

**TURK YE CUMHUR YET
MARMARA ÜN VERS TES
AVRUPA B RL ENST TÜSÜ
AVRUPA B RL S YASET VE ULUSLARARASI
L K LER ANA B L M DALI**

**THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN
CITIZENSHIP WITH REGARD TO
IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

YÜKSEK L SANS TEZ

Deniz Çelik

istanbul, 2008

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T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ

ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Deniz ÇELİK'in "THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP WITH REGARD TO IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION" konulu tez çalışması 14 Kasım 2008 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

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ÖZET

Avrupa bütünle mesinde kültür ve kimli in yeri sorunsal,, bütünle menin bir ad,m daha ileri gidebilmesi için Avrupa'nın çözmesi gereken temel ç,kmazlardan biridir. Bu ç,kmaz, 2005 y,l,nda Anayasal Antla ma'nın onaylanmas, sürecinde yap,lan referandumlarda Frans,z ve Hollandal, seçmenlerce reddedilmesi ve Anayasal Antla ma'nın yerine haz,rlanan Lizbon Antla mas,ın, Temmuz 2008'de rlanda referandumunda ba ar,s,zl, a u ramas,yla, daha aç,k ve önemli hale gelmi tir. Avrupa Birli için çözmek zorunda oldu u bu kriz, Birlik'in vatanda lar,n,n nezdindeki me ruiyeti ve ödaha yak,n bir Birlik'in nas,l kurulaca , hakk,ndaki tart, malar, alevlendirmi tir. Bu çal, ma, bir yönetim ekli olan Avrupa Birli ine ait olma duygusu üzerine oturan bir vatanda l,k bilinci ve Avrupa Birli i vatanda lar,n,n birlikte izleyebilecekleri belirli de erler ve siyasi hedefler sa layabilecek politik bir Avrupa Birli i kimli ini tart, maktad,r.



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ABSTRACT

The place of the culture and identity in the integration has long been one of the most basic challenges that the European integration has to solve for moving a step forward. This challenge became more apparent and crucial as a consequence of not only the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters at the referendum held for ratification in 2005, but also failure of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was prepared instead of the Constitution, at the Irish referendum in June 2008. This crisis that the European Union has to cope with has exacerbated the discussions about the legitimacy of the European Union in the eyes for its citizens and how a ever closer Union can be established. This study, in general, tries to discuss the possibility of a political identity of the European Union, which may establish a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union as a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens of the European Union pursue jointly.

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INTRODUCTION

The place of the culture and identity in the integration has long been one of the most basic challenges that the European integration has to solve for moving a step forward. This challenge became more apparent and crucial as a consequence of not only the by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters at the referenda in 2005, but also failure of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was prepared instead of the Constitution, at the Irish referendum in June 2008. This crisis that the European Union has to cope with has exacerbated the discussions about the legitimacy of the European Union in the eyes for its citizens and how *never closer Union* can be established.

Although national identity is one of the strongest senses of belonging, especially, since 1960s, different and particular identities are searching recognition in the political arena. The main argument of this study is even individual member states already have certain problems to carry a common cultural identity that binds their citizens, create a common sense of belonging and is the source of their legitimacy, it seems difficult to have a common cultural identity that establishes a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union. In this manner, the identity of the European Union should be a political identity, more than a cultural one and a political identity, which neither substitutes, nor competes with national identities. A democratic citizenship of the European Union may offer such a political identity and may establish a sense of *us* for peoples who have not a common nationality, language, ethnicity and culture. So, this study, in general, will try to discuss the possibility of a political identity of the European Union, which may establish a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union as a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens of the European Union pursue jointly. For this purpose, first of all, what citizenship of the European Union is will be analyzed in order to see the path to what it should be, and then, the approaches to nationalism and national identities will be discussed since they may help to analyze a possible identity of

the European Union and more importantly, they may show how an identity of the European Union can be possible.

The first chapter of the study will focus on the concept of citizenship in general and the content and the limits of the citizenship of the European Union in particular. The concept of citizenship will be analyzed with regard to its historical development from the Greek city states to modern and democratic nation state. Nevertheless, the classical Republican or Communitarian and Liberal theories of citizenship will be discussed, when the rest of the first chapter of the study will focus on the European citizenship with regard to legal and historical development and content of the concept. The part entitled content and the limits of the European citizenship will argue certain discussions about and critiques to the existing structures of European citizenship through the concept of "market citizenship" and basic characteristic of European citizenship is that it bases on the citizenships of the Member States.

The second chapter of the study will focus on nationality in general. Such an approach not only offer a prototype for an identity of the European Union in terms of political or cultural values, but also help to understand new nationalism of contemporary Europe can be seen as a reaction to the changing cultural structures of the nation states. In this context, it may also help to discuss the relation between national identities and identity of the European Union. As such, the concepts of nation and nationality and different approaches to these concepts will be analyzed as a prototype for an identity of the European Union. So, the theories of nationalism under the titles of Primordialism, Modernism and Ethno-symbolism will be discussed. The different schools of Primordialism will be analyzed with the studies of Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz. Under the title of Modernist approaches the different schools as Economic Transformation, Political Transformation and Socio-cultural Transformation will be discussed with the ideas of Tom Nairn, Michael Hecter, John Breuilly, Eric Hobsbawn, Ernst Gellner and Benedict Anderson. These different approaches to nationalism may offer certain clues to how an identity of the European Union should be analyzed and established. Nevertheless, the contemporary rise of nationalism or in other



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words new nationalism of Europe and the differences between classical nationalisms and this new type of nationalism will be the last discussion of the second chapter.

The last chapter of the study will focus on, in general, different approaches to a possible European Identity that can bind the citizens of the European Union to each other and to the Union itself with regard to the relation between the identity of the European Union and national identities. So, first of all, it will be discussed whether there are common cultural values shared by all Europeans that a cultural European identity can be built on by referencing common language, history and religion. Secondly, whether cultural cohesion is necessary for a European identity, whether a conflict between national identities and European identity is necessary, whether a constitutional patriotism can be a solution for the European identity and how a European identity can be built a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union as a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens of the European Union pursue jointly will be analyzed. Finally, the concepts of politics of identity and multiculturalism will be discussed as a solution of the identity crisis of the European Union today.

CHAPTER 1

EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship does not only present a relation between the individual and the political community determined by rights and obligations, but also offers an identity that binds individuals and creates a sense of belonging and togetherness within the political community. In other words, citizenship means both expectations of the individual from the political community and expectations of the political community from the individual, and a status that allocates the individual to a certain group and differentiates others from this group. In a nation state, this tie is generally a national identity, which is generally determined by a common language, history and culture. However, when the citizenship of European Union as a supranational body matters, it is obvious that this kind of citizenship is different from a classical concept of national citizenship since not only the rights and obligations of the citizens of European Union are different, but also it is difficult to find a European identity creates a togetherness and determined by a common language, history and culture. As such, in this part of the study, the citizenship will be analyzed from historical and conceptual points of view first, and then, the contemporary content and the limits of the citizenship of European Union will be discussed.

1.4. The Historical Development of Concept of Citizenship

The concept of citizenship emerged in the Greek city states as a legal status determined by obligations, more than rights, for instance if a citizen does not express his idea on an important issue, he might loses his membership to the political community. Nevertheless, citizens of Greek States were only free men since it excludes children, women, slaves and foreigners from citizenship. Thanks to certain developments of civil law in Roman Empire, the concept of citizenship developed also. In the Roman Empire, citizenship was a privileged status determined by rights such as serving in the army, voting in the assembly, right of action, trading and marrying with other Roman citizens. However, after the collapse of Roman Empire, the development

of citizenship was interrupted since during Medieval Age, the peasants were excluded from citizenship since medieval citizenship, which offered privileges more than obligations to individuals, was granted to only aristocrats. However, the two revolutions in the late 18th century and early 19th century ó namely French Revolution and Industrial Revolution ó had a certain impact on the nature of the relation between the individual and the political community. Now, citizenship is not only a legal status determined by rights and obligations, but also a political tie that binds not only the nation and the state, but also the individual and nation.

In a similar manner, according to Oldfield, this change is the story of the transition of the ñcommunityø to ñsocietyø in other words, ña transition of ñtraditionalø to the ñmodernø. He supposes that there is a certain difference in the ways that link individuals to each other and other larger social groupings between ñcommunityø and ñsocietyø¹. Oldfield analyses the medieval community as an example to the concept of ñcommunityø. In a medieval community, where ñthe guild, the village, the church, the monastic order were the main actors, there was an ñacceptedö hierarchy. Each individual had a particular place in this hierarchy and had a particular duty was important for the survival of the community. Oldfield describes the place of the individuals in this community as ñsecure places, self-sufficient and relatively isolatedö. He supposes that every individual accepted the social role that they were born into and the moral codes, customs and traditions of their society. These roles, according to Oldfield, could not be questioned. This stable world was ñdisturbed by French and Industrial Revolutionsö and social relations changed also as a consequence of the change in positions of the parties in these relations. Economic, military, religious and political changes triggered the change in not only the character of the individual, but also social relations. According to Oldfield, ñindividuals were now no more than atomized units in an amorphous aggregate, rather than the integrated members of an organic wholeö. He supposes that the reason of these changes was the ideas of the 16th and 17th centuries against Church and the state. The thinking ñwhich secured a privileged position for the individualö was the consequence of the development of the

¹ Adrian Oldfield, **Citizenship and the Community Civil Republicanism and the Modern World**, London: Routledge, 2001, p: 15.

natural rights as onatural, existed prior to society and the stateö and the main purpose of these rights was öto secure and protectö individuals against society and the state².

Sørensen³, who analyses the Greek city state, the Roman Republic and Empire, the Medieval and Renaissance city and democratic nation state, supposes that the concept of citizenship was öinvented and defined and reinvented and redefinedö in these four different historical eras and each of these eras had own interpretation of the concept of citizenship. In the *Greek city-state* citizenship was the membership in the Athenian polis as a ölargely passive, legal statusí complement of formal obligations and privilegesö. However, in ancient Greece, only 40,000 of 250,000 inhabitants were citizens since children, women, slaves and foreigners were excluded from citizenship. The main rights of the citizens were the right to speak and vote, right to have own land, when the main obligations were to obey the laws, to serve for military and to pay tax. In *Roman Republic* citizens had six privileges, four them public as service in the army, voting, eligibility for public service and equality, when the rest two were private privileges as the right to inter-marriage and to trade with other Roman citizens. However, citizenship became a political instrument in the expansion process to an Empire since Romans began to trade land in exchange of citizenship. In other words, offering citizenship in the exchange of land was a mean to expand without using military force. However, this kind of citizenship was offering a öhalf-citizenshipö since it only allowed enjoyment of only private right, but not public rights. Consequently, the mean of citizenship changed during the expansion process of the Empire and citizenship became an instrument served for political interests. In the Medieval and Renaissance Europe, a system that Sørensen calls as ösystem of loyaltiesö was dominant where church, princedoms and feudal lords were the main actors. The rest were rural people as the biggest part of the population and according to Sørensen they can be described as ösubjectsö not as öcitizensö⁴.

However, as a consequence of four factors emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, the medieval citizenship turned into citizenship of the *Modern European*

² Adrian Oldfield, *ibid*, p: 15-17.

³ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *The Exclusive European Citizenship*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996, p: 16-20.

⁴ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 19.

nation-state as a modern and egalitarian form of citizenship. The first factor, according to Sørensen, was Westphalia peace settlement, which established territorially defined states in external terms and centralized and sovereign states in internal terms. Second factor was the need of the loyalty of the people to this sovereign and centralized state and a legal distinction was had to be drawn between inhabitant and the aliens as a consequence of this need of loyalty of people to the state. The third factor, according to Sørensen, was the development of popular sovereignty as the idea of the people as a whole have the legal ... right to make ultimate decisions concerning their laws and mode of government. Finally, as the fourth factor, as a consequence of the Reformation, religious freedom as one of the first civil rights emerged in some countries or the Reformation led to the creation of a more and more politically alert population in other countries. Nevertheless, Sørensen supposes that after the French Revolution, the idea of popular sovereignty became to be identified with the *ideology of nationalism* and *capitalism*. He states that

Citizenship was defined by, and made dependent upon symbols of collective identification. Thus, with the creation of the nation-state, the need to create border controls between *us* and *them*, i.e. between nation states, arose. The nationalist idea did, in this way, create a closure between political communities, and a rational way of excluding aliens from citizenship. National identity became the decisive factor for the allocation of citizen rights⁵.

About the relation between capitalism and citizenship, Sørensen supposes that capitalism contributed to remove of the traditional institutions and lessened the economic and social power of the aristocracy. Nevertheless, capitalism helped the accumulation of private wealth and selfish pursuit of interests.⁶

Another important study on citizenship belongs to T.H. Marshall entitled 'Citizenship and Social Class', the relation between citizenship and capitalism is being analyzed in detail. In Marshall's opinion, emergence of civil rights contributed to the development of capitalism since economic freedom is one of the most important parts of individual freedom. However, in the idea of Marshall, citizenship and the capitalist

⁵ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 20-21.

⁶ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 25.

system were in at war as a consequence of the relation between class with capitalism and the integrative character of the citizenship since citizenship bases on equality of rights and duties, when class is a structure of social inequality in the contrary. Nonetheless, citizenship has an integrative characteristic since it creates a certain sense of community membership and loyalty to a civilization and this relation is protected by common law. Through citizenship, members of the community can participate to the social and political life which they belong⁷.

According to Marshall, the citizenship developed in parallel with the three sets of rights and the establishment of appropriate institutions. He divides citizenship into three parts: civil, political and social. The civil element of citizenship is based on the rights for individual freedom ó liberty of the persons, freedom of speech, thought and faith, to right to own property and the right to justice. The first group of rights is these civil rights which were developed in the 18th century with the development of judicial system and individual freedoms. The second is the political element of citizenship as right to participate in the exercise of power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. In other words, according to Marshall, in the 19th century, political rights have created the political participation and individual participation to decision making processes. And finally, Marshall stresses on social element of citizenship as the whole range from right to economic welfare and social security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. Put another way, in the 20th century, emergence of social rights has provided the concept of quality of life with the development of education and welfare services⁸.

According to Sørensen⁹, who supposes that citizenship should be analyzed in relation between an individual as a citizen and a political community, one of the most

⁷ David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, **Changing Europe, Identities, Nations, Citizens**, London: Routledge, 2002, p: 10.

⁸ T. H. Marshall *Citizenship and Social Class* available in http://www.ucc.ie/social_policy/Marshall_Citizenship.htm [23.10.2007] and T. H. Marshall, **Class, Citizenship and Social Development**, New York: Anchor Books, 1965, p: 78679.

⁹ Jens Magleby Sørensen, **ibid**, p: 12613.

important characteristics of the concept of citizenship is that citizenship can only be bestowed on individuals, and not collectivities. Sørensen states that citizenship represents a two-way relationship between the individual (citizen) and the political community. On the one hand citizenship offers a membership to a political community to an individual; on the other hand this membership distinguishes a citizen from a subject, who is ruled by a political community since there are some expectations of the political community from the citizen. In other words, when the relation of a subject with the political community is a top-bottom relation, the relation of a citizen with the political community is reciprocal relation where both sides have expectations from each other.

From this point of view, he suggests that the concept of citizenship should be discussed in formal and substantive dimensions. Citizenship is a status legally ascribed to certain group of individuals that binds them together and distinguishes them from other individuals of the same or a different citizenship status in formal matters. As such citizenship creates a legal and political community and excludes all other individuals that are not parts of this community. However, the substantive citizenship is defined with the rights and the duties of the citizens of a political community. These rights and duties create a sense of loyalty and belonging and the resources for the survival of the community by providing an internal security, stability and identity¹⁰.

In a similar manner, Delanty¹¹ supposes that citizenship as membership of a political community involves a set of relationships between rights, duties, participation and identity. Delanty distinguishes two different models of citizenship. On the one hand, citizenship is a formal and legally coded status in market and state-centered conceptions of the classical tradition of modern liberal thought. On the other hand, citizenship is more substantive dimension participation in the civic community and it refers a more active kind of participation. Delanty criticizes the citizenship theory of Marshall in five points. According to Delanty, today there are different kinds of exclusion which cannot be accommodated by a model of social rights such as gender

¹⁰ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 13.

¹¹ Gerard Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics*, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000, p: 10.

and race related exclusions. This rise of cultural and collective rights, according to Delanty, may be accepted as further models of rights. Second, there is a challenge of *globalization* and *multiple modernities* to the theory and the issues related to media and information such as protection of cultural heritage or linguistic rights cannot be simply overlap with the theory of Marshall. According to Delanty, the theory of Marshall ignores the active dimension of citizenship and social classes were the passive recipients of state-given rights and Delanty adds citizenship is also a consequence of popular mobilization leading to winning of rights. Forth, Delanty argues the strict separation of Marshall between private and public realms. Finally, Delanty criticizes Marshall for decoupling citizenship and nationality. He states that

Marshall did not question the tie of nation and state; the state as the provider and guarantor of rights and the nation as the focus of identity. Today in global age this linkage cannot be taken for granted. The state is no longer command of all the forces that shape it and sovereignty has been eroded both downwards to subnational units, such as cities and regions, and upwards to transnational agencies, such as the European Union. With respect to citizenship, what this means is the marriage between citizenship and nationality is broken. At least, there is no perfect equivalence between nationality, as membership of the political community of the state, and citizenship, as membership of the political community of civil society¹².

Similar to the Delanty's critiques to Marshall's idea of citizenship, concept of citizenship began to be criticized in parallel with the discussions on difference and multiculturalism especially after 1970s. Before stressing on the changes in the idea of the citizenship, one should analyze the classical theories of citizenship first.

1.5. Some Discussions on Modern Concept of Citizenship

As it is mentioned before, citizenship does not offer a legal status determined by expectations of the individual from the political community and expectations of the political community from the individual, but also creates a sense of commonness and togetherness as a part of national identity. However, with the 1960s and 1970s, this commonness began to be questioned with movements of minorities and subaltern

¹² Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 14-19.

groups such as feminists, blacks, gays, ethnic minorities and migrants for recognition of their distinct identities by the political community. The question of what the place of these particular cultural identities in the relation between the individual and the political community raised questions about the nature of the citizenship also.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy¹³, citizenship is a legal status, defined by civil, political and social rights; a political agent makes citizens to actively participate in society's political institutions and is membership in a political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity. These elements are also the different dimensions of the concept of citizenship. There are two classical models or theories of citizenship as Republican or Communitarian model, which is referred mostly in the writings of authors like Aristotle, Tacitus, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington and Rousseau, and Liberal model of citizenship, which can be found in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Adam Smith.

The most important characteristic of Republican or Communitarian model is self-rule, embodied in classical institutions and practices and active participation of citizens in processes of deliberation and decision-making. From this point of view, the republican model focuses on the second dimension of citizenship as a political agent. Liberal model of citizenship roots from early-modern reflections on Roman law and bases on the first dimension of the citizenship defined by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In other words, citizenship, in Liberal model, means being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution. The roots of the modern classical liberalism can be found in Great Britain, in the works of, among others, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Adam Smith.

However, as it is mentioned before, the classical models of citizenship began to be criticized in 1970s. Feminist theories suppose that the republican and liberal models of citizenship make a rigid separation between the private and the public spheres¹⁴ and exclude the private sphere from politics and exclude women and disadvantaged

¹³ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Citizenship, available in <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#1.1>, [21.02.08]

¹⁴ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, **Citizenship**, available in <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#1.1>, [21.02.08].

groups from the shared culture of the public domain¹⁵. Thanks to these critiques of feminists, alternative conceptions of citizenship began to be discussed. According to the classical theories of citizenship there is only one public and it ignores the private realm. Nevertheless, Feminist approach to citizenship criticizes the male oriented perspective and ignorance of issues of personal identity and autonomy¹⁶. The feminist approach raised questions related to the place of the disadvantaged groups in the society not only in terms of rights, but also recognition of their identities. The politics of identity in relation with multiculturalism and nationality will be discussed in the third part of the study in detail.

According to Delanty, radical theories of politics including Feminist approach can be seen as an attempt to deepen citizenship in a more political manner. He states that

The various positions on radical democratic citizenship point to a threefold model of citizenship entailing the politics of voice, difference and justice. Citizenship is as much about the articulation of problems as it is about their resolution. This recognition of voice is a position shared by many feminists the second follows from this recognition of communication: the universalist assumptions of liberalism must be relativized to take account of difference. This is less a retreat into relativism than a qualified particularism, a differentiated universalism. Finally, citizenship entails a commitment to justice, not as a formalistic equality of opportunity but as a substantive goal. This model of justice works only if it is strong on local levels and is organized in a participatory mode and can empower those groups most effected by the exercise of power. Clearly, one of the implications of radical democracy is a shift from a model of consensus to one of dissensus¹⁷.

To sum up, the two challenging ideas has been tried to be analyzed here, one is Republican and Communitarian theories, which see citizenship as a legal status based on rights and duties, when the second is radical democratic theories, which see citizenship as a question of participation and identity. Despite they are challenging ideas of citizenship, neither Republican - Communitarian models of citizenship, nor feminist

¹⁵ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 43.

¹⁶ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 46.

¹⁷ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 46-47.

and radical democratic theories of citizenship raise questions about the national characteristic of citizenship. According to Delanty, in terms of national bases of citizenship, the only difference between the classical models of citizenship and critiques raised by Feminist theories raised against these classical models is in their emphasis on either the nation, or the state¹⁸. However, another important critique to classical models, especially liberal theory of citizenship is raised by the cosmopolitan or post national theories of citizenship. Post national theories of citizenship rejects the definition of citizenship as the property of either state or the nation and as such it offers a post-national concept of citizenship¹⁹.

The cosmopolitan or post national approach to concept of citizenship depends on the idea that nationalism cannot function as a suitable focus of allegiance and identity and the collective identity of the modern state should depend on more abstract and universalistic political and legal principles that transcend cultural difference. According to post nationalists, pluralism embarrasses culture of majority to serve as the basis of shared identity. As such, post-nationalists suggest that this culture of majority should be replaced by universalist principles of human rights and rule of law in order to prevent imposition of a particular majority culture on minorities²⁰. According to Delanty, post-national form of citizenship is one that is based primarily on residence. Citizenship as a nationality is based on birth, with some exceptions. Delanty supposes that European citizenship created by Treaty on European Union can be given as an example to post national citizenship²¹. According to Habermas, the initial impetus to integration in the direction of a post national society provided by the substrate of a European-wide political public sphere embedded in a shared political culture²².

From a similar point of view, Neveu who defines the concept of citizenship as not only a status but also a membership in a political community stresses on the

¹⁸ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 51.

¹⁹ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 51.

²⁰ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Citizenship, available in <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#1.1>, [21.02.08]

²¹ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 65.

²² Jürgen Habermas, qtd in Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 65.

difference between nationality and citizenship. Neveu states that a nationality of an individual may not correlate with his citizenship by giving the example of a Pakistani residing in Britain. According to her the correlation between nationality and citizenship depends on political and cultural histories of different examples, for instance in France, there is a case of high correlation between citizenship and nationality. She adds "such distinctions are more important to the on-going debates about European citizenship along with the relationships with identity(ies), and especially national identity". Neveu states that the European citizenship is building a political community (a polity) distinct from national identities²³.

In the rest of this part, the historical development of the European citizenship will be analyzed by referencing legal developments. Afterwards the content and the limits of the European citizenship will be discussed in order to understand whether European citizenship is building a political community distinct from national identities or not.

1.6. Citizenship of the European Union

Before discussing the concept of Citizenship of the European Union, analyzing the development process of the European Citizenship will help to understand the aim and drawbacks of the Union.

1.3.1. The Development of European Citizenship ó Legal and Historical Background

Although the Treaty on European Union is a milestone in the history of the European Citizenship in legal terms, the previous developments that established the basis of the European Citizenship should be analyzed in order to understand the place of the European Citizenship in the European integration process.

²³ Catherine Neveu, "European Citizenship, Citizens of Europe and European Citizens" in Irene Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), **European Union: Building, Imaging and Experiencing the New Europe**, New York: Berg, 2000, p: 120.

1.3.1.1. Main References to the European Citizenship before the Treaty on European Union

Although, establishing an ever closing Union among peoples of Europe is a long term purpose of the Union, the European integration can mostly establish a closer Union among member states, more than peoples of Europe until Treaty of European Union. The aim to complete single market was the most important concern of the integration for many years. However, the Treaty on European Union was an important sign that the place of the Union in the minds or hearts of the peoples of Europe began to be one of the most important interests of the Union. However, the negative reactions to this new kind of citizenship firstly determined Treaty of European Union, and then developed with the Constitutional Treaty were the signals of how the Union was late to consider the tie between individuals and the Union.

According to Maas²⁴, the European Citizenship emerged as a consequence of “a continuing series of political junctures that span the entire history of European integration” and as a consequence of the need of safeguarding rights of the Europeans. In other terms, according to Maas, the European Citizenship evolved in accordance to the institutions, political and judicial integration of the Union. He states that

The freer trade of the 1950s and 1960s created demands for freer movement of labor. Political commitment transformed this demand for mobile labor into individual mobility rights for workers. This altered the political environment and produced pressures to extend the scope and expand the content of those rights. Because of continued political commitment, this process of extension and expansion of rights resulted in a common European citizenship.

In a similar manner, Dunkerley and Others suppose that for many years the most important concerns of the European Community were on market issues. Individuals were only considered in terms of their economic activities and treated as economic actors. The Treaty of Rome used the term “workers” rather than citizens.

²⁴ Willem Maas, **Princeton workshop on *The State of the European Union***, Volume 8, 16 September 2005, p: 1, available in <http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Maas%20Memo.pdf> [12.02.08].

Before the first enlargement occurred 1st January 1973 with the membership of UK, Ireland, and Denmark to European Union, the first summit was held in Paris in with the participation government leaders of prospective member states. At this meeting, Prime Ministers of Italy and Belgium suggested that "the right to vote and be elected in local elections should be granted to all Community citizens"²⁵. The term "citizen" was used at the meeting of Heads of States in Paris in 1974 for the first time and stated that "working group be instructed to study the conditions and the timing under which the citizens of the nine Member States could be given special rights as Members of the Community". According to Dunkerley and Others, here, civil and political rights, including right to vote and hold public office, were the main concerns.²⁶ At the summit a special working group was established to search which "citizens of member states could be given special rights as members of the Community" and Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans was given the task to study "under what conditions and according to what timetable European citizenship could be granted to the citizens of the nine Member States."²⁷ Consequently, Tindemans Report, as another important step to develop a European Citizenship status presented to the European Council in 1974.

The Tindemans Report states that

The construction of Europe is not just a form of collaboration between States. It is a rapprochement of peoples who wish to go forward together, adapting their activity to the changing conditions in the world while preserving those values which are their common heritage. In democratic countries the will of governments alone is not sufficient for such an undertaking. The need for it, its advantages and its gradual achievement must be perceived by everyone so that effort and sacrifices are freely accepted. Europe must be close to its citizens²⁸.

The report suggested that the European Union should "protect the rights of Europeans where this can no longer be guaranteed solely by individual States" and

²⁵ Commission of the European Communities (1975: 27) cited in Willem Maas, *ibid*, p: 5.

²⁶ Bulletin EC 1974: Point 111 cited in Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 13.

²⁷ Willem Maas, *ibid*, p: 5.

²⁸ Bulletin of the European Communities 1/76 available in http://aei.pitt.edu/942/01/political_tindemans_report.pdf [27.10.2006]

create concrete manifestation of European solidarity by means of external signs discernible in everyday life and nevertheless "European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life".²⁹ The rest of the Tindemans generally examined the details of the economic and social right of the European citizens.

In 1986, Single European Act that aimed the completion of the internal market with free movement of persons, goods, capital and services used the term persons rather than workers. However, As Dunkerley and Others state, the evolution of the concept of European citizenship was formalized in the Maastricht Treaty, which was designed to give the citizens more sense of belonging to the European Union³⁰.

1.3.1.2. The Treaty on European Union and Introducing European Citizenship

At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the Union had to deal with significant political changes. The Berlin Wall was collapsed and the Soviet Union was dissolved. In this challenging geopolitical context, which would lead unification of Germany, dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and establishment of new states in the Central and Eastern Europe, The Union was preparing to introduce three pillar system that envisaged political cooperation foreign policy, military and justice and home affairs. In such a political environment, one of the key concerns of the Dublin summit in 1990 was "to shape future political union by introducing European citizenship rights"³¹. In the Annex I of the Summit Conclusions, it is stated that in order to transform "the Community from an entity mainly based on economic integration and political cooperation into a union of a political nature, including a common foreign and security policy", one of the main concern of the Union should answer the question of "How will the Union include and extend the notion of Community citizenship carrying with it specific rights (human, political, social, the right of complete free movement and

²⁹ Bulletin of the European Communities 1/76 available in http://aei.pitt.edu/942/01/political_tindemans_report.pdf [27.10.2006]

³⁰ David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 15.

³¹ Willem Maas, *ibid*, p: 10.

residence...) for the citizens of Member States by virtue of these states belonging to the Union?³²

Delanty suggests analyzing the European Integration in three phases. In the first times of the integration, Delanty supposes that, as a consequence of the desire for peace and cold war, the main concern of the integration was to establish economic ties between Member States. With the establishment of European Economic Community, the peacemaking process was finally achieved. Delanty supposes that this first phase of the integration was only a process of rescuing the nation state and supranational politics cannot be anything other than relations between states. However, according to the Delanty, with 1980s, the economic integration began to shift to also political cooperation along with the economic ties. In this second phase of the integration, legal and administrative integration was also achieved, despite the emphasis on the sovereignty of the member states. Delanty supposes that interest in culture and the questions of identity began to be key dimension of the European integration. By the early 1990s, the third phase of the integration began with the Treaty on European Union. According to Delanty, the main concern became social integration more than economic and political integration in this phase. Delanty states that European integration is no longer a matter of economic and political steering but has penetrated into the social itself with a legal concept of citizenship³³.

The Treaty of Maastricht has changed many of the existent structures of the EU and introduced some new policy areas and increased the awareness of the people on many important issues one of which is European Citizenship of the Union.

According to Dunkerley and others, the main purpose of the Union with Union citizenship was to strengthen and enhance the European identity and a more intensive participation of the European citizens to the integration process. They suppose that there were three main objectives of making citizenship of the Union. The first objective was to guarantee a better life with right to work, a decent living standard and environmental

³² The European Council, **Dublin - 25-26 June 1990**, Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1990, Washington DC: EC Office of Press and Public Affairs, available in http://aei.pitt.edu/1401/01/Dublin_june_1990.pdf, [17.02.08]

³³ Gerard Delanty, **Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics**, p: 109-110.

protection for the citizens of the Union.³⁴ The second reason was an active participation and sense of belonging of the citizens to the activities of the Union may help to reduce the democratic deficit problem. The third and probably the most important reason of the need of a Union citizenship was to build a European identity that enhances the legitimacy of the European integration³⁵.

First of all, in Article F (2), the Treaty on European Union³⁶ accepts European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950s as the general principles of Community Law. In a similar manner, in the Article six, the Treaty prohibits all kinds of nationality discriminations. The Convention can be seen as the legal basis of the basic human rights of European citizens. However, Article 8 of the Treaty that establishes the citizenship of the Union and determined the citizenship as "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union", declares some other rights that the citizens can enjoy along with the rights provided by the European Convention of Human Rights. First of all, the Treaty gives "the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States" by stressing that these rights are subject to some limitations and conditions. Second, with the Treaty, citizens, who reside in a Member State, have the right vote and can be a candidate at municipal elections of his region. Third, the Treaty grants diplomatic protection to citizens of the Union in the territory of a third country "which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented". Fourth, citizens have the right "to petition the European Parliament" and "apply to the Ombudsman". Finally, the Treaty charges Commission to report the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Economic and Social Committee in every three years about the applications of the provisions of the Treaty related to the citizenship of the Union.

It is obvious that the Treaty on European Union was a significant step in the development process of the citizenship of the European Union. First of all, the word

³⁴ European Parliament Imbeni Report cited in David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spiby and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 15.

³⁵ David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spiby and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 15-16.

³⁶ The Treaty on European Union, available in <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>, [27.01.08]

citizenship is expressed around. However, the citizenship established by the Treaty on European Union only exists where national citizenships do not. Nevertheless, the Treaty declares national citizenship of a Member State as a precondition for Union citizenship. Another important point should be highlighted is there is no certain obligation of the citizens of the European Union.

1.2.1.3. Developments with regard to the European Citizenship After the Treaty on European Union

During Intergovernmental Conference before the Treaty of Amsterdam that was met at the Corfu European Council at the end of 1994, a Reflection Group was established and discussed the establishment of a "Union closer to its citizens" and a "People's Europe". The Group set three main headings;

- Union closer to its citizens;
- More democratic and efficient institutions, especially in the context of future enlargement;
- Strengthen the Union's capacity for external action and to make more coherent the Union's performance as the European Community.³⁷

On this basis established by the Reflection Group, the Treaty on Amsterdam made some amendments on the articles of the Treaty on European Union, which define European citizenship. The first and the most important amendment was the Treaty of Amsterdam add "citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship" to the 8(1) Article of the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, the Treaty added "it is first necessary to be a national of a Member State in order to enjoy citizenship of the Union" and "European citizenship will supplement and complement the rights conferred by national citizenship". Nevertheless, the Treaty of Amsterdam added to the 8(d) Article of the Treaty on European that "Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies in one of the languages mentioned in Article 248 and have an answer in the same language." The languages mentioned in

³⁷ Presidency Conclusions of European Council at Corfu, 24-25 June 1994, available in <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUROPEAN%20COUNCIL%20AT%20CORFU%20-%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf>, [02.02.2008]

Article 248 are Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish³⁸.

It will not be a mistake to say that the Treaty of Amsterdam did not make a certain change on the existing provisions regarding Union citizenship in comparison with the Treaty on European Union. Or, even, it can be thought as a small step backward since it's insistency on the nature of the citizenship depending on national citizenship.

According to Dunkerley and Others, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not make a significant change and only added to Article 8 that "citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship". They suggest that this was a result of the rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht in the first Danish referendum. As such, the Treaty of Amsterdam tried to strengthen the sovereignty of the member states with regard to Union citizenship and emphasized a model of the European Community as a union of states³⁹. However, The Treaty of Amsterdam included the anti-discrimination provisions and accepted the recognition of human rights as a criterion for membership to the European Union.

1.2.1.4. The Treaty of Nice and Charter of Fundamental Rights

Another important step for the Union citizenship and its multicultural dimension was the Charter of Fundamental Rights that was proclaimed at the Nice Summit in December 2000. The objective of the Charter was to increase protection of individual rights within EU legislation and in the European institutions. These rights are divided into six sections: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' rights and Justice. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the significance of the human rights as a common value for the EU. According to the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at

³⁸ The Treaty of Amsterdam, available in <http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf>, [02.02.08]

³⁹ David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 20.

the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.⁴⁰

Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights forbids any form of discrimination with regard to gender, ethnicity, language, religion, or membership of any other minority group. Nevertheless, in the 3rd chapter, Article 21, any discrimination on the basis of nationality is excluded. In brief, the rights of the citizens are listed at the Charter of Fundamental Rights as right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament, right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections, right to good administration, right of access to documents, Ombudsman, right to petition, freedom of movement and of residence, diplomatic and consular protection.

However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was only a political declaration as such it has no binding and legal significance. But the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is a certain step to clarify the content and the limits of the Union citizenship. The Constitution accepts the Charter of Fundamental Rights as it is along with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nevertheless, it develops not only the fundamental rights, but also citizenship of the Union in the Article 7. Nevertheless, in Article 8, the Constitution repeats the rights of citizens established by the Treaty on European Union and Treaty of Amsterdam such as right to move and reside freely, right to vote and stand as candidate in elections, right to diplomatic protection in third countries where nationals are not represented, and right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the Institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Constitution's languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. As usual, the Constitution repeats "Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship; it shall not replace it."

⁴⁰ The Charter of Fundamental Rights, Available in http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf [23.10.2006]

However, after the rejection of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe not only created a shock about the future European establishment and project, but also it stopped the integration process. After the rejection of the Draft Constitution at the referendums in France and Holland, the studies began on Lisbon Treaty in 2007 in order to make the institutional changes and simplify the decision making process. The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13th December 2007.

The Treaty of Lisbon, in Article 6, declares that "the Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" and proposes to give the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same value as the main treaties. However, most importantly in an additional protocol to Treaty of Lisbon, Poland and UK used their right to opt out from the Charter. Consequently, Poland and UK could not be ruled by European Courts on these issues. On the other hand, the Treaty makes some small changes on the European Citizenship in legal terms. According to the 8 (a) Treaty of Lisbon; "Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union". However, According to Jo Shaw⁴¹, "the limited changes to the legal and constitutional nature and scope of Union citizenship, means that it is possible to address the same criticisms towards post-Lisbon citizenship as applied to post-Maastricht and post- Amsterdam citizenship". Shaw adds that although there are several references to the citizens in the Treaty, the Treaty does not define what citizen is.

In contrast, there is a significant point that should be highlighted here. Although, there is clear connection between these values and citizenship, in Article 1 (a) of the Lisbon treaty, it is stated that "the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities" and envisages "a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail". These values expressed clearly by the Treaty of Lisbon can be seen as a first step to create basic values and political objectives that

⁴¹ Jo Shaw, "The Treaty of Lisbon and Citizenship", **European Policy Brief for Education & Research**, June 2008, available in http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief_Citizenship.pdf, [23.08.2008]

citizens of the European Union pursue jointly that may be a basis for a sense of belonging to the European Union for its citizens. However, the ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon was rejected at the Irish referendum in June 2008 and the integration process has been interrupted.

1.2.2. The Content and the Limits of the Citizenship of the European Union

In this last part of this chapter, the main purpose is to discuss what kind of citizenship European citizenship offers and the limits of this new kind of citizenship. As it is mentioned before, according to Marshall, the citizenship developed in parallel with the three sets of rights and the establishment of appropriate institutions. He divides citizenship into three parts: civil, political and social rights. The civil element of citizenship is based on the rights for individual freedom – liberty of the persons, freedom of speech, thought and faith, to right to own property and the right to justice. The second is the political element of citizenship as right to participate in the exercise of power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. And finally, Marshall stresses on social element of citizenship as the whole range from right to economic welfare and social security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society⁴².

Marshall describes the development of the rights of the citizens in the nation states of Europe as a path from the development of civil rights to political rights, and to social rights afterwards. However, in the light of the Marshall's concept of citizenship, Sørensen states that it is not possible to say that the development of the rights of the citizens follows the similar path of the Marshall's citizenship since the Union does not experience the same historical development with nation state. As such, he analyzes whether there is civil, political and social rights of the European citizens, although the same historical development does not exist.

⁴² T. H. Marshall, *ibid*, New York: Anchor Books, 1965, p: 78679.

Sørensen supposes that equality in European Law is only sought through elimination of cross national discrimination. So, the citizenship cannot be individualized and EU regulations are about elimination of national and not individual discrimination and inequality. Sørensen states that if one accepts European integration as an intergovernmental organization for economic cooperation, European citizenship has only got a functional role to play since it promotes the mobility of workers as an important factor of production. The social rights granted for workers such as unemployment or pension rights are only initiative factors of mobility of workers, and thus social welfare or standards of living does not play a crucial role. Sørensen supposes that the political rights of the citizens are not so much important since they are irrelevant to economic cooperation or at least absence of political rights does not obstruct labor mobility. According to Sørensen, not only basic civil rights such as freedom of movement and collective civil rights such as trade unions, but also civil rights developed in Treaties are promoting mobility of workers. Sørensen supposes that

Citizenship rights exist only because the market exists, and not out of a will to create a more equal and more all encompassing status for the people of Europe. The primarity of the Market, is reflected in the types and limited scope of European citizen rights. Citizenship of the Union is created to make the ideal of Internal Market function efficiently. It is thus created to achieve economic goals and is not an objective in its own right⁴⁴.

In a similar manner, Oliveira notes that the origin of the Union citizenship bases on the principle of the free movement of people. So, the Union citizenship is a part of fundamental economic freedoms of the market rather than a political right of a democratic system. As such it is a market citizenship⁴⁵.

However, according to Marias, the creation of rights and functioning of European Court of Justice may create a supranational civil society when the citizens exercise their rights in full. The rights of free movement may trigger the establishment

⁴³ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 123.

⁴⁴ Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 124.

⁴⁵ Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira cited in Peo Hansen, 'European Citizenship or where Neoliberalism Meets Ethnoculturalism Analysing the European Union's Citizenship Discourse', *European Societies*, Vol: 2, No: 2, 2000, p: 149.

of European civil society. He supposes that since the nation states will be unable to cope with the needs of European civil society, this movement will move to a supranational political society. According to Marias, European citizenship is the core of Political Union and forms the foundations of its political legitimacy. As such, Marias sees the development of European citizen rights more than a legal dimension of citizenship. These rights thanks to these rights, a European political community will emerge and this community will be independent and superior to the national political communities. In other words, European citizenship will evolve and include the political, social, cultural and physiological dimensions of citizenship⁴⁶. As it is mentioned above, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy⁴⁷, citizenship is a "legal status, defined by civil, political and social rights"; a political agent makes citizens to actively participate in "society's political institutions" and is "membership in a political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity". These elements are also the different dimensions of the concept of citizenship. When Marias supposes European citizenship will evolve and include physiological dimensions of citizenship, he references this third dimension of citizenship, as a distinct source of identity. There is a growing debate the content of European identity or identity of the European Union that will be the main theme of the discussions will be analyzed in the third part of this study.

From a different point of view, according to Hansen, the citizenship of the European Union should be analyzed as a creation of new rights and opportunities for certain elite groups or bourgeoisie and not a larger whole rather than as an empty concept not creating new rights and opportunities for people in the Union. In other words the citizenship of the European Union creates "a fragmented citizenship policy establishing special rights, not for Europeans as a people, but for special groups of Europeans in practice".⁴⁸

The basic characteristic of European citizenship is that it bases on the citizenships of the Member States and this is mostly referenced at the critiques of the European citizenship. In other words the European citizenship doesn't substitute the

⁴⁶ Epaminondas A. Marias, qtd in Jens Magleby Sørensen, *ibid*, p: 124.

⁴⁷ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Citizenship, available in <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#1.1>, [21.02.08]

⁴⁸ Peo Hansen, *ibid*, p: 149.

citizenship of each member state. According to the Article 8 of Treaty of Lisbon, in all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it. Shaw, who compares the Treaty on European Union and Treaty of Lisbon, he states that

In both texts, it is made clear that EU citizenship does not replace national citizenship. Expressing Union citizenship as additional to national citizenship was insisted upon by the Member States, in order to reinforce the point that EU citizenship can only add rights, and cannot detract from national citizenship. Legally speaking, additionality, reinforcing the duality between national and EU citizenship seems to be a more accurate delineation of the two statuses, and avoids any unfortunate implications that there is somehow a duty on the part of one status to bend to the will of the other, in order to achieve the sought after ‘complementarity’. Conceptually speaking, it makes the point that the development of different layers of citizenship entitlements is not a zero sum game, in which rights given at one level must necessarily detract from those given at another level⁴⁹.

In a similar manner, Dunkerley and Others state, ‘European Citizenship is based on the rule of member state nationality, and the procedure within which nationality is conferred and defined by each member state’⁵⁰. Nevertheless, O’Leary supposes that there is no direct political link between the European Citizen and the Union since only the Member States have the right to ultimate control of ‘access to, enjoyment of, and even forfeiture of, the rights of citizenship of the Union’. He states that using nationality as a base for citizenship of the European Union shows that the Member States have a strong sovereignty on the issue⁵¹.

⁴⁹ Jo Shaw, *ibid*, available in http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief_Citizenship.pdf, [23.08.2008]

⁵⁰ David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 17.

⁵¹ Siofra O’Leary qtd in David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 17.

O'Leary states that

the member states thus have ultimate control of access to, enjoyment of, and even forfeiture of, the rights of citizenship of the Union. As a result, no direct link, political or otherwise, has been created between Union citizens and the Union, although this link could be regarded as a fundamental ingredient of citizenship at national level. The use of nationality as a base for Union citizenship also demonstrates that member state sovereignty, rather than promotion of individual rights, remains of ultimate concern to the architects of the Union Treaty⁵²

The discussions and critiques to citizenship of the European Union show that such a citizenship could not create a direct relationship between the Union and its citizens. Such an identity is not only inadequate to operate as a distinct source of identity that establishes a sense of belonging to the Union, but also abstaining about the status of millions of legal long-term residents, who live in the Union without being citizens since they are not national citizens of the member states. As such, in the third chapter of the study will try to find an answer to the question how a citizenship of European Union can establish an identity of the European Union and create a direct link between the Union and its citizens.

The discussions up to now focused on a comparative analysis of the concept and theories of national citizenship and citizenship of the European Union. This comparative analysis will also be used at the second chapter of the study. In the second chapter, the concept of national identity as one of the most important collective identities will be used as a prototype for a possible identity of the European Union. Nevertheless, the contemporary crisis of the national identities in Europe with regard to the growing multicultural characteristics of the societies as a consequence of globalization, free movement and residence of people thanks to the single market and immigration and ethnic mobility of people and new nationalist trends in Europe as a reaction to these certain social and political changes will also be discussed at the second chapter. Since the problems of the European nation states about how particular cultural

⁵² Siofra O'Leary qtd in David Dunkerley, Lesley Hodgson, Stanislaw Konopacki, Tony Spybey and Andrew Thompson, *ibid*, p: 17.



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groups can live together under a democratic structure will also be used as a prototype for European Union. Nevertheless, analyzing the new nationalism in Europe emerged as a consequence of these social and political changes may present an approach about the relation between national identities and the identity of the European Union.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONS AND NATIONALISMS: A BRIEF THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

In theory, nation states are sovereign, autonomous institutions on a certain territory. If one considers the Peace of Westphalia as the establishment of the international system that depends on nation states, the hegemony of the nation states exists more than 350 years. However, as a consequence of the certain global changes, there is a growing debate that began at the end of the 20th century about the hegemony, efficiency and the future of the nation state. This hegemony of the nation state is today challenged by economic, social and political globalization. As a consequence of technological developments both in production and communication, global exchange of goods and services, financial flows, powerful multinational and transnational companies and financial institutions, migration of populations and global threats that individual nation states are inadequate to cope with such as global terror, environmental problems and global organized crimes have weakened the hegemony and effectiveness of nation state. Nevertheless, the relation between state and the nation is changing also. Although national identity as a sense of commonness and belonging to a nation is still one of the most powerful collective identities, this sense of commonness is also being questioned. The values and institutions of most of the nation states that generally established by a dominant ethnic group are challenged by the recognition demands of subordinate ethnicities or different cultural groups and this challenge is becoming more apparent as a consequence of growing flow of populations and migrations and developing multicultural structures of the societies. The picture of the relation between national identities and other particular cultural identities is relatively more complex. The enlargements of the European Union and the free movement and free residence of people within European Union thanks to Single Market and supranational dimension of the European integration creates a three dimensional problem that the European Union and the Member States have to solve. The first dimension of the problem is what the reaction of the national policies to the recognition demands of particular cultural

identities, minorities and subordinating groups should be. Second, how European Union should solve the conflict between these demands of recognition of minorities and the new nationalist movements that can be seen as a reaction to these changes and finally and more importantly, how an identity of the European Union, which provides a peaceful integration of national and migrant minorities, can be established. When the last dimension of the problem will be discussed in the third chapter of the study, this second chapter, on the one hand, will try to examine the different approaches to nationalism, which may offer a prototype for a possible identity of the European Union. On the other hand, nationalism and national identity phenomenon in Europe countries, most of which are multicultural states, will be discussed in order to see the relation between national identities and other collective identities of particular cultural groups.

2.1. Nations and Nation States

Although nation state as an institution is challenged by economic, social and political changes of globalization, it should be taken into consideration that the nation state is still most important actor in the international political arena and this well-established system continues more than three centuries. Nation state as a concept envisages a state and a nation and a tie between these two. However, there are certain debates about not only what nation is, but also what the tie between nation and state is.

Although there is a general consensus that modern concept of nation has emerged in the 16th century, according to Christophe Jaffrelot, the theorization of the concept began in the 19th century⁵³. The discussions on the concept of nation has increased since the 19th century, but still there is no definition of the concept that most of the researchers has agreed on.

There are different approaches to the definition of the concept of nation. However, there are two main theories that try to define the concept. The first theory bases itself on objective elements. According to this theory, in order to be a nation, a group of people must have the same ethnic roots, speak the same language and believe

⁵³ Christophe Jaffrelot, *ÖBaz*, Ulus Teorileriö, Jean Leca (ed.), **Uluslar ve Milliyetçilikler**, translated by Siren demen, Istanbul: Metis Yay,nlar,, 1998, p: 54.

the same religion. The other theory bases itself on the subjective elements of a nation. According to Renan, who stresses on these subjective elements of nation, a nation builds itself on the will of its people to live together, a shared culture and solidarity. According to Renan, ða nation is a soul, a spiritual principleö and depends on a rich legacy of memories and a will to live together⁵⁵. According to Schulze⁵⁶, the definition of Renan is still valid today. According to him, a nation is ðstate of mindö and a community that only exists as long as in the minds and aspirations of its members. Nations build themselves on national awareness.

The recent studies focus on two main problems with regard to definition of the concept of nation. The first problem is not only the lack of a definition that mostly agreed on, but also the existence of contradictory definitions. The second problem is the difficulty of the separation of the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism and nation state from the nation as a concept as itself. In this context, defining nation as a concept becomes impossible without depending on the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism and nation state and without being affected from the certain approaches to these concepts. For instance, according to Hobsbawm, modernity is the main characteristic of nation and everything that relates to nation. He states that the word of nation did not use in its modern sense before 1884 and the word is a young concept with regard to the historical background⁵⁷. In a similar manner, Benedict Anderson states that although nation is one of the common values of the modern era, it is difficult to define the nation as a concept⁵⁸. Generally the method of searching an answer to the question of ðwhat is nation?ö is trying to find an answer to the ðWhat is the elements that form a nation?ö In that context, the common definition of nation is ða collective community that speaks the same language, shares the same belief and belongs to the same history⁵⁹. However, at the same time these criteria are not valid for all nations. For instance, Canada that

⁵⁴ Y. Furkan en, **Globallesme Sürecinde Milliyetçilik Trendleri Ve Ulus Devlet**, Ankara: Yarg, Yay,nevi, 2004, p: 11.

⁵⁵ Ernst Renan, ðLecture at Sorbonneö, **11 March 1882 in Discours et Conferences**, Paris: Calman-Levy, 1887 available in <http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/nation/renan.htm> [23.09.2007].

⁵⁶ Hagen Schulze, **States, Nations and Nationalism**, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1994, p: 97-98.

⁵⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm, **1780'den Günümüze Milletler ve Milliyetçilik Program, Mit, Gerçeklik**, translated by Osman Ak,nhay, 2nd Ed., Istanbul: Ayr,nt, Yay,nlar., 1995 p: 29633.

⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson, **Hayali Cemaatler Milliyetçili in Kökeni ve Yay,Imas**, translated by skender Sava ,r, 3rd Ed., stanbul: Metis Yay,nlar., 2004, p: 19.

⁵⁹ Mümtazer Türköne, **Siyaset**, Ankara: Lotus, 2003, p: 632.

accepts French and English as official languages is a nation although its citizens do not speak the same language. By the same token, Swiss people speak three different languages (German, French and Italian). Nevertheless, Anthony D. Smith gives the examples of Catholics and Protestants and Polishes and Serbs and Croats and states that these are some of ethnic communities those identities are based on religious differences. He adds that despite the connective aspect of religion, religion is one of the most important reasons of social differences⁶⁰.

Nevertheless, Anthony Smith⁶¹ who analyses the ethnic roots of nations supposes that national identities like ethnic identities have destiny, myths and memories. In that context, he states that it is easier to analyze ñationalism as an ideologyö than analyzing ñation as an organizational cultureö. So, one should focus on subjective characteristics of a nation as permanent features (memory, values, myths and symbolism) rather than objective factors.

Despite these controversial definitions of nation, the history of nation states gives important data in order to understand the nation as a concept and everything that relates to nation. The nation states emerge in the Middle Age Europe as a result of development of bourgeoisie, an increasing power of centrist structures and important moral and ideological effects of French Revolution.

Despite the lack of a compromise on the way of which the nation states emerged, certain discussions focus on two different structuring. The first is nation states which bases on ideas and principles of liberalism and French Revolution. This liberal nationalism fits best with Western Europe, especially English and French nation states. The second type nation state structuring generally bases on ethnicity and develops under intellectual leaderships, for instance German and Italian nation states.

Seton-Watson supposes that there is two different structuring as new and old nations. The old nations emerged before the nationalist doctrine and are based on

⁶⁰ Anthony D. Smith, **Milli Kimlik**, translated by Bahadır Sina Ener, 2nd Ed., Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999, p: 21-22.

⁶¹ Anthony D. Smith, **Ulusların Etnik Kökeni**, translated by Sonya Bayramoğlu and Hülya Kendir, Ankara: Dost, 2002, p: 22-23.

national consciousness and national identity. Seton-Watson gives the English, Scottish, French, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Hungarian and Polish nation states to the old nations. The new nations emerged in parallel with a development of national consciousness with an orientation of small political elites such as German, Italian, Asian and African nation states. As such, the differentiation as new and old is related to the roots of national consciousness rather than historical approach⁶².

From a similar point of view, Hans Kohn states that while French nationalism is cosmopolitan, egalitarian, universal and enlightened, German nationalism emerged as a reaction to developments in the West, especially in France. As such, German nationalism bases on more romantic, ethnic and cultural roots since it gives importance to emotions and feelings in comparison with an enlightened ideology⁶³. In a similar manner, Hannah Arendt⁶⁴ supposes that German nationalism developed as a reaction to France and French nationalism. She defines German nationalism as a mean to make people together in order to struggle foreign despotism by encouraging the consciousness of the common roots. However, she adds, with colonialism, German nationalism became a racist reaction as a result of transform of these pure national aims to an effort to create a German nation which bases on blood and Aryan race.

Consequently, discussions on the nature of the nation focus on two types of nation that depend on two different sources: Civic and ethnic nations. In the first, the commonness of a nation depends on common, flexible political rules and values, when the second type grounds on strict cultural values such as ethnicity and religion. This categorization can be a useful base when how an identity that can be accepted by peoples of Europe, who do not have a common language, religion, ethnicity and even nationality, of the European Union can be established. Analyzing the approaches to nationalism can draw a more comprehensive picture about this categorization of commonness due to political or cultural values can be. In that context, in this part of

⁶² Hugh Seton-Watson, qtd. in Hüseyin Sado lu, *öTürkiye'de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikalar*,ö, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay,nlar,, 2003, p: 19.

⁶³ Hans Kohn, qtd. in Ay e Kad,o lu, *öMilliyetçilik-Liberalizm Ekseninde Vatanda l,k ve Bireysellikö*, Tan,l Bora (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Dü ünçe: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: leti im Yay,nlar,, 2002, p: 2846293.

⁶⁴ Hannah Arendt, *Totalitarizmin Kaynaklar*,, translated by Bahad,r Sina ener, İstanbul: leti im Yay,nlar,, 1996, p: 81.

the study, in order to understand the different dimensions of the concept of nation, theories of nationalism, or in other words the approaches to nationalism will be tried to be analyzed.

2.2. Nationalism: Conceptual Discussions and Different Approaches

The concept of nationalism is used in 1774 by Johann Gottfried Herder for the first time and has become widespread with the increase of the participation of the peoples to the politics in 17th century in England, in the 18th century in the United States and France and finally in the 19th century in Germany. The idea of nationalism was born during the French Revolution. The pre-modern political units were organized as realms, principalities or kingdoms. The people of a country were subjects and their political identity only includes the loyalty to the ruler, but not to nation or motherland. However, the revolutionaries in France came into action in the name of the people of France against Louis XVI in 1789 and accepted the people of France as the French nation. So, nationalism in the French Revolution was a revolutionary and democratic creed, reflecting the idea that subjects of the crown should become citizens of France⁶⁵. These movements spilled over Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa after the 19th century, and as a consequence of these movements, there are presently 192 members of United Nations.

At this part of the study, the theories of nationalism under the titles of Primordialism, Modernism and Ethno-symbolism will be tried to be discussed. The different schools of Primordialism will be analyzed with the studies of Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz. Under the title of Modernist approaches the different schools as Economic Transformation, Political Transformation and Socio-cultural Transformation will be discussed with the ideas of Tom Nairn, Michael Hecter, John Breuilly, Eric Hobsbawn, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Finally, the Ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism will be analyzed through the studies of Anthony D. Smith.

⁶⁵ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, New York: Palgrave, 2003, p: 155.

4.2.1. Primordialism

Similar to the categorization on the nature of the nation states, about the question how nations emerged, one can make a separation among the approaches to nationalism. When the first approach, namely Primordialist approach supposes that the ties that bring the members of a nation are ancient, or even primordial and natural. According to Primordialist approach, the members of a nation have the same language, culture, religion and even same blood.

According to Özkır,ml, primordialism is not a theory but an approach. He states that primordialism öis an umbrella term used to describe scholars who hold that nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since time immemorialö⁶⁶. Primordialism argues that especially in pre-modern societies, the ties that make the group together or identity of the group take root from a natural and even biological basis⁶⁷. In that context, the primordialist approach generally is based on the idea of the existence of national identity or national consciousness in pre-modern societies.

Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz are accepted as the most important representatives of the primordialist approach. Sociologist Edward Shills, in his article with the title of öPrimordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Tiesö, which focuses on soldiers of the Second World War in 1957, states that the success and dedication of soldiers in the war takes its roots from soldiersø attachment to their commandants, families and colleagues rather than patriotism or attachment to party symbols⁶⁸. According to Schills öthe strength of the attachments one feels for her/his family members does not stem from interaction, but from a certain ineffable significance í attributed to the tie of bloodø As such, this kind of attachment can only be primordial, original and natural, in other words can only exist from the beginning of the history⁶⁹.

⁶⁶ Umut Özkır,ml,, **ibid**, p: 64.

⁶⁷ Anton Allahar, öThe Politics of Ethnic Identity Constructionö, **Identity: An International Theory and Research**, Vol: 1, Issue: 3, 2001, p: 198.

⁶⁸ Edward Shills, qtd. in Meral Öztoprak Saır and H. Serkan Akıl,, öEtnisite Kuramlar, ve Ele tirisiö, **C.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol: 28, No: 1, 2004, p: 9.

⁶⁹ Edward Shills, qtd. in Umut Özkır,ml,, **ibid**, p: 65.

As another important representative of primordial approach, Clifford Geertz makes a similar definition for primordial ties, such as

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the *givenness* or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed *givenness* of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of them⁷⁰.

Anton Allahar suggests that primordialism should be analyzed in two categories: hard primordialism and soft primordialism. Hard primordialism supposes that the human beings are tied each other by blood and established communities by the same way. Blood create a confidence and acceptance and loyalty as a consequence. In that context, the social interactions between individuals are natural and automatic. However, soft primordialism focuses on a social but not biological interaction. The most important thing is the way of which an individual perceives the community and reads the symbols of the community. In other words, blood is not necessary for the sense of belonging to a community and socio-political identities are not biological or constant⁷¹.

In a similar manner, Sa ,r and Ak,ll, analyze the primordialist theory under two main categories. The first type of primordialism sees the distinguishing features of a community like culture, tradition, language, religion, history as the most important points. But the second type focuses on biological-genetic features and accepts ethnicity as a consequence of kin selection as a mean to take an advantage in using the scarce resources⁷².

Primordialism, whether soft or hard one, supposes that the ties and factors bring the members of a nation are granted by birth, and so they are constant and

⁷⁰ Clifford Geertz, qtd. in Umut Özk,r,ml,, *ibid*, p: 65.

⁷¹ Anton Allahar, *More than an Oxymoron: Ethnicity and the Social Construction of Primordial Attachment*, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol.: 23, Issue 3, 1994, p: 20.

⁷² Öztoprak Sa ,r and H. Serkan Ak,ll,, *ibid*, p: 9

irreversible. This approach based on strictly determined cultural values of a nation, or even biological factors are criticized by the modernist approach that supposes that nationalism is a part of the process of modernism.

2.2.2. Modernism

Modernist approach supposes that nation is not a natural and necessary part of society and history, in other words nation is a modern formation just like capitalism or bureaucracy, but not based on language, religion, history and ethnicity. Although the concept of nation has a great importance in the modern world, it is subjective to the conditions and it takes its roots neither history nor human nature. Nevertheless, modernists argue that nations emerge in the 18th century and formations before 18th century were coincidental and exceptional cases. In that context, modernists define nation and nationalism with regard to the conditions and processes of modernism⁷³.

Smith states that there was a common opinion of the neutrality of nation and the permanence of the world system that bases on nation states until the mid 20th century. However, the important developments in mid 20th century created a need of re-analyzing of the concept of nation along with other concepts. According to Smith, one of these developments was the emergence of nations that cannot be determined as nations clearly like Nigeria, Indonesia and India and the awakening of national emotions and even nationalist demands of Basques, Quebec, Flemish that were accepted as self-satisfied integrated parts of West. The second important development was that the bloc countries except the two super powers had been constrained in political, militarist, economic movements. Finally, the emergence of multinational companies with huge budgets that are developed in terms of economy, technology and specialization and the threat of these companies to the nation state structure⁷⁴.

Anthony Smith argues the two different perspectives of Modernist approach as the Modernist school that focuses on social-economic aspects and the Modernist school that focuses on politics⁷⁵. However, this paper will use the Özk,r,ml,ø method to

⁷³ Anthony D., Smith, **Uluslar,n Etnik Kökeni**, p: 30-31.

⁷⁴ Anthony D., Smith, **Uluslar,n Etnik Kökeni**, p: 29-30.

⁷⁵ Anthony D., Smith, **Uluslar,n Etnik Kökeni**, p: 31.

understand the different schools of Modernist approaches as Economic Transformation, Political Transformation and Socio-cultural Transformation.

2.2.2.1. Economic Transformation of Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter

One of the schools of modernist approach tries to explain the existence of nations in an economic dimension. Since the 16th century, certain capitalist and powerful countries such as England, France, Spain and somehow Holland colonized East Europe, then Middle and Latin America. However, these imperialist attempts had concluded with a mass or national resistance with the leadership of the elites in colonized territories after 1800s. Nevertheless, these exploitative relations were established not only with other countries, but also within these capitalist countries on different ethnic groups. In that context, the resistance of ethnic communities such as Scot, Welsh, Flemish, Breton, Basque and Catalan communities in order to gain their identities should be analyzed with the same approach⁷⁶.

Scottish thinker Tom Nairn, who establishes his theories on economic dynamics of the society, is generally accepted as one of the most important advocates of not only the modernist approach, but also neo-Marxist approach with his article with the title of *Break Up of Britain* in 1977. According to Nairn, the roots of nationalism does not depend on the cultural dynamics of societies, but depends on the process since 18th century, in other words on the world history. In that context, nationalism should be defined within the era since French Revolution up until the present day. Nevertheless, nationalism is a socio-historical consequence of rapid development of capitalism in the world society. As such, nationalism is the "price of the pressure" that has been created on the less developed countries by the developed countries⁷⁷.

One of the most important representatives of the Economic Transformation School is Michael Hechter with his theory of *Internal Colonialism*. Hechter⁷⁸ defines nationalism as "collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation

⁷⁶ Anthony D., Smith, *Uluslar, n Etnik Kökeni*, p: 31.

⁷⁷ Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, London: Sage, 2002, p: 41-62 and Umut Özkırmlı, *ibid*, p: 87-92.

⁷⁸ Michael Hechter, *ibid*, available in <http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/hechter.htm>, [23.09.2007].

congruent with those of its governance unit^o and continues with a ^ocollective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit^o in order to understand differences between types of nationalism in his study with the title of *Containing Nationalism*. These are;

State-building nationalism is the nationalism that is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It is the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogeneous. Thus, [B]eginning in the sixteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, the rulers of England and France attempted fitfully perhaps, and with more or less success-to foster homogeneity in their realms by inducing culturally distinctive populations in each country's Celtic regions to assimilate to their own cultureⁱ *Peripheral nationalism* occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government (as in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia). Often this type of nationalism is spurred by the very efforts of state-building nationalism described aboveⁱ *Irredentist nationalism* occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals (as in the case of the Sudeten Germans)ⁱ *Unification nationalism* involves the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state, as famously occurred in nineteenth-century Germany and Italy. In this case, the effort to render cultural and governance boundaries congruent requires the establishment of a new state encompassing the members of the nation. Whereas state-building nationalism tends to be culturally inclusive, unification nationalism is often culturally exclusive.

In *Internal Colonialism*, starting point of Hechter is the ethnic conflicts and assimilation problems that emerge in America since 1960s. Hechter focuses on assimilation attempts that aim to melt ethnic or racial minorities which are impoverished and disappointed as a result of the marginalization from the national culture. He argues that when the cultural division of labor emerges as a result of the convergence certain cultural differences with the economic inequalities and when the necessary internal group communication emerges, the chance of ethnic societies for integration to national society will be low. The consequence of such kind of

differentiation will possibly be separation of powerful ethnic communities from the central nation⁷⁹.

2.2.2.2. Political Transformation ó John Breuilly and Eric Hobsbawn

Political Transformation as a school of Modernism uses some changes in the nature of politics such as the emergence of modern bureaucratic state, recognition of the right to vote in order to explain nationalism. John Breuilly is accepted as one of the most important thinkers of nationalism literature with his study that is named as *Nationalism and State* since its first publication in 1982. Breuilly, who uses a historical perspective, states that nationalism is a form of trying to understand politics and is a method that tries to understand and analyze nationalism more than a theory. According to Breuilly, a nationalist argument should depend on these assertions:

1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
3. The nation must be independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty⁸⁰.

The literature on the concept of nationalism refers to thoughts, class interests, economic modernization, physiological needs and culture. However these concepts are not enough to explain and understand nationalism. According to Breuilly, nationalism is only about politics and political power. In the modern world, the control of power belongs to the state and nationalism should be related to attempts to have and use this power⁸¹. The second important feature of nationalism is the relation with modernization. With the modernization process, the division of labor is differentiated. In pre-modern societies, certain institutions that act on behalf of certain groups had multi-functional structure. Breuilly gives guilds that had economic, cultural and political functions as examples to these multi-functional institutions. However, since the 18th century, this type of division of labor has changed and each social function has

⁷⁹ Umut Özk,r,ml,, **ibid**, p: 96-99.

⁸⁰ John Breuilly, qtd. in Umut Özk,r,ml,, **ibid**, p: 104-105.

⁸¹ Umut Özk,r,ml,, **ibid**, p: 105.

been directed by certain and single institution. Market economy and politics have been directed by specialized bureaucracies. In this state that has been built upon a liberal logic, the division between private powers and public powers has got sharpen. Nevertheless, as a consequence of this change on the division of labor, there has been an emphasis on individuals rather than particular group members. In that context, the most problematic side of this new structure is the difficulty of establishing a connection between state and society. At this point, a nation, as a body of citizens not only provides legitimacy to the modern state by the logic of general will, but also develops an identity that can be canalized by political elites and enables the standardization of the society⁸².

Another important thinker, who advocates Political Transformation, is historian Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm supposes that the concept of nation can only be defined a posteriori and with nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm⁸³ summarizes his approach to nationalism with five points.

First of all, according to Hobsbawm, a nation only matters when it is related to a national state. As such, he uses the concept of nationalism in the sense of Gellner definition "the congruence of political and national units" Gellner's implication makes modern nationalism different from other and less demanding forms of national or group identification. Secondly, according to Hobsbawm, nationalism comes before nations. So nations do not create states and nationalisms. Nevertheless, he highlights the nationalism as a modern phenomenon and advocates that nation is not essential and constant. Thirdly, politics, technology and social transformation affect nationalism. Nations exist not only in the functions of a territorial state but also in the context of technologic and economic developments. As such, nations should be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative and economic conditions. The other point is that

Nations constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions,

⁸² Umut Özkır, ml., *ibid*, p: 105-107.

⁸³ Eric Hobsbawm, *ibid*, p: 23-28.

hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist⁸⁴.

Nevertheless, he states that nations are actually top-down formations, however, the assumptions, hopes, aspirations and interests of individuals should be taken into account while defining nation.

2.2.2.3. Cultural Transformation ó Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson

The last Modernist school is Cultural Transformationism that focuses on social and cultural transformations in order to explain the concept of nationalism. The most important representatives of the Modernist School are Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.

Gellner defines nationalism as a principle of òthe congruence of political and national unitsö and advocates that nation is based on nation state more than national culture. He focuses on a historical process that includes the development of nation state and the formation of all national symbols that the nation states needed in order to explain this relation between nation and the nation state. According to Gellner, human history is formed by three stages as the hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate and industrial societies. In the hunter-gatherer societies, because there was no division of labor, state structure had not established yet. However, in the agrarian society, a literate and specialized stratum emerged. As a result of a standard and constant script, a cultural and scientific centralization, or in other words the emergence of a cultured and intellectual ruling class became possible. He states that;

Literacy, the establishment of a reasonably permanent and standardized script, means in effect the possibility of cultural and cognitive storage and centralization. The cognitive centralization and codification effected by a clerisy, and the political centralization which is the state, need not go hand in hand. Often they are rivals; sometimes one may capture the other; but more often, the Red and

⁸⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, available in <http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/hobsbawm.htm>, [23.09.2007].

the Black, the specialists of violence and of faith, are indeed independently operating rivals, and their territories are often not coextensive⁸⁵.

According to Gellner, there were generally two different type of division of labor was formed: a ruling class consisted of warriors, priests, clerics, administrators, burghers and the others (peasants). In these societies, this division of labor was so clear and it is impossible to mention any kind of homogeneity as a result of certain cultural differences between classes. Because, literacy only belong to the clergy and this created an important difference between clergy and the others. According to Gellner⁸⁶;

These two crucial and idiosyncratic forms of the division of labor - the centralizations of power and of culture/cognition - have profound and special implications for the typical social structure of the agro-literate polity. Their implications are best considered jointly, and they can be schematized as shown in figure 1.




Figure 1 General form of the social structure of agrarian societies (is available in <http://members.tripod.com/GellnerPage/gellner11.html> [27.09.2007])

According to Gellner, the most important feature of agro-literate societies, the ruling class as the small part of the population was rigidly separated from the rest of the

⁸⁵ Ernst Gellner, **Nations and Nationalism**, London: Backwell Publishing, 1983, p: 8.

⁸⁶ Ernst Gellner, **ibid**, p: 8-9.

society and the borders between classes were not permeable. Nevertheless, both for the ruling stratum as a whole and for the various sub-strata within it – as warriors, priests, clerics, administrators, burghers – was separated from the peasant in the base of cultural differentiation rather than homogeneity. As such, the whole system favors horizontal lines of cultural cleavage, and it may invent and reinforce them when they are absent. In that context, in these societies that were organized as empires or small autonomous societies, these horizontal lines were the source of legitimacy of the clergy and the Church. However, with the industrialization process, social, ideal and constant progress became possible for the first time. This progress necessitates a new division of labor as a result of scientific and economic developments.

Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and continuous improvement. Not surprisingly, it was the first society to invent the concept and ideal of progress, of continuous improvement... And indeed, something unusual, something unique, had happened⁸⁷.

Industrial development needed workers that had a scientific knowledge at least for using the industrial machines. So, the Church lost its monopoly on literacy and scientific knowledge. Social roles changed and the permeability between cultural strata increased. According to Gellner, in the industrialized societies there is

Egalitarianism and mobility engendered by the distinctively industrial, growth-oriented economy. There are some additional subtler traits of the new division of labor, which can perhaps best be approached by considering the difference between the division of labor in an industrial society and that of a particularly complex, well-developed agrarian one. The *obvious* difference between the two is that one is more stable and the other is more mobile. In fact, one of them generally wills itself to be stable, and the other wills itself to be mobile; and one of them pretends to be more stable than social reality permits, while the other often claims more mobility, in the interest of pretending to satisfy its egalitarian ideal, than its real constraints actually permit. Nevertheless, though both systems tend to exaggerate their own central features, they do indeed

⁸⁷ Ernst Gellner, *ibid*, p: 21.

markedly possess the traits they claim as their own when contrasted with each other: one is rigid, the other mobile⁸⁸.

Gellner supposes that nationalism is rooted in a *certain kind* of division of labor, one which is complex and persistently, cumulatively changing. Since industrialization standardized the social conditions and prevented the centralization of high cultures as the ruling class that has literacy and scientific knowledge and created a certain and clear cultural identity that the all society can be together under by the way of education⁸⁹.

As one of the most important representatives of Cultural Transformationism, Benedict Anderson begins with the difficulty to define the concept of nation by analyzing the current literature on the concept. As such, Anderson suggests this definition for the concept of nation: "an imagined community - an imagined political community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".

According to Anderson⁹⁰, nation is an imagined community, because "the members of even smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear for them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion". However, Anderson criticizes the idea of the nation is not only imagined, but also it should be analyzed with invention and dishonesty. As, according to Anderson, all communities in the world that there is no face-to-face relation between members are imagined. In that context, nations should be analyzed with how they come into being, in what ways their meanings have changed and how their legitimacy is formed. Nevertheless, nation is imagined as limited. Anderson states that no nation can include the whole humanity and all nations are surrounded and limited by other nations. Nations are imagined not only as limited, but also as sovereign. Because nations emerged in an era in which the hierarchical dynastic realms began to lose their powers as a result of Enlightenment and the French Revolution. According to Anderson;

Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the

⁸⁸ Ernst Gellner, *ibid*, p: 11.

⁸⁹ Ernst Gellner, *ibid*, p: 57.

⁹⁰ Benedict Anderson, *ibid*, p: 17-22.

living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.

Finally, nation is a community because it necessitates a fraternity despite the inequalities and exploitation. He states that ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.

As it is mentioned before, Anderson advocates that nation and nationality are particular cultural artifacts. In that context, in order to understand what nation and nationalism is one should analyze the how and when they come into being, how their meanings have changed over time and how they create such legitimacy. According to Anderson, nationalism emerged in the 18th century as a consequence of spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces and once emerged, it becomes an applicable model for great variety of social terrains by a correspondingly wide variety of ideologies. As such, Anderson suggests that a persuasive explanation of nationalism should only confine itself to specifying the cultural and political factors which facilitate the growth of nations⁹¹.

2.2.2.3. Ethno-Symbolism

As Özkırmlı, notes that modernist approach has been questioned in detail by scholars. A certain group of these scholars focus on the role of pre-existing ethnic ties and sentiments in the formation of modern nations. Instead of focusing on the invented or constructed nature of nationalism, these scholars overlook the persistence of earlier myths, symbols, values and memories of nations and the certain importance of these concepts on the people⁹².

Smith defines his position as the midway between primordialism and modernism and names this position as ethno-symbolism or historical ethno symbolism. According to Spencer and Wollman, when Smith rejects primordialism in a certain way,

⁹¹ Umut Özkırmlı, *ibid*, p: 105.

⁹² Umut Özkırmlı, *ibid*, p: 167.

he criticizes modernism for rejecting the continuing relevance and power of pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a firm base for the nation-to-be⁹³. Smith aims to explain the nature of national identity and the intensity of sentiments that root from this identity by the way of analyzing the elements and the components of the concept of nation. So, Smith goes back to the pre-modern era or to the 18th century that is accepted as the starting point of nationalism by the most of the scholars in order to locate national identities and ideologies in the long-standing perspectives of group identities and sentiments⁹⁴.

In order to understand Smith, because he certainly rejects primordialism, the approach of ethno-symbolists to modernism seems to be a good starting point. As it is mentioned before, according to Smith, there was a common opinion of the neutrality of nation and the permanence of the world system that bases on nation states until the mid 20th century. However, the important developments in mid 20th century created a need of re-analyzing of the concept of nation along with other concepts as a result of certain developments such as the emergence of nations that cannot be determined as nations clearly like Nigeria, Indonesia and India and the awakening of national emotions and even nationalist demands of Basques, Quebec, Flemish that were accepted as self-satisfied integrated parts of West. Nevertheless, the bloc countries except the two super powers had been constrained in political, militarist, economic movements. And finally, the emergence of multinational companies with huge budgets that are developed in terms of economy, technology and specialization and the threat of these companies to the nation state structure⁹⁵.

After explaining the reasons of questioning the naturalness of nations, he summarizes modernist approach as a belief in modernity of the nation and conditionality of nationalism. Smith accepts the modernity of the nation states as a political norm and accepts that although there was a certain national sentiment at the end of the 15th century and at the beginning of the 16th century, nationalism as an ideology and a movement emerged at the end of the 18th century. However, he argues

⁹³ Anthony D., Smith, **Uluslar, n Etnik Kökeni**, p: 167.

⁹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, **Milli Kimlik**, p: 28-29.

⁹⁵ Anthony D., Smith, **Uluslar, n Etnik Kökeni**, p: 29-30.

that there was a certain similarity in the pre-modern or even in the archaic world with the idea of national identity and national thoughts in the modern world such as the idea of unity in Greek City States or Rome or the struggle of Ionia with the Persian occupancy. As such, Smith questions and criticizes the idea of the pure modernity of the nations⁹⁶ and he tries to explain the early ethnic ties of nations in order to base his approach on a historical background. In that context, Smith uses the term of 'ethnie' and its symbolism in order to explain the ethnic roots of the nations. He argues that in order to explain how and why nations emerged, one should start from ethnic ties and identities, which form their cultural basis. So, Smith suggests that there is certain continuity between pre-modern ethnies and modern nations, because modern nations base themselves on the cultural basis of pre-modern ethnies and it is impossible to separate this cultural basis from the modern nations. This cultural basis includes historical symbols, myths, memories and values. Thus, Smith defined nation as: 'a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties'⁹⁷.

To sum up, Smith⁹⁸ argued that ethnicity is the most influential origin of the nation-states. Smith based this argument on three main reasons: First of all first nations were formed on the basis of pre-modern ethnic cores. As a consequence of 'being powerful and culturally influential, they provided models for subsequent cases of the formation of nations in many parts of the globe'. Secondly, ethnic model of the nation has become popular because 'it sat so easily on the pre-modern demotic kind of community that had survived into the modern era in so many parts of the world'. Finally, ethnic unity is a necessary condition for the national survival and unity because it would be very hard for a community to survive without a coherent mythology, symbolism of history and culture.

The basic assumptions of the approaches to nationalism may offer a certain background in order to analyze the changes within the European Union with regard to

⁹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, p: 32-34.

⁹⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, p: 75.

⁹⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, p: 133-134.

Europeanism or an identity of the European Union. For instance, the voluntarily transfer of sovereignty of nation states to the European Union on even areas of high politics is a certain change about who holds and uses the power. From the point of Breuilly, who supposes that nationalism is about the use of political power and the nationalism emerged since the nation state holds and uses this power, this change in the holder and the user of power may trigger a similar change to the transformation caused by nationalism at the end of the 18th century. On the other hand, the multi-level governance of the European Union as sub-national, national and supranational governance requires a different division among powers also and this new division can be analyzed with a similar point of view what Breuilly calls as the division between "private powers" and "public powers" in the modern state based on liberal logic. Also, Hobsbawm supposes that the changes in politics, technology and social transformation effected nationalism and one may suppose that certain changes in these areas can also affected the emergence of new trends similar to the emergence of nationalism. Nevertheless, from the point of the Hobsbawm's assumption that supposes nationalism comes before nations, one can suggest that a Europeanism depends on an identity of the European Union can also help the emergence of a consciousness of being European among the peoples of Europe. In a similar point of view, the assumption of Gellner that stresses on the division of labor, egalitarianism and mobility emerged in the industrial society can also be analyzed in the scale of the European Union with regard to the permeability between horizontal cultural strata throughout the Europe. However, in this study, it is preferred to discuss the relation between nationalism and European integration with regard to new social fragmentations as a consequence of growing multicultural structure of societies rather than explaining European integration through the assumptions of theories of nationalism.

The approaches discussed up until now offers two different prototypes for a supranational identity of the European Union (Although it is impossible to make a rigid separation between cultural and political factors when the collective identities matter, the categorization used here depends on what makes the members of the group together.): A collective identity based on cultural values such as common history, common culture, common religion or a more flexible collective identity grounds on

common political values and interests. On the one hand, a collective identity as a sense of belonging to a group based on cultural values strictly determines the boundaries of the group and this complicates the inter group relations as a consequence of the exclusive characteristic of such an identity. A political collective identity, on the other hand, requires determined political norms, values and interests shared by the members of the group and based on more previous and more elastic cultural values. The question whether an identity of the European Union should be a cultural identity or a political one discussed in the next chapter of the study. However, the rest of this chapter will focus on the two dimensional crisis of national identity in contemporary Europe: New social fragmentations as a consequence of growing multicultural structure of societies and the rise of new nationalism as a reaction to political, economic and social changes within Member States of the European Union.

2.3. Crisis of the National Identity in Contemporary Europe: Multicultural Societies versus New Nationalism

The rise of the right wing and extreme right wing parties across the Europe shows that nationalism remains one of the most important political factors. However, this contemporary rise of nationalism differs somehow from nationalism emerged in the 18th century and spilled over Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa after the 19th century explained above. This nationalism can be seen as a reaction to political, economic and social changes as consequences of not only globalization, but also deepening and widening process of the European integration. Thanks to technological developments in communication and transportation means, the mobility and flow of people changes the social structures. However, the picture of Europe is more complex. On the one hand since the single market allows the citizens of European Union to move and reside freely within the Union, and nonetheless, legal and illegal immigration, the social structures of the Member States are becoming more multi-ethnic and multicultural. On the other hand, these new immigrant ethnic minorities have their different identity and sense of belonging to their particular cultural identities and they seek a political representation and recognition of their separate identities. As such, in this part of the study, the contemporary rise of nationalism in Europe as a reaction of

these changes will be discussed. Using such an approach may be helpful in order to analyze the relation between a possible identity of the European Union and national identities. Nevertheless, analyzing the challenge among different particular cultural identities may throw a light on how European Union can bring culturally different peoples of Europe together under an identity of the European Union.

Delanty stresses on some differences between classical nationalism and new nationalism of Europe. First, new nationalism does not try to bring the most of the population together, in other words it is exclusive, when classical nationalism is inclusive. So the other of new nationalism is more immigrants than other nations or nation states and focuses on the internal problems of the nation state. As it is mentioned above, classical nationalism is analyzed by generally referencing social, political or economic transformations. However, Delanty supposes this new nationalism is a consequence of the crisis of the national identity of the nation state more than a product of an ideology similar to the liberalism, conservatism and socialism. Delanty makes a differentiation between civic nationalism and - nationalism similar to the political or cultural nationalisms discussed before. According to Delanty, civic nationalism, or political nationalism, refers to state and membership of a political community, when ethno-cultural nationalism refers to membership of a cultural historical community. According to Delanty, this new type of nationalism focuses on these ideas of historical community more than universalistic aims. Delanty supposes that civic nationalism is in crisis today as a consequence of the incoherence between universalistic aims of civic nationalism and ideas of the historical community. He states that the crisis of the nation-state today refers to the separation of the state from the nation. The state is no longer dependent on a national culture and frequently it has rejected certain core elements of the national culture. According to Delanty, the new nationalism mainly opposes this change in the nature of the nation state⁹⁹.

However, Rex, who focuses on national identity in democratic welfare states, supposes that nation states may adopt four different policies to the presence of particular

⁹⁹ Gerard Delanty, "Beyond the Nation-State: National Identity and Citizenship in a Multicultural Society - A Response to Rex", **Sociological Research Online**, Vol. 1, No: 3, available in <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/3/1.html>, [25.06.2008]

cultural identities. The first alternative is keeping the minorities or subaltern groups out of the society and rejecting the ways of life of minorities. Rex states that this exclusive alternative is supported by especially extreme right parties such as the National Front in France, the Vlaamse Blok in Belgium and Freedom Party of Austria. The second alternative of the nation state is accepting the minorities as 'temporary residents without political rights'. In this case, Rex uses the Marshall's approach explained in detail in the first chapter and he supposes although the minorities lack civil and political rights, they have some social rights. He gives the *Gastarbeiter* system of Germany. The third alternative, according to Rex, is accepting the minorities with the condition of resigning their own culture and organizations. In this alternative that Rex calls as assimilationism, all individuals have equal rights 'accompanied by the discouragement of minority cultures or political organization'. Rex gives France as example and the exclusion of minority cultures from the schools; however, this exclusion also is applied to religious groups of the majority since the education has to be secular. The rest alternative is multiculturalism, which will be analyzed in the third chapter in detail, and integrating the minorities in the society. Multiculturalism is mainly combating racial and color discrimination, recognition of particular identities, and tolerance to cultural diversity. Rex gives Sweden, Netherlands and somehow Britain to this last alternative. However, he adds, despite these multiculturalist policies, there is 'no ideal egalitarian form of multiculturalism to be considered'¹⁰⁰.

Consequently, the discussions up until now show that the existence of minorities and subaltern groups and the seeking for recognition of these groups cannot be disregarded and the response of the nation state may differ from exclusion to recognition. As it is mentioned before, the new rise of nationalism and the place of minorities are discussed here as a prototype for a solution at the European scale. However, it should be highlighted that the discussions here focus on the relation between the dominant culture and identity of the nation state and the particular identities of the minorities or cultural groups. Yet, about the identity of the European Union, not only there is no a dominant identity similar to the national identity, but also the gulf

¹⁰⁰ John Rex, 'National Identity in the Democratic Multi-Cultural State', **Sociological Research Online**, Vol. 1, No: 2, available in <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/2/1.html>, [25.06.08]



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between different cultures is more crucial since an identity of the European Union tries to bring peoples of Europe from different 27 countries, who have different nationalities, cultures, languages and religions, together. As such, in the last chapter of the study, different approaches to a possible European identity that can be accepted by all these different peoples of Europe and that can minimize the tensions arising from the resistance of the national identities will be discussed.

CHAPTER 3

CHANGING IDENTITIES AND THE IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Report of Leo Tindemans, which is also an important report in the development process of the citizenship of the European Union as it is mentioned before, states that

No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must take itself felt in education and culture, news and communications. It must protect the rights of individual and strengthen democracy through a set of institutions which have legitimacy conferred on them by the will of our peoples. The image of Europe must be in line with motivations and opportunities, must demonstrate to those within and without the solidarity of our peoples and values of society¹⁰¹.

Approximately 30 years after this report, we still discuss how European Union will be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. Habermas supposes that the most important challenge of the European integration today is to protect the "great democratic achievements of the European nation state" beyond its limits. According to Habermas, these achievements of the nation state that should be protected by the nation state are not only the protection of civil rights, but also "welfare, education and leisure" as preconditions for an effective citizenship. As such, Habermas suggests "As a political collectivity, Europe cannot take hold in the consciousness of its citizens simply in the shape of a common currency"¹⁰². So, how can the consciousness of the unity of European citizens go beyond the shape of a common currency? In this chapter of the study, in general, different approaches to a possible European Identity that can bind the citizens of the European Union to each other and to the Union itself with regard to the relation between the identity of the European Union and national identities. The rest of

¹⁰¹ Bulletin of the European Communities 1/76 available in http://aei.pitt.edu/942/01/political_tindemans_report.pdf [27.10.2006]

¹⁰² Jürgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs A Constitution, 2001, available in <http://www.newleftreview.org/A2343>, [17.06.2008]

the study will examine whether a multicultural, political identity of the European Union is possible.

3.1. Identity of the European Union: Cultural or Political?

The discussions of the identity of the European Union generally focus on whether it should be a political identity that binds the European Union and its citizens and creates a sense of togetherness among the peoples of Europe through political norms and values, or it should be a cultural one that bases on a shared history and tradition similar to the national identity. As such, a brief history of concept of Europe may serve as a background whether there is a shared history or tradition that the identity of the European Union can be built on.

The question of legitimacy of the European Union as a political body for its citizens has been a much-discussed issue about the nature of the European Union. According to Meyer, European Union lacks a sufficient sense of shared citizens identity is a necessary condition for its legitimacy as a body politic and the solidarity of its citizens and the Union is still a far cry away from the achievement of such a political identity of its own that would be sufficiently well enshrined in the hearts and minds of its citizens and thus serving its proper ends in the political process¹⁰³. Meyer sees this deficit as the main reason of the crisis that the European Union has come face to face with in the ratification process of the EU constitution, and the Treaty of Lisbon. So, according to Meyer, this crisis is a two-dimensional identity crisis since it concerns not only the identity of the Union as a political body, but also the identity of the citizens as a sense of belonging¹⁰⁴.

According to Smith, although neither the idea of united Europe, nor national identity is new, there is a growing interest in the European idea and its relationship to national identities. As such Smith asks

¹⁰³ Thomas Meyer, "European Identity", 2006, University of Graz, Seggau Summer School, available in http://www.uni-graz.at/en/bibwww/bibwww_strategicfocus/bibwww_see/bibwww_see_projects/bibwww_soeggau/bibwww_soeggau_program/bibwww_soeggau_meyer_inhalte.htm, [12.09.2006]

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Meyer, "ibid", available in http://www.uni-graz.at/en/bibwww/bibwww_strategicfocus/bibwww_see/bibwww_see_projects/bibwww_soeggau/bibwww_soeggau_program/bibwww_soeggau_meyer_inhalte.htm, [12.09.2006]

is it simply the fact that European unification, in whatever form, is for the first time a distinct possibility or that we can make Europe where previous generations could only dream about it? Or is it rather that the sheer pace of social and political change has forced us to reassess rooted structures like nation state, and hallowed values like national identity¹⁰⁵.

According to Smith there is a certain reason behind the growing interest to cultural effects of the integration and the question whether European identity is possible and legitimate. Smith supposes that a person may have multiple identities in sociological terms and the order of preference of these identities is conditional and these different identities are concentric than conflictual. As such, according to Smith, a conflict between national identities and European identity is not necessary. Nevertheless, Smith supposes that national identities are superior to a possible European identity. National identities are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularized and, still widely believed, when European identity is deficient of both as an idea and a process. According to Smith, European identity lacks a pre-modern past or a prehistory which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth¹⁰⁶.

In ancient Greek mythology, Europa, who was the daughter of King of Tyre, was admired by Zeus. Zeus, in the shape of a bull, abducted Europa and took her to the island of Crete and Europe became the queen of Crete. Although in ancient Greece, the term of Europa was used only to Athens and Sparta, later it stood for whole Greek Land and the meaning of Europa extended to the lands of North also. Although the term Europe was used in Roman Empire to refer the a geographical area includes much of the European continent and some parts of Asia, Europe, began to be used for the first time to refer a culture with the acceptance of Christianity by the Roman Empire. However, it should be highlighted here that the Roman Empire was divided in two parts in the 3rd century, and this division produced two versions of Christianity: the Roman church of West and Orthodox church of East. Nevertheless, in the Christian teaching, the Europeans are seen as the children of one of the three sons of Noah, when the other sons are accepted as the ancestors of Arabs and Africans. With the emergence of Islam in

¹⁰⁵ Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1992, p: 55.

¹⁰⁶ Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the idea of European Unity", p: 55.

middle East and the Persian and Barbarian attacks from East moved the centre of Christianity to Europe. The Christianity of Europe was enhanced with the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, especially under the rule of Charlemagne, who was called as "Father of Europe" in the 8th century. The conflicts with Islam and Crusades enhanced the link between Christianity and Europe in the following centuries. Another important development in the conceptualization process of term Europe was the oversea expansions of the Western European countries and the concept of Europe began to refer to some values of European civilization along with the Christianity. However, as a consequence of rapid development of capitalism, Age of Enlightenment, Renaissance and Reform, and finally French Revolution in short, as a consequence of modernity, the well established tie between Europe and Christianity was somehow broken and the European continent was divided into particular nation states. Now, Europe as a concept began to refer to values of Enlightenment such as rationalism, secularism, progress and a "superior" civilization¹⁰⁷. Consequently, ancient Greece, Roman Empire, Christianity, colonialism and Age of Enlightenment, Renaissance, Reform and French Revolution are the milestones in the historical development of the concept of Europe.

As it is mentioned in the second chapter, in his theory of Ethno-symbolism, Smith focuses "the persistence of earlier myths, symbols, values and memories" of nations and the certain importance of these concepts on people¹⁰⁸. In a similar manner, Smith searches earlier myths, symbols, values and memories belongs to Europe that a possible European Identity can be constructed upon. Smith states that most of the languages of Europe belong to the Indo-European family and nevertheless, although there are certain lines between Latin, Germanic and Slavic subfamilies, there is also a certain interrelation and movement among these languages. Second, despite the heated discussion on the issue, the idea of Europe "from the Urals to the Atlantic" may serve as the territorial symbolism of a European possible identity. Third, Smith argues that the religious differences do not play a vital role in the European integration by giving example of inter-Christian divides. Nevertheless, Smith supposes that "there is a clear

¹⁰⁷ For further discussions see J.G.A. Pocock, "Some Europes in Their History" in Anthony Pagden (ed.), **The Idea of Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p:55-71, Dunkerley and Others, **ibid**, p: 109-116, F. H. Burak Erdenir, **Avrupa Kimli i: Pan-Milliyetçilikten Post-Milliyetçili e**, Ankara: Ümit Yay,nc,l,k: 2005, p: 57-87.

¹⁰⁸ Umut Özk,r,ml,, **ibid**, p: 167.

sense, in which Europeans see themselves as not-Muslims or as not-Jews. Finally, According to Smith, in most of the European countries, there is a sense of the outsider directed at immigrants and guest-workers. Smith asks "Might not the older the older nationalistic exclusive attitudes to foreigners now become 'Euro-nationalist' exclusion of blacks, Asians and non-Europeans?"¹⁰⁹

Similar to the Smith's search for cultural memories for Europe, there are also other attempts to find historical, religious, geographical or even ethnicity that a European Identity can be built on. Here, a comparative analysis can be helpful between a cultural European identity and national identity. In general, national identity is a sense of belonging to a group sharing a common language, religion, history and even ethnicity. Founding a common ethnicity or race for Europeans is the most difficult criterion for a shared identity since thanks to the heritage of Fascism of the Continent and the experience of World War II; discussing racism here is meaningless for European integration. Nevertheless, common language is one of the biggest obstacles to establish a cultural European identity. Although, as Smith states most of the languages of Europe belong to the Indo-European family, the languages of Basques, Estonians and Hungarians are excluded from this generalization. On the other hand, although they belong to the same linguistic family, there are still certain differences between these languages. A common religion is the most discussed issue among these elements. The relation between Europe and Christianity is always obvious despite the secular ideas of modernity. The place of the Christian Democrats at European politics and discussions whether the Constitution should refer to Christianity in its preamble can be seen as examples of this relation. However, Christianity has certain weaknesses to establish commonness among Europeans. First of all, there is a certain division among Christians through denominations. This division is old more than 18 centuries and the history of Europe is full of bloody wars among these denominations. A common history, as another component of a cultural European identity should refer to these wars also. On the other hand, it is currently estimated that Muslims in the EU member states total more than 13.5 million; if non-recorded immigration is taken into account, the real figure is much higher. Islam is now the second largest religion in the Union, after

¹⁰⁹ Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the idea of European Unity", p: 68-69.

Christianity. Finally, it is obvious that a common religion for European Union will become exclusivist more than deepening the integration. As it is mentioned before, the history of Europe is the history of wars among European states. The heritage of ancient Greece and Roman Empire was not enough to prevent these wars. On the other hand, the division between West and East Europe survived until the end of the 20th century. About the Age of Enlightenment, Renaissance and Reform, and finally French Revolution as the milestones stones of European History, it is clear to see that all the member states of the European Union do not have the similar experiences. For instance, how much Romania experienced these developments. Consequently, the diversity among European peoples is so deep for establishing a cultural identity requires a cultural homogeneity. Most importantly, such a cultural European identity may challenge and compete with the national identities and create unavoidable tensions. Nevertheless, this type of identity may increase the reactions to changing cultural structures of the nation states or in other words increase the new nationalist trends discussed in the second chapter.

In a similar manner, in contrast to Smith's search for myths, symbols, values and memories for Europe, Meyer supposes that there had been a high degree of cultural diversity in Europe throughout its entire history. As such, Meyer suggests that European identity should be understood as a political concept more than a cultural one. According to Meyer,

As the EU understands itself basically as a liberal, participatory and social democracy the insistence on any form of cultural identity that goes substantially beyond the political culture of democracy itself would seriously contradict its constitutional identity and undermine its own genuine norms of legitimacy. There can and needs to be a discussion about the cultural foundations the political culture of democracy necessitates but there is no legitimate space for the idea that the EU requires a shared cultural identity of all its citizens¹¹⁰.

The question whether there should be a cultural cohesion for a European identity also discussed by Delanty. Delanty supposes that a model of culture as a ground

¹¹⁰ Thomas Meyer, *öbidö*, available in http://www.uni-graz.at/en/bibwww/bibwww_strategicfocus/bibwww_see/bibwww_see_projects/bibwww_soeggau/bibwww_soeggau_program/bibwww_soeggau_meyer_inhalte.htm, [12.09.2006]

of consensus is not cohesive, but it is more conflictual and, nevertheless, the relation between culture and identity is getting more of a basis of contentious action since Delanty supposes that culture leads to fragmentation more than social integration. In a similar manner, in terms of European integration, Delanty supposes that the best model that can be followed should be one that does not seek to reproduce on the transnational level that which has already decomposed on the level of the nation state. He continues as the missing cultural component of European social integration cannot be found in the national culture. He states that a far more important project would be to embark on a programme of Europeanization aimed to institutionalize cultures of contention built around new norms of public commitment and promote a self-critical European identity. He references to the idea of 'constitutional patriotism', which will be discussed below, and he suggests for social European integration identification with the procedural principles of the constitution. In other words, Delanty suggests that a European cultural identity cannot be defined by reference to nationality, territory, geography or cultural heritage¹¹¹.

Meyer uses three leveled explanation to explain the experiences of individuals in liberal democratic states in order to explain why European political identity should not be cultural identity. Meyer supposes that all cultures in the world experience an irreversible process of internal differentiation in terms of religious-metaphysical level as ways of believing, socio-cultural level as ways of living and political-cultural level as ways of living together. He supposes there is a tendency that individuals may share political-cultural values of living together, when they have different ways of believing and ways of living in most of the liberal democracies. He states that

It can be said to be the very meaning of a liberal democracy to institutionalize that specific minimum of common political- cultural norms and values in a binding manner that opens and guarantees the maximum possible space for cultural- religious and socio- cultural divergence. The norms and institutions of a post-liberal participatory and social democracy in their turn are

¹¹¹ Gerard Delanty, 'Social Integration and Europeanization: The Myth of Cultural Cohesion', **Yearbook of European Studies**, 2000, p: 234-235 available in <http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/rodopi/09204792/v14n1/s12.pdf?expires=1221416659&id=45920036&titleid=1272&accname=Guest+User&checksum=4F6B64CFEBF9D1EC4DC043F22FA06607>, [23.07.2007]

meant to universalize the values of liberal democracy so that they may gain real life effectiveness for the entire citizenry of a community. Hence, the identity of the European Union as a multi-level liberal democracy legitimately cannot be defined otherwise than in political terms. European political identity is not a cultural identity but an institutional guarantee for the greatest possible cultural diversity that is compatible with its political values and institutions.¹¹²

In other words, an identity of the European Union should offer an institutional guarantee for cultural diversity. So, how such an identity should be established? At this point, Habermas suggests a system that is based on the solidarity of peoples who have not a common language, ethnicity and culture, but who are collected under a democratic constitution. According to Habermas, if the constitution defines itself through democratic values and human rights, this will create a will of the citizens to accept the authority of the system and make the citizens together by subscription to democratic values and human rights. In such a system, constitutional patriotism binds citizens to each other by accepting democratic values and human rights in contrast to traditional pre-political ties in nation states. A political identity established on constitutional patriotism is based on respect to difference and plurality and neutrality of the law to differences. Habermas states that

Citizens, who are politically integrated in this way, share the rationally based conviction that unrestrained freedom of communication in the political public sphere, a democratic process for settling conflicts, and the constitutional channeling of political power together provide a basis of checking illegitimate power and ensuring that administrative power is used in the equal interest of all. The universalism of legal principles is reflected in a procedural consensus, which must be embedded in the context of a historically specific culture through a kind of constitutional patriotism¹¹³.

¹¹² Thomas Meyer, *öbidö*, available in http://www.uni-graz.at/en/bibwww/bibwww_strategicfocus/bibwww_see/bibwww_see_projects/bibwww_soegggau/bibwww_soegggau_program/bibwww_soegggau_meyer_inhalte.htm, [12.09.2006]

¹¹³ Jürgen Habermas, *öStruggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional Stateö*, Amy Gutmann (ed.), **Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p: 134.

Nevertheless, Habermas adds, a coherent system of rights requires politics of recognition that will also protect the integration of the citizens to the political life and thanks to this integration; the citizen can presents his or her identity¹¹⁴.

In a similar manner, Eriksen and Fossum suppose alternative non-state cosmopolitan model as a solution to democratic deficit of the European Union. According to Eriksen and Fossum, the challenge of European integration to democracy is also a challenge to cope with interdependence and diversity. So a solution to this democratic problem of diversity will not only establish a "complex multilevel and pluralistic European setting", but also "rescue" the national democracies¹¹⁵.

As it is mentioned before, Meyer suggests a more political European identity rather than a cultural one. He states that political identity should be based on two pillars: a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens pursue jointly and that bind citizens. Consequently,, a European identity should have these two components. Meyer stresses to six central dimensions that are stated in the Treaties of the European Union and the Draft Constitution and that can serve as the certain basic values and political objectives. These are

- A liberal democracy under the rule of law and universal basic rights
- A Participatory Democracy,
- A multilevel trans-national polity under the principle of subsidiarity
- A Social Space under universal social and economic basic rights.
- A multicultural community
- A civil global power

These six objectives of the European Union, Meyer suggests, are the values that a European political identity can be built upon¹¹⁶. Consequently, the discussions about how an identity that European Union needs today is a democratic, flexible,

¹¹⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *ibid*, p: 112.

¹¹⁵ Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, "Europe in Transformation: How to Reconstitute Democracy", **Recon Online Working Papers**, 2007, p: 26-27 available in www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html, [27.06.2008]

¹¹⁶ Thomas Meyer, *ibid*, available in http://www.uni-graz.at/en/bibwww/bibwww_strategicfocus/bibwww_see/bibwww_see_projects/bibwww_soeggau/bibwww_soeggau_program/bibwww_soeggau_meyer_inhalte.htm, [12.09.2006]

political and most importantly multicultural identity in order to create the tie between the Union and its citizens and create a sense of belonging among the citizens. So, the rest of the chapter, multiculturalism and what multiculturalism can offer to an Identity of the European Union will be discussed.

3.2. Changing Identities: Politics of Identity and Multiculturalism as a Solution

The discussions up to now show that the cultural structures of the societies are changing and currently societies are far from being homogenous entities as a consequence of easier mobility of persons. This change brings two questions together for democratic societies. On the one hand, in formal dimension, how can these different particular cultures live together? On the other hand, as the substantive dimension, can citizens with diverse ethnicity, gender, race, culture be treated as equals? In order to give peaceful answers to these questions, this part of the study will examine politics of identity and multiculturalism.

3.2.1. Politics of Identity

As it is discussed through the approaches to nationalism, nation generally requires a sense of commonality and somehow homogeneity among the members of the nation. The equality of the members of the nation also somehow depends on this commonality. However, democracy is being challenged by changing cultural structures of the societies as a consequence of mobility of people. Since, the sense of commonness is not so much common any more as a consequence of the seeking of recognition of the particular cultural groups within societies. Societies are now divided into sub cultural groups, which demand equal treatment in every field of life. So, politics of identity is based on equality of different identities. As such, politics of identity can be a good reference point for the identity of the European Union that can provide an equal democratic representation for its citizens.

According to Parker, all politics are identity politics:

Political activity is - and, at its best, is - animated by efforts to define and defend who I am, or we are, or you are, or hope to be, or hope to be seen to be. By extension, it is motivated by our imagination of what is or ought to be mine or ours or yours. It is not only about self-government. Nor does it always involve much in the way of public debate. What structures it, often beneath the surface, is the always unfinished enterprise of self-construction and self-presentation.¹¹⁷.

However, the questions concerning identity pullulate also within politics where different dimensions of the concept of identity have been used and discussed. As Fearon mentions that the debates on identity can be found in every field and subfield of political science. For instance in comparative politics, *identity* is the key concept while nationalism and ethnic conflicts are discussing or in international relations, *state identity* at the heart of the state sovereignty and realist theory. Nevertheless, identity is referred in political theory where gender, sex, race, nationality, ethnicity or culture matter¹¹⁸.

As it is discussed in the first chapter, in 1970s, feminist theories suppose that the classical models of citizenship make öa rigid separation between the private and the public spheresö¹¹⁹ and exclude the private sphere from politics and exclude öwomen and disadvantaged groupsö from the öshared culture of the public domainö¹²⁰ and classical theories of citizenship there is only one public and it ignores the private realm. Nevertheless, Feminist approach to citizenship criticizes the male oriented perspective and ignorance of öissues of personal identity and autonomyö¹²¹ and raises questions related to the place of the disadvantaged groups in the society not only in terms of rights, but also recognition of their identities. In a similar manner, Anne Philips supposes that öpeople do not define themselves just as citizens of a nation but, either through choice or necessity, often identify with some smaller sub-groupö¹²².

¹¹⁷ R.D. Parker, öFive Thesis on Identity Politicsö, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 01934872, Fall2005, Vol. 29, Issue 1

¹¹⁸ James D. Fearon, öWhat is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)ö, 1999, p: 1, available in <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/iden1v2.pdf> [25.03.2007].

¹¹⁹ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, **Citizenship**, available in <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#1.1>, [21.02.08].

¹²⁰ Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, p: 43.

¹²¹ Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, p: 46.

¹²² Anne Phillips, qtd in Michael Kenny, **The Politics of Identity**, Polity Press: U.K. 2004, p: 43.

Fossum states that since cultures and societies become more linked and interconnected, in other words, more multicultural, concerns about identity, both regarding recognition of uniqueness, as well as recognition of equality and equal value is growing. The struggle of groups and collectives for recognition can be defined as politics of difference. Fossum supposes that this struggle of recognition is supported by United Nations and European Union through system of human rights protection and promotion¹²³.

Kenny states that the term of politics of identity is used to refer to a number of transformations in group behavior and political argument as new kinds of social mobilization based upon various collective identities that were previously hidden, suppressed or neglected by the dominant culture of liberal society and by the agenda of the political left since the 1960s. Nevertheless, these movements not only root from a characteristic, shared identity that constructs the interests and prospects of individuals, but also make people together under certain social markings.¹²⁴

In a similar manner, according to Hoover and others, the identity politics constructs a connection between individuals and political projects based on elements that are very basic to their self-conceptions. Individuals regard these groupings as a means to distinguish themselves from the larger population through sharing common certain important characteristics with other members. In other words, these groupings depart from a commonality that is based on difference¹²⁵.

According to Fossum, this politics based on difference might be a rival for national identities, as it is discussed in contemporary rise of nationalism in Europe in the second chapter. He states that

The recent upsurge in identity politics is interesting in that national identities must compete with a range of claims for recognition from women's groups, gays and lesbians, aboriginal peoples, immigrants, ethnic groups, and other

¹²³ Jon Eric Fossum, *ibid*, available in http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_17.htm, [23.12.2007]

¹²⁴ Michael Kenny, *ibid*, p: 2.

¹²⁵ Kenneth R. Hoover, James Marcia and Kristen Paris, **The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key**, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1997, p: 48.

feel deprived of self-confidence, self respect and self-esteem. Contemporary patterns of identity politics stimulate claims and claimants that pursue gender-based, ethnic, regional and other modes of identification that bear no resemblance to national identity¹²⁶.

Kenny states that the growing influence, appeal and the impact of politics that is driven by identities are criticized and argued by many commentators. Some of these commentators accept politics of identity as a change in the character and culture of democratic states. According to them, the political alignments that were shaped by individual interests or ideological discussions have had a fundamental change in the last thirty years. Now, people come together under certain groups, which reflect people's collective personality and their different culture. According to this approach, identity politics is a consequence of this fundamental change and transformation in the political life¹²⁷.

However, when the identity of the European Union matters, the politics of identity means a joint participation of wide range of identities from national identities to social movements and to particular identities of individuals. Today, an exclusive identity of the European Union is barely possible, when even national identities are becoming more inclusive, universalist and more importantly multicultural.

3.1.2. Multiculturalism and European Citizenship

The question of the place of the minorities or subaltern groups in the nation states has always been a problem. However, the concept of "multiculturalism" emerged as an ideology in the 1960s especially in the discussions about the systems of the United States and Canada. The concept of multiculturalism is generally defined with the words of diversity, cultural plurality or intercultural dialogue. However, are these words enough to explain different approaches to multiculturalism? But it is clear to see that multiculturalism can be discussed where a liberal democracy is exist.

Dwight D. Murphey states that multiculturalism as an ideology

¹²⁶ Jon Eric Fossum, "Identity-Politics in the European Union", **ARENA Working Papers** available in http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_17.htm, [23.12.2007]

¹²⁷ Michael Kenny, *ibid*, p: 2-3.

expresses a reservoir of alienation against the cultures, ethnicities, religions and mores of Europe and of peoples who derive their origins from Europe (such as those of the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada), while championing the perspectives and ways of life of non-European peoples. When expressed less stridently, it praises "diversity" as a high value and supports the substitution of non-European customs for those that have heretofore prevailed in the West. This is a "diversity" that is advocated for Western nations, but is not at the same time pressed upon other cultures such as those of China, Japan or Latin America.¹²⁸

According to Amy Gutmann in multicultural democratic liberal state should protect the basic rights of all citizens— including freedom of speech, thought, religion, and association, manipulation of the cultural values that are represented by public institutions should be prevented and finally the public officials and institutions that make cultural choices are democratically accountable, not only in principle but also in practice.¹²⁹

John Horton defines multiculturalism as "the co-existence of a significant plurality of diverse cultural groups with sometimes conflicting values or ways of life within a single polity". He mentions with cultural groups as groups that are seeking accommodation within a society, not seeking political independence or secession. He adds the women as a group that also seeking an accommodation within a society to some degree, although they are not a cultural group. He uses the Bhikhu Parekh's definition of culture as "a historically created system of meaning and significance, or what comes to the same thing, a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives". According to Horton this system of beliefs should be analyzed "as interrelated in complex, diverse and changing ways - some elements will be more central than others, some more easily modified or abandoned, and so on". He supposes that there is no problem with the culture itself. But the problem is how the culture should be interpreted

¹²⁸ Dwight D. Murphey, "Multiculturalism and the West", **The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies**, Vol: 30, No: 2, 2005, p: 203.

¹²⁹ Amy Gutmann, **Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p: 10-11.

or understood. Nevertheless, in modern societies, the cultures cannot be differentiated from each other.¹³⁰

Today the social structures of most of the nation states consist of different ethnic and cultural groups. Nevertheless, the current territories of the nation states generally do not overlap with cultural boundaries. As a consequence of the mobility of the people thanks to the recent developments in transportation and communication means, these heterogeneous characters of the societies become more apparent. As it is discussed in the previous chapter, nation states require somehow homogeneity through national values and is based on a national identity, which is somehow superior to other cultural identities. However, in parallel with the changes in the social structures of the societies, the superiority of the national identity to other cultural identities is being challenged by the recognition demands of these identities. When the European Union matters, the picture is more complex. When we compare with the national societies, the level of divergence and difference is higher in the European Union, and most importantly, and it is almost impossible to mention a superior cultural identity or a cultural identity of the majority, which is superior to other cultural identities similar to the national identity. As such, multiculturalism for the European Union should be an equal co-existence of diverse cultural groups within a single polity and the stress should be on equality and divergence of particular groups rather than giving a voice to culturally oppressed groups.

As it is discussed in the first chapter, the citizenship of the European Union is being criticized for being inadequate to create a link between the Union and the citizen since it is based on the citizenships of the Member States and it means the exclusion of millions of long term residents from citizenship status. In a similar manner, the Union is silent about the political presence of the minorities and subaltern cultural groups and only calls Member States to enhance their efforts to integrate their migrants and liberalize their citizenship regimes. As such, all deficiencies in the citizenship regimes and the political attitudes to particular cultural groups of the Member States will also be

¹³⁰ John Horton, *Liberalism and Multiculturalism Once More unto the Breach* in Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights*, New York: Routledge, 2003, p: 25-26.



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the deficiency of the citizenship of European Union since the citizenship of the Union is based on national citizenship of the Member States.

If one defines multiculturalism as equal co-existence of diverse cultural groups within a single polity, a multiculturalist policy pursued by the European Union may provide a peaceful solution to the question of how different cultural groups can live together, how equal treatment to these different groups can be guaranteed and how democratic demands of these groups for recognition of their particular identities can be met. Nevertheless, a political identity of the European Union reinforced by a multicultural European citizenship may establish the mentioned sense of belonging of a citizen to the other citizens and the Union itself.

The European Union stresses on high level of cultural diversity among the peoples of European Union by highlighting the aim to integrate in diversity. This motto of the European Union may offer also a solution to the identity crisis of the Union. Not only it is impossible to differentiate the cultures from each other, but also comparing the cultures is meaningless. As such, only a political, multicultural identity of the European Union can establish a sense of *us* for peoples who have not a common nationality, language, ethnicity and culture and a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union as a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens of the European Union pursue jointly. Nevertheless, such an identity, since it does not reference superior cultural values will neither substitute, nor compete with national identities.

CONCLUSION

The long term aim of an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe is being challenged by the hesitation of the peoples of Europe and this challenge become more crucial as a consequence of the reactions of the voters at French and Dutch Referenda for the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and Irish Referendum for the Lisbon Treaty in 12th June 2008. This crisis of the European Union today can be seen as the biggest obstacle that should be overcome not only for the deepening process of the European integration, but also further widening process. On the one hand, the European integration has always been criticized for being an elite project and being far from the hearts and minds of the peoples of the European Union. However, the experiences of the rejection of the Treaties show that the step that the integration reached today cannot be legitimized without the will of the individuals. On the other hand, there is also a certain discussion about how an identity of the European Union can create a sense of belonging for the citizens of the European Union and what kind of integration the citizens of Union are the parts of.

Citizenship is not only about the rights or duties of the individuals in a political community, but also it is a status that binds the citizen to the political community and citizens to each other by creating a sense of belonging to a certain political group. However, the citizenship of the European Union established by the Treaty on European Union and somehow developed by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties fails to establish mentioned tie between the citizen and the Union with regard to two interrelated aspects. First, the current citizenship of the Union can be seen as a secondary citizenship, which offers some privileges, but not obligations and duties, for the national citizens. Nevertheless, the current citizenship of the European Union operates only when civil and some political rights matter but not social or cultural rights and only where national citizenship is not referred. Secondly, this citizenship of the Union is based on the rule of member state nationality and consequently, millions of legal long-term residents, who live in the Union without being citizens, are excluded from the political community.

Nevertheless, this citizenship cannot go beyond the limits where national citizenship is challenged by political and social changes.

The social and political changes that are challenging the national citizenships today are the consequences of two main trends. On the one hand, in the second half of the 20th century, a large scale of social movements such as rise of feminism, gay and lesbian liberation or recognition demands of particular groups had a certain effect at the political agenda. On the other hand, thanks to rapid technological developments in the communication and transportation means and global flow of capital, people and information make the mobility across nation states easier and change the somehow homogenous social structures of the societies. Emergence of new substantive and sub cultural groups and their seeking for the recognition of their particular identities has also affected the relation between citizen and the state. As a consequence of the democratic demands for recognition and equal treatment, the classical citizenship determined by a dominant culture has evolved to a more multicultural and universalist definition in the democratic liberal societies. The picture of the European Union is more complex. The free movement of people within the Single Market encourages the mobility across member states and the movement from periphery to the centre for a better life has created complicated relations between state and individual and among individuals. However, when the national identity matters, certainly, this change in social and political life brings a reaction and a resistance together, despite the weakening relation between nation and state. The rise of extreme right in the member states is addressing to changing nature of the nation as the dominant culture and the state, which has been forced to recognize the particular cultural identities and provide equal treatment. This identity crisis of the nation state may offer a background to the discussion about the character of an identity of the European Union.

The discussions about the identity of the European Union generally focus on whether it should be a cultural identity similar to the national identity depends on a common history, language, culture and religion, or a political identity determined by shared political norms, values and interests. A cultural identity of the European Union requires shared cultural values such as that the sense of togetherness and belonging of

the citizens of Europe can be built on. However, the cultural values of the peoples of Europe may lack creating a sense of commonness. For instance, although most of them belong to the same language family, there is no common language used by citizens of the Union. There are currently twenty three different languages accepted as the official language of the European Union. Nevertheless, a cultural European identity needs a common history similar to the national histories. However, is there a common history that was experienced by each twenty seven nation states? Although the heritage of ancient Greece and Roman Empire can offer a somehow commonality, the rest of the European history consists of division and wars between European States for centuries. For instance, during the end of World War II, that was only 63 years ago, 70 million people, most of them were civilians, were killed. Finally, a common religion for the European Union is the most discussed aspect of such a cultural identity. There is always a strong relation between Europe and Christianity. However, Christianity has certain weaknesses to establish commonness among Europeans since the division of Christianity to denominations is old more than 18 centuries and the history of Europe is full of bloody wars among these denominations. Nevertheless, accepting Christianity inherently as the religion of the European Union means exclusion of only approximately 20 million Muslims lives in the European Union. When one considers other religions, beliefs and atheists, a common religion for European Union becomes impossible. Most importantly, such a common religion cannot be discussed, when a secular and liberal democracy matters. Besides, on the one hand, such a cultural identity may compete with national identities and cause certain tensions. On the other hand, a cultural identity for the European Union may create a Fortress Europe and makes further enlargement impossible.

So, how is an identity of the European Union needed? There are always deep cultural differences among peoples of Europe. However, a cultural cohesion or commonality is not necessary for the identity of the European Union. The discussions up to now show that a European cultural identity can be exclusive, conflictual or even divisive rather than cohesive and integrating one. Then, how an identity of the European Union is needed? Although it is so difficult to make a rigid separation between cultural

and political values, what is stressed here is the characteristics of the values that makes the members of the group together.

A political identity depends on shared political norms, values and interests such as democracy and human rights and a multicultural polity guarantees equal representation and treatment may establish a system that the interests of particular cultural groups are same: equality. A polity, which is blind to all cultural differences and neutral against all different groups, may provide an equal representation to particular identities. Such the interest of equal treatment and equal representation of different identities may create a political environment in which particular identities individuals and groups can survive and develop. Nevertheless, this guarantee of equality may serve as the basis and legitimacy of the polity. When the European Union matters, a political identity which is based on equality, respect to human rights, neutrality and rule of law and participatory democracy may serve as the reason of why citizens of the European Union should live together.

Such an identity not only binds the citizens to the Union itself, but also creates a sense of commonness and togetherness among the citizens by creating a consciousness of respecting other differences in consideration of respecting to own difference. Nonetheless, people may have multiple identities and the order of priority of these identities is conditional, a political identity of the European Union may neither substitutes, nor competes with national identities In brief, respect to difference and most importantly neutrality of law over different cultural groups may establish a consciousness of citizens as a sense of belonging to the European Union as a polity and certain basic values and political objectives that citizens of the European Union pursue jointly. The motto of the European Union as "united in diversity" may provide a certain background for the integration to determine its attitude to social and political changes.

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