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MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY: THE EU-RUSSIA-US TRIANGLE

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

TUĞBA ERBİLGİN

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ONAY SAYFASI

Ensitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Tuğba ERBİLGİN'in "SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY: THE EU-RUSSIA-US TRIANGLE" konulu tez çalışması 14 Kasım 2008 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/ oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

Onaylayan:

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Onay Tarihi

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ÖZ

Bu yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı, Avrupa Birliği (AB), Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Rusya Federasyonu'nda 'enerjinin güvenlikleştirilmesi' konusunu ve bu durumun söz konusu üç aktörün dış politikaları üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektir. İnceleme, adı geçen aktörlerin enerji güvenliği konusunu nasıl ve ne derecede siyasileştirdiklerini ve "güvenlikleştirdiklerini" ortaya koymak amacıyla yürütülmüştür. Bu doğrultuda, 'söz eylem'in rolü ve Kopenhag Ekolü'nün çok-sektörlü güvenlik tanımlaması üzerinde durulmuştur. Çalışmanın ana argümanı, enerji konusunun AB, ABD ve Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki aktörler tarafından siyasileştirildiği ve belli bir derecede de güvenlikleştirildiğidir.

Birinci bölüm, tezin teorik çerçevesini çizmektedir. Farklı ekollerin 'güvenlik' kavramına getirdikleri farklı tanımlar Kopenhag Ekolü yaklaşımı vurgulanarak incelenmiştir. Çok boyutlu güvenlik tanımı ile Kopenhag Ekolü, sağladığı geniş güvenlik anlayışıyla 'enerjinin güvenlikleştirilmesi' konusunun incelenmesinde önem teşkil etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu ekole ağırlık verilmiştir. Ayrıca, Ole Wæver'ın ortaya koyduğu güvenlikleştirme (securitization) ve de-securitization (konuların güvenlik kavramı altında ele alınmaması, normalleşmesi) kavramlarına ağırlık verilmiştir. Birinci bölümü takip eden üç bölümde ise, sırasıyla, AB, Rusya Federasyonu ve ABD'nin enerji politikaları resmi belgeler ve politika yapım sürecinde etkin olan aktörlerin söylemleri doğrultusunda, petrol ve doğal gaz esas alınarak incelenmiştir. Beşinci bölümde ise, enerji konusunun güvenlikleştirildiği söylemlerin karşılaştırılmalı analizi yapılmış, NATO'nun enerji konusuna katılımına değinilmiştir. Adı geçen aktörlerin, 11 Eylül 2001 ve Ağustos 2008 tarihleri arasında verdikleri söylemler kapsamlı bir şekilde incelendikten sonra varılan sonuç şudur: Özellikle, Rusya-Beyaz Rusya ve Rusya-Ukrayna enerji krizleri sonrasında, enerji konusu uluslararası gündemdekini yerini sağlamlaştırmıştır. Enerji güvenliği konusunun yüksek derecede siyasileştirildiği ve belli bir derecede de "güvenlikleştirildiği" görülmüştür. Enerji konusu *yüksek politika*nın parçası haline gelmiş ve bir *varoluşsal tehdit* olarak algılanmaya başlamıştır. Ancak, enerjinin güvenlikleştirilmesinin bir dereceye kadar gerçekleştiği sonucuna varılmıştır. Bunun nedeni, yüksek derecede kamu ilgisi olmasına rağmen 'oyunun yerleşik kuralları'nın henüz yıkılmamış olmasıdır.

ABSTRACT

This study aims at analyzing the 'securitization of the energy issue' in the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA) and the Russian Federation and the impact of this on their foreign policies. Analysis is made in order to see how and to what extent the issue of energy security is politicized and "securitized" by the actors. The role of the 'speech act' and the multisectoral definition of security of the Copenhagen School are given special emphasis in this regard. The major argument of this study is that the issue of energy is politicized and to some degree securitized by the actors in the EU, the USA and the Russian Federation.

The first chapter aims to set the theoretical framework of the study. Therefore, the different definitions of the term 'security' are analysed focusing on the different schools of thought with special emphasis to the approach of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School's approach gives a broader understanding of security with its multidimensional definition which is an important point for the study of 'securitization of energy'. Furthermore, the concepts of securitization and de-securitization of Ole Wæver are given weight in line with the context of the study. In the following three chapters, the energy policies of the EU, the Russian Federation and the USA are analysed respectively in terms of oil and gas based on the official documents and the speeches of the relevant important policy actors. In the fifth chapter, a comparative analysis of the actors' energy securitization discourse is made and it is followed by the involvement of NATO in the energy issue. After comprehensive analyses of the speeches of the actors between September 11, 2001 and August 2008, the study comes to a conclusion that especially after the Russia-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine energy crises, energy has consolidated its place at the top of the international agenda. It is seen that the issue of energy security has been highly politicized and to a certain extent "securitized" by the actors. It has become a part of *high politics* and it has started to be perceived as an *existential* threat, that of survival. However, energy securitization has been realized to a certain extent as the 'breaking of the established rules of the game' has not come into existence yet although a high degree of public concern is present.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEI	**Advanced Energy Initiative**
ANWR	**Arctic National Wildlife Refuge**
Bn	**Billion**
CFSP	**Common Foreign and Security Policy**
CSS	**Critical Security Studies**
EBRD	**European Bank for Reconstruction and Development**
ECFR	**European Council on Foreign Relations**
ECSC	**European Coal and Steel Community**
EIB	**European Investment Bank**
EISA	**Energy Independence and Security Act**
ENP	**European Neighbourhood Policy**
EPAct	**Energy Policy Act**
ESS	**European Security Strategy**
EU	**European Union**
FDI	**Foreign Direct Investment**
G-8	**Group of Eight**
GATT	**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**
GDP	**Gross Domestic Product**
GECF	**Gas Exporting Countries' Forum**
IEA	**International Energy Agency**
MSs	**Member States**
Mtoe	**Million Tones**
NATO	**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**
NEP	**National Energy Policy**
NEPDG	**National Energy Policy Development Group**
NSS	**National Security Strategy**

OPEC	**Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries**
PCA	**Partnership and Cooperation Agreement**
PJ	**Petajoule**
RFS	**Renewable Fuel Standard**
SU	**Soviet Union**
TJ	**Terajoules**
TSS	**Traditional Security Studies**
UK	**United Kingdom**
UN	**United Nations**
US	**United States**
USA	**United States of America**
WMD	**Weapons of Mass Destruction**
WTO	**World Trade Organization**

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INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to analyse the “securitization of energy” and the impact of this on the foreign policies of the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA) and the Russian Federation. The role of the security ‘speech-act’ and the multisectoral definition of security of the Copenhagen School are given special emphasis in this regard.

Energy is important for the continuation of daily activities. It is vital in the sense that there is a growing reliance on energy for the working of factories, cooling and heating households, transportation, lightening, working of mechanical devices, for military, etc. As can be seen, it has a central role in many kinds of human activities. Therefore, the secure supply of the finite energy resources has gained prominence.

The analysis of the securitization of energy in the EU, the USA and Russia is made by taking into consideration oil and gas. Furthermore, in order to specify the issue in a time-frame, September 11, 2001-August 1, 2008 is chosen as the time-frame of this study. The motive behind taking 9/11 as a starting point is that with the events of 9/11, the fear that energy supply routes and infrastructure may be a target of terrorists added a great deal to the existing concerns over energy and helped its securitization. Also, the importance of 9/11 results from its being a catalyst for the EU to develop strategic thinking and to adopt a more global role in dealing with the threats. Apart from September 11 events, the crises between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus on the energy issue also facilitated the process of securitization in this regard. On the other hand, the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 is not included within the time-frame of this study due to its complex dynamics which involve but also go well beyond the issue of energy.

In this study, security is seen as a 'speech-act' and therefore, the analyses are made through the examination of the speeches of the relevant policy actors.[1] The reason behind this emphasis on the security speech-act is that for the approach of the Copenhagen School, defining something as a security issue is realized through social construction. "Issues become 'securitized', treated as security issues, through speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such."[2] As in the words of Wæver, "we can regard 'security' as a *speech act.* In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)."[3] Hence, one can argue that securitization is about discourse as it is in this 'speech-act' that the issue becomes a security issue and starts to be regarded within the security domain. It is the political discourse where utmost importance is given to the 'acceptance of the audience' as the securitization process would not have been finalized without such an acceptance. Therefore, it can be argued that security is seen as a speech-act that is "enunciated by elites in order to securitize issues."[4]

The overall aim of this study is to analyse how and to what extent the issue of energy security is politicized and "securitized" by the actors of the international arena, to see whether the actors of the EU, Russian Federation and the USA have made the issue of energy a part of *high politics* and whether they have started to perceive it as an *existential* threat, one that of survival, by taking it out of the 'normal political agenda'.[5] The major argument of this study is that the energy issue is politicized and to a certain extent securitized by the actors in the international arena, namely, the EU, the USA and

[1] As this is a master's thesis, it goes well beyond the scope of this study to make discourse and content analyses. The aim is to scrutinize some security speech-acts in order to see/check whether or not the EU, the USA and Russia politicize/securitize the issue of energy and how these actors use the security speech act with this aim. This study does not aim to make discourse and/or content analysis.
[2] WILLIAMS, Michael C.; 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization of International Politics', *InternationalStudies Quarterly*, 47:4, 2003
[3] WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.), '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 55
[4] LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.); '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 9. Note that Lipschutz interprets from Ole Wæver.
[5] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 23

the Russian Federation. It is of paramount importance to emphasize that this study does not argue that the issue of energy should be securitized; it attempts to analyse whether it is being securitized or not. Moreover, the study does not conclude whether the threat is 'real' or not. It is also important to underscore here that this study does not aim at making discourse analysis; the aim is to analyse whether the actors use a security speech-act or not within the time-frame of 9/11, 2001 up until August 2008. Therefore, instead of analysing the individual events or issues, a thorough examination is made covering all the speeches of the policy actors related to the energy issue within this time-frame. Another important point to be mentioned here is that within the scope of the study, only the speeches of the high-ranking officials and/or heads of state and government are taken into consideration. The role of the civil society or the multinational corporations is deliberately ignored. Furthermore, while doing the analysis, it is not intended to de-construct the speeches; instead, within the speeches, the parts that are related to the energy issue and the parts that have connotation to security and/or energy securitization are taken into consideration.

The significance of this study is that in the analyses of 'energy security', there is a gap as the issue is only taken into consideration within the economic dimension. However, within such a context, there occurs a gap as energy has its impact on the political, environmental, military spheres also. Therefore, the goal of this study is to open the way for further in-depth research in a way to fill in this gap with the use of the multidimensional approach of the Copenhagen School.

Methodology

In this study, a comparative analysis of securitization of energy in the EU, the USA and Russia is made. Since security is taken as a 'speech-act', thorough examination of the speeches of the respective actors is made within the time-frame of September 11, 2001 up until August 2008. It is important to underscore here that in the analysis of speech-acts; only the declarations and speeches of heads of state and government, the high-ranking officials and official documents issued by the major institutions of the three actors are considered. This is because the official bodies are the

ones with a predetermined authority to securitize an issue. It should be noted here that it is also because of this emphasis on agents with a predetermined authority to securitize issues that the security speech-acts of other agents such as non-governmental organizations or multinational corporations are deliberately ignored. To put it briefly, the selection criteria regarding the speech-acts analysed here refer to official speech-acts which involve the direct use of the terms "energy" and "security" together, as well as those which involve the use of words such as "lifeblood", "life or death issue", "vulnerability", "risk", etc. that have security connotation.

It can be contended that the issue of energy is highly politicized and is in the process of securitization by aforementioned actors as high importance is given to the issue at the respective Security Strategy Documents[6] of the EU and the USA, the Green Papers of 2000 and 2006 of the European Commission on Energy and the National Energy Policy of 2001 of the USA. These documents are only some of the official documents analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, one can see top level meetings where the issue of energy has been given floor such as the July 2006 G-8 Summit and the November 2006 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Riga Summit. Therefore, these meetings are studied as well.

It should be noted that in the analysis made in this study, is supported with graphs and tables which show the energy supplies and energy dependency rate of the actors. The use of such tables is especially significant for this study as they reflect the relationship between energy dependency and securitization of energy. A thorough analysis of the facts and figures on energy clearly show that the USA and the EU which are dependent on foreign energy supplies tend to securitize the issue more when compared with Russia which is one of the major energy suppliers in the world.

[6] As defined by Biscop and Coolsaet, a security strategy is a policy-making tool that outlines the long-term overall objectives that are to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments that are to be applied to that end; it serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment. In this sense, strategy documents are important because the EU and the USA have determined the prominent threats for them and the instruments that they will use to tackle with these threats. So, they are like road maps that help one predict how they will react to certain issues, and which instruments they will use. For further info see: BISCOP, Sven, COOLSAET, Rik; 'The World is the Stage-A Global Security Strategy for the European Union', The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2003

The research questions of this study are:

- What is securitization of energy?
- How and to what extent do the actors, namely, the EU, the Russian Federation and the USA securitize the issue of energy?

The first chapter aims to set the theoretical framework of the study. Therefore, the different approaches on the meaning of the term 'security' are analysed focusing on the different schools of thought and debates with regard to the definition of 'security' after the Cold War. Special emphasis is given to the approach of the Copenhagen School as it gives a broader understanding of security with its multidimensional definition of it which is an important point for the study of 'energy securitization'. The concepts of securitization and de-securitization of Ole Wæver are given weight in line with the context of the study. Moreover, 'securitization of energy' is defined. The differences between the terms of 'energy security' and the 'securitization of energy' are highlighted. Finally, the importance of energy in daily life is examined in a way to answer the question of why there is a 'need/tendency' to securitize energy.

The second chapter deals with the energy policy of the European Union (EU) and the securitization of energy in the EU. First, the historical background of the energy policy of the EU is analysed which is followed by a facts and figures part in order to give a snapshot of the EU's position in the energy issue. Furthermore, a thorough analysis is made based on official documents of the EU and the speeches of the important policy actors within a time-frame of 9/11, 2001 up until August 2008 related to the issue in order to check whether the energy issue is taken out of the realm of politics and started to be considered in the realm of security, whether there is a perception of existential threat that justifies the breaking free of the normal political rules of the game in the EU. It is followed by a section that tries to give response to the question of whether the EU can speak with a single voice in the issue of energy or the Member States (MSs) follow their national interests or not. Finally, the reflection of the energy policy of the EU on its foreign policy is examined giving emphasis to the Energy Community Treaty and Energy Charter Treaty.

In the third chapter, Russian energy policy and the securitization of energy in Russia are studied. As in the second chapter, this is done first by a historical analysis of the energy policy of Russia that is followed by facts and figures part. Furthermore, the energy policy of Russia is examined within the time frame of 9/11, 2001 until August 2008 through the speeches of the relevant important actors. An examination of the speeches of the political actors in Russia, related to the issue of energy, is made in order to check whether the energy issue is taken out of the normal political rules and put into the security domain. Finally, the implications of energy on Russia's bilateral and multilateral relations are given place with special emphasis to the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus crises, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and the 2006 G-8 Summit.

In the fourth chapter, US energy policy and the securitization of energy in the USA is scrutinized. First, a historical background of US energy policy is given that is followed by facts and figures section to make it more concrete how much the USA consumes and produces oil and natural gas. Moreover, an examination of the speeches of the relevant actors within the time frame of 9/11, 2001 until August 2008 is made in a way to see whether a securitization process is realized or not in the issue of energy. The reason of taking 9/11 as a starting point is that the issue of energy has started to be put on the agenda of the actors more often. For the EU and the USA especially, the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in a perception of fear that the energy infrastructures could also be a target of terrorists as well. Furthermore, the involvement of NATO in the energy issue is touched upon in this chapter as it also reflects the importance given by the US to the issue. The role of NATO in this regard is significant as it constitutes an important securitizing move itself.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, the comparative analysis of the securitization of energy in the EU, Russia and the USA is made. This chapter gives emphasis to the positions of the aforementioned actors on the energy issue and compares their positions with each other in a way to see to what extent they politicize and further securitize energy. This study ends with a conclusion part where the general findings are given place.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The security approach of the Copenhagen School to analyse the issue of energy is important as it gives a broader understanding of security with its multisectoral definition of it. In this regard, in this section, special emphasis is given to the Copenhagen School. First, the different approaches to "security" are analysed on a historical basis. Second, the debates on security studies after the Cold War are touched upon and it is followed by a section focusing on the Copenhagen School's approach of security and securitization. Finally, the securitization of the energy issue and the meaning of it are examined.

1.1. Conceptual and Historical Evolution of the Term 'Security'

Security may be defined as being free from threat or danger; particularly, it is about survival. In fact, as Buzan puts it, the concept of security itself is an "essentially contested concept"[7] like love, freedom and power in the sense that it is inherently ambiguous which gives rise to theoretical discussions and unsolvable debates on the meaning of it[8] because at its core, there are "moral, ideological, and normative elements that render empirical data irrelevant and prevent reasonable people from agreeing with one another on a fixed definition."[9] Therefore, from one person to another, the perception becomes different depending on differences such as social and economic status. For instance, at the individual level, the perception of security of a Hollywood movie star and the perception of security of a homeless person would not be the same. On a state level, it would change in accordance with the power the state can demonstrate. Besides, security or threat perception may also change in time and space.

[7] BUZAN, Barry; '*People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold WarPeriod'*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1991, p. 7
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.); '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 7

The conception of the term 'security' has been and is being transformed through the last few decades. The '60s, as put by Walt, was the 'golden age'[10] of security studies, and it gained its resurgence during '70s. First of all, there occurred a change in the label; from "strategic studies" to "security studies". In '70s, the concept of security broadened, including economic concerns; in '90s another redefinition including the issue of the environment was made and with the new millennium; it can be argued that the issue of energy has started to be regarded in this realm. The different approaches to the understanding of the term security can be analysed under two different headings where the first one deals with the widening-deepening debate; and the second deals with different schools of thought, namely, traditionalists; critical security studies (CSS); and constructivists in general, Copenhagen School in particular.

During the Cold War, security was regarded as in a realist perspective, as something to do with military means only. The assumptions of neo-realism were on the agenda for the understanding of the world. But, the end of the Cold War had a drastic change in the security environment with the emergence of new kinds of threats such as terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which can not be dealt with only militarily. Conventional meaning of security has been transformed in this new environment; security is no longer apprehended in defensive terms only as it started to include other sectors. It can, therefore, be argued that any issue can be taken in the realm of security and that the term of security, epistemologically and ontologically changed.

The critics of the traditionalist camp would like to see individual security at the core instead of state security as states themselves can be the source of threat to its own citizens. For them, the *raison d'état* is the citizens of the states; therefore, the most important thing is to have the security of the individuals,[11] in a more Kantian

[10] WALT, Stephen M.; 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35:2, 1991, p. 213

[11] There are four main types of threats to individual security: a) physical threats such as pain, injuries, death; b) economic threats such as seizure or destruction of the property, deprivation of the access to labour or elections; c) threats to the rights such as arrests, deprivation of the basic civil rights; d) threats to the position or status such as degradation or public humiliation. For further info, see: BUZAN, (1991:

perspective, the maintenance of human security. Freedom from hunger gains importance in this regard. Bipolar Cold War world, with the prevailing of intimidation and fear of the unexpected devastating threat kept the realist understanding of security on the agenda. The end of the Cold War opened up a debate on the state-centric understanding.

"Traditional Security Studies (TSS) is usually objectivist as it sees states as given, eternal form of units; and it has rules about the behaviour of states that take on something close to natural science status, such as the balance of power and arms race theory."[12] Both the CSS and the Copenhagen School are constructivist. However, there is a slight difference between the two. In CSS, change is seen as an ongoing process. Security is a socially constituted practice, contingent product of human action and "the social world does not exhibit any iron laws."[13] For the Copenhagen School, security is also seen as a socially constructed practice. But, change is not always possible as these socially constructed practices themselves may be sedimented and become hard to change.[14]

Traditional realist perspective views security as a condition given prior to language, and holds that security is a desirable condition or good, that the more national/global/individual security one has the better.[15] Contrarily, CSS see security not as a given, they see it as a discursive one instead, which is constructed through subjective and/or objective threat. What is at stake is therefore not a choice between a material or an ideational explanation of security. Poststructuralism's point is that it is through discourses that the material and the ideational are represented for us and by

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37), People, States and Fear, cited in : BAJAGIC, Mladen, and Zelimir Kesetovic; 'Rethinking Security', December 2004, p.5

[12] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis'*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 203

[13] BUZAN, Barry; 'Rethinking Security After the Cold War', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32:1, 1997, p. 19

[14] BUZAN, Barry, Wæver, Ole; 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies', *Review of International Studies*, 23:2, 1997, cited in: Thorsten Gromes and Thorsten Bonacker, 'The Concept of Securitization as a Tool for Analysing the Role of Human-Rights-Related Civil Society in Ethno-Political Conflicts, *Shur Working Paper Series*, March 2007, p. 8

[15] HANSEN, Lene; 'A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32:4, 1997, p. 385 note that Hansen interprets from: WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*. New York,: Columbia University Press

us.[16] It can therefore be argued that once something is constructed, it does not necessarily mean that it can not be deconstructed and changed. What is important here is to be able to deconstruct and then re-construct in a virtuous way.

Arnold Wolfers defines security in objective sense, namely, the absence of threat to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.[17] As the securitization perspective clarifies, there is no such thing as 'real' security issues. Every item which is classified as an existential threat is a result of 'security politicization/securitization.' There are no objective threats; conditions such as war, terrorism, disease or pollution turn into threats only if a political entrepreneur classifies them as such.[18]

1.1.1. Widening-Deepening Debate

After the end of the Cold War, the traditional state-centric definition of security has started to be questioned. One of the vigorous debates was in the non-traditionalist camp itself: the wideners and deepeners. Widening vs. deepening debate is related to the expanding of security studies across different sectors and referent objects. The former refers to: "broadening the agenda to new threats, adding economic, societal, political, environmental risks to the classically dominant military threats.[19] And the latter implies: "a deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects, that is, units receiving threats, adding individuals, ecological system, community, etc to traditional state-centric agenda.[20] Therefore, the actors have also changed as a result of this debate. It is not only the political and military actors that have role in the security issues but also the non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental ones have gained prominence.

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[16] *Ibid*., p. 382
[17] WOLFERS, Arnold; cited in: BAJAGIC, Mladen, and Zelimir Kesetovic; 'Rethinking Security', December 2004, p. 2, available at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/Mesko/208034.pdf, retrieved on: 18 July 2008
[18] ERIKSSON, Johan; 'Debating the Politics of Security Studies: Response to Goldmann, Wæver and Williams', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3, 1999, p. 347
[19] HUYSMANS, Jef; 'Security! What do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:2, 1998, p. 227
[20] *Ibid*.

As put by Tarry: "the wideners argue that a predominantly military definition does not acknowledge that the greatest threats to state survival may not be military, but environmental, social and economic."[21] Then, it would not be wrong to argue that the approach of the Copenhagen School can be put on this side of the debate. While the deepeners: "ask the question of whose security is being threatened and support the construction of a definition that allows for individual or structural referent objects, as opposed to the state.[22] Therefore, the deepeners, instead of taking the security of states at the centre, defend taking human security at the centre.

1.1.2. Traditional Security Understanding

First, there is the traditional realist understanding of security which has national security as its core concern. For traditionalists, security understanding is seen only in military terms; they do not want to have a broadening/widening of the concept of security.

With the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, states started to be regarded as the most important actors. This had its implications on the understanding of security as well. The traditional understanding of security takes its base on the realist understanding in that states are the most important actors.

As the international system is anarchical, the states act in a self-help situation to protect their own existence. Anarchy means the absence of an international authority. "That is to say, there is no world government analogous to the national government of states, which can maintain the law, administer justice, and prevent large-scale outbreaks of war."[23] Moreover, national independence, maintenance of territorial integrity and

[21] TARRY, Sarah; 'Deepening and Widening: An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 1999, available at: http://www.jmss.org/1999/article3.html, retrieved on: 01 September 2008
[22] *Ibid*.
[23] SHEEHAN, Michael; *'Realism and Security' in International Security: An Analytical Survey*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK, 2005, p. 8

sovereignty are the core values in this state-centric understanding of the traditionalists.[24] As Miller put it: "threats to national security are posed by other states, the nature of threats and the way to deal with them require military responses."[25] In line with this argument, Levy defines security as a situation where threats to a nation's most important values come from the actions of foreigners.[26] In Waltian terms, "security studies may be defined as the study of threat, use, and control of military force…and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war"[27] Moreover, Helga Haftendorn sees security as "the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation from external overthrow or attack."[28] From the traditionalist perspective, "security policy consists of the use of armed forces -the military and the police- to free the state and its citizens from threats."[29]

However, during '80s and '90s, this understanding started to be criticized by some scholars in that it was argued that if security means being free from threat, the non-military dimensions also play significant role in both determining and dealing with such threats. In this sense, constructivist and critical approaches which commonly in criticize the realist perspective came to the fore.

Richard Ullman's article "Redefining Security" of 1983 and Barry Buzan's book "People, States and Fear" of 1983 involved critiques of the traditional realist understanding of security. There is also the 1980 report of the United Nation's (UN) Brandt Commission of 'North-South: A Programme for Survival' that called for a new concept of security that would transcend the narrow notions of military defence and

[24] MILLER, Benjamin; 'The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24:2, June 2001, p. 17
[25] *Ibid*.
[26] LEVY, Marc A.; 'Is the Environment a National Security Issue?', *International Security*, 20:2, cited in: KRAUSE, Keith; 'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of Critical Security Studies', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33:3, 1998, p. 304
[27] WALT, Stephen M.; 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35:2, p. 212, cited in: MUNSTER, Rens Van; "In-securing Security Studies: The Politics of Studying Security", Aberystwyth, March 2004, available at: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/politics/nyheder_og_begivenheder/Rens310304.htm, retrieved on: 20 June 2008
[28] HAFTENDORN, Helga; 'The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:1, 1991, cited in MILLER, Benjamin; 'The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24:2, June 2001, p. 1
[29] HUYSMANS, Jef; 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:4, 1998, p. 487

look more towards the logic of a broader independence."[30] In fact, the 1989 issue of Survival (31:6) is devoted entirely to these non-military aspects. In this sense, issues such as human security, intra-state rivalry, ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, terrorism, diseases such as AIDS, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), pollution, scarcity of resources, depletion of ozone layer, global warming gained prominence. It is argued by the critics of the traditionalists that the state itself may pose threat to its citizens such as with human rights abuses. As a result, the centrality of national security is not solely important anymore. For them, beyond the state level, there are the individual and global levels as well. "On the individual level, the new values are associated with human rights and needs. On the global level, the focus is on transnational values common to all humanity: the spreading of democracy and free markets; ensuring the well-being of the human race against common threats."[31] Another important aspect in line with these was the declaration of the United Nations Security Council on January 31, 1992 as it was declared that threats to international peace and security could come from "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields."[32]

1.1.3. Critical Security Studies

For a critical scholar, the world of threats and intentions is supremely a constructed one, involving history, culture, communication, ideologies and related factors.[33] In this sense, Critical Security Studies (CSS) see threats and security as social constructions. They believe that it should be possible to deconstruct this reality to replace it with superior ones. "CSS open up for discussion how things should and could be rather than how they are."[34] CSS consider not only threats as a construction, but the

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[30] SHEEHAN, Michael; '*International Security: An Analytical Survey*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK, 2005, p. 43

[31] MILLER, Benjamin; 'The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24:2, June 2001, p. 22

[32] SHEEHAN, Michael; '*International Security: An Analitical Survey*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 100

[33] KRAUSE, Keith; 'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of 'Critical Security Studies'', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33:3, 1998, p. 306

[34] ERIKSSON, Johan; 'Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:311, 1999, p. 319

objects of security as well. On the same line, "the realist view of the state as the referent object of security as well as the widening of the concept to 'new' security objects, such as the environment or the society, are self-consciously treated as social constructions."[35]

As CSS believe that states themselves may pose threats to its citizens (in the sense of human rights abuses for example), individuals, rather than states should be given prominence. CSS theorists believe that security can be best achieved through *human emancipation*, defined in terms of "freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political, and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do."[36]

1.1.4. The Copenhagen School's Approach to Security

For the Copenhagen School:

> Security is a socially constructed concept. It has a specific meaning only within a particular social context. Its received meaning is therefore subject to change as a result of material changes in the external environment and changes in the ways in which we think about issues. [37]

Multisectoral definition of security in terms of the Copenhagen School's approach includes not only states as the key referent objects. In this sense, there is the widening of the referent object itself including such as ethnic or religious groups and the environment. It is of great importance to define here what is meant by the term '*referent object*' in order to better understand this multisectoral approach. A referent object is something "in whose name the security operation is conducted."[38] In other

[35] *Ibid*., p. 318, note that Eriksson interprets from KRAUSE, Keith; 'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of 'Critical Security Studies'', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33:3, 1998, p. 309-314
[36] BAYLIS, John and Steve Smith; '*International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era'* in: Baylis and Smith (ed.s), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2004, Third Edition, p. 313
[37] SHEEHAN, Michael; '*International Security: An Analytical Survey*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK, 2005, p. 43
[38] WÆVER, Ole; 'European Security Identities', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34:1, 1996, p. 107

words, an actor would justify the measures that are to be taken by saying: "X is threatened therefore, we have to..." [39] where X implies to the referent object.

The security approach of the Copenhagen School groups security under five sectors which are namely: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. As Huysmans put it, for Buzan, a '*sector*' is a lens through which one looks and which highlights a specific dimension of a holistic reality –sectors "are views of the whole system through some selective lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units."[40] Sectors are seen to identify specific types of interaction. For instance:

> The military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority; the economic sector is about relationships of trade and production; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.[41]

It is like a lens through which one sees the world. In every kind of sector, the analysts look to the whole but they see only one part of its reality. It is also worth to mention here that all sectors are interlinked with each other. For instance, economic issues are linked with political ones in the sense that economic downturn may lead to political instability or vice versa. More emphasis is given to the environmental sector in this study as this sector has some attributes that are closely related with the issue of energy.

1.1.4.1. The Military Sector

This sector falls into the highlight of the traditionalist understanding of security. As the state is the most important actor, the survival and sovereignty of the

[39] *Ibid.*
[40] BUZAN, Barry, Charles Jones and Richard Little; *'The Logic of Anarchy'*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 30-31cited in: HUYSMANS, Jef; 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:4, 1998, p. 502
[41] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis'*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 7

state is given high prominence. “The agenda of military security is focused largely around states, although other referent objects and securitizing actors are also in play.”[42] The use of force is the common response to deal with threats in the name of protecting the territorial integrity of the state, civil order and peace and sovereignty. In the military sector, the referent object is the state, thus, it has the legitimacy to use force. Tribes may be regarded as the referent objects as well. Nonetheless, it is of utmost importance to mention here that in the post-Cold War era, the threats have been generally intrastate ones rather than interstate. As Tarry put it: “the number of civil conflicts - former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, to name a few - far surpass the number of interstate conflicts.”[43] Therefore, the type of threat has changed; as the threats do not necessarily come from other states but may come from within the state itself. This may take its base from a secessionist group, ethnic or religious groups fighting with each other. To be able to deal with these threats, the role of international organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is indispensable. It can thus be argued that the nature of the response has also changed. With the peacekeeping and crisis management operations, the international organizations take their place in the military sector. It is still the armies that make up these peacekeeping and crisis management operations; however, their tasks for dealing with such kinds of crises differ from the past in the sense that their ability in interoperability, sustainability or rapid deployment gains more importance than their ability in the use of conventional arms.

1.1.4.2. The Economic Sector

The referent objects of the sector ranges from individuals, through classes and states and the global market itself. “What constitutes an existential economic threat depends upon the referent object. For individuals, economic security can be understood in terms of basic human needs. For a firm, lack of existential qualities; for a state, not

[42] *Ibid*., p. 50
[43] TARRY, Sarah; ‘Deepening and Widening: An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s’, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 1999, available at: http://www.jmss.org/1999/article3.html, retrieved on: 01 September 2008

being self-reliant in the resources required to feed its population and industry." [44] This final remark is important in the context of this study. As will be seen in the following chapters, the EU and the USA draw attention to their dependence on foreign sources in energy needs. The actors in the USA mention several times about the linkage of energy with economic growth. The dependence is also important as it will impede the dependent state from taking its decisions freely. Moreover, with the impact of globalization, the interdependency among states has increased. There are fears that "the global market will generate more losers than winners and will heighten inequalities"[45] in the sense that it will broaden the gap between the rich and the poor and that this may lead to conflicts. In addition to that, this sector takes its place in the security domain because the interdependency of the states in the global market cause concerns. There are fears that in the case of an international economic crisis, it would not be only one state that would be affected by the devastating impact of the crisis; instead, the impact would be on the international community as a whole.

1.1.4.3. The Societal Sector

For Ole Wæver, societal security comprises situations that society comprehends as a threat to its identity.[46] It is "the ability of the society to survive and keep its essential character under changed conditions and possible or real threats. It is a question of sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, associations, religious and national identity and customs in framework of acceptable conditions for development."[47] It is worth to mention here that the societal security is not about the security of the nations, what is important here is the security of the large, "self-sustaining identity groups."[48] Therefore, it is about collectivities and their identity. In the same vein, the society is about the "self-conception of communities and of

[44] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis'*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 100
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 116
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] WÆVER, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 23
[48] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 119

individuals identifying themselves as members of a community."[49] It is important to make the distinction between the social security and the societal security where the former deals with the individuals; and the latter deals with collectivities.

The survival of the society's identity is the core concern in this sector. What is at stake is the 'we-ness' feeling of the community. Ethnic or religious conflicts or the issue of migration are all under the concern of the societal security as they all pose threat to the identity of the society. Societal security has political inclinations as in the case of migration for instance because the migration of the group may occur as a result of the oppression or coercion of the state.

1.1.4.4. The Political Sector

This area is closely related to the sovereignty of states and the states themselves. As in the military sector, states are the main referent objects of the political sector. However, there is an important difference in that in the political sector, nonmilitary threats to sovereignty gains prominence; not the military ones. Furthermore, though it is the territorial state that is the main referent object of the political sector, other state-like political organizations such as emerging quasi-superstates like the EU or stateless societal groups that have strong political institutions like minorities and clans can be referent objects in the political sector. [50]

"Political security as distinct from politics in general is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions) among them."[51] It is important to state the linkage of the political sector with the others. In fact, this would not be surprising as security itself is political. It is the political actors that make the issue become a part of security domain.

[49] *Ibid*.
[50] *Ibid*., p. 145
[51] *Ibid*., p. 144

1.1.4.5. The Environmental Sector

With the UN Brandt and Brundtland Commissions of 1983, environmental threats started to be given priority. The referent object of environmental security is the environment; besides this, there is this "concern for the preservation of existing levels of civilization."[52] The carrying capacity of the earth in relation to the increase in the world population, the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change, all constitute the speech-act of this sector.

Environmental security is defined by Buzan as "the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend."[53] Therefore, it has become an issue of security as it encompasses the same dangers of nuclear weapons with the possibility of events that could trigger a complete collapse of human civilization. "According to Sheehan's interpretation of Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, the environmental debate is really about preserving existing levels of human civilization. The real concern is whether or not the ecosystems needed to preserve and further develop human civilization are sustainable"[54] As is seen in the following sections, this is the same with the securitization of energy.

Environmental security is related to energy in the sense that it includes the depletion of natural resources, various form of pollution, particularly those involved in the storage and transportation of chemicals, oil, and nuclear materials, and problems of energy scarcities and uneven distribution.[55] "National energy policies would need to take account not just of the price and supply of fuel, but also of the global environmental consequences of certain forms of energy use."[56] As Tuchman put it; "economic growth…. requires more energy use, more emissions and wastes, more land converted from its natural state…. Whether the planet can accommodate all of these

[52] *Ibid*., p. 75
[53] SHEEHAN, Michael; '*International Security: An Analytical Survey*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK, 2005, p. 100
[54] *Ibid*., p. 101
[55] *Ibid*., p. 103
[56] *Ibid*., p. 105

demands remains an open question."[57] This concern is also why the environment and energy security got politicized first, and then started to be perceived as security issues.

1.2. Securitization and De-securitization

Securitization and de-securitization are concepts introduced to the security literature by Ole Wæver. "Securitization is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization."[58]

Non-politicized politicized securitized

The spectrum above shows the place of the issues with regard to the way they are dealt with by the actors. In this sense, it can be argued that at the non-politicized side of the spectrum, the issue is not a concern for the public and the state does not deal with it; in the politicized part, the issue becomes a public concern where any government decision or resource allocation may be required; and finally on the securitized part, the issue starts to be presented as an existential threat, where the requirement of emergency measures and the justification of actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure come to the fore.[59]

"When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?" [60] This gains prominence in the sense that "if no signs of such acceptance exist, we can only talk of a *securitizing move*, not of an object actually

[57] MATHEWS, Jessica Tuchman; 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, 68:2, 1989, p. 163
[58] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 23
[59] *Ibid*., p. 24
[60] *Ibid*., p. 25

being securitized."[61] Therefore, for the completion of the securitization process, the acceptance of the audience for the use of extraordinary measures is essential. Furthermore, "the distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure, survival, priority of action because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure."[62] It is in fact that rhetoric itself that makes the audience accept the actors' using extraordinary measures. With this rhetoric, the actors make them believe that their survival is at stake and in that way they justify their breaking of the normal political rules of the game.

What is argued by the Copenhagen School is that defining something as a security issue is realized through social construction. "Issues become 'securitized', treated as security issues, through speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such."[63] Hence, one can argue that security is a speech-act and, thus, securitization is about discourse. It is the political discourse where utmost importance is given to the 'acceptance of the audience' as the securitization process would not have been finalized without such an acceptance.

When security is defined as a speech-act, there are three types of units in security analysis: "*Referent objects* which are the things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival; *securitizing actors* are those who securitize issues by declaring something existentially threatened; *functional actors* are those who affect the dynamics of a sector."[64] It is argued that "a successful securitization, has three components: existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules."[65]

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[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 26
[63] WILLIAMS, Michael C.; 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization of International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47:4, 2003
[64] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 36
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 26

An important point that should be kept in mind regarding securitization is its intersubjective character. What is meant by intersubjectivity is: "security (as all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects, but among the subjects."[66] Consequently, the senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent."[67] Therefore, it is in their relation of the subjects with each other that the issues become securitized or not. The securitizing actor initiates the process by uttering an issue under security domain. However, if the audience does not perceive any threat from that issue and if they do not accept the securitizing actor's claim that it poses a threat on them, securitization does not take place. That is also why the intersubjective character is important.

De-securitization means taking the issues "out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere."[68] Thus, the issue is taken out of the realm of security. The issue is no longer viewed in terms of threats or something that requires extraordinary measures. The breaking of the normal political rules of the game does not take place as there are no perceptions of existential threat. For Wæver, de-securitization must be aimed as securitization is not a good thing. The act of securitization may lead to over-securitization and bring into one's mind the questions like: "Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense?"[69] What makes an issue so special to get its place in the security realm?

"Security is about priority, about elevating issues to absolute priority. If an issue has not pushed almost all other issues aside, it has not been fully securitized."[70] For the Copenhagen School, security is a socially constructed concept as it has a

[66] *Ibid*., p. 31
[67] HUYSMANS, Jef; 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:4, 1998, p. 57
[68] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, Introduction, p. 4
[69] WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.), '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 64
[70] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 176

specific meaning only within a specific social context. It emerges and changes as a result of discourses intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. It is important to answer one question then: When and how does an issue begin to be conceived in the realm of security? As Wæver put it: "security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state and deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself. This in turn undercuts the political order."[71] In this sense, security is about survival. By naming something in the realm of security, "a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development."[72]

As Knudsen put it: "A key aspect of the securitization idea is to create awareness of the arbitrary nature of 'threats', to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy is not given by 'nature' but chosen by politicians and decision makers who have an interest in defining it in just that way."[73] In this sense, for the Copenhagen School, security is a specific form of social praxis. With the securitization of an issue, the issue is taken out of the realm of the normal political rules of the game. In some cases, this may be violations of human rights, in others this may come to the fore by levying taxes. In any case, the audience accepts to obey the emergency measures which they would not 'normally' do; they do so for fear that if they do not obey, it may be too late to handle the issue and that they may reach 'a point of no return'[74]; their survival may be at stake.

1.3. Securitization of Energy

Energy security has long been on the agenda of the international actors. However, securitization of energy is a recent one. In the last years, especially after 2006, one can see that the actors of the international arena have been securitizing the

[71] WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.), '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 54
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 55
[73] KNUDSEN, Olav F.; 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: De-securitizing Securitization', *Security Dialogue*, 32:3, 2001, p. 359
[74] WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitizing Sectors?: Reply to Eriksson', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3, 1999, p. 338

issue. The issue of energy is being securitized by the actors in that it has become a part of *high politics* and it has started to be perceived in terms of *existential* threats, i.e. in terms of survival. Thus, energy is taken out of the 'agenda of normal politics' and the 'breaking of the established rules of the game' has been justified to prevent any danger that it may pose if no prevention had been taken.[75] It is of great importance to mention here the difference between the terms of "energy security" and the "securitization of energy". Energy security is the "access to sufficient energy supplies at reasonable prices from a stable source as well as the actual, physical security of gas and oil pipelines."[76] In energy security, the secure supply of energy at a reasonable price gain prominence, thus, the economic side is important and the political side of the issue is ignored; whereas with the securitization of energy, the political side has also been given prominence.

As just mentioned, energy security is defined as the secure supply of energy at a reasonable price. However, this is only one side of the coin, that of consumer countries. As for the part of producers, for Russia for instance, security of demand would be important. As Yergin argues: "sufficient access to markets and consumers, for the resources they are exporting, which in most cases constitute the bulk of their government revenues."[77] When this taken into regard, it can be argued that: "for Russia, the aim is to reassert state control over 'strategic resources' and gain primacy over the main pipelines and market channels through which it ships its hydrocarbons to international markets."[78] Finally, there is the side of the transit countries. For them, the security of the supply routes, retaining and securing their transit status gain prominence as it contributes a lot to their economy.

It is especially after the Russia-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine crises that the issue of energy is being continuously put on the agenda by the policy actors. Therefore, it can be argued that energy, in particular, oil and gas in this study, is no longer apprehended

[75] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; '*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 23
[76] RADOMAN, Jelena; 'Securitization of Energy as a Prelude to Energy Security Dilemma', *Western Balkans Security Observer*, No.4, January-March 2007, p. 2
[77] YERGIN, Daniel; 'Ensuring Energy Security', *Foreign Affairs*, 85:2, March/April, 2006, p. 71
[78] *Ibid.*

only in economic terms. It is not only a tradable commodity as the actors have put the issue in the domain of security. In this sense, the following questions should be responded: Why is energy being securitized? What is so special and important about it?

The reason behind the use of security speech-act in referring to energy, first of all, is the increasing demand and dependence of the actors on finite energy resources.[79] For example, the EU is highly dependent on Russian natural gas and the USA is foreseen to be dependent on Russian oil in the future. The transportation sector of the USA necessitates a huge dependence on oil which is now supplied through the 'insecure' Middle East Region. Energy is securitized in line with this growing dependence on energy. It has become an issue of high politics. Therefore, it has started to be perceived as an existential threat to the survival of the state and other actors. It is perceived as an existential threat in the sense that it has a vast area of usage: the importance of it in the economic sphere, transport, industry and military operations is undeniable and the reliance on energy has intensified. Furthermore, as in the case of the securitization of the environment, in the securitization of energy, the scarcity of resources triggers the process of securitization itself especially with the increasing energy demand with the new industrializing countries such as China and India. In addition to that, the ongoing high oil prices is an issue of concern.

Another important point lies in the definition of the term energy security from the perspective of the consumers. For them, there is a need to have access to sufficient energy resources with affordable prices from stable sources. It can be argued that with the increasing demand, the actors have the fear of not being able to get 'sufficient' energy. This fear is relevant in the International Energy Agency's (IEA) World Energy Outlook of 2007. According to this: "the current trends in the world energy system, with increasing global demand especially in developing countries, underinvestment in the energy industry, and instability in oil and gas producing regions, are unsustainable if

[79] See Annex I for the general world outlook on energy.

one is to avoid an *energy gap*."[80] This fear itself also triggers the process of securitization.

Moreover, they have the fear that the increasing trend of the prices will continue and that it may reach to a level of unaffordable prices. Finally, as will be seen in the following sections, especially in the case of the USA, the third element which is maintaining energy from stable sources is also missing as it is very often stated by the actors that they get their energy from 'unstable' regions. In a similar vein, the aforementioned energy crises of Russia with Belarus and Ukraine caused the EU question the reliability of Russia as an energy source. As a result of these factors, in their speeches, the actors have started to securitize the energy issue. Hence, it is the utterance itself that makes the audience perceive the energy issue in the realm of security. As Huysmans put it: "it is the utterance of 'security' which politically introduces security questions in a publicly contested policy area. Thus, if successfully performed the speech-act makes a security problem."[81] In fact, it is the rhetoric of the actors that initiates the securitization process because as in the words of Wæver: "by uttering 'security', a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it."[82] In this line, the issue of energy has also started to be regarded in the security realm as a result of the actors' related speeches that regard energy as an existential threat.

1.4. Concluding Remarks

Energy security has long been on the agenda of the international actors. However, securitization of energy is a recent one. For a better understanding of this

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[80] 'World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights', The International Energy Agency, p. 42, cited in: Bas R. Percival, 'The Risk of Energy Securitization of the Eurasian Continent', *The Clingendael International Energy Programme Briefing Papers*, July 2008, p. 3, available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080700_ciep_briefing_paper_percival.pdf, retrieved on: 01 September 2008, The quotations are replaced with italics by the author of this study.

[81] HUYSMANS, Jef; 'Language and the Mobilization of Security Expectations: The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security', Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions , Mannheim 26-31 March 1999, p. 8

[82] WÆVER, Ole; 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (ed.), '*On Security*', Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 55

securitization process, it is of utmost importance to respond to such kind of questions: What is existentially threatened in the case of energy? Who are the securitizing and functional actors? One can argue that the perception of existential threats may vary from one actor to another. In this study the test case is the case of the EU and the USA as the consumers, since the scarcity of energy and the failing of ensuring the secure supply of it pose a threat to their survival. However, for Russia, as being the producing country, energy is important for its economic survival. It can be argued that energy is vital to the survival of the actors as it is used almost everywhere nowadays and therefore; the absence of it poses an existential threat. It is closely related with the survival of the state/actors in terms of their economy, transport and military needs. Energy is such an issue that has an all-encompassing nature with its economic, political, military and environmental dimension.

Within the scope of this study, in the energy issue, the securitizing actors are the EU, Russia and the USA with their high rank officials. In this sense, in the next chapters, these actors' energy policies are analysed respectively in a way to understand how and to what extent energy is being securitized.

II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY

Energy is important for the continuation of daily activities. It is vital in the sense that there is a growing reliance on energy for the working of factories, cooling and heating households, transportation, lightening, working of mechanical devices, for military, etc. As can be seen, it has a central role in many kinds of human activity. Therefore, the secure supply of the finite energy resources has gained prominence. In fact, energy security which is also defined about the secure supply of energy at reasonable prices has long been on the agenda. For instance, the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) was a response to the oil crisis of 1973. The Gulf War of 1991 was also another example of the battle for energy.

For the European Union also, energy plays a crucial role. In fact, the idea that led to the birth of European integration process was energy-centric with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the signing of Euratom Treaty for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The main energy sources of those times have been replaced by other sources of energy, namely, oil and natural gas.[83] In this respect, in this chapter, first, the historical background of the EU activities in the issue of energy are given on facts and figures in such a way to show the level of dependence or self-sufficiency in the aforementioned resources. Then, the question whether the EU is securitizing the issue of energy or not is tackled through an analysis of the official documents and speeches of the important actors. The answer to the question whether the EU can speak with a single voice in the issue of energy or the Member States (MSs) follow their national interests is also questioned in this chapter. Finally, the reflection of the EU's discourse concerning the securitization of energy on the foreign policy of the Union is evaluated.

[83] The scope of this thesis is limited with oil and gas; this is not to deny the importance of the other main sources of energy like nuclear energy, renewable energy and solid fuels. But, to achieve analytic utility oil and gas are an issue of concern.

2.1. Historical Background of the Energy Policy of the EU

The ECSC and Euratom Treaties were energy-centric. The main aim was to pacify France and Germany by taking coal and steel production under a High Authority. Back then, coal was the main energy product and was necessary for the reconstruction of the continent after the war and nuclear energy was seen as the energy of the future. In this regard, these resources gained more importance. Later on, coal started to be replaced by oil from the Middle East. After the ECSC Treaty and Euratom Treaty, the first move related to the issue of energy came with the 1955 Messina Conference where it was declared: "ministers have agreed on the following objectives:… putting more abundant energy at a cheaper price at the disposal of the European economies.."[84] This shows one the importance of the energy issue for the MSs. After the Messina Conference, the issue of energy was put on the agenda of the EU in 1988. The issue was included in the Internal market programme in 1988 after long debates during '80s, and the MSs decided to open their markets in the electricity and gas sectors. It is worth to mention here that it was not included until 1988 as the creation of a single energy market was not part of the single market project. It was also not a part of the Single European Act of 1986. The national interests of the MSs and their right to sovereignty in the energy issue were still the case at that time and it is still relevant now. The MSs have their veto power in energy, thus energy remains intergovernmental. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union (SU), to institutionalize relations with the new states in the issue of energy, the EU launched the Energy Charter initiative, which turned into the Energy Charter Treaty.[85] The first directive was adopted in 1996 for electricity and in 1998 for gas. The Lisbon Council of 2000 set the date as 1st July 2007 for the opening of the market in these sectors and from this date on, the citizens can freely choose their energy provider companies.

When one wants to consider the steps taken in the case of energy through the official documents, he/she has to wait till 2000. In November 2000, the Commission

[84] PIEBALGS, Andris; Speech to the Energy and Climate Change, Groups of the Institute of European Affairs, 12 March 2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/speeches-press_releases/piebalgsspeechtoiea_en.htm, retrieved on: 10 April 2008

[85] At the end of the chapter, more emphasis is given to the Energy Charter Treaty.

issued a Green Paper entitled ***'Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply'***. "With this Green Paper, the Commission appeared as a strategic actor defining Europe's interests, future challenges and possible responses… the Commission emphasized just how poorly equipped the EU was to face the potential problems."[86] In this line, in the Green Paper, it is declared that energy policy has assumed a Community dimension, though there was a lack of understanding on the creation of a Community energy policy. It is further stated that the EU was facing two new challenges: environmental concerns influencing energy choices and the development of the internal market, which has given a new place and a new role to energy demand and could lead to political tensions. According to the document: "the main objective of an energy strategy should be to ensure, for the well-being of its citizens and for the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all consumers, whilst respecting environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable development."[87]

After the 2000 Green Paper, the most important initiative came with the informal summit of Hampton Court held in October 2005 where the MSs asked the Commission to prepare a proposition on this issue. The United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister wanted to re-launch the debate on the development of an EU energy policy. Later on, based on that Summit, the 8th March 2006 Green Paper was issued: ***'A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy'***. In January 2007, it was followed by the issuing of the Communication from the Commission to the European Council: ***'Energy Policy for Europe'***.

The impact of environmental concerns in the issue of energy is undeniable. In the Green Paper of 2006, it is stated:

> If Europe is to achieve its economic, social and environmental objectives, it has to address major energy-related issues such as a growing dependence on energy imports,

[86] KEUKELEIRE, Stephan, Jennifer MacNaughtan; '*The Foreign Policy of the European Union*', Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 242

[87] European Commission, Green Paper: 'Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply', European Commission, 29 November 2000, available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27037.htm, retrieved on: 10 April 2008

volatile oil and gas prices, climate change, increasing demand, and obstacles to a fully competitive internal energy market.[88]

Three core objectives were determined, namely, sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply. The Commission determined six priority areas:

1) Energy for growth and jobs: completing the internal energy market; it includes opening up of the gas electricity markets to prevent national reflexes and protectionism;
2) Security of supply: solidarity between Member States; The Commission also proposes creating a European Energy Supply Observatory to monitor the energy market and identify potential shortfalls. A mechanism for rapid solidarity could be put in place for cases where a country's supply is in crisis following damage to its infrastructure;
3) Tackling security and competitiveness of energy supply: towards a more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix;
4) The EU at the forefront of tackling climate change;
5) The aspects of energy and research; encouraging innovation: a strategic European energy technology plan;
6) Towards a coherent external energy policy; An external energy policy must enable the EU to respond with one voice to the energy challenges of the coming years.[89]

As mentioned above, on 10 January 2007, the Commission released a Communication to the European Council and the European Parliament; **'An Energy Policy for Europe.'**[90] In order to be able to deal with the energy challenges, the Communication aims at ensuring a secure energy supply, reducing the greenhouse gas emissions at least 20% by 2020 to fight against climate change; and to implement a common international energy policy as it is impossible to achieve the objective of secure, competitive and sustainable energy alone. In this sense, cooperation with the consumer, producer and transit countries gained prominence.

Finally, based on the Commission's Communication, the energy package of January 2007, the European Council of 9 March 2007 adopted a comprehensive energy

[88] European Commission, Green Paper: 'A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy', 08 March 2006, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf, retrieved on: 10 April 2008
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, 'An Energy Policy for Europe', Brussels, 10 January 2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf , retrieved on: 01 June 2008

'**Action Plan for the period of 2007-2009**'. The measures that the Commission will take under this Action Plan are:

1) Dynamic energy performance requirements for products, buildings and services,
2) Improving energy transformation,
3) Moving on transport,
4) Financing energy efficiency, economic incentives and energy pricing,
5) Changing Energy Behaviour,
6) International partnerships.[91]

However, besides these measures taken by the European Council, it is worth to mention here that energy does not have its place in the Treaties. The Lisbon Treaty[92] has a solidarity clause indicating that the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. This includes the cases of energy ruptures. Furthermore, the political commitment to tackle the twin challenges of climate change and energy policy is fully reflected in the Treaty. With the Treaty of Lisbon, for the first time, the treaties contain a section on energy.

2.2. The EU's Dependence on Energy: Facts and Figures

The EU is not able to respond to its own energy needs. Therefore, it is highly dependent on imports. In this section, based on the Eurostat data[93], information on the dependency, consumption and production figures of the EU are given.

[91] European Commission, Communication from the Commission, 'Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential', 19 October 2006, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action_plan_energy_efficiency/doc/com_2006_0545_en.pdf, retrieved on: 09 July 2008

[92] It is important to mention here that the Treaty of Lisbon has not come into force yet. It has been signed by the 27 MSs; however, the ratification process is still going on and concerns are high especially after the Irish 'no' vote at the referendum for the ratification of the Treaty.

[93] Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environemnt Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at : http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

Table 2.1.

Energy Dependency - All Products

Per cent (%)

	1995	2000	2005
EU-27	**43.3**	**46.7**	**52.3**
EU-25	**43.5**	**47.2**	**52.9**
Belgium	80.5	77.8	78.3
Bulgaria	57.2	46.5	47.1
Czech Republic	20.6	23.1	27.4
Denmark	34.5	-33.7	-51.6
Germany	57.3	59.8	61.6
Estonia	35.7	30.8	25.8
Ireland	69.4	84.5	89.5
Greece	65.7	69.3	68.5
Spain	71.6	76.5	81.2
France	47.9	50.9	51.6
Italy	82.3	87.3	84.4
Cyprus	99.1	98.8	100.7
Latvia	68.4	57.0	56.0
Lithuania	64.0	60.5	58.4
Luxembourg	97.7	99.8	98.0
Hungary	48.8	56.0	62.9
Malta	104.5	100.8	100.0
Netherlands	19.3	38.6	37.8
Austria	66.5	65.6	71.8
Poland	-0.2	11.1	18.0
Portugal	89.0	87.2	88.2
Romania	30.9	21.8	27.4
Slovenia	50.1	52.5	52.2
Slovakia	70.6	66.5	64.6
Finland	53.1	55.8	54.7
Sweden	37.5	39.0	37.2
United Kingdom	-16.3	-16.7	13.9

Per cent (%)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	43.3	43.9	44.9	46.0	45.0	46.7	47.3	47.4	48.8	50.1	52.3
EU-25	43.5	44.1	45.1	46.4	45.5	47.2	47.8	47.9	49.3	50.5	52.9

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

As was just mentioned above and as can be read from the figures, the EU is highly dependent on imports. In total, the EU-27 imports approximately 52% of the energy it consumes. This percentage rate differs from one MS to another. It is important

to highlight the increasing trend in the dependency rate as in ten years, between 1995 and 2005, total energy dependency rate of EU-27 increased by 9%. The only MS that has a negative energy dependency rate is Denmark with -51.6%. On the contrary, the United Kingdom (UK) which had -16.3% of dependency rate in 1995 experienced a reversal in the situation in 2005 as its dependency increased to 13.9%.

The scope of this thesis only covers the situation related to oil and gas. There is an import dependency of 82% on oil and 58% on natural gas in the EU. The two tables below show MSs' energy dependency on oil and gas.

Table 2.2.

Energy Dependency - Oil

Per cent (%)

	1995	2000	2005
EU-27	**74.4**	**75.8**	**82.2**
EU-25	**74.7**	**76.3**	**82.7**
Belgium	99.5	100.1	100.9
Bulgaria	100.0	96.1	102.6
Czech Republic	98.3	95.4	97.4
Denmark	13.4	-78.1	-104.8
Germany	96.4	95.4	97.1
Estonia	105.2	101.9	71.8
Ireland	100.2	98.8	99.7
Greece	98.4	100.2	97.7
Spain	101.1	101.0	101.2
France	96.9	98.6	99.6
Italy	93.7	96.5	91.8
Cyprus	101.0	100.5	102.3
Latvia	102.6	94.3	101.8
Lithuania	114.6	100.8	92.7
Luxembourg	98.2	102.1	99.4
Hungary	71.5	77.5	79.2
Malta	104.5	100.8	100.0
Netherlands	85.4	99.7	97.1
Austria	89.4	90.1	92.2
Poland	95.6	96.9	96.0
Portugal	100.6	98.8	102.2
Romania	49.3	34.9	38.1
Slovenia	97.8	101.6	101.1
Slovakia	106.2	92.7	81.9
Finland	94.6	106.9	98.8
Sweden	95.4	99.5	103.8
United Kingdom	-57.3	-54.6	-2.6

Per cent (%)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	74.4	75.5	75.8	77.0	72.9	75.8	77.2	75.9	78.3	79.7	82.2
EU-25	74.7	75.9	76.1	77.4	73.3	76.3	77.6	76.4	78.9	80.1	82.7

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

Table 2.3.

Energy Dependency - Natural Gas

Per cent (%)

	1995	2000	2005
EU-27	**43.6**	**48.9**	**57.7**
EU-25	**43.9**	**49.6**	**58.4**
Belgium	98.2	99.3	100.6
Bulgaria	99.5	93.5	87.7
Czech Republic	98.0	99.8	97.8
Denmark	-47.2	-64.8	-113.9
Germany	78.6	79.1	81.3
Estonia	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ireland	3.6	72.1	86.7
Greece	-	99.1	99.1
Spain	97.4	101.6	101.4
France	93.0	100.0	99.3
Italy	63.9	81.1	84.7
Cyprus	-	-	-
Latvia	99.0	101.9	105.6
Lithuania	100.0	100.0	100.6
Luxembourg	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hungary	60.3	75.4	81.1
Malta	-	-	-
Netherlands	-77.4	-49.5	-59.3
Austria	84.8	80.6	88.2
Poland	64.6	66.3	69.7
Portugal	-	100.3	103.8
Romania	24.9	19.8	30.1
Slovenia	100.6	99.3	99.6
Slovakia	86.8	98.8	97.2
Finland	100.0	100.0	100.0
Sweden	100.0	100.0	100.0
United Kingdom	1.0	-10.7	7.0

Per cent (%)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	43.6	43.5	45.2	45.7	47.9	48.9	47.3	51.1	52.5	54.0	57.7
EU-25	43.9	43.5	45.5	46.0	48.6	49.6	48.0	51.8	53.1	54.6	58.4

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at : http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

As can be read, the import dependence of oil increased by approximately 8% between 1995 and 2005, increasing from 74.4% to 82.2%; while the import dependence of natural gas increased by approximately 14% between 1995 and 2005, increasing from 43.6% to 57.7%. Denmark remains the only net exporter country in both oil and gas. The Netherlands, with the dependency rate of -59.3% on natural gas, is also an exporter country in this regard and the UK, although its dependency rate of oil increased from -57.3% to -2.6% from 1995 to 2005, remains an exporter country in oil. However, it is worth to mention that with this increasing rate, it is not surprising to see the UK as an importer country in a few years.

Table 2.4.

Primary Energy Production

			(ktoe)	Year 2005, share of each fuel to total (%)					
	1995	2000	2005	Hard Coal	Lignite	Oil	Gas	Nuclear	RES
EU-27	**939 808**	**931 166**	**890 026**	**13**	**9**	**15**	**21**	**29**	**13**
EU-25	**897 473**	**892 702**	**852 022**	**13**	**8**	**15**	**21**	**29**	**13**
BE	10 939	13 065	13 913	-	-	-	-	88	12
BG	10 191	9 834	10 553	0	40	0	4	46	11
CZ	31 373	29 443	32 368	72	0	1	0	20	6
DK	15 544	27 607	31 168	-	-	61	30	-	9
DE	140 786	132 013	134 858	13	29	4	11	31	12
EE	3 483	3 249	4 219	-	75	8	-	-	17
IE	4 020	2 175	1 650	-	48	-	28	-	24
EL	9 702	9 946	10 290	-	83	1	0	-	16
ES	31 207	31 189	30 126	17	4	1	-	49	29
FR	126 024	131 086	135 232	-	-	1	1	86	12
IT	29 219	26 780	27 597	0	-	22	36	-	42
CY	42	43	50	-	-	-	-	-	100
LV	1 561	1 560	2 290	-	0	-	-	-	100
LT	3 709	3 173	3 682	-	1	6	-	72	21
LU	47	57	74	-	-	-	-	-	100
HU	13 456	11 207	10 321		17	14	23	35	11
MT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NL	65 909	56 912	61 834	-	-	4	91	2	4
AT	8 493	9 584	9 447	-	0	10	15	-	75
PL	97 931	78 440	77 721	72	16	1	5	-	6
PT	2 602	3 109	3 578	-	-	-	-	-	100
RO	32 143	28 630	27 451	0	21	20	35	5	18
SI	3 020	3 085	3 479	-	34	-	0	44	22
SK	4 808	5 970	6 547	-	10	5	2	70	13
FI	13 151	14 758	16 203	-	13	-	-	37	50
SE	31 512	30 052	34 337	-	1	-	-	54	45
UK	248 934	268 199	201 037	6	-	43	39	10	2

		(Mtoe)	
	1995	2005	Change 95-05
Total	941	890	-5%
Oil	169	130	-23%
Gas	189	188	0%
Nuclear	223	257	15%
Hard Coal	187	114	-39%
RES	85	119	40%
Lignite	88	81	-8%

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

As can be read from the tables 2.4. and 2.5., total energy production of the EU decreased by 5% while the total energy consumption increased by almost 10% (161 Mtoe) between the years 1995 and 2005. It would not be fortune telling to contend that with this trend going on, the EU's import dependency will continue at an increasing pace.

Table 2.5.

Gross Inland Consumption

			(ktoe)	Year 2005, share of each fuel to total (%)					
	1995	2000	2005	Hard Coal	Lignite	Oil	Gas	Nuclear	RES
EU-27	**1 650 394**	**1 711 983**	**1 811 317**	**13**	**4**	**37**	**25**	**14**	**7**
EU-25	**1 579 981**	**1 656 306**	**1 752 287**	**13**	**4**	**37**	**24**	**14**	**7**
BE	50 459	57 168	54 952	10	0	37	26	22	4
BG	23 304	18 610	19 884	13	21	24	14	24	6
CZ	40 800	40 304	44 795	45	0	22	17	14	4
DK	20 248	19 662	19 538	19	-	42	23	-	16
DE	338 250	340 143	345 451	13	11	36	23	12	5
EE	5 481	4 635	5 563	0	57	20	14	-	11
IE	10 844	14 319	15 121	13	5	55	23	-	3
EL	24 174	28 140	31 240	1	28	57	8	-	5
ES	102 207	122 698	143 486	14	1	48	21	10	6
FR	239 896	258 985	275 438	5	0	33	15	42	6
IT	161 262	172 537	186 766	9	0	45	38	-	6
CY	1 970	2 381	2 461	1	0	96	-	-	2
LV	4 763	3 947	4 718	2	0	29	29	-	36
LT	8 686	7 069	8 592	2	0	32	29	31	9
LU	3 335	3 628	4 698	2	0	66	25	-	2
HU	25 864	25 000	27 920	5	6	27	43	13	4
MT	808	769	953	-	-	100	-	-	-
NL	73 374	75 712	80 963	10	0	40	44	1	3
AT	26 721	28 726	33 980	11	1	42	24	-	21
PL	100 019	90 777	93 935	45	14	24	13	-	5
PT	19 611	24 108	26 677	13	-	58	14	-	13
RO	47 108	37 067	39 146	7	15	26	36	4	13
SI	6 103	6 415	7 305	5	16	35	13	21	11
SK	17 692	17 483	19 407	18	5	21	31	24	4
FI	28 959	32 483	34 515	10	5	30	10	17	23
SE	50 446	47 849	51 555	5	1	28	2	36	30
UK	218 011	231 368	232 259	16	-	36	37	9	2

(Mtoe)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	1 650	1 708	1 693	1 710	1 698	1 712	1 752	1 745	1 787	1 808	1 811
EU-25	1 580	1 637	1 627	1 649	1 643	1 656	1 696	1 688	1 728	1 750	1 752

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF, retrieved on 09 July 2008

The tables 2.6. and 2.7. below show the oil and gas import sources of the Union.

Table 2.6.[94]

Crude Oil Imports
Into the EU-27 (in Mio tonnes)

Origin	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Russia	112,4	136,8	154,7	170,8	188,9	188,0	189,0
Norway	115,9	108,1	103,1	106,4	108,6	97,5	89,1
Libya	45,5	43,8	39,2	45,9	50,0	50,6	53,2
Saudi Arabia	65,1	57,5	53,1	61,5	64,5	60,7	50,9
Iran	35,5	31,4	25,9	34,7	35,9	35,4	36,4
Other, Middle East	54,7	48,3	43,2	27,8	28,5	30,0	32,1
Kazahkhstan	9,9	9,1	13,4	15,9	22,2	26,4	26,8
Algeria	21,4	19,3	18,0	18,6	21,6	22,8	16,5
Other Origin	55,3	60,6	64,7	61,1	49,3	61,9	70,6
Total Imports	**515,8**	**514,9**	**515,3**	**542,9**	**569,5**	**573,3**	**564,6**
in Million barrels	3765	3759	3761	3963	4158	4185	4121

Source: Energy and Transport in Figures, Directorate-General Energy and Transport, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/pocketbook/2007_en.htm, retrieved on: 08 July 2008

[94] For further info: see Annex II

Table 2.7. [95]

Gas Imports
into the EU-27 (in TJ, terajoules)

Origin	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Share 2006(%)
Russia	45397 09	4421 515	4554 744	4895 252	4951 044	4952 879	4927 552	42,0
Norway	1985 231	2136 379	2601 569	2699 473	2801 723	2671 779	2844 269	24,2
Algeria	2203 075	1957 181	2132 477	2158 803	2042 137	2256 826	2134 886	18,2
Nigeria	172 020	216 120	217 882	335 929	410 260	436 319	560 986	4,8
Libya	33 442	33 216	25 536	30 390	47 809	209 499	321 562	2,7
Egypt						202 419	317 420	2,7
Qatar	12 443	27 463	87 952	80 414	160 170	195 713	245 158	2,1
Oman		40 509	45 336	23 221	53 316	71 379	28 999	0,2
Other Origin	149 144	183 245	99 209	78 167	259 929	367 681	348 477	3,0
Total Imports	**9095 064**	**9015 628**	**9764 705**	**10301 649**	**10726 388**	**11364 494**	**11729 309**	**100,0**
in Mio Cubic meters	240 610	238 509	258 326	272 530	283 767	300 648	310 299	

Source: *Ibid.*

As can be seen, Russia is the main importer country of oil and gas to the EU. From 2000 to 2005, the EU-27 natural gas imports rose by 29%; while imports from Russia rose by 9%, from Norway by 33% and from Algeria by 2.4%. From 2000 to 2005, the EU-27 oil imports rose by 7%; while imports from Russia rose by 10% and in the imports from Norway there was a decrease from 21% to 17%. Thus, it can be argued that Russia is an important supplier of energy to the EU and will remain so in the foreseeable future. Besides, from the figures, it is seen that from 1995 to 2005, the final energy consumption of the EU-27 increased by almost 9.7%. The highest increase had been in the transport sector with an increase of 21%.

2.3. Securitization of Energy in the EU

In this part of the study, the official documents of the EU and the speeches of the important policy actors related to the issue are analysed in order to check whether the energy issue is taken out of the realm of politics and started to be considered in the realm of security, whether there is a perception of existential threat that justifies the breaking free of the normal political rules of the game. Within the page limitation of the study, a time frame is determined which starts from September 11, 2001 and ends in

[95] For further info : see Annex II

August 2008. Therefore, documents from this date until August 2008 are examined. In particular, the Council Conclusions and the speeches of relevant important actors related to the issue, namely, Andris Piebalgs as the Commissioner responsible for Energy and Transport and his predecessor Loyola de Palacio; Benita Ferrero-Waldner as the Commissioner responsible for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and her predecessor Chris Patten as the Commissioner responsible for External Relations; Jose Manuel Barroso as the President of the Commission and his predecessor Romano Prodi; and finally Javier Solana as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU are analysed. It is important to mention here that from the speeches of the actors, the parts related to the energy issue are analysed in such a way to search for security arguments. Their wording gains prominence in that regard as the analysis is made in order to see whether and how the wording has a 'security' connotation or if there are words that make one perceive the issue as an existential threat.

The EU is dependent on imports by 52% and this is forecasted to rise to 90% for oil and 70% for gas by 2030. As a result of this huge amount of increase in import dependence and other factors like: the ongoing high oil prices, the rising energy demand with the industrialising newcomers such as China and India, the negative impact of energy use on the environment with climate change, the EU started the process of developing an energy policy in order to be able to take common action in this issue and act in unity. Especially, after the Russia-Ukraine[96] and Russia-Belarus[97] crises, the MSs

[96] The natural gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine started in March 2005 as a result of the Russian Gaz supplier company Gazprom's demand for an increase in the natural gas prices for the gas it provides to the Ukraine. Gazprom wanted to increase the price from $50 to $230 per 1,000 cubic metres. The continued rejection of Ukraine to pay this price resulted in Russia's cutting of natural gas to Ukraine on January 1, 2006. It was important for the EU also, as 80% of EU natural gas from Russia pass through Ukraine. The crisis was resolved on January 4, 2006. Under the deal, Ukraine buys gas from a Swiss-registered company that is half-owned by Gazprom, called Rosukrenergo. Rosukrenergo buys gas from Gazprom at $230 per 1,000 cubic metres, and from Turkmenistan for much less. It supplies gas from both sources to Ukraine, and Ukraine pays an average of $95 per 1,000 cubic metres. For further info: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4569846.stm.

[97] The dispute started when Gazprom wanted to have an increase in the gas prices and Belarus denied to pay. Later on, Russian oil company Transneft stopped delivering its crude oil to Belarus through the Druzhba pipeline in January 2007. About 20% of oil to Germany pass through Belarus, therefore, the crisis affected the EU also. Besides Germany, oil supplies to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic has been affected as there was a decrease in the volume of oil and they had to start drawing on their operational stocks.

started to take the issue more seriously. Before then, Russia was always seen as a credible, reliable supplier.

After the 9/11 events, the issue of energy started to be a subject of political discourse as can be seen in the statement of Ms. Palacio, the Commissioner responsible for Energy and Transport:

> Energy is the *lifeblood* of our economy. Without affordable and reliable energy our current standard of living would be inconceivable. The tragic events of 11 September and their aftermath have increased the *urgency* of keeping our energy security under control. Suddenly the *risk* of disruption has escalated. First, the *risk* of willful damage to plant and infrastructure, whether that means a terrorist attack on an energy installation at home or a pipeline rupture abroad. Second, the *risk* of volatility in oil markets, which would have a damaging effect not only on Europe's economy, but also on global economic stability. Above all, it reveals our *vulnerability* to supply interruption – external and internal.[98]

The statement above is important for the securitization analysis in the sense that energy is seen as something vital to the economy; it is the *lifeblood* of it. Furthermore, there is a sense of *urgency* to deal with the *risks* in the energy sector. Moreover, Palacio draws attention to the *vulnerability* of the EU to supply disruption. Therefore, one can argue that there is a perception of an *existential threat* in the case of energy.

A year later, in 2002, she continues on drawing attention to the importance of developing an energy policy and acting together with the other actors to be able to deal with this threat.

> These are *uncertain times*. We are still feeling the shock waves of the attacks of 11 September last year and as globalisation expands, the *risks* become also *global*……no matter what our position on the world stage -energy producer, supplier or consumer - we all have in common the need for *global stability*, certainty and *security*…..*Energy policies have a wide and long-lasting impact on global stability and economic development*. Wild fluctuations in oil prices can have a distorting and destabilising effect on the economies of both producers and consumers and also a devastating effect on debt repayment by developing nations. Recent history shows us that, over the past

[98] PALACIO, Loyola de; 'The EU Energy Policy in Transition: Transforming Objectives into Market Realities', European Society, London School of Economics, London, 22 November 2001. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

> three decades, each economic recession has been preceded by steep increases in the price of crude oil…..energy has become a *central strategic issue*, also in other countries across the world.[99]

Palacio underscores the relation of energy to economic development and global stability. She states that the risks that she has talked about have become global. More importantly, she names energy as a central strategic issue. It is seen that even in the year of 2002; certain actors try to put the issue on the centre of the security domain.

Moreover, in 2003, there were blackouts overall the EU that affected the MSs and led them to take response which was also reflected in speech of Paladio. In addition, the urgency to take measures was once again highlighted by the Commissioner responsible for Energy and Transport:

> Recent black-outs both in the US and in the EU have been a wake-up call and a public discussion has now seriously begun on security of supply as the Commission envisaged in its 2000 Green paper. *Urgent measures* are necessary. Security of energy systems will be at the top of the agenda at the next meeting of the Council of EU Energy ministers in December.[100]

In another speech she stated: "recent geopolitical events have placed the issue of security of energy supply *at the top of the international political agenda*." [101] Likewise, in another speech she stated: "The subject of energy has been making its way rapidly up the political agenda. It is safe to say that it has now arrived near, or indeed, *at the top of the list*."[102] This statement shows that energy has started to be regarded as a top priority issue or a security issue, for that matter, by the EU. Furthermore, it can be argued that it has been highly politicized and indeed, it can be said that the actors are trying to securitize it.

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[99] PALACIO, Loyola de; 'The Way Forward of the IEF in Addressing International Energy Issues', 8th International Energy Forum, Osaka, 23 September 2002. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[100] PALACIO, Loyola de; 'EU Energy Policy Looking to the Future', Round table of high level US business executives on Transatlantic energy issues - US Chamber of Commerce Washington, 21 November 2003. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[101] PALACIO, Loyola de; 'Enhancing European Union Energy Security and Integrity', Industrial Conference "Odessa-Brody-Plock Oil Transportation Project', Brussels, 27 May 2003
[102] PIEBALGS, Andris; 'Energy Challenges Facing the EU', Polish Senate Conference on "The Security of Poland's Energy Supplies vs. European Energy Policy", Warsaw, 30 May 2006

A thorough analysis of various statements by different EU officials reveals that the issue of energy in the beginning of the new millennium was only considered within the scope of climate change issues and environmental concerns. For instance, in 2004, it is stated: "Improvement in energy efficiency and increased use of renewable energy sources are essential for environmental and competitiveness reasons. The EU-wide indicative target for energy efficiency as supported by the Council is important in focusing efforts."[103] It was the same in 2005 Council Conclusions, as it was stated under the heading of climate change and sustainable energy.

Energy started to be regarded 'separately' from the environment issue especially after 2006 with the ongoing increase in the oil prices and the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The MSs started to try to develop an Energy Policy only after that time and the issue of energy started to be regarded as something in the external dimension. For instance, the endeavour to make energy an issue of foreign and security policy can be openly seen with the statement of Solana: "We are already working together on liberalizing and integrating energy markets within the European Union. It makes sense to complement this with concerted action on the external side."[104]

When it comes to the Council Conclusions, it is again seen that in the last years, energy issue has become an issue of high relevance as it is discussed under a separate heading. However, it is of utmost importance to mention here that before 2006, the Council conclusions took the issue of energy in relation to climate change and the environment. After 2006, it was started to be regarded separately and the endeavour to create a common policy and an external energy policy for the EU came to the fore.

It is seen that with their statements, the actors are like rendering a wake-up call in the perception of the MSs that there occurred a change as the world is not the same anymore. Therefore, there is an *urgent* need to develop a policy to be able to deal with this change. This need becomes clear with the following statements of Piebalgs. What is

[103] Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 25/26 March 2004
[104] SOLANA, Javier, 'Europeans must act collectively on Energy Strategy', Financial Times, 9 March 2006

also important here is that the situation of energy is named by Piebalgs as 'unsustainable':

> The time of cheap energy is over. In addition, there are *increasing concerns* over the ability to match global supply and demand. The world is entering into a new energy era which requires a *global response*….There is a need for a clear and *pro-active policy* on securing and diversifying energy, and in particular gas supplies.[105]

> However, it is clear that, over the last couple of years, the world has entered a new energy landscape. Rising demand for imports from a larger number of countries, geopolitical complexities about energy supply, the challenge of climate change and volatile prices, supported by a mix of unexpectedly strong demand, the risk of terrorism and an ageing infrastructure; all these factors have brought home the *unsustainable nature of our energy situation*.[106]

This emphasis on energy as a security issue is seen in all the actors' speeches. Waldner also states:

> We can no longer take secure and affordable energy supplies for granted. We are all being exposed to increasingly intense competition for global energy resources from other parts of the world, and are becoming ever more dependent on oil and gas imports from regions facing *geopolitical uncertainties*. This has meant that the issue of ensuring energy security has moved to the *centre of public policy* and *international politics*, as well as business decisions.[107]

It is seen that energy has become the centre of public policy. The multifaceted nature of energy is also relevant here as it is an issue of not only international politics but also business. Barroso also stresses the importance of energy issue: "My intention is to make energy a *central issue* at every EU Summit with third countries throughout 2007."[108] Moreover, it is not only an endeavour of developing a suitable atmosphere for the development of a common policy. According to Barroso: "One of the most rapidly

[105] PIEBALGS, Andris, 'Recent EU Developments on Energy Policy', Speech to the International Energy Agency Governing Board Members, Paris, 13 June 2006. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[106] PIEBALGS, Andris; 'EU and Russian Energy Strategies', EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Conference Moscow, 30 October 2006. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[107] WALDNER, Benito Ferrero; Opening Address to the Conference: Towards an EU External Energy Policy to Assure a High Level of Supply Security, Brussels, 20 November 2006. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[108] BARROSO, Jose Manuel; Opening Speech at the External Energy Conference, Brussels, 20 November 2006. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

evolving global issues is one that affects us all: energy…. there are few greater *geopolitical challenges* confronting us today than energy."[109] It is not only Barroso that talks about the energy's being a geopolitical challenge, Piebalgs also underscores that. It is regarded and presented as a great challenge because of this all-encompassing nature. "The *energy challenge* is one of *the greatest challenges* the world faces. Climate change, global security, sustainable economic development: the *major political challenges* which we face every day can only be resolved if we are able to resolve the *energy challenge*."[110] Piebalgs contends similarly elsewhere in this line by saying: "now the issue of energy security is on the table of every energy minister, as well as foreign, finance and industry ministers across Europe."[111]

The multifaceted nature of energy is stated by Barroso as energy is not an issue in itself; it has impact on other sectors:

> If I am asked today what is the most important issue for global security and development, the issue with the highest potential for solutions but also for serious problems if we do not act in the right way, it is energy and climate change. Energy today is not only considered as a *major challenge* from an economic point of view but precisely for its implications for environment and climate. Because of increased competition for scarce resources, it poses serious concerns for global security…… It is *the great challenge* of our generation.[112]

It is seen that there is a discourse going on to make the issue of energy regarded as an *existential threat*. "Another central *challenge* is to develop a low-carbon economy and to guarantee the security of energy supply. A large majority of Europeans identify climate change and energy security as *major threats*."[113] Barroso puts special

[109] BARROSO, Jose Manuel; 'Speaking With a Common Voice: Energy Policy in the 21st Century', Honorary degree ceremony, Georgetown University, 9 February 2006. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[110] PIEBALGS, Andris; 'EU's Response to the Global Energy Challenges', Speech at the Vilnius Energy Security Conference, Vilnius, 11 October 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[111] PIEBALGS, Andris; 'Nabucco Pipeline – Searching for Alternative Routes for our Gas Supply', Speech at the "Nabucco Energy Ministerial Conference", Vienna, 26 June 2006
[112] BARROSO, Jose Manuel; 'Our Energy Future in an Interdependent World', World Energy Congress Rome, 12 November 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[113] BARROSO, Jose Manuel; 'European Union and Global Order', EPC Annual Conference, Brussels, 26 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

emphasis on climate change and energy: "Energy and climate change are the defining *challenges* of our generation."[114] Therefore, energy is defined as the major threat of the time.

It can safely be argued that energy is being used as a political tool by Russia or other actors. Piebalgs states this concern with his remark:

> The *energy challenge* is one of the *greatest challenges* we face……. But there are other developments to which we must be alert. Governments in various parts of the world are viewing their energy resources as a *strategic instrument*, to be used for political ends. 80% of the globe's oil reserves are in the hands of state-controlled entities…[115]

This statement is important in the sense that Piebalgs talks about the use of energy as a strategic instrument. It is seen that the issue has been put on the foreign and security domain. What is more important is that in the same speech, he also underscores the need to "move away from the traditional perception that energy is a national security issue – it is a European security issue."[116] This is the clearest example of the securitization of the issue of energy in the EU. Energy is not only a *national security issue*; but it is a *European security issue*. It is significant because for the protection of national security, military measures may also be used as national security refers to the survival of states. However, Piebalgs states that it is not only a national security issue but a European one. Therefore, this statement may have the connotation that if necessary, the European states (which in this case refers to the EU MSs), may take cooperative action to protect their own security.

It is of utmost importance to mention the perception of the linkage between foreign policy and the issue of energy. The remarks of Solana in 2006 and 2007 respectively are interesting in this sense. As he says: "the scramble for territory of the

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[114] BARROSO, Jose Manuel; 'The EU-Norway Partnership: A European Approach to Energy Security and Climate Change', Europe Conference, Oslo, 25 February 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[115] PIEBALGS, Andris; 'Oil and Gas Geopolitics', Speech at the Lisbon Energy Forum 2007, Lisbon, 2 October 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[116] *Ibid.*

past maybe replaced by a scramble for energy."[117] First, he names the issue of energy as a scramble and later on, he names it as a 'battle':

> The *battle* for energy supplies also has consequences for *foreign policy*. Some producer States use their resources blatantly to gain influence. And some large consumers make their foreign policy subject to the need to ensure supplies. They do so to an extent that is not healthy for international society as a whole.[118]

This is significant in terms of 'securitization' because the issue of energy is regarded as a battle which may mean that it may turn into a war-like situation. Furthermore, energy is related to the foreign policy as it is stated that the battle of energy supplies has consequences for foreign policy. Therefore, it can be argued that the energy issue has been put in the foreign and security policy domain. It is also reflected in the statements of Javier Solana, the High Representative of CFSP:

> Energy questions have shot to the *top of the international agenda*…Hardly a day goes by without a decision or event highlighting how much *energy questions are linked to international politics*. This is an *important challenge* which will stay with us for years to come. But it is also an *urgent* one. The *link between energy and foreign policy* works in two directions. We talk a lot about how we can use our foreign policy instruments and relationships to secure our energy interests. *Call it energy security through foreign policy*. In practical terms, this means being more united and disciplined in our energy diplomacy. Promoting sound market principles and investment protection in our neighbourhood and beyond. Developing joint crisis mechanisms and strategic reserves, especially in gas. Above all, it means making progress with diversification in supply and transit routes... *But there is also energy security in foreign policy*…Oil and gas rich countries are nine times more likely to suffer from violent conflicts than those which are non-resource rich. Nearly all experience political instability, poor governance and human rights abuses. This is partly because oil and gas revenues often lead to corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and insufficient economic diversification. But also because they shield countries from external pressure, including us, to promote good governance.[119]

Energy is seen as an existential threat now and has been stated by the actors as such in relevant matters and statements. The European Security Strategy (ESS) though did not include energy as the five key main challenges in 2003; it seems that the review

[117] SOLANA, Javier; 'Towards an EU External Energy Policy', Speech at the EU Energy Conference Brussels, 20 November 2006

[118] SOLANA, Javier; Speech to the Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 7 November 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[119] SOLANA, Javier; 'The External Energy Policy of the European Union', Speech at the Annual Conference of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Brussels, 1 February 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

of it would state also energy as one of the challenges. "No doubt the review of the European Security Strategy will incorporate some of the new issues which have become more prominent in the international agenda such as all the questions related to energy and climate change."[120] This need is also reflected in another speech of Solana as follows:

> The ESS was based on an analysis of the *major global challenges* as they stood in 2003. But today some of them are more relevant than others of five years ago and we also have new ones. Climate change and its effects on international security, and energy security were not contemplated in the strategy……We have to take account of these developments.[121]

It should be worth to mention here that the strategy documents are important because the EU has determined the prominent threats for them and the instruments that it will use to tackle with these threats in these strategy documents. So, they are like road maps that help one to predict how they will react to certain issues, and which instruments they will use. In particular, the ESS is important because with this document, the EU for the first time started to develop a strategic thinking.[122]

Besides Solana, Ferrero-Waldner has also made the same remark a couple of months ago:

> The second big issue on my mind is the revision of the EU's 2003 Security Strategy. The Security Strategy's basic focus on terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime is still valid five years on. But there are other *global challenges* which are not mentioned and should have been, like energy security, climate change and migration.[123]

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[120] SOLANA, Javier; Speech at the Conference of COFACC, Paris, 21 July 2008

[121] SOLANA, Javier; Address to the European Parliament on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, 4 June 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[122] BISCOP, Sven, COOLSAET, Rik; 'The World is the Stage- A Global Security Strategy for the European Union', The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2003, p.1, available at: www.irri-kiib.be

[123] WALDNER, Benita Ferrero; 'The European Union and Its Place in the World – the current agenda', Speech at College of Europe, Bruges, 7 April 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

She continues in speaking about the strategy that the EU should follow to be able to deal with this challenge:

> For that the EU needs a more *proactive* and coherent *energy security diplomacy*: addressing energy security in our political dialogue with all external partners; discussing and taking action to protect critical infrastructure and diversify supply routes; and building on the memoranda of understanding we have already signed with countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Egypt, and also Turkmenistan and Jordan.[124]

There is a public concern in the energy issue also. It can be argued that there is an acceptance of the issue by the audience that the issue of energy constitutes a threat. According to the statistics of Eurobarometer and the survey conducted between October 11 and November 15, 2005 in the 25 EU Member States and acceding candidate countries "A majority of EU citizens (47%) would prefer European level decisions on the new energy challenges such as energy supply security, growing energy consumption and climate change, 37% and 8% prefer energy decisions on a national or local level respectively."[125] According to another survey conducted in 2007, "almost two thirds (65%) of the citizens believe that the EU is in a better position to negotiate energy supplies and prices for all Member States, against 26% who prefer their government to act independently. Europeans express a strong level of solidarity on the issue of energy: almost eight out of ten (79%) EU citizens agree that in the case of a sudden shortage of oil and gas, the affected Member State should be able to rely on the reserves of other EU countries, while only 17% is opposed to this."[126] As can be seen from the results of the survey, in two years, there is an increase in the percentage rate of the people who want the EU to have a role in energy issue. One can thus come to the conclusion that there is an increase in the audience acceptance.

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[124] *Ibid.* The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[125] Eurobarometer Survey: European Citizens in favour of a European Energy Policy, IP/06/66, Brussels, 24 January 2006

[126] Eurobarometer Survey: Europeans Support Greater EU Action on Energy and Climate Change, IP/07/280, Brussels, 5 March 2007

2.4. Energy as an EU Policy or a Policy of Member States?

This section attempts at answering the questions: Is the European Union heading towards a Common Energy Policy? Or is this a sum of 27 different energy policies of the Member States (MSs)? There is no unity in the MSs' energy policies which also results in the lack of a 'Common Energy Policy' like that of Common Agricultural Policy or Fisheries Policy. The EU can not speak with a single voice in the case of energy. This is first of all, due to the differences of the bilateral, historical relations of the MSs with the producer countries. For instance, the MSs have bilateral energy deals with Russia which also prevents the EU acting in unity and standing strong before Russia. Secondly, this is due to the differences of MSs' dependency rates in that some of the MSs can produce the energy that they consume (most of them do not) and among the rest of the MSs the rate of dependency of each one differs. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the EU is not doing anything at all. It is aware of the importance of energy and the growing dependence on it. Therefore, it has been taking measures to be able to deal with any kind of problem that may come to the fore as a result of a rupture in the supply of energy. It can be argued that the EU is still on the crawling phase of developing an Energy Policy.

It is of great importance to mention the terminology that the EU uses while dealing with the development of an Energy Policy. It does not name it as a "Common Energy Policy" rather it chooses to name it as "Energy Policy for the EU". Hence, the EU uses a euphemism here. As in the other cases of foreign policy area, at the beginning, it tries to soften the issue as the MSs are not yet ready to transfer their sovereignty because energy issue is still regarded as a national policy issue, an issue of *high politics*. Change has started in this understanding; but still, the MSs need time for that. In this sense, instead of naming it as a 'Common Energy Policy' which would disturb some MSs, with the use of euphemism, they try to develop this policy.

As was just mentioned, the European Union does not have a Common Energy Policy like the Common Agricultural Policy. One of the reasons of this is that they have different bilateral/multilateral relations with the producer countries, in this case, Russia.

Some MSs are highly dependent on energy supplies, whereas some are producers. Besides, their dependency on the kind of energy that they use differs in terms of oil, gas, nuclear energy or renewables; they have differences in their energy mix. All of these impede their speaking with a single voice in the case of energy. Nevertheless, the steps taken in the last years with the issuing of the Energy Strategy and Green Papers show their desire to act in more unity.

The EU is dependent on Russia in terms of oil and gas. This may be used as a political leverage by Russia. The Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus gas crises made this threat perception concrete and acted as a catalyst for the EU to develop measures to be able to tackle with such kinds of problems. But, still, can one talk about an Energy Policy of the EU? The answer to this question by analysing the energy dependency rates of the MSs and their bilateral relations with Russia as being the major exporter country for them would be "no".

In this sense, the classification of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is used and the MSs are categorised under five headings in terms of their energy dependency and status in their relations to Russia. These are:

> **1) 'Trojan Horses':** Cyprus and Greece who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions;
> **2) 'Strategic Partners':** France, Germany, Italy and Spain who enjoy a 'special relationship' with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies;
> **3) 'Friendly Pragmatists':** Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia who maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals;
> **4) 'Frosty Pragmatists':** Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues;
> **5) 'New Cold Warriors':** Lithuania and Poland who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.[127]

[127] LEONARD Mark, POPESCU, Nicu; 'A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations', European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Paper, November 2007, available at: http://ecfr.3cdn.net/456050fa3e8ce10341_9zm6i2293.pdf, retrieved on: 01 July 2008

It can be argued that instead of working in coherence and unity, the MSs see it more advantageous to have bilateral relations with Russia. For instance, Russia has bilateral agreements with Austria, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary over pipeline projects. The article in Herald Tribune states this with the title of "*Hungary Chooses Gazprom over EU*". It is argued that Hungary's agreement with Gazprom to extend a pipeline from Turkey to Hungary competes with the EU plan to construct its own pipeline (Nabucco) to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies.[128] Furthermore, the signing of separate bilateral visa facilitation deals by France, Germany and Italy with Russia can also be given as an example in the sense that these MSs try to develop some preferential relations with Russia due to their dependence on its energy sources. However, these were suspended by the European Commission as they would constitute a breach of Schengen rules.[129] Moreover, Germany and France also have bilateral relations with Russia. Gaz de France, the French gaz company, extended their long-term contracts with Gazprom about gas delivery till 2030.

The figure below shows the dependence of some of the MSs' dependence rates on Russian natural gas.

Table 2.8.

Major Recipients of Russian Natural Gas Exports, 2006-2007			
Country	2006 Exports (bcf/y)	2007 Exports (bcf/y)	2006 % of Domestic NG Consumption
Germany	1.339	1.378	37%
Italy	756	742	25%
France	353	346	20%

[128] 'Hungary Chooses Gazprom Over EU', International Herald Tribune, 12 March 2007, available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/12/news/hungary.php, retrieved on: 10 June 2008. It is also worth to mention here that the Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany recently changed his position with regards to this issue as Russia agreed to build gas storage facilities in Austria rather than Hungary.
[129] LEONARD Mark, POPESCU, Nicu; 'A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations', European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Paper, November 2007, available at: http://ecfr.3cdn.net/456050fa3e8ce10341_9zm6i2293.pdf, retrieved on: 01 July 2008

Czech Republic	**261**	**247**	**79%**
Poland	**272**	**247**	**47%**
Hungary	**272**	**226**	**54%**
Slovakia	**240**	**223**	**100%**
Austria	**233**	**191**	**74%**
Finland	**173**	**166**	**100%**
Romania	**180**	**138**	**28%**
Bulgaria	**113**	**120**	**96%**
Greece	**95**	**111**	**82%**
Slovenia	**25**	**18**	**64%**
Lithuania	**99**	**122**	**96%**
Latvia	**49**	**72**	**74%**

Sources: "Domestic Consumption" EIA International Energy Annual, 2007; "Exports 2006 and 2007" Gazexport as cited by Energy Intelligence, March 2008, and 2008 Gazprom 1Q Quarterly Report; "Sales to Baltic and CIS States 2007", CIS and E. European Databook. 2006 from Gazprom Annual Report, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html, retrieved on: 14 July 2008

As can be seen from the figures cited above, Russia supplies approximately 82% of Greece's gas needs, though gas represents only 7% of the country's energy resources needs. In the case of Germany, 37% of German gas needs is supplied by Russia which makes Germany Russia's most important gas market. It is also of great importance to mention here Leonard and Popescu's statement that "German energy companies are central to the German-Russia partnership, to the extent that the only foreigner on Gazprom's board of directors is a representative of Germany's E.ON. Germany and Russia are also building the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic seabed together."[130]

[130] *Ibid.*

Russian trade with Italy was €21.2 billion in 2006, making Italy Russia's third biggest trading partner after Germany and China. Italy is also the second biggest importer of Russian gas, which accounted for 25% of the Italian market in 2006. Besides, in November 2007, Italy's energy giant ENI and Gazprom signed a deal to build a €10 billion gas pipeline called South Stream that will run under the Black Sea from Russia to the EU. For France, the dependence rate on Russian natural gas is 20%.

The case of Slovakia is based on full dependence on Russian raw materials as Russia supplies 100% of its gas and 97% of its oil needs. Finland is another MS that has a full dependence on Russia with her 100% of gas needs coming from that country. For Lithuania, 96% of its gas imports and 90% of its oil imports are from Russia and for Latvia, the Russian gas supplies is 74% of its need. Furthermore, Russia supplies approximately 13% of Spain's oil needs but no gas. Though not mentioned in the table above, Belgium gets only 4.9% of her gas needs from Russia.[131] It can be argued that it is only Denmark which has freedom of action with regard to the issue of energy and its relations with Russia as it is a net exporter of gas and oil and it has only 1.71% of trade with Russia. The Netherlands is a gas exporter country but its production is in decline. In the case of Sweden, there is no dependence on Russian energy resources as almost all Swedish gas comes from Denmark. Almost 30% of Romanian gas comes from Russia; but 70% is domestic production. As can be seen, the EU MSs are highly dependent on Russian energy. Furthermore, they have differences in their energy mix and there is still not a rule to regulate this. It is stated in the official documents that it should be regulated but it is still an ongoing process and has not been realized yet. Therefore, as was already responded under this heading, the answer to the question whether the EU has a Common Energy Policy or not would be "no". Due to their differences, the MSs can not speak with a single voice yet. It can be argued that the EU is an *economic giant, political dwarf, military worm and an energy louse*. However, this is an ongoing process and the MSs are aware of the importance of developing a coordinated policy in this area and taking common measures in this regard. This desire is also relevant in the statement of Waldner: "In the area of our external energy relations we need to speak

[131] *Ibid.*

with one voice and put all our policies such as trade, development, competition, Research and Development at the disposal of our energy security." [132]

2.5. The Reflection of EU Energy Policy on Foreign Policy

The European Union has three core objectives in its energy policy, namely, competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply. Besides, the MSs stated their desire to have an external energy policy in the documents related to the issue. For instance, the 2007 Communication from the Commission to the European Council determined priority areas for an effective external EU Energy Policy during the next three years. These are:

> • The EC and its Member States should be a key driver in the design of international agreements, including the future of the Energy Charter Treaty and the post-2012 climate regime.
> • EU energy relations with its neighbours are fundamental to European security and stability. The EU should aim to build up a wide network of countries around the EU, acting on the basis of shared rules or principles derived from the EU energy policy.
> • To enhance relations with our external energy suppliers, further developing comprehensive partnerships based on mutual interest, transparency, predictability and reciprocity.
> • To continue to develop closer energy relations with other major consumers, in particular through IEA and G8 or through intensified bilateral cooperation.
> • Develop the use of financial instruments, via enhanced co-operation with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the establishment of a Neighbourhood Investment Fund, to enhance the EU's energy security.
> • To improve the conditions for investments in international projects, working for example to secure a clearly defined and transparent legal framework and appointing European coordinators to represent EU interests in key international projects.
> • Promote non proliferation, nuclear safety and security, in particular through a reinforced cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
> • A comprehensive Africa-Europe Energy partnership. The importance of Africa as an energy supplier has increased greatly in recent years, but its potential is still greater. The dialogue should include security of supply, technology transfer in renewable energy, sustainable exploitation of resources, transparency of energy markets and respect for good governance. The dialogue should be launched through a joint event at the highest level.
> • As already mentioned above, an international agreement on energy efficiency.[133]

[132] WALDNER, Benita Ferrero; Concluding Remarks at the Conference: Towards an EU External Energy Policy to Assure a High Level of Supply Security, Brussels, 21 November 2006
[133] Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, 'An Energy Policy for Europe', Brussels, 10 January 2007, p.18, available at:

Besides the above-mentioned priorities, Waldner speaks of some instruments:

> These instruments include our European Neighbourhood Policy, our contractual relations with our main energy partners in central Asia, the Middle East, the Gulf, Africa, South America, USA, China, India and our whole network of bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements, and specific cooperation schemes.[134]

To this end, a Neighbourhood Investment Fund was created in order to increase funding of the projects related to the development of energy infrastructure. Furthermore, it is intended to increase the cooperation with the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian areas. Finally, the energy cooperation with the European Neigbourhood Policy (ENP) is important as the Action Plans established with the ENP countries address issues such as:

> • More energy dialogue,
> • Progressive convergence of energy policies and legal/regulatory frameworks,
> • Improving energy network connections in which we all have strong mutual interests related to energy security,
> • Promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources,
> • Possible participation in EU energy programmes and events.[135]

The relations among the producer, consumer and transit countries also gain prominence for the EU and it has attempted to develop strategic partnerships with these countries. The priorities that are to be realized with these partnerships are as follows:

> • conclude negotiations of the Energy Charter Transit Protocol and secure the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by all signatories to the Charter;
> • invite the Commission to set out elements for an agreement with Russia on energy within the framework of the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;
> • extend the EU's internal market in energy to its neighbours (including the expansion of the Energy Community Treaty);
> • make better use of the ENP mechanism to further the EU's energy policy objectives; enhanced dialogue with Algeria will be particularly relevant;

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http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf , retrieved on: 01 June 2008

[134] WALDNER, Benita Ferrero; Opening Address at the Conference: Towards an EU External Energy Policy to Assure a High Level of Supply Security, Brussels, 20 November 2006

[135] The European Neighbourhood Policy, Improving Mutual Understanding, Culture, Education, Youth, Research, p. 6, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/enp-sector-2007_en.pdf, retrieved on: 01 June 2008

> • give full support to infrastructure projects compatible with environmental considerations and aimed at opening up new supply routes with a view to diversifying energy imports which would benefit all Member States;
> • integrate the EU's energy objectives fully into its trade policy and pursue these through the WTO, as appropriate;
> • attach particular importance to energy in the context of the Union's relations generally with major third-country partners.[136]

From the statement above, one can see the importance given by the EU to the enhancement of relations with the third countries in the energy issue. The EU is aware that dependence on solely one state, namely, Russia, may be problematic. In this line, the MSs try to diversify their supply routes.

2.5.1. Energy Community Treaty

The Energy Community Treaty came into force on 1st July 2006 with the aim of creating an integrated market in energy in terms of electricity and gas between the EU and the other contracting parties.[137] With the Energy Community Treaty, the contracting parties decided to apply the main elements of the European energy policy.

> It implies acceptance of competition and clear rules concerning the functioning of the market and also addressing social consequences linked with the restructuring of energy companies, the introduction of market prices for energy and the protection of workers and vulnerable customers.[138]

When the geographic position of the contracting parties is taken into account, i.e. between the major producer and consumer countries in the Caspian and the Middle East, the reason of the EU's desire to integrate these countries by signing up this Treaty becomes clear.

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[136] Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 June 2006
[137] Contracting parties are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Third countries may be accepted as observers.
[138] European Commission Press Release: The Commission promotes the social dimension of the Energy Community, Brussels, 18 October 2007, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1559&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, retrieved on: 02 April 2008

2.5.2. Energy Charter Treaty

At the Dublin Summit of 1990, the Dutch Prime Minister proposed cooperation in the energy sector with the former Soviet Union countries and the Eastern European ones to be able to both improve the EU's security of supply and realize economic growth in these countries. The Charter was signed on 17 December 1991 in The Hague.[139] The purpose of this Treaty is to promote East-West industrial cooperation through legal safeguards in the areas of investment, transit trade and dispute settlement. The importance of the Charter is that the signatories should abide by the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trading energy materials and products.

In December 1999, the Charter Conference started the negotiations of an Energy Charter Transit Protocol and agreement was reached at the end of 2002. However, there remains a problem. Russia, one of the most important energy exporting countries, refuses to ratify it because of this Transit Protocol attached to the Charter, although signed the Charter. The reason behind this is related to the statements in the Transit Protocol. According to this, the parties: "reaffirm their commitment to secure established flows and not to interrupt or reduce the existing flow of Energy Materials and Products in Transit; and acknowledge the importance of open energy markets, access to Energy Transport Facilities, as well as security of energy supply."[140] This would constrain Russia on the energy issue. No crisis like the one that occurred between Russia and Ukraine could occur under this Protocol. Furthermore, if it had signed the Protocol, Russia would no longer be able to inhibit the freedom of transit due to its destination or energy ownership and also it could not apply different prices. Furthermore, the Protocol necessitates non-discriminating access of companies and other countries to Russian pipelines, this would primarily challenge the gas transportation network controlled by state-owned gas holding Gazprom. In fact, what is

[139] The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects were signed in Lisbon on 17 December 1994 by all signatories to the 1991 Charter except for the United States and Canada. The EU and its Member States are signatories to the Treaty and the Protocol. For further info: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27028.htm

[140] Final Act of the Energy Charter Conference with Respect to the Energy Charter Protocol on Transit, Energy Charter Secretariat, 31 October 2003, available at: www.encharter.org, retrieved on: 10.05.2008

wanted from Russia is its allowance of access to its pipelines to independent producers and other countries, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As Kolchin put it, this is not desirable for Russia as it does not want to become a gas transit country or liberalize Gazprom's export gas pipelines.[141]

The signing of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia is not expected in the foreseeable future. The carrot of WTO membership to Russia has not worked so far either because Russia does not want to lose its leverage in the energy issue. It wants to maintain its super power in the case of energy to regain its powerful status in the international arena.

2.6. Concluding Remarks

The issue of energy has long been on the agenda of the Member States; in fact, the step towards European integration was related to the then key energy resource of coal. However, the securitization of energy is a recent one. From the analyses of the speeches of the important actors and the statements in the official documents, it is seen that especially after 9/11 and the Russian-Ukraine, Russia-Belarus crises, the EU started the process of developing a common policy regarding this issue. It can be argued that this acted as a catalyst for the EU. Before that period, energy was also on the agenda but only in relation to climate change, economic growth and market liberalization. The politicization of energy already started in relation to these. However, especially after the above-mentioned cases, the actors started to have their securitizing acts in that the energy issue started to be presented as an existential threat, one of the great challenges of today and tomorrow. Nevertheless, this is still an ongoing process. It can not be argued that there is a securitization in the EU; instead there is an endeavour, tendency to do so especially in terms of mobilization; extraordinary measures.

The EU still does not have a determined common energy policy. There is an acceptance in the audience also that the issue of energy has become one of the key

[141] KOLCHIN, Sergei; 'Why Russia Refuses to Ratify Energy Charter', 07 April 2006, available at: http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~crs/energycharter.htm, retrieved on: 11 May 2008

threats; but, no breaking free of the normal political rules of the game has taken place yet. In fact, as can be seen in the words of Solana: "we do not yet have an external energy policy for Europe"[142]; no proper policy has been established in the EU yet. The MSs do not speak with a single voice in the case of energy as a result of their bilateral relations and national interests and their differences in their energy mix. As for today, it can be argued that the EU is somewhere in-between the politicization and securitization part of the spectrum drawn in the first chapter. It is true that the EU tries to adjust its external relations in accordance with its energy needs but the debate is still going on and no extreme polices have been taken. Therefore, it can not be argued that there is a total securitization of energy in the EU. In fact, there is not a proper EU energy policy yet. Furthermore, there is still a tendency to deal with the issue of energy in terms of the issue of climate change.

[142] SOLANA, Javier; 'Towards an EU External Energy Policy', Speech at the EU Energy Conference, Brussels, 20 November 2006

III. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY

The Russian Federation[143] has the largest natural gas reserves in the world and it is the second largest oil exporter country. Therefore, it would not be surprising to see that energy is one of the main priority areas in the Russian policy-making. Moreover, Russia's economy has been affected positively by her vast energy incomes. For instance, the Stabilisation Fund that was established to accumulate money from oil tax revenues when the oil prices are high in a way to compensate for the times of low oil prices has much more money than the target size. "The Fund has been rapidly expanding and reached $25bn in March 2005, exceeding the originally intended target size of $18bn (500 bn rubles)."[144] As just mentioned, Russia is one of the major energy exporter countries in the world. However, the reliability of Russia as an energy provider has started to be questioned by the consumer countries after Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus crises and especially after the recent crisis over Georgia. As just mentioned above, energy revenues play an important role on the economic development of Russia. Furthermore, the EU is highly dependent on Russian natural gas and it is predicted that the USA will be dependent on Russian oil. Therefore, it is evident that the issue of energy will be on the agenda on the bilateral and multilateral relations of the aforementioned actors in the foreseeable future. It is also because of this decisive role of energy that the actors are trying to develop an Energy Policy of their own. In this respect, in this section, first, the historical background of the Energy Policy of Russia is analysed which is followed by facts and figures part. Later on, an analysis of the speeches of the political actors in Russia, related to the issue of energy, is made to be able to see whether the actors are trying to securitize energy or not. Finally, the implications of energy on Russia's bilateral-multilateral relations are analysed.

[143] Thereafter, it is referred to as Russia.
[144] EROCHKINE, Pavel; 'Russia and its Oil: Friends or Foes', in Jennifer Moll (ed.), 'Blueprint for Russia', Foreign Policy Centre, the United Kingdom, 2005, p. 28, available at: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/553.pdf, retrieved on: 22 May 2008

3.1. Historical Background of the Energy Policy of Russia

After the demise of the Soviet Union (SU), Russia had issued Energy Strategy documents in order to develop an energy policy with the aim of having a reliable supply of energy and exporting capacity. The realization of the state Energy Policy in Russia started with the adoption of the 1992 document, ***'The Concept of Russian Energy Policy in New Economic Conditions'***. In 1995, it was followed by the document ***'Main Directions of Energy Policy of the Russian Federation till 2010'*** and ***'Energy Strategy of Russia (Main Provisions)'***. In 2000, the document '***Main Provisions, Energy Strategy of Russia till 2020'*** was adopted and finally, in 2003, the document ***'Elaboration on Main Provisions of Energy Strategy of Russia till 2020'*** came to the fore as a very important document. Special emphasis is given to the 2003 document as this is in line with the time frame of this study and the Russian Energy Strategy document of 2003 replaced the former ones. This document is important in the sense that it is like a road map as it outlines the priorities for Russia in the energy sector till the year 2020.

The main priority of Energy Strategy of Russia is based on increasing and improving energy efficiency. Other priorities can be summarized[145] as the:

- completion of structural reform of natural monopolies in fuel and energy complex and restructuring of a coal industry;
- prolongation of structural modification of branches in fuel and energy complex and improvement of the structure of fuel and energy balance;
- decreasing of production costs in energy sector, optimization of the using of available industrial potential, liquidation of the unprofitable plants, growth of profitability of the others;
- forming the internal prices for energy resources at a level providing of energy sector and fuel producers self-financing;
- raising the level (quality) of management in joint-stock companies operated in fuel and energy complex.[146]

[145] It is worth to mention here that due to the lack of transparency and the language constraints, secondary sources are generally used in this section.
[146] MASTEPANOV, Alexey M.; Slides on: 'Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/presentations/doc/energy-strategy2020_en.pdf, retrieved on: 10 August 2008

In the same vein, it is stated in the Russian document that the realization of improvement of energy efficiency would be achieved by:

> ▪ decreasing of energy intensity in production and energy supply expenditures of the society as a whole;
> ▪ reducing the impact on environment;
> ▪ realization of the concept of sustainable development;
> ▪ energy and technological development of the labour forces of the country and improvement of their economic effectiveness and competitiveness.[147]

It is not surprising to see that Russia, being the producing country, generally underscores pricing, enhancing its infrastructure and decreasing its production costs in its energy policy. There is a difference among the actors of this study, namely the EU, the USA and Russia, in dealing the issue of energy. Yet, the issues like the realization of sustainable development and the protection of the environment are the common concerns of all. According to the Strategy Document there is a need to make a change in the pricing policy which would include:

> ▪ stage by stage expanding area of application of market fuel and energy pricing in the internal market;
> ▪ providing for financial stability and investment attractiveness of fuel and energy enterprises;
> ▪ removing existing disproportion between prices of main types of energy resources;
> ▪ deepening price (tariffs) differentiation for different categories of consumers;
> ▪ stage by stage liquidation of all forms of crosssubsidizing.[148]

As Russia states how it would develop its pricing policy, the items above are important. The fourth one especially can be given emphasis because it is seen that Russia would apply different prices to different consumers. More importantly, there is the mentioning of 'deepening' this price differentiation. However, how Russia would categorize the consumer countries or which criteria it would use for this differentiation is not mentioned. Another important point is the first item in that Russia states its desire of applying market prices in the country. As will be seen in the facts and figures part below, Russia needs a large amount of investment for its aging infrastructure. Therefore, this issue is also stated in Strategy.

[147] *Ibid.*
[148] *Ibid.*

3.2. Energy Production - Facts and Figures

Russia has started to be considered as the 'energy superpower' because it has the largest natural gas reserves and thus, it is the largest natural gas exporter. It has the eighth largest oil reserves in the world; however, it is the second largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Russia is the third largest consumer of energy. In this section, data is given on the Russia's energy production, consumption and its place in the world with regard to energy. The chart below shows the proven natural gas reserves in different parts of the world. It is seen that there is a huge difference between the Russian reserve level and the others'. The Middle East region has greater volume than the Russian level; however, it should be kept in mind that the Middle East is composed of many states.

Table 3.1. Proven Reserves of Natural Gas in Different Parts of the World, 2005

Region	Volume, billion m3
Russia	47 700
North America	7 446
South America	7 090
Europe	6 635
Africa	13 487
Middle East	71 376
Asia and the Pacific	17 442

Source: Gazprom, http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article20150.shtml

As can be read from the tables 3.1. and 3.2., Russian oil production is increasing. In the last decade, it has increased by approximately 62%; while the consumption in Russia has increased by approximately 11.5%. The slow growth rate in consumption when compared with the production rate is significant. Finally, it is worth to underscore the huge amount of increase in the US oil imports from Russia in the last decade.

Table 3.2. Oil and Natural Gas Production and Consumption Patterns

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day)											
Total Oil Production	6101.09	6069.67	6312.32	6723.64	7159.73	7658.89	8534.78	9273.77	9512.98	9676.57	9875.77
Consumption	2562.48	2488.61	2537.62	2578.50	2590.23	2636.41	2681.86	2750.81	2757.00	2810.76	2858
Total Oil Exports to U.S.	13	24	89	72	90	210	254	298	410	369	413
Natural Gas (Billion Cubic Feet)											
Production	20168.4	20867.6	20825.3	20631.0	20511.0	21026.6	21768.2	22386.2	22622.8	23166.6	NA
Consumption	13433.8	14044.8	14013.0	14129.5	14412.1	14567.4	15291.4	16022.4	16153.1	16598.1	NA

Source: Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/, retrieved on: 15 July 2008

The Russian energy consumption in different sources is shown in the chart below. Natural gas and oil are the forerunners among the other energy sources in the domestic energy consumption of Russia. As can be seen, as the largest natural gas producer of the world, Russia meets 55% of its energy needs by natural gas which is followed by a 19% of oil use.

Graph 3.1. Total Energy Consumption in Russia, by Type (2005)



Source: Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/pdf.pdf, retrieved on: 15 July 2008

As can be seen from the graph below, although Russia has a high amount of proven reserves; its production capacity remains relatively low in the gas sector. The gas production rate is lower than the proven reserves. This is due to the old-aged infrastructure and insufficient investment. In this line, the tables below show the investment need of Russia for the old age infrastructure.

Graph 3.2. Share of Russia in World Energy, 2002



Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004-Russia Presentation, available at: http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2004/WEO2004_Russia.pdf, retrieved on: 15 August 2008

Graph 3.3. Energy Investment Needs in Russia, 2003-2030



Source: World Energy Outlook 2004, International Energy Agency, available at: http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2004/WEO2004_Russia.pdf

As can be seen from the figures of the Graphs 3.3. and 3.4., there is a growing need for investment in the oil and gas sectors. The investments are important in the sense that if not invested sufficiently, Russia may fail to respond to the rising demand for natural gas. This may lead to an 'energy crisis' in the world if the importers of the Russian natural gas did not have enough energy to compensate for that or if they did not have any other alternatives. In the case of the EU, for instance, some Member States are nearly 100% dependent on the Russian natural gas. Therefore, it can be indicated that in order to prevent such a 'crisis', not only the investment and technological advancement of the Russian energy infrastructure should be enhanced but also alternative energy suppliers and energy resources should be developed.

Graph 3.4. Investment Required According to the Energy Strategy



Source: Russian Energy Strategy 2003-2020, cited in: Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.s), 'Russia'a Energy Sector between Politics and Business', Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies, Bremen, February 2008

Furthermore, the contribution of the energy sector to the Russian economy is indispensable. As can be read below, after, Iran and Algeria, Russia is the third largest country in terms of the impact of oil and gas sectors' contribution to its GDP.

Graph 3.5. Contribution of Oil and Gas Sectors to GDP, 2002



Source: World Energy Outlook 2004-Russia Presentation, International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2004/WEO2004_Russia.pdf, retrieved on: 15 August 2008

As seen from the figures of Graph 3.6. below, there occurred a huge increase in the amount of money saved in the Stabilization Fund that was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, especially in 2006 and 2007. This was due to the high oil prices. By the same token, it can be predicted that this trend will continue as the energy prices remain high. This, again, shows the contribution of the energy sector to Russian economy. From 2006 on, the amount of money in its Stabilisation Fund has been greater than its external debt.

Graph 3.6. External Debt and Stabilization Fund 2004-2007, US dollar Billion



Source: Russian Energy Strategy 2003-2020, cited in: Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.s), 'Russia'a Energy Sector between Politics and Business', Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies, Bremen, February 2008

It is important to give some information about the major oil and gas companies in Russia. In the gas sector, the state-owned gas company, Gazprom, holds the monopoly. According to the data taken from Gazprom's website, "Gazprom has more gas than any other gas company in the world, with about 17% of the world's proven gas reserves, and over 60% of Russia's reserves."[149] Unlike the gas sector, in oil sector, the companies are privatized. Unlike Gazprom, Lukoil is a private oil company. "The

[149] For further info: http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article20150.shtml

Company has around 1.3% of global oil reserves and 2.3% of global oil production. Lukoil dominates the Russian energy sector, with almost 19% of total Russian oil production refining."[150] However, oil transport is in the hands of Transneft, a state firm that was established in accordance with the Russian Federation Presidents Decree on 17 November, 1992 and the Government of the Russian Federation Regulation dated August 14, 1993. Furthermore, Rosneft, the leader of the Russian petroleum industry, primarily engaged in hydrocarbon exploration and production, production of petroleum products and petrochemicals, and marketing of these outputs. The state holds a little over 75% in the Company, while approximately 15% of shares are free-floated.[151]

For the oil transport, the pipelines and railway are used. The pipelines carry the Russian oil to European consumers, while due to the lack of pipelines connecting Russia and Asia, the transport of oil is realized via railways. As in the case of natural gas sector, there is a need for investment and for technological advancement. As can be seen from the facts and figures part, natural gas use is higher than the use of oil for domestic consumption. Thus, natural gas is important in the domestic market.

3.3. Securitization of Energy in Russia?

In this section, the energy policy of Russia is analysed through the speeches of the high ranking officials and heads of state and government in order to check whether the energy issue is taken out of the normal political rules and put into the security domain. The time scope is taken as September 11, 2001 till August 2008. In this sense, the speeches of the Minister of Industry and Energy, Viktor Khristenko; the foreign ministers of the period, namely, Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov; and the presidents, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are analysed. It is important to mention here that from the speeches of the actors, the parts related to the energy issue are analysed in such a way to search for security arguments. Their wording gains prominence in that regard as the analysis is made in order to see whether and how the wording has a 'security'

[150] For further info: http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_29_.html
[151] For further info: http://www.rosneft.com/about/

connotation or if there are words that make one perceive the issue as an existential threat.

The issue of energy has become an issue of international concern. For Russia also, as one of the major producer countries, it constitutes an important part in its policy making. The importance given to the issue in this sense can be seen in the Energy strategy document of 2003 as it is stated that "ensuring *national security* – that is the fundamental task of the energy policy."[152] This remark is significant in the sense that the national security is related to the energy policy here. National security is about the survival of states. Therefore, in terms of securitization analysis, this gains importance as it may bring into one's mind the use of military means for the protection of its national security. In the following remark of Putin this relevance is more evident. In a threatening style, he states:

> If Europe considers Russia as an alien element, then we will be *placing obstacles* in the way of broader cooperation. But if Europe treats us as an equal partner, then it will not apply the rule that no EU country can get more than 30% of its energy from a non-member country. Today such rules apply and they may set limits to our cooperation. And in Europe and Germany they will inevitably increase prices, including for households. By contrast, if we pursue this work on a long-term basis and drop the unjustified rules with regard to Russia, proper and timely performance of its obligations will be guaranteed. That will stabilise the European economy and will contribute to price stability both for industry and for consumers.[153]

In this statement, Putin explicitly threatens Europe that they may put obstacles to broader cooperation if Europe considers Russia as an alien element. Putin wants the EU to get rid of the rule of not importing more than 30% of energy from a non-member country and he tries to realize this aim by the use of a threatening style. Furthermore, a year later, at the 10th Anniversary of Gazprom, he talked about Gazprom's lever role in Russia's economic and political influence:

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[152] Energeticheskaya Strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 goda (Russia's Energy Strategy until the Year 2020), Ministry of Industry and Energy, 2003, cited in: LARSSON, Robert L., 'Russia's Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier', Swedish Defence Research Agency, p. 67, March 2006, available at: http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1934.pdf, retrieved on: 12 March 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connate security.
[153] PUTIN, Vladimir; Closing Remarks at the Petersburg Dialogue Forum, 9 April 2002, Weimar, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/04/09/0000_type82914type84779_149800.shtml, retrieved on: 04 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

> Gazprom is a key element in the system of the country's energy security and its export potential. Equally important, it is a *powerful lever of Russia's economic and political influence* in the world. All this prompts us to closely follow the state of affairs in the company. It is not by chance that government representatives hold the majority of seats on the Board of Directors. That is one more proof of the strategic significance of the company and the need for government control over its status.[154]

This is another important statement of Putin in the sense that he admits that they use Gazprom, the country's number one company in terms of energy, as an economic and political influence. This may justify the fear of the other actors in the EU and the USA that Russia uses its energy power as a political weapon and may contribute to their perception of *existential threat* in the issue of energy. In the same vein, in another occasion, Putin mentioned about the state control over Gazprom which again is in line with the Russia's use of Gazprom as a political and economic leverage:

> The gas pipeline system is the creation of the Soviet Union. We intend to retain state control over the gas transportation system and over Gazprom. We will not divide Gazprom. And the European Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they will have to deal with the state.[155]

Later on, in 2007, Russian authorieties denied this claim of using energy as a political leverage: "We do not make a political issue of energy problems."[156] Yet, Putin talked about establishing a gas cartel, something like a gas-OPEC with other gas exporting countries, including for instance Qatar and Iran. In this issue again, the actors both deny and defend the issue. For instance, during his visit to Qatar in February 2007, Putin said: "we do not reject the idea of creating a gas cartel." [157] Moreover, on April 9,

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[154] PUTIN, Vladimir; Speech at a Gala Meeting to Mark the 10th Anniversary of Gazprom, 14 February 2003, The Kremlin, Moscow, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/02/14/0000_type82913type84779type127286_158665.shtml, retrieved on: 04 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[155] FELGENGAUER, Pavel; 'Oborona neftegazovoy truby', Novaya Gazeta 76, 13 October 2003, http://novayagazeta.ru, Speech of Putin, cited in: FREDHOLM, Michael, 'The Russian Energy Strategy and Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual Dependence?', Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2005, p. 9

[156] PUTIN, Vladimir; Interview with Time Magazine, 19 December 2007, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/12/19/1618_type82916_154779.shtml, retrieved on: 04 May 2008

[157] PUTIN, Vladimir, Speech cited in: 'Russia's Energy Sector between Politics and Business', Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.s), *Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies*, No. 92, February 2008, Bremen, available at: http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de, retrieved on: 04 May 2008

2007, he "announced that Russia will send a high-level delegation to the Gas Exporting Countries' Forum (GECF) meeting in Doha on April 9, 2007, where the issue of creating a gas cartel has been formally put on the agenda."[158] However, the foreign minister Lavrov had already denied this claim in 2006:

> There are no plans to set up a gas OPEC. Honestly speaking, I haven't heard such calls, although I've heard others - calls that it is necessary to set up an energy NATO. This idea is, of course, confrontational and I am glad that it has not found any serious support. But that the consumers of energy resources, including gas, are trying to coordinate their positions is a fact. We see this in the debate within the same European Union. Rather than attempting to impose on somebody artificial schemes, it is important in such discussions to look for real agreements based on the balance I've spoken of - on respect not only for consumers' interests, but also for those of suppliers of energy resources.[159]

Since 2006, the energy issue has started to take place more and more often in the statements of the officials. The importance of the issue is underscored by the Foreign Minister Lavrov: "Energy is moving to the *forefront of world politics*."[160]

Furthermore, in dealing with the issue of energy security, it is seen that Russia always underscores 'energy poverty' and the political actors state their desire to decrease the level of energy poverty and increase people's access to energy sources.

> Russia, with consideration for its positioning on the global market, understands the *problem* of energy security not only as its own domestic issue, but primarily as a common *problem* of securely providing countries and the people of the planet with energy resources, as a *challenge* to the entire world community. This is why for the first time in G8 history Russia highlighted the need to frame an agreed position of the leading world countries in adopting measures to tackle energy poverty, i.e. insufficient access of people from the poorest countries to modern energy sources. We are moving

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[158] *Ibid.*

[159] LAVROV, Sergey; Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions following his Meeting with Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja, Moscow, 20 June 2006, Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Information and Press Department, available at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2ac16e7c0426c698c3257193004d1bed?OpenDocument, retrieved on: 05 May 2008

[160] LAVROV, Sergey; Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Questions from Russian Television Channels on Outcome of Conference of Russia's Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives Abroad and on Pressing International Issues, 28 June 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Information and Press Department, available at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5304e1e1da09d446c325719d002c719b?OpenDocument, retrieved on: 04 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

> away from the utilitarian perception of *the energy security problem* as an entirely raw material problem and begin to speak of energy security in its technological, social and, most importantly, humanitarian aspects.[161]

In this statement of Khristenko, energy security is defined as a *problem* first and then, it is defined as a *challenge*. It is such kind of a challenge that affects the entire world community. Another important point here is that the multifaceted nature of the energy issue is underlined. It is stated that it has its impact in technological, social and humanitarian ways. Below, its impact on the economy is also mentioned:

> Global energy security may be defined as a *stable* system of legal, political and primarily economic relations allowing to maintain efficient functioning of the world energy system, removing and making up for negative effects of various destabilizing factors in order to ensure secure demand and steady supply of energy, robust and streamlined operation of regional and world energy markets in full compliance with the mandatory requirements of technological and environmental safety.[162]

This statement of Khristenko may also lead someone think that if energy security is not maintained, the legal, political and economic relations would be unstable. Moreover, as just mentioned, energy security is regarded in terms of economy. It is important to mention here that in Russia, the issue of energy is generally put on the agenda with its relation to its economic growth and development. For instance, Putin stated that: "There is no doubt today that energy is a *crucial resource* for socio-economic development and progress and that it has a direct impact on the well being of everyone living on this planet."[163] At the G-8 meeting of 2006, he said: "This is an issue

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[161] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Presentation of the Centre for Sustainable Energy Development in Conjunction with Unesco, 3 November 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/37, retrieved on: 03 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[162] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Introduction at the International Conference on Energy Security Prior to the G8 Energy Ministerial Meeting, 13 March 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/1, retrieved on: 02 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[163] PUTIN, Vladimir; Speech at Meeting with the G8 Energy Ministers, 16 March 2006, The Kremlin, Moscow, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/03/16/1302_type82912type82914type84779_103208.shtml, retrieved on: 03 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

that affects all of our countries and practically the entire world economy."[164] In fact, the relation of the issue of energy to economic development has always been stated especially by Putin in different occasions. In addition, the relation to the environment is not ignored:

> In many respects energy defines *international security* and social and economic development today. In practice the well-being of millions of people directly depends on it, on energy security. We consider that the G8 will be able to develop a coordinated strategy in this sphere, a strategy that allows us to ensure that the world's population and global economy have access to energy resources at affordable prices and with minimal damage to the environment.[165]

Besides the mentioning about the energy issue related to the environment, more importantly, Putin states that energy is an *international security* issue. Therefore, the issue of energy becomes not only a national security issue but also an international one.

It is not only Putin who is mentioning about the linkage between energy and economy. The Minister of Industry and Energy, Khristenko said: "global economic development now depends on energy."[166] Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also talks about this linkage: "Energy in the world today is a major component of sustainable economic and social development of a state and of the growth of its economic might."[167] He also said: "Energy security is an integral part of sustainable development"[168]

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[164] PUTIN, Vladimir; Speech at a Meeting with G8 Parliamentary Leaders, 17 September 2006, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/09/17/0000_type82914type84779_111285.shtml, retrieved on: 03 May 2008

[165] PUTIN, Vladimir; Opening Address at the Meeting with G8 Finance Ministers, 11 February 2006, The Kremlin, Moscow, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/02/11/1400_type82914_101549.shtml, retrieved on 02 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[166] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; 'G8 Meeting is not a Trading Floor', Interview to the Izvestia newspaper, 28 April 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/12, retrieved on: 02 May 2008

[167] LAVROV, Sergey; Summary of Speech at Tenth International Sakhalin Oil and Gas Conference, 27 September 2006, available at: http://www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru/pr002-e.html, retrieved on: 03 May 2008

[168] LAVROV, Sergey; Transcript of Replies to Media Questions at the Final Press Conference of the Participants of the Ministerial Meeting of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Malmo, 13 June 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Information and Press Department, available at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5adbd6655b5fd72dc32572fe00390053?OpenDocument, retrieved on: 03 May 2008

Another point that has been stated several times by the actors is the need to act together:

> It is time for all of us to move forward, follow the same rules and engage with each other to develop an energy security policy. We undoubtedly will not agree on every detail but, hopefully, we can settle on the most important elements of an energy security programme.[169]

The need to take cooperative action is again mentioned by Khristenko; no matter being a producer, consumer or a transit country. He stated: "an 'energy monologue' from whatever geographical position it is vocalized, would be unproductive. The more attention is paid by the parties to mutual arguments, the better they understand themselves and the better they are able to manage their own risks."[170]

Furthermore, the environmental dimension has also been mentioned as an important part in the case of energy. For instance, the 2003 Energy Strategy document of Russia, in the words of Khristenko has three core principles, one of which is related with the environment. "The basis of our Energy Strategy is made up of three "core principles". These are: energy security, energy efficiency, and environmental friendliness."[171]

One of the most important points of the energy policy of Russia is to promote energy efficiency. As put by Khristenko:

> For Russia the energy efficiency and consequently access to new energy saving technologies, materials, and equipment is an issue of paramount importance as it is for European countries. It is due to the fact that Russia being a major energy producing and transit country is at the same time a major and unfortunately not the most efficient energy consumer.[172]

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[169] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; 'Russia Seeks a Constructive Energy Dialogue', 10 May 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/18, retrieved on: 02 May 2008

[170] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Speech at the "Energy Strategy: Resources and Risk Management" Round-table discussion as part of the 10th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, 13 June 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/14, retrieved on: 02 May 2008

[171] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Speech at the "Energy Strategy: Resources and Risk Management" Round-table discussion as part of the 10th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, 13 June 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/14, retrieved on: 02 May 2008

[172] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Speech at the 62nd UNECE Session, Geneva 'The Role and Significance of the Energy Policies of the Russian Federation within the Overall Context of Energy Security for the Un

As was already mentioned, when speaking about energy, the Russian political actors underscore the issue of energy poverty. For instance, Mr Khristenko, at the G-8 Summit of 2006 -where Russia was holding the Presidency- identified three global energy problems which need to be solved by the international community,. These were: energy poverty, underdevelopment of new and ecologically-friendly energy technologies, and sharing of energy best-price. What he said about energy poverty in a more detailed way:

> **Energy poverty:** there is a tremendous gap between those who have energy and those who don't. The problem is especially acute in Africa, where lack of energy hinders the growth of industry and trade, prevents people from taking advantage of information technologies, and limits the spread of knowledge. Germany has named Africa as one of its priorities for their Presidency of the G8. But the development of the continent is impossible without solving energy poverty. For many of those living in Africa the issue of access to energy is without exaggeration a *life or death issue*.[173]

Energy poverty is an issue that the Russian officials very often underscore when they talk about energy security or the issue of energy. In rhetoric, it is seen that they give importance to that. Another important point in this statement is that Khristenko defines energy as a *life* or *death issue*. It is true that he refers to the situation and people living in Africa and their lack of access to energy; yet, this shows the importance given to the energy issue. In a similar vein, a couple of months ago, without referring to Africa, Khristenko defines energy as the source of life. In addition to that he states that energy security is becoming a deciding factor:

> Energy is the *source of life* on earth. Energy security is becoming a *deciding factor* for the future of the planet. The development of new energy technologies is a condition of economic growth and sustainable development, and is certainly a component of the global energy strategy.[174]

Ece Region', 11 May 2007, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/44, retrieved on: 01 May 2008

[173] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Speaking in Paris at the Ministerial Conference on Energy, co-hosted by UNESCO and the Russian Ministry of Energy, October 2007, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eicw/eng/news/11, retrieved on: 03 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[174] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation, 'Humanitarian Principles of Sustainable Energy Development', conference "Energy in the Changing World", Paris, 31 May 2007, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/46, retrieved on: 02 May 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connate security.

After analysing the speeches of the actors, one can come to the conclusion that Russia has been politicizing the issue. However, there is not a securitizing move like the one that was seen in the case of the EU. First, Russia does not perceive the energy issue through a threat perspective. It is true that energy constitutes an important role in the eyes of the political actors for its economic development and its revival as a powerful actor of the international arena. Therefore, it has prominence in its foreign policy, in its relations with the other countries. In rhetoric, when speaking about energy, Russia generally draws attention to the issues of economic poverty, energy efficiency, cooperation and economic considerations. It is also true that supply of demand is essential for Russia as being the producer country. However, unlike the case of the EU MSs, Russia does not see an *existential threat* that should be dealt with in a way to guarantee its survival. Therefore, in the spectrum that is shown in the first chapter related to the politicization, securitization and non-politicization, Russia takes its place in the politicization part in terms of its approach towards energy.

3.4. The Reflection of Energy on Russia's Bilateral-Multilateral Relations

As being one of the most significant actors in the energy sector, Russian relations with other actors are affected by energy. The energy issue may sometimes cause deterioration of relations. In this section, certain bilateral and multilateral relations are analysed with regard to the energy issue. In the analysis of these relations, the politicization of energy becomes apparent as well. However, this does not lead to a use of rhetoric that makes the audience perceive energy in terms of an *existential threat.*

3.4.1. The Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus Crises

In January 2006, Russia cut off its gas deliveries to Ukraine over disagreements in gas prices. However, this cut off also had impact in Europe as it led to a decrease in some of the European states' gas level. This crisis led Europe to question the reliability of Russia as a credible provider of energy. But, this disturbs Russia and the Russians deny the claim that Russia is using its energy power as a political leverage. For Khristenko:

> Every dispute over Russia's reliability as a supplier shall be based on facts. Over more than forty years we are a reliable supplier of energy carriers for European consumers. Russia has never interrupted the supply of its energy carriers to Europe – even during the cold war and the financial crisis of 1998, because we historically treat ourselves as a part of Europe. This shows that Russia, regardless of its inner problems or tense relations with the rest of the world with which we can find ourselves in confrontation, will never interpret energy as a weapon, means of pressure or certain pretence.[175]

It should be borne in mind that the natural gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine started in March 2005 as a result of the Russian Gaz supplier company, Gazprom's demand of an increase in the the natural gas prices to the Ukraine. Gazprom wanted to increase the price from $50 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. As can be seen, Ukraine was paying subsidized prices. The continued rejection of Ukraine to pay this price resulted in Russia's cutting of natural gas to Ukraine on January 1, 2006. It was important for the EU also, as 80% of EU natural gas from Russia pass through Ukraine. In fact, Russia does not understand why the West accuses Russia in this issue because it was justifiable for Russia to demand an increase in the prices of gas especially when it was decided to have a gradual increase in its own domestic gas prices also. Khristenko further states:

> In the 15 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been subsidising the economies of many of the former Soviet republics, supplying power resources to them at prices equal to a quarter of average world prices. These subsidies must end, not for political reasons but for economic ones.[176]

The crisis was resolved on the 4th of January in 2006. Under the deal, Ukraine would buy gas from a Swiss-registered company that is half-owned by Gazprom, called Rosukrenergo. Rosukrenergo would buy gas from Gazprom at $230 per 1,000 cubic meters, and from Turkmenistan for much less. It would supply gas from both sources to Ukraine, and Ukraine would pay an average of $95 per 1,000 cubic meters.

The dispute between Russia and Belarus started when Russia wanted to have an increase of $180 per ton in the oil prices to Belarus in December 2006 and Belarus

[175] KHRISTENKO, Victor B.; 'Confidence Towards Russia', 11 July 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/23, retrieved on: 04 May 2008
[176] KHRISTENKO, Viktor; 'Russia Seeks a Constructive Energy Dialogue', 10 May 2006, available at: http://www.minprom.gov.ru/eng/appearance/18, retrieved on: 04 May 2008

denied paying. As retaliation, Belarus imposed a $45 transit tax per ton on Russian oil shipments. Russia denied paying these taxes and later on, Russian oil company Transneft stopped delivering its crude oil to Belarus through the Druzhba pipeline in January 2007. About 20% of oil to Germany pass through Belarus, therefore, the crisis affected the EU also. Besides Germany, oil supplies to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic has been affected as there was a decrease in the volume of oil and they had to start drawing on their operational stocks. The cut-off lasted for three days. It was resolved as Belarus backed down from its retaliation of $45 increase of oil shipment and Russia agreed to reduce the newly imposed $180 per metric ton export tax sent to Belarus to $53 a ton.[177]

3.4.2. The 2006 G-8 Summit[178]

In the 2006 G-8 Summit, holding the Presidency, Russia put the energy issue as the main focus. Global Energy Security was one of the priority areas of the Summit. It was stated that in order to enhance global energy security, there are some challenges that are to be overcome. These are:

- high and volatile oil prices;
- growing demand for energy (estimated to rise by more than 50% by the year 2030, approximately 80% of which would still be met by fossil fuels, which are limited resources);
- increasing import dependence in many countries;
- enormous investment requirements along the entire energy chain;
- the need to protect the environment and to tackle climate change;
- the vulnerability of the critical energy infrastructure;
- political instability, natural disasters and other threats.[179]

Furthermore, the states declared their commitment on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving the global environment, enhancing energy security, and cutting air

[177] HOLLEY, David; 'Russia, Belarus Resolve Dispute over Oil Duties', Los Angeles Times, 13 January 2007, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/13/world/fg-russdeal13, retrieved on: 20 August 2008

[178] The Group of Eight is an international forum of the major industrialized countries, namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA.

[179] Global Energy Challenges, St. Petersburg, July 2006, available at: http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html, retrieved on: 20 May 2008

pollution in conjunction with efforts to reduce energy poverty.[180] By putting the energy issue at the heart of the Summit when it was holding the Presidency for the first time, Russia showed how significant this issue was for it. Furthermore, it was important to find a multilateral basis to discuss this issue to be able to find a united action. It is also important in terms of 'securitization' process in that the actors defined energy as a challenge to be overcome.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

The issue of energy has been a concern for the public especially in the last few years. In Russia also, it plays an important role in its policy-making; there is the politicization of energy in Russia. However, this does not lead to securitization. The discourses usually focus on energy efficiency, energy poverty, economic development and the environment. In Russia, energy is not regarded as an *existential threat*. Therefore, energy is rather a politicized issue than a securitized one for Russia.

Energy also plays an important role in Russian economy. The economic growth of Russia, especially after Putin's second term as President, owes its pace to the gas and oil revenues. In more concrete terms, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank estimate: "In 2005 the oil and gas sector represented around 20 percent of the country's GDP, generated more than 60 percent of its export revenues (64 percent in 2007), and accounted for 30 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country."[181] As Friedman put it, one can argue that "High prices of oil and gas transformed Russia from the sick man of Europe to the boss man".[182] Besides, as mentioned throughout the chapter, Russia needs a huge amount of investment for its infrastructure and technological advancement. In this sense, it can be argued that as much as the West needs Russian energy, Russia also needs the demand from the West

[180] *Ibid.*
[181] 'Country Analysis Briefs: Russia', U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, available at: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Background.html, retrieved on: 28 July 2008
[182] FRIEDMAN, T.; 'The Really Cold War', The New York Times, 25 October 2006

for her economy. Therefore, the parties should be abstaining from an "energy security dilemma".[183]

It is argued that there is a re-nationalisation of the energy sector in Russia. This may be true in a certain sense. For instance, as put by Larsson: "with the law of 2004, there is a limit on foreign ownership of the companies. The new law on subsoil resources forbids foreigners to own more than 49% of Russian energy companies."[184] It is also argued that Russia is using her 'energy superpower' as a political weapon to be able to realize its national interests. It is true that Russian actors, especially Putin, do not abstain from making threatening speeches. However, what should be kept in mind here is that as there is interdependence in the energy issue, the parties can not jeopardize their interests.

[183] As described by Andrew Monaghan, such a dilemma might occur when the two sides continue to feel insecure vis-à-vis each other and begin to make preparations in case the other intends to threaten it. These preparations create extra suspicion and provoke additional measures in order to better prepare for an eventual threat. Translated into energy relations, such preparations would result in an intense race to diversify purchases and sales away from each other.", cited from: 'Russia's Energy Sector between Politics and Business', Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.s), Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies, No. 92, February 2008, Bremen, available at: http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de, retrieved on: 04 May 2008

[184] LARSSON, Robert L.; 'Russia's Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier', Swedish Defence Research Agency, p. 83, March 2006, available at: http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1934.pdf, retrieved on: 12 March 2008

IV. THE USA AND SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY

The USA has long been self-sufficient in the energy sector till 1950s, however due to the decline in domestic oil production; its dependency on foreign sources increased. It is the third largest oil producing country in the world, though the high consumption rate makes it dependent on foreign sources as it comes first in oil consumption. Among all the others, especially the transportation sector of the USA necessitates a huge dependence on oil which is now supplied through the 'insecure' Middle East Region. It is also worth to underscore here the fact that oil and natural gas provides 62% of the country's energy needs according to the 2001 National Energy Policy Report.[185] In fact, with a 5% of world population, the USA consumes over 33% of the oil used for road transportation in the world. [186] This increasing trend in the energy dependency rate and the ongoing high oil prices put the issue of energy on the agenda. In addition, there were blackouts in California in January 2001 that led to discussions on the issue of energy. In this sense, George W. Bush launched the process of developing an energy policy for the USA.

In this chapter, first, the historical background of the Energy Policy of the USA is analysed within the time frame of 9/11, 2001 until August 2008. It is followed by a facts and figures part to make it more concrete how much the USA consumes and produces oil and natural gas. Furthermore, an analysis of the speeches of the high ranking officials and heads of state and government within the same afore-mentioned time frame is made in a way to see whether securitization occurred or not in the issue of energy. The chapter further portrays the US' securitization of energy and the role of NATO in the securitization of energy.

[185] National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, The White House, Washington DC, Chapter 5, p. 3, May 2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, retrieved on: 24 July 2008

[186] JAFFE, Amy Myers; 'The United States and the International Energy Barrier' in: Sharon Burke and Christine Parthemore, A Strategy for American Power: Energy, Climate and National Security, Center for a New American Century, June 2008, p. 82

4.1. Historical Background of the Energy Policy of the USA

As stated in the American energy security document, the USA imports about 60% of the oil it consumes.[187] The production of oil has been in decline since decades, while consumption increases steadily. Therefore, having a coherent Energy Policy is important for the USA. The energy policy of the USA is analysed within the time frame of 9/11, 2001 up to August 2008. However, this is not to claim that the issue of energy has not been on the mentioned actor's agenda before 9/11, 2001. In fact, since the World War II, the importance of the issue of energy and the significance of Persian Gulf Region to the national interests of the USA have been mentioned several times by the political actors due to the region's significance in oil supplies.[188] What is important to mention here is that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is seen that there is a change in the discourse of the political actors in the USA in the sense that the fear of terrorist attacks to the supply routes and infrastructure gains importance as well. Moreover, there is a tremendous rise in threat perception and the realization of the vulnerability of the USA with 9/11, 2001. The fact that September 11 attacks paved the way to the US invasion of Iraq should also be kept in mind in this regard.

After coming to the office in 2001, George W. Bush established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG). The name of the group explains its aim: their task is to develop a long-term energy policy for the USA that will help the country to respond to its energy needs. On this basis, the '***National Energy Policy'*** (NEP) was declared in May 2001. In fact, energy policy was not a major election theme for Bush. However, the impetus came with the blackouts of 20001 in California and massive blackouts of August 2003 in Northeast as they showed the need for reinvestment.[189] The National Energy Policy Report starts with a big heading: 'Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future'. This gives one an idea about the so-called 'Cheney Report' itself before reading it. The first part is about the energy

[187] American Energy Security: Building A Bridge to Energy Independence and to a Sustainable Energy Future, The Southern States Energy Board, Norcross, Georgia, July 2006, available at: http://www.americanenergysecurity.org/AES%20Report.pdf, retrieved on: 25 July 2008
[188] See the Nixon and Carter Doctrines that are also related to the issue.
[189] MOENS, Alexander; '*The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, and Loyalty*', Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, 2004, p. 78

challenges facing the USA one of which is "increasing our energy supplies in ways that protect and improve the environment"[190] Second challenge is seen as the repairing and expanding of the energy infrastructure.[191] The components of the NEP are threefold as it was stated:

> • The Policy is a long-term, comprehensive strategy. Our energy crisis has been years in the making, and will take years to put fully behind us.
> • The Policy will advance new, environmentally friendly technologies to increase energy supplies and encourage cleaner, more efficient energy use.
> • The Policy seeks to raise the living standards of the American people, recognizing that to do so our country must fully integrate its energy, environmental, and economic policies.[192]

Increasing energy security of the USA is one of the goals mentioned in the NEP. According to the report, this will be realized through decreasing the dependency of the USA on foreign sources of energy. In this vein, in order to respond to the growing domestic energy demand, it is suggested to increase domestic energy supplies. It will be done through the use of latest drilling technology in both onshore and offshore areas of the USA, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for instance, an area in the northeastern Alaska. However, this is questioned by the environmentalists. Increasing energy conservation and efficiency is another goal stated in the NEP. Energy efficiency is defined in the report as: "the ability to use less energy to produce the same amount of lighting, heating, transportation, and other energy services"[193] Furthermore, increasing America's use of renewable and alternative energy is another goal that to be achieved. In this line, it is recommended to have an increase in the budget for the research and development of renewable energy resources.

Currently, the U.S. has enough coal to last for another 250 years.[194] Protection of the environment is one of the goals of the NEP. Thus, research and development for clean-coal technologies is emphasized in order to use this vast amount of resource.

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[190] National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, The White House, Washington DC, Overview ix, May 2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, retrieved on: 24 July 2008
[191] *Ibid.*
[192] *Ibid* ,xi
[193] *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, p. 1
[194] *Ibid.*, xiii

Moreover, improving America's aging energy structure is another goal that is mentioned at the report. Finally, the report mentions about the aim of strengthening global alliances in such a way to enhance national energy security and international relationships. It is stated that "the national energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to support U.S. and global economic growth."[195]

The endeavour to develop a long-lasting comprehensive Energy Policy continued with the issuing of the ***'Energy Policy Act'*** (EPAct) on August 8, 2005, "the founding text of the new American Energy Policy"[196], in the words of Paillard, civil administrator from the Ministry of Defence. In the EPAct, it is again sought to decrease the dependence of the USA on foreign sources and to diversify the energy supply routes.[197] Similar to the 2001 NEP document, increasing domestic production is aimed in the EPAct. Other aims are to increase efficiency and conservation in homes and businesses. Improving the energy efficiency of vehicles is important and to be able to support this, the EPAct, more importantly, offers consumers federal tax credits to encourage them to buy fuel-efficient hybrid-electric vehicles also for energy-efficient appliances and products. These credits would also be available.

The EPAct was followed by the Bush Administration's ***'Advanced Energy Initiative'*** (AEI) of 2006 that aims a 22% increase of funding in clean energy research which would be based on a change in the way that the vehicles are fueled and a change in the way the houses are powered.[198] As the transportation sector constitutes most of the energy consumption, this is an attempt to have a decrease in that. In this vein, the development of advance battery technologies to have cars operating solely on battery for a 40 mile range and having large numbers of Americans to choose hydrogen fuel

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[195] *Ibid*., Chapter 8, p. 1

[196] PAILLARD, Christophe-Alexandre; 'The Energy Policy of the USA: Myths and Reality?' (La Politique Énergetique des États-Unis: Mytes et Realités?) in: 'Energy Security: Towards New Power Struggles?' (Securité Énergetique : vers de Nouveaux Rapports de Force?), Strategic Research Foundation, 12 September 2005, p. 36. Note that the translation from French to English is made by the author of this study.

[197] Energy Policy Act 2005 Section 1837: National Security Review of International Energy Requirements, The US Department of Energy, February 2006, p. 23

[198] Advanced Energy Initiative The White House, National Economic Council, February 2006, p. 2, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/energy/energy_booklet.pdf, retrieved on: 06 August 2008

cell vehicles by 2020 are aimed.[199] Finally, in December 2007, Bush signed the ***'Energy Independence and Security Act'*** (EISA) as a further step in fulfilling his Twenty in Ten initiative of January 2007 which targeted reducing US oil use by 20% in ten years, from 2007 till 2017. As mentioned in the Fact Sheet of the White House, the EISA aims to expand the production of renewable fuels as it will set a mandatory Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requiring fuel producers to use at least 36 billion gallons of biofuel in 2022; to decrease US dependence on oil by setting a national fuel economy standard of 35 miles per gallon by 2020 and to address climate change.[200]

The importance given to the issue of energy can be seen from the measures taken in the last years. This shows the willingness of the USA to develop a comprehensive Energy Policy. In fact, after the 1992 Energy Policy Act document, the NEP of 2001 was the first attempt to develop an energy policy. It is also important to mention here that the National Energy Policy of 2001 recommended that the USA should make energy security a priority of its trade and foreign policy."[201] The multifaceted dimension of energy is prevalent here. Besides the initiatives that were mentioned above, the National Security Strategies (NSS) of the USA of 2002 and of 2006 also gave place to energy issue. They mentioned about the enhancement of energy security. In the NSS of 2006, it is stated: "the United States is the world's third largest oil producer, but we rely on international sources to supply more than 50 percent of our needs."[202] Energy has become an issue of high concern in the USA, therefore, it would not be surprising to see more initiatives coming to the fore as the US and world demand for energy is increasing steadily.

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[199] *Ibid.*

[200] Fact Sheet: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, The White House, 19 December 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071219-1.html, retrieved on: 25 July 2008

[201] National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, White House, Washington DC, May 2001, chapter 8, p. 130, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, retrieved on: 24 July 2008

[202] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 33
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, retrieved on: 24 July 2008

4.2. Facts and Figures

The USA is the world's largest energy consumer. It ranks eleventh worldwide in reserves of oil, sixth in natural gas, and first in coal.[203] Between 1973 and 2000, US dependence on foreign oil rose from about 35% to more than 52% of domestic production.[204] It is important to mention here that the rising demand for foreign oil is not the only problem. Natural gas also takes an important share in the US energy demand as natural gas generating capacity is expected to constitute about 90% of the projected increase in electricity generation between 2000 and 2020. The figure below shows the sources of energy consumption in the USA. It is important to see the share of petroleum and natural gas in the overall energy use. As can be seen, in the USA, oil accounts for 40% of US energy consumption, natural gas for 23%.

Graph 4.1. US Primary Energy Consumption by Source, 2005



Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 2005, available at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038405.pdf, retrieved on: August 2008

[203] Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government,Country Analysis Brief, available at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=US, retrieved on: 25 July 2008

[204] BAHGAT, Gawdat; 'United States Energy Security', Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 26:3, Fall 2001

As mentioned earlier, domestic production in terms of oil has declined in the USA and this trend still continues though there is an increase in US oil demand. The USA imported about 58% of the petroleum which includes crude oil and refined petroleum products, that was consumed during 2007. About half of these imports came from the Western Hemisphere. The graphs below indicate this situation clearly.

Graph 4.2.



Graph 4.3.



The United States remains self-sufficient in natural gas production while it is the world's third largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia and Russia. It produces 10% of the world's petroleum and consumes 24%, therefore, it still imports over 50% of her needs from the Americas - Canada (18.2%), Mexico (11.4%), and Venezuela (10.1%) - as well as from Saudi Arabia (11.0%), and Nigeria (8.4%).[205]

4.3. Securitization of Energy in the USA

In this section, an analysis of the speeches of the relevant actors related to the US energy policy is made in order to see whether the issue of energy is securitized by the US actors or not, to see whether the USA uses a security speech-act or not in the energy issue. In this sense, the speeches of the President, George W. Bush; the Secretaries of State, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice; the Secretaries of Energy, Samuel W. Bodman and Spencer Abraham and the Under-Secretary of Science at the Department of Energy, Raymond Lee Orbach are analysed within the time frame of

[205] Energy Information Administration, Official Statistics from the US Government, available at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm, retrieved on: 30 July 2008

September 11, 2001 until August 2008. It is important to mention here that from the speeches of the actors, the parts related to the energy issue are analysed in such a way to search for security arguments. Their wording gains prominence in that regard as the analysis is made in order to see whether and how the wording has a 'security' connotation or if there are words that make one perceive the issue as an existential threat.

The issue of energy has been on the US agenda especially in the last years. It is also seen throughout the analysis of the speeches below. Especially after 2006, the actors started to talk about energy more often. Yet, even in 2001, one can see that the Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, talks about the issue in terms of national security as can be seen from his remark: "I think it is time for all of us to understand that our energy and science programs should be judged by whether they advance this nation's energy - and hence, national - security."[206] This is an important remark in tracing 'securitization' because he terms energy as a national security issue. The national security of a state is about its survival and one of the means to protect the national security of a state is the use of military means. It is true that Abraham does not say anything about military measures; however, still, naming energy under national security terms may have the connotation of it. In the same vein, the National Energy Policy of 2001 recommends that the USA should "make energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy."[207]

Furthermore, at the 25th Anniversary of the Department of Energy, Secretary Abraham underscored: "The mission we all share - enhancing America's energy and national security - is even more profound today than it was in October 1977. October 2002 finds us a nation at war. It finds us a nation facing serious energy challenges over

[206] ABRAHAM, Spencer; The Mission and Priorities of the Department, Remarks by Spencer Abraham, Quarterly Leadership Meeting, The United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2001, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/02/02-10_Leadership%20Meeting.htm, retrieved on: 02 September 2008

[207] National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, White House, Washington DC, May 2001, chapter 8, p. 130, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, retrieved on: 24 July 2008

the coming decades."[208] Here again, energy is related with national security. More importantly, after mentioning about America's being in war, though he's referring to the 'War on Terror', Abraham draws attention to the fact that the USA faces energy *challenges*. Moreover, this is not the only place that he talks about this challenge. A few months later, referring to the issue of energy he said: "Department of Energy will continue assist in meeting this *homeland security challenge*."[209]

It is seen that the actors not only see energy as a national security issue but also a foreign policy issue. The multifaceted nature of energy is underscored several times by the actors. The remark of Bush after the August 2003 blackouts in the Northeast USA is interesting in this regard:

> National security means economic security for every single citizen. And one of the lessons we learned a while ago was that a reliable, affordable electrical power is essential for economic growth in America. It's an essential part of an economic plan. If you're interested in creating jobs, you'd better have energy. You're not going to have an economy grow without reliable sources of energy.[210]

It is seen that energy is also regarded as an economic issue as it is *essential* for economic growth and job creation. What is more, energy is related with economic security in this statement of Bush. In another occasion, he makes a remarkable point in terms of 'securitization': "Reliable and affordable energy is critical to our *economic security*, our *national security*, and our *homeland security*."[211] This is a significant securitizing move because energy is related not only to economic and national security

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[208] ABRAHAM, Spencer; Former Secretaries of Energy Celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the Department of Energy, 8 October 2002, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/02/02-08_25th%20Anniversary.htm, retrieved on: 02 September 2008

[209] ABRAHAM, Spencer; Statement of Energy Secretary at the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 25 February 2003, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/03/03-02_Senate%20Energy.htm, retrieved on: 02 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[210] BUSH, George W.; Remarks by the President to Plant Employees and Local Community Leaders, Monroe, Michigan, 15 September 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030915-6.html, retrieved on: 15 August 2008

[211] BUSH, George W.; President Commends Bipartisan Support for National Energy Policy, 18 November 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031118-7.html, retrieved on: 15 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

but also to homeland security. It is important because homeland security denotes defense. The Department of Homeland Security in the USA was established in 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks with the mission of preventing terrorist attacks in the USA. Besides acts of terrorism, natural disasters and other emergencies are also the Department's concern. Although it is the Ministry of Defence that takes the military measures and leaves the civilian ones to the Homeland Security Department, still, relating energy to homeland security is actually an important se*curitizing move*.

Another important aspect about the multifaceted nature of energy is its relation with the environment. Therefore, the actors very often mention about the challenge of energy with regards to environmental concerns and contend that these two greatest challenges of the time (energy and the environment) should be handled together. Secretary Abraham states:

> I would like to take this opportunity to discuss one of the *central questions* of our time, and that is the question of how the world should address the *profound energy challenges* it will face in the 21st century....Finding a path to meet the *dual challenges of* energy security and environmental stewardship will require *global cooperation*.[212]

The relation of energy with the environment is once again underscored besides the mentioning of the vitality of energy in economy by the Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman: "Energy is the *lifeblood* of our economy and our modern way of life. Ensuring secure and affordable energy supplies, in a way that protects the environment, is one of the *most serious challenges* facing every nation on Earth."[213]

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[212] ABRAHAM, Spencer; Remarks Prepared for Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, Chatham House, London, 20 May 2004, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/04/05-20-04%20Chatham%20House%20London.html, retrieved on: 02 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[213] BODMAN, Samuel; Commencement Address to the Georgia Institute of Technology, 7 May 2005, Atlanta, Georgia, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/05/May%207.html, retrieved on: 02 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

Furthermore, there are many occasions in which the actors talk about the *vulnerability* of the USA in the case of energy. The *vulnerability* of the USA in terms of energy has been confirmed by the President Bush linking it to economy:

> This growing demand for energy poses *serious challenges*, and one of them is energy security. Right now much of the world's energy comes from oil, and much of the oil comes from *unstable regions* and *rogue states*. This dependence leaves the global economy *vulnerable* to supply shocks and shortages and manipulation, and to extremists and terrorists who could cause great disruptions of oil shipments.[214]

On another occasion:

> Some of the nations we rely on for oil have unstable governments, or fundamental differences with the United States. These countries know we need their oil and that reduces influence. It creates a *national security issue* when we're held hostage for energy by foreign nations that may not like us. Energy is also part of our *economic security*, as well…I mean, the global demand for oil has been rising faster than supply because there's new economies that are beginning to gin up, new economies growing, like China and India. Oil prices rise sharply when demand is greater than supply. And when they do, it strains your budgets. It hurts our families, it hurts our small entrepreneurs. It's like a hidden tax. And so we're *vulnerable to high prices of oil*, and we're *vulnerable to sudden disruptions of oil. The dependence upon oil is a national security problem, and an economic security problem.*[215]

This statement is significant as it also reflects the multifaceted nature of energy as it is regarded as both national and economic security problem. It can be argued that energy is an issue of foreign policy, economy and the environment. The USA must act "for the sake of economic security, national security, and for the sake of being good stewards of the environment."[216] Growing oil demand in the USA is seen as a serious problem as the USA gets its oil through 'unstable' or 'unfriendly' regions. Then, as it is a national security issue, what would be the measures to take in the case of disruption?

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[214] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Participates in Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change, 28 September 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070928-2.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[215] BUSH, George W.; President Discusses Advanced Energy Initiative In Milwaukee, 20 February 2006, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060220-1.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[216] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Attends Washington International Renewable Energy Conference 2008, Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., 05 March 2008, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080305.html, retrieved on: 12 August 2008

Though he does not respond to this question, Bush's remark is significant as he talks about how much he worries about the national security implications of dependence on foreign energy.

> I have spent a lot of time worrying about the *national security implications* of being addicted to oil, particularly from parts of the world where people may not agree with our policy or our way of life, and the *economic security implications of being hooked on oil*, particularly since the demand for oil is rising faster than the supply of oil. And any time that happens it creates the conditions for what could be price disruption and price spikes at home are like hidden taxes on the working people of our country.[217]

However, a couple of months later, it is seen that the response may be *forceful*.

> And so we talked about common-sense ideas. And I really do appreciate the members from both political parties thinking strongly about how we can work together to serve the American consumer and make us less dependent on foreign sources of oil. The prices of gasoline should serve as a wake-up call to all of us involved in public office, *that we have got an energy security problem and a national security problem, and now is the time to deal with it in a forceful way.* And I am heartened by the fact that we were able to have such a constructive dialogue, and that there's a commitment to get good legislation out of the Congress.[218]

However, this does not necessarily mean that the response is military measures. Because of the vagueness of the term forceful here, one can not be one hundred percent sure of that. It can also be argued that he means working on the ways to deal with the problem of energy dependence in an intensified and effective way. Nonetheless, it is very important as it has the connotation to use force. On another occasion, the President talks about one of the ways to deal with sudden disruption of supply:

> …if a terrorist threat -- if terrorism is a threat to the supply of -- our energy supply, then I believe it makes sense to address that terrorist threat by doubling the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, so that, rather than 750 million gallons of crude oil in storage in case there's a disruption based upon a terrorist threat, there's a billion-five.

[217] BUSH, George W.; President Participates in Energy Conservation & Efficiency Panel, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, Colorado, 21 February 2006, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060221.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[218] BUSH, George W.; President Meets with Members of Congress, Discusses Energy Policy, The Cabinet Room, 03 May 2006, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060503-7.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

> In other words, if we're saying dependence on oil creates a terrorist threat, let's do something about it now. Let's say that if the threat does come, there's enough crude oil in storage to be able to deal with the short-term economic consequences of an attack.[219]

Another measure to deal with the shortage of supply due to terrorist attack or else, Bush suggests: "We also must diversify our Nation's energy supply, and the way forward is through technology."[220] For him:

> …dependency upon energy from somewhere else means that you're dependent upon the decisions from somewhere else. And so as we diversify away from the use of gasoline by using ethanol we're really diversifying away from oil. Secondly, dependency upon oil creates an economic problem for not only the United States, but anybody else who imports oil. In a globalized world, if the demand for oil goes up in China or India, it runs up the price of gasoline in our respective countries. And therefore, diversification away from oil product is in the economic interests of our respective countries. And finally, we all feel incumbent to be good stewards of the environment. It just so happens that ethanol and biodiesel will help improve the quality of the environment in our respective countries.[221]

By the same token, in another occasion, he said:

> I like the idea that farmers are growing energy that powers our cars. I'd rather be paying American farmers than people overseas for the energy that fuels this economy. And so when you're making a vehicle that runs on ethanol, or a flex-fuel vehicle, you're really helping *national security*. I know that *when you're dependent on oil, and the objective of some of the terrorists is to destroy oil networks, it creates a national security problem for us. In other words, the more we're dependent on oil from somewhere else, the more we're vulnerable to national security issues*. Because it's going to be *necessary for this country for national security and economic security reasons to start using different kinds of fuels*.[222]

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[219] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Discusses Energy Initiative, DuPont Theater, Hotel du Pont, Wilmington, Delaware, 24 January 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070124-4.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008

[220] BUSH, George W.; President's Radio Address, 27 January 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070127.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008

[221] BUSH, George W.; President Bush and President Lula of Brazil Discuss Biofuel Technology, Petrobras Transporte S.A. Facility, São Paulo, Brazil, 09 March 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070309-4.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008

[222] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Discusses Energy Initiatives in Missouri, Ford Motor Company, Kansas City Assembly Plant Claycomo, Missouri, 20 March 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070320-7.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

Dependence is regarded as a national security issue because of the possibility of a terrorist attack on the oil networks. In order to deal with it, Bush suggests increasing ethanol and biodiesel use for vehicles by the development of technology.

Another significant remark came from the Secretary of State, Rice, in 2007, when she stated that the energy issue constitutes a global challenge and it has its impact on various sectors. It is also important to underscore the fact that she named the situation as *crisis*.

> Energy is truly a *global challenge* - making a decisive impact on issues as diverse as security, diplomacy, development, and climate change. No one nation can address the *global energy crisis* alone. We need to work together to seize new opportunities to develop cleaner and more efficient sources of energy and to prevent the global and rapidly growing demand for energy resources from generating unnecessary confrontation in the years ahead. We are looking for new opportunities, identifying new partners, and working in new ways to tackle the energy challenge more effectively.[223]

The following statement of the EU-US Summit of 2007 in Washington D.C is also important as the actors drew attention to the *urgency* of the global challenge of energy. Moreover, in their view, this crisis situation could only be handled with global action.

> Ensuring secure, affordable supplies of energy and tackling climate change are central, interlinked *global challenges facing the international community*. Addressing these issues requires *urgent*, sustained global action and an integrated policy approach, using a wide range of regionally, nationally or internationally defined policy tools and measures. We are determined to ensure access to affordable, clean, and secure sources of energy to underpin sustainable global economic growth and to protect our environment. Tackling *the challenge of energy security* will also require unprecedented international cooperation in several areas, including increasing energy efficiency, market transparency, diversifying energy supplies – including the share of renewable energies – and protecting and maintaining the world's energy supply system.[224]

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[223] RICE, Condoleezza; 'Ensuring a Sound Energy Future', Remarks With German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, U.S.-EU Energy CEO Forum, Washington, DC, 19 March 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/mar/81934.htm, retrieved on: 01 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[224] 2007 U.S.-EU Summit Statement: Energy Security, Efficiency, and Climate Change, 30 April 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070430-8.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008

The urgency was also mentioned by Bush, as he said referring to energy: "It's a national security issue to be dependent on oil from parts of the world where some of the folks don't like us. It's an issue that's got to be dealt with -- *now*." [225] This statement clearly indicates the urgency of dealing with the issue of energy implying that if no measures are taken, it may be too late.

As mentioned above, in many occasions, the actors assert how energy constitutes a significant challenge to the security of the USA. However, the following remark is slightly different from the previous ones as energy security is defined as one of the biggest challenges of the coming decades. "This evening I would like to say a word about one of those *challenges*, perhaps *the biggest*, that we face as Americans today and in the coming decades: energy security."[226] Orbach further declared: "With energy security a global issue, in tandem with climate change and other environmental concerns, we need to do that again. Energy and environment are front and center as our challenge for humanity."[227]

It is not only energy that poses greatest challenge to humanity as the actors take energy and the environment together and state that they should be tackled together. This is apparent in the following remarks of the President: "I believe that it is essential that we have a comprehensive energy policy to be able to deal with the *challenges* we're going to face in the 21st century, whether that be energy independence or economic security or good environmental policy."[228] The interrelatedness of economic and environmental dimensions is relevant also in the statement:

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[225] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Visits Cleveland, Ohio, Intercontinental Hotel Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, 10 July 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070710-6.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connate security.

[226] ORBACH, Raymond L.; Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Dr. Raymond L. Orbach Under Secretary for Science at the Ph.D. Commencement Georgia Institute of Technology, The U.S. Department of Energy, 3 May 2007, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/May%203.html, retrieved on: 02 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[227] ORBACH, Raymond L.; Remarks Prepared for Dr. Raymond L. Orbach at the Announcement of the DOE Bioenergy Research Centers National Press Club, Washington, DC, 26 June 2007, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/June%2026.html, retrieved on: 02 September 2008

[228] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Discusses Energy Initiatives in Athens, Alabama

> High crude oil prices yield higher gasoline prices. And therefore, there's an economic issue for being dependent on oil. And there's an environmental cost for being dependent on oil. When we're burning carbon, it creates greenhouse gasses, which is an issue that we need to deal with. So we have a fantastic opportunity to do something different, for the sake of our *economy*, for the sake of our *national security*, and for the sake of the *environment*.[229]

It is worth to underscore the fact that as time goes by, the rhetoric on energy also changes in that the actors start to name energy not only as a challenge but as the most pressing one: that this is a critical time, that it is monumental. As can be seen from the following statements of the Secretary of Energy, Bodman:

> This is such a *critical time* in our history. As a nation, we face *tremendous challenges* to our security, to our health and well-being, and to our future economic competitiveness. Among our *most pressing issues* is improving our energy security and addressing global climate change issues that we at the Department of Energy grapple with daily.[230]

He goes even further by stating that it is the greatest challenge of humanity: "The energy and environmental challenge confronting us in the century ahead is truly *monumental*. It may be one of the biggest challenges humanity has ever faced."[231] The challenge of energy is not only monumental but also it is *massive* and *pervasive*.[232]

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, 21 June 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070621-12.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[229] BUSH, George W.; President Bush Visits Cleveland, Ohio, Intercontinental Hotel Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, 10 July 2007, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070710-6.html, retrieved on: 14 August 2007. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[230] BODMAN, Samuel, Washington D.C., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary Bodman at the Department of Energy National Science Bowl, 5 May 2008, available at: http://www.doe.gov/news/6205.htm, retrieved on: 16 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[231] ORBACH, Raymond L.; Assuring a Secure Energy Future, L.M.K. Boelter Lecture, UCLA Engineering Technology Forum, De Neve Commons, UCLA, Tuesday, 27 May 2008, available at: http://www.er.doe.gov/News_Information/speeches/speeches/08/LMK_Boelter/index.htm, retrieved on: 02 September 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[232] BODMAN, Samuel; Remarks As Prepared for Delivery for Secretary Bodman fort he U.S. Chamber of Commerce's 4th Annual North America Forum, 16 June 2008, Washington D. C., available at: http://www.doe.gov/news/6341.htm, retrieved on: 16 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

Although it is beyond the time-frame of this study, the following statement of Bush should be mentioned at this point as he summarizes the policies designed for meeting the challenge of energy.

> Our objective should not only be to manage the current situation, but to avoid any crisis in the first instance. This requires a four-part strategy. First, to make energy security a priority of our foreign policy, by restoring American credibility with overseas suppliers and building strong relationships with energy-producing nations in our hemisphere. Second, to encourage environmentally-friendly exploration and production of domestic energy sources, like oil, natural gas and coal. Third, to promote the production of electricity, to keep pace with America's growing demands. Fourth, to support the development of cost-effective alternative energy sources. The goals of this strategy are clear, to ensure a steady supply of affordable energy for America's homes and businesses and industries, and to work toward the day when America achieves energy independence.[233]

After analyzing the speeches of the relevant policy actors of the USA, it can be argued that the actors are trying to securitize the energy issue. It has been stated that energy is the greatest challenge to humanity and that there is an urgency to deal with it. Moreover, energy security is always connected to the environment which in itself is a securitized sector. It is true that there is an existential threat; however, another component of the securitization process is still missing: the use of extraordinary measures. There is no evidence that the USA has taken any unconventional measures in order to deal with the issue of energy. Therefore, it can not be argued that energy is totally securitized in the USA. Nevertheless, in the non-politicized, politicized and securitized spectrum, it takes its place very close to the securitized part because the issue is regarded in terms of a national and homeland security issue. It is an issue that affects the economy and the environment; thus, the future economic growth of the country.

4.4. The US' Securitization of Energy and the Role of NATO

Since energy has begun to be regarded increasingly as a security issue, certain actors started to question the possible role of NATO in ensuring energy security. At the

[233] BUSH, George W.; Remarks by the President and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham in Swearing-In Ceremony, The Oval Office, 2 March 2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010302-7.html, retrieved on: 16 August 2008

November 2006 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Riga Summit, the issue of energy security was put on the agenda and the role of an American senator was significant in this regard.

The transfer of the issue to the level of NATO is important as it can be argued that it is an open indication that the issue of energy is securitized. The involvement of NATO is seen as a way to secure the transit routes and uninterrupted supply of energy. This desire was relevant at the November 2006 Riga Summit of NATO, when the American senator Richard Lugar wanted to have a redefinition of Article V[234] of the North Atlantic Treaty in such a way to encompass energy security which would mean that a cut on the energy supplies on one of the member states could be seen as an attack on the whole alliance and they may take coordinated action including the use of force"[235] At his keynote speech to the German Marshall Fund conference in Riga, Senator Lugar said: "in the coming decades, the most likely source of *armed conflict* in the European theater and the surrounding regions will be energy scarcity and manipulation. It would be irresponsible for NATO to decline involvement in energy security".[236] However, he makes clear:

> This does not mean that attempts to manipulate energy for international political gain would require a NATO military response. Rather, it means that the Alliance must commit itself to preparing for and responding to attempts to use the energy weapon against its fellow members. NATO must become a reliable refuge for members against threats stemming from their energy insecurity.[237]

In fact, the issue of energy was not a totally new one in NATO. In the 1999 Strategic Concept of NATO, under paragraph 24, it was stated:

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[234] In the Article 5, it is stated: "an armed attack against one or more (members) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"; and the article further goes on to call for "coordinated action among alliance members, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security."

[235] KATIK, Mevlut; 'Energy Security, Georgia Hot Topics for NATO', 2006, available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16981, retrieved on: 05 August 2008

[236] LUGAR, Richard G.; 'Energy and NATO', Senator Lugar's keynote speech to the German Marshall Fund Conference in advance of the NATO Summit, 27 November 2006 in Riga, Latvia, available at: http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/press/speech/riga.cfm, retrieved on: 05 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.

[237] *Ibid.*

> Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the *disruption of the flow of vital resources*.[238]

Therefore, it would not be surprising to see the actors that would like to have NATO involved in this issue base their arguments on that document. By taking into account the new global context, one can argue that oil and natural gas are vital resources and thus should be under the protection of NATO.

At the Riga Summit declaration, a paragraph is dedicated to the issue of energy.

> As underscored in NATO's Strategic Concept, Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. We support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. With this in mind, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and, upon request, assist national and international efforts.[239]

From the statement above, it is seen that in the case of a disruption of the vital resources, NATO may take action upon the request of the Allies. What is important here is that it is stated that NATO may add value for the security interests of the Allies. Therefore, it will be acting as complementary. On this basis, one can argue that the Allies do not want to have any duplication. However, NATO's complementary role actually remains unclear as it is not specified to what the Alliance will be complementary. Nonetheless, this Summit Declaration is significant in the sense that NATO may have a role in times of energy supply disruptions or any other energy-related problem. Furthermore, at the Riga Summit, a Comprehensive Political Guidance was issued. In this Comprehensive Political Guidance which provides a framework and political direction for NATO for the next 10 to 15 years, the disruption of the flow of

[238] The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO On-line Library, NATO Press Release, 24 April 1999, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, retrieved on: 05 August 2008. The italics are added by the author of this study to draw attention to the parts that connote security.
[239] Riga Summit Declaration, NATO On-line Library, NATO Press Release, Riga, 29 November 2006, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm, retrieved on: 05 August 2008

vital resources is also counted to be one of the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in that period.[240]

It is also worth to mention here about the working group that was established after the 2006 Riga Summit, the NATO Task Force on Energy Security. Furthermore, NATO itself is questioning the role it can take for the enhancement of energy security. Some reports regarding energy issue were presented in NATO: the 2006 Report on 'Energy Security', the 2008 Report on 'Energy Security for the Transatlantic Region' that provides an overview of the challenges and possible responses, and another 2008 Report on 'Energy Security: Co-operating to Enhance the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures'.

Moreover, more recently, in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the North Atlantic Council was given the task to prepare a consolidated report on progress achieved in the area of energy security for consideration at the 2009 summit. More importantly, in the Summit Declaration, it was stated:

> Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO's approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO's endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security.[241]

As can be seen above, the measures to tackle the issue of energy were determined with the 2008 Bucharest Summit and it was stated that NATO would have a consultative role in energy security. In addition, once again, the complementary role of NATO was underscored.

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[240] Comprehensive Political Guidance, NATO On-line Library, NATO Basic Texts, 29 November 2006, available at: http://www.nato.int:80/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm, retrieved on: 05 August 2008

[241] Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO Press Release, 03 April 2008, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html, retrieved on: 05 August 2008

As was mentioned several times throughout this study, especially after the Russia-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine energy crises, energy consolidated its place at the top of the international agenda. Through the examination of the speeches of the actors that has been made in the previous chapters in order to check whether there is a security speech-act or not, it is seen that actors are trying to securitize the issue of energy. The EU, Russia and the USA, they all take their places in the different parts of the securitization spectrum. None has completed the whole securitization process as no tangible extraordinary measures have been taken yet. In addition to other actors, NATO also started to question its potential role regarding the issue. On the other hand, when it comes to the participation of NATO, it would be naïve to argue that the issue is not securitized. In fact, it can be argued that the involvement of NATO is securitization itself.

4.5. Concluding Remarks

The USA is the largest consumer of energy in the world. Despite its self-sufficiency till the midst of the century, due to the decline in her domestic production, it has become a net importer of energy. Therefore, there occurred a need to develop a comprehensive energy policy for the country. Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the tremendous rise in threat perception and the realization of the vulnerability of the USA, Bush tried to develop one. However, it is still an on-going process.

After a thorough analysis of the speeches of the relevant actors of the USA, it is seen that the actors are trying to securitize the energy issue. Energy becomes the greatest challenge to humanity in their terms, with the possibility to affect many sectors. It is of utmost importance to underscore the fact that the USA very often considers the problem in relation to the environmental problems. It is stated that these two greatest challenges should be handled together. This is important in the sense that the environment is already a securitized sector and by mentioning energy in tandem with it, the actors try to persuade the audience that energy is also an issue of security. Finally, one can argue that due to the lack of extraordinary measures, the whole securitization

process has not finalized in the USA. However, this does not prevent the USA from taking its place very close to the securitized part of the spectrum.

V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENERGY SECURITIZATION IN THE EU, RUSSIA AND THE USA

Energy has found its place on the agenda of the international arena, especially in the last few years. As seen in the previous chapters, the EU and the USA have been trying to politicize and securitize the issue and energy has also become an issue of priority for Russia. The reason behind this importance attached to energy are manifold: the increasing demand for energy, the on-going high oil prices, the negative impact of energy use on the environment and the energy crises between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus. Furthermore, energy is vital for the continuation of daily activities. It is vital in the sense that there is a growing reliance on energy for the working of factories, cooling and heating households, transportation, lightening, working of mechanical devices, for military, etc. Therefore, the secure supply of the finite energy resources has gained prominence. This chapter attempts at analysing the respective positions of the EU, the USA and Russia on the issue of energy.

5.1. Dependency or Supremacy in Energy?

Does the level of dependency or supremacy in the energy issue affect the actors' perceptions and determine their securitizing or politicizing moves? The answer to this question would be 'yes' because with the high dependency rate, the perception of fear that the foreign supplies may be cut increases. This causes the actors to have a tendency to securitize the issue.

The European Union is dependent on foreign sources in energy. In fact, it comes first in Russian energy exports. However, it is true that there are differences in the dependency rate of each Member State and their energy mix. The EU-27 imports 52% of its energy and this has an increasing pace.[242] Due to this high and on-going dependency rate, from the security speech-act analysis of the second chapter, it is seen that the EU has an inclination to securitize the issue of energy. This is not the case in

[242] See facts and figures part of Chapter II.

Russia as Russia is an energy superpower with its largest natural gas reserves of the world and it is the second oil exporter country in the world. As Russia is not dependent on this 'vital' source of energy, it does not have the perception of fear and therefore, it does not regard the issue as an existential threat. Though the issue finds its place on the top of the agenda of the policy actors due to its significance to Russia's economy and its bilateral and multilateral relations, it does not reach to a level of securitization. In the case of the USA however, the actors are more inclined to securitize the energy issue. As in the case of the EU, this is again due to its high dependency rate of foreign sources in energy. The USA is the largest energy consumer country of the world even though it constitutes only 5% of the world population. In 2007, it imported 58% of its petroleum.[243] Moreover, the US oil exports from Russia is increasing significantly. This is important because it may affect their bilateral relations.

As can be read from the remarks above, the EU and the USA are highly dependent on foreign energy supplies and they both have a tendency to securitize the energy issue. On the other hand, being a producer country, Russia is self-sufficient and it has supremacy in this issue. Moreover, Russia rather politicizes the issue of energy instead of securitizing it. This is significant because it shows one the link between energy dependency and securitization. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a relationship between the level of dependency and the tendency to securitize the issue of energy.

5.2. Comparison of the Process of Securitization of Energy in the EU, the USA and Russia

After a thorough examination of the speeches of the actors between September 11, 2001 and August 2008, it is seen that the issue of energy has been highly politicized and in a certain extent "securitized" by the actors of the international arena. The issue of energy has been to a certain extent securitized by the actors in that it has become a part of *high politics* and it started to be perceived as in terms of an *existential* threat, that of

[243] See facts and figures part of Chapter IV.

survival. Thus, it is taken out of the 'normal political agenda'.[244] However, one can claim that securitization of energy has been realized to a certain extent as the 'breaking of the established rules of the game' has not come into existence yet although a high degree of public concern is present. Furthermore, there are differences in the degree of politicization and securitization and in the attitudes of the actors in the EU, the USA and Russia towards the energy issue. One of the reasons of this is the difference in the amount of their energy reserves. For instance, the EU is highly dependent on Russian natural gas and it is predicted that the USA will be dependent on Russian oil as its oil imports from Russia is in increase.

In the case of the EU, it is seen that the Union is highly dependent on imports in terms of energy as it is not able to respond to its own energy needs. Russia is one of the main providers of energy sources to the EU. A comprehensive analysis of various statements by different EU officials reveals that the issue of energy in the beginning of the new millennium was only considered within the scope of climate change issues and environmental concerns. It is with the energy crises between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus that the EU has started to put more emphasis on the energy issue and has started to deal with it not only in relation to the environment but also 'separately'. The MSs started to try to develop an Energy Policy only after that time and the issue of energy started to be regarded as something in the external dimension. It is seen that energy has become the centre of public policy.

Moreover, the multifaceted nature of energy has been underscored very often by the actors. This is the case in the USA and Russia, as well, in the sense that the actors state that energy touches upon economy, the environment, and, foreign and security policy. Different from Russia, in the EU and the USA, it is seen that there is a discourse going on to make the issue of energy regarded as an *existential threat*. What is more important is that in the EU discourse, energy is not only a *national security issue*; but it is a *European security issue*. In other words, the means to deal with it should also be collective/European means.

[244] BUZAN, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde; 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p. 23

Furthermore, there is a sense of *urgency* to deal with the *risks* in the energy sector. Both the EU and the USA, draw attention to their *vulnerability* to supply disruption. The EU and the USA started to regard energy as a top priority issue or a security issue. Both actors name the *energy challenge* as one of *the greatest challenges* the world faces. In addition, in both the USA and the EU, energy is seen as something vital to the economy; it is the *lifeblood* of it. Energy has started to be presented as an existential threat, one of the great challenges of today and tomorrow.

Nevertheless, this is still an ongoing process. It can not be argued that there is full securitization in the EU; instead there is a tendency to do so. However, no extraordinary measures have been taken yet. The MSs do not speak with a single voice in the case of energy as a result of their bilateral relations and national interests and their differences in their energy mix. As for today, it can be argued that the EU is somewhere in-between the politicization and securitization. It is true that the EU tries to adjust its external relations in accordance with its energy needs but the debate is still going on and no extreme polices have been taken. Therefore, it can not be argued that there is a total securitization of energy in the EU.

In the case of Russia, the rhetoric is quite different as it is one of the major energy suppliers of the world. It is not surprising to see that Russia, being the producing country, generally underscores pricing, enhancing its infrastructure and decreasing its production costs in its energy policy. It is of utmost importance to underscore the fact that Russia needs a large amount of investment for its aging infrastructure; there is a growing need for investment in the oil and gas sectors. The investments are important in the sense that if not invested sufficiently, Russia may fail to respond to the rising demand for natural gas. This may lead to an ‘energy crisis’ in the world if the importers of the Russian natural gas did not have enough energy to compensate for that or if they did not have any other alternatives. In the case of the EU, for instance, some Member States are nearly 100% dependent on the Russian natural gas. Therefore, it can be indicated that in order to prevent such a ‘crisis’, not only investment in and technological advancement of the Russian energy infrastructure should be enhanced but also alternative energy suppliers and energy resources should be developed.

As in the case of the other two actors, in Russia as well, the multifaceted nature of energy is underscored. However, the emphasis of Russia is very often on the relation of the energy issue to its economic growth and development and the relation of energy to the environment. It is true that in some cases Putin states that energy is an *international security* issue and he sometimes uses threatening style. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is a perception of existential threat in Russia as the one in the USA and the EU. Another important point is that when speaking about energy, the Russian political actors very often underscore the issue of energy poverty. In the speeches of the actors in the EU and the USA, this is not the case.

After analysing the speeches of the actors, one can come to the conclusion that Russia has been politicizing the issue. However, there is not a securitizing move like the one that was seen in the case of the EU or the USA. First, Russia does not perceive the energy issue through a threat perspective. It is true that energy constitutes an important role in the eyes of the political actors for its economic development and its revival as a powerful actor of the international arena. Russia's economy has been affected positively by her vast energy incomes. Therefore, it has prominence in its foreign policy, in its relations with the other countries. However, in rhetoric, when speaking about energy, Russia generally draws attention to the issues of economic poverty, energy efficiency, cooperation and economic considerations. It is also true that supply of demand is essential for Russia as being the producer country. However, unlike the cases of the EU MSs and the USA, Russia does not see an *existential threat* that should be dealt with in a way to guarantee its survival. Furthermore, Russia does not see itself vulnerable in the energy issue and there is no perception urgency as in the cases of the EU and the USA to handle this issue. Therefore, in the spectrum that is shown in the first chapter related to the politicization, securitization and non-politicization, Russia takes its place in the politicization part in terms of its approach towards energy.

It is also argued that Russia is using its 'energy superpower' as a political weapon to be able to realize its national interests. It is true that Russian actors, especially Putin, do not abstain from making threatening speeches as just mentioned. One can argue that Russia wants to regain its powerful status in the international arena.

That is also why the actors in Russia sometimes use an aggressive style in their speeches by using their most powerful lever, namely the issue of energy. Moreover, it seems that the other two actors feel some constraints in criticizing Russia in its human rights abuses due to the formers' dependence on Russian energy sources. However, what should be kept in mind here is that as there is interdependence in the energy issue, the parties can not jeopardize their interests. Russia needs a huge amount of investment for its infrastructure and technological advancement. In this sense, it can be argued that as much as the West needs Russian energy, Russia also needs the demand from the West for her economy. Therefore, the parties should be abstaining from an "energy security dilemma".[245] What is more, there seems to be an existential threat; however it may also be argued that this 'threat' may not be that existential as Russia is dependent on the EU on trade and investment for the infrastructure. As Fredholm put it: "Russia is dependent on the incomes from gas and oil as 37% of federal budget revenues and 20-25% of the Russian GDP derive from oil and gas."[246]

In the case of the USA, the threat perception is the highest when compared with the EU and Russia. This may be due to its high dependency on foreign energy sources; it comes first in oil consumption. For the USA, energy becomes a national security issue. It is seen that the actors not only see energy as a national security issue but also a foreign policy issue. It has been stated that energy is the greatest challenge to humanity and that there is an urgency to deal with it. Moreover, energy security is always connected to the environment which in itself is a securitized sector. The discourse in the USA even furthers this by saying that energy is related not only to economic and national security but also to homeland security. It is important because homeland security denotes defense. The Department of Homeland Security in the USA was established in 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks with the mission of preventing

[245] As described by Andrew Monaghan, such a dilemma might occur when the two sides continue to feel insecure vis-à-vis each other and begin to make preparations in case the other intends to threaten it. These preparations create extra suspicion and provoke additional measures in order to better prepare for an eventual threat. Translated into energy relations, such preparations would result in an intense race to diversify purchases and sales away from each other.", cited from: 'Russia's Energy Sector between Politics and Business', Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.s), Working Papers of the Research Centre for East European Studies, No. 92, February 2008, Bremen, available at: http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de, retrieved on: 04 May 2008

[246] FREDHOLM, Michael; 'The Russian Energy Strategy and Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual Dependence?', Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2005

terrorist attacks within the USA. Besides acts of terrorism, natural disasters and other emergencies are also the Department's concern. Although it is the Ministry of Defence that takes the military measures and leaves the civilian ones to the Homeland Security Department, still, relating energy to this Department is important in terms of its significance as a *securitizing move*. Growing oil demand in the USA is seen as a serious problem as the USA gets its oil from 'unstable' or 'unfriendly' regions. Dependence is also regarded as a national security issue because of the possibility of a terrorist attack on the oil networks. Therefore, this is one of the most remarkable securitizing moves of the USA in the case of energy.

It is true that there is security speech-act which names energy as an existential threat; however, another component of the securitization process is still missing in the USA: the use of extraordinary measures. Therefore, due to this lack of extraordinary measures, the whole securitization process has not been finalized in the USA. Nevertheless, in the non-politicized, politicized and securitized spectrum, it takes its place very close to the securitized part because the issue is regarded in terms of a national and homeland security issue. It is an issue that affects economy and the environment; thus, the future economic growth of the country.

Despite some differences among the actors, namely the EU, the USA and Russia, in dealing with the issue of energy; some issues such as the realization of sustainable development and the protection of the environment are the common concerns of all the three. All the three actors talk about energy with regard to the environment and contend that these two great challenges should be handled together. This is important in the sense that the environment is already a securitized sector and by mentioning energy in tandem with it, the actors try to persuade the audience that energy is also an issue of security. Additionally, the multifaceted nature of energy is underscored several times by the three actors. Besides relating the issue of energy to the environment, the USA, the EU and Russia also refer to its economic and national security dimensions. Therefore, energy becomes a concern of environmental policy, foreign and security policy and economic policy. In some cases it even carries the risk of becoming a concern of defence policy.

5.3. The Reflections of Securitization of Energy on the Relations of the EU, the USA and Russia

When it comes to the bilateral relations of the EU and USA with Russia, it is seen that the European Union has a more institutionalized relationship with Russia. This may be due to its high energy dependency on the mentioned actor. As Cameron put it: "…the EU has a far wider and deeper relationship with both the US and Russia than the US and Russia have with each other. For example over 60% of Russian exports go to the EU and only 5% to the US. The EU-US trade and investment relationship is by far the most important in the world."[247] In the case of the energy issue, the European Union has a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and an Energy Dialogue with Russia.

5.3.1. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue

The EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that forms a legal basis for EU-Russia relations was signed in 1994 and came into force in 1997 for a 10 years period, but it was decided to extend the partnership on an annual basis from 2007 on if the parties do not withdraw from it. It aimed to promote cooperation between Russia and the EU in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Cooperation in the issue of energy also constitutes an important part in this partnership.

In 2000, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was launched. As was declared in the Joint Declaration by the parties, the Energy Dialogue:

> will provide an opportunity to raise all the questions of common interest relating to the sector, including the introduction of co-operation on energy saving, rationalisation of production and transport infrastructures, European investment possibilities, and relations between producer and consumer countries. The planned ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia and the improvement of the investment climate will be important aspects in this context.[248]

[247] CAMERON, Fraser,; 'USA-EU-Russia: Areas of Cooperation and Confrontation', The Third Europe-Russia Economic Forum, Vienna, 23-23 April 2007, available at: http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/assets/files/EU-US-Russia%20Vienna.pdf, retrieved on: 15 August 2008

[248] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/overview/index_en.htm, retrieved on: 25 May 2008

The desire to enhance cooperation in the energy sector is understandable when the dependence of the EU on Russian energy and Russia's dependence on the revenues from the EU is taken into account.[249] Furthermore, it is important to have "the possibility for mutual access to markets in the energy sector, EU investments in the upstream sector in Russia and Russian access to the downstream sector in the EU."[250] Thus, it would be a win-win situation. It is also worth to mention here that ensuring energy security constitutes one of the core objectives of the Dialogue.

5.3.2. The US-Russia Energy Partnership

In May 2002, the US-Russian Energy Dialogue was launched by the Presidents, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin to enhance global energy security. In October 2002, the first US-Russia Energy Commercial Summit was held in Houston, USA. "During the summit, industry and government officials agreed to identify barriers to trade and investment in the energy sector, discuss policies to improve the commercial climate, and explore opportunities for business partnerships."[251] Moreover, a Commercial Energy Working Group was established during this summit that includes representatives from Russian and American energy companies. The second U.S.-Russia Commercial Energy Summit was held in St. Petersburg, Russia on September 22-23 where new areas of cooperation such as electric power, natural gas development, and alternative energy sources were on the agenda.[252]

Throughout this study, it has been mentioned several times that Russia needs a huge investment for its old-aged energy infrastructure. The US-Russian cooperation in

[249] "Russian energy exports account, in value, for some 45% of exports to the EU. 50% of Russian oil exports (crude and products) of 218 million tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) were to the EU in 2001. This represented 20% of the EU's oil imports and 17% of total EU oil consumption. Some 63% (130 billion cubic metres (Bcm)) of Russia's natural gas exports of 205 Bcm were delivered to European countries in the year 2000, with contractual requirements to increase deliveries to around 200 Bcm by the year 2008. Approximately 56% (73 Bcm) of the natural gas exported to Europe in 2000 was delivered to the EU.", for further info: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/overview/why_en.htm
[250] KREFT, Heinrich; 'Geopolitics of Energy: A German and European View', p. 5, available at: www.aicgs.org/file_manager/streamfile.aspx?path=&name=kreftenergy.pdf, retrieved on: 12 June 2008
[251] US-Russia Commercial Energy Summit (September 27, 2003), US Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Moscow, available at: http://moscow.usembassy.gov/fact_09272003f.html
[252] *Ibid.*

the field of energy not only responds to the US desire to diversify its foreign energy supplies but also the Russian desire to get investment. For instance, as was stated in the fact sheet released by the White House in 2002: "Russia is the fifth-largest export market for U.S.-made oil and gas field equipment. Last year, American companies exported $282 million of oil and gas field equipment to Russia."[253] Furthermore, Sakhalin I and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium's Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline are the U.S.-Russia joint investment projects. Moreover, there are the U.S. energy services companies in Western Siberia and the Volga-Urals.

Furthermore, in the April 2008 US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, the parties stated that cooperation remains an area of significant potential for both. "We will intensify U.S.-Russia energy collaboration through a new, more structured energy dialogue that would bring together the best Russian and American minds to focus on expanding energy supplies in an environmentally-friendly manner while developing new lower-carbon emission energy sources."[254] Therefore, it can be argued that this is a win-win situation; the parties would be better off cooperating with each other. However, the clashing of interests in the region blocks such a long-lasting productive cooperation.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

The issue of energy has long been on the agenda of the actors; however, the securitization of energy is a recent one. The vitality of energy in daily life activities and its importance in other sectors like economy, military and politics has made the issue one of 'the greatest issues of the time'. It is seen that the issue of energy has been highly politicized and in a certain extent "securitized" by the EU, Russia and the USA in the sense that it has become a part of *high politics* and it has started to be perceived as an *existential* threat, one that of survival. However, the 'breaking of the established rules of

[253] Fact Sheet: Energy Relations, The President's Trip to Europe and Russia, US Department of State, The White House, Washington D. C., 24 May 2002, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-20.html, retrieved on: 12 August 2008
[254] US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, US Department of State, The White House, Washington D. C., 06 April 2008, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080406-4.html, retrieved on: 12 August 2008

the game' has not come into existence yet although a high degree of public concern is present. Therefore, the securitization process has not been completed.

In the European Union, there is a tendency to securitize the energy issue. However, this has not finalized yet as no tangible extraordinary measures has been taken. In the case of Russia, it is seen that Russia is politicizing the issue and there is not a securitizing move like the one that was seen in the case of the EU or the USA. The reason behind this is that Russia does not perceive the energy issue through a threat perspective. Finally, for the USA, the threat perception is the highest as energy is seen as the greatest challenge to humanity. However, due to the lack of extraordinary measures, in the case of the USA also, the securitization process has not been completed yet. On the other hand, the involvement of NATO in the energy debate represents the clearest securitizing move regarding this issue.

Furthermore, the rate of dependency on foreign sources has an impact on the policy choices of the actors. For instance, it is seen that with a high dependence rate on foreign sources, the EU and the USA are more inclined to further the politicization of the issue of energy and they get closer to the securitized part. In contrast, Russia as the producing country rather politicizes the issue. This rate of dependence also has impact on the actor's bilateral relations. The EU is highly dependent on Russian energy and therefore, it has a more institutionalized relationship with Russia. The USA, itself, though emphasizes cooperation with Russia in the energy issue; this does not lead to such a deep cooperation as the one Russia has with the EU. This is because the USA's dependence on Russian energy is lower as it has multiple sources and the two actors' clashing interests in the region.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to analyse the securitization of energy in the EU, the USA and the Russian Federation comparatively. The issue of energy has been on the top of the agenda of the international actors especially in the last years due to its multifaceted nature and the ongoing high oil prices. The major argument of the study has been that the mentioned three actors politicize and to some degree "securitize" the energy issue (although its extent differs from one actor to another) and in order to check this claim, thorough examination of the speeches of the important policy actors in the EU, the USA and Russia have been made in such a way to see whether the mentioned actors use security speech-act or not in the energy issue. Furthermore, the following questions have been raised and responded: What is "securitization of energy"? How and to what extent do the actors securitize the issue of energy?

After the thorough examination of the speeches of the actors from September 11, 2001 until August 2008, it is found out that the issue of energy security has been highly politicized and to a certain extent "securitized" by these three actors. However, it is of utmost importance to mention here that the degree of politicization and securitization differs in each of them. It is seen that energy issue has become a part of public concern in all the three actors in the sense that it has started to be regarded as part of *high politics*.

If one wants to rank the politicization and securitization of the EU, the USA and Russia, it is seen that the USA is the closest one to the securitization part of the continuum that is given in the first chapter. This is because in the USA as energy becomes a matter of not only economic and national security but also a matter of homeland security. The European Union is somewhere between the politicization and securitization part of the spectrum, while Russia takes its place on the politicized part. Therefore, the energy issue, as was mentioned above, has been highly politicized by all the three actors; however, the securitization of it has been realized only to a certain extent. Being the producer country, Russia does not perceive any existential threat like the EU and the USA. In rhetoric, when speaking about energy, Russia generally draws

attention to the issues of economic poverty, energy efficiency, cooperation and economic considerations. Nevertheless, it does not also refrain from using security rhetoric to define the issue of energy, when and where necessary. In the case of the USA and the EU, on the other hand, although there is a high perception of existential threat, vulnerability and urgency, there is no deviation from the normal political measures. As in the terminology of the Copenhagen School, no 'breaking of the established rules of the game' has come into existence yet.

Therefore, it can be concluded that, as has been mentioned several times throughout the study, especially after the Russia-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine energy crises, energy consolidated its place at the top of the international agenda. It is seen that actors are trying to securitize the issue of energy. However, the EU, Russia and the USA, they all take their places in the different parts of the securitization spectrum. None has completed the whole process as no extraordinary measures have been taken yet.

Another important aspect of energy is its multifaceted nature. This has been underscored by all the three actors as well. Energy is generally mentioned in relation to the environment. Moreover, the actors indicate the multifaceted nature of energy as both national and economic security problem. Therefore, energy becomes a concern of the environmental policy, foreign and security policy, economic and political policy and in some cases it becomes a concern of defence policy. The involvement of NATO in the energy debate, besides the other three actors, is especially important with regard to the securitization of the issue and its potential defence implications.

In line with all the comments made above, it can be argued that future research may revolve around the following questions: Does the issue of energy fit into one or more of the sectors of the Copenhagen School or does it pop up as a sixth sector? Or, does it encompass all, and thus, should it be analysed through a cross-sectoral lens in terms of the five sectors of the Copenhagen School? Furthermore, when the August 2008 Georgian-Russian crisis is considered, one can say that other important questions of future research may be: Is the issue of energy getting militarized? Does securitization

lead to militarization in this respect? Can they be regarded as the two sides of the same coin?

ANNEX I

World Primary Energy Demand 1980-2030 (IEA Reference Scenario)



Source: World Energy Outlook 2006, International Energy Agency, 2006, available at: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2006.asp

As can be seen from the figure above, global energy demand is increasing at a steady pace. According to the IEA Reference scenario, the world energy demand is expected to rise by 60% by 2030 where global oil demand is projected to grow by 1.6% per year.

The Top Oil Producing Countries, 2005

Rank	Country	MM bpd	Percent
1	Saudi Arabia	9.6	13.0
2	Russia	9.1	12.4
3	United States	5.1	7.0
4	Iran	4.1	5.6
5	China	3.6	4.9
6	Mexico	3.3	4.5
7	Norway	2.7	3.7
8	Nigeria	2.6	3.6
9	Venezuela	2.6	3.5
10	United Arab Emirates	2.5	3.5
11	Kuwait	2.5	3.4
12	Canada	2.4	3.2
13	Iraq	1.9	2.6
14	United Kingdom	1.7	2.3
	109 other countries	*19.5*	*26.6*
	Total	**73.3**	**-**

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2004, *International Petroleum Monthly*, April 2006

Top Oil Consuming Countries, 2005

Rank	Country	MM bpd	Percent
1	United States	20.7	24.7
2	China	7.0	8.3
3	Japan	5.4	6.5
4	Russia	2.7	3.3
5	Germany	2.6	3.1
6	India	2.5	2.9
7	Canada	2.3	2.7
8	Brazil	2.2	2.7
9	South Korea	2.2	2.6
10	Mexico	2.1	2.5
11	France	2.0	2.4
12	Italy	1.8	2.2
13	United Kingdom	1.8	2.2
14	Spain	1.6	1.9
	200 other countries	*26.9*	*32.1*
	Total	***83.6***	**-**

Ibid.

Forecast of World Oil Production to 2030

	2004	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	Annual Growth 2004-2030
	(million barrels per day)						
Conventional	**80.5**	**86.1**	**90.0**	**95.7**	**100.9**	**106.3**	**1.1%**
Middle East	21.3	24.8	25.6	27.0	28.9	31.1	1.5%
Russia	9.3	9.5	9.9	10.7	11.1	11.3	0.7%
United States	8.4	9.4	9.6	9.5	9.1	8.9	0.2%
Africa	3.5	3.6	4.5	5.4	6.7	8.0	3.2%
Caspian Area	2.3	3.0	4.2	5.2	5.3	7.4	4.6%
Other South and Central America	4.2	4.3	5.0	5.8	6.5	7.0	2.0%
Mexico	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.5	4.8	5.0	0.8%
Western Europe	6.9	5.9	5.3	5.2	4.8	4.4	-1.7%
South America	2.8	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1	1.5%
Venezuela	2.8	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1	1.5%
Rest of World	14.9	14.9	14.4	15.0	16.0	14.9	0.0%
Nonconventional	**2.0**	**4.9**	**6.9**	**8.0**	**9.7**	**11.5**	**7.0%**
North America	1.1	2.3	3.0	3.6	4.5	5.1	5.9%
Rest of World	0.8	2.6	3.9	4.4	5.3	6.4	8.2%
Total	**82.5**	**91.0**	**96.9**	**103.7**	**110.6**	**117.8**	**1.4%**

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2006

Forecast of World Oil Consumption to 2030

	2004	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	Annual Growth 2004-2030
	(million barrels per day)						
United States	20.8	22.2	23.5	24.8	26.1	27.6	1.1%
China	6.6	8.6	9.8	11.4	13.1	14.9	3.2%
Western Europe	13.6	13.4	13.4	13.5	14.0	14.3	0.2%
Other Asia *	6.1	7.6	8.7	9.9	10.9	12.1	2.7%
Middle East	6.1	7.2	7.8	8.3	8.9	9.3	1.7%
South and Central America	5.3	6.3	7.0	7.8	8.4	9.1	2.1%
Former Soviet Union	4.1	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.2	5.4	1.0%
India	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.8	4.3	4.9	2.7%
Africa	3.0	3.6	4.0	4.3	4.6	4.8	1.9%
Japan	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.1	-0.9%
Rest of World	9.2	9.8	10.2	10.6	11.0	11.3	0.8%
Total	**82.5**	**91.0**	**96.9**	**103.7**	**110.6**	**117.8**	**1.4%**
* Excluding, FSU, China, India, South Korea							

Ibid.

ANNEX II



Source: Slides by J. A. Vinois, Special Session: 'Investing in and Financing the Hydrocarbon Sector to Enhance Global Energy Security', European Commission DG TREN, Eurostat, available at: http://www.unece.org/energy/se/pp/EnCom16/28Nov07/1.2_Vinois.pdf

Net Imports of Solid Fuels and Oil

(1000 tonnes)

	Solid Fuels			Oil		
	1995	2000	2005	1995	2000	2005
EU-27	**120 823**	**154 805**	**196 560**	**504 431**	**526 781**	**590 543**
EU-25	**112 770**	**148 312**	**187 616**	**491 011**	**519 105**	**581 369**
BE	14 186	10 959	7 926	24 441	28 776	30 340
BG	3 562	3 451	4 181	6 512	4 066	5 182
CZ	-12 318	-8 025	-5 760	7 961	7 470	9 658
DK	13 031	6 340	5 911	1 493	-7 806	-9 106
DE	17 239	34 917	39 855	129 187	124 037	120 271
EE	1 492	1 275	147	1 184	615	842
IE	2 888	2 756	2 968	5 706	7 946	8 457
EL	1 421	1 165	583	17 274	19 694	20 421
ES	14 654	21 042	24 282	58 820	70 972	79 518
FR	13 514	19 748	20 830	84 852	89 953	93 983
IT	19 114	19 408	24 777	89 726	88 789	79 543
CY	26	60	64	2 052	2 572	2 828
LV	250	88	120	2 106	1 102	1 642
LT	266	134	320	3 710	2 278	2 651
LU	753	183	119	1 720	2 278	3 009
HU	2 167	1 720	1 944	5 475	5 283	5 828
MT	-	-	-	901	832	975
NL	13 942	13 201	13 152	32 426	41 602	47 625
AT	3 910	4 527	5 884	10 117	10 810	13 107
PL	-34 023	-25 477	-20 512	15 422	20 079	21 673
PT	5 963	6 287	5 278	14 083	15 827	16 812
RO	4 491	3 042	4 763	6 908	3 610	3 992
SI	415	519	629	2 199	2 369	2 570
SK	8 467	5 750	6 123	3 699	2 778	3 246
FI	6 030	5 520	5 188	8 221	10 405	10 799
SE	3 924	3 392	3 563	15 801	15 440	17 106
UK	15 459	22 823	44 225	-47 565	-44 996	-2 429

Oil	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	504	524	527	548	513	527	550	537	557	571	591
EU-25	491	511	515	538	505	519	541	529	549	562	581

Source: Eurostat Pocketbooks: Energy, Transport and Environemnt Indicators, 2007 Edition, available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-DK-07-001/EN/KS-DK-07-001-EN.PDF

Net Imports of Natural Gas

(PJ)

	1995	2000	2005
EU-27	**6 759**	**8 957**	**11 948**
EU-25	**6 324**	**8 703**	**11 638**
Belgium	485	618	660
Bulgaria	212	128	114
Czech Republic	299	348	351
Denmark	-70	-134	-233
Germany	2 461	2 645	3 058
Estonia	27	31	37
Ireland	4	115	140
Greece	-	79	108
Spain	350	720	1 407
France	1 279	1 664	1 894
Italy	1 327	2 187	2 784
Cyprus	-	-	-
Latvia	46	52	67
Lithuania	94	96	116
Luxembourg	26	31	55
Hungary	257	339	456
Malta	-	-	-
Netherlands	-1 227	-800	-974
Austria	251	244	339
Poland	270	307	397
Portugal	0	95	181
Romania	223	126	195
Slovenia	35	38	43
Slovakia	211	265	268
Finland	132	159	167
Sweden	35	36	39
United kingdom	30	-433	278

(PJ)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
EU-27	6 759	7 416	7 559	7 874	8 521	8 957	8 895	9 640	10 398	10 946	11 948
EU-25	6 324	6 932	7 192	7 550	8 274	8 703	8 660	9 378	1 091	10 644	11 638

Source: *Ibid.*

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