

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**ETHNIC TURKS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
TOWARDS A TURKISH LOBBY IN EUROPE**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Mehmet Kaan SAHİLYOL

İstanbul - 2008

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ÖZET

Günümüze dek oldukça ender olarak araştırılmış olan Avrupa Birliği'nde yaşayan Türkler, Avrupa'da yüzyıllardır varolan olumsuz Türk imajı, ve Türk karşıtı lobilerin Türk imajını daha da olumsuzlaştırma çabaları arasındaki bağlantı ve etkileşimler bu tez çalışmasında kapsamlı bir biçimde incelenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Dünyada lobiciliğinin ilk başladığı yer olduğundan dolayı Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ndeki Türk lobisi de kapsamlı olarak ele alınmış, Avrupa Birliği içindeki Türk topluluklarının etkin bir lobi oluşturmada Amerika'daki Türk lobisinin deneyim ve yapısından ne derece faydalanılabileceği kapsamlı olarak incelenmiştir. Tez çalışmasının bundan sonraki bölümlerinde Avrupa Birliği içindeki Türklerin buldukları ülkelerdeki tarihsel gelişimi ele alınmış, ortak paydalar ve farklılıkların üzerinde detaylıca durulmuştur.

Avrupa Birliği sınırları içerisinde yaşayan beş milyonu aşkın Türk ve Türk kökenlinin yarısından fazlası Almanya'da bulunduğu için bu ülkede bulunan Türk toplumunun demografik, tarihsel, ve sosyolojik özellikleri derinlemesine incelenmiş, orta ve uzun vadede bu ülkede etkin bir Türk lobisi oluşmasının ne kadar olası olduğu irdelenmiştir. Söz konusu Türk lobisi etkin ve siyasi olarak dikkate alınacak bir güç haline geldiğinde Alman ve diğer AB üyesi ülkelerin Türk karşıtı söylem, siyaset ve faaliyetlerini şimdiki kadar kolaylıkla yürütemeyecekleri, en azından Türk karşıtlığını iç politika malzemesi yapamayacağı öngörülmüştür.

Çalışmanın son bölümlerinde Türkiye'nin son 25 yılda terörle olan mücadelesi ve bu haklı mücadelenin Avrupa'daki Türk karşıtı lobilerce bir insan hakları sorunu olarak gösterilmesinin Türk imajına olan olumsuz etkileri ele alınmış, AB nezdinde etkin olan güçlü bir Türk lobisinin varlığı durumunda bu olumsuz etkilerin büyük ölçüde önüne geçilebileceği görüşü dile getirilmiştir.

ABSTRACT

The interaction and connections between the Turkish communities in the European Union, the negative Turkish image in Europe, and the attempts of anti-Turkish lobbying groups to further deteriorate this negative image were the main focus of this dissertational study.

Due to the fact that the phenomenon of lobbying first started in the United States, the emergence of ethnic lobbies in America was examined in depth, mainly with the intention of analysing Turkish-American lobbying activities more thoroughly. In the light of the experiences and organizational structure of the Turkish-American lobby, the need and capability of Turkish communities in Europe to emulate the Turkish-American example was thoroughly analysed.

Given that more than half of the five million ethnic Turks within the European Union reside in Germany, special attention was devoted to the demographic, historical, and sociological background of German Turks, and the possibility of transforming this community into a powerful Turkish lobby was discussed in detail. With the possible emergence of such a Turkish lobby, it was furthermore proposed that the German, as well as other EU member governments would not be able to continue their biased anti-Turkish policies and activities with such an ease and indemnity.

In the final sections of the study the focus shifted to the Turkish war on terror which has been going on for the last 25 years, the attempts of anti-Turkish lobbies to distort this war as a strictly human rights issue. It was argued that the existence of a European wide Turkish lobby is indispensable in coping with the defamation and slandering efforts of the anti-Turkish lobbies, and to obtain the well deserved support for the Turkish war on terror.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, when Turkey was declared as an official candidate to join the European Union, three topics with seemingly little relevance have been occupying the agendas of Turkish media, politicians, and academicians. These three apparently irrelevant issues were the ethnic Turks within the European Union, the negative Turkish image in Europe, and the lobbying activities of Turkish, and as well as of anti Turkish organizations. As any ordinary person who follows the daily media easily notices, these three topics are covered, reported, and interpreted as if there is little interrelation or connection between them, and any potential interactions between them are largely ignored. Since the early 1960s, when Turkey seriously started to aim at the European Union membership, this negligence has arguably been characterizing the study of Turkish-EU relations.

Given such a negligence regarding the connection between these obviously interrelated issues, the successful propaganda efforts of anti-Turkish lobbies even in countries like Germany, where there is a huge number of ethnic-Turkish population, does not attract much curiosity or astonishment. Fellow Turks usually do not ponder about the obviously strange phenomenon that although a significant portion of ethnic Turks possess the citizenships of the countries in which they live in, cannot form an influential Turkish lobby. The fact that Turkey, as compared to any other country, can be ruthlessly criticized without any fear of strong reactions obviously does not disturb Turkish lobbies and organizations that should normally prevent this very action from happening in the first place. It is furthermore noteworthy that this lack of understanding started to be noticed by foreign researchers and observers, while the same sensitivity seems to be lacking, to a great extent, among Turkish politicians, journalists, intellectuals and academicians.¹

¹ James Pettifer (1998), *The Turkish Labyrinth. Atatürk and the New Islam*. London: Penguin, p.152

For instance, most studies dealing with the anti-Turkish propaganda activities of Greek and Armenian lobbies do not mention the 5-million-strong ethnic Turkish community within the European Union, which could act as a counterweight against the influence of anti-Turkish groups.² By skipping this important fact, these studies simply overlook the bizarre failure of Turkish communities to counter Greek- and Armenian propaganda efforts. Whenever these studies deal with historical anti-Turkish bias in Europe, they often fail to mention how skillfully anti-Turkish lobbies exploit these existing biases in order to add further negativities into the Turkish image. By the same token, when discussing or reporting about a negative EU decision regarding Turkey, the possible reactions of a European wide Turkish lobby, or the lack thereof, is often omitted. As a result, the underlying reasons behind why Turkey is criticized in a harsher, biased, and sometimes uncivilized way, is simply overlooked or misunderstood.

It is indubitably feasible to examine the activities of Greek- and Armenian lobbies without even mentioning the existing negative Turkish image in Europe, which arguably facilitates the works of anti-Turkish organizations to a great extent.³ A study of the negative Turkish image, however, would be misleading, if not incomplete, without referring to the Turkish communities in Europe, the presence of anti-Turkish lobbies in much of Europe and North America. The arrival of Ottoman Greeks in America, for example, and their subsequent achievement of influential positions in the U.S. society can be dealt with without even touching on the anti-Turkish bias they had carried to America. By the same token, it is also not wrong to study the negative Turkish image without focusing on the activities of anti-Turkish lobbies which aim to worsen the already negative image of Turkey. Nevertheless, these abovementioned studies will be destined to be incomplete as long as they ignore the strong connections and interactions between lobbying, Turkish image, and the Turkish community in the European Union.

² With the Bulgarian and Rumanian accession to the European Union in January 2007, the number of ethnic Turks has increased by approximately one million, reaching 5 million
<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/01/12/siyaset/asiy.html>

³ Nicole & Hugh Pope (2000). *Turkey Unveiled. A History of Modern Turkey*, New York: Overlook Press, p.40

A further setback for the present day researcher who focuses on only one of these subjects is the difficult and complicated triangle which these three inter-related topics form. For instance, especially when dealing with the negative Turkish image in Europe, any researcher would be hard pressed to figure out the main responsible factor for its continuous presence for centuries. Is it rather the biases and prejudices of modern day European societies, the continuing inappropriate actions of Turkish communities in Europe, or is it the relentless efforts of anti-Turkish lobbies in order to maintain and strengthen the existing anti-Turkish image? Or, the main responsible actors for the partly failed integration efforts of Turkish communities in several EU member states; is it the ignorance, arrogance, and conservativeness of Turkish immigrants, or the European host societies who are indoctrinated to see all Turks with a medieval attitude? Or, is it the anti-Turkish lobbies that do their best in order to prevent European public opinion from seeing Turks in a more tolerant, welcoming, and warm manner?

The answer to the sample questions above is probably that all mentioned factors bear some responsibility for a given problem, but that one specific actor has the main share in terms of guilt or responsibility. Nevertheless, it is essential for the researcher to rid him/herself from all personal feelings and ideologies in order to single out the main responsible factor. Since it is extremely difficult to achieve such neutrality in such an ideologically loaded subject, studies who try to combine lobbying efforts, Turkish image, and Turkish communities in Europe often results in contradictory dead ends. It is therefore more realistic, and arguably more feasible, to compare the combined effects of these factors with the effect of a single, isolated factor.

The main focus of this study is the Turkish community within the European Union and this community's actual and potential contributions to the Turkish lobbying efforts, as well as to the improvement of the Turkish image abroad. The study will, by the same token, focus a great deal on the Turkish image and the activities of both Turkish- and anti-Turkish lobbies because of the aforementioned interactions between lobbies and the changes of Turkish

image. Since the interrelatedness and synergy between Turkey's EU aspirations, Turkish image, Turkish lobbies and anti-Turkish lobbies make these issues inseparable, an artificial isolation of a single issue will not be attempted. Thus, the study will firstly deal with the emergence and development of ethnic lobbies in the United States, as well as with these lobbies' attempts to improve the image of their ancestral homelands in America. It will mainly concentrate on Greek- and Armenian lobbies which have achieved considerable success in undermining Turkish efforts to have a better image in Europe and in the United States.

Regarding the anti-Turkish lobbies, the main focus will be the Armenian lobby in the United States while the Greek lobby both in the U.S. and in the E.U will also be dealt with special attention. The decisive factor regarding the respectively heavier focus on Armenian lobby is rather due to recent positive developments in Turkish-Greek relations since 1999.⁴ Mainly due to the relative improvements in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, the anti-Turkish activities of the Greek lobbies have decreased significantly. Even though the Greek lobbies in the U.S and within the E.U continue to exercise strong pressure on Turkey regarding Cyprus, the anti-Turkish efforts of these lobbies in other issues came almost to a standstill regarding Turkey's EU aspirations. There have even been few examples of Greek lobbying for Turkish causes, such as the Greek Nea Demokratia (New Democracy) Party's lobbying for the AKP's admission into the European Peoples' Party group in the European Parliament.⁵ In the light of these recent developments, this study will put heavier emphasis on Armenian lobbying activities rather than on Greek ones, since Armenian efforts reflect a more persistent anti-Turkish struggle, both in the recent past and in present.

Even though there is no separate section for the Jewish lobby in the United States, the arguably most powerful ethnic lobby in the world will be dealt with

⁴ According to the Official Website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish-Greek relations entered a 'totally new era in July 1999', which was further enhanced by the Greek endorsement of Turkey's EU candidacy at the Helsinki European Council on 10 December 1999.

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-greek-relations.en.mfa>

⁵ Ann Dismorr (2008). *Turkey Decoded*. Beirut: Saqi. pp. 164-165

especially with regards to its interaction with the Turkish lobby in America. Since there has traditionally been a great deal of collaboration between the Jewish American and Turkish American communities, Jewish political activism will frequently be examined along with Turkish lobbying activities. Moreover, as there are no substantial Jewish communities left in Europe due to the Nazi holocaust between 1933 and 1945, there are understandably no significant European Jewish organizations which are comparable to the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States. Nevertheless, the Jewish lobby will frequently be brought up as a striking example when dealing with the theoretic background of ethnic lobbying. Especially the success story of Jews, with regards to their achievements in the United States in less than a century, will be subject to careful study with the aim of discovering structural similarities with Turkish lobbies in Europe.

The Turkish lobby in the United States, which can arguably be considered as the most effective Turkish lobby worldwide, will be analyzed in a separate subsection, and its successful aspects will be frequently presented as role models for the Turkish communities in Europe. The organizational structure of the Turkish-American lobby, as well as its emergence after the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus will be summarized in a historical perspective. Special attention will be devoted to the achievements of Turkish lobby in the U.S despite the relatively small number of Turkish-Americans in the United States. In the same context, it will be discussed whether similar achievements can be emulated by the Turkish lobbies in Europe, given that ethnic Turks in Germany, Holland, France, and Belgium are much larger than those in the United States, both numerically and in proportion to the overall population.

Despite all of the advices and suggestions which will appear in the contexts, the aim of this study is certainly not to lecture on how to make the Turkish lobbies succeed in their efforts. As all nations and their ethnic diasporas are unique with regards to their cultural, political, and organizational characteristics, it would be unrealistic to directly apply a successful lobbying strategy of an ethnic group on another. Nevertheless, certain generalizations and overall improvements can arguably be deducted from the organizational

and activity patterns of world's leading ethnic lobbies. Moreover, certain lessons and conclusions can arguably be deducted from successful organizations of Turkish groups in parts of the globe other than Europe. These two assumptions regarding the applicability of certain lessons are the reasons why the Armenian-American lobbying organizations, in addition to Turkish-American lobbies, are selected as a focus topic in the study.

In the subsequent chapters, the geographic focus will shift to Europe, and the Turkish immigration to the EU countries will be examined in the light of lobbying theories which were derived from U.S experiences. Following a summary of mass migrations, ethnic minorities in Europe, the demographic, historical, and sociological characteristics of Turkish immigrants will be the main focus. In the following two subsections, the Turkish community in Germany, where more than half of European Union's five million ethnic Turks reside, will be scrutinized comprehensively.⁶ It will furthermore be discussed in great detail whether the strong Turkish presence in Germany may be organized into a strong Turkish, or pro-Turkish, political lobby in the long run. Lastly, it will also be scrutinized why the numerically significant Turkish presence in several European countries could not be transformed into a political lobby so far.

In the penultimate section titled 'Turkish Image in Europe and Turkish Lobbies', the main point of focus will be the difficulties of the present Turkish lobbies because of the existing Turkish image in Europe. It will be demonstrated that negative propaganda of anti-Turkish lobbies do not only manipulate decisions and minds only in Europe's national parliaments, but also in schools, newspapers, workplaces, and even cultural centers. As a result, it will be argued that, the opinions and minds of most Europeans are being indoctrinated with anti-Turkish attitudes even during their childhood and adolescence. These arguably successful activities of anti-Turkish lobbies,

⁶ According to a 2005 article published in International Herald Tribune, there were 2.6 million ethnic Turks in Germany. Thus, until the 2007 EU expansion, ethnic Turks in Germany arguably comprised almost two-thirds of the Turkish presence in Europe
<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/11/14/news/turks.php>

whose main aim is to worsen the already negative Turkish image in European public opinion, will be demonstrated through clear and concrete examples.

The final subtitle 'Turkey's War on Terror and Turkish Image in Europe', which should arguably become a separate dissertation itself, deals with the Turkish state's attempt to cope with the ethnic and religious terror which has been ravaging Turkey since early 1970s. Special attention is devoted to the attempts of anti-Turkish organizations which try to influence the European Union to condemn Turkish anti-terror struggles as minority rights violations and human rights abuses. Because these anti-Turkish lobbies often succeed in their attempts to label Turkish counterterrorism efforts as human rights abuses, the reasons behind Turkish lobbies' failure to stop these defamation activities is also scrutinized. Without denying the tragic occurrences of occasional human rights violations during the Turkish fight against terror, this section also deals critically with the European Union's discriminatory treatment of Turkey. With the help of these arguably striking examples, the successes of anti-Turkish lobbies will be demonstrated in this strategically vital area, where Turkey's moral, legal, and official right to defend its citizens is indisputable.

Even though the combined study of these three closely interrelated topics probably exceeds the scope of this dissertation, as well as the abilities of the author, an academic attempt to coalesce them into one single study was arguably overdue. Turkey has been suffering, at least for several decades, from the lack of empathy and understanding regarding its need to combine its European aspirations, counterterrorism activities, and image improvement. In order to gain this empathy, however, primarily Turkish citizens and defenders of Turkish causes should be aware of such a need. It is only through educated Turks and Turcophiles, who can eloquently summarize, elaborate and defend Turkish positions against anti-Turkish lobbies' accusations, that Turkish causes, especially Turkey's EU aspirations, can be advanced further.

ORIGINS OF ETHNIC LOBBYING IN THE WORLD

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Ethnic lobbying is the entirety of all political, economic and social activities carried out by an ethnic group constituting any minority in a country, in favor of their homeland or in favor of their ethnic kinsmen in any part of the world.⁷ As the first sentence suggests, an ethnic group does not necessarily have to have an existing homeland to engage in lobbying on behalf of the ethnic kinsmen. On the contrary, many ethnic groups have historically engaged in lobbying activities for homelands which have never existed as independent political entities. These ‘imagined’ homelands rather happened to be geographical descriptions which had previously not existed as a state, such as Palestine or Kosovo, or autonomous administrative regions such as Corsica, Galicia, and Basque country. Lastly, several ethnic groups, such as Jews and Greeks, have been able to re-establish their homelands which had existed only several centuries ago.

Historical evidence regarding the Jewish, Irish, and Greek diasporas’ success in establishing an independent homeland strongly suggests that ethnic lobbying may be conducted without the central command of an existing home country. The American Jewish Committee (AJC), for example, which is probably the strongest Jewish lobby group worldwide, was founded in 1906, 42 years prior to the foundation of Israel in 1948. Even though the AJC’s initial mission was to ‘*protect Jewish populations in danger*’, active support for the creation of a Jewish homeland was admittedly among AJC’s goals as well.⁸ In other words, the first and most important aim of the ethnic lobbies without a homeland (which generally is under the occupation of other countries or is claimed to be so) is to establish a homeland. The Jewish lobby that had aimed

⁷ The verbatim definition of ‘ethnic lobbying’ as it appears on the text was coined by the author of this study.

⁸ Official Website of the American Jewish Committee
http://www.ajc.org/site/c.ijIT12PHKoG/b.789093/k.124/Who_We_Are.htm

to set up a Jewish country from the late 19th century to 1948 when Israel was established, and today the Basque and Kurdish lobbies dreaming about founding an independent Basque Country or Kurdistan can be given as examples of the longing for an imaginary homeland.

The conception of nationality disseminating first in Europe before the second half of the 19th century and then in all over the world was arguably the main initiator of the development of ethnic lobbying phenomenon. As ethnic communities started to align themselves along linguistic and cultural lines, rather than religious ones, a new type of fraternity emerged among peoples who shared the same language, history, and culture. As states had existed centuries before the emergence of nations and nationalism, it was not surprising that emerging nations started to strive for their respective nation states. By the same token, it was arguably predictable that the notion of nationhood would soon dominate diaspora communities as well, which would also start to support the causes of their ethnic kinsmen.⁹

Even before Germany was united, for example, the Americans of Bavarian, Saxon and Prussian origins supported Prussia financially and politically in the French-Prussian war in 1870, which further suggested that ethnic lobbying has developed in parallel with the conception of nationality. Nevertheless, as the unified Germany became a more dominant power, German-American relations started to show first signs of troubles as well. As the unified Germany started to assert itself as a dominant player in world politics, a rivalry between American and German interests began to emerge especially in naval and economic areas.¹⁰ In that sense, the influence of the German-American lobby grew arguably in parallel with the increase in the rivalry between unified Germany and the United States.

Shortly after the unification of Germany in 1871, the leaders of the German Community in America proudly expressed that the immigrants who come to

⁹ Ernest Gellner (1999). *Nations and Nationalism. New Perspectives on the Past*. Oxford: Blackwell Publications, pp. 5-6

¹⁰ Official Website of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany
<http://usa.usembassy.de/garelations8300.htm>

the USA would not be Prussian, Bavarian or Saxon but German.¹¹ Such a passionate attitude arguably shaped the ethnic awareness of new German immigrants as well as of existing German-American communities. As a result of this rapidly spreading awareness, the German lobby gradually gained power from 1871 to 1917 when the USA entered the war against Germany. It was only by 1917 that the growing influence of the German-American lobby could be checked by the English lobbies, which finally managed to convince the United States to join the First World War on British side.

The turn of the tide for the German-Americans was therefore the year of 1917, when the arguably supreme British/Anglo-Saxon ethnic and political lobby of the United States finally overwhelmed the German influence in American foreign policy. As America's "*political institutions, culture, and people all had an unmistakably English cast from the beginning*", it was ultimately impossible for the German-American lobby to prevent the United States from joining the First World War against Germany¹². In other words, German-Americans were not successful in their greatest struggle in overwhelming the English lobby which was embedded in the Anglo-Saxon culture of America. Although they had managed to delay the U.S. participation in the First World War for three years, the mighty German lobby eventually lost its greatest struggle against the invincible influence of the British lobby and Anglo-American affinity.

The two World Wars which marred and characterized the first half of the twentieth century also confronted Germany and the United States twice, and expectedly reduced the influence of the German lobby in America. Nevertheless, the organizational structure and political activism of German Americans continued to serve as a paradigm for other ethnic groups which looked for a role model after having arrived in America in substantial numbers. Namely Jewish, Polish, Irish and Greek communities, which boasted substantial numbers in America in the late 19th century, openly acknowledged that they obtain several main principles and their organizational blueprints

¹¹ Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. p 46

¹² Stephen Steinberg (1989). *The Ethnic Myth. Race, Ethnicity and Class in America*. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 13

from German-Americans. For instance, American Jewish lobbies took the anti-French propaganda activities of the German origin before half century ago as an example in their anti-Nazi activities started in 1933, and engaged in successful lobbying activities to show that the interests of the Americans were overlapping with those of the Jewish.¹³

If it is assumed that the ethnic lobbying that is perceived in today's sense has existed since the second half of the nineteenth century, certain conclusions can arguably be reached by examining the experiences of the ethnic groups in the USA where these lobbying activities started. For instance, like the Americans of German and Jewish origin mentioned before, the Americans of Italian, Irish and Greek origin went through difficult processes after they arrived in the New World, and it took generations for them to gain some prestige and influence in the United States. The American Jews, who were regarded as unreliable, dirty, shifty, rude and dangerous by the American public and even by the university professors a century ago, today have established in the public opinion that these unjust accusations are examples of racism, bigotry, and discrimination.¹⁴

Today, using the aforementioned negative expressions about the Jews automatically is perceived to be racism and anti-Semitism, and the people using such expressions are considered, mostly justifiably, as racists by the American society. Though it is arguably true that few critics of Israel and of Jews in general are motivated by anti-Semitism, there are undeniably many critics of Israel who have great sympathy for the Jewish people. Thus, it can even be argued that the negative discrimination against American Jews in the past has caused a certain sense of self righteousness among the Jewish community. Because of this prevalent self-righteousness, any American or foreign politician who criticizes the arguably unconditional American support for Israel's policies is most likely to be labelled as a racist or as an anti-Semite by the Jewish organizations in the United States. In the words of John J.

¹³ Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. pp. 104-105

¹⁴ Stephen Steinberg (1989). *The Ethnic Myth*, pp. 234-236

Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, two renowned American academicians who intensively focus on the activities of the American Jewish lobbies:

“Equally important, the [Jewish] lobby has gone to considerable lengths to shape public discourse about Israel by putting pressure on the media and academia and by establishing a tangible presence in influential foreign policy think tanks. Efforts to shape public perceptions often include charging critics of Israel with anti-Semitism, a tactic designed to discredit and marginalize anyone who challenges the current relationship”¹⁵

Although the same sensitivity is not shown for insulting and humiliating of other communities and ethnic groups in the American society, it is admirable that the American public has realized their previous prejudices and unjust behaviour towards the American Jewish Community. Surely, realizing of the prejudices against the Jews by the American society is a result of the success of the Jewish society in their struggle against the anti-Semitic propaganda. Unsurprisingly, the American Jewish society has not only succeeded in establishing a respect towards the Jews while refuting the anti-Semitic propagandas but it has also raised awareness among the American society, at least to some extent, about prejudices against other ethnic groups. As it can be understood from this achievement, the American Jewish Society has not only passed an individual and social phase in as short time as two generations, but also it has made nearly the entire of the American public to accept this transformation.

Regarding successful lobbies in the United States, the most prevalent hypothesis is that in order that the ethnic groups who come from a different ethnic origin than that of the majority can engage in lobbying activities, some factors or conditions have to present in the first place. The factors can arguably be divided into two as external conditions (or, environmental

¹⁵ John Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt (2007). *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. London: Penguin, p.16

conditions) and internal conditions.¹⁶ The external factors (environmental conditions) are the conditions created by the host state the ethnic lobby is in and the relations between this host state and other countries. These external (environmental) conditions, which are shaped as a result of a historical development lasting for ages, are fixed conditions which can only be changed by the will of the host state in the middle and long term. Since these external conditions cannot be changed by the ethnic lobbies in the short term, they can be accepted as the local rules of the lobbying game.¹⁷ For instance, the structure of Canada which reflects the liberal Anglo-Saxon culture and accepts a significant part of the people coming to the country with their own will is an external (environmental) condition for the ethnic lobbies in this country.

The internal conditions are the internal organization of the lobby, its size and the elements comprising the ethnic lobby. These internal conditions can be changed with the efforts of the elements constituting the ethnic lobby. For example, the lack of cooperation and communication among the ethnic lobby that the people of Turkish origin in Germany try to establish is an internal condition for this Turkish lobby. This is because today the German government, state structure and NGOs do not officially engage in activities to impede the cooperation and communication among the elements constituting the Turkish lobby. In other words, the lack of cooperation, Alawite-Sunni conflict, lack of communication with the homeland Turkey, the sociological and cultural properties of the Turkish people that they bring to Germany from Turkey, i.e. internal conditions create the main obstacles for a potential Turkish lobby in Germany

Even if it is assumed that the German government kindles the differences and conflicts between Alawites and Sunnis, Turks and Kurds, and leftists and rightists in order to prevent the Turkish lobby from emerging as a unified

¹⁶ The terms '*external / environmental conditions*' and '*internal conditions*' were coined by the author of this study. Therefore, the verbatim definitions of these two terms are the authors' own wordings as well.

¹⁷ In accordance with the author's definition of '*external/environmental conditions*' and '*internal conditions*', these terms are further elaborated by citing Canadian political environment, and Turkish Community in Germany, respectively.

block, it will not be realistic to claim that such differences and conflicts are created completely by Germany. To put it differently, in such situation the German government cannot be accused of changing the environmental conditions against the Turkish lobby but of manipulating the internal conditions of the Turkish lobby. The internal conditions of the Turkish lobby cannot be manipulated by directly dividing the electorates of Turkish origin but by encouraging the politicians of Turkish origin to realize such division. The fact that the German political parties have been publishing Turkish newspaper announcements for the electorates of Turkish origin since 1994, who were at the time under 50 thousand people is an obvious indicator that they do not deny the political power of those of Turkish origin.¹⁸ It can therefore be argued that even if certain officials in the German government engage in subversive activities among the Turkish Community, these activities do not represent the official German policy towards German Turks.

Considering the above mentioned factors, the external/environmental conditions can be regarded as the preliminary condition in order for the ethnic lobby to be successful. For instance, it can be said that almost all of these prerequisites exist for an ethnic lobby in America, assuming that the United States has amicable relations with the ancestral homeland of that particular lobby. For example, the Americans of Mexican origin are a fortunate ethnic lobby in terms of environmental conditions since their country is on good terms with the United States, and there are over 25 million American citizens of Mexican origin.¹⁹ If a lobby is still unsuccessful under such appropriate external/environmental conditions, the reason for that are most likely the internal conditions such as lack of numbers, organization and coordination, as well as division among that particular ethnic group.

Although the external (environmental) conditions which are the most important indicator whether an ethnic group can engage in lobbying activities in the host

¹⁸ Riva Kastoryano (2000). *Kimlik Pazarlığı*, İstanbul: İletişim. pp. 231-232

¹⁹ Official Website of the U.S Census Bureau. Accordingly, there are 28.3 million U.S residents with Mexican origin, constituting 9 % of the United States' total population

http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/011613.html

state are somehow integrated to some extent, they can be divided into three categories as political, historical and geographical.²⁰ Simply put, the geographical conditions are about whether a country having an ethnic minority has borders with the country of origin of that particular ethnic minority, political conditions are about the mutual relations between these two countries and historical conditions are about the reason why the ethnic groups are in that particular country. When these conditions are analyzed it can be seen that the ethnic groups which have been fortunate in terms of political, geographical and historical conditions are today's most successful ethnic groups to the extent that their internal conditions allow.

In order that the political conditions are available for the lobbying activities, first of all, there should be good relations between the homeland (if any) of the minority ethnic group and the country where this groups is in. In case of the lack of such good relations, it is impossible to persuade the host state that their interests overlap with the interests of the homeland of the minority lobbies. For instance, although the relations between Turks and Greeks have started to improve, the half-century of bad relations make the lobbying of the people of Turkish origin in Greece nearly impossible. The people of Turkish origin who constitute nearly 1% of the Greek population barely defend their rights let alone lobbying²¹. In contrast to the situation of ethnic Turks in Greece, ethnic Greeks in the United States run very successful lobbying activities, and often influence American foreign policy towards Greece. Although they constitute only 1% of the American population, in similar proportion to the Turkish Community in Greece, the political influence of Greek-Americans is incomparably higher than that of ethnic Turks of Greece. American Greeks' political clout was most obviously demonstrated after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and induced the American Congress to impose an arm embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978.²²

²⁰ The separation of external/environmental conditions into three different subgroups, namely geographical, political, and historical, was coined by the author of this study as well.

²¹ Baskin Oran (1991). *Türk Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, Ankara: Bilgi. pp. 24-25

²² Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press pp. 172-173

Secondly, there should not be a historical struggle for land between the homeland of the minority ethnic group and the country they live in. Such struggles for land usually result when the lands under the rule of their own nation pass to the other at the end of the war and such nation become minority in the new ruling state. As a result of the wars causing such situation, the formerly ruling country and the newly ruling country become neighbouring countries, and the communities of the nation of the formerly ruling country which become minority are seen as a danger by the new state. Turks living as minority in Bulgaria and Greece despite being a member of the ruling nation during the Ottoman era, and the Russians who have become the unwanted minority in Baltic countries after the separation of the USSR can be an example to this situation.²³

The ethnic communities who transform into minority from a ruling nation due to war and occupation can barely have the chance of comfortably and effectively organization, irrespective of their rate in the general population. For instance, although almost 20% of the Israel's population is of Arab origin, the struggle for land between the Arab and Jewish communities since the establishment of Israel make it impossible for the Israel citizens of Arab origin to engage in lobbying activities in Israel.²⁴ It has even become daily news that the MPs of Arab origin who are elected for the Israel Parliament Knesset are accused of being traitors by the MPs of Jewish origin on the chair of the parliament.

We can give an example that interests Turkey more closely, which is the Ottoman Turks, constituting the majority of the population in the south-eastern and north-western Bulgaria until 1913. Although Turk-Bulgarian relations are friendly and cordial today, the Turks that constitute about 10% of the Bulgarian population do not have the chance to engage in effective lobbying due to the historical and territorial conflicts between two societies. Although the Movement of Rights and Freedoms, a party of mainly Turkish origin has

²³ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050801935.html>

²⁴ Official Website of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
<http://www.cbs.gov.il/statistical/arabju.pdf>

become the ruling partner in the elections of 2005, it is accepted by the Bulgarian politicians that the majority of Bulgarian population do not have trust in the Turkish minority. Hence, there are several European politicians and academicians who claim that Bulgaria, becoming a full member to the European Union on 1 January 2007, submitted some part of its government to a party of Turkish origin only in order to impress the EU about its minority policy. Regardless of the actual motivations of the Bulgarian strategists, the it goes without saying that the Bulgarian authorities granted ethnic Turks and all other minorities all fundamental rights according to Copenhagen Political Criteria.²⁵

In parallel with the example of Turks in Bulgaria, in countries separated from the USSR and where nearly one quarter of the population is the ethnic Russians such as Lithuania and Latvia, people of Russian origin are not even allowed to participate in political life. These two Baltic countries even rejected to give the right of citizenship to the Russian living in their country until 2004 when they became a member to the European Union, and stopped their resistance due the European Union's insistence on the issue of citizenship as a sine qua non term. Therefore, in situations where the ethnic groups constituting the ruling nation have become minority on the same lands after the wars, it has been historically demonstrated that they do not have much chance for lobbying and other political activities.

The third condition that will help an ethnic minority to succeed in lobbying activities is the historical reason why that minority is in the host state. The minorities in a host state have become minority either because they have immigrated in that country or their homelands has been under the domination of a new country. For instance, Turks in Germany, the Netherlands and France are in these countries because of immigration while Turkish presence in Bulgaria and Greece are due to the loss of previously Ottoman Turkish territories to these countries. In other words, Turks who became a minority in a country as a result of their historical homelands losing territory have become

²⁵ 'Bulgaria's Turks and Turkey's Kurds'. *Turkish Daily News*. 13 November 2007
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=88448>

minority due to the conditions out of their control. The ethnic lobbies of immigration origin, on the other hand, are ethnic communities coming to the host state from their homeland willingly and making economic, social and cultural contributions to their new country. Therefore, their status as immigrants provided them two important advantages.

As a general rule, the labour migrants arrival to the home state escaping from the difficult conditions of their homeland and acquiring a social status in their new country is usually respected and appreciated by the majority in the host state. The Americans of Italian, Greek, Jewish and Irish origins and the Australians of Italian and Greek origin were despised in the first generations but in the following generations they have gained respect and appreciation. With an optimistic approach, it can be expected that the people of Turkish origin in Germany and other European countries can accomplish a similar success within few generations as well. Given that the number of Turkish employers in Germany increased from 20 thousand in 1985, to over 50 thousand in 2000, may arguably be perceived as an indicator of the optimistic outlook for the near future.²⁶

Contrary to the immigrant Turks in Germany, the Germans in South Tyrol, Poland and former Czechoslovakia, the Turks in Bulgaria or the Arabs in Israel have had to live in the new host state which is the new occupant of their own land as a result of the developments out of their control. Since they have become citizens of a new host state without their own will, they have usually been regarded as disloyal and unreliable by the dominant national majorities.²⁷ The minorities in the example of South Tyrol, Poland and former Czechoslovakia have been partially released of these pressures as both their former and new countries became members of the European Union, but still the distrust regarding them has not been totally overcome. It can therefore be asserted that it is yet too premature in order to predict whether EU

²⁶ Panikos Panayi (2000), *Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany*, p. 224

²⁷ Kamusella, Tomasz & Terry Sullivan. (1999) "The Germans of Upper Silesia: the struggle for recognition", s. 173-175 in Karl Cordell, *Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe*, London: Routledge

membership will solve all problems stemming from the ethnic identities of minorities.

Neighbouring countries which are not included in a supra-national structure like the European Union experience historical border conflicts and minority problems in a more fierce way. The joining of one of such countries who are a party to the said conflict and distrust in the European Union does not facilitate the problem, on the other hand this makes the minority and border issues more complicated as seen in the examples of Baltic countries-Russia and Turkey-Greece. In other words, the existence of historical minorities tend to complicate the bilateral relations between the host country and the ancestral homeland of that specific ethnic group, especially if both countries are not members of a supranational structure such as the European Union.

The fact that the people of Arab origin are excluded from Israeli military service and the people of Turkish origin in Bulgaria and Greece were not given arms during the military service until recently are the most striking examples of the aforementioned distrust between host countries and historical minorities.²⁸ The distrust against the Turkish ethnic minority in Greece even came to the point of collecting ethnic Turks' licensed shotguns and hunting rifles in 1974.²⁹ Given that such scale of distrust and scepticism has not been present in countries where the Turks have arrived as migrant workers, the more difficult and precarious situation of historical Turkish minorities stand out clearly. Although immigrant Turks in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and France indubitably face discrimination in a social and political sense, they do not face official and pronounced discrimination such as exemption from army duty.

The geographical factors, in parallel with the historical developments determine whether two countries are neighbouring countries or not, and these factors have great effects on the status of the minorities who live in one of

²⁸ Official Website of the U.S State Department, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm>

²⁹ Baskın Oran (1991) *Türk Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, p. 33

these countries and being an ethnic extension of the other country. Examples for such neighbourhood-minority relations can be the Hungarians in Romania, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece and the German in the South Tyrol of Italy. These ethnic groups continue their existence as the citizens of a country next to that of they are descending from but they mainly feel connected to the country they are descending from rather than that they are a citizen of. For this reason, although the relations between Romania-Hungary, Turkey-Bulgaria or Italy-Germany are good, the countries hosting the ethnic extensions of the neighboring countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Italy do not approach to these ethnic extensions with full trust and liking.

The main reason for the distrust and antipathy of dominant majorities is the fear that these ethnic minorities in their land will eventually annex the territory they are living into the country they are descending from. This fear cannot be claimed to be very groundless when we consider the attempt of Greece to occupy Turkey putting forward the Greek minority in Anatolia as an excuse, Germany to occupy Czechoslovakia putting forward the Sudeten Germans as a pretext, and in very recent history the Serbia to occupy Bosnia Herzegovina putting forward the Serbian minority as an excuse.³⁰ Therefore, the fear that the ethnic minorities descending from a neighbouring country will lead to occupation of that host country or a war has perpetrated into the collective sub-consciousness of all European countries, and does not seem likely to vanish out of the memory of the societies in the short term.

The role of the European Union in alleviating the expansionist and irredentist fears has recently become evident, although even the EU cannot serve as a panacea for all centuries-old border conflicts. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated through the improvement of German-Polish, Italian-Austrian, and Hungarian-Romanian relations that the EU membership all concerned parties contributes to the solution of border and minority problems. After the Austrian accession in 1995, and Polish and Hungarian accessions in 2004, their minority and border problems with their already-EU-member neighbors

³⁰ Donald Kagan (1995). *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. pp. 402-404

were solved expediently. However, the continuing Gibraltar problem between England and Spain, and the border problems between the Republic of Ireland and the North Ireland demonstrated that the European Union cannot solve all border and minority issues miraculously.³¹

On the other hand, if one minority-hosting country does not share a common border with the ancestral homeland of that particular minority, it can be argued that the distrust in the host state decreases and the tolerance increases. The Germans living in Romania during the Cold War and the Turks living in the former Yugoslavia were treated better when compared to other ethnic groups in these countries since there is no common border between Turkey and Yugoslavia, and Romania and Germany.³² Arguably, the lack of common border also arguably made the minority-hosting countries relatively more confident in their territorial integrity, since a direct annexation by the minority's ancestral homeland was militarily unfeasible. Even though modern warfare has significantly improved airborne and amphibious capabilities of national armies, these substantial threats arguably affect a nation's security concerns not as much as the threat of direct invasion by land.

As a result, although the joining of two neighbouring countries having a historical border and minority issue between them in the European Union do not solve the problems fully, it is obvious that such problems become insignificant for politicians and public opinion. Today there is no justifiable reason for Austrians who can visit Italy without passport and border checks, to occupy South Tyrol, or for Germans visiting the Alsace region of France to occupy these lands again. Having the opportunity to live and work in these regions without any waiting time or permit undoubtedly plays a significant role in the decrease of irredentist notions among EU citizens. Thus, the project of a borderless Europe significantly reduced, if not wholly eradicated, the mutual irredentist claims of EU member states.

³¹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/278251.stm>

³² Banu Avar (2006). *Sınırlar Arasında. Hüzünün toprağı Balkanlar'dan geleceğın gücü Avrasya'ya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, pp.24-26,

The single most important blow dealt to the aspirations of irredentist and ultranationalist groups within the European Union was arguably the Schengen Agreement, which aimed at the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders within the EU. The Schengen Convention, which was based on the Schengen Agreement in 1985, was signed in June 1990, and came into effect in March 1995.³³ As of 2008, all European Union member countries with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania, have become signatories to the Schengen Convention, which allowed their respective citizens to travel freely between the signatory states. The five remaining EU member states mentioned above, as well as non-EU member Switzerland, officially declared that they intend to implement the Schengen Convention in the future.³⁴

Even though the Schengen Convention is officially only one of the numerous conventions which have become part of the European Union's body of legislation, its psychological effect on the EU citizens have arguably been significant. By effectively removing border checks between Hungary and Slovakia, between Germany and Poland, between Austria and Italy, and between Czech Republic and Germany, for example, the Schengen Convention effectively cures the national psyches of these countries the histories of which were characterized by border conflicts. Germans, for example, who were born in the Sudetenland, which has become part of Czech Republic after the Second World War, may freely visit and even live in this region without requiring the permission of Czech authorities. This newly acquired freedom, in turn, greatly reduces the incentives of the German ultranationalists and irredentists to seek the return of the Sudetenland to German sovereignty.

However, the border and minority issues between the controversial states which are not fully or partially joined in the EU still continue fiercely. The tensions between EU member Greece and EU candidate Turkey for nearly

³³ Official Website of the European Commission
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm

³⁴ Slovak Ministry of Interior Official Webpage
http://www.minv.sk/schengen/?co=europa_a_schengen&lang=en

half century, the conflicts for Kosovo region and Albanian minority between Serbia and Albania continue fiercely and intensively. Although Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which are known to be the Baltic countries became a full member of the EU in 2004, the problems of the people of Russian origin are not solved fully. The Baltic countries which were promised membership in 1990s from the European Union may not have the motivation to make improvements with regard to the people of Russian origin on their land. Since Russia is not expected to join the EU in seeable future, it does not seem possible that there would be a positive change in the status of the Russian origin people who are mistreated in Baltic countries.

Like the Baltic countries, Greek Administration of Cyprus became a full member of the European Union in 2004, but the border and minority issues between it and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which was left outside the EU, still continue. The failure of the European Union to unite Cyprus thorough enlargement created bitter resentment even in several European countries. Especially, accepting the Greek Region of Cyprus into the EU like an award for the Cyprus Greeks who rejected the solution plan after the referendum made in both sections of Cyprus in April 2004, and like a punishment the Cyprus Turks who accepted the Annan Plan, has made the tension and division in Cyprus more serious.³⁵ After 2004, it has arguably become impossible for the European Union to convince Turkish Cypriots that their security and dignity could be guaranteed by Europeans in case of future interethnic conflicts.

The European Union which surrendered to the blackmail of EU member Greece which has arguably considered Cyprus as its ethnic and political extension has become a union of states under the domination of nepotism rather than justice with this unjust attitude. With the Greek Cypriot entry into the EU, the Greek influence in the Union was further increased, and the number of EU countries which were willing to veto Turkish accession due to the Turkish-Greek problems was increased to two. The Greek Cypriot

³⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1021835.stm

membership in the Union thus exacerbated Turkish expectations of a just solution to the Cyprus problem. It furthermore strengthened the already existing Turkish sentiment that “*Greece will always ultimately control policy in Brussels, and Turkey will never move closer to the Holy Grail of full membership*”.³⁶

Since these continuing border and minority issues of Europe started even before the birth of the European Union, it is obvious that the emergence and expansion of the EU has not solved these problems instantly or completely. While the prospect of European enlargement undoubtedly contributed to the solution of German-Polish, Hungarian-Romanian, and Italian-Austrian minority conflicts, it has failed miserably in solving the Cyprus problem. Since it is inconceivable that the EU would not learn from its previous experience, it is not easy to understand why the EU did not attempt to solve the Cyprus problem in similar fashion to previously solved ethnic problems within the EU. The most probable explanation for EU’s deviation from its principles has been, however, the intensive lobbying efforts of Greek lobby which already been part of all EU decision making bodies since 1980. As the Greek lobbyists intensively campaigned for the EU accession of the Greek-Cypriot administered part of the island, the European Union finally bowed to Greek pressure in 2004 in exchange for few symbolic assurances and gestures towards Turkey.

Through its blatant failure in promoting a satisfactory solution in Cyprus, the European Union arguably compromised on its traditional policy of including or excluding both parties involved in a political and military conflict, and thus damaged its reputation for neutrality. While it was arguably also a wrong decision to permit Greek accession to the EU without admitting Turkey, that mistake became even more blatant with the admittance of Greek-controlled part of Cyprus. Especially in the light of Greek-Cypriot rejection of the U.N

³⁶ James Pettifer (1998), *The Turkish Labyrinth. Atatürk and the New Islam*. London: Penguin. pp. 165-166

sponsored reunification plan, the Greek tendency towards intransigence in Cyprus became most evident.³⁷

Hence, Greece and the Greek-Cypriots gained a strong trump card against Turkey who wanted to join to a structure they were already in, and obtained an opportunity to intensify their well-disguised blackmails and anti-Turkish and propaganda. By leaving the Turkish Cypriot Community outside the decision making mechanisms of the Union, the EU furthermore deprived Turkish lobbies of the opportunity to have an insider voice within the EU. Instead of using the prospect of EU enlargement as an incentive for dialog and cooperation, the EU has provided the Greek Cypriots with an enormous incentive for being permanently intransigent towards the Turkish Cypriots. If this intransigence, strongly encouraged by the pro-Greek stance of the EU, will permanently undermine EU-Turkish relations in the future, remains yet to be seen.

Consequently, it can be argued that the aggregate influence of ethnic lobbying has constantly been growing on a global scale, both at national, as well as supranational level. As the accomplishments of the Jewish lobby in the United States present a clear example of successful lobbying efforts on national level, Greek lobbying at the European Union presents a revealing example of the more recent phenomenon of lobbying at supranational level. As the definitions as well as perceptions regarding ethnic lobbying constantly changes, however, it is inevitable that even the most successful lobbies face unexpected changes and challenges. Due to these frequent and unexpected changes, however, emerging lobbies such as the Turkish organizations in Europe may find it even harder to adapt to the rules of unpredictable lobbying environments and political struggle.

³⁷ Ann Dismorr (2008). *Turkey Decoded*. Beirut: Saqi. pp. 153-154.

ETHNIC LOBBYING THROUGH DIFFERENT THEORIES' PERSPECTIVES

The starting point for any theoretic background study regarding ethnic lobbying is indubitably the United States of America, where the namesake phenomenon first started more than a century ago. Especially following the period between 1840 and 1880, when eight million Europeans had arrived in the United States, ethnic lobbying among the second generation immigrants became ever more visible. In the following wave of immigration between 1880 and 1930, 24 million more Europeans immigrated to the United States, constituting '*the largest population movement in recorded history*'.³⁸ Even though it took generally at least one generation before the arriving ethnic communities started to lobby on behalf of their ancestral homelands, the United States thus became the first country to familiarize itself with the phenomenon of ethnic lobbying.

Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that it was first American academicians and historians who, in the late 19th century, started to focus on ethnic influence issues. Due to these studies of American researchers the first phase of lobbying activities were recorded, evaluated, and interpreted in an increasingly scientific fashion. Consequently, many competing theories regarding the influence of ethnic lobbies were created by American academicians, whose attitudes and theories were, in turn, probably influenced by their own ethnic backgrounds. It was only in the second half of the twentieth century, that Western European academicians and researchers started to apply these American-born theories to their continent as they started to receive large waves of labor migrants.

The first theory which attempts to explain the influence of ethnic lobbies is the 'elitist' theory, which strongly opposed the idea that ethnic groups should, and did, not have an influence on American foreign policy. According to the elitist school, foreign policy is determined by a group of elites who is immune to

³⁸ Stephen Steinberg (1989). *The Ethnic Myth. Race, Ethnicity and Class in America*. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 33-35

ethnic lobbies' pressure, and cannot be intimidated by the pressure of the ballot box. Since it is mostly the U.S administration which suffers from the ethnic politicking of vulnerable Congressmen, elitism has traditionally been a favorite ideology of members of American governments. Although most American presidents and administrators had arguably enlisted the support of major ethnic groups throughout their election campaigns, they overwhelmingly embrace the elitist ideology once they are elected to the office. According to researcher and academician Alexander Deconde, the elitist school of thought

“insists that an elite based on class, ancestry, or other connections, and seemingly immune to minority and other pressures, has always made basic foreign policy. Prominent professional bureaucrats and diplomats, as well as academics, are convinced that it should continue to do so. They condemn what they perceive as the subordination of policy-making to domestic exigencies and deplore especially any dependence it may have on minority politics. They believe that foreign policy should not have to rely on popular support through the ballot box or on the vagaries of public opinion expressed through different means.”³⁹

The elitist school of thought arguably compromises on democratic accountability at the expense of rendering foreign policy immune to ethnic- and other lobby groups' pressures. By basing their assumption on the perfect and impeccable experience of a country's foreign ministry and diplomats, the elitists consider the influence and interference of interest groups in foreign policy detrimental. Hence, supporters of the elitist school usually respond to the accusation of democratic deficit that the politicians do not follow elitist guidelines betray both their constituencies and their country. As elitists believe that the final foreign policy of a country will be determined by elitist groups, the amount of money and other favors spent by lobbying groups will be useless regardless. Therefore, elitists believe in the sincerity and straightforwardness of refusing any favors or financial contributions from ethnic pressure groups, as these contributions will not change the foreign policy regardless.

³⁹ Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, p.3

The major setback of the elitist theory is its inability to determine if and when the incursion of ethnic lobbyists into these elite groups can be detected successfully. Especially in a country like the United States, where the British and Jewish lobbies have literally merged with American ruling circles, it may be impossible to distinguish between a carefully disguised ethnic lobbyist and a member of the elite group. This type of 'undercover' ethnic lobbying, on the other hand, may be even more detrimental to a country's foreign policy than overt and straightforward versions of ethnic lobbying. While a country's foreign ministry and administration may resist effectively the overt pressures of powerful ethnic lobbies, the same resistance may not be shown against covert infiltrations into elitist decision making mechanisms.

The other important and related criticism against elitist foreign policy is its lack of democratic accountability. Since it is one of the fundamental assumptions of the elitist approach that public opinion is very prone to hysteria and chauvinism, supporters of elitism openly admit to such a lack of democratic control. The supporters of elitist perspective also respond to this criticism that the notion of democratic accountability is present during elections, when the overall performance and foreign policy of each government is evaluated by the electorate.⁴⁰ Thus, supporters of the elitist school argue, the lack of democratic accountability claim may have a point only in countries where there are no free and periodic elections. In contrast, according to the supporters of the elitist school, the electorate may reward or punish the 'elitist' governments during elections by reelecting or removing them, respectively.

The assimilation theory, which has been starting to gain wide acceptance since the 1960s, acknowledges the prior influences of ethnic lobbies in American foreign policy, but claims that this influence has ended in recent times. The supporters of assimilation school based their claims on the fact that the majority of German, Irish, Jewish, Italian immigrants to the United States have been assimilated into the mainstream American society.

⁴⁰Even though the defence of elitist school through free, periodic elections has generally characterized the supporters of troubled Latin American democracies, it can arguably be applied universally.
<http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7295.html>

Accordingly, as the second, third, and fourth generations of immigrants eventually lose their connections with their ancestral homelands, their voting patterns become independent from their ethnic background. Thus, the argument goes, while a first generation Italian American votes with her ethnic Italian consciousness, a third or fourth generation Italian American votes with her mainstream American values.

Another important point of assimilation theory with specific regard to the United States is that ethnic groups have been hybridizing while assimilating. Due to increasing levels of intermarriage, the process of assimilation was facilitated as well as accelerated. As it would be much more difficult for an American citizen with multiple ancestries to follow the issues of all of her ancestral homeland, it would also be easier for her to join mainstream Americans. Hence, she will most likely become less inclined to think, vote, and act according to the specific mixture of her ethnic identities. American political scientist Gabriel Almond, basing his claim on this statistical fact, declared the victory of assimilation theory with special regard to foreign policy, and stated the American foreign policy was finally liberated from the pressures of ethnic lobbies.⁴¹

While many American ethnic groups underwent assimilation processes which has been described by Gabriel Almond, experiences of several other U.S ancestry groups could disprove Almond's assimilation claims. Although several U.S ethnic groups, such as German Americans and Italian Americans, have assimilated into the mainstream American society to a great extent, the same cannot be said about Jewish and Irish Americans. Although most Jewish and Irish Americans have been living in the United States for several generations, they have consistently resisted assimilation into mainstream society. According the John M. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, who have arguably written one of the most controversial books on the Jewish lobby in 2007:

⁴¹ Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy* Boston: Northeastern University Press, p.7

*“Making this discussion of pro-Israel groups and individuals in the United States even more difficult is the age-old charge of ‘dual loyalty’. According to this old canard, Jews in the diaspora were perpetual aliens who could never assimilate and be good patriots, because they were more loyal to each other than to the country in which they lived. The fear today is that Jews who support Israel will be seen as disloyal Americans.”*⁴²

Accordingly, it has never been unusual to hear Jewish lobby’s influence during escalations of Arab-Israeli conflict, and Irish American protests whenever there is friction between Irish-British relations. Moreover, it is even argued that the level of ethnic Jewish consciousness has been growing since the creation of Israel in 1949. Therefore, most academicians and researchers concur that assimilation theory applies only to some U.S ethnic groups, while some ethnic groups, such as Jewish-Americans, are admittedly beyond the scope of the assimilation school of thought.

The Irish, like most Jews, were initially subject to similar suspicion and discrimination due to their Catholic beliefs and their anti-English attitude, which was generally perceived negatively by the Anglophile public opinion in America. According to Arthur Schlesinger, one of the prominent American experts on American ethnic relations, *“The Irish were regarded as shiftless and drunken: moreover, they were papists, and their fealty to Rome, it was said, meant they could never become loyal Americans.”*⁴³ In other words, and in similar fashion to the Jewish case, the religious factor was emphasized with regards to the Irish Americans’ alleged failure to integrate and become full Americans. By emphasizing the Catholic and Judaic faith of the Irish- and Jewish Americans, respectively, the chauvinistic American circles arguably tried to justify the prejudices of the American white, Protestant, and Anglo-Saxon majority towards these two ethnic groups.

It was therefore largely through assimilation theory’s opponents’ concentration on Jewish- and Irish resistance to assimilation that the theory lost its

⁴² John Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt (2007). *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. London: Penguin, p.13

⁴³ Arthur M. Schlesinger (1992). *The Disuniting of America*. London: Norton. p. 29

academic validity. While the chauvinistic accusations against Jewish and Irish Americans regarding their failure to become loyal Americans have been largely baseless, it goes without saying that these two ethnic groups have largely managed to protect and maintain their ethnic identities until present. The Irish and Jewish success in becoming integrated to the American society without being assimilated, in turn, led to the emergence of alternative theories which attempted to explain the ethnic components in America.

In their widely acclaimed book 'Ethnicity: Theory and Experience', sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan claimed that the ongoing immigration to the United States has been the most important determinant of American foreign policy. In what they called the 'ethnicity theory', Moynihan and Glazer based their claims that ethnic lobbies are the single most important pressure groups in the United States.⁴⁴ Given that the United States is a country of immigrants, the ethnicity argument goes, arriving immigrants never sever ties with their ancestral countries due to the continued arrival of new immigrants from the same ancestral homelands. Not surprisingly, Glazer and Moynihan point to the unconditional and continuous support of Jewish lobby for Israel as a clear demonstration of their claim's validity.

The ethnicity theory, which utterly contradicts with the assimilation theory regarding the assimilation of arriving immigrants, is also in stark contradiction with the elitist theory regarding the influence of ethnic lobbies in foreign policy. The elitist school claims that ethnic or immigrant lobbies cannot influence American foreign policy regardless of whether or not they try to achieve such an influence. The ethnicity school responds to the elitist claim that several ethnic and immigrant groups are willing to do ethnic lobbying, and that they usually succeed in their ethnic lobbying attempts. The assimilation theory, on the other hand, retains that all immigrant groups get eventually assimilated into the American society, so that they do not bother forming ethnic lobbies after few generations. Thus, the more controversial ethnicity school rather focuses on the intents of ethnic groups in the United States, while assimilation

⁴⁴ Nathan Glazer & Daniel Moynihan (1975). *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 23-24

and elitist schools rather focus on the effects of these ethnic groups in case they choose to lobby on behalf of their ancestral homelands.

American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger furthermore defined an extreme version of ethnicity approach which he defined as ethnocentrism. Having examined the effects of ethnocentrism in the United States, Schlesinger concluded that the strongest version of ethnocentrism was present among African Americans. While acknowledging reasons such as slavery, discrimination, and segregation which may have forced the African Americans to assume an ethnocentric attitude, Schlesinger strongly criticized their ethnocentric stance which he defined as 'afrocentrism'. If all ethnic groups which were wronged in the past would start viewing American history from their own victim hood perspective, Schlesinger concluded, then no ethnic group would bother to worry about aggregate American interests:

"The ethnicity rage in general and Afrocentricity in particular not only divert attention from the real needs but exacerbate the problems. The recent apotheosis of ethnicity, black, brown, red, yellow, white, has revived the dismal prospect that I happy melting pot days Americans thought the republic was moving safely beyond – that is, a society fragmented into separate ethnic communities. The cult of ethnicity exaggerates differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives ever deeper the awful wedges between races and nationalities. The endgame is self-pity and self-ghettoization."⁴⁵

The fact that the critical lines above stem from a liberal, tolerant, and himself a German-American historian sufficiently demonstrates the strong reactions which are caused by the ethnicity school of thought. It is also noteworthy that Schlesinger, instead of describing ethnicity as a theory or school of thought, rather defines it as a cult and apotheosis. Schlesinger's term apotheosis, which literally means the exaltation to divine rank or stature, demonstrates his claim that ethnicity started to be much bigger and more important in many Americans' lives than it normally should be. In other words, the ethnicity theory arguably became much more than a school of thought which

⁴⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger (1992). *The Disuniting of America*. New York: Norton. p. 102

celebrated people's diversity, and turned into a fashionable cult which started to threaten the unity of the United States.

A further theory which, despite having initially emerged in early 20th century, starts to gain wide level academic acceptance is the school of pluralism. According to the pluralist school of thought, the assimilation approach is nothing but a tacit approval for forced Americanization. Because the pluralist school was also widely influenced by political liberalism, it furthermore assumes that human beings are rational, good natured, and aware of their individual interests. According to American sociologist and philosopher Horace Kallen, who has coined the term 'pluralism', ethnic groups can perfectly be loyal to their country of citizenship while they continue to cherish their bonds with their ancestral homelands.⁴⁶

The founder of the pluralist theory, Horace Kallen, based the initial part of his argument on his claim that German Americans, which were treated with skepticism and disrespect during both world wars, did not deserve that kind of negative treatment. According to Kallen, the great majority of German Americans historically considered themselves first and foremost as Americans, while their bonds to Germany remained on sympathy levels only. While most German Americans arguably tried their best to prevent the United States from entering the war against Germany, they served as loyal American citizens when war became inevitable. As a result, thousands of German Americans, including the chief of staff and later president Dwight Eisenhower, fought valiantly against Germany in First- and Second- World Wars.

The fact that thousands of German Americans lost their lives fighting against Germany in both world wars arguably illustrated Kallen's point that people's ethnic identities and other personal traits should not be used in predicting their loyalty and patriotism. The valiant and patriotic acts of German Americans, still the largest ethnic group in the United States, clearly demonstrated that most Americans are perfectly capable of making the

⁴⁶ Stephen Steinberg (1989), *the Ethnic Myth*. Boston: The Beacon Press. pp. 253-254

distinction between loyalty to one's own country and sympathy for one's ancestral homeland.⁴⁷ This valiance and loyalty on part of German Americans, in turn, strongly support Kallen's initial claim that they did not deserve the skeptical and negative treatment during both world wars.

Notwithstanding pluralism supporters' claims on the contrary, the pluralist liberty to have more than one ethnic identity applied only to white Americans until 1960s, while black Americans continued to be subject to discriminatory and segregationist policies. Given this widely accepted contradictory situation, many early 20th century prominent American politicians, including President Woodrow Wilson arguably subscribed to pluralist school of thought without challenging the status quo. Although the U.S Supreme Court took a courageous decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka* by acknowledging the legitimacy of racial protests as early as 1954, American politicians' hesitation in following suit with the Supreme Court lasted for another decade.⁴⁸ Thus, the world's arguably largest democracy had to live with shameful and segregationist policies until the 1960s due to racial overtones among the white Americans.

Hence, in a peculiar way, the American political leaders who started to follow pluralist policies oddly inserted tones of racism into this otherwise tolerant school of thought. While other school of thoughts such as elitism and ethnicity practically coexisted with overt tones of racism, the use of some pluralist policies along with racial segregation attracted wide ranging criticism and controversy. Especially idealistic pluralists strongly attacked the American political establishment for allowing segregationists elements to infiltrate the pluralist school of thought. Therefore, the application of pluralist tolerance only towards ethnic groups among white Americans caused a great controversy

⁴⁷ According to the report of U.S Census Bureau, 42.8 million people, who make up 15 % of American population, considered themselves of to be of German ancestry as of 2000. Thus, they continued to constitute the largest ethnic group in the United States, followed by Irish Americans.
www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-35.pdf

⁴⁸ Stephen Steinberg (1989), *the Ethnic Myth*. Boston: The Beacon Press. pp. 213-214

and division among declared pluralist, and arguably damaged the academic credibility of pluralism.

It was only after the abolition of racial segregation in the United States in the mid 1960s, that many political scientists and statesmen started to embrace pluralism in an open and enthusiastic fashion. With the end of the ongoing segregation, which had turned pluralism into a hypocritical, unrealistic theory endorsing racially discriminating policies, pluralism made a significant comeback after 50 years. Many academicians, political scientists and community leaders started to base their ideologies on pluralist principles without fearing accusations of being hypocritical. Consequently, pluralist school of thought became the dominant ideology in the United States, where people of all ethnic backgrounds started to rediscover and appreciate their differences.

Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s when Communist bloc countries involved in increasingly oppressive policies, the North American continent started to become increasingly permissive and liberal in ethnic issues. With the advent and emergence of pluralist policies, the United States has arguably become the most democratic country with regards to ethnic group and race relations. Even in Western Europe, which was in the same ideological side with the United States, ethnic repressive policies were continued to some extent. Ethnic Turks in Greece, ethnic Austrians in Italy, and Corsicans in France were repressed in varying degrees even though these countries officially belonged to the 'Free World'. In other words, the pluralist school, which has made a significant comeback in North America after 1960s, was not received with similar enthusiasm on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe.

After the end of the Cold War, advocates of pluralism in Europe overcame most of the obstacles in both Western and formerly Communist parts of the continent. Mainly due to the euphoria resulting from the end of the Cold War, most Western European countries further liberalized their minority laws in order to provide their Eastern European counterparts with more incentives to fully democratize their governance. With the prospect of becoming EU

member states, many Central and Eastern European countries also realized the need to democratize their relations with their ethnic minorities. As some EU member countries, such as Germany, had ethnic extensions in formerly Eastern bloc countries like Poland, it was not surprising that the candidate countries faced increased pressure to improve the situation of their minorities. It was arguably pluralism which provided the most appropriate theoretical framework in order for these countries to push with necessary political and social reforms. As some nationalistic circles generally opposed to the idea of granting ethnic minorities more rights, the pluralist framework was arguably useful for candidate countries' governments in devising counterarguments against these nationalistic groups.⁴⁹

Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the validity and influence of pluralism was severely shaken, even though it continues to be the dominant theoretical framework for analyzing ethnicity and minority issues. Since the perpetrators of September 11 bomb attacks were all Moslems, an intensive amount of prejudice and bias reentered the subject of ethnic, religious and minority relations. While countries of the Western world, both in Europe and in North America, so far refrained from pointing a direct finger at Moslems in general, the image and personal credibility of most Moslem communities in these countries suffered a great deal. Consequently, some countries chose to spend increased level of efforts for further integrating their Moslem minorities, and continued to make use of the pluralist theoretical framework in devising solutions. More conservative media, political, and academic circles, however, started to blame pluralism and multiculturalism for Europe's failure to integrate their Moslem minorities.

It can therefore be concluded that the few years after the September 11 events witnessed mixed results for the pluralist school of thought. A significant part of Western public opinion has still been supporting the continuation of

⁴⁹ Due to the historical complications in the German-Polish relations, conservative Polish circles strongly opposed the idea of granting the German minority extensive rights. Though Germany compromised on many other issues, it did not compromise on its requests for Poland's German minority during Poland's accession negotiations with the European Union. Consequently, Poland had to accept a new and unpopular minority law permitting the use of German at local level.
<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laender/Poland.html>

liberal, pluralist policies in order to facilitate the integration of Moslem migrants. In similar fashion, however, significant sections of the Western public already started to believe that the security of their countries was compromised because of increasingly liberal attitudes toward Moslem immigrants. As a result of this emerging fear and suspicion, Turkey's EU bid will most likely be affected due to the popular resistance towards the idea of a predominantly Muslim country in the Union. Whether this current wave of anti-Moslem hysteria can be subdued with the help of humane, inclusive, and pluralistic policies, remains yet to be seen.

NET IMMIGRATION OF VARIOUS EUROPEAN NATIONALITIES TO THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1930⁵⁰

Ethnic Group	Estimated Total
Germans	5.900.000
Italians	4.600.000
Irish	4.500.000
Poles	3.000.000
Canadians	2.800.000
Jews	2.500.000
English	2.500.000
Swedes	1.200.000
Scots and Scots-Irish	1.000.000
Norwegians	770.000
Slavs	750.000
French	580.000
Hungarians	500.000
Greeks	400.000
Danes	300.000
Finns	275.000
Portuguese	250.000
Total	31.825.000

⁵⁰ Stephen Steinberg (1989). *The Ethnic Myth. Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America*. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 41

DIASPORA LOBBIES

ARMENIAN LOBBY AND GENOCIDE ALLEGATIONS: A SUCCESS STORY

Whenever the Turkish lobby in the United States, or elsewhere in the world, has to counter hostile lobbies, the debated issue may not always be an actual problem, but also an historical event which is attempted to be re-interpreted by an anti-Turkish interest group. The Turkish lobby in the United States, for instance, has generally to cope with the powerful Greek-American lobby when it comes to current issues like Imia/Kardak islets, Cyprus problem etc., while it has to struggle against the Armenian lobbies when it comes to historical issues such as genocide allegations. Regardless of the actuality of the disputed matter, the Turkish lobby in the United States usually ends up being overwhelmed and overpowered by the numerical, financial, and organizational superiority of Greek- and Armenian lobbies. As a result, many anti-Turkish decisions, legislations, or declarations pass in the local, state, and eventually in the federal congresses of the United States. Once having been voted as a law in the United States, the same anti-Turkish legislation may be used as a springboard in other countries, especially in Europe.

The aforementioned strategy is especially used by Armenian lobbyists in the United States, so that the passed legislation would be used as a political and moral pressure tool in further countries. This clever strategy is arguably first used in France, which has a significant and influential Armenian community, and later on extended to other European countries. Even in countries such as United Kingdom and Germany, where the relative influence of Turkish communities is stronger than that of Armenians, a pro-Armenian legislation passed in France and United States can be used as an effective tool by Armenian lobbyists. These pro-Armenian legislations, once secured in the United States or France, have therefore a 'domino effect', which trigger similar decisions and legislations in many other countries.

In a strange fashion, the few failures of the Armenian lobbyists usually happen not because of the counter efforts of the Turkish lobbies, but because of the effective blockings of American administrations which intervene in order to limit the harm done to Turkey. In such cases, the American government confers with senators, congressmen, and legislators who are known to support anti-Turkish legislations, and tries to convince them that the proposed legislation is contrary to U.S interests.⁵¹ In other words, in rare occasions when Turkey succeeds in overpowering anti-Turkish lobbyists, the success is almost always a direct result of U.S governments' interventions.

While the anti-Turkish activities of Greek- and Armenian lobbies display big similarities at the first sight, these two lobbies are quite different when it comes to their methodology. The anti-Turkish propaganda efforts of the Greek lobby are almost always proportional to the amount of friction between Turkey and Greece at a given time.⁵² Whenever there is a crisis between these two countries, such as 1974 Cyprus intervention, 1987 seabed territorial disputes, and 1996 Kardak / Imia crisis, the Greek lobby is suddenly activated, and is busy trying to convince the world how justified the position of Greece is, while complaining about Turkish intransigence. When Turkish-Greek relations are maintained on a friendly basis, however, especially the Greek lobby in the United States does not try to attack or dispute Turkish positions in order to agitate the Turkish side on a continuous basis. Even though several 'Pontus Genocide Day' memorial events are organized in the U.S, as well as in Greece, it is a well established fact that neither Greek governments nor its U.S extensions wholeheartedly support these activities.

In contrast to the homeland-dependent attitude of diaspora Greek lobbies, especially the Armenian lobby in the United States acts almost totally independent from the current status of the Turkish-Armenian relations, and is focused on one single aim only. This single aim, which has partially reached its goal due to the recognition of several countries, is the recognition of Armenian genocide allegations. Especially the Armenian lobby in the United

⁵¹ Henry Kissinger (2000), *Years of Renewal*, London: Phoenix Press pp. 237-238

⁵² James Pettifer. *The Greeks. The Land and People since the War*, London: Penguin, pp. 41-43

States has successfully turned this issue into the *raison d'être* of all Armenians, and dedicated a great part of its financial efforts to reach this goal. Thanks to successful lobbying and manipulation, even the more current tragedy of Azeris in Karabagh became a less popular and less disputed topic than the Armenian allegations which has supposedly happened almost a century ago.

When the historical development of Armenian anti-Turkish activities is examined, it becomes clear that most academicians and researchers separate Armenian lobbying efforts in two chronological periods. Several prominent researchers of this topic, such as Kamuran Gürün, Andrew Mango, Sedat Laçiner, Gündüz Aktan, and Bilal Şimşir, concur in this periodical division, and agree that 1965, the 50th anniversary of the alleged genocide, is a tipping point in the history of Armenian lobbying efforts. In other words, the Armenian diaspora which has been simmering with the hateful anti-Turkish flames until 1965, started to make itself felt as an influential actor in American, and eventually in European political and academic circles.⁵³

Even though it is a well-established fact that the anti-Turkish activities of Armenian lobbies have drastically increased after 1965, this does not mean that this lobby was totally pacific against Turkey prior to this year. For instance, the United States Senate has rejected the Turkish-American Friendship and Trade Treaty, which also included the Lausanne Treaty, on 18 January 1927, mainly as a result of successful Armenian lobbying and politicking. Nevertheless, Turkey and the United States have reached a *Modus Vivendi* through the exchange of diplomatic notes only one month after the rejection of the treaty.⁵⁴ Thus, Turkish-American relations, which had been interrupted since 1927, were reestablished after 10 years despite initial Armenian resistance. Nevertheless, the Armenian lobbies have managed to put a permanent stain in Turkish-American relations in form of the non-recognition of the Lausanne Treaty, which guarantees Turkey's territorial integrity.

⁵³ Sedat Laçiner (2004). *Türkler ve Ermeniler. Türk Ermeni İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Kaknüs. pp. 58-59

⁵⁴ Bilal Şimşir (2006). *Ermeni Meselesi, 1774-2005. 3.basım*. Ankara: Bilgi. s. 163-166

In 1965, the year which signifies the 50th anniversary of the alleged genocide, an unusual and widespread Armenian activity was simultaneously launched in all countries with significant Armenian diaspora populations. Coordination efforts between local Armenian organizations in France, Lebanon, former Soviet Union, and the United States were intensified with utmost speed and efficiency. Even Armenian organization living in opposite sides of the Cold War ideological division have started collaborating with the aim of worldwide 'genocide' awareness. While Armenian lobbies in the entire world intensified their anti-Turkish propaganda and defaming efforts, Turkish authorities or Turkish diaspora organizations failed to recognize this emerging threat for at least two decades. In the words of Sedat Laçiner:

"During the entire 1980s, Ankara, which has woken up from its deep sleep due to Armenian bills and assassinations, convened few meetings, issued monotonous condemnation messages, and formed commissions which had no function or influence. Some officers were given the task of distributing brochures defending Turkish thesis, and some propaganda was made, in Turkish, aimed at themselves. The materials which were sent to Turkish missions abroad were either lost, or destroyed by Armenians. In summary, Turkish efforts were shallow, and did not achieve more than repeating the old clichés. Therefore, Turkish counter efforts neither contributed to the defense of the Turkish thesis, nor to the creation of a Turkish perspective and strategy."⁵⁵

As the author of the quote above correctly observes, Turkish diplomats, government officials, academicians, and intellectuals were all too late in responding to Armenian allegations which started to defame Turkey since 1965 on an increasing level. As a result, the first Turkish organized counter efforts, which have started to form in 1990s, had to struggle against an already indoctrinated public opinion in both America and Europe. Consequently, it has been very difficult ever since to reverse, let alone stop the damage caused by Armenian lobbyists. Not surprisingly, it has been

⁵⁵ Sedat Laçiner (2004). *Türkler ve Ermeniler. Türk Ermeni İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Kaktüs Yayınları. p. 75 (translated by the author of this paper)

almost impossible to talk about Turkish-Armenian relations without making a reference to the genocide allegations.

The strategy of approaching each and every problem in Turkish-Armenian relations from the 'genocide' perspective is acknowledged also by Armenian lobbies which did not bother to disguise their satisfaction with their propaganda tools. The Armenian National Congress of America (ANCA), which is the largest Armenian lobbying organization in the United States, for instance, declared its mission to 'influence American politics to benefit Americans of Armenian origin, and to have the 'Armenian genocide' recognized in the entire world.'⁵⁶ ANCA is also very straightforward in expressing its goal to attract more sympathy for Armenia due to the recognition of the alleged genocide. After having recognized as a 'victim' nation, Armenia will almost certainly attract more sympathy whenever it enters a quarrel with neighboring countries.

Regardless of the amount of truth in the Armenian allegations, the nature and ethnic composition of countries which recognize Armenian propaganda is very revealing with regard to the genuineness of Armenian propaganda. France, Argentina, Greece, Lebanon, and Russia, which stand out as countries which have recognized the 'genocide', have significant and very influential Armenian communities.⁵⁷ Since it is highly unlikely that the science of history is coincidentally more advanced in these countries, it is very probable that the recognition of genocide allegations is mainly a result of political influence. In other words, it is highly unlikely that some hidden historical facts can only be discovered in countries with significant, and politically influential, Armenian communities.

Since democratic systems bestow a disproportionately high voting power on monolithic voting blocks, and most Armenian genocide bills are voted prior to general elections, the accuracy and validity of these political decisions are highly disputable. Consequently, while the high correlation between the

⁵⁶ Armenian National Congress of America Official Website. www.anca.org

⁵⁷ "Hollanda Ermeni Soykırımını Tanıdı". *Vatan*. 24/12/2004

relative strength of the Armenian community in a given country, and the recognition status in that country does not totally disprove Armenian claims, it certainly casts a strong doubt on these allegations. Thus, the Turkish authorities and individuals do have an inalienable right to question the decisions and legislations of countries which revise their official history in accordance with the demands and expectations of their local Armenian lobbies.

Even though the Armenian community and its lobbying extensions are on par with those in the United States, the federalist political structure of the U.S. allows Armenian organizations greater opportunities to usurp their voting powers. Even though they are virtually nonexistent in most parts of the United States, Armenian communities in few key states, such as California, New York, and Massachusetts become important voting blocks in elections. Moreover, as the American electoral system favors bipartisan political competition between Republicans and Democrats, and few percentage points often determines the winner of a state election, concentrated groups of Armenian Americans are often wooed by local politicians. It will therefore be more explanatory and illuminating to focus on the Armenian lobbying activities in the United States.

According to most resources, most Armenian-Americans of today, whose numbers are estimated to be between one- and one and a half million, are ancestors of Ottoman Armenians who arrived in the U.S between 1875 and 1925.⁵⁸ Given that the present Republic of Armenia's population is around three million, and that the total number of Armenians worldwide is about seven millions, the relative strength and significance of the Armenian-American population becomes clearer. According to these statistics, about one fifth of all Armenians, and one third of all diaspora Armenians, lives in the United States. Given that the majority of these Armenian-Americans live in

⁵⁸ For a more detailed history of Ottoman Armenians in the United States, see: Heather Gregg. 'Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the US.' http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/13_divided.pdf

few U.S states in a concentrated fashion, the voting power of this community becomes more apparent.

The Armenian diaspora which has been immigrating to the American states of California, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Michigan, started to improve its organizational capacity and started propaganda activities after the end of the Second World War. During the Cold War years, Armenian-Americans also enjoyed wide ranging support and sympathy from the American public due to the fact that their homeland was under Soviet occupation. Like Polish-American and Ukrainian-American communities whose homelands were also under Soviet yoke, Armenian lobbying organizations enjoyed and utilized American public's moral and political support.

Because of Soviet occupation of Poland and Ukraine, American politicians also discovered new way to obtain votes from Polish- and Ukrainian Americans, which they eventually extended to Armenian-Americans as well. In order to please Polish-Americans who were concentrated in Midwestern states such as Illinois and Indiana, U.S President Henry Truman had organized a meeting with Stalin and pressed for the return of Polish territories annexed by Soviet Russia.⁵⁹ Even though such efforts did not have positive and tangible results, they almost always resulted in increased political support from the targeted ethnic group in the U.S. These experiences most probably launched a tradition of ethnic politicking in the United States, the results of which, like the current Armenian genocide resolutions, do not necessarily serve American interests.

While Polish- and Ukrainian Americans stopped their anti-Soviet activities after their homelands were freed from the Soviet yoke, Armenian Americans even intensified their propaganda efforts after the end of the Cold War. While most Americans with Polish and Ukrainian ancestry did not keep any form of

⁵⁹ Alexander Deconde. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, pp. 125-126

hostility toward Russian public, this has not been the case with Armenian Americans in their attitude toward Turks and Turkey. The emergence of an independent Armenia, far from soothing Armenian American propaganda efforts, even intensified the anti-Turkish campaigns of the Armenian diaspora.

Probably the single most important contributor to Armenian lobbying efforts in the United States was George Deukmejian who had served as the governor of California from 1983 to 1991. Only one year after assuming the office of the governor, Deukmejian contributed greatly to the Armenian genocide bill in the California State Senate, which signified the first recognition of Armenian allegations on State level. As one of the only three statesmen who succeeded in getting elected two consecutive terms to California governorship, Deukmejian nevertheless did not hesitate to use his personal clout for Armenian causes.⁶⁰ Mainly due to Deukmejian's personal efforts, many Soviet Armenians who had obtained permission to leave the Soviet Union settled in California, thus also increased the ethnic Armenian population of the state.

Another important factor which further ignited and provoked Armenian diaspora has been the Karabagh problem which has started in 1988, when both Azerbaijan and Armenia were part of the Soviet Union. Especially when Armenia managed to occupy entire Karabagh and a significant part of Azerbaijan proper, Armenian lobbying was badly needed in order to counter the world opinion which was rather sympathizing with the plight of Azerbaijani refugees. It became therefore necessary for the Armenian lobbies to further intensify their genocide recognition activities, so that the current aggressiveness of newly independent Armenia could be justified by past sufferings of Armenians.⁶¹ As of 2007, and in retrospect, it can certainly be asserted that these increased propaganda efforts of Armenian lobbies have succeeded. This success is mainly evident in the fact that the world opinion knows more about the alleged Armenian genocide than the ongoing plight of

⁶⁰ Governor of California Official Website, "Governors of California" section <http://gov.ca.gov>

⁶¹ Audrey L. Altstadt. *The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian Rule*, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, pp. 213-215

half a million Azeris who are still living as refugees due to Armenian aggression.

Due to their efforts during the Karabagh conflict, the Armenian American organizations revealed a significant difference from other Eastern European lobbies which also aimed to free their ancestral homelands from Soviet yoke. While the ethnic lobbying extensions of Hungarians, Poles, and Ukrainians follow peaceful and reconciliatory policies toward previously hostile countries, Armenia, along with its powerful diaspora, assumed an aggressive position toward a neighboring country. Its aggression was furthermore awarded in a perverted fashion by the American Congress, mainly due to the relentless efforts of Armenian American organizations. Hence, Azerbaijan was literally punished because of having suffered Armenian occupation. In Sedat Laçiner's words:

*"The Armenian lobby, which was lead by Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) successfully lobbied for the Freedom Support Act's section 907, and effectively blocked American aid to Azerbaijan for more than 10 years. The relevant expression in the 907th section read as 'until Azerbaijan stops all types of aggression and embargo to Armenia and Karabagh'. This section could be removed only in 2001."*⁶²

This piece of legislation, the injustice of which is probably unique, its approval by the American Congress, and its long duration between 1992 and 2001, is probably one of the best demonstrations of how an influential ethnic lobby may twist and manipulate the most indisputable facts. The punishment of Azerbaijan, which only responded to the occupation of its territories by imposing a blockade to Armenia, is an admirable success of Armenian lobby if the moral and ethical considerations are left aside. By the same token, this excessive relentlessness of Armenian lobby towards their Azeri neighbors is a strong indication of their potential harm which they can inflict on Turkey if their activities are not countered properly.

⁶² Sedat Laçiner (2004). *Türkler ve Ermeniler (Türk Ermeni İlişkleri)*. İstanbul: Kaknüs. p. 151

The Armenian Genocide bill, which was constantly blocked by successive U.S. administrations during the Cold War, and which could be passed only on state level, came very close to being accepted by the U.S Congress in 1990. Despite President George Bush' opposition to the genocide bill was blocked by the extreme efforts of several pro-Turkish senators. Using a political tactic called 'filibustering', Senators opposing the bill discussed about the bill for several days, thus buying time for the conviction of senators who were initially in favor of genocide recognition but who did not know much about the subject. Hence, the Armenian 'genocide' bill was eventually rejected by a very narrow margin in the U.S Senate, and the Turkish-American relations were saved from being seriously and irreversibly damaged.⁶³

The final negative effect of Armenian lobbying in the United States become more evident in recent years as intensive Armenian efforts started to jeopardize the cordial relationship between the Jewish American and Turkish American organizations. Due to increased pressure of Armenian propagandists, several prominent members of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which is one of the most influential American Jewish organizations, started endorse Armenian genocide claims. The change in ADL's attitude was most evident in the statements of Abraham Foxman, the national director of the ADL, who claimed that the Ottoman Empire's actions against Armenians '*were indeed tantamount to genocide.*'⁶⁴ By publicly claiming that the Ottoman deeds were equivalent to genocide, Foxman was arguably conducting a U-Turn from ADL's official view of 1915 events as 'atrocities' and 'massacres'.

While few commentators claimed that the shift in ADL's position was partly due to the worsening of Turkish-Israeli relations since the AKP's election victory in 2002, they acknowledged the pressure of Armenian groups as well. Especially leaders of the Turkish American organizations were quick to recognize the Armenian manipulation in the contradictory statements of

⁶³ Deconde, Alexander (1992). *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, pp. 195-196

⁶⁴ <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=82039>

Jewish opinion leaders, which tended to increasingly support Armenian claims. During an interview with the Boston Globe newspaper, Nurten Ural, president of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), expressed the Turkish lobby's view that the ADL was '*pressured to do something they really did not believe in.*'⁶⁵ By clearly emphasizing the Turkish-American view that the ADL was not solely responsible for the its opinion shift, Nurten Ural was arguably trying to save Turkish-Jewish relations from further damage while simultaneously pointing to the Armenian manipulation and interference.

Although Armenian lobbies success in manipulating public opinion in America remained largely limited to the official view of the Anti-Defamation League, Armenian propaganda activism has increased both in America and Europe. Since it usually requites at least a decade to bring a rejected bill to the Senate floor in a revised form again, Armenian lobbyists have most probably shifted their attention from the American continent to Europe after 1990. Armenian genocide allegations, which have failed to reach recognition on American federal level, eventually were carried to the European continent, and eventually achieved recognition in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, Poland, and the Netherlands. The 'domino effect' tactic, which has once failed on American federal level, was successfully used in Europe, while France, the European country with the strongest Armenian population, was used as a political springboard.

As a result, the Armenian lobby achieved its first major success in 1998 when French Senate, the upper house of the bilateral French parliament, recognized the 1915 events as 'genocide'⁶⁶. The final remaining hope of shelving the bill for the pro-Turkish lobbies was finally faded in 2001, when the French National Assembly, the lower house of the French parliament, also endorsed the decision of the French Senate recognizing the genocide bill.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/08/22/adl_chief_bows_to_critics?mode=PF

⁶⁶ 'France recognizes Armenian genocide', *BBC Online Network*, 29/05/1998

⁶⁷ 'Fransa 'Ermeni Yasası'nı kabul etti'. *Hürriyet*. 18/01/ 2001

Thus, the Armenian genocide allegations entered the French legal and judicial system, and made it illegal to deny Armenian genocide allegation in public.

Ismail Cem, the late Turkish statesman and former Foreign Minister, has summarized the nature and activities of Armenian community in France, where he spent several years of his life:

“The source of the constant friction in French-Turkish relations is the enmity and obsession of French-Armenians toward Turkey. This subject has affected the French attitude in general, and caused several crises in bilateral relations. French governments keep constantly declaring that they do not endorse the activities of French lobbies like the way U.S administrations do when an Armenian bill reaches the Congress floor. It is like saying ‘this is the jurisdiction of the Senate or of House of Representatives, but we do all in our power to stop them’. In other words, French governments also shift the blame to lobbies, their own local governments, and even their own parliaments.”⁶⁸

In his observations above, Ismail Cem certainly did not miss the similarities between the bicameral political systems in France and in the United States, both of which is home to a numerous, politically active, and zealous Armenian community. Cem is also very quick to observe that the activities of Armenian lobbies have always been used both as a ‘carrot’ as well as a ‘stick’ towards Turkey. Whenever countries with strong Armenian lobbies aim to extract concessions from Turkey, they tend to ‘activate’ their local Armenian lobbies to undertake some anti-Turkish activity, mostly in form of a genocide bill. Eventually, whenever the concessions are obtained, the administration intervenes and blocks the bill temporarily. Nevertheless, like in the case of France, it is also possible that even the administration loses control of the Armenian lobby, and bilateral relations with Turkish are damaged on a permanent basis.

Consequently, France, having failed to show the strong resistance of American administrations toward Armenian genocide bills, ended up

⁶⁸ İsmail Cem (2005). *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya. İkinci Cilt. Avrupa’nın ‘Birliği’ ve Türkiye*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, p. 49

accepting the distorted history version which the Armenian lobby has imposed upon them. As a direct result of the genocide bill, even the Turkish Embassy in France was sued by Armenians for denying the 'genocide', but was later acquitted because of diplomatic immunity.⁶⁹ It is tragic and noteworthy, however, that the acquittal decision was not based on the baseless nature of the allegations, but on diplomatic immunity.

After having achieved its first recognition in France, the Armenian lobby has intensified its efforts in further European countries with the aim of gaining acceptance for the genocide allegations. The Armenian propaganda in United Kingdom first manifested itself in 2001, when the British ambassador to Armenia publicly declared that 'the events between 1915 and 1923 should be recognized as genocide. Nevertheless, the British government soon denied this statement and declared that these events, however tragic, may not be labeled as 'genocide'.⁷⁰ A few days later, also the British diplomat retracted his statement and claimed that the expression 'genocide' was added to his words by the Armenian media. Thus, in one of the few cases, a small crisis ignited by Armenian lobbies, was solved according to Turkey's views and expectations.

Unfortunately for Turkish lobbying efforts, their small success in United Kingdom was rather an exception than a rule in countering Armenian propaganda. Thus, another significant blow was dealt to Turkey few days after 17 December 2004, when Armenian genocide allegations were recognized by Holland, which was also holding EU Presidency at that time.⁷¹ Although the concentration of intensive Turkish diplomatic and lobbying efforts on Brussels at that time was partly responsible for this outcome, the whole truth was arguably more disturbing. Even if Ankara's diplomatic and lobbying efforts were totally channeled to the Brussels Summit, the existence of an influential Turkish political presence in the Netherlands made the fiasco rather

⁶⁹ Mine G. Kırıkkanat. 'Ermenilerin Türk Elçiliği'ne açtığı dava reddedildi'. *Milliyet*. 16/11/2004

⁷⁰ Gündüz Aktan. *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddialarıç Avrupa'da Irkçılık ve Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliği*, Ankara: Aşına Kitaplar, pp. 26-27

⁷¹ Armenian National Congress of America (ANCA) website. Press release titled 'Netherlands Parliament Recognizes Armenian Genocide. 24/12/2004

inexcusable. Especially in the light of the fact that there were four Turkish MPs in the Dutch Parliament at that time, the question of how the Turkish lobby in the Netherlands failed to block the Armenian bill remains unanswered.

With the recognition of the genocide allegations in the Netherlands, the Armenian lobby also managed to link Armenian propaganda with Turkish-European Union relations. Since it is a well known fact that a significant number of political parties in Europe have traditionally been opposing Turkey's EU accession, it was hardly unexpected that the effective Armenian lobby found a way to exploit this opposition. It can therefore be argued that the Armenian lobbying organizations, both in the United States and in Europe, have learned perfectly how to infiltrate into foreign policies of countries, especially into their bilateral relations vis-à-vis Turkey.

A further demonstration of Armenian lobby's damaging effect on EU-Turkish relations was the attitude of French government prior to the Brussels Summit in 17 December 2004. Even though both chambers of the French Parliament had been recognizing the genocide allegations since 1998, the French government and ministers carefully refrained from using the 'genocide' word. This tradition of refraining from directly insulting Turkish sensitivities came to an abrupt end on 14 December 2004, when French foreign minister Michael Barnier used the word 'genocide' while referring to the 'events in 1915'.⁷² This attitude and statement of Mr. Barnier clearly demonstrated how abruptly and unexpectedly European statesmen and politicians could use Armenian propaganda against Turkey at any time.

Even though it is extremely unhealthy for both the European Union and Turkey to let an ethnic lobby blackmail and manipulate their bilateral relations, it is very difficult to claim that Armenian statesmen are concerned about this unpleasant situation. Vartan Oskanian, the Armenian foreign minister, did not make a secret of his pleasure that genocide allegations started to impede Turkey's EU aspirations. While commending Michael Barnier's support for

⁷² 'Fransa ilk kez 'soykırım' dedi'. *Milliyet*. 15 Aralık 2004

Armenian genocide claims, Oskanian expressed his satisfaction that genocide recognition had become an issue which grew beyond Turkish-Armenia relations.⁷³

Having previously achieved a significant success in the Netherlands, which has a considerable Turkish community, the Armenian lobby finally achieved its first success in Germany in 2002. Due to intensive Armenian lobbying efforts, one single sentence which accused the Turks of committing genocide against Armenians was inserted into the high school history books in the state of Brandenburg.⁷⁴ Through this single sentence, the Armenian lobby has arguably succeeded in manipulating politics also in Germany which is home to 2.5 million Turks and Germans with Turkish ancestry. Having gained political experience in the federal system of the United States, it was hardly surprising that the Armenian lobby found it easier to penetrate German politics from state level as well.

In reaction to this Armenian provocation, the Turkish community in Germany, in collaboration with the Turkish foreign ministry, started an intensive campaign in order to remove the sentence inserted by the Armenian lobby, from Brandenburg history books. In January 2005, the state of Brandenburg agreed with Turkish demands and removed the disputed sentence from the high school curriculum. Nevertheless, this time the German press rushed to the defense of the Armenian lobby, and criticized the campaign which was orchestrated by the Turkish foreign ministry. The center-right 'Die Welt' newspaper went one step further, and accused Turkey of interfering in the education policy of German states (Bundesländer).⁷⁵

Even the respected weekly magazine 'der Spiegel' which has smoothed its anti-Turkish tone in previous years, used very strong terminology in order to criticize the Turkish lobbying efforts. Der Spiegel quoted Christian Democrat

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Regina Mönch 'Völkermord an Armeniern vom Lehrplan genommen'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 24/01/2005

⁷⁵ Gudrun Mallwitz. 'Armenien wieder im Lehrplan: Platzbeck rudert zurück'. *Die Welt*. 8 Februar 2005

politician Sven Petke's criticism that 'Potsdam's education program cannot be dictated by the propaganda ministry in Ankara', which made clear reference to the infamous ministry of the Nazi regime.⁷⁶ Due to the strong backlash caused by the German press, the heavily disputed sentence was reinserted into the school books of the Brandenburg state. Thus, the Armenian lobby, supported by a myriad of several other known and unknown actors, overwhelmed the resistance of 2.5-million-strong Turkish-German community, which was in turn led by the Turkish foreign ministry.

As expected, the present German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was the leader of the chief opposition CDU party in early 2005, did not miss the opportunity to exploit the Armenian issue further. Despite her exceedingly tolerant approach towards ultra nationalistic German groups who deny the Holocaust, Merkel became an ardent supporter of Armenian allegations following the heated debate about Brandenburg history book curriculum. She furthermore acted even quicker than Armenian lobbies themselves in carrying the genocide allegations from state to federal government level. In February 2005, Merkel presented the German lower house Bundestag with a bill which required Turkey to 'apologize for its past misdeeds' and requested Armenians to 'accept the apology'.⁷⁷

For the German opposition leader, who was to become Germany's first female chancellor few months later, the Armenian bill was arguably a sign for many things to come, most of which in the form of opposition to Turkish EU membership in all aspects. It was therefore not surprising that when Angela Merkel was requested to prepare a bill which would endorse Armenian genocide allegations, she did not need to be asked twice. In the light of Merkel's persistent negative attitude towards Turkey, both before and after her election as the German chancellor, it was not surprising that she emerged as the champion of Armenian causes when she was approached by Armenian

⁷⁶ Irine Repke, Sven Röbel, Holger Stark 'Bosporus in Brandenburg?' *der Spiegel*. 31 Januar 2005

⁷⁷ Fikret Bila. 'Merkel ve İrtemçelik'. *Milliyet*. 26 Şubat 2005. s.18

organizations.⁷⁸ It was however mainly due to the skills and experiences of Armenian lobbyists, that Merkel's passionate opposition to Turkey's EU membership was transformed into a piece of German legislation shaped by Armenian propaganda.

It should be noted, however, that any level of success for the Armenian lobby in Germany will most likely have more damaging consequences for the image of Turks and Turkey in Europe. In France and in the United States, a very powerful Armenian lobby may, to a certain extent, explain the audacity of anti-Turkish legislations, since there is simply no equally strong Turkish lobbies to balance Armenian activism. In Germany, however, as the country with the highest number of Turkish citizens, ethnic Turks, Turkish consulates and organizations, should not have the luxury of not countering Armenian propaganda and slandering efforts. If, even in Germany, Armenian lobbyists can spread any anti-Turkish propaganda as they please, they can easily do so in any other country as well.

A further interesting fact about Armenian genocide allegations is that most of world's prominent academicians', historians', and researchers' firm belief in the falsehood of the genocide allegations. In 1985, for instance, 69 academicians working at prestigious American universities published a joint letter to the U.S House of Representatives, and stated that the Armenian genocide allegations have no historical base. The letter also warned U.S Congressmen that Armenian lobbies abuse American democratic system by sacrificing historical realities in exchange for material or voting support.⁷⁹ Even though Armenian lobbies in the United States did not go as far as directly accusing all 69 academicians as being Turkish agents, they arguably succeeded in downplaying the importance of such a significant declaration. Instead, Armenian organizations rather shifted focus on the publications of

⁷⁸ Angela Merkel has been considerably persistent in her opposition to Turkish membership in the European Union, regardless of whether Turkey fulfils the membership criteria or not. Two BBC articles, published prior and after Merkel's becoming German Chancellor, testify to this fact. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4695943.stm> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6121106.stm>

⁷⁹ 'Attention Members of the U.S. House of Representatives (19/05/1985). The official website of the Turkish Embassy in Washington. www.turkishembassy.org

their own institutions and academicians, and tried to counterbalance the effects of the academicians' letter.

Regardless of the amount of truth in Armenian allegations, it is an undisputed fact that the Armenian lobby aims to block Turkey's EU bid, especially by repeating its successful U.S. state-by-state strategy in all EU member countries. Especially in France and Belgium, where there are financially and politically influential Armenian communities, the Armenian lobby started a passionate campaign in order to establish 'genocide' recognition as a precondition for Turkey's EU accession. It is hardly surprising that Armenian lobbyists easily find European allies while they passionately lead their campaign to block Turkey's EU membership. Many European statesmen, politicians, and individuals find themselves willingly on the Armenian side, since their campaign gives them just one more reason to oppose Turkish membership in the EU.

It will therefore be not very surprising for Turkey to encounter another precondition of 'genocide' recognition in addition to other unexpected and indefinable preconditions such as 'absorption capacity'. If this becomes the case, it can certainly be argued that European supporters of this Armenian 'cause' are more concerned with blocking Turkish EU membership than with consoling the wronged Armenians. If and when the 'genocide' recognition becomes a precondition for Turkey's EU accession, it will undoubtedly and definitely be rejected by any Turkish government which will be ruling at that given period. It would be to naïve and optimistic, even for the Armenia lobbyists, to expect that any Turkish statesman or political party will allow her own nation to collapse under the weight of a baseless and unjustifiable accusation.

It is therefore imperative for the Turkish official circles, governments, and foreign missions to collaborate in order to explain to the world opinion the truth behind the tragic events between 1915 and 1923. In addition to efforts to convey the truth, all Turkish organizations should investigate how to reach and re-convince European public opinion about the falseness of Armenian allegations. Given that Greek propaganda and slander efforts against Turks

and Turkey has significantly decreased during the last decade, Turkish lobbies will most likely find it easier to concentrate their efforts in countering Armenian activism and propaganda only.

If Turkish counter-propaganda efforts to disprove Armenian slandering efforts becomes successful, the aggression and provocative actions of Republic of Armenia will most likely to be revealed to the world opinion. Unable to disguise behind the alleged genocide, the irredentist and aggressive policies of Armenia towards its neighbors will be much harder to justify. By disproving Armenian propaganda, Turkish lobbies would have also contributed to the science of history by freeing historical facts from the monopoly of powerful ethnic lobbies. If, however, Turkey's and Turkish lobby's efforts in disproving Armenian propaganda and slandering fail, however, the Turkish image in the world will worsen in the medium to long run. In the words of Turkish academician and author Emre Kongar:

“Accepting the 1915 events as genocide, and presenting it to the world as such, equals to the misinterpretation and manipulation of history. Unfortunately for Turkey, this misinterpretation finds its way into many countries legislations which declare that Turkey committed genocide. Without a single doubt, these legislations are very dangerous decisions, because most of the aim at the education of the youth in the respective countries. This means that, in the near future, many generations will emerge in many developed countries which will be indoctrinated with the falsehood that Turks had committed genocide on Armenians. These generations, in turn, will become the next lawmakers in these countries and serve to perpetuate the propaganda of Armenians.”⁸⁰

The biggest concern of Kongar is, according to the paragraph above, the successful planning and achievement of long term goals of Armenian lobbies. As Kongar correctly observes, some of the better educated people in California, Canada, France, and Holland will become politicians, academicians and prominent businessmen in twenty or thirty years. Just because they have learned in their schoolbooks that Turkey had committed

⁸⁰ Emre Kongar (2005). *Küresel Terör ve Türkiye*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. s. 89

genocide on Armenians, they will very probably act and decide with Armenian sympathy and anti-Turkish feelings when they reach decision making levels. Because they will most likely never find out that the Armenian lobby had been responsible for their biased indoctrination, they will unknowingly continue to serve as Armenian propaganda agents.

Given that the 'barbarian Turk' image, which was carved into European common memory during Ottoman-Habsburg wars of three hundred years ago, still survives to some extent in European minds, the effects of an additional 'genocidal Turk' image will probably become clearer. For a slightly arrogant European public opinion, which has even a hard time admitting the wrongs of three hundred years ago, it will be almost impossible to admit that the Armenian genocide was a result of Armenian manipulation. Due to this historical anti-Turkish bias and arrogance, it will not be sufficient to ask only the assistance of European countries' governments whenever the Armenian lobby starts a campaign in that respective country. It is therefore imperative that Turkish authorities, in close collaboration with all Turkish missions and organizations abroad, recognize the Armenian slandering activities as an imminent national threat, and react with utmost diligence and swiftness. Failing to do so in the short to medium run will certainly render Armenian damage to Turkey's and Turkish image permanent and irreversible.

TURKISH LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES

Especially following Turkey's failure on 17 December 2004 to obtain a clear signal for EU accession, the lobbying discussions in Turkey gained momentum again, with the main topic being the failure of five million of so ethnic Turks to form an effective Turkish lobby in Europe. Even though some media circles declared that obtaining a starting date for accession negotiations is a clear victory for Turkey, the majority of Turks rather thought that pre-conditioned and open-end negotiations were meant as an insult to Turkey. Since no other EU candidate country was treated in such an arbitrary and whimsical manner, most Turks felt that they were being humiliated for wanting to join the European Union.

The majority of Turkish intellectuals, academicians, and journalists who interpret expressions like 'privileged partnership' and 'absorption capacity' as carefully disguised insults believe that these kind of responses from Europe are mainly due to the lack of an effective Turkish lobbying and public relations efforts. Even though Turkish prominent columnists such as Abbas Güçlü, Serpil Yılmaz, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, and Güngör Mengi have divergent interpretations regarding the decisions of the Brussels Summit, they all converge regarding their opinions on Turkish lobbying. In other words, all of these journalists agree that Turkey had to forego several well-deserved benefits and privileges due to lack of effective lobbying at EU level.

Even though the Turkish lobby in the United States is outside the scope of this study in the strict sense, its successful organization especially after the 1974 Cyprus intervention is highly relevant in the discussion of a need for a Turkish lobby in Europe. As the Armenian lobbying organizations were successfully imitated by the Armenian communities in Europe, positive Turkish experiences in the United States should be duplicated also in European countries. It is therefore essential to examine the emergence and structure of Turkish grassroots organizations in the United States, with the aim and hope of witnessing the emergence of similar Turkish organizations in Europe.

Among the immigrants who arrived from the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were distinguished by the fact that they or their families were Muslim and their language Turkish. These two factors officially differentiated them from the Christian groups, such as the Armenians or Greeks, who came from the Empire or from Arabic speaking Muslims who also emigrated from Ottoman Turkey. The first Turkish Minister of Culture and historian Talat Sait Halman, in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, provided the following definition: "The term Turk or Turkish designates a person born in the Ottoman Empire before 1923 or in the Turkish Republic after 1923, who is Muslim or whose family was Muslim, who was raised in a Turkish speaking household and who identifies as a Turk."⁸¹

According to U.S government records, the number of immigrants from the Ottoman Empire was quite insignificant from 1820 through 1860, averaging less than 20 per year. The majority of these individuals (86 percent) returned to Turkey following the establishment of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Moreover, although about 360,000 immigrants from Ottoman Turkey arrived between 1820 and 1950, only an estimated 45,000 to 65,000 immigrants were believed to be Muslim Turks. The majority of these immigrants were other Ottoman ethnic minorities, which were rather Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Syrians. For the year 1921, for instance, only 158 immigrants out of the total 2654 quota for disintegrating Ottoman Turkey were actually ethnic Turks. There were, nevertheless, 658 Armenians, 631 Syrians, and 417 Hebrews (Jews). There were even more ethnic Greeks than ethnic Turks who had entered the United States under the Turkish quota in 1921.⁸²

According to most historians dealing with U.S immigration patterns, a large percentage of early Turkish Americans were illiterate although their literacy rate was much higher than that of the Ottoman Empire. According to the historian, and the first Turkish Minister of Culture Talat Sait Halman, most of the well-educated group among the Turkish immigrants eventually returned to

⁸¹ The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History. Online Edition.
<http://ech.case.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=TIC>

⁸² Hinman, George Wheeler (2005). 'Natural Origins: Our New Immigration Formula (1924)'. *The American Review of Reviews* (No. LXX, No 3)
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1315840/posts?page=68>

Turkey but the less-educated remained in the United States. These remaining Turks, according to several historical accounts, largely retained their Turkish customs throughout the 1940s and 1950s without assimilating into the lifestyle of their newly adopted country.

Unlike the earlier wave of immigrants, however, the post-World War II generation was highly educated and included about 4,000 engineers and physicians. These numbers would have undoubtedly been higher but strict U.S. immigration regulations—which were enforced from the mid-1920s until 1965—placed an annual quota of 100 on Turkish nationals. Again, many of these professionals returned to Turkey after living in the United States for a brief period. Since the 1970s, the number of Turkish immigrants has risen to more than 2,000 per year. Many opened small businesses in the United States and created Turkish American organizations, thus developing Turkish enclaves, particularly in New York City. Still others came for educational purposes, contributing to a constant increase in estimates regarding total population of Turkish Americans, which currently range from 100,000 to 400,000.

Since the first great wave of Turkish white-collar immigrants started to arrive in the United States after the end of the Second World War, it can be argued that the history of a Turkish-American presence in the United States is much younger than those of Polish-, Greek-, Jewish-, and Armenian-Americans. Even though several clusters of Turkish immigrants are mentioned in early twentieth century sources, this Turkish presence had quickly disappeared due to assimilation and to lack of contact with the ancient homeland. It can therefore be argued that the first frequent mentions about the Turkish community in the United States started with the escalation of the Cyprus conflict which started in 1963 and culminated with the Turkish intervention in the island.

During the initial years of the Cyprus conflict, it can be argued that the American public opinion was already pre-Turkish due to the atrocities of EOKA terrorists on Turkish Cypriot civilians. Even though the Johnson

administration actively encouraged Greek Cypriot intransigence by threatening to leave Turkey undefended in case of a Soviet attack, the majority of American academic- and media circles have assumed a pro-Turkish position. Following the 'bloody Christmas' during which hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were massacred under the command of EOKA leader Nikos Sampson, for example, prestigious newspapers like New York Times and Washington Post started to refer to Sampson as 'Butcher of Cyprus', and heavily criticized their own government's inaction to stop the bloodshed.⁸³

Moreover, the majority of the U.S media considered the American support for the Colonel's Junta in Greece as fascistic and racist, as the junta was openly supporting enosis in Cyprus. The American administration at that time, on the other hand, found itself in the precarious position of not supporting the largely communist opposition to the Greek junta. By doing so, the U.S administration ended up supporting the Greek military regime which was, in turn, supporting EOKA's terrorist activities. Mainly because of this deplorable and unethical stance of their own government, the American media and public generally felt sympathetic to the Turkish cause without any need of intervention or propaganda from the Turkish community in the U.S.

The Greek-American lobby, which has been present and active in the United States for at least a century, on the other hand, rather chose to remain silent on the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots. Even though most prominent Greek-Americans refrained from criticizing the Colonel's Junta and EOKA's actions, they did not publicly endorse their ethnic kinsmen's barbarous acts either. Despite this relatively cautious and seemingly distant attitude, Greek-American organizations were heavily criticized by some academic and media circles because of their failure to condemn Greek and Greek Cypriot misdeeds. Meanwhile, newspaper reports of an imminent Turkish Cypriot genocide were publicly confirmed by the United States Undersecretary of

⁸³ Henry Kissinger (2000), *Years of Renewal*, London, Phoenix Press pp. 234-235

State George Ball, which further intensified anti-Greek sentiment in American public.⁸⁴

It was rather on 15 July 1974 when both the Greek-American lobby, as well as of the relatively weaker Turkish-American community which could not even be considered a proper ethnic lobby, were alarmed and activated. Following the Greek junta's coup d'état which toppled Cypriot President Makarios and aimed at unifying the island with Greece, Turkish army intervened in order to save the Turkish Cypriot population from total annihilation. After unsuccessful attempts to broker a peace deal which would safeguard the lives and rights of Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish army resumed its operations and brought about 37 percent of Cypriot territory under Turkish control.

Following the final push of the Turkish army which brought the northern third of the island under permanent Turkish control, the Greek-American lobby quickly activated all of its financial and human resources, and bombarded the American Congress with faxes, letters, and phone calls in order to condemn Turkish actions in Cyprus. While the better organized, more experienced, and numerically superior Greek-Americans managed to start and instant propaganda campaign, the smaller, and unorganized Turkish-American community initially had a hard time to raise its voice against Greek propaganda efforts. Thus, mainly due to the initial inaction of the Turkish-American organizations, most U.S Congressmen did not have any idea about the justifying conditions and legal background of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus.⁸⁵ The Greek-American lobby, on the other hand, provided the Congressmen with all possible types of propaganda which purported that the Turkish intervention was nothing but a unilateral and unjustifiable act of aggression.

The Greek-American lobbyists claimed that the Turkish military, armed with American weapons in violation of agreements limiting the use of arms to

⁸⁴ Assembly of Turkish American Associations official website. 'ATAA statement on Cyprus for European Subcommittee' www.ataa.org/reference/trnc/statement_ataa.html

⁸⁵ Müjde Ker Dinçer. *Lobicilik*, Izmir: Alfa. p.180

defensive purposes, were the aggressors, and asked for an arms embargo on Turkey. The American president and Henry Kissinger, U.S Secretary of State who was a hated figure among Greek-Americans, opposed such an embargo. According to Henry Kissinger, the pro-Greek legislators “*were doing nothing more than simply playing ethnic politics*” and thereby risking “*unraveling the entire fabric of American foreign policy*”.⁸⁶ Despite the U.S administration’s efforts, the Congress approved the arms embargo, which went into effect in February 1975. Regardless of pro or contra of the arms embargo, all concerned parties acknowledged the Greek lobby as the primary force in the passage of the embargo legislation.

The Turkish government retaliated to the embargo decision by closing all American bases in Turkey with the exception of the Incirlik base, and withdrew part of its military forces from NATO command structure. Thus, the Greek lobby, which claimed the support of three million Greek-Americans, created a “extremely severe and disturbing foreign policy problem” according to U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.⁸⁷ In other words, the southeastern flank of NATO defense structure was damaged seriously and two NATO countries came at the brink of war due to initial Greek aggression and Turkish response, and eventually only the Turkish side got punished for it. The arms embargo imposed on Turkey remained in effect for three years, until it was finally lifted through the intense efforts of the American administration.

Within the few years following the Turkish intervention and the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey, Turkish-Americans and Turkish foreign missions started to comprehend the importance of lobbying especially in the United States. It was also gradually recognized that Turkish lobbying needs could not be delegated to the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, especially in cases where the individual and emotional dedication of Turkish individuals is essential. Nevertheless, since lobbying has always been a numbers’ game, it became also clear that the Turkish-American community, which numbered

⁸⁶ Alexander Deconde (1992), *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, pp. 172-173

⁸⁷ Henri Kissinger (2000). *Years of Renewal*. London: Phoenix Press. pp. 236-238

only around 50.000 in 1974, was numerically not sufficient in order to form a powerful Turkish lobby alone.⁸⁸ Thus, Turkish authorities, along with Turkish-American leaders realized that it would be necessary to obtain professional help from American lobbying organizations in addition to grassroots activities by Turkish-Americans. What the Turkish authorities did not realize was, however, that the coordination between big lobbying firms and grassroots organizations was at least as essential as the hiring of lobbying firms.

Consequently, while Turkish-Americans started to form their local grassroots organizations on state and federal level, Turkish authorities started to sign agreements with American professional lobbying firms. Even though Turkish foreign missions and agents showed considerable efforts in selecting and supervising the activities of these lobbying firms, it has always been a heated discussion topic whether or not these firms contribute anything to Turkish lobbying efforts, The opponents of hiring prominent lobbying firms frequently brought up the argument that the interests of Turkey and Turkish-Americans could not be defended by firms which have neither ethnic nor personal connections to Turkey.

Regrettably, there are only few and only partial studies which focus on dealings between Turkish authorities and professional lobbying firms in the United States. Few pieces of partial information are available, however, from the works of several Turkish academicians who have done some research on Turkish lobbying efforts. Tayyar Arı, for example, found out that in 1981, the Turkish government first started to work with 'Gray and Company' lobbying firm, which has later changed its name to 'Hill & Knowlton'. According to Arı, the Turkish government paid a total of 1.1 million U.S dollars to 'Hill & Knowlton from 1981 until 1994, when it did not renew its contract with that lobbying firm. The Turkish government eventually signed another contract with 'Fleishman-Hillard Inc.' public relations company, and paid a total of 2.1 million U.S dollars for its lobbying services.⁸⁹ Since the book of Tayyar Arı

⁸⁸ Alexander Deconde (1992), *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, p. 173

⁸⁹ Arı, Tayyar (2000). *Amerika'da Siyasal Yapı Lobiler ve Dış Politika*. İstanbul: Alfa. pp. 222-223

was published in 2000, it has not been possible to obtain specific information regarding the lobbying firms which have worked for Turkish causes.

Another Turkish academician with a focus on Turkish lobbying efforts in the United States, Müjde Ker Dinçer, asserted that Turkish governments started to work with professional lobbying countries during Gerald Ford's presidency between 1974 and 1977. Given that this period coincides with the arms embargo imposed on Turkey, however, it was hardly surprising that Turkish authorities did not renew the contract with that particular company after 1977. According to Dinçer's findings, Turkey then signed an agreement with 'Doremus and Company' lobbying firm, and paid an approximate amount of 200.000 U.S dollars per annum to this company. Since the activities of this company remained limited to sending letters to several U.S officers, the contract of 'Doremus and Company' was eventually terminated by Turkish authorities.⁹⁰ For the later periods of Turkish lobbying history in the United States, Dinçer's findings endorse the related statements of Tayyar Arı.

When it comes to the benefits and results of hiring professional lobbying firms, however, both Müjde Ker Dinçer and Tayyar Arı reached similarly unclear and ambivalent conclusions. While both researchers mentioned the fact that 'Fleishman Hillard Inc' is one of the most prestigious and influential lobbying firms in Washington D.C, they did not delve into specific details how the services of this firm contributed to Turkish lobbying efforts. While both Turkish researchers frequently complained that the hired professional firms failed to obtain the desired results for the Turkish lobby, they did not specify whether Fleishman Hillard Inc. belonged to these groups of firms or not. Therefore, even though both academicians provided useful information about the identity of lobbying firms which worked for Turkey, they did not offer clear conclusions or interpretations regarding the outcome of their collaboration with Turkish authorities.

⁹⁰ Dinçer, Müjde Ker (1998). *Lobicilik*, İzmir:Alfa pp. 181-182

The second component of Turkish-American lobbying efforts, which are conducted in collaboration with, however separately from, professional lobbying firms are grassroots activities. These activities rather constitute the individual efforts and local organizations of individual Turkish-Americans who have been settling mostly in the East Coast of the United States since early 1950s. Consequently, there are several Turkish-American associations and organizations in the U.S. states of New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, Texas, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia, where there are significant Turkish-American communities. In the states of New York and New Jersey especially, there are a dozen of Turkish associations which also organized themselves under a Turkish umbrella organization.⁹¹

While the necessity of involving professional firms, at least in the case of the Turkish lobby in the United States, has been a political necessity, it is also a well established fact that the U.S. authorities view pure grassroots activism as a more benign and respectable form of lobbying. Especially in comparison to the activities of professional lobbying firms, American official circles frequently expressed their preference for grassroots activities. This preference was arguably most evident in the testimony presented before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding an attempted legal limitation of grassroots activities. In a powerful argument which heavily criticized American governments' attempts to regulate grassroots activities, it was asserted that:

"...as a policy matter, regulation of grassroots lobbying makes little or no sense in addressing the problem of government corruption. Contact between ordinary citizens and members of Congress, which is what "grassroots lobbying" seeks to bring about, is the antithesis of the "lobbying" at the heart of the recent congressional scandals. It is citizens expressing themselves to fellow citizens, and citizens to members of Congress.... Thus, grassroots voices remain a critical counterforce to lobbying abuse."⁹²

⁹¹ According to the official website of Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), more than 25 of the total 54 local Turkish organizations under ATAA are concentrated in the states of New York and New Jersey only. www.ataa.org

⁹² Excerpt taken from the Prepared Testimony of Bradley A. Smith on 1 March 2007. Official Website of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary <http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=750>

Through the conclusions of the American House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, U.S. legislators clearly expressed that any limitation or strict regulation of grassroots activism would play into the hands of professional lobbying firms which have already been inflicting serious harm on the American political system by corrupting and manipulating a significant number American politicians. The official and clearly pronounced aversion of the U.S. authorities towards professional lobbyists, combined with the clear American preference for grassroots lobbying activities, arguably urged most U.S. ethnic groups to emphasize their grassroots organizations. It was therefore regrettable that Turkey, lacking a considerable ethnic extension in the United States until recently, launched the organization of Turkish grassroots activities in America considerably later than other countries with powerful ethnic lobbies.

Turkish grassroots organizations, which rather became more active and better organized after the 1974 Cyprus intervention, followed mostly the examples of Armenian-American, Greek-American, and Jewish-American grassroots formations with the aim of emulating their successful structures. Turkish-Americans, having successfully absorbed the grassroots activities of other ethnic lobbies, started to organize local campaigns, to send letters and faxes to the legislators in their constituencies, and to become part of the local politics. Despite the lack of a verifiable support from Turkish foreign missions and professional lobbying firms, local Turkish-American communities in many parts of the U.S succeeded in forming a nationwide Turkish-American lobby.

Even though the Turkish-American community in the United States has historically been numerically inferior to Armenian-American and Greek-American communities, it has become a force to be reckoned with starting in the early 1990s. Even though the latest U.S Census reported the number of Greek-Americans as more than one million, and that of Armenian-Americans as 400 thousand, these ethnic lobbies already started to be disturbed about the activities of Turkish-Americans whose numbers only recently exceeded

100 thousand.⁹³ While the Armenian- and Greek-American ethnic lobbies have previously had to overcome the Turkish government's influence in the U.S administration previously, they eventually had to overcome the resistance of Turkish-American lobby as well. In the words of academician Osman Özsoy:

“While there was not even a mention of a Turkish lobby in the America ethnic lobby studies until early 1990s, similar studies in the following years focus on Turkish lobbying activities with increasing frequency. Moreover, interviews with Greek- and Armenian-American community leaders clearly demonstrated that they were increasingly concerned with the increased influence of the Turkish lobby. These community leaders also expressed concern that Turkey was spending immense amounts for lobbying efforts, and thus gaining a big influence in the U.S. administration.”⁹⁴

Americans with Turkish ancestry, who had been organizing into a lobby for the last 30 years, also figured the need to form umbrella organizations in order to coordinate their efforts at national level. With this purpose, several local Turkish-American organizations founded the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), which has become the largest Turkish umbrella organization in North America. Recognized by both American and Turkish governments as an ethnic lobbying assembly, ATAA effectively united almost all Turkish organizations scattered throughout more than 30 U.S states. As of 2007, ATAA boasted 62 memberships of local Turkish-American organizations. Given that the number of ATAA member Turkish-American associations was 54 only three years ago, it can safely be argued that the ATAA has continued its growing success also in the new millennium.⁹⁵

The ATAA's sister umbrella organization, Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA / TADF), on the other hand, has rather focused on

⁹³ Official webpage of U.S Census Bureau. 'U.S Ancestry'
www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-35.pdf

⁹⁴ Osman Özsoy (1998). *Türkiye'nin İmaj Sorunu*. İstanbul: Alfa. p. 259

⁹⁵ The official website of ATAA constantly updates its pages listing its component members. As of September 2007, 64 Associations were listed, 62 of them being located in the United States and Canada, while 2 of them were located in Turkey. www.ataa.org/component/

enlisting other Turkic and ethnic Turkish communities from the Balkans, Crimea, and Central Asia into the Turkish-American lobby. Consequently, entities such as Azerbaijan Society of America, American Association of Crimean Turks, and Association of Balkan Turks traditionally constituted a significant part of 40 component associations of FTAA.⁹⁶ Even though FTAA traditionally focused more on grassroots activities such as organizations of Turkish cultural events and festivities, both FTAA and ATAA never acknowledged an official division of labor with their respective counterparts. Nevertheless, the amount of mutual respect and collaboration between FTAA and ATAA strongly demonstrated that these two umbrella organizations truly considered each other as 'sister' associations.

Turkish researchers and academicians focusing on the Turkish lobbying efforts in the New World were also quick to notice the growing influence of Turkish-American associations. It was also observed, however, that these associations' potential for growth was limited due to the scarcity of financial resources. It was furthermore considered a sad dilemma that, while the Turkish state was distributing millions of U.S. dollars to American lobbying firms, even ATAA, the most successful Turkish-American umbrella organization, was suffering under financial difficulties. As Tayyar Arı duly observed:

"Since its foundation, the Assembly of Turkish Associations (ATAA) has been struggling and fighting against prejudices, ignorance, and anti-propaganda about Turkey successfully. The only sources of income of the ATAA are membership fees and donations. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that it is impossible to assume all lobbying efforts of Turkey and Turkish-Americans with a budget of only 300.000 U.S dollars."⁹⁷

An argument could be made, however, that Tayyar Arı's observation about the financial difficulties of ATAA did not solely originate from Turkish governments stinginess. Given that many prominent Turkish-Americans, such as Ahmet

⁹⁶ Official website of Federation of Turkish American Associations / Türk Amerikan Dernekleri Federasyonu www.tadf.org

⁹⁷ Osman Özsoy (1998). *Türkiye'nin İmaj Sorunu*. İstanbul: Alfa. p. 229

Erteğün, the late Arif Mardin, Egemen Bağış, and Mehmet Öz, all assumed active duties within the ATAA, their failure to raise the required funds became more questionable.⁹⁸ Since no documents regarding the financial contributions or personal donations to ATAA was available, however, it was quite impossible to figure out the real reason behind ATAA's financial difficulties.

Regardless of the validity of ATAA's financial difficulty claims, it goes without saying that the financial and educational statuses of most Turks and Turkish-Americans have historically been higher than their ethnic kinsmen in Europe. This educational and financial prestige, which was enjoyed by ethnic Turks in America, in turn, rendered most of the Turkish-American individuals as potential lobbyists for Turkey. Even though the Turkish-American community spread to the entire 50 states of America, their concentration in the U.S East Coast contributed to the facilitation of coordination efforts among ethnic Turks.

During the last two decades, also numerical increases in the number of Turkish-Americans contributed to the self-confidence and enthusiasm of lobbying efforts. The official number of American citizens with Turkish ancestry, for example, increased from 83.850 in 1990 to 117.575 in 2000.⁹⁹ Even though the number of Turkish-Americans remained far behind those of Greek-Americans and of Armenian-Americans, the growth ratio of Turkish-Americans strongly suggested that they would numerically catch up within few decades. Moreover, the fact that more than 100.000 Turkish citizens who had obtained Green Cards in the 1990s would most likely to cause a further increase in the number of Turkish-Americans during the first two decades of the new millennium.

It could also be considered an advantage that the Turkish-Americans concentrated in certain areas of the United States instead of having spread equally throughout America. Due to federal system in the United States,

⁹⁸ <http://www.turkishjournal.com/i.php?mid=161&yid=1>

⁹⁹ The U.S Census Bureau regularly lists only American ancestries which exceed 100.000. Thus, in 2000 Census, Turkish-Americans were listed for the first time as an U.S ancestry group. www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-35.pdf

especially members of House of Representatives, who face reelection pressure every other year, have traditionally been very susceptible to the pressures of ethnic lobbying groups. As it was previously mentioned, the Armenian-American communities in California and Massachusetts have constantly been demonstrating the importance of strategic concentration in key states and regions. While the Turkish-American community is nowhere concentrated as the Armenian-Americans are concentrated in California and Massachusetts, there are several areas in New York and New Jersey where Turkish-Americans constitute a relatively significant community. Prominent Turkish-American individuals in these U.S areas with heavy Turkish concentration can therefore accomplish an important task by getting elected to local offices, from which they can eventually seek mandates at federal level. While it is quite unrealistic to expect to see a Turkish-American Congressman after the 2008 or 2010 elections, such a prospect can arguably be possible in the second decade of the new millennium.

The Senate, on the other hand, is regarded as a more deliberative body than the House of Representatives. With only two senators from each 50 U.S states, the Senate is smaller and its members serve longer terms, allowing for a more collegial and less partisan atmosphere that is somewhat more insulated from public opinion than the House. Thus, senators, who are elected for 6 years, have traditionally been more likely to appreciate and defend American interests rather than to act as paid spokespersons of certain ethnic lobbies. It can therefore be argued that the numerical superiority of anti-Turkish lobbies in the United States does not influence the Senators as much as it does the Congressmen. Nevertheless, as there is a high amount of personal contact and interaction between Congressmen and Senators, certain anti-Turkish notions or impressions may be transferred from the Congress to the Senate floor.

As it has historically been quite impossible to reach the number of ethnic votes in order to influence the decisions of U.S senators, especially in the more populous states like California, New York, Texas, and Illinois, ethnic lobbying efforts aimed at influencing the majority of senators were almost

always futile. Nevertheless, since there are several dozens members of House of Representatives in populous U.S states, it has traditionally been easier to access and influence these legislators regarding key ethnic issues. While the Turkish-American community even lacks this required population concentration even in states like New York and New Jersey, Armenian-Americans have large and influential communities in key locations such as Massachusetts and California. With tens of thousands of concentrated votes in Glendale, California and Watertown, Massachusetts, Armenian-Americans undoubtedly have the necessary political clout in having their preferred candidate elected to the U.S House of Representatives.

As a result, despite the diligent and noble efforts of the growing Turkish-American community, Greek-, and especially Armenian-American lobbies continue to have the upper hand in their struggles to influence and manipulate American politics. As it was previously discussed in greater detail, the most obvious demonstration of this greater influence has been the attitude of the U.S Congress since the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Many years later, the majority of U.S politicians who had voted for the arms embargo on Turkey publicly confessed that they acted under the pressure of their Greek-American constituencies.¹⁰⁰ While the personal opinions of U.S House members about the injustice of the embargo certainly mattered a lot, it mattered much less than their own voting pattern which actually approved the American arms embargo on Turkey.

The current problem of relatively stronger Greek- and Armenian lobbies is exacerbated by the fact that most Turkish-American individuals or local community leaders cannot find an official Turkish counterpart in Turkey. There are, as of 2007, still no Turkish consulates or representations in U.S cities like Miami, Boston, San Francisco and Detroit, which all have sizeable Turkish-American communities. This scarcity of this official and diplomatic Turkish presence is undoubtedly a big factor of frustration for enthusiastic

¹⁰⁰ Henry Kissinger, in his book 'Years of Upheaval', refers frequently to the attitudes of several members of U.S House of Representatives who argued privately against the arms embargo, but still voted for the embargo on House floor. Many of those House members eventually apologized to Kissinger for not having kept their promises to vote against the embargo.

Turkish-Americans who need assistance for their personal needs, as well as for their aspiration to contribute to Turkish lobbying efforts.¹⁰¹ Due to the vast geography of the United States, and the presence of only five Turkish consulates, many Turkish-Americans have to endure large travel costs in order to get in touch with Turkish representations.

Without a doubt, the Turkish lobby in the United States, which is carefully being build by the praiseworthy efforts of the Turkish-American community, still lacks the historical experience, human resources, and financial power which has been enjoyed by the rival Greek- and Armenian- American communities since early 1900s. Regardless of individual clouts, efforts, and wealth of local Turkish-American communities, it is not surprising to witness their failures when they try to neutralize or counter rival Armenian- or Greek-American activities. When they are left to their own paces and destinies, therefore, the Turkish-Americans will most probably require at least several decades in order to catch up with their Greek- and Armenian counterparts in terms of financial resources and political clout. In several decades from now, however, it would certainly be too late in order to reverse and repair the damage which would be inflicted by the Armenian lobby on Turkish cause and image.

Due to the exigency of defending Turkish causes and of improving Turkish image, it is absolutely essential to support the enthusiastic efforts of Turkish-Americans. This urgently required support can be provided mainly through the consultancy of professional lobbying firms and the political assistance of Turkish foreign missions. Although it is a difficult task to determine exactly which amount of lobbying tasks are to be completed by professional lobbying firms, the difficulty of striking such a delicate balance should not discourage the Turkish lobbyists from aiming for the better. It should realistically be acknowledged that many Turkish lobbying goals would certainly be reached

¹⁰¹ In addition to the Turkish Embassy in Washington D.C, there are currently only four Turkish consulates in the United States, namely in Houston, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York. For further information regarding the locations of Turkish representatives abroad, see the official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.tr.mfa>

by trial-and-error, and that a certain loss of time during the process is inevitable. Fortunately, many more goals would simply be reached by coordinating the efforts of Turkish-American grassroots activities, professional lobbying firms, and the additional support of Turkish foreign missions.

The final, and probably the most important reason for enthusiastically supporting the Turkish lobbying efforts in the American continent are the spillover effects to the lobbying scene in Europe. Especially in the first decade of the new millennium when Turkey struggles with its own, as well as with European Union dynamics, the additional support from across the Atlantic is absolutely essential for the Turkish lobbying efforts in Europe. Given that the Turkish communities in Europe are less experienced and organized in order to form an effective lobby, the accumulated know-how of Turkish-American lobbies is absolutely essential. Not only in order to counter Armenian anti-propaganda with increasing intensity, but also in order to improve the negative Turkish image in Europe, the Turkish communities in the European Union have much to learn from their ethnic kinsfolk in America.

LOBBYING IN EUROPE

ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES IN EUROPE vs. IN AMERICA

While it is rather Western European countries which have the largest share of foreign migrants among their populations, the most suitable countries for ethnic lobbying efforts are arguably Canada, the United States, Australia, and to a certain extent, the United Kingdom which all share a common Anglo-Saxon culture. Despite being the birthplace of the Anglo-Saxon culture, the United Kingdom is still the most ethnic-nationalistic one among these four countries. The more nationalistic attitude of Great Britain is mainly due to the fact that it has largely been influenced by the continental European concept of nationalism. Consequently, the United Kingdom stopped considering itself as an immigration country, at least to a certain extent, after the French revolution.¹⁰² Following the emergence of nationalism in 1789, the United Kingdom eventually obtained a hybrid character which is a mixture of Continental European nationalism and Transatlantic Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism.

The United Kingdom, due to its geographic isolation from Continental Europe, has not experienced the occupation of foreign troops on its soil ever since the Norman invasion.¹⁰³ Even though Napoleon and Hitler seriously considered invading British islands in the early 19th and 20th centuries, respectively, neither of them succeeded in realizing their plans. As a result, the British public opinion hasn't had firsthand experience with occupying troops of an enemy nation for almost a millennium. Due to this fortunate lack of foreign occupation, the British public opinion has historically been more open and welcoming to immigrants than any other European country. While this warm and positive attitude has been disrupted several times in recent history due to

¹⁰² Geoffrey Blainey (2007). *A Very Short History of the World*. Victoria: Penguin. pp. 318-320

¹⁰³ http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/normans/invasion_threat_print.html

world wars and other major conflicts, it has never been lost permanently since the emergence of United Kingdom in history.

Canada, Australia, and the United States all emerged as independent nations in history after having obtained their independence from Great Britain through war or through peaceful means. Even though these three countries were all home to native peoples, they were rendered insignificant through assimilation and ethnic cleansing. Thus, by the time they obtained their independence from Great Britain, the populations of Canada, Australia, and the United States were predominantly white and European.¹⁰⁴ While the French Canadians in Quebec successfully resisted assimilation into the Anglo-Saxon majority of Canada, they have eventually assumed the liberal and multicultural attitude of their fellow countrymen. Hence, the mainly white immigrant populations of these three countries had little reason to despise further immigrants who were just following the paths of their own ancestors.

There are, largely due to the colonization history of Canada, United States, and Australia, no historical minorities which have a tradition of civil and political unrest. Unlike the Basques in Spain, Corsicans in France, and Turks in Bulgaria, these former three former British colonies never experienced ethnic rivalry between two originally European rival ethnic groups. Even though the French speaking Quebecois have been challenging the Canadian government with independence movements since early 1900s, successive referendums have been demonstrating that independence supporters were always a minority among French-Canadians.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the Quebec issue eventually stopped being an ethnic problem in a typically European fashion, mainly due to the extremely liberal and democratic stance of Canadian governments. It can therefore be argued that even if the majority of Quebec voters eventually

¹⁰⁴ According to the CIA World Factbook, Native Americans make up 2 % of Canada's, and 1 % of U.S. population, while Aborigines make up 1 % of Australian population.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>

¹⁰⁵ The population of Quebec voted twice in referendums regarding secession from Canada in 1980 and in 1995. Although the notion of independent Quebec was rejected in both referendums, the Quebec secessionists lost only by a 1 % margin in the 1995 referendum.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1203358.stm

decide for secession, their decision will be carried out and implemented peacefully.

In the United Kingdom, the thorny issue of Northern Ireland contributed to the fact that the British government has not been able to approach ethnic minorities as liberally as the governments of Canada and the United States. Especially the I.R.A terrorism, which has claimed many lives in the 1970s, created a general notion of skepticism toward minorities in Britain. The fact that their own citizens with Irish ancestry were capable of carrying out terrorist attacks against them contributed to an increased sense of English nationalism in the United Kingdom. This nationalism, however, rather manifested itself in an increased awareness of being English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh, rather than in the discrimination towards other ethnic groups, especially towards the Irish. On the contrary, this awareness even contributed to the recognition of similarities between Britain's major ethnic groups, especially between the Britons and the Irish. This recognition led to the conclusion, among some scholars, that "the great majority of the British feel more identity with the Irish than with other Europeans, and indeed most do not feel that the Irish are foreigners."¹⁰⁶

Despite the harm inflicted by their own nationals, most Britons still remained open to the idea of immigration from the rest of the world, albeit to a smaller extent than Americans, Canadians, and Australians. Even though this 'openness' is slowly being reduced towards Moslems after the tragic events of September 11, the Britons still may be considered to have the most liberal attitude among Europeans towards immigration. According to a 2002 survey, which was commissioned by the Islamic Society of Britain, for instance, found that Britain's non-Muslims tended to be more suspicious of British Muslims since September 11, 2001.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the same survey also showed that number of British non-Muslims who thought that Muslims play a valuable role in British society outnumbered those non-Muslims who did not agree.

¹⁰⁶ http://www.britishcouncil.org/studies/england/report_6.htm

¹⁰⁷ 'Attitudes Towards British Muslims', pp. 2-3
<http://www.isb.org.uk/iaw/docs/SurveyIAW2002.pdf>

These results, in turn, clearly suggested that the majority of British population was willing to live together with the Muslim- and other minorities, even though certain events created a relative amount of suspicion in the public opinion.

In most parts of Continental Europe, the level of tolerance, acceptance, and enthusiasm for new immigrants has historically been lower than in the United Kingdom. Due to frequent wars, invasions, and disintegration of empires, most European countries ended up with significant ethnic minorities, which were often ethnic extensions of neighboring countries. Like the ethnic Germans in Poland, Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania, Corsicans in France, and Basques in Spain, most of these ethnic minorities were considered as potential threats. Regardless of whether or not these perceived threats were justifiable, these negative attitudes served as a psychological barrier between these countries' dominant majorities and ethnic minorities.

In cases where the ethnic minorities' causes were owned and protected by neighboring countries, the respective ethnic minorities were generally considered as 'fifth columns' by their host countries. In other words, these minority populations were assumed to have loyalties to countries other than the one in which they were residing. By the same token, they were assumed to support other nations (most likely the ones which are populated by their ethnic kinsmen) in war efforts against the country they were living in. This last assumption, in particular, turned ethnic minorities in Europe into potential scapegoats and alleged traitors until recently.¹⁰⁸ Especially during the Cold War, when ethnic minorities such as Turks in Bulgaria and Germans in Poland remained in the wrong side of the Iron Curtain, they were generally treated with utmost harshness and skepticism.

It was mostly in Bulgaria where the skepticism towards ethnic minorities reached paranoid levels during the last decade of the Cold War. Even though

¹⁰⁸ According to R.J Crampton's authoritative book 'A Concise History of Bulgaria', the scepticism and discrimination against Bulgarian Turks have been gravest during the Cold War period, even though Poland's Germans faced certain repressions and discriminations as well. While R.J Crampton admitted his lack of comprehensive knowledge about other minorities in Communist bloc countries, he concluded with certainty that the sufferings of Bulgarian Turks were indubitably greatest.

ethnic Turks made up only about 10 percent of Bulgarian population and were concentrated only in two regions of Bulgaria, they were increasingly perceived as a large threat by the Communist Party. Bulgarian authorities fear and skepticism were also exacerbated by the fact that the birth rates among Bulgarian Turks were higher than the rest of Bulgarian population. Moreover, the Communist regime also hoped that 'playing the nationalistic drum' would increase popular support, especially if it could relate to the historical chauvinism aimed at the Ottoman Empire.

"In 1985 Bulgarian Turks were told to choose from a list of Slav names which they wished to adopt; and if they delayed or refused one were chosen for them. In many cases they resisted and troops had to be called in, with even tanks and elitist paratroop red beret units being deployed. It was the largest military operation undertaken by the Bulgarian Army since the end of the Second World War."¹⁰⁹ The communist regime in Bulgaria furthermore closed all Turkish radios and newspapers, and went as far as banning the use of Turkish in public. These racist and inhumane policies remained under effect until 1989, when the Communist government under Tudor Zhivkov was forced to resign.

Similar policies of mistreatment and oppression were aimed at Germans living Poland and Czechoslovakia as well. Even though the number of ethnic Germans living in Iron Curtain countries decreased significantly due to mass expulsions, the remaining German communities were continued to be oppressed during the entire duration of the Cold War. Especially the largest remaining German minority in the Upper Silesian region of Poland have been subject to continuous oppression since the early 1950s until the end of the Cold War. Moreover, despite Polish official claims that there were only about 200,000 Germans living in Poland in 1950s, more than one million Germans left Poland for Germany between 1950 and 1990.¹¹⁰ This discrepancy between the Polish claims and actual German refugee numbers strongly suggest that Polish authorities were also suppressing the ethnic identities of

¹⁰⁹ R.J Crampton (1997). *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 209

¹¹⁰ Thomas Kamusella and Terry Sullivan (1999) 'The Germans of Upper Silesia: the struggle for recognition' in Karl Cordell (ed.) *Ethnicity and Democratization in the New Europe*. London: Routledge. pp. 175-176

Poland's German minorities. Similar to the case of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, the Polish authorities were arguably deporting ethnic Germans after having failed to assimilate them by force.

The immigration waves from Southern Europe to the industrial Northern Europe started in early 1960, and created a totally different group of minority populations in countries like Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and the United Kingdom. As opposed to having lost their ethnic homelands to new conquering countries, these new immigrants deliberately chose to become a minority in these industrial countries. Unlike the Bulgarian Turks, for example, who had become minorities in a land which had been part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks in Germany obtained a minority status with their own free wills.

Other ethnic minorities in Europe, like the Irish in the United Kingdom and the Basques in Spain, Austrians in Südtirol region of Italy, and Corsicans in French have become a constant source of friction in these countries. Fortunately for the stability of Europe, the political crises created by these minority problems were smaller due to the fact that both the host countries and the ethnic minorities were both on the western side of the Iron Curtain. Despite the fact that Austria has been a nonaligned country until the end of Cold War, however, the relations between this pro-Western neutral country and Italy became increasingly tense due to the South Tyrol issue. In 1960, the Austrian government filed an official complaint against Italy at the United Nations due to the situation of ethnic Austrian minority in South Tyrol. It was only in 1992 that Austria formally recognized that the Italian government was fulfilling its responsibilities toward its Austrian minority.¹¹¹

The Western Europe of 1970s and 1980s were characterized by violent demonstrations and even bombing campaigns which terrorized especially major cities of Spain, France, and the United Kingdom. The separatist organizations of Basque Independence Movement (ETA) and Irish Republican

¹¹¹ Werner A. Widmann (1997). *Südtirol*. Hamburg: ADAC, p 15

Army (IRA), through their violent and indiscriminate terror campaigns, were constantly creating sources of public antipathy towards ethnic minorities. As a result, the majority public opinions in especially Spain and the United Kingdom became more frustrated and skeptical regarding the arrival of further ethnic immigrants.

The Western European public opinion in the 1970s and 1980s, unlike their counterparts in North America, increasingly considered immigrants of other races and nationalities as renewed sources of concern and instability. While Canadians were familiar with European style ethnic tensions due to the French-speaking Quebec issue, they had never encountered terrorist activities on their soil due to ethnic problems. The racial segregation in the United States, which has lasted until mid 1960s, on the other hand, had little to do with American public's perception of labor migrants. As black Americans were asking nothing more than equal rights as American citizens, their struggle was never perceived as an ethnic or separatist unrest by the U.S public opinion. Therefore, neither of the two North American countries had any historical or demographic reason to suspect the arrival of new immigrants in their territories.

The majority of Western European countries' populations, due to their more turbulent recent histories than their North American counterparts, were arguably unprepared for the massive influx of foreign immigrants which had culminated in early 1970s. While European researchers, academicians, and insightful politicians were quick to realize that the motivations of the immigrant workers were totally harmless, the public opinion in Western Europe was skeptical of their presence. It took Western Europeans few decades to figure that this new wave of immigrants would not become fifth columns as it was often the case in the twentieth century Europe. Unlike the Greeks in Ottoman Turkey, Germans in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, or Italians in former Yugoslavia, the migrant workers in Western Europe did not engage in any form of subversive or treacherous activities in recent history.

Although the European public opinion gradually acknowledged the harmless nature of migrant workers in the 1990s, at least two strategic decades of integration efforts were squandered. As a result, countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom ended up with ethnic minorities of labor migration background who still experience integration problems. While the United Kingdom has historically been more favorable toward immigrants in European standards, the British immigration policy also became more restrictive in the last few decades. Hence, though the traces of Northern American liberalism can still be found in the attitude of the British public, most Britons rather tilted towards continental skepticism with regards to arriving immigrants.

The comparison between the United Kingdom, by far the most liberal and welcoming Western European country with regards to labor migration, and North American countries clearly demonstrates that the New World is a much suitable place for all immigrants which intend to improve their financial, political, and ethnic potentials. Even the United Kingdom, which has literally founded all other Anglo-Saxon countries in the world, has been unable to isolate itself from the nationalism and skepticism prevalent in Continental Europe. The imminent invasion threats during both world wars, and the I.R.A terror campaign has pushed the United Kingdom toward more indoctrinated, restrictive, and unwelcoming policies towards immigration. Consequently, the entire Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, has lagged far behind North America and Australia in welcoming, treating, and integrating immigrant worker communities.

For the formation of ethnic lobbies, it is an absolute necessity that an immigrant group may grow in terms of economic, financial, and social influence in the countries in which they reside. Especially the United States, but also Canada and Australia have so far proven to be safe havens for successful formation of ethnic lobbies. Notwithstanding the amount of power and influence enjoyed by certain American lobbies, there has never been a popular movement in the United States with the aim of banning, prosecuting, or punishing these lobbying organizations. On the contrary, the United States

learned to make good use of these ethnic lobbies by using them as pressure tools against countries which are deemed to act contrary to American interests. As it was described previously in greater detail, many countries may be indirectly intimidated by the United States through the activation of an ethnic lobby operating on American soil.

In Europe, due to social and historical factors discussed previously, these developments were often undermined before an ethnic minority attempted to form a political lobby. As immigrant ethnic communities did not even find the chance to integrate into the dominant society, they failed to fulfill the first prerequisite of forming an ethnic lobby in the first place. As they were failing to integrate into the dominant society, however, the prejudices of the dominant society towards them arguably increased, setting in motion a vicious circle which made future integration even more difficult. Moreover, immigrants without the language proficiency and without the citizenship of the country of residence automatically disqualified for any social or political influence in most European countries. Consequently, with the possible exception of Armenian lobby in France, and the arguably fledgling Turkish lobby in Germany, no ethnic lobbies were allowed to flourish on European soil.

Foreign Population in 15 EU Member States as of 2002¹¹²

Country	Total Population	Foreign Population
	(x 1.000)	
Belgium	10.309,7	846,7
Denmark	5.368,4	266,7
Germany	82.440,3	7.318,6
Greece	10.964,1	761,4
Spain	41.116,8	1.370,7
France	58.520,7	3.263,2
Ireland	3.897,0	187,2
Italy	57.844,0	1.464,6
Luxembourg	439,5	162,3
Holland	16.105,3	690,4
Austria	8.032,9	710,9
Portugal	10.335,6	224,9
Finland	5.194,9	98,6
Sweden	8.909,1	476,0
United Kingdom	58.731,1	2.459,9

¹¹² Bundesministerium des Innern. "Auslaendische Bevölkerung und Bevölkerung insgesamt der Europäischen Union"

TURKISH PRESENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

With the addition of another million Bulgarian and Romanian citizens with Turkish ancestry, the number of ethnic Turks in the European Union reached 5 million as of January 2007. As the Turkish media was very quick to point out, this figure of five million was higher than the populations of seven EU member states, namely, of Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.¹¹³ Although most newspaper articles in Turkey did not make much distinction between ‘Turks’ and ‘ethnic Turks’ in Europe, the satisfaction from having reached that figure was evident in most articles. This palpable satisfaction was also related to growing Turkish public awareness that growing influence of European Turks would lead to a better understanding between Turkey and Europe.

The most recent EU enlargement in 2007, in addition to having increased the number of ethnic Turks by one million, also changed the composition of EU citizens with Turkish ancestry. Prior to the enlargement in 2007 which welcomed Bulgaria and Romania into the EU, ethnic Turkish presence in the Union was large consisted of immigrant workers who had arrived in Western Europe after early 1960s. The only exception was the Turkish minority in Greece which numbered about 100.000. This ethnic Turkish community in Greece owed its presence not to labor migrations, but to 500 years of Ottoman presence in the Balkans. With the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, however, the number of EU countries with historical Turkish minorities increased to three, while the number of historical Turkish minorities exceeded one million.

The remaining four million ethnic Turkish individuals in the European Union are mostly migrants who arrived in Western Europe as ‘guest workers’ starting

¹¹³ In an article published by newspaper Milliyet on 12 January 2007, Gülay Fırat claimed that the number of ‘Turks’ in the European Union increased to 5.2 million as of January 2007. The expression ‘Turk’ as opposed to ‘ethnic Turk’ even in a liberal newspaper like Milliyet strongly suggests that distinction is not perceived by most Turkish readers

in early 1960. More than two-and-a-half million of these four million ethnic Turkish immigrants live in Germany, and constitute the single largest ethnic minority in Germany. Moreover, about 300.000 ethnic Turks live in France, while an approximately equal number of Turks reside in Holland. In Austria, which is home to the fourth largest Turkish community, the number of ethnic Turks exceeds 100.000.¹¹⁴ It can therefore be statistically deducted that more than half of European Union's ethnic Turks live in Germany, and that almost 80 percent of Turkish migrant workers are concentrated in the four EU countries mentioned above.

The United Kingdom and Belgium rank behind Germany, France, Holland, and Austria in terms of the numbers of ethnic Turks living on their territories. While the official number of 73.000 probably reflects the true figure for ethnic Turks in Belgium, the number of ethnic Turks in the United Kingdom is likely to be higher than 66.000, due to the unaccounted numbers of Turkish Cypriots. As Cyprus had been under British administration since 1878, and was turned into a Crown colony in 1914, most Turkish Cypriots became British citizens in the period between 1914 and 1960, when the British rule ended. Although it has not been possible to keep official tracks of Turkish Cypriot immigration to the United Kingdom, an estimated number of 100.000 Turkish Cypriots arrived in British islands between 1878 until 1960s.¹¹⁵

The single most important aspect of the Turkish Cypriot community in the United Kingdom is its counterbalancing effect with regards to the powerful Greek and Greek-Cypriot communities. The Turkish Cypriots in the United Kingdom, which have had traditionally good organizational capabilities due to their minority status in Cyprus, carried their experiences to Britain after 1878. In a period of more than a century, many Turkish Cypriot organizations achieved significant levels of political, economic, and social power in big cities like London, Birmingham, and Manchester. In the words of the British

¹¹⁴ Muzaffer Dartan (2002) "Die Auswirkung der Ersparnisse der in Deutschland lebenden Türken auf die türkische Wirtschaft" in *Das Deutsch-Türkisches Verhaeltnis*. Bremen: Universitatet Bremen, p. 171

¹¹⁵ Christopher Hitchens (1997). *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. London: Verso. p. 33

academician and researcher James Pettifer, who specializes in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus:

*“A complicating factor in Britain is the existence of a large, well organized and politically influential Turkish Cypriot community, much larger than the mainstream Turkish diaspora. Most of these people have been in Britain since the turmoil in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, and some for much longer than that... Even the relatively few mainland Turks in London and Birmingham often work for Turkish Cypriot employers and so are drawn into the periphery of the conflict with Greece and the Greek Cypriots.”*¹¹⁶

In other words, the Turkish Cypriot community in Britain does not only defend the interests of their ethnic kinsmen in Cyprus, it also involves mainland Turks in their dispute with Greek Cypriots. By combining the causes of Turkish Cypriots with those of mainland Turks, Britain's Turkish Cypriot community successfully defends Turkish positions with an effectiveness which is hardly seen in continental Europe. Due to their respectable status and successful lobbying efforts, Turkish Cypriots significantly contribute to Britain's relatively favorable foreign policy towards Turkish Cypriots, which is also arguably the most pro-Turkish attitude among all EU countries.¹¹⁷

With regards to the percentage of ethnic Turkish populations in EU member countries, Germany is the leading country with three percent of its 82 million people being of Turkish ancestry. In the Netherlands and in Austria, where the Turkish communities are numerically smaller, they still constitute more than two percent of the total populations. In France, where the number of ethnic Turks approximately equals the Turkish figure in the Netherlands, they constitute about 0.5 percent of total French population. Although the absolute, as well as relative numbers of ethnic Turks in a European country certainly matter, the more important factor in terms of political influence is the number of Turks who have the citizenship of the country of their residence.

¹¹⁶ James Pettifer (1998). *The Turkish Labyrinth. Atatürk and the New Islam*. London: Penguin. p. 150.

¹¹⁷ David Barchard (1992). *Asil Nadir and the Rise and Fall of Polly Peck*. London: Victor Gallancz Ltd. pp. 176-178

According to a study by Faruk Şen, the director of Center for Studies on Turkey (Zentrum für Türkeistudien) in Essen, the percentage of European Turks who had obtained the citizenship of residence varies greatly from country to country. The study shows that more than 75 % of 300.000 ethnic Turks in Holland have already obtained Dutch citizenship in 2000, while only about 20 % of Germany's 2.5 million Turks were German citizens in the same year. This comparison, although far from serving as an absolute proof, clearly suggests that ethnic Turks in the Netherlands made better progress towards integrating to the Dutch social and political structure than their ethnic kinsmen in Germany. It can hence be asserted that ethnic Turks who have obtained the citizenship of the country in which they reside are much better positioned to form an influential Turkish community.

In Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania, in contrast to other EU member countries, the citizenship has never been an issue for the ethnic Turkish communities living in these three countries. Due to the fact that the rights and existence of Turkish minorities in former Ottoman territories had been secured by international treaties, these ethnic Turks automatically have the citizenship of the countries of their residence. Thus, it can safely be asserted that among the one million ethnic Turks who reside in Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania, the citizenship ratio is very close to 100 percent. Especially in Bulgaria, the current level of Turkish political integration is demonstrated through the Bulgarian government, where the ethnically Turkish Movement of Rights and Freedoms is the junior coalition partner. Since the 2005 Bulgarian Parliamentary elections, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms holds 34 seats in the 240-seat Bulgarian Parliament, as well as three ministries.¹¹⁸

Despite numerous difficulties encountered by ethnic Turks in EU countries which were formerly Ottoman territories, it can be argued that their situation is gradually improving since the 1990s. During the Cold War years, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Romania were under constant pressure to relinquish their

¹¹⁸ Official Website of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
<http://www.dps.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0464&g=>
For the Turkish version of the website, see:
<http://www.dps.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0269&g=>

ethnic and religious identities. As it has previously been mentioned before, Bulgarian Turks were even forced to renounce their Turkish names and obtain Bulgarian ones. Also in Greece, until late 1990s, the Turkish minority of Western Thrace had to obtain permission from Greek authorities in order to do minor repairs in their houses. Given the agonizing conditions of ethnic Turks in these three EU countries during Cold War years, it can safely be claimed that the situation of historical Turkish minorities in the Balkans has improved dramatically during the last two decades.

The number of ethnic Turkish deputies in an EU member states parliament is also indicative of the level of integration and influence of the Turkish community in that particular country. After the Bulgarian accession to the EU in January 2007, 28 ethnic Turkish members of the 240-seat Bulgarian parliament took the leading position in representing the Turkish presence in the EU.¹¹⁹ Prior to Bulgarian accession, Germany used to be the most significant country in terms of ethnic Turkish representation in Bundestag. As of 2007, five ethnic Turkish deputies from three different political parties in the 613-seat Bundestag are representing the interest of Germans with Turkish ancestries¹²⁰.

In the Netherlands, where the level of political integration of migrant Turks is arguably highest, there are three ethnic Turks in the 150-seat Tweede Kamer (Dutch House of Representatives).¹²¹ Even though the number of ethnic Turkish representatives is numerically smaller in Holland than in Germany, their ratio is much higher in the Dutch parliament. While ethnic Turks do not even constitute one percent of the German Bundestag, they make up two percent of the Dutch House of Representatives. This higher level of representation in the Dutch Tweede Kamer strongly suggests that ethnic

¹¹⁹ Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament. '40th National Assembly' (2007) <http://www.parliament.bg/?lng=en> While the Movement of Rights and Freedoms is represented by 34 deputies in the Bulgarian parliament, only 28 of them are ethnic Turks.

¹²⁰ Official Website of Bundestag, the German lower house of the Parliament. (2007) <http://www.bundestag.de/mdb/bio/index.html>

¹²¹ Official Website of Tweede Kamer der Staten General (Dutch House of Representatives) (2007) http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/members_of_parliament/index.jsp

Turks in Holland are better integrated into the national political system than their ethnic kinsmen in Germany.

The numbers and percentages of ethnic Turkish deputies in EU member states' parliaments' are certainly not a foolproof indicator of all aspects of Turkish political integration in these specific countries. For instance, the lack of any ethnic Turkish deputies in the British parliament does not necessarily contradict with the fact that the Turkish community in the United Kingdom is one of the most integrated Turkish communities in Europe. Moreover, the fact that the United Kingdom is one of the most ardent supporters of Turkish EU membership is quite noteworthy in the light of German reluctance for Turkish accession to the EU, although several ethnic Turks serve as deputies in the German Bundestag.

It is therefore not feasible to establish a general correlation between an EU member countries' support for Turkish causes and the number of ethnic Turkish deputies in its parliament. Especially after the 2005 elections in Germany, for example, the ruling CDU-SPD coalition hardened its opposition to Turkey's EU membership despite the increase of ethnic Turks in the Bundestag as compared to previous elections in 2002. Thus, the attitude of German government towards Turkey has changed for the worse from 2002 to 2005, while the level of ethnic Turkish political representation has changed for the better during the same period. By the same token, the United Kingdom, which has never had an ethnic Turk in its House of Commons, has been a traditional supporter of Turkish accession to the European Union.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the presence of large, well-integrated Turkish communities in any EU member country undoubtedly contribute positively to the bilateral relations between Turkey and that particular EU country. As dominant majorities in European countries start considering Turks as integrated and approachable members of their society, their perception of all Turks will inevitably change for the better. It is far from certain however, whether this positive contribution necessarily results in that country's increased support for Turkish EU membership. In an optimistic case, local

Turkish communities' consistent contributions to the European host societies will eventually result in a better Turkish image and increased support for Turkey's EU membership in the long run. However, it is also quite early in order to be able to predict whether all Turkish communities in EU member countries will ever achieve the required level of integration and influence.

The only certain conclusion which can be made with regards to the Turkish diaspora in Europe is that currently the majority of the European Turks lack the necessary education, political integration, and a healthy connection with the Turkish state in order to be able to act as Turkish lobbyists. Turkey, in turn, is currently unable to obtain the emotional support of many diaspora Turks many of whom it prosecuted and mistreated in the recent past. While the prosecutions of some diaspora Turks, especially of those who were active supporters of terrorist organizations, were arguably justifiable, many Turks had to escape to Europe in order to avoid prosecution for being political activists. Although most of these ethnic Turkish diaspora activists would normally be willing to involve in lobbying activities for Turkish causes, their resentment with the Turkish state for their past mistreatments arguably prevents them from doing so. Thus, a comprehensive dialog and reconciliation between the Turkish state and Turkish diaspora in Europe is the indubitable prerequisite for the creation of an effective Turkish lobby in Europe.

The need for the complete democratization of Turkey and for the full reconciliation between the Turkish state and the Turkish diaspora was eloquently expressed in the words of James Pettifer, who also pointed to the dangers awaiting those diaspora Turks who had never been politically active before:

“Without a fully functioning democracy in Turkey, it will be difficult to engage the energies of the Turks abroad in defense of the interests of the country. The great majority of Turks in the coffee shops of Berlin and Munich were part of a largely non-political underclass at home, so it is not surprising that a significant proportion of

them become adherents of extremist political or religious ideologies when they settle abroad".¹²²

It can therefore be concluded that the interests and well-being of the Turkish communities in Europe can not be secured only be increased through collaboration between Turkish authorities and Turkish diaspora, but also through full democratization in Turkey. As long as many members of the European Turks have longstanding troubles with Turkish law and justice back in Turkey, these individuals cannot be expected to channel their heartfelt efforts for Turkish causes. Thus, with the exception of those individuals with terrorist and separatist credentials, Turkish authorities should treat European Turks more leniently and understandingly when it comes to solving remaining bureaucratic hassles. Although deliberate and repeated disregard for the Turkish law should be punished swiftly, inadvertent and accidental errors of Turkish diaspora members should be treated with clemency and tolerance. It is only in this way that the Turkish state can justifiably expect a reciprocate sympathy and dedication from European Turks whenever Turkey needs support for its positions and actions on European platforms.

¹²² James Pettifer (1998). *The Turkish Labyrinth. Atatürk and the New Islam*. London: Penguin. p. 152

Distribution of Turkish Citizens in the European Union¹²³				
Country	Total Turkish Citizens (1991)	Working Turkish Citizens (1991)	Total Turkish Citizens (1999)	Working Turkish Citizens (1999)
Germany	1.612.623	695.740	2.107.426	739.446
France	236.793	98.020	287.343	78.965
Holland*	191.455	89.000	279.786	48.000
Austria	130.000	56.222	138.860	53.463
Belgium	81.775	23.488	73.818	26.855
United Kingdom	50.000	30.000	66.000	37.600
Denmark	27.929	12.036	38.055	13.639
Sweden	22.414	10.000	35.943	5.300
Italy	13.290	4.300	8.500	--
Finland	--	--	2.000	--
Spain	756	--	904	--
Luxembourg	190	15	220	60
Portugal	57	--	--	--
Ireland	42	16	--	--

* Dual citizens were not included for the year 1999

¹²³ Muzaffer Dartan (2002). "Die Auswirkung der Ersparnisse der in Deutschland lebenden Türken auf die türkische Wirtschaft" in Hagen Lichtenberg & Muzaffer Dartan, *Das Deutsch-Tuerkische Verhaeltnis*. p. 171

Historical Turkish Minorities in Southeastern Europe¹²⁴		
Country	Population with Turkish ancestry (2000)	Ratio of ethnic Turks to total population (%)
Bulgaria	848.000	10.5
Romania	30.000	0.1
Macedonia	82.000	3.9
Kosovo	10.800	-
Greece	120.000	1.2
Moldova	153.000	3.5

Ethnic Turks who have obtained the citizenship of their country of residence in the EU¹²⁵ (As of year 2000)	
Germany	470.000
Holland	225.000
Belgium	55.000
Austria	50.000
France	30.000
Sweden	22.000
United Kingdom	13.000
Denmark	12.000

¹²⁴ Paul Robert Magocsi (2001). *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*, London: Thames & Hudson pp. 199-201

¹²⁵ Faruk Şen (2002). "Mögliche politische Auswirkungen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei". s. 8 www.eab-berlin.de/berichte/tuerkei0602/berichtfaruk_sen140602.PDF

GERMANY'S IMMIGRATION AND TURKISH POLICY

The social, historical, and political background of a host country, previously defined as environmental conditions, play as important a role as the characteristics of the ethnic lobby itself. As it was discussed in preceding sections, countries with liberal Anglo-Saxon values, such as Canada, the United States, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, provide generally better opportunities for ethnic and immigrant groups to flourish in influence and status. Furthermore, these Anglo-Saxon countries tend to permit the accession of individuals with immigrant- or minority backgrounds to all levels of state bureaucracy. To cite a significant and current example, Alper Mehmet, the current British ambassador to Iceland who is of Turkish-Cypriot ancestry, demonstrates that even first-generation immigrants may be entrusted with highly strategic diplomatic positions by British authorities.¹²⁶

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon countries which have historically been more open toward immigration, Germany has arguably not been providing sufficient opportunities for ethnic and immigrant lobbies to flourish. This unwelcoming attitude has historically been present in Germany's laws, attitudes, and foreign policy, which has traditionally discouraged foreign laborers from settling in German soil permanently.¹²⁷ Moreover, the fact that more than nine million ethnic Germans settled in Germany after the end of the Second World War further triggered the discrimination towards immigrants with non-German ethnicity. Mainly due to this historical exigency, German society became tilted toward discrimination between ethnically German refugees and non-German labor migrants.

The Turkish migrants especially, which had enjoyed a great deal of respect and hospitality in Germany during late 19th century, have generally not experienced a very welcome and positive attitude since early 1960s when

¹²⁶ Halil, Eltan (2004) Our Man in Iceland. *The Guardian*, 8/4/2004, pp. 4-4

¹²⁷ İbrahim Canbolat (2003) *Almanya ve Dış Politikası*. p. 218

they started to arrive in West Germany in thousands.¹²⁸ While the Turkish and other foreign immigrants did not face strong resistance from public opinion from German public during the first decade of their presence, this relative tolerance started to change in late 1970s. As the German public started to realize that the ‘Gastarbeiter’ (guest workers) eventually were becoming ‘Einwanderer’ (immigrants), a significant portion of the German society grew increasingly disturbed about their presence. Although more recently coined terms such as ‘Mitbürger’ (co-citizen) by the liberal minded sections of German public continue to resist xenophobia, it is far from certain that the liberals will overwhelm German society.¹²⁹

It can therefore not be expected from Germany, a country which has based its citizenship law on ‘jus sanguis’ (blood right) principle since 1870s, to switch to very liberal attitudes toward immigration within the matter of few decades. Even if it is assumed that Germany has been sincerely attempting to reform itself as an immigration country for the last couple of years, a certain amount of resistance against these attempts would be predictable. Given that most German politicians as well as German media have been following a biased and anti-immigration discourse for several decades, it would understandably take many years to convince German public opinion that the policies and attitudes of the past were simply wrong and unjustified.¹³⁰ As many politicians would expectedly attempt to avoid public reactions, however, at least some of these attempts at liberalizing German society with regards to immigration may falter due to public opinion’s resistance.

Nevertheless, Germany has been expected to make gradual reforms to its restrictive immigration policies since late 1970, when it became obvious that a great majority of guest workers were to stay permanently. Especially after early 1990s, when a renewed influx of ethnic Germans started to arrive from

¹²⁸ Nedret Kuran-Burçoğlu (2003). Türk Alman Kültürel İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Gelişimi. *Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume 11, Nr. 1 pp. 91-92 .

¹²⁹ Riva Kastoryano (2000). *Kimlik Pazarlığı*. İstanbul: İletişim. p. 27

¹³⁰ Stephen Hoadley (2003). Immigration, refugee, asylum, and settlement policies as political issues in Germany and Australia. Paper presented to the conference entitled *The Challenges of Immigration and Integration in the European Union and Australia*.
http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/Archive/hoadley_paper.pdf

Eastern bloc countries, Germany started to be criticized for its discriminatory policies which disadvantaged its non-German residents. Given that Germany has arguably hesitated at least for a few decades before liberalizing its immigration policy, it is highly likely that certain aspects of these liberalization attempts are conducted out of pure political necessity.

West Germany, which has been in need for additional labor forces since the end of the Second World War, met its labor demand initially from arriving ethnic Germans from lost German territories. With the addition of arrivals from East Germany, an estimated number of 12 million ethnic Germans arrived in West Germany between 1945 and 1960.¹³¹ An argument can thus be made that the existing labor demand of West Germany was sufficiently met by arriving ethnic Germans from Poland, former Czechoslovakia, East Prussia, and East Germany. In other words, during the initial fifteen years following the end of the Second World War, the labor demand for the growing West German economy was exclusively met by ethnic German newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe. It was therefore only after 1960s when the ethnic German influx from the East came to a standstill and West German authorities were forced to meet the ever growing labor demand from Mediterranean countries.

Turkish labor migrants, like their Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian, and Tunisian counterparts, started to be recruited by German authorities in early 1960s, as a result of the labor shortage in growing West German economy. Like their German recipients, the majority of them did not have any idea that they were going to stay in Germany for more than few years. As a result, migrant Turks, Italians, or Yugoslavs, with the exception of those who had married Germans, did not bother to obtain German citizenship or even permanent residency. Thus, even though the conditions of most migrants in their homelands did not

¹³¹ Dartan, Muzaffer (2002). "Die Auswirkung der Ersparnisse der in Deutschland lebenden Türken auf die türkische Wirtschaft" in Hagen Lichtenberg & Muzaffer Dartan & Ali Eriş, *Das Deutsch – Türkische Verhältnis*. Bremen: Universitaet Bremen. p. 169

permit them to return to their home countries after few years, the majority of them preserved their intention to leave Germany in the near future.¹³²

Starting with the economic crisis in 1973, however, German authorities stopped receiving further foreign laborers and starting to impose restrictions on the contracts of foreigners present on German soil. Consequently, only spouses and family members of foreign workers, who had already been working in Germany for several years, were permitted to settle in Germany. While the foreign workers who were citizens of a EU country like Italy were able to circumvent these restrictions to a certain extent, Turks, Yugoslavs, and Greeks (until Greece's EU accession in 1981) started to face more hardships due to German authorities decisions.

Despite the ongoing struggles of foreign workers to save sufficient financial means to secure their return to home countries, German public opinion increasingly became hostile to the presence of these migrant laborers. According to an opinion poll in 1982, the number of Germans who believed that the 'foreign workers should immediately leave Germany', reached two-thirds of respondents.¹³³ Thus, the majority of German public arguably failed to understand that the economic crisis in Germany was not caused by the presence of foreign workers, but by the global economic crisis. Perhaps more significantly the German public opinion poll reflected the continuing German tendency to blame foreigners whenever economic difficulties stroke Germany.

Although the situation of migrant workers was rather a German domestic issue, the German authorities' persistent failure to promote integration started to draw criticism in international arena. As most of the foreign workers, whose numbers exceeded seven millions, lacked citizenship and most social rights, their voices of discontent started to become heard across Europe in mid

¹³² Kettenacker, Lothar (1997). *Germany since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 224

¹³³ Schönwalder, Karen (1996). "Migration, refugees and ethnic plurality as issues of public debate in (West) Germany" in David Cesarani & Mary Fulbrook, *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*. London: Routledge. p. 166

1980s.¹³⁴ The German government, which had been led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl since 1982, thus felt increasing pressure from abroad to improve the conditions of migrant workers. Consequently, when the CDU-FDP coalition led by Helmut Kohl won its third term in the 1990 elections, the pressure for citizenship and immigration reforms became even stronger.

The 'Auslaendergesetz' (foreigners' law) which went into effect in 1991, and the 'Gesetz zur Aenderung Asylverfahrens, Auslaender- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften' (law regarding change of asylum-, foreigner-, and citizenship regulations) which went into effect in 1993, arguably achieved limited improvements in the status of foreign workers in Germany. According to the combined legal effect of these new laws, two groups of foreigners gained rights to become citizens in Germany. Those immigrants who had been legally residing in Germany for 15 or more years, as well as those who went to school in Germany for at least six years, and who had been residing in Germany at least for eight years, were accordingly granted citizenship.¹³⁵

Henceforth, the strict German citizenship law, which based 'Germanness' purely on blood connection, and which had been in effect since 1913, was softened for the first time with the passage of the new laws in 1991 and 1993. Even though these two new laws applied only to a limited group of foreign migrants, it was considered as a first important gesture towards Germany's migrant communities by the German government. Nevertheless, the new law of 1993 also repealed the German asylum procedure, which used to secure automatic asylum to refugees which arrived from countries with proven records of human rights violations¹³⁶. Thus, even though these new laws had

¹³⁴ Turner, Henry Ashby (1992). *Germany from Partition to Reunification*. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 163-164

¹³⁵ Kaya, Ayhan (2002). "The Hyphenated Germans: German-Turks". *Private View*. Spring 2002 Issue: 36-43. http://www.tusiad-us.org/content/uploaded/pw11Hyphenated_Germans.pdf

¹³⁶ Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu (1996). "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in David Cesarani & Mary Fulbrook, *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*. London: Routledge p. 25

a predominantly more permissive and liberal attitude at first sight, they also included clauses which restricted certain areas of German immigration process.

During the first years following the change of German citizenship and immigration laws, there were no notable increases in the number of foreigners which enjoyed more civil and political rights in Germany. The number of ethnic Turks, for instance, who were eligible to vote in 1994 German elections, was estimated around 50.000, which amounted only to about three percent of Turkish community in Germany. According to the same study, about 100.000 foreign workers obtained German citizenship between 1991 and 1994, while 400.000 ethnic German immigrants from Eastern bloc countries were granted citizenship by German authorities.¹³⁷

The numerical discrepancy between ethnic German immigrants from Eastern European countries and foreign workers who had been legally residing in Germany strongly suggested that the German authorities were still acting in discriminatory manners in naturalization. These ethnically biased policies were also criticized in several German newspapers, which claimed that the 'Germanness' of Eastern European immigrants were mostly dubious and disputable.¹³⁸ Despite ongoing criticism from certain domestic media and political circles, Helmut Kohl's government thus continued discriminate against its resident foreign immigrants, and clearly favored ethnic Germans when it came to naturalizing resident aliens.

During the fourth and last term of Helmut Kohl's government from 1994 to 1998, the effects of the 1991 and 1993 laws started to become more evident in terms of naturalized resident aliens. As more and more Turks, and other foreign nationalities began to fulfill the 15 year residency of six years of

¹³⁷ Brandt, Birgit (2000). "Citizenship and International Migration: Discussion of the German Situation" in Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Gül Tokay, *Redefining the Nation State and Citizen*, Istanbul: Eren p. 225

¹³⁸ For a comparative study of discriminatory immigration policies in Germany and in Israel, see: *Ethnic-Priority Immigration in Israel and Germany: Resilience vs. Demise* <http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg45.PDF>

schooling requirements, the number of naturalized foreigners started to increase drastically. As a result of this increase, the number of ethnic Turks with German citizenship reached 220.000, 160.000 of which voted in the 1998 general elections. According to several scholars' estimates, however, most of these Germans with Turkish ancestry voted for SPD or the Greens, instead of voting for the CDU which had relaxed the citizenship law in 1991. With the exception of recently naturalized ethnic German immigrants who opted predominantly for the CDU, overwhelming majorities of other working migrant groups also voted for the SPD or the Greens¹³⁹.

After the election victory of SPD-Greens coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 1998, Germany's official stance towards non-EU resident aliens became more liberal and tolerant. The ruling SPD-Greens coalition first tried to pass a federal law which would allow resident aliens to vote in local elections. Even though this draft law could not be ratified due to passionate CDU opposition, a compromise was reached which would grant more power to German states in regulating the participation of resident aliens. Consequently, several German states with overwhelming SPD majorities, such as North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony, adopted state laws which would facilitate political participation and naturalization of residing foreigners.

The ruling SPD-Greens coalition also made recent improvements in the German citizenship law in 2000, even though it was far from fulfilling the expectations of most resident aliens. While the residence requirement without schooling condition was reduced from 15 years to 10 years, the possibility of dual citizenship was virtually eliminated for immigrants with Turkish- and other non-EU nationalities. This ban on dual citizenship, in turn, was largely the result of a compromise with the Christian Democratic opposition of this period, which had vehemently opposed the liberalization of Germany's immigration and naturalization policy.

¹³⁹ Canbolat, İbrahim S. (2003). *Almanya ve Dış Politikası*. Bursa: Alfa. p. 226

Unlike Bavaria, and most southern German states with predominantly conservative voters, SPD-dominated states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony also interpreted some federal laws in accordance with the benefits of their foreign residents. Due to the fact that the articles 73 and 74 grant German states (Bundesländer) legislative powers in several areas as well as the responsibility to implement and interpret federal legislation, most states also followed suit in either more liberal or more conservative way.¹⁴⁰ Since the most recent citizenship law of 2000 stipulated that a foreigner should have resided at least for 10 years and that she should have a valid work permit, more liberal German states interpreted this as a requirement for a legal work permit at the time of the citizenship application.

More conservative states like Bavaria, on the other hand, interpreted this law that there was no specific clause regulating the required period of work permit possession. Having approached the legal loophole from a conservative and arguably xenophobic perspective, the Bavarian government preferred to interpret the law as a simultaneous requirement for residence, as well as work permits. By applying this conservative legal interpretation, federal states like Bavaria imposed their own regulations, and required from citizenship applicants valid work permits which had been valid for several years at the time of the application.¹⁴¹ As a significant number of citizenship applicants had obtained their work permits several years after having obtained resident permits, however, they were automatically disqualified as potential German citizens.

Ethnic Turks with German citizenship, whose numbers have drastically increased in the years following the election victory of Gerhard Schröder in 1998, started to be considered an important factor in German foreign policy as well. Gerhard Schröder, who was undoubtedly aware of the potential ethnic Turkish votes, generally refrained from policies which would directly insult or

¹⁴⁰ Simon Green (2001) "The Greens and the Reform of the German Citizenship Law" p.5
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws18/green.pdf>

¹⁴¹ Can Ünver, the Labor attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Berlin, as well as Kenan Kolat, president of the Turkish Community of Berlin-Brandenburg concur that all German states interpret the Citizenship law of 2000 according to their own interests. The author conducted private interviews with Mr. Ünver and Mr. Kolat in Berlin between 8-11 April 2005.

hurt Turkey and German Turks. Therefore, unlike the increase of Germans with other ancestries, the influence of Germans with Turkish background started to be a subject of study and discussion after 1998. According to the late Turkish statesmen, journalist, and researcher Ismail Cem:

*“The biggest difference between Luxembourg (1997) and Helsinki (1999) Summits was that two different German governments were at power at these two summits. As the date of the Helsinki Summit was approaching, German Chancellor Schröder and German foreign minister Fischer were much warmer toward Turkey than the previous German governments of Helmut Kohl. At least, they were not opposing Turkey’s designation as an official EU candidate country, and were trying to convince other EU countries which might oppose Turkish candidacy. Belgium, Austria, and Luxembourg were also in close touch with German foreign ministry, and were strongly influenced by the Turkish policy of Germany”.*¹⁴²

The improvement of German official attitude towards Turkish migrants in Germany, as well as towards Turkey’s EU candidacy, was reflected also in the number of ethnic Turks who obtained German citizenship between 1998 and 2002. According to German political scientist Ulrich von Wilamowitz – Moellendorf, the number of Germans citizens with Turkish ancestry doubled to almost half million by 2002. Like in the previous elections, about 75 percent of ethnic Turkish voters opted for either SPD or the Greens in the 2002 elections, arguably showing their appreciation of SPD-Green coalition’s immigration policies.¹⁴³

While there is no specific study regarding the voting patterns of other immigrants with labor migration background, there is no reason to assume that their previous preference for the SPD and Greens might have changed in the 2002 elections. As most ex- Yugoslav, Albanian, Tunisian, and Iranian immigrants follow similar patterns as non-EU and non-German communities, it

¹⁴² Ismail Cem (2005). *Avrupa’nin ‘Birliđi’ ve Türkiye*. Istanbul: Bilgi p. 121-122

¹⁴³ von Wilamowitz – Moellendorf, Ulrich (2002). “Das Wahlverhalten der eingebürgerten Türken”.

URL: www.kpv-nw.de/kpv/wahlverfahren.pdf p.2

can safely be assumed that they overwhelmingly supported the SPD-Greens coalition in the 2002 elections.

Immigrants who originate from Russia, as well as other formerly Eastern bloc countries, however, continued their traditional support for the CDU also in 2002 general elections in Germany. According to the German sociologist Andreas Wüst's findings, 73 percent of this electorate group voted for the CDU, by far the highest percentage of support among any social or ethnic group in Germany.¹⁴⁴ The persistent level of electoral support for CDU strongly demonstrated the continuing gratitude felt by ethnic German immigrants toward Helmut Kohl's ruling party from 1982 to 1998. Even though the Christian Democrats had been in opposition since 1998 and Helmut Kohl no longer lead the CDU, ethnic German immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe continued to be ardent supporters of the CDU.

It can be concluded that the overall situation of immigrants with non-EU background has improved significantly during the rule of the SPD-Greens coalition between 1998 and 2005. Even though the SPD-Greens coalition failed to promote the participation of non-citizen immigrants in Germany's social life and local politics, it assisted those immigrants who wanted to obtain German citizenship. Thus, ethnic Turks, Albanians, or ex-Yugoslavs who wanted to renounce their citizenship and fulfilled the German citizenship requirements became German nationals in increasing numbers. Those labor migrants, who did not want to give up their previous citizenship, and those who did not fulfill the citizenship requirements, however, did not experience much improvement in their isolated and neglected conditions.

¹⁴⁴ Official Magazine of North Rhine – Westphalia's Immigrant Community
http://laga-nrw.de/data/migration19_2004.pdf

Number of former Turkish Nationals who obtained German citizenship¹⁴⁵	
Year	Number
1972-1979	2.219
1980	399
1981	534
1982	580
1983	853
1984	1.053
1985	1.310
1986	1.492
1987	1.184
1988	1.243
1989	1.713
1990	2.034
1991	3.529
1992	7.377
1993	12.915
1994	19.590
1995	31.578
1996	46.294
1997	42.240
1998	59.664
1999	103.900
2000	82.182
Total	424.513

¹⁴⁵ Official Website of the Turkish Embassy in Berlin “Zur Integration der Türken in Deutschland”.
p. 9
<http://www.tuerkischebotschaft.de/de/archiv/2002/ALKitap2002.pdf>

GERMANS OF TURKISH ORIGIN AND TURKS IN GERMANY

A 2002 research study demonstrated that 98 percent of two and a half million ethnic Turks and Germans of Turkish origin residing in Germany did not have permanent return in prospect and that 53 percent of these two and a half million people have been residents in this country for over 15 years and thus possess the right to be legally naturalized citizens of Germany.¹⁴⁶ This research study thus revealed that the 'guest workers', as they were previously known in Germany, have almost completed their transition to become permanent residents, regardless of their citizenship status. In other words, the study demonstrated that almost all ethnic Turks with German citizenship and Turkish nationals with long term or permanent German residence permit would, according to this research study, spend the rest of their lives in Germany.

The attitudes observed among Germany's Turkish immigrants who did not acquire German citizenship notwithstanding their legal right have their bases in political, economic and sentimental reasons. A considerable number of those emigrants of Turkish origin who do not acquire citizenship notwithstanding their existing right currently refuse to renounce their Turkish citizenship due to the fact that the right of dual citizenship is not provided for in the German civil code that went into effect 2000. Especially Turkish nationals, who are older than 40 years of age, are currently unwilling to renounce their Turkish citizenship even though they would qualify for German citizenship after having renounced their Turkish ones. Despite the resistance of middle-aged Turkish nationals to renounce their Turkish citizenship, it is expected that this resistance will eventually subside, especially as the social convenience of being a German citizen becomes widely known among ethnic Turks in Germany.

¹⁴⁶ Muzaffer Dartan. "Die Auswirkung der Ersparnisse der in Deutschland Lebenden Türken auf die Türkische Wirtschaft", *Das Deutsch-Türkische Verhältnis*, Bremen: Universitaet Bremen, p. 171

According to several academic studies and extrapolations, German citizens with Turkish origin will exceed one million in short term, provided that no radical alterations are made to German civil code. The Turkish Research Center in Essen, as well as certain academics state higher figures and estimate the prospective number of members of Turkish origin likely to acquire German citizenship in short term to be one and a half million.¹⁴⁷ Although there appears to be no certain agreement on the figures regarding the future number of German Turks, it is very likely that the number of German voters of Turkish origin will receive a relatively more influential position compared to the current situation. Especially as the Germans with Turkish ancestry increasingly become politically active, the increased ratio of political participation among ethnic Turks with German citizenship will increase, along with the actual number of German citizens with Turkish ancestry.

The significance of the number of Turkish-Germans is further underscored by the fact that the ratio of French-Armenians to the total population of France barely exceeds 0.5 percent, whereas the ratio of Greek-Americans to the total USA population is merely one percent. Given that the Armenian lobby in France and Greek lobby in the United States is very influential especially with regards to anti-Turkish activities, it goes without saying that their numerical strength is more than sufficient for lobbying purposes. From the same numerical perspective, the ratio of Germans of Turkish origin to the German population has already exceeded the one percent barrier and is predicted to reach in medium term the two percent limit equivalent to one and a half million Germans of Turkish origin. Even though Germany's Turkish community would probably need more than few years in order to catch up with their Greek-American and Armenian-French counterparts in terms of influence, the increased level of naturalization among Germany's ethnic Turks is the first important step towards matching the influence of these two rival lobbies.

Moreover in medium term, i.e. in the years till 2010, it is estimated that approximately two million of Germany's residents of Turkish origin will have

¹⁴⁷ Onur Bilge Kula. "Almanya'daki Türklerin Kültürel Kimliği". *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Volume 11 (1), p. 125

attained the essential criteria required for German citizenship.¹⁴⁸ Even though it is not possible to predict the actual number of ethnic Turks who would actually use this legal right to German citizenship, it is estimated that between 60 to 75 percent of eligible Turks would obtain German nationality. Thus, according to the more optimistic estimate of 75 percent, 1.5 million ethnic Turks would have obtained German citizenship by 2010. Even though the ratio of eligible voters among recently naturalized ethnic Turks would be slightly lower than among mainstream German voters, the resulting decrease in ethnic Turkish political representation would be minimal.

The rise in the number of Germans with Turkish ancestry, as well as their voting power started to attract the interest of German politicians as well as of German media. Mainly because of this rising interest and increased awareness, German political parties as well as periodicals began to feel the urge to disclose their views on several Turkish-related topics. Several issues, ranging from Turkish bid for EU membership to the problems of Turkish immigrants in Germany, were covered and discussed with increased frequency by German journalists and politicians.¹⁴⁹ Even though the support of the German media for Turkish EU membership has been fluctuating generally, most newspapers tended to concur that German political parties abuse Turkey's desires and expectations regarding the European Union.

For instance, according to the arguments of the left-leaning newspaper, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the hesitant attitudes of both SPD (German Social Democratic Party) and CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) towards the EU membership of Turkey stems from the voters of Turkish origin. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* states that CDU politicians refuse to lock the European Union door against Turkey in order to abstain from causing further offense on the Turkish voters' side, whereas SPD politicians, bearing the aim of winning ethnic Turkish votes, are trying to create the impression that they sincerely

¹⁴⁸ Faruk Şen (2007). *Euro-Türkler. Avrupa'da Türk Varlığı ve Geleceği*. İstanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık, p. 48

¹⁴⁹ Dieter Sauter "Die Bedeutung Deutschlands für die Beziehungen der Türkei zur Europäischen Union", *Das Deutsch-Türkische Verhaeltnis*, Bremen: Universitaet Bremen, p. 101

and unconditionally support the EU membership of Turkey, which, in fact, they cannot entirely seize for themselves¹⁵⁰.

Nevertheless, promoting Turkey's European Union bid has become a daunting fact due to the attitude of the German society which has developed a postmodern sense of prejudice against Turkey via a thirty-year-old history of anti-Turkish publications, discourses and news reports. These observed prejudice and reluctance inherently put a check on the support provided to Turkey by the Schröder government and cause rather complicated inconsistencies between the government's policies and public discourse. As quoted from Muzaffer Dartan, who frequently touches upon the indecisiveness and inconsistency in the attitudes of German political parties and politicians towards Turkey;

*“Prime Minister Schröder has declared that they are going support Turkey on the way to the setting of a negotiation date. However, he also frequently stated that the decision to be made in the EU Summit of 2004 will not be related to the actual membership of Turkey, but only to the commencement date of negotiations, since the German public opinion is not exactly in favor of Turkey's membership. Hence, German Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs have constituted “a membership policy specific to Turkey” by on one side arguing that the support of the Union is essential for the permanence of the reform process in Turkey and this also holds significance for Europe, but on the other side declaring that the initiation of negotiations is inherently separate from membership and thus the issue of membership could be included in the European agenda only after a certain amount of time (10-15 years at best)”*¹⁵¹

Considering that the German Prime Minister Schröder celebrated his 60th birthday in 2004, it can be argued that he has postponed the Turkish full membership issue to a date which he may not survive to see. This hesitation

¹⁵⁰ Susanne Höll & Nico Fried. ‘Wenn aus Türken Deutsche Wahler werden’ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. p. 8

¹⁵¹ Muzaffer Dartan. ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye-Almanya İlişkileri’. *Avrupa Birliği Üzerine Yazılar*. p. 131

of Gerhard Schröder, in turn, should be regarded as the most incontrovertible evidence proving that he and his government will never provide Turkey with more support than affordable within the limits of public approval. Probably not without doubts about granting full support to Turkey's membership to EU himself, the German Chancellor cannot be expected to let the German public opinion turn a grave face to him merely for the sake of ethnic Turkish votes. Given that Schröder's SPD-Greens coalition had been rated behind the Christian Democrats in almost all opinion polls held since 2004, it was rather understandable that Schröder did not want to appear as the 'Chancellor of Kreuzberg' to German public.

The figure mentioned above for the number of residents of Turkish origin in Germany and statistical statements such as the ratio of naturalized citizens of Germany to the members of Turkish origin define the outer (environmental) conditions of the gradually developing Turkish lobby in Germany. The condition regarding the workers' numbers were deemed as environmental because the number of labourers sent from Turkey to Germany has been determined by the German government and the Turkish government, respectively, and the number of Turks entitled to acquire German citizenship has been determined by the German governments. In the processes regarding these decisions, the Turkish lobby in Germany had not yet been established or was, in a more optimistic sense, in the making. Therefore, the Turkish lobby was not consulted within this process and could neither have influence on, nor make a contribution to these decisions.

Moreover, although German and Turkish authorities jointly decided the numbers of Turkish labour migrants which were to be sent to Germany, Turkish authorities were left out of the decision-making mechanism in the following decades. Neither Turkish authorities nor residents of Turkish origin in Germany were ever consulted on the investigations regarding the actual status of asylum applicants during the politically driven immigrations which had peaked between early 1980s to mid-1990s. Appeals made by Turkish authorities and Turkish organizations in Germany regarding the criminal backgrounds of some of these political migrants fell largely on deaf ears. As a

result of this uncompromising attitude of German authorities, thousands of immigrants from Turkey were admitted to Germany actually on solely economic grounds, a considerable number of whom used the statement that they had to leave Turkey for political reasons in order to acquire refugee status.¹⁵²

In fact, the context of historical development of Turkey-Europe relations deems quite normal the credible and sympathetic impression which the asylum seekers left on the German public opinion. This is mostly done by exaggerating the political restrictions in Turkey, and withholding an asylum applicant's criminal record from German authorities. By disregarding an asylum applicant's criminal record, German authorities arguably demonstrate their conviction that a certain individual's prosecution in Turkey was caused only due to political activism. At any rate, these controversial laws of Germany, as well as of most other Western European countries, allowed political refugees from Turkey to organize and lobby their respective country's governments. In other words, these laws welcomed and encouraged the provocateurs within the Turkish immigrant groups to finance subversive activities such as revolutionary Marxism, Kurdish separatism, and radical Islam.¹⁵³

Since it is impossible, at least in short term, to change these attitudes established now as historical facts upon a background of hundreds of years, the decisions taken by Turkish and German governments up until now should be regarded as the environmental/external conditions affecting the Turkish community in Germany. By the same token, the aforementioned anti-Turkish sentiments are the results of an accumulation of centuries, which has further been reinforced with the intensive Turkish emigration in the last 40 years, and became almost an established myth for German public opinion. Therefore, only a long-term, continuous and patient course of lobbying could prove sufficient to overcome these anti-Turkish prejudices. It is hence inevitable that

¹⁵² Nermin Abadan-Unat (2006). *Bitmeyen Göç. Konuk İşçilikten Ulus Ötesi Yurttaşlığa*. İstanbul: Bilgi University, p. 71-72

¹⁵³ Andrew Mango (2004). *The Turks Today*. London: John Murray, p. 65

the first few years of even a very successful public relations campaign on behalf of Turkey will be met with stiff resistance, as more deep rooted and established anti-Turkish prejudices will prove difficult to remove.

Despite the strong and deep-seated presence of anti-Turkish sentiments in Germany, the strongest assumption that the residents of Turkish origin in Germany were able to change has been the anticipation that the Turks of Germany will one day return to Turkey. Even though most 'guest workers' initially set foot in Germany with the aim of working and saving for only few years, the interaction of several factors both in Turkey and in Germany kept perpetually postponing their return to Turkey. Eventually, as most Turkish workers realized and acknowledged the economic unfeasibility of returning to Turkey, they expectedly intensified their efforts to remain in Germany. The most important indicator of the increase in the inclination to stay in Germany should be the gradual decrease observed in the percentage of returns from 15 percent in 1976 to 6.6 percent in 1981 – when the toughest of attitudes were observed on the German authorities' side – and finally to 2.2 percent in 1996¹⁵⁴.

Even during the times when the unwelcoming attitudes of German offices were at their peak, namely in early 1980s, the political complications and military administration tragically contributed to the increase in the inclination among members of Turkish origin to stay in Germany. The general hesitation of Germany's Turks to return to Turkey under any circumstances was further strengthened due to the political, social and economic hardships awaiting them back in Turkey. It was this political, economic and social development process that enabled, and even stimulated, ethnic Turkish entrepreneurs and politicians of to raise their voices and to intensify their efforts to gain social acceptance within a society where they were not wanted. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of present German residents of Turkish origin are

¹⁵⁴ Muzaffer Dartan. "Die Auswirkung der Ersparnisse der in Deutschland lebenden Türken auf die türkische Wirtschaft". p. 171

either the ones who had resisted the pressures, or their children and grandchildren.¹⁵⁵

As ordinary Turkish migrant workers had to struggle with official, social, financial, as well as bureaucratic burdens which were partially created deliberately by German authorities, certain immigrant groups from Turkey were arguably subject to preferential treatment. Although German official circles arguably failed to show understanding and hospitality to the Turkish workers whom they themselves had invited to Germany in 1960s; they seemed to be rather far away from this strict attitude when it came to the supporters of separatist terrorist organizations most of whom applied for asylum with falsified reasons. With this new understanding and hospitality towards the allegedly political refugees, German authorities also encouraged the anti-Turkish activities of these individuals.

This process also had a negative effect on the morale of Turkish residents in Germany, making them feel more unwanted than any other ethnic group in the country. Some Turks found consolation in extreme religious or nationalistic ideologies as a reaction to such developments and became part of a grand vicious circle that sabotaged the integration and adaptation process of the residents of Turkish origin. Despite all these negative factors, most members of the Turkish society in Germany managed to save themselves from this harmful instinct and went on moving forward towards gaining a socially accepted place within the German society.¹⁵⁶

Persisting in their will to stay in Germany even in times when the German governments wanted to send them back to their countries, the Turkish society has managed to prove to both the German authorities and German public opinion that their existence within Germany is not temporary. During this process, the Turkish society in Germany also adapted itself to the sociological landscape of Germany and became involved in a more intensive interaction

¹⁵⁵ Faruk Şen (2007). *Euro-Türkler. Avrupa'da Türk Varlığı ve Geleceği*. İstanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık, p. 14-15

¹⁵⁶ Chris Morris (2005). *The New Turkey. The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*. London: Granta. pp. 192-193

than ever with the German society through their efforts to learn and defend its legal status. Although certain groups of Turkish migrants, such as the recent arrivals to Germany as 'political refugees' arguably did not integrate as much as the rest of the Turkish community, German Turks in general have made significant progress.¹⁵⁷ As a result of this interaction, the Turkish society became integrated, although not wholly, into German social, economic and political life and started to develop and educate itself on the issues effecting both the Turkish society and its ethnic kinsmen in Turkey.

Thanks to this very interaction, the German society managed to trim the edges of their deep prejudice and antipathy towards the members of Turkish community. As ordinary Germans started to get more acquainted with ethnic Turks as their colleagues and neighbours, they arguably forsook a considerable part of their insistence of Turks' and foreigners' return to the countries of origin. The improved and more understanding opinions of those Germans who shared their desks with Turks in elementary and high schools in the beginning of 1960s probably had a positive effect on this partial improvement, considering that the students of 1960s would be politically active in thirty years' time. Consequently, in early 2000s the German society became more inclined than ever to have Turks and other ethnic groups besides, although not necessarily within, themselves provided that these foreign groups could speak German and become integrated into the society. Finally, an important segment of about twenty million Germans, which had visited Turkey during the last few years, were arguably persuaded by German Turks to visit the ancestral homeland of their friends, colleagues, and neighbours.¹⁵⁸

It can further be argued that the external (environmental) conditions in Germany are in a relatively optimistic state ever since the day Turkish labour migrants set foot on Germany. Even though Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy

¹⁵⁷ Faruk Şen (2007). *Euro-Türkler. Avrupa'da Türk Varlığı ve Geleceği*. İstanbul: Günizi Yayıncılık, pp. 23-25

¹⁵⁸ Chris Morris (2005). *The New Turkey. The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*. London: Granta, p. 194

towards Turkey's EU bid remains pessimistic, most German Turks have achieved a certain level of success and integration in the German society. In other words, the conditions of the host state, Germany, are relatively more suitable for Turkish lobbying activities than it was ten years ago. It is therefore absolutely essential that Germany's Turkish community show intensive efforts to organize and structure its political activity, and thus improve its internal conditions in a period when the external conditions are relatively optimistic.

Contrary to the popular assumption, the most important responsibilities in the evaluation of these inner conditions are to be entrusted not with the authorities in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Relations or Turkish Embassies but with the residents of Turkish origin in Germany. The grounds for this division of responsibility stem from the fact that the Turkish authorities and diplomatic missions are loyal to the benefits of Turkey and Turkish citizens and not the benefits of the residents of Turkish origin in Germany. However harsh it may sound, the interests and destinies of Germans with Turkish ancestry cannot be entrusted to Turkish authorities due to legal, practical, and moral reasons. Thus, the task of defending the rights of German citizens of Turkish origin lies in the hands of deputies of Turkish origin within the German parliament, Turkish associations, organizations and lobbying bodies in Germany and the Germans of Turkish origin themselves as the very citizens of a country.

Within the same context, German citizens of Turkish origins are expected, above all, to be loyal to Germany which they are connected to with ties of citizenship and secondly to the benefits of Turkey which they are connected to with ties of sentimental virtues and kinship. Just like any other country, Germany has the right to expect its citizens to prove loyal to Germany above all. Therefore, German citizens of Turkish origin should never be in the position of voluntary and loyal servants of Turkey or Turkish of Turkish interests. In order to attain this civil awareness, German citizens of Turkish origin should be informed of the necessity to become good German citizens first in order to serve the benefits of Turkey and of the fact that they themselves are the keys to the improvement of the Turkish image in Germany. Hence, the German citizens of Turkish origin should be better

educated about the need to defend German interests first, especially if they are expected to involve in Turkish lobbying activities as respectful German citizens.

Although the German press and public opinion are still largely devoid of accusations against German citizens of Turkish origin to be more loyal to the benefits of Germany than to the benefits of Turkey, the Turkish press in Germany has been subject to such criticism. Several German journalists and academics were quick to point out that the German citizens of Turkish origin are still mentioned as “Turks” especially in the Germany editions of *Milliyet* and *Hurriyet*. Many articles published in these newspapers regarding the pre-election period for the 2002 federal parliament elections in Germany caused disturbance within German circles with such statements as “Turks make their mark on elections” or “Turks have the say”¹⁵⁹.

As it will be further discussed in the following chapters, certain fractions among the German Press found this approach and indoctrination towards Germans of Turkish origin very negative and inappropriate, and defined this attitude of Turkish press as “anti-integration”. The more reactionary elements in the German press claimed that these attitudes constituted an intervention in German domestic policy and demanded that the publication of Turkish newspapers in Germany be halted. While the proposals to ban Turkish newspapers were generally perceived as too radical and extreme, the proposal to ban certain Turkish movies found significant support among the German public opinion. Arguing that the movie ‘*Kurtlar Vadisi / Valley of the Wolves*’ “*does not encourage integration but sows hate and mistrust against the West*”, for example, Bavarian Premier Edmund Stoiber called on German cinemas to stop showing the movie.¹⁶⁰ Even though such a prohibitionist attitude is arguably hypocritical for a German minister who often criticizes Turkish democratic credentials, his strong reaction clearly demonstrates the German uneasiness regarding Turkish chauvinism.

¹⁵⁹ Irina Wiessner. “Einmal Türke, immer Türke”. *die Tageszeitung*, p. 1

<http://www.taz.de/index.php?id=archivseite&dig=2002/10/23/a0181>

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1909933,00.html>

Although these extremely aggressive views of German politicians and newspapers are another sign of their anti-Turkish bias, their criticism is not fully baseless. Especially several Turkish newspapers' designation of individuals of German citizenship as "Turks" is not a helpful approach for the integration of the Turkish community. Given that not only nationalistic or chauvinistic newspapers, but also mainstream Turkish newspapers such as Hürriyet often refers to the German citizens with Turkish ancestry as simply 'Turks', the discomfort among certain German journalists and politicians are partly justifiable.¹⁶¹ While there is nothing wrong with emphasizing the ethnic 'Turkishness' of Germany's Turks, it is rather unconstructive to omit the fact that these people are German residents, and partly German citizens as well. Consequently, it should not be very surprising to witness German disappointment at Turkish media's persistent emphasis solely on the Turkishness of the Germans of Turkish ancestry.

Although certain groups among German journalists arguably exaggerate the jingoist attitude among some sections of the Turkish press, at least part of this criticism is regrettably justifiable. In order to correct this chauvinistic and counterproductive journalistic attitude, a considerable portion of Turkish press needs to train itself in order not to put the increasingly strengthening and renowned Turkish lobby in Germany into a difficult position and to raise its level of awareness in this matter. Unfortunately, a significant portion of Turkish press has not yet managed to throw off this sentimental and jingoist attitude and to abstain from feeding nationalist indoctrination to their kinsmen in Germany. As a result of this jingoist attitude, not only has the credibility of Germans of Turkish origin been damaged in the eyes of both German press and official authorities, but also the German citizens of Turkish origin have found themselves in a dilemma of conscience due to these unjust accusations.

¹⁶¹ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/agora/article.asp?sid=1&aid=1656>

It can safely be argued that the Germans of Turkish origin who have been acquiring German citizenship in increasing numbers and becoming more effectively active in German politics, are of sufficient maturity to decide for themselves what's right and what's wrong. These Germans of Turkish ancestry will surely show more interest, affection and warmth towards Turkey than other Germans and continue to enjoy their ties of soul and heart with their kinsmen in Turkey. These ties will surely inspire them to support and participate in the activities of the Turkish diplomatic offices, and strive, wherever necessary, to shape German foreign policy in favor of Turkey. Although a certain level of synergy between Turkish officials and German Turks are absolutely necessary in order to coordinate lobbying efforts, Turkish officials' condescending and patronizing attitudes are no longer welcome or necessary.

It goes therefore without saying that the overwhelming majority of German Turks have tried to serve as bridges of friendship, affection and understanding between Turkey and Germany since the day they set foot in Germany and did never involve in actions which were harmful to German or Turkish interests. Given the general and inherent goodwill and diligence of Germany's Turks, it would only be counterproductive to condemn the dual identities of this valiant community. As Germany's Turks were owned, supported, and welcomed neither by Germany nor by Turkey, their largely successful effort to stand on their own feet alone deserves awe and admiration. Given their admirable success, it is absolutely obvious that the inconsiderate attitude of Turkish press would only harm and stigmatize Germany's Turks and Germans of Turkish ancestry, and play into the hands of anti-Turkish circles in Germany.

THE TURKISH IMAGE AND LOBBIES IN EUROPE

EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE TURKISH IMAGE

One of the most interesting and striking political processes initiated in the second half of 20th century and still in progress in the first years of 21st century is the ongoing Turkish attempt to become a member of the European Union. From 1987, when Turkey formally submitted its application to the Union, until 2008, when these lines of this essay have been written, 21 years eventful years have passed, which have in turned changed the face of Europe. With the collapse of communism, Central and Eastern European countries, as well as former Baltic Republics became independent countries. The Cold War, which has divided the European continent since 1945, has officially ended when the Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved in July 1991.¹⁶²

Following the end of the Cold War, most of these Central and Eastern European countries started to seek further integration with the Western world, and attempted to become part of the European Union. Even former Yugoslav republics such as Slovenia and Croatia, which had to fight the Serbian-led Yugoslav army in order to secede from Yugoslavia, proved their willingness to share part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority by applying for EU membership. Also Czech Republic and Slovakia, which opted to separate from Czechoslovakia through peaceful referenda, were eventually united under the roof of the European Union in 2004, when both countries were admitted as members. While these Eastern and Central European countries have been undergoing one of the most turbulent and drastic transformations of their entire history between 1987 and 2008, however, Turkey has been knocking on EU's door without even achieving a significantly improved prospect of membership as compared to 21 years ago.

To cite some recent examples, Czech and Slovakian Republics freed themselves from the communist regime under the Soviet Union in 1990,

¹⁶² <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE4D9143BF931A35754C0A967958260>

divided Czechoslovakia via a peaceful settlement in 1992, applied for European Union membership in 1995 and became Member States to EU in 2004. Baltic Republics, were freed from Soviet occupation in 1990, applied for European Union membership in 1994 and became Member States to EU in 2004. Administered under the dictatorship of General Franco between 1939 and 1975, Spain adopted democratic regime in 1977, applied for European Union membership in 1979 and became Member State to EU in 1986.¹⁶³ Malta, the smallest EU member in terms of population, secured independence from England in 1964, became one of the non-aligned countries for 13 years after 1971, applied for European Union membership in 1990, withheld its application in 1996, reapplied in 1998 and eventually became Member State to EU in 2004.¹⁶⁴

Rumania and Bulgaria, which had applied to the European Union in 1992, became EU members in 2007, meaning that 15 years had elapsed between the dates of their application until their eventual membership. Croatia, on the other hand, officially applied for EU membership in 2003, and its candidate status was approved by the European Council in 2004. Having commenced the negotiations on 3 October 2005 simultaneously with Turkey, Croatia is expected to become an EU member by 2009 or by 2010.¹⁶⁵ Thus, if Croatian EU membership indeed materializes in 2009, it would most likely be a record with regards to the shortness of the time period between the official application for EU membership and actual EU accession. This short interval of six years would be probably the starkest contrast with the period of 21 years which had elapsed since Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987.

Although Turkey initiated the accession negotiations with the European Union at the end of 2005, it has now become clear that these negotiations may not result in full membership, even if Turkey successfully concludes all negotiation chapters. In the most optimistic case of Turkish EU membership by 2014, 27

¹⁶³ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/992004.stm

¹⁶⁴ Der Fischer Weltatmanach EU Erweiterung (2004). p. 137

¹⁶⁵ Official Website of the European Parliament
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/030-5248-106-04-16-903-20070412STO05232-2007-16-04-2007/default_en.htm

years will have elapsed between Turkey's date of application until its actual EU accession. This period of 27 years will be, in turn, 12 years longer than the second longest waiting period of Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, even if it is assumed that Turkey would become an EU member by 2014, the question of why the Turkish membership process had lasted for so long would not lose its validity.

Even though the inconsistencies, insincerities and democratic shortcomings in the domestic politics of Turkey undoubtedly have a role in this delay, it is an undeniable fact that none of the other candidate countries could possibly possess a perfectly functioning democratic system. Moreover, countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which were economically weaker than Turkey as of their accession date in 2007, were not institutionally more prepared than Turkey in terms of EU compliance either. According to a World Bank study in 2006, Turkey ranked 83rd among 229 countries and territories in terms of Gross National Income per capita, while Romania and Bulgaria ranked 91st and 98th, respectively.¹⁶⁶ Although Turkey has not totally adopted European norms and standards regarding individual attitudes as well as official policies, these deviations and shortcomings are not more significant than several southern and eastern European nations which have become EU members in 2004 and in 2007. In the words of prominent Turkey expert Andrew Mango:

*"The disciplined habits and anonymous relationships of contemporary society have not yet replaced the more lax codes of personal networks which permeate Turkish society. But Turkey is not unique in that respect. It has much in common with other south European countries. Membership in the European Union has helped these countries mend their ways".*¹⁶⁷

It can therefore be safely asserted, if not totally concluded, that the reason behind the European Union's hesitance towards Turkey has little to do with Turkish shortcomings regarding economic, administrative, and social norms in Europe. The fact that several southern and eastern European countries with

¹⁶⁶ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>

¹⁶⁷ Andrew Mango (2004). *The Turks Today*, London: John Murray, p. 9

similar and bigger shortcomings have been enthusiastically supported from their candidacy until their eventual EU membership clearly proves this assertion. After having eliminated economic, administrative and social shortcomings as possible reasons behind EU's Turkish policy, only emotional and subjective factors, such as the Turkish image in Europe and anti-Turkish sentiments among the Europeans, remain as probable reasons behind the discriminatory attitude towards Turkey. These subjective factors, although they are much more difficult to demonstrate than economic variables, arguably determine the fate of EU-Turkish relations in a clandestine, often unpredictable, and arguably harmful manner.

Numerous European politicians who privately declare their full support to Turkey's membership to European Union frequently have reservations regarding publicly declaring their support. They generally justify their hesitation to declare open support for Turkish causes by their concern that their pro-Turkish stance might face strong resistance by their electorates. Regardless of the actual sincerity or falseness of these personal declarations of support, it is striking to see that these politicians regard the negative image of Turkey as such a major and insurmountable stumbling block. Involved in these experiences in his own personal relations during his term as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem shared his observations and experiences with the Turkish public opinion:

“Historical conditionings, prejudices and obsessions observed in many European Union countries lead to a negative impact in public opinion. A considerable fraction of the society, a fraction that has the potential to be a determining force in elections, has a negative view of the possibility of developing relations with Turkey or the politicians who would become the initiators of such a development. Frankly, there is a serious compensation in many member states awaiting those politicians in favor of and undertaking the realization of closer relations with Turkey. The decision making fractions, effective industrial, commercial and banking circles, academic circles and strategically reasoning military members of these same communities possess a different way of evaluation. These fractions are in favor of absolute continuity of a process spread over time, because they see the benefits of both EU and member

countries, and of themselves as classes in the continuity of the process regarding Turkey".¹⁶⁸

This observation Ismail Cem shared as to why the politicians and statesmen who try to develop relations between Turkey and their countries and between Turkey and European Union should "watch their step" leaves no need for further explanation. Briefly, politicians and statesmen with closer attitudes to Turkey have to act despite the public opinion whereas the politicians in deliberate efforts against Turkey act confident in almost all cases of the support of a populism wave behind them. Thus, pro-Turkish European politicians mostly have to make headway against anti-Turkish prejudices and negative public opinion, while anti-Turkish politicians base their policies on existing negativities and biases. Consequently, while European politicians opposing Turkey's EU bid generally obtain automatic support from a biased public, those who wish to see Turkey as a EU member have to face an almost certain backlash from the electorate.

The present anti-Turkish prejudice has arguably its roots in the centuries-old Catholic-Ottoman Turkish conflict which has arguably started in 1095 when Seljuk Turks took control of Jerusalem and restricted access to Christian pilgrims, which in turn led to the first Crusade in history.¹⁶⁹ Even though the anti-Turkish sentiments had its ebbs and flows, it has arguably survived until present through countless books, generations, kingdoms, and alterations. In recent times prejudice has intensified at times of human rights violations in Turkey, activities of anti-Turkish lobbies and with the magnitude of the steps Turkey tries to take. It has therefore been relatively easy to monitor when this dogmatic power commonly denoted as "Crusades" or "Christian Club" has become more active as a source of trouble for Turkey. What has been more difficult to figure out, though, has been how this mysterious and dogmatic, as well as complicated power could be employed by turcophobic circles with great effect and ease. Therefore, it is essential to understand the essence of

¹⁶⁸ İsmail Cem (2005). *Avrupa'nın "Birliği" ve Türkiye*. p. 76

¹⁶⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4938202.stm>

these anti-Turkish prejudice and power in order to better analyze when they increase or decrease in strength.

Even though it is not absolutely suitable to search for a sole key terminology to define the anti-Turkish power in Europe, the most fitting expression in the case of such an attempt could be claimed as “negative Turkish Image”. Given that the Ottoman Turks conquered all Balkan nations due to military superiority, this superiority fed the Turkish image with notions of fear, ruthlessness, and oppression. As these Balkan nations did not have any option other than to acknowledge and submit to Ottoman military might, they had to mentally downplay this power by adorning it with negative adjectives. It was therefore a natural and expected survival mechanism that those European nations living under the Ottoman rule had to convince themselves that they were morally and humanely superior to Turks, even though they had been subdued and conquered by Turkish military superiority.

As the Turkish rule of Balkans and certain parts of Eastern Europe lasted for several centuries, however, the need to perpetuate the anti-Turkish sentiments among conquered nations became a necessity for survival. Given that the Ottomans generally allowed the continuation of religious and linguistic traditions of conquered nations, these freedoms also permitted the creation of anti-Turkish myths and sentiments. Thus, although many forms of atrocities, barbarism, and persecutions were prevalent of other parts of Europe as well, the Ottomans started to be singled out as the ‘others’ in comparison with the rest of European nations. Consequently, grievous atrocities committed by other European kingdoms, such as the Spanish Inquisition, French persecution of the Huguenots, and Europe-wide witch hunts did not create the image of ‘otherness’ for these respective nations.¹⁷⁰

Even though the Turkish image started to change partially with the Ottoman Empire’s decline in military and political power, it had conserved the attribution of “otherness” until the foundation of Turkish Republic. Especially after the

¹⁷⁰ Gündüz Aktan. *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları. Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği*, Ankara: Aşina Kitaplar, p. 205.

failure of second Vienna siege, the adjectives of “strength” and “fierceness” contained in the Turkish image was eventually replaced with “laziness” and “despotism”. To put in other words, there had not been a noteworthy change in the Turkish image with the decline of Ottoman military threat on Europe, which could be defined as an improvement. On the contrary, several adjectives which also included some form of admiration and fear were replaced with adjectives which rather contained contempt and derision.¹⁷¹

With the decline of Turkish threat towards Europe after the 18th century, the turcophobic and anti-Turkish views had also declined and nearly ended during the start of 19th century. It even started to be argued on what sort of a political authority should be established instead of the Ottoman Empire which showed the symptoms of regressing and dissolving among European countries. The “Eastern Question” as stated in English sources had entered into the strategic calculations of all European countries, and the quest for partition of the dissolving Ottoman lands started to occupy the European politicians’ minds.¹⁷² This rivalry and quest among leading European powers regarding the partition of the Ottoman Empire, however, necessitated the maintenance of the negative Turkish image, so that the plight of Ottoman Turks could be explained and justified to European public opinion.

As the military power of the Ottoman Empire diminished, the Turkish fear was substituted by intellectual and exotic curiosity, which transformed into emotions of anger and criticism in the late 19th century. As the Ottoman forces that used extreme force to quell revolts in the Balkans were harshly criticized by especially the British media, the adjective ‘barbaric’ started to be used increasingly with reference to alleged Ottoman atrocities. Although there were reporters stating that both the Ottoman forces and the Bulgarian irregulars were effective actors in this unfortunate and bloody event, British press in general announced the events as “Bulgarian atrocities” and displayed a prejudiced attitude accusing only the Ottoman government.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/4/avaner.php>

¹⁷² J. M. Roberts (1997). *The Penguin History of Europe*. pp. 310-311

¹⁷³ Alan Palmer (1995). *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*. p. 140

With this biased and prejudiced approach, the “terrible Turk” image within the European subconscious was once more revived in times of political necessity. In case of a conflict between a European nation and Turks, the Turks were unilaterally depicted as the unrighteous, merciless and responsible side. As a result of this outdated “Barbarian” image which was successfully resurrected from its corpse back in the Middle Ages, European States started to spit fire and prepare intervention against the Ottoman Empire every time a Christian minority experienced quarreled with Ottoman authorities. However, defending the actions against Turks as extreme reactions against Turkish cruelty at best, Europe chose silence when Muslims and Turks were ill-treated under the control of Balkan states which started to gain their independence starting from mid-19th century.¹⁷⁴

The Turkish image that became increasingly negative and forced to a position of “otherness” through centuries entered a course of fast and effective improvement with the establishment of Turkish Republic. Especially the twenty-year period from the unrighteous occupation of Anatolia in 1919 notwithstanding all international agreements until the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk witnessed an unprecedented improvement in the Turkish image. The European public opinion reflected with respect and appreciation that the Turkish people became an example of maturity by adopting the contemporary values of the Western European countries that made Turkey experience one of the major injustices in history.

Although numerous Turkish individuals contributed to this Turkish renaissance which improved the Turkish image and rendered it more in line with the reality, it was an established fact not only within Turkey but also in the Western world that the architect and leader of this project was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Therefore, within the period from the end of the First World War until the first years of the Republic, the European respect towards the Turkish people and their deep appreciation towards Atatürk became frequently interrelated and

¹⁷⁴ Yılmaz Öztuna (2006). *Avrupa Türkiye'sini Kaybımız. Rumeli'nin Elden Çıkışı*, İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, pp. 193-194

the improving Turkish image came to be identified with Atatürk in person. Turkey also proved itself to be worthy of appreciation even in issues such as democratic rights and freedoms which are known to be one of the most important issues in the eyes of the 20th century Europe. As historian Bernard Lewis stated:

“In his political views, Kemal Atatürk was an heir of the Young Turks – their nationalist, positivist and Westernized wing. The two dominant beliefs of his life were his belief in the Turkish nation and his belief in progress; for him, the future of both lied within the civilization that connoted nothing but the West’s modern civilization. His nationalism was healthy and rational; there were no motives as to violate the rights or goals of nations with pride or refuse the responsibility of the national past with anger. [...] In their darkest moment in history, the Kemalist Revolution gave a new life and hope to the Turkish people, returned to them their energy and confidence and soundly directed them not only to the road to independence, but also to the road to a more rare and more valuable virtue, to freedom.”¹⁷⁵

As duly expressed by Bernard Lewis, Kemal Atatürk has established the Turkish Republic on the basis of Western Civilization which he considered as the “only civilization”. By acknowledging the Western Civilization as the only path to modernity, Atatürk had either abandoned or reformed all elements that led the European perception of ‘other’ with regards to Turkey. Consequently, the majority of the European public opinion has esteemed not only the reforms which Atatürk established on personal rights and freedoms during his life time, but also the democratization process to be established after him. The respect and sympathy dimensions of European public - which saw the “other” of its own image in the Turkish image – toward the reforms of Turkish Republic is also striking seeing the fact that Atatürk’s Turkey has made a progress in a short time. Regrettably, Turkey has failed to own up Atatürk’s legacy at a time when it was needed most, especially in order to fend off the criticisms originating from century-old prejudices.

¹⁷⁵ Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu*. pp.290-291.

In the light of Atatürk's proven contributions to the Turkish quest for modernity, democratization, and Westernization, the motives behind the increasing foreign support for the 'moderate Islamist' movements become more evident. As the opponents of Turkish EU membership undoubtedly realized, the best way to obstruct Turkey's European venture is to portray secular, democratic segments of Turkish society as tiny, militarist, and elitist minorities. By doing so, Turkey would be presented as an authoritarian and anti-democratic country where the ruling elites, backed by a bullish military, vehemently oppress 'moderately' Islamist majorities. Even the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), a Paris-based 'autonomous' agency of the European Union, arguably became part of the efforts to defame and libel the secular Turkish republic. In an occasional paper published in 2007, it was stated by the EUISS that:

*"The ongoing crisis in Turkey must be seen against the background of a bifurcated society, a weak political system, a low-level insurgency in Eastern Anatolia, and a military-dominated power elite steeped in a state ideology known as Kemalism. Kemalists perceive political Islam, Kurdish nationalism, and European liberalism as their main challengers. Therefore, and for other reasons explained in this Occasional Paper, a confrontation between the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party which has its roots in political Islam, and the military was expected at some point in time".*¹⁷⁶

Though most of the statements in the EUISS Occasional Paper, such as the claim that there was going to be a confrontation between the AKP and the military, were already proven to be wrong and baseless, the overconfidence of some claims deserves closer attention. It is very noteworthy that the paper views Kemalism as an aggressive and repressive ideology which strongly opposes European liberalism. Even though older generations of educated Europeans most likely know that it was thanks to Kemalism that Turkey embraced most reforms in the 1920s, and laid the foundations for its current EU candidate status, the majority of younger Europeans are not aware of these realities. Thus, publications such as this occasional EUISS paper may

¹⁷⁶ Walter Posch. Crisis in Turkey. 'Just another bump on the road to Europe?' *EUISS Occasional Paper no: 67*. p. 5 <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ67.pdf>

easily convince younger generations of Europeans that Kemalism is intolerant and authoritarian in its essence.

The other contradictory and biased claim in the EUISS paper is the assertion that the secular society in Turkey is limited to 'military-dominated power elite', clearly implying that the great majority of Turkish population is strictly Islamist and hostile to secularism. While it is admitted on the same paper that the Turkish military was able to gather a large level of support from universities, labour unions, and middle class citizens, there is no explanation of how such an 'elite' minority could rally masses behind Turkey's secular causes. Thus, while the occasional paper does not attempt to downplay the significant number of Turkish secularists in following pages, it attempts to disguise this fact whenever the author directs heavy criticism at the Turkish armed forces. Consequently, for many readers who simply lack sufficient attention to catch this self-contradiction in the occasional paper, the secular portion of the Turkish society, which admittedly consists of many millions of Turks, is defamed as 'military-dominated elites'.

The most significant and alarming aspect of the EUISS Occasional Paper is that it is written by an official, however autonomous, agency of the European Union. Regardless of the 'individuality' of the opinion expressed in the paper, it is indubitable that it also reflects the European Union's opinion about Kemalism, secularism in Turkey, and the attempted rise of political Islam. As it was mainly due to Kemalism, secularism, and Atatürk's guiding principles which laid the foundations for Turkey's EU candidacy, it is quite self-contradictory that these very principles are mercilessly disparaged by the EU. It remains to be seen whether the EU simply wants Turkey to stop being itself in order to join the EU, or simply attacks Turkish secularism with the intention of impeding Turkish accession. Regardless of the Union's motives, however, it is quite certain that all segments of Turkish secular society is in desperate need for better lobbying in order to show the world that they are not a bunch of 'military-dominated elites'.

There are numerous European academicians, journalists, and researchers, who are unmistakably aware of Kemal Atatürk's contributions to the Turkish society as a whole, and that it is these very contributions which serve as a prerequisite for the EU membership in the 21st century. While it is certainly necessary to reinterpret and revise some of Atatürk's guidelines in order to cope with the global challenges, the Union's unrealistic demands and expectations should not be interpreted as a dismissal of these values. As the Turkish society develops and matures continuously during the course of EU candidacy, it is a welcome and inevitable development that secularist guidelines and Atatürk's principles would be questioned, revised and criticized.

Nevertheless, the abandonment of these guidelines and principles will undoubtedly prove detrimental to the interests of the Turkish Republic, especially in the current period when the notion of 'Moderate Islam' is being promoted by powerful interest groups within Turkey and the EU. Regrettably, the promotion and advocacy of this 'Moderate Islam' is mostly expressed in form of passionate hostility towards Turkish secular establishment, and it is generally accompanied by the proposition that secularism and democracy are not compatible.¹⁷⁷ As the merits of Kemal Atatürk as a political, military, as well as philosophical genius has been acknowledged by most foreign statesmen and academicians, the failure of Turkish individuals to acknowledge these very qualities would be absolutely detrimental. Regarding the outrageous claim that Atatürk's guidelines and Turkish secularism are incompatible with the needs of today's democratic society, the most appropriate response are arguably words of Andrew Mango:

*"The balance between liberty and order has to be adjusted continuously. Atatürk's priority was order. It is because the order which he established has largely held, that the Turks can now embrace democracy, as the new secular, universal religion".*¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Philip W. Sutton & Stephen Vertigans (2005), *Resurgent Islam. A Sociological Approach*, Cambridge: Polity, pp. 183-184

¹⁷⁸ Andrew Mango (2004). *The Turks Today*, London: John Murray, p. 24

TURKISH IMAGE AND ANTI-TURKISH LOBBIES

Almost all professional and experienced lobbies are known to follow two different forms of propaganda activities simultaneously. These activities are, in its simplest form, promotion of the lobbies' causes and defamation of rival groups' causes. In its more traditional and harmless version, ethnic lobbies promote the homelands of their ethnic kinsmen in cultural, historical, political, and financial arenas. Since this type of lobbying activity by itself does not harm or denigrate rival ethnicities directly, it can also be called 'constructive', as well as 'promotional' lobbying. The second type of lobbying, on the hand, primarily focuses on damaging rival lobbies' image and causes, and can therefore be called 'destructive' lobbying.¹⁷⁹

The activities of the Greek Americans in the United States, for example, can be mostly considered as promotional lobbying. Greek Americans spend great efforts to present Greece as the sole representative of the antic Hellenic civilization, and try to prove that the entire Western civilization is based upon Hellenic values. Even though there is a certain amount of indisputable validity in these claims, Greek American lobbies professionally exaggerate the Hellenic influence in Western societies. Consequently, the Greek lobbies render the American public opinion more sympathetic towards the Greece of today, since it arguably represents everything which was once Hellenic.

The more clandestine and lesser known version of lobbying is propaganda activities directed against a rival ethnic group, with the aim of denigrating and defaming the image and causes of the rival lobbies. These types of activities, which can also be called 'destructive' lobbying, are usually performed by experienced and professional lobbyists. As public opinions in the Western world became relatively more sensitive toward open acts of racism and ethnic chauvinism especially after the end of the Second World War, professional

¹⁷⁹ The terms 'constructive / promotional lobbying' and 'destructive lobbying' were coined by the author of this paper.

lobbyists usually engage in well-disguised forms of defamation and anti-propaganda. Although this destructive form of lobbying has been existent in the Western world for centuries in the form of anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, and anti-Turkism, it was effectively refined recently in order to gain acceptance among more educated masses. Thus, 'destructive' lobbying mostly aims at the subconscious of public opinions, and thus remains the most refined and dangerous form of ethnic lobbying.

Anti-Turkish propaganda, which had started centuries ago in Europe, however, was not refined or concealed for a long time since it was mostly directed at an uneducated, and mostly illiterate European public opinion. Anti-Turkish propaganda in Europe, which was initially started with the aim of gathering volunteers for the Crusades, reached varying forms and intensities over the centuries. Especially during the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Ottoman state was at the peak of its power, the success of the Turks was presented as a punishment of God. Mostly relying on the ignorance and bigotry of the masses, the Catholic Church propagated the view that the Turkish menace would stop if the people would follow the orders of the clergy properly. Having spread over a period of several centuries, especially Catholic church's anti-Turkish propaganda penetrated even children's books and prayers, thus becoming a permanent part of the European folklore.¹⁸⁰

Anti-Turkish propaganda continued way into the 18th century, when the Ottoman Empire stopped being a menace for Europe. Johann Gottfried Herder, who had lived between 1744 and 1803, and was known to be the most influential and intellectual philosopher of his time, proposed the idea of 'Republic of Europe' for the first time in history. Even though the major part of Ottoman territories was in Europe by the time of Herder's proposal, the German philosopher did not want to see the Ottoman Turkey in his imaginary Republic of Europe. Since Herder was a big admirer of ancient Greeks, and he had never forgiven Ottomans for having ended the Byzantine Empire, it is probable that his judgment about Ottoman Turkey's 'Europeanness' was

¹⁸⁰ Wilhelm Kuehlmann & Leyla Coşan. Speeches made at the 'Europe Days' Conference organized by the European Community Institute on 8 May 2006.

influenced by his personal feelings. Despite his alleged dedication to rationalism and objectivity, Herder's antagonism towards Ottoman Turkey becomes more bizarre in the light of the fact that he had never been to Ottoman lands in his lifetime.¹⁸¹

It is arguably surprising that even Johann Gottfried Herder, whose intelligence, knowledge, and insight was admitted by his critics, allowed his judgment to be influenced by his anti-Turkish prejudices. Although the modern sense of 'political correctness' was not a pressure factor by the 18th century, the newly emerging enlightenment required a certain amount of objectivity from personalities of Herder's caliber. Thus, Herder's inability, or unwillingness, to provide solid evidence of Ottoman Turkey's lack of European-ness is arguably astonishing even in the less objective circumstances of 18th century. The lack of opposition or criticism from Herder's European contemporaries can be thus considered as a further demonstration of the prevalence of anti-Turkish attitudes among European peoples.

The arguably inexcusable habit of basing anti-Turkish attitudes on historical myths rather than on facts continued also in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when Europe literally entered the modern ages. Although it became unacceptable to present any serious argument without supporting evidence in most debates, blatant criticism and direct insults directed at Ottoman Turkey was largely tolerated. While the alleged atrocities and barbarisms of other nations were received with a great benefit of doubt, allegation about Ottoman misdeeds were almost always acknowledged as established facts. The double standards and hypocrisy of the European press in the late 19th century appalled even scholars such as Andre Gerolymatos, who largely supported the Turcophobic versions of historical events. Referring to clashes between Bulgarians and Ottoman Turks during the 1876 Bulgarian uprising, Gerolymatos noted that both sides committed gruesome atrocities, which were duly observed by numerous European journalists and consular officers. Given the solid testimonies regarding the mutual nature of these atrocities,

¹⁸¹ Nedret Kuran-Burçoğlu (2005). *Die Wandlungen des Türkenbildes in Europa*. Spur Verlag. pp. 42-44

Gerolymatos protested that the European press “*focused only on the activities of the Turks, which had considerable impact on public opinion and ultimately could not be ignored by European governments.*”¹⁸²

Not for the last time, the singling out of Turks as the only aggressors and perpetrators of atrocities internationalized the Bulgarian crisis, and created the desired conditions for intervention by European powers. The ethnic tensions and the Ottoman Army’s treatment of Bulgarians were dubbed as ‘*Bulgarian Horrors*’ by William Gladstone, the British Liberal Party statesman and opposition leader in 1876. Such a definition arguably played into the hands of British, Russian, and Austrian Turcophobic circles which had been looking for an excuse to obtain further territorial concessions from the ailing Ottoman Empire. Further manipulation of the mutual atrocities and the biased coverage of the Bulgarian uprising eventually mobilized Russia, which declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877.¹⁸³ Although no other major European power joined Russia in its war against the Ottomans, the hostile public opinion created by the biased coverage of events prevented other European powers from acting against Russia, which was indubitably the aggressor in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877.

Regarding the bilateral relations between Ottoman Turkey and neighboring countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was arguably Greece which had gained most from the negative Turkish image prevalent in Western Europe. The Greek manipulation and promotion of negative Turkish image, in turn, was predominantly kept alive by the British politician William Gladstone, who had served four times as Prime Minister between 1868 and 1894.¹⁸⁴ Gladstone described the Ottoman Turks as ‘*a tremendous incarnation of military power, an advancing curse that menaced the whole of Europe, leaving a broad line of blood marking the track behind them*’. He was also straightforward in his view that he saw the Turks as a relic from ‘*the black day*

¹⁸² Andre Gerolymatos (2002). *The Balkan Wars. Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. New York: Basic Books. pp. 200-201

¹⁸³ Caroline Finkel (2006). *Osman’s Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*. London: John Murray, pp. 484-485

¹⁸⁴ http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/gladstone_william_ewart.shtml

when they first entered Europe, one great anti-human specimen of humanity'.¹⁸⁵

Given the biased and harsh attitudes of Western European statesmen, which were most clearly epitomized in the opinions of William Gladstone, Greek statesmen and politicians increasingly resorted to the sympathies and assistance of Western powers whenever the opportunity rose. This was especially the case after the Greece had won its independence from Ottoman Empire in 1829 until 1913, when the Greek kingdom had expanded its territory at the expense of Ottoman Turkey for the fifth consecutive time. Arguably in all of these Ottoman-Greek conflicts between 1829 and 1913, Greek statesmen and political activists managed to present the Ottomans as aggressors, and to enlist the support of European major powers which did not need to be asked twice. It was hardly surprising then, that the young Greek kingdom, which has always been the aggressor state in the Ottoman-Greek wars, managed to obtain territory from the Ottomans five times in 84 years, despite having lost all military battles with the exception of the First Balkan War.¹⁸⁶

Another noteworthy consequence of the Greek territorial expansion in the 19th century was that hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Turks were left at the mercy of the occupying or advancing Greek forces. While many Ottoman Turks preferred to escape from the advancing Greek armies and settled in unoccupied parts of the Ottoman territories, many more were unable, or unwilling to leave their hometowns and villages. As a result, those Ottoman Turks who remained in Greek-occupied territories became subjects, and also often victims, of the Greek kingdom. Nevertheless, the European powers, and especially the British politicians, routinely downplayed the atrocities committed against Turks while they categorically exaggerated the Turkish misdeeds. In the words of Greek-Canadian historian and researcher Andre Gerolymatos, who combined his own observations with those of 19th century prominent British historians:

¹⁸⁵ James Pettifer (1993). *The Greeks. The Land and People since the War*. London: Penguin. p. 192

¹⁸⁶ <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=61606>

*“The siege of Tripolis in 1821 and the subsequent slaughter of the Muslim population was the result of a combination of fear and the [Greek] army’s sense that it had been cheated. For six months, the Greeks had laid siege to the city, and the troops had been promised booty to make up for their not being paid..... The Greek insurgents stumbled onto brutality because they lacked the professionalism needed to conduct disciplined warfare. For the Ottomans, on the other hand, savagery was the mechanism of imperial control.”*¹⁸⁷

It goes without saying, in the light of Andre Gerolymatos’ biased evaluation of Turkish and Greek atrocities towards each other, that the downplaying of Turkish sufferings, in addition to the exaggeration of Turkish misdeeds, constitutes an important component of anti-Turkish propaganda. As it would be impossible for a reasonable historian to deny or neglect the plights of Ottoman Turks at the hands of the Greeks, the only possible way to maintain a predominantly anti-Turkish attitude would be to downplay or belittle Turkish sufferings. It can therefore be argued that Gerolymatos tried to do exactly this by presenting Greek brutality as an exception while portraying the Turkish transgressions as a rule. By presenting the wrongdoings of other nations towards Turks as reactions against Turkish brutality or as exceptionally rare incidents, historians and academicians like Gerolymatos arguably urged their readers to think that the usual villains were, as it had always been, the Turks.

If it was William Gladstone who was most eager to be manipulated by anti-Turkish propaganda, it was Eleutheros Venizelos who, after having intensively studied and contemplated the anti-Turkish attitude in Europe, had made most use of these prejudices for the sake of his own country. Intensifying his anti-Turkish propaganda after the defeat of Germany in 1918, Venizelos started an intensive campaign in order to convince especially British- and French public opinions that ethnic Greeks were being massacred in Anatolia. The majority of French- and British statesmen, having been exposed to the same anti-Turkish propaganda as their public, did not have to be asked twice. In the words of

¹⁸⁷ Andre Gerolymatos (2002). *The Balkan Wars. Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. New York: Basic Books. pp. 174-175

academician İbrahim Erdal, who has done extensive research about Turkish-Greek relations in the early 20th century, “*Venizelos has step by step succeeded in accomplishing the ‘Megali Idea’ from 1919 until 1922. His propaganda was so successful that the Allied Powers officially declared that the reason for the Greek occupation of Izmir was ‘preventing the massacres of Greeks.’*”¹⁸⁸

The observations and conclusions of Turkish academician İbrahim Erdal were further corroborated by the findings of British academician, journalist and researcher James Pettifer who has done extensive research on Turkish-Greek relations in the 19th century. Although certain arguments and conclusions of Pettifer have arguably been tarnished with anti-Turkish bias as well, his general conclusions about the Western European perception of Turkish-Greek conflicts have arguably been commendable. In an arguably rare example of self-criticism, Pettifer thus managed to summarize the pro-Greek and anti-Turkish bias in Western Europe, from which he was admittedly influenced as well. In the words of Pettifer, “*behind all Greek-Turkish disputes, there is a ball and chain of old symbolism and iconography in which Greece is seen to represent law, decency, rationalism, Christianity and European civilization, while Turkey represents anti-democratic principles, Islam, totalitarianism, and so on*”.¹⁸⁹ Though Pettifer acknowledged a relative decline in the Western European anti-Turkish bias after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, he nevertheless insisted on the enduring validity of his claim until present.

The Greek occupation of Western Turkey from 1919 until 1922, which had detrimental effects both on ethnic Turks and ethnic Greeks, eventually led to an increased understanding of Turkish causes in Europe. The notion that other European nations, especially Greeks, were also capable of dreadful atrocities started to gain acceptance in Western Europe. Even though it was too late to reverse the tragic fate of ethnic Turks and Greeks in Aegean Turkey, it became relatively more difficult in Europe to make Turks

¹⁸⁸ İbrahim Erdal (2006). *Mübadele (Uluslaşma Sürecinde Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1913-1925)*. Translated by the author. p. 25

¹⁸⁹ James Pettifer (1993). *The Greeks. The Land and People since the War*. London: Penguin. p. 192

scapegoats for all bloodsheds. For the first time in recent history, it was acknowledged, even by some Greek authors, that the eruption of a major war was not the result of Turkish barbarism, but of pure Greek aggression.¹⁹⁰ Thus, it became a necessity for anti-Turkish propagandists to develop new and more subtle methods of lobbying after the 1920s.

The relative improvement of new Turkey's image in Europe made it impossible for anti-Turkish lobbyists to propagate their agendas in traditional and relatively direct ways. Since it became clear that especially British and French statesmen were hoodwinked by Greeks into a major war in Anatolia in 1919, anti-Turkish propaganda in its rudest form became highly suspected and disliked in Europe. Even though there has not been an official apology or assumption of responsibility regarding the occupation of Anatolia between 1919 and 1922, certain groups and circles in Europe publicly admired Turkey's successful war against this occupation which derived its alleged legitimization from Greek propaganda. Nevertheless, this admiration did not prevent anti-Turkish propagandists from searching and finding more subtle and alternative channels, such as literature and media.

Following the collapse of traditional defamation activities against Turkey after the Turkish military victories in 1922, new categories of destructive propaganda started to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s in Europe as well as in North America. Even though the emerging forms of anti-Turkish propaganda did not claim to be based on scientific facts, they managed to keep centuries-old anti Turkish notions alive until this day. These new forms of propaganda can be grouped into films, novels, television sequels, and caricatures in the daily press. While novels had been the first and most prevalent form of this new form of anti-Turkish propaganda until the 1950s, they had mostly been replaced by films, TV sequels, and newspaper caricatures since then.

Franz Werfel's 'Forty Days in Musa Dagh', and Karl May's 'Durch das wilde Kurdistan' can be considered as significant examples of anti-Turkish

¹⁹⁰ Dido Sotiriou (2005). *Farewell Anatolia*. Athens: Kedros, pp. 300-301.

propaganda in forms of novels. Having the equivalent effect of today's television series, these and similar novels in the 1930s and 1940s reached a high level of popularity in German-speaking countries in Europe. Even though these novels did not provide readers with historical documents or scientific proofs, they conditioned readers' minds about Turks' allegedly unpredictable and violent nature. Since these novels were not of diplomatic or official nature, there was no way that they could be repudiated, disputed, or countered by Turks or by those who thought that the novels did not reflect the reality.

In his novel, 'Forty Days in Musa Dagh', Franz Werfel described the struggles of some Armenian villagers who were resisting deportation orders of Ottoman authorities. During the course of the book, the struggles of the Armenians were praised while the efforts of Ottoman soldiers to evacuate the villagers were strongly criticized. In Karl May's 'Durch das wilde Kurdistan', Turks were depicted as the sole responsible nation for Kurds' plights and lack of a homeland. Both novels concurred in their conclusion that Turks were rather occupiers in a land which has never belonged to Kurds or Armenians.¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, as only a small part of the readers would be familiar with these facts, the historical reality would not help Turkey much in saving its stained image.

As means of mass communications have drastically improved after the Second World War, movies and eventually TV series replaced novels as subtle propaganda tools. As even television was not as widespread as movie theaters until the late 1970s, it can be asserted that the preferred means of propaganda from the early 1950s until early 1980s have been movies. Movies like *Midnight Express*, for example, which had depicted Turkey as a backward, authoritarian, and totally corrupt country, achieved great successes in terms of attendance and sales. The movie, which had greatly exaggerated the shortcomings of the Turkish penal and judicial system, thus arguably

¹⁹¹ Karl May spent considerable time in Ottoman lands and wrote further novels regarding Ottoman Turkey, such as 'Von Bagdad nach Stambul'. Although he has generally not been very critical and judgemental about Turks and Turkey, he arguably sympathized with nations which lived under Ottoman Rule. For further information, see the Official Website of Karl May foundation. <http://www.karl-may-stiftung.de/>

defamed Turkey more effectively than any anti-Turkish lobby could do in any other form of propaganda. According to Independent Movie Database, an official organization for the evaluation and promotion of movies worldwide:

*“While [Midnight Express] is entertaining to watch and has its level of suspense at various points it is not a truly ‘true story’ much of it according to the real Billy Hayes never happened and his eventual escape is very different from what is depicted in this motion picture. It also tends to demonize the nation of Turkey and presents a distorted view of its people”.*¹⁹²

The majority of American viewers, unlike the commentators on the IMDB, were however not in a position to correct or protest in unjust portraying of Turkey in ‘Midnight Express’. Even the apology of Alan Parker, the director of the movie, was arguably too late in order to reverse or repair the damage done to the image of Turkey. Given that even the author of this research paper was mocked with reference to Midnight Express several times during his stay in the United States, suggests that the movie successfully penetrated into the American pop culture. In other words, the ‘realness’ of the happenings in ‘Midnight Express’ has stopped mattering long time ago, as the images and messages of the movie had been carved deeply into the memories of the American public.

Another form of propaganda which requires little proof and factual information is the use of caricatures as means of defamation. Although a known means of journalistic art since the late 19th centuries, the use of caricatures became popular in the 1980s. Mainly appearing on the political satires or newspaper columns, this means of propaganda was also discovered by anti-Turkish lobbies. As it is extremely difficult to protest or disprove a message conveyed by a caricature, Turks living abroad were usually helpless against these defamation attempts. Having discovered an effective and subtle way to provoke the anti-Turkish feelings among European readers, anti-Turkish lobbyists started to resort to caricatures with increasing frequency.

¹⁹² Official Website of the Independent Movie Database (IMDB)
<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077928/>

The image of corrupt Turk, fundamentalist Turk, uncivilized Turk, and oriental/un-European Turk is widely used in the caricatures which frequently appear in American and European newspapers.¹⁹³ Especially when the caricatures accompany a column or article which criticizes Turkey, the caricature serves also the purpose of strengthening the message of the columnists or journalists. While there is always a possibility of writing a counter-argument against a newspaper article however, it is highly unrealistic to take the same action against a biased caricature. Especially when the reader possesses already a subconscious anti-Turkish bias due to his or her prior education, the caricatures contribute to the affirmation of these prejudices.

It would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that watching of an anti-Turkish movie or reading of an anti-Turkish caricature would turn people instantly into haters of Turks and of Turkey. It would undeniably take more than one piece of anti-Turkish propaganda in order to manipulate an individual's opinion about Turks and Turkey. Nevertheless, given that the European, and increasingly also the American public opinion has already been inundated with anti-Turkish propaganda, even small amounts of media prejudice would serve as complements of the defamation efforts. Consequently, even admirable and praiseworthy actions of Turkish public may be presented as deplorable actions, mostly without being detected by the targeted public.

As a result of carefully directed propaganda, even the most educated sections of the European public were eventually indoctrinated by the anti-Turkish lobbies. By the amalgamation of anti-Turkish novels, movies, TV series, and caricatures, the Europeans who consider themselves as intellectuals also received their share of indoctrinations and biases. Academic researchers, journalists, and lawmakers who are supposed to constitute the most educated subsections of European public opinion consequently lost part of their

¹⁹³ Two Turkish academicians, Yaşar Adanalı and Sinan Erensi, dedicated their entire research at the Aarhus University to the study of anti-Turkish propaganda through caricatures.
<http://www.iho.au.dk/instituttet/publikationer/jmc/newsletter-20.pdf>

objectivity when they were dealing with Turkish matters. As the opinions expressed by these highly intellectual group of Europeans is highly respected, however, their own anti-Turkey biases usually harm Turkish image more than any other form of anti-Turkish propaganda.

During the demonstrations on April and May 2007 against the efforts of AKP to have an Islamist elected to the office of the president, for example, were mostly seen through biased perspectives by European opinion shapers. The general opinion propagated by the Turkish Islamists, as well as anti-Turkish lobbies, were thus converged in the opinion that the protesting masses were nothing but supporters of anti-democratic actions and of the army. Even authors like Günter Seufert, who is mostly known as a German expert on Turkish issues, deliberately or inadvertently expressed that typical bias and propaganda in his coverage of the events.

In his article, which was published in the centre-left German newspaper 'die Zeit', Seufert acknowledged the significance of the demonstrations in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, where a combined total of several million secular Turks took to the streets. Later on in his article, however, Seufert went on to say that the demonstrators were simply organized by the Turkish armed forces, and that they were somehow related to Turkish army officers. Answering his own question against which danger millions of Turks took to the streets, Seufert stated that there was no danger present in Turkey. Basing his answer on his assumption that the AKP is not an Islamist party, Seufert thus dismissed the motives and concerns of millions of secular Turks who had organized probably the largest mass demonstrations in the history of the Turkish Republic.¹⁹⁴

It is certainly possible that Günter Seufert's biased attitude towards Turkish secularist is simply due to his misinformation, naiveté, or lack of proper research. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that an academician and researcher like Seufert would be unfamiliar with simple numerical and

¹⁹⁴ Günter Seufert (2007) 'Das aufgeklärte Antlitz'. *Die Zeit*. 01/05/2007

statistical facts. Given that the number of Turkish army officers is around 15.000, it is extremely unlikely that every officer could recruit more than 250-300 persons in order to reach the combined number of demonstrators in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. While Seufert's misleading statements certainly deserve the benefit of doubt regarding its deliberateness, it is highly unlikely that these basic errors were committed fortuitously.

Unlike the few cases where the anti-Turkish bias of respected European opinion shapers like Seufert is very palpable, the prejudices in most articles or published opinions easily escape the attention of the average readers. Especially when a European journalist reports about Cyprus, the status of the army in Turkey, PKK terrorism, or Armenian allegations, most Europeans are arguable ready to read a piece of article which will be almost certainly anti-Turkish in its attitude. Due to the combined efforts of anti-Turkish lobbies and their extensions in the media, Cyprus would most likely be associated with Turkish aggression, PKK terrorism would be coupled with human rights issues, Armenian allegations would be presented as genocide, and the Turkish Army would be accused of being anti-democratic in most articles. According to the observations of Sedat Laçiner, whose specific focus is the Armenian lobby:

"The combined efforts of Armenian groups, combined with the activities of Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Kurdish separatist, and other radical anti-Turkish groups greatly hinders the lives of Turkish immigrants, as well as of Turkish individuals who are in business contacts with European countries. The persistent anti-Turkish propaganda activities of these well-organized groups sooner or later lead to a communication breakdown between Turkey and Western public opinion. Eventually, Turkey meets a strong public resistance in matters such as Cyprus, EU accession, free trade, free movement of workers, and Kurdish issue which initially seem not interrelated. This public resistance, in turn, often forces the leaders in European capitals to assume anti-Turkish attitudes as well".¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Sedat Laçiner (2004). *Türkler ve Ermeniler (Türk Ermeni İlişkileri)*. İstanbul: Kaknüs. p. 158

According to Laçiner, especially the Armenian lobby has engaged all of its resources and allies in order to damage Turkey's image in Europe, and thus managed to become a part in Turkish-EU relations especially in the areas of thorny issues. Due to successful Armenian propaganda and manipulation, problems stemming from Kurdish separatist activities or Greek intransigence in Cyprus may have repercussions in Armenian genocide allegations, or vice versa. Consequently, an image of a very dangerous and opportunistic Turk is created, who should not be compromised or tolerated even in issues where the other side is undeniably mistaken. Accordingly, the Turkish side should always be treated with utmost intolerance and intransigence, so that the arguably interrelated interests of Armenians, Greek-Cypriots, Kurdish separatists, and the EU in general can be protected.

Though the ultimate message conveyed by the anti-Turkish lobbies is highly biased, bigoted, and arguably racist, it is abundantly manifest that this message is being received with increasing eagerness in Europe. It arguably serves the agendas of most European politicians who wish to postpone or permanently hinder Turkey's EU accession based on the accusations of anti-Turkish lobbies. As it is extremely likely that careful journalistic or academic research would disclose the unfairness of these accusations, the European politicians would most likely intervene in order to prevent such a research from being conducted. Even if such a scientific or academic study were to refute the claims of anti-Turkish lobbies, a considerable amount of time and financial resources would be necessary in order to inform the public opinion these findings. Therefore, preference and financial support would be granted to those researchers and journalists with a known anti-Turkish bias, so that their coverage of Turkish issues would reflect the same biases and prejudices. Other journalists and researchers, on the other hand, who are known to conduct independent research regardless of financial incentives or intimidations, will probably be ostracized or left out in the first place.

As Western Europe has most probably the most educated and democratic public opinion, however, it would be inevitable that certain politicians, academicians, journalists, and researchers become aware of the injustices

committed against Turkey. As it is impossible to silence or oppress these individuals overtly in a democratic society, anti-Turkish lobbies and their political auxiliaries would try to marginalize and discredit these individuals as best as they can. By doing so, the anti-Turkish lobbies, in collaboration with their political connections, would not only prevent these individuals from creating a pro-Turkish attitude among their respective communities, but they would also try to hurt their own respectability as a means of punishment.

One alarming example regarding the increased amount of anti-Turkish bias in the 21st century is the increased amount of opposition to Turkish membership in Austria. According to the report of ESI, a Berlin-based research and policy group, there was little distinction between Austrian attitudes towards Turkey and other EU candidate states until recently. According to the ESI report, the Democratic Party, which was in opposition in 2004, accused the ruling Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) of 'going soft' on Turkey and forced the ÖVP to block EU's accession talks with Turkey. The ÖVP government, which has generally been steadfast in resisting to opposition parties' demands and pressures, made an exception in the case of Turkey. In accordance with the demands of the opposition party, the ÖVP did all it could do in order to stall the start of EU-Turkish accession negotiations during the Brussels Summit in December 2004.¹⁹⁶

The ESI report further stressed the fact that while the EU enlargement have normally included intense debates across business associations, media, trade unions, and academic institutions, the Austrian politicians have avoided 'any serious debate on the merits of Turkish accession. *"Instead, politicians have played on popular fears and prejudices, absolving themselves of responsibility for the decision by pushing off the issue off to a referendum. Public opinion has therefore hardened against Turkish accession."* As a result of this 'hardened public opinion' in Austria, the ESI report furthermore predicts that

¹⁹⁶ *Turkish Daily News* online edition, February 4, 2008
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95438>

any referendum on Turkish accession between 2014 and 2020 would have a strongly hostile outcome against Turkey.¹⁹⁷

What the ESI report arguably omits, however, is that there has been a subtle and latent anti-Turkish bias in most Austrians' minds for several centuries. Even though such a bias may have remained in a dormant or suppressed form for a few decades following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, events after the 1960s arguably contributed to the reactivation of the anti-Turkish bias in Austria. The arrival of conservative, undereducated, and isolated Turkish guest workers in early 1970s and the arrival of genuine as well as phony political refugees in the 1980s led to an intensification of the latently existing anti-Turkish attitude in Austria. Not surprisingly, many PKK activists as well as terrorists were hidden among the pseudo-refugees which arrived in Austria in great numbers. In roughly a decade following their arrival in Austria, these terrorists and their sympathizers organized themselves as an efficient anti-Turkish lobby and propaganda group.

While Turkish authorities were quite busy and relatively successful in coping with the PKK propaganda in Germany, this was regrettably not the case in Austria. Thus, when the Austrian Democratic Party, which was in opposition in 2004, tried to corner the ruling Austrian People's Party, it enthusiastically wagered Turkey's European aspirations, and the ruling ÖVP defended itself by sacrificing the proposed wager. Although the Austrian public opinion would have arguably revolted against such a demagogic act if it had involved any other EU candidate country, there was no significant criticism or protest against the sacrifice of Turkey. It was hardly surprising then, that the right wing Freedom Party found the courage to plaster Vienna with posters declaring '*Turkey in the EU? Not with me!*' during the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95438>

¹⁹⁸ Chris Morris (2005). *The New Turkey. The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*. London: Granta, p.24

Another striking and regrettable incidence regarding the accepted the anti-Turkish bias in Europe took place in France, which, like Austria, stood out in the first decade of the new millennium as a fervent opponent of Turkish membership in the EU. The zealous aggression of French anti-Turkish organizations became most evident by the Armenian actions against reputable American historian Bernard Lewis. Because Bernard Lewis frequently stated that the genocide allegations were Armenian attempts to bend history in their own interests, he has been persistently harassed by Armenian lobbyists in France since the early 1990s. Although initial Armenian attempts to bring Lewis' statements into trial were unsuccessful, a Paris court eventually decided to hear the Armenian case against Lewis. Mainly due to extensive Armenian lobbying at French political and judicial levels, a French court ultimately condemned Bernard Lewis for 'denying the Armenian genocide' in 1997.¹⁹⁹

It should furthermore be noted that the decision of the French court was reached prior to 2001, when French legislators officially recognized the Armenian 'genocide'. The fact that Armenian lobbies simply managed to have Bernard Lewis' freedom of speech condemned even prior to the French genocide law clearly demonstrates the power of the anti-Turkish forces in France. The French verdict can therefore be interpreted as a sign of more severe legal interpretation to come, as the Armenian genocide allegations have been incorporated into French law in the meantime. By condemning a respectable and prominent author like Bernard Lewis, French legislators furthermore demonstrated that they take the allegations of French-Armenians more seriously than the well-researched findings of a distinguished academician. It should hardly be surprising then, by the same token, that no other writer or academician took the courage to criticize Armenian allegations on French soil ever since the decision on Bernard Lewis.

Given that most independent-minded scholars, statesmen, and media members in Europe are under increasing threat of being intimidated by anti-

¹⁹⁹ Alain Gresh. 'Malevolent Fantasy of Islam' in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2005.
<http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/16lewis>

Turkish organizations, a new field of activity for Turkish lobbies is becoming inevitable. In addition to their activities for the promotion of Turkish causes, Turkish interest groups abroad have to support and defend individuals who independently resist the anti-Turkish bias present in their respective countries. Since several prominent intellectuals, scholars, and academicians, as in the previously mentioned case of Bernard Lewis, are vehemently lambasted by European anti-Turkish organizations, defending the personal and professional integrities of these individuals has arguably become a Turkish strategic task as well. As these individuals are often portrayed by anti-Turkish lobbies as Turkish agents or propagandists on Turkish payroll, Turkish lobbies face a multifaceted task while defending these supporters of Turkish causes.

On the one hand, Turkish lobbies can proactively challenge the efforts of those who try to present all pro-Turkish journalists, politicians, and academicians as Turkish agents by effectively demonstrating that the majority of these individuals are in no way connected or affiliated with Turkish interest groups. As the burden of proof lies with the accusers and defamation activists, Turkish lobbies should take legal action against the organizations which try to defame pro-Turkish individuals without any tangible proof. Once they become aware of the prospect of legal action and probably conviction, most anti-Turkish organizations would most likely hesitate to defame pro-Turkish individuals. In other words, anti-Turkish organizations can be discouraged from attacking and insulting every Turkey friendly academicians and journalists indiscriminately once they realize that their groundless accusations and insults will not remain unreciprocated.

On the other hand, Turkish lobbies should assist the supporters of Turkish causes by providing them with legal, moral, and academic support in their efforts to counter the defamation attempts of anti-Turkish organizations. As providing these academicians and researchers with direct financial assistance would arguably be interpreted as sponsorship of these individuals, such form of support should be avoided as much as possible. Only in cases where it is absolutely necessary, Turkish lobbyists may also provide financial assistance for individuals who face an extraordinary amount of aggression and hostility

from anti-Turkish circles. Even though the determination and distinction of scholars who sincerely and objectively support Turkish causes is arguably intricate, dealing with such subtle issue has become an inevitable task of Turkish lobbies.

In case Turkish lobbies fail in their arduous task to discover, distinguish, and support respectable European scholars, it is very likely that these academicians will be silenced or manipulated before having reached any academic or journalistic prominence. Given that most of the European pro-Turkish circles and individuals lack the financial and political resources to challenge the well-financed anti-Turkish propagandists, they will be inevitably marginalized without the support and guidance of Turkish lobbies and Turkish foreign missions. This, in turn, would strongly discourage future academicians, journalists, and researchers from publishing any article which support a pro-Turkish argument in any area of conflict. As winning the support of the educated European public opinion is one of the foremost tasks of Turkish lobbies, failure to support and defend pro-Turkish Europeans will eventually lead to the failure of this strategic task as well.

TURKISH LOBBY IN GERMAN MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

Germany, which is home to more than half of European Union's ethnic Turkish community, is arguably the one EU country with the largest concentration of Turkish associations and organizations.²⁰⁰ While it is still disputable whether the loose conglomeration of these organizations and associations can be called a 'lobby' in the strict sense, they possess most of the characteristics of an ethnic- and political lobby. The most significant substantiation of this designation is mostly evident in the German media, which has been calling the activities of German-Turkish organizations and individuals as 'lobbying' since the election victory of Gerhard Schröder in 1998. While the amount of sympathy and criticism regarding the 'lobbying' activities in the German media depends on individual as well as political preferences, it can be asserted that the frequency of the 'Turkish coverage' has been gradually increasing since the mid 1990s.

Especially German newspapers and television channels, which stand on the right side of the political spectrum, have been covering the activities of the Turkish media with a rather strictly critical bias. Especially in the period between 2002, when Schröder's government was re-elected by a narrow margin, and 2005, when the CDU became the senior partner in the early elections, the attitude of the rightist press was especially harsh towards ethnic Turkish political activism in Germany. Probably due to the fact that the SPD-Green coalition had won the 2002 elections by a margin of only few thousand votes, and the fact that most Germans with Turkish ancestry had voted for the SPD, contributed to the bitterness of pro-CDU media in Germany. Consequently, criticisms ranging from civilized complaints about Turkish lobby's role in the elections to open accusations of treason appeared on rightist German media.

²⁰⁰ According to an article by 'Economist' magazine, the number of ethnic Turks reached 2.6 million as of April 2008, which makes up more than half of European Union's 5 million ethnic Turks
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10958534

In one of the harshest examples of German criticism aimed at ethnic Turkish lobby, an article in the radical rightist weekly 'Junge Freiheit' is noteworthy with regards to summarizing the attitudes of the German extreme rightist press. Calling Gerhard Schröder as the 'Chancellor of Kreuzberg', Junge Freiheit accused the German government of following a foreign policy which aimed to please Germans of Turkish ancestry, but which was contrary to German interests.²⁰¹ The same article furthermore claimed that the ethnic Turks with German citizenship voted only with consideration of policies regarding Turkey, and that these voters did not worry about German domestic issues. In a connecting argument, the Junge Freiheit claimed that this Turkey-oriented attitude of German-Turkish voters made them effective lobbyists on behalf of the Turkish government and its official extensions. Even though the article did not make a direct claim of 'treason' or 'lack of patriotism' regarding Germans with Turkish ancestry, it however insinuated these claims very strongly.

Also situated in the extreme right of the German political spectrum, the official magazine of the ultranationalist Republikaner Party vehemently criticized the voting behavior of German Turks while appearing to attack the personality of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In an article titled "Chancellor of the Germans or Chancellor of the Turks", the Republikaner Party magazine pointed to the narrow 2002 election victory of Schröder by only 6000 votes, and indicated that 80 per cent of 470.000 German Turks voted for the SPD-Green coalition.²⁰² Hence, in a hardly subtle message, the Republikaner publication held Germans with Turkish ancestry responsible for the 2002 election victory of the Social Democrats and the Greens, which were, in turn, accused for their pro-Turkish policies. While refraining from direct appeals to the German public with regards to the unpatriotic acts of German Turks, the Republikaner magazine arguably came very close to German legal limits regarding incitement to hatred.

²⁰¹ Kurt Zach, "Aus Zuwanderern warden Authochtone" *Junge Freiheit*, 26/09/2002

²⁰² <http://www.rep-gg.de/httpdocs/report-0203.pdf> p.2

In the more mainstream German media with center-right political leanings, the criticism against Germans with Turkish ancestry has traditionally been softer and more civilized. It has become also a common trait among mainstream German media to blame rather the politics of SPD-Green coalition than the ethnic Turkish supporters of these parties. Generally refraining from assailing Germans with Turkish origins directly as agents of the Turkish Republic, mainstream rightist German media has rather accused Chancellor Schröder's government of misleading and manipulating ethnic Turkish voters. Thus, at least seemingly, the moderately rightist section of the German media has thus acknowledged the loyal and law-abiding credentials of Germany's ethnic Turkish citizens, and refrained from assailing or insulting them directly.

The German daily 'die Welt', which is the centre-rightist newspaper with the largest circulation, provides several examples of typical German rightist approach to issues related to Turkey and Turkish-Germans. Unlike more radical publications like Junge Freiheit, Welt does not perceive the large number of Germans with Turkish ancestry as a menace for the German society. On the contrary, die Welt often reports about the achievements of prominent Turkish-German individuals, such as Fatih Akin, and Lale Akgün in a predominantly positive and constructive attitude. Moreover, die Welt employs one German-Turkish editor, Iris Alanyali, who often reports about the lives and hardships of German-Turks in a personal, insightful, and empathetic manner.²⁰³ Even in issues where the redaction of the newspaper has the contrary opinion, there are frequently articles which quote individuals who support the EU membership of Turkey. Few days before the Brussels Summit in December 2004, for example, die Welt published a comprehensive interview with prominent Turkish businessman Mustafa Koç who had firmly expressed his view that Turkey belonged to Europe.²⁰⁴

The empathetic and warm tone of the newspaper die Welt regarding the German-Turks drastically changes when it reports about the relationship

²⁰³Iris Alanyali, "Wie Ich Deutsche wurde". *Welt*. 19/09/2006

http://www.welt.de/kultur/article153949/Wie_ich_Deutsche_wurde.html

²⁰⁴Ayhan Bakirdögen, "Bald werden wir EU-Niveau erreichen". *Welt*. 14/12/2004

http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article358419/Bald_werden_wir_EU-Niveau_erreichen.html

between the Social Democrats, Greens, and the German voters with Turkish origins. In many articles in die Welt, the fact that most German citizens with Turkish roots vote for leftist political parties is considered highly awkward and suspicious. Basing its suspicion on the fact that Turkish electorate, in most elections after 1950s in Turkey, have been voting for centre-right political parties by about a two-third majority, die Welt redaction often express the worry that these 'Germans' vote base their preference solely on German parties' attitude towards Turkey. Consequently, in the view of die Welt, these voting patterns are highly suspicious since they do not reflect the preferences of regular Turks residing in Turkey.

The following conclusion of the newspaper die Welt is that most German citizens with Turkish roots do not participate in German elections in order to fulfill citizenship duty to Germany. On the contrary, most ethnic Turks with German citizenship arguably participate in German elections in order to emerge as a power block which represents the interests of Turkey. While the redaction of die Welt, unlike more radical publications such as Junge Freiheit, refrains from denouncing German-Turks as bad citizens, it often suggests that their attitude as German nationals is questionable. Moreover, die Welt mostly maintains that this objectionable attitude of ethnic Turkish voters is rather due to the manipulative and misleading approach of leftist political parties towards German-Turks. In other words, German citizens with Turkish ancestry are portrayed as victims, rather than perpetrators, of German leftists' political conspiracy.

In a 2003 article published by die Welt, it is possible to witness the exact attitude of the newspaper's redaction regarding the close relationship between German-Turks and German Social Democrats. Having introduced the successful career of Vural Öger with approval, the newspaper went on to question the motives behind Öger's nomination by SPD as a candidate for European Parliament elections. Focusing on Öger's possible motivations, die Welt reporter argued that Vural Öger, who has undeniable capitalist and liberal credentials, would not become a candidate from SPD under normal circumstances. Therefore, die Welt's argument went on, that Öger must have

been hoodwinked into SPD candidacy by the promises of Gerhard Schröder regarding the EU candidacy of Turkey. In other words, the Social Democrats have arguably exploited Vural Öger's weakness regarding his ethnic roots, and convinced him to become EU Parliament candidate on SPD ticket.²⁰⁵

The most significant aspect of *die Welt's* article regarding Vural Öger's candidacy is its extremely harsh tone against the SPD, combined with its tolerant and empathetic attitude toward Vural Öger. While acknowledging that Öger's decision about his candidacy may have been influenced by his love and dedication for Turkish causes, *die Welt* refrains from judging Öger's motives as immoral and unpatriotic towards Germany. On the other hand, *die Welt* overtly assails the SPD for exploiting Öger's wish to enter German and European politics, arguably with the additional aim of supporting Turkish causes. While *die Welt's* leniency regarding Vural Öger's motives appears initially tolerant, it is certainly not free from the suggestion that even the most 'Germanized' ethnic Turk is destined to act as a supporter of Turkish causes.

The harsh and unrelenting criticism of the newspaper *die Welt* was often directed against Gerhard Schröder as well, who has served as the Chancellor of Germany between 1998 and 2005. Especially before and during the Schröder's visit to Turkey in February 2004, frequent articles and editorials criticized the pro-Turkish policy of the German chancellor. Basing their arguments on the fact that every EU candidate country which had started accession negotiations ended up being EU members, *die Welt* columnists and reporters strongly criticized Schröder's support for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. As the accession negotiations always resulted in membership, according to *die Welt's* opinion, Schröder's support for the start of negotiations with Turkey was equivalent to supporting Turkish membership in the European Union.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Wolfgang Ehemann, "Ein Millionär kämpft für die SPD und die Türkei: Vural Öger" *die Welt* 17/11/2003

http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article273476/Ein_Millionaer_kaempft_fuer_die_SPD_und_die_Tuerkei_Vural_Oeger.html

²⁰⁶ Andreas Middel & Nikolaus Blome, "Reingelassen" *die Welt*. 24/02/2004

<http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article295614/Reingelassen.html>

According to the article written by two die Welt columnists regarding Schröder's support for Turkey, a process called 'Beitrittsautomatismus', which can be translated as 'accession automatism' would be activated with the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. After the start of accession negotiations, the EU would arguably assist, lead, and guide Turkey through this lengthy process, and would eventually take Turkey into the European Union. Thus, as long as Turkey did not withdraw from the negotiating table, the EU would sooner or later admit Turkey as a member. Consequently, as asserted by the article, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has deliberately committed a grave error when he lobbied and struggled for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.

The summary of the relations between the German leftist establishment and German-Turkish voters according to die Welt can therefore be considered strictly Machiavellian and improper. The first and foremost alleged travesty is the fact that most German-Turks vote for Germany's leftist parties, despite their conservative and rightist personal and social backgrounds. As it is arguably not feasible to obtain two thirds of ethnic Turkish votes by German leftist parties under normal circumstances, the SPD and the Greens must have mislead and manipulated German citizens with Turkish ancestry. Playing especially on the sympathies and hopes of German-Turks with regards to Turkey's EU aspirations, these leftist politicians allegedly convince most ethnic Turkish voters to support their own parties. Therefore, according to die Welt redaction, the Germans with Turkish ancestry are rather victims than perpetrators of ethnic politicking by Germany's leftist politicians.

The best antidotes against the manipulative and misleading policies of the SPD and the Greens towards Turkish-Germans, according to die Welt, are extremely sincere and straightforward policies conducted by the Christian Democrats (CDU). As die Welt is firmly convinced that the seemingly pro-Turkish policies of the Social Democrats are nothing but ethnic politicking aimed at ethnic Turks, realization of this dishonest strategy would certainly

cost the SPD thousands of Turkish-German votes.²⁰⁷ As most Germans with Turkish ancestry are normally rather on the center-right of the political spectrum, they would mostly switch to CDU after having realized that SPD's support for Turkish causes were without foundation and honesty.

Thus, the first and foremost advice of *die Welt* for the CDU is to prove that the SPD can and will not stand behind its promises of support for Turkey. By proving German Social Democrats' lack of sincerity and lack of enthusiasm in their support for Turkish causes, *die Welt* argument goes, Germans with Turkish ancestry may eventually be turned into CDU voters. Although there may be a bit of truth in this argument, the existence of other alternative political parties, such as the FDP and the Greens, arguably weakens the argument of *die Welt* newspaper. Given the fact that the majority of ethnic Turks continued to vote for the SPD and the Greens in the 2005 early elections, however, it remains dubious whether *die Welt's* advice for the CDU has been useful in curbing leftist parties' popularity among Germans with Turkish ancestry.

The section of the German press with leftist leanings, on the other hand, has arguably undergone a drastic transformation after the election victory of SPD in 1998 with regards to its attitude towards Turkey. Influential weekly magazines like *der Spiegel*, and daily newspapers like *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, which had been the most ardent critics of Turkey since the early 1980s, started to soften their tone and intensity of the criticism directed at Turkey after 1998. Because of probable connections and ideological similarities between the leftist media and the SPD-Greens coalition, the German government between 1998 and 2005 had a probable relative influence over most of the leftist newspapers, magazines, and TV channels. As it was the strategic decision of the SPD-Greens coalition to support, at least formally, Turkey's EU bid, it is therefore very likely that Schröder's coalition government spent considerable effort in order to soften leftist media's criticism towards Turkey.

²⁰⁷ Hans-Jürgen Leersch. "Türken", *die Welt* 16/02/2004
<http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article293597/Tuerken.html>

Moreover, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish security forces, and his subsequent collaboration with Turkish authorities regarding the European supporters of PKK terrorism probably contributed to the softening of German criticism towards Turkey. Especially as German, Greek, and French involvement in some PKK activities were confessed by Öcalan, these countries faced the threat of global condemnation because of these irresponsible policies. As these developments were considerably recent by the time of Schröder's first election victory in September 1998, the new German government most probably saw it fit to amend its policy towards Turkey and Turkey's terrorist adversaries. Especially after the suicide attacks of 11 September 2001, German leftist press' tolerance towards terrorist organizations like the PKK was further reduced, while the sympathy for countries like Turkey which had been fighting terrorism for decades increased drastically.

'Süddeutsche Zeitung', Germany's leftist newspaper with the largest circulation, along with the weekly 'der Spiegel' magazine, serves as the main indicators of German leftist press' attitude towards Turkey. Although both Süddeutsche Zeitung's and well as der Spiegel's coverage of Turkey had been quite biased and negative until the late 1990s, both journals reversed their anti-Turkish attitudes after the change of government in Germany in 1998. Der Spiegel magazine, for instance, which had been one of the most prominent opponents of Turkish EU membership since the early 1980s, went as far as lambasting German CDU leader Edmund Stoiber for vehemently opposing Turkey's accession into the EU in 2006.²⁰⁸

Also 'Süddeutsche Zeitung', which had been an ardent critic of Turkey's European as well as Kurdish policies until 1999, abruptly assumed a pro-Turkish attitude especially with regards to Turkish struggle against ethnic separatism and EU bid. Especially prior to European Union summits Süddeutsche Zeitung started to publish articles, reports, and interviews which

²⁰⁸ Sebastian Fischer "Stoiber erwärmt das Herz der CDU". *der Spiegel*. 28/11/2006
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,451127,00.html>

mostly included statements and opinions in favor of Turkish membership in the European Union. Prior to the Brussels Summit in December 2004 in particular, the number of articles supportive of Turkish accession increased significantly in the pages of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Interviews with the Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen and German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, abundantly expressed the favorable opinion about the need to start accession negotiations with Turkey.²⁰⁹

Not surprisingly, the weekly *der Spiegel* was also running several articles shortly before the Brussels Summit, which were passionately advocating the need to launch accession negotiations with Turkey. In an article which reported about the anti-Turkish stance of the main opposition leader Angela Merkel, *Spiegel* followed the example of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and accused Merkel of turning Turkish EU membership into a heavily xenophobic domestic policy tool. The article furthermore criticized Merkel for damaging Germany's credibility in the international arena, as all previous German governments promised support for Turkey as long as Turkish authorities fulfilled membership criteria. As Merkel favored concepts such as privileged partnership and absorption capacity with regards to Turkey, the redaction of *der Spiegel* condemned this attitude as unreliable, irresponsible, and harmful for German interests.²¹⁰

Der *Spiegel's* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung's* common support regarding the EU membership of Turkey, it can be asserted that the significant portion of the German leftist press stood united behind Turkish efforts for EU membership during the time of Gerhard Schröder's chancellorship between 1998 and 2005. Unlike their rightist counterparts, the German left did not make a big deal out of the religious differences and Turkey's economic and political hardships. In consistency with their support for Eastern European countries which became EU members in 2004, leftist German media generally saw

²⁰⁹ Christian Wernicke. "Die EU muss der Türkei helfen" Ein SZ-Interview mit dem Erweiterungskommissar Günter Verheugen über den Reformprozess in Ankara. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 10/9/2004 <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/26/38987/>

²¹⁰ Lars Langenau. "Widerstand gegen Merkels Wahlkampfschlager" *der Spiegel*. 13/12/2004 <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,332623,00.html>

Turkish shortcomings rather as regular obstacles than permanent blocks on the path of Turkey towards EU membership. Even though the sincerity and the real motivation of this support were not exactly known, the leftist media in Germany greatly contributed to the image of Turkey as a European country.

As it is impossible for Turkey or any other country to change for the better or worse overnight, it is also unfeasible to improve or deteriorate its policy regarding a specific issue, such as terrorism or relations with Europe. It is therefore highly unlikely that Turkey became a fully democratic, modern, and European country in a matter of months between the election first election victory of Gerhard Schröder in September 1998 and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999. While it is true that the intensity of PKK's terrorist activities were reduced dramatically in the same period, the essence for the German press' vehement criticism, such as alleged and actual human right abuses did not end as a whole. It is therefore quite likely that the leftist section of the German press was rather influenced by the relatively pro-Turkish attitude of the German government, than by the sudden change of its perception regarding Turkey.

It can therefore be argued that the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder between 1998 and 2005 had a positive, however indirect, effect on the Turkish image in Europe. Although the seemingly pro-Turkish policies of the SPD-Greens coalitions deserved wide-ranging criticism regarding their sincerity and effectiveness, they nevertheless contributed to the perception of Turkey as a European country in the German press. In order to support the pro-Turkish policies of Schröder's government, the majority of leftist German newspapers, magazines, and TV stations conformed to the official German view regarding the Turkish EU bid. Even though some editors or prominent journalists of these German newspapers may have disagreed with the recent tolerance and support for Turkey, they arguably chose to be rather quiet about their disagreements. Thus, although the combined support of SPD-Greens coalition and the leftist German press failed to facilitate Turkey's accession process in the long run, it nevertheless resulted in an improvement of the Turkish image in German public opinion.

The relatively empathetic and supportive approach of the leftist German media arguably continued also after Angela Merkel's election as the German Chancellor in 2005. Prominent left leaning publications such as der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung started to criticize German government's negative attitudes towards Turkey even though the Social Democrats continued to be part of the government as junior partners. The relative reluctance of the SPD in the coalition government to stand of for Turkey's EU bid also attracted criticism from leftist German newspapers. As the lack of synergy between the coalition partners CDU and SPD has always been a source of resentment in most German media, this shortcoming was arguably most evident in Germany's foreign policy towards Turkey. In an overall summary of the period between 2005 until 2008, the influential leftist magazine der Spiegel went as far as claiming that the failure of the CDU and of the SPD to impose their wills on each other crippled Germany's influence and prestige not only in Turkey, but in the entire world.²¹¹

Consequently, a final argument can be made that the mobilization of support from a leading EU member government for Turkish causes should never be underestimated, even though the end effect of such support can be only limited or impermanent. As in the example of Chancellor Schröder's support for the start of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, even this kind of arguably superficial and half-hearted support has arguably resulted in permanently positive outcome. In this specific situation, for example, the EU has started accession negotiations with Turkey, and this process is quite irreversible regardless of the current resistance and opposition within the EU member states.

Even EU leaders like Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, who vehemently oppose Turkish membership in the EU unconditionally, have already acknowledged the irreversibility of ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey. Nevertheless, instead of openly disregarding previous agreements,

²¹¹ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,553531,00.html>

they arguably opted to play unfair against Turkey by making Turkish membership subject to the approval of national referendums. In case Germany, arguably most influential EU member, and the host of the largest Turkish community in Europe, starts to initiate this unfairness towards Turkey, it is almost certain that other EU countries would find the courage to follow suit. Then, in similar fashion, several EU countries would spend considerable efforts to freeze, postpone, or terminate altogether negotiations with Turkey, but these efforts would undoubtedly hurt the credibility of these countries, and not that of Turkey. In such a case, the issue of European Union's credibility has been eloquently summarized by Ann Dismorr, who had served as the Swedish Ambassador to Turkey between 2001 and 2005:

“The generally recognized principle of Roman law ‘pacta sunt servanda’ (agreements are to be honoured) is a part of European cultural heritage, something which the EU should respect and protect. Assuming Turkey will succeed in meeting the necessary obligations, a rejection, including a ‘privileged relationship’ rather than full membership, would be disastrous for the EU.”²¹²

As the notion of honoring the agreements are, like the concepts of rule of law, respect for human rights, and democracy, a part of European cultural heritage, it should be unthinkable that the European Union may compromise on any of these values. As Turkey has made significant progress towards obtaining and implementing these arguably European values, it also deserved to be treated fairly and justly by the European Union. In case the European Union chooses to follow Angela Merkel's guidelines and offers Turkey only a privileged partnership instead of full membership, however, the Union would have compromised on the European, as well as universal, principle of honoring agreements. If that scenario becomes reality, however, Turkey should not be disappointed, and consider itself truly fortunate for not becoming part of a supranational organization which is devoid of universal, as well as European, values.

²¹² Ann Dismorr (2008). *Turkey Decoded*. Beirut: Saqi, p. 210

Opinions of 25 EU Member States' Citizens regarding select statements about Turkey and the European Union as of September 2006²¹³

To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights	85 %
To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy	77%
Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	66%
The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession	61%
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography	56%
Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history	40%
Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region	33%
Turkey's accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population	29%

²¹³ Eurobarometer 66, online edition p.225
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf

TURKEY'S WAR ON TERROR AND TURKISH-EU RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF TURKISH IMAGE IN EUROPE

As the European Union celebrated the 50th anniversary of its foundation in 2007, Turkey was continuing its war on ethnic separatist terrorism which had started in 1984, and marking the 20th anniversary of its application to the European Union. There had been sporadic occurrences of terrorist activities on Turkish soil prior to 1984, such as the actions of rightist- and leftist extremists which had led to the military coup in 1980. Nevertheless, these prior waves of terror had lasted only for a few years, and ended as a result of a military intervention. In the years following 1984, however, ethnic separatist terror caused by the PKK was occasionally complemented by the Islamic fundamentalist terror which had targeted mostly secular intellectuals. The killings of Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Uğur Mumcu, Necip Hablemitoğlu, were therefore rather considered as acts of fundamentalist terrorism, while the killings of Turkish soldiers and civilians in southeastern Turkey were regarded as ethnic separatist terrorism.²¹⁴

The most important aspect of Turkey's war on terror after 1984 was that it had to be conducted in chorus with increased Turkish efforts for EU membership. Though Turkish methods of combating terrorism had not met with serious EU-related repercussions prior to the official Turkish application in 1987, the EU had become the most important observer, critique, and evaluator of the Turkish war of terror after this date. As the Turkish image had considerably deteriorated in Europe after the 1960s due to the increased activities of anti-Turkish lobbies, however, the task of explaining the exigencies of the war on terror became increasingly difficult for Turkish authorities. Consequently, Turkey had to face an ever increasing amount of excessive criticism, misunderstanding, insult, and lack of cooperation from its European counterparts.

²¹⁴ Emre Kongar (2005). *Küresel Terör ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, pp. 92-93

The only fortunate outcome of Turkey's increased encounter with terror has been the emergence of a prominent group of individuals who started to study and deal extensively with the causes and types of terrorist activities. Prominent foreign and Turkish journalists, diplomats, academicians and authors, such as Andrew Mango, Taha Akyol, Fikret Bila, Emre Kongar, Stephen Kinzer, Beril Dedeoğlu, and Kamuran Gürün all concentrated a great deal of their studies on terrorism in Turkey. Although the existence and growing knowledge of these individuals did not liberate Turkey from the plague of terrorism, they nevertheless contributed greatly to the public awareness about the nature of terrorism. According to the analysis and classification of Emre Kongar, for example, Turkey has been targeted by four different sorts of terrorist activities since the 1960s. These four varieties are:

- 1) *Armenian terror which directly targets Turkey and Turkish territories*
- 2) *Rightist/racist and leftist/anarchistic terror which had plagued Turkish society in the 1970s*
- 3) *The racist/separatist terror which emerged after the 1980s*
- 4) *Islamic fundamentalist terror which has targeted the secular and democratic order and followers of Atatürk.*²¹⁵

According to the analysis and classification of Emre Kongar, the second type of terrorist activities which stemmed from ideological differences came to a halt abruptly following the military intervention in 1980. The year 1984, however, which marked the end of ASALA's terrorist activities suspiciously was also the starting year of the PKK's separatist terror which has continued until this day. In other words, with the exception of the first few years following Turkey's association agreement with the European Community in 1963, the entire period of Turkey-EU relations was accompanied by various kinds of terrorist activities in Turkey.

The significance of Turkey's losses due to separatist terror can be better understood by a comparison of Turkish terror casualties with those of the

²¹⁵ Emre Kongar (2005). *Küresel Terör ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, p. 95.

European Union countries. As compared to estimated 35.000 terror victims between 1984 and 2007 in Turkey, Spain and the United Kingdom, the only two EU countries with similar experiences, have lost about 1000 victims to terror in the same period.²¹⁶ While the experiences of these two EU countries regarding terrorism contributed to a relatively better understanding of Turkish causes, they nevertheless did not amount to a full support for Turkish war on terror. Moreover, these relatively lower amounts of casualties induced both Spain and the United Kingdom to pass the toughest terror laws among the EU member countries. Especially the most recent British anti-terror law was even criticized by several EU institutions and the British House of Lords, because it was allegedly incompatible with European human rights laws.²¹⁷

While it is not feasible to generalize the overall amount of EU countries' support, focusing of individual EU states' behavior during Turkey's hardest times could give strong clues about their attitudes. A general argument can be made, however, that EU member states with recent losses due to terror have been more sympathetic to Turkish anti-terror struggle and EU candidacy altogether. The previously mentioned examples of Spain and the United Kingdom constitute the core of European countries the historical experiences of which caused a pro-Turkish attitude. Although these two countries do not generally provide Turkey with a blank check in its efforts to combat terrorism, their defense and approval of Turkish anti-terror efforts generally satisfies Turkish authorities.

EU countries with significant anti-Turkish lobbies, on the other hand, have arguably a tendency to take anti-Turkish stances whenever Turkey's struggle with terror intensified. The harsh and unconstructive criticism towards Turkey voiced by France, Sweden, and Denmark is therefore arguably a result of intensive anti-Turkish propaganda in these countries. The powerful Armenian lobbies in France, as well as influential pro-Kurdish groups in Scandinavian countries, intensify their efforts especially in times of increased Turkish efforts

²¹⁶ Andrew Mango (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone*. P. 31

²¹⁷ Official BBC website (2004) 'Terror detainees win Lords appeal' 16/12/2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4100481.stm

against terrorism. As a consequence, these groups deprive Turkey of EU level support at times when the Turkish need for such a support is most needed.

France, which exhibits mixed historical background with regards to its suffering and understanding due to terrorism, has rather been standing closer to the group of EU countries with the least amount of understanding for Turkish struggle against terrorism. Even though France had recently witnessed separatist as well as ideological forms of terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s, it generally refrained from recognizing Turkey's right to combat terror. Especially the separatist and mostly terrorist campaign of Corsican nationalists has been damaging French economy for several decades, and it has taught French authorities valuable lessons with regards to terrorist damage.

Though Corsican separatist bombing campaigns have been causing few injuries, according to a 1999 BBC report, they have been doing great damage to the tourism industry since early 1970s. Despite the ongoing Corsican struggle and bombing campaigns for decades, however, "*successive French governments have been unwilling to offer meaningful regional autonomy, including official status for the Corsican language and recognition of the Corsicans as a distinct nationality*". The French refusal to grant any form of autonomy to Corsica, in turn, has been based on the French republican creed of a unitary state, which arguably inhabited by one 'nation of citizens'.²¹⁸ In other words, France has consistently been refusing Corsican demands for autonomy simply due to the fact that these demands were incompatible with the laws and characteristics of the French republic.

The similarities between the unitary nature of the French- and Turkish republics, and similar French experiences regarding terrorism, French lack of understanding and support for Turkish anti-terror efforts become more astounding. Unlike countries like Germany, United Kingdom, and Spain which have federalist state structures, France and Turkey share the common

²¹⁸ BBC official website (1999) 'Bombs linked to Corsican separatists' 22/05/2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/350222.stm>

concepts of the centralised and unitary state. Even though this unitary nature of the state allows the expression of individual differences on all aspects of life, it limits certain ethnic demands in order to protect the interests of the state. While successive French governments did not hesitate to curb and refuse Corsican rights on the basis of protecting the centralized state, they have traditionally been the harshest critics of Turkey when Turkish authorities acted with similar concerns.

The first tangible signs of French lack of support for Turkey became visible in early 1980s, when French authorities started to show growing tolerance of the activities of the terrorist ASALA organization. In 1982, French security authorities went as far as signing a deal with ASALA leaders, which permitted ASALA propaganda and accommodation in exchange for ASALA's promise of not involving in any violent acts on French soil. This excessive tolerance and naivety of French authorities were soon rewarded with one of the major terrorist acts on French soil in 1983, when ASALA terrorists attacked Orly airport in Paris.²¹⁹ Consequently, France, which had been consistently refusing Turkish requests for collaboration against Armenian terrorism since early 1970s, was forced to declare ASALA as a terrorist organization. France's designation of ASALA as a terrorist organization and its subsequent withdrawal of support probably contributed to the cessation of ASALA's terrorist activities in 1984. Nevertheless, France's stubbornness about granting ASALA support and recognition until Armenian terrorism had shed blood on French soil left a lasting stain in Turkish-French relations.

Belgium, which had been remained rather untarnished from terrorism in its recent history, generally assumed a similar attitude to that of French with regards to Turkish counter-terrorism efforts. Although Belgium has traditionally been a rather insignificant European country with regards to its size, population, and resources, its function as the 'capital' of the EU has put the decisions of Brussels at the center of European political activity. The insensitivity and misunderstanding of Belgian governments have therefore

²¹⁹ Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan (2003) 'The French Experience of Counter-terrorism'. p. 29 <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/shapiro20030301.pdf>

been a consistent source of concern for Turkey, mainly because the official policies of Brussels would be most likely pursued by other EU countries.

The most concrete example of Belgian intransigency regarding Turkish requests was the actions and judgments of Belgian authorities during the trial of Fehriye Erdal who was officially charged with the murder of prominent Turkish industrialist Özdemir Sabancı. Although Belgium was one of the first signatories of European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, the Belgian judiciary refused to try Erdal on charges of terrorism due to a legal loophole in European Convention. Having claimed that the acts of terrorism were limited to acts committed with ‘bombs, dynamites, rockets, full-automatic weapons, and bombed packages’, a Bruges court ruled that Erdal’s act could not be considered terrorism since it was committed with a pistol.²²⁰

The Belgian authorities, with the final decision of the Bruges court, succeeded in obstructing the extradition of Fehriye Erdal to Turkey after nine years of judicial struggle. The Bruges courts decision was arguably preposterous in its refusal the terrorist nature of Erdal’s act based solely on the type of weapon used. By the same twisted logic, the Bruges court may as well have refused the terrorist nature of the September 11 attacks in the United States. Basing the decision solely on the weapon used to commit the act, the attackers would not be deemed terrorists since they used airplanes rather than weapons prescribed in the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.

Greece, which has been Turkey’s only EU member neighbor until the Bulgarian accession in 2007, has arguably failed to support Turkey in its ongoing struggles against terrorism as well. From the early days of ideological terror in the 1970s until the capture of terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, Greece has been a staunch supporter of groups and organizations which aim at the unity and the stability of Turkey. Especially after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, successive Greek governments have been trying to

²²⁰ Murat Yetkin (2005) ‘Fehriye Erdal Olayı ve AB’nin terörizm kriterleri’ *Radikal*. 02/11/2005
<http://makale.turkcebilgi.com/kose-yazisi-41857-murat-yetkin-fehriye-erdal-olayi-ve-ab-terorizm-kriterleri.html>

combine their efforts to stain the image of Turkey with their struggle to destabilize Turkey. In other words, the efforts of the Greek lobbies in Europe and those in the United States to present Turkey as an aggressor went hand in hand with Greek governments' support for separatist elements in Turkey between 1974 and 1999.²²¹

In the 25 years following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greece has generally clung to the policy of antagonizing Turkey on all issues without provoking an upfront war between two NATO member states. After the Greek accession to the European Union, however, Greece added a third aspect to its anti-Turkish efforts and policies. While the Greek governments have been concentrating on supporting subversive elements in Turkey and on tarnishing Turkish image between 1974 and 1980, Greek authorities also started to undermine Turkish-EU relations after their own accession in 1981. Having become a member of the European Union before Turkey could become a member, Greece thus managed to present all aspects of Turkish-Greek problems from a strictly Greek perspective. As the first show of this newly gained power, Greece exerted its first ever veto in the EU by obstructing the 4th financial protocol with Turkey, and thus blocked the Union's financial assistance to Turkey.²²²

Even though the tensions in Turkish-Greek relations were relatively eased in late 1980s mainly due to the conciliatory policies of late Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal, a permanent improvement in bilateral relations could not be reached. Following the crisis of Kardak/Imia islets in 1996, Greek support for the terrorist and subversive activities in Turkey arguably reached another climax. Even though most experts in international law supported the Turkish claim on the islets, successful Greek lobbying within the European Union resulted in an EU declaration that the islets were legally belonging to Greece. Although Greek authorities did not dare to claim possession over the islets

²²¹ Alexander Deconde (1992). *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*, Boston: Northeastern University Press pp.172-173

²²² Onur Öymen (2003). *Silahsız Savaş*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi pp. 472-473

due to heavy Turkish opposition, the issue of sovereignty over the Kardak/Imia islets has remained in limbo ever since.

While an outright war between Turkey and Greece over the Kardak/Imia islets was prevented by the intervention of the United States, and to a lesser extent, of the EU, the tension between two neighboring countries remained quite intact. As Turkish officials were rather disappointed at EU's failure to settle to dispute objectively, Greek authorities were also frustrated due to the EU's total and absolute support for the Hellenic cause. The tension between Turkey and Greece regarding the Kardak/Imia dispute further increased after the publication of an article in the British newspaper Sunday Observer in 1997. The article in Observer revealed "*links among leaders of the leftist Greek terror organization November 17, the Greek secret service, and the PKK, claiming that Athens sheltered and trained PKK rebels who planned attacks in Turkey*".²²³

It was only after February 1999, when the terrorist leader Öcalan was captured by Turkish security and intelligence services in Kenya, that the consistently anti-Turkish attitude of Greece started to change. As the majority of the world opinion acknowledged the PKK's terrorist nature following Öcalan's capture, the Greek government found itself in an increasingly precarious and difficult situation. As the Kenyan intelligence services provided clear and undeniable evidence regarding the logistics and financial support of the Greek Embassy in Nairobi for Öcalan, the Greek state was in danger of being designated as a terrorist country. As the designation of a 'terrorist country' was permanently detrimental to the strategic interests of Greece, Greek authorities eventually decided to soften their anti-Turkish policies in order to soften arguably justified Turkish counterreactions.

Mainly due to the tolerance and permissiveness of these EU countries, anti-Turkish media channels, some of which with a clearly terrorist agenda, found opportunity to broadcast on European soil. Basing their propaganda mainly on

²²³ Spiros Ch. Kaminaris. 'Greece and the Middle East', *Middle East Journal of International Affairs*. Vol.3 no.2, p. 41 <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/kaminaris.pdf>

the claim that Turkey is an oppressive and totalitarian country, these media channels manipulate several EU countries into granting them permission to broadcast from their soil. By obtaining permission to broadcast in a European Union country, anti-Turkish propagandists thus achieve two goals simultaneously. First of all, these channels obtain official recognition of their anti-Turkish propaganda that they are innocent TV stations which were banned by the arguably oppressive regime in Turkey. Secondly, their following broadcasts provide them with the opportunity to further defame Turkey on a daily basis.

Especially the broadcasting struggle of the Med-TV, which later changed its name to Roj-TV demonstrates all aspects of an anti-Turkish propaganda mechanism in form of a television station. With production studios in Brussels and broadcasting studios in the United Kingdom, Med-TV has served as the main PKK propaganda tool in Europe between 1995 and 1999. Although Turkish security and intelligence officials repeatedly provided their Belgian and British counterparts with plenty of evidence regarding the links between the PKK and the Med-TV, the Turkish warnings mostly fell on deaf ears. Only when Turkish intelligence officers presented their Belgian counterparts with official correspondence between the PKK and Med TV, Belgian police raided the production studio of Med TV on 18 September 1996. Though five employees of Med-TV were arrested on charges of terrorism, they were released one month later, and the investigation of a Brussels public prosecutor remained inconclusive.²²⁴

The United Kingdom, which has had rather a similar terror experience with Turkey than with Belgium, eventually acted to stop the broadcasts of Med-TV on British soil in April 1999. Following a complaint by a public prosecutor, the Independent Television Commission of the United Kingdom prohibited the broadcasts of Med-TV on grounds that the programs were inciting to commit crimes and aimed at creating public disorder. Nevertheless, it took Med-TV only three months to re-organize itself under the name of Medya-TV, and to

²²⁴ Andrew Mango (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, London: Routledge, p. 82

move its headquarters to Paris as of July 1999. Although Turkish officials continued to provide French- and Belgian authorities with solid evidence about Medya-TV's links with Med-TV and the PKK, Medya-TV has continued its existence for another five years.

It was on 13 February 2004 when French authorities finally responded to the intelligence provided by Turkish- and American authorities, and cancelled the broadcasting licence of Medya-TV. Even though French authorities did not prosecute the employees of Medya-TV, they nevertheless deported the station chief on grounds of another criminal conviction. Not surprisingly, Med-TV soon resumed its broadcasts as Roj-TV, and its management was assumed by the Mesopotamian News Agency which had proven links to the PKK. As of 2007, Roj TV has been continuing its broadcasts and terrorist propaganda through satellite and internet, targeting mostly the unitary state of Iraq and Turkish armed forces.²²⁵

In addition to the passive support of several EU countries for the terror activities of anti-Turkish groups, several EU decisions went even further by publicly condemning Turkish counterterrorism measures. For example, the 'Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question', which was issued by the European Parliament in 1987, condemned Turkey for not recognizing the 1915 events as genocide. The same resolution, even though it was highly irrelevant in its own context, referred also to the Cyprus, Aegean, and Kurdish issues, and criticized Turkey in all of these different areas. Though the PKK terror had been plaguing Turkey for three years at the time of the resolution in 1987, it was remarkable that no reference was made to the terrorist activities of the PKK.²²⁶

The 1987 resolution of the European Parliament was also remarkable that its timing coincided with the official Turkish application to the European Union. Given that the presently independent Republic of Armenia was part of the

²²⁵ In addition to its satellite broadcasts, Roj TV also engages in terror propaganda on its website. In the Turkish sections of the website, Roj TV summarizes its broadcasting background and admits that it is the continuation of MED-TV and Medya-TV.

²²⁶ Emre Kongar (2005). *Küresel Terör ve Türkiye*. p. 95.

Soviet Union in 1987, and there were no tensions between Turkey and the Soviet Union at that time, there was a strong suspicion on the Turkish side that anti-Turkish forces within the EU were set in motion again. As the 'Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question' failed to contribute to the solution of any problem, it nevertheless contributed to increased terrorist activities in Turkey. Combining the insights of Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand with its own evaluation, Sedat Laçiner observed that:

"The PKK terrorist attacks increased regularly after each EU decision which referred to the Kurdish problem in a prejudiced way. It is also noteworthy that Kurdish groups were joined by Greek and Armenian groups which engage in joint activities in Europe and in the United States.....According to the officials who met with Birand, the ASALA, and Armenian terror in general, was expected to end after the EU resolution on Armenian question. That is because ASALA terror has successfully completed its mission. From now on, an increase in Kurdish terror should be expected. The European Parliament resolution will be effective in increasing this Kurdish terror".²²⁷

An argument can possibly be made that the lenient and accommodating attitude of most EU countries towards anti-Turkish organizations with terrorist credentials could be explained with the existence of historically negative Turkish image in Europe. As the original catalyser of this negativity was probably lost in history, it can safely be asserted that it is too late to tackle and analyze the initial roots of this negativity. It is therefore not useful attempting to establish a cause-and-effect relation between the Turks and European in history. Moreover, even if it could be assumed that the origins of this anti-Turkish prejudice could be detected, disproving or tackling these initial assumptions would not improve the Turkish image of today. An amalgamation of justified and unjustified prejudices has been leaving its mark on the image of Turkey for centuries, and the discovery of the original wrong assumption would not help in improving the negative Turkish image of today.

²²⁷ Sedat Laçiner (2004). *Türkler ve Ermeniler (Türk Ermeni İlişkileri)*. Istanbul: Kaknüs. p. 104

It may certainly be argued that Turkey, since its foundation in 1923, has not been a fully democratic country where individual liberties present in Western European states could be enjoyed to its full extent. It is also an undeniable fact that the Turkish military, mainly due to the strategic exigencies of Turkey, enjoys a slightly more influential position than its counterparts in other European countries. It can furthermore be asserted that certain liberties in Turkey rather exist in theory only, while the use of these liberties is often restricted or hindered by the agents of the state authority. Finally, it is also very difficult to claim that especially the Christian minorities are entitled to full religious rights and privileges which are enjoyed by the Moslem majority in Turkey.

These democratic deficits are nevertheless not characteristic of only Turkey. Several EU candidate countries, as well as many recent members have pieces of legislations which are undemocratic and restrictive in their natures. Most of these countries, however, never had to deal with terrorist activities part of which was promoted and supported from abroad. In few cases, such as the activities of the Basque separatists on both sides of the French-Spanish border, the authorities successfully cooperated in order to combat terrorist activities. As recently as in 2007, however, Turkish security and intelligence units unsuccessfully continue to seek Iraqi counterparts in order jointly to combat against PKK terrorism.

Even though it may be admitted that successive Turkish governments committed grave errors in their treatment of the Kurdish minority over many decades, this mistreatment does not give ethnic Kurds any legal or moral right to engage in terrorist activities. While the European Union generally recognized this difference between civil ways of protest and terrorist activities in case of Spain and the United Kingdom, it lacks similar levels of understanding for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Moreover, the EU persists in bringing the Kurdish issue as a stumbling block in front of Turkish membership, strongly suggesting that it would never assist Turkey in solving this problem before or after an eventual EU membership.

It is also noteworthy that as many as a dozen current EU members have had considerable minority problems prior to their accession to the Union, and that a considerable portion of these problems have persisted after becoming EU members. These countries, such as Baltic republics, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Romania were admitted into the EU despite ongoing ethnic problems within their borders. Although all of these new members had to sign several agreements promising eventual improvement of these minority issues, non of them were kept outside of the EU because of not having tackled the issue before EU accession. Instead of being lambasted and condemned continuously by the European Union, these countries were admitted into the Union with the apparent hope solving these problems after having become a member.

It would therefore be a great injustice towards Turkey to claim that the existence of terrorist activities on Turkish soil, as well as the Union's refusal to admit Turkey as a member, are only due to Turkish democratic deficits and its restriction of some individual freedoms. As the attitude and membership policy of the EU clearly demonstrates, similar and even graver deficits and shortcomings can easily be tolerated whenever virtually any country other than Turkey is in question. Moreover, as in the case of Spain and the United Kingdom, unusually strict laws and counterterrorist measures are eventually accepted by the EU institutions as necessary evils.

It goes without saying that Turkey should continue its democratization process and takes further steps towards recognizing the religious and certain linguistic rights of its minorities regardless of Turkish expectations of EU membership. Recognizing and improving these democratic rights would certainly demonstrate Turkey's self-confidence and self-respect, rather than indicate a weakness towards European Union's demands. The increased amount of self-confidence, in turn, would most likely gain the admiration of European opinion leaders and intellectuals, leading to an eventual pro-Turkish shift in the European public opinion. As the British journalist James Pettifer duly observed, *"if Turkey wishes to accomplish its foreign-policy objectives in*

*Europe, it can only do so with the support of the educated European public.*²²⁸

The assertion that Turkey should improve its record on minority rights and individual freedoms does not imply, however, that the Turkish authorities should tolerate terrorist activities aimed at the very existence of the Turkish Republic. By establishing a very clear border between political struggle for personal freedoms and terrorist activities, Turkish authorities should clearly define the areas where they would, and should, show zero tolerance. In other words, Turkey should also resume its war on terror without being intimidated by the excessive demands and precautions of the Union, which could not even be satisfactorily met by most EU member countries. Pointing to the historical and specific security requirements of each individual country, Turkey should increase its lobbying efforts in order to explain the exigencies which are imposed on Turkey due to its geographic location.

As the membership in the European Union undisputedly signifies a greater level of security and welfare for the Turkish people, it has always been reasonable for Turkish political leaders to seek EU membership. Certain sensitive issues with involve Turkey, such as the Cyprus problem, the PKK terror, and minority rights would most probably be solved more swiftly and easily within a European Union framework. As one of the main concerns of Turkey is its territorial integrity, EU membership and the ensuing territorial security will relax Turkish minds with regards to separatist activities. Thus, Turkey is very probably justified in struggling for becoming an EU member first, and permanently solving some of these issues later.

Nevertheless, the European Union seems at least as adamant as Turkey in its resolution not to admit Turkey before all problems which serve as obstacles to EU membership are solved by Turkey alone. While the EU seems certain that Turkey will most probably not be able to conduct its war on terror simultaneously with its membership efforts, it remains unyielding towards

²²⁸ James Pettifer (1998). *The Turkish Labyrinth. Atatürk and the New Islam*. London: Penguin. p. 151

Turkish requests for more understanding and tolerance. With this intransigent and intolerant attitude, the Union increasingly appears to be forcing Turkey to make a decision between its territorial integrity and possible EU membership in an indefinite future. As the determination of Turkey to protect its territorial and national integrity remains as steadfast as ever, European Union's intolerance and vagueness toward Turkish exigencies are likely to divert Turkey from its path toward Europe in the near future.

There are arguably several gestures and compromises which Turkey has made in order to make a certain progress towards European Union membership until today. There are most probably further necessary gestures and compromises which should be undertaken by Turkey in order to maintain and improve its current dialogue and relationship with the Union. Improvements and further guarantees regarding individual rights and freedoms, certain liberties of Christian minorities, as well as more constructive attitude towards Greek-Cypriot authorities could be considered as some of these gestures and compromises legitimately expected by the Union. As these arguably legitimate EU demands could be met with dignity, Turkey may also strengthen its hand against the unrealistic demands of the Union which are indubitably detrimental to Turkey's interests. In other words, meeting the Union's justifiably demands also serves Turkish causes by proving Turkish willingness to accept European standards whenever they do not threaten the very existence of the Turkish state.

With regards to the democratic demands of Christian Turkish citizens, for instance, Turkish authorities may set an example of goodwill by easing the restrictions on Christian religious education in Turkey. Especially the AKP government which is in power since 2002, and which passionately champions the causes of religious freedom, may show a sign of goodwill by allowing the reopening of the Heybeliada Theological School. As the Turkish Foreign Ministry confirms that "*Turkey understands the need of the Greek Orthodox Community to train its clergy*", quick and concrete steps in dealing with the Heybeliada Theological School issue would indubitably increase Turkey's

credibility in the international arena.²²⁹ Moreover, such a tolerant step would also help the ruling AKP government to prove its claim that their support for religious freedom does not only apply to Muslims, but to Christians and all other Turkish citizens with different religions as well.

Nevertheless, compromising on war on terror is totally separate and distinguishable from all other types of compromises which have been made so far by Turkey, mostly with the aim of coming one step nearer to European Union membership. While most other compromises demanded by the Union may, if formulated and applied properly, be beneficial for Turkey, it is absolutely impossible that any compromise on war on terror may benefit Turkey. As the European Union is most probably aware of Turkish exigencies with regards to war on terror, the unrealistic demands regarding Turkish counterterrorism activities could not be caused by naivety or ignorance. On the contrary, these demands most probably stem from a carefully disguised strategy, drafted by adamantly anti-Turkish elements within the EU, to damage the integrity and interests of Turkey permanently.

²²⁹ Official Website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/theological-school-in-heybeliada.en.mfa>

CONCLUSION

Between 1999, when Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate of EU, and 2002, when the AKP won the Turkish general elections, the Turkish progress towards European Member membership, as well as continuous improvement of Turkish image in Europe was arguably remarkable. The abolition of the capital punishment, the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece following the earthquake disasters in both countries, and the swift acceptance of democratization packages in the Turkish Grand National Assembly created an unprecedented positive attitude with regards to Turkish-EU relations. The capture of the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, and his ensuing confessions about several EU countries' financial and logistic support for the PKK, arguably pressured the morally-humiliated Union to approach the Turkish standpoint with increased respect and understanding.

As there has always been strong links between ruling governments and media corporations in all European countries, the positive and optimistic attitude regarding Turkish-EU relations was increasingly reflected in European magazines, newspapers, and television stations. Even certain segments of the European media, which has traditionally been adamantly anti-Turkish in its coverage of Turkey-related issues, began to show signs of objectivity and empathy towards Turkish causes and EU-related goals. Having passionately rejected the 'Europeanness' of Turkey previously, these media groups also started to refer to Turkey as an essentially European country, albeit with numerous, however curable, defects and shortcomings. Instead of referring to these defects and shortcomings in a condescending and disdainful attitude, the European press mostly considered them as corrigible and, in most cases, tolerable.

Although certain legislative improvements regarding democratization were continued also after the election victory of the AKP in November 2002, the EU's official perception of Turkey has started to change. While acknowledging

that a single-party government is better for Turkey's economic and political stability, even pro-Turkish circles in Europe began to suspect the real motivations behind AKP's seemingly pro-European policies. Opponents of Turkish accession to the European Union, on the other hand, rather perceived AKP's election victory as a clear sign of Turkey's emerging Islamist and conservative values. In other words, the election victory of the AKP provided the European opponents of Turkish membership with further reasons to strengthen their opposition while it weakened the hands of Europeans who wished to see Turkey inside the European Union.

While a certain part of increased opposition to Turkish EU membership after the election victory of the AKP in 2002 was based on hearsay, prejudice, and propaganda, part of it was undoubtedly the policies of the AKP which were not in line with Turkish strategic goals. As the AKP reduced Turkish struggle for more democracy and freedom to solely the issue of the headscarf, for example, it touched a very sensitive nerve not only in Turkey, but also in several EU countries with significant Muslim minorities. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's relentless insistence on keeping the Islamic headscarf issue on the agenda consistently created friction in Turkey, as well as in Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland.

As AKP's pressure for allowing university students to wear the Islamic headscarf in the universities intensified, the resistance from secular Turks, and the repercussions of the ensuing tensions became highly popular in European public and media. While some EU countries, such as France, adhered strictly to the secularist view and sided with Turkish proponents of the headscarf ban, Germany rather took the view that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf should be permitted. Regardless of the general tendency within the EU regarding the headscarf conflict in Turkey, European public opinion started to perceive Turkey as a country where the rights of a predominantly religious society were restricted by a secular minority. Consequently, both proponents and opponents of the wearing of headscarf contributed, unwillingly or deliberately, to the negative image of Turkey as an unstable, authoritarian, and fragmented society.

An argument can therefore be made that there is no common agreement among European countries about what kind of Turkey they prefer to see in the near future. While almost all proponents of Turkey's EU accession agree that the Turkish state should strictly maintain its European, secular, democratic, and unitary character in the future, there is a high level of disagreement among opponents of Turkish EU membership. While some sections of the opponents wish to see Turkey preserving its European and secular character due to its strategic importance for Europe, several others believe that Turkey should transform into a predominantly Middle Eastern, Islamic, and semi-democratic country where some of the laws are dictated by religious dogmas. By letting Turkey radically transform into such a 'moderately Islamist' country, these opponents of Turkish EU membership expect to render Turkey disqualifiable for European Union for good.

It goes without saying that particularly those opponents of Turkish EU membership who wish to see Turkey as a semi-theocratic, 'moderately Islamist' state in the future have most probably further hidden agendas which are carefully disguised from public knowledge. As Islamist tendencies continue to grow in the first decade of the new millennium, many statesmen and academicians start to suspect that Turkey was chosen to 'lead' this emerging Islamist movement according to Western directive. According to this doubtful theory, Turkey would be supported to propagate a moderate form of Islam while it would gradually distance itself from European values, institutions, and aspirations. Although it will probably take years, even decades, to be able to prove or refute such a suspicion, it is clear that there are many tangible factors which hint at the veracity of these conspiracy claims.

The most tangible clue about tacit European support for turning Turkey into a mildly-Islamist and non-European country, at least at certain levels, has been the continuous endorsement of the AKP's policies which has been in power since 2002. As certain European institutions and observatory bodies usually turn a blind eye to AKP's restrictive and reactionary policies, such as attempts

at criminalizing adultery, they also endorse AKP's political activism when it presents itself as champions of democracy and individual liberties in other issues. During AKP's recurring political campaigns which demanded relaxing or removing the headscarf ban at universities, for example, most European politicians and institutions backed the position of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government.

By openly supporting political activisms orchestrated by the AKP, and turning a blind eye to other Turkish movements for individual liberties, most factions within the EU disclosed their preference solely for pro-Islamist kinds of reforms. While the democratic efforts of Turkish trade unions, women's rights movements, and gay rights activists found little coverage in the European media, the majority of European journalists tended to consider the headscarf problem as an issue of 'personal freedom'. By neglecting the civil rights activities of Turkish secular circles, most European opinion leaders played into Turkish religious conservatives' hands, and portrayed the conservatives as the sole champions of rights and freedoms. This unilateral support for the AKP's policies, in turn, strengthened AKP's image as a 'victimized' party, while damaging the image of Turkey as a country where all kinds of religious liberties were suppressed by the bureaucracy and military.

The new Turkey which is arguably desired by certain factions in Europe is undoubtedly incompatible with the modern, secular, democratic, and European Turkey envisioned by Kemal Atatürk. Despite their misinterpretation, abuse, need for revision, and shortcomings, Kemal Atatürk's guiding principles have been extremely valuable to Turkey during good times, as well as during times of crises and upheavals. On the other hand, all political and societal factions in Turkey as well as in Europe which mercilessly assail these principles have been unable to create a better framework and ideology for carrying Turkey into the future. Dismissing these irreplaceable principles and exchanging them for dubious designs prepared by non-Turkish actors would therefore amount to undermining the very core of the Turkish republic.

Given that many political parties and powerful lobbies base their strategies on undermining Turkish membership in the European Union, it is expectable that these groups focus their propaganda efforts on the alleged unstable, undemocratic, Islamic, Middle Eastern, and un-European nature of Turkey. As it would be extremely difficult to convince a public opinion with Turkish sympathies that Turkey does not deserve to become an EU member, these possible sympathies become the biggest obstacle for anti-Turkish groups. Given that there are already existing negativities and prejudices about Turkey and its alleged non-European and undemocratic qualities, it is usually not difficult to build upon these existing biases.

Given that Turkish sympathies in European public opinions are rather easier to eradicate than existing prejudices and negativities of the Turkish image, it arguably takes only few negative incidents for the Turkish image to revert to its previous negativity. As it was previously mentioned in this study, the improvements of the Turkish image during the early years of the Turkish Republic was largely erased as a result of Turkish labor migrations to Western Europe starting in the early 1960s. In similar fashion, it can be argued that the relative improvements in the Turkish image in the late 1990s started to be undermined due to AKP's insistence on narrowing down individual liberties to solely the wearing of the headscarf. As simply no positive quality of the Turkish image gained permanence in the collective minds of the European public opinions, anti-Turkish lobbies and parties have usually an easy task whenever they want to assail and damage these qualities.

It should furthermore be noted that the Turkish war on terror provides anti-Turkish groups, parties, and lobbies with arguably the best opportunity to blemish Turkey's image in Europe. Mostly at the cost of presenting proven terrorists as freedom fighters, anti-Turkish lobbies in Europe spend great efforts to present Turkey as a country which gravely violates human rights and individual freedoms. Especially as loss of life and property is common during to course of counterterrorism activities, anti-Turkish lobbies aim to abuse these tragic events solely for the promotion of their agendas. Collaborating effectively with Turcophobic elements in European institutions, media, and

non-governmental organizations, anti-Turkish lobbies try to assure that the coverage of Turkish war on terror is permanently manipulated and misinterpreted. As a result of these media manipulations, Turkish war on terror often gets portrayed like the oppression of groups and individuals with legitimate and rightful causes.

Turkish groups, associations, and organizations which can be collectively called the Turkish lobby in Europe have made a certain progress in the recent years towards countering the activities of anti-Turkish interest groups. By participating in the local politics, media enterprises, and non governmental organizations, Turkish communities in Europe have taken the first steps towards working as a Turkish lobby. Though issues like lack of sufficient coordination, individual grievances, and ideological conflicts continue to epitomize the typical problems of Turkish organizations, significant progress have been achieved in order to overcome these difficulties. Consequently, the initial prerequisites for becoming a 'Turkish lobby' have arguably been fulfilled, while the structural and organizational efficiency of a proper ethnic lobby has yet to be reached.

Moreover, the Turkish authorities' decades of neglect arguably educated Turkish communities abroad about the need for self-sufficiency and considerably autonomy. Although increased ideological splits among the Turkish authorities increased the confusion, rather than the self-confidence, of Turkish organizations in Europe, many lessons were also learned. While those Turkish organizations which did not have any political or organic connections to Turkish authorities became rather more effective and influential, those Turkish groups which were supposed to be assisted by Turkish authorities tended to regress and trail behind. In other words, Turkish authorities' half-hearted and ideologically motivated attempts to assist their preferred Turkish organizations in Europe proved mostly counterproductive and detrimental to these very organizations, while other, and independently organized Turkish groups eventually learned how to survive and act by themselves.

Despite the initial optimism due to the recent progress of Turkish organizations towards becoming an effective Turkish lobby on European scale, ideological divisions and confrontations threaten the potential influence of this emerging lobby. As overt and tacit supporters of 'moderately Islamist' causes attempt to shape the new Turkish image according to conservative Moslem vision, the creation of such an image is strongly opposed by Turkish secular establishment and a significant portion of the public. Regrettably, the current AKP government, which goes as far as asking '*Turkish embassies across Europe to improve links with Milli Görüş*', a movement which was deemed as a threat by German authorities, arguably promotes division, in contrast to unity, among ethnic Turks in Europe.²³⁰

A further symbolic, however significant factor which exacerbates the present prejudices surrounding the Turkish image is arguably the political manipulation of the headscarf issue. Even though the current headscarf ban at universities and public offices is interpreted as anti-democratic by certain Turkish circles, it should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights endorsed the necessity of such a ban in Turkey. In a landmark decision in the case of Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey, the Court "*did not lose sight of the fact that there were extremist political movements in Turkey which sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts*", and upheld the decision of Turkish justice.²³¹

Given that even the highest European judicial authority acknowledged the risk of imposition of religious symbols in Turkey, it is arguably very counterproductive for Turkey's own governing party to insist on the lifting of such a ban for the sake of political populism. As there are numerous anti-Turkish lobbies which look forward for another opportunity to portray Turkey as an authoritarian, un-European, an antidemocratic country, Turkey's own government should refrain from playing into the hands of the lobbies. Given the unfortunate fact that even Turkish national sportsmen are occasionally

²³⁰ Chris Morris (2005). *The New Turkey. The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe*. London: Granta, p. 191

²³¹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4424776.stm>

subject to physical attacks by religious zealots because of their ‘inappropriate’ clothes, Turkey’s ruling party should acknowledge that Turkey’s alleged democratic deficit cannot be limited to the headscarf ban only.²³² In a country like Turkey, where certain intolerant and aggressive habits regrettably hold sway in some parts of the society, tolerance and civilized behaviour cannot be promoted though favouritism and preferential treatment of certain political groups. Therefore, regardless of a possible future membership in the European Union, religious conservatives in Turkey should honestly acknowledge that their ideological supporters may occasionally be the perpetrators, rather than victims, of intolerance, discrimination and bigotry.

While it is indisputable that the existing biases and prejudices play a significant part in European Union’s lukewarm and hesitant attitude towards Turkey, it has also been established that for several EU countries, support for eventual Turkish membership is a foreign policy issue.²³³ As an EU Member State’s foreign policy towards Turkey is strongly dependent on its bilateral relations with Turkey, an influential Turkish lobby in that particular EU country would undoubtedly make a positive contribution to Turkey’s relations with any European nation. Even though there are few influential European countries, such as France, where the influence of anti-Turkish lobbies is likely to remain much stronger than that of the Turkish lobby, a gradual pro-Turkish shift in most EU Member States’ public opinion will probably isolate and marginalize the French opposition towards Turkey.

By marginalizing and isolating anti-Turkish opinions in countries like Austria and France, Turkish lobbies may at least promote wide-ranging discussions in these countries regarding the unconditional hostility to Turkish presence in Europe. Through the promotion of such comprehensive discussions, Turkish lobbies can arguably help these countries to define themselves in terms of their self perception and Europeanness. As “*an essential part of any definition*

²³² <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=762205>

²³³ Barysch, Katinka (2007). *What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why*. A Centre of European Reform publication. p. 3
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_kb_turkey_24aug07.pdf

of identity is the line that divides Self from Other”, an emotional and unjustifiably stubborn insistence of Turkish ‘Otherness’ would also prove that the European definition of Self requires the exclusion of Turkey.²³⁴ Although such an acknowledgement of Turkey’s necessary exclusion for the sake of Europeans’ self perception would be disappointing for Turkey, the Turkish nation would at least free themselves from the notion that their failure to become an EU member is due to their own shortcomings.

As secular sections of the Turkish society, arguably justifiably, struggle to create the image of Turkey as a modern, European, democratic, and secular country, their ensuing confrontations with those with ‘moderately Islamist’ agendas hinder the creation of a common national strategy. The ideological confrontations and political divisions among European Turks, which has arguably been exacerbated by AKP’s policies since 2002, regrettably reduced the likelihood that the Turkish community in Europe may emerge as a unified and powerful Turkish lobby in the near future. This lack of a unified response and the reduced likelihood of a powerful Turkish lobby, in turn, encourage all anti-Turkish lobbies worldwide which act with the knowledge that the major part of their slandering and propaganda efforts would remain unreciprocated.

²³⁴ Bernard Lewis (1999). *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*. London: Phoenix. p. 113

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