

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANA BİLİM DALI**

**EUROPEAN UNION'S QUEST FOR AUTONOMOUS CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CAPACITY**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Dila Ungan

İstanbul-Eylül 2007

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ÖZET

Bu Yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) kriz yönetimi alanında özerkliğini ve de manevra kabiliyetini, NATO'yla ilişkileri göz önünde bulundurularak, nasıl tanımlandığını analiz etmektir. Çalışma temel uc argüman üzerine kurulmuştur. Birinci argüman, AB'nin kriz yönetimindeki özerkliği ve de belli ölçüdeki manevra kabiliyeti AB'nin ve de NATO'nun önceliklerine bağlı olarak tanımlanır. İkinci argüman, AB'nin askeri operasyonlarının sivil operasyonlarla tamamlanmasının özerklik tanımı üzerinde büyük etkisi vardır. Üçüncü argüman ise, her askeri operasyonun kendi özellikleri içerisinde ele alınmasıyla AB'nin özerkliği ya da manevra kabiliyeti sinanabilir. Bu argümanları kanıtlayarak, çalışmanın ana sorusuna cevap verebilmek için, AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma alanında geçirdiği değişimleri ve gelişimi, tarihsel bağlamda –Soğuk Savaş sonrası- AB-NATO ilişkilerinin gelişimini ve de teoriden sıyrılarak AB'nin pratikteki deneyimleri olan askeri operasyonları ile sivil operasyonları üzerinde durulmuştur.

Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın birinci bölümünde; Soğuk Savaş sonrası AB-NATO ilişkileri ve de AB içerisinde kriz yönetimi alanında özerkliğin sağlanmasıyla ilgili istekli seslerin yükselmesi incelenmiştir. Bu bölüm, çalışmanın ana bölümü olan ikinci bölüme hazırlık niteliğindedir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, AB'nin yürütmüş olduğu askeri operasyonlar; özellikleri, kapasiteleri, AB ve NATO'nun öncelikleri ve de Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası üzerindeki etkileri ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Bunlar Concordia, Artemis ve de Althea operasyonlarıdır. Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü ise, ikinci bölümü tamamlar niteliktedir. Proxima, Kinshasa Polis Misyonu, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu Misyonu ve de Bosna Hersek Polis Misyonu incelenmiştir. Bu bölümün amacı, özerkliğin sağlanması için sivil operasyonların ne denli önemli olduğunu ve askeri operasyonları takip etmesi gerekliliğini göstermektir.

Bütün bu incelemeler sonucunda, şu sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır:

-AB, krizin coğrafi konumu ve de güvenlik ve savunma konularındaki görev ya da yük paylaşımı prensibi sayesinde şekillenen kendi öncelikleri ve de aynı konulardaki NATO'nun önceliklerini hesaplayarak kriz yönetimi hususunda özerklik ve de manevra kabiliyetini tanımlar.

-AB'nin askeri operasyonları sivil operasyonlarıyla tamamlandığı zaman kriz yönetimindeki özerkliği de tamamlanır ve güçlenir. Çünkü sivil operasyonlar askeri operasyonları amaç ve özellikler yönünden tamamlar ve de AB'nin kriz coğrafyasına yönelttiği bütünleşmiş kriz yönetimini tanımlar.

-AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki özerkliği ya da manevra kabiliyeti, her operasyonun kendi içerisinde; uluslararası durum, krizin coğrafi konumu, taraflar, tarafların öncelikleri ele alınarak, tek başına analiz edilmesi ile sınılanır.

ABSTRACT

This study aims at analysing autonomy and the margin of manoeuvre that the EU might define while taking into account the predominant role of NATO in security and defence fields, with a strong emphasis on the military operations of the EU. The first argument of the study is that ‘autonomy and the margin of manoeuvre of the EU in crisis management are determined by the priorities of the EU while taking into account NATO’s priorities’. The second one is that ‘when the military operations of the EU are complemented with its civilian missions, they have greater impact on the definition of the Union’s autonomous reaction capacity’. In order to enhance and prove these arguments, the study is built upon the historical evaluation of the EU in the security and defence fields, the historical evolution of the EU and NATO relationship after the Cold War and upon the test cases that are the EU’s military and civilian crisis management operations in order to evaluate autonomy and margin of manoeuvre.

Within this framework, the first chapter of the study is constructed on the EU and NATO relations after the end of the Cold War, on the rising voices for the quest for autonomy by the EU. The EU is analyzed as an awakening partner in security and defense issues. The first chapter constitutes the basis, the supporting point and the guidelines for the second chapter. The second chapter is constructed on the concrete cases, -the military operations of the EU namely, Operation Concorida, Artemis and Althea- where the EU has experienced the margin of manoeuvre and autonomy in crisis management and also it is constructed on the importance of the priorities of the EU and NATO. It constitutes the spinal column of the study. The third chapter is considered as necessary and complementary to the second chapter, as its objective is to underline the importance of the complementarity of the civilian capabilities of the EU to the military ones in the definition of autonomy. In this context, EUPOL/Proxima, the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC, the EUPM/BiH are analysed.

The study reaches the conclusion that the EU might define autonomy and the margin of manoeuvre in crisis management, according to its priorities which are shaped by the geographical location of the conflict, by burden sharing principle and also taking into account NATO priorities. Secondly, when the military operations of the EU are complemented by the civilian

operations, they have a great impact on the definition of autonomy as they complement the military operations in terms of objectives, in terms of defining the integrated approach of the EU. Thirdly the case-by-case analysis is required in order to gauge autonomy or the margin of maneuver of the EU. Because each operation occurs in different international context, necessitates the involvement of specific actors, it has its own reasons, characteristics, requirements.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFSOUTH: Allied Forces Southern Europe
BiH: Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFE Treaty: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF: The Combined Joint Task Force
CONOPS: Concept of Operations
CSCE: Cooperation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
(D-)SACEUR: (Deputy) Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EC: European Community
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: The European Union
EUCE: European Union Command Element
EUFOR: European Union Force
EUFOR/BiH: European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUMC: European Union Military Committee
EUPM: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL: European Union Police Force
EUSEC/EU: EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC
EUSR: The European Union Special Representative
fYROM : former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GFAP : General Framework Agreement for Peace (the Dayton Peace Accord)
HQ: Headquarter
IGC: Intergovernmental Conference
IPTF: United Nations International Police Task Force
IPU: Integrated Police Unit
JFC: Joint Force Command

MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OPLAN: Operation Plan

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PSC: Political and Security Committee

SAP: Stabilisation and Association Process

SFOR: Stabilisation Force of NATO

SG/HR: Secretary General/High Representative

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe

ToA: Treaty of Amsterdam

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nation Security Council

USA-US: United States of America

WEU: Western European Union

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INTRODUCTION

1999 was marked as being a turning point in the history of the European political construction. It brought into play the European Security and Defence Policy. It had given the European Union (EU) the margin of manoeuvre, the reaction capacity in the domains where integration was unthinkable. 'A potentially autonomous' characteristic (Gordon, 2004:215) was attributed to the manoeuvre capacity of the EU.

The ESDP has been designed 'to provide the EU with the means to respond to global and regional security threats' as Gross underlines (Gross, 2006:3). This turning point was consolidated by the declaration of the ESDP operational in the Laeken European Council in 2001. This reaction capacity and autonomy that the EU might develop requires a particular attention because its definition must take into consideration the existence of the main autonomous defence and security actor: NATO. In this study, it is intended to analyse the margin of manoeuvre and autonomy that the EU might define while taking into account the predominant role of NATO in security and defence fields, with a strong emphasis on the military operations of the EU. The ultimate aim of this study is to answer the question: How can the EU define autonomy in the area of crisis management? Its analysis is based on the consideration of three hypotheses; the first one is that autonomy and the margin of manoeuvre that the EU might define are determined by the priorities of the EU while taking into account NATO's priorities. The second one is that when the military operations of the EU are complemented with its civilian missions, they have greater impact on the definition of the Union's autonomous reaction capacity in the field of security and defence. The third one is that each military operation should be analysed on a case-by-case analysis in order to gauge the EU's autonomy and its margin of manoeuvre.

As the term autonomy is the key word of this research, it is necessary first of all to stress what autonomy means and why acquiring autonomy in defence and security fields was difficult for the EU. Being autonomous requires 'a measure of personality, individuality, a degree of oneness and unity' (Van Eekelen, 2006:103), responsibility on the security and defence issues and the sense of commonness. It has to be interpreted in a concrete way as 'having willingness, capacity, decision-making mechanisms, instruments, presence of credible forces and the capacity

to deploy these forces¹ in order to have a say on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management areas. Its installation was a difficult process due to the different approaches of its Member States to security and defence integration, to its relations with NATO and with the US. To cite examples, there were clashes between the Atlanticist and Europeanist EU Member States about security and defence integration. The Atlanticists would like to preserve the preeminence of NATO whereas the Europeanists would like to opt for an autonomous security and defence dimension for the EU. Their national interests, their willingness to have the role of a promoter of the European integration and their relationship with the US had played a major role in shaping their choices.

In the light of the definition of autonomy how and when the concept of autonomy in the security and defence issues is articulated in the EU framework, can be better understood. The entry of the concept into the European jargon had been realized in the 'declaration of Saint Malo in 1998'² by two avant-garde actors representing opposite views on European security and defence: United Kingdom and France. But the very abstract façade of autonomy had begun to appear at the European stage after the collapse of the bipolar system.

Another cause of the expanding quest for autonomy was to better manage the responsibilities deriving from the principle of 'globalisation and multilateralism' (Solana, 2004:6). This situation requires the revision of the relations with NATO and so far a review of the perspectives of NATO and the EU. The haste of the idea of autonomy on the EU side has coincided with the prospects of NATO to create a European Pillar within NATO to satisfy the quest for autonomy. So it is necessary to devote a specific attention to the evolution of the idea of autonomy in the wake of the Cold War's end. With the Saint Malo Summit which is considered as a turning point in the quest of autonomy, history witnessed a new period. This new period's dynamics reinforced the evolution of the autonomy of the EU which surpassed the mechanisms that would be constructed within NATO and in which the dynamics necessitated a new type of cooperation with NATO.

¹ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I.

² For further information see Rutten, M.(2001).

In that context, the EU's acquisition of autonomy in the field of security and defence does not only depend on the construction of appropriate mechanisms and political will by the Member States. But it also depends on its orchestration of the relations with NATO. On the subject of autonomy; NATO has its own advantages. One might argue if it is an advantage or an innate characteristic of such an entity. The emphasis on the innate characteristic requires the reference to the *raison d'être* of NATO. But the objective here is not at all to compare NATO and the EU on the basis of their *raison d'être*. The objective here is about reflecting the nascent autonomy of the EU in the military area, including its civilian capacity, taking into consideration its relations with NATO. The concept of autonomy requires the adoption of defence capacity and the reinforcement of this capacity with civilian reaction one; in which the EU has acquired expertise.

Autonomy in security and defence fields for the EU presupposes mainly:

- 'Consensus in the field of foreign policy' (Mammonas, 2002:5), security and defence policies and the development of a sense of commonness,
- 'Common strategy and perspective in issues of today's world' (Mammonas, 2002:5),
- Concrete and 'consistent external policies with mechanisms of implementation' (Mammonas, 2002: 5),
- Reinforcement of Europe's technological and research potential in the field of security and defence investments on information, research and communication technologies,
- Intelligence gathering,
- Persuasion of public opinion and national parliaments,
- Ability 'to monitor the developments in crisis situations' (Howorth, 2000:33),
- Ability 'to provide military expertise and capacity' (Howorth, 2000:33), ability to give military advice` (Howorth, 2000:33)
- Operational capacity, full operational power- civilian and military-
- 'Deployable forces', (Howorth, 2000:38)
- Ability to 'perform the operational functions of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning', (Howorth, 2000:33)
- Close cooperation between the EU level and national level.

After giving the definition and the different components of autonomy and the autonomous action capacity in the military field and after putting the accent on the historical turning point for the concept of autonomy, it is also necessary to put the emphasis on the military operations of the EU as the test cases to evaluate the capacity of the EU. This study also aims at analysing those operations conducted by the EU with NATO's partnership as well as EU-only operations.

An analysis of the developments that took place after St. Malo and of the military operations of the EU shows that it is not possible to state that all military operations of the EU are conducted with full autonomy. It would be better to interpret them as the examples of experimenting different grades of margin of manoeuvre. The operations Concordia and Althea were realized under the Berlin Plus Arrangements which means that the EU made use of the Alliance's resources and capabilities for its operations. These operations can be regarded as examples to test the EU's capacity to take its responsibility in the military field. For example, the Operation Artemis was conducted under the logic of experimenting the EU autonomy in the military field without any recourse to the Alliance's capabilities and resources. One might easily note that the military operations of the EU do not follow each other by pursuing a progressive logic. Each operation corresponds to a certain level to evaluate the capacity, the willingness, the convergence or the divergence of point of views within the EU on defence and security issues.

Autonomous capacity of the EU, due to its sui generis characteristic, is an end product of the combination of military capacity with the non-military one. Furthermore, autonomous action of the EU takes shape according to the priorities of the EU and NATO as underlined by the military representatives of Republic of Turkey to the EU³. The important point is to analyze autonomy and margin of manoeuvre on a '*case-by-case*' basis linked to the circumstances reigning the international agenda and the context of the conflict⁴.

In this framework, the first chapter of the study is constructed on the EU and NATO relations after the end of the Cold War and on the rising voices for the quest for autonomy by the EU. It consists of a historical evaluation. The turning points in the intra-European relations, NATO and the EU relations, the St. Malo Summit, the Berlin Plus Arrangements, declaration of

³ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I.

⁴ Ibid.

an autonomous ESDP, the search for the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU are underlined in this chapter. The first chapter constitutes the basis, the supporting point and the guidelines for the second chapter. The second chapter is constructed on the concrete military cases where the EU has experienced the margin of manoeuvre. It constitutes the spinal column of the study. The analysis is about decorticating the context, nature, authenticity of military operations; the EU and NATO relations, their influence on the ESDP with a view to portray the level of autonomy of the EU. The aim is to show how the EU defines autonomy and different levels of margin of manoeuvre depending on a *case-by-case logic*⁵. The third chapter is considered as a necessary part, complementary to the second chapter, as its objective is to underline the importance and the complementarity of the civilian capabilities of the EU to the military ones in the definition of autonomy.

According to this classification, the reader might raise the question of ‘Why does not the Turkish dimension in the EU-NATO relationship take place in this research?’ Or ‘Why is not the question of non-EU European members of NATO in the Berlin Plus Arrangements process- the most problematic; the case of Turkey- mentioned in this study?’ The answer to these questions is just a matter of design of the study. This design is based only on the assessment of autonomous response capacity of the EU; taking into consideration its relations with NATO. The assessment of autonomous response capacity of the EU targets the military and civilian operations as being the test cases for manoeuvre capacity. The aim of this study is neither the evaluation of the decision-making in the defence and security fields in the EU nor the assessment of decision – making autonomy; but it is rather the evaluation of the EU’s autonomous reaction capacity.

⁵ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I.

CHAPTER.I.

EU-NATO RELATIONS AFTER THE END OF COLD WAR: THE EU AS AN AWAKENING PARTNER IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ISSUES

The ultimate objective of this chapter is to assess the relations between the EU and NATO after the end of the Cold War until the period when the EU's quest for autonomy in security and defence issues was theoretically realised. Within this framework this chapter is composed of four sections.

The first section includes the period from the end of the Cold War till the Maastricht Treaty. It involves a brief analysis of the respective European and Atlantic perspectives on European security integration. It is useful to state here that the Atlantic perspectives are identified with the American ones. The reason for such identification is the assumption of the US influence in NATO. From this perspective, the famous burden sharing issue is the main focus of the first section. The second section is about the attempt to revitalise WEU. It raises the question about what kind of a revitalisation was needed and about what kind of a relation was aimed at with NATO and the EU. The third section focuses on the launch of the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) by NATO. It involves the questions about a Europeanization of NATO or a subordination of the EU. It is concluded by an important turning point for the EU's future security and defence capacities, which is the Amsterdam Treaty. The fourth part is about analysing the developments about the EU's quest for autonomy in security and defence fields and about the quest for a new equilibrium between NATO and the EU. Within this context, the fourth part focuses on the developments after the Amsterdam Treaty, the Saint Malo Summit, the declaration of the ESDP operational, the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership.

Before this analysis, it would be insightful to underline that the first attempt by the Europeans to have defence integration was experienced by the plan on the establishment of a European Defence Community. The plan was proposed in 1950 by René Pleven. The aim was to have a pan-European defence system by the participation of France, the Benelux, Italy and Western Germany. But the plan failed in 1952 because of the fears that the EDC threatened France's national sovereignty and of the fears about Germany's remilitarization.

European security integration is defined as crucial but its relation with NATO has a very high importance. On the basis of this point of view, attention is paid to the period commencing after the end of the Cold War. The aim in doing that is to know the international context in which the EU's initiatives and its relationship with NATO are formulated or redesigned and to understand the principle of causality in which the turning points in the EU-NATO relationship were experienced.

I.1. The Reconfiguration of the Responsibilities of NATO and the Burden-Sharing Issue:

The end of the Cold War was undoubtedly a decisive moment not only for the course of history but also for the international system in its entirety. This argument can be regarded as ordinary by reflecting rather a stereotype. Because the common idea about the end product of the Cold War and the prospects deriving from the end of the Cold War are expressed in similar styled sentences. But, this stereotype, it becomes an essential component in order to redefine the international system and the international actors.

At the end of the Cold War, 'international institutions continue to be challenged by States' interests'(Deighton, 2002:722-723). Two different facts played a major role; the first one was the emergence of the new independent States in the Europe`s neighbourhood (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Commonwealth of Independent States) and the second one was the different intentions and difference in the interpretations to re-configure out the European Communities and at the same time NATO (ibid.:723). Different interpretations should lead in the second case to the quest for the new appellations for European integration and for a more political role of the EU. French President Chirac preferred to call it as a process leading to a more United Europe⁶ in a speech at the Bundestag and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, preferred rather to name thje EU as a 'superpower'⁷ in his Warsaw Speech in 2000.

⁶ Cited in Deighton (2002: 723): Chirac, J.(2000), 'Our Europe', The Federal Trust, Essay Number:20, for the speech in its entirety, please refer to <http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/default.asp?pageid=215&groupid=8>.

⁷ Cited in Deighton (2002: 723): Blair, T.(2000), 'Warsaw Speech', for the speech in its entirety, please refer to <http://www.guardian.co.uk/tonyblair/story/0,,378818,00.html>.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War might be interpreted as the end of the road for NATO as '*its raison d'être* had ended with the collapse of first, Soviet Union's European Empire and then the Soviet Union itself' (ibid.:723). Then, another *raison d'être* had to be found for the survival of NATO. NATO's *security* actorness was chosen as the new *raison d'être* for its survival. According to Guehenno, NATO - once defined as a defence alliance - 'abandoned this *defence first* doctrine by emphasising on cooperative security vision' (2000:103) in the new international context. This new situation necessitated efforts to create a new equilibrium in transatlantic relations. This new definition of areas of action and the newly added capacities required an expanded review of transatlantic relations under the title of burden sharing.

I.1.1. Interaction Between the European and Atlantic Perspectives on European Security Integration and the Issue of Burden-Sharing

Early 1990's was marked by the different approaches for the future organisation of European Security and by different arguments for NATO's existence as it is emphasised in the previous section. Among such arguments, opening NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact Members (Deighton, 2000:723), the maintenance of security and peace for the European continent by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Hatjiadoniu, 2000:1) or the Europeanization of NATO might be cited. A fascinating journey for the Europeans had begun within these discussions. The dream about having a combined European defence/security capacity has coincided with the necessity to embark on European security integration. This raised the question why Europe needed security integration.

Gambles (1991:6-7) gives a three pronged answer to such question that reflected the Europeanists stance towards security integration:

-First, the need for ‘the preservation and the extension of the *European Security Community*’⁸(ibid.:6) is considered primordial.

-Secondly, the need for a ‘more effective and efficient protection and promotion of the vital national interests of European states in international relations’ is important (ibid.:n/a). This promotion was only feasible by having a concerted foreign policy, integrated security objectives and a civil and military reaction capacity (ibid.:8).

-Thirdly, the goal was to unite the Europeans under common objectives by promoting the European security integration (ibid.:10).

While these motives presented new opportunities for Europe, the other side of the Atlantic never backed from the idea of power sharing. The idea was to prevent the emergence of a new rival in security and defence issues. Rather a partner with a ‘risk sharing’ (Hunter, 2001:149) perspective was preferred. The American attitude towards European Security Integration was ‘ambivalent’ (Larrabee, 2006:171) as underlined by Larrabee. This ambivalence is explained by Larrabee as: First, the US was keen on the fact that ‘a strong European partner would help to manage new security threats most of which emanate from beyond Europe’s borders’ (ibid.:171). Secondly, the US was expecting that such integration should not ‘undermine NATO’ (ibid.:171). The American way of thinking regarding European integration oscillated between three schools of thought as Sloan (2000: 4-5) underlines:

-The first school is ‘the traditional school’ (Sloan, 2000:4). It ‘envisions that a stronger Europe will be an important part of a continuing transatlantic community of shared interests and cooperation’ (ibid.:4).

⁸ Cited in Gambles (1991:6-7). The concept first introduced by Karl Deutsch refers to ‘a region, in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes, a community in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. A variety of factors may contribute to the emergence and maintenance of a security-community, including the consolidation of liberal democracy as the sole form of government in the region, creating a Kantian ‘pacific union’ of liberal republics, the development of complex networks of political and economic cooperation and interdependence among states in the region, and the entrenchment among publics and decision-makers of a well-founded fear of general war.

-The second one is called the 'domestic interests school' (ibid.:5). 'This school sees the EU as part of the answer to the need for the US to respond more effectively to its internal agenda'(ibid: 5). This perspective has deep roots in the defence burden-sharing debates'(ibid.:5).

-The third one is 'the US security interests school' (ibid: 5). 'This tendency has suggested that the United States must actively defend its interests in the European integration process` (ibid.:5).

To give a fixed definition of burden-sharing is not very easy, bearing in mind that the concept itself and the burden-sharing trends evolve over time. Burden-sharing in the field of security and in defence (with respect to the special characteristic of the transatlantic relationship) is about sharing the risks. In early 1990`s the essence of security integration for Europe was the issue of burden sharing versus power, from the American Point of view.

I.1.2.The European Dimension within the Atlantic Alliance

After emphasising the American and European stances toward European security integration, it is time to portray the historical turning point that the EC faced and at the same time the historical evolution of a European pillar within NATO. The turning point was by the EC declaration to call an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which would aim to put into practice a 'political union which would progressively develop a common foreign and security policy' (Howorth, 2000:16) under the initiative of the two promoters of the European integration, France and Germany. This determination and the initiative from the European side must be read as a voluntary step to have a margin of manoeuvre and to create gradually an autonomous security and defence capability. The clarification of such an initiative and its enhancement were followed by a special meeting held by the USA- and France: the Key Largo meeting.

Why was the Key Largo meeting important? This meeting had been essential in reflecting the traditional oppositions (ibid.:16) between the USA and France on the subject of defence and security. For the USA, 'the definition of the new role of NATO' (ibid.:16) in the new

international conditions was on the top of agenda and they emphasised on the preeminence of NATO whereas for Europe, led by France, the emphasis was on the ‘emergence of a strategically autonomous Europe’ (Boniface, 1997:2) while ‘acknowledging the preeminence of NATO for the European security’ (ibid.:2).

The significance of the Key Largo Meeting was its fruitful conclusions that gave birth to the initiative to gather the NATO Summit in London. By this NATO Summit, the decision to attribute new capacities and new instruments to the Alliance compatible with the new international context was taken (North Atlantic Council, 1990a). The London Summit enhanced the idea of the transformation of the Alliance. The end of this Summit revealed new opportunities⁹. It had given a boost to a security and defence role for Europe. The aspirations of European security and defence actorness would exactly mean, first the facilitation of NATO’s burden to ensure a secure environment on the continent. Secondly, this aspiration would make ‘the Europeans responsible for themselves if nothing else’ (Pachta, 2005:21). It would present a measure to balance interest-sharing and the enhancement of self-esteem and self-consciousness for the European side.

The significance of the London Summit was essentially based on three novelties as cited by Ambassador Henning Wegener in his speech about the Transformed Alliance: The first ‘important feature of the London Declaration is its thoroughly operational nature’(Wegener, 1990:2). Accordingly, political preoccupations on security should be complementary to pure military preoccupations. The second one was the reiteration of the military reform in NATO in line with the CFE Treaty. The third one was about the transformations on the European Continent, ‘the new conceptual approach for Europe’ (ibid.:3). This final novelty presented the promoting idea that opened the door for a new period of conventional cooperation between NATO and the EC (ibid.:6). Such cooperation paved the way for the creation of a security and defence role for the Europeans to share NATO’s tasks and to alleviate its burden.

In December 1990, the North Atlantic Council’s Communiqué reiterated the objectives of the London Declaration on Europe’s role: ‘A European security identity and defence role,

⁹ For more information about London Summit, see Annex-II-.

reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity` (North Atlantic Council, 1990b).

The NAC Final Communiqué of June 1991 concretized another idea that had arisen from the London Declaration of the Alliance and issued a statement on NATO's core security functions, stressing that while emphasizing the Alliance would pursue its essential functions, 'the Allies would also develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerged in the Twelve and the WEU and the Alliance' (North Atlantic Council, 1991a). The Heads of State and Government participating to the North Atlantic Council in Rome, in 7-8 November 1991, agreed on the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. It emphasised on the Alliance objectives and security functions, the new approach to security and the guidelines for defence (North Atlantic Council, 1991b). The development of a European pillar within the Alliance with the intentions of assuming a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe (ibid.) was encouraged by the Alliance's New Strategic Concept¹⁰.

I.1.3. The Foreign and Security Policy Façade of the EU: An Incremental Process

The period 1990-1991 for the Europeans was marked by ambitious plans, on the way of extrication from taboos. The ambitious plans were the progressive creation of a political union covering at first instance a foreign and security policy. The promoter of this ambition in the EC was, without doubt, France. France had an *avant-garde* role in putting into practice a genuine foreign and security policy for Europe. This stance derived mainly from the the need 'to

¹⁰See Annex-III-.The Alliance's New Strategic Concept put special emphasis on the development of a European security and defence identity.

rebalance the Euro-American relationship'¹¹ (Howorth, 2000:15) after the end of Cold War. Under François Mitterrand's presidency - as well as after the end of Cold War- 'France advocated a more autonomous European defence system'¹² (ibid.:15). 'A greater security and in the longer term defence role for the EU via WEU'(ibid.:15) would enhance the division of labour between NATO and the EU, by playing the card of complementarity of roles.

The French way of thinking promoted a 'dual approach' (ibid.:14). This duality refers to the irreversibility of NATO's role in security and defence issues and to the appetite to give a political dynamism to the EC by constructing the security and defence façade of EC¹³ (ibid.:14). This idea to give a political dynamism to the EC led to a Franco-German initiative. Concretely speaking, the joint letter of Kohl and Mitterrand addressed to the gathering of the Intergovernmental Conference on a political and a monetary union in 1990 stressed the ambitions to put into practice a genuine foreign and security policy¹⁴.

In December 1991, the Heads of State and Government reached an agreement on the Draft Treaty of the EU in the Maastricht European Council. This draft was about changing the structural panorama of the EC/EU and multiplying the policy areas of the Union. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992. The declaration on Western European Union (WEU) issued at the time of the Maastricht European Council as an attachment to the Maastricht Treaty made clear 'the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters'¹⁵.

The quest for the idea of political Europe and for the EU's international presence via the development of CFSP had arisen out of pure necessity. First, there was the need to rebalance international arena after the end of Cold War. Secondly, 'the economic giant but political dwarf'

¹¹The author here referred to Gordon, P.H. (1993), *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press and Menon, A.(2000), *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence: The Politics of Ambivalence*.London: Macmillan.

¹² *Op.cit.* Gordon, P.H. (1993).

¹³ Cited in Howorth (2000,p.14). J.Howorth here referred to Philip H. Gordon (2000,p.14), *A Certain Idea of France:French Security Policy and Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1993), Frederique Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN: de la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européenne*(Paris: Masson, 1991)

¹⁴ For further information on this letter, see *Agence Europe*, 'European Prospect, Mitterrand and Kohl urge European Political Union', 20 April 1990,accessed through <http://www.ellopos.net/politics/miterrand-kohl.htm>.

¹⁵ For the full text of the declaration on Western European Union-Maastricht 10 December 1991, see Annex-IV-.

(Haine, 2004a:35) situation had to be overpassed. Thirdly the EU had to be able 'to face up various threats, to build security in the Union's immediate neighbourhood and to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism' (Solana, 2004:6-7). The EU, with the Maastricht Treaty had acquired a Common Foreign and Security Policy. But the practical security and defence role belonged to WEU as the EU had not developed these capacities. Concretely speaking the EU preferred to empower itself by empowering WEU. The following part is designed by this logic.

I.2.The Revitalisation of WEU: The 'Either...or; Both' Syndrome

Western European Union was given 'primary responsibility for all aspects of the EU's CFSP with defence implications in the Treaty on European Union' (Duke, 1996:168). It was clear that since the mid-1980's, WEU's 'prolonged 30 years of inactivity'(ibid.:168) was experiencing an awakening. To cite important examples, 'WEU gained its instrumental military role in the Iraq-Iran war and then during the Gulf War, WEU became the security arm of the EC'(ibid.:171). But the problematic thing was to know how this awakening would influence the relations between the EU and NATO. Two possible scenarios were reigning on the future of the EU and on the future relations between the EU and NATO; WEU would either be an 'intermediary organisation between the EU and NATO' (Howorth, 2003:4) or represent the security and defence wing of the EU (ibid.: 4). The first scenario was about the burden-sharing tasks between NATO and the EU.

These scenarios were going also in parallel with an ambiguous interpretation of the ESDI. The reason and the pretext of its launch was a source of divergence between two approaches. The first approach was to respond to European wishes to develop a CFSP. The second one was to emphasise the need for a more balanced transatlantic relationship.

In an atmosphere where these scenarios reigned, the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Ministerial Council made in June 1992, reiterated WEU's role as 'the defence component of the EU and at the same time as the means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic

Alliance'(WEU Council of Ministers, 1992:6) as it was first defined in the Declaration on Western European Union. It also reiterated a certain number of civil-military missions cited first on the declaration on WEU in Maastricht Treaty. These missions are 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'(ibid.:6).

While events took this turn in the European security landscape, history was facing the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian tragedy. The Yugoslav crisis marked decisive moments to test the loyalty of both the US and the European Allies to the promises on rebalancing the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic and the loyalty of the EU vis-à-vis its own prospects and intention to deal with the crises especially in its neighbourhood. Unfortunately the political divisions over the Yugoslav break-up signalled a series of failures on the part of Europeans. These failures gave birth to a tragedy when 'the horror of the ethnic cleansing and the concentration camp' (Haine, 2004a:39) ideas were back again on the European Continent. Soon it had become clear that a revitalisation of WEU would not be adequate to cope up with the challenges facing Europe. Obviously, NATO intervention would be the only solution but the problem was that the US was reluctant to be involved. The failure of the immature CFSP, the relative ineffectiveness of WEU and the reluctance of NATO – in the beginning of the crisis-inevitably pushed for a reconsideration of the European security landscape. The Yugoslav crises proved how transatlantic relations were important (ibid.:41) and how 'substantial use of military force in Yugoslavia required the use of NATO' (White, 2001:116) and how the security understanding of NATO and the EU should be complementary via WEU.

I.3. The Europeanization of NATO or A Subordination of the EU? The Concrete Façade of the ESDI

Under the circumstances mentioned in the previous sections – the launch of CFSP, the duality of role for WEU, the insecurities in the periphery of Europe - the Heads of State and Government of the Allies had strongly agreed on the creation of an ESDI within the Alliance at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994. The end product of the Summit, the ministerial communiqué emphasised on the 'strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance

through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union¹⁶ clear (North Atlantic Council, 1994). But this recognition had some limits which aimed to protect NATO's supremacy as a security provider and its defence role.

The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept (CJTF's) was endorsed by NATO's Brussels Summit in January 1994. CJTF concept should 'reflect the readiness to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions by the North Atlantic Council, for operations led by the Western European Union' (NATO Handbook, 2002). The Combined Joint Task Forces concept of NATO was developed for the purpose of strengthening the European Pillar of the Alliance, enabling the European Allies to use NATO assets and capabilities in crises where the US was not willing to get involved. The CJTF's would be separable but not separate from NATO according to this logic.

Modalities regarding the use of CJTF's by WEU were agreed on in NATO's 1996 Berlin Summit. With the words of Haine, it would mean that 'WEU could act independently but making use of NATO assets and capabilities' (2004b:133). Two years later in the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of NATO, it was reiterated that these forces could be placed 'under the political, operational direction of WEU' (North Atlantic Council, 1996)¹⁷.

The Berlin Communiqué was in a way about the tightening of the Atlantic links and in another way it was about enhancing and deepening the European Pillar of the Alliance¹⁸. The conclusions of the NAC on ESDI, was considered as a green light for the EU to assume security

¹⁶ Article 5 of the Ministerial Communiqué is significant in this respect, Article 5 'We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.'

¹⁷ For more information on the Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council Berlin 3 June 1996, see Annex-V-.

¹⁸ See Annex-V- Article 5 is significant: Much has been achieved, but now is the moment to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet the new challenges. Therefore we are determined to adapt Alliance structure. An essential part of this adaptation is to build a ESDI within NATO which will enable all Europeans Alliance to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership.

and defence responsibilities although there are some limits. In a way it represented a free trial period and an awakening period for the EU in these fields.

In the meantime, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg had agreed on 'the full integration of WEU to the EU' (Whitman, 1999:14) in line with their Europeanist stand about security and defence. The British way of thinking shaped by the Atlanticist stand insisted that 'WEU as an autonomous organisation would represent the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance' (ibid.:14). This tension which could endanger the completion of the ESDI and the future of CFSP was resolved by finding a balanced wording and understanding for the Atlanticist and Europeanist sides in the Amsterdam Treaty. In the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (ToA), 'the separation of WEU and the EU was retained' (ibid:10) but ToA foresaw 'the possibility of integration of WEU into the EU on the basis of a decision by the European Council' (ibid.:10).

As a conclusion, the period between the end of the Cold War and the Amsterdam Treaty was a marathon for the EU. It experienced transformations and multiplication of policy areas which affected its relations with NATO. The attempts to have a say and a margin of manoeuvre and to have responsibilities and capabilities in security and defence fields had more or less succeeded, but improvements were necessary. The following part reflects on the developments in the European Security and Defence landscape bearing in mind the quest for a balance with NATO and the priority given to the development of an autonomous EU capability in these fields.

I.4.The Rising Voice for the Quest of Autonomy and the Launch of the ESDP

This part covers the period between the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty and the declaration of the ESDP operational. The reason for choosing this timeline is to reflect on the transformation from the rising voices for the creation of a genuine (autonomous) security and defence policy within the EU to the solid installation of the necessary mechanisms. To clarify the issue, it is needed a strong reference to the turning points for the adoption of autonomy in the fields of European security and defence. Secondly, an evaluation of the relations between NATO and the EU during the attempts to create a European-only security and defence policy is needed.

An analysis on these lines would illuminate the practical façade of the security and defence integration, namely the military operations of the EU. Within this context, the St. Malo Meeting, the Berlin Plus Arrangements, the launch of the ESDP, its declaration as operational and the mechanisms made available to it are scrutinized in this part.

Generally speaking, the creation of the ESDP was regarded as a revolution since it ‘adds the – still limited but functional - hard power element to the wide range of European soft power tools’ (Pachta, 2005:40). It was also seen as a radical and fundamental change in cultural and institutional concepts used by the EU, when the Union’s so called ambiguous relationship with NATO is taken into consideration. In that sense it was expected that the launch of the ESDP would change the fact that the reaction capacity and capabilities of the European Union have been divided between WEU and NATO. It would eradicate the widespread idea that the EU is a *political dwarf* when it comes to responsiveness to the international crises. In this context, an operational ESDP was a development which went beyond simple technical implementation. It represented collective willingness and spirit at the EU level that started to take shape at the end of the Cold War.

I.4.1.After Amsterdam: Articulation of ‘Full Instrumental Power’¹⁹

After the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, a period of the convergence of the objectives on the autonomy was witnessed. This raised a couple of questions such as: What are the changes in the international context that caused a shift in the EU towards more convergence in the fields of security and defence? What are the dynamics behind this attempt to converge the way of thinking about defence and security?

The most important dynamic was the worsening situation in the Balkans. ‘Law and order in Albania basically collapsed’ (Tanner, 1998:3) following the failure of Pyramides scheme and the Parliamentary elections. When the Albanian crisis broke up; the response by the international community was a reluctant one. The refusal ‘to contemplate a military operation’ (Tanner, 1998:3) by the North Atlantic Council, the incapacity of ‘WEU Council to take up the OSCE

¹⁹Please note that this phrase was used by Larsen,H.(2004,72).

proposal' (Tanner, 1998:3) to handle the crisis are examples of such reluctant behaviour. A late response to the Albanian Crisis was formulated on UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 1101 for the creation of a 'coalition of states led by Italy' (Favretto et al., 1997:1). Italy, together with; 'Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Spain and Turkey; participated the Operation Alba; that was the first crisis management mission conducted in Europe by a multinational military force composed by Europeans only' (Tanner, 1998:3). Without undermining the Europeanness and its success, 'WEU had missed an opportunity to successfully contribute to an out-of area-mission'²⁰ (ibid.:3). For the European security and defence understanding, the operation was marked by the lack of willingness and solidarity of several EU Member States.

After the Yugoslav crisis, the Albanian problem showed that 'the EU can not speak with one voice' (ibid.:8). Another problematic issue was raised about the US stance towards Europe. The US stance in these crises oscillated between 'indifference and unilateralism'²¹ (de Schoutheete, 2004:16). This atmosphere prepared a fertile ground to rethink the defence and security façade of the EU and to revise the defence and security understanding within the Union. 'The reticence' (ibid.:20) of the US towards the European security and defence was interpreted as another reason to revise the EU and US relations (Howorth, 2000:25).

I.4.2.Towards A Turning Point for the Autonomy: Saint Malo

A very remarkable and radical change - if one might dare to talk about a U turn regarding European security and defence- was experienced by the United Kingdom - the ardent defender of Atlanticism and the supremacy of NATO. An expression of willingness which meant in a way to be on the same wavelength with the French point of view was articulated first in *Strategic Defence Review White Paper* in July 1998. This initiative stressed 'the vital role of the EU's CFSP' (ibid: 25), the irreversible defence role of the United Kingdom (UK Ministry of Defence, 1998:149), 'Britain as a leader in Europe and the international community'(UK Ministry of

²⁰The author here referred to the address by Admiral Venturoni, Chief of the Italian General Staff to the WEU Fiftieth Anniversary Conference on "WEU on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century", Brussels 17 March 1998.

²¹ The author here referred to the formulation by Dominique Moisi, RAMSES 2001, Dunod Pour l'IFRI, Paris: 186.

Defence, 1998:10), 'a more effective European Security and Defence Identity in NATO through the WEU' (ibid.: 94). After this initiative, the new position of the United Kingdom concerning the EU's defence role had become clear during the Informal European Summit, Pörschach (24-25 October 1998) and the Summit of Defence Ministers of the EU in Vienna (11-12 December 1998)²². The stance of France favouring autonomy - not very much astonishing- and the British stance had reached its zenith at the Franco-British summit held in Saint Malo. This Summit was considered as a green light to lay the foundations of autonomy²³. It raised the question on how the UK and France reached a consensus on the development of autonomy for the EU in the defence and security fields. Different reasons might be given for this consensus.

From the French point of view, the autonomy for the EU in the security and defence fields has always been on the agenda, ranking with high priority. The ultimate aim has been keeping 'the credibility of the political Europe' (Gnesotto, 2004:13). In the French subconscious, 'a strong political Europe' (Blunden, 2000:19) and the autonomous reaction capacity was 'sought to complement and amplify its national voice' (ibid.:19).

From the British perspective, an autonomous European security and defence dimension was out of question until the process leading to Saint Malo Summit. But it would not be satisfactory to say that the Saint Malo Summit was a *deus ex machina*, - the root cause of a miraculous and sudden change- in British point of view. After the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, the British position experienced several changes (Whitman, 1999:9). Among different reasons of this change, first, the newly elected Labour Government was motivated to assume major roles in 'the European integration project' (ibid.:11), especially after the British alienation from the Economic and Monetary Union formulation (Deighton, 2002:725). The idea behind this motivation was about 'projecting the British leadership in Europe' (ibid.:725). The second reason was the willingness to reconstruct the EU credibility in defence and security fields which was a failure due to lack of consensus and inaction in the Balkan Crisis. Indeed, it was not only a British failure or reticence but the UK took part in this collective failure. It was the best moment to encourage a Europe of security and defence in order to reinforce or reconstruct its credibility as the fear of US 'isolationism' (Howorth, 2000:23) was always there. Third reason to convert

²² For more details, see to Rutten, M. (2001).

²³ For the full text of Saint Malo Summit Conclusions, see Annex-VI-.

into the idea of an autonomous European security and defence dimension was the acknowledgement of ‘stagnation in the process of development of the ESDI within NATO’ (Piana, 2002:2-3). All the good reasons were there to converge the British and French point of views about autonomy.

This development surely presented a genuine European characteristic. But it is necessary to mention here that the US officials’ surprise at St. Malo turned out to be a worry about the possibility of weakening the Alliance by this convergence and by this radical change on the British side. The 3Ds principle was backed and enshrined under the Clinton administration by Madeleine Albright as the US response to these developments. These 3Ds referred to avoidance from decoupling, discrimination, duplication between NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy that would be developed.

I.4.3. From the ESDI to An Autonomous ESDP

As mentioned before the EDSI was developed in the year 1994 within NATO. This concept was on one hand based on a division of strategic, geographic and civil-military burden; on the other hand it presented a preparative phase giving room for a manoeuvre capacity for the EU.

The year 1999 appeared to be a good opportunity for the EU to go beyond the speech act on autonomy. History was facing a rather tragic development concretized by tensions leading to the Kosovo War. Despite the theoretical existence of CFSP, no one could deny the diplomatic and military ‘impotence of the EU’ (Grant et al., 2001:10) during the Kosovar tensions and Kosovo War. EU’s inability to find a practical solution to the Kosovo problem led to the deployment of a peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO.

The Kosovo war was seen as a lesson to reconsider the defence capabilities of the EU. It was the concrete example of how the ‘US remains involved in European affairs’ (Katzenstein, 2000:1). St.Malo Summit was a result of the lessons taken from the EU’s ‘pathological inability’

(Senghaas, 1993:15) to deal with the Kosovo crisis, NATO's Washington Summit on the other hand, welcomed the developments in St. Malo Summit and stated in the Summit's Communiqué:

- 'the acknowledgement of the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
- the necessity of ensuring the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency between NATO and the EU, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
- the acknowledgement of the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
- the attached importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.
- the determination to develop the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations.'²⁴ (North Atlantic Council, 1999).

The development of an independent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched by the Cologne European Council of June 1999 'as a distinctive part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy'. (European Council, 1999a). The launch of the ESDP is the reflection of the appetite for autonomy. Following Cologne European Council, in the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999, the EU adopted a European Headline Goal, putting the accent on the military capacity of the Union. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council are important because, it reiterates 'the determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises' (European Council, 1999b). The European Council has agreed in particular the following:

²⁴For the text of the Washington Summit Communiqué, see Annex-VII-.

- ‘cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States’(ibid.).

The European Council of Santa Maria de Feira reinforced these military capacities by adding the civilian assets for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations by 2003 (European Council, 2000).

Nice European Council, incorporated the ESDP into the Nice Treaty. The Treaty of Nice (2000) entered into force on 1 February 2003. It contains amendments which reflect the operational development of the ESDP (Euractiv Website, n/a). The transition from an ESDP in theory to practice was made by the Laeken Summit in 2001 by ‘declaring the ESDP operational’ (European Council, 2001).

As a conclusion, the period between 1999-2001 was marked by a wide-range of initiatives taken by the EU to acquire an autonomous security and defence policy. These initiatives were well targeted and could be regarded as successful. The willingness and the determination of the

EU necessitated in these fields a more balanced and appropriate approach to its relations with NATO.

I.4.4. The Strategic Partnership Between NATO and the EU

The progress within the EU has pushed NATO to search for a new kind of collaboration between the two organizations. The consciousness about common strategic interests had boosted the idea of partnership and complementarity. This partnership and complementarity had been realised by the joint declaration of NATO and EU on the ESDP which paved the way for the adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements.

The EU and NATO Joint Declaration on the ESDP was a first step towards the consolidation of the strategic partnership in rhetoric. The declaration which was made on 16 December 2002 reiterated shared values, the indivisibility of security, the continued important role of NATO in crisis management, conflict prevention and set the modalities for the EU's access to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations. The principles of the new relationship between NATO and the EU would be based on the following principles:

- Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organizations are mutually reinforcing, while recognizing that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;
- Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;
- Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

- Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations²⁵.

The Berlin Plus Arrangements provide the basis for NATO and the EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing the EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. They consist of the following major elements:

- a NATO-EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);
- assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;
- presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;
- procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- terms of reference for NATO's Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European command options for NATO;
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations²⁶.

The Berlin Plus Arrangements, in parallel with the EU-NATO Declaration, reshaped the relations between NATO and the EU. This adjustment was seen as a necessity after the EU reform in security and defence fields which started with the St. Malo process. These reforms and adjustments gave room for the autonomous reaction capacity for the EU on one hand, and, a more balanced relation between the EU and NATO on the other. The operational impact of these

²⁵ For the text of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP 16 December 2002, see Annex-VIII- and NATO Website, 'NATO-EU: A strategic partnership How did the policy evolve?', accessed through: <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html>.

²⁶ Ibid. NATO Website.

developments and how the operational aspects affect NATO-EU relation's will all be discussed in the next chapter as they are testing ground for complementarity and the search for autonomy.

CHAPTER.II.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TESTING GROUNDS FOR AUTONOMY

The EU's military operations are considered as testing grounds to evaluate the capacities and the degree of autonomy that the Union might develop. It is better to underline first, that there is no gradual evolution in the EU's autonomy. The level of autonomy has been shaped according to the merits of each conflict.

This chapter analyses three military operations conducted by the EU, namely Operation Concordia, Operation Artemis and Operation Althea and searches for the answer of the question 'Is autonomy on case-by-case basis a result of priorities of NATO?'. These operations are chosen for specific reasons. First, they reflect how the arrangements between the EU and NATO are implemented. Second, they are the concrete cases on which the EU and NATO relations are evaluated. Third, they are the early examples of the EU's manoeuvre capacity. These operations are evaluated in line with the hypotheses of this study, in terms of their nature, the components of autonomy, the characteristics to gauge the European character and the impact of the operation on the evolution of the ESDP. At the end of this chapter, the case-by-case approach are evaluated for each operation in order to go in line with the hypotheses of the study.

II.1.Operation Concordia: First Military Operation of the EU

The European Union launched Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) by replacing the Operation Allied Harmony conducted by NATO. Concordia was launched with the aim of 'ensuring stability, security and the implementation of Ohrid Peace Agreement signed in 2002' (EUFOR Concordia Website, 2006). Operation Concordia was formulated by the resolution 1317 of United Nations Security Council. Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 launched the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The operation was conducted through the participation of 13 EU Member States and 14 non-EU NATO Member States (Lindström, 2004:117).

The military presence of the EU in the Balkans reflected an avant-garde position just after the launch of the ESDP. This operation reflected a significant will to prevent the widening of the conflict while the proximity of the region to the EU was especially taken into account. Ensuring the stability of its neighbourhood was a condition to maintain the EU's own stability. But it is better to remember that it was not possible to refer to the military aspect of crisis management by the EU side in the very early days of the conflict. The situation was settled by the military intervention of NATO under the name of Operation Essential Harvest²⁷. This operation was then followed by two other military operations. The debate on the succession of the operation Allied Harmony-the latest operation of NATO in the fYROM- was already on the agenda of the Barcelona European Council. The Seville European Council followed by the Copenhagen European Council made possible the launch of the Operation Concordia, as a successor of the Allied Harmony.

II.1.1.The Nature of the Operation

To begin with, the importance of the operation derives from its quality to be the first military operation of the EU after the launch of the ESDP. Besides this characteristic, the context of the period, the emphasis on the ambitions of the EU and the nature of the operation are the other highlights making this operation important.

The launch of the Operation Concordia has its own strategic reason. It is mainly explained by the need for the European Union to regain its 'credibility' and 'build its reputation as a security actor in Balkans' as stated by Stefanova (2004:1). Operation Concordia was the first example of the implementation of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, by making use of NATO assets. According to Vincze (2004: 4) the use of NATO assets by the EU caused confusion on the European nature and on authenticity of the operation. But apart this scepticism, 'the EU assumed the tactical-operational part of the operation' (Gross, 2006:11).

²⁷ NATO Website, NATO's Role in fYROM, accessed through: <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>.

The civil and military personnel deployment allocated by the EU Member States and non-EU European Allies to Operation Allied Harmony and to the EU-led Operation Concordia was interestingly similar (Vincze, 2004:2). Beyond this quantitative comparison, the Concordia Mission was also marked by the reticence and cleavages between the EU Member States. The traditional contrast in point of views was pointed out by the main actors of the Core Group, the lack of contribution of the neutrals and the hesitations of the atlanticists.

Table-1-Personnel Participating in Concordia in FYROM 2003

The European Union		Third States	
Austria	11	Bulgaria	2
Belgium	26	Canada	1
Finland	9	Czech Republic	2
France	145	Estonia	1
Germany	26	Hungary	2
Greece	21	Iceland	1
Italy	27	Latvia	2
Luxembourg	1	Lithuania	1
Netherlands	3	Norway	5
Portugal	6	Poland	17
Spain	16	Romania	3
Sweden	14	Slovakia	1
United Kingdom	3	Slovenia	1
		Turkey	10
Total	308	Total	49

Source: Lindström(2004, 117)

After giving some basic quantitative information about the Operation, the chain of command structure should be emphasised. In the Operation Concordia, ‘the Political and Security Committee exercised under the responsibility of the Council the political control and strategic direction of the operation’(Council of Ministers, 2003a) The Council authorised the ‘Political and Security Committee (PSC) to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union’(ibid.). ‘The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitored the proper execution of the military operation’(ibid.). The PSC and the EUMC were in close cooperation

with the corresponding level of NATO, these were the North Atlantic Council and under its authority the Policy Coordination Group and International Military Staff.

‘The Council appointed the EU Operation Commander with the approval of NATO’(Council of Ministers, 2003a), the EU Operation Commander was the D-SACEUR of NATO –Amiral Feist, responsible of the strategic command of the operation. ‘EU Operational Headquarters installed at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons’(Masson, 2006:72). The EU Force Headquarters in Skopje were responsible of the tactical and operational control of the forces on the ground under the authority of Major General Maral (then replaced by General Dos Santos) (ibid.:105). NATO’s regional HQ AFSOUTH/Naples was mainly ‘the liaison component of the chain of command’ and was involved in the operational command’ (ibid.:73). The European Union Command Element (EUCE) was established in the HQ AFSOUTH by NATO, a coordination authority between DSACEUR and Force Commander, composed of mostly NATO officials (ibid:105). ‘The EU Command Element-EUCE was under the authority of Chief of Staff of HQ AFSOUTH in Naples’(ibid.:72).

The division of labour on the ground between NATO and the EU and the execution of the operation was shadowed by the ‘*dual hatted*’ (ibid.:105). characteristic of the chain of command. First, D-SACEUR, ‘Operation Commander Amiral Feist acted more specifically on political and strategic direction of the operation’(ibid.:104), that was, in reality, under the responsibility of the PSC. Second, NATO’s regional HQ ‘AFSOUTH performed many functions of the Operation Commander’(DSACEUR) (Monaco, 2003:2). Another ‘controversy had arisen over the role of the HQ AFSOUTH’(ibid.:12), ‘some Member States suggested that its role had not been agreed in the original joint action and amounted to a manipulation of the EU Chain of command’ (Quille, 2004:3). Last controversial point was about the EUCE , as it was established within the AFSOUTH and as the EU Command Element was under the authority of Chief of Staff of HQ AFSOUTH’ (Masson, 2006:105), there were the feeling that ‘the EUCE was not fully under the EU control’ (Monaco, 2003:2).

Concordia Operation apart from these shortcomings was effective because it was an ‘inherited mission’ (Kostovicova, 2004:15) as the operation had been launched just after the

intervention by the three operations of NATO to put an end to the interethnic conflict and to stabilize the situation in the FYROM. The controversial and chaotic situation had been resolved by NATO. Open to interpretation, this situation is justifying the complementarity of the missions between NATO and the EU. It raised a question on a conditionality which might be translated as the fact that the military engagement belongs first of all to NATO, while the role given to the EU has to be carried out according to the stabilization of the situation. In that sense, it was highlighted that the EU could not develop an independent military capacity and could not ensure its autonomy under the ESDP.

II.1.2. The Impact of Operation Concordia on the ESDP

In order not to be so much pessimistic on the concept of autonomy for the EU/ESDP, it is important to say that Operation Concordia marked a turning point to put into practice the theoretical ESDP and to define a new model of transatlantic relations. As Jovin (2004:2) underlines, the importance of Concordia was related to its characteristic to be the first operation conducted under the Berlin Plus Arrangements that represented a testing ground for the genesis of the EU in the international security arena. Although the opinions oscillated between the quest for the autonomy of the EU and NATO's primacy in defence and security issues, the context of the period necessitated a *'holistic approach'* (Keohane, 2004:3) to security. Such a *holistic approach* to security required a common denominator for the issues of security, a strategic partnership and a combination of civil capacities with military ones. In the light of this approach, the significant point was to ensure the complementarity of the tasks between NATO and the EU. So what does this concept consist of? This concept consist of the 'differentiation of the roles'²⁸ without the idea of competitiveness due to the priorities of the EU and NATO and a 'more equal burden sharing' (Gardner, 2002:1) according to the context of the international security arena.

The launch of the Operation coincided with the preparations of the US to engage into a stabilization process -depending on the interpretation - in the name of the war against terrorism and in the name of the democratization process of Iraq (Bono, 2004:2). This attempt was named as Operation Iraqi Freedom. A possible Iraqi war was a real challenge for the EU as it coincided

²⁸ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

with the launch the Operation. The divergence between the EU Member States regarding the Iraqi War (Vincze, 2004:5), stimulated those who were in favour of the launch of Concordia. The determination of the United States on its priority area, the ambition of the Core Group enhanced by the opposition to Iraqi War are considered as the reason for the boost for the EU articulation to lay down the action capacity as underlined by Bono (2004:2). This situation, as a typical example of complementarity of the tasks depending on the priorities²⁹ might be understood as a first step towards a more equal burden sharing.

To accentuate different components and characteristics of the Operation Concordia made clear the evaluation of the mission. Some analysts stated that the Operation is a pure reflection of premature and the ‘modest scale of the EU military operation’ (Vincze, 2004:2). The Commander of the EU’s Operation Concordia, Pierre Maral, in an interview given to the Southeastern European Times, admitted this modesty as ‘the main objective of the operation was prevention’³⁰(Maral, 2003:1). He explained this mission as ‘We are like firefighters, if you respond to the fire at the beginning, you don't need a lot of water. It's the same principle’(Maral, 2003:1). According to other analysts, often the official discourses about Concordia called the operation as full of ‘symbolic value’³¹ (Vincze, 2004:1) and emphasized on the historical significance of the operation on its characteristic of ‘constituting a test of the EU’s ability to undertake a military mission’ (Gross, 2006:11) and developing operating procedures. From the FYROM side, the EU presence on FYROM supported the reform process in the country. Operation Concordia ‘extended the EU’s operational competences and capabilities beyond the non-military sphere’ (Vincze, 2004:6).

As it is mentioned, Operation Concordia is far from being an autonomous mission by the EU. The Berlin Plus Arrangements, in this context, served as an important platform to put into practice the theoretical ESDP at a minimum level of capacity. To conclude Operation Concordia had proved first that an operation under the EU flag is feasible. Second it focused on the

²⁹ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I.

³⁰ For the whole interview please refer to

http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2003/04/030423-VALENTIN-001

³¹ The author here referred to Statement by Commission President Romano Prodi on the commencement of the Operation Concordia, Brussels, 31 March 2003.

complementarity of the EU and NATO in defence and security fields. Third it reassured the feasibility of Berlin Plus Arrangements. Fourth, it proved the EU willingness and effectiveness to ensure the stability in its neighbourhood.

II.2. Operation Artemis: First Test for Autonomy

2003 took its place in the course of history as the year of the concretisation of the Laeken European Council Conclusions, which means the implementation of the operational capacity of the ESDP. The Council of the EU after having taken the decision about the launch of Operation Concordia under the framework of Berlin Plus Arrangements, adopted the decision to launch a second operation. It is the first autonomous operation of the EU in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conducted out of the European Continent 'the traditional experiment field of the ESDP' (Bagayoko-Pénone, 2004:101), out of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, which means without any recourse to the capacities and the instruments of NATO.

Operation Artemis, officially named as Interim Emergency Multinational Force, was formulated by the Resolution 1484 of the United Nations Security Council. The Operation was launched by Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on 5 June 2003. The presence of the EU in Bunia was a turning point. Initially the efforts to manage the interethnic crisis, the conflicts between Hemas and Lendus and to manage the humanitarian crisis were taken by the mission of the United Nations, in Democratic Republic of Congo. Gradually, the EU forces replaced the UN troops that were already deployed there. Finally the EU troops in Ituri numbered 2000 (Lindström, 2004:119).

After giving the essential elements of the Artemis operation, the stress must be laid on the evaluation of the mission which became a platform of debate concerning autonomy and its significance for the ESDP.

II.2.1. The Nature of the Operation

At first instance, the importance of Operation Artemis ensued from its characteristic of being the first autonomous military operation of the EU under the ESDP. At this point it is necessary to assess the driving force behind the launch of the operation outside the borders of Europe. It should be underlined first, that this operation introduced as the first autonomous military operation of the EU, launched ‘at the request of the United Nations under a UN mandate’ (Tardy, 2005:55). This call, in a proper way of thinking, was not a direct and explicit calling aiming the take over by the EU. This calling was a general one, made upon the degradation of humanitarian situation in Ituri (Faria, 2004:40) and ‘the atrocities that the population in Ituri has faced’ (Bagayoko-Pénone, 2004:102). These factors necessitated the replacement of MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo). France presented herself as the promoter of Europe’s global role in a new intervention area. What was the reason behind this voluntary initiative of France? From one point of view, France had taken this initiative because she would like ‘to play the role of promoter for the nascent ESDP’ (ibid.:104)³². French ambitions about the EU-led defence capacities were not negligible. From another point of view, this initiative derived from ‘her willingness to integrate her African politics into a multilateral framework’ (ibid.:104). Then, the future Artemis Operation before being thus called as such, was initially given the name of Operation Mamba as France had taken the initiative on the call of United Nations.

Within this context, one might ask how an operation aimed to be conducted under an ad hoc coalition has become a proper European one, introduced as the first of its kind in this regard. The willingness to restore the credibility of the Union in the international arena and the solidarity spirit within the EU after the contradictions over the Iraqi question (Faria, 2004:41) was an important reason for the reconciliation of divergences about the defence façade of the EU. With the words of Faria (ibid.:40) ‘the right political conditions prevailed in the EU context to translate this humanitarian intervention into the first EU mission beyond the European Continent’. It is also possible to interpret it as a willingness for the reconciliation between the ex colonialist

³² The author here referred to Klein, J., P. Buffotot, N. Vilboux, *Towards a european security and defence policy : challenges, opportunities*, Paris, Economica, 2003.

powers and their dominions. Until that moment, the active contribution to the stabilisation of the region was ensured by the trade instruments and traditional aid campaigns (Faria, 2004:33). But a military operation with the objective of bringing peace, solidarity and justice was added as an important instrument to this stabilisation process.

After having stressed the driving forces and the converging interests of the Member States behind the launch of Operation Artemis, it is now time to refer to the nature of the operation with its objectives and its duration. The Operation Artemis was carried out without any recourse to the infrastructure, the capacities, and the instruments of NATO. Only the means and the capacities of the Member States avid to this kind of intervention were used. France had played a significant role in the mobilisation of these means. 'France acted as framework nation'(ibid.: 42).

To begin with, 2000 peacekeeping troops were deployed in Ituri (Lindström, 2004:119). 'The 1700 troops were provided by France' (ibid.:119). French Major General Neveux was the Operation Commander, Operational Headquarters was in Paris. Force Commander was Brigadier-General Thonier and Force Headquarters were located in Entebbe and Kampala.

The objectives of the operation were 'the stabilization of security conditions, the improvement of humanitarian conditions in Bunia, ensuring the protection of the airport, ensuring the protection of the internally displaced people in the camps in Bunia, the contribution to the safety of the civilian population, the UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town' (UNSC, 2003:1) .The duration of the operation was limited to three months, considerably a short period of time. But it is better to underline that these modest scale components does not undermine the importance of the operation and the work done there while taking into account the risky environment reigning in the country.

The autonomous character of the operation, that makes the difference from Concordia Operation launched under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, eradicated the problems experienced in Concordia. A vital difference here is the disappearance of the problematique of double-hatted character of the control and command structure. The PSC 'under the responsibility of the Council exercised the political control and strategic direction of the operation'(Council of Ministers,

2003b). The PSC mainly responsible to make the appropriate changes in chain of command and OPLAN (Operation Plan) if necessary (Council of Ministers, 2003b). The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) was held responsible 'to supervise the conduct of the military operation and it acted in interaction and close cooperation with the Commander of the Operation'(ibid.).

The importance of the operation is derived from its nature. The launch of an autonomous operation necessitated taking into account NATO and some possible tensions. Two factors were significant in the launch of the operation with this regard. First one refers to the future engagements of NATO and the United States (Faria, 2004:47) and the second one refers to the convalescence period of the EU after experimenting a 'deep schism on the question of intervention of Iraq` (Koechlin, 2003:232). Concerning the first point one might argue that NATO had been in a reticent behavior to provide capacity and the means for the conduct of an operation in DRC. It was simply because the priorities of NATO had targeted Western Balkans and Afghanistan³³ (Faria, 2004: 47). The operation in Iraq by the US, to ensure democracy and stability in the country and to clean up of Iraq from the weapons of mass destruction, was a highly important engagement that externalized the crisis of DRC for the US. As the United States of America had engaged in the war in Iraq, it gives a green light to the idea of an autonomous operation that would be launched by the EU in the DRC (ibid.:40). Operation Artemis, far from being a source of transatlantic tensions or rifts, was regarded as a reinforcement of the idea of division of tasks between NATO and the US and the EU based on geographical differentiation.

The second answer to this question is that the EU had considered the launch of this autonomous operation as an emergent opportunity to break up from the clashes experienced over the Iraq war (ibid.:47). Restoring the credibility and the prestige of the EU as an international actor was the priority of the Union. In this sense, the call of the United Nations rescued the EU from being a weak international actor.

³³ The author here referred to Fiorenza, N.(2003). 'EU force seeks mission after Congo'. *European Defence*.

Within this framework, one might argue that the autonomous conduct of the operation by the Union arised from the complementarity of the tasks between NATO and the EU. It would not be wrong to state that the priorities of NATO and the US shaped the distribution of tasks, but mainly the context of the period and conflicts approved this burden sharing.³⁴

II.2.2.The Impact of Operation Artemis on the ESDP

Observing different aspects concerning the autonomy of Operation Artemis would present a clear evaluation of this operation. Although there were divergent ideas on the reason of the launch of this autonomous military operation, Artemis was a significant step for the development of the ESDP. These divergent ideas derived from a range of negative opinions about different aspects of the operation. These negative opinions focused on the limited objectives and the limited duration of the operation. These opinions raised the question on whether the EU could take the initiative to launch the operation although there was no call by the UN. Although there was some skepticism regarding this initiative issue, the EU's ardent step to gain expertise and to test its capacities went beyond the principles of Berlin Plus Arrangements. Experiencing autonomy with the Operation Artemis was a way to reassure EU's role of an international actor in the international arena (Faria, 2004:47). Concretely speaking, since the idea of the launch was clear, the idea of burden sharing, the situation of each one in its side dealing with different security problems would be based on the strategic interests and political will of the two sides.

Operation Artemis was called as a cornerstone to reinforce the EU's capacities of crisis management and was regarded as `a laboratory of conflict management` (Braud, 2006:1). As Braud (ibid.) states that a `learning-by-doing` process for the EU shaped ways of addressing conflicts. Operation Artemis boosted the process of creation of an agency in the field of defence capabilities, developments, research and acquisitions for armament by 2004. Furthermore the framework nation concept used in Operation Artemis was assessed as the best `formula` (Faria, 2004: 49) to satisfy the shortcomings in the operational planning capabilities of the Union.

³⁴Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

II.3.Operation Althea

The European Union launched Operation Althea as its third military operation, -its second one carried under the Berlin Plus Arrangements- in Bosnia-Herzegovina by replacing the SFOR (Stabilization Force) of NATO. The Council of the European Union decided by the Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 to conduct a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina(BiH). The aim of the operation is to ‘provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility deriving from the Dayton Peace Agreement, to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH’ (Council of Ministers, 2004a). The United Nations Security Council Resolution no.1551 of 9 July 2004 provides the legal mandate for the launch of the Operation Althea. NATO by its side, agreed at Istanbul Summit (June 2004) to end its Stabilization Forces in BiH by the end of the year 2004. NATO welcomed ‘the readiness of the European Union to deploy a new and distinct UN-mandated Chapter VII mission in the country, based on the Berlin Plus Arrangements agreed between two organisations’(North Atlantic Council, 2004).

The mission is conducted by the participation of twenty-four Member States of the EU and of eight non-EU States, the number of troops on the ground is about 2500 (EUFOR/BiH Website, 2007a). The EU had deployed ‘comprehensive suite of instruments, which range from military, to civil police, to justice, to economic’(NATO Website, 2005). So, Operation Althea is an experimenting ground of the complementarities of civilian and military means (Quille, 2004:1). Operation Althea would constitute an important component of an integrated European approach to BiH. The EU, by this means would ‘help BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process’(EUFOR/BiH Website, 2007b). The military presence of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina also reflects as well the climax of the rapprochement with the region after having the example of EUPM/BiH.

The replacement of SFOR does not mean the end of NATO presence in BiH. The presence of NATO Head Quarters in BiH would be preserved on the request of the authorities. This situation seems to compel a duality but Dayton Peace Agreement gives the legal approval of a dual presence.

II.3.1. The Nature of the Operation

Operation Althea reflects the nature of the interaction between the EU and NATO in a very significant way. Furthermore, EUFOR as the successor mission to SFOR `is the largest operation ever launched by the EU` (NATO Website, 2005). These two characteristics necessitate its evaluation from a reaction capacity perspective including qualitative and quantitative aspects.

To start with, in quantitative terms; the operation is the largest operation carried out by the EU under the ESDP. The initial number of troops deployed on December the 2nd 2004 was about 7000, now 2500 troops are on the ground (EUFOR/BiH, 2007a). On the basis of this quantitative data, Operation Althea goes beyond the success of Concordia, which was conducted approximately 500 civil and military personnel. The main difference with SFOR is marked by the absence of the United States (Fishpool, 2004:1).


In qualitative terms, the objectives of the operation cited before is ` the task of providing a deterrence role in order to ensure the continued compliance with, and a responsibility to meet the provisions of, Annex 1.A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP – the Dayton Peace Accord), and of supporting the work of the EU Special Representative (EUSR), Lord Ashdown, and the core tasks of the Office of the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan, and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)’(Quille, 2004:1-2). The context in which this operation was launched already determined the objectives. But it would not be wrong to state that the hard task of military intervention had been already concluded by SFOR within the framework of the key military missions foreseen in Dayton Peace Agreement.

Within this framework, as Michel mentions, the objectives reflected purely *holistic approach* of the EU which required not only the development of the military capacities but also its combination with civilian capacities to be able to regulate the problems of security (Michel, 2004:88). This approach corresponds better with the aim of the operation which was stated as peace-keeping. According to a point of view it reflects the trend towards the prevalence of the civilian dimension of the ESDP over the military one underlining the complementarity of tasks between NATO and the EU.

The vital reason for the launch of the Althea Operation reflected some duality and seemed to be two-faceted. The first reason why the EU had launched this operation derived from the busy agenda of NATO and the US in the Middle-East, such as stabilization process of Afghanistan and the enforcement of security forces on the ground in Iraq. The second reason was the willingness by the EU to restore its credibility and to overcome its weakness during the Bosnian War and its very premature approach towards the Balkans in the beginning of the conflict. These weaknesses would be compensated by giving the perspective of EU accession to the BiH.

The Operation Althea is carried under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, it is drawing upon NATO's common assets and capabilities, it is based on the principle of equality of partners. According to Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 the launch and the planning of the operation belonged to the strategic and political responsibility of Political and Security Committee(PSC) (Council of Ministers, 2004a). The PSC cooperates with the appropriate level by the NATO side-Policy Coordination Group. 'The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the proper execution of the EU military operation conducted under the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander'(ibid.). The EU Operation Commander is at the same time the D-SACEUR. EU Operational Headquarters is located at SHAPE (ibid.). The EU Force Headquarters is located in the operation zone(Sarajevo).In this framework Berlin Plus Arrangements functions quite good since the spirit of cooperation and coherence is experienced without talking about autonomy for EU. But it is necessary to stress while gauging the equality of the partners in the framework of Berlin Plus Arrangements with regard to chain of command.

Table-2-EUFOR Chain of Command



Source: EUFOR Althea Website,
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=30

It can be said that there are some improvements in the chain of command structure. First, ‘the role of the Operation Commander was clarified’ (Masson, 2006:107) in comparison with Concordia. Second ‘both organisations recognised the importance of having a three-tier command structure encompassing DSACEUR at SHAPE, JFC Naples and the EU force commander on the ground’ (Monaco, 2004:2). As it was stated before, there were some contradictions over the role of the AFSOUTH. But the Operation Althea had not experienced this contradiction. Thirdly, the Operation Plan (OPLAN) of the Operation Althea recognised that the EUCE would be the coordination element between the Operation Commander and the Force Commander on the ground (Masson, 2006:107). A discrepancy had been experienced by the decision of NATO to retain its military presence with its Headquarters in Sarajevo which

cohabited with EUFOR Headquarters in Butmir (Monaco, 2004:2). But initially, it was on the request of Bosnian Authorities that NATO would retain its Headquarters in Bosnia..

II.3.2.The Impact of Operation Althea on the ESDP

Operation Althea, as the second testing ground for the Berlin Plus Arrangements, marks an improvement for the capacity to handle the crisis for the EU and for an egalitarian burden sharing between NATO and the EU. The Operation Althea under its quantitative characteristics, showed that with the experience that the EU had with Concordia, the EU has passed the preparatory stage and became able to deploy a very considerable number of troops on the ground. The Operation Althea under its qualitative characteristics, reflects the readiness to handle the crisis situation although the chaotic situation was already pacified by SFOR and although the Operation Althea is an ‘inherited mission’ (Kostovicova, 2004:15). Regarding the chain of command structure, it was obvious with the Althea Operation that DSACEUR at SHAPE, JFC Naples and the EU force commander scheme would present a more equal understanding in NATO and the EU cooperation.

II.4. Is ‘Autonomy on Case-by-Case Basis’ A Result of Priorities of NATO?

This concept was first used in the context of coordination between NATO and WEU. This one is transferred lately to qualify the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. The concept was anchored in Berlin Plus Arrangements. This context as a whole referred, to ‘differentiation of roles according to the geographic location of the conflict and the burden sharing principle based on the type of the conflict’³⁵ in the understanding which this study is built upon. So this understanding goes in parallel with the overt meaning of the concept. This section may appear as a simple repetition of some characteristics of the EU military operations, but the maintenance of these parts is strongly emphasized as they will specifically answer the problematique and justify the first part of the hypotheses.

³⁵ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

While referring to Operation Concordia carried out under Berlin Plus Arrangements, autonomy was not the case. But this reasoning can not be a limit for the evaluation of the operation. In the understanding of this research, this operation is considered as the reinforcement of the EU's international actorness and as well as a preparatory stage of the next autonomous missions, a learning phase of putting the ESDP into practice³⁶. The EU was driven by its own priorities to launch the mission. Because geographic location of the conflict offered an important opportunity to experiment the military role for the EU. But on the other hand, the end of the NATO's mission was coincided with the decision of US to launch a freedom operation in Iraq. The US prepared perhaps the fertile ground for this take over and to experiment the burden sharing on security issues. In this case, one might stress the priorities of the two sides as the determinant factors for handling the crisis situation

The second military operation of the EU, Operation Artemis, is the end product of an autonomous initiative. The EU was not only giving its initials to the qualification of the operation but also the Union possessed an entire autonomy from the decisional process to the command structure (Council of Ministers, 2003b). The take-over of the operation from the United Nations constituted an example of the complementarity of security actorness of NATO and the EU. Why? Because the security of Subsaharan Africa concerned -and concerns in general- first the Europeans due to the historical ties. Second, NATO was reluctant to interfere the crisis as geographically Africa does not constitute a priority area for NATO (Faria, 2004:47).

The third military operation of the EU, Operation Althea, is conducted under Berlin Plus Arrangements. The EU used the assets of NATO, it does not mean a subordination of the EU to NATO. While comparing with the very first operation conducted under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, the second one is an updated version of the mission via NATO assets. Because the EU experienced an improvement of its capacities and of the coordination between command structures. It proved that with such experience, the EU will be able to assume more responsibilities in foreseeable future.

³⁶ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

After this brief evaluation underlining the evolution of EU capacities and the *case-by-case*³⁷ logic of autonomy, one might raise the question on the fact that whether the EU autonomy on a mission is determined by the priorities of NATO³⁸. This problematique stresses the debate on the supremacy of NATO and the definition of autonomy of the EU with regard to NATO.

Let's make a flashback to Operation Concordia. While referring to the reasons of launch of Concordia, they were initially marked by the need for the USA to engage in another destabilized corner of the world in order to carry the War Against Terrorism and to bring democracy to Iraq (Bono, 2004:2). These reasons had prepared ideally the basis for the launch of Concordia by the EU. On the other hand, another reason linked to an internal instability and divergence made room for the launch of the operation. This divergence between Member States was about the launch of Iraqi Freedom Operation by the US. One might ask what is the linkage between the clash between Member States on Iraqi War and the convergence on the launch of the first military operation. It was this clash that gave the impetus to the Core Group of the EU to launch the operation (ibid.). Why? Because the international identity and actorness of the EU has been already damaged on several occasions till that day. The clash over the Iraq question was the latest example. In order to reverse this situation and alter its status in the international relations, The Union, thanks to the Core Group had opted for the launch of the operation, which was identified as a priority. Convergence over the operation would mean a sign of robustness by EU side. At this point the geographical proximity of the crisis as well, as it occurred in the very near European neighbourhood, had laid down a suitable ground for the launch of the operation³⁹.

Regarding the second military operation, autonomous one, EU-led Operation Artemis, the same question would be raised. Had the NATO preferences served as a motivation for the EU to launch Artemis? It is better to underline at first instance that NATO was reluctant rather than silent on the DRC question. A possible operation by the NATO side to DRC was even not on the agenda. The overt reasons are most probably the engagements in different corners of the world (Faria, 2004: 47). Two types of priority have to be mentioned from the EU side. First, according

³⁷ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

to the historical ties, the geographic location⁴⁰ of the conflict represented a priority for the EU, which led to a burden sharing. Secondly, the EU had defined its priority as the launch of an EU-led operation would 'heal the bitter political differences among Member States on intervention in Iraq' (Faria, 2004:41).

While underlining the third military operation of the EU, Operation Althea, the fertile ground for the launch of the operation was prepared by the end of the SFOR mission by NATO. SFOR in a sense had completed its mission; it was time to complement this mission by providing deterrence, continuing compliance with the responsibility deriving from the Dayton Peace Agreement, contributing to a safe and secure environment in BiH' (Council of Ministers, 2004a). One might interpret it as 'the transition from Dayton era to Brussels era' (UNSC, 2005:11). The priority by the EU side underlined by the fact that at the beginning of the crisis in BiH, the EU was silent to respond the conflict but the EU is in the position to handle the crisis, thanks to the developments regarding the ESDP. The geographical proximity and the differentiation of tasks that led to burden-sharing, shaped the priority of the EU⁴¹.

According to this analysis, 'the priorities of NATO and the EU are determined by the location of the conflict and the idea of burden sharing'⁴². This logic refers to differentiation of roles. It is necessary to state that their priorities are not independent from each other, they are in a sense complementary.

⁴⁰ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

CHAPTER.III.

EU'S MANOEUVRE CAPACITY AND AUTONOMY COMPLETED BY CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

The military operations of the EU that were analyzed until now, provide the EU the full autonomy or certain degree of margin of manoeuvre. As it is mentioned before, in the definition of autonomy, the priorities shaped by the location of the conflict and the idea of burden sharing⁴³. In this context, another understanding of autonomy would underline the aspect of a civilian management of the crisis. In other words, the complementarity between civilian and military crisis management capacity of the EU would enhance the autonomous manoeuvre capacity of the ESDP⁴⁴.

The civilian crisis management capacity of the EU is an integral part of the crisis management capacity described by the Presidency Conclusions of European Council of Helsinki 1999. But concretely speaking, it was Santa Maria de Feira European Council in June 2000 'identified priority areas for targets in civilian aspects of crisis management and of specific targets for civilian police capabilities'(European Council, 2000). In the annex to the Presidency Conclusion four priority areas are given; these are, 'the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection'(ibid.).

The specificity of the EU which makes its difference on the international arena is its ability to possess and to mobilize a vast range of means and instruments –civilian, trade, humanitarian and military- to cope with security concerns (Solana, 2003:11). The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council of December 2003 foresaw the capacity for the EU to conduct the military operations in parallel with civilian ones (ibid.).

While reviewing the arguments to ensure the autonomy of the ESDP, the question is to know whether the civilian crisis management capacity within the ESDP would enhance the autonomy of the ESDP. Within this framework, one may answer this question as: The EU

⁴³ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

envisages a civilian crisis management besides its military capacity, thus the logical way to define the ESDP autonomy is to underline the complementarity of military crisis management with civilian ones. This is because it is clear that the civilian crisis management is an asset to define the autonomy of the ESDP. The necessary ‘synergies between its civilian and military crisis management instruments both as regards the development of generic concepts and tools and the planning and conduct of operations’(The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 2004:5) was agreed in the document entitled Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP. This synergy is considered as an added value to the existing manoeuvre capacity of the EU. It is stated in the same document that the Civilian Headline Goal for civilian crisis management will be developed in order to carry forward the process of improving capabilities (European Council, 2004a). The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was elaborated at the Brussels European Council (2004b).It includes:

- ‘Elaborating key planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios,
- Creating a Capabilities Requirement List,
- Assessing national contributions to the Civilian Capabilities Requirements List and the identification of capability shortfalls
- Ensuring a Civilian Headline Goal follow-up process.’(Lindström, 2007:5)

Within this context, this chapter aims at analysing the civilian missions of the EU to reflect on their complementarity to the military missions. That is why Operation Proxima, the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and EUSEC/EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic Of Congo and the EUPM in BiH are chosen as the test cases to complement the military operations of the EU.

III.1.Operation Proxima

The first example of complementarity⁴⁵ was experienced after the termination of Operation Concordia, with the launch of Operation Proxima- the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM)-. Operation Proxima was launched by the Council Joint Action

⁴⁵ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

2003/681/CFSP of 29 september 2003 for one year. The Operation was designed as a ‘follow-on mission’(Lindström, 2004:121) to the Operation Concordia. The establishment of the mission is done ‘in line with the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001’ (EUPOL/Proxima Website, 2007). The deployment of Police Forces was an autonomous action by the EU side, on the request of local authorities. Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP of 22 November 2004 had extended the mandate of Proxima till 15 December 2005.

III.1.1.The Nature of the Operation

Operation Proxima was the second police operation run by the EU. The objectives of the operation were as follows:

- ‘the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime, focussing on the sensitive areas,
- the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Minister of Interior, including the police,
- the operational transition towards, and the creation of a border police, as a part of the wider EU effort to promote integrated border management,
- the local police in building confidence within the population, enhanced cooperation’(Council of Ministers, 2003c).

200 police experts of the EU were on the ground. Operation Proxima was a civilian mission aiming at ‘assisting the fYROM authorities in consolidating stability and the rule of law, in coherence with the objectives of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) (EUROPA Website,2007). The Operation Proxima had not ‘operated under Berlin Plus Arrangements’(Lindström, 2004:121), as Proxima was not a military operation. From this perspective, the Operation Proxima was conducted by the European-only means and decision-making process.

According to the Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003:

- 'The Political and Security Committee exercised political control and provide strategic direction to EUPOL Proxima.
- The General Secretariat of the Council elaborated the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with the assistance of the Police Head of Mission/Head of the Planning Team.
- The Planning Team drew up the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and developed all technical instruments necessary to execute EUPOL Proxima.
- The EU headquarters were located in Skopje with one central co-location unit at the Ministry of Interior level; and some units co-located within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at appropriate levels'(Council of Ministers, 2003c).

The Operation Proxima had 'a unified chain of command'(ibid.), to cite the elements of chain of command:

- 'The European Union Special Representative (EUSR) reported to the Council through the SG/HR.
- The Political and Security Committee provided the political control and strategic direction.
- The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner led EUPOL 'Proxima' and assumed its day-to-day management.
- The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner reported to the SG/HR through the EUSR.
- The SG/HR gave guidance to the Head of Mission/ Police Commissioner through the EUSR'(ibid.).

III.1.2.The Impact of the Operation Proxima on the ESDP

The Operation Proxima as, it was stated before, is the second police operation conducted in the ‘traditional experiment field of the ESDP’ (Bagayoko-Pénone, 2004:101):the Balkans. The EU had launched this operation just after the termination of the Operation Concordia which had military nature. As it is stated in the Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003, ‘Operations EUPOL Proxima and Concordia must be considered as separate operations, subject to separate decisions’ (Council of Ministers, 2003c). But it should not be neglected that the Operation Proxima is of complementary nature⁴⁶ to the Operation Concordia. First, it completed Concordia in terms of objectives. Second a military operation had to be pursued by a civilian rehabilitation process to ensure the endurance of peace. Proxima mission had rehabilitated the margin of manouever in the crisis management capacity of the EU but in a civilian way. Third, the EU had ‘gained its credibility as an international actor by the launch of the Operation Proxima’ (Peclow, 2004:4), as it complemented Operation Concordia.

III.2.EU Civilian Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo: EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and EUSEC/EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa was launched in April 2005 and the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC was launched on 8 June 2005 constituted the civilian façade that complemented⁴⁷ the first autonomous military mission of the EU in the DRC. In the post-conflict phase the EU was engaged to support the civil administration, the emergent rehabilitation of the country and the establishment of the rule of law in the DRC.

The legal basis of the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa is Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004. The Congolese authorities addressed an official request to the High Representative for `the European Union assistance in setting up the IPU-integrated

⁴⁶ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

police unit-, which should contribute to ensuring the protection of the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus` (Council of Ministers, 2004b).

The second civilian operation in DRC is the European Union mission to provide ‘advice and assistance for security sector reform’ (EUSEC DR CongoWebsite, 2007) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The legal basis of the mission is Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005.

III.2.1.The Nature of the Operations

The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa was the first police operation conducted by the EU in the DRC after the first autonomous military operation Artemis. ‘The Congolese interim government and the UN officially requested to the EU’ (Grevi et al, 2005:8) for the launch of a police mission in Kinshasa. The objectives of the operation were ‘monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and according to international best practices in this field’(Council of Ministers, 2004b).

30 staff member conducted the operation. The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa had not ‘operated under Berlin Plus Arrangements’(Lindström, 2004:121), as this operation was not a military operation. From this perspective, the Operation was conducted by the European–only means and decision-making process. ‘Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The General Secretariat of the Council shall elaborate the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The Planning Team shall subsequently draw up the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and develop all technical instruments necessary to execute EUPOL Kinshasa’⁴⁸.The chain of command structure was as follows:

- ‘The European Union Special Representative (EUSR) reported to the Council through the Secretary General/High Representative,

⁴⁸ This paragraph is taken from the Council of Ministers(2004b),Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’)

- The PSC shall provide the political control and strategic direction,
- The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner led EUPOL Kinshasa and assumed its day-to-day management,
- The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner reported to the Secretary-General/High Representative through the EUSR,
- The Secretary-General/High Representative gave guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner through the EUSR' (Council of Ministers, 2004b).

This European-led genuine police mission, was an example of the integrated approach of the EU to the DRC. The duration of the operation was initially for one year but on 8 December 2006, 'the Council extended the mandate of the EUPOL Kinshasa until 30 June 2007' (EUPOL/Kinshasa Website, 2007).

The second civilian operation of the EU in the DRC was the EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission, was launched 'on the request of Congolese government'(EUSEC DRC Website, 2007) aimed at 'providing advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army in the DRC and providing advice and assistance for security sector reform that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law in DRC'. (Council of Ministers, 2005). The chain of command structure remains 'unified'(ibid.) and comprised the following:

- 'The Head of Mission led the advice and assistance team, assume its day-to-day management and report to the SG/HR through the EUSR.
- The EUSR reported to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and to the Council through the SG/HR.
- The SG/HR gave guidance to the Head of Mission through the EUSR.
- The PSC exercised political control and strategic direction'. (ibid.)

III.2.2. The Impact of the Operations on the ESDP

These two civilian missions are characterized by their European nature operating in the context of an autonomous ESDP. In the case of the missions in DRC, the chain of command, the political and strategic direction belonged purely to the EU without any duplication. The consolidation of the autonomy in the case of DRC missions was experienced by the complementarity of Operation Artemis with the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and the EUSEC-EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This complementarity made the ESDP stronger than it was, in the crisis management.

III.3. EUPM-European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This third example of complementarity of military and civilian missions⁴⁹ differs from the previous examples. Operation Althea was preceded and was followed by EUPM in other words Operation Althea and EUPM had been conducted simultaneously which enhance the EU's margin of manoeuvre. The EUPM launched on 1 January 2003 for a period of 3 years by the Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP. 'It followed-on from the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (EUPM/BiH Website-A, 2007).

III.3.1. The Nature of the Operation

'The EUPM represents the EU's first-ever civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP' (Grevi et al., 2005:1). 'EUPM operates in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement' (EUPM/BiH Website-B, 2007). The objectives of the operation are:

- 'to preserve, through continuity with the achievements of the IPTF mission, the existing levels of institutional and personal proficiency;
- to enhance, through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting, police managerial and operational capacities; to this end, to focus on delegation of power and quality-oriented

⁴⁹ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

management principles as well as improving operational planning capacity based on analysis;

- to strengthen professionalism at high level within the ministries as well as at senior police officers levels through advisory and inspection functions;
- to monitor the exercise of appropriate political control over the police’ (Council of Ministers, 2002).

200 staff member were initially involved in this operation, by the 31 August 2007, 166 staff member are on the ground (EUPM/BiH Website-C, 2007). The chain of command structure of the EUPM is as follows:

- ‘the EUSR shall report to the Council through the SG/HR, the Political and Security Committee shall provide the political control and strategic direction,
- the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall lead the EUPM and assume its day-to-day management,
- the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall report to the SG/HR through the EUSR,
- the SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of Mission/ Police Commissioner through the EUSR’(Council of Ministers, 2002).

The EUPM headquarters were located in Sarajevo and ‘24 monitoring units were co-located within the various Bosnia and Herzegovina Police structures at medium-high level’(ibid.). Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 November 2005 ‘established a follow-on police mission which has a duration of two years (from 1 January 2006 until the end of 2007)’(EUPM/BiH Website-A, 2007).

III.3.2. The Impact of the EUPM on the ESDP

EUPM is the first mission launched under the ESDP. The mission represents the willingness to make the ESDP operational putting into practice the civilian crisis management capacities. The EUPM represents a fertile ground to test the European capacities and to evaluate the autonomy of the EU in managing simultaneously with Operation Althea. The chain of

command, decision-making, the planning, the composition of Headquarters and 24 monitoring Unit are of European Nature which reinforce the European autonomy. 'The EUMP rehabilitated the importance of the non-military crisis management for the EU' (Peclow, 2004:4) .The EUMP represented an important element of the EU integrated approach to the BiH.

III.4. The Complementary Nature of the Civilian Missions

The analyses made in this chapter clarifies that,

- Operation Proxima complemented Operation Concordia,
- The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC complemented Operation Artemis,
- EUPM/BiH complemented Operation Althea.

The civilian crisis management missions that are analysed in this chapter prove that the EU is able to tackle with crisis with different range of instruments. It is an important feature of the EU which shows that the EU has a holistic approach to security questions. The civilian missions analysed in this chapter show that they complement the military missions. Because, first, as the military crisis management feature of the EU is relatively new, several shortcomings might occur. Within this context, the civilian crisis management operations of the EU, in a sense heal these shortcomings. Second, the civilian operations complement the objectives of the military operations. Third, each military operation had to be followed by a civilian rehabilitation process in order to establish permanent peace. Fourth, when the civilian operations complement the military missions, they have greater impact on the definition of the Union's autonomous reaction capacity in the field of security and defence.

For example, as the first military operation of the EU, Operation Concordia was conducted under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, autonomy for the EU is out of question. The EU by launching the autonomous, genuine Operation Proxima complemented this lack of autonomy in a civilian way. The second military operation of the EU, Operation Artemis was conducted in an autonomous way. The two civilian operations, the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and the EU

Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC, enhanced the security actorness of the EU and also its credibility. The third operation, EUPM/BiH while complementing Operation Althea, which was conducted under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, enhanced the margin of manoeuvre capacity of the EU and proved the integrated approach of the EU towards the BiH.

CONCLUSION

The EU, since the early 1990`s had expressed with much more ardour its willingness to have autonomy in the fields of security and defence. NATO as well expressed its willingness to allot a certain margin of manoeuver to the EU. But it does not mean the attribution of pure autonomy. The Alliance would logically preserve its primacy and oneness in the fields of security and defence.

The attempt of NATO to create a European Pillar within the Alliance - a separable but not separate force - was finally realized in the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communiqué, Brussels 10-11 January 1994. But the creation of this pillar did not satisfy and did not stop the EU in its quest for autonomy. The will to prove its international actorness with autonomous capacities in the fields of security and defence led to the convergence of the point of views. This will was strongly expressed at the legendary Saint Malo Summit. The period commencing with St. Malo had indicated an evolution towards autonomous reaction capacity of the EU in crisis management. The components of the evolution of autonomy in the crisis management were laid down by Helsinki, Cologne, Feira and Nice European Councils (Dupont, 2003:59). The complementarity between military means and civilian ones had been ensured in this context. The Laeken European Council had declared the ESDP operational by the year 2003, which ensured a transition from rhetoric to practice. While these represent the developments from the EU side, its cooperation with NATO had entered to a new era as well, concretised by the adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements and the new strategic Partnership between the EU and NATO.

Acquiring autonomy in the security and defence field for the EU has been a long process. Its installation has been difficult and problématique due to the different approaches of its Member States to security and defence integration and to its relations with NATO and with the US. The disagreements between the Atlanticist and Europeanist Member States about security and defence integration are significant in this respect.

Putting autonomy into practice in the field of security and defence for the EU is not realised in a gradual way. This means that putting autonomy into practice does not follow the

path of its theoretical evolution and installation, as it is experienced with the Military Operations of the EU. As it was analysed in the second chapter, Operations Concordia and Althea were conducted under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, far from being totally autonomous, whereas Operation Artemis was conducted with total autonomy. This wording of *total autonomy* and *far from being totally autonomous* is not something that can be proven by mathematical techniques. It can only be understood with a proof reading of the components of the crises, the relations between NATO and the EU, the capacity and the willingness of the Member States and the convergence of the Member States' points of view to handle the crises. It also depends on the principle of avoiding the intersection of the EU's and NATO's interests. In other words, these elements shaped the limits of the EU's autonomy in the security and defence fields.

In this context, the ultimate aim of this study was to answer the question: How can the EU define autonomy in the area of crisis management? In order to answer this question, this study was built upon three arguments. The first argument of the study was that the autonomy and the margin of manoeuvre of the EU in crisis management was determined by the priorities of the EU while taking into account NATO's priorities. The second one was that when the military operations of the EU were complemented with its civilian missions, they had greater impact on the definition of the Union's autonomous reaction capacity. The third one was that each military operation should be analysed on a case-by-case analysis in order to gauge the EU's autonomy and its margin of manoeuvre.

The launch of Operation Concordia proved that the EU had experienced a certain level of margin of manoeuvre. The priority of the EU was shaped by the proximity of the location of the conflict⁵⁰ and its willingness to build its reputation as a security actor in Balkans. This one was a chance for the EU to share the burden with NATO. Operation Concordia enjoyed a margin of manoeuvre far from being totally autonomous as it was an operation conducted under the Berlin-Plus Arrangements. Operation Proxima enhanced the margin of manoeuvre of the EU under the ESDP and its approach to crisis management; as it complemented Operation Concordia in terms of objectives, margin of manoeuvre and the rehabilitation process of the region.

⁵⁰ Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

The EU had full autonomy in the launch, conduct, and command structure of Operation Artemis thanks to the geographical location of the conflict, because the geographical location was in the priority area of the EU due to the historical ties⁵¹. As NATO was reluctant to handle the crisis while it was engaged in Afghanistan, the Union dealt with the DRC crisis. This, in a sense led to burden sharing. Operation Artemis, when it was complemented by the EUPOL Mission Kinshasa and the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in DRC, enhanced the Union's autonomous reaction capacity in a crisis.

Operation Althea, the third military operation of the EU enhanced the margin of manoeuvre capacity of the EU as it was conducted under the Berlin-Plus Arrangements although the EU did not have total autonomy over the operation. The priority of the EU was shaped by the proximity of the location of the conflict⁵² and the Union's willingness to build its reputation as a security actor in the Balkans. This operation was complemented by the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It enhanced the margin of manoeuvre of the EU under the ESDP, as it complemented Operation Althea in terms of objectives, its margin of manoeuvre and the rehabilitation process of the region.

In the light of this case-by-case analysis, this study reached to three conclusions:

First, the EU might define autonomy or a margin of manoeuvre in crisis management, according to its priorities which are shaped by burden sharing principle and by the geographical location of the conflict and also taking into account NATO priorities⁵³.

Secondly, when the military operations of the EU are complemented with its civilian missions, they have greater impact on the definition of the Union's autonomous reaction capacity in the fields of security and defence.

Thirdly, the case-by-case analysis is required in order to gauge autonomy or the margin of maneuver of the EU. Because each operation occurs in different international context,

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Interview with the military representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16 May 2005, see Annex-I-.

⁵³ Ibid.

necessitates the involvement of specific actors, it has its own reasons, characteristics, requirements.

ANNEX-I-

Interview with the Military Representatives of Turkey to the EU, 16.05.2005, Brussels

Q: How do you define autonomy in defence and security fields, what are the characteristics of autonomy?

A1-Autonomy is first of all the willing to take responsibilities in defence and security fields and the power or the ability to transform this will to action, so the capacity. In the case of the European Union, autonomy requires the political will and the convergence of the MS point of views on defence and security issues and its transformation to a common action and to a set of common tactics. This initiative to take responsibilities, on the other hand necessitates the appropriate mechanisms- the decision-making, the instruments- to react, the institutions, the convergence of defence capabilities, the presence of credible forces and the capacity to deploy these forces

A2-As it is stated before, the willingness to handle the crisis situation has a priority in the definition of autonomy but it must go hand in hand with the effective functioning of genuine European structures such as the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, the EU Operation Centre-which will be effective on 1st of January 2007. When we underline the characteristics of autonomy, I can add to what is said until now, the capacity of taking decisions, the capacity of taking initiatives, the genuine chain of command structures, the appropriate instruments, the communication capacity.

A1-But I think that the issue of autonomy in the EU case has to be analyzed while referring to main defence actor –NATO.

Q: As we know the EU has realized 3 military operations, how do you evaluate these operations in terms of capacity of the EU or in terms of margin of manoeuver of the EU?

A1-We have to classify first the operations. Operation Concordia and Althea have been realized under the Berlin Plus Arrangements which means when a crisis arises, the EU may intervene with making use of NATO assets and capabilities. Operation Artemis on the other hand was conducted under the genuine initiative of the EU, it was an autonomous operation carried on by the EU's means and capacities. Despite the limited timeframe and limited military personal capacity, the Operation Artemis deserves the success label.

A2-I would like to emphasize, as my colleague made the difference between two types of operation, that the quest for the autonomy for the EU does not follow a gradual logic. In fact we did not have enough cases which may allow a very healthy evaluation. But with the examples that we have, we deduce that an operation presents a new experience ground with new characteristics in order to reach in the future autonomy. The EU's manoeuver capacity and ability differ according to the context of the conflict, the circumstances reigning in the international agenda so, the evaluation of autonomy requires a case-by-case approach.

A1-It is better to underline, in my point of view, in the Operations conducted under Berlin Plus Arrangements as well the EU possesses a certain degree of autonomy or, let`s say a certain degree of genuine manoeuvre capacity, as they represent essay ground for the EU to require a margin of manoeuvre. Operation Concordia was the first essay ground to test the capacities of the EU, it is clear that it was not a big operation in terms of the effectives of contributing countries, timeframe, objectives. We should admit that the EU faced difficulties but anyway, the Operation was an asset and a chance for the EU to make small steps towards autonomy. Operation Althea repaired at least certain insufficiencies of the EU. The progress that the EU experimented was about the creation of a liaison cell in AFSOUTH and in SHAPE in order not to be in the same error faced in the chain of command structures of Concordia. As you know, the problem in Concordia was the change of the chain of command structure in favour of NATO.

Q. In this case you mean that Berlin Plus Arrangements should not be considered as an obstacle for the evolution of autonomy or that the Arrangements would not lead to a dependence?

A1-In my opinion, the wording `dependence` is not suitable for the situation, some people may interpret it like that of course. But I think that we have to have clear cuts between an autonomous operation and an operation conducted under Berlin Plus Arrangements. In other words an autonomous operation is a genuinely European Operation, the other one have some European component in it but it does not reflect an entire autonomy as the former does. Maybe it is better to call the Operations conducted under Berlin Plus Arrangements as the fertile grounds in order to flourish future autonomous actions. They are in proper term testing and exercising grounds to develop the chain of command structures or the military reaction capacities. Parallel to this one, the aim of the ESDP is not at all making the EU a world *gendarmarie* or is not to attribute a defence alliance characteristic to the Union.

A2-I think as well that calling Berlin Plus Arrangements as an obstacle to develop defence and security capacity of the EU, does not reflect reality. Just think about the Operation Concordia, if the EU did not experience this operation, it would probably have some hesitations to launch its autonomous military operation.

Q-You talked about the approach case-by-case in order to evaluate autonomy or the level of autonomy, would you like to explain this issue while referring to the military operations?

A1-This case-by-case approach is important to evaluate autonomy. The launch of each operation is quite related with the circumstances reigning the international agenda and the context of the conflict. These two determine the differentiations of roles according to geographic location of the conflict and the task of sharing the burden based on the type of the conflict. The differentiation of roles according to location of the conflict and the task of sharing the burden have a great impact on the determination of autonomous action of the EU. To cite the examples:

Operation Artemis is an example of EU autonomous action. As, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents one of the geographic priorities of the European Union or NATO has no great interest to intervene to the conflict arising in African Continent. The differentiations of roles according to location of the conflict was very obvious in this case. In the cases of Concordia and Althea, burden sharing principle and the location of the conflicts had priorities. The military

aspects of the crisis management had been already achieved by NATO. The military crisis management complemented with civilian aspects would be finished by the EU.

Q-Do you think that differentiations of roles according to location of the conflict and the tasks of burden sharing are primarily determined by NATO priorities?

A1-To be correct on that it is not only NATO priorities that have determined the evolution of these concepts. The priorities of the EU are as well essential as the EU has the autonomy to decide on the security and defence questions. It is better to underline also the priorities of NATO and the EU are determined by the location of the conflict and by the idea of burden sharing.

Q-A last question will be about the civilian aspects of the EU and the military one, do you think that their complementarity can play a role to strengthening the autonomous capacity vis-à-vis NATO?

A1-Absolutely, the civilian aspects of crisis management complete the military operations of the EU. The EU from the beginning, it was created as a civilian actor, and it gained a lot of expertise on the civilian crisis management. I think that it is a very good characteristic of the EU in which it can exercise the autonomy .

A2-It is important in this point to stress the complementarity of Operation Concordia with Proxima, Artemis with EUPOL Kinshasa and conversely the EU police mission in BIH and Operation Althea, this panorama is a great asset for the EU as NATO has very recently acquired the experience on civilian aspects of crisis management.

Thank you very much for your time and for your interest in this interview.

ANNEX-II-

Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration")

London, 6 July 1990

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer

adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred WoÈrner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this Autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "Open Skies".

11. The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.

12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.

13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate

a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.

18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, inter alia:

- CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
- CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
- CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
- CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.

22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalised to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:

- a programme for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchange of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and
- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.

ANNEX-III-

The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Rome, 8 November 1991

At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below. 21. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

22. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

Part III - A broad approach to security

Protecting peace in a new Europe

23. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

24. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

25. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all

European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

26. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

27. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognises the valuable contribution being made by other organisations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

28. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

Cooperation

29. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

Collective Defence

30. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

Management of crisis and conflict prevention

31. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

32. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

33. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

Part IV - Guidelines for defence

Principles of Alliance Strategy

34. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

35. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it

does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

36. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

ANNEX-IV-

Maastricht Treaty

TITLE V PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

ARTICLE J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.

ARTICLE J.1

1. The union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
 - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
 - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives;
 - by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2;
 - by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

ARTICLE J.2

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In

international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

ARTICLE J.3

The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security policy shall be the following:

1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members.
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

ARTICLE J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
2. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.

ARTICLE J.5

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and international conferences.
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the presidency shall be assisted if needs be by the previous and next Member States to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks.
4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE J.6

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

ARTICLE J.7

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Councils or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

ARTICLE J.8

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

ARTICLE J.9

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

ARTICLE J.10

On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.

ARTICLE J.11

1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European

Communities.

The Council may also:

- either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be applicable;
- or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the Member States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided.

DECLARATION ON WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

MAASTRICHT 10 DECEMBER 1991

I. DECLARATION

by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union

on

THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Introduction

1. WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
2. WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

WEU Member States take note of Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union which reads as follows:

"1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article 48(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.'

A. WEU's Relations with European Union

3. The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

To this end, WEU will take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union:

- as appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonization of working methods;

- establishment of close co-operation between the Council the Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other;
- consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;
- arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;
- encouragement of closer co-operation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

B. WEU's Relations with the Atlantic Alliance

4. The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance.

- WEU Member States will intensify their co-ordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized.
- Close co-operation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO.

C. Operational Role of WEU

5. WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular:
 - WEU planning cell;
 - closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
 - meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff;
 - military units answerable to WEU.

Other proposals will be examined further, including:

- enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;
- development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy.

Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.

D. Other Measures

6. As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels.
 7. Representation on the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the European Union.
 8. WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J.4(6) concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this Article with a view to furthering the objective to be set by it in accordance with the procedure defined. The WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.
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II. DECLARATION

by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are members of the Western European Union

"The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European States on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the following:

States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992."

ANNEX-V-

Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council Berlin 3 June 1996

We have today given new impetus to the process of the Alliance's adaptation and reform, which began in 1990 at the NATO Summit meeting in London and was carried forward at the 1994 Brussels Summit. Taking into account the sweeping changes in the security environment in Europe as new democracies have taken root and following the adoption of our new Strategic Concept in 1991, we have reorganised and streamlined our political and military structures and procedures; reduced significantly our force and readiness levels; and reconfigured our forces to make them better able to carry out the new missions of crisis management, while preserving the capability for collective defence. In addition, we have been conducting an expanding array of outreach activities with our Partners. We want to make our adapted Alliance better able to fulfil its main purpose: peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

5. Much has been achieved, but now is the moment to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet new challenges. Therefore we are determined to:
 - adapt Alliance structures. An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership;
 - develop further our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management and the Alliance's efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, while maintaining our capability for collective defence; and
 - enhance our contribution to security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by broadening and deepening our dialogue and cooperation with Partners, notably through PfP and NACC, and by further developing our important relations with Russia and Ukraine, as we maintain our openness to new members through our established enlargement process and strengthen our links with other organisations which contribute to European security.
6. Today we welcome the progress achieved in the internal adaptation of our Alliance, building on the decisions taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit, in particular:
 - the completion of the CJTF concept. By permitting a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions, this concept will facilitate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR. We now request the Military Committee to make recommendations to the Council for the implementation of this concept to the satisfaction of all Allies, taking into account ongoing work to adapt military structures and procedures;
 - the establishment of the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), which will meet the need, especially in NATO's new missions, for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints;

- the first results of the Military Committee's Long-Term Study, which will result in recommendations for a military command structure better suited to current and future Euro-Atlantic security. We task the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long-Term Study, consistent with the decisions we have taken today;
- completion of original work plans of the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) to address the common security concern of proliferation;

the meeting later this month of the North Atlantic Council (Defence Ministers), in which all 16 NATO countries will take part. The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.

As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:

- identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQs, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC;

elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

Further, the Alliance will support the development of the ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU. On the basis of political guidance to be provided by the WEU Council and the NAC, such planning would, at a minimum:

- prepare relevant information on objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions;
- identify requirements for planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;
- develop appropriate plans for submission through the MC and NAC to the WEU for review and approval.

ANNEX-VI-

British-French Summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998

For more than fifty years European countries were primarily focused on NATO for defence cooperation, despite occasional efforts to improve, or rather establish, the EEC/EC/EU's external activities and endow it with a political identity and defence responsibilities. All of this then altered with the so-called 'sea change' in the United Kingdom's attitude towards EU defence and its lifting of its decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an 'autonomous' military capacity, at the Franco-British summit in St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. St-Malo is widely considered as the start of the European defence project. The new opportunity presented by St-Malo was very rapidly followed up by a multitude of farther-reaching declarations and proposals.

JOINT DECLARATION

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers).

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states.

The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity

for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.

5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.

ANNEX-VII-

Washington Summit Communiqué

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999

An Alliance for the 21st Century

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO and to set forth our vision of the Alliance of the 21st century. The North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defence; it embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defence and security partnership.
2. Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Alliance was founded in troubled and uncertain times. It has withstood the test of five decades and allowed the citizens of Allied countries to enjoy an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and prosperity. Here in Washington, we have paid tribute to the achievements of the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. The Alliance will work with other nations and organisations to advance security, prosperity and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. The presence today of three new Allies - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - demonstrates that we have overcome the division of Europe.
3. The Alliance takes the opportunity of this 50th anniversary to recognise and express its heartfelt appreciation for the commitment, sacrifice, resolve and loyalty of the servicemen and women of all Allies to the cause of freedom. The Alliance salutes these active and reserve forces' essential contributions, which for 50 years have guaranteed freedom and safeguarded trans-Atlantic security. Our nations and our Alliance are in their debt and offer them profound thanks.
4. The NATO of the 21st century starts today - a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships. To this end, we have:
 - approved an updated Strategic Concept;
 - reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join;

- completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;
 - launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;
 - intensified our relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened our consultations and co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
 - enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and
 - decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
5. As part of the Alliance's adaptation to the new security challenges, we have updated our Strategic Concept to make it fully consistent with the Alliance's new security environment. The updated Concept reaffirms our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; takes account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; presents an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; reaffirms our commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance; highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue; underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including forces which are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively; and provides guidance to the NATO Military Authorities to this end.
 6. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

8. We reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible. We are pleased with the progress achieved in implementing the Berlin decisions and reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance on the basis of our Brussels Declaration of 1994 and of the principles agreed at Berlin in 1996. We note with satisfaction that the key elements of the Berlin decisions are being put in place. These include flexible options for the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations, as well as specific terms of reference for DSACEUR and an adapted CJTF concept. Close linkages between the two organisations have been established, including planning, exercises (in particular a joint crisis management exercise in 2000) and consultation, as well as a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities.
9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and - following the St. Malo Declaration - in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:
 - c. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
 - d. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
 - e. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
 - f. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.
 - g. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.
7. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:
 - . Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
 - a. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;

- b. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- c. The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to address these measures on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. The Council will make recommendations to the next Ministerial meeting for its consideration under review.

ANNEX-VIII-

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP 16 December 2002

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,

Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century;

Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members;

purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged;

Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management;

Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities;

Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles:

Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;

Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;

Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;

Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;

Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;

Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations;

To this end:

The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002;

NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002;

Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.

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