

**TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLAR ARASI  
İLİŞKİLER ANA BİLİM DALI**

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARDS  
THE WESTERN BALKANS:  
THE CASE OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV  
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Mustafa Korkmaz**

**İstanbul 2005**

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## ÖZET

Soğuk Savaşın bitmesi Avrupa’da AB’nin gelişimini de etkileyen çok önemli değişimlere sebep olmuştur. Berlin Duvarının yıkılmasının olumlu bir sonucu da Yalta Konferansından bu yana Avrupa kıtasını bölen “demir perde”nin kalkması olmuştur. AB bu yeni ortamdan istifade ederek Doğu ve Orta Avrupa’daki eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerinin dönüşümünün rotasını genişleme kozunu kullanarak belirlemiştir. Bu büyük bir politika başarısı olarak görülmektedir. Diğer taraftan komunizmin sona ermesi Yugoslavyanın şiddetli parçalanma sürecinde tanık olduğu gibi yıkıcı milliyetçiliklerin önünü açmıştır. Avrupa Birliği için Yugoslav krizi genişletilmiş rolünü sergilemek için iyi bir fırsat olarak görülmekteydi. Yeni geliştirilen Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) için Yugoslavya ilk test olmuştur. Ama AB için etkin olma bakımından Yugoslavya testi başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. ODGP’nin eksiklikleri yanında Avrupalı politikacıların bölge ve bölge halkı üstüne önyargıları çatışmanın yanlış yorumlanmasına sebep olmuş ve tutarlı bir politika oluşturulmasına engel teşkil etmiştir. Şiddetin yükselmesinde sonra A.B.D. liderliğinde izlenen politikalar sonucu Dayton Anlaşması ile savaş sona erdirilmiştir.

Dayton sonrası dönemde AB bölgenin yeniden yapılanmasında en önemli aktör durumundadır. 1990’ların ikinci yarısında ODGP mekanizmalarının güçlendirilmesi ve Komisyon tarafından Batı Balkanlar için tasarlanan İstikrar ve Bütünleşme Sürecinin bölge ülkelerine sunduğu imkanlar sayesinde AB Batı Balkanlardaki olası büyük çaplı çatışmaların önüne geçmeyi başarmıştır. Bu tezin konusu olan Makedonya AB dış politikasının etkinliğini anlamak için çok uygun bir örnektir zira bu ülkede meydana gelecek bir istikrarsızlığın bütün Balkanları olduğu gibi Avrupayı da etkilemesi beklenmektedir. AB ülkeleri daha önceki hatalarından ders alarak Makedonya da baş gösteren çatışmalara sırasında ortak bir tutum izlemiş ve bu da krizin bölgeye yayılmasını engellemiştir. Makedonya ve diğer Balkan ülkelerinde yakalanan görece istikrarın devamlı kılınması için bu ülkelere AB ile bütünleşmelerinin yakın bir gelecekte mümkün olabileceği yönünde güçlü sinyaller gönderilmesi gerekmektedir.

## **ABSTRACT**

The end of the Cold War has led to drastical changes in Europe that directly influenced the evolution of EU. A positive outcome of the collapse of Berlin Wall was that the “iron curtain” dividing the European continent since the Yalta Conference has been removed. EU in this new climate seized the opportunity and determined the course of transformation of the former Soviet republics in Central and Eastern Europe with the carrot of enlargement. This was a major policy success for the EU. On the other hand the fall of communism resulted in the emergence of destructive nationalisms as witnessed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. For the EU the Yugoslav crisis seemed to represent an opportunity to demonstrate its enhanced role. Break-up of Yugoslavia was the first test case of the newly developed Common Foreign and Security Policy( CFSP) of the EU. However the Yugoslav case for EU is one of failure to act effectively. In addition to deficiencies of CFSP, the prejudices of the European policy makers regarding Balkans caused misinterpretation of the conflict which in turn became an obstacle for a coherent policy. The US after the escalation of the violence took the lead and the crisis came to a halt with the signing of Dayton Accords in 1995.

In the post-Dayton period EU became the main actor behind the recovery of the region. Thanks to the enhanced CFSP tools provided in the second half of 1990’s and to the carrots offered with the initiation of Stabilisation and Association Process by the Commission EU prevented the intensification of possible disputes in Western Balkan countries. The focus of this thesis FYROM is a perfect case in revealing the scope and extent of the European foreign policy since the instability in that country would not only have consequences in the Balkans but also in the EU itself. The EU states learnt from their mistakes and achieved unity in dealing with FYROM that impeded the spread of the conflict throughout the region. In order to keep this success in dealing with FYROM and the other Western balkan countries permanent, EU should take measures in persuading them that the integration of Western Balkan countries to the EU is not a distant goal.

## INTRODUCTION

For many observers the fall of communism and the end of Cold War paved the way for ‘a new world order’ which will make the traditional security and defence capabilities matter less in the future. This led to a wave of optimism among the EC/EU elite that it can be more influential in the international arena in the post Cold War period with its socio-economic weight and experience in multilateral diplomacy. But the blooming hopes faded with the failure of the EU in dealing with the violent break-up of Yugoslavia (The EC/EU intervention will be examined in Chapter 2). The tools of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy that was sorted out in Maastricht in 1992 were less than sufficient to create a cohesive and effective policy during the crisis. The reason for the failure was quite correctly identified by Hill as a result of the capabilities-expectations gap and in this new era the EU's dependence on the United States in situations of crisis did not seem to have declined. (A broader analysis of the EU's international role and its foreign policy will be made in the first chapter).

However it would be an incomplete argument to link the failure just with the institutional deficiencies of the EU. The Balkan image on the minds of the Western elite and policy-makers also set an important barrier in the path to devise a meaningful policy to prevent the bloodshed. The violent conflicts in Western Balkans were generally explained by the western media and the political leaders with the rhetoric of the return of “ancient hatreds”(Ali&Lifschultz 1994 :18). The Balkans were presumably very unlike other, more western societies in this respect. Thus the war was characterized as the product of centuries-old enmities between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims,-a tribal blood feud, a ‘typical’ Balkan convulsion which could not be understood and mediated by any intervention by the civilized world (Ali&Lifschultz 1994: 18). Laura Silber and Allen Little claim that “foreign ministers from the European Community, sent to Yugoslavia in 1991 to resolve the crisis, often alluded to the “Balkan temperament, a south Slavic predisposition—either cultural or genetic—toward fratricide” (Silber&Allen 1996: 159). Robert Kaplan went further to claim that “...Nazism can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophousus of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the Southern Slavic World, Hitler learned how to hate so

infectiously” (Kaplan 1993: xxiii). Goerge Kennan believes that the underlying force behind Balkan developments was not religion but aggressive nationalism;

But that nationalism, as it manifested itself on the field of battle, drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant, tribal past. And so it remains today. What we are up against is the sad fact that developments of those earlier ages... had the effect of thrusting into the southeastern reaches of the European continent a salient of non-European civilization, which has continued to the present day to preserve many of its non-European characteristics (Kennan in Todorova 1997: 5-6).

Todorova (1997) in order to figure out the underlying reasons of these comments that had an impact on European involvement in the Balkans, came up with the term Balkanism to point the process of construction of the image of Balkans as the uncivilized, irrational ‘other’ of Europe. According to Todorova, the formation of the Balkan image/sign/stereotype was a two-century process, beginning in the 18<sup>th</sup> century with the first contacts by Western travellers with the Balkans. 18<sup>th</sup> century Enlightenment values of progress, civilisation and reason provided a reference point from which to measure other cultures and thus perceive their relative industrial backwardness, undeveloped social relations, lack of political institutions, and culture based on superstition and submission; this was found in the Balkan peoples. As for the notion of "civilized world," self-attributed by the west to its "Selves" during the Enlightenment, it may be noted that it indirectly defined itself in opposition to each of the illustrations above: in respect to the "backwardness" of eastern Europe, there stands the "progress" of the west; in respect to the "violence" of the Balkans, there stands the "civility" of the west (Hayden 1995). Balkans became the repository of negative characteristics against which a positive image of Europe and the West has been constructed (Todorova 1997: 188). In this sense ‘Balkans’ can be related to the ‘Orient’ as understood in Said’s ‘Orientalist’ discourse.

Seeing Orientalism as a dialectical process helps us recognise that it is not merely a Western imposition of a reified identity on some alien set of people. It is also an imposition of an identity created in dialectical opposition to another identity, one likely to be equally reified, that of the West. Westerners, then, define the Orient in terms of the West, but so others define themselves in terms of the West....Of course, the way I have cast this privileges the West as the standard against which all others are defined, which is



appropriate in view of both the historical political and economic power of the West (James Carrier, quoted in Todorova 1997:10)

It is true that both the 'Orient' and the 'Balkans' are European constructs, made possible because of existing hierarchies and their performance of particular functions for Europe. But there are distinctions. Hayden describes the process of imagining the Balkans as one of "nesting orientalisms". Todorova suggests that "Balkanism" can be posited as an independent and specific rhetorical paradigm, not "merely a sub-species of orientalism," for the part of Europe that was under Ottoman rule. Todorova shows that "balkanism independently developed a rhetorical arsenal of its own via its specific geo-political, religious and cultural position, best epitomized in a travelogue of the late 1920s as a "wavering form', a composite of Easterner and Westerner...no longer Orientals nor yet Europeans" (Todorova quoted in Hayden 1995). On the one hand, the region is seen as 'irreparably oriental' because it spent nearly five centuries as part of the Ottoman Empire. On the other, it is indisputably part of Europe. Balkans are deemed as the geographic and cultural bridge between the 'West' and the 'East'.

Nevertheless modernity in the Balkans is connected to 'Western' influence in terms of economic, social and political development<sup>1</sup>. The beginning of modern Balkan history can be regarded Western European as the idea of the nation-state is a Western European invention, as Balalovska points out " it is doubtful whether in an atmosphere in which the national was imposed as the hegemonic paradigm in Europe, as the gold standard of "civilised" political organisation, the imperial or any other alternative could be viable. The impact affected all aspects of the subordinate culture:their traditional values and ways of thinking, as well as their economic and social organisation in Balkans" (Balalovska 2003).

The elites of the Balkan states had no choice but to imitate the European model of the nation-state and nationalism. Neither historic rights nor issues of self-determination were important in delienating frontiers. As Todorava puts forward " at the very most,

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<sup>1</sup> German, French, and English scholars helped to establish national identities in Balkan countries emerging from Ottoman rule. The constitution of a cultural heritage of the Southern Slavs and the development of Serbo-Croat began with support from Austrian and German scholars, including the distinguished philologist, Jacob Grimm. Shortly after the massacre at Chios in 1882, the French scholar, Claude Fauriel, took it upon himself to prove that modern Greeks had a true national identity and a cultural heritage undoubtedly derived from ancient Greece (Thiesse 1999)

these elements shaped the controversial and incompatible Balkan irredentist programmes<sup>2</sup>. But the size, shape, stages of growth, even the very existence of the different Balkan states were almost exclusively regulated by great power considerations following the rules of the balance-of-power game” (Todorova 1997: 29-33).

It is a historical coincidence that the identities and states in question were shaped at about the same time as the Balkan stereotype was reinforced in the West in the beginning of 20th century with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 (which were deemed by some authors as a result of manipulation of great powers) (Balalovska 2003) This was a time of European decadence and insecurity. European values were the focus of serious challenges. In addition the world war challenged Europe’s peace system and self-image as the center of all civilization. Communism challenged liberalism and the West’s capitalist traditions. The need for protection of decaying social values resulted in the identification of a negative other that would make Europe feel better about being Europe.

The term ‘Balkanisation’ came back on the agenda to define the region that became a battlefield after the fall of communism. It is generally echoed that Balkan violence is more violent because it is archaic, born of clan societies. Todorova cites a very impressive Balkanist narrative during the war which was used to emphasize the distinction between Balkan women and the Western women regarding their reaction to rape.

The rape is meant to collectively humiliate the enemy. What do the raped women think of first? Of something different from Austrian, American or English women. The latter would ask themselves: why me precisely? They would receive support from their families, but they would think primarily in individual terms. These women think first of their husbands, of the children, of the parents, of the relatives - of shame. This is how the many rapes can be explained. They are symbolic acts which are supposed to reach the opponent in his political entirety (Todorova 2003: 279)

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<sup>2</sup> Morgenthau defined the nationalist paradox in Balkans as such: There are no inherent limits to the application of principles of nationalisms. If the peoples of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia could invoke the principles against Turkey, why could not the people of Macedonia invoke them against, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia?... Thus yesterday’s oppressed cannot help becoming the oppressors of today because they are afraid lest they be again oppressed tomorrow. Hence, the process of national liberation must stop at some point, and that point is determined not by the logic of nationalism, but by the configuration of interest and power between the rulers and the ruled ( Morgenthau quoted in International Commission on Balkans 1996: 29

These kind of overgeneralizations that are not based on any sociological surveys were widely held among Western media aimed at stressing the distinction between us and them. A negative, all-Balkan image, therefore, meant that the Balkan peoples were particularly sensitive to how they were perceived, and thus their identities were a result of the ways in which 'Europe' defined them (Balalovska 2003). In the post Dayton period a lot of studies were made and a huge literature on Balkan issues was formed in order to understand the region better and eliminate the stereotypes about Balkans. Also the EU played the leading role in the reconstruction of Western Balkans (excluding the period of NATO war-fighting over Kosovo) by using mainly its 'soft power' instruments that turned out to be quite effective in times of peace such as the membership incentive (which is the most influential one), Stabilisation and Association Agreements, trade preferences and the new CFSP tools at its disposal that. (Further analysis will be made in Chapter 3 the EU's policy towards whole region and in Chapter 4 towards FYROM )

It must be noted that the EU neither had the necessary instruments to prevent the bloodshed in Balkans nor the EU member states had willingness to do so because of the stereotypes and prejudices of political leaders towards the region as mentioned above. The indifference and despise on part of European states to the region compounded with the inadequate capabilities of the EC/EU, and the reluctance of use of force and sending troops to end a conflict that is perceived to be a consequence of "ancient hatreds", prepared the ground for the most dreadful atrocities in the continent since World War 2. This was a huge blow for the European foreign policy. The post-Dayton period was a chance for the EU to showcase the extent and scope of its soft power and the EU seized the opportunity and played a key role in reshaping of the Western Balkans.

## **I. THE DEVELOPMENT of EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Students of international relations have not yet succeeded in developing concepts and theories that allow us fully to understand foreign policy cooperation within the EU and the EU's role in the international system (Sjursen 1998: 1). White (2001: 28-32) sees that there are two dominating approaches in the analysis of the EU's international role. First approach is the one in which the actor behaviour is explained as a function of the international institutions or other structures in which they are located. Here, the emphasis would be more on the decision-making, the EU institutions' agendas and capabilities, and different policy processes in which member states adopt their behaviour. The second approach is the 'EU as an actor approach' which concentrates on the EU's impact on world politics, focuses on outcomes and sees the EU as a single actor. There is still ongoing debates on how to best characterize this new international actor. An international actor has been defined by Gunnar Sjöstedt as one who is delimited from others and its environment, is autonomous and possesses certain structural prerequisites such as legal personality, a diplomatic corps, and the ability to negotiate with other international actors ( Sjöstedt 1977: 15-17). Clearly, this classification can not be easily applied to the contemporary EU. As Allen and Smith stated, 'the difficulty in studying Western Europe's international role is that 'the notion of a 'foreign policy' carries with it a conceptual framework which is inseparable from the state-centric view of world politics' (Allen and Smith in Sjursen 1998: 2). To overcome this difficulty the focus was put on the EU's capabilities on the global stage subsumed under the term 'actorness'. Actorness refers to a theoretical perspective that incorporates both the internal dynamics of institutional development and the changing nature of international environment in which the union has to operate (Hill 1993: 309). Additionally Allen and Smith suggested that by using the concept of international 'presence', it is possible to study the impact of the EU in different policy areas of the international system, and to show that the EU has considerable structure, salience and legitimacy in the process of international politics (Allen and Smith in Sjurse 1998: 2). Presence concerns the impact of Union's external behaviour which does not rest solely upon its actorness, but rather on its multidimensional presence. The concept thus emphasizes outside perceptions of the community and the significant effect it has both on the psychological and operational environments of third parties' (Hill 1993: 309). As

the concepts of actorness and presence are closely interlinked, Hill (1993) maintains that a capability-expectations gap is originating from the tensions between them and then concludes that ‘ if the gap is to be closed and a dangerous tension relieved in European Foreign policy, then either capabilities will have to be increased or expectations decreased ‘ (Hill 1993: 321).

White (2001) building on the earlier works of Hill and White suggests the notion of a European foreign policy system. By “system of European foreign policy”, White refers to the emergence of three axes of foreign policy that mutually influence each other: i) national foreign policy; ii) the EU's foreign and security policy; iii) the EU’s external relations. The first one refers to the separate foreign policy activities of the EU’s member states. These are still important despite the increased scope of the two other types of foreign policy activity. The second refers to the political dimension of the EU’s foreign policy co-operation, usually referred to as the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The third refers to the more established foreign economic relations within the first pillar (see White 2001: 39-41). As Whitman puts it this kind of thought especially seen in the works of Hill aimed to explore the international role of the EC/EU by delienating its functions in international system before making a decision about the form of the EC (Whitman 2002:7)

The author of this thesis on the other hand believes that the civilian power approach that was firstly mentioned by Duchene is instrumental in describing the international significance of the EU. He argued that the EEC could not and would not develop into a full federal state with a common army and common government, a super-power in the making or an unarmed neutral power (Duchene in Stavridis 2001: 2). According to Duchene , a civilian power has two main characteristics , both of which were present in the EEC in the 1970’s:

1. a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces;
  2. a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards
- (Duchene in Stavridis 2001: 2)

The widely held view that EU which is in the process of developing a European Security and Defence Policy can no longer be deemed to be a civilian power is also misleading. As Maull states, ‘ the role concept of a civilian power does not describe any inability or

unwillingness to use military force, rather it suggests the specific ways in which military force will be applied- never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit of civilizing international relations (Mauil 2005: 781).

Under this theoretical framework the historical evolution of the CFSP and the involvement of Commission in this process will be examined to evaluate the extent of communitarization in these policy areas. This is important since the ability of the EU to act cohesively could be strengthened by reinforcing the role of the Commission The effect of foreign economic policy will also be illustrated in the test case

### **1.1. From European Defence Community to Maastricht Treaty**

Throughout the various stages of European integration, the concepts of a political union, a common foreign policy, a common defence policy, have been brought to agenda occasionally. The first such plan was the European Defence Community (EDC) initiative. Inspired by Monnet, Rene Pleven, initiated the plan that aimed to create an integrated European army under joint command. In addition to elements of their national forces, the participants would pledge to defend Europe under a Supreme Allied Commander in time of conflict (but under national control in all other circumstances). In accordance with this, a European Defence Minister with its own command and staff structure was proposed. The suggested army would be comprised of contributions at the battalion level and would total some one hundred thousand men. The plan also envisaged a European Council of Ministers with a single defence budget and arms procurement process. For all but the West Germans it was to be an army and other participants could also retain national forces for colonial and other uses. (Duke 1999: 18). In other words, the plan proposed a limited rearmament of Germany within the framework of EDC. The Korean War prepared the ground for the initiative. The Korean War proved that German military contribution was vital for European security against the Soviet threat. Monnet saw in this proposal both a threat and an opportunity: a threat because German contingents in NATO might lead in the direction of a new German army and the creation of a new road-block on the way towards a political union, an opportunity because the proposal could perhaps be diverted to increase the scope of integration by extending it to defence and military matters (Pryce 1973:18). The plan

was signed after discussions by the 6 members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The corollary of the EDC was a political project aimed at establishing a federal or confederative structure, presented in 1953. The European Political Community would have created a two-chamber parliamentary assembly, a European Executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. It was planned that, the Political Community would have wide powers and in the long run, the EDC and ECSC would be incorporated into it. But this project could not be realised after the rejection by the French National Assembly in 1954.

In 1960's the focus shifted to foreign policy cooperation. According to Bretherton&Vogler "by the early 1960's the need to balance the European Community's growing significance in external economic relations with an explicit foreign policy dimension became a subject of often contentious discussion" (Bretherton&Vogler 1999: 174). Especially De Gaulle was discontent about this fashion and this led to the formulation of Fouchet Plan that envisaged a highly intergovernmental Political Union. Agreement could not be reached and the project was not on the agenda after 1962.

In 1969 in the Hague Summit member states agreed to organize consultation meetings at different political levels in order to lay the foundations of foreign policy cooperation. The Davignon Report presented in 1970 to the Luxembourg Summit was the starting point for the European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC involved regular consultation and formal quarterly meetings between national foreign ministers supported by a Political Committee (PoCo) comprising political directors (senior foreign ministry officials) representing each member state and a range of specialist Working Groups composed of foreign ministry officials (Bretherton&Vogler 1999: 174-175). Two more reports were to follow in the following years. 1973 Copenhagen and 1981 London Report proposed that Commission should be fully associated at all levels. This was an important step since the first ten years of EPC's operation were characterized by a series of *ad hoc* arrangements to accommodate Commission involvement in those frequent circumstances where EC and EPC matters overlapped and where EC instruments were essential to policy implementation (Bretherton&Vogler 1999: 176).

Provisions introduced by the Single European Act established an institutional basis for EPC, the group of European correspondents and a secretariat working under the direct authority of the presidency. The objectives of EPC were also extended to all foreign policy issues of general interest, and with the entry into force of the Single Act in 1987, 17 years after its launch, EPC obtained its own legal basis.<sup>3</sup> Later on an EPC secretariat was established in Brussels with the aim of assisting the Presidency in preparing and implementing the activities of EPC in administrative matters. Article 30 codified previous EPC practices and contained the provisions governing the Community's constituent members cooperation within the field of foreign policy. The reassurance of Commission's association to EPC at all levels and with the obligation of revolving presidency to inform and consult the Parliament about the issues it is dealing with, led the EPC's integration into the community.

However, Article 31 denied the European Court of Justice any jurisdiction over the EPC issues. Also Article 30(1) defined EPC's guiding principle : a commitment by High Contracting Parties to 'endeavour jointly to formulate a European foreign policy'. Two points were of significance. First , the reference to the member states as 'High Contracting Parties' was an augur that they were still reluctant to renounce their predominant role in issues of 'high politics'. Second the intent of commitment was attenuated by limiting it to endeavour only, not achievement (Kintis 1995 : 1173). The need for the Twelve prior to the adoption of national policies, to inform, consult, and to take full account of the positions of the other partners were outscored. The SEA gave EPC a looser character basing it on voluntary participation. In SEA member states decided to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security. It should be noted at this point that Commission with its expertise on financial and economic diplomacy and technical and humanitarian assistance although outside the framework of union foreign policy contributed to the European security which will be more evident in enlargement in 1990's that displayed the strength of EU's civilian power (Sjursen 1998: 98-99).

In some major conflicts like the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and Cyprus Crises of 1974, EC could not adopt a common policy. In Van Eekelen's view:

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<sup>3</sup> <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm>



The only area in which the EPC had been successful was in connection with the Helsinki process, first in the creation of Conference on Security in Europe (CSCE) and later in its transformation into Organization for Security in Europe (OSCE). There, the EC clearly provided the major initiatives and managed to turn Soviet proposals into an important set of principles among states. The most important result was that the treatment of human rights became a legitimate subject of diplomatic intercourse (Van Eekelen 1999: 45).

In the end as Nuttall put forward “ from its initiation in 1970 until its demise with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, EPC represented an attempt to harmonise the foreign policies of the Member States on an intergovernmental basis with each Member State exercising a veto over any common action” (Nuttall quoted in Whitman 1998: 165)

## **1.2. The Maastricht Treaty**

The end of the Cold War changed the context in which the European Communities operated, most notably the dissolution of the distinction between West and East brought about new threats as well as opportunities since the end of distinction between Western and Eastern Europe removed many of the difficulties previously encountered in the way of a more solid and more “European foreign policy”. The German unification also increased pressure on establishment of some sort of a common foreign and security policy. There was a need to keep Germany as European because of the sensitivity about German past that brought wars and instability to the continent. Besides Gulf War showed the limits of EPC, that the EC’s action was limited to coordinating diplomatic action and imposed sanctions. Also there was an urge from member states as well as from extra regional actors to bridge the gap between progress in the economic field and political cooperation. The fledgling Internal Market and the evolving Economic and Monetary Union were signs of the economic maturity of the European Community pressing for the coming age of political union (Kintis 1995: 1174). Kintis (1995) also points that transformation of international environment from a bi-polar to a multi-polar system, created the need to follow collective policies covering both commercial, economic and security issues.

Two main debates dominated the agenda before the creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Laursen 1996). First one was between Europeanists and Atlanticists, former represented by France which asked for the development of CFSP independently from US and NATO, latter represented by Great Britain and Denmark which urged that the CFSP shall not compete with the function of the NATO. The other debate being among intergovernmentalists, represented by France and Great Britain that asked the CFSP to be in the domain of the governments, executed by the European Council and based on unanimity, and supranationalists represented by Germany and Italy that would like a more communitarized CFSP with Commission and Parliament involved and the use of QMV prevailed.

The Treaty on European Union transformed the EC into a new three-pillar structure. Pillar one, the European Economic Community, was joined by two new areas of activity, pillar two, the CFSP, and pillar three, cooperation in the area of Home and Judicial Affairs. Title V of the TEU contains the main provisions governing the CFSP. By escaping the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice CFSP kept the intergovernmental structure of EPC.

The CFSP is guided by the following objectives (Art J. 1 TEU-M):

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union, and its member states in all ways;
- to preserve the peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of United Nations charter (1945) as well as the principles of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the objectives of CSCE Paris Charter (1990);
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The objectives are to be realised through 'systemic cooperation' (Art. J. 2). Member states agreed to support the Union's external and security policy and refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations (Art. J. 2).

The European Council is the highest organ of CFSP. It determines the principles and general guidelines of CFSP and adopts common strategies<sup>4</sup>. Council of Foreign Ministers (EU Foreign Ministers and the Commission External Relations Commissioner meet as the General Affairs Council (GAC) ) takes decisions related to the formulation and implementation of the the new instruments of the CFSP ‘common positions’ and ‘joint actions’. The former require the Member states to implement national policies to comply with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue to reach a common policy and the latter have a more specific scope and respond to concrete situations; their objectives, their durations, and the means necessary for the implementation are usually defined. Joint actions on the other hand have a more specific scope. Generally both common positions and joint actions had to be decided by consensus. Exception could be made in the implementation of an already agreed joint action. Then, QMV could be possible but it was hardly the case. For instance, between November 1993 and December 1994 eight joint actions were decided, only in one of them QMV was utilized (see Whitman 1998: 169-170). (also the financing of these operations caused more divisions between policy makers as will be demonstrated in the next chapter).

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (known as COREPER), comprising ambassadors of EU Member States to the EU and the Commission Deputy Secretary General was located above PoCo<sup>5</sup> by the TEU. It convenes at least once a week to prepare Council meetings and decisions, including those related to the General Affairs Council and CFSP. To sum up, the TEU appointed the Community institutions, the Council of Foreign Ministers, COREPER, and the Commission to be jointly responsible for decision emerging from both Pillar 1 (Community competence) and Pillar 2 (CFSP) with a view to encouraging more coherence in EU external policy (Peterson quoted in White 2001: 97). The EP was also to be kept informed and consulted in the issues of the CFSP. The role of the rotating Presidency was improved. It plays a vital part in the organisation of the work of the institution, notably as the driving force in the legislative and political decision-making process. It organises and chairs all meetings and works

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<sup>4</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp) for more information on the roles of the institutions in CFSP process

<sup>5</sup> PoCo deals with only pillar 2 matters, whereas COREPER sees all the material discussed by the Council, it is the gatekeeper for everything (Bretherton&Vogler: 1999: 181). The tensions between PoCo and COREPER casts the perfect example of the worsening turf battles between community and national institutions after the formation of pillar structure.

out compromises capable of resolving difficulties. This is a key role in CFSP, where decisions are taken by unanimity. Also the role of Troika was reinforced. By doing so, the EU attempted to enhance its visibility in world politics and in international organizations (Art J. 5).

The Commission is fully associated with the work carried out in the field of CFSP (Art J. 7). The Commission may, as any Member State, refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and may submit proposals to the Council - although it does not have the sole right to do so as in Community matters. Its representational role was also enhanced. Not only did it represent all areas of Pillar 1 competence but, together, with state diplomatic missions, it was now responsible for consistency in all external actions, and it was involved through the Troika at ambassadorial level in advocacy and coordination of CFSP policy 'on the ground.'(White 2001: 98). Since 1993 one commissioner has also been responsible for CFSP matters (former DG IA today DG RELEX (external relations), covering human rights policy, election assistance and observation, security issues, relations to other international organizations and Commission's network of delegations around the world. The Commission also implements the CFSP budget (under the EC budget) including through appropriate financial proposals. The TEU stipulated that CFSP operation were to be financed either from the Community budget or by the Member states, applying a scale to be decided case by case. Moreover in 1991 the Commission established the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in order to provide humanitarian assistance in cases of natural disasters and armed conflicts. Although it is outside the scope of CFSP, the work of ECHO is often a necessary condition for efforts in conflict prevention or crisis management as the Yugoslav case reveal.

The Commission with the Council have a shared responsibility to ensure consistency, required by the Article C of the Common Provisions of TEU, between action under the CFSP and under the Community Treaties in the context of the Union's 'external relations, security, economic, and development policies.

Finally, the steps to develop a common security policy were taken which is the most important move to differentiate CFSP from the EPC. The Article 2 of the common provisions of TEU, stipulated that one of the Union's objectives is to 'assert its identity

on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to common defence. The Western European Union became an integral part of the Union and could be requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (Art J. 4). In the declarations attached to the Treaty, WEU member states stated their aim to develop the WEU as the defense component of EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>6</sup>

WEU was founded in 1954 with the modification of the Brussels Treaty (1949) to include Italy and Germany, revitalized in 1984. The WEU served as a platform that includes defence related aspects of the CFSP. At the same time a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) began to be developed within NATO upon the initiative of European members and facilitated by the US will for burdensharing. US allowed the ESDI to take shape in NATO however there were some conditions attached: As put forth Clinton's Secretary of State Madeline Albright "the 3 d's": no duplication (of NATO functions), no discrimination (against non-EU NATO members), no decoupling (between NATO and EU)

Six months after the declaration attached to Maastricht on WEU, WEU decided to engage in military crisis management through the so-called Petersberg Tasks (June 19 1992) as defined;

- humanitarian and rescue tasks
- peacekeeping tasks
- combat-force tasks in crisis management including peacemaking.<sup>7</sup>

Later the Combined Joint Task Force was launched in 1993 and was endorsed in the Brussel Summit of NATO in 1994. Alliance Heads of State and Government directed that the further developments of the concept should reflect their readiness to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions by the North Atlantic Council, for operations led by the WEU.

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<sup>6</sup> TEU, Final Act, Declaration on WEU, Declaration 1, par. 1

<sup>7</sup> See Petersberg Declaration by WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers; 19 June 1992

### 1.3. Amsterdam Treaty and Beyond

With Amsterdam CFSP's capacity for action has been reinforced through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making. The establishment of Policy planning and Early Warning Unit, introduction of “common strategies” and “constructive abstention” and the creation of the post of High Representative (HR) for CFSP were steps towards the goal mentioned above.

The most important innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty was creating the office of the High Representative for CFSP. To adapt Henry Kissinger's famous question, Europe now has a phone number (it is + 32 2 285 6111) (Whyte 2001: 8). The widely discussed function of HR has been created but his tasks will not be performed by a political personality as initially proposed by the French but by the Secretary General of the Council. The HR/SC "shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries".<sup>8</sup> External representation and implementation of the CFSP are further strengthened by the work of Troika, which incorporates the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country holding the EU Presidency, the High representative of the CFSP, the commissioner Responsible for External Relations and , if necessary, a representative of the country that will hold the next EU presidency.. Furthermore , special representatives with a mandate for particular policy issues may now be appointed (Art. 18). The HR/SG will be helped in his tasks by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, composed of experts from General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission, and the WEU. Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit has a double mandate: the monitoring and assessment of international developments and the elaboration of policy options and recommendations. One of its key function is therefore to provide early warning on imminent or potential crises.

In addition to common positions and joint actions; the Treaty adds a new policy instrument; “common strategies”. The European Council defines, by consensus,

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<sup>8</sup> see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp)

common strategies in areas where the member states have important interests in common. A common strategy specifies the objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and Member States (Art. 13). A common strategy is considered a general framework achieving specified goals which can be implemented by joint actions and common positions.<sup>9</sup> The concept of joint actions has been further elaborated in order to make it more flexible towards changing situations and to ensure the commitments of the Member States (Art. 14)

The decision-making rules were also modified (Art. 23). Decision-making by the unanimity remains the general rule in CFSP. A reinforced QMV is possible but only for implementing common strategies, joint action or common positions which before have already been adopted by unanimity. There is an additional safeguard providing the possibility for a member state to oppose a decision by QMV, for important and stated reasons of national policy. The Council can bring the matter before the European Council which has to decide by unanimity. In practice this means that a member state which opposes a QMV can always use a veto. In order to prevent this outcome, the Treaty brings a new mechanism called “constructive abstention” (Art 23). A member state may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration and shall not be obliged to apply the decision but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. The abstaining state is asked to refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede the Union action based on that decision. However if the abstaining states together account more than one third of the weighted votes, the decision can not be adopted. This rule is widely seen as a reaction to the Greek veto on the recognition of Macedonia or on matters in relation to Turkey which used to block any common policy (Forster&Wallace 200: 484). Mechanism certainly increases the flexibility of the CFSP since a “coalition of the willing” could no longer be prevented to act (Peterson&Boomberg 1999: 230). But there is also the risk of splitting the CFSP into different groups of states that act together on a particular issue.

Finally the Treaty strengthens the relationship between the EU and WEU. It paved the way for a closer association. Generally, the CFSP is covering all aspects of foreign and security policy (Art. 11), including matters with defence implications (Art 13). For that

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<sup>9</sup> The first common strategy, the strategy for Russia was adopted by the Cologne European Council six months later.

purpose the EU now could avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have either defence implications or are related to crisis management according to the Petersberg Tasks which have been explicitly included in the Treaty (Art. 17). As far as these tasks are concerned, all the EU member states whether WEU member or only observers, have the right to participate on equal footing in planning and decision making in the EU.

Amsterdam Treaty by the establishment of High Representative led to increased 'Brusselization' within the Union foreign policy (see Peterson&Boomberg 1999: 246-249). The roles of Commission and the parliament did not significantly improve. The Amsterdam Treaty provided for CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget, except where the operations have military or defence implications or if the Council unanimously decides otherwise.

Just like the Maastricht provisions needed to be enhanced as a result of the failure during the break-up of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Crisis showed the limits of the new instruments. In 1998 the conflict outbreak before the entry into force of Amsterdam in 1999. Also in 1998 a fundamental change occurred at the meeting between the French president Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. With the St. Malo Declaration both governments acknowledged the need for the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces. This was made possible by the change in British policy after the new Labor government led by Tony Blair came to power. He talked of "placing Britain at the heart of Europe".

As Van Eekelen states " Blair had realised that a credible CFSP needed a military capability and that the United Kingdom, with its professional army and experienced diplomacy, could make a crucial contribution towards building it" (Van Eekelen 1999: 51).

This paved the way for the decisions at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 where the member states agreed to integrate the WEU functions and stated that by the end of 2000 the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose.<sup>10</sup> The European Union should develop its ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis

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<sup>10</sup> European Council in Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Annex 3 , European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and defence.



management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union (the Petersberg Tasks) through the development of the full range of civilian and military means at its disposal. Only the common defence clause was not transferred to the EU in order to avoid duplication of the NATO . The former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was appointed HR for CFSP during this summit. The crisis management was placed at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. Since 1999, almost every European Council has strived to develop the Union's capacity for autonomous action under the ESDP, which is an integral part of the CFSP.

The framework of the European Security and Defence Policy was agreed at Cologne Summit and in Helsinki Summit in 1999 the Cologne Summit's agreement was attempted to be realised. The Summit set a goal to be able to establish a Rapid Reaction Force comprising 50-60 thousand soldiers until 2003 that could be deployed within 60 days and sustain itself for at least one year.

The military component of ESDP was accompanied by new military structures introduced at Nice. The Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS as it is known by its French acronym) is the linchpin of the CFSP and the ESDP. The PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis. It is composed of national representatives at senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of Member States' Permanent Representations. The Commission is fully associated with the work of the PSC, through its own representative. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) was also introduced at Nice. The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU while the EUMS is responsible for early warning, strategic planning and situation assessment<sup>11</sup>. The Feira European Council in 1999 and Gothenburg European Council in 2001 aimed to enhance civilian crisis management mechanisms. It was agreed to form a police force comprising of 5000 officials in order to enhance crisis management capabilities. Furthermore, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been created in order to improve relations between the military and civilian components. Commission in the meantime developed a rapid reaction mechanism to strengthen the conflict

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<sup>11</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#1](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#1) and Güncel Haber, Şubat-Mart 2003

prevention component of ESDP in 2001. Used to provide rapid financing for crisis management the mechanism may be implemented where there is a threat to public order. This aid may cover all activities outside the scope of the ECHO.

The Nice Treaty of 2000 also introduced changes to the CFSP. Firstly in the area of enhanced cooperation, which will be possible for the implementation of a joint action or common position if it relates to issues that do not have any military or defence implications. If no member states object or call for a unanimous decision in the European Council (the emergency brake), enhanced cooperation is adopted in the Council by a qualified majority, with a threshold of only 8 member states. The PSC's role in the ESDP process was reinforced with the power of taking decisions to exercise political control and strategic direction of a crisis management operation.

The suspension of Turkey's veto at the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 paved the way for agreement between NATO and EU on the so-called Berlin plus<sup>12</sup> arrangement, allowing the EU use of NATO assets for its operations that was put into practice in March 2003, with the first EU military deployment in FYROM by the "Operation *Concordia*". Part of the decision between the two sides say that:

The NATO EU strategy cooperation and the implementation of the Berlin plus will be confined to NATO members and those non-NATO EU members that have subscribed to the Partnership for Peace Programme. This means that from the ten new acceding states, Cyprus and Malta will not have a say in the use of NATO assets, although they would still be able to decide on issues related to ESDP. The EU leaders had also decided to enable non-EU European allies, like Turkey, to raise its concerns if an EU operation is conducted in its geographic proximity or if it risks affecting its national security interests (quoted in Spiteri 2002)

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<sup>12</sup> The term "Berlin Plus" is a reference to the fact that the 1996 meeting where NATO foreign ministers agreed to create a European Security and Defence Identity and make Alliance assets available for this purpose took place in Berlin. The "Berlin-Plus" arrangements seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and comprise four elements. These are: assured EU access to NATO operational planning; availability to the European Union of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including developing the European role of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); and adaptation of the NATO defence planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations (De Witte 2003)

After the failure during the disintegration of Yugoslavia EU realised the necessity to equip itself with new crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms. But these are not securitizing acts aiming to transform EU into a military power as mentioned before. It should be noted that EU's main leverage is its civilian role and its soft power that transforms the countries in relation with it. These mechanisms will reinforce that role. On the other hand as Cebeci puts "EU's role as a civilian power endows CFSP/ESDP with a wide spectrum of foreign policy tools ranging from humanitarian and development aid to economic sanctions that are essential for the pursuance of long-term policies for the elimination of root causes of conflict (Cebeci: 2002: 163)

## **II. EC/EU and the DISINTEGRATION of YUGOSLAVIA**

The disintegration of Yugoslavia had an enormous effect in the evolution of the Union's foreign policy. As mentioned before besides the institutional deficiencies the policies of the European states were guided with their prejudices about the region. One may even put forward that the EC/EU would not intervene even if it had capabilities due to the misled views of Western European policy-makers and media about the inhabitants of Yugoslavia. They did not grasp the nature of the conflict accurately due to the prejudices and the lack of information about the political, social, and economic structure of Yugoslavia. They also did not reckon the possible effects of the crisis on the whole Europe. However it is noteworthy that the European states learnt from their mistakes afterwards, and in the post-Dayton period EU pursued policies that helped to stabilise the region.

### **2.1. Causes of Disintegration of Yugoslavia**

As mentioned before the origin of the dissolution of Yugoslavia was generally explained in the west with the rhetoric of the return of 'ancient hatreds'. In contrast to these arguments Djilas notes that "throughout Yugoslav history, intraethnic cultural differences shaped by regional dissimilarities were often greater than cultural differences between ethnic groups" ( Djilas 1995:86). Marriages between people of different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were on the rise during the decade before the war. In 1991 3 million people in Yugoslavia (in a population of 22 million) were products of ethnically mixed marriages or were married to someone of a different ethnicity (Woodward 1995: 36) After Tito's death in 1980, the percentage of the population that identified itself as "Yugoslav" as opposed to an ethnically defined nationality (e.g. Serb, Croat, Muslim) also grew significantly.<sup>13</sup> Many ordinary people did not know or care about the ethnic identity of their neighbors before hostilities began. As late as 1989, the majority of Serbs favored a liberal future for Yugoslavia, the preservation of the federal state, and Yugoslavia's integration into "Europe." Ante Marković, the last Yugoslav

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<sup>13</sup> According to 1981 census fastest growing group after those who defined themselves as Albanians were those who defined themselves as Yugoslavs, approximately 1.2 million people, or 5.4 percent of the total population. This number was five times as high as that of the 1971 poll. Yugoslav identity rose in some areas from 0 to 10 percent and in some areas to more than 25 percent, indicating a remarkable assertion of shared political identity (see Burg&Berbaum 1986:535-536)

prime minister and free-market reformer and a Croat, was the most popular politician in all six republics. It is certain that there are historic differences and animosities in the region. But as the International Commission on Balkans note “ there is little or no evidence that such hatreds played a major role in the pre-twentieth century history of Serbs;Croats and Muslims” ( International Commission on Balkans1996: 15)

Another explanation that was widely held by many in Balkans was to evaluate the return of nationalist conflicts as reflecting ambitions of the great powers to reestablish their Balkan spheres of influence in the post-Cold War reordering of the international balance of power(International Commission on Balkans 1996: 13)<sup>14</sup>. This argument may be illustrative for the developments in Balkans for the period from the 18th century to mid 19th century. In this war, unlike the Balkan conflicts that ignited World War I, the great powers worked together to end it. What did play a role was not the direct involvement of outside powers but the changing international environment beyond the Balkans.

Another international-level explanation for the dissolution of Yugoslavia is offered by Susan Woodward. According to Woodward “Yugoslavia was held together not by Tito’s charisma or repression of national sentiments but by a *complex balancing act in the international arena* and a mixed economy and a political system that provided governmental protections of social and economic equality and shared sovereignty among its nations” (Woodward 1995: 22) It is inevitable to agree Woodward on the role of the foreign policy in maintaining the federation. As one of the founders of the non-aligned movement, Tito’s Yugoslavia enjoyed a high level of international prestige. Yugoslavia became eligible for loans from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and eligible for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and entry into association agreements with the European Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). As mentioned before Woodward(1995) argued that the institutional structures of the Yugoslav state provided a basis for prewar political stability in Yugoslavia. According to Woodward Yugoslavia’s pattern of global integration and domestic economic reform shaped by international financial institutions in the 1980s undermined those institutions. Liberalization and global integration

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<sup>14</sup> Evidence cited include German support for Croatia’s independence and Turkey’s support for the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina

required the weakening of those very state structures that had provided political stability.

In addition to that Yugoslavia attracted significant economic assistance and support from the West when the Soviet threat was imminent because of its strategic importance. The important speech of Gorbachev at the United Nations in December 1988 in which he openly abandoned the two camps approach and declared his policy choice of non-intervention to Eastern Europe in choosing their political system (known as Sinatra Doctrin) facilitated the end of Cold War. In 1989, the United States removed Yugoslavia from its list of countries eligible for Western credits. The strategic importance of Yugoslavia fell as the rivalry of superpowers declined significantly as a result of these developments (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 14)

However it would be misleading to identify the matter on just international level. There were problems with the very institutional structures of Yugoslavia, especially, the 1974 constitution. Yugoslavia was a federal State of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist democratic community based on the power of the working people and on self-government (Woodward 1995: 28). The founding(constituent) peoples (Narods) of Yugoslavia were Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes, and, after the 1963 constitution, Muslims (in the sense of a political community- not a religion). Individual members of the six constituent nations (not fully coincident with the territorial boundaries of the republics) had rights as members of those nations and as ethnic peoples(defined by a common religion,language, and political consciousness) (Woodward 1995: 31)

In addition, there were many citizens who identified ethnically with a people who had a national homeland elsewhere, called nationalities such as Jews,Czechs, Romanians, Russians,Bulgarians, Turks, and Italians. There were also Romany and Vlachs whose nation had no homeland. They were all guranteed to preserve their sense of community and its inheritance. Albanians and Hungarians were given two autonomous territorial units in republic of Serbia where they predominated; Vojvodina and Kosovo (Brunner 1996: 34). These peoples in total constituted ten percent of the population in 1991.

A progressive decentralization of the system was introduced by the constitution of 1974. Remarkable economic and political power shifted from federal center to the republic and the provinces. Even the two provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo) gained full autonomy over their parliaments, budgets, and judicial systems after 1974, giving them near-republic status (Woodward 1995: 40). As a result of this and other developments, on the federal level, a fragmentation combined with a partial regionalism and person-related regulations for the protection of minorities took place, the extent of which gradually started to endanger the efficiency of the system as a whole (Brunner 1996:35). Uzgel believes that the Yugoslav idea that ‘brotherhood and unity’ could be achieved through more decentralization, self-management and ethnic tolerance, led to the undesirable and unexpected result that each republic and province evolved into a kind of nation-state (Uzgel 1999: 213). The federation was divided along national lines. The only pluralism that was now allowed to exist was pluralism along these national lines (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 24). This attempt to reformulate the national problem in Yugoslavia through a democratic process was crushed later on by the local officials since the ground for them was prepared by the institutional deficiencies created by this process.

The weakening of federal government structures of accountability and opportunities for resource control led regional and local officials to favor specific ethnic constituencies. When regional officials were still accountable to the central federal government and depend on central support to stay in office, they were unlikely to make extremist ethnic appeals to attract local support. As Denitch puts it “with the federal government weakened and loyalty to the center diminished, there were no incentives for political entrepreneurs to lower the tone of their agitating and provocative discourse. Nor were there incentives for intellectuals to abhor the expression of provocative nationalist sentiments” (Denitch 1994:136). In Yugoslavia, once nationalists had gained the upper hand in Serbia, this fueled other nationalisms in Croatia, Slovenia and in Bosnia. Woodward argues that although much of the population in Serbia favored political liberalization, liberal politicians could not counter nationalist opposition alone (Woodward 1995:97). They looked for support from other republics to devise a liberal political program but the liberals especially in Croatia and Slovenia were anti-federalist. They consistently boycotted the traditional Yugoslavist policy of Belgrade to redistribute funds from the wealthier republics to

the poor regions of Yugoslavia. This undermined the power of federal government and paved the way for Milosevic.

As mentioned above Milosevic was the first leader to capitalize the deficiencies in the system to maintain political power. Two documents laid the foundation on which the nationalist project of Milosevic was built. First one was the signing of a petition by 200 prominent intellectuals, surprisingly including the three former editors of prestigious Marxist journal Praxis in Belgrade in 1986 which had a nationalistic tone, defining the situation in Kosovo<sup>15</sup> as genocide and the indifference of officials regarding this incident was called as treason (Uzgel 1999: 215). The other and more important one was the Memorandum of Serbia's Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 which was considered to be the ideological expression of the ideal of 'Greater Serbia' (Ali&Lifschultz 1994: 23). The Memorandum stated that:

Since 1981 the Kosovo Serbs had been subjected to an Albanian War and to genocide. The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and in Metohija is the worst defeat in all Serbian-led battles of liberation from Orasac in 1804 to the 1941 uprising. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Serbian Communists who had remained loyal to it are responsible for this humiliation  
(International Commission on Balkans 1996: 25)

According to Glenny (1996: 32) until 1987, the Titoist balance was functioning with two 'political taboos', overt nationalism and the active participation of the masses in the politics. These two taboos started disappearing in 1987 when Milosevic denounced the Serbian leadership in Kosovo. While there were cases of abuse against the Serbian minority by Albanians, this could not be called a systematic ethnic cleansing as the Serbs asserted

## **2.2. The Path to War**

In 1989 the Serbian Parliament revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. After this development Kosovo and Vojvodina's representation in the

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<sup>15</sup> In March 1981, the students in Pristina University revolted and it spread to other towns in Kosovo and partly to Albanian inhabited Western Macedonia. This time they were openly calling for an independent Kosovo and unification with Albania.



Federal Presidential Council <sup>16</sup>continued but their power to act independent from Serbia in voting procedure no longer existed. Bearing in mind the support of Republic of Montenegro to Serbia on any case, it became impossible for a decision to be taken against the will of Serbia in the Council (Tuporkovsky 1993:19)

In September 1989 the Slovenian Parliament amended its constitution to legalize political parties and the free, multiparty elections to be hold in a year in response to the unilateral act of Serbian Parliament mentioned above. Croatian parliament made a similar amendment to their constitution after a short period. Woodward claims that “the demand for elections did not originate from popular pressure, but from politicians seeking more political power over their territories and opposition intellectuals seeking more political influence over the course of events” (Woodward 1995:117).

The fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of League of the Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990 that was convened to sort out the disagreements between republics and federation could not be successful. The congress became an opportunity for the next step in the Slovene goal of transforming the country into a confederation of states-in this case, by transforming the League of Communists into a confederation of ‘free and independent republic communist parties’ and then accepting the end of its constitutional status by adopting multiparty elections (Woodward 1995:115). The Serbs harshly opposed this and the Slovenian delegation left the congress.

On the other hand the parliaments of the republics subsequently took decisions regarding sovereignty which stressed the right of republics to act independently from the federation. The political fragmentation of the 1990s reflected a more general trend seen in the erosion of the Yugoslav common market, the nationalization of education systems (Serbs, Albanians, and Slovenes no longer used the same textbooks), and, finally the nationalization of the media (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 27)

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<sup>16</sup> Yugoslavia was ruled after Tito’s death by this council composed of the presidents of the six republics and two autonomous regions, with members taking turns as federal president.

Another factor contributing to the acceleration of dissolution was the elections of 1990<sup>17</sup>. The elections were held in April and May in Croatia and Slovenia, in November in Macedonia and in December in the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. In Montenegro and Serbia ex-communists (renamed socialists), in Croatia, Slovenia, and in Macedonia newly established nationalist parties won the elections.

In the aftermath of the elections the main debate was the restructuring of the political system. Croats and Macedonians called for reform in the federal system but Serbs rejected this proposal. Serbian argument was that further reforms would cause fragmentation and in order to avoid this, recentralization of state under the leadership of Serbs was crucial. The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) as the last centralized institution committed to the Yugoslav legacy out of conviction or self-interest supported Serbia's stance. Milosevic made good use of this situation, eventually transforming the YPA into the fighting arm of Serbian nationalism (International Commission on Balkans 1996:25). After the elections YPA suspended the transfer of weapons and ammunition from army to the police forces in Republics. This caused Croatia and Slovenia to set up national guards as embryos of their new militaries (Burg 1993:361).

Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to play a mediatory role between the secessionists (Slovenia and Croatia) and the centralist (Serbia). Their main aim was preservation of Yugoslavia because they were aware of the dangers of the disintegration for them. On June 3rd Gligorov, aided by Alija Izzetbegovic, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed a new Yugoslav framework (so called asymmetric confederation or graded federation) which would have included a common army, currency- and foreign policy (Daskolovki 2004:55). However the Serbs declined this and declared that: Serbia is against any solution that would make the Serbs minority in any given territory within Yugoslavia (Burg 1993:361)<sup>18</sup>. This

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<sup>17</sup> Susan Woodward (1995:118) argues that Slovenia had insisted successfully that republican elections occur first, and it continued to veto any countrywide expression of preferences, from a proposed federal referendum on the constitutional amendments at the end of 1988 to a referendum on the fate of the country scheduled in 1990. The first democratic elections were thus not the opening of choice for Yugoslavia but its closure

<sup>18</sup> This led the famous question of 'Why should I be a minority in your state when you could be in mine?' that perfectly describes the dissolution.

paved the way for the YPA intervention (firstly to Slovenia) after the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia.

### **2.3.The EC/EU Policy During the Dissolution.**

The first six months of the Yugoslav crisis coincided with the final stages of the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Many of the most sensitive issues were unresolved at the time but there were those who felt that precedents might be created by the way that Europe acted in Yugoslavia that could affect the future institutional pattern (International Commission on Balkans 1996:58). Also there was a mood of confidence in the Community. This was partly a result of the unprecedented acceleration of integration since the mid –1980s, capped by the commitments undertaken at Maastricht and partly a result of being seen to be playing a key role in the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (White 2001:107). After the success of the U.S. might in the Gulf War, there were many both inside and outside the community who believed that the Community’s status as a ‘civilian power’ in what was regarded as a new post-cold-war world made it perfectly suited to take the lead in an environment where military force now suddenly seemed irrelevant (Hill quoted in White 2001:108).

The remarks of Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg foreign Minister and thus the President-in-office of the European Community displayed this mood:

If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans  
(quoted in International Commission on Balkans 1996: 56)

For the then European Community, the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia seemed to be a chance to demonstrate its enhanced role yet the policy did not match the ambition that is identified by Christopher Hill as the “capability-expectations” gap in the EU’s CFSP in his prominent article “*The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role*” . In order to analyse the EC/EU policy better, diplomatic mediation, military and civilian intervention will be dealt with

separately(although there are overlaps between the civilian and military intervention as White (2001) suggests).

### **2.3.1.Diplomatic Mediation and Use of Recognition as a Policy Tool**

After the fighting erupted in Slovenia, EC reacted rapidly and brokered the plan known as the Brioni Declaration signed in July 1991 by the Federal Presidency, Slovenia and the European Community in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The document confirmed the cease-fire and paved the way for the Yugoslav Army to withdraw from that republic. Although EC mediators believed that they addressed the issue correctly, this was hardly the case. As Noel Malcolm puts it “the fundamental failure of the Western politicians was that they looked only at the symptoms of the war, not at its causes: it was as if they did not even want to understand the nature of Milosevic’s project” (Malcolm 1994:241). Serbia’s leadership was not very much concerned to keep Slovenia in a united Yugoslavia since the Serbs in Slovenia comprised less than two percent of the population and the Slovenian territory was not significant for Serbian nationalism. The Brioni Declaration favored both Slovenia, because a three-month moratorium on independence was not a rejection of independence, and Serbia, because it left the Yugoslav Army free to regroup in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbia was preparing local Serb communities to wage war (International Commission on Balkans 1996:43).

As the bloodshed continued, in late August 1991, EC foreign ministers established a Conference on Yugoslavia, headed by Lord Carrington, the EC Chief Mediator on Former Yugoslavia with the broad objective to bring peace to all in Yugoslavia and to sort out a comprehensive and just settlement to the conflict. An Arbitration Commission chaired by Robert Badinter was established for assistance to the Conference to define the issues of conflict. In early October Lord Carrington devised a plan (although Milosevic initially accepted the plan, he rejected the it later on) that envisioned to reorganize Yugoslavia as a loose association of sovereign or independent republics with guarantees for human rights, civil liberties and minority rights in accordance with the UN, OSCE, and Council of Europe documents.

At the end of November 1991 the Arbitration Commission declared its first opinion on constitutional issues under dispute. It advised that:

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution, and the republics should settle their problems of succession while upholding the 'principles and rules of international law,' with special regard for human and minority rights (International Commission on Balkans 1996:44).

On December 8, the Serbian authorities rejected these findings. On December 16, after the fall of Vukovar, the EC foreign ministers set a deadline by which republics could apply for recognition as independent states. The applicants were to be evaluated by the Arbitration Committee with their performance in fulfillment of conditions like democracy, human and minority rights, respect for international law, the inviolability of borders, and peaceful resolution of regional disputes. Successful applicants would get recognition in mid-January. However Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23.<sup>19</sup> EU recognized Slovenia and Croatia the following month. Pond states that, "in the event, the remaining members (especially France and Great Britain) went along recognition for the sake of promoting agreement on other issues in Maastricht, despite their uneasiness about Germany being back in the old game of power politics" (Pond 1999: 44). German policy was harshly criticized for undermining the common foreign policy efforts. As Misha Glenny puts it, "Not only did the German decision seal the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it made a mockery of the consensual foreign policy which the European Union was striving to build on its way towards economic and political integration"(Glenny 1996: 164). Laura Silber and Allan Little commented that "the EC's first confident common foreign policy-making ended in shambles; the Community's own carefully formulated legal and diplomatic mechanisms shot down by old-fashioned political expediency" (Silber&Little 1995: 222)

What were the motives behind Germany's policy. Djilas claimed that "Germany pressed for recognition partly because it was well aware that historical ties and proximity would entitle it to considerable influence in an independent Croatia and Slovenia(Djilas 1995:97) The more cynical version of this claim was that with its new international

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<sup>19</sup> The Arbitration Commission supported the recognition of Macedonia and express reservation for recognition of Croatia later on. Instead EU recognized Croatia on 15 January 1992 and Macedonia had to wait until December 1993 because of the Greek opposition.

power position, Germany was trying to recreate its World War II alliance with an independent Croatia and impose a divide-and-conquer strategy in the Balkans to protect its interests and enhance its power in the region.

As mentioned before even though these comments make an accurate point they ignore the context in which this decision was taken. This decision was taken not least under the pressure of the public (and published) opinion which was immensely agitated by the unfolding horrors of the conflict and by the wave of hundreds of thousands of refugees beginning to arrive in the Federal Republic (International Commission on Balkans 1996:59). The German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher put forward that recognition could have prevented and delegitimized Serb aggression (Bağcı 1994: 55). Despite, the Serb and YPA leadership interpreted the earlier support for Yugoslav unity as allowing them in pursuing their goals and the violence intensified after the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state on April 6 1992.

After the failure of Carrington, the London Conference on August 1992, established a successor to the EC Conference on Yugoslavia . This International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) had two Co-Chairmen. Cyrus Vance appointed by United Nations and Lord Owen, appointed by the EC. Their main task was to promote a settlement in Bosnia. In conjunction with the principles of the London Conference Vance and Owen produced the first detailed proposal for a political settlement.

Put together originally by a Finnish diplomat, Marti Ahtisaari, the plan was for turning Bosnia into a set of 'autonomous provinces' or cantons which would exercise almost all the functions of government, including policing. The central government of Bosnia would be concerned only with national defence and foreign affairs. The Serbs pushed harder and when the plan was issued in what was said to be its final form at Geneva in January 1993, even defence had been stripped from the powers of the central government (Malcolm 1994: 247). The merits of Vance-Owen plan were its insistence that refugees should be allowed to return and its provision that the cantons corresponding to Serb-occupied areas would not be connected on the map in such a way as to make it easy for them to seek to join Serbia as a territorial bloc

The critics to the plan put forward that the January version unlike the earlier plan labelled the cantons ethnically and gave the impression that boundaries on the plan were not final. By the time the plan was announced people were still living in ethnically mixed towns. Ali&Lifschultz stressed that “the plan provided a perverse rationale for one of the most violent phases of land grabbing and ethnic cleansing yet seen in the Balkan war by tempting the owners of the national provinces to full possession of their mini-states “(Ali&Lifschultz 1994: 38). The proponents of the plan thought that this was the best game in town. Yet the principal US decision to leave the essentially European problems to hands of the Europeans went only as far as the success of Vance-Owen Plan. Osmançavuşoğlu purported that, ” at the end, the plan, which was the heart of the European effort, was doomed to failure by none other than the Americans” (Osmançavuşoğlu 2004 126-131). It should be noted that Izzetbegovic government in Sarajevo did not support the plan either. The Owen-Stoltenberg (Vance’s successor) Plan which was modified at the end of 1993 into the European Union Action Plan shared the same destiny. While the US administration long opposed the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans for a reconstructed Bosnia-Herzegovina on the grounds that it tended to reward Bosnian Serb aggression and reinforce ethnopoliticization of the Balkans, the Dayton accord was no less flawed in this respect(Woodward 1999: 283). Further differences arose when US supported the lifting of September 1991 UN arms embargo so that Bosnian Muslims could be armed in April 1993. In 1994 US offered another strategy that envisioned lifting of the arms embargo and air strikes but this was again rejected by Europeans because this could risk the lives of European soldiers and officials on ground.

After the Sarajevo market massacre in February 1994 outside parties especially the US and (to an extent Russia) which was absent from the Yugoslav stage until then began to pursue a more active policy and took the lead in mediation process. In March 1994, US diplomats (supported by their German counterparts) gained their first crisis management success by convincing the Bosnian Croats and Muslims to create a confederation. The US attached importance to cooperation but did not want to deal with all twelve governments or with the EU. Therefore the Contact Group came into being due to two main reasons. First the US refused to cooperate with David Owen and UN negotiator Thorvald Stoltenberg within the framework of the ICFY. Secondly, some major European diplomats were convinced that a close cooperation between the main

European powers, the US and the Russia would be essential for a solution to the conflict (Schwegmann 2000: 4). The Contact Group, comprising Britain, France, Germany, US and Russia was established in April 1994. It has been argued that the establishment of the Contact Group as an important framework for action, with senior officials of only three member states meeting regularly with US and Russian officials to try to negotiate a ceasefire, marked the point at which the EU essentially ceased to function as a single entity on policy towards Bosnia ( Peterson&Bomberg: 1999: 243).

In addition to market massacre a in February 5 1994 the world was stunned by another one in Sarajevo on August 28 1995. The Serbian seizure of UN soldiers as hostages in July 1995 was another factor that triggered the decision to use force. US took the lead in this period and after the NATO operation brokered the settlement at Dayton.

### **2.3.2. Military Intervention of EC/EU**

The initial contribution to peacekeeping (provide the conditions for peace and security) in Yugoslavia made by the Community, was the establishment of European Community Monitoring Mission in the summer of 1991. It had a military rationale that quickly merged with a set of civil functions (White 2001: 111)- just like the United Nations Protection Force that will also be analysed . It was composed of unarmed, civilian EC officials. In addition to monitoring the implementation of ceasefires they attempted to mediate between warring parties. Unfortunately they had little effect in preserving the several ceasefires negotiated by the EC Troika during 1991, moreover the monitors themselves were in considerable personal danger (Bretherton&Vogler 1999: 209).<sup>20</sup> This led to coordination of activities with United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by 1992-1993. Initially, established in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure that the three "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. In the course of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was enlarged to include monitoring functions in certain other areas of Croatia. In June 1992, as the conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and

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<sup>20</sup> In January 1992 five EC monitors were killed when their helicopter was shot down



Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and its environs. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR was also deployed in Macedonia). By the end of 1993 19.000 soldiers in Bosnia and 6000 soldiers in Croatia were deployed under the auspices of UNPROFOR.

However valuable the civil role of these two bodies, their lack of success in maintaining a real peace on the ground<sup>21</sup> soon led to a lengthy and divisive debate about peacemaking- the use of military force to compel the combatants to cease fighting and negotiate a political settlement (White 2001:112). France proposed a WEU presence in Croatia in August 1991 and supported a similar proposal on September. But Britain rejected these proposals. On September 19, 1991, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd insisted that the Foreign Affairs Council of the EC expressly exclude the possibility of military intervention (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 61). Germany expressed reluctance based on the prevailing restrictive interpretations of its *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) and the ability of German armed forces to intervene out of the NATO area (Duke 1999:203).

In the meantime the options for military intervention for WEU were set out in a working group that was formed by a French proposal. The first option envisaged a unit of 2000 soldiers to give logistics support to EC monitors, the second option that envisioned escort and protection to monitors required 5000-6000 soldiers. Third option was the establishment of a peace force comprising 4500-5000 lightly armed soldiers and 3000-5000 ceasefire monitors. The last option was to set up a peace force composed of 20000-30000 heavily equipped troops. None of these options were deemed to be acceptable by the WEU Council of Ministers (Edward 1997: 186-187). Since the EC/EU countries could not agree on the nature of military intervention, the focus was diverted to UN. It was this failure to agree in the WEU rather than the setting up the Contact

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<sup>21</sup> UNPROFOR did not have the means to stop the illegal use of force and it had to deal with all the combatants and needed their blessing (especially Serbs) in order to achieve its humanitarian tasks. UNPROFOR was therefore paradoxically employed not to stop the illegal use of force, but to render it more acceptable by alleviating humanitarian suffering.

Group 18 months later, that arguably marked the end of an independent EU intervention in former Yugoslavia (Soetendorp quoted in White 2001: 112).

NATO undertook the peace force tasks under the auspices of UN. In 1992 NATO supplied the UNPROFOR with an operational headquarters, comprising approximately 100 staff, plus equipment and supplies. The enforcement of no fly zone over Bosnia, air support to UNPROFOR and the protection of the safe havens in Bosnia were all administered by NATO air base in Italy (Gow 1997:130-133). Finally the NATO led operation 'Deliberate Force' to enforce UN Security Council resolutions paved the way for Dayton. In accordance with the terms of the Dayton peace agreement, and with UN Security Council legitimation, a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60000 personnel was deployed in Bosnia later replaced by the Stability Force (SFOR). This was decisive in demonstrating the fact that NATO was the main actor in preserving European security.

### **2.3.3. Civil Intervention**

The first action on the civil field as a reaction to the escalation of violence was the decision to impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia within the framework of EPC on November 12, 1991. EPC's decision suggested the suspension of the existing trade and cooperation agreement, the reduction of textile limits, the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the list of PHARE beneficiaries, and the call to UN for an arms and oil embargo. The economic cost of these sanctions to Yugoslavia was estimated to be around 1 billion dollars. The third financial protocol which was worth 807 million ECU between the EC and Yugoslavia covering the period of 1991-1995 and the 100 million ECU supposed to be allocated to Yugoslavia from the PHARE program was cancelled (Holland 1992: 137-138). The sanctions initially imposed on the whole Yugoslavia were later revoked for the republics except Serbia and Montenegro. Since the sanctions did not produce the expected outcome, the attempt to police sanctions saw the innovative decision of July 1992 to deploy naval forces under the auspices of the WEU in the Adriatic and on the Danube to try to make the Blockade of Serbia more effective (White 2001: 114). This was another case of the blurring of civil and military intervention.

In 1993 the first CFSP joint action decision was taken by the European Council that envisaged support for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia Herzegovina. But the decision could not be implemented due to disagreement on financing (whether from the community budget or on a shared national basis) of the operation. Later on, the EU assumed responsibility for administrative function of the city of Mostar in October 1993 and appointed successive administrators-Kosschnik, Peres Casado, and Garrod-. Additionally, in a joint EU/ WEU activity the WEU assumed responsibility for training a joint Bosnian– Croat police force. The role of the EU Ombudsman was expanded into the CFSP area with responsibility for addressing complaints arising from the EU or joint activities with the WEU in Mostar (Duke 1999: 213)

The Yugoslav crisis ended with the signing of Dayton Peace Accords, which were initialed in Ohio on November 21, 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia on December 14, 1995 in Paris. About 250,000 people died and another 2.7 million were turned into refugees during the conflict. The Accords proposed to recast Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state of two “entities”: The Bosniak-Croat Federation comprising and the Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska received 49 percent of the original Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Bosniak-Croat Federation received 51 percent. These entities would have far-reaching autonomy, including the right to establish special relationships with neighbouring states. The accords also establish Sarajevo as a united city under the control of the new central government. In Dayton the parties also made a solemn commitment to turn over indictees and to cooperate with the Hague-based, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that was established in 1993 by the UN Security Council. Out of 162 persons indicted by the ICTY, well over 120 were accused of crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from all sides of the conflict. The most important achievement of the ICTY is the Slobodan Milosevic’s arrest in 2001 and trial of him. But the two important figures Radovan Karadzic the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and General Ratko Mladic who are as responsible as Milosevic for the bloodshed could not be arrested and put on trial.

The International Commission on Balkans regarding the EU policy during the disintegration of Yugoslavia made the comments mentioned below:

EU was not short of decisions on Yugoslavia. The EU for instance played a significant role in civil reconstruction in places where peace held. The ECHO has been the principal contributor to the humanitarian aid and refugee programs of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The failure of policy to be more effective should more justly be based on the lack of priority that governments gave to the issue, the lack of understanding of the nature and the implications of the conflict not only for those directly involved but more widely for Europe, and the lack of a positive consensus for resolute action especially between the major powers Great Britain, France and Germany. Great Britain was the power most consistent in discouraging the international use of military force especially one without the involvement of US. France on the other hand tried to preserve its status as a front-rank international power and strengthen the European defense pillar inside and outside NATO. These are the reasons of French proposal for a WEU intervention in Croatia. Germany as mentioned before was the main force behind recognition (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 58-61).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was regarded as a test case for the newly formed CFSP and the failure of the EC/EU policy was generally explained with institutional shortcomings and deficiencies of the CFSP such as the absence of military capabilities, early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms, the inefficiency of rotating presidency, the negative effect of unanimity principle. The capabilities did not match the expectations. In addition to the fact that CFSP after Maastricht was unable to handle all issues, EU members did not understand the nature of the problem and did not give priority to the issue mainly because of the prejudices and stereotypes about the region.

### **III. EU and WESTERN BALKANS in the POST-YUGOSLAV PERIOD**

As Gligorov puts it:

The European Union's activities in the Balkans reflect an acceptance of the distinct transition dynamics of the two groups of states: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and the Western Balkan countries. Western Balkans is the name given to the region that consists of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM and Albania, ), including Kosovo as defined by UN security Council resolution 1244 (Slovenia was able to distance itself from the region and move closer to the Visegrad-group). South-East Europe, on the other hand, consists of all Balkan countries (i.e., all the countries that have territories or parts of territories in what geographically belongs to the Balkans,) plus Hungary. The regional initiatives concerning Southeast-Europe include the so-called Rayamont Process, the South East European Co-operation Initiative (SECI), and in a more inclusive way the Central European Initiative and the Stability Pact (SP) (which will be further analyzed). All these and a number of other initiatives have aimed at securing stability in the region via promoting co-operation of one kind or another (e.g., in areas of culture, economy, politics, and security) (see Gligorov 1999: 33)

However according to Kavalski "such externally-recognised division of the region persists and tends to be viewed as an obstacle for the promotion of a sustainable framework of Balkan regional cooperation and owing to such differentiation, the implications of EU involvement were different for the two tiers of countries, and the result is a separate 'integration dynamic' for different countries, and according to Kavalski, the promotion of two separate Balkans" (Kavalski 2003:197-212) Instead of adopting a consistent, well-defined and long-term strategy for the entire region, the European Union initially underestimated the political problems in the former Yugoslavia, and applied ad hoc policies to each country (Pierre 1999).

#### **3.1. EU Policy Between 1995-99**

In the period 1995-1999, the five Western Balkan countries were deemed non-eligible to be part of the enlargement. The Regional Approach was launched by General Affairs Council in 1996-7 to deal with these countries. The main aim of this approach is to

reinforce the successful implementation of Dayton/Paris and Erdut peace agreements<sup>22</sup> and to achieve political stability and economic integration. The Regional Approach established a strict political conditionality by setting conditions such as respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, protection of minorities, market economy reforms and regional cooperation. There was no mention of membership. It resembled the conditionality regime established for the Central and East European applicants through the 1993 Copenhagen criteria<sup>23</sup>.

Instead the EU offered carrots like trade and financial assistance. The EU launched the OBNOVA financial programme designed to help reconstruction in Western Balkans, having already included countries like Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina in PHARE (Anastasakis&Bechev 2003: 6-7)<sup>24</sup>. Western Balkan countries other than Macedonia and Albania which had Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements were given autonomous trade preferences by the EU, based on the provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded in 1980 with former Yugoslavia. According to Uvalic “Regional Approach appeared rather late (after four years of military conflicts); it remained vague (with no proposals for concrete programs of regional cooperation); it had limited financial backing; and perhaps most importantly, it offered no incentives to these countries to carry forward its main objectives” (Uvalic 2001: 13).

### **3.2. EU Involvement After the Kosovo War**

Until 1999 EU mainly pursued a “wait and see” policy. The Kosovo Crisis proved that EU needed a more active policy to the region. It was once more showcased that ultimate peace and security in Europe would not be established unless the Balkans reached stability. The Kosovo Crisis that broke out in the beginning of 1999 and came to an end with the NATO’s air campaign, ‘Operation Allied Force’ was a clear indicator in terms of Europe’s security concerns regarding the region. That is why the Kosovo Crisis was considered as the major motivating factor behind the creation of the SP for the South

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<sup>22</sup> See From Regional Approach to the Stabilisation and Association Process , The EU’s relations with the South East Europe-The EU’s actions at [http://europa.eu.int/com/external\\_relations/see/actions/sap/htm](http://europa.eu.int/com/external_relations/see/actions/sap/htm)

<sup>23</sup> Be a stable democracy, respect human rights and the rule of law and protect minorities; have a working market economy; adopt the common rules, standards and policies which make up the body of EU law

<sup>24</sup> Croatia was also included among PHARE beneficiaries in 1995, but this provision was suspended after the military takeover of Krajina in August 1995.

East Europe. European states realised that the region could not be left to its fate. If the US and NATO had done the dirty work of defeating Milosevic militarily, the Europeans had to pay the bill and generate economic growth and political stability in the region.

The SP launched by the German presidency of the EU in June 1999 resurrected the idea of the hour of Europe. It is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international cooperation to develop a shared strategy for stability and growth in South-East Europe among more than 40 countries, organizations and regional groupings. SP is not a new international organization, and has no independent financial resources. The key aim of the SP is to contribute to stability in the region. Stability is seen as conducive to development and prosperity, which are the ultimate goals of the whole process. Other objectives include securing peace, democracy, open market economy, multicultural and civil societies (Gligorov 1999: 33-35). In order to reach economic and political stability regional cooperation is essential. As Modanu(2003) states the Balkan states are interdependent and they all have a clear interest in strengthening regional stability and cooperation. Improved regional integration will lead to economic development by mending the trade and investment flows that were disrupted after the war. The SP has specifically made clear that regional cooperation is a precondition for integration into the EU-Atlantic structures. This was stressed by the then Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen: “if countries want to join the European Union then they must prove that then can develop regional cooperation and resolve their problems in cooperation with their neighbours” ( quoted in Altmann 2003:142). As evident in Verheugen’s speech the membership of these countries was envisaged eventually. According to Uvalic” the SP provided an important carrot in addition to sticks: the prospect of EU membership for the five SEE non-candidates” (Uvalic 2001: 15)

As Carl Bildt concluded:

The EU sponsored Stability Pact, aimed at helping the economies of the region, opens up a new perspective. We must do whatever we can to stop the further Balkanization of the Balkans, and try to further the Europeanisation of South-Eastern Europe. We must look not at our exit strategies from the region but at the entry strategies of the region into European groupings. The EU must replace the vicious circle of disintegration in the region as a whole with the healing powers of long-term integration (quoted in Varwick 2000)

However it was unclear how the SP suited with the goal of integration. It was not an accession platform. The strategy mainly focused on reconstruction with the funding of EU, member states and international financial institutions. Although initiated by the German Presidency, it was placed institutionally under the OSCE. The EU was one of , but definitely the most important, contributors. EU had to develop a new bilateral strategy in order to settle the problems more efficiently.

### **3.3. From Stability to Integration –EU Policy After 2000**

Lehne commented that the year 2000 marks the beginning of a more pro-active and coherent EU policy towards the region (Lehne 2004: 111-123). First of all the nature of the problem had changed with the end of the era of nationalist troublemakers.<sup>25</sup> Triantaphyllou stated that not only have these leaders gone but their political infrastructure has been crumbling as well (Triantaphyllou 2002: 66). All countries were now committed to European ideals and the potential for a major conflict seemed to be diminished. Second factor was that there was a new consensus on Balkans policy in the EU. Throughout 1990's with intense work on Balkan issues EU became more aware of the nature and the implications of the conflict and the need for a comprehensive approach to deal with this. Finally the success of the enlargement process in CEECs gave a huge confidence to the EU in overcoming problems in Western Balkans. Although Western Balkan states share similarities with these countries, there are some significant differences as well. Batt identifies three differences. First one is the political culture. While pointing political culture as an obstacle for Western Balkans she does not resort to the typical stereotype of Balkans. Moreover she denounces the known derivatives of the term Balkan as 'Balkanisation,' which means messy fragmentation, and 'Balkanism,' which refers to barbarism, primitivism, tribalism. She further argues "that ethno-linguistic 'tribal' nationalism was quintessentially a 'Habsburg' (CEEC's success was sometimes explained with reference to the Habsburg legacy) product, subsequently exported to the Ottoman world- whose own record in cultural coexistence was for much of its history somewhat better" (Batt 2004: 12). The real difference in political culture is that unlike CEECs the Western Balkans self-confidence on their

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<sup>25</sup> The death of Franco Tudjman (the nationalist president of Croatia) in November 1999 and defeat of Milosevic in Serbia in September 2000 elections in Serbia.



European vocation is quite low. They think that they may not be able to cope with the challenge. There is also a mistrust and scepticism against the EU since they can not make sure if the EU really wants them. It failed them in 1990's why would it not do right now. Another difference is that the states in Western Balkans are not functioning effectively and do not have unchallenged jurisdiction within secure borders (The statehood question will be further evaluated). The last difference is the legacy of war which caused the isolation of the region from Europe (Batt 2004 : 10-17).

In line with the factors Lehne outlined, the presidency conclusions of Feira Council in June 2000 noted that its objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe, and affirms that 'all the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership'.<sup>26</sup> Later in November the EU launched Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) (offered by commission in 1999) in Zagreb Summit for Western Balkans, in the meantime process of separating the Western Balkans from the Stability Pact recipients Bulgaria and Romania ended with the Helsinki Council decision in December 1999 to start membership negotiations with these countries.

SAP was composed of three basic elements: a)Stabilisation and Association Agreements(SAA), b)unilateral trade concession,and c)financial assistance. There are two phases in SAAs. In the first phase, namely the preparation phase, the countries included in SAP are to get prepared for the signing of the SAAs. The second phase is the negotiation and implementation of the reforms by countries included in SAP. It was declared that those states that make progress in meeting conditions like the democratic and market reforms, respect for human rights, working for the return of refugees and cooperating with the Hague-based (ICTY), and building up their capacity in the domain of justice and home affairs could sign association agreements, like the Europe Agreements with the Central and East European Candidates<sup>27</sup>. The aim is gradual creation of a free-trade area and preparing the ground for reforms that would help complying with the EU standards. The agreements are important for Western Balkan countries since they provide a framework in relations with the EU.

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<sup>26</sup> Presidency Conclusions of the Santa maria da Feira European Council. No 200/1/00. 19-20 June 2000

<sup>27</sup> See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Stabilisation and the Association Process for the countries of South Eastern Europe, COM(99) 235, 26 May 1999

The SAA's are regarded as the instruments for the long term integration of Western Balkans into the EU structures. Moreover it should be emphasized that the agreements are tailor-made. In other words since a new kind of contractual relations would be built with the EU, the agreements have to take into account each country's economic, social and political conditions. Yet there is a common intention stated in each agreement: to achieve some sort of a formal association with the EU. That is why the EU, with the mechanisms created by the SAA's such as the meetings of the Stabilisation and Association Councils helps prioritize reforms, shape the countries according to the EU models, solve problems and monitor their implementation. Agreements have been signed with the FYR Macedonia (March 2001) and Croatia (November 2001). On January 31 2003, the EU formally opened SAA negotiation with Albania. For BiH and the FYROM, the establishment of Consultative Task Forces has proved an effective means of helping national authorities to focus on national and EU oriented reforms.<sup>28</sup> . According to Michael E. Smith, "these agreements are also the result of another Commission strategy to increase its influence in the EU foreign policy. Indeed, rather than wasting its resources and inviting disputes by initiating numerous CFSP actions, the Commission has tended to pursue a strategy of embedding foreign policy issues in broader sets of EU agreements or policies, such as "Association Agreements" . These agreements are in fact institutionalized frameworks to help achieve coherence among the EU's policies toward important areas of interest" (Smith 2001:185)

The second component of SAP is the trade concessions. EU agreed to open asymmetrically its markets even before the signing of a SAA. The aim was clear: to boost the general level of imports from the Western Balkan countries, which have so far remained very low, at less than 0,6% of all Community imports and thereby to encourage economic growth in the region. The trade regime serves as a catalyst to the development of a network of free-trade agreements and secure implementation of these reforms, with a view to the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association

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<sup>28</sup> See Report from the Commission - The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe - First Annual Report <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/>

Agreement <sup>29</sup>. The EU's decision to open its markets has already provided a much needed stimulus to exports.

For financial assistance Brussels unveiled Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Development, and Stability (CARDS) programme, which was to assist domestic reforms and reconstruction in the countries in question and replace PHARE and OBNOVA.<sup>30</sup> CARDS was put into practice before the launching of the SAP and the EU's approach to assistance became more structured with this programme. The EU assistance to the region between 1991-1999 was about 4.2 billion Euros and CARDS assistance (200-2006) has an overall budget of 4.65 billion Euros. CARDS assistance is managed in a number of ways. The delegations of European Commission in Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina directly manage most national programmes and projects. In Serbia and Montenegro<sup>31</sup>, and in FYROM European Agency for Reconstruction which was established in February 2000 delivers the assistance. Initially the focus was on emergency and humanitarian assistance. Later on, it concentrated on rebuilding infrastructure, fostering reconciliation and the return of refugees. Now the main aim is the institution building and harmonisation with EU norms. In that regard, the country strategies and multi-annual programmes are drafted in accordance with CARDS programme. In November 2001, the European Commission published for the first time annual reports on the progress in implementing SAP. Importantly alongside the important political and economic conditions, the reports monitored the level of harmonisation with the *acquis*

The EU insisted that SAP was its contribution to the Stability Pact. While the SP focuses on regional cooperation in the fields of economics, politics, and security, the SAP is intended to act as a mechanism for upgrading EU relations with individual countries. The two elements are interrelated, in that the conditionality instituted by the SAP urges the Western Balkan states to engage in regional cooperation activities (partly

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<sup>29</sup> See Report from the Commission - The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe - First Annual Report <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex>

<sup>30</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000. 5 December 2000

<sup>31</sup> CARDS mandate also included Kosovo, before that the EU was the largest single donor of aid where it has been active through its humanitarian agency European Community Humanitarian Office and Interim Task Force for Assistance for Reconstruction in Kosovo and also EU took over responsibility in the economic reconstruction of Kosovo under the framework of UNMIK

in the framework of SP) (Anastasakis&Bechev 2003:7). Kavalski asserts that “the EU instituted the SAP in the Balkans as a way of giving it an attainable vision for accession to the Union, so that EU norms and standards could take root” (Kavalski 2003: 204-206). It can also be regarded as the the EU acknowledgement of the Europeannes of the Balkans.

### **3.4. Thessaloniki Summit and Enhanced SAP**

When taking over the EU presidency in 2003 Greece made clear that EU will step up involvement in the region. The Western Balkan countries’ basic demands before the summit were the handing over of the Western Balkan portfolio to the Enlargement Directorate and the channeling of the funds left from 2004 enlargement into the CARDS programme. The Thessaloniki Summit that took place in June 2003 did not meet those demands. The EU reiterated the potential candidate formula introduced in the Feira European Council 2000 and was reluctant to transfer the portfolio to the then enlargement Commissioner Verheugen. Besides only 200 million euro were added to the CARDS programme until 2006. As a result many in the region thought of Thessaloniki as a failed opportunity.<sup>32</sup>

However it should be noted that the EU introduced important instruments in Thessaloniki. The SAP was boosted to a level approaching the enlargement template. It introduced European Partnerships, a mechanism for supporting each country’s progress through identifying priorities across sectors. Termed ‘European Integration Partnerships’ in the Commission’s original proposal, the mechanism is clearly modelled on the Accession Partnerships in force for the candidates of Central and Eastern Europe. To strengthen the SAP states’ institutions, the EU also launched twinning exchanges with administrative staff from the Member States, and made the region eligible for technical assistance for harmonising national legislation with the *acquis communautaire*. Brussels also opened its research and education programmes. In addition the Thessaloniki Summit initiated regular EU-Western Balkan meetings for political

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<sup>32</sup> see more on RFE/RL Newswire, 23 June; Patrick Moore, EU Membership for the Western Balkan States Remains Over There Far Away, RFE/RL Balkan report, 27 June 2003

dialogue at the ministerial level on a number of common-interest issues including Justice and Home Affairs. Its first meeting took place on 9 December in Brussels.<sup>33</sup>

With Thessaloniki the SAP became a more coherent integration framework. Moreover by giving the Commission a greater role, EU reassured that the attention will not be diverted from the region.

While the SAP plays a major role towards the stability and integration in the region the enhanced CFSP instruments were efficient in coping with the political conflicts in various parts of former Yugoslavia (More detailed information on the path to the brokering of Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the crisis in FYROM and changed the political and legal structure of the country will be given in the next section). March 2002, under EU auspices and the sustained pressure by Javier Solana, Serbian and Montenegrin representatives signed the Belgrade Agreement, that prevented Montenegro from holding a referendum regarding the founding of an independent Montenegro (at least until 2006) and paved the way to a restructured State Union. The Constitutional Charter entered into force in February 2003. Unlike in FYROM, the US was not a party to diplomatic talks. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told visiting Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic that the U.S. supports the EU-sponsored agreement to keep Serbia and Montenegro together and expects Podgorica to comply. This policy is firmly in place despite widespread sympathy within the U.S. policy community for Montenegrin independence. This was a significant example to illustrate the point that in the post-11 September world, the U.S. has yielded leadership in the Balkans to the EU.<sup>34</sup>

Ohrid and Belgrade Agreements were the first successes for the EU in maintaining post-Yugoslav security. EU police missions are active in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. EU has now the direct influence for the territorial status-quo and for the tackling of inter-ethnic conflicts. These CFSP measures surely overlap with the SAP agenda. The SAP conditionality covers the political requirements arising from the CFSP actions. One should bear in mind that Mr. Solana could not have had the results he had,

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<sup>33</sup> see The Western Balkans and European Integration Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM (2003)285-21/05/03; Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003

<sup>34</sup> see "RFE/RL Newslines," 30 April 2002 and RFE/RL Report 3 May 2002

without the incentives provided by the European Commission y. Peace-building and institution building in the region is interrelated. The EU needs to continue to implement CFSP measures in order to promote the stabilisation of the region, but shall also stick with the promise of integrating the West Balkan countries gradually into European structures.

Overall, EU conditionality is established on the following in Western Balkans:

1. the general Copenhagen criteria-political, economic, and acquis related- applied to all candidate and potential candidate countries;
2. The Regional Approach and the SAP
3. country-specific conditions to be met before entering the SAA negotiation phase and condition arising out of the SAAs and CARDS framework;
4. conditions related to individual projects and granting of aid, grants, and loans;
5. conditions that arise out of peace agreements and political deals(e.g. resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council(that confirmed the territorial integrity of the then Yugoslavia, now Serbia and Montenegro), and the Dayton, Ohrid and Belgrade Agreements). (Anastasakis&Bechev 2003: 7-8)

### **3.5. How Successful is the EU Strategy?**

Although much progress has been made it should be emphasized that results of EU conditionality have fallen behind expectations. EU conditionality relies upon three implicit assumptions:

1. that differentiation among the countries generates a positive climate of competition on the way towards accession,
2. that the reform process enjoys support from the local elites and populations;
3. that the EU's guidelines and templates are equally beneficial for all of the countries, at least in the long run (Anastasakis&Bechev 2003: 9)

Differentiation within Western Balkans is notable, as a result of various factors Lehne observes that one factor is historical accident. He cites Serbia and Montenegro instance and points out that, she could only begin the process after the fall of Milosevic. Another is difference in capacity. It is easier for Croatia which has more than twice the per capita of any other Western Balkan country to approach European standards (Lehne 2004:

119). Croatia and FYROM has completed SAAs. The European Council of 16/17 December 2004 decided that accession negotiations would be opened on 17 March 2005 with Croatia, provided that there was full cooperation with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. However the EU concluded in March 2005, after numerous warnings from, the chief prosecutor for the, ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, that the Croatian government is not striving enough to arrest the General Ante Gotovina who is charged with the slaughter of hundreds of Serbs in Krajina.<sup>35</sup> This was a step backwards in EU-Croatia relations. Although the Croatian Democratic Union(HDZ), party of the former extreme nationalist president Franco Tudjman, did a good job of making reforms for the integration with the EU after returning to power with 2003 elections, the reluctance to hand over Gotovina is disappointing.

Negotiations on SAA with Albania have been going on since 2003. The third SAP Annual Report on progress made by Albania in the context of the Stabilisation and Association process was finalised by the European Commission in April 2004 and called for greater commitment in fighting organised crime, human trafficking, money laundering and corruption.<sup>36</sup> This might be seen as a sign that negotiations will continue for a while.

Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, currently, meetings of the Consultative Task Force constitute a central forum for technical and political dialogue. The most recent CTF meeting took place in Sarajevo on 19 May 2005. Discussions focussed on the priorities identified by the Commission in its 2003 Feasibility Study for the negotiation of a SAA.<sup>37</sup>

In its Feasibility Report of 12 April 2005, the Commission concluded that Serbia and Montenegro is sufficiently prepared to negotiate an SAA with the EU. On 25 April 2005, the EU Council endorsed the Feasibility Report and invited the Commission to submit the negotiation directives for the SAA. In line with the “twin-track” approach, negotiations will be held with the State Union or the Republics in their respective fields of competence. The pace of SAA negotiations depends on progress by Serbia and

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<sup>35</sup> see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/croatia/eu\\_relations.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/croatia/eu_relations.htm)

<sup>36</sup> see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/albania/eu\\_albania\\_relations.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/albania/eu_albania_relations.htm)

<sup>37</sup> see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/bosnia\\_herzegovina/eu\\_relations.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/bosnia_herzegovina/eu_relations.htm)

Montenegro in addressing the issues highlighted by the European Commission.<sup>38</sup> Cooperation with the ICTY is essential for Serbia and Montenegro especially with regard to the hand over of , general Ratko Mladic, who is responsible for the atrocity in Srebrenica that stunned the international community.

This differentiation is not solely a result of conditionality and compliance with the Commission's criteria. The Western Balkan countries are different not only in terms of level of reform and capacity to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria but also in terms of their degree of sovereignty. As Noutcheva states "There is a wide variation of protectorates and semi-protectorates in the region with open questions of internal and external sovereignty in addition to sovereign countries" (Noutcheva 2004). The region comprises self-governed states such as Croatia and Albania, international protectorates such as Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, , and a loose federation Serbia and Monrenegro. The consensus over the territorial framework of the state is not only a pre-condition for democratic transition, but also for EU integration. The EU can only integrate functioning and legitimate states. EU is not expected to lower its standards but it should step up its involvement in the state-building process in the short-term. The EU is already very much related with the state-building process. As Batt expresses "obvious examples of this are the police missions in FYROM and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their role is not only short-term conflict management but also long-term assistance to institution building in the security sectors of these countries" (Batt 2004: 129). Also in order to enhance regional ownership of the reforms by political elites EU should develop an exit strategy after helping them to establish a sound institutional framework, legal infrastructure and public administration for their modern states and offer a more inciting carrot than the potential candidacy formula of the SAP. The goal of membership should be made more viable. The transfer of the SAP portfolio to the enlargement directorate in early 2005 and the Croatian bid for membership and the application of FYROM for membership in March 2004 are significant signals to the region. Most importantly the EU has to take action regarding the final status of Kosovo. The standards before status formula did not work as the violence erupted in March 2004. As Glenny puts " The absence of final status is inflicting an increasingly heavy toll on Kosovo's economy encouraging the development of what several observers have referred to as a black hole

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<sup>38</sup> see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/serbia\\_montenegro/serbia\\_montenegro\\_eu\\_relations.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/serbia_montenegro/serbia_montenegro_eu_relations.htm)



in Balkans” (Glenny 2004: 94) . EU also should deal more effectively with the threat of organised crime which can undermine all stabilisation efforts as the assassination of Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003 demonstrated. In order to tackle organised crime and improve regional integration which is an important step for political and economic stability EU should make the SP’s work more relevant and should focus on policies that will endorse the regional identity and eliminate negative attributes about the region to pave the way for deeper integration. The states will cooperate more as they feel good about being a Balkan country. As a result they will not try to distance themselves from the region and their neighbours.

## **IV. TEST CASE: FYROM**

### **4.1. Theoretical Considerations**

Before attempting to analyse the origins of the Macedonian Question it would be fruitful to shed light on concepts like nation, nationalism and national identity. Because the whole conflict is related with the construction of national identity of the ethnic Macedonians and the effect of the attitudes of its neighbours in shaping Macedonian nationalism. Also theoretical information is vital to interpret the outcome of Tito's nation building process in Macedonia.

A lot of scholars have tried to define the nation, all have done so by reference to a group of people, bound together by some set of shared characteristics or circumstances. They disagree, however, about the nature of that which nationals share, and on the source (naturally given, imposed by elites, or arising from nationals' own activities) of nationhood.

Perennialist theories emphasize the permanence of nations. Their main argument is that nations are a product of extended kin groups and should be viewed as such (Smith 1998: 147). This means that belonging to a nation or certain identity is not only natural but it is inherited. Nations have always existed. National communities reveal ancient origins and continuity. Pierre Van der Berghe suggests that "the very notion of nation is an extension of kin selection" (quoted in Smith 1998: 127). On the other hand the modernist theories defend the recent, invented and constructed nature of nations and nationalism. B. Anderson's (1991) assertion is that the modern nation depends vitally upon the ability of its members to imagine the existence of numerous fellow nationals, a conceptual leap that became possible with the development of print-capitalism, and resulted in the construction of national identities and the modern nation state. For Anderson a nation is:

An imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their-fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives their communion (Anderson 1991: 6).

To sum up he argues that the concept of nation is constructed and these constructed nations are unthinkable, and thus could not have existed as we understand the nation today without the ability on the part of a nation's members to imagine crowds of fellow nationals. The imaginative ability depends on a means of communication, in this case print-capitalism which is a modern invention.

Hobsbawm maintains that nationalism's main characteristic and goal is its drive to build a nation state. His main contribution to the understanding of states, nations, and nationalism is the 'invention of tradition' theory:

Invented tradition is meant to be a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seem to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with the historic past (Hobsbawm 1983: 1-2).

He implies that the building of an imagined or real identity that is rooted in the historic part of a community is crucial and vital for it to become a state or to consolidate its nationhood. In this sense, identity, the process of its construction, or lack thereof, is at the core of nationalism. Gellner (1983) argues that the necessity of a trained workforce in order to achieve industrial economic growth led to the modern state and homogeneous education systems which disseminated high culture and standardized language, creating the ideal conditions for the development of nationhood. He further suggests that nation is an artifact created by nationalism that rose as a result of the special economic and social conditions linked to the establishment of industrial societies. As Gellner puts it, "Nation is an artifact ... Nationalism sometimes takes pre-existing cultures, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically ... sometimes invents them" (Gellner 1983: 55-57) In all these thoughts, it is stressed that nations are constructed by elites.

Smith's ethnosymbolism theory's contribution is located between perennialist and modernist theories. According to Smith nations do not possess the characteristics of invention more than other types of social organizations and ideologies and there is a

limit to the manipulation of elites. The study of ethnies, ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific theory, and a sense of solidarity’ (Smith 1986: 32), is fundamental to his theory. Smith explores the origins of nation and national identity and finds them in ethnic identity as a pre-modern form of collective cultural identity. In his view, ‘Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and the notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture’(Smith 1991: 25). Smith adds, ‘ there is a felt affiliation as well as a cultural affinity, with a remote past in which a community was formed, a community that despite all changes it has undergone, is still in some sense recognized as the same community’(Smith 1991: 33).

Smith’s work on the relevance of the ethnic origins of nations becomes central to his understanding of, ‘why and where particular nations are formed, and why nationalism, though formally alike, possess such distinctive features and contents’(Smith 1998: 191).

As can be observed there are no objective criteria that can define the nation. According to Smith, “ a nation is a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991: 14). A combination of objective and subjective criteria could be utilized in order to define nation. Rupert Emerson locates nationhood in subjective understandings and identifications of a nation’s members, arguing that “ the nation is today the largest community, which, when the chips are down, effectively command man’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a whole” ( Emerson 1960: 95-96). Thus, for Emerson, a nation is defined as that group to which the person gives his ultimate loyalty-that group with which, she most identifies.

In order to analyse national identity it is necessary to study the movement that bring nations into being, namely nationalism. Smith defines nationalism as the ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a

population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation (Smith 1991: 73). It is noteworthy in this assertion that all the members of the population need not share the belief in the existence of the nation or the potential nation. Elie Kedouire's work on nationalism is quite descriptive. The nationalist doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government (Kedouire 1960: 19). All nations have the inalienable right to self-determination. The feature of world divided into nations is particularly important since it highlights the fact that existence of others is an element inherent in national identity. According to Connor (1994) sharing a national identity generates an emotional bond among fellow nationals which is fundamentally psychological and non-rational. It is not irrational, only beyond reason. This is so because, basically, a nation is a group of people, who feel that they are ancestrally related. In Connor's view, the nation is the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is from this perspective, the fully extended family. However, the sense of unique descent, need not, in nearly all cases will not, accord with factual history (Connor 1994: 202). This belief divides humanity into us, fellow nationals and the others non-members of our community.

Triandafyllidou's (2002) argument of national identity emphasizes the effect of the *other* in the formation of national identity in a detailed manner. In her work national identity is conceived as a double-edged relationship. On the one hand, it is inward looking, it involves a certain degree of commonality within the group. It is thus based on a set of common features that bind the members of the nation together like the one's in definition of nation of Smith. On the other hand, national identity implies difference. It involves both self-awareness of the group but also awareness of others from whom the nation seeks to differentiate itself (Triandafyllidou 2002: 26-27). By transforming the work of Frederic Barth on ethnic identity to national identity, she stresses the reproduction of nations via the maintenance of boundaries that distinguish them from others. As a matter of fact, boundary is the point of realisation of both identity and difference. Identity formation is not entirely a matter of self-ascription; it is a matter of ascription by others as well. To take an example from the field of international relations and its constructivist approach, Alexander Wendt defines social identities as sets of meanings that an actor "attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is,

as a social object (Wendt quoted in Balalovka 2003). That is to say individuals and groups acquire social identities from the ways others treat them and from the social practices which confirm the treatment they receive from others. These practices are continuously reproduced. As Triandafyllidou puts it:

If difference is defined by social factors so is similarity. In other words, the specific features considered to characterise each group, i.e. the cultural content of national identity, are shaped through interaction between different groups. If some differences are emphasized and others marginalised, this implies that some features will be taken to symbolise the identity of the specific group, the essence of membership of it, and others will be downplayed.<sup>39</sup> In this sense, national identity is formed and constantly re-defined and developed through interaction with other collectivities or groups. Different elements may be socially relevant in distinguishing between different pairs of groups. The emblems of difference may vary between groups. ( Triandafyllidou 2002: 30-31)

National identity is formed and consolidated through interaction, co-operation or conflict with Significant Others<sup>40</sup>, which influence the shape that national identity will take. The Macedonian nation is a perfect case since its uniqueness and separateness has been strongly contested by several of its neighbours (external others) and also by the Albanian minority (Internal other)<sup>41</sup>. The attitudes of the others in turn shaped the evolution of Macedonian identity. Especially after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Macedonians felt more threatened since the protection provided by federal Yugoslav state was no longer present against the claims of its neighbours. Consequently the nationalism among ethnic Macedonians rose.

#### **4.2. Macedonia and the Origins of Ethnic Question**

The focal point of the Macedonian Question is the issue of the origins of the Slavic people inhabiting geographical Macedonia, and consequently, the issue of who has the

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<sup>39</sup> For instance Gellner suggests that the awareness of a shared nationality on the part of the population of a backward region is initially based on a negative trait: their exclusion from the nation of the privileged. As mentioned before even though he states that nationalism does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, these may be purely negative (Gellner 1964: 167-71).

<sup>40</sup> Significant others are groups that share with the nation, some common features (cultural, ethnic, territorial).

<sup>41</sup> It is worth noting that internal significant others are perceived to erode the unity or and/or the authenticity of the nation from within, while external significant others are deemed to challenge territorial and/or cultural integrity of the nation from the outside (Triandafyllidou 2002: 42).

right to the Macedonian land as well as the ownership and significance of the name 'Macedonia'(Engstrom 2002: 5). It must be underlined that nations express their identities in the cultural landscape of places and territories (White quoted in Engström 2002: 2)

In Wilkinson's view:

Macedonia defies definition for a number of reasons...History no more sets its seal upon the boundaries of Macedonia than does physical geography. This region is distinctive not on account of any physical unity or common political experiences but rather on account of the complexity of the ethnic structure of its population (Wilkinson quoted in Danforth 1995: 57)

Viewed from a geographic prism, the Balkan region known as Macedonia lies between the Shar and Osogova Mountains in the north, the Rila Mountains and Mesta River in the east, the Bistrica River, the Aegean Sea, and the Pindus Mountains in the south, and the Albanian highlands in the west (Perry 1997: 227). It is interesting that there has never been any serious debate regarding the outlines of geographic Macedonia. In most general terms, it includes three areas; the territory of the present Republic of Macedonia (Vardar Macedonia), the south-western part of Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia), and the Greek province of Macedonia centered on Thessaloniki (Aegean Macedonia). Throughout history many states have been established and crushed on this territory. The most significant one is the reign of Alexander the Great (336-323 BC). However contemporary Macedonians are descendants of the Slav tribe, which migrated the region in the sixth and seventh centuries. Starting from the fourteenth century Ottoman Turks conquered this area.

A brief insight of national awakening in Balkans is essential to analyse the Macedonian Question. The population of Ottoman Empire was organized into communities or administrative units, known as millets, based on religion rather than on language or ethnicity. As Kitromilides stress, "the appearance of national definitions which registered an awareness of ethnic distinctions among the Orthodox Christian groups of Balkan society, illustrates in a precise and documented manner the transition from ecumenical community of Balkan Orthodoxy and the religiously defined millets to a still inchoate, inarticulate and uncertain world of linguistic nations"(Kitromilides 1994: 151).

An 'imagined' community based on a shared Orthodox faith gradually broke up into several 'imagined' communities based on a shared sense of national identity (Danforth 1995: 58). Regarding nationalist aspirations in Balkans Kitromilides suggests that “How these claims, and aspirations were shaped and articulated, and what were the origins of national assertiveness that underlay them, are not only major questions in the political and intellectual history of south-eastern Europe, but also important issues with intrinsic theoretical significance for understanding the phenomenon of nationalism” (Kitromilides 1994: 149). He then proposes a three-fold analysis: the initial concepts of ethnic identity in the writings of Balkan intellectuals, the role of modern-state during the national identity formation and the antinomy between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and nationalism. Balkan nationalism flourished in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Kitromilides argues that:

It was precisely in this period that an articulate movement of cultural change, reflecting the influences, and espousing the values of Enlightenment, made its appearance in south-eastern Europe, using the Greek language as its medium of transmission. The literature produced in Greek under the impact of the ideas of the Enlightenment introduced for the first time the concepts of distinct ethnic identities in Balkan society (Kitromilides 1994: 151).

The Ottoman served as the significant other in this process and emphasis has been put on the medieval or ancient past of the Balkan nations at the expense of their more recent histories. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Balkan nationalism saw a gradual shift from the revival of cultural identity to the creation of new political entities through the process of emancipation from the Ottoman Empire. From their inception many of the newly created states saw their mission as annexation of the remaining national territory (International Commission on Balkans 1996: 29). In the early decades of nineteenth century Greece, Serbia, and Romania emerged as independent states as a result of national revolts against the Ottoman Empire.

The Macedonia Question was born in 1870 when Russia, on behalf of the Bulgarian nation, pressed the Ottoman Empire into allowing the creation of a Bulgarian Orthodox



Church<sup>42</sup>, or Exarchate, separate from the Greek Orthodox Church. The authority of this newly established Exarchate was to include parts of Macedonia, then an Ottoman province<sup>43</sup> (Barker quoted in Jengstrom 2002: 5). Now Orthodox communities in Macedonia had the choice of affiliating with either the Greek patriarch, the Bulgarian exarch, or the Serbian Orthodox Church.. In addition through the construction of churches, and schools and the assignment of priests and teachers these three countries conducted intense propoganda campaigns whose goal was to instill the ‘proper’ sense of national identity in the Christian paesants of Macedonia in order to justify their claims to the territory these people inhabited ( Danforth 1995: 59). The Slavs of Macedonia were vulnerable to cultural assimilation. (Yasamee 1995: 122).<sup>44</sup> Most inhabitants of Macedonia were illiterate paesants with no clearly developed national sensivity at all. National identity was something that was imposed on them from the outside as a result of the three competing nationalist campaigns of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria.

Any expression of national identity that was encountered among the Macedonian peasantry was purely superficial, and owed its existence to religious or educational propaganda (establishment of Society of Saint Sava by Serbs in 1886 and Method Society by Bulgarians), or even to terrorism (Danforth 1995: 60). Greek scholars express that especially from the 1860’s onwards, in the Tanzimat reform area, the dissemination of education facilitated the consolidation of Greeek national feelings among greek, Vlach, Albanian, and Slav speaking inhabitants of Macedonia (Gounaris 1995: 412). Unlike this it is claimed by some authors that most of the Christian Slav

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<sup>42</sup> Nationalism brought with it the nationalisation of the Orthodox church which became quite important in nation-building process. In 1833 for instance Church of Greece declared its independence from patriarch of Constantinople. The other churches followed the example. As Kitromilides (1994) argues, modern concepts of secular statehood and nationality could not accomodate the framework of Orthodox unity in the Balkans.

<sup>43</sup> In 1878 as a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Bulgaria achieved her independence. The treaty of San Stefano granted Bulgaria the regions of Macedonia and thrace. However threatened by a large and powerful pro-Russian Bulgarian state on the strategic Balkan Peninsular, the Great Powers intervened by summoning the Congress of Berlin. The result of the congress was the return of Macedonia and part of Thrace to Ottoman Empire (Yerasimos 1994: 96).

<sup>44</sup> This characteristic of the Balkan nationalisms is deemed to inspire Kuhn’s divisions of nationalisms as the voluntarist/political one, which persisted in the Anglo-Saxon world, and the ethnic/organic one which became typical of Eastern Europe (Smith 1998: 146). Smith also makes a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former is based on a historical territory, legal-political community in which the members are equal legally and politically, common citizenship culture and a common ideology. The latter emphasizes birth ascription, common descent, popular movements, local languages, and customs. Ethnic nationalism rose in places that lack institutions or if the existing institutions do not meet the basic requirements. He admits that all nationalisms comprise certain levels of ethnic and civic components. He also stresses that all nations including civic ones need an ethnic core to maintain their existence (Smith 1991:9-13). As a result we can conclude that the states rely on a formal civic nationalism.

population, which constituted the majority in Macedonia identified themselves as Bulgarian. Ivo Banac points out that , there never was any serious doubt that the Slavic population of Macedonia belonged to the same historical, linguistic, and cultural zone as the Bulgarians (Banac 1984: 308). Yerasimos claims that their argument may be justified with the activities of leaders of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) who continued to identify themselves as Bulgarians although the motto of the organization was Macedonia for Macedonians (Yerasimos 1994: 97). Their main goal was autonomy of Macedonia. But VMRO's leadership was challenged by the formation of Supreme Macedonian Committee in Sofia that aimed annexation of Macedonia by Bulgarians. Danforth points out that, in spite of these political differences, both groups including those who advocated an independent Macedonian state and opposed the idea of a Greater Bulgaria, never seemed to have doubted the predominantly Bulgarian character of the population of Macedonia (Danforth 1995: 64). Roudometof (1996) unlike these views asserted that there is a difference between Supremacists and Separatists (the two movements favoring an autonomous or independent Macedonia during the 1893-1913 period), viewing both groups as Bulgarian nationalist organizations aiming at the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria would be inaccurate. In effect, the Separatists' argument according to Roudometof (1996) was that the Macedonian Slavs are a nation of their own--the Macedonian nation. The Ilinden Uprising on 20 July, i.e. according to the new calendar: 2 August, St. Ilija's Day (Ilinden) in 1903, which resulted in the proclamation of the "Krushevo Republic was harshly suppressed by Ottoman forces.

On the other hand Serbs as evident in Cvijic's work tried to refute the claims that Macedonians were Bulgarian. The point of this approach was to demonstrate that rights of Serbs to Macedonia was no less justified than Bulgarian claims. Cvijic established that amorphous Macedonians will assimilate with the nationality of the state that gets hold of them, be it Serbian or Bulgarian (Banac 1984: 311).

Numerous contemporary sources put forward that in the Slav-speaking districts of Macedonia solidarity of ethnic feelings was exceptional. Various anecdotes have been noted about individuals shifting continuously national identity for long periods of time, according to personal interests, or about brothers sharing different national loyalties:

A characteristic example is the following conversation between chieftain Euthymis Kaoudis from Crete with a certain Naoumi, local of the Lake Prespa region in 1904:

‘Why have you acted in this way Naoumi? We were friends before, but now we are enemies! When did you become a Bulgarian? I am going to kill you!’, thundered the chieftain. ‘Oh, no Euthymi! I do not change my mind, but what could I do? Had I refused, I would have been killed by the Bulgarians’ mumbled Naoumi. The chieftain changed his mind: ‘I am going to spare your life now...but next time I shall kill you, if I am told that you are collaborating with them (Gounaris 1995: 412)

Also ideas about the separateness of Macedonian nationhood were echoed by some intellectuals. Krsto Misirkov (1874-1926), the first creator of systematic conception about the national essence of Macedonian people (Banac 1984) called for Macedonian linguistic and national separatism. By referring to himself and other Slavs of Macedonia in the first person plural, he admits that ‘our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers have always been called Bulgarians and that in the past we have even called ourselves Bulgarians’. He describes the emergence of the Macedonians as a separate Slav people as ‘perfectly normal historical process which is quite in keeping with the process by which the Bulgarian, Croatian, and Serbian peoples emerged from the South Slav group (Danforth 1995: 63).

In 1912, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro completed the Balkan League in order to push the Turks out of Balkans. The first Balkan War began in 1912 and the League defeated the Ottoman Empire. However the fragile alliance among the Balkan countries collapsed over the division of Macedonia. Bulgaria declared war on her allies in 1913, determined to incorporate Macedonia in her territory, but was defeated, as both Romania and Ottoman Empire joined Greece and Serbia. Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913 concluded the second Balkan War. Macedonia was divided among neighbouring states: Greece retained 51.6 percent of territory, Serbia (that later joined in 1918 to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that was called Yugoslavia after 1929<sup>45</sup>) occupied 38.3 percent of territory, and Bulgaria ended up with the 10.1 percent of the territory (Gounaris 1995: 412). The immediate affect of partition was the debulgarisation of the territories under the Greek and Serb control.

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<sup>45</sup> Serbia’s political system- the Serbian Royal House, its governing class, and its army- became the core of the new state and its unitary constitution (Woodward 1995: 23)

The territorial composition of Treaty of Bucharest was mainly reconfirmed after the end of World War 1.<sup>46</sup> At the end of World War 1 there were very few historians or ethnographers who claimed that a separate Macedonian nation existed. It seems that at this time most of the Slavs of Macedonia, especially those in rural areas, had not yet developed a firm sense of national identity at all. Danforth cites a passage from *Life in the Tomb*, Stratis Myrivilis' novel about life on the Balkan front during World War 1, a Slavic-speaking family from a village in Vardar Macedonia is described as wanting to be neither "Boulgar", "S'rrp, nor "Grrts"(Danforth 1995: 65). Significantly, there is no positive statement of what they do want to be. In Danforth's view "of those Slavs who had some sense of national identity the majority considered themselves to be Bulgarians, although they were aware of the differences between themselves and the inhabitants of Bulgaria" (Danforth 1995: 65).

In the interwar period Bulgaria's main motive was to free Macedonia. Bulgarian ambitions to free Macedonia were further encouraged by the fact that most of the Slavic population in Macedonia at that time had not developed a distinct national consciousness, which in turn justified the intensification of Serbization and Hellenization of the Macedonian population (Perry 1994: 63) Within Greece and also within the new kingdom of Yugoslavia, the campaigns of cultural and linguistic assimilation rose. Within Greece, the Macedonian Slavs were designated Slavophone Greeks, while within Yugoslavia, they were officially treated as South Serbs (Yasamee 1995: 126-127), and the language spoken there was considered as dialect of Serbian (Danforth 1995: 65). In both countries, schools and media were used to disseminate the national ideologies and identities, and also the languages of the new ruling nations, the Greeks and the Serbs. These were compounded with the moves to change the composition of the population. Serb colonists were transferred to Yugoslav Macedonia, while in Greek Macedonia, the mass settlement of Greek refugees from Anatolia reduced the Slav population to minority status. At the same time, native Macedonians, under economic as well as political pressures were emigrating to other areas of Yugoslavia (as many as 26.000 in 1938 alone) and abroad (10.244 left for Bulgaria

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<sup>46</sup> Bulgaria joined Germany and the Central Powers in WW1 driven by the desire to liberate Macedonia from Greek and Serbian control. Again Bulgaria suffered a defeat and the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 confirmed the partition.

between 1913-1920). (Banac 1984, Yasamee 1995). This period of assimilation and terrorization of the native Macedonians led to the anchoring of a separate Macedonian nationhood more among the Macedonian intellectuals. The developments in the Comintern also inspired these thoughts. Between 1933-35 Comintern gave its support to an original thesis, developed by the Yugoslav Party, which held that Macedonian Slavs were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians but constituted a separate Macedonian nation.

The question as to whether a Macedonian nation actually existed in the 1940's is hard to answer. But as Wilkinson concludes the Macedonian Slavs, whatever might have been their origins, had arrived at a state in their national development when identification with either the Serbs or Bulgarians was no longer possible in theory or in practice (Wilkinson quoted in Danforth 1995: 66). After the World War 2 communists seized power in Yugoslavia. Whether a Macedonian nation existed or not the Communists had important political reasons to declare that one did exist in 1944 when People's Republic of Macedonia was established in 1944. As Perry points out:

The establishment of a Macedonian republic based on a Macedonian nation undermined Bulgarian territorial claims to Macedonia and scotched the notion that Macedonians were Bulgarians. The recognition of a Macedonian nationality also made it difficult for Serbians to maintain that Macedonians were part of the Serbian nation. The founding of a Macedonian Republic thus reduced the size of any potential Greater Serbia. Because it included a fair-sized Albanian minority, Yugoslav Macedonia was also a guarantee against a Greater Albania (Perry 2000: 271).

Another motive behind the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's decision to recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nation was the desire to extend Yugoslav control over Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia as well (Jelavich 1983, 2: 321). The Tito-Stalin dispute in 1948 prevented the realisation of these territorial ambitions and also caused the Bulgarian Communist Party to distance itself from its earlier support to the Yugoslav notion of a separate Macedonian nation.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> In 1948 use of the Macedonian language was forbidden in Pirin Macedonia, and in 1958 Bulgarian Communist Party again opted for the position that Macedonians were Bulgarians and neither a Macedonian nation or language existed

The Macedonians were given their own republic within a federal Yugoslavia (The establishment of Macedonia was hailed as the Second Ilinden) and great efforts were made to promote an independent Macedonian culture. Crucial to these efforts was the creation of a new Macedonian literary language, taught in all schools and propagated through the mass media. The new Macedonian literary language was based on the west-central dialect for two important reasons. It was this dialect that had the most speakers and was the most different from both Serbian and Bulgarian. This was also the dialect that Krste Msirkov had suggested as the basis for a Macedonian literary language in 1903 (Danforth 1995: 67). The general consensus is to treat Macedonian as a language and not as a regional dialect despite the Greek and Bulgarian nationalist perspectives.

As Roudometof (1996) suggests the decision as to whether a given transitional South Slav dialect belongs to one or another language is not a linguistic one but a sociopolitical one

History writing played a significant role in bolstering Macedonian national identity. The task of historical research in Skopje was to promote historically the existence of the Macedonian nation. The Communist Party, when writing Macedonian national history, drew a level between, at first, the beginnings of the “Macedonian people” with the phases of the creation of the “Macedonian nation”, and in a Marxist-Leninist way established that they date from the start of the mature industrialisation of the Balkan area – therefore from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the fifties, this had already been already corrected, so that the Ohrid kingdom of Tsar Samuil from the 11<sup>th</sup> century – a date which was given advantage over the great movement of peoples and the settlement of the Slavs on the Balkans in the period following the 6<sup>th</sup> century – marked the beginnings of the “history of the Macedonian people (see Troebst 2003). The failure of Ilinden uprising was described and interpreted with the involvement of Bulgarians (Supremists). The failure of the Uprising was therefore no fault of the good Macedonians; all blame rested on the shoulders of "evil" foreigners. Macedonian socialists extolled VMRO and the Krushevo Republic as native examples of cross-cultural cooperation and brotherhood (see Krapfl 1996: 297-316). The establishment of a national Macedonian Orthodox church was another key element in the formation of Macedonian national identity, the church benefited from a state policy which acknowledged the cultural heritage of Orthodoxy

The intellectuals and the political leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had definitely a significant impact on the nation building process. But it would be misleading to ignore the feelings of the masses.

As Verba states:

Unless those individuals who are physically and legally members of a political system (that is who live in its boundaries and are subject to its laws) are also psychologically members of that system ( that is feel themselves to be members) orderly patterns of change are unlikely. It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimises the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers ( Verba 1965: 529)

The Macedonians knew what they do not want to be namely- Greek, Serb or Bulgarian before the establishment of People's Republic of Macedonia and this is significant as mentioned before in the construction of national identity. It is certain that state policies, the ideologies that legitimate them, and the institutions and organizations that realize them, all influence the process of identity formation as individuals are socialized and become citizens of particular states. To a great extent states have the power and the resources to determine what choices are available to people and what the rewards or the sanctions will be when they exercise these choices and adopt specific identities. The Titoist regime by stressing in some cases by creating differentiating marks endorsed a distinct and unique Macedonian national identity.

As Danforth states “the process of state formation and nation formation coexist in a dialectical relationship. Together, they result in the creation of new nation-states in which the bonds of race, ethnicity, language, and religion which constitute the nation are raised to the level of political principles that define the state and this is what happened in Macedonia”. (Danforth 1995 66).

#### **4.3. Re-emergence of Macedonian Question after the disintegration of Yugoslavia**

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of an independent republic of Macedonia have resurrected the Macedonian Question and put it back on the political

agenda of the Balkans. The collapse of the federal state has been followed by a rupture of all the links which had tied together the various republics since the 'national pact' created by Tito after the Second World War (Banac, 1984). In November 1990 the first multiparty elections were held in Skopje and they were won by the former communist party in a landslide victory. In January 1991, the parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence and shortly afterwards proclaimed the independence of the country. Issues concerning the Macedonian Question some of which communism had temporarily suspended regained momentum in the early 1990's.

According to Brown (1998) none of these disputes were new. Clashes with Greece over the name of the Republic and its Slavic inhabitants began in the 1940s, the Serbian church mounted opposition to the Macedonian church's bids for autocephaly throughout the 1960s and Albanian citizens of Yugoslavia made the claims to the status of narod that Albanian citizens of Macedonia do today<sup>48</sup>.

Although Greece's opposition to the new Republic of Macedonia have been remarkable, it will be more accurate to firstly focus on the Bulgarian attitude as it directly threatened the authenticity of Macedonian national identity. Since Macedonia became an independent republic in 1991, Bulgaria has assumed the role of big brother, taking an overt interest in the political development in Macedonia, whilst assuring that Bulgaria makes no territorial claims on the Republic of Macedonia (Engström 2002: 7). Bulgaria could not have recognized both the state and the nation, for the simple reason that Macedonia claimed a part of Bulgarian history, hence recognizing the nation would mean giving up a part of Bulgarian national historical identity. In 1992 Bulgarian president Zhelyu Zhelev explicitly stated that Bulgaria recognized the state of Macedonia, and not the nation, further reiterating the Bulgarian position that Macedonia was only a geographic term (Engström 2002: 7). It was widely voiced in Bulgaria that today's Macedonians are former Bulgarians who had to live separately for a long time because of turbulent historic developments and thus have forgotten their "Bulgarianness." The so-called Macedonian language is simply a dialect of the Bulgarian language.

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<sup>48</sup> But these were not at the levels of opposition after the independence of Macedonia in 1991 since Macedonia was under the roof of Yugoslavia



Macedonian identity, consequently, is ‘artificial’ and does not really exist.<sup>49</sup> As Jengström points out “Bulgarians fail to consider the changing nature of national identity and language, a process illustrated by the observation from the 1920s onwards that the Bulgarian identity in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia went into decline” (Engström 2002: 8). However a Joint Declaration (signed on February 22, 1999), cleared the way for the resolving of the language dispute. The language dispute with the ensuing problem of Macedonian claims for protection of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria were solved by an intriguing compromise which can be described as “‘recognition’ (or rather acceptance) of the Macedonian language for a firm rejection of Macedonia’s ‘minority’ claims to Bulgaria. The declaration refers to the Macedonian language as the official language under the Macedonian Constitution (Bakalova 2003). The Bulgarian assertions are also directed against the history and territory (Ohrid is claimed by both Macedonians and Bulgarians as the cradle of their national cultures) of Macedonia.

Greece on the other hand constantly opposed to the international recognition of the republic under its constitutional name. Thus, the name Macedonia has come to describe not a political unit subordinated to a federation of several national communities, but a nation-state. The Greek approach has been to use whatever leverage it can within the EC to prevent recognition of a state called Macedonia and to attempt to base diplomatic initiatives on the assumption that some sort of new Yugoslav federation may well emerge that will include Macedonia as a component part (Pettifer 1992: 482).

From a Greek perspective the name Macedonia is, and has always been, considered a constituent element of Greek cultural heritage (Engström 2002: 9). The dispute between the two countries over the name of the new Republic is part of a “global cultural war” (Featherstone quoted in Danforth 1995: 147) in which these two states have been fighting over the control of symbols, traditions and glorious ancestors. Macedonia was recognized by the UN under the temporary name of FYROM (UN Security Council Resolution, April 8, 1993).

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<sup>49</sup> The European Court of Human Rights which ruled against Bulgaria in 2003, forcing her to acknowledge a Macedonian minority was a heavy blow to the core of Bulgarian nationalistic ideology of this kind (Bakalova 2003)

Greece has also opposed the use of the flag of FYROM, because it bears the image of the 'star' of Vergina. This 'star' or 'sunburst' as it is often called, was discovered in the mid-70s at Vergina, where the ancient Macedonian capital 'Aegai' was located, at the south-west of Thessaloniki, and is considered to be the emblem of the empire of Alexander the Great (Triandafyllidou, Calloni & Mikrakis 1997). From a Greek nationalist perspective since the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, both the name Macedonia and the sun or star of Vergina are Greek, and any use of them by Slavs constitutes not only the theft of Greek national property but also proof that Skopje harbors irredentist claims on Greek territory (Danforth 1995 148). As a response to Greece's concerns in September 1991, the Parliamentary Assembly of Macedonia adopted a declaration according to which FYROM reiterated its recognition and acceptance of the state's borders and did not have any territorial claims over its neighbours.

The argument is based on the specific political role assigned to cultural symbols within the nation-state. These are supposed to represent the continuity and unity of the national community through history. Therefore, the flag and the very name of the new state have been judged contradictory by the Greek government (Triandafyllidou, Calloni & Mikrakis 1997).

Greece's opposition delayed the recognition of Macedonia by EC (see footnote 15) which had a huge negative impact on the new Macedonian state that was trying to re-establish its identity. The Greek battle against Macedonia culminated in 1994 with an embargo over FYROM. Thus, Macedonia was denied access to the port of Thessaloniki, its main commercial channel. At the same time Macedonia had to comply with the sanctions placed on Serbia by the European Union, thus losing another commercial partner (BBC Monitoring, September 8, 1994). Greece's restrictions were threatening the country with economic collapse. As a condition of lifting economic sanctions, Greece was asking not only the name of the state to be changed but also for the removal of the star of Vergina from its flag. As a result of diplomatic intervention by the Clinton administration and Cyrus Vance an Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia was concluded in 1995, according to which the two parties agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity and Greece recognized Macedonia as an independent state

(Engström 2002: 9-10). The government in Skopje also agreed to remove the star of Vergina from its flag.

Serbia, FYROM's eastern neighbour regarded Macedonia's independence with caution but Yugoslav Army withdrew peacefully from Macedonia. It was not until April 1996, that Belgrade and Skopje established new diplomatic ties and signed an accord that represented the opening of a new chapter in both states' histories. The reason for delay is the notion amongst Serb elites that the Macedonians were Serbians and Vardar Macedonia is nothing but Southern Serbia. As Brown (1998) indicates the Serbian Church also never recognised the Macedonian, and nor did the rest of the world's Orthodox churches. As Engström puts forward " although Serbia today officially acknowledges both the Macedonian state and the nation, it is widely believed that throughout the ages the Macedonian Slavs were devoid of any particular ethnic characteristics, and always represented a part of *une mass flottant* that stretched between the true Serbs and true Bulgarians" (Engström 2002: 10).

In Albania the formation of the new state has been welcomed, primarily because it is seen as a counterweight to Serbia and an irritant to Greece (Pettifer 1992: 480). The Albanian state was not a significant threat to the young republic's territorial integrity because it was preoccupied with internal economic and social troubles but the political leaders of Albania declared that the Macedonian state do not just belong to ethnic Macedonians.

In conclusion, the relationship between the republic of Macedonia and its neighbours can be summarised as follows: Bulgaria is the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in language; Serbs are the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in religion; Albanians are the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in statehood; and Greeks are the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in the name of the nation, its language and the state (Engström 2002: 11).

The nationalistic disputes between Macedonia and her neighbours only confirm the importance of identity for the successful operating of a state and a nation. As mentioned before identity is an integral part of nation/nationalism. The process of identity building is based on confronting the other in order to reaffirm and establish the self.

#### **4.4. The Albanian Problem in the New Republic**

Within the new Republic, the division that attracts most attention is that between the Macedonian Orthodox majority and the large Albanian minority, who are mostly Muslim. The rift between Albanians and Macedonians go back to 1960's. Albanian nationalist flare-ups in Macedonia, such as those that occurred in 1968 and 1981 were contained by Macedonian leadership. During the 1980's the Macedonian government imposed repressive measures against its Albanian population, that strengthened the historical experience among the Albanians of discrimination and alienation from the Macedonian state<sup>50</sup>, which in turn has had repercussions on their contemporary political attitudes (Brunnbauer 2002: 12) Albanian demands are various, and range from greater use of the Albanian language in higher education, fairer employment opportunities in public sector, acceptance of the population figure of Albanians that they believe to be about 40-50 percent, through constitutional changes to make Macedonia a bilingual and bicultural state, to secession of regions with a local Albanian majority, (Danforth 1995) The Albanians boycotted the national referendum for independence in 1991. Paradoxically the Albanian parties participated in the 1991 elections and won 23 seats in the 120 seated parliament. Moreover Party for Democratic Prosperity PDP joined the coalition government.

Albanian political leaders further rejected the 1991 constitution of the newly declared Republic of Macedonia on the grounds that it was a step backwards in terms of their legal status. As mentioned before, the 1974 Constitution, granted Kosovo and Vojvodina an autonomous status within the republic of Serbia, and also allowed the Albanian language to be used officially in areas where there is a majority of Albanian population. This Constitution furthermore made the Albanian ethnic group a constituent nation of Yugoslavia. Albanians harshly opposed the wording of the preamble of the constitution of the new republic that stated: Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other

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<sup>50</sup> Especially after the Tito-Stalin break in 1948 (Albania supported Soviet Union) the Yugoslav government discriminated against the Albanians politically, economically, and socially. Most Albanian-language schools were closed and measures were taken against the Albanian intelligentsia and teachers of history and language (Babuna 2000: 69)

nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>51</sup> The Albanians have serious concerns that the Preamble is too national oriented and states that Macedonia is exclusively a country of the Macedonians as the only constituent nation. Macedonian ownership of the state was also implied, including article 7, which declared the Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet as the only official language and alphabet in the country, and article 19 (3) that explicitly mentions the Macedonian Orthodox Church by name, while defining the other religious denominations broadly as communities and groups.

Another issue that ignited the Albanian reaction was the education issue. According to the Constitution, the minorities have the right of education in their language at primary and secondary school level. The Albanians of Macedonia had the same rights in the ex-Yugoslavia, except at that time they could continue their education in Albanian and go to the University of Prishtina (i.e. they had university education in Albanian in their country) (Babuna 2000: 80). However, they could not get a university education in Albanian after the independence of FYROM. This is where the Albanians base their claims for a university education. These disagreements sealed the interethnic relations in FYROM in 1990's.

In 1992 ethnic Albanians boycotted the regular Macedonian census and claimed that they numbered between 40-50 percent of the population of FYROM<sup>52</sup>. Albanians therefore demanded to be considered the second constitutive people of the Republic of Macedonia (Brunnbauer 2002: 13). The demographic issue is quite significant since the high-birth rate of Albanians became a major concern for Macedonian nationalists who fear that they will be outnumbered in the future. This fear on the Macedonian side led to a new citizenship law that the Macedonian parliament passed in December 1992. The law requires that to be a citizen of the Macedonia one has to live at least 15 years in the country. This requirement denied citizenship to many Albanians as well as other minorities. In 1994, for example 150,000 people (mostly Albanians) failed to meet these requirements though they had papers from the ex-Yugoslav government (Poulton 1998: 67).

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<sup>51</sup> see [http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electjp/mk\\_const9092.htm](http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/electjp/mk_const9092.htm) for 1991 constitution.

<sup>52</sup> According to 2002 census Albanians comprise 25.17 percent of the population. (The EU provided around € 1.5 million worth of assistance to ensure a successful performance of the 2002 Population Census )

On 11 December 1992 a referendum was held among the Albanians on the creation of an autonomous sector in the Albanian-inhabited parts of Western Macedonia under the name Illyridia (Babuna 2000: 81). The majority of Albanians voted in favor of autonomy but the referendum was declared illegal by the Macedonian authorities.

As early as 1992 Macedonian Albanian politicians refrained from any direct rhetoric pertaining to greater Albania, or secession from FYROM (Daskolovski 2004: 57). In 1993 PDP made it clear that autonomy was not on their agenda. They focused on achieving a partner-nation status for Albanians ( Babuna: 2000: 81). However in 1993, several Albanian PDP high-ranking officials- among them the former secretary general of the party and the deputy ministers for health and defense- were arrested on an accusation of possession of machine-guns and of planning to create the Republic of Illirida (Poulton 2000: 197). In 1994, within the PDP a radical faction established a new party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDP-A), which after the joining of National Democratic Party in turned into the Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA).

Another serious political problem emerged in December of 1994 when a private Albanian language university was established in Tetova by the municipal councils of Tetova, Gostivar and Debar. The government resisted to that move by declaring the university illegal and charging its rector and four other people with inciting the Albanian population in Macedonia to resistance and civil disobedience (HRW 1996: 148). Another wave of open conflict arose when in 1997 the Pedagogical Faculty in the state Skopje University allowed for the training of the teachers in the Albanian language. This spurred demonstrations in Skopje by nationalist Macedonian student (Poulton 1998: 81). The tireless efforts of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel to bring about an agreement between Macedonian and Albanians on the issue of higher education in the Albanian language eventually resulted in the establishment of the trilingual (Albanian, Macedonian and English) South East European University in Tetova<sup>53</sup> (Engström: 2002: 5).

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<sup>53</sup>Besides the High Commissioner's efforts, the deployment of the peacekeeping force as a measure of preventive deployment between 1992-98 (UNPROFOR until 1995 then UNPREDEP) contributed to the the non-violent period in 1990's

The strongest outburst of violence in 1990's occurred when the Albanian mayors from DPA raised Albanian flags in the town-halls of Tetova and Gostivar. Special police-forces without any special warning moved to Gostivar and Tetovo, took down the flags and arrested key members of the DPA local leadership. Police beat the demonstrators, entered private homes without a warrant and even detained individuals who did not take part in the events. Clashes left 3 people dead and at least 200 wounded (HRW 1998).

After the parliamentary elections in 1998 an unlikely governmental coalition was formed between the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), the new Democratic Alternative Party and the DPA was made. This government unexpectedly performed well and took steps to improve the interethnic relations<sup>54</sup> but the Kosovo crisis brought a halt to these efforts.

The effects of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and the war in Kosovo were devastating for FYROM. The short-term humanitarian crisis caused by the arrival of almost 300.000 refugees –which depleted the country's financial reserves – and the late arrival of international humanitarian aid has given way to a long-term economic crisis. Unemployment has reached 50 percent, general exports have decreased by 80 percent and bilateral trade with Yugoslavia, the main trade partner has fallen by 20 percent, with Yugoslavia representing the main transport route, transport costs have increased, adding to the losses, savings (510 million dollars) have been pumped into supporting the refugees, pensions and salaries are suspended, increasing social discontent, some 80 percent of the enterprises have suffered indirect damages and many have had to close down after the destruction of Serbian infrastructure due to the traditional industrial and commercial interdependence (Clement 2000: 63). The refugee exodus of Albanians in Macedonia combined with massive international attention to their plight, caused enormous tensions between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority (Woodward 2000: 40) The conflict by introducing the Kosovo problem into everyday political life polarised interethnic attitudes. Meanwhile, many young Macedonian

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<sup>54</sup> Immediately after its inauguration the government enacted an amnesty law which pardoned among others the mayor of Gostivar and Tetova, sentenced to rather harsh prison terms after the 1997 riots (Daskalovski 2004: 60)

Albanians joined the ranks of KLA fighting the Serbian forces , while villages on the Macedonian border to Kosovo became their logistical bases. Macedonian press was alarmed by militarization of ethnic Albanians. The quick victory of NATO and the return of refugees relieved the tension.

However after Kosovo, the Albanian community with the effect of the worsening economic conditions were not satisfied with the governments performance regarding the solution of their problems. The finalizing of the negotiations between Macedonia and Serbia on the demarcation of the boundaries that aimed at improving controls and restricting illegal crossings was also deemed to be another source of contention since it disrupted the illegal activities of the Albanian-led mafia.

FYROM was plunged into a minor civil war in the spring and summer of 2001. Led by Ali Ahmeti, the previously unknown 'National Liberation Army' or NLA (acronym of which is ONA in Macedonian and UCK in Albanian) a motley group of former KLA (also UCK in Albanian) fighters from both Kosovo and Macedonia, Albanian insurgents from Southeastern Serbian regions of Preshevo, Bujanovac, Medvedja crossing the border into Macedonia as well as foreign mercenaries, organized a seven -month armed insurrection against the Macedonian government (February-August 2001) (Daskolovski 2004: 61). At the first stages of the conflict the leaders and militants of the NLA made conflicting declarations on their ultimate goal be it the the elevation of Albanians' status to partner nation, establishment of a new federation, or the incorporation of the Albanian populated areas in Macedonia to Kosovo. Its rhetoric later became one of fighting for human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and constitutional reforms (Daskalovski 2004: 61). The fighting resulted in more than 200 casualties, among them over sixty Macedonian soldiers and policemen. More than 100.000 persons were exiled or internally displaced. Violence came to a halt with the signing of the Ohrid Agreement.

#### **4.5. The Fundamentals of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Minority Rights**

An explanation of the scope and evolution of the terms minority and minority rights is vital in evaluating the structure proposed by the Ohrid Framework Agreement since its



main aim is to impede a future interethnic conflict between the Albanian minority and the Macedonians.

International treaties and conventions could not be able to define what is meant with minority. The reason of disagreement on the definition of what is meant with minority is closely related with the concern of some states over their sovereignty, fear of secession and unity of their nations. The U.N. Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has defined a minority as follows:

A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law (E /CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para 181, from U.N. Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1985 meeting, quoted in Iván Gyurcsík 1993: 22)

It must be noted that a group of citizens of a state constituting a majority as in South Africa may be oppressed as well. In addition the above definition implies the existence of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. Another important category is the national minority category. A minority then is a self-perceived and self-defined group that wills to protect its identity and sustain its existence and minority rights are supposed to help to attain this goal.<sup>55</sup>

After World War 1 the League of Nations attempted to set up a system of protection of minorities for the newly created states and for the defeated states. The states of Eastern and Central Europe were forced to make Minority Agreements to be guaranteed by League. The minorities within these states were granted the rights to use their language, to open their schools, to freely practice their religion and to be equal in front of the law. There was no right for autonomy. These agreements did not specify the content of the term minority.

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<sup>55</sup> The host state must recognize the ethnic minority status even tacitly for an ethnic group to have ethnic minority rights. On the other hand if the national minority is defined as a group that deems itself to be part of a nation but reside in territory controlled by another nation, it need not to be recognized by the host state since it is regarded as a nation by the state that is controlled by the members of the nation it belongs (Albania in this case). Consequently a national minority is both self and other-defined.

The Council of the League had the right to declare the violation of the minority rights by using the articles of agreements. However, the system lacked effective sanctions and handicapped by the fact that the rights of minorities in the WWI victors were disregarded.

United Nations Charter (1945) and UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) did not emphasize minority rights specifically. The UN's primary concern was the sovereignty of the states and human rights. The motive behind this attitude was the reaction of the manipulation of minority rights in 1930's by Hitler.

Nevertheless International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed in 1966) that entered into force in March 23, 1976 stated that:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language

The covenant also made a distinction between ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. It was agreed that religious and linguistic minorities may exist separately from the ethnic groups. Yet there was again no effort in defining the minority. International Covenant rather than pointing the the rights of distinct minorities opted the formula of the rights of persons belonging to such minorities. This formula was a compromise over the concerns of individual rights, group rights of minorities, and protection of the state sovereignty.

18 December 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities' Art. 1 state that 'States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural,religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. However Art. 2 got back to the old formula of persons belonging to minorities by stating that 'Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.' Also the Article 2.3 stresses the

right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation. Art. 2.4 . indicated their right to establish and maintain their own associations and Art 2.5. set out the right to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties. The national minority category was included in the declaration but there was again no definition of a minority. Declaration was perceived as a progress in as to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights since it seemed acknowledged the minorities as definable groups having certain rights (Miall 1994: 14-16). These two and the other UN documents also lacked effective monitoring and sanction mechanisms.

The CSCE/OSCE documents also do not attempt to define minority. The Helsinki Final Act's (1975) document states that:

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere .

The Helsinki Final Act is more vague than International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the rights of minorities. Moreover, only the national minorities were mentioned. With the end of the Cold War, the then CSCE focused more on minorities and their rights with the mechanism of Human Dimension. CSCE Copenhagen meeting in June 1990 designated the rights of the persons belonging to national minorities more specifically. Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law (Art. 31), have the right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will (Art 32). In particular, they have the right to use freely their mother tongue

in private as well as in public (Art 32.1), establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions, organizations or associations, which can seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well as public assistance, in conformity with national legislation (Art. 32.2), establish and maintain unimpeded contacts among themselves within their country as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage or religious beliefs (Art 32.4), to disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue (Art. 32.5). Moreover as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, establishment of appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities is envisaged (Art. 35). The right to autonomy just mentioned is a milestone for minority rights. This perspective was reiterated in the CSCE Paris and Helsinki Summits. The establishment of the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities in 1992 has worked as a useful conflict prevention tool. However in general the OSCE lacks authoritative power.

The Council of Europe has also attached importance to minority rights. The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 pointed the rights of national minorities. Various articles underlined rights of freedom of expression, religion, association, travel..etc. Art. 14 stated that ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. The European Court of Human Rights and the Commission are effective tools in implementing the principles of the Convention. The decisions of the ECHR are binding. In February 1995 The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities was signed by a lot of countries. Although considered as the first multilateral tool of protection of minorities that is legally binding in Europe, the sanctions are not effective. As Nas notes “the specific rights for persons belonging the minorities as incorporated in international documents are formulated as injunctions to the states. Minorities are not the subject to international law” (Nas 2000: 17).

The Framework Agreement<sup>56</sup> signed after the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001 has largely changed the constitutional framework of the previous political system of the country.. Due to the shock of an armed ethnic conflict and the pressure of the international community, a new model has been set-up with Ohrid, known in political theory as *power sharing*. . As Maleska points out “as far as the Balkans are concerned, after a series of brutal civil wars and interventions, the United States and the European Union are cautious when the right to self-determination is at stake, and they stick to the principle of not changing borders by force. For the time being, as important external “players,” they respond to violent ethnic conflicts in the societies that are ethnically divided (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia) with the model of power-sharing.” (Maleska 2005). The model is inspired by the work of Lipjhart Lipjhart mainly focused on the power sharing mechanisms in states like Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. The purpose of power-sharing or consociationalism is to reach a form of democracy in which the views of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities are always taken into consideration in addition to the wishes of majorities. Thus the minorities will not be alienated. Instead of majoritarian rule consensus and equality is stressed. One more significant goal is to prevent the involuntary and enforced assimilation.

Consociational democracy is based on four main characteristics:

- government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the political society
- mutual veto or concurrent majority rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests
- proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds
- a high degree of autonomy for each segments to run its own internal affairs

(Lijphart 1977: 25)

Lijphart maintains that consociational democracy is appropriate to societies where there is not a single majority of one ethnic group and where there are not large disparities among different groups and where there are strong core of moderate. It would be more convenient the ethnic groups’ size to be close to one another. There should not be too

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<sup>56</sup> Full text can be found at <http://faq.macedonia.org/politics>

many ethnic groups in order to avoid complexity in decision-making. Also the total population of the country should relatively be small. Critics of it emphasize that it results in the division of a more plural society into more homogeneous and self contained elements. On that view consociational democracies are by nature conservative, stagnant and oppressive. Lijphart concedes that “the segment to which an individual belongs stands between him and the national society and government and the segment may be oppressively homogeneous. Consociational democracy is more concerned with the equal or proportional treatment of the groups than individual inequality... segmental isolation and autonomy may be obstacles to the achievement of societywide equality” (Lijphart 1977: 48-49). Also the emphasis on inter-elite cooperation is criticized. The bargaining between different ethnic groups may not work in practice since rival elites may rise who are against the cooperation. Consequently, the leaders of the ethnic groups, not to be weakened by the challenges from their communities will have to assume more extreme measures in order to defend the interests of their groups.

In line with the consociationalist principles of Article 69 (2) is significant:

For laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols the Assambly makes decisions by a majority vote of the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the representatives attending who claim to belong the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. In the event of a dispute within the regarding the application of this provision, the Committeon Inter-Community relations shall resolve the dispute.

This amendment anticipated the minority veto for the protection of minorities in Macedonia. This provision also applies for the election of a third of the judges of the Constitutional Court, the members of the Republican Judicial Council, and the Ombudsman. The latter will give particular attention to the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life. The agreement further provides for far-reaching decentralization of the possibly the most centralized state in Europe (Loomis, Davis & Broughton quoted in Brunnbauer 2002:6). The numbers of the municipalities were also reduced. Local governments are granted enhanced competencies, including the right to select local heads of police, but with some centralized controls. The agreement names

Macedonian as the official language, but Article 7.2 provides that any other language spoken by at least (Albanian in this case) 20 percent of the population is also an official language. Languages other than Macedonian which are spoken by at least 20 percent of the inhabitants of a municipality will also serve as an official language in self government. State-funding for university level education is to be provided where the language is spoken by 20 percent of the population. In order to rid ethnic connotations the Preamble was also amended.

The new Preamble states:

The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia taking over responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good- the Republic of Macedonia.

#### **4.6. Critics to the Ohrid Agreement**

FYROM submitted an application for EU membership on 22 March 2004. The Commission has been tasked by the European Council in May 2004 to prepare an Opinion on this application and make a recommendation whether or not to open accession negotiations with the country. Having answered additional questions in the EU Questionnaire, the Macedonian government is preparing for EU membership candidate status, with the European Commission's (EC) avis expected in fall 2005. It must be noted that the situation is still fragile in the country. Ethnic Macedonians resent the Ohrid Agreement since they believe that the state is weakened and undermined with decentralization. The unitary character of the state is considered by the Slav Macedonians not simply as a protector against militant ethnic destabilization. For the Macedonians it is much more a core part of their national identity.

On August 11 2004 the parliament passed a Territorial Organization Act, the last of a legislative initiatives required by the Ohrid Agreement. By increasing the powers of administrative districts and decreasing their number from 123 to 76 in 2008, the act

decentralizes the country by giving more powers to local government and increases the representation of ethnic Albanians in government. This act exacerbated the already existing tensions between Macedonians and Albanians. Ethnic Macedonians feared that the plan would lead to division of the country along ethnic lines and ultimately make it easier for ethnic Albanians to secede and unify with neighbouring Kosovo. A lot of demonstrations some of them being violent took place against the act. Some minor incidents also took place between Albanians and ethnic Macedonians in 2005.

In addition to the resentment of ethnic Macedonians, critics state that power-sharing arrangements are more suitable for industrialised societies with less sharper distinctions than the ones in developing countries. The Lebanese case is quite illustrative in that sense. And also power-sharing mechanisms are generally considered as temporary measures to build confidence but in FYROM the EU and US envisages it as the permanent solution. Critics also note that, the principle of double majorities required for certain legislation, places emphasis on ethnicity and therefore contrasts the aim of transforming Macedonia into a civil, non-ethnically based society.

Ohrid Agreement presumed not simply an institutional mechanism of decision making across ethnic lines, but also within the ethnic communities. In the 1990's the political system encouraged the twinning process of representation and government across ethnic lines. Both biggest Macedonian parties\_ SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE-had twinned for consecutive governments with both strongest Albanian parties.-the PDP and the DPA, placing political-ideological competition entirely within ethnic communities. The revolt was seen by some authors as the reaction of a group of Albanian elites to this process. The September 2002 elections paved the way for reproducing of the twinning mechanism this time with a different actor from the Albanian side. Ali Ahmeti's new ethnic party Albanian democratic Union for Integration formed a coalition with Crvenkoski's SDSM. This structure supported by the EU is criticized to pave the way for clientalism and corruption.

#### **4.7.The EU policy towards the FYROM**

The EC/EU involvement in Macedonia began in 1992. The EU began funding projects in 1992. In 1996 Macedonia became eligible for funding under the PHARE programme,



in 1998 EU and Macedonia concluded Cooperation and Trade Agreement by which FYROM received asymmetric trade preferences with the EU. The EU assistance has since increased to some 452.3 million Euro between 1992-2001 plus the 91 million assistance which ECHO distributed to help the government to provide shelter, health care, educational facilities for refugees following the 1999 Kosovo crisis. 259 million assistance dispersed through PHARE/OBNOVA programmes were used to support the reform of the economy and improve infrastructure. In addition in 1998 the Office of the resident Envoy in Skopje was opened. In March 2000 EC representation in Skopje was upgraded to a permanent delegation of the European Commission.

On April 9 2001 Macedonia became the first Western Balkan country to conclude a SAA with the EU before the escalation of the conflict. EU has designated about 36 million Euro in assistance for Macedonia in 2001. The new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was first used in the FYROM crisis. The first action undertaken under the RRM was in March 2001 to repair the houses destroyed or damaged by the fighting in the areas of Tetovo and Skopska Crna Gora<sup>57</sup>. In October 2001 the Commission adopted a decision to finance a Confidence Building Programme in FYROM also under the RRM. The 10.3. Million euro budget for this action was conditional on full ratification of all amendments to the FYROM Constitution stipulated by Ohrid Agreement, as well as of a new law on local government<sup>58</sup>. The Commission has also proposed to extend to FYROM the mandate of the European Agency for Reconstruction for Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Europe Aid, the EU agency for development was also involved in the management of the crisis. It set up a special working group in Brussels and a local team to support projects in FYROM

The EU has also taken a leading role in international diplomatic efforts to promote peace in Macedonia. The Macedonian crisis demonstrated the appropriateness of the decision of the creation of the post of High Representative. As Nicholas Whyte puts it, “rather than pompous and ineffective statements from the Council of Ministers, Europe is now sending in Javier Solana, a figure with almost the authority of an American Secretary of State” (Whyte 2001: 4). In addition, High Representative authorised an official from the

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<sup>57</sup> 491 houses were rehabilitated allowing the return of 3000 displaced persons

<sup>58</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/rrm/fyrom.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/fyrom.pdf) and <http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/main/fyrom-a1c2a3.htm>

newly created Policy unit as the permanent liaison in Skopje to deal with the problems when he himself could not be there as well as EUMM observer teams in Northern Macedonia. The EU at first endorsed Macedonian government's measures to counter the Albanian rebel attacks and supported Skopje's positions on not entering talks with insurgents on the one hand, on the other hand the EU urged the government to avoid further escalation of the conflict through its large-scale-counter-offensives and to start a dialogue on political reforms with the elected Albanian parties instead (Schneckener 2002: 31). This view was notified to President Trajkovski in the EU Stockholm Summit that was held in March. Javier Solana and external relations commissioner Chris Patten made several trips to Skopje in full cooperation with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. NATO and EU collaboration on the matter was remarkably good and close especially after the escalation of the conflict as NATO was essential in crisis management and military deterrent at the time.

In several meetings in Skopje Solana and Patten pressed Macedonia's political parties to agree to unite in a grand coalition that could improve inter-ethnic relations and build a national consensus in European integration issues. On June 25 the EU named, Francois Leotard to be special permanent envoy for Macedonia.<sup>59</sup> The EU declared that further financial assistance to Macedonia would be contingent upon a political settlement to the conflict. Under the international pressure to prevent fully-fledged civil war from breaking out the, Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Crvenkovski (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, SDSM), Arben Xhaferi (DPA), and Ymer Ymeri (PDP) agreed on a package of wide-ranging amendments to the constitution and far-reaching legislative changes that should meet the Albanians long standing demands known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (Brunnbauer 2002: 2). EU envoy Leotard and the US envoy James Pardew successfully mediated the intense negotiations. The ratified by the party-leaders on August 13 paved the way for the deployment of a small NATO force to begin disarming the rebel forces<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> In late October he was replaced by Alain Le Roy

<sup>60</sup> Operation Essential Harvest comprising 4500 European forces began collecting rebel weapons on August 27 and completed its mission within a month. Later on NATO launched the smaller Operation Amber Fox to provide a monitoring presence and security for international civilian personnel overseeing implementation of the Framework Agreement.

The EU did well in the FYROM case unlike its earlier record in Balkans. However the EU missed some early signs that were pointing to the fact that a crisis might emerge in FYROM, long before it actually emerged in March 2001. First the growing influence of Albanian refugees from Kosovo regarding interethnic relations in FYROM following Milosevic campaign on Albanians in Kosovo and the NATO air campaign was neglected. Repeatedly the Macedonian government warned the international community that it could not take more refugees on its soil, for economic reasons, but also by fear of reverting the fragile ethnic composition of the country (Clement 2000: 62-64) . Second, there was a lot of evidence that a massive activity of arms-smuggling in the region of Kosovo-northern Macedonia and Southern Serbia was occurring. Reports were available showing that Albanians in Macedonia border villages were arming themselves. Finally, the EU failed at establishing a linkage between the crisis of the Presevo Valley and a possible crisis in Macedonia (Schneckener 2002: 40)<sup>61</sup>. The attention of the international community was more focused on Kosovo and Serbia, and Macedonia was regarded as a relatively stable country and a model for the other countries in the Balkans.

Beyond foreign policy Macedonia became the first place to employ EU's defence goals. Once the issues regarding NATO and EU operational and institutional links were resolved with the Berlin Plus formula, the US supported the handover of NATO mission in Macedonia to EU. The EU Rapid Reaction Force replaced NATO's Allied Harmony. Operation Concordia represented the EU's first military operation and the first demonstration of the Berlin plus arrangement. The operation comprised about 350 troops from over two dozen countries. The core aim of the operation was to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of Framework Agreement. On 15 December 2003 an EU police mission Proxima, took over. Within this mission EU police experts monitor, advise, and mentor the Macedonia's police to help them to fight organised crime as well as promote European standards.

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<sup>61</sup> The crisis of the Presevo Valley can be analyzed as a consequence of the Kosovo war. After NATO stopped its air campaign, Milosevic had to agree to the withdrawal of its security forces from Kosovo and to the establishment of a five kilometers-deep demilitarized zone along Kosovo's border with Serbia known as Ground Safety Zone. In this zone, an Albanian guerilla force emerged, the stated claim of the guerilla was to unite their region with Kosovo. This was a major concern for Macedonia because the Presevo Valley is located on the Northern border of Macedonia. Serbian army to come back in the Presevo Valley, under NATO supervision in March 2001.

In addition the financial arm of the SAP, CARDS funded projects in order to bring stability and reduce the ethnic tensions in the country. CARDS programme allocation for 2002-2004 to Macedonia is 136 million Euro with the focus on developing government institutions, legislation and harmonisation with European Union norms. Help is directed at reinforcing democracy and the rule of law; human rights; civil society and the media; and the operation of a free market economy. Bulk of the assistance is on administrative capacity building, economic and social development and justice and home affairs.

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## CONCLUSION

EU performed quite successfully especially during the post- Dayton period in the Western Balkans. The EU also did a good job in dealing with the crisis in FYROM. It must be mentioned that the intensity of the crisis in FYROM was far less than the Yugoslav and Kosovo crisis. CFSP's current structure does not allow a flexible decision-making mechanism which would be quite instrumental in times of more violent crisis. Commission's more active involvement in that realm would be instrumental but it is not a popular idea among European states right now. It may also cause a democratic accountability problem. EU is considered as a civilian power with its immense attraction and socio-economic weight, but as mentioned earlier the military capabilities shall not be neglected. EU as a civilian power needs a credible military force to reinforce its foreign policy because civilian tools are effective in longer term stabilisation of the regions by eliminating the root causes of the conflicts. Some situations may require rapid response. The ESDP is an innovation towards that goal but its effectiveness has not been tested seriously yet.

The dictum that enlargement has been the most powerful foreign policy of the EU is largely valid for the Western Balkans. The EU conditionality tied to the membership perspectives embedded in the SAP has been its most effective tool as mentioned throughout the thesis. Also as illustrated in the brokering of the Belgrade Agreement, that prevented Montenegro from holding a referendum regarding the founding of an independent Montenegro, and in the test case FYROM regarding the prevention of further violence, brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement and on later stabilisation efforts the new CFSP/ESDP tools were pretty instrumental.). In this case the SAA with FYROM has been the key leverage for EU in pushing the Macedonian officials to sign Ohrid. One big failure for the CFSP was missing the earlier signs of conflict that became obvious especially after the Kosovo Crisis and the NATO bombardment. The business in FYROM is not finished yet.

Regarding FYROM the critics mentioned before about the Ohrid Agreement made accurate points but it must be mentioned that it is the best game in town. The ethnic Albanians and Macedonians already sustained distinct ways of lives and their interaction was quite low before Ohrid. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a similar mechanism was

established the interaction among ethnic groups was significant and in that sense Dayton may be criticized for putting emphasis on ethnicity. In FYROM there was already an emphasis on ethnicity even before the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There are certainly flaws in the agreement but as long as the carrot of the EU membership is viable, further major conflicts may be avoided. Membership aspiration serves as the glue that holds the ethnic groups in FYROM together. That is why EU should keep making solid statements regarding the future membership of FYROM and it can easily be speculated that if the country gets candidate status, she will evolve to a liberal civic democracy more rapidly and the overemphasis on ethnicity will be diminished. EU by transferring SAP portfolio to enlargement directorate sent an important signal to FYROM and other Western Balkan countries. After the accession of ten new members it was considered that EU will divert its attention from the region. It seems certain that all Western Balkan states will join the EU at some point.

EU also in order to relieve the tensions in FYROM and in the region, has to take action regarding the final status of Kosovo. The “standards before status” formula did not work out as violence erupted in Kosovo in March 2004. The ambivalence affects FYROM most because of the influence that the Kosovo Albanian elite exert to its Macedonian counterpart. EU shall not ignore the effects of the organized crime in dealing with FYROM and other countries and EU should bolster regional cooperation and make the work of SP more relevant to tackle organized crime. EU also should keep up the institution-building process especially in the security sector by its police mission Proxima in FYROM

Moreover the UN roundtable talks between Greece and FYROM on reaching a compromise regarding the name of the republic failed and Greece declared that it will veto FYROM membership to the EU under these circumstances. This is a huge threat for stability in FYROM and the EU should exert pressure on Greece to lower the tone of its opposition considering the fact that Greece policies in 1990's contributed a lot to the predicament in FYROM.

The EU in the post-Dayton period managed to bring stability to the Western Balkans in a short time. It is a significant success in a time of US disengagement from the region due to her focus on ‘war on terror’ after September 11. But another must for EU in

addition to keep the integration goal alive, is to make the people inhabiting in Balkans to feel good about being residents of the region and their regional belongings should be bolstered. Western Balkan countries opt to distance themselves from their neighbours and region due to the stereotypes mentioned throughout the thesis. It is crucial because the regional cooperation is a vital component in stabilisation and development of the region.

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