European allies. The Mitterand government wanted to lessen American influence, although not to the point that the US security guarantee was withdrawn. France was not seeking to bring down the Alliance but to supplement it with a stronger European dimension.

The West German response to transatlantic strains was not the most strident but it was nevertheless the most significant. Throughout the Cold War, the FRG had been the staunchest supporter of American security policy, regarding it as vital to its own security interests. However, the early 1980s witnessed the first signs of open discord in US-German security relations. The hard-line American stance towards the USSR was perceived to damage the cooperation that Germany had carefully cultivated with the East and re-emphasized its vulnerability as NATO's front-line. Conventional American military strategies such as Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) and Air-land Battle 2000 proved to be unsettling for the Germans for they smacked of a more aggressive stance. The FRG was finding itself diverging with its superpower patron over the sorts of issues that had proved to be the bedrock of their relationship[380].

A mechanism had to be found, therefore, both to heal the divisions in trans-Atlantic relations and to give the Europeans more influence in security policy. If disagreements were left to fester, they might have escalated into public recrimination. The Europeans required a forum to help them concert their views before addressing them to the US.

There were also echoes of what Stanley Hoffman had called in the 1960s the *logic of diversity* - the idea that the variety of ways in which the member states related to the outside world necessarily imposed limits upon integration between them. The British government began to wonder whether the special relationship with the USA was not preferable to involvement in a European foreign policy arrangement that had failed over ex-Yugoslavia. Greece was clearly

[380] ***Ibid***, pp. 12,13

following its own line in the Balkans, and Italy was pursuing its own interests in new frameworks in South-Eastern Europe[381].

It was not just that the logic of diversity was visible that is those who were cautious about Europe were ready to develop that diversity further. In Britain Euro-skeptics wanted to believe that Europe and the USA were alternatives that is the special relationship with the USA and full participation in the European Union should not be seen as alternatives. The special relationship had a future if Britain was an active partner in Europe[382].

The new partnership has received new impetus with the signature of the New Transatlantic Agenda at the European Union-United States summit in Madrid on December 3, 1995 - has developed a great potential so that it should ideally develop into a key element on the world political scene[383].

However, the US and the EU cannot adopt a *laissez-faire*[384] approach vis-à-vis their relationship. If the transatlantic relations is to continue in constant fast forward then they must be sure that not only do they agree on the direction they are going but also that they do not put obstacles in their own way. The Helms-Burton Act and the d'Amato bill are a case in point. Strong efforts have to be undertaken to eliminate such obstacles of a clearly divisive character[385].

At the beginning of 1995, there was talk of stagnation and crisis in the transatlantic relationship. The end of the Cold War was seen as the end of the *"raison d'être"* for this relationship, the absence of the common foe interpreted as the absence of a common purpose.

If in 1995 EU-US relations were at a crossroads, then there was also the strong political will to take a pro-active approach towards them and adapt them to the needs of the future. Sir Leon Britton for the European Commission and Warren Christopher for the US Government,

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[381] Taylor, ***op. cit.***, p. 71
[382] ***Ibid***, p. 72
[383] Monar, ***op. cit.***, p. 13
[384] A phrase stands for "leave alone". It is a general injunction to avoid interference. It has come to mean the social and political policy of not interviewing in the economy.
[385] Monar, ***op. cit.***, p.13

expressed the view that indeed there were many reasons for the EU and the US to work on their relationship and make sure it responded to the challenges of the post-Cold War World[386].

From a European perspective, what are those challenges? The first is to keep the US engaged in Europe. Bosnia is probably the most striking example of the need for a continued US presence in Europe. As the conflict in former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates it is only where the EU and the US have acted in agreement, it has been possible to contain the conflict.

Generally, there is the need to consider together how the processes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and EU enlargement can best contribute to the development of a comprehensive structure of security in Europe.

The second is the need for cooperation between the EU and the US to cover the international arena such as The Middle East; human right abuses in China or the catastrophic situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

The third is to ensure continued mutual commitment to face up to the other, so-called 'new" challenges, e.g., environmental degradation, requires coordinated responses by the world's leading industrial nations[387].

The EU and the US agreed that something had to be done about it. They also agreed that a pragmatic approach was necessary if they were not to get bog down in endless institutional difficulties over the negotiation of a transatlantic treaty or potentially fruitless discussions over a transatlantic free trade zone. This is how the idea of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint EU-US Action Plan was born: the documents focus on the substance of the relationship regardless of legal constraints, leaving it to either the EU or its Member States to act on specific matters as required. The documents also have an additional advantage over a treaty in that they are both specific and flexible, in other words, they commit the partners to take a number of concrete actions now but they can also be modified and adapted to new challenges[388].

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[386] *Ibid*, p. 14
[387] *Ibid*, p. 15
[388] *Ibid*

The breadth and detail of the initiative reflect a degree of the political consensus that is unique and can serve as solid basis for the relationship for years to come. The EU-US political dialogue now covers seven geographical areas (Africa, Asia, Central Europe, Latin America, and Middle East. Maghreb and the Newly Independent States) and seven global areas (UN, arms control, consular affairs, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and terrorism).

The former US Ambassador to the EU Stuart Eizenstat stated that NTA and Action Plan mark the European Union not simply as an economic and trade organization but rather as a political force that able to join the United States as a full equal partner in a whole array of foreign policy initiatives. And there is more to it that is for the first time the world's major powers agree to do more than just consult each other: they agree to act together and jointly take responsibility in facing the world's most pressing challenges[389].

In the area of trade and economics, in addition to reaffirming their commitment to consolidating and strengthening the multilateral trading system, the US and EU have also developed an innovative and flexible new concept: the New Transatlantic Marketplace. Under this phenomenon, they intend to progressively facilitate trade and investment conditions. This exercise has been helped by a joint study in which the EU and the US will together look at the remaining trade obstacles and try to develop strategies to overcome them. This study helped to prepare the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) decided at the London EU-US Summit of 18 May 1998. This study also serves to keep alive the concept of the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), an idea that is not ripe, but one that may merit discussion in the near future. A further element is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue through which business leaders have the opportunity better to indicate their priority concerns and to feed concrete proposals into the decision-making processes on both sides of the Atlantic. This dialogue has been proven to be useful to speed up and to focus the efforts of both administrations[390].

TABD has been so successful in getting businessperson from both sides of the Atlantic together for an intense and constructive exchange of views on how to improve the policy framework of the transatlantic business relationship.

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[389] ***Ibid***, p. 16
[390] ***Ibid***

Moreover, NTA is an all-weather instrument and should help through stormy times as well and it is not the last step in the efforts to strengthen transatlantic relations. In the current fragile geo-political situation, and in the light of the challenges both the EU and the US have to address, there is no alternative to the EU-US partnership[391].

7.1.1. Western Political Order

If American-European relations are to be strengthened, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must recognize and preserve the aspects of western political order that have made it stable and successful. The first step is to recognize that the US and Europe have over the last fifty years indeed built a political order. The US and Europe do not just have "relations" but rather share a common political order that they jointly created over half a century – and it is a political order that requires that they operate in particular ways to ensure its continuation. Despite the notions of economic and security relations between the western allies, these states have built an Atlantic world that has provided more physical security and economic prosperity for more people than any other political order in history. The second task is to understand how this order has worked to dissolve the tensions and insecurities that result from the shifting disparities of power between America and Europe. The Western order has developed distinctive institutional practices that integrate and bind together the US and Europe in ways that make American power more restrained and less provocative. The bargains and institutional practices have also helped both fostering European unity and connecting Europe with the outside world order. NATO is the cornerstone of this elaborate system of institutions that provide reassurance and credible commitments.

International institutions can make the exercise of power more restrained but they can also make that power more durable, systematic and legitimate. The US and Europe need to remember the institutional roots of Western order – and seek to strengthen and expand these institutions. The US needs to remember that its power is made acceptable to the rest of the world when it is manifest within regional and global multilateral institutions. If it decides to operate in a more unilateral or disengaged manner, the rest of the world will respond

[391] *Ibid*, p. 18

accordingly. Europe, also, needs to look for ways to forge new institutional bargains with the US and connect the European Union more directly to the Atlantic world[392].

The second idea behind Western democratic order was that the new arrangements would have to be managed through international institutions and agreements. It was not enough simply to open the system up. There would have to be an array of trans-governmental and international institutions that would bring government officials together on an ongoing basis to manage economic and political change. This was the view of the economic officials who gathered in Bretton Woods in 1944.

The third idea was a new social bargain would underlie the western democratic order. This was the message that Roosevelt and Churchill communicated to the world in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The industrial democracies would provide a new level of social support for the societies of the Atlantic world. Finally, the West was to be tied together in a cooperative security order. This was a very important departure from past security arrangements within the Atlantic area. The idea was that Europe and the US would be part of a single security system. Such a system would ensure that the democratic great powers would not go back to the dangerous game of strategic rivalry and balance of power politics. It helped to have an emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union to generate this cooperative security arrangement. But the goal of cooperative security was implicit in the other elements of Western order. But a security relationship between Europe and the US that lessened the incentives for these states to engage in balance of power politics was needed and probably would have been engineered. A cooperative security order ensured that the power of the US would be rendered more predictable. Power would be caged in institutions thereby making American power more reliable and connected to Europe. The Western order that emerged after 1945 was built upon these institutions and principles. When relations between Europe and the US enter a period of conflict it is important to return to the founding logic of the order[393].

7.1.2. Binding Institutions and Restraints on Power and Cooperation

[392] Ikenberry, G. John. "Strengthening the Atlantic Political Order". The International Spectator, A Quarterly Journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Volume 35, Number 3, September 2000, pp. 59,60
[393] *Ibid*, pp. 61-63

NATO is at the center of the complex set of institutions that cut across the Atlantic and provide basic elements of restraint and reassurance. It is precise that this institutional complex that mitigates the insecurities arise when states of unequal power are operating within a single political order.

NATO was created to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in. In fact, the security alliance was the key to the building of an elaborate set of institutional arrangements that provided strategic restraint, reassurance and integration among the Atlantic democracies. The Atlantic pact, however, has had additional purposes. One was to tie Germany to Europe – which revealed the logic of security binding. Another purpose of the Atlantic pact was to institutionalize the American commitment to Europe. The final purpose of NATO was as a vehicle to commit European countries to European-wide unity and integration, evaluated by the American officials as a critical rationale for the alliance[394].

The US conceded as much commitment as needed to keep the Europeans on their path toward integration and reconstruction. Restraint, reassurance and commitment were the price the US had to pay to achieve its order-building goals in Europe and more widely. Together, these institutional arrangements were critical in giving shape to the order among the Atlantic states and overcoming the insecurities otherwise inherent in highly asymmetrical power relations. The rise of the Soviet Union reinforced western solidarity and that solidarity, however, imagined and acted upon before Cold War hostilities broke out[395].

American power is made more acceptable to other states because institutionalized. NATO and the other security treaties establish some limits on the autonomy of American military power, although these limits are only partial. Other regional and global multilateral institutions also function to circumscribe and regularize American's power in various economic and policy realms. The lesson of American order building in this century is that international institutions have played a pervasive and ultimately constructive role in the exercise of American power. This complex and highly institutionalized system of restraint, assurance and commitment has operated for most of the last fifty years under the shadow of the Cold War. Today, it will be increasingly necessary to make the system of restraint, commitment and assurance more explicitly and formal if the system is to last without the Cold War's shadow.

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[394] ***Ibid***, pp. 63,64
[395] ***Ibid***, p. 65

A new American - European pact might include the following elements. First, the US and Europe need to reaffirm the postwar bargain that has several aspects. The US agrees to exercise its military and political power in concert with Europe and through regional and global multilateral and inter-governmental institutions. The US both restraints the most excessive expressions of unilateralism and arbitrary power and commits itself to extended deterrence. In return, the Europeans pursue an agenda of continental integration and cooperation that is deeply compatible with regional and global openness. Europe also agrees not to organize its security affairs in a way that lays the groundwork for strategic rivalry between itself and the US. The two units agree to a binding security pact that trumps all other security arrangements. Second, the US and Europe need to push forward with engagement on their many transatlantic disputes. There is need to be more self-conscious efforts to develop routine ways to resolve these disputes and identity emerging disputes before that overwhelm political leaders. Third, the EU and the US need to continue to search for new institutional innovations that will facilitate joint leadership. Fourth, one of the sources of stability in the Atlantic region is the dense set of private transnational relations and networks. These should be fostered. The societies of Europe and the US will continue to interweave. The more infused the Atlantic world is with transnational groups and organizations, the more these are likely to cooperate and act with a common purpose. Fifth, the leaders of the Atlantic world must redouble their efforts to talk about the Atlantic world as a distinct political community. This is a critical source of stable order in the Atlantic. The region may be held together by "interests", but it will be more durable if it is also held together by "identity". Europe and the US must continuously act to construct this common identity. Political engineering is made easier if the political identities of the parts are similar and congruent. Finally, the US has to deal with its unipolar power problem. American power has become more provocative and it is increasingly an obstacle to cooperation. The US must realize that the asymmetries of power that have long marked the postwar political landscape have been rendered more acceptable when that power was institutionalized. The important point for European and American leaders to remember is that they have fifty years of institutions and practices that have kept the order stable. Those institutions and practices are still available for the same purpose[396].

[396] *Ibid*, pp. 67,68

The European Union has improved the internal stability of its member states. The end of the Cold War poses a new pan-European challenge to the EU. So far, the net effect has been to encourage deeper and fuller integration. The 1990s can be counted a highly productive decade for the stability and constitutional evolution of the European Union and its member states, despite a difficult period economically. For America's constitutional progress, the decade was less encouraging despite record economic prosperity. The need of the Cold War has brought new danger to the American constitutional system. The sudden disappearance of that enemy leaves the US with excessive power. At the same time, it removes the pressure for constitutional discipline. The combination of excessive power and governmental indiscipline is not good for the US, the West or the world in general. The US needs to be contained – not by a new enemy, but by an old friend[397].

7.1.3. Sociological Aspect of Transatlantic Relations

A different dimension of the sociological influence on international relations concerns the attitudes of people in the aggregate that is, the direct and indirect influence of public opinion on the policy processes of the nations of the Atlantic area and of the industrial nations more generally. Recent surveys reveal no growth in support for protectionism on the part of the public and broad recognition that the world is genuinely interdependent, especially in economic terms. The public represents a fundamental change in attitude from earlier generations of Americans, especially those that predated the Second World War. There is also public commitment to an active international role for the United States. Finally, there remains a fundamental aversion to the use of military force overseas except in certain highly selective and relatively clearly defined circumstances. The American public is internationalist, not isolationist or protectionist, yet that internationalism is of a cautious variety, especially regarding the use of force[398].

Co-operation between the two cultures are promising factors today encouraging operation. The multinational corporation has proven to be a durable and influential factor in a more global, integrated economy.

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[397] Calleo, *op. cit.*, p. 79

[398] Cyr, I. Arthur. After the Cold War, American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia. New York University Press, 1997, p. 20

The end of the Eastern bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of Communism as a genuine, influential, at the core consistent ideology in Europe and much of the rest of the world has been a direct result of human action, of a wave of popular resistance, which even well-established police states proved unable to defeat. In very practical terms concerning popular opinion, one great advantage for American foreign policy is the basic support among the American public for the United States to exercise broad leadership on the international front[399].

7.2. Domestic Context of Transatlantic Relations

With the end of the Soviet threat, governments and citizens are well aware that this is a period in which the sharp reduction of classical external security threats permits them to concentrate more on the tasks of reforming and revitalizing their societies. Transatlantic governments are limited by these domestic factors as they attempt to cooperate to defend their national interests, to meet proximate threats, and to try to shape the international environment for the new millennium[400].

In Europe, politicians and public opinion are largely self-absorbed by a range of national problems that is stimulating economic growth, lowering unemployment, downsizing the welfare state, dealing with the consequences of an aging population, ensuring adequate health care, combating crime, and reducing drug use.

All this means that Europe's willingness and even capacity to join with the United States in dealing in any strategic and comprehensive way with the challenges and opportunities of the international system in the next five years may be modest. In some sense, this is understandable. Both EMU and EU enlargement remain unfinished tasks[401].

This external situation has permitted most Americans to center their attention on the many challenges that confront US society: the state of the economy, education, crime, drug abuse, health care, and welfare reform.

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[399] ***Ibid***, p. 24
[400] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, p. 12
[401] ***Ibid***, p. 13

7.3. The Euro-Atlantic Community

Contacts between the United States and the EC were regularized in 1989-1990 as a basis of "Euro-Atlantic architecture" cooperation. Similarly signing Transatlantic Declaration (November 1990) between the two sides committed them to regular high-level contacts at a time when the United States was coming concerned about Europe's growing volatility[402].

As for the characteristics of the emerging European Union foreign policy, it is worth to note that economic relations across the Atlantic are sometimes quite stormy. The United States is particularly angered by the agricultural protectionism of the European Union. High tariffs and the imposition of quotas make it very difficult for American farm products to penetrate the European market. Americans also complain that Europeans compete unfairly with heavily subsidized farm products on world markets. However, Europeans express dissatisfaction with American trade policies, too; for example, US restrictions imposed on steel imports from Europe[403].

Political aspects of EU-US relations have grown deeper in the 1990s. It also introduces the notion of an EU-US "foreign policy cooperative culture" to describe and explain the bilateral consultative process and to identify examples of coordinated and complementary foreign policy responses related to that process[404].

EU-US foreign policy cooperation now covers:

- The world's major regions and key issues (e.g., Asia, weapons proliferation)
- Takes different forms (sanctions against repressive regimes, diplomatic recognition)
- Operates at different levels (bilateral, multilateral)
- Varies in composition of its key players (EU-United States-Canada)

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[402] McCormick, *op. cit.*, p. 290
[403] Steiner, *op. cit.*, p. 351
[404] Regelsberger, *op. cit.*, p. 297

- Organize into scheduled and ad hoc consultations (from Working Groups to heads of government)

- Draws on a dense web of bilateral links (States, EU member states-United States)

- Entails meetings around the world (Washington, New York, Brussels, other EU-member capitals, third country capitals, and international conferences and organizations)

- Draws on considerable resources of the participant governments to prepare, schedule, attend, participate, and implement the results of bilateral consultative meetings.

EU-US foreign policy consultations and negotiations tend to factor into the decision-making in other bilateral (e.g., Washington-Bonn) and multilateral forums (NATO, UN). After the Transatlantic Declaration, the EU-US political relationship is likely to gain more exposure that provided a framework for EU-US cooperation that has only been in operation since November 1990[405].

EU-US political relations refer to the formal and informal, scheduled and ad hoc, diplomatic exchanges between the EU and the United States over bilateral, multilateral, and international political and security issues and developments.

Within the context of political relations, there is a "foreign policy cooperative culture" that is:

- A relationship between actors of roughly comparable economic and demographic size (e.g., GDP);

- Who are at similar levels of societal and political development (advanced industrialized democracies);

- Who are bound by similar political values and principles, which affect foreign policy behavior (human rights, respect for international law);

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[405] *Ibid*, p. 299

• Bound to a framework of bilateral policy consultations that entails mutual commitments and responsibilities (Transatlantic Declaration);

• Committed to minimizing policies that work at cross-purposes and seeking common or complementary approaches to international problems (arms proliferation);

• Prepared to agree to disagree over certain policy issues without endangering overall cooperation (response to Bosnian War);

• Prepared to harness considerable diplomatic and financial resources to obtain similar objectives more effectively than if each acted alone (aid coordination to Eastern Europe)[406].

Thus, the EU-US culture of foreign policy cooperation, with its various processes and manifestations, neither replaces nor competes with bilateral relations between the individual EC states and the United States. Instead, this cooperation draws from and thus complements strong and historically deep bilateral interstate ties. The EU and the United States have, or are developing, special cooperative relationships (or partnerships) with other states.

The Euro-Atlantic Community has yet to formulate effective responses to prospective problems. This is the case in spite of the recognition that they are fundamental to the security of Europeans and North Americans alike. Responding to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, US Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher stated[407]:

> "Nothing less is involved than the possibility of a revived nuclear threat, higher US defense budgets, spreading instability and a devastating setback for the world democratic movement. This is the greatest strategic challenge of our time ... bringing Russia of history's most powerful countries - into the family of peaceful nations will serve our highest security, moral and economic interests".

Many would argue that Western institutions and policy makers failed to respond adequately to a crisis which most anticipated, and this failure deepened the crisis and undermined the

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[406] ***Ibid***, p. 300
[407] Latter, Richard. The Future of Transatlantic Relations. May 1993, Wilton Park Paper 71, 1993, p. 2

position of reformers in the former Soviet bloc who were the most ardent advocates of a new cooperative order.

The outcome is by no means certain and effective decision-making that is required if the EC members are to play a full and coherent part in the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic community. Internal decision-making procedures must be improved if the Community is to act effectively on such issues as developing balanced trade relations with the United States with formulating and implementing effective security and foreign policies.[408].

The EU's relationship with the United States has fluctuated as the interests of the two sides have joined and parted. The United States was originally supportive of the idea of European integration. The interests of the United States and Western Europe continue to overlap at almost every turn. However, as economic issues replace military security as the key element in the transatlantic relationship and as the power of the EU grows and the United States looks increasingly to Latin America and Asia. The United States will need to redefine the balance between prosperity and security and bring economic issues to bear in its relationship with Europe[409].

The early 1980s witnessed growing tensions in US-European relations, particularly over the question of appropriate policies to pursue towards the USSR. The United States had emerged disillusioned from the period of détente, unable to secure the expected moderation in Soviet foreign policy. The invasion of Afghanistan and the progress in Soviet military modernization had left the US feeling it deceived. Hence, the Reagan administration entered office in January 1981 with a determination to reassert American power and to confront the Soviet Union around the globe in order to constrain its expansionist tendencies[410].

Differences in trans-Atlantic attitudes towards the USSR resulted in tensions within NATO. The US tended to view the European approach as deriving either, from 'military timidity' or selfish economic interest. Washington also complained about the unwillingness of their allies to bear a larger share of the defense burden. With sharp increases in American military spending and with a ballooning budget deficit, Washington criticized the Europeans for failing

[408] ***Ibid***, p. 18
[409] McCormick, ***op. cit.***, p. 290
[410] Rees, ***op. cit.***, p. 12

to do more. In particular, this focused on the failure to implement the NATO target of a three per cent real increase in defense spending that had been agreed in 1979.

In contrast, the West Europeans were reluctant to sacrifice the benefits that they had derived from the détente process. As a region, Europe had enjoyed a decrease in tension and had witnessed the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, in 1975, which formalized the status quo.

Individual countries had also experienced important improvements in their contacts with the East that is Germany, for instance, had transformed its relationship with the German Democratic Republic and had established a prosperous trading relationship with Moscow. Such factors made West European states cautious about following the US anti-Soviet lead. They were all too aware that renewed Cold War hostility would focus once again upon Europe and increase the risk of it becoming a battleground between the superpowers[411].

7.4. Transatlantic Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America

Opportunities currently exist for the US-European relationship help to mold the 21st century's world[412]. The two sides of the Atlantic continue to share vital interests and face a common set of challenges both in Europe and beyond. These challenges are so many and diverse that neither the United States nor the allies can overcome alone, especially in light of growing domestic restrictions on the implementation of foreign policy. Thus, protecting shared interests and managing common threats to the West in the years ahead will necessitate not only continued cooperation but also a broader and more comprehensive transatlantic partnership than in the past.

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[411] *Ibid*

[412] In the early twenty-first century, the most influential set of debates is that between so-called cosmopolitans and their critics. These debates take place over a wide variety of issues. Both morally and politically, examples would be the justification of the use of force, character and implications of intercultural meetings and dialogue, and requirements of international justice and the desirability and possibility of large-scale political transformations, e.g., the changing character of the state or the possibility of institutional reform in world politics such as a move towards cosmopolitan democracy. See, Rengger, Nicholas. "Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit from Eden?". International Affairs. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Volume 76, Number 4, October 2000, p. 763

As seeking to intensify a partnership, the most important departure from current US policy is the guiding Europe concretely over time much further into a global strategic partnership with the United States to help shape the international system in the new era[413].

Harmony across the Atlantic is not a goal in itself, but rather an instrument to improve the security and well being of societies on both sides of the Atlantic and of the world. Other nations have begun to play important regional roles, but only US-European collaboration has an effective global leadership over a sustained period. Although the mid-December 1998 attack on Iraq by the United States and Britain demonstrates, the use of force still has a legitimate place in transatlantic policies, its role is smaller and more complicated to implement than in the past[414].

To continue with that approach to international relations in the period ahead would ignore the powerful trends around the globe toward democracy and market economies that promise to continue to enlarge the core of democratic nations. Western values and institutions are attractive the world over and can become progressively more so.

Two broad prospective questions on the future of US-European relations are; within Europe, how can the largely positive trends on the continent be maintained and through which transatlantic policies, and what improvements can be made in US-European strategic cooperation outside Europe?

These issues regarding transatlantic collaboration outside of Europe could again raise traditional burden-sharing problems across the Atlantic[415].

7.4.1. The Transatlantic Partnership

Although transatlantic partnership between the EU and US will have some challenges, the successfully overcame conflicts by the both sides give hope for the partnership. On the one side, the challenge the US-European partnership faces in the period ahead is threefold. First is to persuade others around the world in post-Cold War conditions to abide by internationally

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[413] Blackwille, ***op. cit.***, p. 7
[414] ***Ibid***, p. 8
[415] ***Ibid***, p. 12

accepted norms and patterns of behavior and the rules of the international institutions that embody them. Second is to deal with the emerging new power centers, of which China and India are the most prominent. Third is to meet the current serious threats to Western interests, especially in the Middle East, when these threats often seem to ordinary citizens more remote, abstract, and complex than during the Cold War[416].

Indeed, on the other hand, the transatlantic partnership successfully - ejected Iraq from Kuwait, stopped the killing in Bosnia, projected stability and democracy eastward through the enlargement of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, intensified a parallel stabilizing enlargement process within the European Union, and made extraordinary progress in Northern Ireland; managed security relations with Russia.

With US vital interests connected to Europe relatively safe for the foreseeable future, Washington's security preoccupations are turning more and more toward those regions where vital American interests are threatened-most particularly in the greater Middle East and, to a lesser and more potential degree, in the Asia-Pacific region. In the greater Middle East, the two sides of the Atlantic differ on the tactics for dealing with virtually every issue in the region. Among them, the prominent issues are; the Israel-Palestinian peace process; western interaction with Iran; how best to slow proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the area; the role of force in defending transatlantic interests in the region; and increasingly, even how best to deal with Saddam Hussein over the longer term[417].

Shortly, the United States and Europe are the only conceivable global partners for each other in seeking to shape the international system in positive ways into the 21st century. Without America, Europe will tend to retreat into a continental fortress mentality or into sustained passivity as threats from beyond the continent progressively build and then intrude into the interests and daily lives of the allies. Without Europe, the United States will likely alternate between brief and usually ineffective spasms of unilateralism interspersed with occasional temptations to withdraw substantially from messy international life. A growing transatlantic partnership consistent with the regional and global challenges of the 21st century will increasingly protect the vital and important interests of both the United States and Europe, and thus the basic welfare of their citizens. As Henry Kissinger has put it, "On both sides of

[416] Blackwille, *op. cit.*, p. 1
[417] *Ibid*, p. 2

the Atlantic, the next phase of our foreign policy will require restoration of some of the dedication, attitudes and convictions of common destiny that brought us to this point - though, of course, under totally new conditions"[418].

7.4.2. A Global US-European Partnership

As for creating a global partnership, both sides of the Atlantic try to constitute a EU-US partnership around the following principles;

• The EU and allied governments should play a more active private and more visible public part in attempting to manage with the United States the regional and global implications of the Asian economic crises. This includes a comprehensive reform of international financial architecture.

• The greatest threat to vital transatlantic interests in Europe is the weak internal security surrounding Russia's nuclear weapons and material as well as its chemical and biological arsenal. While the United States is not doing enough to address this danger, the allies are doing almost nothing. This should urgently change; the Europeans should spend much more money on the problem.

• Despite the current enormous difficulties inside Russia, the West should continue to do what it responsibly can to promote economic reform within the country, if the Russian government takes the necessary steps, and increase greatly its support for democratic institution building in Russia.

• NATO should put an end to all military conflict in the Balkans and keep it that way.

• After the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO in 1999, there should be an informal pause for at least three to five years before any new candidates invite to join the alliance.

[418] ***Ibid***, pp. 2,3

• The United States and the European Union should begin to negotiate gradually, a genuinely open trade and investment area - a true single transatlantic market - with real deadlines.

• Both the United States and Europe should work harder to help ensure Turkey's Western orientation[419].

• NATO should conceptually broaden its new Strategic Concept to deal with threats to shared Western interests beyond Europe, especially in the Middle East: to protect Gulf oil, to slow the entry of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems into that region, and to undertake the long-term joint military planning necessary to prepare for these contingencies.

• Western Europe should substantially accelerate its military modernization and power projection capability in order to have the option of joining the United States effectively in defending Western vital interests in the greater Middle East with force, if that should become necessary. This includes intensified US-European work on theater ballistic missile defenses, stand off forces, and defense industry cooperation across the Atlantic.

• The United States should maintain the clear lead in mediating negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. The EU's role should nevertheless grow over time. Europeans have a right to expect that Washington confront directly and strongly either one, or both, of the parties when their policies are thwarting the peace process.

• The United States and Europe should accelerate efforts to reinvigorate the Gulf War coalition and resume the use of sustained force against Iraq if Saddam Hussein continues to take provocative action. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council should maintain the economic sanctions on Baghdad into the near future and rigorously enforce those sanctions to try to deny Iraq materials that could be utilized for its NA/MD and ballistic missile programs.

• With respect to Iran, the United States and Europe need to forge a new strategy and opening toward Iran based on a specific set of agreed criteria regarding Tehran's external

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[419] *Ibid*, p. 4

behavior. The allies should become much more engaged in the effort to slow Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

- The EU and individual European governments that, in terms of commercial objectives in Asia, should increasingly bring the region into their strategic calculations and international security perspectives. This will require a concerted American effort to involve the allies much more in developing analyses and policy options regarding Asia.

- Cooperative efforts to combat international terrorism, environmental degradation, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking should be strengthened within the transatlantic community[420].

7.4.3. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership

The main goal is to intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral EU/US co-operation and common actions in the field of trade and investment.

The impact of various regulatory approaches in crucial areas such as biotechnology, environment and food safety, data privacy, government procurement and intellectual property, consumer and plant health demonstrate the need to increase the level and quality of the bilateral co-operation.

Transatlantic Economic Partnership at the 18 May 1998 EU/US summit, in London aimed at breaking down the barriers to trade across the Atlantic and working more closely together to pursue multilateral liberalization. There is no doubt that the TEP has a political significance because it is obvious that strengthening economic relations improving and reinforcing overall relationships.

New multilateral trade negotiations started in 2000 including implementation of WTO agreements, dispute settlement, services, agriculture, trade facilitation, industrial tariffs, intellectual property rights, investment, competition, government procurement, environment, WTO accessions, developing countries, electronic commerce and labor standards.

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[420] ***Ibid***, p. 5

In February 1990, US president Bush and EC Council president Haughey agreed to set up biannual EC-US presidential summits. Thus, before German unification and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EC and the United States were already putting their bilateral political relationship on a more pragmatic and post-hegemonic footing. The United States instigated the adjustments because it knew that the EC was going to become a more powerful political unit, and the EC recognized how valuable the US anchor in Europe was[421].

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 confirmed the need to give a more concrete structure to relations. The democratic revolutions that followed in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Soviet power increasingly reminded the Bush administration of the need to improve relations with the EC. The new US policy was pragmatic: If the United States were to have influence with the EC, it could not be seen opposing further EC unification. Thus, it would the best for the United States to work with the EC to develop a relationship in which the responsibilities and burdens of western interests shared[422].

Four developments are important in terms of the state of the EU-US political relationship in the mid-1990s. In fact, the years 1993-1994 exacerbated the development of the EU-US political relationship because they managed to break the previous constraints on foreign policy cooperation through the following events

- The entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 November 1993;

- Completion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on 15 December 1993;

- The NATO summit on 10-11 January 1994;

- The North Atlantic Council on Bosnia on 9 February 1994[423].

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[421] Regelsberger, ***op. cit.***, p. 306
[422] ***Ibid***, p. 307
[423] ***Ibid***, p. 313

Indeed, a new chapter in EU-US political relations has opened as the result of the coming into force of the TEU, with its provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity. As the EU develops a more effective means of conducting foreign and security policies and can back its powerful economic diplomacy with a Politico-military capability, the prospects for EU-US foreign policy cooperation expanding into new areas of security are increased in ways previously not thought possible.

Conclusion of the Uruguay Round after seven years of negotiations enables the EU and the United States to put aside many commercial disputes of the past decade and turn to improving other areas of the bilateral relationship, including foreign policy.

The NATO summit was a historical turning point in EU-US political relations for the first time, NATO:

- Gave its full support to CFSP and ESDI, which it maintained would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance;

- Concluded that the EU and NATO share common strategic interests;

- Endorsed the notion of Combined Joint Task Forces to allow WEU to draw on NATO assets in support of CFSP outside the NATO area;

- Supported and commended the EU action plans of 22 November 1993 to secure a negotiated settlement in Bosnia[424].

The NATO decision is a boost to prospects for an ESDI related to NATO, and it also pays tribute to the task of mediation in former-Yugoslavia that was assigned to the EU. It was extraordinary that a NATO summit communiqué should refer to the EU seven times, to the ESDI seven times, to WEU nine times, and to the CFSP two times. A major strain in transatlantic security relations has been alleviated as a result of NATO (US) recognition of the role of WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to serve the future security of the EC.

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[424] ***Ibid***, p. 314

The February 1994 North Atlantic Council ultimatum on the belligerents around Sarajevo to withdraw reflected intense consultations between the United States, the EU, and EU governments.

Europe and the United States finally agreed in February 1994 on a two-pronged strategy to lift the siege of Sarajevo through NATO auspices and to work for a negotiated settlement based on the EU's revised action plan (first broached in November 1993). In short, although Bosnia was a key' source of EU-US conflict, it was also a key source of intense Allied cooperation and coordination over diplomatic efforts, sanctions monitoring via NATO and the WEU, and humanitarian airlifts[425].

The transatlantic partnership in the 1990s consists of a complex web of institutions wherein the United States and Europe cooperate in the spheres of politics, security, economics, and culture.

Responding to changed security realities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlarged to encompass the states of Central and Eastern Europe through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 and the Partnership for Peace program in January 1994. The main transatlantic partners are also the main players in the economic organizations of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank group, and were the dominant forces behind the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization in January 1994. These actors also consult through the Group of Seven (G7)[426] industrialized states and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. To these, was added the Declaration on US-EC Relations of 23 November 1990, which established a framework for regular and intensive consultation[427].

Consequently, the institutional expression of the transatlantic relationship is expanding, and it is doing so in a way that is inclusive. Security institutions are evolving in a way this is compatible with regional security complexes, and supportive of former adversaries. In economic matters, the forces of globalization also seem to be creating pressures for

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[425] ***Ibid***, p. 315

[426] The seven economically largest free market countries: Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, and Germany

[427] Wiener, Jarrod (Editor). The Transatlantic Relationship. Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996, p. 1

convergence. As the division between trade and investment becomes blurred, the institutional arrangements for dealing with these issues may respond through initiatives either in the OECD or WTO as well as at the expense of multilateralism. Moreover, it may be too traditionalist to concentrate on the nation-state as the only actor. Global interdependence means a genuine interdependence, horizontally and vertically. There has long been a vast literature on the growing awareness of and interest in the role of intra-state actors in both shaping national foreign policies and acting independently in the international arena. This is an important phenomenon in the United States, which has been active in seeking overseas investment and promoting overseas sales. This type of activity has increased in recent years and now encompasses local, state, regional and even ethnic group activities in both influencing US foreign policy and pursuing their own agendas abroad[428].

7.5. Economic Dimension of Transatlantic Relations: European Monetary Union and Euro-Dollar Relations

Areas in which the US and the EU acting together could contribute to the expansion of world trade. That is where success has been found in the past. In the Uruguay Round, it was only when the US and the EU took the lead, when the US and the EU found a meeting of minds that those difficult negotiations were brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Today, this may be where success lies. Jointly, it is possible to influence global trade negotiations to ensure better offers from the global trading partners, resulting in mutually beneficial agreements[429].

With respect to another kind of trade challenge, the US and the EU agree on the need to reduce both tariff and non-tariff trade restrictions and it is made some progress in this area. Scholars have been studying together to identify ways to eliminate remaining barriers to transatlantic trade.

Steady progress has been made on Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). That would affect transatlantic trade by allowing products tested, certified, or inspected in one country to be accepted throughout the transatlantic marketplace. It is nearing agreement on a first group of MRAs and continuing the negotiations on others. Although it is agreed on the goals and objectives, MRAs present a unique set of challenges. Although their task is complicated by

[428] *Ibid*, p. 22
[429] Monar, *op. cit.*, p. 8

differences in the regulatory structures and laws both government and industry agree that it is well worth the effort. The business leaders of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue have clearly stated the importance of removing non-tariff barriers, particularly those in the regulatory area. Each day it is delayed on agreement adds unnecessary costs to businesses and to consumers. These are the most significant trade barriers remain between the sides. To resolve them would give a new boost to the transatlantic trade[430].

7.5.1. The EMU and Euro

The creation of the euro, the new currency of the monetary union, raises a host of questions for the United States, the rest of the world, and the external relations of the European Union. The most important question among them is whether monetary union will lead to cooperation or rivalry between the United States and Europe. This question can be examined through concerning the political, economic, and institutional interests of the two sides[431].

To C. Randall Henning, the euro's impact on the international community depends on further developments within the European Union. According to Henning, if the European Union provides stability to Central and Eastern Europe, undertakes economic policy reforms, and develops the institutions for external monetary policymaking, then, the monetary union will have beneficial effects on the rest of the world, the United States in particular. He adds that if the European Union is unable to build upon the monetary union in these ways, the euro's impact outside Europe will not be favorable[432].

On the other hand, in his appraisal of the euro's potential as a global currency, Pier Carlo Padoan asserts that multiple equilibrium in the international financial system are present and anchored in "currency regions" and that there will be a transition phase between a "low" (regional) and a "high" (global) equilibrium[433]. The transition, to him, will be a function of policy options followed by EMU authorities, particularly EMU's exchange rate policy and its attractiveness for non-EMU countries. Although the dollar is likely to remain the dominant currency in the short run, Padoan argues that over the long term the euro may well rival the

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[430] ***Ibid***, pp. 8,9

[431] Henning, C. Randall and Pier Carlo Padoan. Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro. European Community Studies Association, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.; 2000, p. 2

[432] ***Ibid***

[433] For direct and indirect benefits of a single currency, see also; Apel, Emmanuel. European Monetary Integration: 1958-2002, Routledge, 1998, pp. 97-100

greenback, at which it will be in the interest of both European and American policymakers to focus on cooperative efforts at stabilizing bilateral rates and ensuring continued prosperity[434].

The euro and dollar are now competing and will continue to compete as international currencies in the marketplace. That competition underscores the need for official cooperation across the Atlantic. Without cooperation between US and European authorities, the risks of monetary and financial instability would be high. With cooperation, the United States and Europe can foster efficient macroeconomic management and exchange rate stability, and improve the functioning of international financial institutions[435].

In sum, US policy is not hostile toward the monetary union. It is distinctly positive-sum in orientation and supportive. However, many officials remain highly skeptical that Europe will be able to muster the reforms to make its economy more flexible and dynamic, create growth and employment, thus benefits the international community[436].

Thus, in that context, it will be useful to mention further both the American and the European interests to consolidate the situation.

7.5.2. American Interests

American interests in monetary union have a political, economic, and institutional nature. Each of these categories contains both positive-and zero-sum considerations to some degree.

European monetary union engages the political interests of the United States in three ways. First, it gives impetus to internal economic reforms undertaken in anticipation of enlargement of EU membership. Second, it promotes *political* integration of the European Union; and third, it has an impact on Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the enlargement process would almost be slower, if not stagnant, without monetary union. Member states know that to enlarge successfully they must reform several of the EU's policies and institutions. In particular, the CFSP and the structural funds in the Community budget must be overhauled. In

[434] Henning, ***op. cit.***, p. 2
[435] ***Ibid***, p. 4
[436] ***Ibid***, p. 17

success, therefore, these policy reviews will probably benefit the United States as well as transatlantic and multilateral economic relations[437].

It has often been said that the euro is the monetary means to political integration in Western Europe. The monetary union provides a number of incentives for member states to cooperate in other economic areas such as fiscal and financial policies. Many have argued that the monetary union is better managed under a political union than under a relatively loose collection of member states.

As American policymakers recognize, the primary US *economic* interests revolves around the question of whether the European economy will be dynamic and vigorous or slow growing. Over the short term, the answer depends on the macroeconomic policies of the euro area. Over the long term, it depends on whether Europe will pursue a substantial list of economic policy reforms to achieve greater labor market flexibility, deregulation, privatization, and fiscal consolidation, including resolution of unfounded pension liabilities. A second major concern is the impact of the euro on the international role of the dollar. A third American interest involves potential constraints on the financing of current account deficits, which could arise if a substantial portion of inventors around the world shifted out the dollar and into euro assets[438].

In general, the formulation of the monetary union and increasing international role of the euro will not constrain US macroeconomic policy through any external financing constraint.

The monetary union gives rise to a host of European *institutional* matters – the organization of monetary policymaking and operations, the mechanisms through which fiscal and other economic policies are coordinated among member states, and the institutions through which monetary policy is coordinated with fiscal policy. It also raises a set of issues that are specifically external in character. This signifies the allocation of responsibility for exchange rate and external monetary policy, the process by which exchange rate policy will be set, the international representation of the euro area, and the ratification of international agreements[439].

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[437] ***Ibid***, p. 18
[438] ***Ibid***, p. 19
[439] ***Ibid***, p. 28

Security cooperation is also important. The United States has acceded in principle to use by the Western European Union, the provisional embodiment of the European Security and Defense Identity, of key elements of the NATO military command structure and NATO assets, subject to a number of conditions. However, the United States remains opposed to any separate European caucus within the NATO Council. American officials fear that such a caucus would render European preferences and decision-making opaque rather than transparent and present lowest-common-denominator positions that are inflexible. If such a caucus had been operating during the 1990s, the alliance would very likely have not reached agreement on Bosnia, Kosovo, or NATO enlargement, among other actions. They performed EU position might well have been either opposed to military action or, in the case of enlargement, unacceptable to the United States[440].

The United States, therefore, has a hierarchy of preferences for outcomes regarding EU institutional evolution and the arrangements through which American officials relate to the monetary union. The first preference is consolidated representation in bilateral bargaining and international institutions, such as the finance G-7, combined with majority decision-making and transparency. The second preference is unconsolidated representation under a consensus rule with opaque decision-making. This preference is closest to the status quo. The third preference is consolidated representation combined with consensus decision-making without transparency. The United States is most likely to confront with minimalist offers and inflexible positions without being able to discern which governments might be blocking agreement and their true preferences[441].

Institutional reform is on the European agenda. First, the Treaty of Amsterdam mandates greater openness in EU institutions, particularly with respect to access to documents and the openness of meetings such as those of the Council. EU institutions are implementing this commitment. Second, as a prerequisite to enlargement of EU membership to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the European Union is committed to convening and intergovernmental conference to consider institutional reform.

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[440] ***Ibid***, p. 30
[441] ***Ibid***, p. 32

The International Monetary Fund will be a particularly important arena of cooperation and competition between the United States and the European Union. Since the creation of the IMF, Europeans have been conscious and sometimes resentful of American influence within the institution. A number of European officials see EMU as an opportunity to counter American influence with collective influence of their own. At stake, among other matters, are the restoration of international financial stability and the construction of a new international financial "architecture" that could reduce the frequency and severity of financial crises[442].

Consequently, monetary union is likely to be in the American geopolitical interest, because it is likely to support economic and political stability in Central and Eastern Europe. European strength within the region will probably serve US interests because the United States and European Union share core political values of rule of law, democracy, and human rights and the United States is eager to economize on resources devoted to foreign contingencies. The impact on American economic interests is more complex. If growth within the monetary union were stifled by inflexibility at the macroeconomic level and the euro area relied on exports as a principal source of growth, US-EU monetary relations could resemble US-German relations during the 1960s and 1970s, which witnessed repeated conflicts over macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. On the other hand, the monetary union itself could well enhance prospects for structural reform, raising investment and growth. Moreover, even if the euro were to tighten potential balance of payments constraints on the United States, this could have positive sides in preventing the United States from making policy mistakes, such as the over-expansionary monetary policies in the 1970s and fiscal policies in the 1980s. In short, though monetary union is likely to be in the interest of the United States overall, it could also present some obstacles and inconvenience in the more narrow international monetary area[443].

The European Union and euro-area are in the midst of a long-term evolution of the institutional arrangements for making external monetary policy and presenting that policy to the international community.

7.5.3. European Interests

[442] ***Ibid***, p. 47
[443] ***Ibid***, p. 51

With the introduction of the euro in early 1999, debate began on its potential as a global currency. That debate is about how the euro-dollar exchange rate[444] will evolve over the next five to ten years. The international financial system before EMU consisted of multiple currency regions in equilibrium and that the system is now in transition between a regional or "low" equilibrium to a global or "high" equilibrium. The course of events during this transition will depend on the policy-making machinery and options chosen by EMU authorities, most notably the exchange rate policy.

In the aftermath of EMU, some analysts have argued that euro is bound to be weak in relation to the dollar initially. The initial weakness of the euro in relation to the dollar is understandable in view of the growth differential between the United States and "Euro-land". Much of the reason for this difference lies in "structural" rather than in "macroeconomic" imbalances in the EU economy, although the behavior of the euro-dollar rate will greatly influenced by economic policy.

There are four major structural and institutional changes are likely to occur: the elimination of a substantial portion of international trade, the disappearances of a number of national currencies and of their respective markets, the introduction of a completely new currency, and the creation of an important new central institution – European Central Bank (ECB)[445]. The first three changes, which are structural, will interact with the ECB's policy, and the external value of the euro rate will reflect this complex interaction. The international monetary system is on the brink of enormous changes[446].

The possible course of the euro's evolution can be assessed both through the standard theory of exchange rate determination and through the theory of "key currencies", as euro is a natural candidate for the role of international currency alongside the dollar. Several conditions must be met for a currency to take up this key role that is the economy that supports the currency must have significant weight in world trade and product, there must be no significant external constraints, capital must enjoy full freedom of movement, financial markets should be deep

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[444] For the role of the euro/dollar exchange-rate in international trade, see; Louis Jean-Victor and Hajo Bronkhorst. The Euro and European Integration, "European Policy" Series, No: 21, Euro Institute, 1999, 115-117

[445] For minimum requirements what the ECB considers and further objectives, see; Issing Otmar. Hayek, Currency Competition and European Monetary Union (with commentaries by Lawrence H. White, Roland Vaubel), Occasional Paper 111, Published by the Institute of Economic Affairs, 2000, p. 29

[446] Henning, *op. cit.* pp. 65- 67

and liquid, and the economy must be strong and stable. The euro satisfies or will be able to satisfy, these requirements.

In the first instance, Europe is already ahead of the United States with 31 percent share of world trade (excluding intra-EU trade) and 20 percent of world product, versus 26 percent and 18 percent, respectively, for the United States[447]. External constraints seem negligible that is in the past two decades, The European Union has maintained a substantially balanced current account whereas the United States has shown a deficit. Capital movement poses no problems, either. The euro's composition and, to some extent, the UK government's decision not to participate in the first phase of EMU, however, leaves the financial market in euros less developed than that of the United States. As for European strength and stability, much will depend on the extent to which the European Union succeeds in restoring sustainable growth and employment. For this reasons, the euro can be reasonably expected to be the second key currency alongside the dollar. What remains to be seen is whether the euro will be more or less equivalent to the American currency or whether it will merely remain a "regional" currency[448].

In theory, multiple equilibrium can occur the evolution of key currencies owing to the presence of externalities associated with the role of "vehicle currency". The equilibrium share of a currency in international reserves and private portfolios may be "small" or "large", depending on whether it plays a regional or global role. To shift from one balance to another, a currency must surpass a minimum critical mass in international use that will allow combine factors, network externalities, to operate.

The concept of multiple equilibrium implies a different share for the euros as an international currency and a different long-term equilibrium level of the euro-dollar rate, to the extent that the demand for euros ensuing from its role as a key currency is related to different supply behaviors. Whether the euro will shift from one equilibrium to another will depend on EMU policies and on whether the markets and monetary authorities of third countries can be persuaded of the euro's stability as an international currency.

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[447] ***Ibid***

[448] For some statistical date concerning both the Euro area and the United States: See; Artis, Michael, Axel Weber and Elizabeth Hennessy (Editors). The Euro, A Challenge and Opportunity for Financial Markets, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000, pp. 301-304

The euro's desirability would be enhanced by the perception that once the euro was introduced the EU economy would grow out of its low-growth/high-unemployment profile. Hence, EU policies in support of growth would have a positive impact on the euro's role in international markets, just as the behavior of the American economy underpins the dollar's attractiveness[449]. In fact, policies enhancing EU growth would be advantageous for both the European Union and the United States because, among other things, a solid and expanding economic environment tends to strengthen international cooperation[450].

7.5.4. Euro-Dollar Relations

Euro-dollar relations can be viewed from at least two perspectives: relations during the transitional phase, with an eye on the immediate impact of EMU on the euro-dollar exchange rate; and relations over the longer term, in a bipolar monetary context. In the short to medium term, the euro-dollar relationship will remain asymmetrical. The stronger growth potential of the US economy as well as the unchallenged global role of the dollar, suggest a leader-follower pattern of transatlantic monetary relations. To the extent that lower EU growth reflects unresolved structural problems and that the possibility for the euro to act as a global currency is contingent on the development of a euro-based financial system, the asymmetric relationship is likely to persist. Even so, an asymmetric relationship can be marked by different degrees of cooperation[451].

Some scholars might argue that a major institutional change such as the establishment of EMU and of a supranational monetary authority in Europe will increase the amount of transatlantic cooperation. Others would counter that transatlantic cooperation is bound to decrease, for by necessity the European Union and the United States will be more interested in their domestic affairs and will seek more inward-looking strategies. Hence, monetary and macroeconomic relations will move toward bilateralism rather than multilateralism.

The "demand" for international cooperation will increase in the first scenario and will decrease in the second. If the first scenario prevails, however, the question remains whether a larger demand for cooperation will be matched by an increase in the "supply" of cooperation.

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[449] See, also; Portillo Michael, Democratic Values and the Currency (with a postscript by Martin Feldstein), Occasional Paper 103, Published by the Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998, pp. 16-19
[450] Henning, *op. cit.*, p. 69
[451] *Ibid*, p. 108

In other words, will international institutions accommodate demand by adjusting to the new scenario? This point may be worrying in the light of past experience, which suggest that in the international system the supply of cooperation usually falls short of demand. Of course, this need not be the case if one considers that a larger supply of cooperation does not imply stronger international institutions but, in many cases, more flexible institutions[452].

A stable euro-dollar exchange rate would help transatlantic economic relations. It would be favored by all actors that involved in global activities, multinational firms, and sectors exposed to international competition. Furthermore, it would represent a major prerequisite for initiatives such as a new transatlantic market place. In addition, insofar as the medium term will see more of sector base or specific rather than general issues on the transatlantic negotiating table, exchange rate manipulation would not be the appropriate policy response by either of the two sides.

Deeper financial interdependence and instability will call for more joint responsibility in providing global stabilization. Deeper transatlantic integration raises the costs of policy conflicts and promotes cooperation. This and the other factors favoring stronger cooperation can be divided into three groups: the gains from mutual concessions, the pressures from domestic constituencies, and the common external threats.

Mutual concessions would produce mutual gains. For instance, a more expansionary EMU macroeconomic policy stance could redistribute the burden of global stabilization for the United States, while giving he European Union a stronger voice and role in international institutions. Before such gains could be realized, however, the European Union would have to resolve its internal conflicts, which as of mid-1999 still represent an obstacle to the implementation of expansionary policies.

7.5.5. The Theory of Economic International Cooperation

The theory of international economic relations, which suggest why international agreements are made and what conditions favor their success, offers some insight into cooperative behavior at the international level. In the absence of a single dominant actor capable of

[452] ***Ibid***, p. 109

playing a hegemonic role in the international system, cooperation is apparently favored by the following factors:

- A small number of actors, inasmuch as this reduces the propensity to free-ride and improves the prospects for penalizing such behavior;

- A long-term horizon, which would allow actors to allocate a higher premium to future benefits from strengthened cooperation;

- Institutions that favor the dissemination of information about the behavior of the actors involved and thus the transparency and predictability of such behavior;

- The willingness of actors to adjust their preferences[453].

In the post-euro era, the first condition is obviously met, as is the third if it is assumed that such institutions as the economic G-7 will continue to function and international institutions such as the IMF will be strengthened. Preferences will be difficult to adjust until EMU countries complete structural reforms and the European Union gains a more prominent voice in international financial institutions. Moreover, the number of actors needs closer attention because it calls for a review of the postwar evolution of monetary relations between Europe and the United States or, rather, of the consequences of US behavior for Europe's international monetary policy options. These relations may be summarized as follows: whenever the United States has behaved "aggressively" in its macroeconomic and monetary relations with Europe, the European countries have increased the degree of monetary cooperation among themselves in order to stem such "aggressiveness". Conversely, periods of "benign" attitude on the part of the American authorities have slowed down monetary integration in Europe[454].

As a conclusion, the long-term position of the euro in the international system remains unclear given the possibility of multiple equilibrium in currency relations. Whether it will shift from a regional to a global role will depend on the extent to which the euro currency region will become the international domain of the single currency. But that will only happen

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[453] *Ibid*, p. 111
[454] *Ibid*, p. 112

if there is increasing integration between EMU and non-EMU countries and if their policy preferences converge.

Both conditions can meet. The process of monetary integration in Europe seems to be fulfilling the requirements for an optimum currency area. In addition, there is little evidence to support the desirability of an "active" exchange rate policy for the euro to support EMU's competitiveness.

The success of the euro as an international currency will also depend on its use by non-EMU countries. These regions of potential euro influence are Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries, and Latin America. Each has different macroeconomic, trade, and institutional ties with the European Union and thus faces different incentives for using the euro as their key reference currency.

These structural features of the euro currency region suggest that EU-US monetary relations will remain asymmetric over the medium term as long as Europe is unable to return to a path of sustained growth and as long as international financial markets are dominated by US banks and financial institutions. At the same time, transatlantic cooperation can be expected to proceed because of the high costs of a conflicting policy environment for both sides. Indeed, several incentives for cooperation are present: the mutual benefits from more balanced macroeconomic burden sharing, the pressures from pro-liberalization business groups, and the need for joint action in the face of international instability. Such incentives should enable both sides to manage their economic affairs more efficiently and to redesign international financial institutions to meet the growing challenges of globalization[455].

[455] ***Ibid***, p. 113

Chapter 8: NATO

8.1. NATO after the Cold War

In the Cold War, NATO's main role was the defense of its own members in the face of a persistent and a real threat. Now, NATO exports security to others. PM Blair has said "We are now creating a framework of stability and security across the whole Euro-Atlantic area, with NATO at the core. The main tool is NATO's PfP program, partnership with 43 countries, including many who were once our adversaries"[456].

NATO began to change to a limited degree in the late 1980s because of the easing of the Cold War. In fact, its real transformation began with the London Declaration of 1990, which stated that the alliance did not consider the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact adversaries and invited them to establish diplomatic contacts with NATO. The alliance declared that it would reduce its reliance on flexible response, though it did not rule out the nuclear option. In November 1990, NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and a joint declaration on commitment to non-aggression and all the members of the OSCE signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. These commitments, seen as formally ending the Cold War, meant to establish a political and cooperative basis for security in Europe[457].

The alliance began a review of its military strategy, resulting in NATO's "New Strategic Concept" dated November 1991 summit meeting in Rome. The concept affirmed that the core purpose of the alliance remained collective defense but declared that since the threat of a monolithic, massive military attack no longer existed, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.

Following the change several institutions came to the scene. The NACC was established in 1991 as a political body including NATO and former Warsaw Pact members. NATO created the PfP and approved plans for creating combined joint task force at its summit in January 1994. In 1997, NATO invited Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic to join the alliance

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[456] Blair, Tony. "NATO at 50". Survey of Current Affairs. Volume 29, Number 3, March 1999, p. 77
[457] Wallander, A. Celeste. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War". International Organization. Volume 54, Number 4, Autumn 2000, p. 717

created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to replace the NACC, signed partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia and Ukraine[458].

Thus, NATO shifted its military strategy from positional defense based upon its Main Defense Forces to the other two categories of NATO forces: Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces. While the Main Defense Forces form the major element of NATO's force structures, the proportions are quite different than during the Cold War. Because of shifting from threat-specific deployments and strategy, the military command structure needed to be adjusted. First, the number of commands was reduced from sixty-five command headquarters to twenty. Second, the changed security environment required not only a simple reduction in commands but also a shift in their capacity and makeup[459].

In the same period, the alliance had to confront the question of how a political-military organization with an exclusive membership could contribute to security in a Europe without threats. NATO's first attempt was to create the NACC as a way of including nonmembers in political discussions. Its purpose was to enable its members to cope with security risks through transparency, improving civil-military security matters.

Many members were dissatisfied with how NATO's post-Cold War political development had lagged so far behind its military adaptation. This was the impetus behind creating the EAPC in 1997 a forum for discussing political issues arising from PfP and for considering the political side of security partnership in Europe for nonmembers.

Even though NATO's declared mission had changed and its forces had been reduced officials agree that its persistence in this period was not due to adaptation but to inertia and a general sense that it must not be allowed to disappear. Central to its persistence was US leadership and determination to remain involved in European security through NATO and US commitment and power to back this up. One reason for the US's commitment was its risk-aversion to even the smallest prospects of Russia emerging as a threat. US commitment was also a result of NATO's internal assurance and stabilization purposes. A third reason for US

[458] ***Ibid***, p. 718
[459] ***Ibid***, pp. 718,719

commitment was recognition that NATO's general assets for decision making and joint military action should be valuable for a broader range of post-Cold War missions[460].

On the military side, NATO's Bosnia operations made clear to its members by 1995 that because of its integrated military command structure NATO was adapted to the post-Cold War European security environment. For forty years, the alliance had created an infrastructure, a set of practices and procedures, and a culture of professionalism in a military command based at SHAPE in Belgium[461].

The integrated command structure as a general asset is crucial to understanding why NATO can act for post-Cold War military missions in Europe. Related with this, Wallander stresses:

> "NATO has the military structure: look at Kosovo. The UN failed in Bosnia: it can do certain kinds of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions very well. But military missions require command and control, so this means NATO. Military command is crucial to what NATO does well"[462].

NATO has the headquarters with planning, logistics, and intelligence staffs, including military personnel who have all planned, trained, exercised, and schooled together for years and developed a deep trust.

Although officials agree that enlargement has been a post-Cold War practice clearly built on NATO's earlier practices for coping with security risks through integration, they disagree on how explicitly the "German question" has influenced this adaptation. Some officials argue that the rationale for enlargement explicitly relies on the German case as a model for potential new members. Others do not draw this parallel, though they do say that if NATO decides to accept new members, it would need to do so through a structure that involves them in military cooperation through political relations, as was the case with Germany[463].

NATO's another adaptation after the Cold War, PfP, was built on the alliance's previous practices of direct military-to-military work, exercises, and democratic control of the military.

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[460] Wallander, ***op. cit.***, p. 724
[461] ***Ibid***, p. 725
[462] ***Ibid***
[463] ***Ibid***, p. 728

Officials agree that the strength of PfP is its practical, concrete program for security cooperation that focuses on military missions, planning, and exercises.

PfP's own procedures have been developed, by relying on NATO's existing practices and structures. In addition, its Planning and Review Process was built on NATO's Defense Planning Process because the latter worked and because it could easily integrate partners into NATO's way of doing things and could shape their militaries.

In this way, PfP has become the mechanism for extending integration and interoperability beyond NATO members, and these, in turn, have served as the basis for NATO's adaptability to its political and military non-threat security missions.

NATO's post-Cold War assets reveal that NATO has clearly adapted to the post-Cold War European security environment. During the Cold War, it developed the specific assets of political-military integration and multinational command and forces to create assurance and supranational defense policy among its members. These assets have proven even more valuable for legitimacy in coping with security risks in Europe after the Cold War. NATO's general political assets for consultation and decision-making, its general military assets for planning and implementing missions, and its specific assets for fostering integration, assurance, and supranational defense policy within alliance structures were the basis for its adaptation and thus for its persistence[464].

Consequently, during the Cold War, NATO developed general assets for political consultation and decision- making, and for military planning, coordination, and implementation. These assets were developed primarily for coping with the threat of a Soviet military attack. To cope with that threat, it also developed specific assets for deterring and fighting a European or global war with the Soviet Union. It also developed practices and procedures for fostering integration among its members to address European security problems that arose from fear, uncertainty, and "national" defense policies with militaries not subject to democratic civilian control[465].

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[464] ***Ibid***, p. 730
[465] ***Ibid***, p. 731

When the security environment changed in the 1990s, NATO members turned to the alliance to address new security problems because NATO's general assets made it an effective political-military security institution capable of dealing with these new concerns. In some areas, NATO's assets have experienced a great deal of adaptation - in particular, a reduction in the number of commands and the development of combined joint task forces based on NATO military practices. In other areas, however, it is achieving multi-nationality of commands and forces. NATO's aspirations still exceed its achievements. In other areas, some new assets have emerged and through these mechanisms, NATO has incorporated nonmembers into virtually all of its practices except those involving Article 5 (collective defense)[466].

8.2. The Transformation of NATO

NATO's Membership Action Plans are far less detailed than the EU's pre-accession strategy, though they serve a similar tactical political purpose that is to offer the prospective applicants the prospects of future acceptance, without any guarantee or date[467].

Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the associated Partnership for Peace, NATO brings together over almost fifty states including former members of both Cold War alliances and former neutrals. These are overlapping the membership of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe this represents "Europe" from Vancouver to Vladivostock, a far broader reach than the Europe from Lisbon to Lublin envisaged by the EU[468].

The European Union itself has never attempted to define the limits of membership, at least not on geographic or historical-cultural grounds. Jean Monnet has said that by those who worked closely with him to have considered the question of the future extension of integrated European institutions relatively unimportant; but in the context of the Cold War, the list of potential candidates remained limited.

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[466] ***Ibid***

[467] Wallace, William. "From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO". International Affairs. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Volume 76, Number 3, July 2000, p. 481

[468] ***Ibid***, p. 482

The new US president and his team in the spring of 2001 launch a new transatlantic initiative, calling on America's allies to cooperate in sharing the burden of maintaining stability across Eurasia and the Middle East. However, the aim serves through EU enlargement, and through the network of associations that the EU has been weaving with its other near neighbors, are not identical to those of transatlantic strategists[469].

The future stability, security and prosperity of the European region, over the next generation and beyond, depend on successful management of the enlargement process: without enfeebling the institutions by failing to adjust, without alienating applicants by offering them second-class membership or by long delay, and without leaving the near neighbors outside embittered by their exclusion. The reordering of institutionalized Europe after the Cold War is not an easy task. The collective diplomacy of West European governments, supported by the weak central institutions of the EU, has not yet proved equal to the challenge[470].

Thus, enlarging NATO would have predictable consequences. First, the Russian threat to the newly admitted countries would not increase. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would not become targets unless a deployment of nuclear weapons and troops there. Second, the conventional forces agreement would be in severe jeopardy-if it was thrown immediately. Third, the START II agreement[471], which already faces considerable difficulties (unrelated to NATO expansion), would be further jeopardized. Fourth, the Russian military would almost inevitably re-deploy their mobile missiles. In addition, the Russian military would probably persuade their government to re-deploy thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, there would be two ways to get into NATO - in terms of economic evolution or in response to a Russian threat.

Proposed two-track policy is the better approach to NATO expansion. First, it does not isolate the Baltic States and Ukraine. In fact, it speaks to their security concerns, because it tells Russia that a threat to their independence may cause a NATO expansion. Second, the two-track approach does not increase the difficulties of Russia's democrats, by suggesting that

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[469] ***Ibid***, p. 492
[470] ***Ibid***, p. 493
[471] The second of the START agreements – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks – concluded by America and the Soviet Union/Russia. The START II agreement, signed on 3 January 1993, involved a two-thirds reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals over ten years, with an end to ground-launched MIRVed missiles

NATO will be expanded regardless of what Russia does. Third, the approach would tell Russian imperialists like Zhirinovsky that their behavior could result in NATO expansion. Fourth, the two-track policy would tell Western Europe that expanding the European free-trade zone to accommodate the newly emerging democracies is no more difficult for it than providing nuclear guarantees is for the United States. Finally, the two-track policy would tell American taxpayers and the American military that NATO deserves support because is an alliance based on America's vital economic and military interests[472].

8.3. NATO and EU Synergy

NATO at the beginning of the new millennium has established itself as the center of Europe's post-Cold War security system. After the British vetoed French efforts in the mid-1990s to subsume the declining Western European Union under the EU as the manifestation of an independent ESDI, the Europeans and Americans finally agreed in 1996 on a formula for developing ESDI within the NATO framework. Under guidelines for "Combined Joint Task Forces", the WEU would borrow "separable but not separate" NATO assets for humanitarian, peacekeeping, or even peacemaking operations that the WEU might wish to participate in directly[473].

NATO secretary-general Solana argued that this should produce an ESDI that would give Europe more muscle and at the same time strengthen transatlantic security links by letting the European share more of the burden of common defense. To the European and American defense elites he preached:

> "Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global partner the United States seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from "too much United States", as some still claim, but from "too little Europe". That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe's own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well"[474].

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[472] Geipel, L. Gary and Robert A. Manning (Editors). Rethinking the Transatlantic Partnership: Security and Economics in a New Era. Hudson Institute, Progressive Policy Institute, 1996, p. 81
[473] Pond, Elizabeth. The Rebirth of Europe. (rev.edition). Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.; 2000, p. 76
[474] ***Ibid***

What Europe needs is a wider "architecture based on different institutions acting toward shared strategic objectives", with each component open to taking in new members.

Certainly in peacekeeping, as the former Yugoslavia demonstrates, NATO is at the hub of Western responses because of its political cohesion, clear defense mission, integrated command, and ready forces.

Internally, some of NATO's difficult tasks such as de-emphasizing nuclear deterrence, downsizing and reorganizing main forces that had been trained to repel a massed frontal attack, and cutting the number of headquarters from sixty-five to twenty - went smoothly. The alliance's decades-old innovation of an integrated peacetime command with constant multinational rehearsals proved its value in readiness for unprecedented multinational operations at short notice under widely varied conditions.

The military Partnership for Peace and its political companion, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are both popular among the more than three dozen participants. The alliance is a "magnetic pole", in Solana's words, and enables NATO "to shape the nature of security" in Europe. "The Partnership can act as a catalyst for a common "culture" of security cooperation which has never before existed in Europe", he declares. Already it is expanding the stable Western European peace, which is far more than a balance-of-power interregnum between wars; it approaches the Kantian concept of an international community[475].

The fact remains that NATO today, as in the past, is generally appreciated for providing the security shield behind which the Europeans can pursue their happiness in tranquility.

8.4. Institutional Establishment and NATO

In the early 1990s, four alternative and mutually exclusive ideas were put forward. First, the French and Belgians articulated a view of a defense identity for the EU that would be separate from that of NATO. Second, the Germans and Czechs supported the development of a pan-European collective security arrangement based on an enhanced C/OSCE. Third, the Russians argued in favor of a concert of powers idea, manifested through a European Security Council

[475] *Ibid*, p. 78

and fourth, the Americans and British supported the centrality of a relatively unchanging NATO [476].

Ten years on, those four ideas have boiled down to two: NATO and a European identity; and whereas ten years earlier the four ideas were mutually exclusive in the early 2000s a Europeanized NATO and a European Security and Defense Policy should look close together.

NATO's perceived weakness raises the stakes of all these debates. At the core, there is no clearly identifiable purpose for NATO and no clear concepts on who should be a member, and who should not. Enlargement gives NATO a purpose, in spreading stability to Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, management of the process of enlargement has and will shape the future of NATO.

Therefore, there are two levels of common interests. First, there is the common interest in the much-boasted "values" of the "international community" such as democracy, respect for human rights, self-determination and free market economies. These values were used as justification for the use of military force to intervene in Kosovo crisis in March 1999. Second, the European states have at least three more specific common interests that is continued access to Middle Eastern oil, avoiding serious political, social and military unrest in the Mediterranean basin and avoiding similar unrest in the western regions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Interest in these geographical regions (Baltics, Caucasus, Caspian Basin and western Russia) varies among EU member states, but all have some interest[477].

In May 1999, the European Council adopted the "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia". This sets out a detailed list of objectives, instruments and means, areas of action, and specific initiatives that the EU will undertake during the Strategy's initial four-year duration. At Helsinki, the European Council adopted a similar common strategy for its relations with Ukraine, another important state to the EU's East. Although a common strategy is merely the first concrete step towards harmonization of policy between the EU member states, it is significant that defines the areas of cooperation and the means to harmonize policy[478].

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[476] Croft, Stuart. "The EU, NATO and Europeanization: The Return of Architectural Debate". European Security, Volume 9, Number 3, Autumn 2000, p. 1
[477] Shepherd, *op. cit.*, p. 18
[478] *Ibid*, p. 19

Europe's dependence on US capabilities is vital for autonomous military action in foreign territory. These are intelligence gathering, strategic lift and logistic support, and high-technology precision and standoff munitions. European dependence on the US is that the technology gap has widened rapidly in the past ten years. The Europeans have fallen behind in many of the modern technologies now part and parcel of the US military machine, e.g., laser guided munitions, stand-off weapons, theatre missile defense systems, C4I technology and stealth[479].

Moreover, Visegrad states[480] turned from the CSCE to NATO, because of two reasons; First, NATO members were not interested in creating a strong CSCE that implied a lessening of NATO. Second, once the CSCE route was blocked, it was inevitable that the Central Europeans would seek NATO membership, given their perception of their history. This does not imply that Russia is aggressive, but it recognizes that for many in Central Europe, instability in Russia is threatening[481].

The creation of a Common European Security and Defense Policy is so important, because it offers the prospects of a change in that dominant idea; not a change away from NATO and transatlanticism but towards a partnership between Europe's two major institutions. A partnership in which NATO's military prowess, and the EU's skills in humanitarian issues is one in which Europeans may be able to play a primary role in alleviating crises on the continent.

Partnership idea between NATO and the EU faces key ideational challenges, ones deeply entrenched by the arguments and events of the early 1990s. Western Europe's architectural debates are dominated by competition. The great contribution of the St. Malo Declaration was that it sought to bring together ideas that had traditionally been seen to be competitive and suggested that they need not be. However, debate from mid-1999 onwards has tended to refocus attention on competition and exclusivity. In Washington, there has been a tendency to portray the process that led to the announcement at Helsinki of European force goals as being aimed at undermining the trans-Atlantic link.

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[479] ***Ibid***, p. 21

[480] Term used to refer to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.

[481] Croft, ***op. cit.***, p. 13

Consequently, the political will to form a security and defense policy for the EU is developing. Improving specific policies has to be one of the primary aims of the new CFSP policy planning and early warning unit, and possibly the WEU. The EU needs the only capabilities for missions it wants to be able to undertake, and it has stated that the Petersberg Tasks are these missions. The Helsinki Declaration outlines, for the first time, the capabilities the EU thinks are necessary for such missions[482].

With the adoption of the Petersberg Tasks and the Helsinki Declaration, a framework for a security and defense policy for the EU is beginning to emerge from the top-down. Now it is time to start addressing the problem from the bottom-up, that is, to improve military capabilities to make an eventual security and defense policy credible[483].

8.5. Europeanization of the Alliance

NATO enlargement was formally launched at the same meeting of the North Atlantic Council (January 1994) as that which finally gave way to the emergence of some form of European Security and Defense Identity. It is important to stress from the outset that ESDI was always a NATO military project, essentially designed to solve a number of structural and political problems within the Euro-Atlantic community[484].

The Cologne Council in June 1999 and the Helsinki Council in December 1999 launched the notion of a Common European Security and Defense Policy as a part of the EU's long-term political agenda. The idea that Europe should play a role in security more commensurate with its size and resources has been promoted in different forms on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, the main focus was always on "burden sharing", while in Europe much of the driving force has been generated by France, whose long-term ambition of creating a more balanced alliance that structured by two more or less equal pillars, has created a veritable consensus across the French political class[485].

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[482] Shepherd, *op. cit.*, p. 27
[483] *Ibid*, p. 28
[484] Croft Stuart, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber. "NATO's Triple Challenge". International Affairs. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), Volume 76, Number 3, July 2000, p. 503
[485] *Ibid*, p. 504

There are two massive problems to be overcome: first, the genuine harmonization of policy between and among the EU member states – including agreement on the necessary resources to achieve the military objectives of CESDP; and second, the establishment of a new, viable trade-off between the strategic objectives of the United States and those of the EU[486].

There are two parallel sets of dichotomies in the development of a single EU-wide defense and security policy. The first is the difference in emphasis between the EU and NATO members and the remaining neutrals. The second is the degree of divergence which still persists between the "Atlanticists" and the "Europeanists" among the eleven EU-NATO member states. The former dichotomy has lost some of its edge as neutral states struggle to define the specificity and relativity of their "non-alignment", but nevertheless they bring to the EU's discussions on CESDP a different cultural approach both to diplomacy and to peacekeeping, while representing a permanent degree of skepticism about the role and function of NATO. The more serious dichotomy is that which pits those for whom the Atlantic alliance in its traditional form remains the fundamental security reference, and those who, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment, wish to see the EU acquiring greater autonomy[487].

The most crucial issue for the future of EU-US relations has to do with consultation procedures, the notion of "autonomy" and the institutional relationship between the EU and NATO.

Many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic view the relationship in terms of a zero-sum game: the greater the element of European autonomy, the weaker the alliance. NATO doctrine currently insists that a new division of labor is being introduced, which will give both the US and the EU a new lease of life in their respective spheres. A RAND[488] study suggests an imaginative trade-off that would allow the EU to move towards considerable autonomy while retaining US commitment. This would EU recognition that "Western" security interests are in fact global and therefore require European acceptance of the "universalization" of NATO's remit, under US leadership and with active EU solidarity. In exchange, the US would guarantee support for CESDP under autonomous EU responsibility. It is to be hoped that the

[486] ***Ibid***, p. 506
[487] ***Ibid***, p. 508
[488] A non-profit institution that helps to improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis.

next five to ten years will witness a sensible trade-off between an EU tightly linked to NATO but enjoying greater confidence and capacity, and a US more relaxed about European capacity and more prepared to share leadership, particularly in the European theatre[489].

8.6. NATO's Internal Restructuring

The types of military initiatives can be distinguished from those of a political nature by using NATO's own terminology. That is external adaptation, which concerns the projection of strategic stability, and encompasses initiatives such as the PfP, enlargement, and partnership relations with Russia and Ukraine; an internal adaptation, which concerns the alliance's military arrangements to support the new crisis management mission, and encompasses the three interrelated elements of the ESDI, the CJTF concept and the new military command structure. The internal adaptations of the Atlantic alliance reached fruition in April 1999. However, the implementation phase of these adaptations has coincided with moves by the EU to assume responsibility for European security and defense policy. Three sets of interrelated issues may well prove equally difficult to achieve in forming mutually satisfactory political and military cooperation agreements with the EU[490].

The first problematic issue was the provision by NATO to the WEU of an operational command capacity. Although the WEU has a military staff of some 60 officers, it critically lacks an integrated operational military command and the necessary associated planning capacity needed to execute a military operation.

A second issue relates to the agreed principle that the alliance will provide NATO assets to the WEU. An abiding question is what military assets exactly constitute NATO assets, as opposed to national assets committed to or voluntarily supplied to the alliance. This issue is no small matter. In principle, NATO assets can be defined as those funded by NATO out of its common structural fund and hence controlled by the alliance.

A third issue, arising from the preceding one, is the question of "necessary duplication". EU member states need to provide for military capabilities that they now lack in order to support a functional CESDP. However, a number of NATO member states, and in particular the US

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[489] Croft, *op. cit.*, p. 510
[490] *Ibid*, p. 511

are concerned that the additional procurement of military capabilities should not detract from NATO, but rather enhance it.

On the one hand, the US supports the new apparent political will of its European allies to provide more capabilities, even if this initiative is driven by an aspiration for a functional CESDP. On the other hand, the US has a number of concerns about the push to develop military capabilities to support the CESDP[491].

As conclusions, challenges outside of the alliance should be the subject of a consolidations program. That is a continuation of managing relations with Russia is in the short to medium term, the best that can be sought.

This sets out the two distinct but again related aspects to this, focusing on the political relationship between the EU and NATO, with its consequent questions about identity, and on the practical military issues concerning a workable relationship between the two. First, in terms of the public debate, clearly it has not so far proved possible to establish a balance in the NATO-EU relationship. Second, the resolution of difficult military questions concerning the alliance's restructuring in the light of a closer EU-NATO relationship is clearly extremely complex[492].

During the cold war, NATO was synonymous with strategy. That has been lost in the transition to a post-Cold war world, as the political dimension of the alliance's role has grown. What has been suggesting is that the alliance needs to develop a new strategy, a largely but not political strategy for facing its triple challenge of dealing with inclusion and exclusion, Europeanization, and military reform and effectiveness.

8.7. NATO's Challenges and Tensions within NATO

NATO seems to be the pre-eminent security organization for the twenty-first Century Europe at least for the early period. It is moving to reorganize itself to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

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[491] ***Ibid***, p. 515
[492] ***Ibid***, p. 518

The rise of NATO to its current pre-eminence throughout the 1990s is a remarkable tale of survival and development in adverse conditions. Briefly, this pattern can be illustrated by looking at snapshots of the situations faced by senior policy-makers at each of NATO's fully post-Cold War summits. In November 1991, the Rome summit endorsed a New Strategic Concept and a political direction for NATO that seemed to meet the changed needs of Europe. By January 1994 the Brussels summit, there was casting around for a role for NATO, and was unable to form a consensus around immediate enlargement and projection of stability, a substantive role in former Yugoslavia, or a NATO-endorsed policy of counter-proliferation. By the 1997 Madrid summit, the alliance was divided over whom to admit to NATO, and was beginning to recognize the urgency of safeguarding cordial relations with Moscow. And the fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington was dominated by ill-concealed divisions over the Kosovo war and an apparent reluctance by the political leadership to accept the military argument that a ground war had to be considered and planned, if not executed[493].

The key characteristic of NATO as a political organization continues to seem to be political fragility. This is apparent in the three fundamental challenges facing the alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, NATO is playing a role in developing a zone of security in Europe; but the alliance is facing the problem of inclusion and even more problematically, exclusion. How can Serbia and Russia be engaged fully in the new security politics of Europe? If such states are to be excluded, then NATO will play a key role in dividing the continent, despite all the pledges by key western policy-makers to the contrary. Second, while many Europeans might agree that "a stronger Europe and a more balanced Atlantic partnership, far from threatening the Western alliance will ensure its integrity and viability", the Europeanization of the alliance is seen by many in Washington as the harbinger of transatlantic decoupling. This is a particular problem for non-EU members of NATO. Despite Europe's woeful contribution to the Kosovo war in military terms, and despite decades of American badgering over burden sharing, this is the context of a debate over increasing the military potential of the alliance's members. Third, how can the alliance appropriately adapt itself in military terms to the new challenges? If the policy of military intensification is unpersuasive, then NATO will be a less effective military instrument in the future[494].

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[493] ***Ibid***, p. 496
[494] ***Ibid***

Uncertainty over the development of European security after the end of the Cold War has resulted in a shifting pattern of security-related organizations. However, as the outlines of new European security priorities emerge, it has become increasingly clear that NATO remains the most credible security and defense body in Europe.

NATO itself faces the parallel challenges of reform and enlargement. After a long delay, there has been progress since 1996 on both issues. The Berlin meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1996 established the underpinnings of NATO's 'internal adaptation' to new circumstances. A key element of reform is the development of a European Security and Defense Identity within rather than outside NATO, primarily through the creation of Combined Joint Task Force headquarters to plan and command operations, which could be led by the Western European Union, using NATO assets. Much in this concept has yet to be defined and there are still sharp differences between NATO members[495].

The small scale of the NATO expansion planned for 1999 has changed the environment for EU enlargement, first by differentiating overtly between the applicants for EU membership, and secondly by influencing the outlook for EU foreign policy, security and defense arrangements

NATO and EU members frequently refer to the two enlargements as 'parallel processes' in order to dampen expectations that one will affect the timing and contents of the other.

NATO has strengthened its position in the politics of European security. Because the EU has so far failed to develop a defense policy independent of NATO it is unlikely that the West will end up divided down the Atlantic fault-line in the foreseeable future. There will be continued tensions and disputes between Europe and the United States, especially on non-military issues, because of different interests, but it is rather clearer now than it was five years ago that the CFSP is no embryonic rival to the US in power politics[496].

[495] Grabble, *op. cit.*, p. 110
[496] Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 35

As the EU becomes more assertive and confident, its relationship with the United States and its place within NATO will change in a way that will reduce its dependence on the US security blanket and compel it to build a "fourth pillar", and the assets are as follows[497]:

• Common defense policies and a common defense force: The seeds of a security union have already been planted and the Balkan crisis has emphasized both the policy fault lines in the European military capacity and the urgency of creating the ability to respond to future emergencies. However, a security union will not be developed without a resolution of several key problems such as policy differences among the EU member states, the neutrality of Ireland and Sweden. Moreover, the independent nature of French foreign policy; and the different spheres of influence and interest of the most powerful member states (Britain and the Commonwealth, France and its former colonies, Germany and Eastern Europe).

• Agreement on the role Germany will play: How long will it take for other Europeans to be comfortable with the prospect of German troops on their soil or of German troops being sent into neighboring trouble spots such as the Balkans?

• Agreement on the relative contributions of the different member states: Will the bigger powers such as Britain, France, and Italy agree to bear the largest share of the burden?

• Agreement on the relationship between the EU and other preexisting security arrangements: Notably NATO and the CSCE.

There is an Agreement on a new balance in the tripartite relationship among the EU, the United States, and Russia. The Balkans debacle has given a foretaste of the possible implications of a newly re-assertive Europe. What effect will Europe's failure to always agree with US foreign and defense policy have on the transatlantic relationship?[498]

The approach by NATO states to Eastern Europe had developed several distinct components by the middle of 1995. One was the so-called Partnership for Peace, which linked the East European states with NATO in a number of commitments, including consulting on security questions, conduct joint maneuver and exchange military information. In December 1994, a

[497] ***Ibid***
[498] McCormick, ***op. cit.***, p. 299

second component was added in the NATO Summit communiqué that stated that NATO enlargement was expected and that it would be welcomed[499].

The major problem was that when there was a need for clarity of purpose and firmness of commitment in view of the dangers of European chaos, the Western states were uncertain, divided, and irresolute. The NATO enlargement plans of the mid-1990s were a part of the problem in that they would produce larger, more inchoate group of states, less united in purpose, and more likely to be seen as threatening by key non-members such as Russia. Also, drawing a firm line around a smaller Western European economic and political space would be a part of the solution, that it would be more likely to contain states which could agree an effective response to new dangers, working where necessary with the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In the discussions about NATO expansion there was very little about how enlargement would alter the mechanisms of the organization, and the assumption seemed to that this was the same organization dealing with new problems. Expansion meant that the organization itself would change, and decisions would have to be made in different ways, by more states, with different experiences and preferences. This would in fact a different organization with the same problems. It was preferable that NATO not to expand at all towards Eastern Europe and to further develop a European Union in which there was institutional effectiveness, reasonable guarantees of security, and an adequate platform for harmonized foreign policy[500]. Its key role in a post-Cold War world may be to ensure stability in the wider Europe, by protecting democracy and stability, especially in Europe's Southern and Eastern flanks[501]. Many European states remain keen to maintain the transatlantic link between the US and Europe which NATO provides.

In October 1991, before the Maastricht summit, France and Germany and the UK and Italy produced contradictory proposals on European defense, the Franco-German proposal sought to downgrade NATO by reinforcing the WEU, whereas the UK-Italian proposals for the WEU were based on the continuation of a strong NATO role. There is already improved co-operation and co-ordination between WEU and NATO.

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[499] Taylor, ***op. cit.***, p. 124
[500] ***Ibid***, p. 129
[501] Jones, ***op. cit.***, p. 269

In 1992, the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), a forum aimed at achieving cooperation in arms security and comprising European member nations of NATO, was dissolved and its functions transferred to the WEU.

The January 1994 NATO summit called for a European security and defense identity (ESDI), involving both NATO and the WEU. NATO is also working out ideas for common joint task forces, involving both NATO and WEU military capabilities. There could be a partial merger between NATO and the WEU, in which their capabilities remain separable rather than separate. However, this could simply confuse matters, by duplicating chains of command. The relationships between these two organizations in post-Cold War Europe have yet to be clearly defined[502].

Ethnic cleansing and other atrocities committed in Bosnia go against everything for which European integration stands. Yet, unlike events in 1914 and 1939, the conflict has been contained and has spared Europe a wider conflagration as a result of EU, the United States, NATO, UN, and Russian policies.

The EU states stuck to a common line despite the many stresses that tested their unity. EU members through NATO and WEU have joined NATO members in monitoring the UN embargo and have been engaged in the largest and longest humanitarian aid effort since the Berlin Airlift. Seven thousand troops from several EU member states remain on the ground in former-Yugoslavia at the service of the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR). Others have served in the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)[503].

After a year of reassessment, the Clinton administration has come up with a clear answer to these questions by genuinely supporting a European Security and Defense Identity. This, in turn, has helped to clarify the internal European debate about the relationship between ESDI and the Transatlantic Alliance.

The NATO summit on 10-11 January 1994 led to agreement on resource pooling: The United States would allow the WEU/Euro-corps to use NATO personnel, equipment, and

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[502] *Ibid*, p. 270
[503] Regelsberger, *op. cit.*, p. 298

infrastructure for operations in which the United States decided not to take part: the formula of "separable but not separate" structures. President Clinton used his first European tour to NATO and EU headquarters in January 1994 to state that the future security of Europe lies in its integration-militarily, politically and economically. He recognized that a strong, confident Europe will make a better partner than a weak, divided one, whether in promoting free trade or in spreading stability Eastward. It is recognition that shared European-US interests in foreign policy far outweigh the differences. CFSP can thus derive strength from a return of Europe's most important partner to its traditional support of European integration. CFSP and the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance will either both succeed, or both fail[504].

An issue of pressing importance is how East European countries can be integrated into West European or transatlantic defense structures. Many of these countries are actively seeking membership of NATO. Existing NATO members have hardly welcomed these overtures with open arms. NATO membership for these countries could embroil existing members in military conflicts in Eastern Europe. To admit some but not others would create a new division in Europe. A specific reason for this caginess has been a fear of antagonizing Russia. In Warsaw in August 1993, Boris Yeltsin gave approval to NATO membership to East European states, but under Russian army pressure argued that East European security should be jointly guaranteed by NATO and Russia. NATO has a 'gradualist' policy in relation to the admission of new members. In January 1994, NATO leaders declared that they expected and would welcome NATO expansion, but without setting a timetable or identifying future applicants. The alternative is to offer the CEECs institutionalized dialogue and collaboration with NATO[505].

8.8. Resolving EU-US Tensions in NATO

The resolution of the transatlantic tensions did not occur. Nevertheless, there were signs of a reassessment of American priorities in the latter part of 1993 and the first evidence of the implications of this were demonstrated in the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit. Underlying the US approach was an essentially political calculation that is that NATO remained the most effective institution for preserving American interests on the continent[506].

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[504] *Ibid*, p. 326
[505] Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 270
[506] Monar, *op. cit.*, p. 23

The launching of the Partnership for Peace initiative at the Brussels Summit gave way the US an acceptance that the issue of enlargement was crucial to the long-term viability of the Alliance. PfP offered each of the states in Central and Eastern Europe an individual agreement that could assist them in the process of gaining accession into NATO. Whereas the NACC had avoided discriminating between the suitability of different states for admission, the PfP program offered each country the ability to influence the speed at which it could become eligible for membership[507].

Complementing the PfP initiative, the US continued to take the lead in building a close relationship with Russia and supporting the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Under the guidance of Deputy Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the US has kept its former adversary informed on security matters, due to its recognition of Russia's pivotal position on future European security matters. It could not accept a veto by Russia over the enlargement process. There was eventual agreement on a Russia-NATO "Founding Act" which accorded Russia a unique status in relation to the Alliance but was politically and not legally binding.

The upshot of these efforts has been that the position of NATO affirmed as the leading institution in the enlargement debate. Although the WEU conducted its own program of developing linkages to the East, offering first a "Forum of Consultation" and then "Associate Partner" status to a group of nine states, the primacy of NATO was unequivocal. The presence of the US within NATO and the limited military capabilities of the WEU ensured that as far as the Central and Eastern European countries were concerned, the Alliance would remain the most attractive institution[508].

The other area was the issue of a European defense identity. Since 1994, there was evidence of a more confident American attitude on this matter. This was the most important development of all as it offered a framework for resolving future US-European disagreements. European defense efforts were not a realistic threat to the primacy of NATO. The US had to been to the conclusion that early European optimism on this subject was misplaced[509].

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[507] ***Ibid***, p. 24
[508] ***Ibid***
[509] ***Ibid***

Under the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, European states could draw on NATO equipment, command and control assets to fulfill tasks that were their unique concern. The CJTF concept provided American endorsement of "... separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements..." The obvious benefit for European states was the avoidance of the need to duplicate defense capabilities that already existed within the American inventory, such as satellite intelligence systems and long-range transport aircraft[510].

The types of missions that the Europeans might undertake had been agreed in the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. These included humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and the role of military forces in crisis management[511].

From the American perspective, the Berlin agreement marked the end of the debate about a rival role for WEU *vis-à-vis* NATO. Although presented in public as a way of facilitating independent European military missions, it meant that a US right of approval would exist over an allied action that required additional military assets. Whether the US would be willing to lend its equipment would be highly questionable and would depend on the circumstances[512].

Thus, the military part played by the European powers, is likely to remain limited for the near future. There has been little progress in developing the concept of a European "Common Defense Policy", (outlined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union).

The 1996-97 EU Inter-governmental Conference resulted in no significant changes in the nature of the WEU's relationship with the EU. The only innovative item agreed in the Treaty was the decision to include the Petersberg tasks. This lack of substantial reform means that the CFSP will lack any real military underpinnings. As a result, the US has felt reassured that the Europeans will not seek to exclude American influence from matters of continental security[513].

8.9. NATO's Role as a Transatlantic Institution

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[510] ***Ibid***, p. 26
[511] ***Ibid***
[512] ***Ibid***, p. 27
[513] ***Ibid***, p. 28

A key role for the transatlantic institutions that have survived the Cold War is to provide structures for building a new cooperative Euro-Atlantic community incorporating the 'Old West' and 'Old East'. The problems involve a complex mixture of economic, political and security issues and often require the involvement of different institutions, or a combination of institutions acting in concert[514].

NATO continues to provide collective defense for its members and for important US-West European cooperation. For many the NACC is a first step in this direction, its deliberations already providing a forum for cooperative security discussions with former Warsaw Pact adversaries. Yet any strengthening of the NACC would require significant infusions of resources, both human and financial.

NATO has moved towards the adoption of a collective security role, but as the 'implementer' rather than an umbrella organization; thus, possible future NATO action in Yugoslavia would be carried out under UN auspices. The CSCE could provide a more Euro-Atlantic based source of legal and moral authority for future collective security actions and peacekeeping. However, it, like the NACC, is the organization's large membership precludes its utility as a collective security organization means that the resources required to strengthen its effectiveness are unlikely to be forthcoming[515].

NATO, the NACC, CSCE, are all potential candidates, but there is no common West European view on which should be developed, and building a consensus is even more difficult when North Americans and East Europeans are involved in the process. Nevertheless, a choice has to be made and it may be best to make that choice based on the existing resources and capabilities available to the potential players.

In economic and trade matters, the EC and the United States are the key actors, and it is essential that they should cooperate to smooth their own relations and assist reconstruction in the East. NATO appears to be best placed to take the lead on security and defense issues; it is able to provide effective forces, and the linked NACC arrangement should be expanded to improve cooperation with the East Europeans, including Russia.

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[514] Latter, *op. cit.*, p. 22
[515] *Ibid*, p. 24

It should be noted that most East European states aspire to NATO membership, whatever the practicalities and likelihood of this in the near term, and this should not be precluded for the long term. A strengthening of the NACC process, for example by establishing a secretariat at NATO headquarters, is essential. Any collective, security operations contemplated should, in the short term, be carried out under UN and/or CSCE auspices, and with the support of Russia and the other East European countries. Using the twin pillars of the EC and NATO, significant progress can be made to develop a genuine broadly based Euro-Atlantic community[516].

The discussion of the best mechanism for keeping the peace in Europe and possibly elsewhere into the twenty-first century is NATO. Expanding NATO does imply using the Alliance for active peacekeeping, at least in Europe[517].

Expanding NATO would change the fundamental culture and character of the Alliance. Over time, an inclusive NATO might become a type of Concert or, more likely, 'Congress' of Europe, with even more emphasis on consultation and more caution in responding to armed conflict than has been the case in the past. The Partnership opens the prospect of using NATO to enhance co-operation in Europe, with an instrument having far more tested durability than any new institution that might be established.

In November 1991, NATO nations at the Rome summit had decided upon a new 'strategic concept' with four main elements. These were: (1) 'to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment'; (2) 'a transatlantic forum for allied consultations'; (3) to deter and resist 'any threat... of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state'; and (4) 'to preserve the strategic balance within Europe[518].

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept reflects flexibility by stating that in order to support security and stability "of the Euro-Atlantic area" the Alliance may decide to engage in crisis management "in conformity" with the UN Charter provided all members agree[519].

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[516] ***Ibid***, pp. 24,25
[517] Cyr, ***op. cit.***, p. 24
[518] ***Ibid***, p. 146
[519] Borawski, John. "NATO Beyond 2000: A New Flashpoint for European Security". European Security. Volume 9, Number 2, Summer 2000, p. 3

In the US view, NATO enlargement serves some purposes such as: expanding the region where wars will not take place because of the security "guarantee" making NATO stronger, strengthening democratic institutions, and not shutting out qualified democracies simply because they were once members of the Warsaw Pact[520].

8.10. US Security Policy in Bosnia and Kosovo and US Leadership

NATO has served US interests, but the pressure of the Alliance influenced the form of the American commitment[521].

Washington recognizes the need to cooperate. To begin with, the perception is that cooperation promotes cohesive action by the allies and makes simultaneous progress on the security, political and economic fronts possible. Second, multilateralism means the Americans can demand that the Europeans do more in Bosnia[522].

In the US view, the use of multilateral mechanism in Bosnia promotes institution building by bringing PfP member states to participate in IFOR and SFOR[523]. "Bosnia validated the wisdom of NATO's initiatives to prepare for enlargement and to engage all its former adversaries in concrete military cooperation through the PfP[524].

Kosovo was a catalyst of a new transatlantic bargain as well as an autonomous European role, variously described as that "common foreign and security policy", a European security and defense identity", or a strengthened "European pillar" for NATO. Kosovo clarified the post-Cold War evolution that began the moment the Berlin Wall fell but was only dimly perceived in the mid-1990s[525].

America's unique credibility in deterrence remains indispensable for the preservation of stability in Europe and so does the US role as primus inter pares[526] for the same reasons that required American engagement when NATO was founded half a century ago. Washington's

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[520] ***Ibid***, p. 9
[521] David, Charles-Philippe. "At Least 2001: US Security Policy and Exit Strategy in Bosnia". European Security. Volume 9, Number 1 Spring 2000.
[522] ***Ibid***, p. 11
[523] NATO-led Stabilization Force
[524] David, ***op. cit.***, p. 12
[525] Pond, ***op. cit.***, p. 182
[526] A Latin phrase meaning a first among equals, the senior or representative member of a group.

ultimate nuclear deterrence may no longer be central. The US leadership, however, in European security continues to be the only device for avoiding leadership by the richest, most populous, and most energetic country in Europe that is Germany. Moreover, nobody, today, wishes to repeat the fatal experiments of 1870, 1914, and 1939, even with the conceived democrats of contemporary Germany[527].

As far as the security of Europe is concerned, the EU had intended to postpone difficult decisions on common foreign and security policy. Until after it had met the three major initial challenges of launching the euro, agreeing on the controversial institutional and agricultural reforms that are needed to prevent paralysis of an enlarging Union, and preparing for the first round of admission of new central European members early in the twenty-first century.

In spring of 1999, the EU was suddenly required, for the first time in its history, to approve a NATO military operation. At the summit level, it complied the security tasks of the Western European Union to transform the French-German-Belgian-Spanish-Luxembourg Euro-corps into Europe's first joint rapid reaction force. The summit also aimed to commit five times as many European troops to Kosovo peacekeeping as the US contingent; and to foot the lion's share of the costs of political, economic, and social development in the Balkans over the next ten years[528].

Europe's major governments keep an inward-looking United States engaged in Europe. Their means to this end is to fortify their joint military capabilities and political will to prove that Europe will help relieve the United States of the residual burden of guaranteeing European security that it still carries ten years after the end of the Cold War.

8.11. A New American Connection and "Coopetition"

The new Europe that is now emerging will test the transatlantic relationship in finance, economics, and psychology as well as in security policy. Each side will have to respect the other as they improvise together the rules of the new game of mixed interdependence and rivalry that executives call "coo-petition". As for the term of coo-petition, it is worth to note that today's governments in heartland Europe simply do not expect to go to war with their

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[527] Pond, *op. cit.*, p. 182
[528] *Ibid*, p. 185

neighbors, nor do they make any contingency plans for such an eventuality. They know that they are too little to solve alone the problems of global warming, instant billion-dollar transfers, or Balkan savagery [529].

In essence, American administrations incline to choose reinforcement of the traditional NATO alliance over unilateralism and over the other alternatives of only ad hoc coalitions or a greater reliance on international institutions. Recognizing the advantages of coalitions in extended influence and in cost savings in the post-Cold War defense-spending squeeze the United States again and again decides to perpetuate NATO as the basis for future coalitions of the willing.

John Roper[530] asserts that the real security interests of Europe and the United States overlap. The allies all agree that their main threats today are economic and social, but that some agonizing cases require the application of military power[531].

The United States, on the one hand, is used to acting as a superpower in order to counter terrorism or aggression by rouge states and to deter future threats. Besides, it can reach decisions rapidly, either on presidential authority or on a simple majority vote of the Senate. On the other hand, medium-sized European states that for half a century depended on the American nuclear guarantee are much more diffident[532].

8.12. The Meaning of Kosovo: American Power and Responsibility in a New Century

The Kosovo operation shows the fault lines in international politics today. In Kosovo, it is seen the possibilities of an international community committed to fighting for human rights. At the same time, it is recognized the great costs and difficulties of using force in the pursuit of peace[533].

If there is one undeniable and universal trend of this political moment, it is an insistence on individual responsibility. It is no longer enough to justify one's actions in terms of necessity

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[529] ***Ibid***, pp. 195-211
[530] Associate fellow at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs.
[531] Pond, ***op. cit.***, p. 196
[532] ***Ibid***
[533] Rosenthal, H. Joel. "Editor's Note: The Essence of an Era". Ethics and International Affairs. (Carnegie Council), Volume 14, 2000, p. 1

and *raison d'etre*. Nor is it enough to excuse human suffering by pleading impotence in the face of the inexorable forces of politics, including that new all-powerful force, globalization[534].

Like Athens in its golden heyday of the Periclean era, the United States in the beginning of the 21st century faces great opportunities as well as great dangers. The opportunities to use its power to accomplish much good are matched by the dangers that it will wield its power irresponsibly, diminishing its credibility and undermining the long-term viability of the very values, it seeks to spread[535].

The exercise of greater responsibility by the US should mean several things. First, American policymakers need to reflect much more carefully than they do now on the destabilizing consequences of Wilsonianism in some parts of the world, and on whether the US is really prepared to bear responsibility for those consequences.

Second, the US needs to own up to its responsibilities for the broader international legal regime within which it operates and from which it derives enormous benefits as the mightiest status quo power in the world.

Finally, as the coalition leader and chief force provider for such interventions, the US needs to wrestle with its responsibilities in conducting the military operations at the heart of humanitarian interventions[536].

8.13. Raison D'etre of NATO

The *raison d'être* of NATO, the principal post-War vehicle for American leadership in Europe, was unclear. Soviet forces were in the process of being withdrawn from the territories of Central European countries and the former state of East Germany had been unified with its Western counterpart and integrated into NATO. It was widely recognized that the alliance

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[534] ***Ibid***

[535] Coll, R. Alberto. "The Meaning of Kosovo; Introduction: American Power and Responsibility in a New Century". Ethics and International Affairs. (Carnegie Council), Volume 14, 2000, p. 2

[536] ***Ibid***, p. 9

needed to be adapted to deal with more likely contingencies than an attack upon the territories of its members[537].

In addition, NATO had to confront the issue of what sort of relationship it would develop with former Warsaw Pact states. In 1990, there was optimism about the future role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that it might serve as a new collective security organization that would transcend the old alliance structures. However, the CSCE proved to be a body that did not enjoy the support of the leading Western powers. Violent Soviet actions in the Baltic States in the early part of 1991 followed by the attempted Moscow coup in August, caused alarm bells to ring throughout central Europe. The focus switched to NATO and states previously allied to the USSR began to request entry into the Alliance[538].

Meeting these challenges would do much to determine the continued relevance of NATO. Yet, there was an absence of consensus amongst the members regarding the desirability of achieving these changes. France and Spain, for example, wanted to limit NATO's post-Cold War role to that of collective defense. This reflected an unwillingness to continue reliance on a transatlantic security framework that had imposed superpower priorities on Europe. France believed that the collapse of the Eastern bloc offered a unique opportunity to re-structure the Western security order and enhance the part played by continental powers.

The London and Rome Summits, in 1990 and 1991, focused on the issues of NATO's transformation and the role that could be played by a more active European defense identity. The possibility of Europe emerging as a defense actor was given impetus by moves towards political union led by France and Germany. This raised the prospect of the European Community being invested with newly acquired competencies in the fields of foreign and defense policy.

In the Treaty on European Union, the Western European Union was accorded the status of the defense arm of the European Union and declared to be an "integral part of the process of the development of the EU". Subsequent to the signing of the Treaty, France and Germany announced that their joint military brigade, which had been established in 1987, would be

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[537] Monar, *op. cit.*, p. 21
[538] *Ibid*

expanded and given the title of the "Euro-Corps". Other states were invited to join the Euro-Corps, which was hailed as the first step towards a European Army[539].

Washington felt that its leadership position on the continent was threatened by these security initiatives by European states. The perception in the US was that the field of defense was at risk of being used to advance broader political goals. One fear was that the WEU could trespass on traditional areas of NATO responsibility and eventually duplicate its role. This would take some time, as the WEU lacked NATO's integrated military structure and robust capabilities, but if the Alliance was left to wither, then the threat was feasible. Another American fear was that European views would be discussed and agreed outside the forum of the North Atlantic Council and would then be presented as an agreed position. As such, the views of European states could come to represent a caucus within the Organization[540].

The problem for the US was that it was unsure how to react to these developments. The result was that it tended to blunder into making heavy-handed statements warning of dangerous consequences if the US was marginalized from decision-making forums.

The Bartholomew Letter, sent to European capitals in February 1991, was an example of such a response building up a defense identity within the European Community, rivaling NATO, could force the US to reassess its role. It also reminded the Europeans that the military resources at their disposal were relatively limited.

As to the transatlantic relationship, one factor has been the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The significance of this problem was due to four main factors. First, the conflict took place on the borders of the western security zone and was consequently of immediate concern to West European states. Second, the severity of the fighting and "ethnic cleansing" ensured that the repercussions from the conflict, such as the flow of refugees were felt across the continent. Third, Europe's security institutions were paralyzed in the face of a complex mixture between an interstate and a civil war situation. Finally, the US and Europe found themselves advocating different strategies to deal with the crisis[541].

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[539] ***Ibid***, p. 22
[540] ***Ibid***
[541] ***Ibid***, p. 23

Because of different approaches to the Balkans conflict, recrimination became a characteristic feature of the transatlantic relationship. In the midst of a major conflict, taking place on the mainland of Europe, NATO seemed to be ineffective and plagued with internal disputes. Despite enormous investment in the Alliance over many decades, the US appeared to be witnessing the twilight of its leadership over the military affairs of the continent. It was recognized on both sides of the Atlantic that steps would have to be taken to restore Western unity in the face of these numerous challenges.

The tensions that characterized transatlantic relations in the early part of the 1990's have been eradicated. Despite skepticism over the extent to which a European pillar in NATO will prove to be effective, nevertheless the turf battles between the Europeans and the Americans appear to have been resolved. All the European countries, including France, support the role of NATO as the leading defense actor on the continent and as the principle forum for ensuring a transatlantic dialogue.

The fate of Bosnia is another issue. The missions performed by IFOR in 1996 and then by the Stabilization Forces in the first half of 1997, were successful in maintaining the peace in Bosnia. At the Bergen meeting of NATO, US representatives announced that they were willing to contribute 5.000 personnel to the SFOR mission, to the evident relief of the Europeans[542].

Yet there is now speculation about what will follow after the expiration of the SFOR mandate in the middle part of 1998. The lack of progress in bringing the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims together and the slow pace of the civil reconstruction effort which means that the conflict could re-ignite if all western military forces were to be removed. As a result, the future of Bosnia remains a potentially volatile issue in US-European relations.

Bosnia is a symptom of a broader question within the transatlantic relationship: whether the US is prepared to maintain its leadership function in Europe? Rather than the often-quoted threat of European defense efforts eclipsing the Alliance, the more realistic problem is that of the Europeans being reluctant to undertake any action without the Americans. The US now talks of a "New Atlantic Community" in which the Europeans represent a more equitable

[542] ***Ibid***, pp. 28,29

partner,' but the US may become disillusioned if the Europeans are unable to do things for themselves[543].

The CJTF concept envisages flexible coalitions of countries coming together for specific operations and it signals that the US may not wish to participate in crises where it does not feel its interests are involved. Yet, an alternative interpretation can be placed upon US actions over the Balkans. It was actually the confluence of a number of factors, including a sense of opportunism and the pressure of domestic criticism, brought America to re-engage over the crisis.

If the US plays a more modest role in the security of the continent, whilst encouraging its allies to share the burdens of global responsibilities, then it must accept the implications.

Surveying the last six years in transatlantic security politics, the enduring lesson remains that constant effort must be invested to prevent the development of tensions. The relationship has been proven to be dynamic with a good deal of inherent strength.

[543] *Ibid*, p. 29

Chapter 9: New Transatlanticism

9.1. New Transatlanticism

As a product of a series of factors, the "new transatlanticism" affected certain issues including the demise of the Soviet Union; the onset of a multi-polar and increasingly interdependent world; the lessening of the impact of politico-military issues and the growing importance of politico-economic factors and domestic concerns.

The "potential for conflict in US-EC relations has also been increased as a result of the emergence of three distinct features of the post-Cold War world". These include the demise of the USSR; the broadening of security issues to include such matters as trade, finance, direct investment and the environment; and domestic debates concerning the roles of the EC and US in their new circumstances[544].

The isolationist streak within American foreign policy, coupled with the lack of unity illustrated by the member states of the EC during the Persian Gulf War, tilts Peterson towards another pessimistic conclusion with respect to future relations between the allies. Lastly, "integration and fragmentation" are the author's third set of factors contributing to allied strain. Ethnic fragmentation, alongside global integration through technological forces, world trade patterns and financial markets, as well as the diminishing utility of military-strategic power are factors that require new solutions on the part of the EC and US.

Peterson, contends that the EC must create new mechanisms that balance member state national interests with community-wide cooperation and external harmony with its allies. Consequently, the reformation of NATO, CSCE, GATT and the UN Security Council will be necessary to manage the strains being inflicted upon the alliance, and maintain this relationship into the 21st century[545].

The principal reasons behind transatlantic differences, strains, tensions and troubles since the onset of the 1960s:

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[544] Rosen, F. and Philip Schofield (Editors). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, the Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Claredon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 52
[545] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, p. 52

• The economic resurgence of Western Europe and the relative decline of the United States since the end of World War Two;

• The onset of the nuclear vulnerability of the United States, either through the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the initiation of nuclear parity between the US and Soviet Union, the lessening the credibility of the American guarantee of extended deterrence;

• The differing and relative positions of the United States and its West European allies, which are based upon the relative position of both;

• In the international arena, giving rise to the presence of global interests for the US, and regional ones for Western Europe;

• With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of its empire, along with the freeing of Central and Eastern Europe into democratic countries, the lack of common enemy between the allies;

• The differing geographical, geo-strategic, historical and experience-related backgrounds of the United States and Western Europe;

•The influence of international events on the allies, and the differing responses on the part of both to these events, partially due to a number of the above listed factors.

Through enlargement of the capabilities of the organization, by way of increased funding and staffing, the Western European Union has become, for Germany and France, the vehicle for the establishment of ESDI. In a declaration attached to the TEU, the member states agreed that this organization should be 'developed as the defense component of the European Union'. Furthermore, the Western European Union may be called upon to 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications'[546].

[546] ***Ibid***, p. 233

Bush signed the Transatlantic Declaration in November of 1990, committing the United States to work with the leadership of the European Union across a range of issue-areas for the betterment of both parties and especially in the politico-military and politico-economic realms of their relationship. It was concluded that the 'development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance'[547].

Javier Solana stated that 'a sound transatlantic relationship must be based on a real partnership in many areas - political, economic, financial, scientific. At the end of his remarks Solana also commented that 'it is also essential to "build new bridges" across the Atlantic by deepening the cultural, scientific and educational ties between the American and European peoples'[548].

In *The Logic of Anarchy* Buzan claims that he has attempted a 'great leap forward' theoretically from Ken Waltz, introducing a mechanism by which one can link differing levels of analysis. Thus, his work should be considered as a new development within current debates concerning International Relations theory[549]. Therefore, again, Buzan is wedded to a certain number of core assumptions of Neo-realism[550], and by association, Political Realism[551]: assumptions that have already been exposed as limiting the ability of this paradigm to explain, comprehensively, EC-US security relations[552].

The same is true of the literature concerned with regime theorization. Scholars working in this area of Structural Realism, most notably Robert Keohane, remain explicitly realist in their analyzes of International Relations, and thus wedded to the core assumptions of Political Realism[553] In the beginning of his article Keohane states that the 'argument developed here is

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[547] ***Ibid***, p. 234
[548] Piening, ***op. cit.***, pp. 96-101
[549] Theory in International Relations consists of dividing the human race into sections, noting the significant properties of each, examining the relationships between them, and describing the patterns formed by the relationship. See, Light, Margot and A.J.R. Groom (Editors). International Relations, A Handbook of Current Theory. Frances Pinter Publishers, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, 1985, p. 8.
Also, for conflict resolution in the wider text of international relations theory, see; Burton John and Frank Dukes (Editors). Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, Macmillan, 1990, pp. 51-68
[550] Also, for neo-realism: See; Spegele, D. Roger. Political Realism in International Theory. Cambridge University Press; 1996, p. 88
[551] For more information political realism, especially its egoistic character: See; Frankel, Benjamin (Editor). Roots of Realism. Frank Cass, London; Portland, Or., 1996, p. 3
[552] Bronstone, ***op. cit.***, p. 237
[553] For core assumptions of political realism: See; Schweller, L. Randall and William C. Wohlforth. "Power Test: Evaluating Realism Response to the End of the Cold War". Security Studies. Volume 9, Number 3, Spring 2000, pp. 69-72

deliberately limited to the systemic level of analysis'. He adds that in this systemic approach the 'actors' characteristics are given by assumption, rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these actor characteristics, but on the basis of change in the attributes of the system'[554].

Given the definition of 'realist' thought, the analysis of the case-study from such a perspective illustrates that while this paradigm is useful in explaining aspects of this transatlantic security relationship, it is unable to comprehensively do so.

The work of Robert Cox, given its adherence to a 'fit' between material capabilities, social forces and institutions, appears to cover a wide range of the requirements for a theory that may be able to explain transatlantic relations in the 1980s, as well as the 1990s. This may be so because of the critique of the 'realist' explanation of the case study.

This critique noted that while material capabilities, systemic factors and institutions were important in contributing to allied disagreements, other non-systemic level forces that operate at the unit or sub-unit levels of analysis, as well as cultural and value-based factors, appear to have played a role in these disagreements. If so, two implications can be posited. The first is that what may be required theoretically is a perspective that is inclusive of these initial factors as well as those secondary ones, without assuming a hierarchy of importance. To this end, the Coxian analysis appears to be appropriate. Secondly, and more practically a richer understanding of contemporary transatlantic trends may be available for the scholars[555].

9.2. Transatlantic Declaration

A more pro-active (less NATO-centered) US policy toward the EC emerged from the review of US foreign policy that occurred in spring 1989. The US government had begun to recognize the central role of the EC in the future of post-Cold War Europe and sought to reach out to it in new and constructive ways. The first breakthrough came with strong US support for the EC Commission to coordinate the G24 aid effort Central and Eastern Europe. This gave the EC a major boost to its prestige as a responsible international actor, symbolized

[554] Piening, *op. cit.*, p. 237
[555] Bronstone, *op. cit.*, p. 246

US recognition of the important role of the EC in Europe, and helped usher in a new era of US-EC policy coordination[556].

The Transatlantic Declaration captured the shift in mentality from hegemonic decline during the Cold War to post hegemony at the end of the Cold War and ushered in a new culture of foreign policy cooperation. The declaration reiterated principles of bilateral relations that go back to the 1940s human rights, democracy, market economics, social progress, and multilateral cooperation. It also reiterated areas of bilateral cooperation already in practice.

New areas of bilateral cooperation were identified, for example, exchanges and joint projects in science and technology, education, and culture. New areas of cooperation in which the EC and United States committed themselves to act on a multilateral basis were also identified: antiterrorism; trafficking, and consumption of narcotics and related criminal activities; protecting the environment; and stopping nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technology proliferation. In terms of foreign policy, the Declaration listed the various new and continuing EC-US consultations[557].

The United States of America on one side and the European Community and its Member States, on the other, the transatlantic declaration is:

- Mindful of their common heritage and of their close historical, political, economic and cultural ties,

- Guided by their faith in the values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties, and in the democratic institutions which have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic over the centuries

- Recognizing that the transatlantic solidarity has been essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the development of free and prosperous economies as well as for the recent developments which have restored unity in Europe,

- Determined to help consolidate the new Europe, undivided and democratic,

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[556] Regelsberger, *op. cit.*, p. 307
[557] *Ibid*, p. 308

• Resolved to strengthen security, economic cooperation and human rights in Europe in the framework of the CSCE.

• Noting the firm commitment of the United States and the EC Member States concerned to the North Atlantic Alliance and to its principles and purposes,

• Acting on the basis of a pattern of cooperation proven over many decades, and convinced that by strengthening and expanding this partnership on an equal footing they will greatly contribute to continued stability, as well as to political and economic progress in Europe and in the world,

• Aware of the shared responsibility, not only to further common interests but also to face transnational challenges affecting the well being of all mankind,

• Bearing in mind the accelerating process by which the European Community is acquiring its own identity in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy and in the domain of security,

• Determined further to strengthen transatlantic solidarity, through the variety of their international relations,

have decided to endow their relationship with long-term perspectives.

The United States of America and the European Community and its Member States reaffirm their determination further to strengthen their partnership in order to:

• Safeguard peace and promote international security, by cooperating with other nations against aggression and coercion, by contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the world and by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and other international organizations;

• Pursue policies aimed at achieving a sound world economy marked by sustained economic growth with low inflation, a high level of employment, equitable social conditions, in a framework of international stability;

• Promote market principles, reject protectionism and expand, strengthen and further open the multilateral trading system;

• Carry out their resolve to help developing countries by all appropriate means in their efforts towards political and economic reforms;

• Provide adequate support, in cooperation with other states and organizations, to the nations of Eastern and Central Europe undertaking economic and political reforms and encourage their participation in the multilateral institutions of international trade and finance.

To achieve their common goals, the European Community and its Member States and the United States of America will inform and consult each other on important matters of common interest, both political and economic. In appropriate international bodies, in particular, they will seek close cooperation.

The EC-US partnership will benefit from the mutual knowledge and understanding acquired through regular consultations.

Both sides recognize the importance of strengthening the multilateral trading system. They will support further steps towards liberalization, transparency, and the implementation of GATT and OECD principles concerning both trade (in goods and services) and investment.

They will further develop their dialogue on other matters such as technical and non-tariff barriers to industrial and agricultural trade, services, competition policy, transportation policy, standards, telecommunications, high technology and other relevant areas.

The partnership between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand, and the United States on the other, will be based on continuous efforts to strengthen mutual cooperation in various other fields which directly affect the present and future well-being of their citizens, such as exchanges and joint projects in science and technology. These includes inter alia[558], research in medicine, environment protection, pollution prevention, energy,

[558] A Latin phrase means among other things.

space, high- energy physics, and the safety of nuclear and other installations, as well as in education and culture, including academic and youth exchanges.

The efforts for trans-national challenges focused on the following fields:

- Combating and preventing terrorism: narcotics and related criminal, such as the laundering of money;

- Cooperating in the fight against international crime;

- Protecting the environment, both internationally and domestically, by integrating environmental and economic goals;

- Preventing the proliferation of nuclear armaments; chemical and biological weapons; and missile technology.

9.3. Institutional Framework for Consultation

Both sides agree that a framework is required for regular and intensive consultation. In 27th February 1990, namely:

- Bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on the one side, the President of the European Council and President of the Commission, and on the other side, the President of the United States;

- Bi-annual consultations between the European Community Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately on either side of the Atlantic;

- Ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika and the US Secretary of State;

- Bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US Government at Cabinet level;

• Briefings, as currently exist, by the Presidency to US Representatives on European Political Cooperation meetings at the Ministerial level.

Both sides are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures for consultation to reflect the evolution of the European Community and of its relationship with the United States.

Keohane and Nye argued that the processes of a complex interdependent relationship are as important as its results. The process of consultations is important. It enables the two sides to share information narrow differences reduce risks of misunderstanding, and seeks common approaches[559].

9.4. New Transatlantic Agenda

In December 1995, New Transatlantic Agenda complemented the EU-US Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. A halfway house toward a genuine transatlantic treaty many have advocated for a number of years. The EU and Canada concluded a similar agenda between them exactly one year later[560].

The possibility of a transatlantic free trade area was unsettled. In studies, discussions, and speeches, the need for further developing the bilateral relationship between the European Union and the United States became a recurring theme. The adoption and entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty; the opening for business of the single market; the EU's role in re-constructing Central and Eastern Europe; the transatlantic stand-off in the closing phases of the Uruguay Round negotiations; the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU. All these events served to heighten Washington's awareness of Europe's growing importance[561].

By the beginning of 1995, it was clear that a new step could not be further delayed. What finally emerged again fell short of a full treaty, but not by much. Unlike the 1990 declaration, which was limited to rhetoric and a commitment to more regular consultations, the NTA singled out four areas for cooperation:

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[559] ***Ibid***
[560] Piening, ***op. cit.***, p. 94
[561] ***Ibid***, p. 109

- "Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world";

- "Responding to global challenges";

- "Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations"; and

- "Building bridges across the Atlantic."[562]

Attached to the NTA is a "Joint EU/US Action Plan," in which the four areas for cooperation are translated from mere rhetorical goals into a series of detailed actions for implementation. If the NTA and joint action plan fail to yield results, the largely declaratory nature of the EU-US relationship may yet need to be reinforced through the conclusion of a more formal treaty.

The first area for cooperation, "promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world" begins with a pledge to work together "boldly and rapidly" in promoting the peace and assisting in the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia. The two parties also agree to continue to provide humanitarian assistance and help with reconstruction, and to support the Bosnian/Croat Federation.

Similar detail characterizes European and US plans to act jointly in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia, Ukraine, and the other new independent states, especially in promoting democracy, coordinating assistance, promoting environmental protection, and more.

Other foreign policy joint actions include:

- Promoting the Middle East peace process;

- Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world;

- Coordinating and cooperation and humanitarian assistance;

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[562] *Ibid*

- Supporting human rights and democracy;

- Cooperating in international organizations;

- Working together in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, international disarmament, and arms transfers[563].

The second goal, "responding to global challenges," commits the European Union and the United States to joining forces in meeting together "the challenges of international crime, terrorism and drug trafficking, mass migration, degradation of the environment, nuclear safety and disease." Again, the actions proposed are noteworthy for their detail. In the area of immigration and asylum, for example, the two sides intend to:

- "Develop a common stance on temporary protection in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees"

- "Coordinate positions on the Conference on Refugees and Migrants in the Commonwealth of Independent States"

- "Improve existing arrangements and exchanges of intelligence in areas of mutual concern, for example, forged identity documents and transport carriers' liability"

- "Convene seminars in 1996 and compare the results of [their] respective studies on migration flows both into the US and into the EU."[564]

The most substantive of the action plan's sections concerns "contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations." The partners agree to work toward strengthening the multilateral trading system by ensuring that the WTO functions properly;

- Promoting the liberalization of financial services, improving the level of protection for intellectual property rights worldwide;

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[563] *Ibid*, p. 110
[564] *Ibid*

• Creating additional trading opportunities by improving access to themselves and international markets;

• Cooperating in harmonizing customs procedures.

• Combating bribery and corruption in international trade.

However, certainly the most ambitious part of this section concerns the creation of what is termed "the New Transatlantic Marketplace." Addressing the numerous areas in EU-US bilateral trade that regularly give rise to disagreements or friction, the parties preface their list of fourteen specific issues by agreeing to "carry out a joint study on ways of facilitating trade in goods and services and further reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers".

For the first time, in other words, the European Union and the United States intend to consider, in a joint study, the possibility of achieving a transatlantic free trade area. In the meantime, as part of a "confidence-building process, they will increase their efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and disputes. The list of areas in which they will make these efforts covers nearly every contentious aspect of bilateral trade relations, from standards and certification to government procurement, from veterinary and plant health issues to telecommunications[565].

The final section, "building bridges across the Atlantic," sets out a series of practical proposals aimed at "deepening and broadening the commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties" between the two sides.

Chief among these is support for the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the first meeting of which took place in Seville in November 1995; several of its ideas form part of the action plan. The second TABD was held in Chicago in November 1996, and annual meetings are planned for the future.

The New Transatlantic Agenda Senior Level Group Report on the EU-US Summit, on May 18, 1998 asserts that:

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[565] *Ibid*, p. 111

• High level EU-US coordination mechanism on the Middle East Peace Process.

• Enhanced impact of assistant efforts through close coordination between European Commission and USA1D programs.

• Worked together to address global challenges to promote international law enforcement and address environmental concerns.

• Developed bilateral trade and economic relationship and cooperation on multilateral trade issues.

• Urged the Transatlantic Business Dialogue to continue its important work, strengthening transatlantic trade relations.

• Continue to work together and with African partners to promote human rights, good governance and conflict prevention.

• Continue to work closely together on counter-terrorism, exchanging information (e.g., on terrorism fundraising), raising awareness of new threats, and encouraging universal adherence to all 11 international conventions.

• Continue to implement the joint statement on electronic commerce, giving priority to the urgent issues of date privacy and domain name allocation. Continue to enhance our dialogue on regulatory issues, including those relating to biotechnology.

• Reaffirm the importance attach to efforts in the OECD to achieve a comprehensive multilateral framework for investment with high standards of liberalization and investment protection that has effective dispute settlement procedures and is open to non-member countries.

The Transatlantic Business Dialogue has set a standard for encouraging business involvement with government in building New Transatlantic Marketplace.

The care of democracy is a joint responsibility. The US and the EU share the conviction that the mechanisms of democracy cannot function unless they are grounded in a civic culture that is continually renewed.

There are various barriers to joint efforts to strengthen and sustain civil society. These include the need for better cooperation between government, business and non-profit organizations and among non-profit organizations themselves; funding limitations for programs; and under-representation or exclusion of important segments of society, including women, ethnic minorities, the elderly, the unemployed and those of low income.

New democracies and newly market-oriented economies are joining and the transformation of the international economy is forcing firms to adopt new competitive strategies, new organizational models, and emphasize the qualifications of their workforce. The closer collaboration of public and private players is essential to meeting the challenges in a way that benefits employers, employees and the common good. Expanded transatlantic exchange can promote the sharing of best practices among companies and union leaders as well as among public leaders in education, training and economic development.

9.5. EU-US Summits Overview NTA Documents the Transatlantic Declaration

The New Transatlantic Agenda has been a new framework for a partnership of global significance, designed to constitute a new quality to the transatlantic relationship.

The NTA lays out an ambitious agenda for expanding US-EU cooperation on promoting peace and democracy, expanding trade, addressing global challenges and building bridges between Americans and Europeans of the post-Cold War generation.

A key element of the US-EU worldwide partnership has intensified diplomatic cooperation. In Bosnia, there have been cooperated closely to support elections and we will continue to coordinate our actions on reconstruction of the war-ravaged region. We are working closely together to support peace in the Middle East. In an effort to counter weapons of mass destruction, we are on the verge of an agreement for the EU to join the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Therefore, the New Transatlantic Agenda has moved the transatlantic relationship from one of consultation, as foreseen by the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, to one of joint action. This intensification of the transatlantic relationship occurred, in part, because of the internal strengthening of Europe under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, and, for the first time, an intergovernmental foreign and security policy. In part, the NTA was also a response by the US and Europe to a proliferation of external challenges, for example, the threat of nuclear proliferation, the war in Bosnia, the fragile peace process in the Middle East, and the need to secure economic growth and employment.

At each summit, leaders review the progress in achieving the goals of the NTA and set priorities for the future. The EU and the US can already point to major achievements under the NTA:

In the area *of foreign policy*, the joint efforts support the process of reconstruction and reconciliation in the former Yugoslav republics, promote dialogue and economic development in the Middle East, and work to end violence and encourage political stability in Central Africa.

Under *global challenges*, the agreement on Chemical Precursors represents a major success in efforts to curb the diversion of chemicals for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs, there is a well-established cooperation in combating drugs in the Caribbean, and there is a work on a joint information campaign aimed at preventing trafficking in women.

On *economic and trade matters,* the successes include the conclusion of the Information Technology Agreement and the Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement in the World Trade Organization, and leadership in the effort to complete the WTO financial services negotiations.

An assessment of the earlier period of NTA implementation contains both negative and positive elements.

On the negative side, there is disappointment at the somewhat limited progress made in trade and economic field, the most traditional area of EU-US cooperation, where things have been

more difficult than expected. Negotiations for an Information Technology Agreement (ITA) have encountered problems that delayed the negotiations; and with regard to the envisaged Mutual Recognition Agreement on conformity assessment there is still only agreement on some of the sectors envisaged for initial coverage.

On the' positive side, the measures have been able to launch many new initiatives that cover areas in which in the past little or nothing was done jointly. From a long list of achievements, two examples are particularly significant. First, important progress has been made towards better coordinating of development and humanitarian assistance. Both sides exchanged programming plans, an exercise that should allow the US and the EU, by taking advantage of different fiscal years, better to avoid operational gaps in their response to humanitarian needs. Second, in the health sector, an area in which previously there was only a very limited dialogue with the US, a task force has been set up, which has already begun its work of setting up a global early warning system and response network for communicable diseases. Lastly, the transatlantic pastures have been quite successful in laying the foundations for a sustained close relationship and one that will continue to grow by taking steps to improve the people-to-people links across the Atlantic.

The final element of the NTA, "Building Bridges across the Atlantic" has significant successes, to exert greater efforts[566].

The TABD provides a model of the power and promise of the transatlantic people-to-people partnership. The TABD is a forum in which business leaders from both sides of the Atlantic meet to discuss and to give "unfiltered" advice to US and EU officials on how best to improve the climate for trade and investment.

At the EU-US Summit in June 1996, the US and the EU, pledged to conclude a comprehensive Science and Technology cooperation agreement in 1997. Among the benefits of that will be collaboration on the development of intelligent manufacturing systems and the exchange of ideas and information in the biotechnology area.

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[566] Monar, *op. cit.*, p. 9

In order to obtain support, whether financial, political, or moral, for the coals of the NTA, there is a need to do a better job of informing the public. Opinion polls and anecdotal evidence indicate in the US and Europe that the public possesses at best, a sketchy knowledge of the EU and its relationship with the US. A recent opinion poll conducted on behalf of the European Commission found that only 20 per cent of the EU citizens surveyed were aware of the 1996/1997 IGC, a conference which is struggling with some of the most basic questions about the shape of Europe's future[567].

The NTA is not, of course, the sum of the US relationship with the EU. Many areas were not included in the NTA. It is recognized that some sectors and issues will continue to be too "hot to handle", such as agriculture.

The internal political developments and concerns exert their influence on the EU-US relationship. The EU faces a host of difficult and fundamental decisions over the next couple of years:

- Enlargement, whether and how to restructure its decision-making process;
- The establishment of a deeper common foreign and security policy;
- The commitment to and mechanics of a single currency;
- The development of common policies in Third Pillar areas of crime, narcotics, immigration, and asylum;
- The creation of jobs and growth.

As noted in the NTA, however, "Domestic challenges are not an excuse to turn inward; we can learn from each other's experiences and build new transatlantic bridges"[568].

The US has always supported European integration; it fosters the national interest in seeing a stable, democratic, prosperous, and unified Europe. The fundamental values that share and

[567] *Ibid*, p. 10
[568] *Ibid*, p. 11

that try to advance together, belief in democratic governments, human rights, a strong multilateral trading system, free trade, stability, and security, far outweigh differences.

The NTA and the Joint Action Plan offer challenges to keep busy well beyond the year 2000. They include areas as diverse as helping developing nations toward economic growth and self-sufficiency; exploring ways to limit global emissions of greenhouse gases; increasing coverage of EU-US bilateral commitments on public procurement: and encouraging artistic and cultural cooperation projects[569].

When, in 1776, the US declared its independence from a European power, it knew not only the negative aspects of European power, but also the vitally positive role Europe played in its interests. European nations extended financial support and political and military expertise to a fledgling nation. The ties between the US and Europe have survived radical changes of geographical and political boundaries.

The economies and societies of the US and Europe intertwine in a network of thousands of companies, universities, trade organizations, research centers, and exchange programs. Transatlantic trade and investment are estimated to directly support six million jobs and indirectly support an additional eight million jobs. Tens of thousands of family members and friends cross the Atlantic each year. A few rough spots in a trade negotiation or over handling a certain foreign policy issue cannot break the ties that bind us.

The future of the relationship between the US and the EU is bright. There is a strong and vibrant partnership, and the NTA, and the EU-US Action Plan take this to a new level. The NTA is not an end point, but the beginning of a deeper relationship.

With US vital interests connected to Europe relatively safe for the foreseeable future, 'Washington's security preoccupations are turning more and more toward those regions where vital American interests are threatened - most particularly in the greater Middle East and, to a lesser and more potential degree, in the Asia-Pacific region. In these crucial areas, the state of transatlantic cooperation is far less bright than on the continent.

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[569] *Ibid*

As for Western security challenges in Asia, including managing the rise of Chinese power, instability on the Korean peninsula, and the growing importance of India, the Europeans are virtually absent in any strategic sense. These issues regarding transatlantic collaboration outside of Europe could again raise traditional burden-sharing problems across the Atlantic[570].

9.6. The Case of "Euramerica" and a World of Blocs

To Michael Lind, the American sphere of influence is shrinking in East Asia and expanding in Central and Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Its center of gravity is shifting eastward, away from the Pacific. The center of gravity of "Europe," like that of the American imperium, is shifting Eastward[571].

The idea of "the West" provided the appearance of cultural inevitability to the contingent NATO alliance.

The strategic skeleton and geo-cultural skin of the American Cold War bloc were never identical. Culturally remote Japan and South Korea were subordinate militarily to the United States than was France, a "Western" nation par excellence.

In the security realm, more and more American foreign policy thinkers favor an as-yet-unnamed pan-Pacific security organization modeled on the Organization for Security and Coop- the notion of "the Pacific Basin" or "Pacific Rim" community, a heterogeneous collection of states includes not only Japan, the United States, and China but also Malaysia, Mexico, and Chile.

Isolationism, or a North America policy - would be a mistake. American isolationism would produce a world of three economic blocs. The idea that the division of the world into trading blocs would somehow inevitably cause a world war is a fallacy, based on the myth that blames tariffs for the Depression and the Depression for the imperialism of Hitler's Germany and Japan.

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[570] Blackwill, *op. cit.*, p. 2
[571] *Ibid*

A purely North American bloc and uniting US and Canadian citizens with their falling wages to impoverished Latin Americans, might well be the weakest of the three blocs in the long run. The major economic bloc in a three-bloc world would probably be not an Asian bloc.

Indeed, the ultimate nightmare, the *cauchemar des coalitions,* for US grand strategists in the twenty-first century might be a Sino-European entente, uniting the world's largest common market with the world's most populous great power.

Isolationism, then, might well lead to the economic and geopolitical marginalization of North America, in a world order dominated by Europe and East Asia. The United States, if it is to maintain its relative power in the next century, must do so as a member of a bloc or alliance whose other members have greater weight than Canada and Mexico: Amerasia or Euramenica.

Membership in an integrated Euramenican bloc would promote the main goal of US foreign policy since the late nineteenth century. Anachronistic talk of "the world's only superpower" to the contrary, the United States today is too weak to dominate the world by itself. A Euramenican condominium that is preponderant in global security and economic matters is still an option. The idea of a Euramenican bloc capable of acting as the center of world politics and world trade in the twenty-first century may be dismissed as a visionary fantasy by Washington policymakers whose horizon consists of months or, perhaps, only weeks. The idea of "Euramenica," though, might be able to compete with the idea of "Europe," in its German or French forms. A Euramenican condominium may prove to be as elusive an idea as the Anglo-American hegemony that never was.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War has given way to an "ambiguous" new order. This situation brought enormous changes to the security environment in Europe and the world as well as the USA. In fact, a feeling of crisis was felt in transatlantic relations with the ending of the Cold War. The underlying question was whether the system that had provided security since the end of the Second World War would be capable of transformation or whether there is a shift to a new framework (or whether the transatlantic security community will survive the end of bipolar confrontation). Within this process, It was clear that a re-balancing of the relationship was necessary but that this would depended both on the path of development that the Europeans chose, as well as the role that the US wished to fulfill. Therefore, one of the important outcomes of the 20th century is the radical change in humanity's attitude to war as a sociopolitical phenomenon.

However, the 21st century is considered as the beginning of the millennium of solidarity. According to this view, people of the current millennium become directly involved in relations between states and regions. Therefore, since globalization is the primary evolutionary phenomenon, challenge and opportunity of current time, it raises the extremely important questions of the type, role, structure, strength and resources of the international system. Within this system, scientists were becoming more optimistic since of the birth of a global consciousness that makes the humans aware of their mistakes and problems and helps to solve them by changing course and adapting to evolutionary requirements.

In parallel with this, since the nature of threats to international peace and security, and the international system has changed, there has been acceptance that the position of sovereignty as the defining concept of international society has been altered during the 1990s. The first change about sovereignty, therefore, was the move from a divine to a national basis since the Peace of Wetsphalia. Then, American and French Revolutions brought the notion of the doctrine of "self-determination" which was effective during the 19th century. At the end of the 20th century, however, the basic rule of international society has been expanded and at the same time, the notions of domestic jurisdiction and non-interference have become conditional. Therefore, it can be said that sovereignty was internationalizing. In that context, The United Nations Security Council's altered definition of international peace and security

confirmed the shift in attitudes towards ending the absolute protection provided by sovereignty. The old issue of international peace and security, therefore, was no longer the real threat. The real threats stemmed from a variety of other sources internal to and beyond the borders of states. The old notion, underpinned by sovereignty, had been to protect the state against interference within its domestic jurisdiction and to maintain order by taking measures to stop external action against states that disturbed the peace. Now the needs has to be became opposed. The critical challenge for peace and security has come to be protecting the order upon which states mostly depend from the repercussions of events inside the borders of problem states. The priority is the need to prevent internal disturbance from infecting the international body an affecting the majority of states that depend on the order.

Within this logic, it is true that the globalization process is changing the nature of international relations in a number of significant and potentially far-reaching ways by, e.g., deepening the interconnections and transactions between actors across continents, and between different issue-areas; and stimulating the proliferation of international actors.

In that respect, a global transformation implies the emergence of a new epoch or configuration of global politics as progressing in technology and the internationalization of production, and manufactured goods; increasing internationalization of services; and increasing technological innovations that have brought change not only to production methods, but also to trade itself, both domestic and international.

In terms of humanistic dimension, it can be said that for the first time since human beings inhabited this earth, it is possible to describe comprehensive networks of social relationships that include all people.

With globalization economic, cultural and political relations develop rapidly independently of the relations between states. Individuals and groups within society begin to develop relationships with international institutions, mediated through cultural forms and institutions of civil society that have themselves developed beyond the national context.

Globalization is, therefore, an objective process with many positive sides (although it has negative sides as well) that has come to stay. It makes it easier for the states to cooperate in the field of economy, whips up economic growth, pushes forward and adds a wider scope to

exchange of high technologies in the economic, scientific, technological, and intellectual spheres which promotes progress throughout the world.

Thus, it is important to see the development of change (as an example of changing of a process) in the world in three different but crucial General Assembly meetings of the United Nations. The 15th session of the UN General Assembly, in 1960 brought forth an anti-colonial movement with a large part of the world community emerging from colonial domination to embark down the path of independent development that created "Third World". In 1995, at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, world leaders came up with an ideology marking the end of global confrontation between the two systems, advancing basic principles of a new world order which could open the way to a new setup in the world. The third meeting of world leaders in September 2000 has marked a new world approach: globalization. In the words of UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, found a base for the new world in the new millennium :"Our post-War institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a global world. Responding effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge for world leaders today". Therefore, it is not difficult to put forward that globalization is a natural process, and just as in any natural process, someone loses and someone gains as a result, but evolution follows the mainstream course and cannot be reversed no matter what.

As far as Europe is concerned, in the Cold War era, international politics of Europe was shaped by the inter-systemic conflict between ideological "camps". The symbolic turning point for Europe was the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 in which the European governments declared to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government for their nations and "full respect" for human rights as the bedrock on which they will seek to construct the new Europe.

According to international environment, European foreign policy system is a sub-system that is embedded in a complex, overlapping and concurrent international system. European Union as an open system receives inputs from and formulates outputs to the environment. While the member states of the European Union form an integral part of the system, they are at the same time in close interaction with their societies and the international system as well.

The European Union's first preoccupation, as a global actor, is the promotion of stability on the continent. From the viewpoint of transatlantic relations, if Europe is seriously unstable,

there will be little or no chance that the allies will be prepared over the longer term to look beyond Europe to a broad partnership with the United States to lead in the management of global international security and political economy. Therefore, increased peace and security in Europe through intense US-European cooperation is a sine qua non for further extending those benign European conditions and successful transatlantic comity into the rest of the world, especially the greater Middle East and East Asia.

The December 1994 NATO summit in Brussels declared "the enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies of the East."

The first wave of NATO's Eastern enlargement has strengthened the "Atlanticist" identity of the East-Central Europeans thereby bringing a new element to transatlantic relations. At the same time, the Kosovo campaign has demonstrated America's leading role in European security, and reinforced NATO's predominance in the European security architecture.

In the US view, NATO enlargement serves four purposes: expanding the region where wars will not take place because of the security "guarantee" making NATO stronger, strengthening democratic institutions, and not shutting out qualified democracies simply because they were once members of the Warsaw Pact.

The dilemmas between European integration and the transatlantic alliance are evident from the difficulties surrounding the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy. The task of building a more coherent European pillar within the transatlantic alliance has been on the policy agenda since the early 1960s. With the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the NATO Brussels Summit in 1994, the construction of the European Security and Defense Identity has been accorded greater importance.

The key to the enlargement of the transatlantic pluralistic security community eastwards is not simply institutional enlargement, but a process of convergence and integration between culturally distinct societies, political communities and value systems across the former East-West divide.

As to the US views, the First World War produced very little change in Americans' commitment to political-military unilateralism, whereas the Second World War led to a dramatic transformation. During the Second World War, unilateralist ideas took a qualitative leap toward high levels of support for internationalism and remained there after the war. In fact, The United States was for many years the dominant partner in its relationship with Europe and certainly, Europe was in no position in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to go it alone without US help. By the 1950s, the United States and the new European Community were very much in a patron-client relationship. In this respect, the United States (along with Britain) was the first country to accredit a diplomatic representative to the European Coal and Steel Community and in 1956 established a separate mission to the ECSC.

The agenda for the US in the 21st century is consisted of the following notions: an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe; a stable, integrated Asia-Pacific community; a decisive force for peace; meeting the new transnational security threats; a new, open trading system; and maintaining strong military and diplomatic capabilities as an indispensable investment in the US's peace and security.

Moreover, the New Transatlantic Agenda that is a keystone in the post-Cold War European security architecture and transatlantic relations highlight many areas in which the United States and the European Union were already working together. However, its greater importance lies in its promise and potential in that which is "capable of being". The NTA testifies to US support for the EU and deepening commitment to remain engaged in Europe's security. It should also be remembered that since the NTA is a long-range effort, take time to realize its goals.

The emergence of a transatlantic security community in the postwar period is a significant development. In this framework, the thickening of networks of economic and social exchange, the emergence of a common market, the spread of complex interdependence and the impact of globalization created "informal Integration". The creation of structures of institutionalised negotiation, compromise and cooperation help facilitate and channel the processes of "informal integration". The spread and consolidation of democracy in the transatlantic area is a factor of major import in the emergence of a pluralistic security community that represents "stable liberal democracies and social market economies". As for "external threat", cooperation within any group is facilitated if that group shares a common

perception of a significant external threat. Finally, as the "pacifier", the USA has often been able to play both a mediating role and to provide leadership in a way that would be impossible for any of the West European Great Powers.

Relations between the US and Europe in the defense field continue to vacillate between a policy of cooperation and a policy of competition. Indeed, these two factors have always been among most countries' motives for participating in single programs.

As far as relations between the US and the EU, tensions between the two actors are focused around the contradiction between the global and regional interests of the various allies. These stem from the position of the United States as a world superpower conflicting with that of the West European states as former empires and present day middle rank powers. However, The United States and Europe are the only conceivable global partners for each other in seeking to shape the international system in positive ways into the next century. Without America, Europe will tend to retreat into a continental fortress mentality or into sustained passivity as threats from beyond the continent progressively build and then intrude into the interests and daily lives of the allies.

In resolution the tensions between the two, it is worth to note the successful complementarity between the US and the EU. As it is witnessed in the Middle East Peace Process, the both sides have overcome certain problems because their vital and important interests have been largely identical and are so perceived by governments, dominant elites, and publics. In addition, the two sides of the Atlantic share history, cultural affinity, and moral values that make the transatlantic partnership unique in the world.

Opportunities presently exist for the US-European relationship helping to mold the 21st century's world. The two sides of the Atlantic continue to share enduring vital interests and face a common set of challenges both in Europe and beyond. These challenges are so many and diverse that neither the United States nor the allies can adequately address these regional and global concerns alone, especially in light of growing domestic constraints on the implementation of foreign policy. Thus, protecting shared interests and managing common threats to the West in the years ahead will necessitate not only continued cooperation but also a broader and more comprehensive transatlantic partnership than in the past.

Harmony across the Atlantic is an instrument to improve the security and well being of societies on both sides of the Atlantic and of the world.

The transatlantic partnership in the 1990s consists of a complex web of institutions wherein the United States and Europe cooperate in the spheres of politics, security, economics, and culture. The institutional expression of the transatlantic relationship is expanding. As important factors, security institutions are evolving in a way this is compatible with regional security complexes, and supportive of former adversaries.

In the economic side, the creation of the euro, the new currency of the monetary union, raised an important question as whether monetary union will lead to cooperation or rivalry between the United States and Europe. To the Americans, euro gives impetus to internal economic reforms; promotes political integration of the European Union, and has an impact on Central and Eastern Europe. Further, the euro is the monetary means to political integration in Western Europe. The monetary union provides a number of incentives for member states to cooperate in other economic areas such as fiscal and financial policies. Therefore, according to the US side, "the formulation of the monetary union and increasing international role of the euro will not constrain US macroeconomic policy through any external financing constraint". On the other side, since the EU policies in support of growth would have a positive impact on the euro's role in international markets, policies enhancing EU growth would be advantageous for both the European Union and the United States because a solid and expanding economic environment tends to strengthen international cooperation. Moreover, the theory of international economic relations offers some insight into cooperative behavior at the international level.

As a most important security organization within the framework of transatlantic security, it would be useful to deal with its position in international arena. First, thus, it should be realized that NATO could adapt to post-Cold War security because it is an organization of hundreds of daily interactions and procedures. NATO functions on a permanent basis and has bureaucracies with practices and procedures staffed by civilians form many countries that work together.

NATO is able to do the three things that have to be done for any policy: mobilize, organize, and implement. Although developed during the Cold War, these capacities translate into post-Cold War missions and are crucial for multilateral security missions.

NATO, therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium has established itself as the center of Europe's post-Cold War security system. The Europeans and Americans agreed in 1996 on a formula for developing ESDI within the NATO framework. However, under guidelines for "Combined Joint Task Forces", the WEU would borrow "separable but not separate" NATO assets for humanitarian, peacekeeping, or even peacemaking operations that the WEU might wish to participate in directly.

In fact, the creation of a Common European Security and Defense Policy is so important, because it offers the prospects of a change in that dominant idea and constitutes a part of the EU's long-term political agenda.

Moreover, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept reflects flexibility by stating that in order to support security and stability "of the Euro-Atlantic area" the Alliance may decide to engage in crisis management "in conformity" with the UN Charter provided all members agree.

Finally, dismemberment of the Soviet Union; the onset of a multi-polar and increasingly interdependent world; the lessening of the impact of politico-military issues and the growing importance of politico-economic factors and domestic concerns created a new transatlantic base for international arena. Transatlantic declaration and the New transatlantic Agenda have contributed to this process that leads to a idea of a "Euramenican" bloc capable of acting as the center of world politics and world trade in the twenty-first century.

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