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AVRUPA TOPLULUĞU ENSTİTÜSÜ
AB SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM BİLİM DALI

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

(M.A. Thesis)

CEM KÜTÜK

İstanbul, 2006

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ABSTRACT

After Maastricht Treaty, distinct, new visions on the future of the European integration and European Union brought forward ever-increasing discussions around European identity. Considering European identity as a discourse, this study dealt with the nature of identity phenomenon, imaginations and conceptualizations of Europe in the past and today, and the designs and constructions of Europe in the national political spaces. Furthermore, the need and motivations for the employment of European identity as a means for legitimization of the present framework and future prospects of European integration process are also considered.

ÖZET

Maastricht anlaşmasının ardından Avrupa'nın girdiği yeni dönemde, Avrupa bütünleşmesi ve Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceğine dair yeni ve farklı görüşler, Avrupa Kimliği konusunda çok boyutlu ve yoğun tartışmaları beraberinde getirmiştir. Avrupa Kimliği'nin bir kurgu, bir söylem olarak ele alındığı bu çalışmada, kimlik kavramının doğası, Avrupa'nın geçmişte ve günümüzde tahayyülü ve kavramsallaştırılmasının yanında ulusal siyasal alanlardaki Avrupa kurguları da incelenmektedir. Bunların yanısıra, Avrupa Kimliği'ninve yaratacağı aidiyet bilincinin, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin halihazırda mevcut ve gelecekte muhtemel yapısal ve işlevsel çerçevesine meşruiyet kazandırma aracı olarak kullanımına yönelik ihtiyaçlar, niyetler ve yöntemler tartışılmaktadır.

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INTRODUCTION

European identity is a significant topic of discussions over the present circumstances and possible futures of European integration that are prevalent both in and out of Europe. Employed in various discourses on different issues, it is manifested with different meanings, contents and functions. A clear and coherent analysis of European identity in the framework of European integration is aimed in this study. After clarifications of the nature and the formation of identity systems in the first chapter, territorial, historical, philosophical and cultural conceptions of Europe in terms are critically investigated in terms of validity. In the third part of the study, the meanings and uses of Europe and European identity in national political spaces are also examined as part of the endeavour aimed at finding out the functions of Europe and the attributed contents of European identity in different political contexts. The emergence of European identity concept in the European citizenship framework is examined with an emphasis on the contextual paradigms. Then, European identity is argued to be a desideratum for advancing European integration along with the neofunctionalist lines. That argument is discussed from the point of both theoretical reasoning and practical applications of strategies. The employment of European identity in order to supply European integration with a longed-for legitimacy is underlined by the discourse analysis of various representative texts.

Identity has always been a decisive factor in the social relationships of humans as it defines the fundamental, discriminating attributes of the actors involving in such relationships. An intrinsic desire of human beings for being considerably different from the others in the surrounding environment has brought about mechanisms of othering in making that distinctness possible. However, identity as a substantial means for political mobilization is actually a modern phenomenon in the sense of its employment.

Ever-intensifying interactions between people, groups, collectives and communities in the last century brought on the accentuation of the similarities and distinctness between the subjects of interaction. In parallel with the advance of individualism, differentiation is increasingly gaining its centrality in the modern conducts of interpersonal and inter-group

communication. Identity systems are the areas in which such differentiation is conceptualized, perpetuated and recognized.

Identities – collective ones in special – are rarely definable in a satisfactory way. This thesis does not embark on a vain endeavor to find a conclusive definition of European identity. Instead, it hopes to present a framework by which conceptualizations, constructions and contradictions of European identity could be considered and evaluated in different contexts, from different perspectives.

Studies on the nature, content and validity of European identity presents unordered universe of claims and arguments. Upon that background, a clear and coherent framework around the concept is tried to be supplied in this study. Identity is much about differentiation and individuality as it is about commonality. Identity is marked and sustained by a divisive boundary of a kind of which function is to mark the distinctiveness between a commonality (sustained to an extent) inside and outside world observably different from those sharing such commonality. That boundary is formed through the distinct characteristics of that commonality, of which the outsiders are deprived of. The problem for European identity is that, for Europe, such characteristics are hard to be conceived of. Considering conceptions of Europe in territorial, historical, philosophical and cultural terms, one inevitably faces the multiplicity and inconsistency inherent in those claims for communality and distinctiveness.

Not only for individuals or society but also for the governments and states, the conception, meaning and function of Europe and European integration differs according to the contexts, interest and structural dynamics of the actors. Therefore both European integration and European identity are inevitably fluid concepts. That fluidity necessitates multi-perspective studies in which clear and systematic approaches to the European identity is supplied.

As it is the case in any study, there are some assumptions upon which the methodological structure and level of analysis are defined. First, contrary to the 'substantialist' approaches, identities, in this study, are assumed to have an instable and evolutionary

nature which is to be conditioned along with time and interactions. By tracing the shifts and multiplicity of meanings and functions, rather than the essence, of European identity, the contexts in which European identity is employed and the dynamics advancing or hampering its employment are prioritized. Second, it is assumed that social realities are not given, but constructed by particular actors in certain direction, aiming specific ends. Thus, rather than taking European identity and its manifestation for granted, the actors involving in and the mechanisms mobilized for the construction of assumed European identities are focused on.

In the first part of this study, the conceptual basis of identity systems, namely the self, the other and their interactions via boundaries are elaborated. Layers of identity and codification of collective identity are tried to be considered briefly. Secondly, conceptions of Europe are scrutinized in critical perspective along with territorial, historical, philosophical and cultural considerations. Thirdly, Europe in member states' imagination and perception is tried to be elaborated together with the context of an emergence of European identity as a political concept. In the last part of the study, European identity is dealt with as a desideratum, a requisite for possible furthering of European integration. In that, the role of discourses and symbols and their intentional uses by particular actors in the conceptualization, formation, transformation and maintenance of Europe and European identity are dealt with in the functional and social constructivist frameworks. Certain discourses, that are argued to be good examples of the set of related discourses, on the reasoning, functions and contributions of European integration to the societies in Europe and on the nature of European identity are intentionally chosen as they are considered to represent the dynamics and mechanisms of the discursive construction of European integration and European identity well.

1. CONCEPTIONS OF IDENTITY

Oxford English Dictionary defines identity as "the fact of being who or what a person or thing is." So the identity is something that distinguishes a person or thing from another of the kind. It does so by its contents namely the characteristics determining the difference between the one (self) and the other. The term is originated in the Latin word of "identitas" from idem which means "same".

Identity is rooted in ancient mathematics and did not emerge in the social sciences literature till the advance of psychoanalysis in the nineteenth century. It was not before the 1970s and 1980s when the concept prevailed in the core of the social sciences. Though identity as a popular concept is often referred to in sociological, anthropological and political studies, those references are generally far away from supplying a clear and coherent framework by which the ambiguity residing in the concept could be withered away. Therefore with that level of ambiguity in the term 'identity', it is of necessity to outline general assumptions about the nature of identity. Indeed, without an attempt to clarifying what is meant by identity, this endeavor to deal with European identity would be useless and burdensome. Identity is understood here as a distinctiveness of an object or a person, a specific part which marks out, but is not necessarily unique to, an object or a person.

Identity is much about differentiation and individuality as it is about commonality (Norton, 1998:3; Connoly, 2001:7-12; Assmann, 2001:74-84). A divisive boundary marking the distinctiveness between a commonality (sustained to an extent) inside and outside world observably different from those sharing such commonality is a sin qua non of an identity system. That boundary is formed through the distinct characteristics of that commonality of which the outsiders are deprived of. However in order to be aware of that dissimilitude between insiders and outsiders, the boundary should be permeable to a degree enabling interaction with each other in various contexts. Antonio's counsel in the fifth act of *Torquato Tasso* epitomizes well the functioning of interactions: 'And when you appear to lose yourself completely, compare yourself to others, so that you may realize yourself' (*Und wenn Du ganz Dich zu verlieren scheinst, vergleiche Dich, erkenne was Du bist*).

In order to manifest themselves, identities require acceptance and recognitions both within and from without. Though the identities can do without external recognition to a limited extent, they are in certain need to be recognized externally if to function conveniently. Identities exhibit themselves particularly sharply when challenged at the margins (Norton, 1988:3). Collective identities can be observed with relative limpidity when juxtaposed against outside groups and their norms. Consequently, the other is of critical prominence in defining the self. However that prominence varies with:

1. The characteristics and 'inherent' features of that other.
2. The nature of boundaries, the precise point at which identities are articulated and challenged.

The other is by its very nature the different. It constitutes a protector of the self, supporting the boundary (between itself and the self) by claiming its otherness. There is no identity which does not have its "other". Because one always experience oneself indirectly. Only our experiences of others could be gained directly. One's relation with others is in fact its relation with itself. Identity can be seen as self-conception, a sense of who we are in relation to others. Because the identity is defined and nominated by the "other" (Connolly, 1991:6-54; Fein and Spencer, 2000:185-186), the self and the other are twin-born.

The self is made different from the other(s), i.e. made up, by the characteristics it has. These characteristics constitute a space which the bounded self occupies. Self is constructed in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized (Connolly, 1991:12-54) in a domain of validity and actuality (Foucault, 1972:253-286). Those differences, however does not have to stand in an antagonistic relation to the identity. It is minor differences which are much more intimidating the collective whole most of the times. Therefore not every 'other' has the same significance in defining the self and its manifestations. Difference at minimum and maximum degrees has the most prominent role on the building of the self. While slight differences can result in the reinvestigating the uniqueness of the characteristics attributed to the self, marginal differences could turn interaction into problematic situation by incongruent communication.

Identities claim a basic form of unity at least (Assmann, 2001:80; Canetti, 1982:110). The realization of this unity and therefore the experience and manifestations of the difference is only available when the interaction with the other(s) takes place. In that regard, identity is not fully self-manifested but it is, to a certain extent, ascribed by the other part of the interactions. Therefore in real sense, identity can not be taken for granted. It is a negotiated end. And this process of negotiation never ends. The more an individual gets involved in interactions, the more space is there for convergences and divergences. As the manifestation of an identity is based on claiming its otherness, then the realization of an identity is only possible at the boundary enforcing the uniqueness (Hall, 1996b:300-303). One inevitably defines one's unique identity with the boundary distinguishing oneself from the others that are different from that one. A social definition of an identity basically involves the claims of certain boundaries as natural (Bourdieu, 1999:120).

Marking the distinction between insiders and outsiders, boundaries are supplying form to the identity systems. That is made possible by allowing – though dynamically regulating that allowance – interaction between inside and outside. Boundaries make the establishment and persistence of groups, organizations and polities in several ways. First, a uniqueness of an identity is made possible with the boundary distinguishing oneself from the others that are different in a sense (Assmann, 2001:72-84). Marking the distinction between insiders and outsiders, boundaries supply a form to the identity systems. They became a central node around which the claims of similarity and unity within can be articulated (Said, 1977: 54).

Second, boundaries serve as focal points for communication and interaction. By the nature of this interaction, recognition of the similitude and dissimilitude happens. Such recognition makes for awareness of the distinctiveness which is then reflected into self-consideration. Then the collective (or political) identity evolves into an address for communication and reference. It is addressed by the members of a collective as the sources of similitude between the insiders. In time, that referencing mechanism makes any perceived out-of-concept similarities into the concept, enlarging the breadth of the identity structure and fortifying it as new domains of commonality are brought up (Hall, 1996:2-5).

For instance, when European 'discoverers' are faced with the natives of in the Africa and Caribbean islands, they became aware of that their skin color is visibly different (darker) from theirs. The interaction between those foreigners has showed the Europeans that color of their skin is another part of their commonality, allowing the emergence of the common identity of a white man. However white skin is not something unique to the Europeans. People from other continents, other nations do also have the same color of skin. But here it is obviously seen that after the interaction with foreigners, a new commonality (a common color of skin) is discovered and reflected into self-consideration. Consequently, out-of-concept similarity (a physiological one) has been added into the socio-political concept of the collectivity. The breadth of socio-political identity is enlarged.

On the other hand, together with relative material and technological power, that new dimension of intra-European commonality fortified Europeans' claims of superiority (in terms of 'civilization', or even race), underlined European collectivity and allowed for positive self-consideration by emphasizing their positive attributes as masters of the seas, new lands and overarching power (Said, 1977: 27-54).

Boundaries are also addressed by the actors from the outside as the sources of distinctness between the two perceived groups, i.e. insiders vs. outsiders. Interaction emphasizes differences (Shapiro, 1997: 94-96). In time, that referencing to the dissimilarity brings for the holistic perception of the group entity, resulting in the monolithic patterns of behaviors towards the other group(s).

Third, boundaries create structure and regularity in an otherwise unordered social universe. The complexity of the social systems, which is originated from uniqueness of the members, is dealt with the categorization - though not on realist terms in most of the time – of the parts into the wholes. This is executed by emphasizing and solidifying the boundaries of a kind. By that referencing mechanism to the boundaries, the solidity of an identity is supplied and fortified. Furthermore, surviving as an entity with a unique identity is ontologically based upon the existence of that boundary (Brewer, 1991:474-476).

Psychologically and sociologically, such a survival is only possible when the feeling of that uniqueness is maintained (Brewer, 2002: 483).

Boundedness must be sustained if a collectivity is demanded to survive. Boundaries do not continue to exist by a law of nature. Then a number of instruments are employed to ensure the maintenance of boundaries. Every collectivity tends to place some attributes of itself beyond questioning, by constructing it to be percept natural, rational or sacred. By doing that, they avoid scrutiny of its foundations (Douglas, 1986:78-85).

1.1 Identity Formation

There are several theoretical approaches to the identity formation phenomena. Two main approaches are present two clear, yet opposite, point of view. While essentialists argue that political identities are rooted more or less from cultural raw material, constructivists finds that connection is tenuous (Diez, 2001:88-94). The essentialist approach to identity formation is driven primarily by cultural background variables. According to this logic, each ethnic core produces a political identity in a more or less direct fashion. Primitive units – i.e. ethnic cores – are presumed to exist. The immutability of gender and ethnicity is of central node in this school of thought. Cultural, religious, historical links within communities are assumed to be natural and stable. The nationalist 'entrepreneur' is to rediscover and transform those cores into a politically mobilized identity.

Constructivism, on the contrast, places more emphasis on politics (Adler, 1997: 319-321). The essentialist link between the cultural raw material and political identities are investigated in terms of validity. An active manipulation by the actors is put forward as the builder of such a link. Constructivist understanding sees identity not as a set of pre-social, invariable characteristics of individuals or groups, but rather as imaginations (Haas, 1997:12-19). It takes the motivation and will of the political activist to selectively emphasize or suppress the ethnic cleavages. By that careful process of selection, political leaders mobilize the population in the political identity. Collective identities thus result from an ongoing process of construction and reproduction of shared understandings about a group's self.

Apart from those ontological claims over identity formation, there is an undeniable sociological change in the role of social groups and individual self in the identity formation. In traditional cultures, identity is more or less fixed at birth and reinforced later in life. However in modern societies, identity formation has increasingly been taken place in the individual domain of social relations. Exacerbated by the multiplicity of social group memberships, weak group ties in modern life result in the variations of individual and social identities. Those variations have inevitable repercussions on the validity and stability of identities. Thus, identities are not formed once and for all, they are, in contrast, mediated and transformed in a constant process.

1.2 Layers of Identity

Identity is definitely a plural phenomenon. It is a multi-layer concept. One does have a personal identity marking his uniqueness, a social identity implying his or her place in the society. One also belongs to a collective identity in any context in terms of his interaction with the groups. Personal identities are self-designations and self-attributions regarded as personally distinctive. They are especially likely to be emphasized during the interaction when other-imputed social identities are regarded as contradictory. Macro (societal level) and micro (the individual level) processes of identity can not be considered separately from each other so that the interplay between 'I' and 'we' is constant. One is not free for determining the social group(s) to he/she is to be belong to. Such complete freedom would necessitate the positioning of oneself outside of the systems of meaning established at macro level –'we'– at society (Fanon, 1963:206-248).

Social identity is that part of the self concept, demarcated by the membership in different social groups and the appraisals connected to that (Brewer, 2004:11-13). Imputed to others in an attempt to situate them in social space, they are based typically on social roles such as 'mother' and 'nurse'. Thus they are most of the times referred to as 'role identities'. They can be based on national, ethnic or religious affiliation, but may also be derived from the membership in a company in which a person is employed or an institution

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to which somebody belongs. The social self-esteem, collective values and norms are connected to social identities (Cooley, 1964:128,164).

On the other hand, social identities condition the attachment and the solidarity to other members of the own group (Hogg and Hains, 1996: 295-298). At the same time they also determine the separation from others, who are not members of the own group and therefore do not share that social identity. In other words, social identities help to locate an individual's place in the community. Social identities always need to be set in the plural form. One occupies different social positions, is engaged in different fields of activity, and is a member of several different groups at the same time. This is especially obvious in modern societies.

1.3 Collective Identity

Though a consensual definition is yet to be reached, it would be reasonable enough to argue that the essence of collective identity originated in a shared sense 'one-ness' or 'we-ness' anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who compromises the collectivity. A corresponding sense of 'collective agency' is embedded in the shared sense of 'we'. One could only find his/her particularity, uniqueness with reference to the bigger mass, a collective. At the same time, however, one should also complete his/her personality with the participation in that collective, resulting in the belongingness and eventual cultivation of 'we' (Taylor, 1989:35-36). That sense of 'we' enables collective action in pursuit of common interests. Moreover it fortifies its existence every time it is referred by the members.

Collective identity is a concept used to construct feelings of community and cohesion. It is a process of bringing commonality into the conscious. It is an enhanced self-understanding of a particular group (Delanty and Rumford, 2005:51-53). This can be furthered by the instance of feminism. People inevitably belong to one of the two genders. However mentioning an identity of men or women is only possible when these purely classifying concepts are mobilized and turned into a feeling of belongingness, solidarity and

conscious of 'us', even furthered by the common actions. Feminism just supplies this: produces a common identity of women (Assmann, 2001:152).

In classical sociology and anthropology, collective and individual identities are considered as quasi given, relatively stable and unchanging. On the contrary, modern approaches emphasize the social interactions in emergence and convergence of collective and individual identities (Delanty and Rumford, 2005:52). Collective identities are formed around certain attributes of similarity and strangeness that enables the distinction of the collective self and other. In that, establishing a demarcation between inside and outside, boundaries plays a significant role. The permeability of boundaries is a critical issue as it conditions the transfers between two sides of a boundary.

Collective identity embodies cohesion. Bringing together the particularities under its umbrella, collective identity weakens the atomizing forces of the groups that are fed by the peculiarities of the members of the collective. Collective identity is more than sum of its members' identical references. Collective and individual identities exist and impact each other (Bourdieu, 1993:54-67). There is a continuous redefinition of both individual and collective self resulting in the dynamic identity system for collectivities.

1.4 Codification of Collective Identity

Codification of collective identities is of necessity if a socially constructed division between external and internal is to appear to be justified and authentic. There are some principal codes employed in the construction of collective identities. A typology of that codification of collective identities could be put forward as such:

1. Primordial codes (so-called natural, concerning gender, generations, kinship, ethnicity, and race)
2. Traditionalist codes (the religion, the traditions, routines and memories of the community are regarded as the core of identity)
3. Functional codes (a spatial togetherness, common interests, citizenship etc.)

Anti-Semitism and racism in Germany and France are examples of the extreme employment of primordial codes. Assumed 'purity' of the 'Arian race' was the central node in Germany under the Nazi regime. The ones who do not have an Arian blood were externalized and classified, whatever their origin, is into the category of the other. Jews were put on the top of the list as the evil-other who resides in the heartland of Germania and exploits its material wealth by organized 'conspiracy'.

The Millet system in the Ottoman Empire could be given as an instance for the traditionalist codes. Besides the religion, the traditions, the rituals and memories had been the defining elements for the identity of the 'Millet's in the Ottoman Empire. Jacobinism in the French enlightenment and Romanticism in the German enlightenment could be argued as the mobilizations of functional codes. In the ideology of French Revolution and in Jacobinism, common values like *liberty*, *fraternite* and *egalite* were the primary codes of the collective identity. However at modern times, codification of a collective identity is executed through a combination of those ideal types of codification.

1.5 Nature of the Identity Phenomena

At the end of the day, one could deal with a personal or a sociological (as in the theory of Giddens (1991)), a social psychological (as in the theory of Tajfel (1981)) conception of identity; however one would be turning around the same point, talking and thinking about some common themes which is used as reference points in all these approaches.

First of all, identity should not be conceived as static, but as dynamic. No form of identity should be taken for granted as complete or stable. Secondly, identity is a more or less integrated symbolic structure with time dimensions (past, present, future), providing important competencies to individuals such as assuring continuity and consistency. Thirdly, identity is a "modern" phenomenon. Conceptually, identity not only presupposes difference, but also a degree of freedom of choice, territorial and social mobility, and uncertainty. The questions in search of identical fixation, namely "Who am I" or "Who are we", can only be asked, if there is a chance of being non-identical. In other words, identity is a matter peculiar to societies where social fate is not determined by divine providence

and birth. Therefore, as a mass problem, it is inherently modern. In pre-modern societies, the occupation with identity is a luxury for layman.

In modern societies however, complex social and economical interactions are commonplace. That multiplicity of interactions inevitably brings forward a plurality of the social roles, communicative actions and group memberships. Plurality complicates definition of the self and others in social universe. At that point the fragmentation of the self is a taken-for-granted fact (Bauman, 1995:46-50).

In sum, identity is both a source of commonality and differentiation. It is a contentious concept much prone to the challenges in terms of validity and reasonability. Serving as the focal point of communication, boundaries constitutes lines of demarcation forming the common distinctness of the members inside and perpetuating that authenticity. They have definite and actual function in comprising the identity system inclusive of the self and the other(s). Identities basically claim (a kind of) unity. A unity is only possible when commonalities of the parts are promoted and dissimilarities between them are quietened down. Thus inconsistencies are also inherent in every form of unity. Humans and collectives are always in search of stability and certainty in themselves and their environments. Upon that certainty concerns of collectives could be avoided or overcome. Resting upon distinct ontological foundations, essentialism and constructivism prevailed in explaining the formation of identities with abovementioned functions. It is reasonable to think that there are certain commonalities in the collectives pre-existing (as in essentialism) or formed through the course of history, shaped by intended constructions by specific actors (as in constructivism). In both perspectives, undeniable is that those commonalities of the collectives today are currently challenged and constantly negotiated.

2. CONCEPTIONS OF EUROPE

2.1 Europe as Territoriality

A dimension of the notion of Europe is the territoriality of the concept. Territoriality is based on a coherent attempt by an individual, group or (in our case) institutions to affect and in a way control social, political and cultural knowledge and relationships by delimitation and tools of manipulation over a geographic area.

The process of compression of time and space, a process that started since mankind introduced bridges and is unfolding as new technologies are introduced, has resulted in a new dimension in social relations: simultaneous communication through new media. With those newly introduced communicative spaces socio-economical and political horizons of territorial entities has always been enlarged and enriched. However the end result of such enlargement is not necessarily the erosion of the territoriality. That is because even enlargement process is bound to territorial references in defining the scope and nature of itself.

Geographically, Europe's physical status as a continent has been much disputable (Davies 1996:3-6). Europe is itself a peninsula, dominated by a 'continental' core of a kind extended by peninsulas (Iberia, Italy, Scandinavia) and islands of various size (United Kingdom, Ireland, Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily). It is widely seen as the natural extension of Asia rather than being a distinct continent. In most reference Europe is made apart from Asia with Urals. However if that criteria is of validity then India should also be dealt with as a continent; similarly it is dissociated by Himalaya chain of mountains. That example makes importance of political manipulation and social conceptualization in terms of territoriality obvious.

However, territorial definitions can not exactly state where Europe begins and ends. It was also the case in the historical analysis. In the ancient Macedonia, lands surrounding northern Mediterranean are referred as Europe. It was bounded in the west by the Atlantic and in the east by the Don (Yurdusev, 1997:12). In times of Roman Empire, Mediterranean

was the center of referral. The territories of *imperii romani* were constituted the Europe. Following the Christianity's penetration into the eroding Roman realm, the Christians began to be referred as Europeans and the land of Christianity ranging from Portugal in the west to the non-Christian territories (Muslim territories from the seventh century) in the east as Europe. After the division of the Empire into West and East in 330 AD, in both Empire, geographical conceptualization of Europe overlapped with the geography of the empires. With the advance of Islam in the east, Mediterranean's function of noting the centerpiece for the geographical connotations of Europe was worn. From the tenth century onwards, especially in the lexicon of the Papacy, Europe is increasingly associated with Christianity and territories in which Christians reside began to be mentioned as Europe.

In the twentieth century, De Gaulle spoke of a Europe ranging "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Yet even the present-day EU, which has expanded eastward beyond anyone's wildest expectation, does not extend to the Urals. In whichever way it is to be defined, physically, Europe is surprisingly small. Distances between the major cities are trivial when compared with Asia and the US. Lisbon and Istanbul, constituting two ends of Europe in most geographical references, are only 3230 km apart.

Apart from pure geographical conception, territoriality emerges where some political authority possesses a high internal measure of controlling power and enforces some effective level of exclusive ownership (Luke, 1996: 491-494). The political bodies rest in their territoriality. The states are formed as an imposition of sovereignty over a particular bounded space. Such delimitation helps defining a space of control over which a specific political aim could be pursued and fortified further by a mechanism of justification rested upon the cohesion in the home and difference between the inner and outer space. In that concern territoriality has a fundamental function in defining, establishing, advancing and justifying the identical systems.

Spaces do not naturally exist by their unity and distinctness. In the physical maps of the World, the lie of the land (rivers, mountains and valleys) is not in parallel with the political boundaries. A meaning of a space itself only existed to the extent that it was postulated there by human thought. Therefore spaces that are cognitively available in the human

conception are not simply given by the nature; they are categorized and formed accordingly by the human collectives. That is to say, particular sections of the earth's surface are thought, mentioned and dealt with in certain ways imagining and producing certain identities in their wake. There is no place that could be labeled as Europe just by the natural distinction. Europe, like any place of human conception, can exist only in so far as one speaks of its existence.

Although its geographical connotations are far away from being stable and reasonable, as a well-entrenched territorial entity, Europe undoubtedly signifies a distinct territory produced, recognized and maintained by referencing mechanism and social, cultural and political imagination. For centuries, people from in and out of Europe have made reference to it, namely it had became a territorial entity in the common language of the world.

However, in no time, including times of the Roman Empire, history witnessed Europe (in the geographical terms of today) in whichever way it is territorially defined, as a united territory under one political entity (Strath, 2002:2-6). The Roman Empire was undoubtedly the brightest achievement in terms of territorial unity; however even in time of the zenith of that advanced political and territorial organization, namely circa 280 AD, north of the Alps could not be dominated by the centre, let aside Scandinavia, Ireland and Scotland.

2.2 Europe as History

Every history of a human collective begins with the foundation myths. Structuring and delineating historical time, the myths always narrate birth of something. Moreover the question of foundation becomes the key for understanding the unity of political and mythical system. Such foundation myths supply an enlightening relation between past, present and future of the collectivity, attributing a specific meaning to the existence of the collective (Assmann, 2001:80-84).

The oldest implying the foundation of Europe known to us is the story of Europa. Circa seventh century BC, Zeus, falls in love with the daughter of King Agenor of Phoenicians, Europa. In the form of a white bull, Zeus convinces Europa to mount him and afterwards

hijacks her to the Crete. Marrying with the king of Crete, Europa never turns back in Anatolia (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2005:9). First of all, Europe is represented by the daughter of the King Agenor. A young woman as a symbol implies purity and innocence. Secondly, it underlines the act of fleeing from collectives residing in the east ('other') though it was not willful. Thirdly, that act of getting away from the east is fortunate as Europa lives happily with the King of Crete.

Roughly seven hundred years after that affair of Europa, another myth of foundation for Europe comes in. It is the story in the Old Testament in which Europe is the third continent created after the Great Flood. The three continents, namely Asia, Africa and Europe, were allotted to the three sons of Noah. While Asia was for Shem and Africa for Ham, Europe was given to Yafes. According to the story, Ham was cursed as he mocked his father Noah. Later, that had been well instrumented by Europeans in racist propaganda employed in the efforts to legitimize the imperialism and exploitation against natives (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2005: 10) in the Africa and Caribbean, and later by racist movements in the United States against the Blacks. Obviously, that second myth of the foundation also denotes the -assumed- privileged status of the Europe and Europeans.

Like places, the past of those places are also socially constructed (Graham, 1998) by the mechanism of selective interpretations used to shape emblematic identities and support particular interests. Resulting from such deliberate selection, the past is often referred to as a linear progression enabling chronological narration of the required themes and motives.

For long time, Europe was not in conceptions and discourses of the collectivities residing in the area of today's Europe. The emergence of the Persian Empire has remarkably promoted the idea of 'western civilization' against the eastern counterpart (Strath, 2002:2).

Another prominent transformation in the spatial and political conception of Europe was the migration of tribes into Europe (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2005:10-12). That dense interaction with foreigners in the towns and villages of Europe has intensified the conceptions of natives and foreigners, motivating people to build conceptions of themselves with the places they

occupy. Resulting in the transformation of Europe's social, cultural and political landscape, those migrations refreshed the social imaginations with new actors and structure in Europe.

2.2.1 Christianity in Europe

The penetration of the Roman Empire by Christianity marks another prominent turn in the conception of Europe. The church begun to play the function of the promoter of the unity in Europe, putting down the stresses of diversity and fostering the image of the commonality by its continent-wide religious, economical and political organization. Infusion of Latin as a common language, at least in the political communication and religious rituals, made one step ahead in formation of a common mind throughout Europe. However, the notion of Europe was substituted with Christianity as a concept for concord.

Nevertheless, The Latin Christian Church supplied some degree of commonalty – but not unity – in the medieval Western Europe. Beginning from 1095, crusades against Islam in the 'Holy Land' have fortified the Pope's claim to supreme political power. Moreover crusades have refreshed attempts, headed by the Roman Church that time, to claim an overwhelming unity in the face of the monotheistic challenge from Islam in the east as a new and great other, namely Muslim kingdoms residing in the east of Mediterranean. That unordinary, dense interaction with a reasonably distinct 'other' inevitably highlighted commonality especially around Christianity.

On the contrary, however, Crusades also gave opportunity to Europeans to rediscover their fundamental distinctness in their traditions, gestures, modes of comprehension and ways of life. Throughout the journeys and military campaigns in Crusades, people from various parts of Europe came together and got a fairly clear picture of their local identity's uniqueness and dissimilar attributes between them (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2005:9-11).

Following the Ottoman expansion into the Balkans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Habsburg Empire and Papacy has promoted the Christian identification against Ottomans. The alien and 'inhumane' Turk was propagated in large parts of European territories.

However, the tolerant regime of the Ottomans has undermined that efforts' fruitfulness. Some Christian states' alliances with Ottomans had relieved the reality that interactions and conflicts between Ottomans and Habsburgs are not of much difference in nature from the engagements between Christian powers throughout Europe. Religious discourse of sacred Christians against 'inhumane' Muslims was just employed to achieve aspirations of power in the Continent. Nevertheless, the long-term implication of the Islamic expansion was, irrespective of this shaky base of pacts and wars, Europe's becoming synonymous with Christianity, defined as a *res publica christiana*.

2.2.2 Rise and Demise of Feudalism

Another cycle of change had been underway from circa 1000 AD by the new social structure and organization called Feudalism. Just emerging from the weakness of the central authority and its inability to preclude local aristocracies from rising as regional authorities, Feudalism gave rise to fragmented and volatile sovereignty and political power. Power was delegated downwards and centrifugal tendencies were flourished consequently. Feudalism as a mode of economic, governmental and judicial organization was unavoidably in contrast with social integration of the local collectives into the larger society. Thus, social atomization took place, damaging social and cultural unity which was the case to an extent in times of Roman Empire (Graham, 1998:45). Those territorial fragmentations and rise of the city-states caused much more limited sense of belongingness to a larger part. People's imagination and feeling of being a member of large societies are waned in time while local roots and identifications were inevitably fortified. Local conceptions of life and weakening of the stable conceptions of Europe are advanced by period of Feudalism. Moreover, since concomitant and sometimes contradictory allegiances were subject to change over time, a confusion of territorial sovereignty became the norm.

Throughout the period of Feudalism, local affinities and roots were reinforced ahead of belongingness to larger communities. Locality in social and identical conceptions had undermined sense of attachments in broader terms. The 'parts' were revitalized in cultural, economical and political terms while the 'whole' were ceased to be initial point of

reference. With the advance of trade through longer routes, issues of security, fiscal and political authority has arisen. Then, out of those economical and political contexts, centralization has regained momentum. Feudal political organizations have evolved into larger political organizations of empires.

2.2.3 Renaissance and the Reformation

By the same token, Renaissance has prioritized humanistic values over Christianity. Turning back to the polytheist times and the thought of the ancient Mediterranean civilizations, Renaissance diverged the source of assumed unity away from religious commonality. On the other way, Reformation had just succeeded in converging Christianity into an issue of disintegration for Europe. Having resulted in numerous continent-wide wars and atrocities that divide in the religious conception of world and life demolished any sense of unity for the whole Europe. The decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the glue of Christianity in uniting Europe in conception have been finalized by the Thirty Years' War in which a new social and political system was born in Europe.

Emergence of the European state system following the Religious wars not just only marked the hardship of holding large empires together because of their high internal diversity and vast geographical layout, but also brought about a well-ordered system of smaller and relatively homogenous states. The long-term transformation of the European polities from the universalistic however weakly amalgamated empires to the plurality of religiously homogenous and bureaucratically more thriving nation-states (Wagner, 2005:48-55). The fragmentation of the Europe into numerous sovereign political structures clearly opened a new era of social and political comprehension. Then the conceptual unity of Europe had eroded in parallel with the empires carrying such a claim.

With the impetus from overseas discoveries and advances in transportation technologies, mercantilism proved to be fruitful in Europe. Following the French Revolution, monarchies in the continent had lost their base for legitimacy (See Hobsbawm, 1992; Braudel, 2003). It was high time for the farewell to multi-cultural and multi-ethnic empires and their claims of unity around certain values and interests apart from ethnic or micro-cultural lines.

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Capitalist sophistication in Britain was accompanied by the scientific leaps and resulted in the Industrial Revolution triggered by the invention of the steam engine. While nation-states promoted mercantilist expansion of nationalist interests, capitalist interests furthered the legitimacy of the nation-states. In that march of the material competition, Europeans increasingly found themselves in fundamental clash of interest between them.

The universal suffrage, institutionalization of mass education by nation-states and widespread availability of printing press along with the national interests paved the way for ever-increasing compartmentalization of Europe by the nationalism. The nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries embodied and enforced their own historical narrative in which even cross-border phenomena are presented in the national contexts.

2.2.4 Europe of Great Wars

The First World War has certainly provided some degree of a common memory of suffering among the allied nations. However it also unavoidably brought fierce and forceful rivalry organized into groupings proving to be a prominent divisive fact between the Allies and the Axis. The French resentment and even hatred towards Germans, German antagonism towards the British was all rooted by the harsh memories of the War.

It was fairly different with the Second World War. Except Britain, the German occupation did provide a common experience. However the circumstances and the resistance were all to differ in countries. Some governments even supported the Nazi occupation while others waged a sustained opposition and resistance. Therefore the memory of the War in the sense of suffering did not contribute much to the commonality in the Europe except well-shared hatred against national-socialist ideology.

However the great degree of the devastation and suffering resulted in the catastrophic state of psychology of the Europeans, especially the intellectuals. The motivation behind the European integration project was certainly that situation of desperation against the

mutually-annihilating continental rivalries which often ruins the revenues and human progress of years (Monnet, 1976:3-9; Dinan, 1999:12-34).

The important here is Europe's history does not supply any uniting momentum, any inspiration that is commonly felt. Sole commonality coming from the past is a deep non-existence of self-efficacy, actually felt desperateness of and tiredness from inter-state antagonisms if not violent interactions, a deep fear from the outer powers, originating from the tradition of forceful domination of the outer world in last four centuries, a period of colonialism, felt throughout the continent just after the World War II.   On such an historical baggage, a historical commonality of Europe or a common past of a kind could hardly be mentioned. Europe, as a collective entity, can not refer to a popular, historic founding myth akin to the US Declaration of Independence, the Glorious Revolution or the Conquest of Istanbul. There was no founding moment; a victorious point of time felt collectively, a positive, transcendent ideal of which Europe as a collective is to be ascribed. European history could be reasonably considered as an agglomeration of national histories.

2.3 Europe as Philosophy

The search for an identity is the search for a substance. What is supposed to be uniquely European then is of concern in our study of identity. Individualism, religious pluralism, constitutionalism and secularism could be assumed to be among the prominent components of that substance.

Based on Aristotle's thought, Thomas Aquinas brought a view of the world in which *lex naturalis* becomes part of the lex aeterna which presupposes knowledge of and participation in God's rational plans are only available for the blessed ones – '*partecipatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura'*. One, in questioning the world around him, must start from reason, i.e. from those consensual theses. It is from this rational and consensual basis the first universal results can be achieved. While Aquinas invites one to start over with "rational" truths, the "rationality" behind such truths is the auctoritas (practices and hierarchies) of the philosophy of antiquity instead of the decrees of the Catholic Church. That philosophical turn was of prominence as adopted in time by the church.

In Aristotelian epistemology, knowledge is possible through the observation of nature. However that observation was essentially different from the empirical methods, solely based on immediate sensorial observation. Then perception is the foundation upon which the truth could be derived via inductive logic. "Natural order" based on the inborn inclinations of men (final causes), which varies according to the rank of the men in society, was to be followed in the distribution of the goods in society. Social order then should be functioning on the principle of proportional equality. Struggles between the sovereign and the nobility placed another doctrinal change in the European political and social comprehension. Charter of Liberties (1100) and Magna Carta (1215) were the signs of concrete success in the endeavor to the plurality and constitutionalism in Europe.

Conception of the natural order was the main point of challenge by the Enlightenment. The epistemology of "enlightened" thought brought about humanistic conception of the world of which the main goal was precisely liberation and emancipation from an order (of thomistic doctrine) that is no longer deemed to be "natural", but unjust and illegitimate. In that new conception, the origins of law should only arise upon the positive will of individuals.

The Protestant Reformation could reasonably be considered as another shift of paradigm which made a great impact in forging religious pluralism which made great contribution in the European conceptions of individualism. For Luther, 'the world can not be ruled according to scriptures'; reference must be made to the positive laws. In Luther's view, the positive laws were the laws promulgated by sovereigns. Nevertheless the escape from the dictate of the Catholic Church in every domain of life was a prominent step in the way to individual liberty.

Following the challenge to the thomistic doctrine by Enlightenment philosophy, in his seminal work, *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1588-1679) argued that in the state of nature, a society does not yet exist (in opposition to the Aristotle's view of society that was a state of nature). Individuals with their rights of self-defense and free conscience cede some of their rights to the sovereign; in return, they have civil rights limited by laws that are exclusive

and guaranteed by the State. Hobbes's contract (he usually called it a 'compact' or 'covenant') was between men who decided to end anarchy by installing a ruler to be obeyed by all. The Leviathan is created for the individual and the social pact is a rational, self-interested calculation of the individual carried out so that he can assert his natural rights. Here we find the reign of rational individual will against the final clauses reflecting the natural order put forward by tradition.

In Locke's (1632-1704) conception of contractual arrangement, the criteria for the transfer of the governing power to a ruler was ruler's preservation of social order and their liberties. When that function is not satisfactorily performed, then (unlike in Hobbes's contract) people had the right of revolt against whom they give up the power temporarily. The Kantian definition of Enlightenment also brings forward individual will using its judgment without subjecting itself to any authority (tradition) (Kant, 1983). With traditional authority there is an element of the sacred about legitimization. That was obviously associated with divine right to rule. As mentioned above, in pre-Enlightenment European political ontology, this divine right supposed to be based on the conception of "natural order". Kant (1724-1804) expressed central importance of freedom of expression for intellectuals in succeeding their self-emancipation. Once it is achieved, Kant assumed, they could help masses to achieve the enlightened life. With Rousseau (1712-78) the delegation of sovereignty to a ruler was also came under critique, it was the people who performs sovereignty through (direct) involvement in all political decisions and freedom is made concrete by participation in decision-making.

French Revolution, on the other hand, had furthered the achievements of Anglo-Saxon secularism in the continent. Founded on the humanistic considerations and intended mainly by those who find theology inadequate, unreliable and unreasonable, secularism has lifted the blocks on the way to the rational reasoning free from dogmatic conceptions of the world. Religion and religious authorities should not interfere with the public affairs of a society. Secularism and its furthered version *Laicite* made European thought remember that the world is a livable place and one has to face the problems of nature and his own practices free from any dogmatic decree imposed by assumed representatives of God on

the earth. Creative thinking and responsible rationality then could be achieved; one could be made fully accountable for his or her acts.

Together with the philosophical individualism, constitutionalism, religious pluralism and secularism, the advance of the 'dual revolutions' in Europe resulted in the success of popular democracies. The experience of popular democracies may be concerned as a fundamental trend of European thought in the last two centuries whereas it should also be concerned that the universal suffrage for woman has just a history of fifty years on average.

The endeavors and experiences of regions, nations and countries of Europe in that course are highly distinct. A unity in the philosophical domain is hard to be conceived of. Current domain of individualism varies significantly between countries like Portugal and United Kingdom. Likewise the case for secularism is of another story. The place and daily implementations of secularism in social life differs between – even in – regions and countries. For constitutionalism to be the common philosophical domain, the course is not of much validity. While the United Kingdom makes a great exception, countries like Spain and Portugal have experienced much limited span of time with democratic constitutions.

2.4 Europe as Culture

Conceptualizations of European culture as a more or less unified, idiosyncratic whole are much contentious. Culture is the collective heritage of a group, a sum of ideas and practices, patterns of thought and behavior that condition collective and individual lives of all members (Bauman, 2001:3). In a continent full of various languages, dialects, customs, folklores and comprehensions of the world, it depends on the extent to which one is prepared to generalize. European culture and Europe as an object of general classification is an attempt to make such a complexity into an order of a kind.

Even when we are walking in a countryside, an area full of trees, we are naturally facing different trees of numerous kinds, each having its' apparent distinguishing feature visible under careful examination. So paying some attention would reveal that they have quite

dissimilar forms to an extent and we are travelling around some kinds of trees. However if we have any opportunity to have a bird's eye view of the area, we will probably call that Gestalt as a forest. The area and the trees constitute a fixed reality, though our conception of all these are quite different, belonging to discrete levels of classification.

This is because unity is perceived through distance. Multiplicity is everywhere, in everything. From a specific distance, however, such multiplicity becomes an ignorable fact. The commonality is put forth for an actual perception. In such a bird's eye view, we visibly prefer to call that area a forest rather than a vast piece of land full of trees of a various kind. This generalization is more meaningful in such situation, from such distance, either because we are probably not interested in the internal specifications of every member of a group (each tree's specific quality from its kind) or this distinctiveness between them is not perceptible from such point of evaluation.

Distance has not only physical dimension. Looking back in time, the rethinking and evaluating the past is another way of distancing oneself from the present time and space. Studying the history of Europe, one can not claim that such Gestalt is a historical reality evolved through in a steady trend. As mentioned above, European history designated by much bloody wars, centuries-long atrocities based on divergent religious conceptions of one religion (between Catholicism and reformed churches), fierce struggle between religions (namely Christianity and Islam), or bloody power rivalry between fiefs, kingdoms, empires, can not be comprehended or labeled as having patterns of historical unity.

The absence of common historical conceptions of Europeans is a fundamental determinant on the question of an overarching conception of Europe as culture. It should also be considered that originally reference of Europe was employed in geographical terms. It is beneficial here to remember that meaning of Europe was loaded with cultural connotations lately (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2005:13).

Again if one prefers to focus on specific facts and processes of a certain time, it is quite possible and logical to emphasize how much cultural differences there are and mostly how contrasting even competing, catastrophic results they have brought forth. If the whole

historical baggage is to be read at an upper level of generalization, it can also be claimed that – though its reasoning is quite discussible – much commonality is also perceptible through history of Europe. The classical version goes on emphasizing a unique comprehension of the world, a special posture towards nature and determinist logic towards human behavior by 'Europeans'. The claim is generally furthered by the articulations of how cultural Europe is quite different from the people of empires where Asiatic, African or 'native' cultural forms are seen to be prevalent. In contending this uniqueness, especially contrasts of any kind with 'non-Europeans' are widely used.

In an appendix to his much-referenced essay 'Notes towards the Definition of Culture', T.S.Eliot argued that Europe's supposed cultural unity can not be rooted in the spheres of language, literature and political institutions. Such claims he concluded, would lead to a superimposed uniformity. The dominant factor in 'Europe's dominant culture' is then 'the common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is'. The Christian tradition enabled the arts and laws to be developed. It is also through Christianity that Europeans trace back their cultural descent to Greece, Rome or Jerusalem. These claims do have an over-generalization. These are much challengeable and offering very simplistic view on the evaluation of series of historical realities.

2.4 On the Validity of Conceptions of Europe

Europe is a concept that has a historical and ideological depth. As of any concept, its meaning and correlations has always been subject to the conditioning of time, space, context and the subjects employing that in their discourses and actions. On such flux conceptual basis, Europe has been open to exploitation in favour of interest of some in the discourses and actions. As detailed above, often-cited place of Christianity as the central node for –assumed- commonality in the history Europe has long ago vanished. Christianity's being a fundamental reference in the self-definition of European people has been wounded first by the divisive and transformative consequences of the division of Roman Empire. With identifying itself with Christianity as the sole protector of it, German Empire had defined Slavic part of Europe as 'other'. That damage was furthered by the Latin invasion of Constantinople in 1204. Secondly, the radical challenge of the

Reformation aiming the contents and the reasoning of the comprehensions of Christianity as belief system had deteriorated the unifying capability of Christianity over the continent.

In historical analysis, Europe and Europeans are hardly witnessed to be in consensual state of peace. Most pro-integration intellectuals are making references to historical differences between 'Europeans' and other people in order to highlight distinctiveness of that 'community' of Europeans and render modern integration attempts reasonable and legitimate. However, it can not be ignored that Europe's past is full of clashed of interests and devastating wars and atrocities originated from those persistent state of rivalry. Experiences of centuries are fairly discouraging in terms of any perceptions or assumptions of any kind of historical notions for a cohesive conception of Europe as a valid base for an entity.

The territorial dimension of those attempts to define Europe and Europeans in a certain way is also of prominence when the concept of Europe is being challenged. Territoriality necessitates a geographical unity with a central political authority possessing an effective controlling power and enforcing some effective level of exclusive ownership. Even in time of Roman Empire those geographical conceptions of Europe and the exclusive political control did not overlap. Moreover, deprived of the harmonious structure of language, literature and political institutions, it is not easy to argue about the cohesive, distinct cultural conception of Europe either.

Those endeavors on the main probable alternatives in terms of assumed validity of Europe as a cohesive and reasonable conception, showed the weakness of the conceptual structure and reasoning behind it. After those considerations on the conception and its metamorphosis in time, it may be reasonable to conclude that claims for a unity in cultural, philosophical and political terms always preceded by a political project serving specific interest of the sponsors of such assumed unity.

3. THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Since people began to come and live together, groups are formed and membership to those groups has become a part of an identical base, defining attributes making difference between them and others. In time, with the advance of human population and mobility, interactions between individuals and groups underlined their differences which brought their increased references to the kinship, myths of common ancestry which is survived by active endorsement of their associates, territories they live and shared memories of struggles against nature and other groups (Smith, 1995:5-12). Ethnic identifications are forged and enforced by the symbols, rituals and ceremonies of a kind that is unique to that specific ethnic community.

For centuries, communities in Europe were led by multi-ethnic empires with a strong central rule. Specific course of events and trends have led communities to realign alongside their 'nationalities' in which the ethnic cores are brought forward though transformed into consciousness of belonging rather than commonality based on race and kinship. Ever-increasing economic exchange, social and scientific discoveries, pace of communications, interactions with unknown cultures of the world through imperialism, advance of relativism have tore apart the connection between history and cosmology.

New glue between communality, fraternity, executive power and comprehension of time had been of need for the survival of the commonality along the rational and productive lines. Nationalism with its claims on the national identity for the masses has been highly effective in its diffusion to the masses through print press, social interaction, enhanced mobilization in times of difficulties and education. That arrival of nationalism however was tied to the political baptism of lower and middle classes. Incorporation of those masses into history has transformed nationality into a central and formative factor. That is why nationalist movements and struggles have invariably been populist, aiming at the popular mobilization of the masses into political objectives for the community (Nairn, 2003:90,208,270-284).

Therefore, the replies to the questions "what we are" and "who we are" are of much prominence in determination of people's reaction to such challenges in their social systems, their views and attitudes toward such new "realities" of the time. Definition of an identity is a challenge which is most of the time in vain. One has to 'admit that the impossibility of a scientific definition of a nation. However, there is a phenomenon and it survives to exist' (Seton-Watson, 1977:26).

As a social-psychological construct, identity has functional purpose. There are five mainly cited functions of identity. These functions are:

- A baseline to understand who one is,
- A certain framework for a self-image of a kind (what one is),
- Meaning and direction through its content, namely, commitments, values and goals,
- Consistency and coherence between those values, goals and commitments,
- Possibility to recognize potential in the form of future possibilities spectrum for collectivities.

Taking the fact that European identity is not based on any reference of ethnic community as 'Europeans' are comprised of people with various nationalities, having distinct local and national cultural structures and religious convictions into consideration, any endeavor to define European identity would leave the attempting subject disarmed and biased rendering the attempt inevitably incomplete. Rather than engaging in such an unproductive effort, here European identity is taken as a concept, as an argument of which assumed functions and possibilities of functioning accordingly are to be discussed and analyzed along with the motivations of subjects in employing such an identity for integrating Europe in specific context of Europe.

The substantive content of European identity in terms of both "who is us?" (Composition of group identity, who is "in", who is "out", who are the "others") and "what is us?" (Content of group identity) is to be thought over thoroughly.

Growing concern about identity is a consequence of the uncertainty produced by rapid change in late modern societies (Giddens 1981:245; Giddens, 1984:23). The compression of space and time, the exponential development of transport and communication, the mass mediated cultural contact with distant peoples both internationally and at home (migration and tourism) intensified the reconsideration and maybe -in part- revision of the identical baggage of individuals and societies as whole. While such intensified social contacts brings forward similarities and distinctions, the certainty supplied by rootedness (in place and culture) and relative stability over time and place becomes shakeable and contestable. Rather, uncertainty and the insecurity are begun to be felt along the metropolis which are marked by population flows, contradictions between the reach of traditions and the uniquely new functional and philosophical necessities brought about waves of changes. Those social, technological and political circumstances promote multi-dimensional and elaborate discussions around the concept of identity.

3.1. Lines of Delimitation for Europe

Dealing with the question of "who is us" for collectives is always thorny and contentious. As collectives are groups of people with some commonalities for certain, but at the same time, particularities as well are rooted and embedded in time and interactions. Europe has come to acquire the status of a widely contested, vague political and moral ideal that has been used for political motives throughout history. In many versions, Europe is imagined as a distinctive cultural entity united by legacy of shared values, culture and identity. References are made to Europe's heritage of classical Greco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy as the core elements of this claimed European legacy. When the differences within Europe are emphasized, it is often in the form of unity in diversity. However religious (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox Christianity) and linguistic differences (Romance, Germanic and Slavic languages) are of concrete historical and contemporary reality

though as correlated, (Catholic–Romance, Protestant–Germanic, Orthodox–Slavic), and essentially are underlying the major cleavages and conflicts in Europe. Protestantism is built on the lines of demarcation, running through the Rhine, which divided the Roman Empire and 'savage tribes' outside empire. Through popular revolutions, another line of delimitation has emerged in the middle of Europe, distinguishing 'modern' Europe marked by the *egalite* and *liberte* from the not-yet-enlightened eastern lands where backwardness is prevalent. Besides those others residing out of 'Europe', significant 'Others' were also located in that 'Europe', those who did not fit in, - Jews, Gypsies, regional minorities such as Marranos in southern Spain, heathens and non-believers. Related to this are underlying and largely uncontested notions of what underpins a modern Europe: these suggest a political structure based on the rule of law which upholds universal human rights; democracy by representation; a mitigated rather than a free-for-all form of capitalism and the existence of a social welfare system.

3.2. The Context for European Identity

It is known from the literature of sociology that when collective expectations clash with collective experience, failures of norms occur. Such failure devastates the foundations of the legitimacy of the system. The demise of legitimacy inevitably opens up a new space of possibility offering various choices. However lack of certainty is prone to hazardous outcome to the interests of every actor in the society. In any clashing period of competitive forces, a certainty of a kind is a glorious side. At the end, a kind of change is to be happened to recreate an effective certainty.

For grasping the emergence of European identity argument and its reasoning in the framework of European integration, both European identity and integration have to be grounded in the global context. Wars have been great influential factors in the creation of nations and states in Europe (Smith, 1998:78-83). As wars were the norm rather than the small intervals in the ongoing peace serving as a most preferred way of bilateral and multilateral struggles of interest, all historical processes have been affected and directed by them.

In the Post-First World War atmosphere, inspired by peaceful circumstances, weakened nationalist propaganda and need for a European wide restructuring, European project was furthered by effective intellectuals and politicians like Aristide Briand and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. Following the execution of Wilson principles, a process of fragmentation has been underway in Europe. The successor states of the multinational empires were in antagonistic stance vis-à-vis each other. Border disputes and internal problems rooted in ethnic and cultural strife had been posing threat to the stability in Europe. The end of 1920s was the time when a group of elites in Europe were lobbying hard for a 'Pan-European order'. Some economic developments like the establishment of the International Steel Cartel in 1926 have fuelled hopes for parallel steps in political sphere. Increasing weariness of Europe on the part of America, Asia, Russia and England have created a sense of idleness in Europe. The pan-European entrepreneurship had been aimed to overcome that idleness (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926:197-198). Within a couple of years, first proposal for a 'European Federal Union' by Aristide Briand arrived. There was an obvious 'necessity for a pact of a general nature, however elementary, to affirm the principle of the moral union of Europe and solemnly to sanction the fact of the solidarity established among European states' and that was because:

> No one doubts today that a lack of cohesion in the grouping of the material and moral forces of Europe constitutes, practically, the most serious obstacle to the development and efficiency of all political and juridical institutions on which it is tendency to base the first attempts for a universal organization of peace (Briand, 1930:328).

In spite of those efforts, economic circumstances in Germany had been worse off since World War I, and sense of national humiliation coupled with malfunctioning of democratic regime, had resulted in the establishment of Nazi regime in Germany. While problem of German borders in the east had been tried to be solved by use of power by Nazi regime, a chain of reaction had been triggered and an infamous World War devastated the continent once more.

In the after-war period, the general shift of power over world affairs away from European countries resulting from the new bipolar world system had furnished distinct ideas and

prospects for the new framework in the continent (Hobsbawm, 1994:225-402). Both in the victorious and defeated sides, damaged national pride and international prestige were common. A shortage of sense of national directions all over European nations was deeply felt by the politicians and intellectuals all over Europe. Observable weariness of grand ideologies and irredentism on Europeans was coupled with a societal situation in which clear lack of social and economic energy prevailed. That psychological cycle of sorrow and low self-efficacy was even dominant in the circles of integrationists in the years immediately following the Second World War. Speeches of Belgium's foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak submit further insight here:

> The Europe that we wanted, the Europe whose position in the world we intended to restore, the Europe that we hoped to make the equals of the United States and of the Soviet Union, is no longer realizable… My earlier enthusiasms, I can now appreciate, were illusions. We have not known how to halt that decline which has been Western Europe's penalty for the follies of two world wars which originated among us. Today we are paying the price of our errors and of our faults […]. (cited in Hodges, 1972: 14)

The determining role of that deep feeling of weakness, inevitable inferiority, was made obvious by the Belgian Prime Minister – and one of the most central figures of European Integration – Paul-Henri Spaak at the Hague Congress in 1948 in front of more than 800 European integrationist:

> A hundred and fifty million Europeans have not the right to feel inferior to anyone, do you fear! There is no great country in this world that can look down on a hundred and fifty million Europeans who close their ranks in order to save themselves (cited in Slater, 1982:60).

Under the circumstances of the emerging 'cold war' between two emerging superpower, there was no time to lose for the Europeans. A way out from that desperate loss of direction should be realized. Feasible efforts should be carried out to revitalize Europe in a sense that clear results should be achieved in economic, social and political terms if a European say would be taken care of in and out of Europe. Necessity for a new leap in the continent was felt even in Britain despite the traditional aloofness toward to the continental

political projects. Efforts towards a new continental order based on cooperation and integration had been intensified throughout the continent and, in Bevin's words,

> it would be very wrong, in the present state of morale in Europe, …to take up a position which obstructs the endeavors of other European powers to achieve closer unity…Furthermore, such is the present material and moral weakness of countries such as France and Italy that they are in danger of losing the will to survive as separate independent nations; and it might be fatal to the preservation of democracy in western Europe if we were openly to discourage the conception of European unity…(Bevin, 1950: 315).

Parallel sentiments were obvious in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 in which 'united Europe' was constructed primarily as the necessity brought forward by the weakness and vulnerability of the Europe at that time rather than grand ambitions for putting Europe in the world scene as a big player back. Primary motivation was to suppress the 'age-old opposition of France and Germany' while constituting 'the first step in the federation of Europe' was secondary to that.

The integration could reasonably be conceived primarily as the consequence of post-war the 'low politics' of foreign and economic policy and geopolitical 'high politics' (Moravscik, 1998:6). Apart from the emerging bi polar world order and dawn of the Cold War, burdensome phases of decolonization also played a great role in the development of pro-European conscious in the following years of the World War II (Young, 1996:12-56). The Suez Crisis was one of the biggest shocks, making the known by a few the visible to a many. The crisis has made especially France aware of its vulnerable position in the wider world as a weak, old power which is easily overshadowed, even in the critical issues for its vital interests, by the new great powers. Threatened by the American cast of adversary power, French imperialism discovered European integration as the only feasible way to counterweight the new powers in the international arena. That inclination has been furthered by the acceptance of the Gaullist demands of having provisions allowing the continuity for the French colonial interests such as favorable tariff on goods imported from the colonies (Moravscik, 1998:103-111).

For Germany, European integration scheme was a prominent step in Franco-German rapprochement which could well be exploited not only to bring Germany in the political scene of Europe as legitimate and valid actor but also to appease France and soften its criticisms to an idea of German rearmament (Moravscik, 1998:86-112). For Benelux countries and Italy, integration along with functionalist rationale meant an assured access to large European markets with and an extra anchor for peaceful relations in Europe. Obvious enough by the instances and analysis above, the European Common Market came at a perfect time to serve a substitute for empires, a new path to international prestige and influence, which would renovate old continent in the ever-lasting pace for power. A further attention should be paid to the specific conceptions of Europe, European integration and European identity in the national political frameworks with the certain emphasis on sociological, cultural and economic backgrounds upon which those frameworks are emerged and conditioned.

3.3. Fluid Contents – Member States and Their Europe

Having specific motivation towards and interests in European integration, each country emphasizes specific domains and particular courses of integration in Europe. Those motivations and interest are rooted in the nature and dynamics of their national identity-building process (Dinan, 1999: 6-38; Graham, 1998: 37-125; Marcussen et all, 1999:614-633). Since social groups tend to define themselves by a set of concepts they could relate them in a positive way, the use of Europe and the contributions of embedding Europe in national political systems are prominent in understanding the identification with Europe in national contexts. Those concepts are articulated with prevalent discourses in society and employment of various symbols, codes or signs of a kind. Following examinations for major countries participated in integration are aimed to consider that whether certain types of nation concepts and collective identities are in significant correlation with certain conceptions of Europe and positions in the European integration.

3.3.1. Europe for Britain

Following the conquest of Normans in 1066, French was the dominating language in the ruling classes and elites. Advance of the influence of French culture in the elite circles was not overlapped with the culture living in the mainly Anglo-Saxon-speaking mass of the population.

However, later on, the recognition of the English as the official language of public transactions in the year 1362 and the English translation of the Bible have marked an early development along with national lines compared to the developments of other nations in Europe. Imposition of the Common Law, to which the King is of no exception, laid the legal foundation for the emergence of a national community with its domain of influence beyond social classes. In the seventeenth century, the aristocracy and the middle class' solidarity against royal absolutism brought the Glorious Revolution resulting in the parliament elected by free and independent citizens.

The British intellectuals were the primary actors in the evolution of the British political system. Contrary to the active construction of the nation against absolutist power and aristocracy in France, a culture of reconciliation emerged upon the realities of social and political circumstances in Britain (Munch, 2001:11-27). Internal homogenization was not accomplished through demarcation of the aristocracy or monarchs, but executed through the establishment of Protestantism and by the increasingly concentration of power in the elected bodies, namely the parliament (Colley, 1986:108). Inclusion of the masses was conceived to be in parallel with the democratic education level of the masses as advocated by the John Stuart Mill. The aspiration of a civic community of people directed towards a common good was furthered well in the British construction of national identity (Callan, 1997:28-32).

Outward demarcation was instrumented against the Continental Europe, coming through the times of wars against Norman rulers, Roman papacy and Catholic absolutism from Spain and France in the Hundred Years War (1339-1453). Threats from unfree continent have to match by the cohesion inside around 'common' English culture which guarantees

a free Britain. The continent as 'other' was the land of irrational absolutism where rational and free will of people was not to be considered in the social and political processes. In culture, the discourse was in parallel highlighting the 'artificiality' of French culture was positioned in certain contrast with honesty and independence of English culture. In cultural and political terms, the British nation was defined in strong opposition of French dominance in Europe, making France and the continent the exact other of British identity in the British mind (Williams, 1991: 70-72: Colley, 1986: 97-117).

The national pride has been reinforced with continuous glories against continental powers in Europe and in the colonies. Britain's emergence as the greatest power in the world fed that national pride further. Even today, British are well ahead of nations of Europe in the sense of national pride in the public (Joyce, 1994:127-155). Likewise percentage of satisfaction with national democracy in Britain (%64) is exactly two times of the average of the EU (European Commission, 1999: 43-45).

After the end of the Empire and dramatically decline of British power and effect in the world scene, the prominence of the European integration has been regarded in a different way and accession to the European community was realized in spite of the French resistance. Those historical demarcations between Britain and Europe had been still much effective in the minds of British nations and especially French elite in the continent that De Gaulle had publicly denounced the possibility of British membership to the Community. De Gaulle's feelings towards the Britain had its counterpart in British political elite which is obvious in Churchill's speech on a European Defense Community and a possible federal European system in the House of Commons on 11th of May 1953:

> We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed in the prepositions, by the preposition 'with' not 'of' – we are with them, but not of them.

A similar sentiment was made publicly available by Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary of Britain, in 1997:

When I first went to Europe, the first European politician I met was Lionel Jospin.

Those remarks have been well signifying the vigor of the social construction of British exceptionalism that is well rooted in the British national identity. Europe does represent Britain's 'Other'.

3.3.2. Europe for France

In France, a central absolutist power had arisen from the rivalry between small territorial powers and consolidated during the Hundred Years War with England (1339-1453). The old regime's political philosophy was supplied by Jean Bodin with the theory of absolutist state sovereignty which was not inclusive of popular democratic inclusion of masses in the political system. That absolutism however, helped much in the dismantling of the independence of regions and estates. Amid that cultural, religious and political diversity, it was inevitable to concentrate power primarily in the center if the building of a modern nation is to be conceived of. That consolidation of diversity into a unity of the core made the idea of community, of which would be the basis for the Revolution, possible. Unlike Germany and Britain, the building of French nation and state was achieved in a deliberate and forceful process of constructing from the zero point. It was not the intellectuals advocating for a presently-diffuse national culture and identity. The state and statesmen have been the architects and craftsmen of the nation. Even in the discourse and actions of the Revolution, *l'etat* was of central position. Through state and its regulatory and distributive powers, the *egalite*, *liberte* and *fraternite* were to be achieved (Hobsbawm, 1975:5-58). The French modernity was inevitably building *through* the state and the nation. Rousseau's social contract were among the independent *citoyens* with equal rights, however it was executed to form a unified community – *la nation une et indivisible* - in a strict sense. The state and nation was prior everything else and it was the law itself.

Interior homogenization was executed through imposition of Catholicism and suppression of regional languages, cultures and identities like Corsican, Breton and Alsatian. In third republic, a vision of federal *Etat Unis d'Europe* was reinforced by the politicians such as

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Aristide Briand. After the Second World War, the traumatic experience of war and German occupation had resulted in the crisis for French national identity (Marcussen at all, 1999: 619-622). A sense of *Grandiose* had been prevalent since the times of Napoleon. *Grande Nation* was revolutionary and powerful enough to enlighten the continent and the world with its *mission civilatrice*. The vulnerability against a german occupation forces however, has undermined self-efficacy of *citoyens* while their conviction in *Grande Nation* had been fundamentally shaken.

At the same time, Britain's position as the historical subject of the primary 'other' has been taken over by Germany as a result of that traumatic experience of invasion. The fundamental challenge was the dealing with Germany and preventing the replay of such devastation for France. Much more importantly, however, the new order in the world dictated by two new superpower and commencement of the cold war, especially American presence and influence in western Europe (Moravscik, 1998:179), has pressurized already problematic circumstances for the French. In the interior, the political scene was divided between the French Gaullists (RPF), the Christian Democrats (MRP) and the Socialists (SFIO) (Brubaker, 1992:49-58). All three political movements have supported the vision of Europe for France though the content of and motivation for that vision differed among them.

The emergence of the Fifth Republic during the war in Algeria in 1958 has brought a certain transformation for French national identity around a construction of France's role in the new World. The notion of independence from interference, sovereignty in full and a sense of *grandeur* was well instrumented in coherent and practical discourses of De Gaulle:

> When one is the Atlantic cape of the continent, when one has planted one's flag in all parts of the world, when one spreads ideas, when one opens oneself to the surrounding world, in short, when one is France, one can not escape the grand movements of the ground. One has to play one's role straightforwardly and comprehensively in order not to be crushed and, at the same time, to serve the cause of all mankind (cited in Marcussen at all, 1999:623).

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It was that *mission civilatrice* which necessitated (and legitimized) the grandeur for France which was not conceivable under circumstances at that time. Obviously, unless France was a part of a whole powerful enough, such mission could not be fulfilled in the era of Cold War. That picture became much more available when Suez Crisis and war in Algeria made the weakness of French publicly available. With European integration, France would not only contain German industrial power, but also guarantee its access to the iron and coal resources in Germany and Luxembourg (Moravscik, 1998:87-91). For French statesmen like Jean Monnet, European integration would mean a large regulated market through which French agricultural and industrial exports could be increased. However, in Gaullist vision, supranational tendencies of pro-Europeans and technocrats should also be tamed and the path integration should be kept along with intergovernmental lines with an end product of *Union d'Etats* (Moravscik, 1998:159-238).

After the economic challenges of 1970s and the failure of leftist Keynesianism in 1981, Mitterand government has adopted much pro-European discourse. In that new stance, allegiance to France was inevitable for French however an attainable future lies in Europe: 'France is our fatherland, Europe is our future' (Le monde, 1992). In the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany once again put France in the sidelines. In the first half of 1990s, French political elite found out the illusion of *grandeur* and *independence*. The fear of German strength was again on the scene. Again that time, French establishment chose support for furthering European integration by approving economic and monetary union (EMU) and Maastricht Treaty (Marcussen et all, 1999:620-623). It was the only feasible way out for continuing French exceptionalism in burdensome European and global circumstances.

French nation state identity was in crisis during 1950s, 1980s and early 1990s. At those three turning points (Marcussen at all, 1999:620-623), French politicians and intellectuals opted for an interest-maximizing way for those specific circumstances. In the 1950s while European integration was let take new steps forward, nation state identity was dominantly instrumented in European issues and reinforced with fever as Fifth Republic was to take root. In 1980s and early 1990s European anchor was well constructed as the feasible way

out for *etat-nation* so that it was to be championed by France in a way that maximizes French political and economical interests. In conclusion, European endeavor has always been a means for French nation state to fulfill its *mission civilatrice* and to realize grandiose in the world scene. European identity was worth to be promoted as long as it is manifested in French way which would add strength to national identity.

3.3.3. Europe for Germany

Germania had been divided into small fiefdoms throughout the middle ages. Mostly free from roman domination, the inhabitants of Germania were called 'Barbarians' by Romans. As much divided in political terms, no concentration of power and no establishment of political centre was the case. Even at the time when other European powers emerged as nation-state in the seventeenth century, Germany was away from the process of nation formation. Particular culture were prominent in the land of Germania, however a political consciousness was still to come. The loose monarchy of the Holy Roman Empire, formally existing till 1806, did not have diffuse impact on the life of its subjects as the interregional communication was just a property of the imperial elite. Ordinary people were deprived of a common usage of language as dissimilar local and regional dialects prevailed (Hobsbawm, 1975: 300-305).

Luther's translation of Bible has marked a prominent step forward in lifting of obstacles for a sense of commonality throughout Germany. However, at the same time, it brought a religious rift between German communities. It was not before 1871 when that religious strife has been overcome. That division and lack of clear victory of one part over another has significantly contributed to the delay in the nation formation. In cultural terms, German elite communities were no exception for French domination. Aristocracy has well been acquired French cultural influences and had no hesitation for that. A late but certain response came from the writers, Herder being the most prominent between them, in the form of advocating and actively constructing a 'German way' in the art and life. Even at that time, German national identity did not exist. The concept was directly linked to a sense of world citizenship as in the manifestations of Goethe (Munch, 2001:65-70).

Countries like Spain, Britain and France have witnessed nation building along with political domination. It was through the state apparatus that very sense nationhood had been established in the minds and hearts of people by the cultural hegemony of a sole language and politically planned public education. Those nations were based on the intentional acts of some majority in the public asserting their language, traditions and culture and for most of the times forcefully imposing them on the diverse minorities who were having their own cultural realities. Therefore it was deliberate acts of cultural homogenization by some group(s) and contributions of involvement of those minorities in external warfare that made nationhood and nation-state possible in Europe (Anderson, 1983:99-144). In certain contrast to the examples in Europe such as Britain, France and Spain, in the German case, the state was not the promoter of the German identity. German idea of 'culture nation' proceeded to the 'state nation' (Munch, 2001:68-70).

Around 1800s, Borussian historians had focused on external political aspirations rather than romantic democratic ideals. Motivated by the ever-growing competition between European states, Prussian landowners of the Eastern Germany (the Junker), the Prussian official corps and the large-scale industrialist had been contributed to the leadership of Prussia in the mobilization against Austria (Hobsbawm, 1975:300-305; Munch, 2001:68-70). The war against France in 1871 made the German *Kaiserreich* and the unification with southern German states possible. In the German empire as well, external warfare mobilized the masses along with national ideals. The attachment to the soil of the Prussian landowners has diverged German nationalism into territorial aspirations far beyond the boundaries of German culture. Resulted in the aspiration for world domination that had been at its zenith during the Nazi regime, that territorial expansionism brought a radical identity crisis when it resulted in the catastrophically demise of the German state (Dann, 1993:45-189).

Soon after 1945, a consensus between German elites and public emerged that European integration was the best means of overcoming Germany's past and having its distinguished place in the family of Europe. Right wing CDU and CSU has conceptualized European integration as an alternative to the irrational national aspirations of the past which proved to be very expansive for German nation (Paterson, 1996:45-56).

Contribution to the assumed unity of Europe was percept as an opportunity for the redemption of German sins in the Second World War. From 1949 on, Adenauer government reverently advocated the Christian Europe model based on common European values, of course, Christian heritage as the foremost between them. For Adenauer, the anchoring of Germany in the European structures was a strategic necessity for the stabilization of social and political life (Bellers, 1991:15-67). While the communist bloc had been joined to the Germany's militarist past as the 'others' of new German identity, involvement in west European political structures had increasingly been considered as the sole way out for doing away with communism as well. Conceptualizing European integration as identical with their aspiration of social democracy, SPD was also among the stable supporters for Germany's leading place in the 'United States of Europe' that could balance two superpowers' ambitions in the continent while promoting a third way by promoting and advancing European economic model of social welfare (Marcussen et all, 1999:622-623). While some frictions in the German left were accusing ECSC as being capitalist tool for advancing industrialists interest over the continent, prominent leaders such as Ernst Reuter, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt were clear supporters of the unification and close relations with the United States.

Post-war German politicians have well instrumented their support and enthusiasm for European integration in the legitimizing new German state, its sovereignty and place in modern Europe (Dockrill, 1991:65-73). Rearmament was achieved as a result of warm relationships with the United States and strategically balance of power over Europe. Even the introduction of Ostpolitik in 1969 did not bring a diversion from European integration efforts of German foreign policy. Contrary to the French hesitations and fears of that time, German reunification was not a turning point in the German aspirations for a united Europe which also marked that German approach to the European integration has remarkably been stable though the original context of its emergence has radically changed over time (Marcussen et all, 1999:622-623). Together with a huge support from German elite for a single European currency, that course of German moves against the various contexts of last fifty years signifies the internalization of European dimension into the German national identity.

In sum, German conceptions of Europe had been constructed along with cultural area till the advance of Prussian nation-building with its militarist orientation takes place. In clear contrast to the much of Europe, German nationhood has its mature cultural background that little was to be invented for the imagination and realization of the proliferation of national bonds in the self definition of Germans. Following the catastrophic end for the military mobilization of territorial ambitions, Germans were in a mood of identity crisis. Post-war resurgence of an integrated European project just filled that emptiness in the German collective imagination for the self and its place in the world. With its parallel othering of the near past and communism, the aspirations of European project just coincided with the German needs for recognition as legitimate and aspirations for reaching a social welfare in a peaceful path on a win–win basis.

3.3.4. Europe for Italy

In the construction of a modern Italian national identity, there is no competing foundation myth to that of the classical legacy of Roman Empire. Cultural artefacts in Italy have been recognized a common heritage throughout Europe, so that it has been possible to mention Italy's leading position in Europe, in historical and cultural terms. However in material and political terms, that was not the case for Italy. Late industrialization and comparatively poor mass education has marked a considerable distance between Italy and the rest of continental Europe in social and political life.

The *Risorgimento* -reawakening- has been birth from a conviction that Italy was behind Europe in every term and had to catch up with enlightened and liberal order that is prevalent in Europe. Risorgimento was driven by a negative self-perception of Italians which pictures them as backward and ill-informed (Woolf, 2002:24). That positioning of the self brought forward the necessity of being reformed and transformed as soon as possible if to be included in the civilized world. That inferiority complex vis-a-vis Europe was in much effect during *italianismo*, ambition for military and colonial expansion, during which *missione civilizzatrice* was tried to be fulfilled in the Libyan and Ethiopian deserts with massacres of the natives. That highlights once more that in times of prevalently felt

inferiority complex, civilizatory missions are being attributed to those communities which are in fact trying to forget their vulnerabilities and weaknesses.

It should be stated that the post-war *Europeismo* were not a uniform trend with a clear and single conception and instrumentation of Europe. As of any society in Europe, distinct groups in Italy have built their own conceptions and visions of Europe. Most prominent ones were a Catholic Europe, a worker's Europe and a Western Europe.

A catholic conception of Europe has mainly been promoted by the Vatican. Inspired by Spain, Vatican tended to promote an authoritarian Catholic regime following the demise of Fascism. However after realizing the public support for democratic parties, Church's vision has been transformed into a supporting stance for Christian Democrats. Following the failure of socialist struggle in Italy in 1970s, a worker's Europe has also lost its significance (Malmborg, 2002:51-71). Conception of Western Europe then remained as a sole alternative in Italian approach to Europe. It rose on the ground of common assumptions aimed towards the modernity and economical might of Italy which was believed to be realized into European economic integration framework.

3.4. The Emergence of European Identity as Political Concept

Emergence, construction and mobilization of European identity concept could be analysed in three periods marking the evolution of the concept of European citizenship. Citizenship is often used as synonym of nationality in the legal sense. It is a philosophical and political concept used to refer to true membership of an authentic democratic state. In sociological terms, membership of an egalitarian society is implied by the concept. Designation of European citizenship constructs European Union as state-like political entity. Therefore establishment and promotion of European citizenship in legal and political frames underlines a new step forward in the supranational reach.

Beginning from 1973, the first period was expanded from the turbulent economic context of problematic of Bretton Woods system and oil crises, and promoted as an instrument to consolidate Europe's place in the international order (Moravscik, 1998:129). The Bretton-

Woods Agreement after the Second World War, based on the dollar, had collapsed in 1971 after years of growing tension between the West European states and their American ally. Political processes aimed at the creation of a capable union in terms of policy making and competencies were the primary subject in the agenda of integration. In the framework of uneasy economic context and turbulent international relations at that time, EC was increasingly required to act with one voice though it was just in the early stage of becoming a fully-fledged polity. Such gradual integration necessitated appropriate means which could be provided by related institutional changes. Diffuse support of 'Europeans' through democratic political systems of member states was to be achieved to fortify desired institutional changes.

As an attempt to satisfy that need, a discourse of European identity was, for the first time, formally employed at the Copenhagen EC summit in December 1973 (EC Bulletin, 1973:12). The leaders of nine EC member states signed the 'Declaration on the European Identity' proclaiming that people of member states shared 'the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual'. It is assured that 'cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected' and 'the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and social justice' are to be defended (EC Bulletin, 1973:12). The final communiqué stated that the first elections of the European Assembly by universal suffrage were to be held around 1978. European identity was dealt with in the larger framework of European 'citizenship' which was assumed to be based on specific rights for citizens of the nine member states (Van der Berghe, 1982:31). In 1974, the heads of state reached an agreement on furthering the efforts to conceptualize special rights to be granted to the citizens of member states in the framework of their being members of the Community. These efforts have brought forward *Tindemans Report on European Union* recommending a certain policy for conceiving of 'People's Europe' proclaiming the need for 'concrete manifestations of European solidarity in everyday life'.

Throughout the fist period ranging from the 1973 to 1983, unity of discourse and action vis-à-vis the rest of the world was the primary motive and efforts aiming the creation of belonging of 'European citizens' to the European project were initiated as the means

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serving that motive. The second period was marked by market oriented paradigm, enhanced constructive efforts of Commission and expanded *acquis* on citizenship (Wiener, 1997:13). The arguments presented in the *Tindemans Report* were advanced in the next step by *the Solemn Declaration on European Union* signed by EC heads of government in 1983. Inviting member states to 'promote European awareness and undertake joint action in various cultural areas', the declaration gave new impetus to the Commission to accelerate its efforts to raise such and awareness in the minds of the people in EC.

However promoting such awareness and attachment in the minds and hearts of 'Europeans' cause a hard-to-escape ontological and discursive clash with regional and national affiliations and sentiments they already subscribe to. That dilemma was obvious in the Commission's communication to the European Parliament on a 'People's Europe' (EC Bulletin, 1988:26). While emphasizing the assumed homogeneity of the European Identity, the communication also signifies the Commission's efforts to preserve unique identities of member states. The Commission was dedicated to 'maintain the distinct national and regional cultural identities and thus the European Identity' (EC Bulletin, 1988: 26). Member states' objection to the loss of their competences in the citizenship issue had diverged Commission's obvious political efforts into a new strategy prioritizing the realisation of political rights of 'European citizens' via the common market mechanisms. The process of market-making and its concrete result such as emerging Schengen network contributed the perception of 'democratic deficit' in the EC.

Finally, with the European Council at Maastricht in 1992, the third period began. In that era, European citizenship that privileges citizen status over economic activity had been promoted. Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (in effect from 1 November 1993) exclusively referred to the concept of European identity:

> 1.Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
> 2.Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall besubject to the duties imposed thereby.

In the Article8e, the Commission's periodical reports (on every three years) taking account of the 'application of the provisions' are designated. On the basis of those reports;

> the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights laid down in this Part, which it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Treaty of European Union overcame prevailing economic approaches to European integration and gave rise to debates concerning issues of polity formation, such as European democracy and legitimacy, the formation of a European demos and European constitutionalism. In that legal framework European law also began to refer to the concept of European identity. Article 6 of the Treaty of European Union confirms that 'the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States' while Article 2 states that it is among the Union's objectives to 'assert its identity on the international scene'. Moreover the Treaty presupposes the presently existence of the European identity in Europe by aiming 'reinforcing the European identity'.

Obvious to conclude that European identity has been conceptualized, promoted and actively reinforced in parallel with the evolution of European integration project. Therefore, to be able to consider European identity in its full dimensions and motivations and aspirations behind it, first of all, the rationale of European integration and framework for the employment of European identity concept in that integration project is to be discussed.

4. EUROPEAN IDENTITY AS A DESIDERATUM FOR FURTHERING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

4.1. Functionalist and Neofunctionalist Arguments on the Nature of European Integration

Having its origins in the liberal-idealist tradition of international relations, functionalism basically asserts that irrationality and disharmony are not endemic to the human condition. Organization of human societies along with primarily functional lines would not only enable political authorities to serve the needs of societies well but also brought a cooperative environment to be prevalent in international conduct. In that the means and designs of the solution to the problems of societies should not be conceived as fixed. Rather they could well be in a dynamic forms changing as the structure and the content of those needs change, namely 'form follows function'. Prioritization of public welfare over any particular ideological strand of thought was characteristic to the functionalist imagination and actions (Rosamond, 2000:30-33). Moreover, considering the states as given was unnecessarily imposing extra costs and hardship in serving the human requirements which should be the quintessential aim of any political idea.

As a departure from the functionalist premises, neofunctionalists reemphasized prominence of political agency and structures, however constituted along with *supranational* principles, in the integration process (Haas, 1961:376). Instead of functioning by technocratic 'automaticity', purposeful actions toward interest maximization by supranational actors are the main propellers of the integration. Incremental strategy is to be pursued because initialization, realization and deepening of integration in one field of social interaction would inevitably result in the pressures for furthering the integrative momentum in other fields, thus enabling 'spillover' into other domains of integration.

The neofunctionalist approach to the European integration is primarily based on the assumption that nation-states as political mechanisms are not appropriate for advance of European societies in times of ever-increasing global and local rivalries. Nation states are assumed to lack a capacity to regulate the global economic, social and political processes.

The Pace and domains of economic exchange exceed the power of nation states while global communication and interaction rendered them ineffectual and outdated (Ohmac, 1995:4-15). Moreover, they are assumed to be the actual source of unproductive and generally forceful competition over the territorial and economic sources. 'Prosperity and vital social progress will remain elusive' (Monnet, 1988:20) until the nations of Europe would form a 'European entity' which is argued to be competent to do what can not be done without such organization. Such entity was envisaged as a supranational entity which marks a step forward in the European endeavour to the ultimate social ends:

> It seems to be the appropriate regional counterpart to the national state which no longer feels capable of realizing welfare aims within its narrow borders, which has made its peace with the fact of interdependence in an industrial and egalitarian age (Haas, 1964:71).

However claims for such European entity did not mean the overcoming of nation-states in any way. Nation-states were there, legitimate and rooted, and integration of any kind would be constructed *through* them, not *instead of* them. Even the foremost personalities of the European integration project were to accept that nature of integration considering the existence of supranational bodies vis-à-vis nation-states. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was one of them stating in 1964 that:

> Our European states are historical reality; it is psychologically impossible to eradicate them. Their diversity is in fact a blessing. We want neither to equalize nor to level them. But there must be…coordination (cited in Moravscik, 1998:86).

In the later stages of integration, the surge global mobility of capital was used to support the arguments claiming that member states' regulations are becoming too weak to regulate economic mechanisms and interactions efficiently. Increasingly hostile competition from emerging economies with lower social and environmental regulations and structural cost advantages is putting the overall competitiveness of the industrialist European economies in a questionable picture. Consequences of that structural trap are especially visible in Labor markets and welfare systems of most of European countries.

Therefore the European Union is to emerge as a supranational political agency to deal with the challenges of those deconstructing trends in a cost-effective way. Systematic imperatives and their visible direct results and side-effects of those trends could only be overcome if a politics makes prolonged efforts in order to overcome the limitations and obstacles inherent in their nature and build capable supranational institutions (Habermas, 1996:292-295). "Ever-closer" integration is argued to be the only feasible path to handle the fraying of social solidarity, welfare systems and the mechanics of economic production. Such "ever-closer union" has been aspired from the beginning of the European integration project of which The Treaty of Rome is a concrete manifestation:

> Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples…

At the beginning, the current objectives were the preservation of peaceful conduct, advancing towards a continent-wide prosperity and fostering the liberal capitalist advancement by coupling it with a unique social model for Europe. The building of a democratic community was left to nation-states till the time to come for furthering integration on political execution level at later stages of integrative process (Mancini and Keeling, 1994:64-69). The transfer of executive power to the institutions of integration project has created an accountability gap in terms of authorization and representation. While competencies of 'European' institutions increase steadily, their span and depth of influence in the life of Europeans is furthered. The characteristic of the institutions' activities has evolved from the market regulation to the market making. That upgrading in span of effect and level of involvement brings forward the widening of the gap in terms of accountability and legitimacy which are not extended in parallel.

However, on the contrary, progress in integration could well deter further integration as the transfer of competencies is to create a certain stress at national political system (Lindberg, 1966:34-48). Moreover the neofunctionalist approach has significantly underestimated the role of affection, historical and cultural belongingness well entrenched in the societies of

member states in the political national attachments and the prominence of national social spaces. That was further deteriorated by the neofunctionalist conception of integration as groups and elite-oriented process in which their transfer of loyalty was seen primary rather than the one of mass public for furthering the integration. The referenda for Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have proved that such conception has not been able to grasp the reality in European politics. Especially, the French and Danish rejection of the ratification of the Treaty for European Union clearly signified that permissive consensus should not be taken for granted.

At that point, it is often cited that the functional integration should be coupled with 'democratic' integration (Wallace and Smith, 1993:137-144; Habermas, 1996:292-294; Wagner, 2005:47-52). Rather than harmonizing economic interactions and developments in a reactive mode, the institutions of the Union should be capable of building and execution of social, cultural, political, economic and international policies in an active mode. That critique of the present form of the union and its institutions constitutes basic point from which the goal of buttressing presently flimsy legitimacy of the EU and its institutions originates (Wallace and Smith, 1993:140-157).

The European identity and public identification with it are then of prominence for European integration's legitimacy and further transfer of power that legitimacy could support for. It is widely consensual that only when there is a meaningful identification between Europeans, problems in the fields such as taxation, social policy, and the distributions of funds and benefits could be dealt with effectively at the European level.

4.2. Legitimacy: A Missing Propeller

Legitimacy is the principle that implies the acceptance of the decisions of a governing subject (a chief, a monarch or a representative government) by (most of) the public on the grounds that governing subject's acquisition and exercise of power has been in accordance with the society's generally accepted procedures and political or moral values. In political terms, an institution is legitimate if such approval is general among those subject to its authority. Four main approaches towards legitimacy are prevalent in the

related studies and discussions. While the consensual approach sees legitimacy from the framework of public support (Burca, 1996:370; Lodge, 1994:344), normative approach emphasizes the moral content of the concept. Thirdly, in legalistic approach, the political authority is to be acquired and exercised through laws and established rules. Lastly, functional approach underlines the efficiency of a political system or authority in serving the needs of the society. Normatively, in a legitimate regime, the executions of the rulers should be moral and congruent with social values (Campbell, 1986:205-213).

European integration have followed the basic functionalist logic of Monnet which prescribes that integrative efforts should start from the least controversial topics and be advanced in more contentious issues and fields in time. From 1957 to 1967, the focus was on the achievement of a free trade area making it possible for goods and services to move freely across borders without tariffs and quotas. July 1968 marked the successful result of those efforts. Two decades later, the internal market for productive factors as well as goods and services is completed. From 1987 on, Single European Act supplied an advanced form of market perfection in European community (Moravscik, 1998:314-378). By the 2003, following the signature of the Treaty of European Union a common monetary policy was in effect.

Having achieved of the above listed integrative steps along with numerous policy structures such as common agricultural policy, regional policy, competition policy, European integration has come to deal with stiffer functional areas marked by the redistributions. Redistributions, by their nature, are always contentions by their nature as they produce winners and losers. Taking resources (via taxation or other indirect ways) from some groups and benefiting other groups is always prone to criticism contention.

As redistribution requires sacrifice of a kind, discussing redistribution immediately raises issues of legitimacy. The legitimacy of any concept, decision or action lies in its achievement of consensual acceptance by the public along with the dimensions of validity and reasonability. Legality and normative justifiability are generally prominent ingredients, yet to be enough, for public support. A sense of attachment is also to be achieved by any political body if diffuse support is to be drawn.

A series of referendums from 1993 up to the referendums in Ireland on the ratification of Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, the referendum on joining the Euro area in 2003 in Sweden have clearly showed that public support for furthering of European integration should not be taken for granted anymore (Golub, 1999:733-737). While the increased pace of European integration could be matched with appropriately wide and deep public debate throughout Europe, the democratic legitimacy of European integration and executions of its institutions is increasingly seen as much questionable (Palmowski and Mayer, 2004: 573-580).

4.2.1. Legitimacy of European Integration and European Identity

Crisis of legitimacy of modern political systems are often reframed as crises of political identity. A legitimacy of a political system is based on its acceptance by citizens as right and reasonable enough to be obeyed. Solely obedience is not enough for a regime to be legitimate as despotic regimes could also be get obedience to it by terror. Being reasonable and 'proper' is also of necessity. It highly depends on the actions and attributes of governments or ruling elite. Reasonable decisions and proper implementations do increase the legitimacy of a system and governing group.

Legitimacy rests in the minds of 'average citizens' rather than being an elite conception. Moreover it is an issue of majority because in every time under any regime there would be a few who do not accept it as legitimate. Furthermore, many of the citizens of a political system may find some aspects legitimate while some other functions or mechanisms in the system are thought to be illegitimate by the same citizens. And last but not the least, appraisals on legitimacy are prone to fluctuations over time. Therefore legitimacy is an issue of majority rather than absolute unity.

The legitimacy of European Union is dealt with from a number of perspectives presenting discrepant approaches. According to the legalistic approach to legitimacy, the EU is legitimate since it is established under Treaties that are approved by the national parliaments. This legalistic approach is contractual in nature. However in the minds of the

'average citizen', that contract and its approval by the representative institutions of their states do not necessitate the rightfulness and congruency of the decisions and acts of the EU. A French farmer would not keep silent on a decision by European Union to cut agricultural incentives just because the Treaty of European Union is signed by France. A British teacher may not perceive the intervention of the Commission in curriculum of a high school in Birmingham as legitimate act even when the responsible commissioner would be a British citizen.

In value-based reasoning, legitimacy for economic, social or political practices is in correlation with the perceived consonance of these practices with the wider value structure. The legitimacy of EU is, then, founded on a sum of values that permit conception and sustenance of the EU as a value based community. Therefore there is a need to clarify the value basis of the European community.

4.2.2. Strategies of Legitimation and the Role of European Identity

In the functionalist logic, the primary function of the European integration is considered to be overcoming the nationalist strains that have been prevalent throughout the past of Europe. For taming ethnos, invention of the European demos apart from ethnic references is aspired. In order to achieve this, European popular identity of a kind were to be constructed in a way that people from distinct ethnic and cultural origins could identify themselves with it. That identification is assumed to bring forth the active involvement in and popular support for European level of executing bodies if given proper 'voice' by constitutional designations of political life.

Peoples of Europe's inclusion in the political processes of European Union are argued to be realized by the means of constitutional design for the Union. That constitutionalist stance's underlying aim is to advance regulatory power of European institutions without which the proceeding of the integration is simply impracticable. Therefore an increasing identification with European integration and its concrete body EU is assured by various means in cultural, economical and political domains. At that point, the employment of discursive construction takes place.

4.3 Social Constructivism and Discursive Construction of Reality

Social constructivism is a truism that social reality is not given, can not be taken for granted either. However it is constructed and reproduced by human agents through their daily practices (Berger and Luckmann, 1976:16-31). Social constructivism is advanced upon a social ontology claiming that, as social beings, humans, their interactions with their social environment and their understandings of the world can not be truly appraised when evaluated separately from the contexts and processes through which they are perceived by a subject of such appraisal. Any consideration of a subject, its decision or action in an isolated context from its social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings would be useless in achieving a true comprehension of its nature (Risse, 2004:3-5). As such, the ontological foundations of social constructivism are in sharp contrast to the ones of rational choice which presupposes the individual action as the basic unit of social life. From that point, a critical claim of social constructivism is furthered by pointing out that social structures and agents are not only mutually codetermined but also they are mutually constitutive.

According to social constructivism, the social environment constitutes who one is (Berger and Luckmann, 1976:16-31). Identities are social beings. They are directly conditioned by the social circumstances. Embedded in distinct social communities, people, at the same time, create, and reproduce culture through daily conducts and actions (Rosamond, 2001:159-163). Meanings are attributed to environment through ongoing process of social construction. With those claims and assumptions, social constructivism ontologically stands in the middle ground between individualism and structuralism (Risse, 2004:3-6). The social construction of the environment is directly connected with the perceptions and interest of the actors. Those interests and perceptions are not formed in advance to interactions, but they are constituted and conditioned through them. The environment, in that respect, is an intersubjective structure in which the norms, rules and boundaries of the possible are emerged (Wendt, 1992:391-407). Social norms regulate behavior of actors and supply a framework for definition of the self as a member of a social community (Risse, 2004:6). The collective norms and understandings put forward the rules for social

interactions. They are not close to a change completely however as in the emergence of them, a consensual acceptance for such change is to be achieved.

In an intersubjective structure of the social and political environment, when such acceptance for a distinct construction is gained to an extent, sets of collective understandings are begun to emerge. Upon the institutionalization of those collective understandings, norms and rules for behavior are articulated. Within the logic of properness, actors form or modify their decisions and actions through those norms and rules which urge them to associate particular identities to particular situations (March and Olsen, 1998:51). As a consequence of the employment of that logic of properness, an 'intended reality' is constituted and reinforced.

In seeking acceptance from other actors, a social construction of any concept, or 'intended reality', involves in communicating practices such as employing specific symbols and discourses. Agents make sense of the world and attribute meaning to the social phenomena through discursive practices (Rosamond, 2001:159-163). Resulting in the comprehension of certain problems in particular ways, discursive practices bring congruent questioning of social problems in a specific way. In that sense, they inaugurate power relationships. Any subject is acting from one of 'subject positions' available in the discursive context when attributing meaning to the social reality (Diez, 2001:85-100). Enabling particular subject positions, then, discursive construction of a social reality is in fact effectual on the emergence of such 'intended reality'.

For communicative practices, firstly, theory of communicative action (of Habermas) is to be examined. According to the theory, in search for a communicative consensus, challenging validity claims in any causal or normative statement is to be carried out by arguments and counter reasoning. Justifications for norms and principles are searched for in argumentative rationality (Braaten, 1991:51-75). Apart from social their context and power relations, actors in a discourse have to be ready to be consensual on a better argument independently from the actors carrying such argument. Instead of the attempts aimed at the acceptance of fixed preferences over an argument or an issue, a reasoned consensus upon argumentative rationality is looked for (Risse, 2004:8). In that kind of approach to the

communicative practices, agents are not only interested in maximization of their interest but rather trying to have a final stance which is reasonable enough in its justification and validity claims.

Second approach to the communicative actions focuses on a discourse as a practice of defining the borders of availability area for the rationale, the decisions and actions by meaning construction. Discursive practices are dealt with in a perspective of power relations. In that, discursive construction establishes the framework of criteria to be used in the evaluation of validity or reasonability of any arguments, policies or claims (Diez, 2001:85-100; Howarth, Aletta and Stavrakakis, 2000:34-65).

4.4 The European Integration and Identity from a Social Constructivist Perspective of Reality

From a social constructivist viewpoint, there is little "given" about European integration. First, the social construction of European integration as inevitable serves specific interest and aims. There is nothing inevitable other than natural forces. Human actions are guided by their decisions. When those decisions and the framework in which they are formed change, the actions based on those decisions vary. Decision makers are conditioned by their social environment. Fundamental alteration in the alternatives in the space for possibility may result into unexpected variation in the preferable paths for an actor or actors. Therefore, as a principle, social constructivism opposes any claim of "givenness" of any idea, action or process (Berger and Luckmann, 1976:16-31; Rosamond, 2001:159-163; Risse 2004: 1-15; Baldwin, 2002: 177-183).

Secondly, the concepts of European integration and European identity constitute a specific interpretation of a social reality. They are not a reality itself, but just interpreted as such. As social construction of anything in a specific way as a reality accommodates particular interest of the actors involving in that construction effort (Onuf, 1998:58-67; Baldwin, 2002:177-183; Risse 2004:1-15), constructs of integrated Europe and European identity of any kind could not capture the reality in the social and political spaces in Europe. Consequently, any efforts to conceptualize European reality in the framework of European

integration or any manifestation through a particular constructs of European integration fall inevitably short of grasping the nature of today's Europe and the dynamics it hosts. Those distinct constructions of European reality based on various motivations lead discrete claims for European identity in the European social universe. By the rationale of social constructivism it is much reasonable to conclude that each of those visionary claims on the contents and dynamics of European identity ontologically render disparate assumed realities for Europe neither of which could be inclusive of the social and political phenomena at its entirety. Every manifestation of belongingness, every claim for cohesiveness and unity for Europe, then just suggest an imaginary reality of its own while attempting to gain acceptance from outside of that particular construction process.

In seeking consensual acceptance from other actors, certain set of collective understandings has to be achieved. Moreover, that to-be-agreed-upon set has to be institutionalized if they are aimed to be transformed in to norms and rules for decision, behavior and actions. Institutions are purposeful organizations with a clearly defined, established system of execution. They are concrete forms of certain understanding, reasoning and aspiration. In that, they construct by their executions a 'thought world' with a corresponding 'thought-style' (Douglas, 1986:48-53). While thought-worlds constitute alternative modes of thinking about concepts and problems, thought-styles articulate the way in which they are presented (Risse, 2004:1-15). National identities are argued to produce far-reaching and exclusive thought-worlds which may claim to be wholly rational and all-inclusive. Such thought-worlds are cosmologies claiming bringing cosmos in order. Rendering the world intelligible and reasoned, those cosmologies tend to be reproducing itself by reproduction and reconstruction. As for European identity, such thought-world is to be of prominence in rendering itself reasonable and valid. In order to supply the European project with such identical framework, actors of European integration employed various discourses aimed at positioning the integration as rational, valid and sometimes inevitable for the attainment of desired outcomes. Moreover, with the advance of the reach and might of the European institutions in time, certain symbols are also developed and made use of by them.

The cognitive dimension of identity includes the frames through which the attribution of meaning is executed and the rules, the way of interacting, that constitute the nature of reality. A collection of constructed and internalized symbolic representations of the world mediates the interactions between external world and individual organisms – be them individuals, entities or institutions. Meanings have been attributed and reinforced through discourses and symbols –signs, gestures, images. In the continuous waves of happenings, those meanings are employed, maintained and transformed.

Discourses enable particular acts by providing agents with a multitude of identical positions in various subjective circumstances. There is no pre-discursive conceptualization of reality (Foucault, 1984:127). In contrast, reality is created through the purposeful use of language. Discourses establish the limits of the possible by setting what is feasible, possible and proper and what is not (Rosamond, 2001:159-163). Lacking certain level of undisputable substance, European identity is fluid concept of which content and use are subject to the discursive manipulations and constructions. Collectivities and institutions are shared belief systems in basic. They are both external and internal to individuals. They are taken for granted when they are socially constructed and reproduced through every day activities.

European integration has been constructed by various actors in congruence with their specific interest base. Discourses as such constitute a certain context. Subjects are not autonomous but they act from a 'subject position' supplied by a discursive context surrounding their actions (Foucault, 1991:58). The effect of words depends on the social context, since they will mean nothing to those who are not part of the speech community that includes them in its vocabulary. In European case, a canon of knowledge, a particular vocabulary is produced and enabled EU-specific discourses to be built around that group of concepts such as spillover, subsidiarity, comitology, conditionality, enlargement, democratic deficit.

The same logic should be applied when analysing the symbolic construction of Europe and European identity. A symbol is anything used to represent something more than itself. Symbols are the heart of cultural systems, for with them we construct thought, ideas, and

other ways of representing reality to others and to ourselves. They are constitutive of reality, connecting individuals to the social and political order, establishing orientations for interpreting the world around them. In that sense, symbols serve as micro nodal points around which perceptions and interpretations can evolve into a relatively stable and immutable cognitive structure. Deliberate creation and enforcement of EU specific symbols in an endeavor to alter people's consciousness of their social and political space has just come to the agenda once the initial integrative period had been succeeded and institutional stance had been formed out. Further integration highlighted the obvious need to establish a unique interactive space which would enable all actors to discuss and negotiate the meaning, the orientation, the functions and ever-evolving structure of European integration project. Deliberate and organized attempts were of need in order to construct European integration and institutions overseeing its realizations as a visible and reasonable social and political space by creating and fostering symbols, mastering narratives of the idea of integrated Europe and its exclusive content.

From the 1980s onwards with the resurgence of integration, the institutions of the EU began to fashion EU specific symbols intended to reconfigure the symbolic universe within which individual Europeans lived. Those symbols have consisted of the same traditional emblems used in the nation-building projects of modernity such as a European Flag, a common passport, an anthem, an EU driving license, an EU product mark, European days, European cities and sporting days. With the more active development of European symbols like the flag, the anthem, the driving licenses, connected to the idea of a European citizenship, one can talk about a more intentional European identity politics guided by the Commission since the 1980s (Shore, 2000:40-66). Symbols represent European integration in many ways they are used. In that representation, they certainly signify the European institutions and argumentative propositions as in the instance of European Unity passports. Euro-passports signify the existence of a state-like entity with a clear delimitation and central political authority with the representative power valid for the whole of the community as for all other passports of the states. However there is much limited ground for such over-arching claims in the case of European Union. Although some competencies it has in that domain, European Union does not have such clear delimitation

and central power as a nation-state. Nevertheless, that symbolic representation fulfills its mission of perpetuation of a social construct (Risse, 2004:1-15).

4.5. Discursive Constructions of European Integration and European Identity

The functions of the discourses on European integration and European identity could be grouped into a threefold category, namely, conceptualizing, perpetuation and deconstructing. In the conceptualizing function, ontological foundations are constructed by organizing temporality and attributing meanings to events through narratives. Discourses as means of disseminating particular information which serve the interests of the owners of them are of vital function in 'building Europe' in a specific way. Manipulation of the present and formation of the new information and ideas is generally the sole instrument available for Europeanists.

4.5.1 Temporal Strategy of Legitimization: Rescue from the Past and the Sovereignty of Nation States

European integration had been tried hard to be conceptualized and constructed by the *entrepreneurs* of integration as the rescue of the continent from the collective past which is to be forgotten as soon as possible. The devastations should not be replicated. The World War II has supplied more than enough experiences of atrocity and humiliating memories for nearly all of Europe that such endeavors to conceptualize that new project of peaceful cooperation and integration were easy to conceptualize as the rescue from past. In that context, the integration project has been presented as the sole way out to peace and prosperity by the architectures and promoters of European integration, as in the Monnet's manifestations in 1943 (Monnet, 1988:20):

> There will be no peace in Europe if states are reconstructed on the basis of national sovereignty…Prosperity and vital social progress will remain elusive until the nations of Europe form a federation or a "European entity' which will forge them into a single economic unit.

Dismantling of the logic of national sovereignty in economical sphere was in fact a starting point of the integrationist rationale. However, for such integrative framework to be promoted, it had to be conceptualized as valid and reasonable move in the European context. The past, which was obviously full of wars and struggles, was tried to be put in sharp contrast with 'peace' that is to be brought by the European integration. Constructing of peace as the basic aim of integration and relating it with an effort to further material resources and wealth was also underlined in the Treaty of Rome: 'Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace,' signatories 'Have decided to create a European Economic Community'.

That social construction of European integration as an only way out from mutually-destructive antagonisms of past involves a deconstruction of nation-states' sovereignty in the economic field while undermining their ontological bases for independence. In Monnet's speech partly cited above, the parts in Europe, namely states, were constructed no longer a viable option for building a sustainable future. Prosperity was directly associated with forming of a European entity which is conceptualized mainly with its economic consequences (See the Treaty of Rome). Prosperity, it is claimed, would not be achieved until it will be dealt with by a 'European entity'. European integration around a single economic mechanism was obviously constructed as the sole solution for overcoming economic hardships the continent was facing. As prosperity and social progress are the main and common objectives of any democratic government in Europe, 'forming of a federation', or a 'European entity' of a kind, is constructed and presented as inevitable. Making something inevitable is a widely employed tactic, in European case, for getting an approval from the actors which is not possible in normal circumstances.

However, in the circumstances of Europe at that time, doing away the nation states in a supranational political union was not feasible. The French reactions to such attempts by the Brussels made that much visible to everyone (Moravscik, 1998:178-201). First of all, states have been inevitable realities of social universe throughout the collective history of humanity. That fact had to be taken into consideration and be embedded in the integration project in a usable and purposeful way. Secondly, any supranational integration has to be achieved *through* joining nation-states not openly at the expense of them. Therefore the

benefits of that functional integration of the economies of European states, especially rise in the standard of living and employment in their economies, are to be emphasized in the discursive construction efforts as in the Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 18 April 1951:

> The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in harmony with the general economy of Member States and through the establishment of a common market as provided in Article 4, to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States…

Fifty-two years later than Monnet's speech above, Javier Solana, EU high representative, in his speech in the inauguration of academic year 2005-2006 at the college of Europe, underlined that overwhelming objective and celebrated fulfillment of that mission of integration project with a perpetuation of European 'rescue' from its past:

> More Europeans than ever before live in peace, prosperity and freedom. From a historical perspective this is not Europe's normal condition. We now have a regional order based on law, equality and solidarity. And we are admired for it by the rest of world.

In Solana's words, European integration is presented as the great historical progress ('than ever before') which has altered Europe's historical route by making peace as normality in the continent. Therefore a temporal construction takes place here. That remarks reflects the thought mode visible in the speech which sees the continent and its people unlucky for their memories of antagonisms and atrocities past. As individuals strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (Turner, 1975:5-34), that damnation of the past would be motivational for attachment to the new system of meanings that is constructed by temporal othering.

Europeans are, according to Solana, lucky, at the same time, for their present conditions of peace, prosperity and freedom all have come with a new 'regional order'. The current shape and condition of European integration is clearly pictured as a 'regional order'

therefore unique to the Europe. Law, equality and solidarity are attributed as fundamental characteristics of the interaction between Europeans and member states. Firstly, European project is conceptualized as a great achievement through which peace, prosperity and freedom has been available. Secondly, that claim is further fortified by the deconstruction of the past of Europe by implying that war, poverty and totalitarianism were the natural state of Europe before that 'regional order' is founded. Thirdly, the legitimacy and validity of the construction in that specific way is perpetuated by the assumed recognition from outside – 'the rest of world'. By the same token, pre-integration Europe is being constructed as an order in which rule of law is not present, the executions are against equality and people do not have a sense of commonality:

We now have a regional order based on law, equality and solidarity.

The instrumentation of peace and the rule of law for rendering the integration legitimate is also much visible in Romano Prodi's speech in the opening of the 2002/2003 academic year of the European University Institute in Florence:

> The Charter of fundamental rights, the European constitution on which the convention on the future of Europe is now working, and the introduction of the Euro are all building blocks in this Europe of peace and rule of law. We have learnt at our cost the madness of war, of racism and the rejection of the other and diversity. Peace, rejection of abuse of power, conflict and war are the underlying and unifying values of the European project.

The contentious and up-to-date processes of European constitution and the introduction of the Euro are all constructed as in relation with the aspiration for Europe of 'peace and rule of law.' With that strategy of linkage, those debatable issues are constructed to be the means in reaching to the consensual ideals such as peace and rule of law. Therefore they were leveled down and controversies over them are tried to be trivialized by putting them into a wider context of ideals. At that point a political pre-decision is attempted to be imposed on public that all of those political moves are for paving the way for an establishment an ideal order in present European context. Furthermore, the present state in the integration also leveled down when those current steps are expressed as the

building blocks. Then, Europe of peace and rule of law is *not* presently available, but it is to be *achieved*. Therefore furthering the current level of integration in those lines of empowering European structures as ambitioned in up-to-date debates is also made legitimate.

The following parts of the text offer another instance of that *temporal strategy of legitimization* of European integration. Articulating the success of the European project by temporal comparisons based on the stability in the continent, it is constructed as legitimate on functional grounds:

> The greatest achievement, however, is undoubtedly the stability now reigning across the continent. Just a few decades ago the state of Europe was precarious and volatile. Now it epitomizes stability. We too often take this for granted but it is an exploit in the history of our continent and the world.

4.5.2 Diversity: Strategies of Avoidance

Diversity has widely been seen and conceptualized as an obstacle to unity in thoughts, perceptions and actions, a barrier in reaching a consensus and cohesion (Kohli, 2000:115). Discourses of Eurocrats on the issue of diversity have been congruent with the conceptualizations of unity in Europe. Romano Prodi's speech, 'Towards a European Civil Society', in second European Social Week, was no exception to that. After having cited that trend in the forging of diversity as an inevitable barrier, he went on as such:

> But European integration has always been about diverse peoples with varied cultures learning to live and work together, discovering shared values and a shared sense of identity.

Referring to the social and political history of Europe, diversity and the communicative and cooperative costs incurred by it are subscribed to. However it is emphasized that the important is the will and efforts towards togetherness and cohabitation in the continent. An alternative mode of thinking, a thought-world, is put forward that rather than focusing on the structural context and input of a process such as the diverse cultural baggage of

European nations, the process of European integration itself presupposing learning process in the socialization (Risse, 2000:1-39) of the actors and their complying with norms of the new contexts is to be underlined. Moreover, the text claims – and constructs - the existence of shared values and a shared sense of identity. Those values and identity were there, waiting to be *discovered*. When diverse people of Europe come together and interactions between them are intensified by the mechanisms of integration, a context for social learning takes place.

> Indeed, diversity is one of Europe's greatest riches. It is an asset, not a handicap. Experience has repeatedly shown that when people with different outlooks and cultural backgrounds put their heads together they are capable of producing brilliantly new ideas. This is exactly what Europe needs in a fiercely competitive world that requires constant innovation.

Emphasizing the reality of diversity in Europe, Prodi tends to construct it in positive terms, as an asset. Rather than mentioning the consequences that put him through it, speech approached the issue from a point of innovativeness and competitiveness in economic terms. *Strategy of avoidance* to mention thorny effects of the reality is clearly perceptible. The claim is even furthered:

> Likewise, I am convinced that diversity does not militate against a sense of shared European identity. On the contrary, it enriches our sense of what Europe is. I would even say that what constitutes "the soul of Europe" is our shared heritage of spiritual values, expressed in our rich diversity of cultural forms. While unifying and consolidating Europe, therefore, it is absolutely essential to preserve its core values and its rich diversity.

Here diversity is given a further status as the content of 'the soul of Europe'. This time the problem is conceptualized in cultural terms and again turned into an advantage in the value-based argumentation, fortifying a sense of shared European identity. Diversity on the other hand has been well instrumented in order to promote and legitimize the extension of supranational mechanisms in the decision making systems such as QMV. In the process of deepening Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP), Delors's discourses well signify such instrumentation and conception (Buchan, 1992:134):

First we would decide, unanimously, whether the meeting was to be in Warsaw, Budapest or Prague. Then we would have to agree whether we were going by plane. Lunch? We would need an opt-out for vegetarians. No doubt we could use majority voting to decide where the smoking and non-smoking sections would be.

4.5.3. European Identity: Constructions of Fluidity

Along with those constructions of European integration in temporal and ideational lines, the foundations and nature of European identity is claimed and reclaimed in order to supply an affectionate base and an ontological reasoning to the European integration. Any discursive attempt to construct the current structure, dynamics, context and the future of European integration is directly or indirectly accompanied by a parallel construction of European identity. As for directly constructive discourses over identity, those strategies of social construction and legitimization are also applied. Such constructions are much more distinct over the issue of identity as its nature is much more fluid than any issue. Prodi's lecture in the European University Institute (20 January 2003) well illustrates the fluidity of the concept and the need for overcoming that by conceptualizing the presently ambivalence interpretations of European identity as prone to dangers for humanity :

> We must think about the identity of the Union now. Because, while the concept of identity does not change, its representation does as a result of political developments. In the past, some saw identity as coinciding with the concept of a 'European Civilization'; others linked it to that of a specific European character, to Europe's diversity. Some of these interpretations had terrible consequences for humanity; others helped us to take giant steps forward. Today there is a great need for a common expression of solidarity and common destiny.

That 'need' is also underlined by the obvious need for delimitation of Europe and European integration. Therefore the European identity should be cleared of fluidity and uncertainties so that it could be constructed as the instrument for such demarcation between European and non-European. Establishing the historical and sentimental lines as the resource pool from which such cherished European identity could be distilled from:

We are trying to build a true political Union. Some kind of European 'area', a Europe with purely civil powers will not do. I repeat, what we want is a truly political Union. This is why, given that it is impossible to fix the geographical confines of Europe, the Union's confines should be sought in identity, which in turn is forged by adherence to a new political project. For identity can not be conceived in a monolithic manner. The Union's unity is drawn from diversity. The European identity is based on history, sentiment and pluralism (p.2).

In conclusion of the chapter, it should be stated that neofunctionalist logic's underestimating of the significance and function of identities in the social and political domains have resulted in the focusing on economical and technical motivations and achievements through European integration. That neglect of the public attachment to the national values and the necessity of diffuse support of masses for the significant political moves of any kind were only realized when it was made obvious by the mass refusal of the critical integrative steps such as Maastricht Treaty. Then social construction of European integration by various promoters of European integration has gained momentum. European integration was tried to be legitimized by the conceptualization, construction and promotion of European identity. While an increasing identification with Europe and European integration is tried to be assured, European integration has been conceptualized as reasonable and inevitable by temporal othering. Europe as a collectivity has been conceptualized and perpetuated by the symbolic construction of Europe in the everyday life of Europeans. Through discursive construction, the inherent diversity of Europe has been pictured as richness instead of an obstacle. In that regard carefully selected historical references and mechanisms of othering towards the non-Europe are instrumented. As examined by the instances above, European identity has been articulated to the European integration by purposeful attempts in which conceptualization, perpetuation and deconstruction has been commonplace.

5. CONCLUSION

There are some certainties and uncertainties about the European integration that makes for the space for discussion, divergence, bargaining and consensus. The European integration project's concrete achievements in terms of institutionalization, span of influence, depth of competencies, functional successes in advancing intrastate trade and market making are certain. Mobilization of neofunctionalist logic in post-war European circumstances constitutes a unique advancement in international relations. Enforcing European integration primarily in areas where lowest resistance towards it proved to be successful, enabling certain level of 'spillover' onto some other areas. However the realization of such 'spillover' effect has only been possible when particular reconciliation between intergovernmental equilibrium and neofunctional rationalization. That is, for most of the time, integration along with pressures coming from pure functional necessities as supposed by neofunctionalist logic was not the case. Nevertheless, such reconciliation most of the times served the interests of national governments and 'supranational' European institutions. Economical achievements in terms of material growth and communicative attainments in terms of peaceful conduct and cooperative practices in Europe have underlined the integration as worthwhile. Therefore it is certain that the emergence and evolution of European integration has significantly contributed to the welfare of European communities in the last fifty years' time.

However, there is still a widespread confusion over, or lack of consensus on, the *reason d'etre*, the meaning, the nature, functions and ends of the European integration. That is basically caused by the multiplicity of the conceptions of Europe and European Union as its political manifestation. Certainly, such multiplicity has grown from the realities of the nations and states which should be considered in their distinct though definitely interrelated frameworks. Those frameworks are formed over distinct social, economical and psychological foundations that are emerged in the course of history for those collectivities. Collective identities are built on both internal homogenization and outward demarcations. Those processes are highly political and contextual in terms of time, interests, aims, alternative means to reach those aims and balance of power. While outward demarcations of British identity was formed against Normans, Papacy and

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catholic absolutism in France and Spain, for instance, the same Papacy was the main factor in internal homogenization in Italy and the imposition of Catholicism was one of the powerful homogenizing trends in France. Protestantism was relied on as the propeller in the advancing the cohesive identification of members of the empire with British national identity. In contrast, however, it was the same Protestantism which was well instrumented as the evil against which the Frenchmen should be mobilized. Ironically, the two foremost sponsors of the European integration, France and Germany have also historically and culturally constructed one another as the object of outward demarcation. In British conception, Europe signifies a continent out there, to be observed and kept in equilibrium, so that any threat toward the British island and interests in the world would not be materialized. The French has been percept Europe as a place where French leadership is natural in cultural and political way. It is an area of practicing *grandiose*. It constitutes a cause putting France in responsibility of leading the continent while such a cause far more outpaces French might and capability if performing it. In the German case, the continent has been an area of sources to which German economic and material growth is relied upon. Therefore a political domination of a kind is of necessity if German interests are to be promoted.

Furthermore, a place, function and mission of European integration just after the continent-wide devastating experience of World War II varied along with material and strategic needs of European states. Such variance even today is a reality as national needs and interest are distinct at certain times over particular European issues. Therefore, European identity is certainly an uncertain concept. Uncertainty is not a norm by itself, rather it is revealed by actors' attempts to reconstruct certainty and their incapacities for achieving that. For any idea to become certain of its content and meaning, a degree of diffuse compromise over it should be present. In European instance however, as detailed above, various actors attribute various meanings and functions to assumed European identity in their identity and political systems. Ergo, dealing with European identity by making particular use of the concepts, the notions and constructions would always end up to a particular reality in the space of concomitant realities diverging around the framework for European integration.

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The increasing transfer of competencies towards European institutions in various domains of social and economical life, create a certain stress at national political system (Lindberg, 1966: 34-48). The neofunctionalist logic's underestimation of the role of affection, historical and cultural belongingness in the attainment of diffuse support for political authorities and their decisions, has resulted in lack of public mobilization for the European issues which have an unavoidable direct and indirect impact in their life. When lack of participation in the decision-making phases and relative hardship of manipulation of those European policies are coupled with increasingly visible and serious effects of those policies and decisions in the lives of Europeans, the public resentment towards European integration, inevitably articulated. The referenda for Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties in France and Denmark, in special, made it visible to everyone that, from that stage of integration on, permissive consensus could not be taken for granted. For the attainment of such permissive consensus, legitimacy of European Union, its decisions and actions is a key factor to be considered. Legitimacy of the European Union is not just judged on the legal grounds of its existence and competencies but also appraised in very terms of reasonability, validity and functionality. Those attributes are gained through a process of examination and judgment by the 'citizens of the Union', in which their conception of the raison d'etre, nature, meaning and function of the European integration and the Union plays a definitive role. Such conceptions are not formed in the air, independently from influence, biases, manipulation through knowledge and attachment through identity systems. On the contrary, they are formed and conditioned thoroughly in the social space of interaction. In that sense, it is reasonable to argue that ideas, motivations, conceptions and judgments are formed in the identity system of the individuals and collectivities. That identity system is inevitably a social phenomenon, emerging and evolving through social interactions. Thus it is socially constructed.

The discursive construction of European integration and European identity in parallel with that need for fixation of its raison d'etre, nature, meaning and function has been underway since the founding fathers and promoters of European integration have realized that in the framework of those particular realities such fixation is of prominence for advancing the

European integration. Permissive consensus emerging around such fixed value and identity system would be the catalyst of the integrative momentum in Europe.

The social construction of a social reality includes the constitution and conditioning the perceptions and interest of the actors involving in that reality. Such conditioning is aimed to achieve an acceptance for the arguments, ontological and functional claims behind that particular construct. As a result of those social construction efforts, sets of collective understandings are aspired to be reached. The institutionalization of those collective understandings enables the constitution of norms and rules for behavior according to which actors form or modify their decisions and actions within the logic of properness. As a consequence of the employment of that logic of properness, an *intended reality* is constituted and reinforced. In seeking acceptance from other actors, by a social construction of any concept, or *intended reality*, communicating practices such as employing specific symbols and discourses are articulated.

Consequently, the issue of European identity should be considered in the framework of the social construction executed by the actors of the integration process. Symbolic and discursive constructions perform three principal functions in that regard. Those functions are conceptualization, perpetuation and deconstruction. Symbolic construction through European symbols such as the Euro, the flag and the anthem of the union are practicing the functions of conceptualizing and perpetuating. By their usage (the Euro in special) in every domain of the daily life of 'European citizens', they not only construct the existence of the state-like political body European integration, but also people's continuous interaction with them perpetuate the validity and actuality of that construct. With the employment of those symbols an affectionate attachment and identification with Europe, thus, a promotion of the European identity is aspired. Besides construction and perpetuation, discursive construction also serves to deconstructing function. This is especially the case for the national political spaces, nation states and identities. Discourses of various kinds aimed at providing the longed-for legitimacy to the European structures, deconstruct the national political structures on the grounds of their assumed lack of proper capacities to solve economic, social and political problems of their citizens. In fact, any discourse arguing the efficiency and properness of 'supranational' mechanisms

of decision and their executions, by its nature, deconstructs the functionality and validity of the national political systems and establishments. On the contrary, discursive attempts claiming the validity and productivity of national political processes undermines the indispensability and inexorability of European-level political structures. Thus, the future of European integration and the European identity would be conditioned by those discursive battles between those intended realities along the lines of nationalism and supranationalism.

There are also certain paradoxes inherent in the assumed European identity. First, the paradox between the assumed unity and the intrinsic diversity in Europe is a predicament. Collective identities claim a form of unity in a social system. Therefore the notion of unity and identity is interrelated. Formation of collective identities is a process of bringing commonality into consciousness of its members. For that reinforcement, a certain level of that commonality should exist for sometime and somewhere. The problem is that Europe is deprived of distinct bases for commonality as such. Particular actors do have particular conceptions of Europe. Various conceptions of European unity going along with religious, territorial, historical, cultural, philosophical and political references coexist in Europeans' and non-Europeans' thought horizons. Those certain conceptions are formed through and congruent with the interest structures, future visions and identity systems of those actors. Divergences in those subjective realities, aspirations and their interpretations mitigate the already burdensome conceptions and claims of unity in European identity.

In an endeavor to overcome that lack of unity, a discourse of 'unity in diversity' is promoted by European institutions which actively designate discursive construction of European integration and European identity in parallel with its need for fixation of its content, nature and necessity. That inevitable diversity is tried to be presented in a form of a particular European value upon which European structures of future should be build. At that point, because of presently clumsy picture that diversity is bringing, 'futurism' comes in at the discursive level where European identity and united Europe is accompanied by futures designated in congruence with the actual needs and necessities of the European politics. Employment of the distinct imagined futures of Europe and European integration not only signify an escape from the present realities of Europe which means an acceptance of the

current impossibility of mentioning about a coherent, unifying European identity, but also further complicate the discussions by transferring the problem into a new discursive and imaginary line allowing much more space alternative visions and claims.

Second paradox of European identity is related with the othering mechanism in the definition of the self. Identity requires difference in order to claim its existence. This difference is converted into otherness in order to secure its continuity as a distinct entity. Identity implies sameness as much as it implies uniqueness. It is much about differentiation and individuality as it is about commonality. European identity would have to entail distorted claims of similarity inside and difference to the outside. For it to be assumed to exist, a divisive boundary of a kind is to be exist, marking the distinctiveness between a commonality (sustained to an extent) inside and observably different outside world. The characteristics of the self are conceptualized in terms of similitude and dissimilarity. As such, the self-definition inevitably includes the definition of the others. For that self-definition is to be complete, the definition of the others is to be cohesive, reasonable enough to prevent challenges from the self-consciousness. European integration has primarily been constructed through the temporal othering in which the past of Europe, characterized by the mutually-destructive rivalries, irrational antagonisms and war between European powers, injustice and unlawful executions of governments, is mobilized as the other of the modern Europe. That strategy of *temporal othering* is still embedded in the European social and political space. German fears for the resurgence of nationalism in (especially east) Germany, British skepticism towards Germany's increasing dominance in the east of the continent and French care for German economic strength signify the artefacts of the memories of the Europe's common but dreadful past.

The self is made different from the other(s), i.e. made up, by the characteristics it has. Ergo, the loadings onto that other also designate the self having particular characteristics that are to be accentuated. When temporal othering towards the pre-integration time span primarily takes place the qualities and attributes that are antithetical to that specific time frame are promoted as the foremost content of the identity. Peace, rule of law, democracy and human rights have been among the primary bases of that endorsed content in temporal othering. This same othering strategy has also been applied in the case of

enlargement of the European Union. Those Central and East European States (CEES) had been under the undemocratic communist regimes imposed by the Soviet Union in which lack of fundamental human rights and democracy was commonplace. Those societies should be saved from that 'inhumane and backward' social and political context by transposing those 'European values' from the European Union. That help from Europe has of course not come for free but rather through conditionality of norms, principles, decisions and actions aimed not only for attainment of structural and value system congruence but also for the interest maximization of member states and societies. Such transposition of the assumed content of identical system onto the new entrants of that system also enables for the perpetuation of the socially constructed intended realities of the system (of European identity) as the confirmation and recognition of the to-be-insiders for the validity of those intended realities is prerequisite for such transposition. Therefore, twofold reinforcement for European identity is being achieved by the employment of temporal othering strategy in the enlargement, namely the recognition from the outsiders and enforcement of the validity and reasonability of the European identity construct inside triggered by the former.

Another paradoxical and problematic issue is Europe's particular conceptions of the non-Europe, the nature of interactions with that non-Europe and the consequences of those on the European identity system. As temporal othering is primary mechanism in the self-definition of Europe after the Second World War, it is often claimed that spatial, social or cultural differences are openly claimed, discussed and maintained in the identity systems of Europe without any antagonistic reactionary stances. However when European conceptions and approaches towards the non-Europe are critically considered, it could well be contented that the colonial attitudes towards the Europe's others are still the case, enabling a congruent cognitive position for the Europeans' employment of classical mechanisms of othering in their identity systems. Colonial attitudes of supremacy have been practiced for centuries, through constant construction of an inferior other and superior self in a mutually-reinforcing way and transposed onto those others. It is not so easy for any collective to change their conception of the out-group and the mode of interaction with them.

Temporal othering in European case does not exclude cultural, social and political othering towards 'outsiders' in and out of Europe. Dynamics of such othering mechanism is of prominence in positioning the contents and functions of European identity both for Europeans and non-Europeans. When in contacts with other cultures, ways of organization, value systems or identities, collectivities practice two kinds of reaction. First, they may reject to acknowledge the cultural or identical remoteness by intentionally or unintentionally assimilation of the other by emphasizing the similitude between two. Second, they may act to incorporate other into the identity system of its own by placing it as exactly opposite of the self. That incorporation of the different as the opposite, the exact other is executed by converging images attributed to other into the stereotypes of the other. That second kind of rejection has been the case in Europeans' conduct with non-Europeans. Though not necessarily wrong every time, stereotypes are produced by ignoring some realities and attributes of the other while underlining and exaggerating others.

Power asymmetry between Europeans and the rest of the world have for around four centuries has diverged the equilibrium in the conceptions of European towards other cultures and identities. Faced with significantly great vulnerability, material and technological backwardness of the local societies in geographical explorations and eventual colonization of the Africa and new territories in Americas, Europeans have developed a specific conception of Europe's place in the world called Eurocentrism (Amin, 1993:4-116). While intellectual and spiritual characteristic of European mind has been asserted to made Europe the place of progress, non-Europe (as Europe's other) was conceived and constructed in relation with negative attributes such as stagnancy, backwardness and ignorance some non-European regions (like China and Japan) and only in some specific historical epochs (like Meiji Restoration in Japan) are granted rationality. Some other parts of the world like Africa are denied for any time to be inventive.

In that regard, Eurocentrism has not only distorted Europeans' communication with the rest of the world, but also perverted European identity system by automatically granting Europe and Europeans centrality in the world while the rest of the world societies are put in the position of periphery. Execution of communication and conduct with outsiders

through such Eurocentric framework inevitably perpetuates those underlying constructions of the self that are far away from reflecting reality in the societies of Europe, and construction of the others that are well transposed onto those others via cultural and economic interactions. That selective interpretation and misconception of the collective self has led to the parallel misconception of the others, leaving identity system of the Europeans vis-à-vis the World in the pathetic interactions between the invalidly defined though active self and the passive other(s) constructed through biased attributions. Such self-enhancing conception of the world circumscribes any positive external implications of the advancement European identity for the world.

The paradoxical relation between national identities and European identity constitutes third point of stress in European identity. That paradox will probably be sustained in the future as they could reinforce and hamper each other at certain points. They both do require some degree of attachment from Europeans and that could rationally be handled in a consensual framework instead of the conflicting one, as in the models presupposing the relevance of both and affirming that one could well feel belongingness to one's nationhood and Europe at the same time, at distinct contexts. However in the process transfer of competencies and power from national to the 'European' political spaces, the 'revival' of national attachments does take place, gaining far ahead primacy over the attachment to the European identity and integration. At such point, any overlapping of the attachments to the national and European polities is much hard not to be mentioned.

Identities are constructed and maintained by interactions; they are mediated and conditioned constantly. The European identity should not be conceived in a way that once it is well rooted in the minds and hearts of the Europeans, the divergences and controversies over that are ended. Any consensus over the concept would only imply a compromise on a particular version among the multitude of conceptions of European identity. That is because European identity is not a concept shaped and evolved through a process, over a considerable time span enough for a collectivity to emerge and deeply rooted in a specific way which is hard to be conditioned by the current or future divergences over any issue. The historical divergences over the meaning and functions of the concept, presently obvious diversity of socio-cultural attributes and the nature of the

European project which necessitates it to be a future-oriented political entity all contribute to the fluidity of the European identity. Moreover, on mature consideration, it is reasonable to argue that that fluidity of the European identity will inevitably be accentuated by the increasing economical, cultural and social interactions not just among the Europeans themselves but also between Europe and the rest of the world.

Suffering from the substance deficit and constant compromise, European identity is a problematic phenomenon to be conceptualized decently, on the grounds of coherence, validity and reasonability. Taking present distinctness of 'Europeans', in social, cultural and political terms, into consideration, any endeavor to define European identity would leave the attempting subject disarmed and biased rendering the attempt inevitably incomplete. European identity is a concept of which characteristics and attributes could not be strictly defined in certain limits. It is a playground of discrepant, often conflicting ideals, imaginations and interests. The decrease in its fluidity and a degree of consensus over its nature, structure and uses, is of necessity for its being a prominent, maybe central, reference in Europeans' identical system and an ineluctable dynamic in the definition of today's and tomorrow's European integration. Such evolution of European identity concept into a valid, certain and much-referenced social and political reality will be determined by the reactions of Europeans toward socially constructed alternatives of European identity in terms of achieving a self-consciousness at the European level and recognition of that by the non-Europeans, namely the world.

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