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**THE ENLARGEMENT PREFERENCES OF THE MAJOR EU MEMBER  
STATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKISH ACCESSION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The decision taken in the EU Summit on December 17, 2004 which promised the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, started a new era in the EU-Turkey relations. Membership issue of Turkey that has been kept in the waiting room for more than four decades, constitutes great significance for both herself and the EU member states, especially because it is evaluated on the grounds of economic and political rationality, universal principles and also cultural facts by decision makers in the member states. While some of them have been favoring Turkey's EU membership referring to these evaluations, others have been objecting her accession considering the same arguments. In this context, given that Turkey's membership issue is considered different from the previous enlargement waves, it is obvious that her fate in the EU will be subjected to the unprecedented intergovernmental bargaining among the member states. On the other hand, although the start of accession negotiations as well as their progress is realized by unanimity of the EU member states, it is believed that the impact of the major ones on the rest will affect the outcome of Turkey's membership issue.

## ÖZET

17 Aralık 2004 tarihli Avrupa Birliđi (AB) Zirvesi'nde, Türkiye ile 3 Ekim 2005'te katılım müzakerelerinin başlatılması yönünde alınan kararla Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. 40 yıldan fazla bekleme odasında bekletilen Türkiye'nin üyelik meselesi kendisi ve AB'ye üye ülkeler için de büyük önem arz ederken Türkiye'nin üyeliđi Avrupa'daki karar alıcılar tarafından özellikle birliđe kazandıracakları, kaybettirecekleri ve hatta kültürel özellikleri açısından değerlendirilmektedir. Bu değerlendirme sonucunda kimi ülkeler Türkiye'nin üyeliđinin yanında yer alırken kimileri de karşısında yer almaktadır. Bu durumda Türkiye'nin üyeliđinin geçmiş genişleme dalgalarından farklı olacağı göz önünde bulundurulacak olursa, katılımın onaylanmasının AB'ye üye büyük devletler arasında geçmiş dönemlerde yaşanmamış pazarlıklar sonucunda karara bağlanacağı aşıkardır. Her ne kadar müzakerelere başlama kararının alınması gibi fasılların açılıp kapanması da üye ülkelerin oy birliđiyle gerçekleşse de, bu ülkelerin özellikle etkin olanlarının diđerleri üzerindeki etkisinin Türkiye'nin üyelik meselesini etkileyeceđi düşünülmektedir.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>APEC</b>	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
<b>CAP</b>	Common Agriculture Policy
<b>CDU</b>	Christian Democratic Union
<b>CEE</b>	Central and Eastern Europe
<b>CEECs</b>	Central and Eastern European Countries
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>COREPER</b>	Committee of Permanent Representatives
<b>CSU</b>	Christian Social Union
<b>DIHT</b>	German Chamber of Commerce and Industry
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>EDC</b>	European Defense Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EFTA</b>	European Free Trade Association
<b>EMS</b>	European Monetary System
<b>EMU</b>	Economic and Monetary Union
<b>EP</b>	European Parliament
<b>ERM</b>	Exchange Rate Mechanism
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defense Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EURATOM</b>	European Atomic Energy Community
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>NAFTA</b>	North American Free Trade Association
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OEEC</b>	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>QMV</b>	Qualified Majority Voting
<b>SPD</b>	Social Democratic Party
<b>TRNC</b>	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>WEU</b>	Western European Union



## INTRODUCTION

Particularly after the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union (EU), with its enhanced supranational nature, has become more influential in global politics. Almost every European country wants to become members of the EU and benefit from its advantages. Thus, enlargement policy is one of the internal dynamics of the EU among other significant policies and aims at widening the borders of the Union in order to impose mutual utility for both the Union's itself and member state. However, the willingness for an enlarging Union is asymmetrical which stems both from the level of enthusiasm of the potential members for being part of this structure and mostly from the level of interest of the existing members in accepting new members.

The ties between Turkey and Europe have long existed and go beyond the recognition of Turkey as a candidate state at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, and even the Association Agreement signed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey in 1963. If the western-oriented tendency during the last days of the Ottoman Empire is disregarded, the Republic of Turkey has always followed 'westernization' policy in order to become a western and, therefore, modern member of the international community, and constantly attempted to promote an environment of peace and prosperity not just for itself, but also for the whole world since its foundation. Like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Council of Europe, European integration project is a very significant instrument for Turkey to continue its policy of westernization and modernization. Since the 1963 Ankara Agreement, Turkey has aimed at becoming part of a grander European vision, which is represented by the EU.

However, the road to the final stage of the accession, namely the negotiations, was not a continuous process. On the contrary, it has been interrupted several times either diplomatically or politically by governments or societies. The support for an EU with Turkey both from Europe and Turkey has seen ups and downs, but the supporters have always managed to convince the opponents, or at least keep the prospect alive. The debate between these two edges consists of the factual data such, as comparative populations, the rates of GDP, market size of Turkey and the EU members are combined with more abstract factors such as culture, religion, historical relations, even

feelings of the societies towards each other. Despite this controversy, there is an unquestionable truth that the Turkish government has made an incredible progress in harmonization with the *acquis communautaire*. Affirmative discourses from the existing member states and from the officials of the European institutions play the most important role in motivating the government.

In this study, Turkey's enthusiasm for the EU membership is evaluated from the EU's perspective and it is claimed that enlargement preferences of the EU lie under consents of the major member states. As can be seen in the previous rounds, like all other policies enlargement policy of the EU revolves around the member states' intentions as well as their bargaining process. In this sense, it is asserted that a prospective Turkish accession to the EU is considerably subject to the blessings of its leading member states. Therefore, the EU – Turkey relations in the thesis focuses on the major member states' enlargement preferences or policies whose bargaining power considered relatively higher than others. This approach is also backed under theoretical framework which also reveals other necessary complementary components for the main argument such as elite-mass interactions.

In the first part of Chapter I, the theoretical approaches of European integration are analyzed in detail in respect of their relevancies to the EU's enlargement policy. Among many distinguished studies of scholars; federalism, transactionalism, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism among European integration theories and social constructivism among international relations theories are employed to find the most appropriate one(s) for explaining the enlargement preferences of the EU. While analyzing the theoretical approaches seeking to clarify widening foot of European integration, some of the approaches are automatically eliminated due to their deficiencies.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the policy making process in the EU with respect to the enlargement issue by referring the hypothesis of the theories singled out in the first part. Liberal intergovernmentalism and social constructivism, which appear as the leading theories of the first part, will seek to define state-society interactions that are to form EU's decision on enlargement at the end. Moreover, Putnam's 'two-level game' is used to broaden the comprehension of the weight of domestic politics in the international arena. In addition to asserting the influence of the

societal groups in the formation of national policies, institutional structure of the EU is analyzed in order to show to what extent national policies matter in the decision making process. Additionally, major member states of the EU are examined since it is believed that the history of the European integration has been mainly formed by the preferences of these member states.

In the second chapter enlargement policies of the major three member states of the EU, Germany, France and the UK, are discussed in detail in order to draw some conclusions for Turkey's EU membership issue. These three member states are regarded as the most influential states in the EU in terms of bargaining power. European policies of each member state are examined firstly in order to rest their approaches on a complementary basis before dealing with their enlargement policies. While mainly the Eastern Enlargement of the EU is selected as the test case, other enlargement waves are also referred when needed.

In the last chapter, the prospective accession of Turkey to the EU is analyzed comprehensively in the light of the previous chapters' findings. After providing a brief historical analysis of the EU – Turkey relations up to 2005, stances of Germany, France and the UK towards a possible Turkish accession in the post-December 1999 period are analyzed by focusing on the main determinants of each state. The first data referred are the statements of political leaders of these countries, especially during the critical turning points such as on the eve of the national elections or during the Intergovernmental Conferences.

Lastly, the public opinion, in other words, the support from the grassroots in Germany, France and the UK for Turkish accession is analyzed by employing the autumn 2006 Eurobarometer survey study. Throughout the thesis, a special emphasis is given to the societal dynamics in each member state as a main determinant in the formation of their national policies. The reason can be explained as the slight shift of weight from the governments to the people in states' policy decisions. Especially when it comes to an issue from the high-politics sphere, like Turkey's EU membership bid, business circles, opinion leaders, media and intellectuals are contributing to the dynamic and interesting debate that takes place in the European academic and political circles. Public participation in such decisions has successfully incorporated into the European political culture, while it is a new concept for Turkey.

Given this trend indicating the importance of the European citizens' opinion in affecting the national policy making, some suggestions are made for the Turkish government and people for improving the national strategies to be employed to realize Turkish Republic's biggest project in terms of scale, effort, progress and public support, namely the EU membership.

## **CHAPTER I.**

### **THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE EU ENLARGEMENT AND FORMATION OF ENLARGEMENT POLICY IN THE EU**

Theorizing the European integration has always been a controversial issue among the scholars, just like they have failed to come up with an exclusive definition of the EU. While it is defined by liberal theorists of international relations as an international organization ensuring interstate harmony and thus lasting peace, it is taken by specialists in international political economy as a regional block that is alternative to the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) or the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). According to intergovernmental approach, the EU is just a complex policy system accumulating the agendas of its actors like its member states or the interest groups in them. On the other hand, neo-functionalism takes the EU as a sui-generis structure denying all the generalization and theorization attempts, claiming that it is a unique kind of actor emerged as a consequence of special circumstances. (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 17-18)

The evolution of the European integration from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was competent only in one policy area, to the EU that has a single flag, an anthem, and a potential constitution along with a single market and a single currency, has been trying to be explained by numerous theories. The clearest distinguishing factor among these theories is the role given to nation-states vis-à-vis people and institutions above states. In view of this distinguishing factor, the chapter compares five different integration theories to explain one of the two interconnected constituents of the European integration process: Enlargement. Then, in its second section, the chapter applies the most relevant theory or theories to the mechanism of enlargement policy making in the EU.

#### **I. 1. Integration Theories: Understanding Integration to Explain Enlargement**

While there is not a particular theory that the scholars agreed on for explaining the evolution of the EU integration fully, it is a necessity to put this process onto a

theoretical basis in order to predict its future. It will help to answer the questions about the future of the EU, such as where will the widening stop and how much more will the deepening continue because its future will be a reflection of its evolution from the ECSC with six members to the EU of 27 states, which defines itself as a “global actor”. Accordingly, Ben Rosamond (2000, p. 18) argues that “...it matters because of what it can tell us about the development of the EU...”

The European integration is an interconnected two-way process, which is a mixture of deepening and widening, and the latter is the main discussion topic of this thesis. For early thinkers like Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli constructing a widened Europe from Atlantic to Urals, along with a deepened integration, is an ultimate aim in the long run. That’s why Europe has been, and is, ambitious to enlarge, just like it has been, and is, ambitious to become more integrated. However, differently from the deepening process, it is hard to base the EU’s enlargement process on a specific theoretical approach. Moreover, enlargement represents a kind of puzzle for all available approaches. In that respect, this section compares five different integration theories with an effort to find out the most relevant one(s) to explain the European enlargement process.

### **I. 1. 1. Enlargement and Existing Models**

The aim of this section is to provide an answer to the questions of *what do the major theories say or predict about the EU enlargement and which integration theory or theories are the most influential one or ones in the evaluation of enlargement among others?* The answers are provided within the existing studies of integration theories.

The attempts to explain the European integration have gradually increased since the foundation of the ECSC. Throughout the history between the 1950’s and the present, many special approaches have been employed by academics for particular periods, whereas, when the issue comes to enlargement, it is the common statement that enlargement lacks particular theory.

Actually, the main reason of this assumption is the dynamic essence of the subject. Enlargement issue contains variables and factors, which show different reactions in relation to the different rounds. Thus, scholars are not able to clarify any enlargement rounds in just one dimension. In all enlargement rounds since the first

wave main concerns have been different. Sometimes, cost and benefit analysis, sometimes security concerns and sometimes emotional factors influenced the rounds. Unlike different theories that are used to explain European integration for different time periods, theories that are applied to each enlargement round could be several.

In this section, the dominant theories of federalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism, social constructivism and liberal intergovernmentalism are chosen among other international relations and European integration theories to conceptualize the enlargement. At the end of their assessment, the outcome provides us with a relevant theory or theories to explain the forthcoming enlargement, in other words, Turkey's membership to the EU.

#### ***1. 1. 1. 1. Federalism and Enlargement***

Michael Burgess defines Europe as “hybrid with its complex institutions, structures and procedures that defy precise definition and categorization in conventional political science term” including “intergovernmental, supranational, federal, confederal and functional elements” (Burgess, 2004, p. 25). However, by adding that the EU is “now on the threshold of a constitutional and political Europe that nothing less than a federal Europe”, he implies his tendency towards the federal approach. (ibid.)

After reminding us that the word has different meanings in different systems, Burgess defines ‘federalism’ in this context as “the application of federal principles to the process of European integration where the term refers to the sense of a coming together of previously separate or independent parts to form a new whole” (Burgess, 2004, p. 30). Considering this quite mild definition, one could argue that the trend of the European integration is federalism. Yet when taking into consideration the projections of the then federalists during the Hague Congress in 1948, one can see a much more stricter federalism dreaming of a system where the nation-states almost fully delegate their competencies to the federal structure. For instance, France desires a closer integration, as opposed to the unionists like the United Kingdom which struggles for a looser structure. Actually, these original positioning of these states in federalists versus unionists spectrum also reflect their current views on enlargement, where the former is a bit reluctant of an expanding the Union, while the latter supports a many members-less

integration situation. This debate is also parallel to the deepening versus widening dichotomy.

As acknowledged by Burgess, it was early post-war years when the federalist movement was at peak. This enthusiasm can be defined by the panic and the fear of another all-embracing European war and by the attempts to prevent another Nazism-case at the end of 40's. Consequently, as opposed to Burgess' claims that this was an "unending process of integration" paving the way to a federal Europe, this process lost its popularity during 50's when the attempts to form a European Defense Community and European Political Cooperation had gone down. (Burgess, 2004, pp. 31-32)

Additionally, Burgess himself poses the "engagement of mass publics in the future direction of the EU" as a challenging factor to realization of the federalist idea. The need for referenda to receive legitimacy for the reforms introduced by new treaties and increasing importance of intergovernmental conferences for the making of these treaties bring the people of 27 nations to the scene for whom it is unlikely to get integrated to such an extent to be called a "federal" union. (Burgess, 2004, p. 41) In other words, federalism is a good reason to trigger enlargement unless we consider the applicant European states, as it advocates United States of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. On the contrary, without having federal components in itself, this prediction is worthless because it is the biggest fear of member-states, at least today, delegating their sovereignty for federal unity. Therefore, any enlargement under Federal constitution is more logical if it resembles to the American type, simply, as the first Federal patterns were constituted among thirteen colonies then it has magnetized and embraced the others.

### ***I. 1. 1. 2. Transactionalism and Enlargement***

Another theory, 'transactionalism' developed by Karl Deutsch is close to the realist school of thought since it maintains states as the sovereign actors in international arena and focuses on security as the determining factor of states' behaviors. *Security community* is the key word in Deutsch's study by which he defines *integration*. According to Deutsch *et al.* (1957, p. 5), integration is "attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its



population". In other words, it is the need for security that brings people together under a community and it is the trust built among them that ties them further. He defines two types of security communities: the first one is amalgamated communities, which are similar to federal units where the former states melt into separate and larger entities, and the second one is pluralistic communities which do not require dissolution of states, but only their awareness of mutual interests and compatibility of their policies. At this point, transactionalism goes away from the realist paradigm and becomes a bit *romantic* where it relies on human attributes such as *trust* and *sense of belonging*. This can also be considered as the deficit of this theory to explain European Integration. Even though the motivation behind integration as Deutsch puts it well was the need for security in Europe that was, it was not the trust of people to each other that brought the Original Six together, but the initiative of the elites.

Consequently, while Deutsch's study can be an alternative model for the European integration as willingness to extend the community made up of people that have the sense of belonging together due to geographical and historical relations and thus consolidating the feeling of security, it is a weakness of it to fail to explain the enlargement in the context of interests, since it does just concern about the *sentimental relations among people*. Although no one can deny the importance of micro level integration extended from the mutual relevance and feeling of trust for macro level integration, those are relevant with the latter stages and they should not constitute a priority for enlargement process. Frankly, by focusing on societies' emotions and feelings, Deutsch underestimates the utilitarian reasons of societies' attitudes towards integration and enlargement, such as economic and political reasons, like the geopolitical concerns of France during its opposition to British membership and the budget and democracy-human rights issues during the discussions about the Eastern enlargement wave.

### ***I. 1. 1. 3. Neo-functionalism and Enlargement***

'Neo-functionalism' is a good school of thought to close the gap of explaining the initiation of the European Integration. Obviously, it has its roots in functionalism which saw integration as the only way leading to perpetual peace with the logic: the more the states are tied to each other, the higher the cost of breaking up these ties, and

so the costs of wars will be. Neofunctionalism, built up on this assumption and based on such a rational calculation, generates however a sui-generis tailor-made theory for the European Integration. According to this theory, states delegate their competency in certain policy areas to a higher authority that decides for their collective good. As long as the number of these common policy areas increases, the integration takes the pace of spill-over. Another novelty in this approach where classical functionalists are criticized is the initiator of this *spill-over* effect. While this process takes place automatically according to classical view, it is initiated and encouraged by technocrats according to the neo-functionalists. Ernst Haas (1968, p. xix) explains this by arguing that “The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement; not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the writer”. The resemblance of this model to the actual progress of the European Integration launched by Schuman and Monnet making it be called as an *elite project* is one of the main reasons why this approach has found wide support among the academia.

Although neo-functionalist approach became dominant in explaining the European integration at its early stages, it was also criticized due to its *Eurocentric* feature. It is true that *spill-over* is the basic dynamic factor in this kind of integration. However, this feature also causes possible set backs in the process of integration because of political factors. In more broad terms, Community is composed of member states and each member state could have different political approach for issues in the European Community (EC) as they pursue their own national interests, therefore spill-over effect is abandoned especially in high politics like enlargement and possible *spill-backs* is recognized during integration. The EC witnessed such spill-backs especially between the years of 60's and 80's. Empty chair crisis paved the way to Luxembourg compromise was one of the main events that testified against the automatic spill-over process.

Such spill-backs are also seen in the realm of enlargement policy. According to a hypothetical scenario in which neo-functionalism theory is valid for enlargement policy, all the countries in the European region would automatically become members. However, we can display the following examples to prove that the assumption is wrong. For instance, the countries like Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland preferred to stay out of the EU in line with their national interests. On the other hand, when the British

application is observed, it can be seen that again national interests of a country, France, were the determining factor on enlargement decision, rather than an automatic membership. As a matter of fact, if neo-functional theory had been dominant all over Europe; firstly both member states and drivers of the Community would have absorbed the UK, secondly those three (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway) would have joined the other European countries as they were expected. Nonetheless, state preferences surpassed the spill-over assumption of neo-functional theory. The inclusion of Cyprus and Visegrad Countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) by the influences of Greece and Germany was a valid example for this approach.

#### ***I. 1. 1. 4. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Enlargement***

While neo-functionalism puts the technocrats to the center of policy making and undervalues the role of states in this process, in the intergovernmentalist view there is a strong emphasis on the state as the actor and its relative power against the other states during bargaining. This aspect of ‘intergovernmentalism’ makes it seem to be quite close to realist paradigm, as it is used in international relations by Hans Morgenthau. According to this realism, international politics is about the interaction of self-interested actors (states) in a situation where there is no overarching authority to provide order in a global scale.<sup>1</sup> This absence of *overarching authority* is directly opposed to the neo-functional view putting the supranational decision-making body –the Commission– in to the center.

This study prefers to analyze integration by separating it into layers of policies. The two-level model proposes that ‘low politics’ issues are determined according to the neo-functional approach, whereas the decisions concerning ‘high politics’ are made by member states following intergovernmental bargaining process. The logic behind this model lies in that the states hesitate to delegate their authority in important matters. In other words, this is an issue of struggle of nation-states for sovereignty that is challenged by supranational decision-making authorities.

This difference between these two tracks reveals itself in different places of integration in economic and political areas. Starting from the Rome Treaty on, all the

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<sup>1</sup> For full text please see:  
[http://www.epsnet.org/EPISTEME/Unit2/Unit2%20II.1%20neorealism/unit2\\_II.1\\_neorealism\\_B2.htm](http://www.epsnet.org/EPISTEME/Unit2/Unit2%20II.1%20neorealism/unit2_II.1_neorealism_B2.htm)

subsequent treaties were designed as to facilitate the operation of the Single Market. The integration has been spilling over from coal and steel to other sectors, from Customs Union to Single Market, and from Monetary Union to a single currency, as described by neo-functionalists. In these policy areas, the member states agreed to totally delegate their authority to a higher body, which is now the Commission.

However, this is not the case for security and foreign policy issues, the “so-called high politics in which the integration has often been described as synonymous with surrendering sovereignty” (Sjursen, 2003, p. 1). William Nicoll and Trevor Salmon (2001, p. 345) also refer to this concern of member states: “they have been mindful of the fact that foreign policy touches directly in those factors which make a state, a state that is the status of sovereignty”.

Enlargement of the EU which is the main topic of this study is clearly one of the issues dealt with the scope of high politics. This is indicated by the fact that it is put under the foreign policy scope in the EU in which the decisions are not left to the Commission, but to the Council made up of the representatives of individual states advocating their national interests, rather than the Community’s. Therefore, paper will focus on the intergovernmental bargaining approach to explain the enlargement policy of the EU.

As mentioned above, this theory takes the realist assumption somehow as maintaining states still as the main actors which act rationally according to their self-interests. Again, on the basis of the realist paradigm, power is the determining factor in state relations. Furthermore, the preferences of states that shape their behavior against each other are defined according to their possibility of survival, in other words military and security reasons, in realist approach which distinguishes ‘classical intergovernmentalism’ from the ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ introduced by Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998).

Both of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Intergovernmentalism are the basis of the European Integration project and underline the significance of national governments vis-à-vis the declining importance of supranational institutions in general. For a comprehensive understanding, it would be the best way to differentiate between these approaches by exposing their arguments. For instance, intergovernmentalists argue that cooperation between states depends on similar interests and institutions cannot progress

without the member states consents. On the other hand, liberal intergovernmental approach explains integration in a different way. First of all, liberal intergovernmentalism seizes the state's behavior as rational. Besides, Moravcsik (1993) the architect of the theory proposes a two-level analysis of domestic preference formation and intergovernmental bargaining. According to this, national interests are influenced by societies and they demand policies and these are generally based on economic interests. In addition to this, between states there is an asymmetrical interdependence and outcome of the negotiations depends on the states' bargaining power and their preferences. Here heads of states act as policy suppliers, as societal interest groups act like policy demanders in domestic preference formation. "National interests...emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481). After the national strategies are determined through this state-society interaction, the individual state tries to make its national policy be accepted by the others as an EU policy.

Before they start fighting for their policies to become EU policies, it is important to look at the factors that shape the member states' positions. It should not be forgotten that the ones that have the decision-making competency in these matters are the politicians, not the technocrats like neo-functionalists claim. Since the politicians' actual interest is staying at office, what really matters is the interest defined by the domestic societal power. Moravcsik asserted that the primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office and this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies. A set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations emerges through this process. (1993, p. 483) Therefore, during these talks, negotiators' bargaining positions are not limitless, but constrained by their voters' preferences at home. If this factor is taken into account, the willingness of European citizens about integration gains importance. Therefore, the suggestion of this thesis is that influencing the EU member states, especially the major ones, is indispensable to become one of them.

#### ***1. 1. 1. 5. Social Constructivism and Enlargement***

Having mentioned the states' preferences, social constructivism is another theory worth discussing here. Thomas Risse introduces 'social constructivism' as "a

challenge to more rationalist approaches such as liberal intergovernmentalism, but also a version of neo-functionalism” (Risse, 2004, p. 160). He makes a differentiation between institution-building process that could be explained by rational choice theories which are agent-centered, such as liberal intergovernmentalism on the one hand; and formation of preferences and interest of these agents that could well be considered as socially constructed on the other hand.

Unlike rational choice theories that put the individuals (persons and states) to the center of decision making, social constructivism emphasizes the social environment of the individuals as the determining factor of their behavior and the interaction between them through which they produce and reproduce the reality.

In fact, Risse puts forward this as a shortcoming of liberal intergovernmentalism and criticizes it for taking the preferences of actors as given, while he shows social constructivism as filling this gap. In other words, he introduces it as complementary, rather than a substitute approach to European Integration theories. This is another factor verifying hybrid nature of European Integration where different aspects of it can be explained by different theories. (Risse, 2004, p. 161)

Risse uncovers another deficit of liberal intergovernmentalism by reminding that there are two directions of effects of Europeanization on policy making; first, the effect of domestic policies on European policies; second, the effect of Europeanization on domestic policies and preferences. Liberal intergovernmentalism puts so much focus on the first direction and misses the second one, while social constructivism sees the impact of further integration on national preferences in which the societies redefine their identity as they further interact with other member and change their attitudes. In that way, the probability of their interests to converge increases, just like the neo-functionalists predict. The concept of *shift of loyalties* (identities) from national to supranational level is shared by both of these two approaches. This idea is the distinguishing point between the two camps; supporting further integration and suspecting the existence of a common European identity. (Risse, 2004, pp. 162-163)

Risse shows the notion of common identity as the only explanation of the affirmative decision on the Eastern Enlargement, although this was against the individual interests of the member states by referring to Frank Schimmelfenning (2001). This *sense of belonging* idea is totally shared by transactionalism. However, in the latter

this sense is created due to some material motivations such as need for security, rather than due to the bondage stemming from the interaction between the societies like in the former. The role of identities and affiliations in the decisions of the member states on enlargement will be examined in detail in the next section.

In the light of the analysis of the integration theories it could be concluded that the best theory to explain the enlargement decisions of the EU is intergovernmental bargaining in which the main actors are the rational states that are obliged to reflect the aggregate preferences of their constituents on the negotiation table. The reason why enlargement is treated differently than the other policy areas making up a bigger part of the *acquis communautaire* and dealt with in a supranational way in terms of institutions and procedures, is that the nation states are still not ready to give up their control on such a vital topic. While the behaviors of the parties during international negotiations are well explained by intergovernmental bargaining, the motivation behind the positions of the states on the table is explained largely by social constructivism which examines the common values of the societal groups that will be reflected to the national policies, and partly by transactionalism that is similar to the former, but adds the *we feeling* to the formation of societal preferences.

Having acknowledged that the EU decision-making process is mainly shaped by these theories, now we will look at this process empirically, first analyzing the policies made at the national level as an outcome of interaction between societies and their governments and then at the international level as an outcome of the bargaining among the member states.

## **I. 2. Formation of Enlargement Policy in the EU**

Analyzing the participants of the policy-making process at recent times, we see that supremacy of state as the ultimate actor has been quite challenged by societies. Citizens that make up the societies do not play the passive *subject* role anymore, obeying the decisions of the legislators. On the contrary, they are more and more involved in this process, affecting the decisions not only in domestic, but also in international politics. Although it was not easy for them to gain this right, recently new mechanisms are invented to facilitate their involvement in politics.

It would not be totally honest to claim that states as the former supreme power-holders take the preferences of societies into consideration for altruistic reasons. The rationale behind this openness is the concern of maintaining office. From a basic calculus, the more a group has a constituent capacity in elections, the more it gets satisfied during the policy-making. Due to these substantial ties, office holders take all ideas and defined interests into account either for domestic or international issues. Therefore, it is expected that states/governments are supposed to maximize society's interests with their institutions.

The EU that puts democracy to the top of its list of values introduced the concept of *governance* instead of *government* which created a legal sphere for the civilian people to interact with the politicians in policy-making. With every new Treaty, it comes up with new institutional reforms putting more and more emphasis on the role of the citizens in decisions, which will be examined in detail below.

The popular theoretical explanation of the EU policy-making model is Robert Putnam's (1998) "two-level game" metaphor that is based on this perpetual interaction between state and society. The two levels he is referring to are as follows:

- 1) *bargaining between the negotiators* (he means the international negotiations run among the representatives of the states)
- 2) *separate discussions within each group of constituents...* (he means the process of national policy-making as an outcome of the struggle between intra-state forces) ( p. 436)

The determining factors at the first level policy-making are easier to follow, because the national policies of states are supposed to be relatively durable and explicitly revealed on the negotiation table. However, the motivations of the actors of the second level (parties, social classes, interest groups, legislators, and even public opinion as Putnam puts out) are harder to observe because the positions of these societal groups are shaped not only by rational, but also by psychological and emotional factors. Furthermore, these positions are silently implied in the elections.

This section examines the policy-formation processes at these two levels, by looking at the priorities of the actors in making their decisions and the means they use in order to make their policy prevail over the others.




### **I. 2. 1 Formation of Societies' Preferences**

As we explained above, “governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena, but on the basis of goals that are defined domestically” (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481). Now the question is how the goals are defined domestically, given that the societies are not homogeneous bodies, but consist of cleavages with conflicting interests. Once these groups come up with their own preferences, it is up to the internal political machine to aggregate these demands. At the end of this competition between the societal groups, they either reconcile through compromises or the interest of the most powerful one comes out at the national interest. It can be seen as a minor reflection of the bargaining process that takes place at the other level between the states. (ibid.)

Once it is recognized that society's expectations are one of the main motivations of the national policies, many policy areas could be engendered by governments according to general tendencies or according to dominant groups in society. Via tendencies governments could also be directed for international cooperation which is an ordinary outcome of foreign policy making. In such cooperations mainly economic aspects are put forward like diminishing or total abolishment of the protectionist trade barriers. Namely, society's preferences are shaped around economic provisions. Nevertheless, sometimes international cooperations may have policy areas different than the commercial ones -like having socio-economic conditions- and usually this kind of cooperation concerns the society as a whole. (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 495) At that time political preferences of the society also play important role in order to carry out the international cooperation. Enlargement policy of the EU can be the best example here. In addition to its commercial side, the political aspect of European enlargement make societies transfer their willingness to governments in two ways based on *Economic and Political Grounds*.

*Figure 1: Formation of preferences*



*A= Demands*

*B= Government Policies*

*C= Formulation of strategy*

In *Figure 1*, society's involvement is explicitly shown regarding a broad cooperation in scope. As it is seen, this type of cooperation also has non-economic aspects like the EU has, and due to the logic of liberal systems society feel free to influence other areas different than economy. On the other hand, conditions and provisions of the cooperation are also very important. Since their outcome will affect domestic societal groups directly, conditions and provisions are examined very carefully. Individual citizens and firms have a strong incentive to mobilize politically when the net costs and benefits of alternative policies are certain, significant and risky. In such circumstances, government policy is strictly constrained by unidirectional pressure from cohesive groups of producers or organized private interests. (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 487) Unless the cooperation serves to their both economic and political views, pressure groups often constraint governments' position. For this reason, it would not be overstated when society is recognized as *observer* in a sense.

As it is given above, the limit of cooperation justifies the involvement of pressure groups in the process. So, if it just concerns economic provisions, producers and large companies and their organizations or affiliations are involved; and if it concerns both political and economic provisions, in addition to producers and large companies, other related pressure groups are involved in the process. Countries' position is almost defined in the mentioned cooperation, the EU, by societies' economic and political preferences. Then, members of this cooperation, bargain for their interest and endeavor to manipulate the legislative institution of the Community for

implementing *favored* policy. But before discussing that, it is functional to make clear a society's main inspirations underlying their preferences in such cooperation. They are classified as economic and political grounds.

### ***I. 2. 1. 1. Economic Grounds***

Due to the main logic of international agreements (as an alternative course), economic provisions of agreements are extremely significant for societies. Putnam (1988, p. 431) highlights the importance of domestic factors in foreign economic policy making. Similarly, Peter Katzenstein (cited in Putnam, 1988, p. 431) argues that the main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international political economy. Such *raison d'être* of the society is wise as it consents to its government to pursue its own interest in international arena. Then when states become a party in cooperation, they tend to pay attention to the demands of their societies and claim more under agreement, in order to serve both their society's demands and their political destiny. So, what could be the main economic motivations or stimulants for society to favor an international policy of government especially under a special cooperation?

Before discussing economic grounds of agreement for a society, it would be complementary to mention the possible road map of the agreement. Since international agreements are carried on more than one state, which are rational, mainly *transborder issues* appeared as unique policy-making area among states. All economic activities foreign trade, flow of capital and services etc. can be counted under transborder issues. Many groups inside the societies such as producers, merchants, simply individuals or legal companies who deal with inter-state commercial activities are the key actors of the transborder issues. Also one of the results of inter-state activities, namely economic interdependence<sup>2</sup> occurs as the basis of negotiating transborder issues.

Indeed, states and –indirectly– societies may suffer from the balance of economic interdependence occurred among themselves. The main reason of this, realization of economic activities under economic interdependence is not *free* since almost every state imposes restrictions on interstate economic activities in order to

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<sup>2</sup> According to Moravcsik, economic interdependence stems from the nature of liberal theories and it emerges as a result of interstate economic activities.

protect some fragile sectors of domestic markets. States' and their societies' domestic goals are undermined due to these restrictions. Restrictions are realized in mutual way. In other words, states can take measures to protect their domestic markets from i.e. negative effects of imports whereas the same approach can also be adopted by their counterparts for the same reason. Unfortunately, by protecting their fragile sectors they also prevent their competitive sectors to open into new markets. Consequently, like Moravcsik (1993, p. 485) underlines, governments seize this *policy vacuum* as a tool for interstate coordination to promote their societies' and their own interests since the increasing transborder flows of goods, services, factors create benefits for their societal groups.

Again when we turn back to our discussion about the society's expectations from an agreement; simply, it can be stated that any agreements which serve to the interest of majority are always favorable for societies. However, the society is not homogenous in terms of classifying interests. It contains many different groups which pursue particular objectives. Farmers, industrialists and their subordinates represent just some of them. Also their perception of interest differs from each other. In fact, all economic sectors want to be active both in domestic and foreign markets to maximize their profits while favoring protectionist policies inside and disproving restrictions outside. However, states cannot supply advantage of exploiting other markets to their societies without having any disadvantages. Creation of that environment is impossible since none of states can present such liberal approach unilaterally.

If governments decide to make policy in the different realms rather than domestic ones for the welfare of societies, they are supposed to be very careful on the negotiation table. This is because the nature of international agreement is based on compromise. In other words, each party of agreement has to sacrifice one or more sectors for the conclusion. That's why, we emphasize on that governments should be careful because they have to make right decision for the society by sacrificing one or more sectors to create additional value for their societies. Therefore, to make right decision on the provisions of agreement, governments take into consideration representatives of every single sector. As a result, after macro economic evaluations they should sacrifice minimally risky sector to gain more. According to Paul Thurner and Eric Linhart, for such possible multi-level international relations, governments

adopt a strategic approach, in which they trade off expected costs and benefits, both at the national and the international level. At the international level, governments are confronted with other self-interested sovereign states-revealing more or less reliable their preferences and their own restrictions. Internally, governments have to take account of the electorate, interest groups. (Turner and Linhart, 2004, p. 5) Generally, minimally risky sectors are the ones which are disadvantageous in international markets and have relatively low shares in economic gains. For example, farmers in Germany and industrialists in France in 1960's; if farmers and industrialists in Germany and France are compared, one can see that in Germany farmers and in France industrialist are in more disadvantaged positions. Under the EC, both France and Germany sacrificed those economically disadvantageous groups to gain more from the trade of economically advantageous sectors. By the help of EC provisions, governments of either nation managed to create new markets through offering some reciprocal concessions, in other words *loss*, which are incomparable to gains. (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 491)

Even though the policy coordination that enables cooperation emerges in accordance with economically dominant groups' preferences, the outcome of the cooperation does not totally neglect other economic groups' interest. In other words, national governments do not let other domestic groups get lost in the national market after trade liberalization in cross-border transactions. Governments balance loses of domestic market share of disadvantageous groups (i.e. farmers in Germany, industrialists in France) with the gains in foreign markets. (ibid.) It is usually realized by subsidies or other financial adjustments.

Basically, economically favorable grounds for an agreement can be provided by maximizing societies' interests. Accordingly, the policy coordination between states is also welcomed by dominant societal groups in each country since the coordinated policies affect positively all societies' net gains. So, if governments manage to meet expectations of every sector by international compromises with suitable provisions, it creates broader societal support for implementation of cooperation.

### ***1. 2. 1. 2. Political Grounds***

Type of the coordination among nations also designates level of participation of society to the process. If it just concerns economic matters, society mobilizes in that

way. But if the scope of coordination broadens to political issues, just like we have been experiencing in the EC, societies also consider the way of that coordination by expressing their political views. By generating public opinion, they also transfer their views to the governments on the eve of establishing a new international agreement or entering existing one or accepting new partners, in order to influence them in positive/negative ways as they do in the economic aspects of agreement.

Unlike economic grounds, political motivations of societies are not easy to capture as they have abstract implications inside. Nevertheless, to provide the rational reasons for the issue, focusing on cross-cutting approaches would be practical. For instance, in the previous part, *maximization of interests* was the common stimulant of societies for an agreement. Similarly, when political grounds of such broaden agreement is considered in the same way, *the sense of affinity* becomes apparent.

The sense of affinity, namely *we-feeling*, is significant for the continuation of an agreement, which bring societies together on the basis of economic as well as political concerns. As in the case of decreasing or abolishing trade barriers to maximize interests, societies should have, at least, mutual understanding, loyalty and confidence to carry out political provisions of the agreement as they are underlying features of *we-feeling*. Deutsch defined *we-feeling* as a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it. Shortly, it is a matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual action, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. (cited in Jones and Van der Bijl 2004, p. 332)

Despite this minimal necessity for lasting harmony in political coordination, ideological grounds which are the main components of political approaches can be differed by two independent variables: society and time. For societies, each single society of agreement has unique national identity, and unique national identity is originated from culture which comes from the religious, historical and geographical habits. Once states initiate a project to supply common policies for their citizens, individuals of any societies or citizens of any states desire to see inside the individuals having the same habits, traditions or the way of understandings because communication between individuals has to be built on common denominators if the project foresees

enduring harmony. In the EU example, in terms of economic and political hub for common policies, the policies are made, improved and expanded by societies and governments, which had economically and politically almost the same passion. The founding six member states were politically European (West-European), catholic and democratic countries. Indeed, Brent Nelsen and James Guth argue that these countries possessed what Deutsch termed as *we-feeling* precisely because they shared catholic cultures (quoted in Jones and Van der Bijl, 2004, p. 333). Between 1975-1985, members of the EC politically shared the enthusiasm for the rule of law and they resisted against autocratic regimes. And lastly in the post-1985 period, human rights, democracy and anti-communist values in addition to the rule of law were politically employed as a common denominator among states to come together.<sup>3</sup> As it is seen, mutual sympathy, trust and mutual consideration among societies have been provided by different political aspects like liberal thought, respect to laws and etc. There is no clear evidence that societies totally welcome politically similar societies because politics' main component, the ideologies (under the influence of religion, history, culture, geography), may change even in small communities like families. Thus, instead of raising such utopian thoughts, modern societies and governments in Europe tend to welcome common values of humanity as the basic need for the building sense of affinity.

Secondly, the impact of time should not be underestimated on the formation of underlying political requirements for political coordination. The sense of affinity or *we-feeling* can redefine itself in parallel to the time. As we see in the given examples above, although there might be some manipulations coming from governments, when we come to the end of 80's, European societies feel the sense affinity to other European

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<sup>3</sup> For the formation of a common-denominator, the thesis does not emphasize especially the role of religion due to two reasons: first of all, since in the enlightenment era 'reason' substituted for the 'religion' in European societies. Indeed, the Constitution underlines continuation of this trend since the proposals to attach Christianity features to the text were rejected. Secondly, in the Christian world sects of Christianity are perceived as diverse religions by societies. For example, Orthodox and Catholic sects of Christianity excommunicate their believers if they practice their beliefs in other churches than their churches. Additionally, sect differentiation caused very bloody events in Europe. St. Bartholomew Day in Paris, Thirty Year Wars, Latin invasion of Orthodox Constantinople during the IV. Crusades and recent Orthodox-Catholic struggle in Yugoslavia between Serbs and Croats show once again the insufficiency of religion for being a common denominator in Europe. Of course, no one can deny the role of religion in terms of cultural heritage of Europe whereas again no one can deny famous the slogan "united in diversity" of EU.

societies which also respect the rule of law, human rights, resist against communism and autocracy, raise the democratic values while emphasizing modernity as well. The same approach put forward also by Moravcsik (1993, p. 483), who believes the identity, interests and the influence of groups vary across time, place and, especially, issue-arena according to the net expected costs and benefits of potential foreign policies.

In order to pool the diverse societies for the political cooperation in addition to economic cooperation, basic needs have to be met according to goals of the project. If it is a modernity project like the EU, humanitarian values become significant instead of sociological and cultural facts. When underlying conditions are provided by the members of cooperation, societies could influence governmental organs or transfer their views for the common policies stemmed from international or supranational institutions as it is seen in the EU example.

Consequently, in light of these economic and political grounds concerning societies' interests, member states determine their own policies to favor their national interests and to meet their societies' demand in the multilateral cooperation. Regarding the EU, one can see that the member states act in the same way as it is discussed; besides the formation of their policy and they also set their bargaining position in the EU institutions to achieve the national goals.

### **I. 2. 2. Formation of the Policies at the EU-Level**

The national policies, the formations of which are described above, enter into competition at the European level to come out as the common policy of the EU. This part of the chapter will examine the procedures and the institutions of the EU on which the competition of the national policies takes place. Although the policy-making process is quite controversial due to its complexity and distance to the citizens (democratic deficit debate), it is designed to remedy the imbalances in terms of capabilities of members in imposing their own preferences on others, such as their financial powers, the size of their territories, or their populations. To pursue this aim, the institutions and the voting procedures of each of them have been designed differently and are in constant change with the institutional reforms in order to adapt to the changing conditions like enlargement. The main decision-making institutions of the EU are the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. All



policies and legislations are coming out in this *institutional triangle* of the EU. Therefore, it will be useful to examine the working procedures of these institutions in order to understand the weight of each single country in the making of common policies.

#### ***1. 2. 2. 1. European Commission***

Alongside the European Parliament and the Council of the Ministers, the European Commission is one of the main three institutions governing the EU. Although the EU is often described as a supranational organization, the Commission is the sole body that complies with this description, since the Commissioners represent the interests of the Union as a whole, leaving aside their national concerns. In other words, it is not the place where a bargaining process described above takes place. It deals with issues that fall into first pillar and occasionally it shares with member states the initiative of legislation of the issues related to the second and the third pillars. In decision making, it is the institution proposing a legislation which is then sent to the European Parliament for opinion and eventually to the Council of Ministers for final decision. Finally, according to the decision of the Council of Ministers, EC does or does not implement the decision.

Inside the Community, especially for the Europeanization of different policies the effect of the Commission cannot be ignored. As John McCormick (2002, p. 88) argues it has not only encouraged member states to harmonize their laws, regulations and standards in the interest of removing barriers to trade, but also has been the source of some of the most important policy initiatives of the last forty years, including the single market programme and the development of the Euro. It can be easily said that the Commission is at the core of integration since the creation of the ECSC whereas member states have been controlling its sphere of influence with the Council of Ministers by addressing its characteristic. The control mechanism executed by member states not to lose their sovereignty shows itself especially regarding the issues of high-politics like enlargement and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Thus in

such issues, the European Commission is obliged for the implementation of directives coming from the compromise of the member states and presentation of its opinion<sup>4</sup>.

Recently, with the institutional reforms the supremacy of the European Commission which is the supranational organ of the Union has been challenged and there is a shift towards national interests, rather than common European interests. According to Suzanne Schmidt (2000, p. 41), by means of different control mechanism in particular over the Commission, governments try to assure their delegated competencies in the Commission cannot easily be used against their interests

### *1. 2. 2. 2. European Parliament*

The European Parliament (EP) is the most representative institution of the EU and its members are elected by eligible voters in the member states through direct elections since 1979. Despite the well-known definition of ‘Parliament’; proposals, amendments and discussion for a new law(s) do not take place under the competencies of the European Parliament. Since the Treaty of Rome signed, the EP’s role in decision-making process has improved gradually. With the Treaty of Rome, the EP was given a consultation role: when Commission proposes a law, the EP could state its non-binding opinion to the Council of Ministers before the adoption of the new law. But almost every decade with the introduction of new treaties the role of the EP in the EU, especially in the decision-making procedure has increased. Lastly, by the Treaty of Amsterdam, powers of the EP were redefined under the headings of codecision procedure<sup>5</sup>, assent procedure<sup>6</sup>, its supervisory feature<sup>7</sup>.

When it is compared to the other institutions, although the EP is relatively more democratic in nature than the Commission and the Council of Ministers, controversially its share in decision making cannot go beyond codecision and consultation procedure.

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<sup>4</sup> In certain cases, the opinion of Commission can provide guidance for final decision that is made by member-states.

<sup>5</sup> Codecision procedure was the product of the Maastricht Treaty. According to this treaty, in 15 areas the Council and the EP shares power in legislation process. With the Amsterdam Treaty number of areas increased to 38 and if the Constitution of the EU ratified this number would reach 85. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty increased the EP’s power over foreign policy issues and the Presidency is obliged to consult for the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

<sup>6</sup> Under assent procedure, the European Parliament has equal power over the decisions of allowing new members, budget, and international agreements with Council.

<sup>7</sup> EP has some supervisory powers over the other institutions. For example, it approves the College of Commissioners as well as it can question the Commission’s agenda.

Moreover, like the European Commission, the EP also faces obstacle of member states about extension of its competency area. McCormick (2002, p. 108) explains this as the one of the main concerns of member states, which has created a complex legislative process in order to preserve their powers over decision making in the Council of Ministers.

Also periodically declined election turnouts strengthened the member states' tendencies against the EP. These elections are seen as uncertain and confusing in Europe, and even most of Europeans do not know what the EP exists for? Dramatically, this tendency has also reflected to elections, while in 1999 the average turnout in Europe was 49,8% in 2004 this has fallen to 44,5%. Similarly, if it is observed country by the country, the same situation can be seen; for instance, in 1999 elections in Britain the average turnout was 22%. Besides, also the countries of last enlargement wave showed poor performance in June 2004; only one out of five eligible persons participated the last European election in Poland and Slovenia.<sup>8</sup>

### *I. 2. 2. 3. Council of Ministers*

Among institutions in this triangle, the Council has a special role. It is accepted as the major institution in the decision making process of the EU. It consists of ministers from member states' governments. The Council carries out the legislation process with the EP. But, since latter's participation is restricted in many policy areas, it steps forward in substantial decisions of the EU. Due to its privileged position apart from the others, all legislative issues are considered by the Council. It can exercise its power on wide-range of policy areas, nevertheless; especially over the policy areas such as foreign and security, justice and home affairs as well as their related areas the Council has distinguished supremacy.

Officially, the Council gets involved in the decision making process after the Commission proposes a new law. Both legislative arms, the EP and the Council deal with it, but if the policy area is under the competency of the Council, the specialists in the Council working groups just pay attention to the suggestions that come from the EP in terms of amendment, disagreement and etc. Then the working groups make the

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<sup>8</sup> See the web-site of the European Parliament, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout\\_ep/turnout\\_table.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/turnout_table.html)

proposal ready for discussion in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) meeting, which tries to ensure early compromise among governments before the proposal moves to meeting of ministers in the Council for final decision. On the other hand, scope of the new legislation can let the COREPER to shift the issue to the Council for debate. When the issue comes on desks of the ministers of the Council, they reach consensus with or without exercising the formal voting. Under formal voting procedure, for policy areas dependent on different voting procedures such as for foreign and security policies, asylum, immigration, economic policy and taxation ‘unanimity’<sup>9</sup> is used and for remaining areas decisions are taken by ‘qualified majority’<sup>10</sup> (QMV), in which a proposal must have 232 out of total 321 votes (%72). As a third way ‘simple majority’ has also been defined in voting. But since the policy making areas in which QMV is used have increased, use of simple majority in decision making procedure has reduced.

On the other hand, the final decisions that have been taken by the Council are assumed to uphold national interests through compromise, bargaining and diplomacy. As it is stated in the previous parts, national governments, which are also significant political figures at home, must satisfy their societies, so in the EU level all member states’ governments are motivated by national interests and political ideologies. In this respect, to orientate the EU level decisions for the preservation of interests, member states designed the Council as one of the most influential bodies of the EU. Additionally, to consolidate this influence in 1974 the European Council<sup>11</sup> was established. Especially by making key decisions on the issues of political and economic integration such as internal market, foreign policy, budget disputes, treaty revisions, new member admissions and institutional reforms, the European Council facilitates the functioning of the Council as well as it draws a general framework for the Commission’s undertakings. (McCormick, 2002, pp. 100-101)

With regard to the Council and the European Council, the terms of *bargaining and forming coalition* have special importance among states to reach a consensus. As

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<sup>9</sup> The use of unanimity gives each member state veto power. To legalize the proposal under unanimity all member states must approve the issue.

<sup>10</sup> According to the QMV, weight of votes is arranged in parallel to the population of member states. Hence, under QMV Germany (82 Mil.) has 29 votes whereas Malta (0.4 Mil) has 3 votes.

<sup>11</sup> European Council consists of head of governments or states of the EU members. They meet twice a year in summits to provide policy direction for the EU.

these institutions are made up by national governments' delegations and are institutionally most powerful, all the EU states endeavor to match the outcome with their own goals or expectations. Their national interests and ideologies compete to come out as the official policy. Nonetheless, this is not easy; national interests or ideologies of member states may vary, they could even be contradictory. As a result, states must persuade each others. That's why bargaining and forming coalition under unanimity and QMV become very important in the Council and in the European Council indirectly. In the case of policies taken by unanimity if each government favors possible policy closest to its preferences, there would be no agreement and consensus for legislation due to veto mechanism. Furthermore the process will not be going beyond the *status-quo*. Therefore, under the umbrella of the Council and the European Council, member states discuss and bargain for their preferences. By using some trade-offs and extra stimulants governments try to persuade other members for their offers. If offers are in interest of other members, they may look to compromise rather than vetoing the policy. The same approaches can also be seen in the configuration of previous enlargement issues. For example, France accepted German reunification after the approval of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU (EMU) by West Germany; likewise South European Countries consented to last enlargement after the allocation of extra funds to them. Policy-making under the QMV attaches importance also to forming coalition in addition to bargaining. Issues that fall under the QMV must have 71% of total votes. So, just like bargaining, forming coalitions could be a very useful method.

In this context, French-German axis has always been critical since their bargaining power and influence are relatively higher than others. They possess 1/5 of total votes while they are known as locomotives of The EU both economically and politically. Therefore, it would be beneficial for smaller states to participate in this integrationist coalition or form a new one. For instance, Poland's gradually increased interaction with Germany and France in the name of Weimar Triangle could be considered as a paving way for a larger coalition. In fact, if the Weimar Triangle revives, Poland could become one of the important key actors in QMV.

#### ***I. 2. 2. 4. Hierarchy between the Institutions in Policy Making***

In line with these considerations, one can reach another important conclusion about the institutions. As it is highlighted in part regarding the Commission, the inferiority of supranational institutions to the intergovernmental institutions in the decision-making procedures of the high-politics matters becomes obvious. Thus, when decision-making process is assessed from the perspective of integration theories, liberal inter-governmentalism -which foresees this type international formations as a result of two-stage process- once again comes forward *vis-à-vis* Neo-functionalism. In the first stage, state preferences take shape in response to demands and pressures from interest groups in society; and in the second stage, government transforms these demands and pressures into a policy and international bargaining takes place for the relevant policy.

#### **I. 2. 3. Determining Factors of the Bargaining Power**

The decisions that fall under the Council's competency are about the most important and hot topics that lie at the center of loss of sovereignty. Therefore, they are open to tough debates and negotiations of the member states, which are allowed to take place at the Council summits. The outcome of the national competitions at this level depends on the bargaining power of the states around the table. Most literature on bargaining in the EU rests on decision-making processes. Scholars dealing with the EU have been proposing different sources for the bargaining power of member states.

Moravcsik (1998, pp. 5, 18) believes that history of the European integration has been affected by the preferences of the larger member states. From his perspective, during the intergovernmental conferences and from the outcome of the treaties, their effects can easily be detected. His approach in this issue is also shared by Jonathan Slapin (2006, p. 54), who provides empirical support for Moravcsik claims to the EU's five largest intergovernmental bargains from 1955 to 1993. What is meant by *larger* is the socio-economic capacity of the member, such as its contribution to the European GDP, to the budget, its number of votes that is determined according to its population, etc. Hence, he argues that the history of the European integration is best understood as a series of important intergovernmental bargains among the EU's three largest member states, Germany, France, and the UK. Below, Table 1 presents demographic, economic

and political indicators to find out current big bosses of the EU from the view of the larger.

Another important source for bargaining strength in the EU stems from Putnam's (1988) well-known masterpiece "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", in which he discusses the international agreements from both national and international level. According to his theory, the determining factor of the bargaining power of states' representatives at the negotiation table is the size of their win-sets. The more a negotiator has acceptable options, the more vulnerable he is to be persuaded. In other words, unless one party is tightly constrained, he is more likely to resist the influences from other parties. This pressure constraining the states derives mostly from the internal forces. Therefore, we can say that the determination of the societies on one issue is one of the most important factors that strengthen the position of their representatives. However, unless the win-sets of the participants are large enough to intersect each other, then they are less open to reconcile and a comprehensive outcome is hard to reach. In Putnam's (1988, p. 438) words: "the smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that the negotiations will break down".

To conclude, the preferences of citizens occupy more and more place at the table, on which important agreements between the states are negotiated. Mostly "two-level game" or "intergovernmental bargaining" concepts are used by scholars like Putnam and Moravcsik, respectively, to define this kind of policy-making. With this new trend, the governments take into account the opinion of the public which are their constituents to keep them in the office. The bargaining does not only take place at the negotiating table, but also among the domestic forces that make up a society. Also the institutional setup and decision-making procedures of the EU are well-designed to aggregate the demands coming from the bottom and putting them before the upper levels of policy-makers allowing the preference of the most influential one to become the European policy. In this respect, an empirical study of this process will be elaborated in the following chapter.

Table 1: Demographic, economic and political indicators

	Area (000 sq. km)	Population (Million)	Gross Domestic Product (Official Exchange Rate- Billion \$)	GDP – per capita (\$)
Germany*	357	82,1	2.872	31.900
UK*	244	60,7	2.346	31.800
France*	547	63,7	2.149	31.100
Italy	301	58,1	1.785	30.200
Spain	504	40,4	1.084	24.400
Netherlands	41	16,5	612	32.100
Belgium	30	10,3	369	33.000
Sweden	449	9	373	32.200
Austria	83	8,1	310	34.600
Denmark	43	5,4	257	37.000
Finland	338	5,2	199	33.700
Greece	131	10,7	223	24.000
Portugal	92	10,6	176	19.800
Ireland	70	4,1	204	44.500
Luxembourg	2	0,4	34	71.400
Poland	312	38	337	14.300
Czech Rep.	78	10,2	118	21.900
Hungary	93	9,9	113	17.600
Slovakia	48	5,4	47	18.200
Slovenia	20	2	37	23.400
Latvia	64	2,2	16	16.000
Lithuania	65	3,5	30	15.300
Estonia	45	1,3	13	20.300
Cyprus	9	0,7	16	23.000
Malta	0,3	0,4	5	21.000
Bulgaria	110	7,3	28	10.700
Rumania	237	22,2	80	9.100

Source: CIA, the World Factbook

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>



## **CHAPTER II.**

### **GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: DIFFERENT STANCES TOWARDS ENLARGEMENT**

As can be seen in the previous chapter, the policy making process of the EU is complex and distinctive. Although one can make general statements about the ways that the EU produces, it is still multifaceted to understand by outsiders and even by insiders. One reason of this outcome is the existence of various elements in the policy making process which establishes the EU on a number of different but interrelated dimensions. Recognizing which elements become dominant in the policy making process is directly related to the issue-areas. The areas referring to common or shared interests are left to the supranational actors; on the contrary, the areas referring to conflicting or contrary interests are left to the competence of member states. Policy areas of competition, customs, public health, internal market, research and innovation, employment and social affairs, fighting against fraud, food safety, external trade, education and the others concern common interests. In these policy areas, all the European society has been supervised by the Commission and none of the member states are involved in directly to manipulate the policies since they have appreciated the Commission's efforts on the behalf of the Community. The other policy areas such as foreign and security, justice, home affairs and enlargement, which can be classified as conflicting policy areas, are subject to the consent of the member states since they have correlation with the member states' sovereignty or with their national interests. For the purpose of reaching consensus on these issues, several approaches including negotiation and bargaining have been developed to influence the other party's expectations by establishing synergies or offering mutual trade offs.

Surprisingly, enlargement policy of the EU is also perceived as a hard issue to reach an accord among member states. In fact, when it is compared to the other policies in the same category like foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, enlargement policy of the EU has more valid grounds to compromise at first sight. Initially, if the EU is examined in macro approach, it is easy to see that the Community is built on two basic concepts, which are the widening and deepening namely

enlargement and institutionalism. Implementations under these concepts pave new ways to better Europe in terms of stability, peace and prosperity; and their harmony and being complementary of each other are also significant. From widening side, this has just one meaning, which is keeping enlargement wave alive until there is no European country left behind, after implementing the required amendments in accordance with the *acquis communautaire*.<sup>12</sup> Unlike widening, deepening does not depend on just one policy area. It contains many different aspects and leads to different policy formations among lots of issues. It is doubtless that the EU has not produced much yet according to institutionalist views, but many structural policies has also been developed to balance and go in harmony with enlargement. The Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty and Nice Treaty could be considered within the framework of harmony between widening and deepening. That's why it is surprising that enlargement policy entails consent of the member states while without it EU denies its own nature as it was defined in the Rome Treaty.

Thus it should be examined that what makes the widening or enlargement very important and why it asks unanimity of member states to be realized? Andrew Moravcsik and Anna Mileta Vachudova (2002, p. 1) argue that enlargement rests on the convergent interests of existing and potential members. The EU leaders support accession because they consider that enlargement provides longer term economic and geopolitical benefits. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to relate enlargement to member state's conceptions of integration rather than to the automatic structure of the Community that absorbs non –member European state when they are ready and willing to join. Although the forthcoming lines of this chapter will provide more concrete and deeper analysis to the question above, economic and political implications of enlargement go beyond the founding fathers' simple prediction.

In the light of these findings, member states' role in enlargement policy become more visible and their preferences stemming from societal base shape the enlargement policy in general. Referring to Chapter 1, especially the core member states of the EU, which hold the bargaining power during the decision making procedure influence the progress of the enlargement policy. Germany, France and the UK, today's most

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<sup>12</sup> We assume that all the European states claim membership of the EU club.

influential members of the EU, enjoy this situation much more than any states. In this chapter, a deep analysis covers policies of Germany, France and the UK regarding their enlargement preferences as the three countries that are the most powerful actors in the EU decision making process. First and foremost, motivations behind enlargement in general rhetoric is given. Then Germany, France and the UK's positions is discussed respectively in line with liberal intergovernmental and constructivist perspectives. While the last enlargement wave is frequently used as test subject throughout the chapter, other enlargement waves are also referred when needed. Above all, reflections of these major member states' stances on Turkey's membership bid are focused in the next Chapter.

## **II. 1. Why Enlargement? Perceptions from the Member States of the EU**

The most common belief about the EU's enlargement is the unprecedented enthusiasm of applicant states for the full-membership. Even if it is a valid premise, it is not the only stimulant that triggers the enlargement process. It is more important to consider what the EU as whole and its member states expect from enlargement. Actually, when the rounds of enlargement are analyzed throughout the EU history three key concepts come forward as *rationales* of the EU and its member states for the enlargement policy, which are mainly economic, political and identity reasons. (Long, 1997, p. 2)

Firstly, enlargement can play an effective role to increase prosperity and welfare. The EU with over 400 million inhabitants always needs new markets to stimulate economic growth. Therefore, new markets through enlargement can serve the EU's economic concerns by increasing the size of the European market. Although new members are likely to benefit from this much in the short run by an immediate positive effects in their economic indicators, the EU also takes advantage of enlargement due economies of scale. In addition to the benefits of scale economies, the EU also consolidates its global role as an international economic actor with since new members increase the size and the share of the EU in the world trade; and therefore it can become more and more influential in the development of the world trade.

Another *gain* for the EU as whole is found in the politics, which refers to stability, rule of law and functioning democracy of the included regions. David Long

focuses on the security aspect of the enlargement and claims that the security concerns of the Western Europe played a more significant role in Central and Eastern Enlargement than it played by the previous ones. (1997, p. 3) Additionally, like in the last enlargement, the same concerns were also one of the main motivations for the EU considering the enlargements towards Greece, Spain and Portugal. Within this framework, it should be borne in mind that while there is concern for the potential new members' security, present member states also perceive enlargement as a means of guaranteeing their own security rather than as a good in itself. (ibid.)

With regard to *identity*, it suggests to embrace geographically and culturally European societies. When compared to the economic and political reasons, it holds abstract values rather than net gains, but it is still influential as much as others. Firstly, belonging to the same geography -as envisaged in the Rome Treaty- is a pre-condition of being a member of the EU. Secondly, to activate the motivation arising from identity applicant European country must share European values. This is the most controversial issue definite in spite of many studies and discussions in this regard. In fact, as it is indicated in the previous chapter, the sense of Europeanness or “we feeling” has been shaped in many different forms in the course of time, from the vague notion of Christendom to the anti-communist model. Today it is defined as:

“Our European values underline the essence of the Europe we want and treasure: A Europe of peace, freedom, democracy, prosperity and justice. The enlargement and integration of Europe to include 27 countries, free of war and totalitarian regimes, underlines the strength of these values and the lessons we have drawn from history: only through a shared undertaking are we able to provide the answers to our citizens in the global world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Cultural and religious pluralism is a strong European value. We are steeped in diversity: of traditions, of cultures, of languages and of nations. It is one of our precious gifts as Europeans. And dialogue is the way to ensure that diversity, far from causing division, enriches our unity. I strongly believe that cultural diversity is a source of Europe's strength and of its ability to promote its values and interests.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Speech of Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, at the plenary session of the European Parliament Strasbourg 13 Feb 2007. For the full text please see, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/77&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

These rationales are important since they are the underlying motivations of enlargement when considering the issue from the perspective of the EU as a whole. However, the member states' own preferences, particularly the major ones', are quite influential in enlargement processes since the member states are strongly motivated by their political alliances or other ties including their historical allegiances, economic and geopolitical interests and etc.

## **II. 2. Germany**

Germany's role in the EU has always been an important subject of academic and political debates. Despite importance of history which is invoked by states to construct on past achievements, the German context is very different. Accompanied by its federal institutional design, it attempts to overcome history while avoiding the repetition of the events during the Nazi regime. Over 40 years it has been trying to "normalize" its state affairs especially the difficulties and constraints on its foreign policy which stemmed from the result of World War II. Indeed, it uses several international institutions such as the EU, NATO, the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to handle the foreign policy issues.

European motivation of Germany holds incomparably different place among these organizations. Beside the taken steps for integration, the multi-level governance feature of the EC has offered Germany a lot in terms of enhancing its diplomatic and economic resources. Moreover Germany found enough space to develop as an international actor through adopting reflexive multilateralism<sup>14</sup> character within the European framework. This dynamic motivation re-united Germany and has made it the "gentle giant"<sup>15</sup> of Europe in opposition to the past memories.

As examined in the previous chapters, Germany has also been benefiting the power of driving the European integration. In other words, German preferences constitute one of the leading figures of the EU. Especially for the policies falling into member states' competences, its weight can explicitly be seen as cases of France and the UK. Vital policies cannot appear without the contributions of major states and

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<sup>14</sup> Federal Republic developed a culture of "reflexive multilateralism" where its increasing actorness was veiled by multilateral process and discourse.

<sup>15</sup> For the concept of "gentle giant", please see Simon Bulmer & William E. Paterson, *Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader?*

whose contributions are shaped by the preferences. Thus, it would be logical to examine implicit intentions behind the major states' preferences. To be precise, major states' European perceptions shape the significant policies of the EU like enlargement policy as one of the most controversial policies. Enlargement policy is in fact subject to the influential states' European perspective by its nature. Like European perceptions of France and the UK, European perception of Germany does matter on enlargement issue. Therefore, before dealing with its enlargement approaches, it would be appropriate to bring out its *Europapolitik* hitherto.

### **II. 2. 1. Germany's European Approach**

Germany, which was one of the founding members of the European project, has distinct place than others since it was created as much less than a classic state in 1949, remained under occupation until 1955, its major city was separated from the rest of the territory and also another state was established in the Soviet occupied zone with different regime. All these events led West Germany to anchor itself to the Atlantic Community and European neighbours to regain its sovereignty beside consolidating its statecraft and economy.

The newborn Bonn Republic gave importance to both European and Atlantic trajectories whereas the course of the events taught Germany that the continent had more to offer than the Atlantic side. In that respect, while the transatlantic relationship was "the hard shell" of the Federal Republic, its asymmetric character meant that it was never likely to be available as a focus of identity in the way that a Europeanized identity later came to be. (Paterson, 2006, p. 3) Especially in terms of economy and diplomacy, becoming part of European integration was seemed very advantageous. Such as export-oriented German economy started to enjoy the large European Market. Furthermore, Federal Republic grabbed an invaluable opportunity to ameliorate its weak state character at the European institutions. However, the first Chancellor Adenauer and all his successors followed European path without annoying the other side of Atlantic. This binary policy was supported by the other state elites and public opinion until the end of nineties.

Being lack of a conventional state, Germany's *Europapolitik* had always subjected to change in line with the global political conjuncture in order to construct

normality. William Paterson (2006) stresses that Germany's *Europapolitik* falls into three phases in which leaders have been seen as the driving force behind policies: *constituting Germany in Europe, struggles for ever closer union* and *more and less Europe*.

With the start of Adenauer's tenure in office, Federal Republic (West Germany) adopted the policy of reorientation towards West. In this respect, he firmly advocated the integration of West Germany into the emerging European and Atlantic communities. In addition to the establishment of close bilateral relations with the US, West Germany also preferred to join the international organizations of the NATO in 1955 and subsequently the EEC in 1957 as one of the founding members. However, the presence of several difficulties made Adenauer and Germany follow the European integration rather than the Atlantic cooperation. Particularly in terms of economy and governance European peg was quite fruitful for West Germany because under this supranational entity Germany started to overcome the deficiency in its state affairs and to disseminate the values of democratic values society which had already experienced terrible results due to the absence of democracy during the Weimar Republic and Nazi period. Regarding economy, it would be fair to claim that the Federal Republic profited from the European integration not only in quantitative terms but also in terms of increase in welfare it evoked the feeling of citizenship among Germans and neutralized the collective insecurities associated with the German past while seeming to promise an acceptable future. (Paterson, 2006, p. 6) By taking role in European cooperation it became easier for West Germany to persuade other neighboring countries about its economic activities because without European integration as a political arena of cooperation West German economic performance would have been perceived as a threat. (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996, p. 7) Additionally, Adenauer's wise maneuver here also was supported by realization of lasting reconciliation with France as well as the acknowledgement of France's leadership in the European integration.

As the follower of Adenauer's roadmap, Willy Brandt made several efforts to secure the constitution of Germany in Europe, and like his predecessors he admitted the attachment of West Germany to the European project and supported the requirements of integration without questioning. Both in deepening and widening terms his governance contributed much to the project, may be more than any statesmen did. Nevertheless, like

the ex-chancellors Brandt did also not betray Franco-German cooperation such as he pushed for European Political Cooperation and the first enlargement wave after De Gaulle. Besides, gradually developing “*Wirtschaftswünder*” and optimistic political situation did facilitate the management of Brandt’s *Europapolitik*, and along with the emergent reflexive multilateralism W. Germany weight in the EC became perceptible. Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* would be the best reference as a mark of these changing conditions. He ignored the inefficient *Hallstein Doctrine* and injected a new vision to Germany’s as well as Community’s external perception. Even if the policy itself did not serve to the ambitious goals, it would be convincing when it is reconsidered from the perspective of Germany’s position which implicitly uploaded its preferences in this issue and persuaded the Community to back the policy in the name of European Peace Order.

Apart from the political figures before his era, Helmut Schmidt was the first agent of the “ever closer union” phase. During his term in the office, he represented a new more self confident German (under Schmidt Germany’s domestic institutions were seen as embedded and effective), the rise of extremism had been replaced with rationality, and in economic terms the German economy was also the envy of her neighbors and the talk was now of “Model Germany”. (Patterson 2006, p. 8) Under these circumstances he asked for more integration, which also meant the enhancement of Germany’s political resources. In this respect, he proposed the introduction of European Monetary Union (EMU) within the EC, made several efforts on security issues and welcomed the second wave of enlargement with the membership of Greece. Despite his *Europapolitik*’s similarities with Brandt’s, increased state identity led Schmidt to involve much more than his predecessors in manipulating the Community’s policies in line with German preferences, and this shifted the position of Germany from follower to co-leader in many aspects. Regardless of the Federal Republic’s potential and its augmented ability, he avoided unilateral implementations on the behalf of W. Germany in the EC. On the contrary, Schmidt tried to attract attention to the successful progression of the European project under strengthened Franco-German relationship, and in order to serve this purpose he developed a close relationship with French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing similar to one that had emerged between Adenauer-De Gaulle. What’s more, due to the other states’ famous misgivings about Germany, Schmidt always behaved cautiously in terms of concealing the Federal State’s development and most of the time



he underestimated Germany's economic and political power: "Germany is one the medium powers of the world. It is a non-nuclear power. It is in lower-class than the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and others". (Time, 1979)

The Federal Republic's second phase of *Europapolitik*, *an ever-closer union*, reached its apogee under the leadership of Helmut Kohl. Throughout his sixteen years in the office, which was the longest of any German chancellor since Bismarck, Kohl supported the European integration with unprecedented enthusiasm and he conducted the traditional *Europapolitik* of Germany in accordance with it. Creation of the Single Market and the EU through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty respectively, introduction of Euro right after the European Monetary Union (EMU), the initiative of last enlargement and, most importantly, the reunification of Germany are possibly seen as reminiscent of Kohl's sincere efforts. All of his achievements on behalf of Europe and Germany made him rank with Adenauer<sup>16</sup> in German history and Jean Monnet in the EU history<sup>17</sup>.

Notwithstanding, none of Kohl's European policies mentioned above could be separated from the vision of normalizing the Federal Republic's status. Even though this had been approved as a mainstream policy by other chancellors before Kohl, no one could generate tangible results as he did. If his sixteen years of tenure is divided in two terms, for the first eight year term, Helmut Kohl stuck to the Federal Republic's regular contribution to ongoing projects of the EC in order to sustain traditional German *Europapolitik*. It had become clear that as much as the Federal Republic pushed for integration it gained in the same proportion. As a result, Kohl backed not only the integration policies –like single market with the Single European Act– but also developed them around a more explicit Franco-German tandem. However, sudden end of the Soviet rule at the end of the eighties changed the political conjuncture in West Germany like everywhere and encouraged the Bonn Republic and Kohl to add a new aspect to the existing *Europapolitik*, which was the finalization of the surviving *Ostpolitik* by reunifying the two sides. For this new situation, Kohl acted prudently because he was aware of general tendency that German Unity would bring with it a

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<sup>16</sup> Helmut Kohl is one of two persons to be awarded by a specially designed Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, the other person is Konrad Adenauer.

<sup>17</sup> Helmut Kohl's contributions for the European Project were rewarded by Honorary Citizen of Europe after he was voted out of office in 1998, an honor previously only bestowed by Jean Monnet.

significant increase in German power (Patterson, 2006, p. 9). Therefore, he avoided the articulation of national interests and unilateral actions for the critical issue. German reunification question was embedded into European integration issue by Kohl through a wise pro-European rhetoric: “German unity and European Unification are the two sides of the same coin” (Mertes, 2002, p. 69) In addition to his pro-European trait and unthreatening leadership, his determined European policy was reinforced by domestic institutions enabled Germany to be reunited after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to Michael Mertes, the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social Union (CSU) neutralized the nationalistic fringes in order to not jeopardize their European policy. Having considered the negative and dangerous influences of the extreme right parties, Kohl had adopted a strategy that ruled out uncompromisingly any coalition or political cooperation with parties of the extreme right, even at the cost of losing opportunities to form CDU-led governments in city halls or on a regional level. (2002, pp. 69-70)

With regard to the Kohl’s second eight-year term, the signs of *an ever closer union* are seemed clearer whereas the same policies in this phase can also be realized in a sense of blocking up the potential reaction that would come from the EC and its countries leaders, especially the most influential ones such as President Mitterrand and Lady Thatcher, who were both skeptics about reunification. Kohl, who was already conscious about the fact that Germany’s fate in Europe depends on its neighbors’ trust, tried to secure the place of reunited Germany in Europe and the EC. For that purpose, he agreed with other countries especially with France in terms of anchoring the Teutonic giant to the European project irreversibly as a peaceful and cooperative partner. Especially the EMU project, stipulated by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991-1992, was key to preventing a reunited Germany from upsetting the European balance. (Mertes, 2002, p. 69) Thus under the Maastricht Treaty, he sacrificed *Deutsche Mark*, which had been a symbol of West Germany’s economic and political success, and it embodied the German stability and their quest for continuity (Mertes, 2002, p. 68) and moreover, after the German reunification Kohl officially announced that Germany would no longer bring territorial claims for the historically German territories remained in Poland and Czech Republic as a sign of goodwill (or benevolence) of New Germany.

After the end of his term in the office in 1998, Helmut Kohl left his mark on history that is made of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German reunification and the establishment of the EU with the advent of Euro. Nevertheless, his contributions to the process of Germany's normalization was much more striking if it is assessed from the realist-European perspective as he effectuated the reunification dream, which was milestone in the normalization process of Germany despite the conventional skepticism all around the Europe. As a consequence, German foreign policy considering the *Europapolitik* became more assertive and less idealistic in the post-unification period due to new political and economic challenges and, of course, due to less constraints. In other words, seen as a normal country like other large ones, Germany has become more assertive and more oriented towards its own interests after reunification, and interests, which may not always coincide with those of its partners. (Jopp, 2002, p. 13) The last phase of the German *Europapolitik*, *more and less Europe* was also launched at that time. Its launch corresponds to the last years of Kohl's period.

As Adrian-Hyde Price and Charlie Jeffrey (2001, p. 692) point out the end of cold war bipolarity and German unification provide a window of opportunity for normative change, and that a number of influentially situated domestic actors have purposefully sought to generate and reshape debate on German European policy norms. According to Paterson (2006), that was the start of another stage in Germany's *Europapolitik*, and he describes the phase as *more and less Europe* or *contingent European policy*. Apart from the previous stages, positive outcomes of the unification such as normalization, and political and mainly economic burden of unification in addition to ambiguity of the post cold-war era triggered the launch of this stage as "critical junctures". In this period, the chancellorships of Germany has leaned to more key areas like constitution which "will allow an enlarged EU to function" (Price and Jeffery, 2001, p. 701) and preferred to adopt more intergovernmental patterns.

Starting from Gerhard Schröder, Germany manifested relatively different stance towards the EU. Contrary to the old stereotypes, as one of the representative of the new generation political actors, Schröder thought hard about the Germany's priorities regarding Europe. In this context, reunification provided Germany with the necessary confidence to advocate its national interests in a more determinant way especially with Schröder coming to power highlighting Germany's enlightened self-interests and

appearing more pragmatic in its concrete European policy. (Jopp, 2002, p. 15) Above all, the economic impacts of rapid reunification like stagnation and high unemployment directed him to take considerable measures against the European policies. One of the primary concerns of Schröder was the net contribution of Germany to the Communitarian policies which was shouldering almost more than half of the contributions. However, new Germany under his leadership was unable to follow the same guidelines due to the enormous costs of reunification and this made Germany difficult to continue with a policy of using financial incentives to motivate other European partners to agree with launching a new integration project. (Jopp, 2002, p. 11) Accordingly, he stood against that and made his policy clear on this issue by asserting “we neither can nor will solve Europe’s problems with a German cheque-book.” (Guardian, 1999) Likewise, Schröder maintained also his radical attitude against tight fiscal policy of the EU which affected the unemployment problem and Landers’ positions negatively since protected German markets under Landers would not get enough subsidies. Regarding the relationship between Franco-German duo and foreign policy, some shifts can be observed in Germany’s state policy. Although the Federal government remained convinced of the importance of the German-French motor, especially on the budgetary issues of the CAP some disputes became apparent. But, before the reunification sometimes disputes were settled just for the sake of the Franco-German partnership. Additionally, prospect of the Eastern and Central European enlargement also deteriorated the balance in favor of Germany, which would not have to subject to the French-centric Europe. Nevertheless, in spite of these developments, no one can claim the Germany has preferred to pursue unilateral policies by ignoring the Franco-German partnership. Instead, it can be considered as slight movement of Germany for its national interests. Another shift did take place in Germany’s European Security Policy. Federal armed forces of Germany -*Bundeswehr*- had firstly been established and then firmly integrated into the NATO forces for a collective defense against the Soviet threat after the failure of the European Defense Community. But, post-cold war occasions led Germany to re-evaluation of the role of its military force in the European order. The Gulf War, the Yugoslavian conflict, the Kosovo issue and recently the establishment of a new world order after the 9/11 attacks affected the Germany’s role in security issues, and undertaking of responsibilities were perceived by

the leaders as an essential item on the normalization agenda. With the exception of Kohl, who was unwilling to involve in military tasks, succeeding leaders, Schröder and Merkel<sup>18</sup> accepted “responsibility” for international peace and security. Even, for this purpose, Germany did not refrain from participating in offensive military operations against a sovereign state (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for the first time since 1945. Today German forces have been employed almost in every problematic area as a part of international operations; except Iraq, German forces have been contributing to the peace keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan<sup>19</sup> and recently in Lebanon under the command of UNFILL II<sup>20</sup>.

Although many characteristics of old patterns still remained in the new Germany’s *Europapolitik*, costly accession of the poorer regions of Eastern Germany and motivation for normalization has necessitated a new trajectory for Germany in the integration process. As a matter of fact, the new trajectory of Germany does not contain entirely radical components inside since it has not left aside its “normative constraints” or come out as “power-maximizer” (Price and Jeffery, 2001, p. 712). Instead it has reflected an image of “normal” or “rational” country which has followed its national interests just like the others in the Community rather than attempted to dominate Europe up to now. Yet, as Price and Jeffery (2001, p. 712) argues, Germany’s size, economic skill and central geographical location, can install potentially far-reaching implications for the future direction of the European integration process and for enlargement of course.

### **II. 2. 2. Germany and Its Enlargement Policy**

Being part of Germany’s *Europapolitik*, enlargement policy of the Federal Republic has developed within the same context and been affected from the same phases that the *Europapolitik* has experienced. Parallel to Germany’s initial strategy for European affairs, enlargement policy was originally shaped around the ideals of the Community. Moreover, as an export-oriented country, the Federal Republic welcomed

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<sup>18</sup> Although she has spent just 2 years in office, Merkel has not adopted a radical change compared to Schroder’s line in terms of foreign politics.

<sup>19</sup> German involvement is the third largest after the US and the UK involvements.

<sup>20</sup> UNFILL II is the official name of the UN troops under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 for 2006 Israel – Lebanon conflict.

the previous waves of enlargement and did not demonstrate any unusual attitude towards applicants, which could be perceived in negative sense. In retrospect, as a distinct state in the divided Europe, which constructed its identity through its diplomacy and particularly its European policy (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996, p. 11), West Germany was seen as a promoter of deeper European integration (Tewes, 1998, p. 117) in terms of both deepening and widening in the phases of *constituting Germany in Europe* and *an ever closer-union*. With regard to the preceding enlargements, Germany also did not put forward its national interests in comparison to the other members. Rather, it supported the materialization of enlargement and, furthermore, underpinned the stages through its financial means where Germany has traditionally been the paymaster. (Paterson, 2006, p. 15)

German reunification, and subsequently the end of the Soviet Empire created an unorthodox atmosphere and had a liberating effect on the potential for German diplomacy. Considering the situation of Berlin or domestic sensitivity to Cold War, the German singularity have disappeared and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) no longer has to employ European integration as a way of compensating for its diplomatic weaknesses. (Bulmer and Paterson, 2001, p. 30) Accordingly, Germany re-calibrated its *Europapolitik* and naturally its enlargement policy in new re-defined Europe where the perspectives of *national interests and preferences* have occupied decision makers' agenda in Germany.

Although the post reunification and cold war era witnessed two enlargement waves, Germany's interests and preferences played crucial role particularly for the initiation and realization of the last wave. That's why the enlargement encompassing the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), which is regarded as "German-led enlargement" by scholars, will be used to clarify the Germany's new stance towards the EU enlargement policy, which is mainly shaped around the motivations of security, economic advantages, moral obligations, internal EU and extra EU factors and historical closeness.

As Michael Baun (1997, p. 5) stresses, the security is a primary reason for Germany's support of the eastern enlargement. Germany, which has suffered from the regional instabilities throughout its history, identified the new conjuncture after the removal of the Iron Curtain as a new threat, and it urged integration of the CEECs into

the Western structures by considering geopolitical concerns and political stability. According to this approach, Germany would benefit from enlargement in two ways. On the one hand, Germany would no longer constitute the eastern border of the EU and move from neighboring instable periphery to the centre. Moreover, throughout the integration of CEECs into the EU the return of authoritarian regimes and even potential alliances of CEE states with Russia would be prevented. (Wood, 2003, p. 290) On the other, enlargement would bring political stability to the CEECs because CEE came to be seen as potentially unstable backyard, which through immigration, organized crime and environmental risks could threaten security and well-being of German society (Tewes, 1998, p. 121). Thus, through enlargement the EU could consolidate the stability in the region and thereby guarantee its own and Germany's security.

Germany's support of the eastern enlargement has also relied upon economic interests. Central Europe with 100 million consumers and annual consumption growth rates of 10 percent and more represents a significant market for exports-largely from the EU, and within that group largely from Germany. (Freudenstein, 1998, p. 45) Since 1989 Germany's trade with the CEECs has gradually developed, and as said by official statistics offices including German Statistics Office and Eurostat, Germany was the most important trade partner of the CEE states by holding 52 percent of \$ 112 Billion of the total two-way trade within the EU members (Business Week, 1997). Furthermore, as the CEECs were the developing states, their demand for German machines and new technology increased their share to the level of 10 percent in Germany's total foreign trade, which was roughly the same level of the Germany's trade with the United States in the mid-1990s. (Martin, 2001, p. 21) In addition to the high trade volume, trade with CEECs was also very profitable for Germany as it acquired trade surpluses. According to Baun, this was resulted in \$ 9 Billion surplus in 1995 while Christian Keuschnigg, Mirela Keuschnigg and Wilhelm Kohler (1999, pp. 17-18) point out trade gains of 7.2 percent for Germany through enlargement in general rhetoric. Strengthening relationships with the CEECs within the framework of the EU would also provide ideal conditions such as lower-cost production facilities plus comparatively cheap and high skilled labor force to German companies in order to boost their competitiveness. In light of these opportunities, business communities, organizations representing commerce and industry saw enormous potential for developing trade with the CEE states and they

engaged in extensive lobbying activities for their accession. Among them, German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) was project's most vociferous proponent. (Martin, 2001, p. 21)

While economic interests have important place for the German sponsorship of the EU enlargement, it also implicitly evokes the liberal intergovernmental approach of governments in the EU structure where domestic context does matter in transnational policy layers. However, among the possible constituents of the society such as labour unions, environmental groups, business circles, agricultural associations, ordinary citizens namely the man in the street; two groups appear as the leading actors of opposite pole in the question of EU enlargement here in Germany. On the one hand, almost every business sector had seen the CEECs as worthy economic opportunity and they uploaded their demands to the government by using professional organizations. In German case DIHT was one of the most enthusiastic advocates in a sense. Once the representation rate of DIHT among the business milieu is taken into consideration, its eagerness is quite a valid reason for German governments to support realization of the enlargement wave. On the other hand, when it comes to other internal dynamics, like German public opinion, that generally embraces ordinary citizens (which was very changeable in the past) with regard to the enlargement, Eurobarometer's studies show us that between the periods of autumn 2000 and spring 2002 German public opinion's positive support for the eastern enlargement varied roughly between 35 percent and 45 percent.<sup>21</sup> Compared to the majority and also to the EU average, it should be appropriate to mention that the rates given above represented the minority in German society and were all below the EU averages.

According to Stephen Wood, just like the other critical EU matters, the enlargement policy of EU reveals a divergence between the aims and methods of elites and the desires of public. Wood claims, if the launch of the CEE enlargement is analyzed from the outset through a German looking glass, it becomes apparent that there was a great gap between the preferences of public, the man in the street in particular and political elites. (Wood, 2002, pp. 23-24) In this context, when the trends in public opinion towards a potential EU enlargement are analyzed before the launch of

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<sup>21</sup> For detailed information please see the Standard Eurobarometer 54, 55, 56 and 57.



enlargement –Agenda 2000 which grants accession of CEECs to the EU- in early 1996 only 11% and in 1997 29% of Germans were in favour of acceptance of new members. Although German government elites including conservative CDU/CSU and socialist SPD (which is also expected to pay attention to the implementation of direct democracy more than the others do, due to general feature of its heritage) connected this opposition to the matter of disinformation and avoided to make an open attempt for resolving this question, the men in the streets opposed the enlargement stressing that it would entail extra costs and cause higher unemployment in Germany. (Wood, 2002, pp. 25-26) In other words, political elites in Germany -neither conservatives nor socialists- preferred to act as Burkean trustee rather than democratically instructed delegates in order to defend the national interests; considering the possible ignorance of ordinary people in foreign politics where the stakes are especially high (Page and Barabas, 2000, pp. 340-341).

Considering the impact of German business circles and ordinary German citizens as the foremost constituents of society to government, it would be fair to claim that business groups represented by DIHT came out as the winner of domestic competition between the interests groups with respect to the liberal intergovernmental approach of government elites. In that respect, Germany's prevailing industry-based economic model should not be ignored in the way that how liberal intergovernmentalism was applied by government which naturally highlight economic concerns rather than thoughts of ordinary people in the streets.

Germany's insistence on the eastern enlargement also originates from moral obligations. Especially after the end of the Cold War, almost all German political leaders came up with the idea of special responsibility for the eastern enlargement. According to their belief, there was a feeling of indebtedness to the new democracies of central Europe for having brought about the peaceful unification of Germany in 1989-90. (Freudenstein, 1998, p. 45) Visegrad countries' struggles for freedom counting Solidarity movement of Poland, resistance in Hungary and Czechoslovakia made German reunification possible. Besides, Germany's past aggression in Europe under Nazi regime caused the division of Europe is another issue for triggering moral obligation since the division led to modernity, democracy in the West and backwardness, dictatorship in the East. As a result Germany aimed at performing its

moral duties and responsibilities by supporting the Central and Eastern European enlargement.

On the other hand, this was also a sign of implementation of *social constructivist* theory in the enlargement policy because both Germany and the applicant states had used the same argument of *the return to Europe*, in which collective understanding was stimulated by referring to common cultural traditions, historical and religious experience before the Cold War period. For the CEECs and German statesmen the argument was strategically important to accelerate the accession of these countries to the EU since it would cause a rhetorical entrapment for enlargement opponents. Although rationalists believe that the argument of the return to Europe is a simple rhetorical device, the constructivist view point to the extraordinary layers of history and cultural connection, which manifest themselves as inter-subjective understanding of that common past with the implication of a natural right to accession for the CEE states. (Brennan, 2000, p. 183)

Unlike security, economy and moral responsibilities, Germany's enlargement preferences were also highly affected by the EU's internal dynamics. In this context, Germany's enlargement strategy combined cautious goals of enlargement and a concurrent reduction in its net contributions. (Wood, 2003, p. 299) By pointing out its net contribution to the EU budget, German policy makers assumed the new enlargement project would lead to a reform in the EU's budgetary issues, which meant a reduction in the Germany's net contributions. According to their projections, prospective members would annoy the current members since their financial situation also allow them to become net receivers of major funds of the EU budget. Their inclusion to these funds especially under agricultural and structural policies was totally against the interests of existing EU members. Similarly, without agricultural reform the CEECs would also be included in the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) mechanism and enjoy the guaranteed high prices and agricultural subsidy instruments. On the other hand, it would create financial problems for some EU members such as France, Spain and Greece, who most profited from the advantages of the CAP. Under these circumstances, beneficiary EU countries would possibly object to full application of the CAP to the candidates upon accession considering their much lower agriculture prices and potential share in the CAP subsidy mechanism.

Structural policy is another area which would become problematic after the realization of enlargement. The regions in Europe (especially southern parts) whose income levels are below 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU average are funded by structural and cohesion funds respectively which constitute together the structural policy. Relatively low income level of prospective members would bring down the EU average and most of the regions that had been funded before would not be able to receive funds again. There would be a shift in funds from southern regions to the central and eastern regions of Europe, which jeopardizes the existing members' interests. Once the Central and Eastern European enlargement would take place, the structural policy would certainly be reformed in direction of fair distribution of the budget expenditures. That's why, in the light of possible developments, reforms in both agricultural and structural policies would become inevitable and they would directly deliver Germany an improved financial perspective (Wood, 2003, p. 302) as Germany supports reforms mainly in terms of reducing its overall net payments.


Germany's efforts for the last enlargement might also rely upon its hidden agenda, which could be the intention of developing its sphere of influence in the EU structure. In this context, Germany's eagerness particularly for the inclusion of Visegrad states can be taken as a precedent. So, how the EU membership of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary could affect Germany's sphere of influence in the EU structure? First and foremost, it should be taken into account that Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are not only backyard of Germany, like South America of the USA but also they share common historical heritages along with Germany. If the maps given below are examined, Germany's either partially or wholly dominance of these regions from 19<sup>th</sup> century to the end of WWII can be seen. Even though millions of Germans were deported by the end of WWII, thousands of Germans are still living in the same regions (Silesia of Poland, Sudetenland of Czech Republic, etc.). Beside this historical motivation, gradually increased economic weight of Germany in the post Cold-war period might cause an opportunity for Germany to develop its sphere of influence in the EU. Therefore, starting from decision making at first and also in many other issues Germany can influence stances of Visegrad states towards the EU and alter the course of European integration in line with its preferences.

Map 1: German Empire in 1871 <sup>22</sup>



Source: Wikipedia  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Germany).

Map 2: Territorial Loses of Modern Germany



Source: Wikipedia  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Germany)

### II. 3. France

Since the inception of *la construction européenne*, France has been one of the important promoters of the European integration and together with Germany they have been regarded as engines of it. However, as a founding member of first the ECSC and then EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) France's position relies on different motivations compared to Germany and the UK in the building of a new Europe. Under strong sense of national identity cultivated during the French Revolution, the desire for lasting peace after three wars with Germany in less than 80 years, coupled with the disappearance of its colonial empire in Indochina then in North Africa and, moreover, never ending financial, social and economic problems (inflation, strikes) as well as permanent political crises (the average life of a French cabinet at that time was only five months) help to clarify the motivations of France for the European integration. (Wesseling, 2002, p. 302)

Within the context of mentioned factors, the European concept of early Pan-European thinkers became an important asset for the French politicians to pursue France's national interests. French economist Jean Monnet and then foreign minister Robert Schuman, who were key actors of the unique plan, saw the opportunity and directed France to take the initiative towards the European unity. On the other hand, the

<sup>22</sup> German Empire of 1871 under Bismarck was containing some territories of modern France, Belgium, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic and Denmark. At that time, Hungary was part of Austro-Hungarian Empire and along with German Empire they formed a dual alliance.

initiative taken by France is perfectly understandable because France was the only nation that could take it at that time. Neither Germany nor Italy could do this. Britain could have, but due to its other options it did not want to. Thus, France took the initiative because it was the only nation in a position to do so and because it had reasons of its own for doing: it was France's own interests (ibid.).

Apart from national interests' stimulant effect for the participation of France in the European unity, it is also possible to observe power of French preferences in the decision-making structure of the EEC/EU throughout the integration process. Driven by the national interests and mainly focusing on geopolitical and economic concerns, European preferences of France have been considered as fundamental as European preferences of Germany and the UK, and in many policy making areas including the critical ones, its choices become a guiding principle for the course of integration. In this respect, since the enlargement is assumed as one of the critical policy areas, considering first European approach of France from the outset up to recent years will generate a strong foundation for a coherent analysis of its enlargement preferences.

### **II. 3. 1. France's European Approach**

When the history of European integration is analyzed from the outset, it is assumed that no one can ignore the French contributions to building of the European unity. Over more than a half century, we have witnessed the pivotal role that has been played by France for the development of European policies and its institutions with a continuous support. French governments have sought different ways to maximize its benefits while minimizing its constraints in order to achieve national objectives within the European arena by trying to ensure that policy and institutional developments are in line with French priorities. (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 17) Although its national objectives are still controversial and ambiguous to identify, by referring to the work of Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright (2006) one can track some clues about its national objectives appropriate to its priorities. At this juncture, Knapp and Wright consider national objectives of France for the European integration as the outcome of four motives: two geopolitical and two economic. They are defined as a strong and predictable relationship with Germany, an enhanced role on the world stage, a subsidized market for farm exports, and a regulatory, monetary, and ideological

framework for economic modernization (p. 29). Governments particularly presidents in France case have been the champions of the process, emerge as the main voice for the articulation of national interests.

Although the French initiative for a potential European integration took place officially in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, French political discourse on some form of European unity had started earlier. Due to destructive results of the WWII in economy and politics, almost all political leaders in France concentrated on the united Europe idea, which embraces both ideal and instrumental implications within itself. In ideal meaning, while this prescribed model was expected to replace the cyclical wars with peace and harmony among nations, it was assumed that the same model would introduce common interests and shared identities instead of the competitive nationalism. Within this framework, the necessity of amicable co-existence with Germany was underlined frequently by the French statesmen since the German and the French nations encountered with each other three times on battlefields in less than 90 years. On the other hand, for instrumental implications, French politicians envisaged that through realization of the given unity model France national interests could be more secure in terms of containing Germany and developing its economy.

In addition to the discussion on the necessity of the European unity, several views were put forward by political leaders for the question of *what sort of Europe should be constructed?* In fact, the Fourth Republic which survived between the years of 1946–1957 hosted 17 different prime ministers who represented diverse political ideologies. Accordingly, from the proposal of “close, peaceful European cooperation under Soviet leadership-with Stalinist economics” (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 20) to the De Gaulle’s confederalist vision of Europe *from the Atlantic to the Urals*, many ideas appeared as different models for European construction. Besides, French politicians tested different formations, which had intergovernmental structure and such as Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe; but their poor performances made politicians support Jean Monnet’s suggestion of sectoral integration that comprises the supranational and intergovernmental patterns together. Consequently, by the famous declaration of Robert Schuman in 1950, firstly under the structure of the ECSC, subsequently under the EEC, having institutionally broader base, mainly French-led European integration was initiated.

With the launch of European integration officially, France's policies regarding the European integration were started to develop gradually. While they had been configured at the primary ministry level until De Gaulle's declaration of the Fifth Republic, among those policies the most striking one was the European Defence Community (EDC) plan. Actually, it was put forward by Prime Minister René Pleven in response to the American call for the rearmament of West Germany under the NATO structure. The intention was to form a pan-European defense force as an alternative to Germany's proposed accession to NATO and to be able control German rearmament with its own means<sup>23</sup>. Even though the treaty was signed in 1952 by West Germany, France, Italy and Benelux countries, it never went into effect as it was rejected during its ratification process in French parliament by a combination of Gaullist and Communists. (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 23) Later having the same aspirations, the then British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister agreed on another plan –Western European Union (WEU)– to supervise the German armed forces; but due to technical reasons it was insufficient against the Soviet threat and Germany's accession to the NATO was affirmed by France involuntarily.

While institutionalization process for a united Europe was progressing rapidly between the years of 1950 – 1957, gradually increased conflicts in French colonies triggered a new breakage in the political atmosphere of France. Especially the intensive wave of terror in Algeria had influenced the course of political events in France and caused to the return of ex-soldier Charles De Gaulle to the politics again in exchange for the promise of a new constitution. De Gaulle, who managed to hold Prime Ministry post two times before the beginning of his presidency tenure in 1959, had firm attitude toward the EEC. His dislike for the supranational features of the Community could be often witnessed since he believes that “there was no future for any kind of Europe other than one of sovereign national states, *l' Europe des Patries*’ (Thody, 1998, p. 29). Nevertheless, he also appreciated the considerable advantage of the EEC for France's interests. It was compatible to the realist perspective of De Gaulle as the EEC offers a leadership of Europe in addition to the ability of conducting free – but pro-Western –

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<sup>23</sup> For the full text please see: <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>

foreign policy between two blocs without sticking to the United States while generating lucrative markets for France's agricultural and armament industry goods.

Nonetheless, the institutional arrangements of the EEC continued to irritate De Gaulle as Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie pointed out (1998, p. 24). To manipulate this situation and block British aspirations for the EEC accession permanently, De Gaulle set out to implement the *Fouchet Plan* in 1962. He argued that the UK's small farming sector and distinctive financial arrangements were incompatible to the EEC mechanism, and its special relationship with the United States could dilute functions of the Community. Additionally, De Gaulle's did not want France's interests regarding the leadership of the Community to be jeopardized by the inclusion of the UK which was among the winners of the WWII and also still superpower of the era that its political influence could compete with France's. Thus, France vetoed the British applications in the years of 1963 and 1967. (Thody, 1998, p. 29) The Fouchet Plan guaranteeing the lesser effect of Commission and non-membership of the UK, collapsed since the other members did not support it.

De Gaulle's objection to the supranational feature of the Community, which forms the basis of his European approach, showed itself once again in 1965. According to the founding treaty of the EEC, in addition to the extension of QMV in the Council and CAP's financial arrangements should have done by 1965, but De Gaulle's uncompromising attitude for both issues and subsequently his withdrawal from the negotiations introduced a new reflex to the Community<sup>24</sup>. De Gaulle made it clear that each government – not the Community institutions – should determine how its *national interest* was defined (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, other five states agreed on 'Luxembourg Compromise' according to which member states have the right of using veto power for controversial issues. Although De Gaulle's European policy was unchallenged till the end of Algeria dispute, after it, political parties such as Christian Democrats, Socialists and opinion leaders started to question his European policy. Especially De Gaulle's unconstructive style over the issues of the Empty Chair crisis and British applications launched wide-ranging arguments among

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<sup>24</sup> Empty Chair crisis.



the political parties and pro-integrationists some of whom contributed to his resignation by opting 'no' in his referendum in 1969.

After the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, Georges Pompidou was elected as the 2<sup>nd</sup> President of the Fifth Republic. Though he was coming from the UDR party<sup>25</sup> whose roots run deep in Gaullist tradition, Pompidou's political vision especially on Europe dramatically differed from the one that his predecessor De Gaulle had supported. In spite of De Gaulle's uncompromising, opposite stance toward integration, Pompidou contributed much to the process of integration in both widening and deepening terms through a *conservative pragmatism*. In addition to the scope of continuity and change, which were his proposals for France's European policy, Pompidou's harmony with his German counterpart, Willy Brandt, also led Franco-German engine work for the sake of European unity.

As a convinced European, Pompidou's main ambition was to make France a more efficient industrialized nation and he saw in the increased competition brought about by the common market one of the best ways of bringing this about. (Thody, 1998, p. 62) In this regard, he was not opposed to the British entry paved the way to forthcoming enlargements. Unlike De Gaulle, Pompidou saw no serious threat for the French national interests with regard to economic and politics; moreover, he believed that economic weakness of the UK at that time was more likely to become an open market for French exporters than a serious rival in the European market. (Thody, 1998, p. 63) On the other hand, Pompidou also attached importance to deepening. He favored introduction of new measures which included a project to create an economic and monetary union by 1980, and the development of *political co-operation* (in the field of foreign policy) to reinforce the Community institutions. (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 26) Although Pompidou's efforts with his fellows for political co-operation could not go beyond forming the basis of CFSP, they did great job by initiating the project of Economic and Monetary Union at Hague Summit in 1969.

In May 1974, Valery Giscard d'Estaing was elected for the presidency post subsequent to the sudden death of Georges Pompidou. Just like his predecessor, Giscard d'Estaing showed his firm belief in European integration. Although the international

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<sup>25</sup> Union Democrats for the Republic, also known as Gaullist party.

political and economic conjunctures were not in favor of the integration, Giscard d'Estaing undersigned vital successes throughout his seven years presidency not only by adapting a practical approach into the France's European vision but also enjoying from an excellent relationship with German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. In March, 1979 with the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS), the two men cooperated towards a single European currency after the unsuccessful attempt of Snake model which was recognized under the EMU plan in 1969 in order to prevent exchange fluctuations. (Thody, 1998, p. 85) While Germany appeared as the leading figure in this monetary structuring mainly owing to French pressures, Giscard d'Estaing succeeded to minimize the loss of French Franc against D-Mark. Besides his efforts for the EMS, one can also observe his contributions in the fields of widening and institutionalism. In this respect, the sustainability of enlargement by bringing in Greece and preparing the way for Spain and Portugal, and introduction of the European Council along with the direct elections for the EP have been listed among his major accomplishments for the sake of the promising European unity. (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 27)

As the first elected socialist president of the Fifth Republic, Francois Mitterrand managed to melt European integration issues and France's national interests in the same pot during his term at the office. In comparison to his predecessors, he benefited from the domestic and international political opportunities of his era and this led him to fulfill his purposes regarding European politics. Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie (2002, p. 28) reveal the mentioned opportunities, according to their belief, the presence of an exceptionally talented political ally, Delors, at the helm of the commission; and three other assets which both Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing lacked such as longevity in office, the support of a loyal parliamentary majority, except during the period of cohabitation, and a friendly partner in the German Chancellor, Kohl were crucial for Mitterrand. His major achievements which mainly took place after 1984, showed themselves particularly in the areas of the Single Market, the EMU and the unexpected German Unification.

Since Mitterrand was aware of the economic and trade realities of France, he endeavored for the completion of the Single Market and the EMU. It was the fact that compared to France, no member state has a more intense economic relationship with its EU partners since 62 percent of French exports went to EU countries, which also held

65 percent of French foreign direct investment by the 1990's. (Knapp and Wright, 2006, p. 29) In the light of this fact, completion of the Single Market would underpin national interests of France while pushing for further integration. Furthermore, Mitterrand also attained another French objective through the Treaty of Maastricht. Before his presidency period, roughly for 20 years monetary union had been one of the key policy areas, and not only French governments but also other governments of the other member states except Germany sought to accomplish it. Their major concern was unfavorable consequences of exchange rate fluctuations in the course of economic transactions between the member states. According to Mitterrand, Germany, which had enjoyed the consequences of fluctuations against French Franc and other currencies due to its economic power, was standing at the center of this policy, and anchoring French Franc and other currencies to the German Bundesbank would settle the matter. Mitterrand's all successes in the European sphere realized by the assistance of Helmut Kohl who linked his ambitions for Germany to the development of Europe and Jacques Delors who was an important ally because of his ability to bend European rules in France's favor on occasion, his skill at reinforcing French networks in the Commission, and the reassurance he offered the public that integration was a French project (Knapp and Wright, 2006, p. 35). With respect to the German Unification, Mitterrand was opposed to any unification plan about East – West Germany because of the geopolitical reasons. Nevertheless, the urgency of issue and the prospect of the EMU present of Kohl made him to let East and West unite.

As the first president coming from Gaullist tradition after Pompidou, Jacques Chirac had adopted various views with regard to the France's European policy since his involvement in European matters in 1970's. At the beginning, he had become popular with his anti-integrationist rhetoric. Even his resignation from the prime ministry post in 1976 was partly associated with the pro-European preferences of President Giscard d'Estaing. This view is also shared by Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie (1998, p. 84), who reflect the same reason into the study that Giscard d'Estaing's over emphasizing to the EU institutions such as the EP caused resignation of Jacques Chirac in July 1976. However his unenthusiastic or extreme conservative attitude towards European issues had not continued throughout his political career. During his second term at prime ministry office under Mitterrand's cohabitation period, Chirac came up with more

pragmatic approaches and he proposed the suppression of non-tariff barriers in the single market programme and argued that majority voting in the Council was essential for that programme to be fully completed. (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 29) He also had influenced his other party fellows – namely the Gaullists – over integration issues and after much hesitation threw his weight behind a Yes vote for the Maastricht Treaty (Knapp and Wright, 2006. p. 36). Considering the quite small difference between the Yes and No votes, it would be more accurate to say that Chirac's support did save the project. Therefore, Chirac's European approach from mid-60's – inception of his political career – till the end of his tenure at Elysée Place can be identified as a tactician without excessive regard for consistency, but always with one eye firmly on domestic politics, in sharp contrast to de Gaulle (ibid.).

Like other presidents of the Fifth Republic, if Chirac presidency is analyzed from the European perspective, then the European motions having priority can be stated as: Firstly, different from his predecessors Chirac lacked from an intensive Franco – German cooperation as Kohl was politically weakened towards the end of his chancellorship, and would lose power in 1998 to a Social Democrat, Gerhard Schröder, for whom Europe was a lower priority. Secondly, his constructive mode and effect on Common Foreign and Security Policy during the Amsterdam Treaty made him champion of the process where he seized the opportunity presented by British acceptance of an EU-linked defence structure to promote the constitution of a 60.000-strong Rapid Reaction Force dedicated to peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks in Europe (Knapp and Wright, 2006, pp. 36-37). His third motion was the preservation of France's equal representation in the Council of Ministers at Nice. Furthermore, he guaranteed the continuation of CAP budgeting for a while despite Schröder's great insistence for rearrangement.

Regarded as one of the foremost architects of the European integration project; through its leaders, France has adopted different approaches to the integration from time to time. Presidents, particularly those performed after De Gaulle, sought to do best both for France and the European project in a self-sacrificing way - irrespective of their previous proclamations, if there are any. Concurrently, they managed to effectuate the fix objectives within reasonable national interests by hiding them behind the idealistic way of speaking. In this respect, having a strong voice in all minor or major issues,

France has also concentrated on enlargement policy. Enlargement policy is assumed as one of few areas where its articulation of national interests and preferences can be observed publicly.

### **II. 3. 2. France and Its Enlargement Policy**

Same as other member states in the EU structure, France's preferences on enlargement are shaped under its European policy and go in parallel with its national interests. Nevertheless, until the end of the 80's, due to France's dominance over the Franco-German axis and its reflection to the EC in terms of *French leadership in the EC* France succeeded to protect its national interests by managing European agenda without striking into a single policy area or using it as a unique lever. Yet, since it is regarded as an important part of the EU's external policy, France has not been totally unconcerned about widening issues. Despite the fact that traditionally, France has been somewhat reluctant to any enlargement of the EU, except De Gaulle's British vetoes, it did not adopt a radical attitude for the previous enlargement stages. (Rieker, 2006, p. 7) Furthermore, French statesmen sought somehow to make use of each enlargement waves including early British vetoes and the late British accession in 1972. While Charles de Gaulle was directly hostile to British membership predominantly because of geopolitical reasons, George Pompidou agreed to Britain's accession but was suspicious of the Ostpolitik conducted by Willie Brandt in the early 1970's. (ibid.) For the accession of Greece and Iberian countries, it was assumed that their accession would cause a political and cultural rebalancing in the composition of the EC which was in favor of France undoubtedly. (Pentland, 2006, p. 4)

However, the occurrence of major shifts after the Cold War both in political and economic terms caused France to re-calibrate its European policies fundamentally. The fact that Germany got released from the diplomatic restrictions on the international arena and started to regain its political as well as economic power upon unification, lead France to revise its policies regarding the European integration including the enlargement policy by putting more emphasis on its national interests and disclosing them publicly.

In this regard, French national objectives under 4 main headings –as has been mentioned roughly in the preceding section– were put forward in more assertive way

concerning the last enlargement process. Even though the last enlargement wave comprising the CEECs resulted in success, none can ignore the role of France since it supervised the enlargement process just like Germany and the UK, and moreover its preferences for the realization of enlargement were perceived as one of the important guiding principles.

Different from the German and the British approaches, France has always been skeptical toward enlargement. Even though it benefited from early enlargement stages considering some areas, as indicated by Pernille Rieker (2006, p. 7), France has usually acted unwillingly to any enlargement of the European Union/Community. Moreover, she thinks that if France faces with the choice between deepening and widening, the French government opts for the former. The role of national objectives in the formation of this preference is undeniable of course. In this regard, French reaction had not been constructive concerning realization of the last enlargement. Also, advent of some speculations about enlargement such as being “German-led” strengthened the unenthusiastic position of France and let to maintain its antagonism. Here, German reunification and its new political gainings right after the Cold War had great effects on France’s approach toward the last enlargement. So, it is believed that first observing the last enlargement process from the perspective of *to what extent it complies with French national objectives* then moving to its political stance would be more helpful for a comprehensive understanding.

As known, the combination of two geopolitical and two economic motives has constituted national objectives of France in the EU. Roughly, they are controlled relationship with Germany, enhanced role in the international arena, profitable and subsidized market for French farmers and opportunities for the development of economic and commercial activities.

From the perspective of France, a possible enlargement comprising 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe could affect the Franco-German tandem negatively. It was likely that increase in the number of member states from 15 to 27 would cause a deadlock not only in the formulation of European agenda but also in the decision making process, where Germany and France have exercised great control. Having a considerable weight on both tracks, France feared that its influence would diminish, but also that the EU would dwindle into nothing more than a free market zone – exactly

what it believes that the British have always wanted. (ibid.) On the other hand, when Germany's economical and geopolitical interests are considered with respect to the enlargement, the controlled relationship between two states would go against France's interests and its containment policy towards Germany would expire.

As one of the pioneers of the European integration, France has influenced the *voice* of the community in the international platforms more than any other members. As de Gaulle had intended for France's foreign policy objectives, it has tried to forge a European community in its own image – EU would, in effect, be 'France en grand' on a supra-national level (Larrabee, 2007, p. 5). Although the post-1990 status of Germany weakened France's aspirations, the EU of 27 would cause more constraints to achieve its foreign policy goals. Additionally, the inclusion of countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary that have had strong US perspective was another problematic issue for France since it has long standing ambitions that the EU could some act as a superpower capable of standing up against the US (Rieker, 2006, p. 8).

As Europe's leading agricultural producer, whose farmers have been producing huge amount of food, France has been the CAP's principal beneficiary, and farm exports a significant part of French foreign trade (Knapp and Wright, 2006, pp. 27-28). However, like in many other policies, accession of 12 new members would strain the functioning of CAP. This is because most of the prospective members such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Lithuania are less industrialized and they have accepted the agriculture sector as main field to carry out their economic activities. In this regard, France, which has benefited from the CAP's advantages to a large extent, perceived the last enlargement wave risky since new accessions could ended its comparative advantage in the market, and lowered amount of subsidies it has received under the CAP.

Lastly, if the last round of EU enlargement is considered from France's economic and commercial activities; the CEECs were not among the France's foremost trade partners during early 90's, and according to the news of Business Week (1997), in 1995 France took only 8% share out of \$112 Billion of the EU's total trade volume with countries of the region. In fact, when Germany's share is disregarded, France portion was even under Italy's. The news also indicated that out of total \$24.4 Billion Foreign

Direct Investment (FDI) between the years of 1990-1995, France investment in the region amounts around \$1.4 Billion which was close to the British records.

Due to all of these reasons stated above the French government opposed to enlargement, at least for a while, and as Schimmelfenning (2001) indicates, France along with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain were the ‘brakemen’ of the Central and Eastern European enlargement. To prevent the realization of enlargement, they – in particular France – came up with alternative models instead of full integration with the region. Most notable one among those was Mitterand’s a rather ill-defined proposal of “European Confederation”, which was declared after his acknowledgement that it would be tens and tens years before Eastern European countries could join the EC. (Baun, 1997, p. 13) According to the model, the CEECs would establish a loose alignment and serve as the basis for Pan-European consultation and cooperation. However, since the CEECs and Germany perceived the model as an obstruction for enlargement, the idea was failed. Another interesting idea was put forward by the European Commissioner Frans Andriessen. It was the affiliate membership that would give the Eastern European countries a voice in EC institutions but no voting rights (ibid.). The model was enthusiastically welcomed by France but for the same reason, Germany opposed the plan. With an idealistic rhetoric Germany claimed that the prospect of full membership was a necessity for those countries to maintain their economic and political reforms. Moreover, the CEECs also questioned these developments in the EC and policymakers these countries compared the EU’s Eastern policy with its relations toward other nonmembers and its behavior in earlier rounds of enlargement and demand equal treatment. (Schimmelfenning, 2001, p. 70) Indeed, France accepted the reality of enlargement due to first Article 237 of the original EEC Treaty which envisaged that all European states right to apply for membership, second member states’ growing recognition – excluding brakemen – about the necessity of the eastern enlargement, third fear of losing the sympathies of the Central and Eastern European societies; and most importantly in order to block Germany not to become a unilateral actor in the region.

France had also deep concerns about the realization method of enlargement. Germany and other neighboring countries such as Austria and Finland demanded limited enlargement process. They insisted that the five Central and Eastern European



countries – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – were more ready than other five countries regarding compliance with the liberal norms that constitute the European community (Schimmelfenning, 2001, p. 60). However, like Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Lauren McLaren (2003, p. 22) argue, for France limited enlargement, especially the inclusion of Visegrad states would be a contribution to Germany's ever-increasing political power. Therefore, France along with the UK and Northern countries supported inclusive enlargement.

When two theoretical approaches are applied to French stance towards the last enlargement, *social constructivism* goes one step further than *liberal intergovernmentalism*. Given the fact that France had not been in favor of the last enlargement due to economic and political reasons as mentioned above the liberal intergovernmental pattern could not be observed as it is seen in German case. Nevertheless, once the last enlargement settled into shape, France had to accept widening reality involuntarily. As Helene Sjursen (2002, p. 506) indicates, France adopted the de Gaulle's vision of a Europe from Atlantic to the Urals to support enlargement by referring single cultural identity of Europe. In other words, it was the implementation of social constructivism over CEECs enlargement.

#### **II. 4. The United Kingdom**

As one of the three major powers along with Germany and France in the EU, the UK's commitment to the shared European vision dates back to the early years of the post-war period. Being a prominent figure in the UK's politics during the 40's and the 50's, Winston Churchill underlined the necessity of the Pan-Europeanist ideology by his call in 1946 for a "United States of Europe", which caused him to be reckoned among the fathers of European unity like Coudenhove-Kalergi. For this purpose, the UK under Churchill put effort for the formation of Council of Europe and the European Assembly though he was ambivalent and reluctant about the role of the UK in his proposal. Later he clarified the UK's position by his famous quote: "We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed"<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, he

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<sup>26</sup> For further information please see: <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/>

offered Pan-Europeanism as a Franco-German project in respect of preventing wars and encouraging cooperation among European countries on the continent. At this juncture, the UK's refusal of joining to the ECSC and subsequently the EEC becomes meaningful. Instead of forming an organic tie with other side of Channel, the UK preferred solely strategic link as stated by Churchill. Additionally, Britain adopted the policy of maintaining close links with the countries of Commonwealth and the US while giving limited room to its European neighbors.

Being among the winners of two world wars, its super power status along with the US and Soviet Russia, its imperial role, prestige, influence and domestic factors might be listed among the factors led the UK to refrain from joining the community in its initial stage. But even after becoming a member of the EEC in 1973 -due to economic reasons- this deep-rooted approach constituted the mainstream version of the UK towards Europe. With reference to Philip Stephens (2005, p. 15), this is "an approach which has displayed at once our acute insecurity and our self-conscious sense of superiority". The UK's enlargement policy has been integral part of its European approach, and it is considered as an important lever in addition to the veto mechanism. Both have served to configure its European preferences: loose and apolitical. In the following part firstly the UK's European approach is analyzed it forms a sound basis for the UK's enlargement policy.

#### **II. 4. 1. The United Kingdom's European Approach**

Perhaps because of the geographical location or long and well-established state system, the UK's relationship first with the EEC then the EU has been often regarded as *semi-detached* by scholars. Alasdair Blair (2004) points out that one of the reasons of the semi-detached status or, in his words, *reluctance* position of the UK stems from its absence in the initial stage of the European Project. He also states that Britain could have played a fuller part in the history of European integration if governments had taken more positive attitude from the outset and extends the debate by pointing out the truth that Britain's has spent a considerable amount of its time as an EU member state in disagreement with the aims of many other member states and European institutions. (p. 584) As it is also mentioned above, even after the full membership of the UK to the

EEC, it has not fully engaged in the issues of the EEC/EU and has stand aloof from the EU structures.

Despite the fact regarding its official entry in 1973, the UK's European perspective was started to be formed in early 40's. In order to create a European consciousness against the Nazi threat, it was the UK that led an initiative with France, and they signed a treaty in which each promised the other not to make a separate peace with Hitler, they declared that after the war, they would do their utmost for a community of action in all spheres for so long may be necessary to effect the reconstruction with assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure liberty of people, respect for law and the maintenance of peace in Europe. (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 691) Just three months after this treaty, Churchill took the initiative one step forward, and offered his French counterpart common defense strategy against growing German aggression. But unfortunately, the fall of France in following days destroyed the evolution of cooperation before starting. Once Churchill's speech on *United States of Europe* is considered, British origin initiatives aiming further cooperation, which were developed in 1940's, might be seen as the central pillar of the speech. However unfavorable progress and result of the war caused the UK to seek its fate outside the continent. Churchill's clarification right after his offer for the United States of Europe runs parallel with this tendency. Also, since the UK had managed to preserve its great power status and taken place among the winners of the war, this caused a superiority feeling among British statesmen over the continent Europe while underlining British patriotism and of course nationalism.

Concurrently, the continent Europe, which had got exhausted as a result of both World Wars, proved its the inefficiency regarding dominant nation-state ideology, and started to debate about coming together under certain principles. In this respect, "not having suffered the shock of defeat, Britain drew very different lessons" (ibid.) Although it did not totally remove the Europe pillar from its foreign policy agenda, the UK preferred to adopt the strategy of developing close relationship with its Commonwealth and the US. Winston Churchill, who served in the office as prime minister two terms during and after war, defined a role in line with this tendency. For William Wallace this was a role of "playing in three circles". The UK's foreign policy would be composed of three main pillars and one of which would related to Europe:

The British Commonwealth and Empire, as it still was, the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon partnership, and the links with our continental European neighbours. (Wallace, 2005, p. 53) According to this, the UK foresaw a union with its commonwealth for counterbalancing the US while acting as a *bridge* between Europe and the US. But later due to the rising independence movements in its dependencies, the defined role for the UK would be shifted from playing in three circles to two, the US and Western Europe.

Although the British governments were principally critical towards Europe at the outset, unpredicted loss of the British Empire and its weak position behind the US took the UK closer to the continent. Harold Macmillan, one of the statesmen saw the value of rapprochement with Europe, albeit skeptic; came up with the idea of forming an organization which is alternative to the EEC and mainly strikes into economic issues rather than political unity. For this purpose, the UK along with Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and Switzerland effectuated the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Through this organization the UK had tried to compensate its loss in economic terms and it was successful for a while. But the progress of the EEC and becoming more and more to the US caused Macmillan to reconsider British foreign policy. The decision to focus on Europe came afterwards and resulted with the application for the EEC membership just one year after the UK, establishment of the EFTA, in 1961. As Bogdanor (2005, p. 693) stated, Europe was seen as a last resort, a final resting place for a country which had run out of options. However, the closeness of the UK to the US policies rather than European ones cost much and prolonged the process of the UK's full membership by 12 years, in which De Gaulle's strong resistance played major role, as he vetoed British application two times in 1963 and 1967.

Prospects of the UK with regard to the EEC membership improved once again after resignation of Charles De Gaulle in 1969. Labor government under Harold Wilson found opportunity to apply to the EEC membership in the same year. Although there were no remarkable signs in terms of a change in British foreign policy priority, European leaders this time especially Pompidou - successor of De Gaulle- did not show pessimistic attitude and the UK finally joined the Community in 1973.

Contrary to the expectations, British vision regarding Europe did not change radically after its membership. Prime ministers including Edward Heath of the

Conservative Party, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan of the Labor Party were all partly or fully skeptical about European integration, and most of them adopted the strategy of avoidance of full commitment to European cooperation in principle. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons of the avoidance of full commitment was stemming from the debates and fragmentations within the political parties. Thus, most of the leaders were pulled back from closer cooperation. Leftist Labor Party and rightist Conservative Party, who are the main political parties of the UK, had had a broad spectrum of views concerning European integration. Their positions towards Europe had often been unsteady; for example from the outset until early 90's none of policy analysts could have classified the standpoints of two main political parties on European integration. Originally the Labor Party had shared more eurosceptic views than the Conservative Party, but later the situation changed. Conservatives rather than the Labor Party tended to give space to eurosceptic ideas. As Stephens reveals, there has rarely been a bipartisan consensus in the UK and disagreements within and between the political parties have been one of the major handicaps for the UK on the way of Europeanization. Compared to most of the other member states, the EU issues are woven into the political fabric. But if one looks back on 30 years of the UK's membership, the consensus on Europe among the largest parties has only been provided one brief period for two or three years after the referendum in 1975. (Stephens, 2005, p. 17)

With the defeat of James Callaghan of the Labor Party in general elections, the Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher came into power in 1979. Thatcher, who hold the premiership post for next 11 years, brought fresh air both home and foreign politics, and moreover set the Conservatives on their present trajectory in respect of European ideology. (ibid.) As Wallace (2005, p. 54) argues, although Thatcher was neutral as a political leader who approached European cooperation without ideological preconceptions, after some hesitation she started to have concerns about the EC regulations which could reverse the policies that she was carrying out. Among the regulations, budgetary issue<sup>27</sup> of the EEC was the vital one that coincided with her

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<sup>27</sup> At that time, %80 of the EEC budget was spent on the CAP but the UK benefited from the CAP relatively much less than other member countries since it has small farming sector. Also, regardless of the

monetary policies. As a reaction, Thatcher began to complain that the UK's net contribution to the EU budget was excessive and looked for support from other members since her claims were justifiable. Continental governments leading by France were lack of a mind-set for a possible compromise, and they insisted on continuation of the status quo. Even though the debate on budget was to be resolved in 1984, reactions of influential states in a patronizing manner affected Thatcher's neutrality toward the European integration negatively. Thus she decided to balance the UK's European relations with another conservative partner Ronald Reagan in the US.

In spite of the experienced negativities on budgetary issues, British government under Thatcher played important roles in the course of the European integration from time to time. Her government's contributions to the formulation of the single market program and efforts for ensuring free trade and competition can be counted among her operations in favor of the European cooperation. Nonetheless, realization of the Single Market by 1993 through the signature of the Single European Act in 1986 was the highest point in the history of the UK – EEC relationship. European governments' attitude for the further integration led Thatcher to look to Europe in a more antagonistic way. This is because she thought just like her predecessors that any transfer of power from the UK to anywhere else would threat British sovereignty. In parallel to her political maneuver, she made other EEC members aware of about position of the UK concerning further integration by making a speech at Bruges, Belgium in 1988. Thatcher expressed frankly her opposition for a federal structure and increasing centralization of decision-making.

Due to harsh internal divisions, particularly over Europe, Margaret Thatcher decided to withdraw from both of her posts and supported John Major as her successor in 1990. In contrast to Thatcher's eurosceptic profile, he was often regarded as *pro-European Conservative* in his party. (Daily Telegraph, 2005) But unfortunately like Thatcher, endless internal conflicts within his party especially over European issues led to the defeat of his party in 1997 elections and the end of his political career. Actually, if his term at the office is evaluated from the perspective of the UK-EEC relations, it is rational to begin from his tenure as Chancellor of Exchequer. As a euroenthusiastic in

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UK's financial status, it was reckoned among the largest contributors for the budget. In fact, at that time the UK was the third poorest member of the EEC.

comparison to his party fellows, Major's involvement with European issues dates back to his service as Chancellor of Exchequer. In this context, even though it was executed in Thatcher's last days, Major's efforts for the British entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) were worthwhile and meaningful. Nevertheless it is difficult to say that his premiership brought in new constructive aspects for the UK's European vision since he could not carry his cabinet or party and the term he governed corresponds with his party's downturn. (Stephens, 2001, p. 69) Firstly Black Wednesday incident of 1992 when the UK was forced out of the ERM, and secondly single currency issue and ratification question of the Maastricht Treaty caused deep strains for the party as well as for the country on its European path. Especially for the ratification, it would be useful to analyze Karen Kieran's article in Guardian where she clarifies the political atmosphere of the UK at that time she stated that the Maastricht Treaty outlined moves towards a single currency, an issue that was to divide the Conservative party for the rest of their time in government. The treaty came into force on January 1 1993, but the battle against his own party to ratify it was akin to pulling teeth for Mr. Major. (Kieran, 2003)

After 18 years in opposition, Labor Party - had undergone a process of transformation in terms of political attitude - entered the office under the leadership of Tony Blair through general elections in 1997. With its new version, Blair's *new* Labor Party, which adopted both centrist and pragmatic approaches, has also dealt with European affairs; and constructive efforts that have been displayed in European matters by Blair led the UK to be appreciated by its EU counterparts.

As Stephens (2001, p. 67) stated, Blair as the most instinctively pro-European Prime Minister since Edward Heath, has begun to rebuild the nation's fractured relationship with its continental neighbors. His government, which has been more united than any of his predecessors', employed a practical method rather than ideology-based politics in European issues. The UK under Blair, formed several alliances with other EU member governments including Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, Antonio Guterres of Portugal, Goran Persson of Sweden, the Netherlands's Wim Kok and Belgium's Guy Verhofstadt; and launched initiatives for the sake of the European integration where it works and pressed, often with success, for decentralization where it is sensible (ibid.). Thus, defense and economy have become favorable fields for the UK to advance in the EU. St. Malo initiative on European defense and the Lisbon Agenda on economic

reform constitute most remarkable examples for the UK's contributions concerning integration. However, despite his absolute control on his party and government, especially, eurosceptic media -The Sun, The Times, The Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph- mainly owned by Rupert Murdoch placed him in an awkward position for further integration in the areas of the single currency and the European Constitution. Incidentally, in the foreign relations context, Blair attempted to render the UK a *leading part in Europe*. Similar to Churchill's *three circle* prevision; Blair alleged the UK's vital bridge role between Europe and the US. It was the dominant concept that imaging the UK between Europe and the US having function of leadership in European international politics while it was assumed that Europe was lack of an influential voice in the US. But as Wallace (2005, pp. 55-56) argued, it has always been an illusion that France, or Germany, or other major European states would accept a privileged British position. These countries have suspected that the UK subordinated its relations with them to its relations with the US. Indeed Stephens claimed that "Gerhard Schröder is right to when he says the traffic on Mr. Blair's bridge is often one way. The government takes the American views to the capitals of Europe. It should more often take Europe's views to Washington". (Wallace, 2005, p. 20) Additionally Blair's positions especially in the US-EU disputes over environmental policy and Iraq War constituted corroborating evidence for the doubts.

Considering the UK's European approach from past to present in general; as a result of cultivated feeling of separateness, which has been encouraged by the country's island geography along with exceptional historical and political background, the UK has tended to be a late and reluctant participant in the European integration. Also, its constant *special relationship* with the US since 1945 and envisagement of Europe – due to ideological reasons – as a United Europe of States rather than a United States of Europe by the UK have kept it from contributing to the European agenda effectively. In spite of the efforts of the recent Blair government, it is important to point out that British governments share the responsibility of the UK's ambivalent and constrained European policy since they have done little. Blair, whose European attempts has often regarded as lesser evil and successful compared to others, his term at the office is assessed ironically by Alasdair Blair (2004, p. 590) as "while Tony Blair has been able to make the case for Britain in Europe....he has not been able to make the case for



Europe in Britain”. In the light of this consequence, it is not too difficult to guess that British policy on enlargement goes hand in hand with ingrained ideological *raison d'être* as much as with pragmatic and utilitarian rationales.

#### **II. 4. 2. The United Kingdom and Its Enlargement Policy**

It might be alleged as confusing and surprising for those who deal with the British case in European integration for the first time. The UK which is renowned for its skepticism and reluctance to the EU issues has always took place among the prominent figures when the issues turn from deepening to widening. Since its entry, the UK has been always among the keenest advocates of enlarging the EU albeit the same enthusiasm has not been presented equally for the integrationist moves that favor the federalist patterns. British anti-federalism is defined by Marie-Kristen Haugevik (2005, p. 3) as reluctance to strengthen the EU level of governance at the expense of national sovereignty. The issue of enlargement, therefore, has been a great opportunity for British statesmen and politicians to counterbalance the federalist orientations as it dilutes the decision making structure in the EU and prevents further integration. In this respect, without any exception the UK has boosted all the enlargement rounds including the last one as much as other supporters composed of founding members headed by Germany and northern countries since they became members of the EEC. Likewise, European enlargement has also been underpinned in domestic context by broad political spectrum in the UK where the European integration issue is likely to cause fragmentations within and between political parties. “Hardly anybody in the UK opposes enlargement openly, and all the political parties are strongly in favour – a highly unusual show of unity on European issue” (Grabbe and Münchau, 2002, p. 7). Yet it should be taken into account that although they do take little room compared with ideological grounds, economic and political implications of enlargement are still reckoned by the UK among the substantial factors to push for enlargement.

Enlargement preferences of the UK refer to specific policy choices just like other members, in which states seek to maximize their national interests. Consequently, with regard to all enlargement rounds after the UK became member, British preferences on enlargement can be seen as the expression of preserving state identity and the perpetuation of economic and political benefits. Since this deep-rooted tendency has

been implicated more or less in all rounds, in order to not get in lost with details, the fifth and the last enlargement which comprised the largest number of countries ever admitted at one time is favored to highlight the British expectations concerning issues mentioned above.

While it has been widely-held opinion that the last enlargement comprising the CEECs was headed by Germany, the UK was another strong voice as a supporter among the member states despite its geographical distance and low-profile relationship with the region. Heather Grabbe and Wolfgang Münchau (2002, p. 8) replace the substance of ideological reasons with geo-political grounds based on an understanding of the strategic importance and historical justice of embracing central Europe. However, it was clear that British governments especially the eurosceptic Conservatives wanted a wider Europe in order to make it loose. It was assumed that if the EU expanded to 25 members, new comers would cause gridlock for the EU structure, and federal aspirations would gradually melt away while securing national sovereignty automatically. Accordingly, McCormick (2002, p. 214) pointed out that Germany was particularly active in promoting the idea, in part because of its historic links with east, while Britain also supported the eastward expansion, but mainly to slow down the process of integration. Enlargement not only secures national sovereignties, but also leads to substantial reordering of the balance of power within the EU. The decisions dependent on the qualified majority system were dominated by the relationship between France and Germany. It was unlikely to pass a policy without consent of those countries (*see table 2*). Perhaps 25 members could shift the balance of power from Franco-German axis to the centre.

*Table 2: Qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers before the Treaty of Nice*

<b>Member States</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
Germany	10
UK	10
France	10
Italy	10
Spain	8
Netherlands	5
Greece	5
Belgium	5
Portugal	5
Sweden	4
Austria	4
Denmark	3
Finland	3
Ireland	3
Luxembourg	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Qualified Majority</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Blocking Minority</b>	<b>26</b>

*Source: McCormick, John (2002). Understanding the European Union.*

Leaving aside the ideological concerns, enlargement also provides an historic chance for the UK to develop its economic interests in Central Europe as well as in the EU. Given the fact that the UK had a tiny proportion of investment in and trade with Central and Eastern Europe, rich potential of the region for increasingly beneficial trade and exchange glamorized image of enlargement in Britons' minds. According to Charles Grant (2002, p. 33), the benefits of the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe are fairly self-evident. Indeed, in the case of the first wave of enlargement, British companies would be able to trade and invest in a single market of 460 million consumers, rather than previously 370 million. One other issue caused great support for the enlargement is the possibility of radical budget reform on the subject of the CAP. It was apparent that an enlargement toward the CEECs requires much more institutional reform and without a revision certain policies such as the CAP and regional funds would render the EU budget worthless for both the existing members and the prospective members. Thus the UK, which receives relatively low subsidies from the CAP and regional funds, rightly supported the enlargement also in this context.

Regarded as belated confession, today several reports and articles on enlargement point out the tangible benefits of the last enlargement wave for the British economy in parallel to the issues discussed above. Moreover, they unpredictably underline the positive impact on the British economy of the influx of migrant workers – which is unusual – from Eastern Europe who contribute an estimated £ 2.5 bn a year to the economy. (Independent, 2006) Also it is argued that the immigration of high skilled, low cost workforce from EU-10 has helped British companies to better compete, with for example the emerging economies of Asia.<sup>28</sup>

The UK was a strong supporter of enlargement also due to its political implications. Especially in the fields of security and transatlantic relations, expansion of the EU borders toward Central and Eastern Europe would serve the interests of the UK. Compatible with its aim of having a high-profile role in international relations of the EU, it is believed that the UK had a desire of extending security to the inwards of Europe by means of enlargement in order to avoid instability, which could have threaten both the UK's and the EU's strategic aspirations. "By extending the security and prosperity enjoyed by Western Europe to the other European states, we shall also enhance our own security and prosperity."<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the UK has been highly criticized because of its transatlantic priorities. Therefore, a prospective enlargement could be a lever to restrain criticizing voices coming from the member states. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary that experienced the aggression of powerful neighbors during the WWII and the Cold War have always had a tendency to cooperate closely with their savior, the US. Therefore, inclusion of these countries especially Poland into the EU structure would lighten the pressure on the UK about its tight relations with the US. Poland and the UK have similar attitude towards European security, since they perceive the NATO's role and the transatlantic relationship as priorities.<sup>30</sup>

If the enlargement policy of the UK is analyzed from the perspectives of *liberal intergovernmental* and *social constructivism* approaches, it would not be wrong to put forward that the UK preferences lie beyond what both theories envisage. However,

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<sup>28</sup> For full text please see: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/enlargement-beneficial-uk-economy/article-159940>.

<sup>29</sup> For full text please see: <http://www.britain.cz/>

<sup>30</sup> For full text please see: [http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grabbe\\_polnewsbull\\_15july\\_04.html](http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grabbe_polnewsbull_15july_04.html)

compared to the liberal intergovernmentalism, the aspects of social constructivism were used more often by British statesmen to pursue their individual and self-interested goals. Although some economic implications were emphasized by British statesmen, it is hard for them to argue on economic and political grounds of national interests because those interests are relatively small comparing to ideological interests. According to Schimmelfennig, the UK's enlargement preferences deviate from the structural pattern of liberal intergovernmentalism since CEECs are neither geographically close nor economically important to Britain. The main reason of strong British commitment to enlargement is related with 'europhobia' of the Conservative governments, who had preferred an extensive widening to deepening in order to dilute further integration rather than deepening. (2001, p. 53) In this respect, the aspects of social constructivism are the only tool to justify the Central and Eastern enlargement from the British point of view. Thus, British statesmen of the 1990's – namely the conservatives – followed the path of their Iron Lady who is regarded as the first British politician called for enlargement by stating: "We must never forget that east of the iron curtain peoples who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots. We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities"<sup>31</sup>

The political discourses of British leaders, especially at the Summits reveal that the British official policy towards enlargement is obviously positive. UK has hitherto been the biggest supporter of candidate countries, parallel to its unionist character favoring widening over deepening. However the public opinion surveys indicate that support from the British public is not in a strong correlation with the official policy of the British government. When we look at the results of Eurobarometer surveys, we see that the average of supporters of Eastern enlargement had been floating around the EU-15 average with 43% and 44%, respectively (Eurobarometer 49, p. 66).

Oya Dursun (2005, p. 6) explains this inconsistency between government's preference and public's towards enlargement with the impact of "British media with a Euro-skeptic nature" on the formation of public opinion that consequently turns out to be "pessimistic on the EU issues". This correlation between media coverage and public

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<sup>31</sup> For the full text please see:  
[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030521/debtext/30521-25.htm#30521-25\\_spnew1](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030521/debtext/30521-25.htm#30521-25_spnew1)

opinion is supported by another Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 61, p. 26)) that reflects that for 50% of British people daily newspapers are the primary sources for European enlargement issues.

As the research method for her study about the impact of media on public opinion about the eastern enlargement in the UK, she chose to compare the media coverage of *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mail* from 2002 when accession negotiations with the 10 Central and Eastern European Countries started, to 2004 when the accession happened and the Eurobarometer surveys between these dates. At the end of her research examining 342 relevant newspaper articles, she found out that the press was being highly critical about the enlargement, regarding especially immigration and its effects on welfare, labor market, and the budgetary burden on the UK's economy.

The insistent support of the British government welcoming the Eastern candidates to the Union compared to the public support that does not surpass the European average much may seem a bit contradictory from an intergovernmental bargaining perspective that assumes that the official policy of a state stems from the preferences of grassroots. However, taking into account the negative messages coming from the media, the consequent fear and prejudices in the public against the Easterners, and the famous British skepticism, the extent of support quite considerable, especially compared to other European nations.

To conclude, Germany, France and the UK – which are regarded as the *Major Three* of the Union – had worked hard for the manipulation of the last enlargement in line with their national interests and objectives. In that respect, while Germany and the UK appeared as the most encouraging states among the EU members, France had first opposed to the realization of the last enlargement. But after realizing the unavoidability of the issue, France supported the enlargement unwillingly and managed to direct the process in accordance with its preferences. If the consequences of enlargement are considered, it would not be wrong to claim that the major three states have achieved their purposes over the last enlargement to some extent. Therefore in the light of the concrete example of the last enlargement, it is believed that the Major Three's approaches and their theoretical bases which are liberal intergovernmentalism and social constructivism will be influential with respect to the Turkey's EU membership bid.

### **CHAPTER III.**

## **TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP ISSUE AND THE MAJOR THREE EU MEMBERS**

In this chapter the theoretical approach on how the states form their decisions in international and national arenas is tested on the case study which is related to formation of decision on Turkey's membership issue. It is an undisputable fact that Turkey's objective to become a member of the EU and the Union's desire to maintain frosty relationship with Turkey have produced a difficult, stressed and often mutually unsatisfactory relationship over the years. In view of over 40 years of waiting in the queue, Turkey seems to be the only country, for which there is no consensus neither domestically nor in the EU about how their relationship should develop. The first question is whether Turkey is eligible for the EU membership candidacy. In other words, it is questioned if it is historically, culturally, politically, even geographically European. If the answer is affirmative, then the debate comes to whether it is eligible for the actual membership, which necessitates complying with the membership criteria.

Obviously, answers to these questions are as diverse as the questions themselves. Some argue that even Turkey's candidacy is doubtful while some claim that Turkey is ready to join its European brothers. On the other hand, some propose a middle-way and say that it should be neither given full membership nor kept out totally, and try to invent a new status, which is far away from satisfying Turkey's expectations. Unlike some technical and more tangible matters, when it comes to enlargement, we encounter such varying standpoints because as mentioned in the previous chapters, the policies do not only come out from rational cost-benefit analysis, but also societal feelings and perceptions matters.

To understand the motivations behind the European policy vis-à-vis Turkey, the stances of the three major member states are analyzed in terms of their national policies in the first level revealed by the leaders' statements on the table and their discourses, and their public's opinion indicated in Eurobarometer surveys. But before that, it is useful to make an overview of the history of the EU-Turkey relations, from the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 until the beginning of the accession negotiations on

October 3, 2005. Such an overview of the relations may be helpful to understand the ups and downs in Turkey's image in Europe.

### **III. 1. Historical Analysis of the Turkey-EU Relations**

This section focuses on the periods, which are seen as the so-called turning points in the relations. First of all, the period between 1959 and 1963 is important in the sense that it marks the beginning of the story, covering Turkey's application for associate membership into the EEC and the signing of the Ankara Agreement. Secondly, late 1970s are seen as a critical turning point in the relations in the sense that the EC's southern enlargement took place and Turkey missed a very important opportunity by not applying for full membership following Greece. 1980s, however, are important since they experienced both deterioration of the relations caused by the 1980 military *coup* in Turkey and a sudden shift through the full membership application in 1987 under the prime ministry of Turgut Özal. Additionally, 1990s, which covered the EU's eastern enlargement and witnessed the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999, are also considered as a determining period in the relations. Finally, the year 2005, in which accession negotiations were opened, is another date, which deserves close scrutiny.

The section, however, does not simply provide a chronology of the developments from 1959 to 2005; it also offers a detailed analysis of each period, focusing and commenting mainly on the reasons behind each side actions as well as on the changing nature of the EU over time. It discusses the main obstacles to Turkey's membership cited by European officials such as the problems related to relative economic backwardness, the level of democracy, the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish issue and human rights. Moreover, it is argued that although the aforementioned factors all legitimately complicate Turkey- EU relations, the perception of Turks as culturally different and essentially non-European is a very important (for some scholars and politicians even the main) factor affecting the relationship between both sides.



### **III. 1. 1. 1959-1963: Turkey's Application to the EEC for Associate Membership and Signing of the Ankara Agreement**

Following the World War I and the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 'westernization' in the political and economic field and having the identity 'European' became the fundamental goals for the Turkish political elite. Since then it has always closely associated itself with the West, becoming a founding member of the UN and the Council of Europe, a member of the NATO and the OECD and an associate member of the Western European Union. After having entered into close cooperation with Europe in the political field, the next natural step for Turkey was to complete its collaboration in the economic area. Thus, Turkey chose to begin close cooperation with the EEC and finally applied for associate membership in 1959 shortly after the Greek application.

The EEC as a response to Turkey's application proposed the establishment of an association until it would become ready for accession. The following negotiations resulted in the signature of an association agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963. According to the agreement, integration process would advance stage by stage and result, at the end, in full membership after realizing a customs union. Turkey's progress would be determinant before passing from one stage to another.<sup>32</sup> As Ziya Öniş (2000a, p. 8) stated, the agreement also envisaged a vague promise -or clear prospect- of full membership at some unidentified date provided that the appropriate conditions had been satisfied.

Looking back, three basic motives can be outlined in Turkey's application for associate membership during this period. First of all, closer relations with the EC seemed necessary for as well as consistent with the Turkey's goal of building a, democratic and Western-oriented state. Secondly, it was believed that establishing close relations would also enable Turkey to prevent Greece, which had also applied for associate membership, from having unfair advantage in its subsequent relations with Turkey. Finally, the long term benefits, which would be produced through closer relations with a strong and influential economic union, were another motive in the Republic's decision to apply for associate membership. (Öniş, 2000a, pp. 8-9)

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<sup>32</sup> According to the Ankara Agreement the association between Turkey and the EEC would be completed in three stages: Preparatory stage, transitional stage and final stage.

### **III. 1. 2. 1970s: The Southern Enlargement and Turkey's Self-Exclusion**

The year 1974 proved to be a turning point in the Turkey-EC relations. It is also seen by many as the beginning of an important divergence in the EC's policies towards Greece and Turkey, which up to that stage had enjoyed a more or less equal status in their relations with the EC. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the collapse of the military government in Greece, (which had been in power since 1968), produced extensive changes in Turkish-Greek-EC relations, in the sense that the new Greek government under the Prime Ministry of Constantine Karamanlis applied for full membership to the Community in 1975 and Greece became a full member in 1981 after the completion of the accession negotiations. (Öniş, 2000a, p. 10)

From a historical point of view, one of the main questions to be asked is why Turkey had failed to apply for full membership to the EC at the same time as Greece, considering that one of the motives for Turkey's application in 1959 was precisely to counteract the initial strategic move on the part of Greece. (Öniş, 2000a, p. 11) One explanation might be that the Turkish political elite underestimated the difficulties that Greece's accession to the Community would pose for the course of the Turkey-EC relations. It was initially believed that Greece would be included only as a weak member, not being able to change the stance of the Community towards Turkey. Additionally, the Turkish political elite at that time also believed that the Community (even with Greece being a member) would abstain from taking decisions against an important NATO power such as Turkey. (ibid.)

By the late 1970's, when it was realized that Greece's early accession to the Community became a serious possibility, concern in Turkey grew and the idea of applying for full membership gained increasing support. However, the growing domestic political and economic instability, and finally the collapse of the democratic regime in Turkey in 1980 by military intervention had ended the hopes for accession.

In short, Turkey, because of its failure to apply for full membership at the same time as Greece, missed a major chance even though some argues that reasons for inaction have valid grounds. Turkey's inaction basically resulted in its exclusion from the EC enlargement. In that respect one can even say that "Turkey's exclusion from the Community at the time of its Southern Enlargement constituted a case of self-exclusion as opposed to exclusion by the Community itself." (Öniş, 2000a, p. 12)

### **III. 1. 3. 1980s: Deterioration of the Relations and Turkey's Full Membership Application**

The Ankara Agreement of 1963 defined the relations between Turkey and the EU primarily in economic terms, as membership of the Customs Union. During the 1980s, however, political aspects such as commitment to democracy and human rights started to appear as collective European identity. While Turkey had previously been criticized by the EC due to mainly economic reasons, the EU in the 1980s also began to pay attention to political issues in its relations with Turkey. Thus, beside economic considerations, Turkey's situation in the issues of democracy and human rights began to constitute a significant barrier before its full membership. (Öniş, 2000b, p. 4) The military intervention in 1980 and resulting bad records in these issues pulled Turkey away from the EU.

Following Turkey's return from *coup d'état* to parliamentary democracy in late 1983 and 1984 local elections with the participation of the prohibited parties, relations with Europe, which had been suspended due to the military *coup* in 1980, started to become normalized. In addition, the transformation of Turkish economy from heavily protected and inward oriented economy to more open and outward-oriented economy throughout 1980s also helped recovery of the Turkey-EC relations. In the light of these positive developments, the relationship experienced a sudden shift through Turkey's full membership application in 1987.

The Commission's Opinion on the application, which was endorsed by the Council in 1990, basically underlined Turkey's eligibility for membership, yet delayed the in depth analysis of Turkey's application until the emergence of a more favourable environment. (Arik, 2000, p. 100) In addition to Turkey's failure of meeting both basic economic and political conditions for full membership, it also put forward that the EC's own situation on the eve of the Single Market completion prevents the consideration of further enlargement. It also underlines the need for a comprehensive cooperation program aiming at facilitating the integration of the two sides. (ibid.)

The fact that the economic dimension had always been a critical factor governing Turkey-EC relations right from the outset is not surprising in the sense that the Community in the late 1950s and early 1960s was far more a project of economic integration as opposed to a political and cultural entity. (Öniş, 2000a, p. 4) However, the

completion of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EC along with the transformation of the European integration's personality to "EU" created a new environment for Turkey, in which political factors such as the level of democracy, rule of law and respect to human rights started to gain importance as much as -even more than- economic considerations. On the other hand, although Turkey's application for full-membership was rejected, Turkey's attempt can be regarded as revitalization the relationship between Turkey and the EC after a long period of deadlock since it led the EC to propose intensifying the relations on the basis of the Customs Union in due time.

### **III. 1. 4. 1990s: Turkey and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU**

As it is known the EU has undergone several successive rounds of enlargement since its foundation in 1957. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, in 1981 Greece and in 1986 Portugal and Spain became member states of the EC. In 1995 the EU was enlarged to include Austria, Finland and Sweden, and at the end of the 1990s it found itself in the middle of a new wave of enlargement, aiming at integrating with the former communist countries in the eastern periphery of the Community, whose candidacy status was granted in 1997 Luxembourg Summit and their membership were realized in May 2004. On the other hand, 1997 Luxembourg Summit was a disappointment for Turkey as it was not included among that group of countries in the Summit regardless of the fact that it is the earliest applicant for membership.

Thus, it can be argued that in spite of the completion of the Customs Union, the late 1990's marked a period of isolation, exclusion, and sense of disappointment in Turkey-EU relations. For Turkey, this perception of being excluded reached a peak point with the EU's Luxembourg Summit of 1997, where Turkey was excluded from candidate status at a time when a number of Central and Eastern European countries emerged as serious contenders for full EU membership. (Öniş, 2000a, pp. 15-16)

#### ***III. 1. 4. 1. 1997: The Luxembourg Summit***

The Luxembourg Summit in 1997, which excluded Turkey from the list of potential full members, caused a deep sense of disappointment on the part of Turkey. While it reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for accession to the EU, it also decided to set up a roadmap in order to prepare Turkey for accession and to propose a new mechanism

to reassess the developments in the future. Additionally, the development of the Turkey-EU relations was based conditional on certain economic, political and foreign policy issues.

The incorporation of the CEECs, whose economic and political performances were not better than Turkey, can be argued as the leading factor that paved the way to the widely-shared resentment of the Turkish society, which thought that the EU treated Turkey with double standard. That's why the Luxembourg Summit is considered to represent another low point in the uneasy and complex interaction between Turkey and the EU. (Öniş, 2000b, p. 8)

#### *Reasons behind Turkey's exclusion from the enlargement process*

The European Council did not grant candidacy status to Turkey and, therefore, excluded it from the enlargement process mainly due to the considerations concerning the economic development and democratic deficiencies. It was argued that although Ankara persistently declared that its economic and political priorities laid in close cooperation with the EU, it merely paid lip service to this goal. Turkey was seen as not ambitious or resolute enough to take serious steps in the economic, administrative and legislative fields. To be more precise, in addition to economic deficiencies, this time the grounds of the exclusion included mainly Turkey's failure to qualify on a long list of *standard of civilization* issues, such as insufficient political pluralism, the military's role in Turkey, problems over Cyprus and human rights issues (with special emphasis on Ankara's treatment towards the Kurdish population and other critical voices). (Buzan and Diez, 1999, p. 43)

#### 1) Economic backwardness:

It is an undeniable fact that Turkey has faced serious economic crises in its history. For the EU, these macroeconomic problems needed to be overcome and a stable economy needed to be established before Turkey can qualify for full membership. Considering the reports submitted by the Commission to evaluate the progress made by Turkey, the economic conditions were far away from the expectations in terms of stability despite the reforms realized so far. Indeed, Öniş (2000a, p. 5) argued that a significant development gap still persists in spite of forty years of sustained economic growth and substantive industrialization. Furthermore, ensuring economic stability and

improving economic conditions were essential not only for the economy itself but also for Turkish governments' self-confidence to undertake necessary political reforms for the fulfillment of political requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria.

### 2) The role of military in politics

The status of the armed forces in politics has been an important factor, which has also been regarded as one of the major issues stands in front of the Turkish accession. For the EU, several military *coups* in Turkey's history were clear evidence for the significant but undemocratic role of the military in Turkish politics. The fact that the considerable role of military in politics is still a striking feature of life in Turkey continues to be an obstacle for the EU membership.

### 3) Human rights and the Kurdish issue

Another important obstacle to the Turkey-EU relations is Turkey's insufficiency to meet the EU's standards on human rights. The human rights issue arises not only from Turkey's authoritarian political traditions and the strong political role of the military, but also from the unsettled issue of Turkey's "Kurdish minority".

According to the EU, mechanisms that create effective impunity for torture and ill-treatment, articles in the Penal Code restricting freedom of expression "on the grounds of protecting the basic characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation", Turkey's legislations concerning non-Muslim minorities (such as property rights) and the Kurdish population (legislative framework regarding broadcasting and education in minority language) and the judiciary system including the powers of the state security courts needed to be reformed as fast as possible. (Emerson, 2004)

### 4) The Cyprus issue

In 1963, three years after Cyprus gained independence from Britain, inter-communal violence broke out between the island's Greek and Turkish communities. This incidence led to an attempt by Greece to seize the government in 1974 and a military intervention by Turkey in response. In 1983, the northern part of the island, by claiming self-determination, declared itself as the *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* (TRNC), which was, however, recognized only by Turkey. Since then the island has been divided, despite repeated efforts of the international community, especially the UN, to bring the leaders of the two sides to the negotiating table. In the referenda on the

so-called Annan Plan in April 2004, the Greek Cypriots said “NO” while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour. After the referenda it was thought that the results would increase the bargaining power of the Turkish side in the international arena.

Despite lack of a comprehensive solution for both sides, the Greek Cypriot-controlled part of the island became a full member of the EU in May 2004 with the name of “Republic of Cyprus” as recognized by the EU. During the accession negotiations started in October 2005, Turkey has been asked to extend the 1963 Ankara Agreement through a supplementary protocol to the new member states, including the Greek Cypriot state, which is not recognized by Turkey. Turkey did so, but felt the necessity of the declaration that this did not mean recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. However, this extension has never been implemented. In December 2006, the EU finally decided to sanction Turkey and suspend negotiations in eight negotiation chapters, which are related to the functioning of the Customs Union.

#### 5) The issue of “identity”

The analysis of the historical developments reveals that it would be unfair to consider economic and political factors, cited by the EU, as the main obstacles to Turkey’s full membership. After all, it should be borne in mind that it was the Community which integrated in a short period of time three southern Mediterranean and ten eastern countries whose level of economy and democracy were similar to Turkey and substantially lower than the Member States’ averages. Similarly, European Council’s approach in the Luxembourg Summit is also criticized by Meltem Müftüler-Bac, who believed the decision not to include Turkey among the candidates for accession caused the EU’s objectivity in evaluating candidate countries to be questioned since Turkey had similar economies and its political problems that were no worse than those of many of the other applicants. This comparative observation suggests that the main obstacles to Turkey’s membership are stemmed from not only economic and political issues that were vowed by the EU regularly, but rather perceptions of Turkey as “the other”. (2000, p. 21) Likewise, Öniş (2000a, p. 6) argues that the Europeans have been far more sympathetic to the idea of integrating Greece in the late 1970s or Poland in 1990s since they appeared as a natural part of the European order, while Turkey was a typical outsider or the other.

### ***III. 1. 4. 2. 1999: The Helsinki Summit***

In response to the exclusion in the Luxembourg Summit, the Turkish government decided to suspend all political dialogue with the EU. Rather ironically only two years later Turkey was proclaimed as a candidate for full membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, which helped to reverse the strong sense of isolation existed over the course of the past years.

In the progress report submitted to the European Council to be held in Helsinki in 1999, the Commission proposed that Turkey should be given the candidacy status, but with the condition of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria for opening of the accession negotiations. Since the European Council followed these recommendations, Turkey's candidacy status was confirmed and its participation to the enlargement process of the EU verified.

#### *Factors Affected the Decision Taken at Helsinki*

The two-year period from the disappointing Luxembourg Summit to the Helsinki Summit is an interesting and paradoxical period to analyze. The Helsinki Decision is obviously a turning point in Turkey-EU relations in the sense that following the disappointment of the Luxembourg Summit, the Helsinki Summit provided a new push for the Turkish side, which has increased the motivation for further reforms. The EU's credibility increased in the eyes of not only the government, but also the Turkish society, which was feeling to be marginalized by the Europeans on the unfair grounds, and reacted to this by adopting a quite radical nationalism. It is just after this decision that the Turkish society began to be more interested in the EU affairs, activities and institutions aiming at raising awareness. Indeed, the relations that were suspended at political level revived and brought both sides closer than any time before. The factors that paved the way to the shift from negative to positive approach towards Turkey are considered below.

#### 1) The important role of Turkey for the EU as a strategic partner

When we came to the end of the 90s, the member states of the EU realized that the EU's dependence on the NATO in military and humanitarian interventions outside its borders was restricting its ambition to become a global actor, and they felt the necessity to ensure automatic access to the NATO sources and to build its own military



forces. As referred to by Bac and Maclaren (2003, p. 27), in the Helsinki Summit the European Council adopted a number of measures to advance the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) stating its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The inclusion of Turkey, whose capability was clearly above the European average in terms of budget and amount of soldiers under arms, seemed as the only way to reach these ends.

### 2) Support from the Social Democrats

In the warming atmosphere from the Luxembourg Summit to the Helsinki Summit, the role of the general shift in the politics in European states should also be mentioned. With the change in European governments from conservative Christian parties to social democrats, which were more favorable to the Turkish accession, Turkey's supporters in the Council increased. Germany was the country where this shift was noticed most with Schröder coming into power and did whatever it could to rescue Turkish-EU relations (Park, 2000).

### 3) Support from Greece

Just a few days before the Helsinki summit, Phil Gordon commented in International Herald Tribune on the possible positions about the Turkish question. He was expecting a surprising shift in Greece's vote, which had been a chronic enemy of Turkey and showed this hostility at every opportunity especially through using its veto right in the European Council. According to him, a new Greek veto of Turkey's candidacy would lead to a slowdown if not an end to the recent warming of relations between the two countries, and a guarantee that neither Cyprus nor the Aegean problem will be resolved soon. In other words, this time Greece was going to decide on rational grounds, since it was seeking support from its EU partners in disputes over sovereignty in the Aegean, and a promise that Cyprus can join the EU even if efforts to unify the island fail. (Gordon, 1999) Indeed, Greece acted on the part of pro-Turkey group during the Summit. Leaving aside this realist approach to the shift in Greece's policy towards Turkey, some scholars argue that the emotional factors had much weight in this change. They refer to the sense of "empathy" resulting from the dramatic earthquakes experienced by both countries consecutively in 1999 and believe that it was the sorrow

and mutual assistance to overcome it that brought the two societies closer. (Katdritzke, 2000)

#### 4) The role of the US

Finally, the US' contribution cannot be underestimated for the affirmative decision taken in Helsinki. Considering its vital interests in the Middle East, and the Central Asia, and Turkey's pro-US profile in the EU, the US – especially since Bill Clinton's presidency – has been regarded as most influential champion of Turkey's EU membership bid outside the EU zone. In that sense, similar to its constructive role in 1996 for the completion of the Customs Union, this time the US appeared as a Turkish voice in Brussels to apply pressure on the EU member states to be more encouraging towards Turkey (Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 24).

### **III. 1. 5. 2004-2005: Opening of the Accession Negotiations**

The period from 1999 to 2004/2005 experienced serious discussions about how to develop the EU-Turkey relationship. Despite the satisfactory outcome of the Helsinki Summit, those opposed to Turkey's accession argued that serious hurdles continued to exist on the road to Turkey's full membership. Politically difficult economic reforms and equally fundamental changes in Turkish domestic politics still needed to be implemented in order to qualify for full membership. Opponents of Turkey's membership argued that Turkey did not respect the basic principles of a liberal democracy because of its discrimination against 'ethnic minorities', political opponents and critics of 'Kemalist' nationalism as well as because of the significant involvement of the army in civil society. Additionally, they argued that the freedom of religion was prevented in Turkey through imposed secularism. Another argument against Turkey's accession was the never ending dispute over Cyprus Island.

However, arguments in favour of Turkey's membership included the belief that this would reinforce democratic institutions in Turkey, strengthen the EU economy in addition to Turkey's strategic position. Some also maintained that the EU could no longer refuse Turkey, since it had an open candidacy for over 40 years, and undertook several significant reforms in the economic as well as political sphere (especially in the areas concerning human rights) in order to satisfy the accession conditions of the EU. Furthermore, it was argued that admitting a predominantly Muslim country such as

Turkey would send a signal to the rest of the world that the EU was not purely a “Christian Club”. In the same vein, close cooperation between a Muslim country and the West would also send a signal to the world that Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” can be avoided.

At last, after an intensive period of discussion, the European Council announced on December 17, 2004 that accession negotiations with Turkey would be officially opened on October 3, 2005. The screening process, which began on October 20, 2005, was completed on October 18, 2006.

In conclusion, a chronology of the developments in the EU-Turkey relations from 1959 to 2005 is provided by focusing mainly on the important turning points in the relations and discussing in detail the official obstacles to Turkey’s membership bid, such as problems related to economic backwardness, the state of democracy, the Cyprus issue and human rights issues. In addition to discussing these official factors, it is also stressed that those factors are not the only ones, which complicate the relations since the perception of Turks as culturally non-European is another, if not the main factor, affecting the course of relations. Additionally, Europe as it evolved from the Community to the Union has undergone considerable changes. While at the beginning the Community was more a project of economic integration, it evolved over the time into a political and cultural identity, which made Turkey’s accession even more difficult.

Analyzing historical developments of the EU-Turkey relations is important in the sense that it helps to grasp the EU’s enlargement policy over the Turkish case in general. That’s why approaches of the major member states towards Turkey are dealt with after analyzing the turning points of the EU-Turkey relations historically.

### **III. 2. Stances of ‘The Major Three’ towards Turkey’s EU Membership**

It is an unquestionable fact that the major states of the EU such as Germany, France and the UK will have the most important and the most special impact on the issue of Turkey’s accession to the EU. As discussed in the previous chapters, it would not be an exaggeration to say that they have shaped policies of the EU concerning deepening and widening. It would be wrong to mention about settled policies of the major three states for Turkey. However, the 1999 Helsinki Summit created a new

environment, in which these states' approaches towards Turkey have grown and let us focus on concrete steps rather than abstract implications. In that sense, following lines touch upon observed approaches of Germany, France and the UK towards Turkey since the Helsinki Summit.

### **III. 2. 1. Germany**

Whilst Germany's approach toward Turkey's EU membership bid is analyzed, the most important point that needs special attention is the political attitudes of two mainstream parties in German politics, which are the Christian Democratic Union Germany / Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU) of the center right and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) of the center left. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD have been looming large in German political spectrum, and since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949 either the SPD or the CDU/CSU has seized opportunity of forming government. In addition to their different political views regarding domestic politics, the CDU/CSU and the SPD also often differentiate in foreign policy issues. Among those issues, Turkey's EU membership is very crucial. While the CDU/CSU has traditionally acted against Turkey's membership bid by justifying their position over cultural and identity disputes, the SPD has defended the idea that the EU should include Turkey once the commitments are fulfilled. Between the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 80s, in other words during the SPD government, Germany had been the voice of Turkey in the EEC. However, contrary to the SPD's constructive attitudes, the CDU/CSU government under Helmut Kohl had not supported Turkey's accession, and even its candidacy status, until the end of his reign. In this respect, the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which officially launched the last round of enlargement, constitutes unprecedented example to present Kohl's firm approach toward Turkey, where he ignored Turkey's hopes for getting candidacy status by strongly asserting the difference of civilizations between Europe and Turkey. (Milliyet, 1997) On the other hand, the SPD-Green Party coalition under Gerhard Schröder's leadership, which came to the power in 1998, had manifested encouraging and supportive approach to Turkey's EU membership bid throughout 7 years of its government. In light of these fundamentals, Germany's approach towards Turkey's EU membership bid is analyzed from the 1999 Helsinki Summit until recently, namely

covering firstly the SPD-Green Party coalition and then the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU–SPD.

The previous government of Germany, the SPD-Green Party coalition had supported the Turkey's EU perspective due to many aspects. In addition to their positive attitude in the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder from the SPD and Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer from the Green Party had managed to render Germany as the locomotive of Turkey in the EU (Dartan, 2006, p. 133). In fact, the SPD – Green Party coalition's common approach toward Turkey had been affected much from the major partner's (SPD) party principles<sup>33</sup>. The universal values such as peace, freedom and human rights come apparent in comparison to the CDU/CSU's references to the Christianity and Christian values.<sup>34</sup> On the whole, the SPD and the Green Party had considered the positive impact of Turkey's membership on the EU since they believe that Turkish membership would cause opportunities both in strengthening the relations between Islam and the West and in securing Europe more efficiently.<sup>35</sup> Despite the loss of votes against the CDU/CSU in 2002 elections, the SPD – Green Party coalition kept its composure and continued to support Turkey's EU perspective without using it as a lever in domestic policy. Likewise, both Schröder and Fischer criticized Merkel's political attitudes as she used the Turkish case for her domestic policy concerns. Furthermore, for Merkel's "privileged partnership" proposal, Fischer claimed that Turkey was already a privileged partner of the EU and exclusion of Turkey from the EU would engender substantially negative consequences. (Hürriyet, 2004a) The German government also stated that the linkage between non-fundamentalist version of Islam and Western enlightenment would be remarkable security profit for Europe in general and for Germany in particular. (Radikal, 2005) Additionally, in a meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in February 2004, Schröder frankly made it clear that the EU was expected to launch

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<sup>33</sup> For the full text of the basic policy programme of the SPD please see, <http://www.spd.de/show/1683396/Basic-Policy-Programme.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> For the principles and the programme of the CDU please see, <http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/partyprinciples.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> For full text please see [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/04/040430\\_schroedereuturkey.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/04/040430_schroedereuturkey.shtml)

accession negotiations with the Turkish government after the fulfillment of the commitments.<sup>36</sup>

To analyze the CDU/CSU's political stance toward Turkey after the Helsinki Summit, it would not be wrong to focus on their "privileged partnership" proposal, which has been developed by the leader of the CDU Angela Merkel. The idea was first suggested in February 2004 before Merkel's visit to Turkey. She describes her proposal as *special, privileged partnership or third way*<sup>37</sup>. According to Merkel, Turkey is an important country for Europe because it is already "geostrategic partner" of Europe, and within this context both Turkey and Europe share common interests in terms of common foreign and security policy. Also, Turkey has had European perspective since 1960, and still the same perspective has been preserved. However, she believes that due to current problems of Europe, and Germany in particular, Turkey's full membership objective is not realistic to be realized. Instead, both the EU and Turkey have to concentrate on other alternatives or formulas to strengthen the existing ties among them. In this context, the "privileged partnership" is one alternative concept reflects the CDU/CSU's view.

For the leader of the CDU, problems of both Germany and the EU basically arise from economic incapability, and it is not possible to solve these problems in the short run. In German case, costs of re-unification along with challenges of globalization have not been overcome. Likewise, the EU is still dealing with digesting problems of the last enlargement round. Thus, it is the fact for her that entry of such a big and economically disadvantaged country would cause nothing but more problems. On the other hand, Merkel argues that Turkey's full membership process can be impeded not only by the EU but also by Turkey. She invokes difficulties of integration just to reveal its probable disadvantages for Turkey by underlining the complex structure of the EU, delegation of power to Brussels in many policy fields and firm EU standards, which can arouse controversy in Turkey since all have to be applied to every state of daily life.

Considering possible effects of Turkey's EU membership on the EU, Germany and Turkey, Angela Merkel emphasized an alternative process like "privileged

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<sup>36</sup> For the full text please see:

[http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/02/040223\\_schroederturkey.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/02/040223_schroederturkey.shtml)

<sup>37</sup> From the speech of Dr. Angela Merkel at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ankara Office on 16.02.2004.

partnership” for Turkey instead of full membership. The process contains important steps in terms of maintaining convergence between the EU and Turkey; but it does not envisage full membership. Accordingly, Merkel’s “privileged partnership” proposal was rejected not only by Erdogan government but also by Turkish public opinion. However, the reaction of Turkey has not refrained the CDU/CSU from supporting their original position. Furthermore, by declaring a joint position on 7 March 2004 CDU/CSU stated that the possible Turkey’s membership to the EU will compel internal dynamics of the community and the EU will just hold the distinction of being free-market in the end.<sup>38</sup> In later periods, the CDU/CSU inserted new but expected arguments to the previous one in order to provoke anti-Turkey sentiments. Over cultural, identity and demographic matters, they claimed that the political composition of the EU would undergo an unfavorable transformation. In addition to their propaganda in Germany, the CDU/CSU has also tried to disseminate and introduce their “privileged partnership” proposal to the other Christian Democrat governments across Europe. In this respect, Merkel and Stoiber sent letter to 10 conservative leaders in Europe. They had suggested in this letter to maintain the EU-Turkey relations on the basis of privileged partnership. Cyprus dispute and human rights issues were presented as their main reason in the letter to favor proposal.

After the inconclusive result of the German federal election on 18 September 2005, the leaders of the SPD and the CDU/CSU agreed to form a *Grand Coalition* under chancellorship of the CDU leader Angela Merkel. Beyond all new implications existing, the Grand Coalition’s would-be policy about the EU perspective of Turkey has been critically important since it contains pro-Turkey SPD and anti-Turkey CDU/CSU. Although the term of “privileged partnership” is not clearly included in the Grand Coalition protocol, there are still many ambiguous statements remind the “privileged partnership” in a sense. Moreover, despite the coalition partners’ declaration regarding their compromise on Turkey’s EU membership issue, the wording in protocol is closer to the ideology of the CDU/CSU rather than the SPD. According to the given statements, it is believed that Germany has special interests in deepening of mutual relations with Turkey at the national and the EU level whereas the protocol warns

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<sup>38</sup> For the full declaration please see, <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/080304-beschluss-tuerkei.pdf>

Turkey by highlighting the “open-ended” feature of negotiation process, which does not guarantee the full membership automatically. It is also stated that economic, demographic and cultural characteristics of Turkey constitute a special challenge to the EU. Nevertheless, the reform process in Turkey is supported and necessities of democratic, judicial and economic reforms are stressed. And lastly, similar to the EU’s official documents, the coalition agreement emphasizes absorption capacity, which is stated in the text as following: “Should the EU not have the capacity to absorb Turkey, or should Turkey not be able to comply completely and in full with all of the commitments which membership entails, Turkey must be linked to the European structures as closely as possible and in a way that further develops its privileged relationship with the EU.”<sup>39</sup>

One other thing that can be regarded as striking is the Merkel’s softening in her rhetoric over the membership issue of Turkey in the aftermath of the German federal elections. In that softening, the role of new foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who is one of the closest colleagues of Gerhard Schröder, should not be underestimated. As a result, both in her private meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and in Bundestag, Merkel emphasized the Turkey-related statements of the Grand Coalition protocol and declared that Germany under her leadership will adhere to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.

To sum up, it is not possible to guess Germany’s policy about Turkey’s integration with the EU in the future. However, current political panorama in Germany shows us that while the political values that the SPD has been supporting are in favor of Turkey’s accession, Unionist Parties’ opposite stance towards Turkey’s full-membership has not changed since they adopted conservative political attitude in principle. Currently, although the Unionist Parties are taking part in the Grand Coalition along with the SPD and softening their rhetoric, they have never left aside their original proposal of “privileged partnership” formula. Thus, if we suppose that this political picture will continue throughout Turkey’s negotiation process, it might be expected that

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<sup>39</sup> Please see the coalition protocol of the CDU/CSU and the SPD coalition government for an in depth analysis, [http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05\\_11\\_11\\_Coalitionagreement\\_foreignpolicy.pdf](http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05_11_11_Coalitionagreement_foreignpolicy.pdf)



the party, which has strong means of evidence with respect to Turkish accession, will make its mark on the process.

### **III. 2. 2. France**

As known, French constitution, which entered into force with the Fifth Republic, attached functions of policy determination and execution of foreign policy to the office of President. Thus, it would not be wrong to consider that the person at the Presidency Office plays great role in terms of determining France's stance on the Turkey's EU perspective. Bilateral relations between two countries have developed since Jacques Chirac was elected as President in 1995 and France has appeared as a country, which seizes the importance of Turkey with respect to its strategic position in Europe and its role in mutual relations. Hence, the evaluation of periods of Chirac –who led France to adopt mainly optimistic views toward Turkey– EU relations throughout his presidency– and Nicholas Sarkozy –who won the last Presidential election against the Socialist Party's candidate Segolene Royal– would provide precious presumption for a possible France's stance on Turkey's EU membership bid in the near future.

Although France had occasionally provided effective support to Turkey's EU perspective, Chirac's presidency was critically more important for Turkey. He became one of the prominent advocates of Turkey's full membership to the EU by using the slogan of "We are all children of Byzantium" (Hürriyet, 2004b). With the awareness of Turkey's contribution to the EU, Chirac supported Turkey's accession and always included Turkey to his EU envisagement during his presidency, even if its accession would take long time. Compared to the previous presidents, Chirac preferred strong, extrovert and containing European vision in international relations and envisaged Turkey as potentially the cornerstone of the European project. However, he tended to be cautious because of the internal dynamics of France. For that reason, Chirac tried not to disturb his discontent constituents by using diplomatic wording for his support instead of publicizing a clear backing<sup>40</sup>. Chirac's thoughts regarding Turkey's EU perspective also reflected to his statements. In this respect, before the EU Summit of December 17, he gave a speech to French television to warn the French opinion leaders about possible

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<sup>40</sup> For an in depth analysis on the argument, see the interview given to NTVMSNBC by Mehmet Sait Akman, 30.11.2004, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/298521.asp>

risks of saying “NO” to Turkey, whose efforts for full membership dates back to the year of 1963. Also Chirac believed the fact that Turkish accession is necessary for stabilization of South Eastern Europe though its accession will take long time<sup>41</sup>. Again, it got possible to observe Chirac’s determined attitude towards Turkey in an interview published in New York Times on September 20, 2003. To a question whether Turkey would join the EU, Chirac answered that: “Turkey’s entry into Europe is inevitable provided Turkey makes the necessary efforts to meet the conditions that we call Copenhagen criteria. These cover political conditions linked basically to the human rights and economic conditions linked basically to the market economy. For the moment, Turkey does not meet these conditions. The Turkish authorities seem very determined to meet the conditions. If this is the case, it will join Europe”. And for another question whether Turkey is a part of Europe, he replied that: “Which principles? There is one piece of Turkey in Europe, and the rest outside, but we have been saying to the Turks for 34 years that they are Europeans. They are in NATO. So it’s not a problem of whether they are in Europe. They want to join. If they meet the conditions, Europe is ready to receive them. The question of whether it’s in Europe or not is a historical and geographical one, matter for the experts, but it’s not the determining factor”.<sup>42</sup>

Although Jacques Chirac struggled to do his best for Turkey’s full membership to the EU, after his re-election as president in 2002, hard-line right wingers of his party, extreme rightist National Front party members, centrist Francois Bayrou’s party and ex-prime minister Laurent Fabius of the Socialist Party and his supporters made use of demagogic rhetoric to put Chirac under pressure (Kaleağası, 2006, p. 215). In this regard, Chirac’s own party UMP’s adoption of anti-Turkey language arising from populist thoughts and vote concerns is striking. Even Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who was known with his loyalty to Chirac, expressed his suspicions publicly as follows: “The issue is not the commitments made by Turkey’s government, it is the attitudes of Turkish society” then he continued “Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism” (Radikal, 2004a). Furthermore, the change of UMP’s chair

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<sup>41</sup> For an in depth analysis on the argument see, [http://www.abhaber.com/haber\\_sayfasi.asp?id=15146](http://www.abhaber.com/haber_sayfasi.asp?id=15146)

<sup>42</sup> Interview given to The New York Times by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, 20.09.2003. For the full text please see <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Interview-given-to-The-New-York.html>

from Chirac's closest ally Alain Juppe to Nicholas Sarkozy, the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and sharp decrease in his public support caused Chirac to re-calibrate his rhetoric and politics about Turkey at domestic and the EU level to a certain extent.

First and foremost, Jacques Chirac offered legislation for referendum with respect to Turkey's accession to the EU after the completion of the accession negotiations in order to lower the opposite voices. As expected his proposal had been backed by his party and consequently it was ratified by French parliament in a short period of time. Additionally, Chirac, who had previously pursued a positive policy for the Turkey-EU relations, started to follow contingent policy. According to Chirac, privileged partnership cannot be accepted for the Turkey-EU relations since Turkey is a part of Europe, but full membership still requires fulfillment of commitments and positive French public opinion (Radikal, 2004b). He also tried to manipulate the domestic pressure over him by using the issues of Cyprus and the so-called Armenian genocide. Before October 3, he criticized the Turkey's approach towards the Cyprus issue and stated the impossibility of the launch of negotiations with a candidate country, who has not recognized any of the EU members. However, in the aftermath of 17 December, that was Jacques Chirac, who promised Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan that the extension of the Custom Union to new members would not mean recognition of Cyprus (Hürriyet, 2005). Lastly, he launched a debate about the Turkish identity right after October 3, in which he urged the necessity of major cultural transformation for Turkish society to conclude the negotiations.<sup>43</sup>

Similar to Germany's Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel, the leader of UMP Nicholas Sarkozy opposed Turkey's full membership to the EU and defended any alternatives other than full-membership. He proposed a "Mediterranean Union" just like Merkel offered "privileged partnership". Sarkozy believed endless enlargement of the EU would end the European project and also asserted that Turkey's accession would cause to the invigoration of Islam in Europe. One of the main reasons of Sarkozy's protest for the full membership lies in predominantly Muslim and overpopulated

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<sup>43</sup> For an in depth analysis on the argument see statements made by M. Jacques Chirac during his joint press conference with Silvio Berlusconi during the 24th Franco-Italian consultations, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Statements-made-by-M-Jacques,6405.html>

Turkish reality. Moreover, while pointing out the dangers of extending EU borders to Syria and Iraq, Sarkozy also emphasized –for the first time– that no one could justify the conveyance of “Kurdistan” issue to the EU. In a television debate just short period of time before presidential elections Sarkozy clarified his position over Turkey against Segolene Royal by saying that:

“Whether it is secular or not, Turkey is a country of Asia Minor ... I won't be able to explain to French school kids that Europe's border neighbors are Iraq and Syria. Plus, we won't go very far when we make the ‘Kurdistan question’ an issue of Europe. I don't believe that we can reinforce stability in the world by killing Europe. I prefer to say ‘You are going to be partners with Europe, we will have a common market, but you cannot be an EU member because you are in Asia Minor’ to Turks” (Radikal, 2007).

Nicholas Sarkozy maintained his opposite attitude against Turkey’s EU membership bid after his election for the presidency post in May 2007. During his first visit to the EU capital Brussels, he stated that there was no change in his thoughts regarding Turkey’s full membership. Then Sarkozy went further by pointing out geographical restrictions and absorption capacity of the EU to justify his position while reminding his famous “Mediterranean Union” alternative for Turkey.<sup>44</sup> Alain Lamassoure, EU advisor to the President Nicholas Sarkozy, also claimed in the aftermath of the presidential elections that Sarkozy’s France would eventually resort to the EU in order to define the ultimate borders of Europe. He further stated that promises for the Balkan countries’ accession to the EU would be kept. However, that would constitute the final round of enlargement. According to Lamassoure, European leaders have been lying to Turkey for the past few years, and new leadership in France will end this dishonesty by directing the process to the alternative paths.<sup>45</sup> In this respect, Sarkozy took a concrete step after all his aggressive statements against Turkey’s EU perspective and blocked Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU in the area of

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<sup>44</sup> For an in depth analysis on the argument please see, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2007/05/070523\\_sarkozy\\_turkey.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2007/05/070523_sarkozy_turkey.shtml)

<sup>45</sup> For the full text please see, <http://euobserver.com/9/24015>

economic and monetary integration, believing that the chapter contains aspects of full-membership.<sup>46</sup>

On the other hand, although it has just passed a couple of months over presidential elections in France, there is a possibility of softening both in Sarkozy's anti-Turkey rhetoric and position when some facts are considered. Firstly, it must be made known that France's new president is vulnerable to US pressure regarding Turkey's accession to the EU since he is the most pro-US leader throughout the Fifth Republic. Moreover, presence of Bernard Kuschner in his cabinet as a foreign minister is also striking in this subject because he is also pro-US politician, who favors Turkey's full-membership after the fulfillment of necessary criteria.<sup>47</sup> In view of that, it would not be wrong to relate the latest maneuver of Sarkozy to the US, who has decided to ease France's stance towards Turkey in the aftermath of his visit to the USA. Accordingly, Sarkozy will not obstruct EU negotiations with Ankara so long as member states agree to take a comprehensive look at the future of the bloc.<sup>48</sup>

In sum, even if it seems that France's approach towards Turkey's accession to the EU is shaped by the president as a part of foreign of policy, the public opinion is undeniably influential in this issue. Chirac's alteration in his approach and placing Turkey's EU fate in the public opinion's hand after the completion of negotiations, and then Sarkozy's presidential victory through exploitation of concerns about Turkey in the public opinion constitute unambiguous evidences of this influence. Same as German case, it is too early to reach a conclusion for France's stance towards Turkey's full-membership since the negotiations will take long time as assumed. It is a fact that so long as Turkey's EU process continues, France's domestic policy will cover the Turkish accession issue as much as France's foreign policy.

### **III. 2. 3. The United Kingdom**

On the contrary to the general skepticism and ambiguity against Turkey's full membership in Europe, the UK has been different from other member states with its

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<sup>46</sup> For the full text please see, [http://www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber\\_detay.asp?PID=319&haberID=370868](http://www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber_detay.asp?PID=319&haberID=370868)

<sup>47</sup> For the full text please see, [http://www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber\\_detay.asp?PID=319&haberID=347422](http://www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber_detay.asp?PID=319&haberID=347422)

<sup>48</sup> Fort he full text please see, <http://euobserver.com/9/24639>

calm and moderate approach. Even though it has some doubts and concerns with respect to the EU, it has been appearing as the most encouraging state as regards Turkish accession to the EU. Regardless of dominant cultural prejudices, which has stand in the forefront of Turkey debates across the continental Europe, the UK has always tended to look into the matter from the technical perspective. In that respect, in contrast to the France's opposition and the Germany's ambivalence, the UK's backing for Turkey on the path of the EU has seemed as sustainable British foreign policy. Three reasons lie behind the UK's positive stance towards Turkish accession, and they are related firstly the European preferences, secondly to the strategic considerations and lastly to classical approach to 'other' identities/cultures of the UK. Thus, before analyzing post-Helsinki approach of British stance towards Turkey – which covers the period of Tony Blair – three reasons cited above are analyzed in brief.

As mentioned within the preceding chapter in detail, the UK has always stayed away from the notion of "Federal Europe" due to its historical peculiarity and political preferences. It prefers to retain national sovereignty instead of transferring it to Brussels. Accordingly, for the UK, the enlargement policy of the EU has been a significant instrument to keep off Europe from the objective of federalism. Therefore, accession of such a big country like Turkey is a golden opportunity for the UK, who has already dreamed of loose and market-oriented European structure through inclusion of new member states. Secondly, Turkish accession is also important for the UK's strategic considerations. In addition to its considerable weight in the CFSP of the EU, the UK also has significant interests in the basins of Mediterranean and the Middle East. Its current presence in Cyprus and in Iraq is vital sign of these interests of it. Turkey, which is neighbor of these basins and has significant defense power, can go along with the British interests. Moreover, Turkey's strong transatlantic orientation is another component that is consistent with the UK's interests. Lastly, the classical British approach to the different cultures and religions is also important for the case of Turkish accession. Similar to the EU, the UK consists of different nations such as English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh. In this respect, English state system has almost always been tolerant to "others", and it has recognized their customs and traditions. Moreover, in addition to different nations other than English, it has managed to melt immigrants in a pot whether they are Muslim or not. Therefore, contrary to France and Germany, which

are discontent with their “others”, it is expected that Turkish accession will not constitute a reference in the discourse of domestic politics.

When the UK’s post-Helsinki approach towards Turkey’s membership is analyzed, Prime Minister Tony Blair and his foreign secretary Jack Straw appear as the biggest champions of Turkish accession in the EU bloc. Blair showed his clear support in this subject explicitly just before 17 December by stating that Britain wanted to see Turkey in the EU and was proud to have championed that over the past few years (Daily Telegraph, 2004). According to Blair, the Copenhagen Criteria, which contains economic, political as well as legal measures, are sufficient for testing eligibility of a candidate country and referring to cultural and religious implications is groundless.<sup>49</sup> Blair further believes Turkish admission has significance not only for Turkey but also for strengthening relations between the West and the Islamic world. While shutting the door will alienate muslims all around the world, letting Turkey in will create an invaluable opportunity to build a bridge among two civilizations (Wheatcroft, 2006). The same conception is also backed by Othon Anastasakis (2004, p. 40), who points out that the mainstream British point of view supports Turkish membership in the EU as this will send a positive signal to the muslim world, preventing a clash of civilizations, whilst revealing the fact that the EU is not an exclusively ‘Christian Club’.

Like Blair, his foreign secretary Jack Straw also sincerely advocated Turkey’s EU membership bid. For Straw, welcoming Turkish accession will be a demonstration that will prove the Western and the Islamic cultures can succeed together as partners in the modern world. Notwithstanding ongoing geographical and historical biases regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid, Straw has also made it clear that Turkey’s geography is a part of European civilization throughout the history and the Turkish society, which has the marks of Greek, Roman and Byzantium civilizations also shares in a sense the common Roman heritage. Furthermore, according to the foreign secretary of the UK, Turkey’s EU membership is critically important for the future of Europe and international community since Turkey’s geographical peculiarity matters in Europe’s

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<sup>49</sup> Excerpted from the text of the press conference given by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on 17.05.2004. For the full text please see, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5825.asp>

security and its future in terms of being a key supply route for the world's energy need and also forestalling drug trafficking, cross-border crime and international terrorism.<sup>50</sup>

Above all, the UK and its political elites across the spectrum –not only the Labor Party– had all been supportive of launching accession talks and view positively the prospect of Turkish membership contrary to the UK's continental partners. In addition to the significant role of above-mentioned three reasons in the evolution of this support, it seems if there is no major political or economic conjunctural change in the globe, the UK's support for Turkey's EU membership bid will continue till the last EU Summit, in which Turkey's accession to the EU either is granted or fails. In that respect, British support among the Major Three is indispensable for Turkey. Nevertheless, in order to spread the support all over the continent or to avoid from the reactions, the UK should emphasize material contributions of Turkey to the EU instead of resorting to the US' rhetoric.

### **III. 3. Public Opinion: Support for Turkish Accession in Germany, France and the United Kingdom**

After analyzing the three major Member States' political stances towards Turkey's EU membership from the Helsinki Summit in 1999 to the present, examining the public opinion in these countries is also very fundamental. Especially, as it is discussed in the light of Moravcsik and Putnam's theoretical approaches in Chapter 2, in liberal democracies governments form their positions in the international arena by taking the concerns and interests of their society into consideration. Therefore, the public opinion in Germany, France and the UK will have a direct impact on their countries' national policy on Turkey's membership, which has already been a controversial issue in the EU agenda. As brought up in the previous sections, the unavoidable impact of public's role in this debate is revealed by the facts that this issue has been attached to a domestic policy etiquette although it is expected to be dealt as a matter of foreign affairs. The leaders shift their position according to the feed-back from

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<sup>50</sup> Speech by the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, "Bridging the Bosphorus – Turkey's European future". For the full text please see, <http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1115146994906&a=KArticle&aid=1125560522451&date=2005-09-08>



their constituents and exploit it as an election promise. In order to find out the preferences of the citizens in these three countries towards enlargement, it is benefited from the Standard Eurobarometer 66 survey.

The Standard Eurobarometer 66 survey, which was carried out between September 6 and October 10, 2006, reflects the public opinion of Europeans prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. Even though the survey covers 30 countries or territories,<sup>51</sup> for the purpose of thesis, just *further enlargement* section of its last chapter is focused to examine more specifically opinions of German, French and British citizens concerning the further enlargement, in particular Turkish accession.

The *further enlargement* section of the last chapter of Eurobarometer 66 survey starts with exploring general tendency regarding the support for further enlargement in the EU. Then, it moves to reveal the choices of future member states and, lastly, the survey narrows its projection and put forwards the opinions of the EU citizens regarding Turkey by using a series of eight statements, with which respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed.


In the section of *further enlargement*, the respondents are first asked the question “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for it and against it.” And among the statements, the one related to enlargement is “further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” (Eurobarometer 66, p. 218). As it is seen from the table below, the shares of supporters and opponents are almost close to each other. On average, while 42 per cent of the EU citizens are against for further enlargement, 46 per cent show their support to for further enlargement. Although the European average is promising for Turkish accession, it hides very large differences and changes in member states’ opinion. If the results are evaluated from the member states’ points of view, support for further enlargement is higher in the new member states than in the existing EU countries. For example, according to the outcomes, the support is the strongest in Poland by 76 per cent and it is followed by Slovenia with 74 per cent share. However, when it comes to the existing EU countries, the support has fallen considerably. Among the existing EU 15 countries, Greece interestingly appears as the most encouraging

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<sup>51</sup> These are 25 Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, the two candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey) and the Turkish Cypriot Community.

state, whose 71 per cent of respondents claim to be in favor of further enlargement compared to 36 per cent of the UK, 34 per cent of France and 30 per cent of Germany. As the major three members of the EU, inclinations of Germany, France and the UK for further enlargement are unfavorable with respect to Turkey's EU membership despite the favorable EU average and the increase in the ten new member states.

Table 3: Support for further enlargement




Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66  
[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm)

Following the question to find out the level of support for further enlargement, the citizens in the EU member states are asked what their choices of future members of the EU are. For this question almost all citizens in the EU zone provide widespread support for the accession of three member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Eurobarometer 66, p. 222). Switzerland, Norway and Iceland leave the rest choices behind with a range of support level between 69 per cent and 78 per cent. The lowest level of support can be observed for Turkey with 28 per cent, which makes it the least desired country in the list of the choices of future members. On the other hand, when the average support for the Turkish membership is divided to its constituents to emphasize the Major Three's tendencies, the UK leads in the group with

30 per cent while France and Germany follow it by 22 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Having considered the general tendency in the EU and the particular member states' public opinion over the Turkish membership, it could be claimed that highly developed and wealthy countries are mostly welcomed rather than poorer countries. In addition, against poorer and/or larger countries the EU member states preserve large reservations, which matters negatively in the case of Turkish accession.


Table 4: Support for enlargement – Tested countries



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66  
[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm)

The final question of *further enlargement* section of the Standard Eurobarometer 66 focuses on the opinions of the EU citizens about Turkey. In this part, eight statements are used for the question to analyze the points that are agreed or not by respondents with respect to the Turkish accession. These detailed set of statements linked to the question are also critically important to understand the reasons of the weak support. The question for this inquiry is as follows: “For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree” (Eurobarometer 66, p. 224).

Table 5: Tendencies for Turkish Accession



Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66  
[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm)

The eight statements presented in the table above firstly reveal the fact that for the EU citizens Turkish accession to the EU should be subject to certain conditions such as systematic respect for human rights (85 per cent) and a significant improvement in its economic level (77 per cent). Secondly, the fear of immigration from populated Turkey is still a problem in the eyes of the EU public. According to the outcomes, more than six persons out of ten think that Turkish accession would trigger the wave of mass migration from east to west. Thirdly, as expected, cultural differences negatively correlated with support of Turkey’s membership. Similar to the outcomes of the statement related to immigration, six out of ten believe that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too important to allow Turkey to join the EU. Lastly, while the EU public opinion is still divided over the Turkey’s geographical and historical closeness to Europe, the most surprising results come from the last two statements related to security in the region and rejuvenation of the European population. In fact, security and rejuvenation can help Turkey’s membership to be supported by the

European citizens since Turkey enjoys its young generation and military capability. However, the results reflect exactly the opposition of expectations. Only 33 per cent of the EU citizens assume that Turkish membership would contribute to the security of Europe. For rejuvenation issue, just 29 per cent of the EU citizens think parallel to the statement.

With respect to the public opinion in the Major Three, the picture is not very different from the EU average. As it can be seen clearly in the table below, although there are not too much difference among the results of Germany, France and the UK in general, British public opinion seems more positive towards the Turkish accession if the numbers are analyzed in detail. British public attitude towards Turkey, which is based on the perception of culture, migration, human rights and economy, presents higher level of support than Germany, France and the EU average. On the other hand, German and French public opinions are highly sensitive and even more alarmed than the EU average regarding the same issues. There is almost consensus among German and French citizens concerning the views that Turkey should respect human rights and improve the state of its economy. Moreover, Germans and Frenchmen/women are also stuck in the issues of cultural differences and migration problem again much more than the EU average. Lastly, the argument of *Turkish accession would contribute to the rejuvenation and to the security of Europe* is not a valid ground to favor the Turkish accession in the eyes of German, French and British public opinion, as it is proved upon the EU average.

Table 6: Tendencies for Turkish accession in the Major Three

% Agree	Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography	Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history	Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region	The cultural differences btw. Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow it to join	Turkey accession would favour rejuvenating an ageing European population	Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights	To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy
Germany	59%	40%	22%	74%	32%	78%	93%	83%
France	47%	30%	30%	65%	27%	67%	89%	77%
the UK	49%	36%	31%	47%	24%	58%	82%	71%
EU 25	<b>56%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>66%</b>	<b>85%</b>	<b>77%</b>

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm)

Taking all these into consideration, the *further enlargement* section of Eurobarometer 66 exposes once again that Turkish accession issue still causes variety in the public opinions of the EU member states. Although the support for further enlargement remains relatively high in the EU, when it comes to Turkey's membership to the EU, the same tendencies preserve large reservations considering mainly the cultural differences, economic incapability, migration and human rights issues. In particular, this picture is also true for Germany, France and the UK with regard to their public opinions' tendencies towards Turkey. Even if, the UK cuts above Germany and France in a sense, no one can speculate about a firm support among the British society in terms of Turkish accession. Consequently, in the light of the survey and the given analysis, it could be claimed that the European public opinion may support Turkish accession not on the grounds of identity but on the grounds of economic rationality and universal principles.

### III. 3. 1. Getting Support of Public Opinion

In the light of the discussions throughout the chapter, it can be concluded that individual member states' - particularly the major ones' - positions constitute one of the main determining factors in the EU decision on enlargement. Considering this

conclusion, it would be sensible to make suggestions to the government most concerned: Turkish government.

Initially, it should be taken into consideration that even if Turkey is a negotiating country along with Croatia, the Turkish accession to the EU in the future seems more different and difficult in comparison to Croatia and also to the ex-candidates in terms of distinct socio-economic and cultural features of country. Accordingly, the cost-benefit analysis of Turkey's full membership is often resorted by the European counterparts of Turkish governments to favor or turndown Turkey's membership and most of whom currently believe the EU's loses will be greater than its gains. In this sense, in order to sell the Turkey's EU membership bid to the member states Turkish government(s) has to focus on marketing of the Turkish accession as much as on the compliance with the *acquis communautaire*. When the costs and benefits are analyzed at once, the influx of migrants, the burden of Turkey on the EU budget and the impact of Turkey on the EU institutions appear as the main elements of the costs side. On the other hand, business opportunities, supply of energy, security concerns, demographic issues and the opportunity of alliance of civilizations form the benefits side. Although the calculation of weight of costs *vis-à-vis* benefits or vice versa is difficult and groundless, Turkish government(s) should capture its European counterparts by adopting a rational rhetoric underlying the significance of benefits while rendering the concerns about the costs abortive.

With respect to the costs side, Turkey can disprove the statements of the EU regarding the economic and political challenges of Turkish membership through credible studies and researches. As mentioned above, one of the most controversial issues is the possible migration in masses from Anatolia to Europe, especially from the Eastern part of Turkey that constitutes the relatively unskilled labor force of the Turkish labor market. Some opinion polls in Turkey indicate that 25% of Turkey's population will move to Europe, once restrictions to free movement are abolished, while 2004 Impact Study of the European Commission estimates the number of immigrants to EU-15 countries as 0.5 to 4 million people. However, Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubaş and Nilüfer Yıldız (2004) found these estimations highly exaggerated compared to their own outcome that range from 1 to 2.1 million for the period of 2004-2030. Moreover, they claim that it is more likely for the EU to get more immigrants under the current

restrictions and even with permanent safeguards than under the free movement of labor. The reason is that any slowdown in Turkish accession process would lead to lower growth rate and higher unemployment in Turkey that increase the incentive of unskilled labor to look for opportunities in Europe under alternative patterns to free movement, i.e. “guest worker” status.

The economic burden of the Turkish accession is another negative element makes the Turkey’s membership difficult especially in the eyes of average EU countries which have already seized great portions from the EU budget. Although in Europe much more concern is put on the re-configuration of power relations once Turkey joins, the negative feeling regarding expected the economic burden of Turkish accession is not underestimated. In fact, the works of Kemal Derviş *et al.* (2004) indicate that the marginal burden of the Turkish accession to the EU budget is not as high as said to be. According to their calculations, the cost of what Turkey would receive from the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds would be rather small compared to the EU’s budget (0.2% of the EU GDP).

Since decisions are taken in the EU’s decision making structure on the basis of the population size of the member states, Turkey will clearly play a major role in decision-making. Actually, this is the issue that most concerns the EU. However, Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén (2005) in their research on the *Impact of Turkey’s Membership on EU Voting* come up with the conclusion that there is no need to worry about this much. Taking the membership of Turkey as the first variable and the ratification of the Constitution as the second, they make a highly complex calculation that takes 134 million possible coalitions into consideration in order to assess the impacts of states in every possible coalition. What they find out after this comprehensive analysis is that Turkey’s membership does not deteriorate the EU’s ability to act. Furthermore, current discussions on the decision making structure of the EU under prospective constitution can also be another tool for Turkish government to depreciate this common belief.

On the other hand, Turkish side has also to use economic, political and socio-cultural benefits of Turkey’s accession in proper ways. Even though Turkey completed the Customs Union in 1996, other economic opportunities should be exposed by the government. Expansion of the EU market, the correlation between Turkish accession



and competitive advantage of the EU has to be mentioned at the right platforms. A population of 70 million, with a high propensity to consume will create an advantage for Europe in the current environment of competition between economic blocs in addition to creating new opportunities of market growth and market integration for the EU. Likewise, Turkish side should also be aware of its geostrategic importance with respect to the EU's security of energy supply and can use this situation as significant tool during the negotiation process. Being situated at the key point of the energy, transportation and communication networks linking east to Europe, Turkey is at a strategically vital location for the security of these networks. Through the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and the other ongoing energy projects such as NABUCCO, Turkey has become a terminal in terms of the oil and natural gas in particular and energy in general in Eurasia. Thus, without doubt Turkey's membership will provide a guaranteed supply of energy and raw materials along with the opportunity of secure access to and the control of the energy sources in Eurasia, which Europe is dependent on.

Turkish side should also highlight the security prone approach of the EU. Yonca Özer, stresses that the Turkish accession would transform the EU into a global actor by extending its borders to the Middle East, Caucasia, Central Asia where critically matter in today's international politics and economics. Furthermore, Turkey's pivotal role between east and west stemming from its geostrategic position and its military capacity and experiences would make the EU a global power spreading peace, security and prosperity to the world. (2007, pp. 89-90)

Although the survey in this chapter indicates that the rejuvenation role of Turkey is worthless in the eyes of public opinion, aging problem will be one of the fundamental problems of the EU in the near future. Many researches and studies reveal that if the current outlook of the EU maintains, the EU economy in general will be in need of 75 million additional labor forces to keep the Member States' businesses afloat. In that respect, by pointing out possible future crises of the EU arising from aging problem, Turkey's accession should be offered as vigor for the EU's demography since the under-35 age group constitutes the majority of its population.

Lastly, officials in Turkey also make use of some rhetoric like contribution of Turkish accession to the EU's identity formation efforts regarding cultural plurality and

preventing the EU from being recognized as a *Christian Club*. In brief, Turkey's membership is also very advantageous for the EU where Turkey will be a bridge between two worlds. This new situation will make a positive contribution to the relations of the EU with the Muslim countries. In other words, the accession of Turkey that has hosted long-established civilizations will be one of the most vital steps of today's alliance of civilizations.

In addition to the efforts changing zero-sum rhetoric to win-win situation over cost-benefit analysis of Turkish accession above, Turkish government(s) should also focus on influence of the individual member states of the EU. In other words, as this thesis illustrates, Germany, France and the UK should be treated in a special way by developing *sui generis* policies towards their governments, interests groups as well as public opinions. Considering the liberal intergovernmental approach, Turkey has to adopt new strategies by identifying priorities and concerns of each country. In that respect, the constructive impact of buying 50 airbus airplanes from France before the December 2004 EU Summit should be remembered as contributing factor to the decision on opening of the accession negotiations. Thus, being aware of the importance of the political economy, Turkish government(s) should pay close attention to the interests groups in each country by establishing new projects, cooperation, businesses and trade networks.

Turkey's endeavours for the EU membership should also be supported by civil society. Despite the Turkish political culture based on centralization and deep-rooted skepticism against the civil society, positive impacts of civil efforts can promote Turkish accession issue abroad. In that respect, Turkish government(s) should assure that civil society is given every opportunity to get involved in the process. As a societal group, their contributions can influence the state-society interaction in the Member States since their activities targets directly European public, and indirectly their decision-makers. In addition to the organized efforts of the Turkish civil society in Europe to raise public awareness about Turkey and to establish pressure on the decision-makers by exploiting their election concerns, the constituents in some European countries with Turkish origin is an asset that should not be neglected. Regarding the constituent power that is the most direct lobbying channel, the impact of the European citizens of Turkish origin in Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, and the

Netherlands increases with every election. The first generation of migration is partly responsible for the doubtful image of Turkey, given their conscious resistance to integration to the country that they were living in. However, the second and the third generations pose an opportunity, rather than a threat for Turkey's image since they have gone up from workers' to employers' class, and become well-educated and successfully competing labor force with the Europeans in the labor market. Therefore, Turkey should make use of the opportunity that Germany and France as two major member states hold respectively the highest Turkish population. The European citizens of Turkish origin should be given the task of representing Turkey at best which starts with successful integration and correct information.

## CONCLUSION

The thesis analyses determining factors in the EU policy making, particularly the enlargement policy. Since enlargement (widening) is a process that goes hand in hand with integration (deepening), theories that explain integration are also expected to help us understand the dynamics affecting the Union's decision on accepting new members. However, the lack of consensus among scholars about a theory that fully explains the European integration with its causes, effects, and tools lead to divergent forecasts about future enlargement(s).

Therefore, the first chapter examines various theoretical approaches seeking to explain the European integration in detail, focuses on liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik as the major theory to analyze Turkey's membership issue. This approach explains at the decisions of the international institutions as a two-level game consisting of the negotiation among the states in which each of them advocates their own national policies on the one hand, and the public debate within each state through which the national policies are formed, on the other. While the first level is well-explained by the intergovernmental bargaining where the rational member states try to convince the others to make their national policy become the common policy, the second level where the debate to form a national policy takes place at grassroots is more complicated since feelings, emotions and some economic concerns of the societies come into the scene. To explain this process, social constructivism of international relations theories besides liberal intergovernmentalism was also employed. It claims that it is the formation or non-formation of common identity that orients societies' approaches against each other. These theories are then applied to the decision-making process of the EU to measure weights of the involving actors analyzing working mechanisms and principles in the relevant institutions. It appears that citizens of a country affect both the policy and the willingness of the states' representatives to advocate this policy at the negotiation table against other states.

To reach some valid assumptions for Turkey's EU membership issue, the second chapter analyzes the positions of three major states, namely Germany, France, and the UK from the same perspective. Since these three members are regarded as the most

influential states –in accordance with the offerings of scholars- in the EU in terms of bargaining, it is believed that the highest influence among the EU member states would come from these majors in the enlargement process as experienced in the previous enlargement waves. In this context, to rest those states’ ongoing enlargement strategies or policies on a sound basis, the European policies of each member state are examined firstly. Starting from Germany then moving on France and the UK respectively, the European perceptions of those major states is highlighted. Germany’s *Europapolitik* which subjected to change in line with the global political conjuncture to construct normality, France’s European preferences trying to ensure that policy and institutional developments are in line with its priorities and the UK’s semi-detached relationship first with the ECC then the EU are appeared as the most important themes of their European policies. In addition to major states’ European approaches, enlargement policies of same states provided by referring to realized enlargement. Although the other enlargement waves are referred when needed, mostly the fifth and the last enlargement which comprised the largest number of countries ever admitted at one time is favored to depict major states’ positions.

The final chapter focuses on Turkey’s EU membership issue. The major three states’ stances regarding Turkey’s EU membership in the post 1999 Helsinki period are examined by focusing on the main determinants of the each single state in detail to make predictions about their answers when they are asked if Turkey should be in or out. After providing a brief historical analysis includes important events, critical turning points of the EU-Turkey relations up to 2005, and the major states’ positions over the issue of Turkey’s EU membership is given. Ideological cleavages of political parties in Germany, French presidents’ domestic concerns and the UK’s long-established, continuous and unique support for Turkey can be grasped through this chapter. Furthermore, the approach for this chapter is supported by supplying the current support in the public opinions’ of the major three member states. As this study gives a particular importance to the societal dynamics or in other words government elite-society relations through applied theories, the support form the grassroots in Germany, France and the UK for Turkish accession is analyzed by employing the autumn 2007 Eurobarometer survey study. The findings in this section are not above or below expectations, even if

the UK appears more encouraging state among others according to data, all major states' citizens are highly sensitive and concerned regarding the Turkish accession.

Taking into consideration all of the topics which have been covered thus far, the thesis reaches a same conclusion with its initial claim. Even if it was simple as well as easy to predict for ones who deal with the EU more or less, the structure behind this widely-accepted claim is highly complex and multi-layered. Accordingly, when Turkey's EU membership issue is analyzed from the perspectives of theoretical facts, previous enlargement rounds then from the positions of Germany, France and the UK and lastly from the state of public opinion of these states, it becomes apparent that Turkish accession to the EU appears as a peculiar case, which is different from all enlargement rounds realized previously. Therefore, having considered the historical judgments and the major member states' tendencies in relation to their electorate, it would be fair to spell out Turkey's membership process to the EU as one lacks of guarantee. A possible membership will be realized not only by Turkey's efforts to comply the *acquis-communautaire* but also by major member states' considerations around utilitarian and universal basis.

In sum, central argument of the thesis is that the enlargement policy, which appears as one of the fundamental high politics issues of the EU, is termed with national preferences of the member states, especially the most influential ones, rather than with supranational feature of the EU. Germany, France and the UK, which have been the most influential states throughout the European integration history, have relatively much more advantages compared to the other members of the Union in manipulating the high politics issues of the EU including enlargement policy. In this context, the EU-Turkey relations have been associated with national preferences of these states, which have been tried to be explained in the thesis by employing state-society interactions with a view to assuming possible outcomes for the Turkish accession.

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