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DEMOCRATIZATION IN SPAIN AND THE ROLE OF THE EC/EU

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To My Mother...

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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRATIZATION IN SPAIN AND THE ROLE OF THE EC/EU

This thesis examines the democratization in Spain particularly within the context of its accession to the European Community/European Union. It argues that democratization, which actually occurs within domestic boundaries, and therefore notwithstanding the dominant role of domestic actors and factors, has also an important international dimension. In other words, it argues that the EC/EU and the European integration process have made a significant contribution to the democratic transformation of Spain.

Keywords: Spain, democratization, democratic transition, democratic consolidation, European Union, European Community.

ÖZET

İSPANYA'DA DEMOKRATİKLEŞME VE AT/AB'NİN ROLÜ

Bu çalışma İspanya'daki demokratikleşmeyi özellikle Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik sürecine ilişkin olarak incelemektedir. Tezin temel argümanı, aslında ülkelerin ulusal sınırları içerisinde gerçekleşen ve bu nedenle ulusal aktör ve faktörlerin baskın olduğu demokratikleşme süreçlerinin önemli bir uluslararası boyutunun da olduğudur. Bu kapsamda, İspanya'daki demokratikleşme sürecine de Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği'nin çok önemli bir katkıda bulunduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İspanya, demokratikleşme, demokrasiye geçiş, demokratik konsolidasyon, Avrupa Topluluğu, Avrupa Birliği.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to various people for their invaluable support and assistance, without which this thesis would not have been successfully completed. In that sense, I would like to express first my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Çiğdem NAS for her helpful guidance, insightful comments, kindness and tolerance both throughout my graduate studies and in writing this thesis. I am equally grateful to Assist. Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre ÇAKIR for his encouragements and advices which contributed a lot to my graduate studies and also to my future plans.

I wish also to thank the participants of my thesis jury, Assist. Prof. Dr. Rana İZCİ and Assist. Prof. Dr. Erhan DOĞAN for their useful comments and constructive criticisms on my thesis. Furthermore, I am obliged to many other academic and administrative staff of the Marmara University EU Institute, among whom I should mention here particularly Dr. Yonca ÖZER, for their valuable support and assistance on many subjects and the development of the topic of this thesis.

I would like to take this opportunity to send my special thanks to a colleague, Mehmet BOZDOĞAN, who ensured my access to Bilkent University Library where I was able to obtain many of the reference books and articles used in writing this thesis.

Finally, I want to express my deepest appreciation of my family's constant support and endless patience. In fact, they have always had the biggest share in my every achievement.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Subject of the Thesis

It is quite ironical that almost a decade after Francis Fukuyama's declaration of *the end of history* (Fukuyama, 1992) with the once and for all overwhelming victory of the western liberalism, United States, the world's largest democracy and the primary actor in leading to that so called "end of history", suffering from the devastating incidents of September 11, engaged in immense military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other non-democratic countries. It has done so with the apparent aim of retaliation and pre-emption of further terrorist attacks claimed to originate from the authoritarian third world countries but also with the aim to install democratic regimes which would foster peace and prosperity to eradicate the roots of terrorism. That has been confirmed by its comprehensive political engineering efforts to implant democracy in *Great Middle East (broader Middle East and North Africa initiative)* to replicate the success of the World War II, in the aftermath of which, it was able to reinstall democracy into the Western Part of Europe as well as introducing it to the other parts of the world such as Philippines, South Korea and Japan.

Perceiving the reality as such, one must confess that "the end of history" is confined to a limited part of the world, in fact, an illusion yet to be achieved in the remaining parts of the world. Implicit in that perception is that democratization, which had long been seen as an issue to be dealt within the realm of domestic politics, has become a indispensable agenda item in the international arena. That means, there is much to be done both by international factors and prominent actors in that tedious way to anchoring democratic regimes in a great number of countries all over the world. Therefore, the subject of democracy promotion has begun to receive significant attention in recent years.

If that is the case, being one of the countries to ignite *Third Wave* (Huntington, 1991) *of* democratization and pioneering the processes leading to the triumph of democracy in the continent of Europe, Spanish experience stands out at a critical junction within

both the history and the geography of the recent democratization movements. After three decades of remarkable economic growth and political transformation, it is now widely acknowledged as an astonishing success story, which needs to be examined thoroughly in order to understand and shape the course of further democratization movements. Democratic transformation put an end to the centuries of decline and external isolation as well as the malaise inflicted upon different sections of the elite and society created after the loss of the empire, and the development gap with the other European nations. Long period of oscillation between monarchical, republican and dictatorial types of regimes ultimately came to an end as its democratic regime successfully accommodated a variety of internal diversities and disputes, which is now put forward as a model to be promoted elsewhere in the world.

2. Main Argument of the Thesis

As outlined above, with the third wave, the focus of academic research shifted from the domestic realm to the international context alongside a similar shift from the *structural* and *modernization* approach to *agency based* explanations in literature. In parallel with the rise of democracy as an international agenda item, EU has emerged as a major democracy promoting actor worldwide in general and especially in the continent of Europe. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Spain's massive transformation process has been accompanied by its accession to the EC (European Community) and the acceleration of the European integration processes.

That particular transformation stands at a point where for the first time in its history, a major international actor or supranational actor, the EU (then EC) proved successful in helping to anchor democracy in country through peaceful means such as the use of *political conditionality.* That constituted a milestone that would have significant implications for its subsequent efforts in particular in Eastern Europe, as well as in many other parts of the world. Mastering what it learned in the 1970s and 1980s, it has developed more sophisticated strategies, albeit containing and preserving the same critical elements.

By examining the role of the EU in Spanish case, this dissertation will try to show that the development and successful consolidation of democracy has recently increasingly embedded into the international context. It argues that the external context within which states operate, be it economic, social, cultural or political, and the conscious efforts of the external actors do really matter in igniting and later enforcing the democratization movements.

However, the aim of this paper is not to argue for the primacy of external factors over the domestic factors in the democratization processes of countries. It is not an attempt to downsize the importance of the external factors either. On the contrary, the focus of this study is to examine the true contribution of the European integration process and the ensuing EU in the success of democratic transition in Spain. In that sense, the significance of domestic factors and actors are acknowledged throughout this paper but they were examined within their special relationships with an important external actor: EU and the European integration process. Therefore a successful democratic transition is taken here as a complex process in which a network of internal and external actors operates towards the same end within a favourable external environment generated by smooth combination of several factors.

Within that context, the EU should not be seen as a once and for all established institution but ever changing, a constant transition in itself, which, by its very own nature will provide spill over effects to its immediate surrounding environment. It is a *sui-generis* case, regarding its double-edged qualities both as a supranational institution and also as an ever lasting integration process in tandem with the globalization. Containing also the qualities of a kind of super-state composed of national states, it also has provided an alternative approach to the US type democracy promotion.

3. Structure (Outline) and Methodology of the Thesis

The process of democratic change in Spain and particular contribution of the European Union within that process will be examined in this thesis in an analytical way under four chapters. The first three chapters will lay down the theoretical background of the democratization and its international dimension particularly through the lenses of the European Union. The last chapter will inquire into the Spanish experience within the theoretical parameters outlined in the first three chapters. In that sense, it will demonstrate how the theory is put into practise within the Spanish context.

The first chapter will begin with studying the meaning of the concept of *democratization* and tries to complement that effort by introducing some of the fundamentals intrinsic in the concept or usually attached or attributed to it by a variety of intellectuals. After that brief entrée to the phenomenon of the democratization, it will be divided into its main subsequent stages or periods, each manifesting different qualities. This chapter will conclude by exploring the two mainstream approaches to the process of democratization, which rather attribute primary roles to the domestic factors and henceforth neglect the external context.

The second chapter, therefore, is an endeavour purporting to integrate that neglected international dimension of democratization to what is given in the first chapter. It examines the true contribution of those factors and their interaction with their domestic counterparts. It does so by looking at not only casual processes but also deliberate policies, strategies and instruments designed for democracy promotion by several actors operating at international level. It further looks into the active efforts of the domestic actors searching for models, strategies and support at the international arena. Finally, international dimension inherent in waves of democratization were looked through the lenses of those three modes of international influence.

The third chapter focuses on a specific international actor, the European Union, which has emerged as a major democracy promoter. It will first analyze democracy inborn into foundation of the European Community (later EU) and the nature of the subsequent European integration process. Then, the process of establishing the EU as a major democracy promoter in parallel with the rise of democratization as an international agenda item will be examined. It will also study the evolution of the EU strategies for democracy promotion.

The fourth chapter will explore the democratization process in Spain. First, a brief historical background of country will be given. Then, main characteristics of the Franco regime will be outlined. Afterwards, key institutions, actors and processes operating at the domestic level in the post Franco era will be identified. The next step will be to embed the domestic scene of the democratization process into the international context. In doing so, political interconnections between domestic actors and EU institutions, as well the impact of EU strategies and policy instruments will be examined in detail. The chapter will conclude by defining the main characteristics of that transformation process and their international dimension, particularly relating to the EU.

CHAPTER I: THEORY OF DEMOCRATIZATION

I.1. Definition of the Concept and its Main Characteristics

Democratization is defined by Schmitz and Sell (1999: 25) as "a process of regime change that is directed towards a specific aim: the establishment and stabilization of substantive democracy". Therefore the concept may latently contain at least three certain qualities, that is the existence of authoritarian, sultanistic, totalitarian type of regime, which is in the process of dismantling, an ideal democratic regime to be built, which may of course change according the definition adopted, and a transformation processes in between (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 46). What becomes significantly relevant here is the definition and the main qualities of the democracy itself toward which the democratization process advances.

In his seminal work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Schumpeter (1950: 260) coined a widely referred classical definition of democracy: "institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote". By that rather narrow definition, he chooses to adopt a more procedural approach to democracy, which focuses on the formal aspects of representation of citizens by political parties through competitive elections. As also emphasized by Schmitter and Karl (1993: 42), "the most popular definition of democracy equates it with regular elections, fairly conducted and honestly counted."

For Linz and Stepan (1996: 3) democratization requires sufficient agreement about political procedures to elect a government, that is free and popular elections. They claim that "democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state."(1996: 5).

For some other intellectuals on the other hand, democratization is an everlasting process, which aims to extend rights to all citizens, rather than merely the establishment of a predetermined set of political institutions for once and all. They stretch the scope of the term to include the rights that enhance the social and economic factors and therefore creating a more convenient environment for the use of those core political rights, e.g. representation, by ensuring equality and participation in their broader meanings.

In some ways the efforts to produce satisfying catch-all definitions for democracy and democratization may be less helpful as they don't provide sufficient guidance in sorting out the countries that are democratic or processes they lead to the establishment and consolidation of democratic regimes. In other words, whatever the definition of the democracy or democratization is, the transitions literature looks also for some common characteristics of democratic transition, although it does not ignore that the concept of democratization may have different connotations in specific cases, in different regions or for different actors. In order to qualify as a democracy, regimes must have norms and procedures that guarantee civic rights for both individuals and groups, ensure rule of law, protection of minorities through constitutions in addition to representation of the citizens by the political parties through free elections (Potter *et al*, 1997: 5).

As Schmitter and Karl (1993: 45) points out, Robert Dahl has provided us with a widely accepted list of those procedural minimal conditions that a modern political democracy or a *polyarchy,* as he rather prefers to use, must have. Those conditions are given below:

1) Constitutionally elected official must have control over the government decisions about policy.
2) Fair and frequent elections comparatively devoid of any coercion to choose those officials.
3) Rights for all adults to vote in those election processes.
4) Rights for all adults to be candidate in the elections to become officials.

5) Freedom for all citizens to express themselves on broadly defined political matters.
6) Guarantee by the law on the availability of alternative sources of information and the right for all to have access to it.
7) Rights for all citizens ensuring that they can establish relatively independent associations or organizations, e.g. political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1971: 3-20).

Therefore, the concept of democratization entails a comprehensive process whereby the necessary institutions and mechanisms are being established and consolidated to adequately satisfy those conditions outlined above, which cover three main dimensions (Sorensen, 1993: 13) *competition, political participation, civil and political rights.* They constitute interrelated aspects of a democratic system. To put it in other words, a competitive system of elections must be established, which also needs to provide means of participation for the electorate through ensuring certain rights for both the candidates and electors. Civil and political rights guarantee participation and proper representation of the views of electorate.

In addition to the procedural minimal conditions proposed by Dahl, some others suggest several broader factors that work towards or against democratization. Linz, Diamond and Lipset (1995: 9-52), for example, put emphasize on the legitimacy of the regime sometimes obtained by good performance; strong and skillful political leadership favoring democratic values and cooperation; an accompanying political culture providing a peaceful and convenient context; a lively civil society generating checks on and balance the government; high levels of socio-economic development providing a material sound ground and resources and resulting more balanced social structure; strong political institutions enhancing stability and durability of the regime; lack of regional and ethnic conflicts; civilian control of military power and a favorable international context as positive factors all contributing to the development of democracy.

The following sections will inquire into the details of democracy and democratization. Therefore, without much going into the details of conceptual definitions, the approach to the meaning and content of the democracy and democratization will rest on Dahl's widely accepted list of conditions, which are summarized into three broad dimensions in the previous sentences. Democratization within that context must be understood also throughout this paper as the process the necessary mechanisms to comply with above mentioned preconditions.

I.2. Stages of Democratization

As outlined above some intellectuals are engaged in providing a satisfying definition for democratization while some others have attempted to examine or put forward some basic preconditions or qualities for any regime to be able to be identified as democracy. Another strand of the democratization theory has indulged to discern certain stages of democratization process. As Sorensen (1993: 25) put it right "the movement from authoritarian to democratic rule is a complex, long term process involving different phases". To that end, it is possible to discern in the democratization literature, three main sub-stages of democratization processes, which manifest different qualities, but may also have some overlapping characteristics and time-span. In theory, each of these specific phases should follow a certain order: liberalization, democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, in practice one stage can be skipped or the preceding one may not result at all in the following one, which may indicate the lack of a successful completion of the democratic transformation process. Or in a similar way, it means that there can be liberalization without leading to democratization.

I.2.1. Liberalization

The complex process of democratization starts with the regime breakdown, that is, the deconstruction or disintegration of the old regime. *Liberalization* is the key term that explains that first phase. It entails the replacement of some of the old autocratic

rules by new ones by the governing elite within the authoritarian regime, which may also engage in a practical endeavour of introducing some civic rights for individuals and groups when facing a legitimacy crisis (Schmitz and Sell, 1999: 25). But once that seemingly practical solution to overcome a sudden legitimacy crisis is ignited, it turns into a long term gradual transformation process, which slowly undermines authority of the regime itself by requiring more and more extension of the rights introduced previously.

Huntington (1991: 9) defined liberalization as "partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections." It envisages rolling back of the state control in certain sectors but does not necessarily mean radically challenging the ultimate power of the authority in shaping final outcomes. Therefore, it can best be seen as certain concessions by the authoritarian ruler, but as argued by Gill (2000: 48) "essential power structure remains intact". What liberalization does in that process is to provide sufficient room for the establishment and operation of autonomous actors that may push for further change in the regime. That is what makes the liberalization process voluntarily initiated by the authoritarian rulers more uncontrollable later.

Liberalization, therefore, is the main theme during the transition. Considering its significance, it must be emphasized here that legitimacy crisis that is generated by certain economic difficulties plays a crucial role in the launching of that liberalization process. Due to the economic hurdles such as slowing down of the economic growth, increasing inflation and unemployment the support for the regime diminishes and maintenance of regime control becomes costly. Division starts within regime elite and a search for some kind of accommodation through liberalization starts. As argued by Gill (2000: 9) "once liberalization has begun, the costs of preventing this from turning into democratization increase dramatically". Questioning the economic competency and therefore legitimacy of the regime intensifies especially if the regime is more associated with the kind of economic strategy, as claimed by Gill (2000:3), "where the authoritarian regime relies heavily upon its capacity to deliver material resources to key support groups in order to

maintain their support, as authoritarian regimes tend to do, economic crisis challenges the social support bases upon which they rest."

At that point, a certain distinction between the liberalization and democratization, or its other sub-stages is needed. Whereas democratization entails a fundamental shift in the power structures so as to make the ruler more accountable to the citizens. Liberalization movement in itself is limited in content and scope, but may evolve into the subsequent and more advanced phases of democratization, which are rather radical in character as compared to the previous.

I.2.2. Democratic Transition

The next step is *transition*, which spans the period from the disintegration of the non-democratic regime and the establishment of a democratic one (Schmitz and Sell, 1999: 25). Democratic transition means a shift from old structures and processes to the new ones. Sorensen (1993: 43) identified this stage as the "*decision phase*, in which there is a deliberate decision on the part of the political leaders to… institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedure".

Therefore, that is the stage where the fight among the competing sections of the elite intensifies on the determination of the rules of the new game in the town. Linz and Stepan (1996: 72) asserts that "there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect- of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself." The quality of the compromise built at this stage among different actors in the society may also determine the fate of the new system, as it also entails a wide spread legitimacy, erosion of which resulted in the demise of its predecessor.

Pace of the transition and the institutional legacies of the authoritarian period may have implications for the outcome of the transition. However, as will be further discussed in the next sections, one of the factors that can have significant impact on the outcome of this stage of transition or decision making is the composition of the leading coalition that works for the transition (Sorensen, 1993: 44). Transitions

initiated and carried out from above either by the rulers in control or elites and from below by masses may acquire different characteristics and advance towards different directions, having also further implications as to the stability and consolidation of the new regime.

I.2.3. Democratic Consolidation

Once that new regime is established, the next step is to test how firmly that regime is established, which is the democratic *consolidation* stage. The institutions established during the previous processes are to be matured during that period. It is a period whereby new structures and processes are embedded and stabilized through the wide spread and long term acceptance by the masses. The type of political action is different from the preceding ones. Whereas the central theme of the liberalization and transition is the changes of the status-quo, "the process of consolidation aims at solidifying the new achievements, routinizing the new forms of political interaction, and deepening the nature of the new democracy." Therefore, the focus shifts from analyzing certain factors that enables regime change to examining factors that stabilizes and legitimizes the new regime.

Some of the intellectuals in this field adopt a rather institutionalist or electoralist point of view on the consolidation process and therefore are engaged in defining relative mechanisms that enables consolidation. To that end, Linz and Stepan (1996: 1) suggested that:

> A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power, that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure.*

As will be detailed in the next section, some others also prefer to recognize significance of some structural factors the existence of which are put forward as necessary to enable the successful completion of the democratic transition processes, which is the democratic consolidation. Schmitter and Karl (1993: 40) argues that "the specific form of democracy takes is contingent upon a country's socio-economic conditions as well as its entrenched states structures and policy practices" and suggest other forms or processes that can provide expression of interests alternative to popular elections.

Linz and Stepan (1996) identified at least five interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions in addition to a functioning state so that a democracy is fully consolidated. First of all, conditions must allow for "the development of a free and lively civil society"(1996: 7) which can constitute a strong counter balance to the state power in case that it is seized or held by non-democratic processes. Secondly, a relatively autonomous political society needs to be established so that the control over the public power and state apparatus is acquired through a free and fair contest among competing political groups, which also provides strong legitimacy to the regime. As argued by Linz and Stepan (1996: 7), it had "great capacity to mobilize the opposition to the military-led bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in South America, most notably in Brazil, and was crucial in Eastern Europe as a vehicle for asserting the autonomy of those who wanted to act "as they were free, especially in Poland". Thirdly, the rule of law must be established to guarantee citizens' freedoms and associational rights; which will in turn further embed autonomy and independence of civil and political societies. Fourthly, in a similar way, a state bureaucracy must be available for democratic aims so that it has sufficient capacity to attain its promises. Fifth, there must be an "institutionalized economic society" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 7).

I.3. Mainstream Theories of Democratization

Some scholars claim that there are certain socio-cultural traditions and political values that are more conducive to the development of democracy (Sorensen, 1993: 26). In that sense, it is usually argued that Western culture provides a more convenient context for the development of democratic institutions and also that due to the lack of similar experiences that creates the core of the Western culture e.g. the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and liberalism, Eastern societies do not provide an appropriate basis on which democracy can flourish.

In a similar style, Huntington (1993: 4) argues for a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy since the modern democratization movements were first observed in Europe and North America and then spreading to the rest of the world, beginning from the protestant countries and later continuing with the Catholic states. Lipset (1993: 136), in a similar vein, claims that "long enduring democracies are disproportionately to be found among the wealthier and more Protestant nations."

Yet, it is hard to identify a systematic tie between the cultural factors and the existence of democracies (Sorensen, 1993: 26). Moreover, as emphasized by Huntington (1993: 21), "cultures historically are dynamic not stagnant." Whereas it is possible to observe continuity in the mainstream characteristics of cultures, change in values and perceptions may become inevitable. Furthermore, building on that cultural thesis, it can also be argued that the spread of western values and culture, coupling with economic and political factors, can contribute to the democratic transition in the non-western societies in the later stages of history.

It has to be emphasized that culture may play certain roles in conditioning democracy, though difficult to track and systematize in all cases. Notwithstanding the roles played by the socio-cultural factors, what is much more examined in the literature in relation to democratization are economic factors and the role of some

prominent actors. As argued by Grugel (1999: 6), the theory of democratization have some schools of thoughts that rather streamlined along two main strands: structuralist/modernizationalist theories of democratization based on the seminal work by Barrington Moore (1966) on the one hand and agency/actor based approach originating from the studies of Dankwart Rustow (1970) on the other. The next two chapters outline the basic premises of both main schools.

I.3.1. Modernization and Structural Approaches

An important part of the literature tries to explain democratization in terms of some structural factors. For that kind of approach, modernization of these structural factors provides a favourable context for the development of democratic systems. Moreover, modernization of those conditions also shifts balance of power within society. Therefore, for that particular perspective, democracy is only possible if some conditions are present. Although both modernization and structural approaches have much in common, the difference between them is that while the first focuses on some social and economic prerequisites of democratization, the second prefers to analyze the changing structures of power that enables democratization (Potter *et al*, 1997: 10).

In line with the modernization approach, Lipset (1959) relates democracy to the levels of economic development. He argues for a positive correlation between economic development and democracy as he finds out that there are few democracies having low level of economic development. According to his outlook, "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy"(Lipset, 1959: 75). Therefore, a high level of socioeconomic development was put forward as a necessary pre-condition of democracy: the presence of an upper threshold beyond which it becomes relatively easy to sustain and consolidate democracy (Gill: 2000: 3; Diamond: 1992: 454; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 159-160).

Gill (2000: 2-4) identified a number of aspects of economic development that helps to explain the emergence of democracies. First of all, economic development,

principally by improving the literacy and overall education level, generates a more tolerant, moderate political culture within which democracy prospers. Secondly, economic development ensures higher income levels and economic security for a larger population, increasing the size of the middle class which, in turn, lowers the possibility of class struggles and therefore a more favourable context for the development of democracy (Sorensen, 1993: 27). That also makes it possible for the governing elite and upper strata of the society to acquire a more positive view of the masses and therefore leads them to diminish their grasp on power, paves the way for the share of power and increasing political rights. Moreover, "wealth will also provide the resources needed to mitigate the tensions produced by political conflict" (Sorensen, 1993: 26).

Intrinsic in that social and economic change is the shift in structures of power within society as put forward by the structural approach (Potter *et al,* 1997: 18). Thus, a particular point in that process of modernization is that economic development and accompanying income improvements diminishes the number the worse off and therefore the powerbase of those radicals and hardliners that constitute considerable challenge to democracy. Economic development also increases the prospects of citizen participation through civil organizations seek to check the government action, to increase transparency and therefore accountability of governments. Another main function of the autonomous civil society organizations is to establish bridges between the regime on the one hand and the masses on the other, hence providing a common ground to communicate views and helps to implant legitimacy of the regime.

Hence, deriving from that argument is that the best that can be done in promoting democracy in other parts of the world was "to encourage capitalist development since markets would create the prerequisites for development and therefore, by extension, the basis for democracy (Grugel, 1999: 6). As argued by Huntington (1993: 21-22), "The correlation between wealth and democracy implies that the transitions to democracy should occur primarily in countries at the mid-level of economic development. In poor countries democratization is unlikely; in rich countries it usually has already occurred."

Every regime embeds itself into the society in one way or another. It establishes ties with several segments of the society, providing them with certain benefits. They, in turn, render their support for the maintenance of the specific regime in concern. The authoritarian regimes are no different in that sense. Among those segments of the society, the businessmen are of special importance, dwelling upon their particular role in fostering economic development that relates to the rest of the society. As claimed by Gill (2000:15), "the new middle class, the industrialist, businessmen and financiers who become important as the economy develops, will seek to pursue their interests not only by operating in the economic sphere, but by applying pressure in the political realm as well." Therefore, in any case of economic difficulty they will search for better alternatives of political regimes to replace the current one.

Similarly, establishing alliances with some other sectors of the society such as land owning class in the rural areas, which usually have strong hold over a vast peasant population can provide the regime with a crucial tool in sustaining their rule (Sorensen, 1993: 27). However, long term socio-economic change due to industrialization undermines the position of traditional landowning class and promotes the rise of a new middle class, which is less likely to provide consistent support for authoritarian regimes in the long term.

Within that context economic growth is of particular significance, since, as long as economy generates prosperity for a sufficient portion of society, the regime will not face significant challenge. That latent social contract between the regime and its subjects is expected to serve as a kind of guarantee for the continuation of the status quo. However, during the process, the businessmen acquire certain privileges *vis-à-vis* the rest of the society and seek further economic advantages by trying to exert influence on the political elite. Monopoly rights, subsidies, protection from external competition, cheap labour force regulations, suppression of trade unions, all these serves to strengthen such kind of relationships. The point that this symbiotic relationship comes under stress is the time when the economy reaches that threshold

and the structural change generated by international factors and policy pressures exerted by external actors.

From that point of view, economic problems such as widespread poverty, unemployment, inequalities in income and wealth, high inflation, and economic recession or low growth rates can play a decisive role in further eroding the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime as they undermine the capacity of the government not only to appease the masses in general but their supporters in particular as well. Moreover, economic structural change undermines support of traditional support groups. However, economic hardships are not alone sufficient to dismantle authoritarian regimes. The loss of legitimacy due to the failure in performance may endanger the acceptance of the regime (Gill, 2000: 12). Sometimes this is overcome through the personal charisma of the leader, which is crucial to the maintenance of the authoritarian political system.

Democracy can be perceived as an outcome of capitalist development, but not inevitable. In some ways the arguments put forward by the exponents of this theory are not sufficiently persuasive. As argued by Sorensen (1993: 26), "Argentina has had many years of authoritarian rule despite a relatively high level of per capita income; the same can be said for Taiwan and South Korea". Moreover, correlation may not necessarily mean a direct causation. Some may argue, in a similar way, that it is the democracy that produces affluence rather than the vice-versa. However, that argument finds few supporters as it is easy find lots of examples where democracy did not bring about economic development (Huntington, 1991: 199).

Linz and Stepan (1996: 77) along with many other transitionalist theorists argue in favour of the specific relationships between economic growth or economic crisis and initiation of transition out of a non-democratic regime as they demonstrate that this relationship between development and probability of democracy does not necessarily provide us with a systematic explanation as to when, how and if a transition will take place and be successful concluded. What they suggest as a better alternative to that pure economic structuralist explanation is an analytical framework combining

politics and economics, incorporating economic trends and perceptions by the elites on the alternative and legitimacy beliefs of the significant sections of the society.

I.3.2. Transition (Actor/Agency Based) Approach

Some conditions may favour democracy more than others, therefore, Sorensen (1993: 25) argues that "for a full understanding (of democratization process) one must study the interplay between these conditions, on the one hand and the choices made by political actors, on the other." To that end, as a staunch representative of the transition approach Huntington (1991: 113-114) identifies four forms of transition: transition through foreign intervention, transition through transaction, transition through extrication, transition through replacement. In the second case, transition becomes possible with the emergence of a reformist class within the governing elite. When that class acquire power in the regime, began to negotiate the terms of change with the opposition while trying to accommodate the hardliner or conservative part of the ruling elite.

In the *extrication* case, although the regime initiates liberalization process, it loses its power and authority to dictate the rest of the process. As the opposition takes up this opportunity to bring down the regime, it faces forceful reaction and therefore a new way emerges which leads to a negotiated transition. In the last case, the opposition takes the initiative to bring down the regime and replace and overthrows the authoritarian regime. Therefore, in each case, the prominence of the role played by the main actors, the ruling elite and the opposition differs (Huntington, 1991: 114).

But distinction among these different kinds of regime change forms is not always easy to make. Sometimes, a particular form of the transition may evolve into another. And in many cases, transaction, extrication and replacement follows each other. What is certain in any case, is one or another kind of interaction between the

governing elite and its opposition, which governs the character of regime change (Gill, 2000: 16-17; Schmitz & Sell, 1999: 31).

The disintegration of the old authoritarian regime may not necessarily lead to the establishment of a democratic regime, but rather to a more authoritarian regime. Therefore, transition is characterized by uncertainty that manifests itself not only in the outcome of the process but also during the process (O'Donnell & Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986b: 3), which creates sufficient room for the elite activity to determine the outcome unlike in the structural analyses. O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead focus on elite/individual action and the uncertainty, attributing little significance to structural factors. As argued by Gill (2000: 45), "if structural factors are assumed to be weak from the outset, uncertainty will doubtless result and a premium will be placed on the decisions and actions of political elites; if nothing else imposes restraints on the developing situation, it will be determined overwhelmingly by the preferences and actions of the political actors." Similarly if the outcomes are determined by the preferences of political actors rather than the structure of the political and economic system, then it leads to uncertainty.

The split within the governing elite over the course of economic and political actions may trigger the dismantling of the old regime (O'Donnell & Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986b: 19). Graeme Gill (2000: 45) argues that split stems from the domestic factors rather than international factors. What the author would like to argue in the thesis is that international factors are crucial in determining the timing of the split and therefore the beginning of the shift in the regime. In fact, it is no coincidence that major domestic regime changes are accompanied or precluded by changes in the structure or course of international economic and political factors.

Whether political or economic, the question becomes to liberalize or not. This question is related to the need to overcome certain domestic and even foreign policy issues such as isolation. That is also where we can observe the emergence of elite pact domestically and with international actors. A well known exponent of the democratization theory, Daalder (1974: 607) emphasized the role of the elites in

moderating political and social cleavages. He proposes that the elites representing their segments must seek to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. In order to be successful in that, they must avoid competition. Instead they must form elite cartels among themselves. That may lead to a necessary depolitisation of the public through practical bargaining usually behind the closed doors by the involvement of technocratic administration and a network of functional organizations. Hence, politics may lose its importance, elections may result in little change and participation may be limited. The system derives its legitimacy from peace and prosperity that are obtained through such accommodating mechanisms.

Therefore establishing pacts among the elite groups is a practical option to decrease the level of uncertainty. Mutual concessions and guarantees that no major party participating in the pact will be seriously disadvantaged as a result of the change in the system may pave the way for a smooth change towards more democratic structures. If that is the case, then negotiations among such powerful groups determine the shape and the fate of the change. Therefore, negotiations usually result in a number of interlocking agreements that creates an interdependent environment that binds actor together (Gill, 2000: 52-53).

O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986a: 38) identify three different kinds of pacts: a pact that governs the withdrawal of military from the politics, a political pact that gradually extends political rights and a socio-economic pact that makes it possible to take critical decision on economy. As argued by Gill, that pact game usually contains four types of actor: the soft liners and hardliners on the side of the regime, moderates and radicals on the side of the opposition (Gill, 2000: 53). Therefore, what implicitly drives from this argument is that soft liners and moderates carefully negotiates the terms of such a democratic transition to ensure that the parts of the pact are not antagonized but also that those hardliners and radicals left outside by the very nature of the game may not have sufficient support or reason to upset the process. Therefore the task is to design pacts and agreements in such a way not to alienate supporters and partners, which may result in widespread opposition that inflicts upon the fate of transition. On the contrary, if the pact making is well

established on agreements that ensure the support of a significant and important portion of the society, then a more stable and less painful change is possible to attain.

An important function of the negotiations is to accommodate certain demands by the regime and its opponents. The regime demands "an amnesty for any offences committed by officials, exclusion of radical parties from future government, continued repression of "disloyal forces" and postponement of radical economic reform and acceptance of liberal economic capitalist model (Ethier, 1990: 11). In return for such guarantees of security, the opposition will seek expanded rights and opportunities in the political sphere" (Gill, 2000: 58). Therefore, pacts facilitates the transition process, by decreasing uncertainty, guaranteeing established interests, marginalize hard liners and radicals, there fore functions as a kind of conflict resolution mechanism.

Then, the question becomes who are those pact members in fact. Apart from political parties, bureaucratic bodies and military institutions, such formal pacts in question usually contains the leaders of the major societal forces such as the church, business associations, labour unions and academic circles. As argued by Sorensen (1993: 30), among those groups of elites, whoever feels certain that their interests will be regarded under the new democratic regime will support the transition process. In other words, those major political forces may participates in the pact building process so as to ensure that their interest will not be affected in a significantly adverse way.

As argued by Huntington (1993: 24), "Economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real." The skills and the believes of the political elite even in the face of hardliner oppositions, radicalism and authoritarian tendencies are of great significance in leading towards democratic transformation. Once political consensus among different actors was arrived on the form, content and timing of democratic change, in the next step a key factor is the degree of commitment by key actors. That is, where competent political leadership manifest its

qualities in dealing with the hardliners that may hinder the successful continuation of a long term consensus.

In sum, democracy and democratization are broad concepts containing many approaches sometimes complementary in their outlook and sometimes competing with each other and constituting alternatives to each other. This chapter, which started by exploring the meaning of democracy so as to ascertain towards what democratization must lead also introduced basic fundamentals of democracy as put forward by Dahl(1959) and summarized by Sorensen (1993). The next step was to classify democratization into its specific sub-period: liberalization, transition and consolidation, each manifesting different qualities. This outlook will prove quite useful in analyzing the democratic transformation in Spain in the last chapter. In another effort, different approaches as to how democratization occurs were outlined. In that, while modernization and structural schools of thought focused on some social and economic prerequisites and also changing power structures, the transitionalist approach emphasized the role of main actors such as leaders, elites or in leading towards democratization. As will be seen in the last chapter, this thesis does not put one against the other but rather shows that they can be used as complementary to each other, each having some dominant roles in different stages of democratization. The next chapter dwells more into the theoretical framework of democratization, this time by introducing an often neglected external dimension.

CHAPTER II:
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATIZATION

States and nations have never lived in a totally isolated environment, where they could have been completely cut off from the impacts of the external factors or deliberate actions of external actors. That significance of the external world has become much more relevant for each and every country all over the world at this advanced stage of history, in the face of global economic and political challenges, though there can be great variances in their openness to the external world.

One way or another, be it trade, tourism, war or diplomacy, not only the elites governing the country but the ordinary citizens of the countries having any type of regime come across elements of external world. That naturally leads them to make comparisons of the internal and the external world, which in turn, inevitably result in some repercussions echoing change. Nature of that interaction and how it is channelled into a particular form of change and towards certain path must be of concern to any scholar engaged in analysing transformation of regimes.

Nevertheless, regime change towards democratization tends to be seen as exclusively domestic affair except some cases where it is imposed by foreigners following defeat in war and invasion e.g. in Western Europe in the aftermath of the World War II (Schmitter, 1996: 27). But the predominant role attributed to domestic factors often deprives us from the knowledge and analyses to assess the true impact of the international context in that process of change in an increasingly integrated and interdependent contemporary world system. However, as Whitehead (1996: 9) claims, "an interpretation which excludes from the consideration the roles played by external actors, their motives or their instruments of actions is bound to produce a highly distorted image of the international dimension of democratization". An increasingly closer interaction with the external world is inevitable in that stage of human history. Thus, the more the country is exposed to those external factors, the higher the possibility that the outcome will be the result of the interaction of domestic and international factors, rather than merely the outcome of the domestic

forces. In that process, external factors may provide considerable contribution to the forces of domestic factors (Gill, 2000: 19).

That may naturally lead us to argue for the universality of that certain phenomenon: external dimension of democratization. However, the task of identifying the role of the external factors in each case is not an easy task since there can be variations in contexts over time and across countries, which provides different opportunities or imposes varying constraints for democracies depending on the size, geographical location, historical legacies and internal structures of countries in concern. Moreover, although the terms "external", "international", which are used interchangeably, may seem to indicate the existence of a single actor, in reality, it is a complex system of a variety of actors and processes, that manifest themselves in rather indirect ways. That is to say, their impact is mediated through domestic forces. Therefore, they are not simple demonstrations of nation states' foreign policies but a complex interconnected set of operations at supranational, national and sub-national levels encompassing "international organizations, human rights groups, foundations, interest associations, media organizations, trans-national firms, partisan internationale, network of dissidents, even private citizens" (Schmitter, 1996: 28).

A good classification of this complex phenomenon is provided by Laurance Whitehead, which is also complementary to the domestic explanations outlined in the previous chapter. Whitehead (1996) employs threefold grouping of international factors in order to understand the complex processes of democratization: *contagion*, *control* and *consent*, which will be outlined in the next sections. To those three modes of international influence, Schimitter, (1996: 29) adds fourth one, *conditionality*, which will be examined, in the next chapter.

II.1. International Ideologies and Diffusion of Democratic Models

A particular dimension of the international context that may have notable impact on domestic affairs and therefore on the fate of regime is the prevailing international political ideologies. Driving from the German tradition of intellectual history, Linz and Stepan (1996: 74) draws attention to the idea of zeitgeist, which they define as the "spirit of the times". They examine the effect of the international political ideology by comparing the interwar period and the period of 1970s and 1980. While the zeitgeist of the interwar period was little supportive of newly established democracies emerging from multinational empires due to the existence of strong contenders to the democracy such as fascism in Italy, Communism in Soviet Union, non-democratic constitutional monarchy or Nazism in Germany and some forms of Catholicism prevailing in some counties and containing little democratic ideas. On the contrary, with the rise of issues in the international arena such as human rights, beginning of the demise of Communism, the non-existence of bygone regimes such fascism and Nazism, the zeitgeist of the period was obviously different from the interwar period and therefore has left different imprints on the democratization movements of the period (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 75)

Powerful individual actors may generate international ideologies such as Huntington's "Third Wave of Democratization, Fukuyama's declaration of end of history with the victory of liberal democracy. As argued by Platner (1993: 34) "Fukuyama persuasively points to the widespread appeal of liberal democracy, its ability to penetrate diverse cultures and win adherents around the world and the absence of plausible contenders to dethrone it from its current hegemony."

Expansion of a particular ideology or establishment of the dominance of a certain political type of regime, in this case liberal democracies, may pose equally important and relevant as to explain the democratization processes. In that sense, a significant aspect of the international context is the *diffusion* effect (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 76) or what is defined by Whitehead (1996: 5) as *contagion through proximity*. The

concepts are extremely helpful in explaining how the ideologies, or more specifically in our case- liberal democratic ideologies, are canalised into practices.

Neighbouring countries may pursue a process of political learning from the successful steps of each other and therefore a transformation which starts in a country may trigger another in its immediate vicinity. As argued by Linz and Stepan (1996: 76) "the more tightly coupled a group of countries are, the more a successful transition in any country in the group will tend to transform the range of perceived political alternatives for the rest of group." That should also be taken as a strong factor in explaining the clustering of democratic transition movements within certain time periods and also within some regions of the world, (e.g., in Southern Europe in the 1970s and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.)

International diffusion effects can lead to a sudden shift in the balance of power within the political regime by altering the perceptions of the political elite on political alternatives and behaviour of the masses towards the available options. Proximity creates neutral transmission mechanisms altering the attitudes, expectations and interpretations of the public at large and therefore encouraging countries bordering democracies replicate the political institutions of their neighbours (Whitehead, 1996: 5). A democratic regime which may have seem so remote for decades may immediately become a viable option in the domestic politics when it appears and accepted as such in surrounding region.

Jean Grugel (1999: 33-41) in his explanation of international factors for democratization, employs another term, *socialization*, that draws attention to the same dimensions of external factors to which *diffusion* and *proximity* often refer. Huntington (1993: 7) identifies the same phenomenon as the *snowballing effect*. Whatever the term employed, the concept refers to one of the possible ways that the international factors exert influence over the democratization processes taking place at the domestic level is through the diffusion of western values emphasizing individual rights, liberties, pluralism and a liberal market economy that socialize the

domestic actors in such a way to adopt certain strategies and models invented and developed outside the domestic realm.

Specific forms of international cooperation or collaboration such as "trade, cultural or student exchanges and the learning processes about institutional models" are among some of the factors that can explain how that socialization or diffusion effects work on ground (Grugel, 1999: 35). In that regard, level of integration with the external world is an important element in determining the effectiveness of diffusion factors. As argued by Gill (2000: 23), "The degree to which the local economy is penetrated by international capital and thereby by actors whose power stems from their international standing, will shape both the course of industrial development and the politics goes with it."

Regarding the revolution in the communication systems in recent times, diffusion effects have gained a salient, albeit powerful appeal in explaining the dramatic collapse of non-democratic regimes (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 76). The development of regional and global networks of communication that can hardly be controlled by the authoritarian regimes help to promote democratization processes through disseminating democratic ideals, freedoms that are long been in use in other countries nearby (Schmitter, 1996: 34).

The diffusion or contagion hypotheses are helpful in predicting possibilities for democratic change in a single country through analysing the conditions in the wider surrounding area. However, they can't predict the overall picture, that is, how and why democratic transformation movements begin and the course that they follow later (Whitehead, 1996: 6). Moreover, it does not provide sufficient explanations or analytical tools for examining and foretelling about the geographical boundaries or number of countries in a specific cluster or sequence of democratization movements.

II.2. International Pressures

Contagion, diffusion or socializing effects can help to explain a good deal of democratization processes taking place at the domestic level. However, in many

other cases, intentional policies of the third actors are quite visible and may have equally important impacts on domestic affairs, therefore useful to explain the spread of democracy from one country to another. Unlike those casual factors that push towards to democratization, the contribution of actors to the democratization occurs through pressures emanating from direct and conscious policies designed for that specific aim.

Whitehead and others (1996) employs the term *control* to refer to the explicit policies, actions and motivations of the external actors to bring democratic regimes to other parts of the world through leading to splits within the authoritarian regime and supporting those who are more in favour of change and democratic reform.

It is often argued that states pursue policies to exert pressures on other states so that they can obtain results in line their national interests. If that is the case, as pointed out by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995: 49) "historically, the industrialized democracies have been ambivalent about fostering democracy abroad and have often seen it in their interest to support authoritarian regimes, as well as to sanction, subvert, and overthrow popularly elected ones appeared unfriendly to their geopolitical interests." However, a major change in the policy orientations of the US under Carter administration and in other western countries beginning with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and producing the Helsinki Final Act (Huntington, 1991: 89) heralded the birth of a new stage in history, in which issues long been confined within the realm of domestic politics such as human rights, freedoms, minority rights have become major policy themes for the international community.

Increasing recognition of the international dimension of democratization has led to significant volume of research on state or super state activities such as European Union, Council of Europe, World Bank, IMF, international aid agencies as well as trans-national non-governmental organizations, and other donor countries or organizations, which generate pressures at the international level economic or

political sanctions, carrot and stick policies and specific conditionalites (Grugel, 1999: 20).

Democracy promotion by dominant states through control can take several forms. Use or thread of use of military activity is one of the most influential tools of such policy, which can be observed in each stage of history, albeit in decline in recent times (Gill, 2000: 19). A democratic country, in that case, as "a victor in a war, against a non-democratic regime can occupy the defeated country and initiate a democratic transition by installation (e.g. Germany and Japan in 1945)" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 73).

Another critical point in that argument is the distribution of power within that system of exchanges. That really matters as "the rise and decline of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states" (Huntington, 1984: 206-7). As argued by Platner (1993: 32) "Democracy seems to enjoy superiority not merely in popular legitimacy and ideological appeal, but also in economic and military strength." To that end, a democratic hegemon at regional or global level can provide significant contribution to the democratic transformation process by playing a determinative role through its geopolitical and economic power, in subverting a non democratic regime. In that sense, Linz and Stepan (1996: 75), draws attention to the role played by US foreign policy in Dominican Republic in 1978 and in Philippines in 1987. Reagans's Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars, economic sanctions and trade embargoes aiming at the USSR and Communist block can be given as other examples (Gill, 2000: 19). Whitehead (1996), in a similar way, tries to illustrate that democracies are often established by non-democratic means, that is, by external imposition. He identified three different methods or tools of imposing democracy on other countries, which are employed by US in some Caribbean countries: *incorporation, invasion and intimidation.*

Grugel(1999: 21) draws attention to the "*Washington consensus* of formal democracy coupled with liberalization of markets as an example of transnationalization in democratization." However, other international actors,

particularly, supranational institutions may pursue policies rather different in content and employ different set of policy instruments. For example, as a regional power, the European Union may, "by a consistent policy package of meaningful incentives and disincentives, play a major supportive role in helping a fledgling democracy in the region to complete a democratic transition and consolidate democracy(e.g., the collective foreign policy)" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 74). Henceforth, its support to establish a stable socioeconomic context through spiritual reinforcement, technical assistance, funds, and organizational support is often emphasized in addition to its role in the liberalization of markets (Gill, 2000: 21). In that sense, conditionalites and prospects for inclusion through membership provides significant impetus for democratic transformation movements experienced at domestic level, which will be further examined in the next chapter.

Other forms of pressure used by actors may contain ideological appeals such as using human rights violations to economic sanctions. Linz and Stepan (1996: 73) identified some other foreign policy instruments that they call as "gate opening to democratic effort". Some formal or informal empires such as British Empire after the World War II and the Soviet Block in the Eastern Europe in 1989, in their dismantling periods, responded to some daunting internal and external pressures by opening previously closed doors to democratization efforts in subordinate regimes.

In addition to the significant actions of states, one must add trans-national non-governmental actors, particularly seeking to promote protection of human rights, minority rights and freedoms and working for the establishment of more democratic regimes in general. International civil society has emerged as strong actor exerting pressures on states. As Grugel(1999: 12) underlines, "non- state actors engage in operations across state borders as a way if affecting changes within states". Religious institutions such as the Vatican and its world wide web of Catholic churches or transnational political parties such as Christian democrats, social democrats or Socialist International favouring democratic values may be seen as influential supporters of democratic transitions all over Europe (Huntington, 1991: 106; Gill, 2000: 20). In addition to exercising influence on the state policies, they

can also help to enhance the capacities of their counterparts and other sub-national and non-governmental organizations working for the same purpose.

To sum up, control hypothesis, by introducing another dimension, external actors and their motivations, complements explanations of the contagion approach. Furthermore, it may provide valuable insights particularly to the initiation and timing of the democratization movements, sequence, scope as well as subsequent fate of these experiments (Whitehead, 1996: 23).

II.3. Consent of the Domestic Actors

A certain dimension of the theory strives to sort out the explanatory power of globalization which point out increasing interdependence between the different parts of the world, which contributes to erosion of the autonomy of states in their domestic decisions. The diffusion, contagion or socialization hypothesis offers a slightly different perspective dwelling upon the same dimension of interaction between global structures and domestic actors. In addition to those rather casual or unintentional modes of international influence that can support the bottom up forces within the domestic realm, the deliberate actions of the external actors, the most prominent of which are hegemonic states or supranational institutions, exert a top-down influence.

However, supply side analyses of the impact of international context are not sufficient to explain how they were received or often consciously being adopted at the domestic level. Furthermore, dwelling upon economic, political, cultural hegemony of the West, perception of the democratization as a merely top-down imposition of structures or institutions or as something resulting from only pressures emanating from the globalization of the phenomenon of democracy may result in a formalistic understanding of democracy. In that sense, a demand side explanation of process, that is, how domestic actors search for, select and adopt or reject ideas, values or institutional models offered by the international context may prove equally

important in understanding or, to put in other words, can be complementary to previous assessments.

Whitehead (1996) argues that a more comprehensive account needs to integrate the intentions of relevant domestic groups and to develop a more elaborate and nuanced understanding of the complex process of their active interaction with the external world. Therefore, he employs the term *consent* to refer to the role and motivations of strategic domestic actors in the adoption of the external values and institutional mechanisms that constitute the core of a democratic regime. To implant a long lasting and stable democratic regime, active and voluntary participation and support of a wide range of groups and actors have to be obtained and maintained in the long run. That means, external imposition or an unconscious learning or socialization processes may not provide realistic explanations.

In a similar way, Grugel (1999: 37), dwelling upon the neo-institutionalism, draws attention to "*adaptations* to international standards as a result of desire to reduce transaction cost." Reducing the cost of international interaction emanating from the differences between domestic and the international structures or structures adopted in a great majority of the external world is a great concern to many elites. Facing the *victory of market economy*, and also the fact that political and economic models developed and used by the Western countries have become international standard, countries which are willing to participate into the global order should seek for ways to adapt their internal institutions and structures accordingly. Thus, over time, a certain convergence of the domestic political and economic institutions with those of the international context is expected to occur as actors prefer to modify and fit those institutional prototypes to their national contexts in their search for solutions and generate long term successes.

Whether to *call* it *consent or adaptation,* naturally drawing from the democratic *transition* literature outlined in the previous chapter, a crucial aspect of that actor or agency based explanation is the interactions and resulting pacts or coalition building

among a variety of forces or actors at the domestic level and as well as at the international level (Whitehead, 1996: 16).

II.4. Waves of Democratization

Apart from examining the literature in an analytical way, it can be also useful to have a general glance at the history of recent modern democratization movements, as it can provide us with further insights on how theory interacts with the reality. In that sense, Huntington offered a widely accepted outlook to the historical background of democratic transformation movement by grouping and classifying them into major periods with varying durations and contents.

He identified three major waves of democratization:

1) The first one, which began in the 1820s, with the expansion of suffrage to a large section of male population in the United States and lasted for about one century, until 1926, resulting in the establishment of 29 democracies (Huntington, 1993: 3). It was "quite spectacular but ephemeral" since most of the countries experiencing change returned to their previous form of government or even to a more authoritarian mode of regime within a short time (Schmitter, 1996: 36). Some totalitarian regimes were established in Germany and Italy as well as in some other parts of Europe within the interwar period.

2) The second period of democratic transformation corresponds to the aftermath of the first World War, initiated by the allied victory reaching "its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave, (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30 (Huntington, 1993: 3).

3) The third and the last one, originating from Southern Europe in the 1970s and diffusing into Latin America during the 1980s, sweeping across Central and

> Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s has created considerable academic research and debate among intellectuals (Schmitz & Sell, 1999: 23). It has become much more powerful and global, far more countries and regions have participated into that wave and few experienced reversion back to their earlier regimes (Schmitter, 1996: 37).

What is particularly important in the third wave of democratization is that it also intensified the debate between the two competing schools of thought: the structuralist and the transitionalist approaches. Huntington (1993: 22), for example, asserts that "the third wave of democratization was propelled forwards by the extraordinary global economic growth of the 1960s." Once that era of growth came to an end with the oil price increases of 1973-1974, authoritarian countries came under stress in their capacities to appease their supporters and the new middle class in particular and the masses in general. Exponents of the agency based school of thought, on the other hand, may draw attention to the exceptional skills of the political leaders and their successful negotiations and pact building activities observed especially in Portugal under the leadership of Salazar (Sorensen, 1993: 32).

Whatever the broad approach adopted, significant roles increasingly attributed to the trans-national factors are noteworthy. Without acknowledging the role and contribution of the external factors one would expect a causal distribution of democratization cases in time and over space. On the contrary, what one can often observe is a clustering of democratization cases in certain periods of human history as well as in certain regions of the world. In other words, democratization movements intensify at certain periods of time or in certain parts of the world, which indicate that they may, in fact, have close interactions. Schmitz and Sell (1999: 38) relates this fact to the global character especially of the Third Wave. To that end, scholars apply different concepts in explaining that phenomenon of the "bunching together of historical and contemporary experiences" (Schmitter, 1996: 37).

For Whitehead (1996), for example, *contagion* may provide the most reasonable explanation considering the international dimensions inherent in the nature of those

waves. Contagion is given as the establishment of democracy in one country increasing the probability of the occurrence of the same in its neighbours. As he put forward, the images of good life in western countries are associated with the democratic regimes they have, therefore increasing dissatisfaction with domestic regimes (Whitehead, 1996: 21).

Linz and Stepan, (1996: 76), on the other hand, employs the term *diffusion* to refer the same phenomenon of the spread of democratic norms and values, from one country to another within a time period that constitute specific waves. Diffusion of western values such as liberty, pluralism, market economy and political rights prepares the ground for a democratic regime.

Grugel (1999: 33-41), in a similar attempt, argues for a simultaneous *socialization* of countries. In this case, socialization is seen as the result of contagion or diffusion of democratic ideals among domestic actors. Moreover, as suggested by Grugel (1999: 35), that approach may also integrate a demand side explanation to the supply side explanations of the first two as socialization of domestic actors contains "adoption selection and also rejection of ideas offered in the international context".

Huntington (1993: 4) identifies five major factors which have made significant contribution to the timing and development of third wave transition to democracy and which also had international connotations. The first two, deepening legitimacy problems of the authoritarian regimes due to diminishing economic performance and the unprecedented economic growth of the 1960s enlarging the urban middle class, rather refer to structural change and also the increasing integration with the outside world. The next two: the striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, and changes in the policies of other external actors such US can be explained by the *control* hypothesis. The last one, snowballing or demonstration effect is already outlined above. Among those five main factors, Huntington, (1993: 5) draws attention particularly to the role and contribution of the European Community to the Third Wave, especially in the Southern Europe.

To sum up, it must be emphasized that while this chapter as a whole tries to complement the theoretical outlook provided in the previous chapter, each section in it also must be taken here as complementary to each other in general, though sometimes they may be put forward as competing approaches. While often casual processes of diffusion of democratic models of governance, socializing aspects of international interactions may condition emergence and development of democracy, the deliberate actions of international actors or states may accelerate that process of democratization through certain tools designed for that mission. Post war impositions, political conditionalites, economic, political and technical support to empower domestic actors working to introduce democratic systems may proceed hand in hand towards the same end, as will be shown in the next chapters.

The opposite is also possible as was the case in the Spanish Civil war in the second half of 1930s. From that point of view, the next chapter can be seen as an effort to further outline how those two aspects of international dimension of democratization operate as European *integration process* interrelates to the first, and the European Community as a prominent *external actor* to the second. That is the approach adopted in this paper.

Furthermore, since in the previous chapter, it was shown how domestic factors are dominant in this democratization literature, the consent or deliberate intentions or actions manifested on the part of domestic actor to search and receive democratic models offered by external actors or factors must be taken as a crucial dimension also. The last chapter focuses on the contribution of the European integration process and the EC as an international actor in the Spanish case. In that, its last sections are a particular attempt to exemplify the process operated to establish the *consent* for regime change.

CHAPTER III:
ROLE OF THE EU IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

III.1. Democracy and European Integration Process

The previous chapter has demonstrated that international actors and external factors can play significant roles in both igniting democratization movements and also later helping to consolidate democratic regimes once they are established. The European Integration process and ensuing European Union is a very valuable case, which manifests different qualities of international dimension of democratization, outlined in the previous chapter. But the chapter will begin with exploring first the basic motivations of the EU as a major actor searching to promote democratic movements. In doing so, the democratic peace theory will be employed here, since it can provide us with an essential analytical view of the democratic background of the EU. Then in the next section, a recently aggravated internal debate in the EU will be attempted to be outlined here and its relation to its external affairs, particularly democracy promotion. The remaining sections will focus mainly on how EU fulfils that mission.

III.1.1. Democratic Peace Theory

As Schmitter (1996: 31) notes, most of the current literature arguing for a link between the international context and democratization date backs their hypotheses to the ideas of Immanuel Kant, who claimed republics, which are accountable to their citizens, tend to promote commerce in general and international trade in particular. According to that *democratic peace theory*, the increased interaction due to trade and exchange between countries, restricts aggressive behaviour and works towards creating a kind of peaceful international environment. The interdependency inherent in that collective system of international exchanges accommodates differences. Therefore, it is usually acknowledged that "democracies rarely fight each other" (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 491) though some others still claim that there is not sufficient evidence to prove or disprove the argument (Schwartz & Skinner, 2002: 167).

If that is the case, the maintenance of that peaceful international environment requires establishment of more and more republican, or as we take here as *democratic*, governments that pursue the interests of their citizens by participating and contributing to the conservation and further development of that peaceful environment produced by mutual exchanges and complex interdependencies (Sorensen, 1993: 94). Hence, that paves the way for the extension of democratization movements as demands by citizens of those countries to participate in that international system creating affluence through trade and support by international actors intensifies. A natural derivation of that argument is that each and every country participating or willing to participate in that international system of interdependencies will adapt themselves and their domestic institutions to the changes in the content and direction of that system. Huntington (1993: 7) identifies it as the "snowballing effect", that is, democratization in once country and its success triggers similar movements in other countries as well. However, as he argued this is not always the case since it also necessitates the existence of favourable internal economic and social context in those countries.

Therefore, expansion of democracy often necessitates active involvement of the other democratic countries in helping and supporting the development of democracy elsewhere. In line with that argument, democratic states are gradually acknowledging the significance of that task to spread of the democracy to the rest of the world. As argued by Diamond (1990: 241), "this is because freedom is more secure in one country when it is firmly plated in others". Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the World War II, facing the challenge of expansion of non-democratic or Communist regimes, United States began to encourage democratization due to not only ethical or moral concerns but also more practical and strategic calculations since "the promotion of democracy was itself seen as the best guarantee of Western security and commercial interests" (Gillespie & Youngs, 2002: 8). As emphasized by Huntington (1984: 194), "no two liberal societies have ever fought each other". Therefore, promotion of democracy has emerged as a long term strategic concern for

the foreign policies of democratic states beginning with the Cold War and especially after the 1970s.

As outlined in the first chapter, elite behaviour constitutes one of the central themes of democracy, which has been proposed as a good solution to the problems of plural societies that struggle to accommodate the tensions between its segments. If that is the case, linking to propositions of the democratic peace theory argued above, more than fifty year old European integration process is another attempt of a similar kind that has been dedicated to accommodate often conflicting interests of the European states by establishing common institutions of governance while keeping most of their distinctive national features intact. If the elite cartels or pacts suggested by the theory are taken as influential mechanisms to accommodate differing interests of the factions or segments of the society at the domestic level, the elite driven European integration process is a well elaborated practice exercised at the supranational level.

In the aftermath of the World War II, dwelling upon the financial resources e.g. Marshal Plan provided by US, emerging as a democratic hegemon, the West European states engaged in comprehensive efforts to establish the foundation of a long standing peace and security as well as prosperity in the European continent chiefly by means of setting up several international or supranational institutions under which they can gather and negotiate for accommodating their disputes and also collaborate on many aspects. An incremental method put forward by the functionalist approach was adopted by Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, the founders of the first supranational institution-the European Coal and Steel Community, as the most realistic path towards further cooperation and integration (Dinan, 1999: 14).

Therefore, permanent reconciliation of centuries old disputes in the continent, especially between France and Germany, was, from the outset, the main reason but the solution was rather economic in content. Economic integration commenced by pooling some strategic resources such as coal, steel and nuclear power under auspices of common supranational institutions, and later advancing with setting a customs union culminated in a common market and monetary union. In fact, Kant's

idea of "spirit of commerce" (Sorensen, 1993: 94) has proven remarkably successful in the European case, as prospects for mutual economic gains from international cooperation especially in the fields of trade and investment were seen sufficiently rewarding to interlock the participating states into a long path leading towards *Ever Closer Union.*

III.2. Democratic Credentials of the EU

Unlike many other international organizations, the European Community has always been a union of states exclusive to those having functioning democratic regimes from its inception in 1970s so far. It is, in fact, a far more advanced form of cooperation than any other of its kind among democratic nations of the Europe. Being composed by democratic states, upholding democratic principles and ideals have received particular concern both in its internal and external affairs.

However, as outlined in the previous section, the dominant motive of the integration has been rather economic, though also security concerns have played significant roles in the beginning. That is, European integration process is constantly being explained and attempted to further deepened by overwhelmingly using economic arguments, perhaps mainly due the functionalist method adopted long before. Siedentop points to that problem of democracy being shadowed by economic concerns, by arguing that "democracy is in danger of being reduced to a competition between elites who manipulate public consumer preferences in a fashion of companies" (Siedentop, 2000: 217). As the integration intensified in recent decades, transferring more and more competences from democratically accountable national states to the supranational institutions of the EU, a growing debate on the democratic credentials of the EU has been more notable.

Therefore, for a number of intellectuals and politicians alike, the so called "Democratic Deficit" problem undermines the democratic credentials of the EU. As Andersen and Elliasen (1996: 3) put it in more precise terms, "the main challenge for the EU is the current impossibility of creating a true parliamentary basis for

democracy". That is due to the fact that European Parliament, the only supranational institutions in EU whose members are directly elected by the citizens of the EU, have limited powers compared to national parliaments in fields of legislation, budget and checks and controls. But democratic accountability requires that the citizens are directly represented by Members of the European Parliament, which has comparable powers and competences to those of national parliaments.

In response to the increasing criticisms on the problem democratic deficit, the member states strived to strengthen the position of the EP in its each major intergovernmental conference. Therefore, the intensification of integration process has been accompanied by a steady increase of the EP competences. Nevertheless, its power still does not match those of national parliaments. Siedentop, on the other hand, questions the feasibility of establishing European wide representative democracy and concludes that is only possible through a constitution at the European level, which is discussed and agreed by the European citizens (Siedentop, 2000: 217).

In order to have a more balanced view of that democratic deficit problem and its repercussions for overall democratic credentials of the EU, one must take into account that "the EU represents a new type of political system within the tradition of parliamentary democracies" (Andersen & Elliasen, 1996: 1). It is a *sui-generis* case, a new form of multi level governance developed within a liberal democratic framework. As pointed out by Newman (2001: 358), "European construction was seen conductive to the stabilization of liberal democratic capitalism within the Western Europe as a whole". Similarly, Andrew Moravscik (2002: 605) goes one step further in arguing that "constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing control of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens."

In the light of the discussion given above, it seems that the democratic deficit will occupy the agenda of EU politics for the coming decades, perhaps to be adequately dealt with only by means of setting up a federal state, with a constitution securing competences for the EP. In fact, that internal debate on the significance of democracy, also have its repercussions for how it is manifested in its external affairs, that is, the active promotion of democracy abroad. It is argued here that contrary to usual expectations, it may enhance the democratic awareness of the EU institutions as well as its member states and citizens. In doing so, it increases the scope and significance of an often neglected subject within the economics and high politics ridden literature on the integration project.

III.3. EU as a Democracy Promoter

The motivations behind the establishment and advancement of the EU have been outlined in the previous section. That contains political dimensions, e.g., establishing a *perpetual peace,* stability and security, as well as promoting national interests through cooperation in the fields of trade and economic integration (Mattli & Plümper, 2002: 553). Consistent with that mission of integration and in line with the arguments outlined in the previous chapter, which draw attention to the significance of the deliberate or active policies of external actors in helping transformation of regimes towards democratization, the EU has recently been acknowledging its own potential in extension of democracy to a wider area. In fact, realizing its success in contributing to the transformation and consolidation of democratic regimes, it has intensified its efforts to be a major democracy promoting actor in the international arena. As Gillespie and Youngs, (2002: 5) claim, "although the United States began focusing more systematically on democratization slightly earlier than the EU, the latter has, since the early 1990s, explicitly sought to develop policy initiatives capable of challenging what many see as Washington's pre-eminence in this field."

However, it is an international or rather to put it right, a supranational organization, having some competences and resources on its own but mostly depending on its

member states. At that point, the role to be played by the EU is significant in drawing together a variety of resources for common policies and therefore avoiding duplication. Consequently, to the extent that the policies of different European governments converge the EU can effectively deploy its resources as a unified actor (Gillespie & Youngs, 2002: 2). Moreover, in contrast to any other international organizations such as NATO or the Council of Europe, EU can have impact on a much wider range of policy areas varying from security to economic and political dimensions (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004: 94).

Notwithstanding the importance of the impact of the EU's policies on social, economic and political circumstances within countries, they should not be taken as grand scale designing but rather conditioning domestic change by helping those working towards establishment of democratic regimes within their countries. The EU strives to do so by employing a range of policy tools that can vary from such coercive measures like political isolation, suspension of trade or other economic sanctions to more positive or incentive based policy tools such as granting financial aid and technical assistance to political support and guidance, which rather target the government and public sector.

In that process, EU also pays special attention to interaction with bottom up pressures improving the balance of power between a variety of actors participating into politics within countries in favour of democratization since strong political, economic and social linkages with those actors are demonstrated to undermine the ability of elites in competitive authoritarian systems worldwide to thwart domestic democratization efforts (Levitsky & Way, 2006). In that sense, the crucial role attributed to the NGOs in igniting democratization in authoritarian states and balancing the elite power is noteworthy. Moreover, NGOs are seen as good manifestations of effective citizen participation in policy making and also exercise of formal political rights. As Youngs (2001: 10) claims, "The prioritization of NGOs, human rights and grass roots projects was conceptualized by policymakers as a positive philosophy and a relative strength of the EU's approach." Therefore, NGO

funding comes to constitute an important portion of the European democracy promotion policies.

Commitment to democracy promotion on the side of the EU has now become more apparent in parallel with its growing global presence in every field of policy thanks to deepened relationships between EU member states and a convergence of national policies. Intensification of the integration project is now accompanied by efforts to put democracy and human rights at the core of the EU's foreign policies and common actions. In that endeavour, a range of EU instruments have been employed so far but since the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the democratic transformation in Spain, which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, the most relevant tools of the EU or to put right, the EC for this period Europe will be examined in the next two sections. Among them, political conditionality was and is still the most powerful democratizing tool available for the EU.

III.3.1. Conditionality in General

According to Schmitter, conditionality implies that domestic actors or governments are required by the external actors to introduce democratic structures or consolidate their democratic regime before receiving a promised reward (Schmitter, 1996: 28-29). Pridham claims that "this is achieved by specifying conditions or even preconditions for support, involving either promise of material aid or political opportunities"(Pridham, 1999: 62). It often refers to the specific strategies of several international organizations such as World Bank and IMF. Asking for some conditions to be fulfilled by the recipient states before they can actually receive what they were being promised, "which supposes that this state will be sanctioned or deprived of foreseen reward if it does not comply with external decision-makers' requirements." (Ethier, 2003: 100). Most of the time, the favours are economic benefits such as donations, credits bearing interest rates lower than usual or which needs to be returned in a longer period.

Economic conditionality long used by such financial international institution was later transformed into a political conditionality by others (Pridham: 1999: 62). Conditionality has also been increasingly used by international actors to enhance democratic capacities of a variety of the countries in need of external aid (Spendzharova, 2003: 146). Democracy promotion in that case is usually seen as an "asymmetrical exercise requiring `donors` to export their experience, skills and merchandise to `recipients` (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2000: 93). Progress in establishing democratic procedures are put as preconditions for external official aids (Gillespie & Youngs, 2002: 5) as well as introduction of provisions in agreements for suspension of external assistance in case to halting to meet democratic conditions.

The EC/EU introduced an explicit clause that links development aid to democracy and human rights only in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 95). Respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law were also incorporated into development agreements with the Article V of Lome Convention (Lome IV), which was later revised and signed in Mauritius on 4 November l995 (EC, 2007). Therefore, violation of that essential element of these agreements could lead to suspension of development aid.

However, as argued by Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel (2002: 4) "from the beginning, the EU (then EC) has made assistance and institutional ties – first informally and later formally – conditional on the fulfillment of democratic and human rights standards". Therefore, it has acquired "a quasi official status" in the EU in its relations to countries especially seeking membership (Pridham, 1999: 63). In fact, EU is now one of those major international actors employing conditionality as a standard foreign policy instrument to enforce democratic reforms and protection of human rights and minorities in its relations with third countries (Youngs, 2001: 3). In fact, it started to play a vital role in consolidating economic and political structures conducive to improvement of democratic rights, through increasingly standardising democracy clauses in its aid packages and framework agreements with other countries. The fact, in the field *democracy assistance*; "the EU's overall effort had reached approximately 800

million euro a year by the end of the 1990s, approximately a threefold increase from the beginning of the decade" (Youngs, 2001: 4), can give an idea on the scale of cases that the EU conditionality finds room to be employed.

Nevertheless, the efficacy of that conditionality as a democracy promoting tool capable of stimulating grand scale change at the domestic level has also increasingly come under criticism. In many cases, it is perceived as a simple top down policy approach that ignores many political and socio-cultural dimensions of a complex problem. Sometimes the credibility of the sanction, that is the probability of withdrawing the reward due to the uncertainty scale or timing of the promised benefits is low or of it is seen as unlikely that the sanction is to be implemented (Ethier, 2003: 100). As argued by Youngs (2001: 1), "The overwhelming majority of analysts have expressed skepticism over the use of punitive conditionality, holding such coercive action to be inappropriate to the generation of embedded 'consent' behind democratic norms."

Naturally drawing from that top down imposed characteristic is poor ownership of the reforms or institutional mechanisms demanded by the donors at the local level. Once the economic benefits are received, economic or political conditions may fade back to previous state of play. That is frequently attributed to the lack of a comprehensive and more strategic approach to democratization. Youngs (2001: 17) draws attention to that often *ad hoc* character of EU democracy aid activities, by demonstrating how "even just within the Commission, which had perhaps the best-developed funding structures, work was financed from such a plethora of budget lines that officials were forming strategy with little or no idea of how their own projects related to an overall picture."

If that is the case, one must not merely attempt to set up more elaborated strategies and to construct better mechanisms to implement those strategies in a more coordinated and concerted manner. The task facing the EU is rather to fit those strategies and approaches in a broader perspective of integration and inclusion, wherever and whenever possible. To put it more specifically, a membership

perspective which draws together a wide range of policy fields and put them under a comprehensive accession strategy with a particular focus on democracy promotion is a far more influential tool.

III.3.2. Membership and Conditionality

Dimitrova and Pridham, (2004: 94) informs that "although the l957 Treaty of Rome specified no explicit political conditions for membership of the European Economic Community, in l962 the Birkelbach Report was adopted, establishing that only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of our Community" (Ethier, 2003: 101). The report declared that the accession was not directly given as a right upon the application of any country but rather that the Community retained the right ask for the commitment by the applicant to the economic, political and institutional obligations that membership entailed (Torreblanca, 2003: 10).

The Declaration on European Identity adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the 9 member states in Copenhagen in 1973 once more declared the determination of the EC to defend democratic ideals and human rights. (Menéndez, 2004: 243). Therefore, it was not until the second enlargement of the EC when Greece, Spain and Portugal showed a clear interest in membership that the EC begun to specify its democratic preconditions: "genuinely free elections: the right balance of party strength (a predominance of pro-democratic parties); a reasonably stable government, led if possible by a credible figure known in European circles; and of course, the inauguration of a liberal democratic constitution (Pridham, 1999: 64). The 1977 inter-institutional declaration adopted by the Commission, Council and the EP on the protection of fundamental rights was another attempt of similar kind preceding the accession of Southern European countries (Menéndez, 2004: 243).

Again facing new potential applicants the Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the principle was incorporated to the Treaty of European Union and also

further elaborated by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 to be strictly applied in its next enlargements. That means certain preconditions have to be met by the applicant states before a membership perspective is granted by the EU (Pridham, 1999: 65).

That prospect of membership to an exclusive club of democratic societies shall be seen as a major strength of European Union, that often distinguishes it from other similar international organizations in that specific race to be the vanguard of democracy promotion in the international arena. As argued by Dimitrova and Pridham (2004: 92), "not all international organizations are equally effective in democracy promotion, that full membership in democratic organizations affects positively democracy promotion and that small, homogenously democratic international organizations have a stronger influence in promoting democratization.

Linking membership to the establishment of a functioning democratic regime definitely entails much more than a simple expectation for a grand scale democratic transformation in recipient countries in return for economic aid packages. As Vachudova (2006: 2) emphasizes "the condition of being a credible future EU member impacted domestic politics in illiberal democracies in a number of ways that are more complicated and intriguing than simple conditionality, the centerpiece of most enlargement studies thus far." Thus, striving to become a major international force, the EU applies " fundamentally different approach to both membership and democracy promotion from other international organizations." In fact, so far the conditionality employed within comprehensive membership perspective has proven successful first in Southern European countries and then in a variety of East European cases.

From a rather theoretical point of view, in analysing that multi-dimensionality of both characteristics and efforts of the EU with respect to promoting democratization as well as being highly conductive, be it intentional or not, to democratization, the framework consisting of the conceptual tools outlined in the previous chapter may be of significant help. That is to say in more precise terms, the accession to the EU is

a comprehensive and highly condensed process not only requiring the candidate countries to fulfil democratic as well as quite a large number of other preconditions, but also encompassing other general aspects: deliberate policies, motives and goals of the EU and its constituting member states; a rather casual but, considering their clear liberal ideological content, diffusion of ideas, values and practices due to dense interaction at every level and in every field; and positive or negative responses of a variety of actors within candidate states, that, contrary to be passively receiving the impositions from outside, already actively searching for exogenous policies and strategies to adopt as relevant solutions to their domestic problems. Therefore, the conditionality here in that particular context works hand in hand with other forms of international influence e.g., *contagion, control and consent*.

The main motives and goals of the EU, and of members under its umbrella are outlined in the first section of this chapter principally through the *democratic peace theory* which contains moral or ethical aspects of democracy promotion as well as more strategic and realistic aspects of ensuring security and guaranteeing the foundations of national economic development by preserving and extending the prospects for liberal international trade that accompany the extension of democracy to a wider portion of the world. If that logic is in general appealing to EU institutions and every democratic member state of its own, then it must be more appealing to be employed in particular within its close vicinity, that is to say, to support the democratic transformation of regimes primarily in the European continent chiefly through granting a membership perspective accompanied by democratic conditions as well a quite a large numbers of incentives. That refers to the *control* dimension of EU's democratic influence intermingled with the *conditionality* manifesting qualities of conditioning and imposing from outside, being practiced via not pure force but carrot and stick policies.

Nevertheless, that is a particular aspect, which needs to be complemented by a perception that integrates how it interacts with the deliberate searches, motives and expectations of the actors on the side of the recipient or candidate counties, that are also being increasingly exposed to casual exchange of information, ideas,

perceptions, opinions or diffusions or manifestations of many other instruments of a broad liberal ideology. Viewed from that specific point, economic integration with the EU, for example, exhibits not only policy concerns of the EU actors given above but also *consent* related aspects: the motivations, active searches and responses of the domestic actors or institutions.

In line with that argument, it should not be seen as an exaggeration to say that membership of EC is desirable and even necessary on economic grounds as it "is expected to be permanent in nature and provide access to an expanding variety of economic and social opportunities far into the future (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 60). Putting that as such, "to be a member a country had to be democratic; hence democracy was seen as an essential step to economic growth and prosperity" (Huntington, 1991: 87). Economic growth and development entails economic integration with other EU member states which ensures access to the European markets for domestic products on favourable conditions (Mattli & Plümper, 2002: 556). That also works towards establishing a strong base for long term economic growth through constructing permanent inter-linkages with other European markets through trade and exchange of capital and services (Huntington, 1991: 88). That creates a more favourable context for a long term economic stability.

Then, support for change towards a more democratic regime becomes quite a reasonable policy option for a considerable number of domestic forces as it requires constant reform and adaptation of the domestic markets to the changing global structures and conditions through participating into integration and reformation process taking place at the European level. Within that context, EU membership and integration process is seen as good mechanism stimulating change at domestic level to adapt to the external world. To that reasoning one should also add the more direct economic rewards or benefits offered by the EU both to be able to set preconditions and also to offset negative impacts of the economic integration. As Vachudova (2006: 3) argues:

> …the process itself serves as a credible commitment to reform. Reversing direction becomes costly for any future government. As candidates move forward in the process, governments are locked into a predictable course of policymaking that serves as an important signal to internal and external economic actors about the future business environment (Vachudova, 2006: 3).

That logic of economic integration and ensuing benefits fits well also into the framework relying on the propositions of the modernization and structural approaches. If change is inevitable after a specific threshold in economic growth and development then the new middle class will seek for mechanisms and institutions to strengthen the foundations of liberal market economy and accompanying liberal democracy, which requires taking its proper place in a league of democratic nations. In that sense, the EU is a heaven for the protection and furthering the interests of the new middle class in countries facing the challenge of regime change.

From a political point of view, to be a part of a strong political alliance, if not yet a military one, is of equal significance for many states in Europe, and henceforth boosting competences of membership perspective in anchoring democratic regimes in those countries and in reinforcing commitment and guarantying no return to authoritarian structure. It is, indeed, "a complex interdependence" involving many types of actors such as parties, interest groups, associations, sub-national entities (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 61). In line with that argument, EU membership is seen as a permanent source of support and as a safeguard by the local elites for the maintenance of newly established democratic institutions (Huntington, 1991: 88). As Vachudova (2006: 2) points out, "over time the EU's leverage strengthened the hand of liberal forces against illiberal ones: not in a duel where good vanquishes evil, but in an iterated electoral game where sooner or later most political actors – especially political parties – saw the benefits of moving their own agenda toward compatibility with the state's bid for EU membership".

To that political aspect, one must add a socio-psychological one: the opportunity to qualify as truly European state and society being able to sharing a common European identity represented by the EU. Grant of membership *per se* to that exclusive club of

European democratic nations is quite valuable to both the citizens and elites of those countries especially after long periods of isolation. Furthermore, if stability of political institutions and mechanisms particularly in times of economic and political despair rest also upon the a sustained positive psychological mood ownership of their new regime, then, is to be best achieved by external political support coming from international actors sharing similar identity, values and structures. Therefore, the social influence of the EU via identification with a major democratic international community highly matters (Schimmelfennig & Engert & Knobel, 2002: 6).

In the lights of the facts discussed above, it is wrong to conclude that apart from usual active or deliberate policies of the European Union institutions or common policies of its member states, the membership perspective brings a new quality, that is, the European integration process per se as a democracy promoting pool, in fact far more influential than any other of its kind. It is put forward by Dimitrova and Pridham (2004: 93-94) as "a new model of democracy promotion" that they identify as "democracy promotion through integration".

III.4. Evolution of EU Strategies

The success of the EU in promoting the establishment and consolidation of democratic regimes in the Southern part of the continent has given a strong impetus to the EU to transform and further elaborate its strategies and policy tools to better fulfil that historical mission. It is now possible to find more commitment on the side of the EU constantly attempting to incorporate democratic principles into its major documents. That has been illustrated by democratic concerns such "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities as the sine qua nonpolitical condition of accession to the EU" in the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, to be effectively exercised as strict political criteria to be met by new applicants in Central and Eastern Europe in its enlargements (Schimmelfennig & Engert & Knobel, 2002: 5). Later, these

conditions were once incorporated to the Treaty of European Union and once more emphasized by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996, which also stated that the membership could be suspended of those condition are violated (Ethier, 2003: 102).

Furthermore, democracy clauses were incorporated to its overall foreign policy objectives and also its aid protocols, extending the scope and scale of the fields within which the conditionality can be applied. Promotion of democracy has been an essential part of the Association Agreements signed with countries in its immediate vicinity (Mattli & Plümper, 2002: 553) and as well as Trade and Cooperation agreements with other countries (Schimmelfennig & Engert and Knobel, 2002: 4). As Youngs (2001: 2) emphasizes, "The EU has sought to establish itself as an influential actor in the domain of democracy promotion and by the middle of the 1990s had availed itself of new democracy assistance funding, provisions for political conditionality and an extensive network of democracy-related initiatives and dialogues with developing countries."

In addition to these political pre-conditions that need to be addressed before starting for accession negotiations, the EU employs a number of mechanisms in the process to support capacity building activities and reforming public institutions (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004: 96).

On the other hand, EU's approach to democracy promotion has been further elaborated to include a variety of dimensions. As argued by Gillespie and Youngs, (2002: 5) later, in 1990s, "the formal remit for democratization work was expanded to incorporate a comprehensive range of democracy's institutional building blocks: civil society, parliaments, judiciaries, decentralized administrations, unions, cultural organizations, conflict resolution, minority and vulnerable groups, education and democratic awareness-building were all identified as areas requiring attention." Linz and Stepan (1996: 96-97) list following types of policies increasingly used by EU institutions: electoral assistance such as financial and technical assistance to governments that have announced the introduction of multi-party elections: election observation and monitoring; support for voter education programmes; support to

human rights groups and other NGOs aiming to strengthen democracy; support to media and support for political parties.

Furthermore, there have been attempts to introduce more efficient coordination mechanisms for the resources allocated to democracy promotion goals by various actors within EU. A European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was created with the aim of gathering of the different democracy promotion projects under a single structure. The same concern applies to the establishment of a Democracy and Human Rights Unit within Commission in 1999. Moreover "a number of new instrument- Common Positions, Common Strategies, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the use of Special Envoys – were introduced to help increase the European Union's unity and diplomatic weight on the international stage, with the perceived need more effectively to convey support for democratic norms being a prime consideration in this regard" (Gillespie & Youngs, 2002: 6).

The EU established a broad remit for democracy work, specifying an aim to focus not only on the minimal formal requisites for democracy but also to strengthen the effectiveness of legislatures, to assist public administration reforms, NGO activity, civic education and democratic awareness programmes, human rights projects, greater civilian control of the military, minority rights and the transparency of governance structures.

Those attempts and developments in advancing the democracy promoting mission of the EU have been welcome by many. Nevertheless, so far it is hard to conclude that they have reached at a point to exert a similar influence matching that of granting a membership perspective through enlargement and inclusion.

CHAPTER IV: DEMOCRATIZATION IN SPAIN AND ITS ACCESSION TO THE EU

Spain has a particular position within the recent trend of democratization, the so called "the Third Wave of Democratization". The impressive political and economic transformation that it has undergone during the last three decades has made Spain as one of the great success stories of modern Europe. After centuries of decline and falling behind other European countries in economic and political spheres, it suddenly emerged as a successful democratizing case to be taken as a model in other parts of the world. That becomes even more impressive considering that it came after a long period of dictatorship preceded by one of the most brutal civil wars in the world in the 1930s.

What is also particular about the Spanish case is that after more than three decades democracy is now firmly established and internalized by all Spaniards. Perceiving the Spanish case as such this thesis aimed at to explore the factors that enabled a successful democratic transformation. In that, though, as acknowledged throughout previous chapters, the primary roles are attributed to the domestic context and actors, for which a theoretical framework was established in the first chapter, it is also ardently argued that there has been an significant external dimension of that democratization in which EC had played a crucial role. In other words, Spanish democratization has taken place within such a context that the European integration process and the EC with its institutions and members have made significant contribution to the efforts of the domestic actors in their attempt to introduce and consolidate democracy in Spain.

This chapter will analyse that process in detail within the theoretical framework established in the previous chapters. It will do so first by giving a historical background prior to the Franco's dictatorship. Then the Franco period will be examined with a particular concern to explore the roots of the regime change, in other words liberalization. Then, factors behind democratic transition of the 1970s

will be analyzed especially by focusing on the role of the EC and the European integration process. In a further attempt, traces of the contribution will be sought for the consolidation period in Spain.

IV.1. The Political System in Spain

IV.1.1. A Brief Historical Background

Being established in the Middle Ages, Spain is one the oldest states in Europe (Royo & Manuel, 2003: 2). After almost seven centuries of partial rule of the North African Moors, which cut off Spain from the rest of Europe, Spain's unity was achieved through conquest and dynastic expansion (Payne, 1973: 56-57). The kingdom of Castille expanded in the Middle Ages to conquer the Moorish (Islamic) fiefs of the south in a process, which was later named as the *Reconquista*. By the end of the 15th century, the kingdoms of Lean, Navarre, Aragon and Portugal were united to Castile through dynastic marriages.

The creation of state was immediately followed by the establishment of an empire. In the 16th century, new possessions were acquired in America and attached to the Crown of Castile. Acquisitions of other possessions in America and Asia made Spain in a world power in the early modern history (Barton, 1993: 106). With the accession of Charles V to the Holy Roman Empire, the structure was further complicated. As emphasized by Keating (1993: 311), it created "a multi-national European empire within which was a multinational Spain, its component units themselves internally divided." Despite Spain's unification under the monarchical state of Castile, and the fact that it has been governed by that central authority over centuries several territories of the Spanish Crown maintained variety of feudal privileges, distinct cultural characteristics and local institutions. Local languages such as Castilian, Catalan, Gallego-Portuguese and Basque prevailed over the course of history. Therefore, it must be emphasized here that, attempts by the monarchy to create a unitary state on the lines of the Louis XIV's France could not be as

successful as in France. Occasionally, various regional communities such as Portugal and Catalonia revolted against the central authority. Separate identities which were preserved by the regional communities but dominated by the central authority over the course of the Spanish history re-emerged in the 20th century.

Henceforth, the process of unification and later the ascendance to the world power status in the 16th century with the establishment of an empire with vast colonies in America and Asia set the course of Spanish history and decline which lasted until the 1970s (Royo & Manuel, 2003: 2). As often reiterated by Spaniards themselves, this imperial heritage has been widely perceived as a major factor hampering its own internal dynamism (Barton, 1993: 108). American gold which run into the country in great amounts provoked massive inflation and economic disruption. Though it retained its colonial markets, little was done to encourage competitive production at home. With the defeats by England and the United Provinces of Netherlands, Spain began to witness a long period of imperial decline (Barton, 1993: 107). Most of the Spanish colonies in the Latin America broke away in the early 19th century. The 1898 defeat by the United States, resulted in the loss of remaining colonies: Cuba, Porto Rico and Philippines.

The imperial decline accompanied by inauguration of several internal struggles. Supporters of the rival dynasty, known as the Carlist, engage in a series of wars and insurrections in the 18th and 19th centuries. French revolution, invasion and occupation by the French in the Napoleonic Wars introduced ideas of French revolution and further undermined the old monarchy (Payne, 1973: 418). Liberals began their struggle against the absolute monarch in order too establish a constitutional government. Moreover, a republican government emerged to overthrow the monarchy altogether. Movements against powerful position of the Church in state and educational system gained momentum. In parallel with these developments, Spain also witnessed the emergence of class struggles and the rise of an anarchist ideology, which added another dimension to that class struggle. Furthermore, the late 19th century witnessed the re-emergence regional nationalist movements, especially in Catalonia and the Basque country. The army increasingly

involved in politics, perceiving itself as the defender of Spanish national unity and the strong state, which resulted in a series of military coups in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The first republic was established in 1868 and lasted only four years. The monarchy was restored. The following period, known as the Restoration witnessed an attempt to establish a liberal constitutional monarchy, designed on the British model. Exponents of that ideal, known as Canovas, thought that this model would prevent Republican aspirations by ensuring stability and economic and political modernization. However, the constitutional regime was manipulated; the privileges of the army, the church and the large landowners were left untouched. It was the 1898 defeat, that produced a shock for the system and led the new generation, know as the *regeneracionistas* to engage in a debate over the question of Spain: the need for reform and modernization, the need to join the club of the democratic industrial Western European states, the need to end the isolation and stagnation (Barton, 1993: 109). Nonetheless, the degenerate system resisted and the regenerationists' efforts achieved little.

The Restoration regime collapsed in 1923 when general Miguel Primo de Rivera staged a *pronunciamiento*. The new dictatorship was not supported by most sections of the society and with the removal of the support of the King, Prima was forced out of office in 1930 (Payne, 1973: 623-624). Two years later, the monarchy itself collapsed and the Second Republic established. However, class, regional and anticlerical tensions continued until 1936, when General Francisco Franco staged a new *pronunciamiento*. However, this time, the constitutional government refused to give in and a three year Civil War began. Other European countries began to be involved in the issue. Hitler and Mussolini sent troops to support Franco (Arango, 1995: 56). Left wing volunteers from Europe and America poured into the country to help republicans. Soviet Union also sent arms to support Republican side. European democracies adopted a policy of neutrality, which worked to advantage of Franco. Franco represented his rebellion as a war against communism and separatism, which gained the support of the Spanish Church and the sympathy of the Vatican. The Civil

War, which lasted three years was a rehearsal of the World War II and produced plenty of atrocities.

IV.1.2. Franco Regime

As early as 1937, Franco was appointed by his fellow generals as the "Chief of the Government of the Spanish State", "head of government", "prime minister" and "president" all in one (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 15). When he finally triumphed in 1939, Franco engaged in a phase of savage repression of all elements of the opposition (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 12). Labour strikes, any other working class movements and all democratic demonstrations were banned; all public meetings except for Catholic and state ceremonies were subject to official permission; all Masonic, Communist and anarchist organizations were prohibited along with any other groups or associations not approved by the government (Arango, 1995: 65). Likewise, any elements of regional and ethnic movements and organizations had their shares from that wholesale repression. Instead of forging a national reconciliation, the new regime "introduced a drastic form of centralism, restraining all forms of regional culture and unleashing a campaign of annihilation of all kinds of ethno-political distinctiveness" (Conversi, 2002: 224).

Franco's regime was a personal dictatorship, a specific form of non-democratic regimes which was based on military power and one-party system. He set himself as "the sole source of authority and the power of the any other actor within his regime depended "on access, closeness to, dependence on, and support from the leader (Huntington, 1991: 111). Therefore, Franco "skilfully used his power to keep any group from achieving permanent ascendancy, maintaining that his own superior power was indispensable to the stability of the regime (Arango, 1995: 67). Therefore, as pointed out by Keating (1993: 314) "while Franco is rightly bracketed with other European dictators of the period, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, his regime was not a totalitarian one in which a single party or movement monopolizes power through an all embracing state." The regime symbolized the triumph of the right wing and

centralist forces in Spain: the army, the Church, the large landowners and the industrial bourgeoisie, which in return received protection from international competition.

Army constituted a centrepiece of Franco's dictatorship regime. Throughout his rule, he developed a mutually beneficial or a "symbiotic relationship" with the army, as both sides and their respective ideological outlook enjoyed a supreme position within society (Arango: 1995: 77). As argued by Huntington (1991: 111)**,** in the Spanish case, along with Portugal, military leaders seized power through *coup d'états* through the forces of military. Once the power is seized "the army remained to the end the ultimate guarantor of the regime's fulfilling its task as set out in the Organic Law of the State – the defence of the institutional order" (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 23). Similar to the other actors in the system, the soldiers shared Franco's ideas against Communism, liberalism and any kind of regionalism, which might , in their eyes, corrupt and divide the society into rival sections and lead to separatism (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 23).

There is no doubt that as in many other dictatorships, without the army, Franco's regime could have achieved seizing the power and ruling for such a long period but it was not the single source of power for Franco's regime either (Arango, 1995: 77). He empowered and well organized the major forces that served as his allies in the Civil War so as to manipulate and distribute power in such way to be able to maintain his rule. He abolished all pressure groups and political parties except the Spanish Fascist Party, the Falange**,** which he used at his convenience since it provided him and his generals with the necessary ideological outlook "because they had no political philosophy of their own beyond a barren brand of military authoritarianism" (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 7). Moreover, it presented "the only organized political following fully committed to the regime, and Franco still found it indispensable" (Payne, 1973: 687).

Catholic Church was another focal point of the new regime. Accordingly, one of the first actions of Franco after the end of the war was to restore the power and privileges of the Church especially in the field of education, which demised under

the Republic and the Civil War (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 7). In that context, Church was seen an important means of restoring the order and the stability in the society. Hence, civil marriage was banned and all marriages had to be performed under the provisions of Catholic Church; divorce was made illegal; religious education was made compulsory (Arango, 1995: 65). In return, the Church, like the Falange, "supplied the ideological and emotional cement which bound together the Nationalists clans" (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 7).

A fourth type of power base supporting the Franco regime was the technocrats and professionals that come to the fore in the 1960s, many of whom associated with the Opus Dei, a semi-secret Catholic lay organization (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 35). Those high rank civil servants believed that a modernized system of authoritarian government could bring development and avoid ideological clashes (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 35). Being mostly educated in foreign countries such as US, UK or France, they attempted to reconcile Catholicism with a modern capitalism and put their expertise at the service of the Spanish service, which prepared the ground for impressive Spanish economic growth in the post world war period (Arango, 1995: 70). Other sections of the society that supported the rule of Franco were the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and the large landowners (Potter et al, 1997: 110).

IV.2. Democratization in Spain

IV.2.1. Looking for the Roots of Regime Change: *A Limited Liberalization*

Spain under Franco's rule declared official neutrality in the World War II despite his obvious sympathy for the other dictatorships "if for no other reason than that he did not believe his regime would be permitted to survive by a victorious anti-German coalition" (Payne, 1973: 686). Therefore, he followed a careful foreign policy, being friendly to the Axis powers during the early years of the war, when they seem on the winning side though making Spain's independence and neutrality clear to both sides

of the war and "working to dissociate himself further from Germany and Italy" towards the end of the war when the Allies' victory was imminent (Payne, 1973: 686).

The course of the war also changed the nature of the Franco's regime inside. When it became apparent after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, that the Axis powers, once helping Franco's victory in Spain, would be defeated, "the caudillo began to retreat from the totalitarianism that would be unacceptable to the victorious allies" (Arango, 1995: 66). Nevertheless, in aftermath of the war, there was a widespread hostility against Franco's regime among the victors as it was seen another remnant of the fascist regimes which should rather have been eliminated along with Hitler and Mussolini. Therefore, the end of the war witnessed aggravation of Spanish isolation. It was neither included in the Marshall plan which helped democratic states of the Western Europe to recover from economic devastation of the World War II, nor joined the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) until 1959 (Royo, 2002: 6-7). Similarly, Spanish participation under the Francoist regime into a European integration process which was confined to the democratic nations of the Western Europe was not a possibility alongside the membership to EFTA (Royo, 2002: 7).

Franco engaged in a limited *liberalization* after the end of the World War II so as to appease the winners of the war. In that sense, the international campaign to punish and isolate Spain after the end of the war especially by the democratic nations of the Western Europe and Soviet Union as well can be seen as a crucial factor, in fact, an important manifestation of the *control* type of international influence that is explained in the second chapter, in igniting first steps of a long way liberalization path intensifying towards the end of the Franco's rule and leading to democratization after his death. Franco response to the new situation were to attempt to introduce some liberalization and re-regularization of the regime so as to differentiate itself from the totalitarian regimes of the previous period and to alleviate the negative backlash from the external world (Payne, 1973: 687-688). After all, as argued by McDonough and others (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 682), "developmental

period of Francoism provided the examplar of pragmatic authoritarianism. The so called Cortes, Spanish parliament was re-established as early as in 1943, having its members nominated by new and more participatory tough corporate and indirect mechanisms and a "Spaniards' Charter" (Fuero de los Espanoles), Spanish bill of rights enlisting liberties was announced soon afterwards (Payne, 1973: 687).

However, Spanish isolation was only overcome to some extent with the emergence of the Cold War environment, within which it was seen as a valuable asset in confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s, some economic agreements were concluded with United States and with some other Western European countries. In the 1950s the United States extended its protection to Spain in exchange of military bases. Therefore, the regime was saved by external support in the 1950s.

Notwithstanding the limited role of that international context within which Franco's Spain tried to escape isolation through superficial change within the regime structure, the real impact of the international context providing the ground for a political liberalization came with the economic modernization and economic integration with the external world. The resulting spectacular economic growth created and expanded a new middle class which would naturally search for the establishment of a democratic regime and participation into European integration. In that sense, though it may seem that Franco's regime suddenly collapsed after his death in 1975, in fact, the seeds of the decline of Franco's authoritarian regime had long been germinating (Potter *et al*, 1997: 110).

Several attempts were made in order to modernize and open the economy. Various agreements were signed with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, all of which prepared integration of the Spanish economy with the global economic system. The regime began to emphasize development and growth. The administration began to be dominated by modernizers and technocrats rather than the old style military officers and Falangists. That economic modernization resulted in a rapid economic growth, and urban development (Arango, 1995: 65-66).

As a consequence attempts to liberalize the economic system and integrate it with the world economy, the Spanish economy took of during the last decades of the Franco rule (McDonough & Barnes & Pina , 1984: 660).

In accordance with the arguments put forward by the *structural or modernization approach*, outlined in the first chapter, the spectacular economic growth during the Franco regime altered the socio-economic structures of the Spanish society by creating and expanding a New Middle Class which tended to believe that "they could manage equally in the future in a more democratic environment" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 79). The new Middle Class would assess the regime in terms of its economic performance. Therefore, as long as the economic growth and accompanying affluence was maintained, economic success would serve as the basis of the regime's legitimacy. However, once that economic growth begins to falter, the New Middle class, would question the legitimacy of the regime and seek for better alternative, making it more costly for the authoritarian regime the repression of the regime (Linz & Stepan , 1996: 79). For example, as argued by Gill (2000:19), oil crisis of the 1970s may have a strong contribution to the demise of authoritarian regimes through undermining economic performance of those states and reducing any international financial resources available for those regimes.

In addition to the emergence of a progressive new middle class, the rapid economic growth improved the power of the working class. Working class organizations which were one of the groups suppressed by Francos's new regime immediately after the Civil War came to constitute even larger amount as result of fast industrial expansion, regained their strength and joined other groups pushing for reform (Carr & Fusi, 1971: 12).

Consequently, economic modernization without a political transformation was difficult to maintain in a context of impressive economic growth which also intensified economic, political and social interaction with the democratic states and peoples of Western Europe (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 78). It was in that economic

modernization that the factors in favour of a political modernization emerged and prospered. “The opening of Spain to Western capitalist economy led to rapid social change, which sooner or later had to have political consequences. Urbanization, industrialization and higher standards of living were not indefinitely compatible with authoritarian political structures (Sanchez-Navarro, 1990: 12). The proportion of Spaniards living in towns climbed from 30 % in 1950, only 30 percent 49% by the end of Franco era in 1970s, the rate of illiteracy dropped from 19% to 9% in three decades and almost a third of the working population has better paying job than the previous generation (Meisler, 1977: 191).

Therefore, another dimension of the structural or modernization approach which provided here a bridge with the international context is that the perception of the new middle class and elite towards external world and especially the EC and the European integration process (Weingast, 2004: 26). “Iberian entrepreneurs knew that their only future lay in Europe. Belonging to the European club was a mission not to be questioned” (Royo, 2002: 4). Having a significant portion of its trade volume with the Western European states, Spain realized the economic benefits of the participation into the European integration process as early as in the beginning of 1960s when it was presented application for the membership which was overturn but also opened the path leading to the signing of a preferential trade agreement in 1970 aiming at eliminating the barriers to between the two sides (Royo, 2002: 7-8; Hughes, 2000: 150).

In a similar way, the economic and accompanying social change set in motion another mechanism of the international pressure: *diffusion,* which is explained in the previous chapters. Urbanization, improvement of literacy and expansion of education to a greater part of the society, affluence and better standards of life led to “greater contacts with other societies via television, radio and travel; and more diverse range of possible protests” (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 78). Greater contacts made Spanish people living next to the citizens of democratic nations of Europe more aware of the economic gaps and political disparities with their counterparts, which would of course have some implications for the fate of the regime. Migrant workers

which were sent to Europe, large amount of tourists coming all around Europe contributed a lot to the change in Spanish society's world view (Lewis, 1992: 121).

As a result of the social change generated by economic growth and transformation, different sections of the society such as university students and teachers, workers, industrialists and even the Catholic Church began to push for political modernization (Arango, 1995: 74). However, as Conversi (2002: 226) points out "the Francoist apparatus had put all its weight behind Spain's economic expansion, but was unable to accept the decentralizing pressures which came in the same package with economic development." regime wanted to maintain its political authoritarianism. Therefore, economic development was not directly accompanied by a parallel full scale modernization of the political system. "This phase of the dictatorship was characterised by a relative degree of 'liberalisation without democratisation'" (Conversi: 2002: 225). A new Press and Publishing Law passed in 1966 replaced abolished censorship before publication; the Law of Religious Freedom declared that non-Catholic Spaniards could not be discriminated against by law and could enjoy civil marriage; obligatory participation in the army, the schools and religious ceremonies were abolished and members of non Catholic religious organizations were allowed to organize and freely practice their religion (Arango, 1995: 72).

That limited liberalization did not appease the majority of the regime's opponents, who raised more and more demands in line with the increase in their number and strength in proportion to the success of the economic miracle (Arango, 1995: 72-23). Economic prosperity produced even a larger group of working and middle class, who assessed the performance of their regime and henceforth its legitimacy not in terms of the progress achieved during the recent decades but rather in comparison with their counterparts in the other Western European countries, who enjoyed far better economic situation coupled with extensive democratic rights and freedoms absent in Spain.

IV.2.2. Post Franco Era: *Democratic Transition*

IV.4.2.1. Building Up Consent among Actors for Transition to Democracy

When Franco died at the age 82 in 1975 after 39 years of command, the fate of his regime was uncertain since his followers were still intact but without a leader (Lewis, 1992: 118-119). Political instability and economic crisis were seen by many people as imminent (Richards, 1999: 163). Therefore, nobody could have imagined such a peaceful transition to democracy and its success after almost four decades of authoritarian repression which was brought to power at the end of three years of violent Civil War. As argued by McDonough and his colleagues (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 653), "whatever its causes, the erosion of authoritarianism does not lead inexorably to the consolidation of democracy, anymore than does revolutionary upheaval automatically result in the creation of a new order." In the immediate aftermath of the death of Franco, "no group, faction or party was sufficiently strong that it could dominate politics alone" (Weingast, 2004: 30). Instead a broad consensus among the major actors in the post Franco era was necessary in order to ensure a successful transition to a democratic regime.

In fact, that was the case in Spain. As argued by Linz and Stepan (1996: 87) "the Spanish transition is in many ways the pragmatic case for the study of pacted democratic transition and rapid democratic consolidation…" Considering that the Spaniards were widely seen as a highly conflictual and violent society due to the legacy of the Civil War, that relatively peaceful and consensual transition to democracy achieved by the Spanish elite has been admired by many outsider observers (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 88).

In that process of regime change, consensus should not only be attributed to the factors that transformed the major actors of the game and their perceptions since the late 1940 but also to the compromises manifested by all, the absence of which

resulted in the devastations of the Civil War almost four decades ago (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 680).

Being the centrepiece of the Franco regime, army was one, but not the only one, of the most important policy actors of the post Franco era since it was seen the guarantor of the old regime. After the death of Franco, some prominent generals opposed the democratization movement as unconstitutional, therefore threatening to fight another civil war to ensure the maintenance of the Francoism but found themselves increasingly isolated (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 23). "The best brains in the army, the professional elite of the General Staff' wanted not to counter revolution but the modernization of a poorly equipped army" (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 24). However, they maintained their main concern for the continuation of the integrity of the state and the country (Weingast, 2004: 22).

The role of the Church, on the other hand, had become less important in an increasingly secularized society, owing to the social and economic transformation of the recent decades (Weingast, 2004: 27). Furthermore, "After Vatican II (1961-63) Catholic Church developed an ideological and institutional position more amenable to democracy (if not to capitalism than ever before" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 75). In fact, as pointed out by Weingast (2004: 27) "in 1973, the Church renounced its having chosen sides in the Civil War" and many priest actively worked for democratic transition.

A similar shift favouring a more democratic view of the society was also more apparent in the perceptions of the bureaucrats of the Franco years which had a great share in the economic modernization and growth especially witnessed during the last decades of Franco's rule as even a greater portion of the bureaucracy came to be composed of liberal minded economic experts and technocrats, having ties with both the old regime, Opus Dei and the new middle class (Weingast, 2004: 27).

Diamond (90: 237) argues that "popular pressure is crucial in including a reluctant or unwilling authoritarian regime to launch a democratic transition and to stick to it".

Such was the case in Spain as well. As outlined in the previous section, the new middle class, industrialists and workers had already raised their demand for political change long before in the last decades of Franco. Moreover, they no longer perceived that the isolationism of the Franco years was possible and pushed for the participation in the European integration process, which also required the establishment of a democratic regime (Weingast, 2004: 26). To that one must add the increase in the civil society activities particularly of student associations and of press even towards the end of Franco period, which "created a space for political organization, participation and dissent" (Weingast, 2004: 27).

Apart from the transformed and conciliatory approaches adopted by the major forces outlined above in the post- Franco era, and democratic demands from the bottom, the skilful political leadership demonstrated by the Spanish King and his newly appointed prime minister explains much of the success that made transition to democracy possible. Effective organization to mobile people for democratic purposes and obtaining their consistent support, and to avoid the risk of violence and chaos, accommodate hardliners through negotiating, all require organizational leadership in determining overall direction regime transformation (Linz (1987: 82). As Diamond (90: 238) puts it, "Here again the skill and judgement of political leaders (in both the regime and the opposition) emerges as an important and, in some cases such as the Spanish transition possibly a decisive variable."

Then, what becomes important is the formation of wider, inclusive associations. Diamond (90: 239) argues that "the value of multiple, diverse associations is that they incorporate a broader range of society", which provides coordination of diversity, ensuring participation, and acquiring support and commitment of the wider population. That can be done by a smooth combination of effective leadership and civil society inclusion, bottom up and top down approaches.

Long before his death, Franco planned the fate of his regime as he declared that Spain to be a kingdom by, a Fundamental Law, the Law of Succession in the Headship of State and later trained Prince Juan Carlos to be the king, whose powers

were set forth another Fundamental Law, the 1967 Organic Law of the Sate (Arango, 1995: 95). The monarchy would provide legitimacy to and ensure the continuation of his regime as well as the national unity of Spanish state and society after his death (Lewis, 1992: 118). When he died, it turned out to be partly as such since the king, Prince Juan Carlos was seen as by many Spaniards "a symbol of continuity" in the midst of such a radical transformation (Huntington, 1991: 127). Thus Juan, Carlos, who was expected to continue the basic tenets of the old regime, once in power, initiated that radical change.

His role was of outmost importance, since "it was for the King to name who would organize the government when Franco disappeared and thus set the course of Spain's future" (Lewis, 1992: 118). The fist government of Juan Carlos was presided over by Carlos Arias Navarro. The King reluctantly reappointed Franco's last prime minister, Carlos Arias Navarro in line with the 1966 Organic Law of the State (Ley Orgánica del Estado) (Richards, 1999: 163). However, the new prime minister was not capable of conducting reform in consensus with the oppostion. In July 1976, the King Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suarez as the President, who set in motion the democratization process in a series of steps by establishing new rules, procedures and traditions (Weingast, 2004: 5). The tactic adopted by the Suarez administration in its rapid, albeit careful path to reform, was often avoiding antagonising too may elements of the opposition simultaneously, and acquiring considerable support (Huntington, 1991: 125). The transition, which he initiated with rather moderate and cautious reforms aiming at introducing a limited representative democracy and at the same time, trying to avoid a major break with the Franco regime, in fact, ended up with the establishment of a modern democracy with the new constitution of 1978 (Weingast, 2004: 30).

Spanish history which followed a zigzag path swinging back and forth between two opposite if not extreme sides and ideological outlooks was finally to find a stable point to settle down. In that sense, transition was the process of the formation of a consent for establishing a consensus among "two Spains…..: the Spain of blind, rigid Catholic conservatism, inward looking and nationalistic, in permanent conflict

with the open, tolerant, forward looking, cosmopolitan Spain of intellectuals and progressives" (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 10). The death of Franco changed the balance in favor of the latter but not without the consent of the other. At the same time, economic transformation of the Spanish society has eroded the class based cleavages of "the long standing propensity towards polarization between the secular left and the religious right" (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 679).

Another manifestation of that main cleavage, which had long historical track within the Spanish society, was the tension between the centre and the periphery. Spain had always been as a country of diverse regions, nationalities and languages (Richards, 1999: 171). A sizable portion of the Spaniards "tend to attach themselves to the local and regional units at the expense of loyalty to the central government: La patria is not la nation" (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 679). However, legacy and the rhetoric of the Franco regime particularly with regard to its stance to "separatism" and defense of Spanish unity were still vivid. In that sense, autonomy may lead to the destruction of the unity of Spain created by history (Carr & Fusi, 1981: 11). Nonetheless, a Spanish democratization without regionalization would not have been satisfactory within the Spanish context since regional actors demanding autonomy had long been a significant component of opponents of the dictatorship and therefore an important element of the democratic camp.

Agreement between the government and the opposition on the constitutional framework of the new democracy and also the new economy were achieved through Moncloa Pacts (Actos de La Mocloa) (Gill, 2000: 53). Through the pacts, major parties in the Cortes agreed on the terms of a comprehensive economic programme containing limitations on trade union activities and on wages, tax reforms, some control of nationalized industries and other issues (Huntington, 1991: 196). As emphasized by Richards (1999: 163), Moncloa Pacts, "which listed broad economic and political objectives and were signed by all major political parties, reflected a willingness on the part of the party's principal political and economic interest groups to cooperate in the development of a democratic system". Huntington (1991: 166) notes that notwithstanding the dominant roles played by Juan Carlos and Suarez in

the transition, *politics of compromise* manifested all relevant parties including the Socialist and Communists, "in reaching agreements in the constituting assembly on constitutional framework for the new democracy and in the so called Pact of Moncloa in October 1977" was a key factor in the success of Spanish democratization.

As argued above and in the previous section, the change of the perceptions of the major actors in Spanish politics can be attributed to several factors among which the socio-economic structural change is of primary importance. And in that, the role of intensified European economic integration and Spanish interaction with it is of primary importance. In fact, European integration processes acted as a kind of bridge linking Spanish economy to the global economy. Therefore, the absorption of Spain into the capitalist international system has fostered democratisation of the actors in Spain (McDonough & Barnes & Pina, 1984: 664). In the next section, that special contribution will be analyzed more.

IV.2.2.2. Integrating the EC into the Context of Building Consent for Democratization

The main concerns of the EC in its historical mission to promote establishment of democratic regimes especially in Europe are already discussed in the previous chapter. Regarding that mission to promote peace, prosperity and stability in Europe within a liberal democratic perspective since the end of the World War II, supporting the consolidation of the newly established democratic systems was quite a reasonable and natural policy option for the EC. Extending membership to Spain would widen the area within which the democratic ideals of the EC could apply and bring peace and prosperity to the peoples of other European countries and therefore ensuring the endurance of its own existence. In other words, "the political, economic and social stability of Spain was also a stability factor of the Community itself." (Royo, 2002: 9). Thus, whatever difficulties or problems that it may encounter in promoting fundamental values and objectives of the Community, still young

democracies of Spain as well Portugal "needed to be given a positive answer regarding their integration. Otherwise, there would be the risk of weakening these new democracies that Europe had committed to defend" (Royo, 2002: 9).

Within that perspective, the EC and the European integration process had certainly played important roles in transformation of the Franco regime particularly in terms of an economic and a limited political liberalization especially in the last decades of his rule, which is already discussed above. However, it was the death of the Franco, which provided a favourable environment for more direct and extensive role that EU could play in supporting the regime change in Spain (Richards, 1999: 177). Like Salazar's Portugal, for many decades after the World War II, the external politics of Franco's Spain were focused more on its colonial empire than on developing relations with the neighbouring European democracies (Royo & Manuel, 2003: 1). Therefore, the long period of isolation of that authoritarian regime from the rest of Europe was voluntary as well as well as imposed from outside.

"Conditionality" or rather to put in more precise terms political or democratic conditionality is the key term that captures the essence of the interaction with a country which desires to be a full member (Pridham, 1999: 60). As mentioned before, the EC presented Spain with the conditionality of having a democratic regime long before, when Spain submitted its application with a perspective to full membership, which was rejected on the grounds that Spain was not qualifying that condition (Royo: 2002). As argued by Diamond (90: 240), democratic conditionality for accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) "provided substantial long term pressure for democratic transition and consolidation in less developed South European countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal), which had been suffering a sense of exclusion under authoritarian rule."

From another point of view, the integration process also promoted the diffusion of ideas, or rather to put in other words, the European ideals in all sections of the Spanish society. In the eyes of many Spaniards, the European Community

epitomized the values of liberty, democracy, and progress that had long been absent in Spain (Royo, 2002: 4).

After years of relative isolationism, the elites in Spain were presented with the challenge and also the opportunity to establish their own democratic institutions, modernize their outdated economic structures, normalize relations with their European neighbors and finally join the European integration process which would help consolidate their new regime (Royo, 2002: 4). They certainly wanted "to be a part of Western Europe and the larger world in which Europe has a role" (Lewis, 1992: 131). Vachudova (2006: 3) argues that "moving toward European integration and away from international isolation serves as a focal point for cooperation among opposition parties and groups that have in most cases been highly fragmented and querulous." That was the case in Spain, because every major actor in the country perceived membership in the EEC as a form of political maturation which would also help to line up Spain's internal and external policies with its European counterparts and to accelerate the Europeanization and democratization of its outdated political structures (Royo, 2002: 4). That consensus among major actors at the elite level was crucial to the smoothness of post-Franco transition to democracy (Gillespie, 1990: 128).

Moreover, rather than being a simple dictation of the preferences of foreign actors, as were in many other cases, the democratic conditionality presented by the EC was a natural part of the European integration process. A new comer should internalize the basic democratic values of the member states with whom it strived to live together under umbrella of the same political structures and institutions to which each every member states have permanent delivered many of their traditional domestic policy competences.

As argued before, economic forces started to push forward for regime change long before the death of Franco since economic growth created a new middle class which believed that its interests would best be guaranteed by a democratic regime anchored in the EC and the long term political and economic stability that it would provide.

That is why Spain signed a preferential trade agreement with EC in 1970s. This fact had become more urgent considering that economic conditions in Spain as well as in many other developing countries worsened in the second half of the 1970s due to the global economic crisis caused by the second oil shock in the late 1970s and many other problems were anticipated (Royo, 2002: 11-12).

In that context, further market integration with the other European economies under the EC would open a vast market for the Spanish goods as well as its service sector such as tourism. It would provide Spanish economy with a more stable context within which to prosper. In addition, from a political point of view the Common Market was also important to Spain. The EC decisions adopted by the EC institutions already directly affected the Spanish economy sometimes more than its own national administrations (Royo, 2002: 9). In that sense, accession into the European Community would allow Spain to have greater influence on decisions taken at the European level, as it would gain the right to vote in all European institutions (Royo, 2002: 9).

From a socio-cultural point of view, the impact of integration is also significant. In the middle ages, eight hundred years of Islamic rule cut off much of Spain from the rest of the Europe (Lewis, 1992: 121). The following period which enabled Spain to acquire overseas colonial possessions and to establish a vast empire was another important factor increasing aloofness. Henceforth, although Spain had much in common with the rest of the peoples' and countries of Europe, the course of Spanish history, had set the Spanish people apart from its counterparts. While its western European counterparts have witnessed political, economic and social maturation, Spain remained committed to the ideals of Catholicism and tradition. That gap had become even wider as other countries in Europe left aside century's old animosities and engaged in the European integration process. In short, as argued by McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1984: 665), "the political economy and cultural setting in which Spain finds itself after the death of Franco have altered considerably since the Western European forerunners began to rebuild their democratic institutions."

Therefore, the Spanish people, in the aftermath of Franco's death, were facing a historical challenge as well as the opportunity of re-orienting their national identity towards a European one. In that sense, membership to the EC provided a remarkable socio-psychological incentive for regime change. Therefore in that regard, as Huntington (1991: 103) claims, "The transitions in Portugal and Spain demonstrated most convincingly that the Iberian cultures were not inherently and immutably anti-democratic." Its entry into the European Community was to reaffirm that the establishment of democracy would enable "to recover its own cultural identity, lost since the Treaty of Utrecht, if not before" (Royo, 2002: 8). That fact had become more relevant to the Spanish people, when their close neighbor in the Iberian Peninsula had just entered into the path of transformation and integration with the Western Europe (Huntington, 1991: 102). When forty-five years of Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown, Portuguese people presented their application for the EC membership as soon as they founded a democratic regime. In such a context, demands by every section of the society for change in the Spanish regime intensified remarkably. Sebastian Royo explains the significance of that socio-psychological aspect of the accession to the EC for Spain and Portugal in following sentences:

> As part of their democratic transitions, both countries embarked on new processes of self-discovery. They have attempted to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues such as culture, nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. The process of integration into Europe has greatly influenced these developments. At the dawn of the new millennium it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese have become "mainstream Europeans," and that many of the cultural differences that separated these two countries from their European counterparts have dwindled as a consequence of the integration process. (Royo, 2002: 5).

In the light of those arguments presented above, as also pointed out by Pridham (1999: 61), the prospect for membership was "an overriding strategic priority" not only for the Spanish government, but also for various sections of the Spanish elite, which was exerted and conveyed to them by various channels or networks. Along with membership to NATO, which was achieved in 1982, accession to the EC was

set by the Spanish elite as principal policy priorities to end decades of isolation (Richards, 1999: 182-183).

IV.2.2.3. Outcome of the Consent: *Complying with the Conditionalities*

It may be put forward that there existed widespread recognition among every sector of society of the need to adjust the old regime established in the early 1940s to the new historical circumstances (Sanchez-Navarro, 1990: 12). Therefore, it was not the necessity of the reform itself but rather what it would contain and how it would be achieved.

At the early stages of the democratization, the overwhelming task of the political leaders was on the hand, to assure to a majority of the people that reforms are adapting political system and structure to best internal external political, economic and social situations, on the other hand, assuring those conservatives that it is not a major breakdown with the old regime and that it preserves certain elements of the past and continuity is also necessary in many dimensions. It is even more so, considering that the Franco regime had a certain legacy still valuable to many portions of the elites and masses alike considering that it re-established and maintained for decades the social and spiritual unity though by questioned means (Sanchez-Navarro, 1990: 12-14).

The Law of Assembly was the first piece of legislation announcing political reform after Franco and replaced a Decree of 20 July, 1939, which was enacted only four months after the end of civil war (Sanchez-Navarro, 1990: 12). It granted to people the right to assemble public meeting but set also the obligation of informing the local governor beforehand and obtaining approval in many cases. A second step towards reform was taken with the Bill of Political Associations which was a significant corner stone as it legalized political parties which constitute an indispensable and distinguished feature of democratic regime as argued in the first chapter of this thesis.

The next movement was to reform the penal code since it was "a necessary step towards effective implementation of the Law of Political Associations, because up to that moment, to establish and belong to a political party was a criminal offence" (Sanchez-Navarro, 1990: 15).

The following step was to persuade the Cortes to pass Law for Political Reform, which echoed a profound change towards establishment of democratic institutional structure (Weingast, 2004: 32). Indeed, that significant piece of legislation signaled a profound change for that remnant of the Franco's regime, Cortes itself. As argued by Sanches-Navarro (1990: 8), "by passing the *Ley para La Reforma Politica (*LRP Law for Political Reform) the Cortes paved the way for radically different system of political representation, which, in fact, was to put an end to its existence" (Sanches-Navarro, 1990: 8). The initiative which originated from informal grassroots was channeled to freshly legalized political parties once the King appointed a Government led by Adolfo Suarez in 1976 (Conversi, 2002: 226). A Law of Political Reform which was largely approved in a popular referendum accelerated the democratic transition. That significant reform was, in fact, originated from reformist elements within the incumbent dictatorship and therefore a process of political change which was ignited from within the established regime legalized political parties including the communist party (Huntington, 1991: 125-6).

The Law for Political Reform paved the way for another milestone in the Spanish transition into democracy. On June 15, 1977, just a year and a half after the death of Francisco Franco, Spaniards, elected by the first freely contested parliamentary elections in Spain since February 15, 1936 a new bicameral Cortes with the authority to write a constitution for Spain (Meisler, 1977: 190). Suarez won the elections with his newly established Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Cenro Democratico – UCD) and all major parties represented in the new parliament (Richards, 1999: 163).

The transition period of the democratization of Spain reached its zenith with the formulation of a new Spanish Constitution. The approval of the Constitution by the Joint Houses of Parliament (Cortes Generales) in a joint meeting of the Congress of

Deputies and the Senate on 31 October 1978 concluded the constitutional process which began with the democratic legislative elections. Afterwards, by a popular referendum held on 7 December, the Constitution was then ratified and finally sanctioned by the King before the Cortes on 27 December (Conversi, 2002: 227).

The Constitutional process was shaped by the nationalist demands and Madrid's attempts to resist them, which had resulted in extensive political changes (Conversi, 2002: 227). Diamond (1990: 237-38) argues that "to the extent that a democratic constitution results from a broad process of popular debate, consultation and participation, it is more likely to fit the country's socio-cultural context and to be widely accepted from the beginning as legitimate". Spanish transition and democratic consolidation has proved that argument. The constitution generated the most substantial and decisive change of all, after all it was produced by a freely elected parliament and as a result of broad consensus formation process, and also approved by the public in a referendum and also by the king as well, all of which reduced the potential harmful divisiveness and henceforth boosted the legitimacy of the new regime (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 83).

The new Constitution guaranteed the protection of all Spanish people in the exercise of their human rights, their cultures, traditions, languages and institutions; declared Castilian as the official language of the State but also that the nation is openly multilingual and other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statutes (Conversi, 2002: 229).

The new constitution also tried to establish a balance between the two historically opposing trends: centralism and regionalization (Conversi, 2002: 228). Historically, in addition to Castille, which dominated Spanish state for centuries, Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia had been three major historical nationalities that preserved their distinctive characteristics within the boundaries of Spain. The new Constitution, though not explicitly mentioning each of them led to the creation of 17 Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Auto´nomas), therefore entirely changing the official map of Spain (Conversi, 2002: 228).

Therefore major political actors reached agreement on economic policy, and the first general elections which were held under the new Constitution in 1979 were again won by Suarez's UCD (Huntington, 1991: 125-6). Once more it must be emphasized here and as argued by Gillespie (1990: 128), the success of the reform process undertaken by Suarez was "swiftly fortified by an experience of consensual decision making, which involved the consultation of party leaders".

IV.2.3. Embedding Democratic Transition into the Accession Process: *Consolidation*

Spain applied for the membership to the European community in 1978, a year later than Portuguese application. The democratization movement in Spain entered a new stage when the European Community started accession negotiations with Spain in February 1979. As Royo (2002: 9) claims, "the opening of the negotiations was an explicit recognition that major changes had taken place in Spain and Portugal that needed to be protected and consolidated within the European context."

It is not easy to ascertain the exact time when the democratic transition in Spain gave way to the democratic consolidation, but some major cases in the early 1980s proved to play decisive role in the consolidation of newly established democracy (Gillespie, 1990: 129).

A major event in the early 1980s manifested how the major actors in Spain had gone a considerable way in consolidating their newly established democratic regime. In February, 1981, some civil guards acquiring support of some of the members of the military attempted to overthrow the new regime by a *coup d'etat*, but failed thanks to the King's defense of the 1978 constitution and wide-spread demonstrations in favour of democratic regime (Richards, 1999: 164). Pointing out to the fragility of the new democratic regime, that failed coup d'état showed that there was much to be done to strengthen democratic reforms. However, the stance of the King and the

majority of the population in favor of democracy also offered good prospects for the newly established democracy (Royo, 2002: 9).

Therefore, when Felipe Gonzales became premier in 1982 as a result of the second free elections, the new democratic regime in Spain had already entered into a path of consolidation (Lewis, 1992: 119-120). The centre-left PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), which remained in power for 14 years until 1996, "has successfully steered Spain towards the consolidation of democracy and membership of the EC" (Hughes, 2000: 149). In fact, for PSOE, the EC membership was seen as a political tool to in order to consolidate democracy (Tovias, 1995: 103).

The accession process *per se* contributed a lot to the consolidation of democracy. It exposed Spanish people more and more to democratic thoughts and practices, which may be evaluated as a process of socialization into European norms and values. Considering the incremental and permanent nature of the integration process, Dimitrova and Pridham (2004: 94) argue that candidate countries "become lock into a permanent integration process that makes it increasingly difficult to reverse democratization.

On 12 June 1985, Spain and the EC signed the Treaty which provided its accession to the EC after a long period of negotiations starting in 1979 (Tovias, 1995: 88)[1]. In line with the Treaty, Spain officially acquired full membership on the 1st of January, 1986, which not only echoed the end of centuries of isolation but also enabled it to be one of the most enthusiastic signatory of the Single European Act in that same year (Richards, 1999: 177). That was indeed a kind of certification of Spain's European identity, that should be seen as beyond a simple unilateral recognition or a bilateral exchange overridden by non-democratic concerns such as security but as something obtained after a long period of transformation and as a result of consensus among member states and absolute majority of the members of EP (Pridham, 1999: 61).

[1] Such a long period of negotiations with Spain and Portugal was due to difficulties in reaching an aggreement on the terms of the participation of these two countries to some major policies of EC such as fisheries and agriculture (Royo & Manuel, 2003: 14)

The accession process and the resulting membership have brought many of the anticipated advantages and benefits, the prospect of which helped to provide a consensus among the various sections of the society and elites in the second half of the 1970s for the regime change towards democratization in Spain in order to be able to qualify for membership to the EC. What acted as strong stimuli for regime change during the transition period, in fact, turned out to be important factors as well in the consolidation of the same trend later, meaning that the accession successfully fulfilled its mission indeed. At this point it is important to note that the consensus among the elites in favour of democracy and EC membership, was conducive to the consolidation of democracy in the 1980s though to a lesser extent than it was the case with the Moncloa Pact towards the end of 1970s (Gillespie, 1990: 134). But as Pridham (1999: 61) put it, "full membership has served to stabilize both political and economic expectations" upon which that consensus was built.

From an economic point of view, on the other hand, the need for economic modernization in the second half of 1970s when Spain's democratic journey started was urgent as it experienced together with Portugal one of the worst economic recessions since 1950s (Royo, 2002: 4). As in many other parts of the world, the need for reforming the economy was obvious but the same debate on the content, direction and mechanisms of a comprehensive reform was also present in Spain with the apparent likelihood of no consensus as well. In that context, the accession process provided Spain with a specific road map defining detailed conditions and benchmarks to be achieved in many sectors of the economy, henceforth helping it to avoid struggling in an ambiguous path. "The extent to which the local economy will determine how vulnerable it is to the ebbs and flows of international financial policy and the sort of financial speculation which has become so common in the 1980s and 1990s" (Gill, 2000: 23).

Under the terms of the accession agreement signed in 1985 Spain had to undertake significant steps to align its legislation on a range of sectors such industrial, agriculture, economic, and financial polices to that of the European Community. The accession agreement also established significant transition periods to cushion the

negative effects of integration particularly for tariff and the removal of technical barriers to trade (Royo: 2002: 5).

Furthermore, membership provided Spain with a permanent source of reform, keeping its economic and political structures constantly updated and henceforth permanently improving Spanish economy's global competitiveness. By the mid 1980s, when Spain was accepted to the EC, the *Acquis Communautaire* contained " 1) the custom union, 2) common agricultural policy(CAP) 3) a unique system of taxes(i.e. VAT) and (4) external trade agreements" (Tovias, 1995: 88). To those the Single European Act of the 1986 added a single market with a quite large number of legislation to comply with, which were even further extended by major treaties of the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium.

Therefore, the accession process presented Spain not only with pre-determined agenda of reform but also provided it with the opportunities to participate and shape every kind of EC decision that would later have significant impact on its economic, political and social structures. As of 1995, "two out of the thirteen members of the Commission, sixty out of the 518 MEPs and one of the thirteen judges at the EC's Court of Justice had to come Spain, which was given eight votes out of fifty-four in the Council of Ministers" (Tovias, 1995: 92-93). To that one must add the expertise on the part of the EC institutions and member states guiding Spanish authorities in their attempts to assume the responsibilities of membership and undertake quite overwhelming reform packages. In that sense, the whole process, in fact, can be seen as a kind of Europeanization of a wide of Spanish domestic policies, many of which had implications for Spanish democratization as well.

The requirements to align Spanish economic policies and structures with those of the EC also brought significant adjustment costs (Royo: 2002: 5). In that sense, as argued above, the participation into the EC decision making mechanisms with a significant voting power enabled Spain which were backed by Greece, Portugal and Ireland, to persuade other member states to introduce a Cohesion Fund, which, together with structural funds were of crucial importance in helping Spain to handle

that daunting task of economic modernization (Tovias, 1995: 97). Spain have benefited extensively from EU structural funds, which have been used to improve the physical infrastructure and capital stock of the country, at the same time contributing to dramatic increase in its trade with the Community and also in foreign investment coming from EC member states (Royo, 2002: 4). As argued by Richards (1999: 178), economic benefits of integration with the EC were spectacular, which could be best observed in the economic boom that it enjoyed in the second half of the 1980s.

The Spanish economy has grown well above the average of the EC/EU, which helped Spain to close the income gap with EC (Tovias, 1995: 98). As a consequence of transformation of economic and political structures of Spain with the accession to the EC, the economic differentials that separated Spain from the EC member states have been reduced to a great extent. For instance, since 1986, Spain's average per capita income grew to 84 percent of the EU average in 1999, which helped it to participate as original founders of the European Monetary Union in 1999 (Royo, 2002: 4). The degree of change can be seen in other economic indicators as well such as low levels of inflation, high levels of export and economic growth as well as economic and political stability.

As a result, from both political and economic as well as socio cultural points of view, the European Community, its member states, institutions and policies have been significantly instrumental in the success of Spain in its democratic transformation (Tovias, 1995: 104). In fact, as argued by Richards (1999: 177), "Nothing has had a greater impact on contemporary Spain's political life and economic fortunes than the country's membership in the European Union." Economic growth and stability, political and socio-psychological self-assurance brought by the EC membership made significant contributions to the smooth consolidation of newly established Spanish democracy. As Pridham indicates (1999: 61), membership "does not directly guarantee the consolidation of democracy; it indirectly makes it is easier for national actors to agree within a narrower range of rules and practices". The role of the EC in democratization of Spain should be seen as such.

CONCLUSION

As emphasized in the introduction, this study has arisen from the recent upsurge of interest in democratization movements, that are increasingly seen as best solutions to the global problems such as international terrorism, state failures, underdevelopment. Within that context, noting the remarkable democratic transformation process of Spain in the late 1970s and 1980s and accompanying economic growth and modernization, political prestige and influence, Spanish case is taken here as a significant success story to be examined from various aspects.

Therefore, this thesis has attempted to analyze the Spanish transition to democracy and the following consolidation of the new democratic regime within a theoretical framework. In doing so, the particular argument of the thesis was that the democratic transition and consolidation processes of Spain can not be fully grasped without acknowledging the true contribution of international factors and actors particularly those of the European Community and the European integration process. Having established the main argument as such, it strived to avoid either an overestimation or simplification of the roles that have been performed by that major international actor, the EC. It rather purported to examine the exact role of the EC in a context of its interaction with the domestic mechanisms, actors, policies and their preferences.

A general theoretical framework is necessary to analyze the democratic transformation of Spain in its accession process to Spain. However, as the first chapter manifested, democratization is a broad concept, which also requires a basic understanding of the concept of democracy towards which democratization advances. In that endeavor, the first step was to give a concise but satisfactory definition of the concept. Since it is hard to produce a catch-all definition, that attempt was further complemented by giving main characteristics of democratization, which put forward by Robert Dahl. That short examination of the concept showed that democratization entails a comprehensive process whereby the necessary institutions and mechanisms are being established and consolidated to adequately

satisfy those conditions outlined, which cover three main dimensions (Sorensen, 1993: 13): *competition, political participation, civil and political rights.*

Therefore, the next step was to examine that complex process from a specific point of view by dividing it to its main stages. In line with the literature outlined, it argued that democratization follows three broad periods. In theory, each of these specific phases should follow a certain order: liberalization, democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, in practice one stage can be skipped or the preceding one may not result at all in the following one, which may indicate the lack of a successful completion of the democratic transformation process. There can be liberalization without democratization. Therefore, the first step is the liberalization, which prepares the ground for the later stages of democratization. The transition is the main stage within which radical change occurs in establishing a democratic regime. Foundation of a democratic regime does not guarantee its fate itself. That means, a consolidation process is needed, during which the newly established institutions, mechanisms and customs are internalized by a majority of the people and main actors of the game, so that it can be stabilized.

That periodical analysis of democratization process is helpful in understanding the path towards the establishment of democratic regime. However, that may not give sufficient analytical insights as to how it is initiated, by whom and why. Therefore, the next step was to examine the how the democratization process is achieved. In that attempt, it is observed that literature of democratization presents two main schools of thought as to the causes of democratization. While structural or modernization approach stresses the role of economic preconditions of the democratization, the transition or actor/agency based approach emphasizes the role of prominent actors, institutions or personalities in leading towards establishment of a democratic regime. In other words, the structural approach argues that a certain level of economic development and accompanying socio-cultural transformation makes democratization possible while actor based approach draws attention to the role of skilful leadership, consensus among major actors etc.

Consequently, structural/modernization and actor/agency based approaches present us with another theoretical view of the subject. Nevertheless, they don't provide a complete picture of the view, as they rather tend to overemphasize domestic dimension of democratization, and hence ignoring the contribution of external factors or actors to the regime change towards democratization. Therefore, in the next chapter, external dimension of democratization was examined in an attempt to complement the arguments and the general theoretical outlook provided in the previous section. Hence, it was another analytical contemplation that attempted to sketch the theoretical framework preceding it.

Building on the general theoretical framework, it is possible to identify, as was shown in the second chapter, at least three main types of mechanisms that the external actors or factors present themselves in the democratization process that takes place on domestic grounds. First of all, dominant ideology of a certain period or "spirit of the time" as some people prefer to use, has some implication for the authoritarian regimes. Since democracy has begun to be established as the dominant ideology throughout the world, the ideas of that certain ideology find channels through which they were conveyed to the peoples in authoritarian regimes. Increased economic and socio-cultural interaction lead to the diffusion of democratic ideals therefore democratization movements in some countries have led to similar movements in other countries all around the world.

The second type of international influence arises from the conscious action of the democratic states or non-governmental international actors. That is to say, these actors engage in active promotion of democratic regimes for various reasons, which are called by some as "control" type of activities. Another external dimension of democratization is driven from the active searches on the part of domestic actors in order to find better alternative solutions to their domestic problems. That means, unlike the other two, where international context present a top down or externally imposed democratization, this type of influence is initiated from within as local actors, in search of democratic models for their regime, voluntarily adapt their

country to the democratic international context and provide their consent for regime change.

The chapter is concluded with demonstration of these three types of international influence within an important phenomenal character of democratization movements. That is, they often tend to cluster in within certain time periods, which are called waves of democratization. If that is the case, therefore one should accept that international dimension present itself in those waves through diffusion and contagion of democratic ideals, and increasing democracy promotion activities of major international actors and also increasing adaptation activities of domestic actors.

After integrating external dimensions of democratization into the main theoretical framework, it is necessary to incorporate an analysis of the democratic roles of a major international actor, the EC/EU in the international arena, which is done in the second chapter. Before detailing the particular contribution of that prominent democracy promoting actor, it was emphasized that some essential characteristics of the EC/EU provided it with extraordinary powers in that field of democracy promotion. The fact that it is a supranational institution that has joined potential competences of both a state and international organization certainly differentiated it from other international actors. That is further accentuated due to the dynamic and everlasting processes of European integration process that shapes and transforms not only the member states within but also every country in its close vicinity outside. That becomes even more significant since integration is firmly based on democratic values and norms shared by all member states.

Having emphasized that *sui-generis* case of the EU/EC, the chapter, then, attempted to demonstrate how democracy is deeply rooted in the foundation of the European integration process. In that, a particular approach, "democratic peace theory" was employed to explain the European integration from a different view point, which provides the logical framework for its later democracy promotion activities outside. That means, in accordance with the democratic peace theory, the European integration is expected to expand in such way as to promote democratization in more

countries and once democratic regimes established, to integrate them into the area of peace, prosperity and stability. In turn, that expansion of democracy guarantees its own future existence. After the theoretical roots of that historical mission of EU's democracy promotion, further attempts were made to examine its other democratic credentials and also the subject of the so called "democratic deficit" which questions that democratic credentials. It is argued that that internal discussion is arisen because of the *sui-generis* case of the EU. Unlike once and all established nation states EU is constantly shaped by an ever lasting integration process that makes its political decision making structures less comparable to its domestic counterparts. However, contrary to usual expectations, that internal discussion increases general awareness of democracy in the public, which may have positive percussions for its external actions of democracy promotion.

After having a look at the democratic background and credentials of the EU, the main mechanisms that it employs was analyzed. That was, indeed, an expansion of the control type of international influence as they were rather deliberate actions of the EU designed for promotion. In that sense, among several policy options two are examined particularly within that chapter since they are seen as more common and influential. Conditionality, often used by the EU institutions and integrated widely to its policies especially designed for its relations with non-member states is a very common tool of democracy promotion, often used by other international organizations and states. However, its overall impact in generating and supporting democratic regimes is questioned since in many cases it remained superficial and only efficient as long as EU present any country under consideration with sufficient rewards such as closer relations, aid or trade, or the threat of withdrawing those economic, financial or other types of incentives which are already been delivered to those countries. Presenting a membership perspective is put forward in this thesis as a far more influential democracy promoting tool, which EU can employ whenever it can do, since use of it is naturally limited within the boundaries of the continental Europe.

To say in more precise terms, the accession to the EU is a comprehensive and highly condensed process not only requiring candidate countries to fulfil democratic as well as quite a large number of other preconditions but also encompassing other general aspects such deliberate policies, motives and goals of the EU and its constituting member states. To those one must also add a rather casual but, considering their clear liberal ideological content, highly relevant and influential process of diffusion of ideas, values and practices due to dense interaction at every level and in every field. That process also contains positive or negative responses of a variety of actors within candidate states, that, contrary to be passively receiving the impositions from outside, already actively searching for exogenous policies and strategies to adopt as relevant solutions to their domestic problems. Therefore, the conditionality here in that particular context works hand in hand with other forms of international influence e.g., *contagion, control and consent*. The chapter further analyzes the evolution of EU democracy promotion strategies and concludes that the membership perspective is still the most influential tool at the hand of the EU.

The first three chapters established the theoretical framework of democratization and how international actors, particularly, the EU and its integration project can contribute and in fact has contributed to the democratization processes that actually take place within the realm of domestic politics. The democratization processes in the final chapter is analyzed by theoretical parameters set out by the previous chapters. The first section showed that Spanish state and society is, in indeed, a very old one, in Europe and most of the recent problems are embedded into the historical path it followed. That is to say, the establishment of Spanish state through re-conquering and its rise as global empire and afterwards long lasting decline has, in many ways, set it apart from the political, economic and socio-cultural modernization experienced in the Western Europe.

Franco era is an extension of that decadence period, in that, it isolated Spain from the democratic nations of Europe. Nevertheless, the roots of an astonishing democratic transformation process should also be dated back to the Franco era, especially the later period of his rule. First of all, the post World War environment provided a good

opportunity to observe how *control* type of international influence was demonstrated, since international actors, the victors of the war led Spain to differentiate itself from the totalitarian regimes that it was affiliated with during the previous decades. However, the external impact was limited due the Cold War environment within which Spain was seen as an important ally particularly for US.

The first stage of a long term democratization, *liberalization* was set in motion by the economic modernization and ensuing significant economic growth, which transformed the social structures. A new middle class came to constitute a larger portion of the society and believed that its interests would be more respected in a democratic regime. Social change also created a more favourable environment for the *diffusion* of external democratic ideals among people, henceforth intensifying internal demands for democratization.

Some degree of political liberalization generated by economic and social change during the last decades of Franco rule prepared the ground for a far more comprehensive democratic transition in the aftermath of Franco's death. It was the *structural* factors that had played significant roles in the *liberalization* phase of democratization. In the next phase, consensus among major actors of the post Franco era and skilful leadership demonstrated by the king Juan Carlos and his appointed president, Suarez, steered Spain towards a successful *transition* to democracy in line with *agency* based approach. However, a particular point that needs to be emphasized is the change in the balance of power between the different sections of the society in a favour of a new middle class demanding democratization. That was a natural extension of increased economic integration with other states and therefore the result of European integration process as well.

From another point of view, international actors, particularly European Community played also a more direct and remarkable role in the formation of that consensus in favour of democratic transformation among domestic actors. They were aware of democratic *conditionality* as well as a wide range of economic, political and socio-psychological benefits presented by the EC. In that inevitable but highly challenging

process of reformation and regime change, the EC and the European states under the umbrella of EC provided a much more favourable external context conducive to democratization unlike the international context during the Civil War four decades ago.

Moreover, to varying extents, almost all major actors of the Franco era had transformed and matured their perception of politics and democracy. Therefore, in the aftermath of the Franco's death, facing a tremendous challenge of democratic transformation and resulting path to membership to the EC, already having acquired a much more conciliatory nature, those major actors such as the Church, the Army, the Falange, the bureaucrats more easily agreed on the terms of democratic transition. A particular example was the Moncloa Pact in that process.

Once *democratic transition* in the face of conditionality was initiated, the accession process presented Spain with a particular agenda of economic and political reform and embedded it into a path of democratic *consolidation.* Therefore, having Spain locked into a certain path of reformation, EC enabled it to avoid stalemate or a long track of internal discussions without producing an overall long term direction for reforms. Instead, accession process familiarized Spanish people, politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals more with the democratic ideals and procedures of the EU and its member states. Political, economic and technical support accompanied to the accession provided Spain with an invaluable context for democratic transformation.

At the final stage of further embedding democracy in Spain, the political, economic and socio-cultural benefits, the prospect of which once acted as strong stimuli for initiating the democratic transition process in the second half of the 1970s, in fact were realized starting with the second half of the 1980s. By acquiring membership of an exclusive club of democratic nations, it enhanced its self esteem and confirmed its European identity. Political and socio-cultural motives were aggravated supplemented by economic and financial benefits directly or indirectly incurred by membership of the EC. Structural funds and cohesion fund, foreign direct investment

and economic stability, all creating a more convenient context for the democratic transition and consolidation.

To conclude in line with what has been argued throughout this paper, accession to the EC/EU is an indispensable dimension in explaining the success of the Spanish democratization. The EC with its increasingly deliberate policies to promote democratization particularly through political conditionality and granting membership perspective created a highly convenient context within which it became much easier for major domestic actors to agree on the terms of regime change and later to stick to whatever they decided on since democratic transformation indeed brought about many of the benefits upon which such a large and successful coalition was based. Accession into the EU ended Spanish political isolation, provided a firm ground for a long term economic modernization and growth and boosted Spanish self esteem.

Mastering what it learned from the Spanish experience, later, the EU prepared and implemented much more sophisticated policies to promote democratization especially in Central and Eastern Europe, in which it has been successful as well to a great extent. Now EU faces another historical challenge to repeat the same successes in contributing to democratic consolidation in other countries in its immediate vicinity, among which Turkish accession offers a good opportunity to further test EU's relevant policies in democracy promotion. To that end, Spanish experience should be further examined by both Turkish and EU actors from various dimensions to draw necessary lessons.

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