

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI**

**CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Selcen ÖNER

İstanbul-2008

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Danışman: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem NAS

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

1977 yılında İstanbul'da doğdum. Ortaokul ve lise öğrenimimi İSTEK Vakfı Tarabya Özel Kemal Atatürk Lisesi'nde yaptım. Lisans öğrenimimi 1995-1999 yılları arasında İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde yaptım. Yüksek lisansımı 2002 yılında Marmara Üniversitesi İngilizce Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde, danışmanlığını Prof. Dr. Günay Gökse Özdoğan'ın yaptığı "The Triadic Relationship Between The EU, Nation-State and Sub-national Regions: The Cases of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Corsica" konulu teze tamamladım.

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ABSTRACT

European identity has been in a construction process throughout history. This process has been still ongoing, but for the first time this construction takes place within an institutional framework provided by the European integration process since the 1950s. The EU provides a close and intense environment for interaction among the Member States and their citizens which has affected the identities of the Member States and their citizens. During the construction process of European identity within the EU, both cultural and civic references and a utilitarian approach have been used at different time periods. With the acceleration of the political integration process in the 1990s, there has been an increasing concern with European identity which is closely related with legitimacy of the EU.

The political elites of the EU and the EU institutions, especially the Commission and the EP have had crucial roles in the construction process of European identity within the EU. Education, cultural and audiovisual policies of the EU have been effective on the construction process of European identity, but to a limited extent, because they are mainly under the control of the national governments. The EU has used some symbols, such as the European flag in order to increase the feeling of belonging of the peoples of Europe to the EU. The EU citizenship was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, but it is dependent on Member State citizenship. The Constitutional Treaty was prepared, but it was rejected in the referendums in France and Netherlands in 2005.

Nation-building and construction of European identity emerged in different circumstances and have different characteristics, but during construction process of European identity within the EU, some similar instruments to those of nation-building have been used in order to establish legitimacy of the EU and to go on the political integration process. European identity has been in interaction with national and regional identities. These interactions have affected construction process of European identity, also national and regional identities in the EU. Turks and Europeans have been in interaction for centuries, thus, they have affected construction process of each others' identities. They have been in a closer interaction process, especially since Turkey was given an official candidate status at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 by the EU. Construction process of European identity within the EU has been also affected by its interactions with Turkey, especially through questioning Turkey's membership in terms of its Europeanness.

ÖZET

Avrupa kimliđi tarih boyunca bir inřa sürecindedir. 1950'lerde bařlayan Avrupa entegrasyon süreciyle birlikte inřa süreci ilk kez bir kurumsal çerçeve içerisinde devam etmektedir. AB, hem üye devletler, hem de vatandaşları arasında yakın ve yoğun bir etkileřim ortamı sađlamaktadır, bu da üye devletlerin ve vatandaşlarının kimliklerini etkilemektedir. Avrupa kimliđi inřa sürecinde, kültürel ve yurttaşlıkla ilgili referanslar, ayrıca faydacı yaklařım farklı dönemlerde kullanılmıřtır. Siyasi entegrasyon sürecinin 1990'larda hızlanması, özellikle Maastricht Antlařması ile, AB'nin meřruiyeti ile yakından bađlantılı olan Avrupa kimliđine karřı artan bir ilgi ortaya çıkmıřtır.

AB siyasi elitleri ve AB kurumlarının, özellikle de Komisyon ve Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun Avrupa kimliđinin inřa sürecinde çok önemli rolleri olmuřtur. AB'nin eđitim, kültür ve iřitsel-görsel politikaları Avrupa kimliđinin inřa sürecinde etkili olmuřtur ama bu etki sınırlıdır, çünkü bu politikalar temel olarak ulusal hükümetlerin kontrolü altındadır. AB, Avrupa halklarının AB'ye olan bađlılıklarını arttırmak için AB bayrađı gibi bazı semboller kullanmıřtır. Maastricht Antlařması'yla AB vatandaşlıđı ortaya çıkmıřtır, fakat üye devlet vatandaşlıđına bađlıdır. Anayasal Antlařma hazırlanmıř, fakat Fransa ve Hollanda'daki referandumlarda reddedilmiřtir.

Ulus inřa süreci ve Avrupa kimliđinin inřası farklı řartlarda ortaya çıkmıřlardır ve farklı özellikleri vardır, ama Avrupa kimliđinin inřa sürecinde AB'nin meřruluđunu sađlamak ve siyasi entegrasyon sürecine devam edebilmek için, ulus inřasının araçlarına benzer bazı araçlar kullanılmıřtır. Avrupa kimliđi, ulusal ve bölgesel kimliklerle etkileřim halindedir. Bu etkileřim hem Avrupa kimliđinin inřa sürecini, hem de AB içindeki ulusal ve bölgesel kimlikleri etkilemektedir.

Türkler ve Avrupalılar yüzyıllar boyunca etkileřim halindedir ve birbirlerinin kimlik inřa süreçlerini etkilemiřlerdir. Özellikle Türkiye'ye Aralık 1999'daki Helsinki Zirvesi'nde AB tarafından resmi adaylık statüsü verildiđinden beri daha yakın ve yoğun bir etkileřim içindedirler. Avrupa kimliđinin AB içindeki inřa süreci Türkiye ile olan etkileřiminden, özellikle de Türkiye'nin üyeliđinin Avrupalılıđı açısından tartıřılmasından da etkilenmektedir.

RESUME

I was born in İstanbul in 1977. I went to İSTEK Kemal Atatürk Private High School. I finished my undergraduate degree at İstanbul University Faculty of Economics, Department of International Relations in 1999. I finished my M.A. degree at Marmara University Department of Political Science and International Relations in 2002. The topic of my M.A. thesis was “The Triadic Relationship Between The EU, Nation-State and Sub-national Regions: The Cases of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Corsica” and my supervisor was Prof. Dr. Günay G. Özdoğan.

Since October 2002 I have been doing my Ph.D. at Marmara University European Union Institute at the Department of EU Politics and International Relations. Between 2002 and 2004 I worked as a research assistant at İstanbul University, Faculty of Economics. Since 2005 I have been working as a research assistant at Bahçeşehir University at the Department of EU Relations.

Between 1 July-1 October 2006, I studied at Free University of Brussels Institute for European Studies as a visiting scholar, with the scholarship I get from TÜBİTAK. Also a made a presentation there on my PhD thesis. Between 15 August-15 September 2007, I studied as a visiting scholar at Aalborg University in Denmark, with the SPIRIT doctoral scholarship I get from Aalborg University and a made presentation there on my PhD thesis.

In addition to these, during my PhD, I participated to the summer school of Danube Rectors' Conference, which was on “regional cooperation” in Pecs, Hungary in 2004 and made a presentation on my M.A. thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACP: African, Caribbean, Pacific
BABEL: Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Languages
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy
CEC: Commission of the European Communities
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
COR: Committee of the Regions
DG: Directorate General
EBU: European Broadcasting Union
EC: European Community
ECJ: European Court of Justice
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
ECU: European Currency Unit
EDC: European Defense Community
EEA: European Economic Area
EEC: European Economic Community
EFDO: The European Film Distribution Office
EMU: European Monetary Union
EP: European Parliament
EPC: European Political Cooperation
EPP: European People's Party
ESDP: European Security and Defense Policy
EU: European Union
EUTRO-AIM: The European Organisation for an Independent Audiovisual Market
EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community
EUROCLIO: European Standing Conference of the History Teachers' Association
IGC: Intergovernmental Conference
IR: International Relations
MEDIA: Measures to Encourage Development of the Industry of Audiovisual Production
MEP: Members of the European Parliament
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO: Non-governmental organisation
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SCRIPT: Support for Creative Independent Production and Talent
SEA: Single European Act
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WTO: World Trade Organisation

INTRODUCTION

The concept of “identity” has been used in many different social science disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and international relations. Various disciplines deal with different aspects of “identity”. “Identity” shows the characteristics of an individual, a social group or a nation. It refers to differentiating characteristics of an individual, a social group and a nation, from the “other”s. Identities are not static and changes over a time. They have always been in a construction and (re)construction process.

In international relations identity is crucial, because it affects the relations between states. They usually act on the basis of being an ally or an enemy. There has been an increasing concern with identity politics in international relations. Especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union, people has started to act primarily on the basis of their collective identities such as ethnic, religious or national identities.

Europe is a construct whose content changes throughout history in parallel with internal changes and alignments in the international system. In accordance with this, the “other”s of Europe have also changed. The boundaries of Europe have not been fixed; especially Eastern boundaries have always been ambiguous. Thus, the concept of “Europe” does not have a fixed meaning; instead its content has always been in a construction and reconstruction process. Moreover, in cultural, linguistic and religious terms, diversity is the main characteristic of Europe. Contemporarily the EU is an attempt to accept this diversity and prevent diversity from drawing boundaries among the peoples of Europe.

Although there were some unification attempts for Europe, they had failed until the end of the 2nd World War. Since the end of the 2nd World War, Europe has been in an ongoing integration process primarily to establish lasting peace. Firstly economic instruments were used in order to reach this goal. Since its foundation, it has been in a widening process through acceptance of new Member States and simultaneously it has been in a deepening process through transferring of more competencies to the EU level. With the Maastricht Treaty the European Community (EC) was transformed to the European Union (EU). In the post-Cold War era, the political integration process has accelerated.

The problem of “European identity” has been increasingly felt in the EU, with the increasing politicisation and deepening of European integration. It is argued that European integration process has reached its limits and for further political integration there is a need to construct European identity. Since European integration increasingly touches upon the boundaries of state sovereignty, there has been a growing need to strengthen people’s identification with the EU.¹ Especially after the book of Anderson, “Imagined Communities”, there has been an increasing concern with the imaginary and constructed nature of collective identities.² As Delanty argues “the geographical entity that is being called Europe is too large and too abstract to be imagined in any meaningful sense.”³

In recent years there has been an increasing concern with the question of European identity in EU studies. Especially the ratification crisis of the Maastricht Treaty and rejection of the Constitutional Treaty at the referendums in France and Netherlands showed the importance of support of the public opinion to go on the political integration process which is closely related with the construction of European identity. As van Ham argues, people will go to a war for their country or nation, they may risk their lives for their religion, but they do not have such an attachment to the EU. Unless the peoples of Europe have feeling of belonging to the EU, the possibility of developing a democratic and an effective Union will be difficult.⁴ The construction of European identity within the EU is closely related with democratic deficit, legitimacy of the EU and constructing the limits and boundaries of the EU.

European identity has been in a construction and reconstruction process throughout history. Since the 1950s European identity has been under construction process for the first time within an institutional framework which has some supranational features. The thesis mainly focuses on the construction process of European identity within the EU, the effects of the integration process within the framework of the EU on identity of the Member States and the EU citizens. The effective factors on construction process of European identity among the EU citizens and construction process of the EU identity which refers to the international identity of the EU, are discussed. Primarily top-down initiatives of the EU

¹ Peter van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper*, June 2000, p.15.

² Franz C. Mayer & Jan Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2004, p.578.

³ Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, London: Mac Millan Pub. 1995, p.132.

⁴ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, pp.15-16.

officials, politicians and EU institutions are analyzed, together with policies and instruments that have influenced this process. Thus, the main research questions which are tried to be answered in this thesis are that: What are the identity shaping effects of the EU on the general public and the EU elites? What are the effective factors on construction of European identity among the citizens of the EU? What is the role of the EU elites in construction process of European identity? What are the role of some policies and initiatives of the EU in construction of European identity? The effects of state-like instruments of the EU such as introduction of the EU citizenship, efforts to introduce the Constitutional Treaty and introduction of symbols of the EU are discussed. What are the unique characteristics of construction process of European identity within the EU? The “bottom-up” approach is also taken into consideration by making references to some public opinion surveys which were made by some scholars and Eurobarometer surveys. Another question is that whether European identity construction process is trying to replace national identities or not, are they contradictory or complementary?

The enlargement process of the EU has influenced the construction process of the EU and European identity. In the post-Cold War era, especially the eastern boundaries have become more blurred. With the enlargement towards the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), answering the questions of “where are the end points of Europe?” and “who is European?” have become more complicated. The Treaty of Rome states that “any European country is eligible for membership to the EC”, but it did not define what “European” means.⁵ The membership of Turkey to the EU and its Europeanness are closely related with this issue. Especially since the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, Turkey’s membership has been questioned by some important political figures of Europe on the basis of its Europeanness. Another important question which is tried to be answered in the thesis is that how do the political leaders, the MEPs and the Commission officials perceive the membership of Turkey, as a contribution, challenge or a threat in terms of construction of European identity?

To answer these research questions, the author made an extensive research involving primary and secondary resources. The research was carried out in Turkey, Brussels and at the University of Aalborg. The author conducted a field trip to Brussels

⁵ Josep R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?” in Montserrat Guibernau (ed.), *Governing European Diversity*, London: Sage Pub., 2001, p.179.

from 1 July 2006 to 1 October 2006 which was made possible by a scholarship from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK). In this period the author studied as a visiting research fellow at the Free University of Brussels at the Institute for European Studies and made a presentation about the thesis at this Institute on 19 September 2006. During the stay in Brussels, the research about the thesis was made at the libraries of the EP and the Commission. In-depth face to face interviews were made in Brussels with twenty MEPs at the EP building and with five top Commission officials at different Commission buildings. The MEPs were chosen especially from the Committees of Culture and Education, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Affairs and also from those who are from the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. They were chosen from different party groups and Member States. The Commission officials were chosen from DG Education and Enlargement. Tape recorder was used, while interviews were being made with the MEPs. When there is a reference to the interview with them, there are references to their names in the thesis by their consent. However, tape recorder was not used during the interviews with the Commission officials and their names are not quoted in this thesis. They were so sensitive about keeping their names anonymous and making sure that what they say is not regarded as statements on behalf of the Commission. Qualitative analysis was made to analyze the interviews. In addition to these interviews conducted in Brussels, one of the MEPs (Kauppi) sent the answers of the interview questions by e-mail. Another interview was made at Bahçeşehir University, with one of the ex-Commission officials who were working at DG Education. Also there are some references to the seminar at Marmara University EU Institute on 22 October 2007 on “Re-imagining Europe: 50 Years After The Treaty of Rome” which was given by Gerard Delanty who is one of the well known scholars in this field. Also an interview was made with him at Marmara University after this seminar.

Between 15 August and 15 September 2007 the author conducted part of her research at the Aalborg University in Denmark by way of a SPIRIT visiting PhD scholarship. SPIRIT is the doctoral school of the Department of History, International and Social Studies of Aalborg University. Prof. Birte Siim was the advisor of the author during her research at the Aalborg University. She also made a presentation about the thesis on 12 September 2007 at Aalborg University to the academic staff of the SPIRIT.

The data of Eurobarometer surveys are used in order to analyze changes in the public opinions of Member States about the issues related with the level of the national and European identity of the citizens of the EU and their perceptions about the EU. In addition to these, some of the documents which were published by the Commission were analyzed. There are also references to some declarations and speeches of the political leaders of Europe, the MEPs and the Commission officials.

The first chapter firstly focuses on the conceptual analysis of the terms “identity” and “collective identity”. Secondly construction of the idea of “Europe” in different periods of history, the attempts for the unification of Europe after the 1st World War and the European integration process after the 2nd World War are explained. Ambiguous boundaries of Europe and the EU and its effects on European identity construction process are discussed. Construction process of European identity and its “other”s are analyzed. Differentiation between “European identity” and “EU identity” is made, also civic and cultural understandings of European identity are compared. Lastly the historical background of construction process of European identity within the EU is analyzed and the reasons of increasing concern with European identity in the EU are discussed, especially in terms of solving democratic deficit problem and establishing legitimacy of the EU.

In the second chapter, firstly theories of international relations and theories of integration are briefly summarized. Secondly social constructivism which is the main theoretical background of the thesis is explained, including its background, main assumptions and its different types. Especially the approach of Wendt and discursive approaches are explained. The role of identity in social constructivism is discussed. Some critiques on social constructivism are stated. Social constructivism is compared with some theories of international relations and with some theories of integration in order to show why social constructivism is more useful to analyze construction of European identity within the EU. Social constructivism is also compared with essentialist approach in terms of analyzing European identity. Lastly how construction process of European identity within the EU is analyzed on the basis of social constructivism is discussed.

In the third chapter, the role of the EU elites, especially the role of the Commission officials, the MEPs and the EU institutions, especially the Commission and the EP in construction process of European identity are analyzed. There will be references to the

interviews which were made with some of the Commission officials and the MEPs by the author. Their perceptions about European identity, whether they define it on civic or cultural basis, they find which instruments the most effective on construction of European identity are analyzed. Also the effects of working at the Commission and the EP on identity of the Commission officials and the MEPs are discussed. After mentioning the gap between the elites and the general public, the effective factors on the level of European identity of the general public are discussed. In second part of this chapter, the roles of education policy, cultural policy, media and audiovisual policy of the EU in construction process of European identity are analyzed. In terms of education policy, especially rewriting of European history and importance of exchange programs like ERASMUS are focused on. In terms of cultural policy, the role of cultural programmes, how cultural diversities are promoted are discussed. In terms of media and audiovisual policy, the difficulties in Europeanization of media, including TV, newspapers and its negative effects on European identity construction process are discussed.

In the fourth chapter, the effects of state-like instruments of the EU such as EU citizenship, the efforts to introduce the Constitutional Treaty and the role of the symbols of the EU are discussed. In the second part of this chapter, nation-building process is explained and European identity construction process is compared with nation-building process especially in terms of their instruments to find out the unique aspects of the construction process of European identity within the EU. The interactions between European identity and national identities are analyzed. Lastly compatibility of national identities and European identity, whether they are contradictory or complementary with each other are discussed.

In the fifth chapter, the interactions between Turkey and Europe and different perceptions about the Europeanness of Turkey are discussed. The discussion of Turkey's position with regard to European identity is analyzed in the thesis due to the reason that, Turkey presents a special case as an EU candidate country that comes from a different culture and identity and takes the centre stage in discussions about the boundaries of European identity. The relations between Turkey and the EU are compared with some previous candidate countries, especially with the countries from the CEE in terms of European identity. The perceptions of some of the main political parties and political leaders about Turkey's membership in terms of European identity are discussed. Also the

perceptions of the MEPs and the Commission officials about Turkey's membership in terms of European identity are discussed. In addition to these, compatibility of Islam and European identity and Huntington's idea of "Clash of Civilisations" are discussed and Turkey's membership is analyzed in this respect. Lastly the effects of the interactions between Turkey and the EU and their effects on construction of European identity within the EU are discussed.

In the conclusion part, after making a brief overview of the chapters, the main conclusions of this thesis are stated. The perceptions of the political elites of the EU and the Commission officials about European identity and their perceptions about Turkey's membership in terms of European identity are discussed. The questions such as, what are the unique aspects of European identity construction process are tried to be answered. In addition to these, the construction of European identity within the EU is discussed on the basis of membership of Turkey to the EU.

The question of European identity has been increasingly discussed in the EU especially in the post-Cold War era. Different aspects of European identity have been discussed, but in this thesis the effective actors, policies and instruments of the EU will be discussed within a common framework and the characteristics of this process will be compared with nation-building to find out the unique aspects of European identity construction process. There are only a few pieces of research about the effects of the EU on identity especially in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's membership has been increasingly discussed on the basis of European identity in the last years. Turkey's Europeanness is still being questioned, even by the political elites of the EU, although the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU has been still ongoing since 3 October 2005. It is the sincere hope and expectation of the author that this thesis will make a contribution to the research in this field which may lead to more analysis related with different aspects of this subject. Although Turkey and the EU have been in a negotiation process for integration of Turkey to the EU, they still do not really know each other which lead to scepticism towards each other and usually acting on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes. The author also hopes that the thesis may make a contribution to mutual understanding of Turkey and the EU.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY WITHIN THE EU

I.1. Conceptual Analysis

I.1.1. The Concepts of “Identity” and “Collective Identity”:

The concept of “identity” has been used in many different social science disciplines such as sociology, social anthropology and international relations. It originated in social psychology.⁶ Each of these disciplines deal with different aspects of “identity”. “Identity” refers to the characteristics of an individual, a nation or an entity, how it differentiates itself from “others” and how it is differentiated by the “other”s.

The concept of “identity” is originally Latin. It originates from “identitas: idem+ens: the same thing”.⁷ It refers to “sameness”. It can be defined as “the state of being equal or identical”.⁸ Identity is an ambiguous concept which is too hard to define.⁹ Niethammer argues that “...identity is a concept in search of its content.”¹⁰ Identity shows “who or what actor is.”¹¹ Taylor states that “to have an identity is to know where you are coming from.”¹² As White argues “individuals and groups act on the basis of what they consider to be their identities.”¹³ Wendt states that in philosophical sense identity is “...whatever makes a thing what it is.”¹⁴ He defines identity as “relatively stable, role-

⁶ Nenad Miscevic, *Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate About Values*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001, p.217.

⁷ Hayden White, “The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity” in Bo Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Bruxelles: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2000, p.69.

⁸ Bo Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.13.

⁹ Richard Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, New York: Palgrave Pub, 2001, p.137.

¹⁰ Lutz Niethammer, “A European Identity?” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.89.

¹¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.231.

¹² Charles Taylor, “The Dialogical Self” in David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman & Richard Shusterman (eds.), *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.305; quoted in Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.5, No.3, 1999, p.277.

¹³ H. White, “The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity”, pp.70-71.

¹⁴ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.224.

specific understandings and expectations about self.”¹⁵ He argues that “to have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about, who one is in a given situation.”¹⁶ According to him, “identities are the basis of interests.”¹⁷ Thus, identity of an individual constitutes the main basis of all thoughts and behaviours of him/her and differentiates that individual from the others.¹⁸

Identity is concerned with the relationship between the “self” and the “other”.¹⁹ The “self” means that “... the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.”²⁰ Identity is related with construction of boundaries of the “self” in order to differentiate himself/herself from the “others”. Marcussen and Roscher argue that the function of identity especially in terms of constructing boundaries is more important than its content.²¹ According to Cohen, identity is “the ways in which a person is, or wishes to be known by certain others.”²² Strath defines identity as “...constructed same and otherness.”²³ Thus, boundaries are constructed between the “self” and the “other”. Identity is a distinctiveness of an object or a person, but it is not necessarily unique. Individual and group identities are constructed through interaction with the “other”s.²⁴ Connolly argues that “identity requires difference in order to be and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.”²⁵ It has to be emphasized that the “other” does not have to be an “enemy”.²⁶ Identity needs difference, rather than “otherness”, but the difference may be transformed into “otherness”; because

¹⁵ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.170.

¹⁷ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, p.398.

¹⁸ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.137.

¹⁹ Paul Gillespie & Brigid Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics” in Michelle Cini & Angela K. Bourne (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2006, p.135.

²⁰ Moris Rosenberg, “The Self-Concept: Social Product and Social Force” in M. Rosenberg & R. Turner (eds.), *Social Psychology*, New York: Basic Books, 1981, p.7; Anthony Pratkanis & Anthony Greenwald, “How Shall the Self be Conceived?”, *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, Vol. 15, 1985, pp.311-329; cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.230.

²¹ Martin Marcussen & Klaus Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.327.

²² Anthony P. Cohen, “Boundaries and Boundary-consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity” in Malcolm Anderson & Eberhard Bort (eds.), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter Pub., 1998, p.22.

²³ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.22.

²⁴ F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, pp.576-577.

²⁵ William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.64.

²⁶ Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, New York: Routledge Pub., 2001, p.191.

usually the existence or perception of threats from the “other” strengthens the identity of the “self”.²⁷ Thus, for the construction of the “self”, it has to differentiate itself from the “others”. Sometimes difference may be constructed as “otherness” in order to strengthen the identity of the “self”.

The introduction of identity in social analysis and its increasing usage in social sciences and public discourse occurred in the USA in the 1960s.²⁸ Identity is a “network of feelings of belonging to and exclusion from human subgroups” such as gender groups, religion and nation.²⁹ Some scholars such as Freud prefer to use the concept of “identification”, instead of “identity”. “Identification” refers to the “dynamic element and the factor of personal choice”.³⁰ There is a psychological need to identify with a collective group or an entity. Identity provides individuals with the “security of community, solidarity, shared patterns of meanings, a bounded world in which to live and in which one can find others like oneself.”³¹ As socio-psychologists argue, identity provides positive “self-esteem”.³²

Identity is not simply given.³³ “Identity is always fluid and contextual; it is a process, always open, complex and unfinished game, always under construction...”³⁴ The construction of identity of an individual is an ongoing process throughout the person’s

²⁷ A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: İmge Pub., 1997, p.21.

²⁸ Roger Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.29, No.1, February 2000, p.2.

²⁹ Amelie Mummendey & Sven Waldzus, “National Differences and European Plurality: Discrimination or Tolerance between European Countries” in R. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Pub., 2004.

³⁰ Luisa Passerini, “The Last Identification: Why Some of us Would Like to Call Ourselves Europeans and What we Mean by This” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.47.

³¹ György Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, London: Hurst&Co. Pub., 2000, p.10.

³² Lauren M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2006, p.18.

³³ Gerard Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity” in Erik Oddvar Eriksen (ed.), *Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU*, New York: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.129.

³⁴ S. Hall, “Europe? Other Self”, *Marxism Today*, August: 18-19, 1991, p.18; quoted in Cris Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol.9, No.4, December 1996, p.488.

whole life.³⁵ Identities are constructed in political and cultural processes with the help of language, emotions and symbols.³⁶ Schöpflin argued that:

...identities are constructed and once constructed it is difficult to deconstruct...how are these identities constructed?...discursively it is through our ideas, conversations, debates, linguistic techniques...³⁷

During the construction process of an identity, how the “others” define it is also important. Wendt gives the example of a professor, “John may think that he is a professor, but if that belief is not shared by his students, then his identity will not work in their interaction.”³⁸ Thus, both ideas of the “self” and those of the “other”s are effective on construction of an identity.³⁹ According to Mead, there is a connection between recognising oneself (“I”) and being recognised and accepted (“me”). There is a permanent balance between them, which constitutes the “self”.⁴⁰ So the “self” is constructed through interactions between the “self” and the “other”.

Both individuals and communities may have multiple identities. Sources of identity may include gender, occupation, social class, ethnicity, religion and nation-state. Having multiple identities does not have to cause destabilisation. They are usually complementary with each other.⁴¹ Non-chosen identities such as race, gender and nation are non-voluntary belongings, which are firm, objective⁴² and more influential on peoples’ behaviour. They are harder to change and people usually have stronger feelings of belonging to this kind of identities than the chosen ones. With the effect of the globalisation process, human beings usually have **multiple identities** which they can move between in different contexts and which are usually concentric rather than conflictual.⁴³ In the contemporary world,

³⁵ Robert Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion” in Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon et al.(eds.), *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2004, p.244.

³⁶ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.22.

³⁷ Interview with György Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, at the building of the EP in Brussels, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

³⁸ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.224.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Cited in R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.244.

⁴¹ Charlotte Bretherton, & John Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge Pub, 1999, pp.223-226.

⁴² N. Miscevic, *Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate About Values*, pp.225-229.

⁴³ Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and The Idea of European Unity”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.1, January 1992, p.67.

individuals have different identity options, which are used in different contexts.⁴⁴ Identities can be nested like “Russian Matruska dolls”, one inside the next. For example, regional identities are subsumed in national identities and national identities are subsumed in European identity. Identities can be “cross-cutting”. Members of one identity group can also be members of another identity group. For example, professional identity can cross-cut religious identities. Identities may be also “separate”. The groups which a person belongs to, may be separate from each other.⁴⁵ Another way of explaining the different identities of a person is, what Risse calls “**marble cake model**”. In this model different components of an individual’s identity can not be separated,⁴⁶ as in the cases of “nestedness” and “cross-cutting identities”, different components of an identity which “influence...mesh and blend into each other.”⁴⁷ In the contemporary world, people usually have multiple identities which may be defined more easily through the “marble cake model”.

Identity can be classified into three categories: Personal, social and political identities.⁴⁸ According to Breakwell, **personal identity** is related with belonging to a family and it also refers to personal characteristics. **Social identity** refers to belonging to pre-existing social groups such as race, gender, social class.⁴⁹ The **political identity** of a citizen is his/her sense of belonging to political groups and political structures.⁵⁰ The political identity of an individual may refer to an individual’s identification with the state (citizenship), with the nation (national identity) or with the synthesis of these in the institutionalised form of the nation-state.⁵¹ Cultural homogeneity is not necessary to

⁴⁴ S. Wallmans, “Identity Options” in C. Fried (ed.), *Minorities: Community and Identity*, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, Dahlem Konferenzen, 1983, p.70; cited in Theodora Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, p.24.

⁴⁵ Richard K. Herrmann & Marilyn B. Brewer, “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU” in Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse & Marilyn B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, New York: Rowman& Littlefield Pub., 2004, p.8.

⁴⁶ Brigid Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders” in R. K. Herrmann; T. Risse & M.B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, pp.75-96.

⁴⁷ Thomas Risse, “Neo-functionalism, European Identity and the Puzzles of European Integration, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.12, No.2, 2005, pp.291-309.

⁴⁸ Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2005, p.20.

⁴⁹ Glynis Breakwell, “Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions” in R. Herrmann, T. Risse, M. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, 2004.

⁵⁰ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.1.

⁵¹ Neil Renwick, “Re-reading Europe’s Identities” in Jill Krause & Neil Renwick (eds.), *Identities in International Relations*, London, Mac Millan Pres, 1996, p.154.

establish a sense of belonging to a political community.⁵² Political identity is subject to a slow process of partial change.⁵³

In international relations, the concept of “identity” has become popular especially in the post Cold War era. The “politics of identity” have emerged with the self-assertive policies of ethnic, minority groups, which have caused important changes in the way politics work. In this era conflicts between different groups have mostly emerged on the basis of ethnic, religious communities and national identities.⁵⁴ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, instead of ideologies; religions, national identities or ethnic identities have become the main basis of identification.

“**Collective identity**” is a feeling of belonging to the same social group such as ethnic group and nation.⁵⁵ It refers to a “we” feeling, collective consciousness.⁵⁶ It divides people into members and non-members of a group.⁵⁷ It refers to the “existence of a social group with a ‘collective project’”.⁵⁸ As Nanz argues “collective identities are expressions of people’s identifications or self-categorisations as members of certain collectivities.”⁵⁹ Collective identity also refers to the attitudes which all members of that group have in common in their thoughts and behaviours which differentiate them from other groups.⁶⁰ People need to be connected with each other and this necessity is provided by collective identity. To be part of a group which has superior characteristics compared to other groups, makes people who are part of the former feel positive.⁶¹ Collective identities are powerful, because they provide a sense of “we”ness. They provide social recognition and approval.⁶²

⁵² Emanuele Castano, “European Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective” in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse , & M. B. Brewer (eds.) , *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, p.43.

⁵³ Furio Cerutti, “Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction” in Furio Cerutti & Enno Rudolph (eds.), *A Soul for Europe*, Vol.1, Leuven: Peeters Pub., 2001, p.4.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.2-3.

⁵⁵ Robert Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination” in H. S.Chopra, R. Frank, et al.(eds.), *National Identity and Regional Cooperation*, New Delhi: Manohar Pub., 1999, p.44.

⁵⁶ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.129.

⁵⁷ Thomas Risse & Antje Wiener, “Something Rotten and the Social Construction of Social Constructivism: A Comment on Comments”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.5, December 1999, p.779.

⁵⁸ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.130.

⁵⁹ Patrizia Isabelle Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.293.

⁶⁰ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.137.

⁶¹ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.71.

⁶² Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & MaykelVerkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, K.von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Europe*, Netherlands: European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1995, pp.24-25.

As Miscevic argues, “the more you are proud to belong, the more you belong.”⁶³ A collective that considers it as “we”, is usually more productive, with a larger capacity for action.⁶⁴ Collective identity formation does not only occur because of economic self-interest or group-level economic interests. The main reasons for formation and maintenance of a collective identity are protection of norms, values and way of life of the group. Thus, the members of the group maintain order in a complex world.⁶⁵

The construction process of collective identities involves negative exclusionary dimension. Identification implies membership; simultaneously it implies the exclusion of non-members.⁶⁶ Collective identity refers to the creation of “we” groups of insiders whose identity is defined on the basis of common values and characteristics, with reference to “they” who are groups of outsiders and thought to have different common values and characteristics.⁶⁷ Wendt defines “collective identity” as the sense of being part of a group which “... gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture.”⁶⁸ He argues that in collective identity formation there is a redefinition of the boundaries of “self” and “other” to constitute a “common in-group identity”.⁶⁹ Neumann asserts that “collective identity is a relation between two human collectives...it always resides in the nexus between the ‘collective self’ and its ‘other’s.’”⁷⁰ Related with the question of identity, the problem of how to fix and maintain boundaries arises.⁷¹ According to those boundaries who are part of “we” and who are part of “they” are clarified. For construction of a collective identity, there is a necessity to encounter and communicate with the “other”s. Through encounters we recognize that we are different from “other”s and we also learn things about ourselves.⁷² As Campbell argues, the logic of identity requires difference, there is a potential for the transformation of difference into “otherness”.⁷³ However, as Rumelili

⁶³ N. Miscevic, *Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate About Values*, p.221.

⁶⁴ Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity and Its Changing Others”, *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, No: 710, 2006, p.7.

⁶⁵ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.72.

⁶⁶ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.236.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.223-226.

⁶⁸ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.337.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.338.

⁷⁰ Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/ Exclusion Nexus” *Alternatives*, Vol. 23, 1998, p.399; quoted in Bahar Rumelili “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.30, 2004, p.32.

⁷¹ R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.247.

⁷² T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, pp.28-29.

⁷³ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, pp.77-78; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p.35.

argues, discursive dependence of identity on difference does not require a relationship between the “self” and the “other” on the basis of “othering”. The way of interactions between the “self” and the “other” may secure the identity of the “self”. The “other” may be constructed as threatening the identity of the “self” which may lead to a conflict among them and legitimise violence towards the “other”. The categories of the “self” and the “other” are not fixed. Thus, collective identity may include what was previously its constitutive “other” one day. Collective identities have been in evolution process. As Rumelili argues, the “other” may be also constructed as “less” rather than “anti-self”⁷⁴ which implies superiority over the “others”.

The interactions between the “self” and the “other” are based on the inclusive/exclusive nature of the “self”. The nature of an identity as inclusive or exclusive is socially constructed. If difference is constructed on the basis of “inherent characteristics”, then the “other” is constructed as permanently different. On the other hand, if difference is constructed on the basis of “acquired characteristics”, there is a possibility for the “other” to become like the “self” one day, thus the “other” is constructed as temporarily different. The interactions between the “self” and the “other” are affected by the response of the “other” to construction of its identity. The responses may vary between recognition and resistance. Recognition by the “other” secures the identity of the “self”. The identity discourses of the “other” reproduce the “self’s” identity. On the contrary, resistance by the “other” threatens the identity of the “self”, which leads the “self” to emphasize the differences of the “other”. In the case of inclusive identities such as democratic, recognition by the “other” leads to the acknowledgement of the self’s superiority and having a goal of becoming like “self”. For example, if a state is constructed as non-democratic, it may acknowledge its shortcomings and perceive the democratic state as a model. This type of response secures the identity of the “self” (democratic state); but if the “other” questions the status of democracy as a desirable system of rule or if it claims to be equally democratic, its response would be a challenge to identity of the “self”. In the case of exclusive identities, recognition refers to the acknowledgement of separateness by the “other” and the “other” accepts that it can never be like the “self”. Thus, recognition produces clear boundary between the “self” and the “other”, but resistance of the “other” threatens the identity of the “self” by blurring the boundary between the “self” and the

⁷⁴ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, pp. 32-36.

“other”. States secure their identities in international relations through associating with or dissociating themselves from other states. States associate when they engage in activities that show their co-belonging within the same community. Association is different from cooperation, because it necessitates feeling of belonging to a common society, but for cooperation there is not such a necessity. As Rumelili argues “inclusive identities allow for association between self and other.”⁷⁵ Association with the “other” means that the “other” may become or at least willing to become like “self” which provides the “self” with the institutional means to influence the identity of the “other”. This provides a relationship between the “self” and the “other” which is not based on the perception of the “other” as a threat to the identity of the “self”. On the other hand, exclusive identities construct the differences of the “other” on the basis of inherent characteristics. The “self” dissociates itself from the “other”. Thus, clear boundaries are constructed between them and the “other” may never become like “self”.⁷⁶

Collective identity formation does not only refer to a process of differentiation, it also refers to the abolishment of differences through “internal homogenisation.”⁷⁷ Usually a certain degree of homogeneity, real or “imagined” has been considered necessary for a sense of community to exist;⁷⁸ but it does not have to be cultural homogeneity. Identity may also arise from a shared experience of political citizenship.⁷⁹ Thus, shared institutional framework and having rights and duties because of being a citizen of that community may also lead to construction of a collective identity. Construction of a collective identity is comparatively easier, if the constituting units are similar to each other, or reconcilable. Collective political identities may be based on shared interests, objectives and common projects, on a “we-feeling of shared destiny”.⁸⁰ Thus, a collective identity may be also constructed on the basis of having a goal of a common prosperous future.

⁷⁵ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, pp.37-38.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.38-39.

⁷⁷ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.146.

⁷⁸ Cited in E. Castano, “European Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective”, p.42. For further detail see also Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, İst.:Metis Pub., 1995; K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953.

⁷⁹ Gary Marks, “Territorial Identities in the EU” in Jeffrey J. Anderson (ed.), *Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on The European Experience*, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 1999, p.85.

⁸⁰ Sanem Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, *Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/05*, New York University School of Law, 2005, p.77.

Collective identities are usually the product of social, political, cultural traditions, values and memories, which have evolved over a time and produced a common heritage.⁸¹ The main instruments which are necessary to construct a collective identity are, symbols, values and norms which show the main characteristics of the community and distinguish it from the “others”. Self-description has to be re-discovered by new generations and members of the group have to be made conscious of it. Thus, the “collective self” is constantly under the construction process like the “personal self”. The success of the collective identity formation depends on the fixing of constructions of its characteristics through specific institutions and being able to introduce them into everyday speech.⁸² Thus, institutional framework and discourses have crucial roles in construction process and maintenance of collective identities.

Collective identities are not usually naturally emerging; they usually develop through a construction process.⁸³ Sometimes the collective identity construction process starts voluntarily, especially with the pioneership of the elites, but sometimes it emerges involuntarily, with the effects of wars, immigrations. If collective identity construction process is started voluntarily, firstly who should be members of that group has to be decided. It leads to the emergence of “we” who agree to follow institutionalized norms. Secondly the reciprocal re-evaluation of the past is made which leads to the emergence of “we” who become aware of their particularity. It emerges through discursive practices. As a result, the members of that community start to “...recognize each other as sharing a particular past.”⁸⁴ Thus, collective identities are usually constructed through reconstruction of the past, introduction of symbols, common values and establishing common institutional frameworks.

Identities of “us” and the “other” are constructed by means of language and symbols; but it does not mean that they are completely “arbitrary inventions”. The construction of a community is not the same as the construction of a subject by someone who uses raw materials to create the desired object. The constructor has to use the

⁸¹ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Pres, 1995, pp.126-127.

⁸² R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, pp.245-246.

⁸³ Elie Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It” in Henry Cavanna (ed.), *Governance, Globalization and the European Union: Which Europe for Tomorrow?*, Dublin: Four Courts Press Pub., 2002, p.90.

⁸⁴ Klaus Eder, “Remembering National Memories Together: The Formation of a Transnational Identity in Europe” in Klaus Eder & William Spohn (eds.), *Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub., 2005, p.209.

materials that he has. Thus, construction is never original; it is the best version of a thing which is made with materials that come from another constructor.⁸⁵ It may be also referred to as “bricolage” which means that “construction determined in part by the materials at hand and not simply by traditional relation between constructor and construction.”⁸⁶ Thus, the construction process of collective identities includes long social and political practices, shared experiences, memories and myths.⁸⁷

During the interviews which were conducted in Brussels by the author, Badia i Cutchet argued that “...I do not believe that an identity can be built, identity is feeling, you feel you are closer to someone. It is not possible to construct...”⁸⁸ These types of identities may be referred to as already given identities such as race; but some collective identities such as national identities can be constructed, which will be discussed in Chapter IV. Schwalba-Hoth argued that the identity building process includes a mixture of natural and external influences.⁸⁹ Thus, the common characteristics and historical background of those people are effective on construction of a collective identity, but also the reconstruction of the past, the construction of a common institutional framework and the introduction of common symbols are also influential in this process.

Schöpflin distinguishes between four types of political identity formation: Firstly identities which are constructed by the state. People who live within a particular state, share some experiences such as paying taxes, participating in elections or conscription. Thus their identities are constructed to a certain extent by state regulations that bind people who live in the same state together. The second way of identity formation is based on the activities of civil society, the NGOs through which people try to reach their goals. The third way is based on ethnicity, through which the bonds of solidarity can be established; but it is constrained by state and civil society. The fourth way of political identity formation is relatively new and it has an international dimension. The best example is the

⁸⁵ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.23.

⁸⁶ C. White, “An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man and in Different Animals and Vegetables and From the Former to the Latter” London, 1799; quoted in B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.23.

⁸⁷ J. Fentress and C. Wickham, *Social Memory, New Perspectives on the Past*, Oxford: Blackwell Pub., Viking, 1992; cited in P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity” p.287.

⁸⁸ Interview with Socialist MEP of Spain, Maria Badia i Cutchet, at the EP building, Brussels, on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

⁸⁹ Interview with German MEP, Frank Schwalba-Hoth from the Greens, at the EP building in Brussels, on September 20, 2006 at 17.00.

construction of political identities in the context of the EU. The EU is operating also as an “identity-forming process”.⁹⁰ In this thesis, especially the “identity-forming” effects of the EU are focused on. Delanty argues that we may distinguish between “the collective identity of a group” and the identity of a “large-scale entity such as a nation.” He adds that “...the larger the group, the more diffuse the identity will be.”⁹¹ It is obvious that the effects of the group on the identities of its members will be much looser, if the group is larger. Thus, the “identity-forming” effects of the EU are loose.

Generally two main approaches are used for studying identities by scholars. One of them is the “top-down” approach and the other one is “bottom-up”. Studying European identity from a “top-down” approach refers to “trying to understand what unifies Europe and Europeans in terms of cultural heritage, values, etc. and how to characterize Europe and a European common heritage.”⁹² On the other hand, the “bottom-up” approach tries to answer questions such as: “Who feels European?”, “why do some citizens identify with Europe while others do not?”⁹³ In this thesis, the “top-down” approach is usually used. The role and perceptions of the EU elites about construction of European identity within the EU and the EU policies and instruments which have affected this process will be analyzed. By making references to some results of the Eurobarometer surveys, the “bottom-up” approach is also taken into consideration.

1.1.2. Construction of the Idea of “Europe” in Different Periods of History and the Attempts for Unification

The concept of “Europe” is used mainly on three bases: Geographical, cultural and political.⁹⁴ Primarily “Europe” refers to a geographical entity (a continent) and it has been perceived as such since antiquity. Europe is also an old civilisation, a political ideal, which is constantly under construction and a future project.⁹⁵ As Herzog argues “Europe has

⁹⁰ G. Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, pp.29-32.

⁹¹ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, pp.130-131.

⁹² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.5.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁹⁴ Menno Spiering, “National Identity and European Unity” in Michael Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub., 1996, p.104.

⁹⁵ R. Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony between Politics, Economics and Imagination”, p.43.

always been a utopia”.⁹⁶ He defines Europe as a “voyage towards goals”. He makes a reference to the English proverb, “it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive.”⁹⁷ Thus, Europe may be defined as an endless “**hopeful travel**”. Kumar asserts that “Europe has always been a promise, an ideal, even an ideology as much as it has been an achieved reality.”⁹⁸ Europe usually refers to an ideal which does not have an end point and can not be totally realized.

“Europe” has been defined on different bases in different periods of history. Strath referred to “Europe” not as a territory but “as an idea and normative centre”.⁹⁹ On the basis of historical studies published over the last decade, it has become increasingly clear that “Europe” is a very old concept, even older than the states which are its components.¹⁰⁰ As Delanty argues, Europe is not only a geographical reality; it is also an idea and identity.¹⁰¹ Passerini perceives Europe as a cultural, intellectual and emotional programme, instead of a political programme. She claims that “Europe” also refers to an “imagined territory”.¹⁰² According to the current Pope of the Catholic Church Benedict XVI, “Europe is a geographic term only in a secondary sense: Europe is rather a cultural and historical concept.”¹⁰³ For Schwimmer, “Europe is a community of shared values in a given geographical area.”¹⁰⁴ Leonard states that “Europe is a patchwork of different cultures, religions, languages and views”, which shows that diversity is one of the main characteristics of Europe.¹⁰⁵ White argues that Europe may be defined by the multiplicity of cultural traditions such as Classical, Judaic, Christian, humanistic, Enlightenment and scientific.¹⁰⁶ Instead of one Europe, there are several Europes: The Europe of Greek

⁹⁶ Philippe Herzog, *Travelling Hopefully: Ethics, Action, Perspective for a Revival of Europe*, Translator: Louise Elliott Wallace, *Europe after Europe Collection*, Editions Le Manuscrit, 2006, p.10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.86.

⁹⁸ Krishan Kumar, “The Idea of Europe: Cultural Legacies, Transnational Imaginings and The Nation-State” in Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain (eds.), *Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003, p.41.

⁹⁹ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.14.

¹⁰⁰ Jacques Santer, “Preface” in Wim Blockmans, *A History of Power in Europe: Peoples, Markets, States*, Antwerp: Fonds Mercator Pub., 1997.

¹⁰¹ For further detail see G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, 1995.

¹⁰² L. Passerini, “The Last Identification: Why Some of us Would Like to Call Ourselves Europeans and What we Mean by This”, p.80.

¹⁰³ Benedict XVI, “Europe and Its Discontents” in Benedict XVI, *Without Roots*, Basic Books, forthcoming.

¹⁰⁴ W. Schwimmer, “Statement on the Occasion of the Opening of the Second Part of the Colloquy on the European Identity”, Council of Europe, September 20, 2001.

¹⁰⁵ M. Leonard, *Rediscovering Europe: The Search for a European Identity*, London: Demos Pub., 1998.

¹⁰⁶ H. White, “The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity”, p.82.

mythology, the medieval Europe, the Christian Europe, the Europe of the Enlightenment and the colonial Europe.¹⁰⁷

Europe was firstly a mythological term and then it became a geographical term.¹⁰⁸ In Greek mythology, “Europa” was the daughter of Agenor who was King of Tyre. Zeus fell in love with her and transformed into shape of a bull, abducted her and swam with her on his back to the island of Crete. It shows that Europe is a continent with its roots in Asia. In ancient Greece the term “European” was firstly used only for the central area, Athens and Sparta, later it was used for the whole of the Greek mainland.¹⁰⁹ For the Greek geographers, historians, philosophers such as Herodotus, Aristotle, Europe was distinct from Asia and Africa.¹¹⁰ The contributions of Greeks to the European cultural heritage were emphasized especially during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. In many EU documents there is a reference to Greece as “being the cradle of European culture and civilization.”¹¹¹ Reding who is the Commissioner for Information Society and Media, made a speech in Greece in 2000 in which she argued that “Greek heritage...is an integrative part of the European cultural identity” and added that it is “impossible to understand our European civilisation without taking into consideration the Greek heritage.”¹¹²

Distinctions between the three continents were legitimated by the story of the sons of Noah. For the Jews and early Christians, the founders of Europe, Asia and Africa are three sons of Noah. Japhet is seen as the founder of Europeans, Shem of Asians and Ham of Africans.¹¹³ The continents such as America or Africa are defined clearly by their coastlines; but it is not that easy for Europe. Europe is sometimes considered as part of Asia. The Greek geographers discussed the eastern borders of Europe which have not still

¹⁰⁷ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU*, p.26.

¹⁰⁸ John Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, New York: Doubleday Pub., 1965, p.107.

¹⁰⁹ David Dunkerley, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, London: Routledge Pub., 2002, pp.110-123.

¹¹⁰ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, p.107.

¹¹¹ European Parliament, “Resolution on the founding of a centre for European culture and civilization”, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No: C 262 , 10.10, 1988 ; quoted in Peo Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and The EU*, Sweden: Umea University, Department of Political Science, 2000.

¹¹² Viviane Reding, “European Cultural Policy”, Speech during visit to Greece, October 2000.

¹¹³ D. Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, Edinburgh, 1957; cited in Peter Burke, “Foundation Myths and Collective Identities in Early Modern Europe” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, p.118.

been clarified.¹¹⁴ Thus, even in geographic terms, it has been too hard to define Europe throughout history. During the Middle Ages scholars knew that they were living in a continent called by classical geographers as “Europe” to distinguish it from the other land masses which were Africa and Asia. From the early 16th century, maps began to enable Europeans to imagine the geographical space in which they were living. In 1511 Martin Waldseemüller produced the first map of Europe.¹¹⁵

The history of Europe has not followed a linear process; instead there have been many ups and downs throughout its history. The history of the European idea is the history of the changing discourses on Europe.¹¹⁶ Writers and intellectuals have dealt with the idea of “Europe” in their books and speeches. “Europe” was often used in liberal and socialist discourses, while the concept of “occident” was usually used by Catholics. “Occident” refers to Christendom against the “Orient”. Contemporarily the concept of “occident” is rarely used in the discourses on Europe.¹¹⁷

Several scholars argue that the roots of Europe can be traced back to Roman political legal legacy, the Greek, Judaic and Christian cultural heritages.¹¹⁸ Valery argues that “I shall consider as European all those peoples, who in the course of history have undergone the three influences...ancient Greece, Rome and Christianity.”¹¹⁹ Contemporarily some of the Christian Democrats still see these historical references as the basis of Europe and even the EU. These processes may be considered as influential on the European historical and cultural heritage, but they can not be considered as the basis of the EU. Marcussen and Roscher state some different constructions of Europe:

-“Liberal nationalist identity construction”: This idea is compatible with the idea of “Europe of nation-states”

¹¹⁴ Jacques le Goff, “The Roots of European Identity” in Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligman (eds.), *Desperately Seeking Europe*, London: Archetype Pub., 2003, p.159.

¹¹⁵ John Hale, “The Renaissance Idea of Europe” in Soledad Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp.46-50.

¹¹⁶ G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, p.3.

¹¹⁷ Katiana Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, pp.124-125.

¹¹⁸ Willfried Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe” in Klaus Eder & Willfried Spohn (eds.), *Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, p.4.

¹¹⁹ Jan Ifversen, “The Crisis of European Civilization After 1918” in Menno Spiering & Michael Wintle (eds.), *Ideas of Europe Since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War*, Basingstoke, Macmillan: Palgrave Pub., 2002, p.327; quoted in Mary Anne Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Pub., 2004, p.322.

- “A wider Europe as a community of values”: “From the Atlantic to the Urals”
- “Europe as a third force”: As a democratic socialist alternative between capitalism and communism.
- “A modern Europe as part of the Western community”: It is based on liberal democracy and a social market economy.
- “A Christian Europe”: It is based on Catholic values.¹²⁰ Thus Europe has been constructed on different bases throughout history. As Llobera argues, contemporarily Europe refers to two main things, which are:
 - The EU as an entity which has been established as result of a common will.
 - The European civilisation or cultural area.¹²¹ In this thesis, the first understanding of Europe will be focused on.

The unity of medieval Europe was largely the achievement of the Church. Thus, “Christendom” became a cultural, geographical and political term after the 9th century. In the Middle Ages, the geographical understanding of Europe was not inseparable from Christendom. Till the 15th century the word “Europe” had been rarely used.¹²² As Guizot argued, the Crusades were the “first European event”. Before the Crusades “there was no Europe”, because there was not any unifying reason.¹²³ In the first army of Crusaders Germans, Italians, Spanish and English joined the French; in the second and third Crusades all Christian nations participated. Guizot argued that the Crusades had helped the emergence of the spirit of Europe. When there was a common “other” of Europe, it strengthens the identity of the collective “self”.¹²⁴ The idea of “Europe” has always been affected by political developments. In this period Europe was mainly defined on the basis of Christianity in opposition to Islam, particularly to the Ottoman Turks.¹²⁵ The emergence of Christianity as a unifying factor was mainly the result of the feudal structure in Western Europe, because there was not any other central political authority. Christianity is not

¹²⁰ M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, pp.333-334.

¹²¹ Josep R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol.23, No.2, 2003, p.159.

¹²² J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, pp.109.

¹²³ F. Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*, 1924, p.160; cited in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.256.

¹²⁴ F. Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*, 1924, pp.149-150; cited in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.256.

¹²⁵ D. Dunkerley, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.114.

homogeneous; it has three major sub-groups which caused lengthy wars.¹²⁶ There are three main internal divisions within Christianity which are Roman Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy.¹²⁷

Especially from the 15th until the 18th century, the Ottoman Turks became the “other” of Europe. During this period, “Turks represented all that was negated in the European identity: savage, barbarian, despotic, oppressive, violent and a threat to European civilisation.”¹²⁸ The adjective “European” was firstly used by Pope Pius II during the Renaissance.¹²⁹ He wrote the book which was called “De Europa”. According to him, Europe is united in terms of religion and it has to express its identity in this respect. For him, Europe does not refer to something geographically.¹³⁰ In 1623 Bacon used the expression “**we Europeans**”.¹³¹ As Orluc argues, one of the main weaknesses of the European idea is “...it remained strong only as long as the threat against Europe was also strong.”¹³² Strath argues that historically European civilisation project had three “other”s: The Orient, the USA and the Eastern Europe. Strath states that “in the mirrors of these others self-images emerged.”¹³³ In comparison with the USA, “Europe had an educating mission”. Europe was contrasted to the USA, who is without culture and history.¹³⁴ Strath asserts that:

The construction of Europe through demarcation of the ‘other’ contained contradictory feelings of both superiority and admiration in the American and Asian mirrors, while in the East European and African mirrors superiority undoubtedly dominated.¹³⁵

This feeling of superiority towards some other civilisations still remains in Europe to a certain extent. H. Yılmaz argues that the “inferior-other” of Europe was the Turks and the

¹²⁶ For further details see G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, 1995.

¹²⁷ Max Haller, “Epilogue: Europe as a New Nation or a Community of Nations?” in Richter Rudolph & Max Haller (eds.), *Toward a European Nation?*, New York: M.E. Sharpe Pub., 1994, p.245; cited in Spyros Blavoukos & Manos Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos”, June 2000, p.14.

¹²⁸ Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Enlarging the EU: Where Does Turkey Stand?”, İstanbul: TESEV Pub., 2002, p.27.

¹²⁹ Philip Dodd, “The Quest for a European Identity”, p.189.

¹³⁰ Dominique de Villepin, “Avrupa’nın Sınırları” in Jorge Semprun, & Dominique de Villepin (eds.), *Avrupa İnsanı*, Translated by Aydın Cıngı, İstanbul: Agora Pub., 2005, p.35.

¹³¹ Quoted in D. de Villepin, “Avrupa İnsanı” in J. Semprun, & D. de Villepin, *Avrupa İnsanı*, p.23.

¹³² K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, p.154.

¹³³ Bo Strath, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, pp.410-412.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.29.

“superior other” of Europe was the USA;¹³⁶ but these “others” are not permanent; they have changed according to different circumstances.

In the Middle Ages, the uniqueness and superiority of Western Christianity was taken for granted. During the 16th century writers, political thinkers, artists argued that, there are qualitative differences between Europe and the other continents. This feeling of superiority was not religious, rather it was cultural and political and it was based on a sense of a superior international order in Europe, a European “concert through diversity”. Lukacs contends that this development from the idea of the *respublica christiana* to Voltaire’s *grande republique d’Europe* emerged because of a growing sense of cultural unity in Europe.¹³⁷ Till the end of the Middle Ages, the term Europe started to be used for the first time in the way which we are accustomed to think about it. The increase in historical consciousness, the disintegration of Christianity, the secularisation process, the fall of Byzantium, the rediscovery of antiquity and the beginning of the expansion of Europe were the main reasons for this development. Between 1400 and 1700 the terms “Western Christendom” and “Europe” became interchangeable. In this period, the word “Europe” acquired also political meaning. The unity of Christendom was replaced by the European state system which led to the emergence of the “Concert of Europe”.¹³⁸

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the idea of “Europe” began to replace the idea of “Christendom” in the West, due to the effects of some developments which occurred at the end of the Middle Ages, such as the rise of secular sovereign states, discoveries across the oceans, scientific discoveries and the religious wars. These factors led to a change in the idea that religion could be the main unifying force among different communities.¹³⁹ Christianity’s importance as a unifying force in Europe declined with the Renaissance and the Reformation. Especially with the Reformation Catholicism which had dominated Western Europe since the separation between Catholicism and Orthodoxism consolidated in 1204, lost its domination. Since the 18th century Christianity has been secularized. Thus, the processes of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment provided the

¹³⁶ Hakan Yılmaz, “Giriş: Türkiye’yi Avrupa Haritasına Sokmak” in Hakan Yılmaz (ed.), *Avrupa Haritasında Türkiye*, İstanbul: Bosphorus University Pub., 2005, p.17.

¹³⁷ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, pp.115-116.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.109-114.

¹³⁹ Hugh Seton-Watson, “What is Europe? Where is Europe? From Mystique to Politique” in George Schopflin & Nancy Wood (eds.), *In Search of Central Europe*, Polity Press, 1989, p.11.

basis for a secular European identity.¹⁴⁰ The Treaty of Utrecht which was signed in 1713, was the last important document in which public reference to the “*Res Publica Christiana*” was made.¹⁴¹

Europe has always been in contact with different cultures, but since the 17th century, some thinkers have argued that it had nothing to learn from the rest of the world. Voltaire asserted that, “Europeans shared the same principle of public law and politics unknown to other lands.”¹⁴² With the Enlightenment, Europe took the role of a universal civilisation project from Christianity.¹⁴³ Delanty asserts that “the idea of Europe became increasingly focused on the idea of progress, which became synonymous with European modernity.”¹⁴⁴ Thus, the civilisational progress of Europe, compared to the “others” was emphasized. Europe referred to “...the heartland of civilisation, progress and power.”¹⁴⁵ For a long time European identity was defined by complex superiority vis-à-vis other cultures.¹⁴⁶ With the Enlightenment in the 18th century, Europe started to be considered as the land of civilisation. A sense of a distinct European culture was emphasized.¹⁴⁷ “During the Enlightenment, the idea of a politically unique Europe was inseparable from the idea of Europe which was culturally unique.”¹⁴⁸ According to Seton-Watson, in the secularizing Europe, styles of architecture, painting and music were still interrelated. Although the growing secular literature was written in different languages, there were similarities in their content. This new secular European culture spread to a wider educated class.¹⁴⁹ In the 18th and early 19th century, French culture was dominant in Europe. French replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy and other elites. “To be ‘European’ was to speak French” in that period.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁰ Tuğrul Görgün, *The Impact of the EU Upon European Identity*, M.A. Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, April 2004, p.11.

¹⁴¹ N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, Oxford U.P., 1996; cited in B Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.29.

¹⁴² Quoted in Philip Dodd, “The Quest for a European Identity” in Dick Leonard & Mark Leonard (eds.), *The Pro-European Reader*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2002, p.191.

¹⁴³ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.29.

¹⁴⁴ G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, p.65.

¹⁴⁵ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.71.

¹⁴⁶ R. Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination”, p.45.

¹⁴⁷ Ahmet Engin Akyürek, *Changing Conceptions of European Identity and Shifting Boundaries*, MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, May 2004, p.34.

¹⁴⁸ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, pp.114-115.

¹⁴⁹ H. Seton-Watson, “What is Europe? Where is Europe? From Mystique to Politique”, p.11.

¹⁵⁰ G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, p.72.

Edmund Burke stated that “no European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe.”¹⁵¹ If a European feels absence from home in any part of Europe, it shows that Europe is not Europe anymore.¹⁵² Here Europe is constructed as a home of all Europeans. Voltaire defined Europe as:

...a kind of great republic divided into several states...They all have the same religious foundation, even if divided into several confessions. They all have the same principle of public law and politics...¹⁵³

Firstly the North had been constructed as the lands of barbarism and backwardness, later it was replaced with the East. Voltaire led the way, when Enlightenment philosophers started to focus on contrasts between the East and the West.¹⁵⁴ As Voltaire and Montesquieu argue “...the image of a despotic East emerged in contrast to a civilised Europe.”¹⁵⁵

Europe consists of many contradictions. As Morin argues, Europe has been constructed on the basis of contradictory processes and ideas such as law and force, democracy and repression,¹⁵⁶ Renaissance and fascism. As Le Goff argues, Europe may be seen as a “...dialectic between the effort to create unity and the preservation of diversity.”¹⁵⁷ According to Veil, “Europe is like the world’s memory. Everything happened there, the worst and the best.”¹⁵⁸ Modern democracy and human rights firstly emerged in Europe, but concentration camps also emerged there. Nation-states which are still the main political actors of the international system, firstly emerged in Europe, as well as the first regional integration process.

Christianity emerged outside Europe but missionary activities developed with European expansion in modern times. The scientific revolution in the 17th century took place in Europe. Modern science, technology and law arose in Europe. From the 19th

¹⁵¹ Quoted in Dominique de Villepin, “Avrupa İnsanı”, p.20.

¹⁵² Cited in D. de Villepin, “Avrupa İnsanı”, p.20.

¹⁵³ Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*; quoted in B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.29.

¹⁵⁴ L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of Enlightenment*, Stanford (CAL), Stanford U.P., 1994, pp.7-8; cited in B. Strath, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other”, p.415.

¹⁵⁵ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.29.

¹⁵⁶ Edgar Morin, *Penser l’Europe*, Paris: Gallimard, 1987, p.33; cited in Deniz Vardar, “EU-Turkish Relations and The Question of Citizenship” in E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (eds.), *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, London: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.88.

¹⁵⁷ J. Le Goff, “The Roots of European Identity”, p.166.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Richard Hoggart & Douglas Johnson, “Ideas About an ‘Idea of Europe’” in Christopher Joyce (ed.), *Questions of Identity: A Selection from the Pages of “New European”*, London: I.B. Tauris Pub., 2002, p.100.

century on European legal traditions influenced different parts of the world.¹⁵⁹ Thus, many developments have emerged first in Europe throughout history. Science is usually seen as an achievement of Europe which differentiates it from other civilisations. It was sometimes claimed that other civilisations can become fully civilised, if they adopt European science and hide their traditional identities.¹⁶⁰

The “**Eurocentric approach**” sees European history through Western European identity, on the basis of a “homogeneous space” and “linear time” and does not take into consideration the contributions of Byzantium, Eastern Europe, Muslim Spain, Jews and even North-Western Europe.¹⁶¹ Some history textbooks make a reference to Europe’s Roman, Christian and Greek origins as particular European achievements.¹⁶² The Eurocentric approach does not mention the effects of the ancient Orient such as Egyptians and Phoenicians on ancient Greece and does not take into consideration the non-European origins of Christianity to connect Greek civilisation and Christianity to Europe. Also it has to be emphasized that the territories of the Roman Empire were not limited to Europe, they extended to Asia and North Africa.¹⁶³ The interactions with other civilisations have affected the construction process of European civilisation; but the Eurocentric approach does not take into consideration the contributions of other civilisations. The idea of “European superiority” was popular especially in the 19th century and early 20th centuries. According to Kaelble, “European superiority” refers to a lasting global leadership of Europe, including political, cultural, military, economic and scientific fields.¹⁶⁴

During the 19th century the geographical and political meaning of Europe was expanding. In 1856 the Ottoman State was accepted to the “Concert of Europe” and most of the Balkans was considered as part of Europe before the 1st World War.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, as Lukacs argues, during the early 19th century the rise of the USA blurred the image of the uniqueness of Europe, because the achievements such as reason, individual liberty,

¹⁵⁹ Remi Brague, “Borders” in F. Cerutti & E. Rudolph (eds.), *A Soul for Europe*, pp.131-132.

¹⁶⁰ H. White, “The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity”, p.80.

¹⁶¹ T. Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, p.216.

¹⁶² Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, “Locating Europe”, *European Societies*, Vol.4, No.3, 2002, p.274.

¹⁶³ Anthony Pagden, “Europe: Conceptualizing a Concept” in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the EU*, p.45.

¹⁶⁴ Hartmut Kaelble, “European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century” in K. Eder & W. Spohn (eds.), *Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, p.19.

¹⁶⁵ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, p.124.

humanism which were attributed to Europe by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, were also adopted by the USA.¹⁶⁶

At the beginning of the 20th century European identity is only a cultural fact; the political idea of Europe was only in the minds of a few people. Frank argues that, in 1900 the British, French and Germans also felt European. In that period, the way of being European was to recognize themselves as nations. He asserts that there was a national consciousness and European identity, but not European consciousness.¹⁶⁷ He also adds that the European consciousness gradually emerged with the effects of exogenous factors, such as rejection of war, fascism, communism and the prevention of European decline.¹⁶⁸ The European consciousness emerged especially after the 2nd World War among the European political elites, which led to the construction of the EC.

The centre and periphery of Europe have changed throughout history. Until the mid 20th century, Europe was divided in social and economic terms between the dynamic industrial central area which consists of Britain, Sweden, France, the Benelux countries, Germany, Switzerland, northern Italy and the rural periphery, which consists of Northern, Eastern and Southern Europe.¹⁶⁹ As Delanty argues, contemporarily instead of one core, there is multi-centric Europe which includes Western, Eastern, Central Europe, Mediterranean and Nordic Europe.¹⁷⁰ In the 20th century until the end of the Cold War, Europe was associated primarily with Western Europe. All parts of Europe have not experienced the same developments. The experiences of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment were generally not experienced by the Eastern Europe. Also after the industrialisation process, Europe was divided into a developed Western part and an undeveloped Eastern part.¹⁷¹

In the history of Europe all of its parts have never been under common rule. The Roman Empire never included the whole of Europe, excluding regions such as Scandinavia

¹⁶⁶ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, p.118.

¹⁶⁷ R. Frank, "European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination", p.45.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.56.

¹⁶⁹ H. Kaelble, "European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century", p.25.

¹⁷⁰ Gerard Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University, European Union Institute, Istanbul, March 22, 2007.

¹⁷¹ K. Kumar, "The Idea of Europe: Cultural Legacies, Transnational Imaginings and The Nation-State", pp.36-37.

and much of Eastern Europe. It was a Mediterranean Empire, rather than a European Empire. Also, Scandinavia did not experience feudalism. In addition to these, the Renaissance did not reach North and Eastern Europe and the Reformation occurred within the boundaries of Latin Christendom.¹⁷² The Roman Empire covered the area generally corresponding to the states which established the ECSC in the 1950s; but it did not include the Byzantine Empire.¹⁷³ The EU can be considered as the most successful attempt in terms of unification of Europe.

The ideas on the unification of Europe started to be discussed earlier than the integration process of Europe after the 2nd World War. One of the first plans that tried to unify Europe was suggested by Pierre du Bois in his work which was called, *De Rucuperatione Terrae Sanctae* (“On the Recovery of the Holy Land”) in 1306. According to this plan, the Pope would lead the way in the establishment of a Council which would try to maintain peace among Christians.¹⁷⁴ Especially with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the necessity to unite increased among intellectuals and politicians of Europe. Plans were prepared by George von Podebrad and Antoine Martini in 1464. The treatise which was written by Martini, was called *De Unione Christianorum Contra Turcas* (“On Christian Unity against the Turks”) which was about a plan to unite Christianity against the Turks. In the plans on the unification of Europe, sometimes Turkey and Russia were included, sometimes they were excluded. In 1693 William Penn, in his “Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe” argued that Russia and the Ottoman Empire have to be included within the institutions of Europe.¹⁷⁵ In 1713 Saint Pierre argued that the world is divided into continents. He suggested not only a European but also an Asian union. He suggested a European federation, which was composed of twenty four European states and establishment of a free trade area, which would avoid war and protect Europe from attacks by the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² A.D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, p.70.

¹⁷³ Angelo Santagostino, “The EU’s Borders and Enlargements in Perspective”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.8, No.2, April-June 2006, p.31.

¹⁷⁴ D. Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992; cited in Zeynep Gülşah Çapan & Özge Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 8, No.1, April 2007, p.102.

¹⁷⁵ H. Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, London: Macmillan Pub. 1998; cited in Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, pp.102-103.

¹⁷⁶ K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, p.129.

Consequently, many philosophers have defined “Europe” on different basis in different periods of history. For Machiavelli, politics is important in the definition of Europe. In addition art, science and technical inventions were used to differentiate Europe from other continents.¹⁷⁷ Machiavelli in his “Art of War” glorified the European spirit. Montesquieu defined Europe as a “nation composed of several provinces”.¹⁷⁸ He was in favour of the construction of a European nation. Rousseau in his “Considerations on the Government of Poland” argues that, “there is no longer such a thing as French men, Germans, Spaniards or even English men...There are only Europeans now. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same habits...”¹⁷⁹ The Romantics of the 19th century suggested a unity in Europe which was based on cultural heritage and Christian tradition. They wanted to counter balance the decreasing role of Christianity. On the other hand, for the future of Europe, Nietzsche dreamed the continuation of “heroic” antiquity and the elimination of Christianity. For him, a good European was atheist and amoral.¹⁸⁰ Thus, there have always been many different perceptions about the idea of Europe throughout history.

I.1.2.1. The Ideas on the Unification of Europe after the 1st World War

After the 1st World War, the idea of Europe was revived.¹⁸¹ In the first half of the 20th century European identity usually emerged as an elite identity.¹⁸² There was a proliferation of organisations and publications in favour of European unity.¹⁸³ The idea of a “united Europe” developed a political dynamism especially after the 1st World War with the “Paneuropean movement” which was founded by Richard Coudenhove Kalergi in 1923. Also Aristide Briand proposed a “United States of Europe” in the framework of the League of Nations.¹⁸⁴ **Kalergi** was one of the most important pioneers of the idea of the

¹⁷⁷ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.28.

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It”, p.89.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, p.130.

¹⁸¹ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on the Development of a European Consciousness*, pp.126-127.

¹⁸² G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, p.111.

¹⁸³ W. Lipgens, *A History of European Integration 1945-1947*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1982; cited in K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, p.131.

¹⁸⁴ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.18.

“United States of Europe”.¹⁸⁵ His idea of “**Panurope**” was founded on the basis of a common European cultural heritage. For him, the unification of Europe was the best way to rebuild European self-awareness and strengthen the “belief in European values”. As a symbol of this movement he chose “the red cross of the medieval crusades resting on the emblem of the sun” on a light blue background. For him, it represented “the oldest symbol of a supranational European community and of international humanitarianism (the cross) enclosed by the European spirit, which enlightened the world (the sun).”¹⁸⁶ Villanueva argues that through this symbol he symbolically united Christian principles with Greek humanism and put them on symbolic blue sky, which represents peace.¹⁸⁷ It is an ambiguous symbol, because the cross refers to both humanism and the crusades. In geographical terms he admitted that Europe could not be clearly defined, so demarcation could be made on the basis of European culture. Like Victor Hugo, Kalergi also excluded Russia and the UK from Europe. They were considered as independent world empires. For him, the USA and the Soviet Union were the “other”s of Europe. He believed in a “European national consciousness”. His understanding of nation-building combined the models of cultural nation and nation-state. He argued that a common language and an integrated idea of a state are not sufficient to build a nation. Even clearly defined boundaries would not lead to the creation of a nation. He believed that, there are close ties between all European cultures. He stated that “...the continent was united by common historical experiences, which were tied together in the collective unconsciousness of all Europeans.”¹⁸⁸ Kalergi included Turkey in his vision of Europe, after the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923.¹⁸⁹

The political integration of Europe on the basis of the renewed European consciousness was the goal of the Paneuropean movement. Kalergi admitted that the European nation is divided into different languages and political groups, but compared to many common characteristics of European lifestyle; he believed that these differences are

¹⁸⁵ K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War” p.140.

¹⁸⁶ R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Panurope*, Vienna, Leipzig, 1926; quoted in K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, pp.141-144.

¹⁸⁷ Daniel C. Villanueva, “Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘PanEuropa’ as The Elusive ‘Object of Longing’”, *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature*, Vol. 59, No.2, Fall 2005, p.68.

¹⁸⁸ R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Panurope*, 1926; quoted in K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, pp.141-144.

¹⁸⁹ P. Bugge, “The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe (1914-1945) in K. Wilson & J. Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, London: Routledge Pub., 1995, pp. 83-149; cited in Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, p.103.

not so important. He also argued that there are similarities between European constitutions and laws which have common roots.¹⁹⁰ However Kalergi's efforts to build a mass European movement failed. He was also planning to create a youth movement, but it also failed. In 1928 he changed the structure of "Paneuropa" to a "leader movement". The organisation started to build a European consciousness among the European elites¹⁹¹ which shows that, construction of a European identity among the masses has been always so hard. Thus, the project of unification of Europe has always been an elite driven project.

In England Eliot wrote about new European consciousness, which was emerging among European intellectuals as a reaction to the Russian Revolution in 1917.¹⁹² In Spain Ortega y Gasset wanted to construct a "European consciousness" against the Orient and the American world which includes Russia. Another reason of this European debate was "the fear of Europe losing its hegemonic role in the world." He argued in his book "*La Rebelion de Las Masas*" that only a European union would realise again the old goals, such as the continent's world dominance. For him, the primary goal of Europe was not peace anymore; the more important thing is Europe's leadership in the world and the power of European elites over the colonies.¹⁹³ Mann also supported the idea of a common Europe. In his article "*Der Europaer*" which was written in 1916, he argues that European peoples have many common characteristics and claims that "...European languages were more closely linked than was generally realised."¹⁹⁴ He also suggests that Europe should abolish its frontiers and "...build a Roman peace throughout the continent as in the days of the *Imperium Romanum*."¹⁹⁵ Till the mid-1920s he had been a supporter of Kalergi's ideas. In 1927 Mann distanced himself from the Paneuropean movement, he criticized Kalergi's emphasis on economic goals and argued that, Europe could not be united only in terms of economics; rather a "spiritual force" could realize this goal.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 1926; cited in K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", pp.141-144.

¹⁹¹ K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", pp.152-155.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p.123.

¹⁹³ Cited in K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", pp.134-135.

¹⁹⁴ H. Mann, "Der Europaer", *Essays* Vol. II, Berlin, Aufbau-Verlag, 1956, pp.255-261; quoted in K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", p.135.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", p.136.

According to Paul Valery, Europeans were peoples who had been influenced by three main developments throughout history: The Roman experience, Christianity and the Greek heritage. He also emphasized that *homo europaeus* is not defined by race, language or customs, but by its goals.¹⁹⁷ He did not only focus on common heritage and culture, he also emphasized the search for the highest good.¹⁹⁸ During the interviews conducted by the author, some of the Christian Democrat MEPs argued that European identity has been constructed on the basis of three main developments, which are Greek heritage, the Roman Empire and Christianity.

Hitler's Germany attempted to establish the idea of a "New Europe". The ideology of Hitlerism resulted in practices which were opposites of the European ideals of humanity, reason and cultural diversity.¹⁹⁹ It shows that there have been contradictory attempts to unify Europe, which are based on contradictory values and instruments. In the inter-war period writers, philosophers and politicians supported a united Europe primarily in cultural and intellectual terms, rather than geographical terms. In most of these cases, Turkey and the Soviet Union were usually referred to as cultural and ideological borders.²⁰⁰ One of the main questions in defining Europe has been whether Turkey and Russia are part of Europe or not. Russia has been sometimes considered as part of Europe, because of its Christian roots. It is sometimes seen as occupying a hybrid space between Europe and Asia. Another perception is to consider Russia as entirely unique.²⁰¹ The case of Turkey vis-a-vis Europe will be discussed in Chapter V.

1.1.2.2. The European Integration Process after the 2nd World War

The 2nd World War negatively affected the European "superiority complex". The genocide shocked people and after the war, the USA and the Soviet Union became the

¹⁹⁷ P. Valery, "Note (ou l'Europeen)", *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, *Variete*, Jean Hytier (Ed.), Paris, Gallimard, 1957, pp.1000-1014; cited in K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", pp.139-140.

¹⁹⁸ K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", p.140.

¹⁹⁹ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, p.130.

²⁰⁰ K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", p.153.

²⁰¹ P. Bugge, "The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914-1945", p.137; cited in K. Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War", p.128.

great powers of the world.²⁰² Europe lost its superiority in the world. The European integration process was perceived as the best way to improve its position in the world by the pioneers of the European integration.

After the 2nd World War at least for a decade, the intellectual tendency was to speak of “Western civilisation” instead of “Europe”. After 1945 Europe entered into another phase which had evolved from the “medieval Western Christendom” to “Modern Europe” and lastly to the “super modern Western civilisation”. During the first decade of the Cold War, it was too hard to distinguish between “the West” and “Europe”. In the 2nd decade of the Cold War, the idea of “Euroamerican civilisation” had weakened especially in Europe. C. de Gaulle in particular proposed the formation of Europe as a “New Force” between the USA and the Soviet Union.²⁰³

The Treaty of Paris (1952) established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaties of Rome (1957) led to the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). In the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, it was referred to as “union among the peoples of Europe”. As Abeles argues “the vision that one day Europe will be a united political entity was shared by the first generation of the EU’s pioneers, but contemporarily there is more sceptical vision of the future.”²⁰⁴ This scepticism about the future of the EU could be also observed during the interviews conducted by the author.

In the official website of the EU, the EU is defined as:

A family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity. It is not a state intended to replace existing states, but it is more than any other international organization. The EU is in fact, unique.²⁰⁵

As it will be discussed, the EU is constructed as a family. The project of the EU is the most recent and the most successful one, in comparison to the previous unification projects of

²⁰² R. Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination”, p.47.

²⁰³ J. Lukacs, *Decline and Rise of Europe: A Study in Recent History with Particular Emphasis on The Development of a European Consciousness*, pp.135-137.

²⁰⁴ Marc Abeles, “Virtual Europe” in Irene Bellier & Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), *An Anthropology of the EU: Building, Imagining and Experiencing The New Europe*, Oxford, 2000.

²⁰⁵ EUROPA, “Panorama of the EU”, retrieved on January 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_en.htm

Europe;²⁰⁶ but all previous ideas and projects on the unification of Europe have influenced the construction of the EU. To be a member of the integration process is voluntary. Although Norway fulfilled all conditions to be part of this process, membership has been rejected by the Norwegians in the referendums in 1972 and 1994.

The application of the UK for membership to the EC was vetoed twice by de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967. Only after de Gaulle resigned, Pompidou allowed joining the UK to the EC in 1973. In 1965 the “Empty Chair Crisis”²⁰⁷ which was resolved with the “Luxembourg Compromise”²⁰⁸ in 1966 shows that the European integration process is not a linear process, instead it has many ups and downs.

It is really difficult to define the political structure of the EU. The EU as an evolving political entity has led to important changes in our conception of politics and identity.²⁰⁹ The EU has accommodated to different circumstances. During the interviews conducted by the author Coveney argued that:

...The EU is a unique project...we are kind of inventing...the reason for being of the EU changes all the time...fifty years ago, it was all about peace and stability...but the last ten years...Europe is now trying to look to other parts of the world...for leadership, trying to offer assistance...²¹⁰

The perceptions about the EU differ from one Member State to another which will be discussed in Chapter IV. It can be argued that there are different nationally defined “Europe”s and ways of “being European”.²¹¹ Even Jacques Delors was unable to define the EC. He referred to it as an “**unidentified political object**”.²¹² In 1987 Edgar Morin argued that “the time had come for the idea of Europe to re-emerge from the shadows to which it had been relegated since the 16th century.”²¹³ He suggested that the future task of Europe was not to invent its identity but to rediscover it.²¹⁴ During the construction process of

²⁰⁶ Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, p.104.

²⁰⁷ President de Gaulle ordered a French boycott of the Council of Ministers, withdrew France’s permanent representative to the EC.

²⁰⁸ “Empty Chair Crisis” was resolved; unanimity was accepted, if national interests are at stake.

²⁰⁹ M. Abeles, “Virtual Europe”, 2000.

²¹⁰ Interview with Simon Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

²¹¹ Tobias Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 159.

²¹² Gilles Andreani, “Europe’s Uncertain Identity”, London: Center for European Reform (CER), 1999, p.2.

²¹³ Edgar Morin, *Penser L’Europe*, 1987; quoted in Enno Rudolph, “Historical Manifestations of European Identity and Its Failures” in Furio Cerutti & Enno Rudolph (eds.), *A Soul for Europe*, Vol.1, Peeters Leuven, 2001, p.146.

²¹⁴ E. Rudolph, “Historical Manifestations of European Identity and Its Failures”, p.146.

European identity, some of the political elites of Europe have argued that there has been already a European identity but the peoples of Europe have to become aware of it.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EC had to accommodate itself to the international circumstances. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EC was transformed to the EU.²¹⁵ During the enlargement process towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the rhetoric of “returning to Europe” was emphasized among the CEE states in order to show that they have been already Europeans. As Passerini argues, the CEE countries want to be referred to as “Europeans in a full sense, not to be considered as second rate Europeans.”²¹⁶ Moreover, a division between the Central Europe and the Eastern Europe was constructed in the post-Cold War era to accelerate the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition to these, the Baltic countries were reconstructed as part of the “CEE countries”, instead of “New Independent States”.²¹⁷ Thus, different countries may be considered as part of Europe according to different circumstances. After uniting the Western and the Eastern Europe under the framework of the EU, the goal of increasing cooperation between Catholics and Orthodox was also emphasized during the Pope’s visit to İstanbul in November 2006 and a joint Catholic-Orthodox statement was signed by the Pope and the Patriarch.²¹⁸

The debate on the project of Europe has been ongoing during its integration process. From the spatial point of view, the EU is a large scale community including different peoples and traditions; from the temporal viewpoint, it is a community in the making which defines itself as a “project”, focusing on an “ideal”, whose realization is always postponed.²¹⁹ As Delanty argues, “there is an absence of a notion of peoplehood in Europe.”²²⁰ He contended that “Europe has become an open-ended agenda.”²²¹ He also argued that there are some competing visions about the European project which are: Intergovernmental, supranational polity, republican model, rights based citizenship and

²¹⁵ A. Santagostino, “The EU’s Borders and Enlargements in Perspective”, p.32.

²¹⁶ L. Passerini, “The Last Identification: Why Some of us Would Like to Call Ourselves Europeans and What we Mean by This”, p.58.

²¹⁷ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, pp.241-244.

²¹⁸ “At Divine Liturgy, Pope, Patriarch Affirm Commitment to Unity”, *The Catholic Review Online*, October 6 2007, retrieved on October 5, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.baltcatholicreview.org/story1.asp>

²¹⁹ M. Abeles, “Virtual Europe”, 2000.

²²⁰ G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

communitarian model.²²² These visions about the EU have been supported by different parties. As Delanty argues, the European project refers to “hope” at the beginning, but contemporarily there is “anxiety” and “scepticism” about the future of the EU, because there is a lack of a common goal. At the beginning the founding fathers had common goals,²²³ but contemporarily there is not a common goal of the EU project, even among the political elites of the EU. As Delanty argues, there is a necessity of finding common goals for the EU, which may maintain and even increase the momentum of the integration process. Some of the goals of the EC, such as building peace and democracy in Europe have already been achieved. Thus, in addition to their maintenance and consolidation, new common goals have to be found out, such as fighting against global warming, fighting against terrorism and overcoming environmental problems.

I.1.3. Ambiguous Boundaries of Europe and the EU

Boundary refers to a demarcation between “us” and the “other”s. Boundaries define who we are, through defining where we are. It is easier to differentiate something which has clear cut boundaries. But it is much harder, when boundaries become blurred.²²⁴ Boundary is a matter of consciousness and experience, rather than a fact.²²⁵ Unlike Africa and the Americas, Europe has never been a continent with definite boundaries. Thus, Europe can be analyzed as an intersubjective cultural and political construct.²²⁶ “Europe is a geopolitical construct, whose boundaries are a matter of ideology and politics...”²²⁷ As Strath argues “...Europe as a set of values or as a region of shared history, has no clear demarcation.”²²⁸ There are no clear-cut geographical, political, cultural boundaries of Europe throughout history.²²⁹ The cultural boundaries of Europe especially have changed frequently and they usually do not coincide with geographical ones.²³⁰ Thus, Europe has shifting political, cultural and geographical boundaries especially in the east. For some, Europe is a tiny peninsula of the huge landmass of Asia; but its inhabitants have different

²²² G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ A. E. Akyürek, *Changing Conceptions of European Identity and Shifting Boundaries*, p.59.

²²⁵ A. P. Cohen, “Boundaries and Boundary-Consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity”, p.22.

²²⁶ Lila Leontidou, “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, Vol.11, No.4, October-December 2004, p.594.

²²⁷ William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London: Pinter Pub., 1990, pp.7-8.

²²⁸ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.34.

²²⁹ T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.297.

²³⁰ A. Santagostino, “The EU’s Borders and Enlargements in Perspective”, p.28.

characteristics from their Asian counterparts and it has a different historical development process from any other part of the world.²³¹ The debates on where Europe begins and ends also have been effective on the construction process of European identity.²³² The boundaries of Europe have changed throughout centuries even during the European integration process.²³³ Moreover, the international organisations which carry “Europe” in their name, such as the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) or the Council of Europe show that there are no clear cut boundaries of Europe, because each of these organisations is composed of different member states. Thus, Europe is characterized by overlapping and unclear boundaries.²³⁴

Usually the countries which are in the east of Europe perceived themselves as the end point of Europe. About where Asia starts Neumann argues that “Slovenes will point to Croatia, Croatians will point to Serbia, Serbs will point to Bosnia...most Greeks and certainly Cypriots will...support the idea that, Europe stops at their doorstep.”²³⁵ The boundaries of Europe are related with “politics and ideology.” The same country under different regimes may be included or excluded from Europe. For example, Spain under the Franco regime²³⁶ was not considered as part of Europe. Russia and Turkey are especially problematic cases. Throughout history they have been sometimes considered as part of Europe, sometimes outside of it. The Bosphorus is usually seen as a geographical boundary which separates Europe and Asia but politically and culturally it is meaningless.²³⁷

The main questions about the boundaries of the EU are: Whether the boundaries of the EU are constructed on the basis of geography or its values, whether they are open-ended or they have limits, whether they are flexible or rigid. The “continual redefining of its boundaries”²³⁸ will help the maintenance of the dynamic structure of the EU. As it was

²³¹ A. E. Akyürek, *Changing Conceptions of European Identity and Shifting Boundaries*, p.60.

²³² For further detail see W. Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, 1990.

²³³ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, pp.39-40.

²³⁴ Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration” in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.170.

²³⁵ Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity and Its Changing Others”, p.10.

²³⁶ W. Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, p.8.

²³⁷ Michael Wintle, “Europe’s Image: Visual Representations of Europe From The Earliest Times to the 20th Century” in Michael Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, p.60.

²³⁸ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, pp. 15-17.

argued, the EU is an open-ended process,²³⁹ thus its boundaries have to be reconstructed according to different circumstances. Although the boundaries of the EU have changed since the 1950s, one of the limits to the openness of the EU is the geographical content of European identity. A state without a territory in the European continent can not join the EU, even though it shares the values and norms of the EU.²⁴⁰ Morocco has strong historical, economic and social ties with their European neighbours, but because of being located on the African shores of the Mediterranean,²⁴¹ its application for membership was rejected on the grounds that it is not a European country. On the other hand, defining the boundaries of Europe only in terms of geography, without taking into consideration political and cultural factors is also insufficient.²⁴² The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are on the North African coast, are considered as formally part of the EU. It challenges the argument that the Mediterranean constitutes a natural boundary²⁴³ of Europe in the south.

The EU has ambiguous boundaries²⁴⁴, mainly because of the widening process since the 1970s. Unclear boundaries cause some difficulties in individuals' feelings of belonging to the EU. The president of France Sarkozy suggested that the EU should become clear about where its borders lie and what other types of partnerships it can offer to countries who want to be an EU member. He claims that "a Europe without borders will become a subset of the UN."²⁴⁵ "EC ministers are reluctant to specify the boundaries of Europe, while enlargement negotiations are continuing..." when insisted officials state that "'political Europe' unlike 'geographical Europe' extends only as far as Turkey, Russia and the Balkans."²⁴⁶ Also the position of Cyprus is interesting. Santagostino argues that

²³⁹ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p.7.

²⁴⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the EU" in Lars-Erik Cederman (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*, Boulder: Rienner Pub., 2001, p.174.

²⁴¹ R. Brague, "Borders", 2001.

²⁴² İsmail Cem, "Turkey in Europe" in Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligman (eds.), *Desperately Seeking Europe*, London: Archetype Pub., 2003, p.96.

²⁴³ B. Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", p.42.

²⁴⁴ Thomas Risse, "The Euro Between National and European Identity", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol:10, No:4, August 2003, p.490.

²⁴⁵ Lucia Kubosova, "Sarkozy Calls for Definition of 'Borders of Europe'", *euobserver.com*, retrieved on March 31, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/21278/?print=1>

²⁴⁶ C. Shore, "Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe", p.483.

“Cyprus is culturally and ethnically European, but geographically Asian.”²⁴⁷ Although Cyprus lies further east than Ankara, it was accepted to the EU without questioning its Europeanness. In the 2001 Laeken Declaration it was stated that “the only boundaries of the EU are the boundaries of democracy and human rights.”²⁴⁸ Here the boundaries of the EU were constructed on the basis of common values.

The boundaries of the EU also change according to different policy fields. For example, “Schengenland” includes Norway which is not an EU member, but not the UK which is a member. Also “Euroland” includes some of the Member States that have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria. But some of the Member States such as the UK, Denmark prefer to use their national currencies, although they already fulfilled the criteria to adopt the Euro.

The lack of clear geographical boundaries weakens the efforts of the EU to be seen as a real entity by its citizens; because clear boundaries are important for “**entitativity**” which affects people’s level of identification. Thus, an increase in the entitativity of the EU will lead to an increase in the identification of its citizens with the EU. Entitativity differs according to the EU elites and public opinion. For the elites, especially for the officials working at the EU institutions, the entitativity of the EU is much more than for the general public. The EU has to acquire a psychological existence in the minds of its citizens to increase their identification with the EU.²⁴⁹ The EU has become much more visible in people’s daily lives with the effects of the establishment of the single market, the Euro and Schengenland. If this kind of measures will be introduced more, this will lead to an increase in the “entitativity” of the EU among the peoples of Europe, which may lead to an increase in their level of identification with the EU.

During the interviews which were conducted by the author, most of the interviewees argued that it is too hard for the EU to have clear cut boundaries. The Socialist MEP, the former Prime Minister of France Rocard argued that:

...necessity for boundary depends on the type of Europe you have and you wish. If the initial project of a real federation with strong power at the top, if that had been realized, boundaries would be absolutely necessary...some of the present members of the EU would not probably have been accepted...national identities disappear, that is not acceptable for the British, Danes,

²⁴⁷ A. Santagostino, “The EU’s Borders and Enlargements in Perspective”, p.29.

²⁴⁸ Jorge Semprun, “Avrupa’nın Sınırları” in J. Semprun & D. de Villepin (eds.), *Avrupa İnsanı*, p.48.

²⁴⁹ E. Castano, “European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective”, pp.43-55.

Poles...the six founding members have that in mind. That project is killed now, by British diplomacy, by the fears of any foreign policy of Europe...the risk to be antagonistic to American one...²⁵⁰

As he mentioned, with the membership of the UK and the recent enlargement towards the CEE, it is too hard for the EU to have a federal political structure in the near future. If the EU will not have a federal structure, clear-cut boundaries are unnecessary.

Duff argued that "...certainly I would oppose drawing lines on maps."²⁵¹ Bozkurt argued that:

...my party is thinking that, we should go on with countries with whom, we already started negotiations, also with Turkey. We should stick on the criteria...we have to look what we want for the further future, for instance there are some other countries in the region from the former Russian states, should they have a chance to become a member or maybe we should find other options like the neighbourhood policy...In public opinion there are very big question marks, whether we should enlarge till the end.²⁵²

Thus, the boundaries of the EU are closely related with the question of enlargement. Coveney argued that "...it is difficult to set those boundaries...I have been quite ambitious as regards enlargement...I have spoken many times in the EP...a supporter of giving Turkey the opportunity to join the EU..."²⁵³ The MEPs who are in favour of further enlargements argue that it is impossible to have clear-cut boundaries of the EU. Fajmon argued that:

...no I do not think there are clear-cut boundaries, it has never been so in European history. In political, economical, religious basis it is open space, boundaries are changing according to the ability of nations to adopt, what is the basis of the majority of European values...Czech nation was not supporting European values before 1999, so we were not part of Europe, but once we adopt these values, we are full participants of the EU. It depends on the ability and will of those nations on the fringes of Europe to adopt these values...I do not want to draw any line, who should be in the EU at the end, who can not be any time. I do not think that, it is possible...²⁵⁴

He defined the boundaries of the EU on the basis of adopting common values. Kauppi also defined the boundaries of the EU on the basis of common values. She stated that:

²⁵⁰ Interview with Michel Rocard, Socialist MEP of France, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

²⁵¹ Interview with Andrew Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

²⁵² Interview with Emine Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁵³ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

²⁵⁴ Interview with Hynek Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

...as long as a nation fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and shares the common European values defined by the draft Constitution currently under ratification, I see no reason why a country should not be able to join.²⁵⁵

Öger perceives the extension of boundaries of the EU as spreading of common values of the EU. He argued that:

...I think the boundaries of Europe end, where Europeans want. One day Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine can be a member. I will perceive their accession very positively. Democracy, peace will extend, free market economy consolidates as much as the extension of boundaries. While Europe which is a model to the world is widening, it will spread welfare, democracy, rule of law and freedom to more societies. I wish one day the boundaries will extend much more...the concept of Europe should be open.²⁵⁶

Özdemir defined the boundaries of the EU mainly on the basis of common values. He argued that:

...it is too hard to say something for the long-term. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, we saw how everything is relative. Europe decided some criteria. The candidate countries have to be European, what does it mean? Mongolia can never be a member. For example, it is impossible to say the same thing for Ukraine now. It can be a member one day...Morocco can not be a member. Because, Morocco is not part of Europe. Belarus may be a member. Even Georgia, other Caucasian states can be a member. But this may happen in a very long term. Probably my generation will not take decisions about these...I am not part of the group, who says that, they can never be a member...if we will take Turkey, Western Balkans, if we say if democracy will go on there, they may be members, how can we say Caucasian countries can never be members? But these are things, which will be discussed...in the very long term.²⁵⁷

He also perceives Eastern boundaries as not clear and argued that, in the longer term even Caucasian states may be members of the EU one day, if they will adopt the values of the EU.

When it was asked, whether there should be clear-cut boundaries of the EU or not, Stubb replied that:

No, two schools of thoughts, one is institutional, everyone can come in, I do not go that far. There are some natural borders. For us to define those borders right now, I do not believe in that. We need to be more broad-minded. The idea of basic values is an important one, but those basic values are only in your mind. I am doing the report most probably on absorption capacity of the EU...to be able to create some kind of borders for Europe. We need to be a little bit more flexible about in our basic thinking, not start defining borders.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Interview with Piia Noora Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

²⁵⁶ Interview with Vural Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Cem Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Alexander Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

El Khadroui is also against the idea of constructing clear-cut boundaries of the EU. He argued that:

...I do not think we can create definite boundaries...what are the boundaries will evaluate over the time and depend on context...Until the middle of the 1970s it was unpredictable that, Spain and Portugal would join the EU...same applied to Greece and Eastern Europe until the end of the 80s...what Europe should do before enlarging is first of all to resolve the problems it is dealing with right now...the proposal for Constitution came too late. Because all the ideas in it, should have been put in reality before the enlargement to Eastern Europe...²⁵⁹

He is not against further enlargements but he emphasized that, firstly the internal problems of the EU have to be resolved before further enlargements. Prets also asserted that it is impossible to clarify the end points of the EU. She stated that:

...you can not say here we stop. It is a question of situation, question of stability inside EU, acceptance of citizens of the EU...We can not fix it...to say twenty seven or thirty members are enough. Nobody can give the answer how far can the EU go. This is a question of a process, the process of people, how they develop European identity...It is another history than America...Europe is another construction...you can not explain citizens, now we have 450 million inhabitants inside the EU...we had huge problems with financing system...when you are saying we will have more and more countries, you need a system how to finance this. Because we will have the difficulties...we do not have treaty...financial basis of the EU, we can not talk about enlargement. Because, nobody will be satisfied then.²⁶⁰

Thus, the extension of boundaries through further enlargements is usually perceived as closely related with solving of internal problems of the EU.

Most of the Commission officials argued that, there is not a necessity for the EU to have clear-cut boundaries. One Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry argued that “even a state does not have clear-cut boundaries. For example, reunification of Germany...Nothing is clear-cut...Boundaries can not be a reason for not changing...”²⁶¹ As he argued, boundaries are not defined firstly; usually they reflect the changes of the international system. One Commission official from DG Enlargement argued that “there is no need for clear-cut boundaries of the EU.”²⁶² He also claimed that “with the membership of Turkey, “reunification of Roman Empire” will be achieved.”²⁶³ One Commission official from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

²⁵⁹ Interview with Said El Khadroui , Socialist MEP of Belgium, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Christa Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

²⁶¹ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, at one of the Commission buildings in Brussels, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁶² Interview with Commission official from France, DG Enlargement at one of the Commission buildings in Brussels, on July 13, 2006 at 17.30.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

argued that especially Eastern boundaries are so relative for different countries. She stated that:

Eastern to me, being Greek it is Middle East, for somebody who is from Germany east is Poland, Ukraine. It is very relative...geographical expansion is difficult because the bigger territory it is more difficult to manage...if you have new member states...Turkey brings us down to Iraq...if you go eastward or south the EU would find itself in new regions...EU is preparing itself for that...the European Neighbourhood Policy...even before that, there was Barcelona initiative, the EU has been in a dialogue with neighbours...the EU identity is now in sort of a confused state...I can not say that, I would see it in a clear cut way...we are in a situation in flux, we have negotiations with candidate countries like Turkey, which has a big territory and will bring us to a non-territory, this could be a bridge...²⁶⁴

Thus, the Commission officials usually perceive the boundaries of the EU as relative which may change according to different circumstances.

On the other hand, some of the MEPs are sceptical about further enlargements and flexible boundaries of the EU. Weber stated that:

...I try to explain it with the feeling of people in my home region...the Eastern border, I think Ukraine and Belarus are European countries, but have a very long way...to take them in the EU...we have to discuss not only what should be the EU...also we have to ask does it function? It must be the criteria for the future for all enlargement discussions. Does EU function with a lot of member states?²⁶⁵

He added that:

...cultural, historical, geographical definition of Europe...the people in my home region...if I say Bulgaria, Warsaw, Prague, they are Europe...it is not a religious definition...we have also Muslim states like Bosnia, it is clearly Europe in a geographical way.²⁶⁶

He implied that there are some geographical limits of Europe, from which Turkey is excluded. For some of the MEPs, extension of the boundaries of the EU through further enlargements is closely related with the “**absorption capacity**” of the EU which is usually emphasized by the Christian Democrats, which was primarily suggested by the Chancellor Merkel. The arguments on the “absorption capacity” of the EU have been made more frequently especially with regards to Turkey’s membership, which will be discussed in Chapter V.

²⁶⁴ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, at one of the Commission buildings in Brussels, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁶⁵ Interview with Manfred Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Some of the MEPs argued in favour of clarifying the boundaries of the EU. Deprez perceived clear-cut boundaries as closely related with his federalist perception of the EU.

He stated that:

It depends on the idea you have of the EU. I am a federalist. I try to build up a European federation. To build up a European civilisation, you need to create some kind of boundaries...it is not possible to build a European federation, which would be contradictory with cultural identity...there are some boundaries, which are culturally defined and Turkey does not belong to the same world.²⁶⁷

He implied that because of being in favour of a federal EU, he is in favour of construction of the EU which has clear-cut boundaries. He argued in favour of the construction of boundaries of the EU in terms of culture and excludes Turkey on this basis. He also stated that:

...if we are unable to give European citizens the sense of protection they need and a kind of boundary, the support for the European construction will keep decreasing. Europe will not disappear but will probably become a kind of 'United Nations'...I feel there is a big danger now...²⁶⁸

He perceives construction of clear-cut boundaries of the EU as a protection against the outside world. He also claimed that if the EU does not have clear-cut boundaries, it may become a kind of UN one day. Schöpflin is also in favour of constructing clear-cut boundaries of the EU. He argued that:

...yes it has to be...we have to say Europe stops here...the boundary is not Islam, I think Albania, Bosnia can be integrated...Turkey could be integrated. But I am very sceptic whether this will happen...by now we have to answer the question, where does Europe end?²⁶⁹

Guardans stated that:

There should be clear-cut boundaries of the EU. We have to have a long debate on where, but yes there must be. Otherwise, we change completely the nature of the EU...after a point I do not see why Chile or New Zealand could not be members of the EU...both countries fit perfectly in the model of the EU, who share the values, traditions, but of course they do not share geography...²⁷⁰

He also perceives clear-cut boundaries as closely related with the future political structure of the EU. Moreover, he implied that if there are not any clear-cut boundaries of the EU, it may transform into a UN one day. Some of the MEPs see Turkey as not part of cultural boundaries of Europe, especially those who define European identity on cultural basis. Although Sommer admitted that it is too difficult to clarify boundaries of the EU, she

²⁶⁷ Interview with Gerard Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

²⁷⁰ Interview with Ignasi Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

perceives further enlargements as a risk for the political integration of the EU. She stated that “it is difficult to define...if we grow too fast, political EU could be at risk.”²⁷¹

Consequently, there is not a common perception even among the officials and political elites of the EU about the boundaries of the EU. Most of them argued that it is impossible for the EU to have clear-cut boundaries. Some of them argued that it is necessary for the EU to have clear-cut boundaries to maintain the ongoing political integration process and to prevent its transformation to the UN. It is obvious that it is too hard to clarify the boundaries of Europe throughout history and having clear-cut boundaries is against the dynamic structure of the EU, which helps it to adjust to different circumstances.

I.1.4. Construction of “European Identity” and Its “Other”s

I.1.4.1. Construction of “European Identity”

“European identity is a specific construct in time and space, whose content changes depending on the social and political context.”²⁷² As “Europe” has always been in a construction process throughout history, “European identity” has been simultaneously under construction. As Strath argues, European identity is a “...contested political programme or project, which must continue to be contested and questioned.”²⁷³ According to Thatcher, “Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome, nor is the European idea the property of any group or institution...The EC is one manifestation of that European identity, but it is not the only one.”²⁷⁴ As Thatcher argued, the idea of Europe has not emerged with the establishment of the EC.

European identity has been defined on different bases in different periods of history. In the Medieval period, Christianity was nearly European identity itself.²⁷⁵ In modern times after the emergence of secularism and the nation-state, Christianity lost its

²⁷¹ Interview with Renate Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, at the EP building in Brussels on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

²⁷² A. Wiener & T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p.171.

²⁷³ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.44.

²⁷⁴ Margaret Thatcher, “European Family of Nations” in Christopher Joyce (ed.), *Questions of Identity: A Selection from the Pages of New European*, London: I.B. Tauris Pub., 2002, pp.206-207.

²⁷⁵ John Mc Cormick, *Understanding the EU*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2002, p.32.

primacy. Contemporarily Christianity is still one of the important components of European identity in cultural and historical terms. In the modern era the dominant collective identity is national identity, which was one of the most effective factors on the emergence of a secular European identity. Secularism and nationalism go hand in hand. With the effect of secularism while the authority of the Church was declining, the authority of the nation-states increased.²⁷⁶ Özdemir argued that “if we look at history, Enlightenment...separation between religion and state...Roman Empire...all could be found in the European identity construction process.”²⁷⁷ Thus, all these processes including Enlightenment, secularism have been influential in construction process of European identity. As Frank argues, a distinction may be made between “European identity” and “European consciousness”. He argues that, European consciousness refers to awareness of the political necessity of building Europe. European identity means to feel European. For the emergence of European consciousness, firstly there is a need to feel European.²⁷⁸ In the context of the EU “European identity is seen to function as a social glue to be invented by the EU institutions and certain intellectual elites.”²⁷⁹

European identity has been defined on different bases by different scholars. According to Bauman, “European identity is a utopia at all moments of its history.”²⁸⁰ Garcia asserts that “the current search for identity in Europe is a response to global economic transformation and to the geopolitical changes in the old continent.”²⁸¹ Kohli puts forward that there are mainly four understandings of European identity. The first understanding is the constitutional one, which was expressed in the “Document on European Identity” that was accepted by the foreign ministers of the EC in 1973. There was a reference to this type of European identity also in the Maastricht Treaty. It refers to the identity of the Community and its independence on the international scene. This type of European identity is referred to as the “EU identity” in this thesis. A second understanding of European identity is the idea of Europe which was manifested in the discourses of intellectuals and politicians. The third one is cultural understanding of European identity,

²⁷⁶ A. N. Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği”, pp.37-41.

²⁷⁷ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from Greens, September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁷⁸ R. Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination”, p.45.

²⁷⁹ P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, p.287.

²⁸⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Europe, An Unfinished Adventure*, Polity , 2004; quoted in P. Herzog, *Travelling Hopefully: Ethics, Action, Perspective for a Revival of Europe*, p.86.

²⁸¹ Soledad Garcia & Helen Wallace, “Conclusion” in S. Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, p.172.

which is reflected in written texts or cultural practices. The fourth understanding of European identity is related with collective identity, which will be referred to as “European identity” in this thesis. This understanding of European identity has been the focus of attention by the European integrationists leading to public opinion surveys, which have been made by **Eurobarometer** since 1972.²⁸² In this thesis mostly the fourth understanding of European identity, which refers to collective identity of the citizens of the EU will be focused on. Also the EU identity in the world is discussed which is closely related with the construction of European identity among the citizens of the EU. If the EU identity is stronger in the world, this will probably lead to an increase in the level of European identity of the citizens of the EU.

By making a reference to Giesen,²⁸³ Eder mentions three ways to construct a European collective identity, which are “primordial”, “traditional” and “reflexive” ways. In the primordial way, the primordial European past is linked with the collective identity of Europeans. This type of construction is made by a small number of the elite. Such primordial notions of Europe were used to justify empire building in Europe and were used by Napoleon and Hitler. In this type of construction, mythical symbols of Europe have been used and there is a reference to the mythical past to construct the unity of Europe. In the traditional way of construction, common ground is constructed through selective retelling of the past, only the events in the past which encourage pride, are emphasized. European success stories are emphasized, such as the success story of European culture as Enlightenment culture (Hobbes, Kant), musical culture (Mozart, Beethoven), literary culture (Shakespeare, Goethe) or the success stories of the founding fathers of European integration. This type of construction of a heroic European past refers to a learning process, which also includes forgetting a lot of things. In this type of construction, the construction of European identity is based on the model of the nation-state. However, it lacks the prerequisites of construction of a nation-state, such as the monopoly of power, not only in terms of physical violence, but also in terms of symbolic violence. The EU institutions have limited real and symbolic power. Thus, construction of a European identity from above by a selective reading of the past is the least possible way to construct European

²⁸² Martin Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, *European Societies*, Vol.2, No.2, 2000, pp.120-122.

²⁸³ B. Giesen, *The Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in German Axial Age*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; cited in K. Eder, and W. Spohn (eds.), *Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement*, p.214.

identity. The comparison between the nation-building and the construction of European identity in terms of their instruments will be made in Chapter IV. Another way of European identity construction is the “reflexive” way. This way of construction is debated in Europe about its Fascist past. It is the most probable way of retelling the narrative of the past of Europeans, but this type of reflexive retelling of the past needs a European public sphere, that provides an atmosphere to tell the past to European citizens.²⁸⁴ The European public sphere has been in a construction process within the EU, but it is still not enough to construct a collective identity.

According to the interviews conducted by the author, it can be argued that there is not a common definition of European identity among the MEPs and officials of the EU. Cutchet emphasized the principle of “united in diversity”. She defined European identity as “...sum of all different identities that exist in Europe...”²⁸⁵ She perceives differences in the EU as its richness. She also added that there are a lot of similarities among them. She stated that:

...in language, I can find the same expressions to express the same feelings...many times they use the same words...there is very close kind of living, in food...when two European people meet in Asia...you feel that we are European...²⁸⁶

She emphasizes that there are similarities among the peoples of Europe in terms of language and the way of living. The peoples of Europe usually become more aware of their similarities when they are outside Europe. Kauppi emphasized the effects of the EU on the construction process of European identity. She argued that:

European identity is an **ever-evolving concept**. The EU marks its won mark by bringing people closer to each other and helps people understand each other better...the EU makes European identity stronger.²⁸⁷

Resetarits stated that “European identity is something, which we have to build up...It is not something already done or in the minds of people.”²⁸⁸ She implied the role of the EU elites in this process which will be discussed in Chapter III. Schöpflin asserted that:

²⁸⁴ K. Eder, “Remembering National Memories Together: The Formation of a Transnational Identity in Europe”, pp.214-217.

²⁸⁵ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Interview with P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland , answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Karin Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

European identity is a constructed identity...its present phase...is something new, which is constructed after the 2nd World War as a way of bringing peace, democracy and prosperity...Europeanness exists in the framework of EU...²⁸⁹

He also emphasized the constructed nature of European identity. He referred to European identity in the EU as a new phase of European identity which has been under construction since the end of the 2nd World War.

Few of the interviewees mentioned the construction of European identity as a goal of the EU elites or institutions. Usually they perceive it as an ongoing construction process, which has been affected by many initiatives and policies of the EU. Fajmon who is very sceptical about the concept of identity and particularly European identity, argued that:

...we can only reasonably talk about it as the outcome of the relationship between the citizen and their state and that certain territory...I am very much against the generalisation of anything. The concept of identity is generalisation...European identity is very complicated to describe by means of any science...²⁹⁰

He added that “I do not think European identity exists at all...it can only be described as a combination of national identities of states, which belong to Europe.”²⁹¹ As will be discussed in Chapter IV, European identity has been in the process of interaction with national identities and does not replace them, but it does not mean that there is not any European identity. The most Eurosceptic MEP among the interviewees was the one from the Independence Democracy Group Thomas Wise who is against the idea of the EU and European identity. He claimed that “European identity does not exist”.²⁹² Rather than an observation, he reflects his position and attitude towards the EU and the question of European identity. He argued that, “...I do not want European identity...”²⁹³ He added that “the EU is a political construct, we do not know where it is going.”²⁹⁴ It can be observed that even some of the political elites of the EU are sceptical about European identity.

Consequently, there is not a common definition of European identity even among the MEPs and the Commission officials of the EU. In this thesis, rather than finding a

²⁸⁹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

²⁹⁰ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Interview with Thomas Wise, MEP of the UK from Independence Democracy Group, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels, on July 12, 2006, at 10.00.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

common definition, perceptions of the EU elites about the construction process of European identity and effective factors on this process are analyzed.

I.1.4.2. The “Other”s of European Identity

European identity has been usually defined against the “other”s, such as communism during the Cold War. According to Neumann and Welsh, the “other” is “the non-European barbarian or savage, who played a decisive role in the evolution of European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states.”²⁹⁵ Hettlage asserts that the EU has achieved its unity and self-definition generally in response to the “other”s;²⁹⁶ but there is a lack of a commonly recognized cultural, geographical or historical “other” which makes demarcating Europe much more complicated. Many Member States were each others’ primary “other”s during long periods of history. On the other hand, one of the most widely recognized “others” of the EU is Europe’s violent past.²⁹⁷ As Ash argues, “Europe’s only defining ‘other’ is its own previous self...the unhappy, self-destructive, at times downright barbaric chapters in the history of European civilisation.”²⁹⁸ Waever argues that the “other” of Europe is its own past. He asserts that those who are further away from the centre are not referred to as “anti-Europe” but “less Europe”.²⁹⁹ Thus, it can be argued that “othering” is not necessary for construction of an identity, but distinguishability is necessary and there are different ways of differentiation.

As Hülse argues, “the discourse on the ‘other’ always contains elements of self-understanding.”³⁰⁰ Strath asserts that “Europe is seen in the mirror of the other.”³⁰¹ In terms of the relationship between self/other in the context of the EU, Rumelili contends

²⁹⁵ Iver B. Neumann & Jennifer M. Welsh, “The ‘Other’ in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, 1991, pp.329-330,336; quoted in Zeki Küçük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.7, No.2, June 2006, p.281.

²⁹⁶ R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.252.

²⁹⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.153.

²⁹⁸ Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s True Stories”, *Prospect Magazine*, Issue 131, February 2007.

²⁹⁹ Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community” in Emmanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.100; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, 2004.

³⁰⁰ Rainer Hülse, “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference: Turkey as Europe’s Other?”, Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, March 26-31, 1999, p.2.

³⁰¹ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.15.

that, the self/other relations may be constituted in many different ways, not on the basis of this question:

Does the EU replicate the nation-state form in terms of externalising difference and legitimizing a violent relationship with its “other”s or has it succeeded in constructing a post-modern community, where self/other distinctions are blurred not only within the community but also in relation to its outside?³⁰²

The position of the EU is in between, it does not have a self/other relationship like the nation-states. But it can not also construct a pan-national community. It can be also argued that self/other relationships have been blurred to a great extent among the Member States of the EU.

In the 1960s the majority of the West Europeans saw the USA as more like “us” than the Eastern Europe which has changed today. Contemporarily there is not a common “other” of the EU among its Member States. The “other” of the EU is usually different for each Member State. For example, British political elites have considered “Europe” as the friendly “out-group”, German elites have seen the past of their own country as the “other” and for French political elites the USA is one of the “other”s.³⁰³ For centuries Islam was the main “other” of Europe, against which European identity was constructed.³⁰⁴ Particularly the Ottoman Empire had been considered as the “other” of Europe. Ash argues that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some politicians and intellectuals have tried to find Europe’s new “other”.³⁰⁵ In the post-Cold War era, there has not been a clear “other” of Europe. Contemporarily it is usually argued that “Islamic fundamentalism” has become the new “other” of Europe.³⁰⁶

For some scholars, anti-Americanism is another component of European identity.³⁰⁷ For example, French writer Simone de Beauvoir during a visit to the USA in 1946 stated

³⁰² B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p.46.

³⁰³ Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse, et.al., “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, p.616.

³⁰⁴ D. Hay, *Europe, The Emergence of an Idea*, 1968; cited in Thomas Koenig, Sabina Mihelj et al., “Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process?”, *Innovation*, Vol.19, No. 2, 2006, p.150.

³⁰⁵ T. G. Ash, “Europe’s True Stories”, February 2007.

³⁰⁶ A. Wiener & T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p.167.

³⁰⁷ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.82.

that, “the term ‘European’ which I never used in France, here I use it.”³⁰⁸ Also the Austrian sociologist Louise Alexandra von Simson who lived in exile in the USA in 1962, wrote that:

...in the USA one totally forgets the European national differences, which in Europe seem to be such important demarcation lines...The unity of Europe became evident and made us feel as Europeans sharing a common culture and a common language.³⁰⁹

Thus, people usually feel themselves more European when they are outside Europe and faced with a non-European culture and identity. In the post-Cold War era, the EU differs itself from the USA in terms of its foreign policy instruments, especially its emphasis on the social and environmental aspects of economic growth and its focus on democracy and human rights.³¹⁰

During the interviews conducted by the author, Bozkurt emphasized the importance of comparing the EU with other regions in order to differentiate European identity, but she did not refer to them as the “other” of the EU. She stated that:

European identity becomes important for people, when you are talking about other blocs. If we compare ourselves with the USA, we think of ourselves as Europeans. If we compare ourselves with Asian countries, we are defining ourselves as Europeans...³¹¹

She added that:

I do not know anybody, when you ask them ‘who are you?’, he/she says I am European. Nobody defines himself like that...It is not sort of umbrella. People do not see it as the main characteristic of themselves. Only if you compare it with other blocs...European identity becomes important for people.³¹²

She also added that “...in an economic way, upcoming competition is from China, India...”³¹³ She argued that there is a competition with different countries and regions, but she does not perceive them as the “other”s of the EU. During the interviews, as an answer to the question on the “other” of the EU, most of the MEPs mentioned the USA and China as economic competitors of the EU. They did not prefer to use the concept of “other”. Stubb stated that:

³⁰⁸ S. Beauvoir, *Amerika Tag und Nacht, Reisetagebuch 1947*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1988, p.77; quoted in H. Kaelble, “European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century”, p.24.

³⁰⁹ L.A. Simson, *Happy Exile*, Berlin, 1981, p. 68; quoted in H. Kaelble, “European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century”, p.24.

³¹⁰ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization”, *Mediterranean Affairs*, Vol. 10, No.3, 1999, p.112.

³¹¹ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ *Ibid.*

We are in constant competition...if you look in purely economic terms: The USA, China, Russia...Do I think that there is a clash of civilisations on the basis of...the 'other', the USA? No I do not think so...people do not really understand the assets of the USA, we have much more in common with them than differences. No, I do not think there is an 'other'. We used to have an enemy, the Soviet Union, the Communist totalitarian regimes...But now we do not have a common enemy...It is...good to be without enemy...³¹⁴

He emphasized that there is not a necessity to have an "other" of the EU in the post-Cold War era. He also emphasized the similarities between the USA and Europe and the importance of cooperation with the USA. Sommer argued that:

...we are not searching for opposites...we are living in good friendship for example with the USA...although we are in competition with the USA in economic field...some claim that, there is an 'other', even there should be an 'other' of the EU...the USA is afraid of the growing EU in the field of economics.³¹⁵

Duff argued that:

...That is not quite appropriate approach to find one's self identity...it should not be exclusive. We are a pluralistic society. But of course there is a certain degree of antagonism towards the USA...We do not share the same values with a lot of people from the USA...We do not have same geopolitical interests with the USA. There are some in common...But I do not think development of the EU has been an aggressive enterprise towards the 'other's'.³¹⁶

He also emphasized that the construction of the EU is not against the "other", but he admitted differences with the USA in terms of values. The consultant of the MEP of Southern Cyprus argued that "USA is an economic competitor, the USA affraids that the EU may be a political competitor."³¹⁷ It can be seen that the EU differentiates itself usually from the USA, especially on the basis of values. Also economic competition with the USA was usually mentioned by the MEPs, but common interests and the necessity for cooperation with the USA were also emphasized by them. Hatzidakis argued that:

We have to coexist with everybody...our future can rely only on peace, cooperation. This should be the basic objective of the EU...We have to defend our identity and values...many differences between us and China...there is huge gap in the way of thinking, values, rule of law, democracy...as regards Americans, there are many similarities, we are friends with Americans, but also there are differences because of our different history. One of the differences is that, USA is a melting pot, we are multicultural Union. We do not want to become a melting pot...principles of the Union are closely linked with this multicultural model.³¹⁸

He also differentiates the EU from the USA. He emphasizes the difference between the multicultural understanding of the EU, which includes respect for and maintenance of

³¹⁴ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

³¹⁵ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

³¹⁶ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

³¹⁷ Interview with Yiannos Charalampidis, Consultant of Yiannakis Matsis the MEP of Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

³¹⁸ Interview with Konstantinos Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

national identities and the “melting pot” understanding of the USA, which refers to the understanding of accepting all the citizens of the USA as Americans. Fajmon is also against the idea of constructing the USA as the “other” of the EU. He stated that:

I am against the idea that, the EU should compete as a region, against the USA or anybody else. It does not give proper reason for existence of EU...some people think that, this is the main reason why we should create European identity is to exclude ourselves from the rest of the world and create something specific, which is opposite to the rest of the world. I do not share that view at all.³¹⁹

During the interviews most of the MEPs argued that the EU is a unique project which does not need to have an “other”. Some of them argued that there has not been an “other” of the EU since its establishment. One Commission official stated that “‘other’ is meaningful, if you talk about a sovereign state, but the EU is not a state.”³²⁰ Guardans argued that “the EU does not need a competitor to define itself...”³²¹ Kauppi asserted that “I really do not like to think of different continents as competitors against each other.”³²² El Khadrouri stated that:

There is no opposite of the EU. The EU is something *sui generis*...It is a peace project, now it has become a political project...I do not think there is a similar model right now in rest of the world...In economic terms, we are quite powerful, but politically we are not able to speak with one voice yet, compared to the USA for instance.³²³

He differentiates the EU from the USA, in terms of talking with one voice. Thus, the political elites of the EU usually do not prefer the construction of European identity against an “other”.

In the post-Cold War era, it has become much harder for the EU to have a clear “other”, because boundaries have become blurred. Schöpflin argued that in the post-Cold War era the “other” of the EU has not been so clear anymore. He asserted that:

...Europe says...we are not America...it is easier to find common ground on some issues with Europeans, than with Americans...we are not Chinese, Indian...Russia is partly European, partly Asian, partly Russian...Europe is not Africa.³²⁴

He added that:

...for a very long time, America was the idealized other. America was Europe’s dreamland. I do not think this is still true. America is becoming to some degree the ‘dark brother’, that is

³¹⁹ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

³²⁰ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

³²¹ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

³²² P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

³²³ Interview with S. El Khadrouri, Socialist MEP of Belgium, July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

³²⁴ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

very recent, it may change...Iraq war, Guantanamo...for some...Turkey still plays this role...there is a current opinion, which regards Islam as a negative other. I think it coexists with all...It is not like the Cold War, when communism was clearly the negative other...It is so easy to be European before 1989; because we were anti-communist...This is a much more fluid situation...³²⁵

One Commission official stated that:

...it is not so easy to define your 'other' nowadays. It does not really work like that...no bipolarity in that sense, the EU and the 'other'...We introduce a different model...in terms of foreign policy, if you follow what Solana does...or the Presidency of the EU especially multilateral approach...the **EU is always trying to bridge gaps**, trying to be in the middle, mediate, negotiate, the same with the Middle East...with Iran...I would not see one 'other' and I would not put in that aggressive way...³²⁶

She contended that the EU is in favour of multilateralism, reconciliation and international law. She emphasized that the EU does not prefer to draw clear lines; rather it acts as a bridge. Özdemir is also against "othering" in construction of European identity; but he admitted that it is too difficult to find common characteristics of European identity. He stated that:

Today it is easier to explain what is non-European. We have difficulties in explaining what Europeanness is. Only we can come together for one issue, what is non-European...If we look at history, some of our friends state that, it was constructed against the Ottoman Empire...today, during the USA-Iraq war, some friends state that, the EU is perceived as a bloc against the USA, in terms of its perceptions about environment, war...I do not agree with this idea. If we look at recent developments, some state that, it is a bloc against Islam. I think that, this idea can not lead to something positive...To be a bloc against another bloc, to construct an identity in this way is not a healthy way to search for identity...Europe will always be an institution, which includes different identities...³²⁷

He added that:

For many people, there is an 'other'. For me, there should not be. For many people, it is the USA. I find it dangerous because it is impossible to solve any problem without the involvement of the USA...even I say this as an environmentalist. How can we prevent climate change without the involvement of the USA?...the USA is the biggest offender. We are at the secondary position. We can solve this only with our American friends. Fight against poverty, hunger, global diseases, spreading democracy, to be against nuclear proliferation...³²⁸

He is against the idea of perceiving the USA as the "other". Instead he emphasized cooperation with the USA in order to cope with global problems. The EU and the USA sometimes have different perceptions about global issues especially in the post-Cold War era, particularly in the last years of Bush administration; but the cooperation with the USA

³²⁵ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

³²⁶ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

³²⁷ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

and the support of the USA are crucial to overcome the common problems of the world, such as global warming, security problems.

Most of the interviewees were against the idea of the “other” of the EU. They mostly had a normative approach. Few of the MEPs argued that, there is “other”s of the EU. Resetarits stated that:

Yes of course there should be an ‘other’...Big other markets such as China, India, Brasil, coming up, USA... If you see it in a cultural way, there is an ‘other’ also...if you think about religion, we are part of Christian world...there is an Islamic world and it is not part of European history...³²⁹

She referred to the USA and China as economic competitors of the EU and she perceives Islam as the cultural “other”. Deprez differentiates between civilisations. He defined European identity mainly on cultural basis and perceived the USA similar to Europe and as part of a common Occidental civilisation. He stated that:

...they are four or five civilisations. For example, Japan, China, India, Muslim world are different civilisations. Europe is only one of those, which is very close to the civilisation of the USA and South America. The Occidental civilisation.³³⁰

As it was argued, the concept of “occident” was usually used by those, who define European identity mainly on cultural basis. Deprez also differentiates Europe, mainly on the basis of Christianity from other civilisations.

Contemporarily boundaries between “us” and “them” are usually drawn between natives and immigrants from outside Europe. Non-European immigrants were increasingly made “more foreign”. Especially the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the USA has accelerated this process and increased the discrimination against the Muslim immigrants, who are living in the Member States. If the internal exclusion of immigrants will not be overcome, European society will have to face with important difficulties in evolving towards a post-national entity. The promotion of exclusivist European identity will in the long-term strengthen nationalistic and xenophobic movements.³³¹ In a study of how EC populations define foreigners, which was based on Eurobarometer surveys from 1988 to 1992, it was found out that the definition of the “other” refers to the immigrant groups in their own states, particularly Arabs, Asians, Turks and also East Europeans for West

³²⁹ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

³³⁰ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

³³¹ Dirk Jacobs & Robert Maier, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction” in M. Gastelaars, & A. de Ruijter (eds.), *A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity*, Maastricht: Shaker Pub., pp.20-23, retrieved on February 18, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://users.belgacom.net/jacobs/europa.pdf>

Europeans.³³² Negative stereotyping of immigrants may lead to a process of negative identification or “**active othering**”³³³ which may cause the emergence of a “**Fortress Europe**”. On the one hand, there has been a dilution of internal borders within the EU, on the other hand, the external borders of the EU has been tightening which has caused increased restrictions towards immigrants and asylum seekers from third countries.³³⁴ There is free movement of goods, people, capital and services within the EU which lead to deletion of boundaries within the EU; but the EU has common external boundaries to the other parts of the world.³³⁵ During the interviews conducted by the author, the position of immigrants were not mentioned by the interviewees as the “other” of European identity, but it can be observed in many Member States that there are important integration problems of immigrants, especially of those, who are from outside Europe. After September 11, there has been an increase in the problems of integration of Muslim immigrants to the rest of the society in Europe, because of the increase in “Islamophobia”.

I.1.5. “European Identity” and “EU Identity”

Contemporarily when we talk about Europe, we sometimes refer to the continent, sometimes to the EU. In the post-war era, “Europe” has been increasingly referred to the process of European integration.³³⁶ The concept of “Europe” has increasingly referred to the institutions of the EU.³³⁷ According to the surveys which were made by Bruter, when people talk about Europe, many of them primarily think of the EU.³³⁸ Thus, the EU has been increasingly used interchangeably with Europe which means that the EU has successfully occupied the social space of what it means to be European.³³⁹

³³² D. Fuchs, J. Gerhards & E. Roller, “Nationalism versus Eurocentrism? : The Construction of Collective Identities in Western Europe” in M. Martiniello (ed.), *Migration, Citizenship and Ethno-national Identities in the EU*, Aldershot: Avebury Pub. , 1995, pp.165-178.

³³³ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.238.

³³⁴ F. Webber, “The New Europe: Immigration and Asylum” in T. Bunyan (ed.), *Statewatching the New Europe*, London: Statewatch,1993, pp.130-141; cited in C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.487.

³³⁵ Philomena Murray, “Introduction Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries” in Philomena Murray & Leslie Holmes (eds.), *Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p.6.

³³⁶ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have we Learned?”, p.255.

³³⁷ F.C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, p.590.

³³⁸ For further detail see M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, 2005.

³³⁹ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p.255.

In the context of the EU, identity has relevance both in the sense of an individual and group orientation towards the EU and also in the sense of an EU identity in relation to other actors in the global system. The EU identity is related with the EU's presence in the world, which shapes perceptions of and behaviour towards "outsiders".³⁴⁰ EU identity is:

A unique way of doing things together within a specific legal order and through institutions, tools and mechanisms that are originally and uniquely set forth by the peculiarities and objectives of the integration process.³⁴¹

The EU's international identity which is referred to as EU identity, has been usually characterized as unique or *sui generis*. The EU has been often defined as a "normative power" or "civilian power", because of distinct foreign policy principles of the EU, such as acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others to achieve international objectives and preference of non-military means to achieve its goals. The EU also emphasizes acting on the basis of rule of law.³⁴² The EC was defined as a "**civilian power**" firstly by Duchene. It refers to an actor which has an influence on the international stage or projects power through using of non-military instruments.³⁴³

The EU identity is strong in terms of trade and economics, but it is weak in terms of politics and security.³⁴⁴ The other main characteristics of EU identity are: It is a supporter of international law, multilateralism, promoter of human rights and democracy. Because of these characteristics, the EU's self-definition of its identity in the international system has been usually defined as a "civilian power". Its primary instruments are aid and trade. It also signs association agreements with third countries or regional blocks. There has been a growing consensus within the EU that it must assert an external identity in the security field.³⁴⁵ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established by the Maastricht Treaty which came in to force in 1993. In the Maastricht Treaty there was a reference to "reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world."³⁴⁶ The "EU identity" is closely

³⁴⁰ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.223.

³⁴¹ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p. 56.

³⁴² Karen E. Smith, *EU Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p.15.

³⁴³ For further detail see F. Duchene, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence" in M. Kolistamm & H. Wager (eds.), *Nation Writ Large: Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Communities*, London: Macmillan Pub., 1973.

³⁴⁴ Ben Tonra, "Conceptualizing the EU's Global Role" in Michelle Cini & Angela K. Bourne (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in EU Studies*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2006, p. 128.

³⁴⁵ B. Laffan, "The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders", p.80.

³⁴⁶ *Treaty on European Union*, Preamble, 1993.

related with the effectiveness of the CFSP or the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). On the other hand, the construction of “European identity” within the EU refers to the attempts to “deepen European citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU”.³⁴⁷ Surveys show that the public approval of the EU’s role is highest in its external policy,³⁴⁸ particularly in terms of CFSP and ESDP.

The main foreign policy goals of the EU are: The promotion of regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, the prevention of violent conflict and the fight against international crime. The EU’s preferred policy instruments generally distinguish it from other major international actors especially the USA. The EU usually tends to prefer **persuasion** and **positive incentives**, rather than coercion, non-violent coercion is used as well, especially in terms of applying negative conditionality.³⁴⁹ To find a common position among Member States has become much more difficult, because of the absence of a common enemy.³⁵⁰ In the construction process of EU identity, the USA has been usually used to differentiate itself. After September 11, transatlantic solidarity was very strong but especially with the intervention of the USA to Iraq the divergences among the Member States have come to the fore. The USA refers to states like Iran, Cuba and Libya as rouge states and tries to isolate these states. On the other hand, the EU has preferred a more cooperative approach and prefers cautious engagement with these states. Also the USA has been more sceptical to sign several international treaties such as the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol.³⁵¹ The EU is not so unique in terms of its foreign policy objectives but the ways to achieve these objectives distinguish it from other international actors. Thus, what the EU does is not so unique, but how it does is unique.³⁵²

In terms of European identity, a differentiation may be also made between state level and individual level. At state level, Eder differentiates between “core Europeans”, “not-yet core members” and “potential Europeans”. “Not-yet core members” and “potential Europeans” are the “peripheral Europeans”. “Potential Europeans” refer to those

³⁴⁷ European Commission, 1996, b: 21.

³⁴⁸ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.246.

³⁴⁹ K. E. Smith, *EU Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p.195.

³⁵⁰ E. Castano, “European Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective”, p.54.

³⁵¹ K. E. Smith, *EU Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p.16.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p.199.

who feel like Europeans, but they have not been considered as Europeans yet.³⁵³ “Not-yet core members” are new comers and “potential Europeans” may be considered as candidate states. At state level being a full member of the EU has become an expression of a country’s belonging to Europe and reflects its European identity. Thus, the EU and its membership rules like the “**Copenhagen criteria**” have an important impact on state identity in Europe. Contemporarily states in Europe are classified as Member States, non-members, associated states and applicant states. Even acceptance of that state as a candidate country refers to possible inclusion of that country and identification of it as “European”. This is one of the most important reasons of the candidate countries’ efforts to become a full member of the EU, such as in the cases of the countries of CEE and Turkey. Membership in the EU is an important badge of state identity. Thus, the EU has caused magnetic attraction for countries around its borders; because the inclusion or exclusion through the EU membership has had an important impact on “state identity” in Europe.³⁵⁴ The accession criteria of the EU affect both the state’s identity and also the identity of the EU.³⁵⁵ The EU identity is reinforced by reference to the “others”, which are considered as ineligible to belong.³⁵⁶ The inclusion/exclusion process emerges both among European-non European people, also among the EU and the rest of the world.

The construction process of EU identity has been affected by the enlargement process, negotiation process with the candidate countries, also by the developments of the international system.³⁵⁷ The position of candidacy is a good example of “how practices of differentiation help to construct European identity.”³⁵⁸ By accepting some states as candidates, the EU constructs them as ineligible to be part of EU identity yet. It differentiates some of the Member States as the natural possessors of these qualities. Also through the status of candidacy the members of the community have the chance to monitor and evaluate the progress of these candidates on the basis of the criteria, which was accepted by the Member States.³⁵⁹ Controlling access through the establishment of criteria

³⁵³ K. Eder, “Remembering National Memories Together: The Formation of a Transnational Identity in Europe”, pp.201-208.

³⁵⁴ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, pp.79-80.

³⁵⁵ Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.7, No: 2, 2001, p.24.

³⁵⁶ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, pp.246-247.

³⁵⁷ Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, p.107.

³⁵⁸ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 40.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

for membership is an important manifestation of actorness of the EU. It enhances its presence in the world, which makes the EU identity stronger. The introduction of eligibility criteria leads to a delineation of political and cultural boundaries between the excluded and the included countries. Moreover, the difficulty in obtaining access to this community increases the perceived value of EU identity.³⁶⁰ The criteria to be an EU member have become much more difficult since the first enlargement in the 1970s, because of the ongoing deepening process of the EU.

The differences between big and small Member States and the presence of many different cultural identities in the EU cause difficulties in construction of the EU identity. There is also a huge difference between the Jacobin tradition of France and the federalist tradition of Germany or between Britain's parliamentarianism and France's presidentialism.³⁶¹ These differences increase the difficulties of finding a common position among them, which have negatively affected the construction of EU identity. According to Arkoun, currently there has been a slow and painful process of constructing European solidarity.³⁶² During the interviews, Coveney argued that:

...the fundamental reason why you do not get...unilateral responses from the EU is that, we do not respond like a country to problems...it is about recognizing lots of different opinions of different countries and giving the small countries as much say as bigger countries on most issues...the issue for us is, doing what is best for Europe and trying to impact the rest of the world using the European model, if we think it would be helpful...³⁶³

He implied that it is too hard to reach a consensus among the Member States about different issues, which makes construction process of the EU identity very difficult; because each Member State has different national sensitivities.

During the interviews some of the MEPs emphasized the importance of the CFSP and the ESDP, they also emphasized that there are different perceptions among the Member States which makes it too hard for them to reach a consensus. Öger stated that:

...there is not one Europe, it has multiple voices, multiple identities...this is a union...which is composed of countries, that have different understandings...One of the voices argue that, we have to be a global player. To be a global player, not only economic power, also to be a political and military power are necessary...Another group argues that, we are tired of wars; we do not want to be a military power anymore. I think it is a wrong thought...being a global player is impossible without having a political credibility...Europe has been in an evolution

³⁶⁰ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, pp.236-238.

³⁶¹ M. Abeles, "Virtual Europe", 2000.

³⁶² Mohammed Arkoun, "Islam, Europe, The Occident: Cultural Identities and Geopolitical Strategies" in K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Europe*, p.183.

³⁶³ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

process. It is not clear what will be the end point, there are some brakes, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands negatively affected this process. Contemporarily they are searching new ways. There is not one voice. The USA can talk with one voice...This is not the case in Europe, instead they are mutual brakes. There is new Europe and old Europe, Poland, France, Germany have different point of views...in a place where there are twenty five voices, it is too hard to be a global player...Europe can not be a global player without having a Constitution...every country is trying to make a European policy by taking into consideration their nationalities.³⁶⁴

Today there are twenty seven voices within the EU with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 which makes to talk with one voice harder. El Khadrui emphasized the importance of speaking with one voice by the EU. He stated that:

...I think Europe understands much more the rest of the world. This can make Europe more important in the future...it will depend on the ability of Europe to really speak with one voice, also to have some military capacity...to have some role to play in conflict prevention...³⁶⁵

The communities of the EC have legal personalities, but the lack of a legal personality of the EU has also negatively affected construction of EU identity. As Rocard argued "...the EU has no legal personality...legal personality was in the project of Constitution but it has been cancelled...we are a collection of nations..."³⁶⁶ If the Lisbon Treaty which was adopted in December 2007 will be ratified by all of the Member States, the EU will have a legal personality.

To find new common goals is crucial for the EU to act with one voice. Möllers asserts that "the European identity which builds upon commonality is future oriented...Europe will become a community of shared vision."³⁶⁷ As S. Baykal argues, in the case of the EU it is more probable to construct "EU identity" on project-based, which is also flexible and future-oriented.³⁶⁸ Europe has to find its own way of solutions to the problems of the world. Because of many historical rivalries and cultural differences within Europe, it is more possible to construct a future oriented identity. Thus, new common goals of the EU have to be found out in order to have a stronger EU identity in the world.

Construction of European political identity refers to increasing the feeling of belonging to the EU, without eliminating national and regional identities. European

³⁶⁴ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

³⁶⁵ Interview with S. El Khadrui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

³⁶⁶ Interview with M. Rocard, Socialist MEP of France, September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

³⁶⁷ Thomas M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, New York: Nova Science Pub., 2003, p.99.

³⁶⁸ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p.3.

identity may be overlapping with different identities. The main characteristic of European political identity is its emphasis on “**unity in diversity**”; but it is hard to reconcile unification and diversity.³⁶⁹ This is the first and unique case in history. As Resetarits argued “...diversity is the key word for Europe.” She added that:

...we have to build up this common identity. People in all over Europe should know, the only chance we have is that, Europe sticks together and has a common identity... **We have to build a European house in a global village.**³⁷⁰

She finds construction of European political identity crucial for the EU to cope with the other actors in the globalized world.

Identity is difficult to measure and compare across individuals. The only regular measures of European identity which have been used by political scientists, are the EU’s semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys.³⁷¹ The questions about identity which have been asked by Eurobarometer, have changed over time in order to make a better analysis of the identity of EU citizens. It is very hard to measure identification with such an “unidentified political object” like the EU.³⁷²

Consequently, the construction process of EU identity refers to the construction process of a collective identity among its Member States and their level of acting with one voice about different international issues. EU identity has been constructed strongly since the 1950s in economic terms, especially in terms of trade; but it is still too weak in terms of politics, security and defense, because of national sensitivities of the Member States; it is harder to act with one voice in these fields. On the other hand, European identity refers to a collective identity among the citizens of the EU which may be constructed mainly on a civic or cultural basis.

³⁶⁹ Bram Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?” in M. Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, pp.133-134.

³⁷⁰ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

³⁷¹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.101.

³⁷² Jack Citrin & John Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe” in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse, et al. (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, New York: Rowman& Littlefield Pub., 2004, p.184.

I.1.6. Civic vs. Cultural European Identity:

Nationalisms can be defined on two main basis: “Civic” and “ethnic”. According to civic nationalism, the cases of France and the USA which are usually given as classical examples; the “nation” is defined “in terms of the willingness of its people to adhere to a certain set of civic values and rules based on *jus soli* (citizenship by birthplace).” On the other hand, ethnic nationalism which can be found in Germany, the nation is defined in terms of ethnic origin and birth, nationality is based on *jus sanguinis* which is based on ancestry and blood ties, rather than residence or choice of people.³⁷³ This differentiation is not concrete, in many cases these two types blend into each other.

Cultural identity refers to a common language, religion, ethnicity, history and myths. On the other hand, civic identity refers to a set of institutional frameworks, which define individual’s values, rights and obligations.³⁷⁴ Usually both of these components of identity exist in people’s minds.³⁷⁵ Thus, it is not so easy to differentiate them especially in the context of the nation-states. German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies distinguishes between *gemeinschaft* and *gesselschaft* which refer to two kinds of collective identity formation. The *gemeinschaft* refers to a deep sense of belonging such as family or village. On the other hand, *gesselschaft* is the modern manifestation of identity which refers to the “artificial construction of identity through state builders’ production and distribution of benefits in exchange for citizen loyalty.”³⁷⁶ Civic nationalism emphasizes the individual’s commitment to the *gesselschaft*, on the other hand, ethnic nationalism emphasize the organic sense of belonging which is the main characteristic of *gemeinschaft*. An analogy may be made between *Gemeinschaft* and construction of European identity on cultural basis, on the other hand, between *gesselschaft* and construction of European identity on civic basis. As van Ham argues, the political consequences of “organic-community building in an EU framework” are risky. Such a “European *Gemeinschaft*” may legitimize

³⁷³ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.66.

³⁷⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.103.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.12.

³⁷⁶ Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society: Gemeinschaft and Gesselschaft*, C.Loomis (trans. and ed.), Lansing: Michigan State Press, 1957; cited in P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, 2001.

exclusion,³⁷⁷ thus construction of a “European *gesellschaft*” is more probable in the context of the EU.

Bruter makes a distinction between identification with the EU as a civic and political entity and a larger Europe as a cultural and historical social space. Europe as a civic and political space refers to the EU.³⁷⁸ According to him, “European civic identity” refers to the perception of belonging to the EU. On the other hand, he defines cultural identity as “...the feeling of belonging to a culturally meaningful human community...the perception of being closer to people within the group...”³⁷⁹ It is too hard to measure in the surveys, whether people refer to civic or cultural understanding of European identity. While European civic identity refers to feeling of belonging to the EU, cultural identity refers to feeling of belonging to a European civilisation or European cultural area. There is a contest over European identity between romantic, historicist constructions and its construction in political terms.³⁸⁰ Spohn distinguishes between “**European civilisational identity**” and “**European integrational identity**”. “European integrational identity” refers to the “attachment, loyalty and identification with the European integration”, on the other hand “European civilisational identity” refers to the broader cultural identity of Europe.³⁸¹ It refers to “an encompassing identity of Europe as a geographical cultural area”.³⁸² For example, Eastern European countries are thought to possess European civilisational identity which accelerated their accession process to the EU; but their identification with the European integration project will take time.³⁸³ “European civilisational identity” may be considered as similar to the “European cultural identity”, on the other hand, “European integrational identity” may be considered as similar to “European civic identity”.

³⁷⁷ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, pp.66-71.

³⁷⁸ Michael Bruter, “Civic and Cultural Components of a European Identity: A Pilot Model of Measurement of Citizens’ Levels of European Identity” in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2004.

³⁷⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.168-169.

³⁸⁰ Ole Waever & Morten Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities” in O. Waever, et al. (eds.), *Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda In Europe*, London: Pinter Pub., 1993, p.67.

³⁸¹ W. Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe”, p.3.

³⁸² T. Jordan, *The European Culture Area: A Systematic Geography*, New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1988; quoted in W. Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe”, p.4.

³⁸³ W. Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe”, p.3.

European cultural identity is based on shared experiences, memories, traditions, myths and symbols of several generations of the peoples of Europe.³⁸⁴ According to Wintle, identity is about an image rather than a reality. European cultural identity is not an objective reality and also will not become so in the future, instead it is a set of aspirations and images. He puts forward that Europe is real in an essentialist sense, but European identity is imaginary.³⁸⁵ As Wintle argues, “cultural identity largely remains at the national level, even with a tendency to move down towards micro-national regional identity.”³⁸⁶ In cultural terms, people usually have stronger national, regional identities than European identity. Smith asks that:

...without common symbols and myths, without shrines and ceremonies and monuments, except the bitter reminders of recent holocausts and wars, who will feel European in the depth of their being and who will willingly sacrifice themselves for so abstract an idea? In short, **who will die for Europe?**³⁸⁷

Smith differentiates between the cultural and civic aspects of identity. According to him, in the future the peoples of the EU may have double identities. A double loyalty would consist of a national level, which represents cultural dimension and a European level which represents a civic dimension.³⁸⁸ European identity which is constructed on the basis of civic elements, would be more compatible with national identities. The compatibility of European identity and national identities will be discussed in Chapter IV.

In cultural and religious terms there are much diversity within Europe, such as differences between the Catholic south and the Protestant north, also between Christianity and secularized Enlightenment identity. The cultural understanding of European identity includes history, civilisation and heritage. On the other hand, civic identity is related with people's identification with the EU.³⁸⁹ Scholars and politicians who define European identity in cultural terms usually, refer to the Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman traditions. They also argue that European political thought, art and social organisation have been influenced by Christian thought.³⁹⁰ Barnavie argues that the bases of European civilisation are: “the Greco-Roman heritage, the Judeo-Christian heritage and the feudal

³⁸⁴ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.126-127.

³⁸⁵ M. Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe”, 1996.

³⁸⁶ O. Waever & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, p.69.

³⁸⁷ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, 1995.

³⁸⁸ A. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, 1992.

³⁸⁹ M. Bruter, “Civic and Cultural Components of a European Identity: A Pilot Model of Measurement of Citizens' Levels of European Identity”, pp.190-208.

³⁹⁰ Duygu B. Sezer, “Turkish Identity, A Test for Europe's Soul?” in Armand Clesse & Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), *Turkey and the EU: 2004 and Beyond*, Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2004, p.268.

system.”³⁹¹ Especially some of the Christian Democrats who usually define European identity on a cultural basis, make references to these processes. But it has to be emphasized that, Christianity or the Greco-Roman heritage does not reflect the experiences of all Europeans. As Delanty argues, because of the multicultural structure of Europe, European identity can not be based on particularistic understanding of cultural identity.³⁹²

The values of Europe in the modern world include support for a welfare state, democracy, liberal economy, opposition to the death penalty and support for multilateral institutions. These values distinguish Europe from less democratic societies and in some respects the USA, which is less committed to multilateralism and the welfare state.³⁹³ According to Laffan, the EU is founded on a system of values, which reflect but also shape the values of the Member States. The EU has embedded these values progressively in its treaties and in its practice of politics.³⁹⁴ Möller argues that European identity emerges from a comparison of the values of Member States with the third states. The EU can be differentiated in terms of fundamental rights, emphasis on environmental protection and having a social market economy. In terms of environmental protection, the difference of the EU can be seen from its pioneering role at international conferences in Rio, Berlin and Kyoto.³⁹⁵ In terms of environmental sensitivity the EU usually differentiates itself from the USA. Fundamental values such as respecting human rights, minority rights and rule of law are usually considered as common values of the EU which are crucial in construction of European identity on civic basis. Some scholars argue that these values are mostly globalized, so they may not be so effective on construction of European identity. Soysal asserts that “at the end of the 20th century, human rights, democracy, progress, equality are everyone’s, every nation’s modernity.”³⁹⁶ It is not so easy for the EU elites and the general public to agree on what are their common values and another question is, to what extent they are peculiarly European.³⁹⁷ What differentiates the EU is that most of these values primarily emerged in Europe. Also the EU puts more emphasis on some values such as respecting minority rights, fighting against discrimination towards women, supporting

³⁹¹ E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It”, p.88.

³⁹² G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.135.

³⁹³ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.183.

³⁹⁴ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as “Identity Builders”, p.79.

³⁹⁵ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, pp.38-40.

³⁹⁶ Y. N. Soysal, “Locating Europe”, p.274.

³⁹⁷ Hans Joas & Klaus Wiegand (eds.), *Die Kulturellen Werte Europas*, Frankfurt: Fischer Pub., 2005; cited in Jose Casanova, “Dilemmas of European Civilization”, *Constellations*, Vol. 13, No.2, 2006, p.237.

sustainable development, being more sensitive on environmental issues and global warming. The death penalty is also forbidden in all of the Member States.

There are differences within the EU even in terms of values. According to World Values Surveys, there are mainly five different European value areas: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, English-speaking and Baltic-former communist one.³⁹⁸ Delanty asserts that Europeans can only be united towards an “other” and by recognizing their diversity. There is no shared understanding of a sense of “European peoplehood”.³⁹⁹ He also argues that there is no European people as a *Volk* or *ethnos*, which refers to a “culturally constituted community of memory and descent”, there is no European people as a “national community defined by the political boundaries of the state and its territory”, there is also no “republican or Kantian notion of European people defined by the civic consciousness of a *demos*.” He contends that there is no desire to construct a European people as an *ethnos*.⁴⁰⁰ It is obvious that to construct European people as *ethnos* is impossible in the context of the EU. The initiatives of the EU may be considered as efforts for the construction of *demos*. According to Laffan, instead of establishing a “European people”, the coexistence of “European peoples” should be emphasized. She puts forward that European identity must be built on a civic basis, such as EU citizenship, Constitution.⁴⁰¹ The role of these civic instruments of the EU on the construction of European identity will be discussed in Chapter IV. She also argues that the EU has been trying to construct a **post-national civic identity**. Democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy are the main characteristics of this civic identity. A country can not be an EU member without adopting them. She also argues that, the EU has been constructed as a moral and a legal community and the EU sanctions against Austria about Haider and his Populist Party’s entry into the Austrian government can be understood in terms of European civic identity.⁴⁰²

During the interviews conducted by the author, usually the Christian Democrat MEPs define European identity on a cultural basis and make references to the common cultural and religious heritage of Europe. Hieronymi stated that:

³⁹⁸ J. Casanova, “Dilemmas of European Civilization”, p.237.

³⁹⁹ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.133.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.137.

⁴⁰¹ B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, pp.98-99.

⁴⁰² B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

...the best definition is in the proposal of the Constitution, it is depending mainly on the common history of Europe...There are three main ideas...Ancient Greece, cultural, religious tradition (Jewish, Christian), Roman democracy, the spirit of Enlightenment.⁴⁰³

But some of the Christian Democrat MEPs such as Kauppi defined European identity mainly on civic basis. She stated that:

...in 1993 the Copenhagen criteria was created to define the entrance criteria to the EU...it defines quite well what is meant by common values. These include a democratic way of governance, a stable market-oriented economy and acceptance of basic human rights...I do not believe religion, ethnicity or geographical location to be of great importance.⁴⁰⁴

Some of the MEPs made a reference to both cultural and civic elements of European identity. Schöpflin argued that European identity includes both cultural and civic elements. He stated that:

...there is a civic element...it is constructed from above...there is also a cultural identity...the **European political identity and political consciousness are very weak but there is actually a European cultural identity**...the problem is **how this identity can be converted into political consciousness**.⁴⁰⁵

According to him, there is already European identity but the EU has to convert European cultural identity to European political identity. Sommer argued that:

I think it works altogether. Of course, there is a cultural identity; although the Member States are a little bit different from each other...Additionally we are sharing common values...those values are expressed in the Copenhagen criteria...democracy...human rights.⁴⁰⁶

Deprez stated that:

I think it is a mix. There is some kind of cultural heritage: the Roman civilisation, Greece, Christianity, secularism. European identity is a mix of those elements, sometimes in conflict, which are related in a specific mixture, which is totally original in the world.⁴⁰⁷

Stubb also made references to both civic and cultural elements, but he mainly defined European identity on civic basis. He stated that:

I think both of them...to say that, there is one specific European identity would be wrong. I lived in the USA for many years; I think there is a specific American identity. But European identity is very difficult to establish...What brings us together are common values...all these people, who are trying to see clash of values between Islam and Christianity are completely on the wrong track. The EU is about universal liberal values such as democracy, fundamental rights, rule of law, market economy...we get from liberal philosophy from 17th and 18th...They have some Christian roots...the cultural heritage and history...We have had various formations of Europe throughout our times...⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰³ Interview with Ruth Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, at the EP building (Spinelli) in Brussels on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

⁴⁰⁴ P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

⁴⁰⁷ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

Hatzidakis argued that:

The EU is based on certain principles, which are freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, tolerance. All these principles come from the period of Enlightenment...you may go back to ancient Greek philosophy, literature, the Roman law or to Christianity...We have to rely on tolerance and peaceful coexistence. We have to promote peace and cooperation in our continent...⁴⁰⁹

Here references are also made to both civic and cultural elements of European identity.

Some of the MEPs emphasized the impacts of Christianity on European identity.

Guardans stated that:

Religion is not part of European identity. Relationship with religion yes...Impact of religion on society...Europe has common values, which come from the French Revolution, Greek heritage...democracy...liberalism...with differences but some sort of social welfare state...role of religion in society, freedom, respect for individual, fundamental rights, engagement with multilateralism...are part of European project.⁴¹⁰

The interviewees from the Commission officials and the MEPs from the Greens, the Liberals and the Socialists usually defined European identity on civic basis. Öger argued that:

...some want to define European identity as a Christian identity...when we talk with some Christian Democrat MEPs they argue that European identity has three main bases: Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christianity...Social Democrats and people who have a more universal vision, define European identity on the basis of common values. These values emerged with the Enlightenment...I think this definition fits much more to contemporary Europe...if we define Europe on the basis of historical factors, we have to make a very controversial discussion...The historical background of Europe is full of wars, Holocaust...with Enlightenment...the focus is on reason, instead of church and religion...Instead of state, monarchy, individual was discovered and the individual has become the main focus, these values make Europe what it is. With the discovery of individual, human rights, state which is based on law...consolidation of democracy, development of bourgeoisie...in the period of Enlightenment, people became conscious and a new system emerged, which is based on reason... For me, Europe is a structure, which is based on reason, instead of beliefs.⁴¹¹

He emphasized the role of the Enlightenment on the construction process of European identity and defined European identity mainly on a civic basis. Duff argued that “we have to define ourselves in terms of liberal democracy, that is the primary one...I am strongly oppose to geography and history as being part of that equation...”⁴¹² He is against the idea of the construction of European identity in cultural or geographical terms. One ex-Commission official stated that:

⁴⁰⁹ Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

⁴¹⁰ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

⁴¹¹ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

⁴¹² Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

European identity is a sense of belonging. What is important for Europe matter to me or not... Do I feel concerned or not?...mainly civic...If I have the sense that, I belong to something, I do not necessarily need to share the culture. My culture may be part of many other cultures...There are a number of values shared with the majority of Europeans.⁴¹³

Özdemir also defined European identity on civic basis. He argued that:

...there are some points, which is common for all of us. One of these is, our emphasis on environment, although there are some exceptions, the tradition of a social state...totally liberal model does not fit to Europe, its opposite also does not fit, a model in the middle...We can define it as hesitation about war, sending military troops, preferring primarily civilian methods...We can see what happened to Blair, we know it happened because of Iraq war. We have a common aspect, although there is generally differentiation between Continental Europe vs. UK...⁴¹⁴

Bozkurt also defined European identity on a civic basis. She argued that "...fundamental values like the rule of law, human rights...I do not think in the cultural way there is a specific European identity...All Member States have different histories, languages."⁴¹⁵ Thus the MEPs who have Turkish origin, mostly defined European identity on a civic basis.

El Khadroui defined European identity on a civic basis and emphasized the cultural diversity of Europe. He stated that:

Europe is a political project. We have common values and we all believe in democracy...believe in same ideals. We do not have same culture. If you will travel around Europe, you will see many differences between traditions, countries...Europe is very diverse and I think this is something very positive.⁴¹⁶

He also argued that:

...Europe is a mixed continent, with a lot of people from different nationalities, religions...There is not one typical European. We are all different, we have some values...but those who say that, Europe is Christian...I do not believe in this...we also share many values together with Arab world. Because they are our neighbours and we have historical bonds with them.⁴¹⁷

He is against the construction of European identity on cultural bases. Instead he is in favour of construction of European identity on civic basis. Prets also defined European identity on common values and common goals and she emphasized maintaining cultural diversity within the EU. She stated that:

⁴¹³ Interview with Ex-Commission official at DG Education, from France, at Bahçeşehir University, İstanbul, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

⁴¹⁴ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

⁴¹⁵ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

⁴¹⁶ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

...European identity is cultural diversity. We do not have European culture. The European culture is diversity...we do not like to have same system, same culture. That is what we are very proud of it normally. That makes difficult to live together, to understand each other. This is the challenge...The common values are social standards, common social basis, living together in peace, common economy should be strong...good play in competition role around the world...environment policy, everybody has access to good health system, human rights is the first one...this is the common European identity, some common aims, but we are different...Common cultural aim must be to save cultural diversity. We were very active in the UN Convention for saving cultural diversity...⁴¹⁸

Thus, there is not a common definition of European identity among the MEPs. Usually Christian Democrats prefer to use cultural and religious references, when they are defining European identity; but most of the interviewees defined European identity mainly on civic bases and they made references to common values such as democracy, human rights, multilateralism and the importance of individual and common goals of the EU such as environmental protection. Some of the MEPs made references to both the civic and cultural elements of European identity.

In 2002 the ex-Commission President Prodi asked the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna to set up a group of academicians and politicians from different Member States to discuss on cultural and intellectual dimensions of the EU. In the results of the Reflection Group, it was stated that:

Europe sees itself as both a zone of peace and a community of values...There is...no fixed list of European values. There is no finality to the process of European integration...Europe is a project of the future...Europe's capacity for constant change and renewal was and remains the most important source of its success and its unique character.⁴¹⁹

It was also stated that, Europe is not a fact, instead it is a task and a process, so it is not possible for Europe to have fixed boundaries and they always have to be renegotiated. About European identity it was stated that, "...it must be negotiated by its peoples and institutions."⁴²⁰ It was also stated that "European culture can not be defined in opposition to a particular religion such as Islam."⁴²¹ It was emphasized that the construction of Islam as an "other" of European identity is too dangerous. Thus, European identity needs to be renegotiated according to different circumstances and it has to be future oriented.

The basis on which European identity is constructed affects people's attitudes towards immigrants and further enlargements. According to Delanty, the construction of

⁴¹⁸ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

⁴¹⁹ *Reflection Group*, "The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe", 2004, pp.3-11.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

European identity is an open ended process of cultural and institutional experimentation.⁴²² As he argues,⁴²³ European cultural identity is too hard to construct, instead it is much more possible to construct European political identity. The construction of European political identity which is future oriented and based on common values, will help the emergence of a multicultural Europe.⁴²⁴ The construction of European identity on the basis of civic values will probably lead to a decrease in xenophobic feelings and make the EU citizens more supportive of future enlargements.⁴²⁵ If European identity is constructed on a cultural basis, the membership of the EU will be much more restrictive. If European identity is constructed on a civic basis, although there is a geographical limit, the boundaries of the EU will be mainly based on “boundaries of common values”. It is too risky to construct European identity in the context of the EU in cultural terms. Religion especially can not be the main basis of European identity, because of secularism and the presence of non-Christian religions in the EU.⁴²⁶ Excluding these people from European identity may lead to an increase in rivalries among people from different religions. Especially with the effect of the last Eastern Enlargement in May 2004, the heterogeneity of the EU has increased much more in terms of language, ethnicity and religion, which make it more difficult to construct European identity on cultural basis. Moreover Turkey which has a predominantly Muslim population and secular political structure, was accepted as a candidate country and the negotiation process has still been ongoing since 3 October 2005. The construction of European identity on the basis of religion would exclude Turkish people, Muslim Bosnians, Albanians and Muslim immigrants living in the EU.

Pope Benedict XVI made a speech on 22-24 March 2007, when European bishops gathered in the Vatican for the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome. He criticized EU leaders for ignoring Christianity and he warned about demographic trends in Europe which may cause risks for the future of Europe. He argued that Europe doubted its identity. He asked that:

⁴²² Gerard Delanty, “Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.3, No.3, 2002, p.357.

⁴²³ G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

⁴²⁴ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.182.

⁴²⁵ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p.256.

⁴²⁶ Manuel Castells, “The Construction of European Identity”, retrieved on April 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.chet.org.za/constructionei.html>

If on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome the governments of the Union want to get closer to their citizens, how can they exclude an element as essential to the identity of Europe as Christianity in which the vast majority of its people continue to identify?⁴²⁷

This speech of the Pope was made while EU leaders were gathering in Berlin to celebrate the EU's birthday and German Chancellor Merkel was signing a declaration on their behalf which makes no reference to religious values. But before the EU gathering there had been a meeting of the centre-right heads of states and governments in Berlin, including Merkel. They adopted another declaration, which mentioned "Judeo-Christian roots", also the contributions of the Christian Democrats to Europe's integration.⁴²⁸ Thus, Christianity is still considered as one of the main components of European identity especially by the Christian Democrats and its role in the construction of European identity is usually emphasized by the Vatican.

According to surveys of Bruter, when people answer non-specific questions about European identity, they primarily think of European civic identity. Also the respondents' civic identity was usually more developed than their cultural identity, except in the British sample. The majority of the British sample tended to have a predominantly cultural European identity. Bruter argues that the main reason of this is the opt-outs of the UK from the two main policy areas of the EU which are so effective on the daily lives of the EU citizens that are Schengen Agreement and the European Monetary Union (EMU).⁴²⁹ He also argues that for the respondents who mainly have a cultural European identity, the images associated with Europe include traditional values of peace, harmony and cooperation between similar peoples and cultures. On the other hand, respondents who mainly have a civic European identity associated Europe with prosperity, free movement, democracy and environmental policy.⁴³⁰ Bruter argues that:

...left-wing and centrist people are more likely to feel attached to an EU 'civic' community, while right-wing voters are more sensitive to perceptions of a European 'cultural' identity and European shared heritage.⁴³¹

He also found that civic European identity has a positive impact on the citizens' support for further European integration, but it is not the case for cultural identity. Thus, if European identity is constructed on a civic basis, the peoples of Europe will have a

⁴²⁷ Lucia Kubosova, "EU Weakens Own Identity by Ignoring Christianity, Warns Pope", *euobserver.com*, March 26, 2007, retrieved on March 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/23775>

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.114-130.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.162-163.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, p.xv.

tendency to support political integration. Bruter also argues that the news have an important effect on “civic” identity while symbols have an important effect on “cultural” identity.⁴³² The role of the symbols of the EU and the effects of the media on the construction of European identity will be discussed in the following chapters.

According to Eurobarometer 66 which was carried out in Autumn 2006, for the EU citizens the three main values, which represent the EU are human rights (38%), democracy (%38) and peace (%36). Margot Wallström, Vice-President of the Commission and responsible for Institutional relations and Communication Strategy, stated that:

This Eurobarometer survey shows that, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, citizens clearly identify the Union with universal values like human rights, peace and democracy.⁴³³

Thus, she emphasizes the civic elements of European identity. According to Risse, the EU has increasingly defined what it means to be “European”, it has been also filling “Europeanness” with post-national civic values. The European integration process would have led to “a quite dramatic reconstruction of European identity.”⁴³⁴

Consequently, European identity has been in a construction process for centuries, but it has been in an ongoing construction process for the first time within the institutional framework of the EU since the end of the 2nd World War. Sometimes cultural references, sometimes civic instruments have been used by the EU during this process.

I.2. Historical Background: The Construction of European Identity within the EU

I.2.1. The Construction Process of European Identity within The EU

The European integration process has been institutionalized for more than fifty years, which has provided the institutional framework for the construction of European identity. The EU has sometimes used cultural references and instruments such as the introduction of symbols and it has sometimes used civic instruments such as the

⁴³² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.xv.

⁴³³ “Standard Eurobarometer 66: Autumn 2006”, *ABHABER.COM*, December 18, 2006, retrieved on December 22, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.abhaber.com/haber_sayfasi.asp?id=15183

⁴³⁴ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p.257.

introduction of the EU citizenship in order to increase support for the ongoing integration process.

The structure of the EU has evolved since its foundation. According to Bruter, the European integration process has evolved from an “international cooperation project” in the 1950s, to a “policy making project” in the 1960s, an “institutionally consolidated system” in the 1970s and a “system trying to foster its own identity and citizenship” in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴³⁵ The first phase began after the 2nd World War. It was a phase of Europeanization that was based on international cooperation to build peace in Europe. The second phase started with the signature of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957. It was a phase of technical integration, when new policy areas have been progressively transferred to European level. The third phase began with the first enlargement of the EC in 1973 and includes the first important institutional reforms of the EC. It can be described as a period of development of the “institutional legitimacy” of the EC. Since the beginning of the 1970s the institutions of the EC have had increasing effects on the citizens and Member States. The last phase began with the Delors’ Presidency of the Commission in 1985. In this period, the EC institutions tried to promote the idea of a “People’s Europe”.⁴³⁶ The initiatives of the EU for the construction of European identity among the citizens of the EU could be mostly seen in the 1980s and the 1990s.

For many founding fathers, the long term goal of the EC was “to dissolve the nation-state and its status as the primary unit of identification” among the peoples of the EC;⁴³⁷ but after a while it was realized that it is not so easy in the context of the EU. Thus, especially since the 1990s the principle of “unity in diversity” has been emphasized which implies the maintenance of national identities, while simultaneously a European identity is constructed. The construction of a European identity is closely related with the goal of “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.⁴³⁸ This goal provides the EU with a “forward looking identity”.⁴³⁹ During the first decade of European integration, the integration process was understood as a political coordination of national economies. In the

⁴³⁵ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.xiv.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.59-67.

⁴³⁷ C. Shore, “Usurpers or pioneers?: European Commission Bureaucrats and The Question of European Consciousness” in Anthony P. Cohen & Nigel Rapport (eds.), *Questions of Consciousness*, London: Routledge Pub., 1995; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and The EU*, p.53.

⁴³⁸ Quoted in C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State? The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, pp.476-478.

⁴³⁹ David Beetham & Christopher Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, London: Longman Pub., 1998, p. 36.

1950s and the 1960s the concept of “integration” was used to refer to Europe as a political project. When “integration” failed as an instrument of mobilisation, “identity” started to be promoted.⁴⁴⁰ As Strath argues, concern with European identity primarily emerged as a top-down strategy to increase support for the European integration project, especially since the early 1970s with the effects of the international atmosphere and economic problems.⁴⁴¹ As Strath argues, “identity” was used as a key concept, while the capacity of national economies was diminishing, the dollar collapsed and the oil price shock had broken down the international order of the political economy. “Identity” was used to re-establish that order and to improve the place of the EC within this order.⁴⁴² Thus, the EC has started to perceive “identity” as an instrument to increase public support. There has been an attempt to increase the feeling of belonging to the EC⁴⁴³ among the peoples of Europe.

The first major setback to the integration process did not emerge because of lack of popular support, but because of the lack of elite consensus on the nature of integration. The “Empty Chair Crisis” in 1965-1966 showed the fragility of the European project and it showed that reliance on an elite-driven process was not enough. This crisis was an important lesson for the Community officials, as a result of which the need to actively stimulate support for and identification with the EC was understood.⁴⁴⁴ It was realized that with the non-attendance of one Member State (France) to the meetings of the Council of Ministers, the integration process may stop. It was also understood that the initiatives of the Commission alone are not enough and it can not go on only as a technocratic project.

The EC has made conscious efforts to encourage the emergence of a sense of common identity among the peoples of Europe.⁴⁴⁵ With the Paris Summit in October 1972 an ambitious programme for the establishment of a political union was introduced. To construct political union, there is a necessity for the construction of Europeans. Thus, the “Europe of goods” had to be transformed into a “people’s Europe”.⁴⁴⁶ In the 1970s and the 1980s the concept of “identity” was used as a cure to bring some cohesion to the EC. It has

⁴⁴⁰ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.20.

⁴⁴¹ B. Strath, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other”, p.401.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, p.385.

⁴⁴³ Yannis Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity” in David Howarth & Jacob Torfing (eds.), *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2005, p.81.

⁴⁴⁴ C. Bretherton & J.Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.231.

⁴⁴⁵ Paul Taylor, *The EU in the 1990’s*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996, p.143.

⁴⁴⁶ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.44.

started be used as a way to solve the problems of the integration process. It has been used both in internal (European identity) and external senses (EU identity) in different periods.⁴⁴⁷ Since the 1970s the EC has tried to construct EC identity in the international system, firstly by the introduction of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which refers to cooperation among Member States in the foreign policy field.⁴⁴⁸ The CFSP was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. Kaelble argues that the EU has been trying to construct European identity mainly in three ways: Firstly the EU institutions have tried to improve the situation of people who migrated within Europe. Secondly free trade within the EU has been established and thirdly scholarships have been given to students to make exchanges among different European countries. In addition to these, since the 1980s the EU has tried to introduce symbols such as the European flag and introduced the EU citizenship⁴⁴⁹ which will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The “**Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity**” which was accepted by the Heads of State and Government during the Copenhagen Summit on 14 December 1973, is one of the main documents of the EU in terms of European identity.⁴⁵⁰ It was prepared after the EC achieved the main objectives of the Rome Treaty; also it coincided with the first enlargement of the EC. In that period the EC was trying to increase its role in the international system. Thus, it was an official attempt to construct EC identity which reflected the goal to promote the EC as a global player.⁴⁵¹ In this declaration it was stated that:

The nine member countries of the European Communities have decided that, the time has come to draw up a document on European identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of the relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.⁴⁵²

In this Declaration definition of European identity involves “reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of the unity so far achieved within the Community...”⁴⁵³ It was also added that they wanted to carry the

⁴⁴⁷ B. Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, pp.137-142.

⁴⁴⁸ M. Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe”, p.3.

⁴⁴⁹ H. Kaelble, “European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century”, pp.25-26.

⁴⁵⁰ M. Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe”, p.3.

⁴⁵¹ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.133.

⁴⁵² CEC, “Declaration on the European Community”, *Bulletin of the European Communities* 12, Clause 2501, 1973; cited in Stefan Höjelijid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop 19: Identity Politics, Grenoble, 2001, p.5.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

work further in the future in accordance with “the progress made in the construction of a United Europe”.⁴⁵⁴ It set out for the first time a framework for construction of a civic European identity which was defined on the basis of rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy; also it showed the status and the responsibilities of the Member States vis-a-vis the rest of the world.⁴⁵⁵ It was stated that:

The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilisation, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism.⁴⁵⁶

Thus, diversity in cultural terms and the dynamic structure of European identity were emphasized in the declaration. It was also stated that “European unification is not directed against anyone, nor is inspired by a desire for power.”⁴⁵⁷ It was also stated that “the identity idea was based on the principle of the unity of the nine, their responsibility towards the rest of the world and the dynamic nature of the European construction.”⁴⁵⁸ In this declaration the external relations of the EC with the rest of the world were summarized.⁴⁵⁹ The responsibility of the EC towards the rest of the world was stated in a hierarchical way. Firstly responsibility towards the other nations of Europe with whom, the Member States were already in cooperation was mentioned. Secondly responsibility towards the countries of the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East was stated. Thirdly friendly relations with the USA were mentioned. Cooperation with Japan and Canada were at the lower level of the hierarchy. After that, *détente* towards the Soviet Union and the East European countries was mentioned. At the end of the hierarchy China, Latin America and also struggle against underdevelopment were stated. The ranking of the Middle East before the USA shows the effects of collapse of the dollar and the oil price shock.⁴⁶⁰ It is also interesting that the East European countries, were considered at the same level with the Soviet Union and they were at very low levels of the hierarchy. It shows that, the EU

⁴⁵⁴ S. Højelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, p. 5.

⁴⁵⁵ CEC, “Declaration on the European Community”, *Bulletin of the European Communities* 12, Annex 2 to Chapter II, 7th Gen.Rep., 1973; cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.45.

⁴⁵⁶ Council of Ministers, 1973; quoted in G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.134.

⁴⁵⁷ Commission, “Concerning European Identity” in *7th General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1973*, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1974; quoted in Y. Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity”, p.82.

⁴⁵⁸ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, pp.20-21.

⁴⁵⁹ M. Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe”, p.3.

⁴⁶⁰ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, pp.20-21.

identity and its relations with other parts of the world have changed according to different circumstances.

There are references to both civic and cultural understandings of European identity in the “Declaration on European Identity”. It includes “references to a common European cultural heritage”, the role of the Community as an entity in the international arena, a civic European identity, which is based on law, democracy and social justice, “exclusion of non-national residents”, special rights to nationals of the Member States was taken for granted.⁴⁶¹ After this declaration, the concept of “identity” was also mentioned in other official documents of the EU, such as the “Solemn Declaration on European Union”, the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. Also some reports on “European identity” were prepared. In December 1974 at the Paris Summit new instrumental measures were introduced by the EC such as elections to the EP on the basis of direct universal suffrage, special rights for citizens of the Member States and creation of passport union. The replacement of national passports by a uniform passport would symbolize a connection of citizens with the Community; it would also “confirm the Community as an entity vis-à-vis the rest of the world and revive the feeling of nationals of Member States of belonging to that entity.”⁴⁶² Thus, non-member countries would recognize the Community as an entity and treat all Community passport holders identically.⁴⁶³

At the Paris Summit, the Prime Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans was given the duty of drafting a report on the necessary measures for the construction of a “Europe of citizens”.⁴⁶⁴ The “Tindemans Report” of 1975 recommended a specific policy for transforming the “technocrats Europe” into a “**People’s Europe**” through “concrete manifestations of solidarity in everyday life.”⁴⁶⁵ It was stated that:

No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. The EU must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in education, culture, news, communications, it must be manifest in youth of our countries and in leisure time activities.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶¹ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.45.

⁴⁶² Bulletin of EC, Supp. 7/1975, p.7 cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.46.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, pp.787-788.

⁴⁶⁶ Leo Tindemans, “EU: Report by Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council”, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement 1/76, 1976; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 59.

In this report the relationship between European identity and progress in political integration was mentioned. It was stated that “Europe can not proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity.”⁴⁶⁷ In this thesis it is also argued that the construction of European identity is crucial in order to maintain the momentum of the political integration process.

From the 1970s till the mid-1980s the Community officials tried to construct European identity also through the construction of “consciousness-raising” initiatives. They tried to construct European identity on “the basis of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values”.⁴⁶⁸ At the Stuttgart European Council in June 1983, new impetus to the construction of political union was given by the adoption of the “Solemn Declaration on European Union”.⁴⁶⁹ The Member States were invited to promote “European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas.”⁴⁷⁰ There was a reference to “European identity”. It was stated that:

The Heads of State or Government, on the basis of an awareness of a **common destiny** and the wish to affirm the **European identity**, confirm their commitment to progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States of the EC.⁴⁷¹

In this declaration cultural references were used, which reflected a change in the approach of the EC by emphasizing “consciousness-raising” as a strategy.⁴⁷² As Newman argues, for most of its history the EU has focused on “workers” rather than “citizens, but during the 1980s its emphasis shifted from “workers” to the “citizens”.⁴⁷³

Since the mid-1980s European identity has started to be emphasized more in order to solve the legitimacy problem of the EC and to maintain support of the citizens to the integration process. Especially since the late 1980s, construction of European identity has been perceived as an important issue particularly in order to mobilize peoples of Europe.⁴⁷⁴ In 1984 at the Fontainebleau Summit, it was stated that:

⁴⁶⁷ Enrique Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity” in Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella, et al. (eds.), *European Integration in the 21st Century (Unity in Diversity?)*, London: Sage Pub., 2002, p.159.

⁴⁶⁸ Commission Communication on a People’s Europe, Bulletin EC, Supp. 2/88; cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.46.

⁴⁶⁹ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.47.

⁴⁷⁰ CEC, “Solemn Declaration on European Union”, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6, 24, 1983; cited in S. Höjelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, p. 5.

⁴⁷¹ “Solemn Declaration on European Union”, Stuttgart, June 19, 1983.

⁴⁷² S. Höjelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, pp.5-6.

⁴⁷³ Michael Newman, *Democracy, Sovereignty and the EU*, London: Hurst & Compnay, 1996, p.152; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.59.

⁴⁷⁴ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p.165.

The Community fulfil the expectations of the European people and take measures to strengthen and promote the identity and image of the Community for its citizens and for the rest of the world.⁴⁷⁵

Also at this summit the decision was taken to appoint an *ad hoc* “Committee for a People’s Europe” (**Adonnino Committee**) whose task was to support European cultural integration. It was chaired by Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino. The emphasis was on culture and communication.⁴⁷⁶ This Committee presented two reports in 1985. The first report was related with “utilitarian support measures”, it was suggested to relax internal border controls and to improve social security provisions for intra-Community immigrants. The second report was on youth, education and cultural policy. The proposals in this report included exchanges, measures to increase the Community’s symbolic visibility in the everyday lives of its citizens. It included measures, which are related with European identity and the Community’s image in the minds of its people. Also, the replacement of “inadequate and obsolete signs” at internal borders, with “border signs of a common design” were suggested. After the committee’s recommendations the Commission expanded its public relations activities.⁴⁷⁷ The reports of this committee also included proposals for a Europe-wide audio-visual area with a European multilingual TV channel, a “European Academy of Science” to highlight the achievements of European science, a “Euro-lottery”, whose prize money would be awarded in ECU, the establishment of European sports teams, school exchange programmes and introduction of a stronger European dimension in education. In addition to these, the creation of European postage stamps was suggested, on which there are portraits of EC pioneers such as Monnet and Schuman. It was stated that they may be beneficial for the construction of Community history.⁴⁷⁸ This Committee also supported the adoption of initiatives, such as introduction of EC passport, EC driving license, EC emergency health card and European flag.⁴⁷⁹ In these reports both utilitarian measures and cultural initiatives were proposed. Most of the proposals of this Committee have been realized during the integration process of the EU.

⁴⁷⁵ Ingmar Karlsson, “How to Define the European Identity Today and in the Future?” in Thomas Jansen (ed.), *Reflections on European Identity*, European Commission Forward Studies Unit Working Paper, 1999, p.65.

⁴⁷⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.44-48.

⁴⁷⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, pp.60-64.

⁴⁷⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.44-48.

⁴⁷⁹ Heather Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web:<http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

The duality in the use of the concept of “identity” continued through the 1980s, it sometimes refers to EC identity and sometimes to European identity among the peoples of Europe. In the SEA which entered into force on 1 January 1987, it was stated that “the High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external matters.”⁴⁸⁰ Here for the first time in the EC treaty, there was a reference to EC identity.⁴⁸¹ The SEA tried to overcome the loss of global economic competitiveness of the EC with the rapid growth of the “Asian Tigers” and internally it tried to overcome the stagnation of economic and political integration.⁴⁸² Since the Delors presidency of the Commission, the EC has developed the project of a “People’s Europe”. The EC has started to express its belief about “the influence of European experience on the development of a European identity.”⁴⁸³ The special emphasis on programmes for youth shows that the EC was trying to construct European identity through the emergence of a new “European culture” among young generations, who have not experienced war.⁴⁸⁴ Moreover, campaigns such as the heritage days have been organized throughout Europe every year to raise awareness of the richness of European heritage. The European cinema days are organized to show the diversity and quality of European film-making.⁴⁸⁵ Especially since the late 1980s in some communications and reports issued by the EC, culture and identity have been mentioned as key aspects of European integration. Several initiatives have been made to create awareness of European identity among the peoples of Europe.⁴⁸⁶ The EC has financed seminars and workshops to give more information to the public about the EU and European culture.⁴⁸⁷

Communication has improved among the peoples of Europe, because many more people have started to speak foreign languages.⁴⁸⁸ Also with the introduction of free movement of people within the EU, the increase in exchange programmes and in the use of the internet which have made going to, travelling and studying in a foreign country easier,

⁴⁸⁰ M. Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe”, p.3.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² T.Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.49.

⁴⁸³ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.32.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁵ *Europe: About Cultures and Peoples* (The Magazine-Education and Culture in Europe), Issue 21, European Commission, Directorate General for Education and Culture, 2003, p.23.

⁴⁸⁶ C Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, 2000.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.40.

⁴⁸⁸ H. Kaelble, “European Self-Understanding in the 20th Century”, p.27.

interaction within the EU has increased. This has positively affected the construction process of European identity. As Llobera argues, the development of a European identity will probably be the outcome of a long process, in which bottom-up as well as top-down initiatives have been effective.⁴⁸⁹ In this thesis the focus will be on top-down initiatives of the EU. However, it has to be emphasized that bottom-up initiatives have also had a very important role. According to Laffan, the EU has mainly three types of top-down initiatives to construct European identity, which are the development of rights and citizenship, the politics of “belonging” and symbols, the development of cross-national networks and cooperation.⁴⁹⁰

The governments of the Member States had based their involvement in European integration on the understanding that, the public provided them with a “permissive consensus” during the ongoing integration process. However, decreasing level of support for European integration, which was seen in the referendums on the Treaties of the EU and the falling turnout rate of the EP elections were perceived as signs of a “legitimacy deficit” of the EU.⁴⁹¹ The effects of the public opinion on the integration process could be observed even in earlier periods. For example, Norway could not join the EU, because Norwegians voted against EU membership twice in the referendums. The importance of the support of public opinion for European integration was understood especially in the ratification processes of the Maastricht Treaty and the Nice Treaty. These treaties could be accepted with the organization of second referendums in these countries. The referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, which were held in France and Netherlands in 2005 and their rejection⁴⁹² was a shock, because it was the first time that, two countries, who were founding members rejected a treaty simultaneously in the referendums.⁴⁹³ Referendums on issues related with the EU are important examples which show that public support for the integration process is crucial.

On the basis of their surveys Franklin and Wlezien argue that public opinion about European integration changes in correlation with the amount of legislation made by the

⁴⁸⁹ J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, p.184.

⁴⁹⁰ Brigid Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1, March 1996.

⁴⁹¹ Andreas Follesdal, “EU Legitimacy and Normative Political Theory” in M. Cini & A. K. Bourne (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in EU Studies*, p. 152.

⁴⁹² L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.10-11.

⁴⁹³ “Constitutional Conundrum”, A Special Report on the EU, “Europe’s Mid-life Crisis”, *The Economist*, March 17-23, 2007, p.10.

EU. They argue that public opinion has become less supportive, because of increasing amounts of EU legislation.⁴⁹⁴ The citizens feel that the EU has started to affect their daily lives much more than before, but they do not have enough chance to control it. It is not so clear, when the EC started to affect peoples' lives more obviously. Sometimes it is argued that, with the creation of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) the EC started to affect citizens' lives obviously, through higher prices for agricultural products. Especially with the SEA, there was a removal of protectionism in national industry, which was mostly considered as a threat, because this would increase competition with companies of other Member States. Also the removal of other barriers of free trade through the principle of mutual recognition affected the daily lives of the citizens.⁴⁹⁵ The effects of the European integration on the citizens' daily lives have increased since its foundation. The question of legitimacy of the EU has led to some efforts to construct European identity from above. European identity is unlikely to arise automatically, it requires conscious efforts.⁴⁹⁶ Thus, the necessity to establish stronger communication with citizens and to generate identification with the EU has gained more importance to maintain the momentum of the integration process.⁴⁹⁷ As Risse argues, "there is conscious identity construction of a liberal and civic community emanating from EU institutions."⁴⁹⁸ The goal of constructing European identity has been stated in some texts of European law, court cases and other official sources such as reports. It is seen as necessary to increase cooperation, solidarity and stability within the EU.⁴⁹⁹ However, there has not been a consensus on which instruments should be used in this process among the EU elites and institutions of the EU.

The question of European identity within the EU has been increasingly discussed especially since the Maastricht Treaty. With this treaty the EC was transformed to the EU and started to be involved in more fields, which affects the daily lives of the citizens of the EU. In the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, Danish people rejected it primarily to protect their national identity. This ratification crisis showed that, the European integration

⁴⁹⁴ Mark N. Franklin & Christopher Wlezien, "The Responsive Public: Issue Saliency, Policy Change and Preferences for European Unification", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol.9, 1997, pp.247-263; cited in L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.9-10.

⁴⁹⁵ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.9.

⁴⁹⁶ K. H. Jarausch, "A European Cultural Identity: Reality or Hope?", retrieved on April 26, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.unc.edu/depts/eucenter/disc_fora98-9/jarauschdisc9811.html

⁴⁹⁷ D. Dunkerley, L. Hodgson, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.119.

⁴⁹⁸ T. Risse, "Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration", p.297.

⁴⁹⁹ Juan Delgado Moreira, "Cultural Citizenship and The Creation of European Identity", *Electronic Journal of Sociology*, retrieved on January 7, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado.html>

process reached its limits and European identity is crucial to go on the deepening process of the EU.⁵⁰⁰

In the Maastricht Treaty, there was mostly a reference to the EU identity.⁵⁰¹ In Article B of the Common Provisions, it was stated that the Union sets as an objective:

To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common security policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.⁵⁰²

The CFSP was introduced which was an important step for construction of EU identity. It was also implied that, it may transform to ESDP one day, which has started to be realized since 1999. In Article F, it was stated that “the Union shall respect national identities of its Member States...”⁵⁰³ It shows that the EU does not have a goal to replace national identities with a European identity. In Article 128(2) of the Maastricht Treaty, it was stated that: Action by the Community shall be aimed in the following areas “...improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples.”⁵⁰⁴ A “common cultural heritage” was also mentioned, but there was not any attempt to define a “European identity” in the Maastricht Treaty.⁵⁰⁵

In the Maastricht Treaty, the concept of “identity” refers to different things in different articles. It might be expected that because of its transformation from primarily an economic organisation to a political union, the concept of “identity” may be also seen in the articles related with education, youth and culture. In those articles there is no reference to “European identity”.⁵⁰⁶ However, the Maastricht Treaty provides the EU with a legal basis for dealing with a much wider range of cultural issues. According to Article 128 under Title IX:

1. The Community shall contribute to the **flowering of cultures** of the Member States, while **respecting their national and regional diversity** and at the same time **bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.**

⁵⁰⁰ T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p.170.

⁵⁰¹ Michael Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe” in M. Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, p.3.

⁵⁰² Quoted in B. Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, pp.138-140.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ Quoted in F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, p.576.

⁵⁰⁵ G. Delanty, “Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism”, p.350.

⁵⁰⁶ B. Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, pp.138-140.

2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and if necessary supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
 - improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples
 - conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance
 - non-commercial cultural exchanges
 - artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty.⁵⁰⁷

In the 1st article there was a reference to the “common cultural heritage”, but also respecting national and regional diversity were emphasized. In the declarations of the EU and the treaty articles when there is a reference to “European identity” and “European culture” usually the necessity to be “rediscovered” is emphasized, instead of the necessity to be “constructed”,⁵⁰⁸ or as in the Maastricht Treaty there are sometimes references to “bringing common cultural heritage to the fore” which implies that there has already been a common cultural heritage which the peoples of Europe are unconscious of. Thus, the initiatives of the EU have sometimes been reflected as efforts to make European peoples more aware of their common cultural heritage.

In the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999, in Article O it was stated that any European country which respects the principles set out in Article F(1) “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” may apply to become a member of the EU.⁵⁰⁹ Here it can be seen that being European which refers to being geographically situated in Europe is an exclusive criteria and difference is based on inherent characteristics. The other criteria for being a member of the EU, such as respecting the principles of liberty, democracy are inclusive, because any state may have these characteristics one day, if they fulfil certain conditions.⁵¹⁰ Thus, both exclusive elements in terms of geography and inclusive elements in terms of common values were used as criteria to be a member of the EU. With the Amsterdam Treaty a new position, the “High Representative of CFSP”, was introduced and

⁵⁰⁷ The Maastricht Treaty, Maastricht, February 7, 1992, p.30, retrieved on September 21, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf>

⁵⁰⁸ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.56.

⁵⁰⁹ Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on EU, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, retrieved on February 20, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>

⁵¹⁰ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 39.

Javier Solana was appointed to that position. Many years before Kissinger stated that he did not know whom to call, when he wanted to speak with the person, who was responsible for foreign affairs of the EC.⁵¹¹ Introduction of this position may be also considered as construction of one of the symbols of EU identity.

A joint declaration of the German and French foreign ministers was prepared for the EU governmental conference in March 1998 in Turin for the political reformation of the EU. It was published under the title “A European Identity Must Develop”. In this document “European identity” was used as the “EU identity” which mainly referred to the development of the ESDP.⁵¹² It can be observed in the legal texts of the EU that the “EU identity” has been used more consistently.⁵¹³ The EU’s external identity was firstly recognized at the level of the UN with Resolution 713 on Yugoslavia, in which the EU was acknowledged as an actor, who is independent from its Member States.⁵¹⁴ After the St. Malo Summit between the UK and France in 1998, the basis of the ESDP was established. An agreement was reached on the establishment of a rapid deployment force, with the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999. However, it has been usually too hard to reach consensus among the Member States about security and particularly defense issues which could be observed in the Iraq case. In 2003 during the USA’s intervention to Iraq with the support of the UK, the responses of the Member States differed too much, depending on their national positions. On the one hand, France and Germany were strongly against this operation, on the other hand, some of the Member States such as Spain and Poland supported the USA. It showed that it is too hard to construct EU identity especially in terms of defense.

In the Millennium Declaration of 1999, it was stated that “the Union’s citizens are bound together by common values such as freedom, tolerance, equality, solidarity and cultural diversity.”⁵¹⁵ Here there was a reference to civic understanding of European identity. The Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty refers to a “reunited Europe” and to the

⁵¹¹ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.126.

⁵¹² FAZ, 29.03.1998, p. 7; cited in L. Niethammer, “A European Identity?”, pp.93-94.

⁵¹³ B. Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, pp.138-140.

⁵¹⁴ *UN Security Council Resolution*, 1991; cited in E. Castano, “European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective”, p.53.

⁵¹⁵ F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, p.576.

determination to “forge a common destiny” only. There is not any explicit reference to European or EU identity.⁵¹⁶

The scholars at the European University Institute in Florence⁵¹⁷ established a forum on “national and regional identities” in 1993-94. It was followed by a second Forum on “European identity” and the “European public space between 1999 and 2001”. In addition to these, the 5th EU Framework Project on “Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses” (IDNET) was completed in March 2003. A bibliography on identity was prepared as part of this project. This bibliography includes works in different disciplines which use different methodologies and have different theoretical backgrounds, such as social constructivism and social identity theory.⁵¹⁸ These academic studies may be also perceived as discourses, which have been effective on the construction of European identity. In 2001 the Commission issued a White Paper on European Governance, which emphasized the reinforcement of “European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union.”⁵¹⁹

A Committee was held, entitled “Towards a Political Europe: 50 Suggestions for the Europe of Tomorrow” whose chairman was Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Prodi, who was the ex-Commission President, asked him to prepare that committee. Its report was published in June 2004. In this report, it was argued that the EU possesses a political identity. It was stated that:

This identity is reflected in a specific model of society with strong characteristics: The inviolability of human rights, a model of sustainable development that does not sacrifice social justice and environment...the refusal to use force, the promotion of law and multilateralism in international diplomacy.⁵²⁰

Here it can be seen that common civic values were emphasized. All these initiatives have been effective on the construction of European identity within the EU. According to Shore,

⁵¹⁶ F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, p.576.

⁵¹⁷ It was established in 1972. The Treaty of Rome which set up the EURATOM, provided for establishment of a European university, which is limited to teaching and research on subjects related with atomic-energy. But the Parliamentary Assembly push the committee, which was mandated to plan for a European university, to make teaching and research in technology, social sciences, economics, history and the development of the EC law.

⁵¹⁸ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.132.

⁵¹⁹ Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?”, *European Union Politics*, Vol.3, No.4, 2002, p.388.

⁵²⁰ Dominique Strauss-Kahn, “What Borders for Europe?”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.3, No.3, Fall 2004, pp.29-30.

what is needed is the creation of a “**European consciousness**” which will transcend national divisions and mobilize the European citizens towards “a new image of themselves as ‘Europeans’ rather than nationals.” He argues that during interviews with the officials of the Commission and the EP, the need for greater EC intervention in the field of culture was emphasized.⁵²¹ This necessity was also mentioned by some of the MEPs during the interviews conducted by the author, but not that much.

In 2005 after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands, the Commission published a paper which was prepared by the Commissioner Wallström. It was called “plan D” and shows different ways of bringing the EU closer to its citizens.⁵²² It was argued that the EU is in crisis because of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. The prime minister of Luxembourg Juncker asserted that “ the EU is not in crisis; it is in deep crisis”. Delors stated that:

The present crisis is the worst in the project’s history, worse than the period of Charles de Gaulle’s ‘empty chair’ in 1965 or Thatcher’s persistent demands for ‘our own money back’ between 1979 and 1984.⁵²³

As Delors argues, today’s European citizens have no dreams similar to the goals of building peace, which was a dream of the peoples of Europe fifty years ago. He also complains that most of today’s national leaders usually blame Brussels, instead of explaining the achievements of the EU to their citizens.⁵²⁴ The Lisbon Treaty in December 2007 which has been under ratification process, there has been an attempt to overcome the crisis of the EU.

In the Declaration for the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, there were generally references to EU identity. It was stated that:

We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that, people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The EU wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight...The EU will continue to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond its borders.⁵²⁵

⁵²¹ C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.476.

⁵²² “Four Ds for Europe” , A Special Report on the EU, “Europe’s Mid-life Crisis”, *The Economist* , March 17-23, 2007, p.19.

⁵²³ Quoted in “Fit at 50?”, A Special Report “Europe’s Mid-life Crisis”, *The Economist* , March 17-23, 2007, p.3.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.6.

⁵²⁵ “Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome”, March 2007.

Maintenance of national identities was also emphasized in the Declaration. It was stated that “we preserve in the EU the identities and diverse traditions of its Member States”.⁵²⁶ At the end of the Declaration it was stated that “...Europe is our common future.”⁵²⁷ The common future was emphasized, rather than common cultural heritage.

Consequently, since the beginning of the integration process of Europe in the 1950s the construction of European identity and EU identity which are closely related with each other, go on simultaneously. These processes have accelerated especially since the 1970s. If EU identity has become stronger, it may lead to the construction of a stronger European identity among the citizens of the EU. In terms of European identity, there are references to both European cultural and civic identity in documents and treaties of the EU. EU identity has also been under a construction process in different policy fields. It has been constructed strongly especially in the fields of trade, economics and environment. On the contrary in the field of the CFSP and the ESDP, when national interests are at stake, it is still too hard to reach a compromise among the Member States. Thus, EU identity is still too weak in these policy fields.

1.2.2. The Importance of European Identity in Terms of Democratic Deficit and Legitimacy of the EU

As it has been argued, in the context of the EU there has been an increasing concern with question of identity since the 1970s; but especially since the 1990s the question of identity has started to be discussed in terms of democratic deficit and legitimacy of the EU. “*Demos*” is necessary for construction of a democratic political system. The EU lacks a “*demos*” which can be defined as a “perceived sense of common political identity”.⁵²⁸ Thus, the application of democracy has to be rearranged within the political structure of the EU.⁵²⁹ *Demos* is the basis for legitimate polity formation, exercise of citizenship and governance at the European level.⁵³⁰ As Höjelid argues, the “European *demos*” does not have to be based on “trans-European cultural affinities, shared histories or on the

⁵²⁶ “Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome”, March 2007.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ Stefano Fella, “Introduction: Unity in Diversity: The Challenge For the EU” in Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella & Michael Newman (eds.), *European Integration in the 21st Century: Unity in Diversity?*, London: Sage Pub., 2002, p.12.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁰ Y. N. Soysal, “Locating Europe”, p.266.

construction of a national myth.”⁵³¹ Construction of a European identity on a civic basis is crucial in order to solve the democratic deficit and legitimacy problems of the EU.

The concept of “**democratic deficit**” was used by David Marquand in the 1970s which led to the idea of “legitimacy crisis”.⁵³² Democratic deficit refers to the problems, which are faced during the implementation of democracy in a political system, such as the problems of transparency, the level of participation of the public to the political system, institutional problems or lack of *demos*. The democratic deficit of the EU refers to the belief that the EU lacks sufficient democratic control.⁵³³ It is the gap between the powers of the EU institutions and the ability of the citizens to influence the decisions of those institutions.⁵³⁴ The lack of a European public sphere is also closely related with the democratic deficit of the EU; because the presence of a public sphere would provide the participation of public to the political system. Habermas argues that, to promote democracy at a supranational level it is necessary to develop a “European networked civil society, a European wide political public sphere and a common political culture”.⁵³⁵ They would have a chance to discuss different issues at the European level. To overcome the problem of democratic deficit in the EU, both institutional measures and measures to construct a European identity have been taken.

The increased attention to the democratic deficit and legitimacy of the EU was accompanied by increasing concern with the question of European identity.⁵³⁶ Since the mid-1980s the project of a “**People’s Europe**” has tried to re-legitimize the European political system. It was designed to propose a new “European social contract” for its citizens and to encourage the construction of a “European political identity.”⁵³⁷ Political integration process within the EU especially in the post-Cold War era has led to the increasing concern with European identity. After the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danes, the “democratic deficit” has been increasingly discussed. To solve this problem,

⁵³¹ S. Højelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, p.21.

⁵³² Cited in Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, p.98.

⁵³³ Lynn Dobson & Albert Weale, “Governance and Legitimacy” in Elizabeth Bomberg & Alexander Stubb (eds.), *The EU: How Does it Work?*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003, p.157.

⁵³⁴ J. Mc Cormick, *Understanding the EU*, p.146.

⁵³⁵ J. Habermas, in C. Cronin & P. De Grief (eds.), *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998; quoted in John P. McCormick, “Habermas, Supranational Democracy and the European Constitution”, *European Constitutional Law Review*, Vol.2, 2006, p.405.

⁵³⁶ P. Lom, “Liberalism and European Identity”, Draft, European University Institute, Florence, 1999; cited in B. Strath, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other”, p.386.

⁵³⁷ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.72.

reform proposals have been made usually on voting procedures and European identity construction project.⁵³⁸ The Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court was that democracy is a system which is based on the existence of *demos*, but there is no European *demos*. Thus, the transfer of some important state powers to the EU would be unlawful.⁵³⁹ It insisted on its right to protect fundamental rights and to review decisions of the EU institutions, if it thought that they might be acting beyond the limits of the Treaty.⁵⁴⁰

Turnout rates of the EP elections are low and have a tendency to decline. Campaigns are on national issues, instead of European ones. The media is also mainly national. Thus, there is no sign of a “Europe-wide *demos*”.⁵⁴¹ As Risse argues, “the European polity does not require “*demos*” that replaces national identities with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist.”⁵⁴² There is a lack of transparency of the EU and there are communication problems between the institutions, elites and the citizens of the EU; because the expanded structures of the EU have not been successfully accompanied by corresponding structures of liberal democratic participation and accountability. Some institutional reforms were made to bring the EU closer to its citizens, but to overcome these problems; there is a need for a more transparent structure and political accountability.⁵⁴³ The EU was the only legislature in the world, which made its laws behind closed doors. But this situation was improved in 2006 when the law-making parts of Council meetings became more open to the public.⁵⁴⁴ On the other hand, it is argued that in comparison with most national governments, the EU institutions are more transparent. Information about the EU is easier to find. In terms of accountability, the Commission answers not only to national governments through the Council, but to the EP as well.⁵⁴⁵ The activities of the Commission and the EP are mostly transparent, the Council

⁵³⁸ L.E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.139.

⁵³⁹ Nikos Prentoulis, “On the Technology of Collective Identity: Normative Reconstructions of the Concept of EU Citizenship”, *European Law Journal*, Vol.7, No.2, June 2001, p.207.

⁵⁴⁰ A. Follesdal, “EU Legitimacy and Normative Political Theory”, p.152.

⁵⁴¹ “Four Ds for Europe”, p.18.

⁵⁴² T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p.270.

⁵⁴³ Lene Hansen & Michael C. Williams, “The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the Crisis of the EU”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 1999, p.236.

⁵⁴⁴ Honor Mahony, “EU Nervous and Introspective at Fifty Years of Age”, *www.euobserver.com*, March 21, 2007, retrieved on March 21 2007 on World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/876/23536>

⁵⁴⁵ “Four Ds for Europe”, p.16.

of Ministers and the European Council have become more transparent especially since the Amsterdam Treaty, but it is still not enough.

For Eurosceptics, political authority has to remain in the Member States, because only they can provide the suitable context for liberal democracy. According to pro-integrationist view, the solution to the democratic deficit can be found by extending liberal democratic institutions to the European level, such as enhancing the powers of the EP. Thus, the EU will become more accountable to its citizens. According to this perspective, the solution to the democratic deficit is giving its citizens a direct role in formulating policies of the EU. In this perspective, it is not right to judge the democratic deficit of the EU according to the standards of national parliamentary democracy, because the EU lacks a common history and culture.⁵⁴⁶ Osterud asserts that there are two ways to solve the democratic deficit of the EU. One way is using similar instruments of nation-building, another way is “constitutional patriotism” (*verfassungspatriotism*), which is based on civic instruments.⁵⁴⁷ The EU has used both of these instruments.

To overcome democratic deficit of the EU, some reforms have been made about decision making procedures. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the role of the EP was extended by increasing the implementation of co-decision procedure and transparency in decision making was increased. The recent treaties and official documents of the EU such as Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Charter on European Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Treaty have tried to promote a more bottom-up involvement of citizens of the EU.⁵⁴⁸ Nanz argues that the EU has been incapable of solving the democratic deficit problem through encouraging political participation in its institutions. The EU has also used identity politics “...by trying to promote an effective European identity at the level of popular consciousness.”⁵⁴⁹ The institutional reforms in the EU or changes in the decision making procedures have not increased public support much. It was understood that democratic deficit can not be overcome only by this kind of technical measures; other

⁵⁴⁶ Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Europe as a Political System: Comparative Politics and Governance Approaches to Integration” in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Pub. 2006, pp.335-336.

⁵⁴⁷ Oyvind Osterud, *Globaliseringen og nasjonalstaten*, Oslo: Ad Notam Glydendal, 1999; cited in S. Höjelijd, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, p.9.

⁵⁴⁸ Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione & Jo Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship” in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw (eds.), *Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2006, p.20.

⁵⁴⁹ P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, pp.286-287.

instruments have to be found out. The EU citizenship was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. It was thought that, it might enable citizens of the EU to identify more with the EU⁵⁵⁰ which will be discussed in Chapter IV. Construction of a collective political identity and constitution-building are instruments to overcome democratic deficit and legitimacy problem of the EU.⁵⁵¹ The Constitutional Treaty would help to overcome democratic deficit of the EU⁵⁵² by increasing people's feeling of belonging to the EU; but its rejection in France and Netherlands caused pessimism about the future of the EU.

During the interviews conducted by the author, the interviewees usually accepted the problems of involvement of the EU citizens to the institutions of the EU. Schöpflin stated that:

...the difficulty that European citizens have in engaging the institutions of the EU...There are very few direct acts...If the EU wants to bring itself closer to the citizens, it has to establish institutions that are closer to the citizens...but the Member States will hate this, because it diminishes their power...⁵⁵³

Schöpflin also mentioned too bureaucratic image of the EU, but he added that it is not worse than the bureaucracy of Member States. He stated that:

...many people think the EU is too powerful...bureaucratic...it is a smaller bureaucracy than any large European city, but the myth is there...there are ways of decreasing the gap...but it is something, which the Member States have to confront, if they want to do it.⁵⁵⁴

The Member States usually do not make enough efforts to decrease the gap between their citizens and the EU. Bozkurt emphasized the transparency problem of the EU and the importance of giving more information to citizens about the EU. She argued that:

Giving information is essential...for years; a lot of decisions were taken behind closed doors. People did not know really what was happening...Sometimes decisions were taken here and then countries have to implement it maybe two years later. At that time people awakened and say...what did Brussels decide?...People should be more aware about process. It should be more transparent. There should be more power to national parliaments...Minister of Foreign Affairs says in the national parliament I am going to do this...but nobody knows, what he is saying in the Council meetings.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁰ Alexander Caviedes, "The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU", *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol.27, 2003, p.262.

⁵⁵¹ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p.32.

⁵⁵² Vivien A. Schmidt, "The EU: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.42, No.5, p.976.

⁵⁵³ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁵ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

Thus, to solve the democratic deficit, transparency of the EU institutions and involvement of citizens to the EU have to be increased and European civic identity has to be constructed without replacing national and regional identities.

Legitimacy of the policy making is a prerequisite for actorness in any democratic political system. As integration deepens, popular support is increasingly required not only for legitimacy also to ensure successful policy implementation.⁵⁵⁶ Legitimacy does not only make institutions and policies ethically acceptable and democratically accountable, it also gives them ability to go on the integration process. Legitimacy is also related with effectiveness of the polity in providing citizens freedom and prosperity. Legitimacy also means active participation of citizens in decision making process.⁵⁵⁷ A political system can have all the characteristics of a democracy, but may still lack legitimacy. The important thing is the willingness to accept the decisions, even if they are not in accordance with one's own interests.⁵⁵⁸

There are mainly three perspectives which have been used since the 18th century as the foundations of legitimacy of political communities. The first one derived from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in 1789 that links the legitimacy of political communities to the existence of political institutions, which are implicitly accepted by society through a social contract. The second one was developed by German political thinkers such as Fichte and Herder who link the legitimacy of political communities to a corresponding "nation" which is based on a common culture. Main representative of the third perspective was Renan who modernizes universalistic theory of the French Revolution and associates the legitimacy of state institutions with the existence of a "common desire to live together" of its citizens. As Beetham and Lord argue, among the three dimensions of legitimacy, which are identity, democracy and performance, identity is likely to be the "weakest link" for the EU.⁵⁵⁹ The lack of a shared collective identity is often considered as one of the main obstacles to the development of legitimacy of the EU.⁵⁶⁰ There are different ways of achieving legitimacy. The authorities are "legally legitimate" if they act in accordance with constitutional rules. The authorities are "socially

⁵⁵⁶ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p. 233.

⁵⁵⁷ F. Cerutti, "Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction", p.9.

⁵⁵⁸ Frank Decker, "Governance beyond the Nation-state: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the EU", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No.2, April 2002, p.263.

⁵⁵⁹ Cited in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p. 35.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

legitimate”, if the subjects abide by them. The authorities are “normatively legitimate”, if they can be justified to the people living under them and impose a moral duty on them to comply.⁵⁶¹ Scharpf argues that there are two types of legitimacy. The first one is called “**input legitimacy**” or “government by the people”. It means that collective decisions reflect the “general will” of people. In the context of the EU this is very difficult to achieve, because of lack of a European *demos*. The second one is called “**output legitimacy**” or “government for the people”. This type depends on government’s problem solving capacity and the satisfaction of people’s needs and wishes. In terms of “output legitimacy”, the legitimacy of the EU is not based on democratic representation and control; instead it is based on the “efficiency of policy output”. This type of legitimacy is similar to Majone’s conception of “substantive democratic legitimacy”. Majone argues that “the EU derives substantive legitimacy from policy consistency and from the expertise and problem-solving skills of regulators.”⁵⁶² Thus, increasing efficiency and problem solving capacity of the EU to satisfy the needs and expectations of its citizens are also effective on its legitimacy.

According to some scholars, democratic legitimacy is only possible, if there is a “*demos*”, which refers to a political community, with some sense of common identity.⁵⁶³ A legitimate governing system has the right to rule and make decisions. Legitimacy is related with, whether citizens see the common institutions as “ours” and whether they believe there is an “us” to be served by common institutions.⁵⁶⁴ As Risse argues, “the higher the sense of loyalty toward a political community among the citizens, the more they are prepared to accept inconvenient decisions and policies of their governments...”⁵⁶⁵ Although their government may not be successful sometimes, if they accept their government as “our government”, they may be more tolerant towards its activities, which maintains stability of the political system.

⁵⁶¹ A. Follesdal, “EU Legitimacy and Normative Political Theory”, p.156.

⁵⁶² F. Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 ; G. Majone, “The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information” , *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 4, No.2, 1997; quoted in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Europe as a Political System: Comparative Politics and Governance Approaches to Integration”, p.187.

⁵⁶³ Michael Zürn & Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State”, *International Organization*, Vol.59, Fall 2005, p.1074.

⁵⁶⁴ L. Dobson & A. Weale, “Governance and Legitimacy”, pp. 157-165.

⁵⁶⁵ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have we Learned? , p.270.

According to traditional social contract theory (Rousseau, 1762), without identity there can be no true legitimacy of that political entity. So every time a new political community has been created, for the legitimacy of the contract that links it to its citizens and gives its institutional acceptability, there is a need for construction of a new political identity.⁵⁶⁶ Rousseau asserts that through a social contract citizens give their political community its legitimacy and its right to determine what is the “general will”. Easton argues that “the development of identity is crucial for the legitimacy of a political system.”⁵⁶⁷ Deutsch also sees identity as a precondition for the stability and democratic legitimacy of a political system.⁵⁶⁸ Habermasians who study European integration, focus on legitimacy and try to find out what kind of identity the EU should possess to be a democratic and legitimate entity.⁵⁶⁹ No law and no rule can really live, if there is not a common identity among people, who have to abide by that rules.⁵⁷⁰ As Çapan and Onursal argue, no political structure that strongly influences the lives of the people can survive, without constructing a sense of “belonging”⁵⁷¹ to that entity. The identification of a citizen leads to acceptance of government’s authority and its decisions. Also it leads to the emergence of a common good that causes a citizen to act as a community member.⁵⁷²

In the case of the EU to guarantee integration process, the construction of European political identity is crucial. Citrin and Sides argue that “...a sense of shared identity among ordinary citizens is critical to Europe’s future development as a political union.”⁵⁷³ Karlheinz asserts that a certain level of common identity is required to legitimize the existence and further deepening of European integration process.⁵⁷⁴ Legitimacy has been

⁵⁶⁶ Michael Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2004, pp.22-23.

⁵⁶⁷ David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, Wiley Pub, 1965; quoted in Wolfgang Lutz, Sylvia Kritzinger & Vegard Skirbekk, “The Demography of Growing European Identity”, *Science*, Vol.314, October 20, 2006, p.425.

⁵⁶⁸ K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, 1953; cited in Sylvia Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 3, 2005, p.51.

⁵⁶⁹ John Erik Fossum, “The EU: In Search of an Identity”, *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol.2, No.3, 2003; Erik Oddvar Eriksen & J.E. Fossum, “Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed”, *International Political Science Review*, Vol.25, No.4, 2004; cited in Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, *ARENA Seminar*, May 9, 2006, p.7.

⁵⁷⁰ F. Cerutti, “Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction”, pp.1-2.

⁵⁷¹ Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, pp.98-99.

⁵⁷² W. Lutz, S. Kritzinger & V. Skirbekk, “The Demography of Growing European Identity”, p.426.

⁵⁷³ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.163.

⁵⁷⁴ Reif Karlheinz “Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity” in Soledad Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p.131.

perceived as one of the important problems of the EU especially after the Maastricht Treaty.⁵⁷⁵ The EU's representative politics have important differences in comparison to nation-states, such as the lack of EU-wide elections for a president or a prime minister. According to Schmidt, the EU passes many of the legitimacy tests in terms of political participation, citizen representation, effective governing and interest consultation, but by different ways.⁵⁷⁶ Legitimacy of the EU does not depend on applying nation-building process to the EU; instead it requires a sense of belonging to a heterogeneous transnational community.⁵⁷⁷ In this thesis it is also argued that the EU is a *sui generis* entity, thus the establishment of its legitimacy is different from the nation-states.

The main question is whether the citizens of the EU support the activities that the EU is deciding and implementing on their behalf. Shore argues that introduction of symbols such as the European flag should come after the establishment of "political legitimacy".⁵⁷⁸ Bruter argues that the initiatives to "give a face" to the EU is more likely to help the EU "to have a greater impact on the citizens than symbols of institutional legitimacy."⁵⁷⁹ The EP has succeeded in progressively gaining political legitimacy. The Council of Ministers has a lower level of support than the EP and the Commission. The EP was first elected by direct universal suffrage in 1979, but only about a quarter of European public trusted it until 1983.⁵⁸⁰ The first reform about the Commission was made by the SEA, which reinforced the power and autonomy of the Commission vis-à-vis the Council. In 1987 the EU citizens were asked for the first time, whether they trusted the Commission, 46% of the respondents stated that, they did. It was six points higher than for the EP. The main reasons for this support were probably because of the economic prosperity of 1987 and Delors' presidency of the Commission since 1985. According to Eurobarometer surveys, the legitimacy of the EP and the Commission have been gradually increased over the past twenty years. This provides these institutions higher level of legitimacy. The trust to the Commission was 46% in 2003, for the EP it was 54%. In some Member States there has been a tendency toward trusting the EP and the Commission more than their national parliaments and governments. The main reason was that, their national

⁵⁷⁵ Camilla Hersom, "European Citizenship and the Search for Legitimacy: The Paradox of the Danish Case" in E. Moxon-Browne (ed.), *Who are the Europeans Now?*, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub., 2004, p.39.

⁵⁷⁶ V. A. Schmidt, "The EU: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?", pp.982-983.

⁵⁷⁷ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.229.

⁵⁷⁸ C. Shore, "Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe", p.490.

⁵⁷⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.91.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.69-72.

institutions were undermined by some corruption scandals. It has been mostly observed in Belgium, France and Italy since the 1990s, it has also reached other countries such as the UK, Finland, Austria and Netherlands. In 2003 only Denmark trusted its national institutions more than the EU.⁵⁸¹ Thus, it usually changes from one Member State to another according to the internal factors.

At the conference in Salzburg which was called as “Sound of Europe” that was held on 27-28 January 2006 during the Austrian Presidency, “**legitimacy through action**” was emphasized. French Prime Minister D. de Villepin mentioned a “crisis of legitimacy” and “identity crisis” of the EU. He proposed a “Europe of projects” to regain citizen’s confidence and suggested tax harmonisation, a common EU border police to address citizens’ needs. Solana also suggested “legitimacy through action” and “result oriented pragmatism”.⁵⁸² These arguments reflect the increasing tendency of the EU towards establishing legitimacy through increasing efficiency of the EU and providing more involvement of citizens to the EU through projects.

To solve legitimacy problem of the EU, rearrangements in institutional framework of the EU and its decision-making procedures have been made. The transparency of the institutions of the EU have been tried to be increased. Both cultural and civic instruments have been used by the EU to construct European identity. In the last years, providing legitimacy of the EU through increasing its efficiency, communication with and involvement of citizens have been increasingly emphasized. Consequently, in order to solve democratic deficit and to establish legitimacy of the EU, institutional rearrangements, such as improving the role of the EP and rearrangements in the decision-making process of the EU such as increasing the use of co-decision procedure have to go on. In addition to these, more information about the EU has to be given to the citizens, the communication with the citizens and their participation to the EU through projects should be increased, which will lead to construction of a stronger civic European identity among the citizens of the EU.

⁵⁸¹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.69-70.

⁵⁸² Mark Beunderman, “EU Leaders Seek Legitimacy Through Action at Elitist Event”, *euobserver.com*, January 31, 2006, retrieved on February 20, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/20797>

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In this thesis, European identity is analyzed mainly within the framework of international relations and particularly on the basis of social constructivism as the main theoretical background. There has been a constructivist turn in international relations theory especially in the post-Cold War era. It has been also used in European studies, especially for studying effects of the EU on norms, values and identities.

II.1. Overview of Theories of International Relations and Theories of Integration

II.1.1. Overview of Theories of International Relations

International relations theories can be generally differentiated as “**positivist**” theories and “**post-positivist**” ones. Positivist theories include realism, liberalism/idealism, neorealism, neoliberalism, etc. Post-positivist theories include international society theory, critical theory, Marxism, etc. Since IR became an academic subject at the end of the 1st World War, there have been three major debates among theories of IR. The first debate is between realism and liberalism, the second debate is between neorealism and neoliberalism during the late 1980s and 1990s, the third debate is between positivists and post-positivists. Social constructivism has been trying to build a bridge between these two approaches.

The idealists or **liberals** argued that war was not a product of human nature.⁵⁸³ They asserted that international institutions can promote peaceful cooperation among states.⁵⁸⁴ The **realists** formulated their views as a reaction to the liberals of the 1920s.⁵⁸⁵ The realist critique of liberals firstly launched by E.H. Carr before the 2nd World War.

⁵⁸³ Scott Burchill, “Introduction” in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p.5.

⁵⁸⁴ Robert Jackson & Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.35.

⁵⁸⁵ Scott Burchill, “Realism and Neo-realism” in S. Burchill, A. Linklater et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, p.79.

Thus the discipline's first "great debate" was between liberalism and realism.⁵⁸⁶ Liberals focus on international law, international organizations, interdependence, cooperation and peace. On the other hand, realists focus on power politics, security, conflicts and wars.⁵⁸⁷ For realists, nation-state is the primary actor in international politics; other international actors such as the NGOs are almost totally neglected. For realists "conflict between states was inevitable in an international system", because of the lack of a compulsory jurisdiction for states. There is "no binding international law or legal system".⁵⁸⁸ Realism became the dominant theory from the 1930s till the 1950s. Realists have a cyclical view of history contrary to the liberals, who argue that, qualitative change for the better is possible. For realists, states in an anarchic international system are permanent characteristics of international relations.⁵⁸⁹ Hans Morgenthau's book "Politics among Nations", which was written in 1948, is one of the main books of realism. According to him, "international politics was a struggle for power between states".⁵⁹⁰ The first major debate was won by the realists. Realism became dominant in international relations not only among scholars, also among diplomats and politicians.⁵⁹¹

From the mid-1980s neo-neo debate dominated international relations.⁵⁹² Both **neorealism** and **neoliberalism** treat state interests as exogenous to interstate interaction. The interests of states are considered as already given. Social interaction is not considered as an important determinant of interests. Actors are not considered as products of their social environment, instead they are considered as atomistic rational beings, which have social relations to maximize their interests. Neorealists emphasize anarchical structure of the international system; on the other hand, neoliberals emphasize the role of international organisations and the NGOs.⁵⁹³ "Neoliberals share old liberal ideas about the possibility of progress and change..."⁵⁹⁴ Keohane and Nye emphasize interdependence between states, transnational relations and non-state actors such as multinational corporations.⁵⁹⁵ On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz who reformulated realism at the end of the 1970s, can be

⁵⁸⁶ S. Burchill, "Introduction", p.6.

⁵⁸⁷ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.44.

⁵⁸⁸ S. Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism", pp.72-77.

⁵⁸⁹ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, pp.43-45.

⁵⁹⁰ S. Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism", pp.73-76.

⁵⁹¹ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.44.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, p.48.

⁵⁹³ Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism" in Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2001, pp.209-214.

⁵⁹⁴ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.48.

⁵⁹⁵ C. Reus-Smit, "Constructivism", p.210.

considered as the main representative of neorealism.⁵⁹⁶ In his book “Theory of International Politics” (1979), he tried to make a scientific explanation of the international system.⁵⁹⁷ He focuses on the structure of the international system and effects of that structure on international relations. He argues that the international system is an anarchy, because of the lack of a worldwide government. He thinks that states are power-seeking and they focus on their security, not because of human nature, rather the structure of the international system pushes them to act in that way.⁵⁹⁸ In neorealism actors are less important than structure. Even state leaders are prisoners of the structure of the international system, which shapes their actions in terms of conducting foreign policy.⁵⁹⁹ Thus, neorealists see the anarchic structure of the international system as the reason of antagonistic interstate relations. Neorealists emphasize relative gains, while neo-liberals emphasize absolute gains. Neorealists deal with how much states gain in comparison with other states, on the other hand, neoliberals deal with how to increase the size of the cake.⁶⁰⁰ The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism can be seen as a continuation of the first debate. But unlike the 1st debate, most neoliberals accepted many neorealist assumptions as starting points for analysis.⁶⁰¹

Since the late 1980s there has been an increase in critiques of positivist theories. **Post-positivist theories** include post-modernism, normative theory, critical theory, etc. These theories are united more about what they reject, rather than what they accept. **Social constructivists** try to bridge the gap between positivist and post-positivist theories.⁶⁰² Thus, the third debate was between “positivist” and “post-positivist” theories. Critical theorists challenge the epistemological, methodological and ontological assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism. They argue that actors are inherently social, their interests and identities are socially constructed. Positivists criticize critical theorists, because of not saying much about “real world” international relations.⁶⁰³

⁵⁹⁶ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, pp.49-50.

⁵⁹⁷ Cited in R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.84.

⁵⁹⁸ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.51.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

⁶⁰⁰ S. Smith, “New Approaches to International Theory”, pp.169-172.

⁶⁰¹ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p. 52.

⁶⁰² S. Smith, “New Approaches to International Theory”, pp.169-172.

⁶⁰³ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.209-214.

Critical theory is mainly based on Marxist thought. It was developed by a group of German scholars, who were known as the “Frankfurt School”. Two main representatives of critical theory are Robert Cox and Andrew Linklater. They reject some main assumptions of positivism which are: There is an objective reality, “the subject/object distinction” and “value-free social science”. For them “the social world is a construction of time and place.”⁶⁰⁴ According to critical theorists, everything which is social, including international relations is changeable. World politics are perceived as constructed, rather than discovered. There is no important distinction between the analyst (subject) and the focus of analysis (object). For them, knowledge can not be neutral politically or ideologically. Knowledge is perceived as “produced from the social perspective of the analyst.”⁶⁰⁵ Cox’s statement reflects this perception: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”⁶⁰⁶

Postmodernism entered into IR in the 1980s. A leading postmodern theorist in IR is Richard Ashley. IR postmodernists reject the notion of objective truth. But they have been criticized for concentrating only on criticizing realism, rather than developing an alternative. Constructivists agree with postmodernists’ critical scepticism of the assumptions of realism and liberalism.⁶⁰⁷ For postmodernists, social science is not neutral; rather it is political, cultural. “...Everyhting involving human beings is subjective.”⁶⁰⁸ Postmodernists claim that the most important “conceptual prison” is modernity and the idea that modernisation leads to progress and better life for all. They criticize the idea that, there is an “ever-expanding knowledge of the human world.”⁶⁰⁹

Normative theory is not really post-positivist. It is “pre-positivist”, it is both pre-modern and modern. It can be traced back to European antiquity, for example the writings of Thucydides. One of the leading representatives of contemporary normative IR theorists is Chris Brown. Normative theory is a theory of values; it is about an ideal world. Normative theory is both about facts and values. In normative theory facts are the rules,

⁶⁰⁴ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p. 248.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁶ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, *Millenium*, Vol. 10, 1981, pp.126-155 ; cited in R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p. 248.

⁶⁰⁷ Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, New York: Longman Pub., 2003, pp.141.-142.

⁶⁰⁸ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.251.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

institutions which have normative content such as rules about war and human rights. Both normative theorists and constructivists focus on intersubjective ideas and beliefs.⁶¹⁰

Constructivists occupy a middle ground between positivists and post-positivists, which will be discussed later in this chapter. They emphasize the process of interaction between “agents” and “structures”, which are mutually constituted.⁶¹¹ According to social constructivism, international relations is seen as a “social reality”, constructed by intersubjective understandings.⁶¹²

II.1.2. Overview of Theories of Integration

Theoretical interest in European integration intensified with the formation of the European Communities in the 1950s. Over time integration studies has started to be considered as a separate subfield of IR. Some scholars treat European integration as *sui generis*, which may cause some methodological problems. This is often referred to as “n=1 problem”. If the EU is considered as unique, theoretical propositions will be difficult to test, because testing hypotheses is problematic on a single case.⁶¹³ Some scholars such as Karl Deutsch, see integration as an instance of nation-building. According to this approach, international political unification is similar to the development process of nation-states. The transformation of tribes into peoples, peoples into nations and nations into international communities follow a similar process. They have evolved through increasing interactions and communication, which leads to the development of common approaches and identities. It is argued that some lessons can be learned from comparing nation-building and regional integration.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹⁰ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, pp.259-262.

⁶¹¹ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, Vol.50, No.2, 1998, p.325.

⁶¹² Tanja E. Aalberts, “The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe: A Constructivist Reading”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.42, No.1, pp.35-40.

⁶¹³ M. Pollack, “Does the EU Represent an *n* of 1?”, *ECSA Review*, Vol. 10, No.3, www.eustudies.org/N1debate.htm; cited in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction” in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2006, p.10.

⁶¹⁴ Cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, pp.10-11. For further detail see K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 1953; K.W. Deutsch, “The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration”, *World Politics*, January 1953, pp.168-196.

One of the ways of analyzing the EU which is popular among IR theorists, is to consider the EU as an international organisation or a regime, which may be compared with other international organisations. Another option is to treat the EU as a polity. This approach is supported by comparative political scientists. They argue that as integration has advanced, the EU's complex institutional structure has started to become similar to a modern nation-state. They prefer to compare the EU with domestic political systems. Among all these options, European integration has been considered mostly as *sui generis*.⁶¹⁵

In this thesis the EU is considered as a *sui generis* entity. European integration process and nation-building are considered as different processes, which occurred in different circumstances and have different characteristics. Construction of European identity is not a European nation-building process on a continental scale. Thus, it can not be perceived as a linear progress from peoples to nations and transformation of nations to international communities, like Deutsch argued. Nation-building and construction process of European identity in the EU are both collective identity building processes and some similar instruments are used in both of these processes. The comparison between nation-building and construction of European identity within the EU in terms of their instruments will be made in Chapter IV, in order to find out unique characteristics of construction process of European identity. The transformation process of collective identities includes overlapping complex processes in the context of the EU.

Over the centuries some thinkers have considered international integration as a way to solve universal anarchy and war. Saint-Pierre, Rousseau and Kant are some “intellectual ancestors of integration theory”.⁶¹⁶ “Pre-theories of integration” are **federalism**, **functionalism** and **transactionalism** which were developed before the integration process of Europe. Federalists want to transfer power upwards to a central authority to secure peace. On the contrary functionalists argue that the concentration of power in a new political authority may cause reemergence of dangers of nationalism at a higher level. Functionalism was developed by David Mitrany in the 1930s. Functionalists suggested that integration has to be depoliticized. They focused on the ECSC or the specialised agencies of the UN as examples of international functional cooperation. On the other hand, transactionalists are in favour of integration which is compatible with the continuation of

⁶¹⁵ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, p.11.

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.17.

sovereign states. Their goal is to end the “state of war” between nations through creation of international “security communities”.⁶¹⁷ Transactionalism was pioneered by Deutsch. Transactionalists see integration as a process of cultural assimilation. “Transactionalism or ‘communication theory’ focuses on the social, rather than political or economic dimensions of integration.”⁶¹⁸ It deals with the conditions which are necessary to create and maintain a sense of community among different countries’ populations.⁶¹⁹ According to Deutsch, international transactions such as communication, migration lead to “processes of social-psychological learning” that cause trust among social actors and construction of common identities.⁶²⁰ In transactionalism integration has two main dimensions: The first one is a process of “social integration” which leads to the formation of pluralistic security communities. In these communities states still have their legal independence, but there is a feeling of “we-ness” during interactions.⁶²¹ The second one is a process of “political integration”. Deutsch argues that, the formation of political communities depend on complementarity of value systems. His approach to international integration is based on the study of nationalism and nation-building.⁶²² Continuously high volume of interaction among peoples of Europe have improved mutual perceptions between these societies, which helped the maintenance and strengthening of the security community, that have been built after the 2nd World War. Thus, growing interaction among these peoples especially in Western Europe has a tolerance building effect, which was predicted by many transactionalist scholars.⁶²³

Two of the main theories of integration are “**neofunctionalism**” and “**intergovernmentalism**” which have been developed during the integration process of Europe after the 2nd World War. Neofunctionalism was developed by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg who tried to explain how economic cooperation in one sector would spread to another and probably lead to political integration. Neofunctionalism was the dominant theory from the 1950s till the mid-1960s. After the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty there

⁶¹⁷ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni , “Introduction”, pp.1-28.

⁶¹⁸ C. Pentland, “Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration” in A.J.R. Groom & P. Taylor (eds.), *Functionalism : Theory and Practice in International Relations*, London: University of London Press, 1975 ; quoted in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, p.29.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁰ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni , “Introduction”, p.29.

⁶²¹ Cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni , “Introduction”, pp.29-30. For further detail see K.W.Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, p.122.

⁶²² M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, pp.30-31.

⁶²³ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 154.

was a revival of neofunctionalism and introduction of “liberal intergovernmentalism”.⁶²⁴ According to neofunctionalists, European integration means building a new political community, which will supersede nation-states. The concept of “**spillover**” is important in neofunctionalist explanation of the integration process. There are different types of spillover. The “functional spillover” means that different economic sectors are interdependent and integration in one sector may create problems that can only be resolved through further integration in other sectors. “Political spillover” occurs, because economic and social integration influences the political aspirations of major social groups in participating states. Another type of spillover is “cultivated spillover” which refers to the role of supranational institutions such as the European Commission in promoting integration.⁶²⁵

Two founding fathers of integration theory who are K. Deutsch and E. Haas used identity-related concepts in their theories. Haas talks about “shifting loyalties” toward supranational institutions. He argues that, instrumental interests lead to initial integration, which refers to transferring of authority to a “new centre” that leads to increasing identification with the “new centre”, which refers to “shifting loyalties”.⁶²⁶ Haas argues that “satisfaction with the organization’s performance would lead to shifting loyalties”⁶²⁷ which may be referred to as an utilitarian approach, that will be discussed in Chapter III. Deutsch uses the term a “sense of community” in his integration theory. He states that:

The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration...turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling’, trust and mutual consideration; or partial identification in terms of self-images and interests.⁶²⁸

He also argues that “collective identification with the community was one of the indicators for the degree of integration”.⁶²⁹ The transactionalist approach of Deutsch is more similar to social constructivism than neofunctionalism; because, transactionalism emphasizes the

⁶²⁴ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, pp.3-6.

⁶²⁵ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Theorising the Common Market: Neofunctionalism and Its Critics” in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, pp.94-100.

⁶²⁶ E.B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (1950-57)*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958; cited in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p. 293.

⁶²⁷ E. B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964; quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p. 294.

⁶²⁸ K. W. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp.5-9; quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p. 293.

⁶²⁹ Quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p. 293.

importance of “shared identities and intersubjective beliefs” to have a successful integration.⁶³⁰ It also emphasizes interactions between peoples and emergence of “security communities”.

Neofunctionalists argue that European integration would gradually lead to transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level, particularly among political elites, who are involved in the European policy-making process.⁶³¹ Haas in his book “The Uniting of Europe” defines integration as a process, in which “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre.”⁶³² Neofunctionalists assert that integration can spread from one policy area to another and transnational political identities can spill over from one elite to another before spreading to a wider public. On the contrary, intergovernmentalists argue that political identities would and should remain national in the process of European integration.⁶³³ Surveys and recent studies on European integration and elite loyalty do not always support the claim⁶³⁴ of neofunctionalists. They underestimated deep-rootedness of national identities. On the other hand, intergovernmentalists argue that the construction of a European identity on cultural basis would compete with deeply rooted myths and memories of national identities. It is obvious that in this competition Europe lags behind, because it lacks symbols and myths which are crucial in construction of collective identities.⁶³⁵ Thus, there is neither a gradual transfer of loyalties from national to the European level, nor do political identities remain totally national, as intergovernmentalists argue. The construction process of European identity has been still ongoing without replacing national identities which are still usually primary collective cultural identities of people. Even among the political elites of the EU, there has not been gradual transfer of loyalties from nations to the European level. European identity has been strengthened as an

⁶³⁰ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.401.

⁶³¹ Cited in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.348. For further detail see E. B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, 1958; E. B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, 1964.

⁶³² E.B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (1950-1957)*, 1958, p.16; quoted in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, p.91.

⁶³³ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p. 34.

⁶³⁴ Cited in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.348. For further detail see J. Beyers, “How Supranational is Supranationalism? National and European Socialization of Negotiators in the Council of Ministers”, paper presented at the ECSA’s 6th Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, 2-5 June 1999; M. Egebjerg, “Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National Officials in EU Decision Making”, paper presented at the ECSA’s 6th Biennial International Conference, 2-5 June 1999.

⁶³⁵ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU*, p.23.

additional layer of identification, a new source of collective identity. According to the interviews which were conducted by the author, usually the MEPs and the Commission officials still primarily have a national identity; but working at the EP and especially the Commission usually make their level of European identity stronger. Most of them feel primarily national and secondarily European which will be discussed in Chapter III.

Intergovernmentalism was developed in the mid-1960s primarily by Hoffman. Intergovernmentalism was started to be emphasized more especially after the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965. Intergovernmentalists argue that states are still the primary actors and they say the last word. Intergovernmentalists assert that national governments may cooperate on economic and technical issues (low politics), but they never want to transfer the control of “high politics” such as foreign policy and security to supranational institutions.⁶³⁶ According to intergovernmentalism, European integration will not affect national identities.⁶³⁷ The effects of the EU on identities of its Member States and their citizens are stronger than intergovernmentalists claim.

Liberal intergovernmentalism was introduced by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, institutions are seen as necessary for international cooperation and integration is seen as a result of economic interdependence. Because of interdependence, governments feel the necessity to facilitate economic cooperation.⁶³⁸ Another recent theoretical approach to integration is new institutionalism, which emphasizes the role of institutions as important actors in integration process.⁶³⁹ Rational-choice institutionalism has some common characteristics with liberal intergovernmentalism. They both see states as rational and unitary actors. Historical institutionalists emphasize how institutions develop over time and affect the position of states in ways that are usually unintended by their founders.⁶⁴⁰ The theories of integration can help to explain only some periods and some aspects of European integration process, rather than the whole process.

⁶³⁶ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Theorising the Common Market: Neofunctionalism and Its Critics”, p.90.

⁶³⁷ M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.348.

⁶³⁸ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “1992 Project, the Revival of Neofunctionalism and the Liberal Intergovernmentalist Challenge” in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, p.187.

⁶³⁹ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Introduction”, pp.3-6.

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.194-198.

II.2. Social Constructivism

In this thesis social constructivism which is one of the theories of international relations and has been increasingly used in recent years, is used as the main theoretical background; because, it focuses on the construction and transformation process of identities. The other reasons of choosing this theory and how social constructivism is used to analyse construction of European identity will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

II.2.1. The Background of Social Constructivism and Its Main Assumptions

Constructivism is sometimes regarded as a new approach. Actually it is an old methodology, which can be traced back to the 18th century writings of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. According to him, the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by people.⁶⁴¹ Firstly **Onuf** introduced the term “constructivism” to IR.⁶⁴² Constructivism has origins in idealism. Hume, Berkeley and Kant argued in different ways that, knowledge is shaped by experience and context. The representatives of modern constructivism in social science were Weber and Mannheim. Mannheim who is the founder of “sociology of knowledge”, established constructivism as one of the main methodologies in social science. His importance in the philosophy of social science is his attempt to relate knowledge with its social producers. He argued that knowledge is produced from a specific social and historical point of view which reflects the interests and culture of the groups in question. Thus, truth depends on its social location.⁶⁴³

Especially in the post-Cold War era there has been a revival of constructivism in international relations. Social constructivists advance a sociological perspective about world politics by emphasizing the primacy of normative structures over material ones, the role of identity in constitution of interests and the mutual constitution of agents and structures. Constructivists argue that understanding how interests are constituted is very important to explain a wide range of international phenomena which was ignored by

⁶⁴¹ L. Pompa, *Vico: Selected Readings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; cited in R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, pp.253-254.

⁶⁴² Rey Koslowski & Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System”, *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No.3, 1994, p. 216; cited in Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.10.

⁶⁴³ Gerard Delanty, *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997, p.113.

positivists.⁶⁴⁴ For some scholars, social constructivism is not sometimes considered as a theory; rather it is regarded as an ontological perspective.⁶⁴⁵ It is also argued that if constructivism is accepted as a theory, it is a “**theory of process**”, not an outcome.⁶⁴⁶ According to Farrell, constructivism is “a progressive research program”.⁶⁴⁷ It focuses on the social interaction process, rather than its result. Some social constructivists argue that, “constructivism is not a theory, but rather an analytical framework”.⁶⁴⁸ The main exception to this tendency is Wendt who has tried to formulate a comprehensive social theory of international relations in competition with Waltz and his theory of neorealism.⁶⁴⁹

According to social constructivists, the social world is not given; it is not something out there, which exists independent of thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. Thus, there is not an external social reality, the laws of which can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory as positivists argue. The social and political world is not part of nature. Instead, the social world is a world of human consciousness which includes concepts, ideas, beliefs, languages, symbols and understandings among people or groups of people such as nations. History is not an evolving external process which is independent of human thought and ideas. According to constructivists, sociology, economics or political science can not be objective sciences in the positivist sense.⁶⁵⁰ Rosamond explains the perception of constructivists as “we are what we make of ourselves and what we make of ourselves will be related to what we make of our environment.”⁶⁵¹ Constructivist scholars recognize the material world which exists independently, but they emphasize its interactions with the social world.⁶⁵² They argue that “the phenomenal world can not be known outside of our socially constructed representations of it”.⁶⁵³ As Delanty argues, one of the main arguments of constructivists is

⁶⁴⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After The Cold War”, Australian National University, Department of International Relations Working Paper, No: 4, 1996, pp.2-9.

⁶⁴⁵ T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p.174.

⁶⁴⁶ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, *International Security*, Vol.23, No.1, Summer 1998, p.196.

⁶⁴⁷ Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No.1, 2002, pp.49-72.

⁶⁴⁸ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.222.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁰ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.254.

⁶⁵¹ Ben Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, pp.658-659.

⁶⁵² M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.252.

⁶⁵³ Vincent Pouliot, “‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.51, 2007, p.363.

that “knowledge both everyday and scientific is a construction shaped by its context.”⁶⁵⁴ Constructivists point out that “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge, in which they are embedded.”⁶⁵⁵ They assert that knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive.⁶⁵⁶ The main focus of constructivism is human awareness and its place in world affairs.⁶⁵⁷ According to Ruggie, social constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life.⁶⁵⁸ Constructivists argue that “international relations consist primarily of social facts...”⁶⁵⁹ The international system is created by people. It is a set of ideas, a system of norms which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place. Thus, states and the state system are considered as artificial constructions. If the thoughts and ideas, which enter into the international relations change, then the system will change.⁶⁶⁰ Unlike positivism which takes the world as it is, “constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being.”⁶⁶¹ According to social constructivism, social realities exist only by human agreement. It also focuses on social ontologies, such as intersubjective meaning, constitutive effects of norms, institutions, discourses and collective identity formation.⁶⁶²

Epistemologically social constructivism brings intersubjectivity into the analysis of regimes; ontologically it emphasizes the impact of social interaction of states on the structure of the international system. Methodologically it offers a research program, which is based on the importance of shared norms in international relations.⁶⁶³ In methodological terms, inductive analysis which is a research strategy that moves from the local to the general, is necessary starting point of a constructivist research.⁶⁶⁴ Pouliot asserts that the methodological requirements of constructivism are: “Induction, interpretation and

⁶⁵⁴ G. Delanty, *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*, p.129.

⁶⁵⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol.20, No.1,1995, p.73.

⁶⁵⁶ Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds” in Dan Sperber, David Premack & Ann J. Premack (eds.), *Causal Cognition: A Multi-disciplinary Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; cited in V. Pouliot, “‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology”, p.363.

⁶⁵⁷ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.253.

⁶⁵⁸ John Ruggie, “What Makes The World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998.

⁶⁵⁹ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, London: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.92.

⁶⁶⁰ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.253.

⁶⁶¹ E. Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, p.11.

⁶⁶² For further detail see Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen & Antje Wiener (eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, London: Sage Pub., 2001.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁴ V. Pouliot, “ ‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology”, p.364.

historicisation”.⁶⁶⁵ Guzzini points out that constructivism is “epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the construction of social reality.”⁶⁶⁶ In terms of ontology all constructivists recognize the “social nature of the world around us”. In terms of epistemology, there are different approaches⁶⁶⁷ in social constructivism.

Constructivists reject the realist assumptions that states always want more power and wealth and state interests exist independently of a context of interaction among states.⁶⁶⁸ They argue that the identities of states depend on historical, political, cultural and social contexts.⁶⁶⁹ In social constructivism structures are endogenous to process and interaction will change “intersubjective meanings” which partly constitute social reality.⁶⁷⁰ Structures are stable patterns, which consist of rules and institutions, but actions usually have unintended consequences.⁶⁷¹ Social constructivism emphasizes learning and socialization processes to link social structure to agents.⁶⁷² For social constructivists, **norms** are shared collective understandings which make behavioural claims on actors. They are not necessarily internalized by the elites. There are two main diffusion pathways for the norms which are “societal mobilisation” and “social learning”.⁶⁷³ Social norms do not only regulate behaviour, they also constitute the identity of actors which define who “we” are as members of a social community. For example, the norm of sovereignty does not only regulate the interaction of states, it also defines what a state is. Thus, it shows one aspect of the identity of a state. According to social constructivism, the characteristics and behaviours of social agents can not be described without reference to the social structure in which they are part of.⁶⁷⁴ The structure mostly determines the rules of interactions among agents, thus, it affects their identity and behaviour. The environment in which agents take

⁶⁶⁵ V. Pouliot, “ ‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology”, p.378.

⁶⁶⁶ Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”*European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.6, No.2, 2000, p.147.

⁶⁶⁷ J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.8.

⁶⁶⁸ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, pp.391-426.

⁶⁶⁹ T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, pp.176-177.

⁶⁷⁰ Andreas Bieler, “Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas”, *Politics*, Vol. 21, No.2, 2001, p.96.

⁶⁷¹ M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.20.

⁶⁷² Thomas Risse, “ ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol.54, No.1, Winter 2000, p.34.

⁶⁷³ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999. pp.551-552.

⁶⁷⁴ Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism Meets Globalization”, August 19, 2004 (draft) in David Held & Anthony Mc Grew (eds.), *Understanding Globalization: Theories and Controversies*, Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming.

action is social as well as material and this setting can provide agents with understandings of their interests. They constitute actor identities and interests, rather than simply regulating their behaviour. Social constructivism emphasizes the process of interaction between agents and structures, thus, they are mutually constituted. Social constructivists try to explain the content of actor identities, preferences and the modes of social interaction.⁶⁷⁵ For social constructivists, collective norms constitute the social identities of actors and they define the basic “rules of the game” of the interactions among different actors. It does not mean that constitutive norms can not be violated or never change. For example, the content of the norm of sovereignty has changed too much over time, but it is still one of the main norms, which constitutes a state.⁶⁷⁶ According to social constructivists, people act toward objects as well as other actors on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. For example, states act differently toward enemies from their allies. Social threats are also constructed. The relations between states mainly depend on the intersubjective understandings on the “self” and the “other”.⁶⁷⁷ An example can be given about nuclear weapons. The USA does not worry about the nuclear weapons held by the UK. But the possibility that North Korea might possess some, causes worries.⁶⁷⁸

Consequently, some of the main assumptions of social constructivists are:

- Human relations including international relations mainly consist of thoughts and ideas.
- Intersubjective beliefs are focused on, such as ideas and assumptions, which are widely shared among people.
- Those shared beliefs express the interests and identities of people.
- Constructivists also focus on the ways those relations are formed and expressed. For example, state sovereignty has no material reality but exists only because people collectively believe they exist and act on this basis.⁶⁷⁹ Although there are some common assumptions, there are different approaches within social constructivism.

⁶⁷⁵ For further detail see J. T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, 1999.

⁶⁷⁶ T. Risse, “ ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, p.5.

⁶⁷⁷ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, pp.396-405.

⁶⁷⁸ For further detail see J. T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, 1999.

⁶⁷⁹ M. Finnemore & K. Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, *Annual Reviews of Political Science*, Vol. 4, 2001, pp.391-416; cited in R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations-Theories and Approaches*, p.254.

II.2.2. Types of Social Constructivism

There is no single constructivist approach in international relations. Social constructivism is usually perceived as an “umbrella approach”.⁶⁸⁰ In the 1990s three types of social constructivism have emerged in terms of their emphasis on agency or structure. “**Systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivisms**”. “**Systemic constructivism**” focuses on interactions between unitary state actors. In this type of constructivism, everything that occurs within the domestic political realm is ignored and world politics is explained by how states relate to one another. The arguments of Wendt may be given as examples to systemic constructivism. He deals with how structural contexts, systemic processes produce different types of state identity. He makes a distinction between the social and corporate identities of the state: The former refers to status or role that international society ascribes to a state. The latter refers to the internal human, ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is. The social identities of states are established by the normative and ideational structures of international society and those structures are seen as the product of state practices.⁶⁸¹

“**Unit-level constructivists**” emphasize the relationship between domestic social and legal norms, the identities and interests of states. Peter Katzenstein’s studies on the national security policies of Germany and Japan can be given as examples to this type of constructivism.⁶⁸² Katzenstein does not entirely disregard the role of international norms in affecting the identities and interests of states; but he focuses on the internal determinants of national policies. Unit-level constructivism has the capacity to explain different types of identity, interest and action across states which systemic constructivism lacks. Systemic and unit-level constructivists reproduce the traditional dichotomy between the international and domestic. “**Holistic constructivists**” try to build a bridge between them. They treat domestic and international as two aspects of a social and political order. They primarily deal with the dynamics of global change, especially the rise and possible demise of the sovereign state. Holistic constructivism has the ability to explain the development of the normative and ideational structures of the international system, as well as the social

⁶⁸⁰ Jo Shaw & Antje Wiener, “The Paradox of the ‘European Polity’”, New York University School of Law, Jean Monnet Center, 1999, retrieved on June 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991001.html>

⁶⁸¹ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.218-220.

⁶⁸² For further detail see P.J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Ithaca, 1996; P.J. Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, Ithaca, 1999.

identities they have produced.⁶⁸³ Checkel argues that domestic and international spheres should not be perceived in isolation. Instead the crosscutting interactions between domestic and international levels should be analysed.⁶⁸⁴ Onuf emphasizes the synthesis of agency and structure which may be referred to as “structurationist” theory.⁶⁸⁵ Onuf’s understanding of constructivist theory is based on Giddens’ structuration theory, according to which, “people and society construct or constitute each other.”⁶⁸⁶ The construction processes and their institutionalisation are important in his understanding of reality. Language has a crucial role in Onuf’s constructivism.⁶⁸⁷ Wendt’s approach is based on “identity”, Kratochwil’s constructivism is based on “norms” and Onuf focuses on the relationship between “words and world”.⁶⁸⁸ Wendt’s approach is mainly used in this thesis to analyze construction process of European identity in the context of the EU.

Among IR constructivists, as Hopf puts forward, there has been a growing recognition that “constructivism starts at home”, which means that “domestic society...must be brought back into any constructivist account of world politics.”⁶⁸⁹ In the field of European studies there has been resistance to further deepening of integration and process of constitutionalisation which has led to theorists of integration to add domestic politics to their arguments; because in the integration theory, Leon Lindberg’s “permissive consensus” seems to have been transformed into its opposite which is “constraining dissensus”.⁶⁹⁰

In this thesis, generally holistic understanding of constructivism is used. The effects of the norms of the EU on identity of its Member States and their citizens are analyzed, meanwhile internal determinants of the Member States are also taken into consideration which have been effective on the construction process of European identity within the EU.

⁶⁸³ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.220-221.

⁶⁸⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics, *ARENA Working Papers*, WP 15, 2003, p.11.

⁶⁸⁵ John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.146.

⁶⁸⁶ Quoted in M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, pp.151-155.

⁶⁸⁷ Cited in M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, pp.151-155.

⁶⁸⁸ M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.196.

⁶⁸⁹ Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.1, 278; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.28.

⁶⁹⁰ Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, “The Neofunctionalists Were (Almost) Right: Politicization and European Integration”, Paper presented at the ARENA Research Seminar, Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, October 5, 2004, p.5; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.29.

In Chapter IV different ways of interactions between European identity and national identities in the EU will be discussed.

Hobson differentiates between three types of constructivism: “international society-centric constructivism”, “state centric constructivism” and “radical constructivism”. Finnemore who emphasizes the importance of structure over agency, can be considered as one of the main representatives of “international society-centric constructivism”. In her book “National Interests in International Society”, which was published in 1996, she argues that state identities are constructed by the normative structure of international society. Her main argument is, international forces can shape national policy by informing states what their interests should be. Especially international organisations have been “active teachers” which guide states to have policies in accordance with certain international norms. Sometimes acting according to those norms may not help to enhance the power of an actor, even sometimes it may be against its interests. She asserts that states may tolerate limits on their sovereignty as a “price”. They may pay that price to have the appearance of “being civilized”. They act according to these norms, because they do not want to be classified as states, who act against the norms of “civilized international society”. They adapt their policies and domestic structures in accordance with the international norms, which are referred to as “civilized state behaviour norms” that are transferred to states through the “teaching activities” of international organisations. These norms affect states’ behaviour subconsciously and encourage them to cooperate internationally, although these types of activities do not satisfy any “power-maximizing” interests of states. By this way states are socialized by the international normative structure.⁶⁹¹ “State-centric constructivists” emphasize the importance of the national (domestic) sphere, rather than the international one. Katzenstein examines the impact of a state’s power upon norms, also the impact of norms upon the state. He attributes high levels of autonomy to state.⁶⁹² This classification of constructivism is similar to the distinction between “systemic” and “unit-level constructivism”. “International society-centric constructivism” may be referred to as “systemic constructivism”, “state-centric constructivism” may be referred to as “unit-level constructivism”. In this differentiation radical constructivism is also mentioned instead of holistic constructivism, which are different from each other. “Radical constructivism” sees the construction of state identity

⁶⁹¹ Cited in J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, pp.149-155.

⁶⁹² J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p.166.

in negative terms which means state identity formation process leads to exclusion, repression and marginalization of minorities. Radical constructivists perceive the concept of sovereignty as a social construct. The state must stabilize domestic society with a unitary appearance. The nationalistic feeling of togetherness is “imagined” as Anderson mentions, because the members of the nation do not know most of the people who compose it. The “self” is defined negatively against the “other”s both inside and outside society to create the appearance of unity. It is argued that states and nations are not real, they do not exist as totally finished entities. It is also argued that currently “the sovereign state” is in crisis. Globalisation undermines it both from within and outside. As long as states exist, violence and war will continue to be the normal instruments of IR; because, states have to create a “threatening other” to construct an imaginary unified domestic political community.⁶⁹³

Checkel differentiates between three types of social constructivist approaches to European integration, which are: “Conventional”, “interpretative” and “critical/radical”. Conventional constructivism is dominant in the USA. It usually examines the role of norms and identity in shaping international political outcomes. Conventional constructivists are positivist in terms of epistemology and they are usually in favour of bridge building among different theoretical approaches.⁶⁹⁴ In terms of methodology, they usually use qualitative methods and a process tracing case study. They have been affected by sociology and some elements of institutional theory.⁶⁹⁵ Within EU studies conventional constructivism has been applied in different ways. For example, Caporaso, Jupille and colleagues analyzed functioning of the EU institutions to build bridges between rationalist and sociological work.⁶⁹⁶ The main focus of conventional constructivists are norms and identity, on the other hand, interpretative and radical scholars focus on power and discourse. Conventional constructivists explore the degree to which supranational institutions like the Commission affect the identities of social agents. Hooghe found out that much of the European-level socialisation in the Commission is a product of prior national socialisation. Thus,

⁶⁹³ J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p.159.

⁶⁹⁴ J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.4.

⁶⁹⁵ J. T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics, 2003.

⁶⁹⁶ James Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel & Joseph Jupille (eds.), “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the EU”, Special issue of *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.36, No.1-2, 2003; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.5.

experiences at national-level are enmeshed with European factors.⁶⁹⁷ Conventional constructivists ask “why” questions, interpretative constructivists ask “how possible” questions.⁶⁹⁸ “Post-positivist constructivists” (interpretative, radical) analyze the EU in a different way from conventional constructivists. They analyze the role of language in constructing social reality. They study the politics of integration through a linguistic approach. Interpretative and critical/radical constructivisms are more popular in Europe. They explore background conditions and linguistic constructions (discourses) which made such change possible. They usually use inductive research strategy that focuses on the reconstruction of state/agent identity. Radical constructivists also focus on linguistics, but they also add a normative dimension by including researcher’s implication in reproduction of identities and world he/she is studying. The power and domination inherent in language are emphasized more.⁶⁹⁹ In interpretative and radical constructivisms discursive methods are usually used. Theoretical inspiration of them is based on linguistic approaches (Wittgenstein, Habermas, Bourdieu). They focus on “discourse, the mediation of meaning through language, speech acts and textual analysis”.⁷⁰⁰

EU constructivists should have a dynamic approach, which means “integrating factors across different levels of analysis”, such as European and national. Emphasizing simultaneity and cross-cutting influences would lead to focusing on process, which is the case for conventional constructivists who study European socialisation⁷⁰¹ or interpretative analyses which make structural readings of European identity by focusing on discourses⁷⁰² or public spheres.⁷⁰³ In this thesis conventional and interpretative constructivisms are used to analyze construction process of European identity within the EU. Conventional constructivism is used, because it focuses on the role of norms and identity in international

⁶⁹⁷ Liesbet Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, *International Organization*, Vol.59, No.4, pp.861-898; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, pp.7-27.

⁶⁹⁸ J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.12.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

⁷⁰⁰ J. T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics, 2003.

⁷⁰¹ J. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, *International Organization*, Vol.59, No.4, 2005; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.28.

⁷⁰² Ben Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and European Identities” in T. Christiansen, K. E. Joergensen and A. Wiener (Eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, London: Sage Pub., 2001; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.28.

⁷⁰³ John Erik Fossum & Hans-Joerg Trenz, “The EU’s Fledgling Society: From Deafening Silence to Critical Voice in European Constitution Making”, Paper presented at the ARENA Research Seminar, Oslo: ARENA Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, October 4, 2005; cited in J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.28.

relations. Especially the role of the EU norms and identity shaping effects of the EU will be focused on. Dynamic approach is used by taking into consideration different levels of analysis such as the EU, Member States and citizens of the EU. Qualitative analysis is made. While interpreting in depth interviews, which were conducted by the author, discursive approach is used which is used by interpretative constructivists. The research questions of this thesis are usually how possible questions, such as “how European identity has been in a construction process within the EU” which are the focus of interpretative constructivists. Also some why questions which are the focus of conventional constructivists, are also tried to be answered such as, why Turkey has been treated differently from the new Member States of the EU, who are from the CEE.

II.2.2.1. Alexander Wendt: “Anarchy is What States Make of It”

Wendt is usually considered as one of the main representatives of social constructivism. He may be considered as a conventional constructivist. He tries to build a bridge between the two traditions (rationalist-reflectivist) through social constructivism.⁷⁰⁴ He emphasizes the “co-constitution of structure and agency” and focuses on this co-constitution process.⁷⁰⁵ “Identity” is the key concept of Wendt’s approach.⁷⁰⁶ He argues that international institutions can transform state identities and interests. According to him, “**anarchy is what states make of it**”.⁷⁰⁷ Wendt criticizes especially the assumptions of neorealism. Anarchy is not accepted as a natural characteristic of the international system. Wendt asserts that self-help and power politics are socially constructed under anarchy. He mentions three ways by which identities and interests are transformed under anarchy: “By the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities.”⁷⁰⁸ He also suggests that the proponents of liberalism and constructivism should join their forces in contributing to a process-oriented international theory.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁴ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, pp.391-395.

⁷⁰⁵ Thomas Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.4, Special Issue 1999, p.612.

⁷⁰⁶ M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.15.

⁷⁰⁷ For further detail see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 1992.

⁷⁰⁸ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, pp.391-395.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.425.

According to Wendt, social constructivism is a structural theory of the international system, which has the following assumptions:

“- States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory.

-The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material.

-State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.”⁷¹⁰

Wendt states that he shares some of Mearsheimer’s realist assumptions such as considering states as main units of analysis, states are rational, they try to survive and we can not be 100 % certain about others’ intentions.⁷¹¹ Wendt also agrees with realists that in the medium-term sovereign states will stay as the dominant political actors in the international system.⁷¹² He rejects the idea that insecurity and aggression are main characteristics of human nature which is one of the main assumptions of realism. He points out that the main reason of conflicts is not struggle for power but “struggle for the recognition”. Anarchy is not driven by universal logic of power like Waltz claims; instead it is driven by “universal logic of identity and a desire for recognition.”⁷¹³ Struggle for recognition may emerge between individuals, groups or states.⁷¹⁴ Wendt criticizes some of the main assumptions of neorealism. He states that:

There is no objective international world apart from the practices and institutions that states arrange among themselves...there is no inevitable security dilemma between sovereign states, because any situation that states find themselves in is a situation that, they themselves have created. They are not prisoners of the anarchical structure of the state system.⁷¹⁵

States’ interests and their identities are constructed in interaction process. If states find themselves in a self-help position, this is because of their own practices. If their practices change, then the intersubjective knowledge, which constitutes the system, will change.⁷¹⁶

Wendt, in his book “Social Theory of International Politics” explains the historical background of social constructivism. He states that a constructivist understanding can be

⁷¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, June 1994, p.385.

⁷¹¹ A. Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, p.72.

⁷¹² A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.424.

⁷¹³ A. Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.9, No.4, 2003, pp.493-511; quoted in Katalin Sarvary, “No Place for Politics?: Truth, Progress and the Neglected Role of Diplomacy in Wendt’s Theory of History” in Stefano Guzzini & Anna Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, London: Routledge Pub., 2006, p.177.

⁷¹⁴ A. Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable”, pp.493-511; cited in K. Sarvary, “No Place for Politics?: Truth, Progress and the Neglected Role of Diplomacy in Wendt’s Theory of History”, p.177.

⁷¹⁵ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 1992.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.405-411.

traced back to classical international theories of Grotius, Kant and Hegel. It was dominant in IR between the world wars and referred to as “idealism” by IR scholars. Thus, he traced back social constructivism to idealism. In the post-war period, other constructivist approaches to international relations were advanced by Ernst Haas and Hedley Bull.⁷¹⁷ In the 1980s three types of constructivist IR theory emerged, which have been affected from all these previous studies. The main representatives of modernist constructivism are Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie,⁷¹⁸ the representatives of postmodernist constructivism are Richard Ashley and Rob Walker⁷¹⁹ and the representatives of feminist constructivism are Spike Peterson and Ann Tickner.⁷²⁰ They share the view that neorealism and neoliberalism are “undersocialized” and they do not deal with how the actors in world politics are socially constructed.⁷²¹ There was a revival of social constructivism in the end of the Cold War. The mainstream IR theory had difficulties in explaining the end of the cold war, because of its materialist basis.⁷²² Thus, social constructivism has been increasingly used in the post-Cold war era.

In “Social Theory of International Politics” Wendt argues that we can attribute human qualities to states.⁷²³ He admits that states which are primary actors in international politics, are mostly autonomous from the social system, in which they are living. The foreign policy of these states is mostly determined by domestic factors, rather than the international system.⁷²⁴ Wendt criticizes Waltz who argues that “anarchy makes international politics a necessarily conflictual self-help world.”⁷²⁵ He criticizes Waltz’s book “Theory of International Politics” which was written twenty years before his book.

⁷¹⁷ For further detail see Ernst Haas , *Beyond the Nation-State*, 1964; E. Haas , *When Knowledge is Power*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

⁷¹⁸ Cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999. For further detail see John Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity”, *World Politics*, Vol.35, 1983, pp. 261-285; Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

⁷¹⁹ For further detail see Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” , *International Organization*, Vol.38, 1984, pp. 225-286; R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change and International Political Theory”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, 1987, pp.65-86.

⁷²⁰ Cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.3. For further detail see V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1992; Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

⁷²¹ C. Wrong, “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 26, 1961, pp.183-193; cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.4.

⁷²² A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.4.

⁷²³ Alexander Wendt , “Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto Critique from a Quantum Perspective” in S. Guzzini & A. Leander (eds.) , *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, p.205.

⁷²⁴ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.2.

⁷²⁵ Quoted in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.6.

He argues that Waltz asked the right questions but gave the wrong answers. He claims that Waltz defined the structure of the international system incorrectly. Wendt offered an alternative social theory of international politics.⁷²⁶ He claims that Waltz does not take into account relationships that constitute a social structure, like friendship, rivalry or the role of institutions. He claims that neorealism can not explain structural change.⁷²⁷ He summarizes his book as a “constructivist approach to the international system”.⁷²⁸ He argues that “constructivism is not a theory of international politics.”⁷²⁹ It shows us “...how actors are socially constructed, but they do not tell us, which actors to study or where they are constructed.”⁷³⁰ He states his goal as defending a moderate, “thin” constructivism against those scholars who sees all types of social constructivism as “postmodernism” and also against “radical constructivists”, who think that “his approach does not go far enough.”⁷³¹ He supports positivists in terms of epistemology and he supports post-positivists in terms of ontology.⁷³² According to him, two main arguments of social constructivism have been increasingly accepted. One of them is “...the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” and the second one is “...the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”⁷³³ He claims that boundaries of the self may change in interaction; therefore cooperating states may form a collective identity.⁷³⁴ He also argues that “...actions continually produce and reproduce conceptions of self and other...”⁷³⁵ Identities are always in a construction process which shows that there is not a fixed “self” or “other”. Thus, cooperating states may construct a collective identity within the EU.

Wendt argues that interests or beliefs do not exist prior to interaction. His position is criticized on the grounds that it is context-free and not taking into consideration “pre-

⁷²⁶ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999; cited in “Forum on Social Theory of International Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.26, 2000, p.123.

⁷²⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp.98-99; cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.16.

⁷²⁸ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.33.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ Quoted in Steve Smith, “Wendt’s World”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.26, 2000, p.151.

⁷³² Cited in S. Smith, “Wendt’s World”, p.151.

⁷³³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.1.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.317.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.35.

socialised actor entering interaction processes”.⁷³⁶ Thus, he perceives actors as “*tabula rasa*” prior to interaction processes.⁷³⁷ Doty criticizes Wendt’s argument of “states are socially constructed, but they can only be socially constructed as unitary actors.”⁷³⁸ Wendt points out that even if a state has multiple personalities domestically, they are socially constructed as unitary actors to work together when dealing with outsiders. Doty claims that state is not a unitary actor. States are affected by different opposing forces, which may push it to many contradictory directions.⁷³⁹ As Wendt argues, although a state has multiple identities, while it is in interaction with others; it is constructed as a unitary actor.

Wendt argues that “anarchy has no logic of its own”,⁷⁴⁰ interests can not be explained without taking into consideration ideas. Ideas and identities shape international relations. He differentiates three cultures of international relations, which are “**Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian**” that affect state behaviour, even the identities of people who make state policies. They are differentiated from each other on the basis of the roles that dominate the system, which are enemy, rival or friend.⁷⁴¹ The social relations within anarchy may range from “a Hobbesian condition of a war of all against all, to a Lockean culture of restraint and finally to a Kantian culture of friendship.”⁷⁴² In a Kantian culture states refer to themselves as “we”. Wendt asserts that for long periods of history states lived in a “Hobbesian culture” where “...the logic of anarchy was kill or be killed.”⁷⁴³ In the 17th century a Lockean culture was established by European states and conflict was constrained by the mutual recognition of sovereignty. He claims that in the late 20th century the international system has been undergoing another structural change, which is referred to as “Kantian culture of collective security”; but this change is limited mostly to the West. He claims that “with each change the international system has achieved a qualitatively higher capacity for collective action...”⁷⁴⁴ In the context of the EU, although

⁷³⁶ Jarle Trondal, “Is There any Social Constructivist-Institutionalist Divide? Unpacking Social Mechanisms Affecting Representational Roles Among EU Decision-makers”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.8, No.1, February 2001, p.5.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁸ Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Desire All the Way Down”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.26, 2000, pp.138-139.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ Quoted in Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas Part-Way Down”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.26, 2000, p.125.

⁷⁴¹ Cited in R. O. Keohane, “Ideas Part-Way Down”, p.125.

⁷⁴² Quoted in “Forum on Social Theory of International Politics”, p.123. For further detail see A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999.

⁷⁴³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.314.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

there are still many problems especially in terms of common foreign and security policy, the Member States have reached higher capacity for collective action in comparison to fifty years ago.

According to Wendt, the character of the international system is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, which are constituted mostly by social, rather than material factors. He argues that material power and interests are also important but their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system and especially which culture is dominant, such as Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian. Structural change means change among these cultures.⁷⁴⁵ He points out that transformation from “a Hobbesian to Kantian culture is not inevitable, but can result from historically contingent processes of collective identity formation among states.”⁷⁴⁶ He defines the contemporary international system as “mostly Lockean, with increasing Kantian elements.”⁷⁴⁷ In the last fifty years, there have been no wars within the EU. Thus, it can be argued that, there is a Kantian culture in the context of the EU, but in wider Europe there were wars in Bosnia and Kosova in the 1990s. If we look at the whole international system, this argument of Wendt is very optimistic when we think about the intervention to Iraq, the conflicts between Israel and Palestinians, etc. The interactions between the Member States of the EU may be described mostly as a Kantian culture. To a certain extent there is an understanding of “we” among them. In low politics it can be usually observed that, while they have been in interaction with other actors such as the USA, especially in terms of issues such as trade and environment, they are usually acting as “we”; but in high politics especially in terms security and defense policy, states still primarily act on the basis of their national interests and it is harder for them to act with one voice in the world. Wendt’s constructivism mostly focuses on the identity of states that can be used to explain the construction of collective identity among the Member States which is referred to as the EU identity. Wendt’s approach can be used in order to understand the construction process of EU identity and to analyze the effects of the interactions between Turkey and the EU in terms of European identity.

⁷⁴⁵ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.20.

⁷⁴⁶ A. Wendt, “Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto Critique from a Quantum Perspective”, p.181.

⁷⁴⁷ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.43.

II.2.2.2. Discursive Approaches: Discourse Analysis in European Integration Studies

The concept of “discourse” can be defined as a “system that regulates the formation of statements”.⁷⁴⁸ As Laffey and Weldes argue, discourse is not just a collection of words; instead it is a set of structures and practices that constitute thoughts or realities.⁷⁴⁹ Fairclough defines “discourse” as a “particular way of representing some part of the world.”⁷⁵⁰ He defines discourse as ways of representing different aspects of the world, including the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts and the social world. Different discourses reflect different perspectives about the world and they reflect different relations of people with the world. Discourses do not represent the world as it is. They represent particular part of the world and they represent it from a particular perspective.⁷⁵¹ Thus, discourses construct a certain way of seeing the world, which have also affected the actions.⁷⁵² “Discourse is shaped and constrained by social structure”, but simultaneously they are “socially constitutive”, so it does not only represent the world, rather it contributes to the “construction of social identities”.⁷⁵³ There are usually alternative and even competing discourses of different groups of people in different social positions. Discourses differ in how social events, processes, relations, social actors are represented, what is included or excluded.⁷⁵⁴ Different discourses may complement each other, they may compete with each other or one can dominate others.⁷⁵⁵

Discourses are linguistic units composed of several sentences such as conversations, arguments and speeches. Discourses affect our views. For example, different discourses can be used for guerilla movements which may be referred to as

⁷⁴⁸ Quoted in Ole Waever, “Discursive Approaches” in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds.) , *European Integration Theory*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.199. For further detail see M. Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, London: Pantheon Pub., 1972.

⁷⁴⁹ Mark Laffey & Jutta Weldes, “Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis”, *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004; cited in Yoshiko M. Herrera & Bear F. Braumoeller, “Symposium: Discourse and Content Analysis”, *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004, p.16.

⁷⁵⁰ Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, London: Routledge Pub., 2003, p.17.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.124.

⁷⁵² Rainer Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, Paper presented at the Workshop on “Analyses of Discourses and Ideas in European and International Affairs”, European University Institute, Florence, May 12-13, 2000.

⁷⁵³ Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity, 1992; cited in Henrik Halkier, “Discourse, Institutionalism and Public Policy: Theory, Methods and a Scottish Case Study”, SPIRIT, Aalborg University, Discussion Paper, No. 23, 2003, p.7.

⁷⁵⁴ N. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p.17.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.124.

“freedom fighters” or “terrorists”.⁷⁵⁶ When statements about a subject are made with a particular discourse, it makes possible to construct that subject in a certain way and it limits the other ways by which this subject can be constructed.⁷⁵⁷ “Discourses have no inherent meaning in themselves and to understand their constructive effects, researchers must locate them historically and socially.”⁷⁵⁸ Discourse analysis is a general term for a number of approaches to analyze written, spoken or signed language use. It is used in various social science disciplines such as linguistics, sociology, social psychology and international relations. The term “discourse analysis” firstly started to be used as the title of a paper, which was published by Zellig Harris in 1952 and it began to develop in the late 1960s and the 1970s in most of the social sciences.⁷⁵⁹ Discourse analysis in social sciences is influenced by the works of Foucault.⁷⁶⁰ Discourse analysis is used for different aims such as analyzing oral communication. It may be considered as a theory or as a methodology which is compatible with different theoretical approaches. In discourse analysis, none of the categories are universally valid. As Waever argues “...different discourses construct concepts and ideas differently...”⁷⁶¹ Text analysis is important part of discourse analysis, but it is not only the linguistic analysis of texts.⁷⁶² “...discourse analysis focuses on the relation between text and context...”⁷⁶³ Political discourse analysis is a field of discourse analysis which focuses on “discourse in political forums” such as speeches and debates.⁷⁶⁴

Discourse analysis may be considered as a methodology which is “qualitative, interpretive and constructionist”. It is founded on a social constructivist epistemology. Social reality is considered as something that we create through interaction. It is also believed that social reality arise out of “interrelated bodies of texts” which bring new ideas

⁷⁵⁶ “Discourse”, *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, retrieved on August 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse>

⁷⁵⁷ Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power” in Stuart Hall & Bram Giebsen (eds.), *Formations of Modernity*, Oxford, 1992, p.291; cited in R. Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, 2000.

⁷⁵⁸ Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley & Nelson Phillips , “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”, *Qualitative Methods*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2004, pp.19-20.

⁷⁵⁹ “Discourse analysis”, *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, retrieved on August 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse_analysis

⁷⁶⁰ M. Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, 1972; cited in N. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p.2.

⁷⁶¹ O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, pp.198-204.

⁷⁶² N. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p.3.

⁷⁶³ C. Hardy, B. Harley & N. Phillips , “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”, p. 20.

⁷⁶⁴ “Political discourse analysis”, *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, retrieved on August 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_discourse_analysis

and practices into the world.⁷⁶⁵ Discourse analysis refers to systematic study of texts to find out their meaning and “how this meaning translates into a social reality.”⁷⁶⁶ Thus, discourse analysis assumes that “reality is socially constructed.”⁷⁶⁷ It constructs reality through interpretive methods. It is a qualitative analysis. It presupposes that texts can be only understood in a discursive context. Differences in interpretation are considered as a source of data. Thus, meaning is constructed and author is part of this process.⁷⁶⁸ Discursive approaches overlap with social constructivism.⁷⁶⁹ As it was argued, according to social constructivists the “social world is socially constructed.” Different types of social constructivism emphasize the role of texts in construction of social world.⁷⁷⁰ Discursive approaches are usually used by interpretative and radical constructivists. Radical constructivists argue that reality in its objective form can not be known. It can be understood only by human interpretation or language. They argue that “...social facts are established through human agreement, which can only be achieved through language.”⁷⁷¹ They point out that “identities, interests and behaviour of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world.”⁷⁷² Thus, social reality is a “linguistic construct” for them which can only be understood through textual and discourse analysis. The aim of discourse analysis is to find out how certain meanings which are assigned to certain material reality started to be seen after a certain period of time.⁷⁷³ In this thesis it is argued that discourses of the political elites of the EU are crucial in construction process of European identity within the EU, in addition to the other factors which will be discussed in the following chapters.

In European integration studies, according to “discursive approaches” there are many Europe’s. Discursive approaches are “against interpreting the EU in state terms” in terms of intergovernmentalism or as a new and big state. The EU is considered as similar

⁷⁶⁵ C. Hardy, B. Harley & N. Phillips, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”, p.19.

⁷⁶⁶ N. Philips & C. Hardy, *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction*, London: Sage Pub., 2002; cited in C. Hardy, B. Harley & N. Phillips, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”, p.20.

⁷⁶⁷ C. Hardy, B. Harley & N. Phillips, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”, p.21.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁹ O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.213.

⁷⁷⁰ N. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p.8.

⁷⁷¹ E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.3, 1997, p.332; quoted in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies” in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, p.399.

⁷⁷² E. Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, p.93.

⁷⁷³ E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, p.332; cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.399.

to a network or postmodern empire.⁷⁷⁴ The EU is a “multi-perspectival polity”.⁷⁷⁵ In this thesis, the EU is considered as a *sui generis* entity which has been still in an ongoing construction process.

There are three approaches of discourse analysis in European integration studies. The first approach emphasizes discourses across nations. It occupies the middle position between the second and third approach, because in some respects it takes Europe as one arena, where basic discourses compete and travel across borders, but sometimes it focuses on the national debates and it tries to explain and understand national policies on Europe. The second approach claims prominence of national discursive spaces and focuses on foreign policies of states. The third approach takes Europe as a whole and focuses on one or a few general discourses as representing the integration process.⁷⁷⁶ In this thesis mainly the first approach is used. The discourses of the political elites of the EU and different discursive constructions of the EU and European identity by the Member states are discussed.

In European integration studies, usually “political discourses” are considered as the most important discourses. Through discourse analysis, the structures in public statements that regulate political debate are tried to be found out. Waever argues that many scholars, who study political discourses, are usually surprised that political language is generally systematic and coherent. Thus, a political speech is not only a short-term justification of a decision; it is also a struggle over the resources for future battles. Discourse analysts are mostly interested in how a politician argues, instead of what he says.⁷⁷⁷ Articles or books of scholars of European studies or any speech of political leaders of Member States or the officials of the EU have been effective on construction of European identity. Diez analyzes the role of language in construction process of the EU. He argues that the attempts of academicians and politicians to explain the characteristics of the EU polity are part of the construction process of the EU. He claims that the EU polity is constructed through language. He states that “...the entire history of European integration can be understood as

⁷⁷⁴ Cited in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.202. For further detail see O. Waever, “Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian”, *International Affairs*, Vol.66, No.3, 1990, pp.477-493; B. Strath, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other”, pp.385-420.

⁷⁷⁵ T. Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse”, p.610.

⁷⁷⁶ O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.211.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.199-200.

a history of performative ‘**speech acts**’ establishing a system of governance.”⁷⁷⁸ For example, “conceptualization of the EU as a system of multilevel governance creates a notion of politics working on different levels, as if it were an objective fact.”⁷⁷⁹ Onuf and Kratochwil use “speech act theory”. “Speech act” refers to “the act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act.”⁷⁸⁰ Thus, language is “performative”, not only “descriptive”.⁷⁸¹ According to Onuf, people construct their worlds through language. Language does not describe reality, instead it constructs reality. He emphasizes the importance of the “speech acts” and “rules”. He argues that social world is constructed by speaking of words, rather than physical activity, which is referred to as “**speech act theory**”. According to this theory, rules are developed from speech acts. Speech acts may be institutionalized into rules through repetition. Rules provide guidance for human behaviour and make shared meaning possible; but they do not determine human behaviour. Onuf differentiates between three types of speech acts in terms of how they link words and world. “Assertives” do not try to change an existing arrangement. “Directives fit world to words, because they change the world.”⁷⁸² “Commissives fit words to the world.”⁷⁸³ According to Onuf, rules can not be differentiated as regulative and constitutive; because, they can not be separated in a socially constructed world.⁷⁸⁴ Thus, according to “speech act theory” language is the main instrument to construct the social world.

Discourse analysts usually look at Europe through its boundaries; because “the boundaries of Europe are lived, they might shape Europe more than its centre.”⁷⁸⁵ Another form of identity construction is based on temporal differentiation. Here Europe is defined in relation to itself along the axis of past, present and future. According to this understanding, Europe’s violent past is considered as the “other” and it is emphasized that there is a necessity for integration in the present to avoid Europe’s future to be like its

⁷⁷⁸ T. Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse”, pp.652-668.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁰ M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, pp.20-22.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸² Quoted in M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, pp.151-155.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁴ Cited in M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, pp.151-155.

⁷⁸⁵ Quoted in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.210. For further detail see S. Boym, “Leningrad into St. Petersburg: The Dream of Europe at the Margins” in B. Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, pp.311-324.

past.⁷⁸⁶ This idea has been emphasized frequently in the discourses of the EU elites and in some official documents of the EU. As it was argued in the 1st Chapter, discourses on the boundaries of Europe, the EU and discourses about “Europe’s own past” as its “other” have been also effective on construction process of European identity.

Through discourse analysis, whether Europe is built in contrast to some external “other” such as Turkey and/or Islam, Russia or the USA have been investigated.⁷⁸⁷ As a result of these studies, it is usually found out that the EU has done this to a certain extent. The reason of this may be explained by the complex structure of the EU which may be referred to as “de facto variable geometry”. It prevents total contrast and leads to “analog model of multiple differentiations.”⁷⁸⁸ Another reason may be its “magnet function”, thus it should avoid exclusionary logic to be a wider Europe.⁷⁸⁹ Discourse analysis contributes to understand how identity is constructed.⁷⁹⁰ Nanz argues that European identity has been constructed from above by bureaucrats of the EU, political actors, theorists of European integration and intellectuals. It has been also constructed and reconstructed in people’s everyday life discourse.⁷⁹¹ Although their influence on construction of European identity is different, everybody within the EU has been part of the construction process of European identity to a certain extent through their discourses. In this thesis the discourses of the political elites and officials of the EU are focused on. Politicians of Member States have different discourses about the EU and European identity. Discourse analysis is used in analysing the in depth interviews which were conducted by the author.

Discourse analysis of European identity may be based on “cultural and identity policies of the EU.” The strategy of the Commission about construction of European identity has changed over the years. As it was discussed in the 1st Chapter, the Commission

⁷⁸⁶ Cited in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.210. For further detail see O. Waever, “European Security Identities”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No.1, March 1996, pp.103-132; B. Buzan, O. Waever, et al., *Security a New Framework of Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.

⁷⁸⁷ Cited in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.210. For further detail see T. Kostakopoulou, “Why a Community of Europeans Could be a Community of Exclusion: A Reply to Howe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35, No.2, 1997, pp.301-314; B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, pp.13-44.

⁷⁸⁸ I.B. Neumann, “European Identity:EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus”, pp.397-416; quoted in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.210.

⁷⁸⁹ O. Waever, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections From a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders” in M. Kelstrup & M.C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, London: Routledge Pub., 2000, pp.250-294 ; cited in O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.210.

⁷⁹⁰ O. Waever, “Discursive Approaches”, p.209.

⁷⁹¹ P. Isabelle Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, p.281.

tried to use the symbols which are similar to those of the nation-states such as flag and anthem in the 1980s. In the early 1990s the EU's policy changed towards a policy which emphasizes the plurality of the identity of Europe.⁷⁹² The principle of "unity in diversity" has been emphasized more. Thus, the official discourses of the EU about European identity have changed since the 1970s.

In discursive approaches feeling of belonging to a state, nation and Europe are considered as identities, which may stay together simultaneously. European identity is not considered as it may replace national identities one day; because, each European nation's "vision of itself" is related with different understanding of Europe.⁷⁹³ In this thesis it is argued that there has been an ongoing construction process of European identity, without replacing national identities. The construction of national identities in Europe were constructed as a result of their interactions with each other and the ongoing interactions between European and national identities have affected ongoing construction of national identities within the EU, which will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Discourse analysis can be also used to explain the dynamics of enlargement process of the EU. To find out the reasons of the enlargement towards the CEE, "speech act theory" may be used.⁷⁹⁴ Fierke, Wiener and Schimmelfennig try to explain the paradox of enlargement process which does not seem in the interest of the Member States, through speech acts (Schimmelfennig refers to it as "rhetorical action"). Like all other acts, acts with words also create unintended effects such as commitments and moral obligations. They also change reality. Thus, words do not only derive from politics, they are often politics itself.⁷⁹⁵ Discursive approaches may be also used to understand the role of identity in Turkey-EU relations which will be discussed in Chapter V. There are huge differences between discourses of the EU elites about the membership of the countries of the CEE and Turkey which lead to different way of interactions between the EU and these countries.

⁷⁹² Cited in O. Waever, "Discursive Approaches", p.211. For further detail see M. Pantel, "Unity-Diversity: Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy" in T. Banchoff & M. Smith, (eds.), *Legitimacy and the EU*, London: Routledge Pub., 1999, pp.46-65; J.M. Delgado Moreira, "Cohesion and Citizenship in EU Cultural Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2000, pp.449-470.

⁷⁹³ O. Waever, "Discursive Approaches", p.205.

⁷⁹⁴ Cited in O. Waever, "Discursive Approaches", p.212. For further detail see K.M. Fierke & A. Wiener, "Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.5, 1999, pp.721-742; M.C. Williams & I.B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pp. 357-387.

⁷⁹⁵ O. Waever, "Discursive Approaches", p.212.

The discourses about the enlargements toward the countries of the CEE and the debates on Turkey's membership have been also effective on construction of European identity within the EU.

II.2.3. Social Constructivism and Identity

Social constructivism deals with the politics of identity and how identities are constructed.⁷⁹⁶ Social constructivism has achieved to establish “identity” as a key component of international relations. According to social constructivists, normative or ideational structures are as important as material structures. They argue that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values have structural characteristics and they have a powerful influence on social and political action.⁷⁹⁷ Social constructivism emphasizes the role of identity in shaping political action.⁷⁹⁸ Zehfuss points out that “identity makes possible the claim that, international politics is constructed.”⁷⁹⁹ Constructivists assume the existence of certain phenomena (ontology) such as identity or preference change as the starting point of analysis and reject rationalist approaches, because of their inability to predict and explain these phenomena.⁸⁰⁰ For social constructivists, normative and ideational structures can shape the social identities of political actors. Reus-Smit gives this example: The institutionalized norms of the academy shape the identity of a professor, thus the norms of the international system shape the social identity of the sovereign state.⁸⁰¹ Institutionalized norms affect identity of actors and their behaviours. Thus, the institutionalized norms of the EU have affected the identities of Member States and their citizens.

According to social constructivists, states are constrained by “social normative structures”. For them, international society is a normative structure which is composed of autonomous and constitutive norms that exist independently from states. They argue that individuals and groups in society are socialized by societal norms, similarly states are socialized by norms of international society. States do not have *a priori* interests. They claim that the identities of states are constructed through norms, which define state's

⁷⁹⁶ T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.192.

⁷⁹⁷ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.216-217.

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.209.

⁷⁹⁹ M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.39.

⁸⁰⁰ Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, No.2, June 2001, p.235.

⁸⁰¹ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.217.

interests. Thus, norms construct identities which lead to changes in the interests of states and that lead to changes in state policies.⁸⁰² Reus-Smit asserts that “normative and ideational structures are seen as shaping actors’ identities and interests through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint.”⁸⁰³ Thus, institutionalized norms and ideas affect what actors consider necessary and possible in practical and ethical terms. When an individual or a state wants to justify their behaviour, they usually make reference to established norms to have legitimacy. A state may justify its behaviour with reference to norms of sovereignty or in the case of intervention to internal affairs of another state; it will try to make a reference to international human rights norms. Making a reference to established norms to justify behaviour is an effective strategy, if the behaviour is consistent with those norms to a certain extent. Sometimes different norms may conflict with each other. For example, the norms of sovereignty and human rights usually conflict with each other.⁸⁰⁴

For social constructivists, it is through reciprocal interaction that, we create the social structures in terms of which, we define our identities and interests.⁸⁰⁵ Identities are socially constructed, thus actors’ understanding of “self” and “other” may change during interaction process.⁸⁰⁶ Hopf contends that “understanding how identities are constructed, which norms and practices accompany their reproduction and how they construct each other is a major part of the constructivist research program.”⁸⁰⁷ Interaction processes within the EU among the Member States and the interactions of the EU with other actors of the world have been effective on construction of EU identity. In today’s world, integration process within the framework of the EU, including its norms, institutions and policies have a dominant role in the construction of European identity.

Collective identities have emerged from an ongoing construction process of shared understandings about a group’s self. The “othering” and identity construction go hand in

⁸⁰² J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, pp.146-148.

⁸⁰³ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.218-219.

⁸⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁵ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.406.

⁸⁰⁶ For further detail see J. T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 1998; A.

Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 1992.

⁸⁰⁷ T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.192.

hand. The discourse on the “other” always contains elements of “self-understanding”.⁸⁰⁸ Wendt states that:

Conceptions of the “self” and interest tend to mirror the practices of “significant others” over time. This principle of identity formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘**looking-glass self**’, which asserts that the ‘self’ is a reflection of an actor’s socialisation.⁸⁰⁹

It means that after a while states start to see themselves as “others” see them, like people.⁸¹⁰ If the “other” treats the “self” as it is an enemy, then by the “principle of reflected appraisals”, it is likely to internalize that idea in its own role identity.⁸¹¹ Only “role” identities such as enemy, friend or rival require the existence of other state; but for example, democracy describes a state’s internal system of rule and all states may become democratic. Sometimes the performance of a democratic identity may lead to discursive differentiation between “fully democratic self” from the “inadequately democratic other”.⁸¹²

According to social constructivists, identities and interests are endogenous to interaction. Thus, they are dependent variables. Structural change occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want.⁸¹³ Wendt argues that the identities of actors are not given; instead they are developed and transformed in interaction.⁸¹⁴ He asserts that “through repeated interactive processes stable identities and expectations about each other are developed.”⁸¹⁵ He also points out that state identities and interests can be transformed by many factors, such as individual, domestic, systemic and transnational factors.⁸¹⁶ He also puts forward that interaction leads to emergence and sustainability of identity. When agents are communicating, they are “reproducing a particular conception of who they

⁸⁰⁸ R. Hülse, “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference: Turkey as Europe’s Other?”, 1999.

⁸⁰⁹ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, pp.399-404.

⁸¹⁰ J. S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, p.141.

⁸¹¹ A. Wendt, *A Social Theory of International Politics*, p.327.

⁸¹² B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 32.

⁸¹³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp.336-337.

⁸¹⁴ A. Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics” in Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p.48; cited in Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity” in Stefano Guzzini & Anna Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, London: Routledge Pub., 2006, p.95.

⁸¹⁵ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.405.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.424.

are.”⁸¹⁷ Thus, during the process of communication, agents participate in the constitution of their identities and counter-identities.⁸¹⁸

Wendt asserts that there are two types of identity formation: “Natural selection” and “cultural selection”. He mostly focuses on cultural selection. There are two ways of cultural selection, which are “imitation” and “social learning”. Imitation means that “...actors adopt the self-understandings of those, whom they perceive as successful...”⁸¹⁹ which is the case also during the enlargement process of the EU. He also mentions two types of social learning: “Simple learning” and “complex learning”. When learning only has behavioural effects, it is referred to as “simple learning” when it has construction effects on identities and interests, it is referred to as “complex learning.” Wendt made a reference to the symbolic interactionist tradition and its main representative Mead, to explain how identities and interests are learned in social interaction. Wendt also mentions the concept of “**mirroring**” or “**reflected appraisals**” in this framework which means that, identities are learned in response to how actors are treated by “**significant others**”.⁸²⁰ All “other”s are not equally important. Some of them can be considered as “significant others” whose responses and attitudes towards the “self” is considered as much more important and effective than the others, thus “significant others” have stronger effects on the construction process of the “self”.

As it was argued, Wendt focuses on construction and transformation processes of collective identities. Wendt puts forward that one of the mechanisms of identity transformation is “conscious efforts to change identity.” He claims that actors can engage in critical self-reflection and they can transform roles. This new behaviour affects the partner in interaction, which will lead to change in its identity.⁸²¹ He usually focuses on changes in state identities. He distinguishes four kinds of identity: “corporate, type, role and collective”. He distinguishes between two types of interests: objective and subjective.⁸²² He also mentions four main national interests: “physical survival, autonomy,

⁸¹⁷ A. Wendt, *A Social Theory of International Politics*, p.341.

⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁹ Quoted in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp.325-327.

⁸²⁰ Cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp.325-327.

⁸²¹ Cited in M. Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity”, p.100. For further detail see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.421; A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999.

⁸²² Cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.198.

economic well-being and collective self-esteem.”⁸²³ He defines “**corporate identity**” as the “... self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality”⁸²⁴ and “**social identity**” as “the sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself, while taking the perspective of others” as a social object.⁸²⁵ Social identities or roles exist in relation to others.⁸²⁶ State’s corporate identity may be defined by its territory, legal framework and other institutions. Its social identities may be, to be a small or a great power, a friend or an enemy. Nations also have corporate and social identities. Collective actors’ corporate identity shows group’s existence, on the other hand, social identity refers to the group’s characteristics, or “the members’ collective conception of the group’s mission or role within a given social setting.”⁸²⁷

In the case of the EU, its corporate identity may refer to its institutional structure, which is too complex to define and it has changed since its foundation and has been still in an ongoing construction process. There are still disagreements among its Member States even about its corporate identity. For example, some founder states of the EU such as Germany and BENELUX countries prefer much more federal corporate identity; on the other hand, some members such as the UK and most of the new members from the CEE prefer intergovernmental corporate identity for the EU. On the other hand, the role of the EU as a soft power, normative power and its democratisation role in the CEE, Turkey, etc. may be considered as parts of its social identity.

Wendt mentions four factors, which may lead to collective identity formation: “interdependence, common fate, homogenisation and self-restraint.”⁸²⁸ He asserts that these factors contribute to cooperative behaviour; they may also lead to reconstruction of the role of states from a “rival” to a “friend”. He also points out that collective identity can be constructed mainly with the effect of interdependence. If states are interdependent to each other, interaction between them is too intense, which leads to emergence of “core

⁸²³ Quoted in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.198.

⁸²⁴ A. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review* 88,1994, p.385; quoted in Lars Erik Cederman & Christopher Daase, “Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory” in S. Guzzini & A. Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, p.120.

⁸²⁵ A. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, p.385; quoted in L. E. Cederman and C. Daase, “Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory”, p.120.

⁸²⁶ Cited in M. Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity”, p.99.

⁸²⁷ A. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, 1994; quoted in L. E. Cederman & C. Daase, “Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory”, pp.120-121.

⁸²⁸ Quoted in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.44.

areas” around which “concentric circles of identification” may emerge.⁸²⁹ Interdependency among the Member States has been effective on construction of European identity among its citizens and construction of EU identity among its Member States.

Constructivist scholars such as Hopf and Zehfuss see identities as multiple and fluid.⁸³⁰ Wendt also argues that each person has many identities such as brother, teacher and citizen. Similarly a state may have multiple identities such as sovereign, Western power, etc.⁸³¹ In this thesis, it is also argued that having multiple identities is so common in contemporary world, especially the context of the EU provides a suitable atmosphere to have multiple identities both for its Member States and its citizens.

II.2.4. Critiques on Social Constructivism

Constructivists mostly focus on cultural, institutional and normative aspects of international relations. They focus on culture, norms, institutions and identity which are examples of an intersubjective world that is created, instead of an objective world that is discovered.⁸³² Sometimes social constructivists are considered as unrealistic, because of their emphasis on the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, identity and language.⁸³³ It is also argued that social constructivists have usually dealt with questions of ontology, but they have not dealt enough with the empirical questions of how identities and interests are produced by practice.⁸³⁴ Checkel points out that the central challenge for constructivists is “theory development”.⁸³⁵ Eilstrup-Sangiovanni asserts that one of the main weaknesses of social constructivism is “the relative weakness of their methodological foundations”.⁸³⁶

In constructivist research there is usually a lack of “observationally distinctive hypotheses”. For example, some constructivist scholars only search for a correlation

⁸²⁹ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999; cited in Hidemi Suganami, “Wendt, IR and Philosophy” in S. Guzzini & A. Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, pp.58-59.

⁸³⁰ J. T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)”, 2003.

⁸³¹ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.398.

⁸³² R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations-Theories and Approaches*, pp.257-258.

⁸³³ T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, pp.176-177.

⁸³⁴ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.425.

⁸³⁵ J. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, p.324.

⁸³⁶ Quoted in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, pp.401-403. For further detail see J. Checkel, “A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies?”, *European Union Politics*, Vol.2, No.2, 2001, pp.219-249; J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, pp.545-560.

between ideas or norms and individual behaviour to show that “ideas matter”. Checkel contends that constructivists have spent so much time on ontological differences between rationalist and constructivist perspectives, but they do not spend enough time to suggest hypotheses and control them by empirical testing. Checkel tries to develop a theory of social learning in the EU. He claims that social learning is more possible, when actors are faced with a crisis or policy failure.⁸³⁷ Thus, one of the challenges of constructivists is to empirically show “...the social interaction processes, through which interests are changing.”⁸³⁸ As Checkel argues, much of the constructivist work is not able to show the mechanisms of “socialisation” and “learning”. Social constructivists can show that social construction matters, but it is much more difficult to show “when, how and why it occurs”, finding out the actors and mechanisms that cause change and the conditions under which they operate.⁸³⁹

In spite of these deficiencies, social constructivism is helpful to understand the effects of the international norms, the dynamics of the interaction processes among actors and their effects on identities. Moravcsik asserts that constructivists have not made an important contribution to empirical understanding of European integration. He argues that they can not construct “distinctive testable hypotheses”. He claims that, constructivists suggest some hypotheses which are in principle falsifiable, but they “... do not employ methods capable of distinguishing the predicted outcome from those predicted by alternative (rationalist) hypotheses.”⁸⁴⁰ Moravcsik recommends constructivists to focus on the specification of testable hypotheses.⁸⁴¹ Many post-positivist analysts disagree about the claims of objectivity and presence of an objective world in social science and reject Moravcsik’s suggestion about falsifiable hypothesis-testing. Among the social constructivist scholars, there is a substantial number of post-positivist scholars, who continue to reject hypothesis-testing and falsification as the standard of social-scientific work and they construct theories which are unfalsifiable through which any outcome confirms the social construction of European identity.⁸⁴²

⁸³⁷ Cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, pp.401-403. For further detail see J. Checkel, “A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies?”, pp.219-249; J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, pp.545-560.

⁸³⁸ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.403.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.403-404.

⁸⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No. 5, 1999, pp.669-681.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp.669-681.

⁸⁴² M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.236.

The main goal of this thesis is not to make “falsifiable hypothesis testing”. Rather than finding an outcome, the dynamics of ongoing construction process of European identity within the EU is focused on. In order to analyze this process, the role of the political elites of the EU, their discourses, the institutions of the EU especially the Commission and the EP, the effects of education, audiovisual and cultural policies of the EU, in addition to these, state-like instruments of the EU, such as introduction of EU citizenship and construction of symbols are analyzed.

II.2.5. Comparison between Social Constructivism and Some Theories of International Relations and Theories of Integration

In this part social constructivism is compared with some theories of international relations and some theories of integration, in order to show the reasons of using social constructivism as the main theoretical background to analyze the construction process of European identity within the EU.

II.2.5.1. Comparison between Social Constructivism and Some Theories of International Relations

Until the late 1980s there was a dominance of materialism in theories of international relations. For neorealists the main determinant of state behaviour is the distribution of material capabilities across states in the international system. Their main goal is to survive which causes balance of power competition. Neoliberals also see state interests as mostly material. Both neorealists and neoliberals see people and states as atomistic, self-interested and strategic actors. Both of these theories do not take into consideration the social dimensions of international politics. On the other hand, social constructivism focuses on social, historical and normative factors.⁸⁴³ Especially in the post-Cold War era, positivist theories were not satisfactory to understand the new realities of world politics. In the 1990s the contribution to the debate about European integration came from social constructivists, who emphasize the importance of actors’ subjective beliefs, such as norms, identities and cultures which are effective on political outcomes.⁸⁴⁴

⁸⁴³ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.225-227.

⁸⁴⁴ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.393.

Mainly in three main respects social constructivism contrasts with positivism. Firstly positivists assume that actors are atomistic egoists, on the contrary, constructivists treat them as social, which means that, their identities are constituted by the institutionalized norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act. Secondly instead of treating actors' interests as given prior to social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to interaction or as learnt through processes of communication. Thirdly, while positivists see society as a place, where actors rationally try to fulfill their interests, constructivists see it as a constitutive atmosphere, which makes them, who they are.⁸⁴⁵ The context of the EU can be also considered as a constitutive atmosphere which affects the identity and behaviour of its Member States and its citizens. Positivist theories presuppose that, state interests are fixed and they do not deal with their identity. On the other hand, constructivists argue that interests are constantly changing, as identities change with the effects of normative structural changes.⁸⁴⁶

In neorealism international system mostly defines the national interests. On the other hand, in social constructivism actors and structures mutually constitute each other.⁸⁴⁷ State interests are mostly constructed by systemic structures. Structure is made of social relationships. Social structures are composed of practices, which are always in process.⁸⁴⁸ In social constructivism, social interaction is the mechanism for the reproduction of structures.⁸⁴⁹ Norms and ideas can shape the identities and interests of states. Norms do not only regulate behaviour, they also define the identity of a state. On the contrary for positivists, norms are totally determined by the interests of actors. Social constructivists criticize positivist theories especially on the grounds that they are "excessively materialist and agent-centric". For positivists, IR appears as mostly the product of agents. State preferences are always based on a power-maximizing rationality.⁸⁵⁰ According to Reus-Smit, positivists reduce the social to strategic interaction; they deny the historical process by accepting universal forms of rationality and reduce politics to "utility maximizing calculation". On the contrary, social constructivists see the social as a constitutive field, mention the role of history as an important factor and emphasize the variability of political

⁸⁴⁵ C. Reus-Smit, "Constructivism", p.219.

⁸⁴⁶ J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, p.146.

⁸⁴⁷ T. Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", p.181.

⁸⁴⁸ A. Wendt, "Constructing International Politics", pp.72-74.

⁸⁴⁹ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, London: Mac Millan Press, 2000, p.172.

⁸⁵⁰ J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, pp.145-147.

practices.⁸⁵¹ According to social constructivism, the existing system is composed of states, if they change their conceptions of who they are and what their interests are, then the system will change.⁸⁵² Social constructivists argue that they provide a better understanding of agency and a more dynamic conception of international systemic structures by emphasizing the interactive relationship among them.⁸⁵³ According to positivists, social interaction may cause change in strategies of actors, but their identities and interests do not change.⁸⁵⁴

Social constructivists argue that social constructivism is based on a “broader and deeper ontology” than positivist approaches. They claim that they provide a basis for understanding broader range of social ontologies such as identity.⁸⁵⁵ In terms of the relationship with positivism, there are different perceptions among social constructivists. Some of them argue that “productive engagement” is possible between these two approaches. Social constructivists focus on the process of “interest formation”, positivists focus on “interest satisfaction”. Some social constructivists try to build a bridge between these two approaches by division of labour among them. According to them, social constructivists may explain how actors choose their interests and positivists try to find out, how they realize those interests. They claim that social constructivism is not a rival theoretical perspective to positivist theories, instead a complementary one.⁸⁵⁶ Checkel and Wendt want to “synthesize” social constructivism and positivist theories. Wendt tries to reach a compromise among them especially by his book “Social Theory of International Politics”.⁸⁵⁷

If social constructivism is compared with post-positivist theories, post-positivist theories totally reject positivist theories. On the other hand, social constructivists, especially conventional constructivists try to build a bridge between positivist and post-positivists. Like critical theorists and postmodernists, social constructivists argue that there

⁸⁵¹ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.227.

⁸⁵² R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.258.

⁸⁵³ C. Reus-Smit, “The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After The Cold War”, p.10.

⁸⁵⁴ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.396.

⁸⁵⁵ T. Christiansen, K.E. Jorgensen & A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, p.533.

⁸⁵⁶ C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.223.

⁸⁵⁷ Cited in M. Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, p.5. For further detail see J. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide”, *European Journal of International Relations* Vol.3, 1997, p.488; A. Wendt, “On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 179-180.

is no external, objective social reality. The social and political world is not a physical entity, which is outside human consciousness. The international system is not something out there. "...It exists only as intersubjective awareness among people."⁸⁵⁸ As Zehfuss argues, in contrast to postmodernists, social constructivists respect the methodologies and procedures of social science and they also engage in debate with positivists.⁸⁵⁹

In this thesis social constructivism is mainly used as a theoretical background to analyze construction process of European identity within the EU; because, positivist theories reduce interaction processes among states to strategical interactions and focus on how to satisfy actors' interests. On the other hand, social constructivism focuses on construction process of collective identities and actors' interests. In the context of the EU the identities of the Member States and their citizens have been in an ongoing construction and reconstruction process with the effects of the highly dense interactions among them and under the influence of the institutionalized norms of the EU.

II.2.5.2. Comparison between Social Constructivism and Some Theories of Integration

Neofunctionalism is one of the main theories of European integration. It can be also considered as a positivist theory. Its main goal was to predict the prospects of political integration firstly in Europe, then in other regions and eventually in the whole world. It tries to find out "...how human collectivities can move beyond the nation-state."⁸⁶⁰ On the other hand, social constructivism is a theory of international relations. It does not focus on a specific outcome such as the emergence of a supranational political community. Haas asserts that if neofunctionalism can be reasonably subsumed by constructivism, it would gain generality and would become part of a theory of international relations.⁸⁶¹ There are many differences between these theories which make it too hard to bridge the gap among them.

⁸⁵⁸ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.253.

⁸⁵⁹ M. Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity", p.117.

⁸⁶⁰ Ernst B. Haas, "Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?" in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, p.440.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp.440-441.

In neofunctionalism integration is expected to occur when societal actors decide that their interests may be better served by supranational institutions, instead of their national governments. Neofunctionalism also presupposes transfer of loyalties to supranational institutions. Such a transfer may occur when actors think that, their interests are better served by European institutions rather than national ones.⁸⁶² According to neofunctionalism, socialisation process and subsequently feeling of belonging will emerge as a “natural outgrowth” of economic integration, without any necessity for taking initiatives to achieve this outcome. On the other hand, the founders of the EU believed that nothing could be achieved without human will, thus the need for some intervention was accepted. Since the 1950s the Commission has started to intervene to socialize citizens of the Member States and to increase their feeling of belonging to the EU.⁸⁶³ Although Member States have increasingly transferred part of their sovereignties to the EU, this has not led to transfer of loyalties of citizens to the EU. In 1968 Haas explained the reason of slowdown of European integration process. He argued that integration was based on “converging pragmatic interests”, which is mostly related with economic welfare. However, there is a lack of philosophical and ideological commitment to cooperate on common values and goals.⁸⁶⁴ On the other hand, there are some similarities between social constructivism and neofunctionalism. Both social constructivism and neofunctionalism focus on socialization, learning and transfers of loyalty, also they both argue that actors may redefine their interests because of interaction within European institutions.⁸⁶⁵ Both deals with the effects of ideas and values on actors’ interests and behaviours and they accept the constraining effects of supranational institutions.⁸⁶⁶ Both social constructivism and neofunctionalism assume that actors’ preferences are not fixed. Like social constructivists, neofunctionalists accept the possibility of transformation of interests during integration process. Both of them assume that integration leads to a high degree of “actor socialization.”⁸⁶⁷ Haas pointed out that there is a similarity between neofunctionalism only with one type of social constructivism which is “soft rational choice” version of

⁸⁶² M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.401.

⁸⁶³ Isabelle Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, *European Law Journal*, Vol.12, No. 5, September 2006, pp.662-663.

⁸⁶⁴ E. B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, p.xxiii; cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.401.

⁸⁶⁵ Cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.400. For further detail see J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, pp.545-560; T. Diez, “Europe as a Discursive Battleground: European Integration Studies and Discourse Analysis”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 36, No.1, 2001, pp.5-38.

⁸⁶⁶ E. B. Haas, “Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?”, p.437.

⁸⁶⁷ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.400.

constructivism. In this type of constructivism, the origin of interests is considered within nation-states, but the effects of transnational movements are taken into consideration. This type of social constructivists includes Peter Katzenstein, Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas.⁸⁶⁸

It can be argued that neofunctionalism is similar to conventional constructivism to a certain extent; but neofunctionalism focuses on the results of the integration process; on the other hand, social constructivism focuses on the process. Neofunctionalism also emphasizes learning and socialisation through interaction, but it mostly focuses on consequences. It does not empirically show the mechanisms of changes in identities and interests. Instead it focuses on the outcomes such as changed identities and interests. On the other hand, social constructivism "...refines neofunctionalism by adding an explicit theory of identity and its transformation."⁸⁶⁹ Thus, social constructivism focuses on the interaction process among actors and transformation of their identities in this process, on the other hand, neofunctionalism focuses on the outcomes of this interaction process. In this thesis, rather than predicting outcomes of the integration process, construction process of European identity in the EU and effective factors on this process are analyzed.

II.2.6. Comparison of Social Constructivism and Essentialism in Terms of Analyzing European Identity

Essentialist or primordialist approach is a way of analyzing the emergence of collective identities which explains the collective identity formation process on the basis of pre-given factors such as common myths, race and culture. According to essentialists, if there are no shared cultural characteristics or history, this may lead to emphasis on differences from outsiders by constructing the "other". Thus, essentialist approach to collective identity formation may lead to emergence of an exclusivist identity.

The essentialist approach to collective identity formation is primarily based on cultural variables. On the contrary, social constructivism focuses on politics.⁸⁷⁰ In the case of nations, "primordialists take identity as fixed by inherited linguistic, racial, ethnic and/or

⁸⁶⁸ E. B. Haas, "Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?", pp.442-443.

⁸⁶⁹ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies", pp.400-401.

⁸⁷⁰ L. E. Cederman, "Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos", p.10.

territorial commonalities.”⁸⁷¹ On the other hand, for constructivists identity is related with common civic values and political practices that bind a national group together; even these commonalities are not perceived as fixed, because, national tradition is a “political invention”.⁸⁷² According to essentialism, there is a national essence that can be discovered, protected and promoted by the state. Essentialists assert that national identity is an integral, essential part of “self”. On the other hand, social constructivists argue that it is impossible to be born with national characteristics;⁸⁷³ identities are socially constructed in specific social circumstances,⁸⁷⁴ such as construction of national identities. Smith’s arguments challenge constructivism, because he adopts a middle ground approach to national identity, by establishing a linkage between social constructivism and essentialist approaches. He defines national identity as a product of both “natural continuity” and “conscious manipulation”. Natural continuity emerges from pre-existing ethnic identity and community, conscious manipulation is made by ideology and symbolism⁸⁷⁵ which are used and enforced by the institutions of the state. It is easier to construct a national identity among a group of people who have already had some common cultural characteristics and historical background.

In terms of European integration, essentialists emphasize the process of convergence of European societies since the end of the 2nd World War. This kind of bottom-up approach assume that increased contact and socialization at both popular and elite levels may strengthen the feeling of community which will push European integration process further. According to this approach, an increase in the level of social contact will lead to creation of a common European identity which is produced from the “pool of the shared experiences”,⁸⁷⁶ but that will take a lot of time. Essentialist scholars do not think about the possibility of superseding nationalism, on the contrary, many social constructivists claim the opposite.⁸⁷⁷ Essentialists argue that Europe possesses little

⁸⁷¹ Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures”, *World Politics*, Vol. 52, April 2000, p.279.

⁸⁷² *Ibid.*

⁸⁷³ M. Spiering, “National Identity and European Unity”, pp.115-116.

⁸⁷⁴ S. Macdonald, “Identity Complexes in Western Europe: Social Anthropological Perspectives” in S. Macdonald (ed.), *Inside European Identities*, Oxford: Berg, 1993, p.6; cited in N. Renwick, “Re-reading Europe’s Identities”, p.155.

⁸⁷⁵ Karen A. Cerulo, “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, 1997, pp.390-391.

⁸⁷⁶ P. Isabelle Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, pp.294.

⁸⁷⁷ L. E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.14.

common cultural and historical background. Thus, it is too difficult among the peoples of Europe to create its common collective identity in essentialist terms. According to essentialists, there is a positive correlation between “culture” and “identity”, thus it is too hard to construct supranational identities, because of the lack of common cultural characteristics among Member States. For essentialists, collective identities are only possible at the highest level for the nation-states. Especially “Euro-pessimists” think about the possibility of further integration negatively in this regard. They argue that “a European polity is impossible, because there are no European people, no common European history or common myths on which collective European identity could be built.”⁸⁷⁸

For social constructivists, identities are seen as socially constructed, that can be shaped by active intervention and planning. The construction of European identity is also possible for them. For example “Germany as a cultural identity was created in the process of forging the *Zollverein* and the Bismarckian Reich.”⁸⁷⁹ Thus, European identity may be also constructed by the will and planning of elites which is an activist and elite-centered vision. On the other hand, for essentialists cultural identities are based on generations of shared memories and experiences, thus common European identity would be likely to evolve through a slow and mostly unplanned process.⁸⁸⁰ According to essentialists, identity can not be constructed by top-down initiatives; instead it needs a long time for the emergence of common cultural characteristics and memories among the people.

In this thesis it is argued that construction process of European identity within the EU has been ongoing without replacing national identities. According to Risse, the European polity does not need to have a “*demos*” which replaces national identity with a European one; instead one in which national and European identities may both co-exist and complement each other.⁸⁸¹ It is also argued that the construction process of European identity have also affected construction process of national identities within the EU. The interactions between European identity and national identities will be discussed in Chapter IV.

⁸⁷⁸ P. G. Kielmansegg, “Integration und Demokratie” in M. Jachtenfuchs & B. Kohler-Koch (eds.), *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1996, pp.47-71; quoted in T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p.166.

⁸⁷⁹ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.124-126.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸¹ P. G. Kielmansegg, “Integration und Demokratie”, pp.47-71; cited in T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p.166.

Consequently, in this thesis social constructivism is mainly used as a theoretical background to explain the construction process of European identity during the ongoing integration process within the EU. The main reason of using this theory as the theoretical background is that, social constructivism focuses on construction process of collective identities. Social constructivism focuses on the symbolic aspects of European integration such as discourses, norms and symbols.⁸⁸² In this thesis, effects of the institutionalized norms of the EU, introduction of symbols of the EU and discourses of the political elites of the EU on construction process of European identity are analyzed. Another reason for using this theory is that, “Europe has to be studied as a process, not as a product.”⁸⁸³ Europe has always been an evolving concept throughout history and it has been in an ongoing construction and reconstruction process which has accelerated within the framework of the EU. The end point of the EU is still unknown and there has not been any clear common goal about its end point. Different Member States and the political elites of the EU have various approaches about the future of the EU which have affected construction process of European identity. As it was argued, social constructivism focuses on the interaction processes among agents, also between agents and structures which have affected construction of identities of Member States and identities of the citizens of the EU.

II.3. Analyzing Construction of European Identity on the Basis of Social Constructivism

Social constructivist scholars have an increasing research focused on European integration and Europeanisation process in the last years.⁸⁸⁴ There has been an increasing concern with effects of institutionalisation in the EU such as generating shared systems of belief, shaping norms and values.⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸² Niilo Kauppi, “Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics and of European Integration”, *Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 104*, will be published in *Theory and Society*.

⁸⁸³ For further detail see M. Abeles, “Virtual Europe”, 2000.

⁸⁸⁴ Cited in J. Trondal, “Is There any Social Constructivist-Institutionalist Divide? Unpacking Social Mechanisms Affecting Representational Roles Among EU Decision-Makers”, p.1. For further detail see *Journal of European Public Policy*, Special Issue on the Social Construction of Europe, Vol.6, No.4, 1999.

⁸⁸⁵ B. Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and The Social Construction of European Identities”, p.656.

As Risse-Kappen argues “international institutions are social environments”.⁸⁸⁶ Participation in those institutions may socialize states.⁸⁸⁷ Koslowski and Kratochwil contend that “the constructivist research program identifies institutions as both elements of stability and as strategic variables for the analysis of change...”⁸⁸⁸ For them, institutions are continually reproduced through the actors’ practices⁸⁸⁹ and institutions have a fundamental role in constituting actors. They do not shape only their behaviours, but their preferences and identities as well.⁸⁹⁰ According to Wendt, an institution is a relatively stable set of identities and interests. He argues that “...institutionalisation is a process of internalizing new identities and interests”.⁸⁹¹ As Checkel argues, constructivists generally think that, institutions matter; they have an influence on social life and international relations.⁸⁹²

Social constructivism may be instrumental in providing a deeper understanding of European integration as a social and historical phenomenon. It examines transformatory processes of integration and helps to understand how the integration process affects states’ identity, interests and behaviour. In addition to these, it helps to understand how rules and norms are created and affect the integration process, which includes creation of supranational norms, such as *acquis communautaire*, the EU citizenship, etc.⁸⁹³ According to S. Smith, social constructivism tries to explain the institutional dynamics of contemporary Europe.⁸⁹⁴ In recent years there has been an important increase in research on the EU on the basis of social constructivism, because, it is a “good case for studying constitutive effects of international institutions.”⁸⁹⁵ S. Smith asserts that “...European

⁸⁸⁶ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995; cited in Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, *International Organization*, Vol. 59, Fall 2005, p.815.

⁸⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁸ Rey Koslowski & Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System”, *International Organization*, Vol.48, 1994, p.227.

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁰ M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.234.

⁸⁹¹ A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p.399.

⁸⁹² J. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, pp.324-48; cited in M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.234.

⁸⁹³ For further detail see T. Christiansen, K. Erik Jorgensen & A. Wiener (eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, 2001.

⁸⁹⁴ For further detail see Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond” in S. Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁸⁹⁵ M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.397.

governance is the example of social constructivism in practice.”⁸⁹⁶ Several scholars focus on “Europeanization” in terms of how interaction with and within European institutions socialize domestic agents and change their behaviour over time. They argue that integration process has a transformative impact on the state system in the EU and its constituent units.⁸⁹⁷ Some scholars analyze the construction of political identities in Europe.⁸⁹⁸ They argue that the EU institutions affect the behaviour, preferences and identities of Member States and citizens of the EU.⁸⁹⁹ In this thesis it is also argued that the integration process within the institutional framework of the EU have affected the identities of the Member States, simultaneously European identity has been in an ongoing construction process among the citizens of the EU.

As Rosamond argues, the focus of “EU-studies constructivism” is different from mainstream IR constructivism. Mainstream IR constructivism focuses on the dynamics of interstate interaction, security dilemma and the nature of anarchy. EU-studies constructivism focuses on the EU institutions which provide atmosphere of socialisation, within which actors’ interests are constructed. It also focuses on the exchange of norms between the EU and domestic polities. In addition to these, it deals with the “...constitutive power of discourses both of European space and the structures within which, that space is imagined.”⁹⁰⁰ Rosamond argues that in recent years constructivists have started to deal with the “social construction of post-territorial regions”. They are made up of people who share common identities and interests that are constituted by shared understandings and norms.⁹⁰¹ Checkel asserts that although more than fifty years have passed since the emergence of the European project, it is so interesting that we do not know much about its

⁸⁹⁶ Steve Smith, “Social Constructivisms and European Studies: A Reflectivist Critique”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No.4, Special Issue 1999, p.689.

⁸⁹⁷ Cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.397. For further detail see T. Christiansen, K. Jorgensen & A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, p.529; T. Risse & A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Social Constructivism” in T. Christiansen, K.E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, p.202.

⁸⁹⁸ For further detail see T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, pp.159-176.

⁸⁹⁹ For further detail see T.Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener, “Introduction” of a special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* on “The Social Construction of Europe”, Vol.6 No.4, 1999; M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.234; T. Risse, “Exploring The Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet The EU”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1,1996, pp.53-80.

⁹⁰⁰ E. B. Haas, “Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?”, pp.453-454.

⁹⁰¹ Cited in B. Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities”, p.658. For further detail see Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998.

“identity shaping effects.”⁹⁰² The “identity shaping effects” of the EU have been discussed especially since the 1990s. In this thesis, “identity shaping effects” of the EU on its Member States, the political elites of the EU and citizens of the EU will be discussed.

Social constructivism focuses on one aspect of the complex structure of the EU, which is construction of norms and identities. It pays less attention to other aspects, such as strategic interaction among states or effects of external factors. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni asserts that social constructivism focuses on “...how actors perceive Europe and imagine its future trajectory.”⁹⁰³ Constructivists do not see “...the EU as a set of objective institutional structures, but rather conceptualize the Union as an institutionalized venue for the construction of ideas, identities and norms.”⁹⁰⁴ The norms of the EU have affected construction of European identity among the citizens of the EU and EU identity in the world.

In this thesis, discourses of the political elites of the EU about European identity, introduction of symbols of the EU and the effects of the policies of the EU on construction of European identity are focused on. As it was discussed in the 1st Chapter, the idea of Europe is a social construct whose content has changed throughout history. Duroselle states that Europe is a “construction of the mind.”⁹⁰⁵ Lowenthal asserts that, “Europe has always been more of a mental construct than a geographical or social entity.”⁹⁰⁶ According to Marcussen, Risse, et al. there are five constructions of “Europe”, which are:

-“**Liberal nationalist identity construction**”: Political sovereignty stays mainly in the nation-states. It is compatible with the idea of “Europe of nation-states.” This idea is still supported in the UK and it was supported in France during de Gaulle’s presidency.

-A “wider **Europe as a community of values** from the Atlantic to the Urals”. This understanding was supported during the early years of the Cold War and re-emerged after the end of the East-West conflict particularly in France and Germany.

-“**Europe as a third force**” which is a democratic socialist alternative between capitalism and communism. This idea was supported among French Socialists and German Social

⁹⁰² J. Checkel, “Social Construction and European Integration”, p.50.

⁹⁰³ Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Future of European Integration Studies: The Road Ahead” in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), *Debates on European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Pub. 2006, pp.462-463.

⁹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.462-463.

⁹⁰⁵ Gilbert Trausch, “Consciousness of European Identity After 1945” in Thomas Jansen (ed.), “Reflections on European Identity”, Working Paper of the Commission, 1999, p. 21.

⁹⁰⁶ David Lowenthal, “European Identity: An Emerging Concept”, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No.3, 2000, p.314.

Democrats during the early 1950s, but then disappeared when they reconstructed their collective identities.

-A “**modern Europe as part of the Western community**” based on liberal democracy and the social market economy. It was supported in Germany towards the late 1950s.

-A “**Christian Europe**” based on Christian, particularly Catholic values. This kind of construction of Europe is common among the Christian Democrat parties in France and Germany during the 1950s.⁹⁰⁷ On the basis of the interviews conducted by the author it can be argued that this perception is still affecting the ideas of some of the Christian Democrats. All these constructions of Europe have become dominant in different periods of history.

The EU has been in an evolution process since its foundation with the effects of the internal and external dynamics.⁹⁰⁸ Hallstein stated that “we are not integrating economies, we are integrating politics. We are not just sharing our furniture; we are jointly building a new and bigger house.”⁹⁰⁹ He uses the metaphor of “house” to refer to construction process of the EU. The EU is a good example of institutionalisation process. Checkel points out that “the EU is institutionally dense environment with plenty of repeated interaction”, which has “**socialising effect**” on actors.⁹¹⁰ Thus, the institutional framework of the EU has provided a dense interaction atmosphere for the Member States and their citizens which have important effects on state identities, identities of the EU elites and citizens of the EU.

Social constructivists usually perceive the EU as a cultural and social environment, which shapes actors’ interests and identities.⁹¹¹ Social constructivism emphasizes the role of identities and norms, for example, to explain the decisions of the Member States to increase the powers of the EP. The norms of the EU have become important parts of

⁹⁰⁷ M. Marcussen, T. Risse, et al., “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities”, p.618.

⁹⁰⁸ Quoted in Mehmet Ögütçü, “Turkey and the EU: How to Achieve a Forward-looking and ‘win-win’ Accession by 2015?”, *Collegium*, No. 31, Spring 2005, p.40. For further detail see Ulrike Guerot, “Europe Could Become the First ‘Post-Modern’ Superpower”, *European Integration*, Fall 2004, it is available at http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2004_fall/2004_fall_36.php4

⁹⁰⁹ Quoted in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.40.

⁹¹⁰ J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, pp.545-560.

⁹¹¹ T. Christiansen, K. Erik Jorgensen & A. Wiener (eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, 2001; cited in Ulrich Sedelmeier, *Constructing the Path To Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact of EU Identity*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p.18.

identities of the Member States.⁹¹² The Member States (macro/state socialization) and individuals within them (individual agent socialization) have been under socialisation process within the EU.⁹¹³ Socialisation can be defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of that community.⁹¹⁴ Socialisation implies that an agent started to act according to “logic of appropriateness”, instead of “logic of consequences”.⁹¹⁵

The EU has the “**highest interaction density** of all international organisations”.⁹¹⁶ The EU has a “European and liberal identity” which are reflected in Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”⁹¹⁷ Wendt focuses on collective identity formation among states and to what extent the interaction among states might lead to cooperative interaction. He points out that “the more actor’s social identities include positive identification with the other, the more likely they are lead to the definition of collective interests...”⁹¹⁸ The construction of collective identities among states creates the basis for solidarity, opportunities for cooperation, loyalty and community.⁹¹⁹

Identity change is a shift from one relatively stable identity to another. According to social constructivism, boundaries of the “self” may change in interaction and cooperating states can form a “collective identity”. According to Wendt, identities are not given but they are developed or transformed in interaction. Identity may change, but it is relatively stable. According to him, “identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone.”⁹²⁰ He points out that one of the ways of identity transformation is based on conscious efforts to change identity.⁹²¹ In this thesis the policies and initiatives of the EU

⁹¹² Berthold Rittberger & Frank Schimmelfenning, “Explaining the Constitutionalization of the EU”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.13, No.8, December 2006, p.1155.

⁹¹³ J. T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, p.803.

⁹¹⁴ Cited in J. T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, p.804. For further detail see Kai Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No.3, 2001, pp.415-433.

⁹¹⁵ J. T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, p.804.

⁹¹⁶ B. Rittberger & F. Schimmelfenning, “Explaining the Constitutionalization of the EU”, p.1158.

⁹¹⁷ Quoted in B. Rittberger & F. Schimmelfenning, “Explaining the Constitutionalization of the EU”, p.1158.

⁹¹⁸ Quoted in U. Sedelmeier, *Constructing the Path To Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact of EU Identity*, p.19.

⁹¹⁹ Cited in U. Sedelmeier, *Constructing the Path To Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact of EU Identity*, p.18

⁹²⁰ Quoted in Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.7, No.3, 2001, pp.318-335.

⁹²¹ For further detail see M. Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison”, pp.318-335.

which have been effective on construction process of European identity, are analyzed. Although there are some conscious efforts and instruments of the EU, other factors and dynamics have been also effective on this process.

In this interaction atmosphere within the EU, the identities' of the Member States have been in an ongoing construction process since its foundation. According to Wendt, structures are not exogenously given, but emerge through interaction process. Thus, through interaction and practice, shared meanings arise. Interaction plays an important role in preserving the *status quo* of sovereign states. Interaction does not only lead to construction of identities, also it sustains them. When entities interact as states, their identity as sovereign states is reconfirmed. Thus, during the interaction process within the EU, nation-states are maintaining their identities mutually as sovereign Member States, who have transferred some of their competences to the EU level. While EU identity has been under construction process, nation-states have been also constructed as "Member States" which is one of their social identities. Wendt claims that, as a result of the interaction process, a kind of "**super-ordinate identity**" would develop beyond the state which causes blurring the boundary between the "self" and the "other".⁹²² This is referred to as construction process of "EU identity" in this thesis.

The framework of the institutional structure of the EU provides a suitable atmosphere for continuing interaction process among the Member States, which has gradually led to the emergence of common interests and "super-ordinate identity".⁹²³ Thus, common way of living and acting in international sphere has emerged among the Member States to a certain extent. According to Sandholtz, the "EU membership matters", because it influences the way actors see themselves and how they are seen by the "others".⁹²⁴ Pollack points out that there is a lot of evidence which suggests that, European integration process has a transformative impact on the European state system and its constituent units. European integration has changed over the years; simultaneously agents' identity and their interests have changed in this process. These changes within the structure of the EU and in the Member State interests and identities can be analyzed on the basis of

⁹²² Quoted in T. E. Aalberts, "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe: A Constructivist Reading", pp.35-40.

⁹²³ Marlene Wind, *Sovereignty and European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2001, p.74.

⁹²⁴ Wayne Sandholtz, "Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.3, 1996, pp.403-29.

social constructivism. For social constructivist scholars, the EU institutions have effective roles on socializing and constituting the actors' identities and interests.⁹²⁵

Wendt asserts that “**interdependence, common fate and homogeneity**” are important factors for collective identity formation. All of these factors may be effective simultaneously on collective identity formation. Even one efficient factor combined with “self-restraint” is enough for collective identity formation.⁹²⁶ He claims that “interdependence” is not a sufficient condition for collective identity formation among states, because, some states may have a fear of exploitation. They can cooperate, if they can overcome this fear. He adds that contemporarily there is a Lockean culture, in which states do not prefer exploiting others.⁹²⁷ He defines “interdependence” as “actor’s choices affect each other’s outcome”.⁹²⁸ It is based on the interaction of two parties. He argues that “common fate is constituted by a third party, who defines the first two as a group.”⁹²⁹ He also mentions the effect of “homogeneity”. Collective identity presupposes that members consider themselves as being alike in terms of the characteristics that define the group. He claims that the perception of “homogeneity” helps to constitute a collective identity. One of its indirect effects is to reduce the conflicts which may arise because of differences. Huntington’s idea of “**clash of civilisations**” is based on the assumption that heterogeneity will increase the potential of conflicts. Wendt points out that internal differences may be a reason of conflicts. Thus, reduction of those differences will promote collective identity formation. He also admits that states may learn to live peacefully with diversity and sometimes similar units may also have some conflicts with each other.⁹³⁰ He adds that homogenisation is not sufficient for collective identity formation, because sometimes when these people “...become alike along some dimensions, they may differentiate themselves along other...”⁹³¹ Moreover, when actors become more alike, there is less potential for a division of labour among themselves. A division of labour increases actors’ interdependence which may help collective identity formation.⁹³² In terms of relations between Turkey and the EU, there is interdependence among these actors, but

⁹²⁵ M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.237.

⁹²⁶ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp.343-344.

⁹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.348-349.

⁹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.349-354.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.355.

⁹³² *Ibid.*

prejudices about each other have to be overcome in order to construct a collective identity among these two actors.

In the case of Europe, several scholars and politicians claim that the states of Europe have a common historical, cultural, religious heritage. In spite of this, conflicts between them led to many long wars during history. This shows that similarity does not always guarantee living in peace and construction of a collective identity easily.⁹³³ Wendt gives the example of Arab countries. Although they have a common religion, language and pan-Arab ideology, they have had a lot of rivalries among each other.⁹³⁴ In some cases, homogeneity facilitates the construction of collective identity by increasing the ability to see “self” and “other” as members of the same group. Wendt argues that as “interdependence, common fate and homogeneity” increase, “actors have more incentive to engage in prosocial behavior which erodes egoistic boundaries of the self and expands them to include the other.”⁹³⁵

In the case of the EU, all of these factors are effective to a certain extent. Especially interdependence among the Member States has been too much since its foundation. There was a common fate among them in the 1950s, because its main goal was to establish and maintain peace in Europe; contemporarily they still have a common fate, which is mainly to survive in the globalizing world. Homogeneity is absent in the case of the EU, instead diversity is its main characteristic. Wendt argues that another important factor in collective identity formation is that, actors have to trust that, their identities and interests will be respected and their individuality will not be completely submerged by the group. External constraints may be effective on building of trust, but collective identity implies giving to the “other” some responsibility to take care of the “self”.⁹³⁶ Wendt points out that “individuals will resist forming groups, if this threatens the fulfillment of their personal needs and groups will resist forming higher groups, if this threatens the fulfillment of

⁹³³ Paul Schroeder, “The Transformation of Political Thinking 1787-1848” in R. Jervis, (ed.), *Coping with Complexity in the International System*, Boulder: Westview Pub. , pp.47-70; cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.357.

⁹³⁴ Michael Barnett, “Sovereignty, Nationalism and Regional Order in the Arab States System”, *International Organization*, Vol. 49, 1995, pp.479-510; M. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; cited in A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.357.

⁹³⁵ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.357.

⁹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.358-359.

group needs.”⁹³⁷ The national identities are respected and protected in the EU, which was stated also in the Maastricht Treaty. The motto of the EU which is “united in diversity” also, reflects the goal of maintenance and protection of diversities within the framework of the EU which is a unique case in world politics. Wendt puts forward that the EU is a good example of “collective identity formation” in international relations, because states begin to see each other as an extension of “self” within the EU.⁹³⁸ Thus, we can speak of a diminishing of the hard boundaries among national identities, or Europeanization of identities within the EU.

The *acquis communautaire* is a constitutive framework which is composed of main norms of the EU that all Member States and citizens of the EU have to follow.⁹³⁹ For social constructivists, norms are collective understandings, which affect behaviours of actors. When new European norms emerge, social constructivists identify two main diffusion pathways: “**bottom-up societal mobilisation**” and “**top-down elite learning**”. In the first case, non-state actors and policy networks are united to support some norms; they mobilize and push decision-makers to change state policies according to those norms. Norms are not necessarily internalized by the elites. The activities of Greenpeace and some of the NGOs may be given as examples of this political pressure mechanism.⁹⁴⁰ The second diffusion mechanism is “top-down” in which norms are primarily internalized by the elites and they make political pressure to diffuse norms. According to Checkel, social constructivism helps to understand interest and identity forming role of institutions. He tries to show how interaction within the institutional structure of the EU constructs the identities and interests of states and other social actors. He analyzes “how norms are constructed at the European level and how once they reach the national level, they interact with and socialize agents.”⁹⁴¹ He puts forward that it is usually easier to construct new norms successfully at the European level, when decision-makers are faced with a crisis or a policy failure.⁹⁴² European identity is “neither established once and for all, nor always firmly in place, but always continually happening.”⁹⁴³ According to Garcia, the unity of Europe is a mental

⁹³⁷ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.364.

⁹³⁸ A. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, pp. 384-396; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 28.

⁹³⁹ M. Wind, *Sovereignty and European Integration*, p.67.

⁹⁴⁰ For further detail see J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, 1999.

⁹⁴¹ J. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration”, pp.545-560; quoted in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “The Constructivist Turn in European Integration Studies”, p.397.

⁹⁴² *Ibid.*

⁹⁴³ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.36.

construct and its identity is a “collective social fabrication over time.”⁹⁴⁴ As Renwick argues, if identities can be constructed, they can be de-constructed and re-constructed. Europe may be considered as a “text”, thus the text of “Europe” can be “de-constructed” and “re-constructed” again and again; because, each reader may understand the meaning of the text in different ways. This is an open-ended way of understanding Europe.⁹⁴⁵ While the idea of “Europe” has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU, simultaneously “European identity” has been also undergoing a construction process. According to Kohli, European identity will be a product of its institutional construction, including its growing cultural networks of communication and exchange, its common economy and currency, political framework of governance, its institutions of redistribution and solidarity, its European-level organisations. In addition to these, another powerful producer of identity might be the creation of a European army.⁹⁴⁶ Policies and other initiatives of the EU institutions which have been effective on construction process of European identity, are discussed in this thesis.

The social construction of “regional selves” occurs in the context of “communicative action” which involves interaction and persuasion processes that go beyond “utilitarian exchange of preferences” as argued by rationalists.⁹⁴⁷ It is argued that the social construction of “regional selves” requires the construction of “non-regional others”.⁹⁴⁸ In the case of the EU, as it was argued, there is not a common clear “other” of the EU in the post-Cold War era. In the interviews which were conducted by the author, the interviewees usually did not prefer to mention any “other” of the EU. It is harder to construct a “regional self” in the context of the EU, because of the absence of clear “non-regional other” in the post-Cold War era.

Construction of European identity depends on the nature of the European polity which has been in an ongoing construction process. European identity should be constructed as a political community which is open and inclusive towards immigrants who

⁹⁴⁴ For further detail see S. Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, 1993.

⁹⁴⁵ N. Renwick, “Re-reading Europe’s Identities”, pp.155-160.

⁹⁴⁶ M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, p.119.

⁹⁴⁷ B. Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and The Social Construction of European Identities”, p.659.

⁹⁴⁸ Cited in B. Rosamond, “Discourses of Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities”, p.658. For further detail see E. Adler & M. Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, 1998; Richard Higgott, “The International Political Economy of Regionalism: The Asia Pacific and Europe Compared” in W.D. Coleman & G.R.D. Underhill (eds.), *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas*, London: Routledge Pub., 1998.

come from outside Europe and other minorities.⁹⁴⁹ Construction of an identity needs primarily difference, not “otherness”. Waever differentiates between “anti-Europe” and “less-Europe” which refers to variability in conceptions of difference. The construction of “others” do not have to be the opposite of the “self”, instead it may be constructed as less than the “self” which refers to having some characteristics that the “self” has to a certain extent, but less than the “self”. Thus, their differences are implicated in the construction of identity, but it constitutes a different form of “self-other” relationship.⁹⁵⁰ It is obvious that if there was a common clear “other” of the EU which was the case during the Cold War era; it would be much easier to construct European identity.

During the integration process of the EU, there has been “collective identity formation” among the Member States which is referred to as “EU identity”. With the enlargement towards the countries of the CEE, they have been included to this process. Wendt points out that, if core actors can construct collective identity, this may probably have demonstration effects which lead to imitation of the core at the periphery. The founder states of the EU have stronger collective identity; its spread to the new members of the EU, especially to those from the CEE will take time.⁹⁵¹

According to social constructivism, construction of European identity in the EU does not have the goal of constructing a “European people”.⁹⁵² Construction process of European identity has been in interaction with national identities which have been transforming national identities, without replacing them. The EU has a multinational, multiethnic and multireligious atmosphere.⁹⁵³ As Checkel argues, the “EU-constructivists should dynamically integrate factors across different levels of analysis” such as European and national. Dynamic refers to the simultaneity of domestic and international developments.⁹⁵⁴ In this thesis, dynamic approach is tried to be used by taking into consideration the simultaneity of construction processes of identities at individual, national and European levels.

⁹⁴⁹ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.39.

⁹⁵⁰ O. Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West-European Non-war Community”, pp.69-118; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 33.

⁹⁵¹ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.348.

⁹⁵² T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.37.

⁹⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁴ J. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.26.

Social constructivists focus on intersubjective beliefs, ideas which are widely shared among people. Shared beliefs express the interests and identities of certain people, the way that a group of people think of themselves in their relations with other groups who are in some respects seen as different from them. In IR such beliefs may be a group of peoples' notion of themselves as a nation, their conception of their country as a state, their notion of their state as sovereign. For example, "the existential reality of a nation" is based on a widely held belief among people that they collectively form a national community, which has its own identity. If such beliefs are only held by a few people, they do not have social and political importance. According to social constructivists, nationalist idea was spread among people in the 19th century by the spread of education and literature.⁹⁵⁵ This constructivist understanding of the emergence of nationalism is similar to what Anderson refers to as "imagined communities". Wendt argues that the state elites have tried to create "imagined communities" through education and language policies, as a result of which those people started to see themselves as being alike and different from the members of other states.⁹⁵⁶ According to social constructivists, Europe has the same prospects to construct a common European identity such as Britain and France had achieved several centuries before⁹⁵⁷ while they had been constructing their national identities. However, there is no consensus on the "*finalite politique*" of European integration, which makes it much more difficult to construct European identity.⁹⁵⁸ Contemporarily it still has a complex institutional structure, the Member States and even the political elites of the EU have different perceptions about the future structure of the EU.

For construction of European identity within the EU, the EU elites have been using similar instruments to those, which were used during nation-building process, especially to increase support to the integration process and to solve the legitimacy problem of the EU. The differences between nation-building process and construction process of European political identity among the citizens of the EU will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

⁹⁵⁵ R. Jackson & G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, pp.255-256.

⁹⁵⁶ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.355.

⁹⁵⁷ David Michael Green, "On Being European: The Character and Consequences of European Identity" in Maria Green Cowles & Michael Smith (eds.), *The State of the EU: Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival*, Vol.5, 2000, pp.294-295.

⁹⁵⁸ Thomas Jansen, "European Identity and/or the Identity of the EU" in T. Jansen (ed.), "Reflections on European Identity", Working Paper of the Commission, 1999, p.31.

The main reason of choosing social constructivism as the main theoretical background of this thesis is that firstly it focuses on identities; particularly it deals with the construction process of identities and their change through interaction. It also argues about the possibility of emergence of a post-national identity. One of the arguments in this thesis is that European identity has been in a construction process within the EU which has affected the identities of its Member States and the EU citizens. As it was argued, social constructivism focuses on the process, instead of results. The end-point of the EU is still not clear. Thus, social constructivism generally provides the theoretical background to understand the dynamics of interactions within the EU and its effects on identities, in addition to these; it may be helpful to understand the interactions of the EU with other actors in the world and its effects on EU identity.

Construction of a post-national identity, without eliminating national and regional identities within a unique political structure like the EU, is the first and unique case in world politics. European identity has been constructed on different basis throughout history, but it has never been constructed within a common institutional framework like the EU. In this thesis, construction process of European identity is analyzed within the framework of the EU. The role of the political elites, some institutions of the EU and effective policies on construction process of European identity are discussed and the construction process of European identity is compared with nation-building process, especially in terms of their instruments. They are both collective identity formation processes within an institutional framework, but they occurred in different circumstances, within different institutional frameworks, thus, they have different characteristics. In this thesis, construction process of European identity is not considered as a European nation-building process. The comparison between construction of European identity and nation-building is made in order to show peculiar characteristics of construction of European identity. Social constructivism is also useful to analyze the interactions between the EU and Turkey. The interactions among these parties have highly increased, since the official candidate status was given to Turkey with the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 which has been also affecting construction process of EU identity, European identity among the peoples of Europe and identity of Turkey. In this thesis, the role of European identity on interactions between Turkey and the EU, the discourses of the political elites of the EU about Turkey's membership in terms of European identity and effects of the interactions between Turkey and the EU on construction of European identity will be also analyzed.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF THE ELITES, THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLICIES OF THE EU IN CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

III.1. The Role of the Political Elites and the Institutions of the EU

III.1.1. The Role of the Political Elites: The EU as a “European Elite Project”

The elites of Europe have always had an important role in efforts for unification of Europe, as it was discussed in the 1st Chapter. The establishment of the EC was inspired by the thoughts of Kalergi, Monnet, Schuman and other founding fathers of the European project. They emphasized the necessity for a united Europe, especially for building peace. The participants of the Hague Conference of 1948 including Churchill, Adenauer and de Gasperi believed in the necessity for international cooperation to achieve peace and stability in Europe. At that time, the perception of European integration was supported by most of the national political elites and majority of the public opinions of the Western European states. Different European nations implicitly supported the European project, which made it possible for European integration process to go on.⁹⁵⁹ This project was usually seen as the only way to build up and maintain peace in Europe. As Taylor argues, within the EC especially at the elite level, there has been the idea of “reconstruction of Europe” from the beginning. The process of European unification was initiated by top political elites of the founding Member States. In this respect, the EU may be seen as a “European elite project”.⁹⁶⁰

The project of the EU has been mostly an elite-driven process since the beginning. The elites have had a very important role since the establishment process of the ECSC. It is argued that “European identity is formed through the activities of the Europeanising elite, such as top managers of industry, experts, leading political figures and intellectuals.”⁹⁶¹ Thus, not only political elites, also intellectuals, academicians, economic elites and representatives of civil society have played important roles in the establishment and development process of the European project. According to Smith, the European project

⁹⁵⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.60-64.

⁹⁶⁰ P.Taylor, *The EU in the 1990's*, pp.140-143.

⁹⁶¹ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.159.

has been constructed through the activities and programmes of business, administrative and intellectual elites, whose needs could no longer be fully met within the nation-state, thus they have tried to build the economic infrastructure and political framework of the EC.⁹⁶² He implies that the EC was established in order to satisfy primarily the needs of the elites. Monnet emphasized the transformative role of the institutions and the elites in building the new European order.⁹⁶³ As Citrin and Sides argue, “European integration has been an elite-driven process, pushed along by officials and experts”.⁹⁶⁴ Mann asserts that “Euro-land is much more a network of upper social classes and elites than of the masses.”⁹⁶⁵ As Beetham and Lord argue, it is difficult to understand the Schuman Plan without the role of Monnet and Schuman⁹⁶⁶ or Monetary Union without understanding the role of Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Helmut Kohl.⁹⁶⁷ In the second half of the 1980s the European integration process was under the joint push of Delors, who was the President of the Commission from 1985 to 1994, also Kohl and Mitterand. They supported the idea of construction of a “People’s Europe”.⁹⁶⁸

The first institutions of the EC was founded by the initiatives of Konrad Adenauer in Germany, Schuman and Monnet in France, Alcide de Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli in Italy and Paul Henri Spaak in Belgium. In that period all major political parties supported the integration process of Europe except the Communists and extreme nationalists. The senior civil servants of all the founding members also played important role in this process. But after the establishment of the EC, some powerful politicians such as de Gaulle in the 1960s and Thatcher in the 1980s caused decreasing the momentum of the integration process.⁹⁶⁹ Thus, the political elites have not always increased the momentum of the integration process of Europe. After the establishment of the EC the political leaders faced

⁹⁶² A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.127.

⁹⁶³ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, London: Routledge Pub., 2000, p.206.

⁹⁶⁴ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.161.

⁹⁶⁵ Michael Mann, “Is There a Society called Euro?” in R. Axtman(ed.), *Globalization and Europe*, London, 1998, p.205; quoted in Robert Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion” in Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, et al. (eds.), *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2004, p.260.

⁹⁶⁶ Cited in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.55. For further detail see J. Monnet, *Memoires*, Paris: Fayard, 1976; R. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: Homme D’Etat*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986.

⁹⁶⁷ Cited in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.55. For further detail see K. Dyson, *Elusive Union*, London: Longman Pub., 1994.

⁹⁶⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.84.

⁹⁶⁹ F. Wilson, *European Politics Today*, New York: Prentice-Hall Pub., 1999 cited in “Who are Europeans?”, *Open Learn*, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

with sceptical reactions of several national public opinions about the European Defense Community (EDC) project, because many of them were not ready for introduction of common defense policy, which affected the rejection of this project by the French political elites.⁹⁷⁰ Thus, the necessity of support of the general public for integration has been understood more. In 1955 the first president of the Commission Hallstein stated that “the EU can not be constructed by experts. It must be built on the unity of the European people themselves.” He added that:

...we want people to...stop seeing themselves only as members of a state in ways inherited from our pasts; we want them to consider themselves also as members of the great European family. But this assumes a change in habits of thought.⁹⁷¹

Thus, there has been the idea of constructing a European family since the 1950s. The European elites have been aware of the importance of identity to guarantee further integration from the beginning. Schuman stated in 1951 that “before Europe develops into a military alliance or an economic community, it has to be a cultural community.”⁹⁷² Schuman was participant of the establishment of the European Cultural Foundation in 1954. The main goal of this organisation is “to increase feelings of mutual understanding, democratic solidarity between the European nations through cultural and educational activities.”⁹⁷³

The founding fathers of the EU, primarily Schuman and Monnet are being constructed in contemporary discourse as “dead kings” to legitimize the EU.⁹⁷⁴ They are the main characters of the newly constructed myths of the EU. Byrne, who is one of the ex-Commissioners argued that “these men and their successors...managed to do what many great leaders, from as far back as the emperors of ancient Rome had tried to do without success, to lay the foundations of a united Europe.”⁹⁷⁵ They have been constructed as “founding fathers” of the EU. They had the intention of establishing an “ever closer union

⁹⁷⁰ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.63.

⁹⁷¹ Gerard Bossuat, *Les Fondateurs de l'Europe*, Belin Pub., 1994, p.194; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, pp.665-666.

⁹⁷² Lindeborg, 1990, pp.28-30; quoted in O. Waever, & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, p.65.

⁹⁷³ “Intervention de Jacques Delors lors de la Ceremonie d'ouverture de l'Annee Academique du College d'Europe, Bruges, September 30, 1999, http://www.europa.eu.Int/en/comm/dg22/carrefour/index_en.html; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.667.

⁹⁷⁴ Bo Petersson & Anders Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, *European Societies*, Vol.5, No.3, 2003, p.237.

⁹⁷⁵ David Byrne, “Looking back, moving forward European Movement”, Dublin, 25 May 2001; quoted in B. Petersson & A. Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, p.241.

of peoples” which was also stated in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome. The EC has made conscious efforts to encourage the emergence of a sense of common European identity among the general public.⁹⁷⁶ In 1964 Schuman stated that:

A true community requires at least some specific affinities. Countries do not combine, when they do not feel among themselves something common and what must be common is a minimum of confidence. There must also be a minimal identity of interests, without which one attains mere coexistence, not cooperation.⁹⁷⁷

He emphasized the difference between coexistence and cooperation, which necessitates construction of a collective identity among its members. From the beginning of the European integration, it has been felt that something more exciting than coal and steel was needed to attract the peoples of Europe to the integration project. The long-term goal of the founding fathers was to unite the peoples of Europe, not only uniting Europe’s nation-states. They wanted to foster a “European identity” to replace national identities, which had brought the European states into wars.⁹⁷⁸ After a while, especially after the Empty Chair Crisis in the 1960s it was understood that it is not so easy to replace national identities, thus the principle of “unity in diversity” and respect to and protection of national and regional identities have been emphasized.

The founding fathers emphasized the importance of informing and educating peoples. Between 1957 and 1963 Monnet established several organisations to enhance people’s knowledge of the European integration. He set up the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe Documentation Centre” to collect documentation on the prospects for European integration in 1957. He founded with the Presidents of the High Authority of the ECSC and EEC Commission a “European Community Institute for University Studies Association” in 1958 to support universities in Europe, scientific investigations about the long-term problems which are raised by European integration and training of people in these fields. In 1963 he established the Institute of European Historical Research⁹⁷⁹ that became an important research forum in which university professors were taught who would make the building of Europe a major subject in teaching and research

⁹⁷⁶ P. Taylor, *The EU in the 1990’s*, pp.140-143.

⁹⁷⁷ Quoted in P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.11.

⁹⁷⁸ William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p.30.

⁹⁷⁹ Quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.666. For further detail see Section 2 of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe Documentation Centre Charter, section 2 of the European Community Institute for University Research Association Charter.

programmes.⁹⁸⁰ In 1978 short time before his death, Monnet entrusted François Fontaine with the task of establishing a Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lausanne which would receive all his archives and should be made available for students from different countries who want to consult them.⁹⁸¹ Thus, Monnet emphasized the importance of research on European history, European integration and supported establishment of institutions in which research is made in these fields.

A. de Gasperi emphasized the importance of support of young generations to the European project. He argued that we must transfer the European ideal to the new generations and stated that, “they are the best preservers of the common heritage...”⁹⁸² In the early 1950s Spaak who was the head of the European Movement, worked for the establishment of an agency which would “familiarize younger generations with the concept of Europe” and “generate interest among the young in Europe-building”.⁹⁸³ In 1951 he started the “European Youth Campaign”, with the support of the American Committee for a United Europe. The programmes of this campaign wanted to organize youth groups in the member states of the Council of Europe and then extended to all young people in Member States of the ECSC. Their goal was to convince the younger generation that “the creation of Europe is in every respect a symbol of progress and an opportunity for peace”.⁹⁸⁴ In order to achieve this goal, conferences, special events on European themes, including films, publications that focus on the economic, social, political and cultural aspects of European integration were organized.⁹⁸⁵ Thus, young generation has been focused on to increase support to integration of Europe.

The national elites of the Member States do not always have common interests. For German political elites, European integration meant overcoming their own nationalist and

⁹⁸⁰ Henri Rieben, *Reconcilier et unir les Européens, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de Recherches Europeennes*, 1995, p. 133; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.666.

⁹⁸¹ H. Rieben, *Reconcilier et unir les Européens, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de Recherches Europeennes*, p. 147; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, pp.666-667.

⁹⁸² Quoted in Jan Figel, European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth, Speech at the Opening of the Youth Summit, March 24, 2007.

⁹⁸³ Jean-Marie Palayret, “Eduquer les jeunes a l'Union : la campagne Europeenne de la jeunesse 1951-1958”, *Revue d'histoire de l'integration europeenne* 48, 49 ,1995; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.667.

⁹⁸⁴ J.M. Palayret, “Eduquer les jeunes a l'Union : la campagne Europeenne de la jeunesse 1951-1958”, p. 50; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, pp.667-668.

⁹⁸⁵ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.668.

militarist past. French elites see European integration as an instrument to externalize French values of Republicanism and Enlightenment.⁹⁸⁶ Thus, different national elites have different perceptions about the European integration. Hoffman points out that:

As in other historical cases, it is from the top that the initiatives will have to come...what is lacking currently is elites and leaders with a daring vision. The convergence of Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer and de Gasperi was exceptional.⁹⁸⁷

As Hoffman argues, currently it is harder to reach compromise even among the political elites about future vision of the EU, which was also seen during the interviews conducted by the author. The role of the EU elites has changed since the establishment of the EC. Delanty argues that relation between the elites and the general public in Europe has changed since the foundation of the EC. Fifty years ago the elites were much more confident, because the general public could follow them much more easily; but as it was seen in the referendums for the Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands, the general public said “no” to the wishes of the elites.⁹⁸⁸ Özdemir asserted that:

It was the Europe of elites before and the elites could carry on themselves. But we understood that we can not go further, without the support of public opinion, lastly in the case of the Constitutional Treaty...⁹⁸⁹

Thus, contemporarily the general public do not follow the elites of Europe easily, like they did at the beginning of the European integration in the 1950s.

The EU elites have benefited most from economic integration and social mobility opportunities which have emerged with the European integration. Highly educated people of the Member States who may become part of national administrative elites, prefer a position at one of the institutions of the EU.⁹⁹⁰ In 1996 Eurobarometer conducted “Top Decision-Makers Survey” to show the view of elites about European integration, which include politicians, senior national civil servants, business and labour leaders and people, who have a leading role in academic, cultural and religious fields. According to this survey, there is a huge gap between the elites and the general public about their thoughts on European integration. Top decision-makers’ evaluation of the EU is much more positive than the general public. One of the question was about, whether membership of the EU

⁹⁸⁶ A. Wiener & T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p.169.

⁹⁸⁷ Stanley Hoffman, *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe (1964-1994)*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p.66.

⁹⁸⁸ G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

⁹⁸⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

⁹⁹⁰ D. Jacobs & R. Maier, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction”, p.19, retrieved on February 18, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://users.belgacom.net/jacobs/europa.pdf>

was a “good” or “bad” thing. 94% of top decision-makers considered it as a “good” thing, 2% as a “bad” thing and 4% “neither good nor bad”. This is in contrast with the general public, 48% of them considered as a “good thing”, 15% “bad thing” and 28% “neither good nor bad”. Also 90% of top decision-makers stated that their country has benefited from membership; on the other hand, half of the general public stated that their country has benefited from the EU membership. For top decision-makers the maintenance of peace throughout Europe should be priority of the EU for the next decade, which is followed by the need to fight with unemployment. On the other hand, for the general public the priority of the EU should be to fight with unemployment.⁹⁹¹ Contemporarily it is obvious that it is not so easy to convince the general public. Despite the decline in importance of the elites’ role, they are still crucial for maintenance of integration process and construction of European identity. The importance of the public opinion and gaining their support for this process have also become much more important to establish legitimacy of the EU and to go on the integration process.

European identity can not be constructed only by top-down initiatives of the EU elites and institutions of the EU. “Bottom-up” initiatives of the civil society and providing channels of participation for citizens to the EU are also necessary. Some scholars argue that to construct European identity there is a need to build up a “Europe-wide civil society” of pan-European voluntary associations and pressure groups.⁹⁹² Contemporarily some new collective actors have increasingly engaged in European affairs such as regional movements, new social movements particularly environmentalists, such as Greenpeace.⁹⁹³ But as van Ham argues, the Europeanization process still remains mainly as an elite-driven project in many respects.⁹⁹⁴

Consequently, construction process of European identity has been affected primarily from top-down, also from bottom-up initiatives. According to Borneman and Fowler, in terms of bottom-up initiatives foreign languages can be taught, an agreed

⁹⁹¹ Eurobarometer, “The EU: A View from the Top, Top Decision Makers and the EU”, Report prepared by Jacqueline M. Spence, September 1996, retrieved on November 4, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/top/top_en.htm

⁹⁹² Jude Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?” in Mary Fulbrook (ed.), *National Histories and European History*, London: UCL Press, 1993.

⁹⁹³ “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

⁹⁹⁴ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.73.

curriculum on European history can be taught, there should be increased Europeanization of sports, increased exchanges at all levels, also intermarriages among the Member States affect this process.⁹⁹⁵ Learning of foreign languages are supported by the EU, there has been an increase in the number of intermarriages and Europeanisation of sports, but little success could be achieved in terms of a common curriculum of European history, which will be taught in all of the Member States. Although bottom-up initiatives have important role in construction process of European identity, in this thesis the role of the political elites and top-down initiatives of the EU are focused on.

Perceptions of Some of the MEPs and the Commission Officials about the Construction of European Identity within the EU

During the interviews conducted by the author, most of the interviewees admitted that European identity has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU and it has become stronger since the establishment of the EC. Only a few of them mentioned the necessity of more intervention of the EU, especially in cultural policy to construct a European identity. As it was argued, European identity, which has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU, is not something totally new. Duff argued that “there has always been a European identity. It has become far more pronounced since post-war experiment of integration...”⁹⁹⁶ Deprez asserted that “...there is a kind of **rediscovery** by European people of the common phase of the culture, but I would not say that, they are building a new kind of culture or a new world...”⁹⁹⁷ He claimed that people have become more aware of European culture, rather than it has been constructed. When it was asked whether European identity has been in a construction process within the EU or not, Özdemir stated that:

Exactly and it is always changing, it is developing...When you go to the USA today, you are considered as European, you also feel European there. In Europe you are considered as German, but in the USA you are European...It was not like that before...European identity is started to be seen by people...My wife is from Argentina, when I go to Argentina, I am considered as European primarily.⁹⁹⁸

⁹⁹⁵ J. Borneman & N. Fowler, “Europeanization”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 26, 1997; cited in “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

⁹⁹⁶ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

⁹⁹⁷ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

⁹⁹⁸ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

One Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry, replied that “yes certainly.”⁹⁹⁹ He added that “it can be built best, if you do not think about it (unconsciously).”¹⁰⁰⁰ He implied that even there are not any conscious efforts to construct European identity; it has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU. One ex-Commission official, who was working at DG Education, argued that “...it keeps changing, as Europe keeps changing, as the world keeps changing.”¹⁰⁰¹ He is a bit pessimistic about European identity, he stated that “...there is less European spirit around...than it used to be ten years ago...”¹⁰⁰² He emphasized the necessity of top-down initiatives of the EU in this process. He stated that:

...there may be construction of European identity...Usually there is a need for some positive leadership to put issues on the table...Issues can emerge from the bottom, but some will never emerge.¹⁰⁰³

Thus, he is in favor of top-down initiatives of the EU in this process, to put some issues on the table. Stubb is also a bit pessimistic about construction of European identity. He stated that:

...spreading of values...it depends on how you define identity, if you define identity as speaking the same language, stand up when we see the European flag, when we listen Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, celebrate our slogan ‘unity in diversity’, I do not think we can have that identity. The only time when you see a common European identity...in Golf Cup...when we play against the Americans. That is the only time, when you see people running around with European flags...Champions League; those kinds of things bring us a common identity...¹⁰⁰⁴

When it was asked that “do you think that top-down initiatives of the EU are enough to construct European identity within the EU?” Stubb replied that:

...No, I think there needs to be more feeling of belonging...I do not think propoganda works, you can not go around and say the EU is wonderful...what the EU should do? Smart decisions, it is not always easy with twenty five states...money is a wonderful way of creating identity, we do not give money to anyone, unless you are farmer, researcher, or you come from a poor region...we do not have a common language...‘we’ feeling among us, Europeans, it is gonna take a long time...there is no magic formula for us becoming good Europeans...I have been in Brussels for eight years, when I first moved here, I had my prejudices of other

⁹⁹⁹ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰¹ Interview with Ex-Commission official from DG Education, from France, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁰⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁴ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

During the interviews conducted by the author, there was an attempt to have one million signatures to prevent meetings of the MEP’s once a month in Strasbourg. While the interview was ongoing, one million signatures were collected, Stubb stated that “this is a good example of identity...” But this initiative can not be realized and still the MEP’s have to go to Strasbourg once a month regularly, which cause losing time and money.

nationalities...after eight years my prejudices have strengthened in a positive way. We all very much have our national identities and prejudices...¹⁰⁰⁵

Hatzidakis also mentioned the problems, which have been faced during the construction process of European identity. He argued that:

...our continent is where world wars occurred...there are many reasons to make construction of the EU difficult...there is a deficit of communication with citizens. It is not an easy task. We have to defeat the basic enemy, which is **historical past** and **prejudices** existing today...different reactions of citizens in the EU must be translated into action by the political elites. We have to explain to citizens, the European leaders have to be real leaders, not only listen people...to convince people about what is necessary for our union...¹⁰⁰⁶

He emphasized the role of the political elites as pioneers of the European integration process. Öger also emphasized the importance of the political elites in this process. He stated that:

Politicians have to talk about this subject with their societies honourably. They should not blame Brussels for all kind of their deficiencies...for problems which emerged because of globalisation...It is a very wrong behaviour, media also follows them. Europe is not considered as I see it here from Brussels. How important the EU is...society has not been totally aware of it yet...they see the widening of Europe as dangerous, they think that Europe only causes harm. These are very wrong impressions...faults of politicians.¹⁰⁰⁷

Some of the MEPs emphasized the role of national politicians in this process, especially their role in informing their citizens about the EU and not blaming the EU about all of the problems in their Member States.

Weber mentioned the importance of both top-down and bottom-up initiatives for construction of European identity. He argues that “it is necessary to have top-down initiatives...also it is necessary to have bottom-up initiatives. If we do not have on the bottom, people who are fighting for Europe, we have no chance...”¹⁰⁰⁸ Wise is against top-down initiatives of the EU. He argues that “anything top-down eventually fails. Whatever initiatives will be done will not be effective. People will see it as a propoganda.”¹⁰⁰⁹ However, as it was argued, the top-down initiatives of the EU have been effective on deepening and widening process of the EU and the construction process of European identity.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Interview with T. Wise, MEP of the UK from Independence Democracy Group, on July 12, 2006, at 10.00.

Some of the MEPs mentioned the effects of immigrants on construction of European identity. Bozkurt argued that:

Identity is changing. Life is changing. We are looking towards things from total other way than ten or twenty years ago. The large groups of immigrants coming to Europe are also changing society. That society is built everyday...¹⁰¹⁰

Guardans also mentioned the role of Muslim immigrants living in Europe on the construction of European identity. He stated that:

Identity is not something freezed in time...we will know the effects in 100 years. The Muslim population in Europe...that is shaping a new European identity...Fifteen million European Muslims and there would be more, that is great, that is shaping European identity. It is in evolution...¹⁰¹¹

Thus, increasing number of non-European immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, have been also affecting the construction process of European identity.

III.1.2. The Role of the EU Institutions

Most political institutions make a considerable effort to promote public identification with them. For example, states try to promote their own nation; religious institutions such as the Catholic Church try to promote common identification among Catholics. If people interact with the institution, its representatives feel its effects on their daily lives; they consider it as a real entity. The broader the scope of the institution and the group of people affected by it,¹⁰¹² it will affect those people's daily lives less, thus it is harder for those people to identify with that institution. Political institutions such as parliaments provide channels for political participation and make common policies for the individuals living in that territory. The common political institutions create a shared political and legal system. Thus, the institutionalisation leads to the emergence of a common political culture¹⁰¹³ which may lead to the emergence of a common political identity. There is a difference between institutions' common legal and political systems'

¹⁰¹⁰ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰¹¹ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

¹⁰¹² R. Herrmann & M. B. Brewer, "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU", pp.13-14.

¹⁰¹³ Cited in M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.33. For further detail see Elizabeth Meehan, *Citizenship and the European Community*, London: Sage Pub.,1993; B. Laffan, "The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders", 2004.

effects on the elites and the general public.¹⁰¹⁴ According to the surveys of Bruter, the elites and the institutional messages have important effects on citizens' identity.¹⁰¹⁵ He found out that the effects of institutions are usually higher on the elites than the general public. He also adds that institutions primarily stimulate the emergence of "civic" identity, because identification is related with common institutions, rules and policy outputs.¹⁰¹⁶ It also depends on the instruments and references which are used by that institution. The effects of the EU institutions on identity of its elites and the general public are very complex. Individuals, who participate more and have greater political knowledge about the EU,¹⁰¹⁷ will probably have stronger feeling of belonging to the EU. According to Herrmann and Brewer, we should not see institutions as "input" and social identities as "output". States may fail to construct nations,¹⁰¹⁸ thus, it is harder for the EU to promote feelings of community.

The institutions of the EU have been effective on construction of European identity since the beginning, but the EU institutions have developed initiatives, which are closely related with construction of European identity since the 1970s that gained momentum in the mid-1980s.¹⁰¹⁹ Bruter asserts that, the EU institutions have influenced the level of European identity of its citizens by constructing symbols of the EU. They have also influenced citizens' identification with the EU indirectly by the performance of European integration.¹⁰²⁰ In the official documents the Commission mentions "common roots", the EP¹⁰²¹ and the Council¹⁰²² have used the term "European cultural heritage"; the EP¹⁰²³ and the Council¹⁰²⁴ also used the term "common cultural heritage" and Commission used the

¹⁰¹⁴ Cited in M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.33. For further detail see Ruth Wodak, "National and Transnational: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials" in R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer, *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, 2004; Liesbet Hooghe, "Serving Europe: Political Orientations of Senior Commission Officials", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol.1, No. 8, available on the World Wide Web: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-008a.htm>

¹⁰¹⁵ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.126.

¹⁰¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰¹⁷ G. Marks, "Territorial Identities in the EU", p.85.

¹⁰¹⁸ R. Herrman & M. B. Brewer, "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU", p.13.

¹⁰¹⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.73.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.148.

¹⁰²¹ Resolutions from 18 January 1979 and 3 May 1974; cited in E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.165.

¹⁰²² 2nd Report from the ad hoc Committee "A People's Europe", adopted by European Council in Milan on 28-29 June 1985; cited in E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.165.

¹⁰²³ Resolution which was taken on 10 September 1991; cited in E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.165.

¹⁰²⁴ Council conclusions of 17 June 1994 concerning children and culture; cited in E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.165.

expression of “some certain characteristics that transcend national or regional differences”.¹⁰²⁵ As it can be seen, especially “common cultural heritage” has been frequently mentioned in some official documents of the EU to make the peoples of Europe aware of their common cultural heritage.

The identity-building capacity of the institutions of the EU depends on their place in the institutional structure of the EU, “the proactive identity-building policies of that institution and the attitudes of the social agents that occupy those roles.”¹⁰²⁶ The Commission has been most active institution of the EU in this field. The Commission and the EP try to create a sense of European identity. They primarily try to contribute to “legitimacy-building efforts”¹⁰²⁷ of the EU. In this thesis the role of the Commission and the EP and the perceptions of the MEPs and the Commission officials about construction of European identity in the EU are focused on.

III.1.2.1. The Role of the European Commission

The Commission is a supranational executive body, which is the guardian of the Treaties, protects the common interests and integrity of the EU. It has an important “agenda power” in the EU,¹⁰²⁸ it proposes legislation and initiates policies. It introduces new ideas about the future of the EU.¹⁰²⁹ It has been one of the most important actors in construction process of European identity within the EU. The effectiveness of the Commission depends on the circumstances. At the beginning when the precursor of the Commission was established as the High Authority of the ECSC, it had greater autonomy, thus it was more effective. After the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965, national interests have started to be emphasized more and the Commission adopted a more cautious and dependent role vis-a-vis the Council. At the end of the 1970s starting with the Commission Presidency of Jenkins and especially during the Presidency of Delors it had a stronger role among the institutions of the EU. For the Commission:

¹⁰²⁵ Communication from the Commission on 29.03.1995, p.1; quoted in E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.165.

¹⁰²⁶ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.85.

¹⁰²⁷ Melissa Pantel, “Unity in Diversity: Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy” in Thomas Benchof, & Mitchell P. Smith (eds.), *Legitimacy and The EU*, London: Routledge Pub., 1999, p.46.

¹⁰²⁸ Svein S. Andersen & Kjell A. Eliassen, “EU-Lobbying: Between Representativity and Effectiveness” in S. S. Andersen & K. A. Eliassen (eds.), *The EU: How Democratic Is It?*, London: Sage Pub., 1996; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.29.

¹⁰²⁹ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.30.

It is necessary for Community action to look beyond economic issues to the major concerns of day-to-day life, which will lead to strengthening the sense of belonging to a European culture and thereby strengthen European identity.¹⁰³⁰

Commission reports frequently show that “Europe existed for the people and to convince them of the benefits inherent in the construction of Europe.”¹⁰³¹ According to the Commission “European identity is the result of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values.”¹⁰³² Thus, there are references to both cultural and civic understandings of European identity and also utilitarian approach is used by emphasizing benefits of the EU for its citizens. Delors asked “who falls in love with an inner market?”¹⁰³³ The ex-Commission President Prodi asserted that “we are seeking a shared identity, a new European soul. We need to build a union of hearts and minds, a shared sense of common destiny, of European citizenship.”¹⁰³⁴ He makes references to both cultural and civic understandings of European identity. During his speech at the EP in 1999 stated that, further development of the EU institutions have to build up gradually “a shared feeling of belonging to Europe”¹⁰³⁵ which shows the role of the institutions of the EU in the construction process of European identity.

As it was argued, there is no consensus on the meaning of European identity. It was seen also in one of the Commission reports, in which it was stated that:

The term ‘European’ has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements, which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction can not be condensed into a simple formula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that, it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the EU, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come.¹⁰³⁶

It shows that there is no concrete, finished European identity yet, rather it has to be reconstructed by each generation. As it was argued in the 1st Chapter, the boundaries of the

¹⁰³⁰ CEC, “A People’s Europe: Commission Communication”, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement 2/88, 1988, quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.60

¹⁰³¹ B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, p.96.

¹⁰³² CEC, “A people’s Europe: Commission communication”, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement 2/88, 1988; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.126.

¹⁰³³ Lindeborg, 1990, pp.28-30; quoted in O. Waever & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, p.65.

¹⁰³⁴ Michael Z. Wise, “Idea of a Unified Cultural Heritage Divides Europe”, *New York Times*, New York, January 29, 2000, p.B 9.

¹⁰³⁵ Quoted in Andreas Follesdal, “The Future Soul of Europe: Nationalism or Just Patriotism? A Critique of David Miller’s Defence of Nationality”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2000, p.503.

¹⁰³⁶ Commission Report 1992, paragraph 7; quoted in Cris Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, *Man*, New Series, Vol.28, No.4, December 1993, p.786.

EU and its end points can not be clarified, thus they have to be also reconstructed according to different circumstances.

The importance of European identity has been usually recognized by the Commission officials. One of the main concerns of the Commission officials is that, what can be done to make people identify more with the EU. To make people more aware of their European identity, the Commission has to simplify that cultural heritage in a way that appeals to people, increases feelings of solidarity among them and emphasizes what they have in common.¹⁰³⁷ The Commission had been operating a *de facto* cultural policy before the Maastricht Treaty gave it the legal right to do so.¹⁰³⁸ Since 1977 the Commission with the support of the EP has developed a cultural policy, which aims to promote an awareness of a European identity. This was given formal recognition by the Heads of State or Government at the Stuttgart and Milan European Councils in 1983 and 1985.¹⁰³⁹ In 1977 the Commission released a communication to the Council, which proposed that, the EC should be involved in economic and social aspects of culture.¹⁰⁴⁰ Moreover the “People’s Europe” department of the Commission hired a professional public relations company to analyze “motivational dynamics relating to Europeanisation”.¹⁰⁴¹ Thus, marketing methods have been also used by the Commission for “selling Europe to the public as a brand product.”¹⁰⁴² In 1993 in the “De Clercq Report” of the Commission it was stated that European integration was a “concept based far more on the will of statesmen than on the will of the people...There is little feeling of belonging to Europe. European identity has not yet been engrained in people’s minds.”¹⁰⁴³ This report shows the gap between the elites and the general public in terms of their level of European identity.

¹⁰³⁷ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, p.794.

¹⁰³⁸ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.46.

¹⁰³⁹ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, pp.779-788.

¹⁰⁴⁰ H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹⁰⁴¹ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, p.788.

¹⁰⁴² W. De Clercq, “Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the EC”, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1993.

¹⁰⁴³ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.52-55.

Many campaigns of the Commission have tried to increase support for some policies and initiatives of the EU, such as introduction of single currency.¹⁰⁴⁴ The Commission DGs which deal with education, culture and audiovisual policies have been trying to increase the public support for integration.¹⁰⁴⁵ These policy fields are closely related with the construction of European identity, which will be discussed in this chapter. “Information and communication” had become a major area of Commission activity by the early 1990s.¹⁰⁴⁶ An important part of the Commission’s PR budget sponsored large scale public events. In 1991 with the help of the Commission subsidy, the first “European Youth Olympic Games” was launched.¹⁰⁴⁷ In 1995 PRINCE (*Programa de informacion para el ciudadano*) was established, that was the successor of the “priority information programmes”, which was launched in the 1980s. It was divided into several “priority information actions” such as the “Citizen’s Europe”, “the euro, a currency for Europe” and “promoting the Union”. For these goals, the Commission publishes leaflets, brochures and distributes them through libraries, universities, European Documentation Centres. Of all the programmes under PRINCE, the campaign to promote the single currency was the most ambitious and expensive one. It sponsored euro festivals, a euro newsletter, euro promotion packs for school children, euro advertising campaigns, “team Europe” speakers, who were sent to schools and trade union meetings.¹⁰⁴⁸ The Commission also sponsored a European youth race, a festival for European car collectors and a “walk for Europe”.¹⁰⁴⁹ The Commission also hosts guided visiting groups at the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels.¹⁰⁵⁰ All of these initiatives of the Commission have been effective on construction of European identity.

The Commission officials have crucial role in the construction process of European identity. Shore argues that:

¹⁰⁴⁴ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.5.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.30.

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.75.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.66.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Vera Gaserow, “2,5 Euro: Wieviel ist den dette?”, *Die Zeit*, Vol. 20, 1997, p.65; quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.76.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Commission, “A Fresh Boost for Culture in the EC”, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement No.4., Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament transmitted in December 1987; quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.65.

¹⁰⁵⁰ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.79.

EU officials are using sociological concepts such as ‘culture’, ‘identity’ and ‘consciousness’ as mobilising metaphors for building ‘European culture’, ‘European identity’ and ‘European consciousness’.¹⁰⁵¹

It was stated by the Commission that, European culture and identity already exist in the “collective conscience of its peoples”, but bureaucratic intervention is needed to make Europeans “more aware” of their identity.¹⁰⁵² Thus, the initiatives of the Commission are usually reflected as efforts to make citizens of the EU become more aware of their European identity. Shore points out that:

The EC needs to adopt more proactive stance towards promoting greater awareness of the Community...Encouraging people to see themselves as Europeans was also regarded as part of a wider strategy for tackling the EC’s lack of popularity, which is related to the EC’s democratic deficit.¹⁰⁵³

Thus, construction of European identity is seen by the Commission as a way to overcome democratic deficit of the EU. One of the ex-Commission Presidents Prodi argues that:

Today there is a great need for identity in the Union, the need for a common expression of solidarity and common destiny...to do this, we must raise the awareness of our citizens...European identity is inextricably linked to a new type of citizenship based on multiple forms of allegiance, ranging from local town to the Union. The single national identity would be replaced by complementary identities.¹⁰⁵⁴

He emphasizes that, the goal is not to construct European identity to replace national identities; instead it has been trying to be constructed in addition to national and regional identities which will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The Commission officials have tried to strengthen popular support for European integration through educational, cultural and audiovisual policies. The Commission also encouraged formation of “pan-European interest groups” in these policy fields. However, according to Eurobarometer surveys, there is widely public opposition for the involvement of the EU in these fields.¹⁰⁵⁵ These policy fields are still under the control of national governments, the EU only has a secondary role and it tries to promote cooperation among the Member States.

¹⁰⁵¹ C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.476.

¹⁰⁵² C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.52-55.

¹⁰⁵³ C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, pp.476-478.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Romano Prodi, “Enlargement of the Union and European Identity”, *The Future of the EU Debate: Archives*, January 20, 2003, retrieved on August 24, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/constitution/futurum/docinstcomm_2003_en.htm#2003

¹⁰⁵⁵ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, pp.149-151.

The Commission supports the research organisation **Eurobarometer** which examines the changes in public opinion of the Member States on a regular basis.¹⁰⁵⁶ It has been established to see the responses of the public opinion to the European integration process. The goal of the Eurobarometer is to show the level of support of the citizens for the EU, also their thoughts about the institutions of the EU and its policies. These surveys have been made since 1973. The reports are published twice a year. Some questions are permanent such as those, which are about support for their country's membership to the EU and since the late 1990s their attitudes towards the single currency have been asked.¹⁰⁵⁷ In addition to these, it has been trying to find the level of European identity and national identities of the citizens of the EU. Current Eurobarometer data do not allow distinguishing between cultural and civic understandings of European identity.¹⁰⁵⁸ As Jacobs and Maier argue, Eurobarometer should not only be seen as a tool of monitoring "European public opinion", but at the same time it reflects the efforts for its realization.¹⁰⁵⁹ As Shore argues, even officials of the Commission accept that, there is still no such thing as a "European public", including the staff of Eurobarometer office.¹⁰⁶⁰

One of the primary concerns of the Commission is to communicate with the citizens. Margot Wallström who is European Commission Vice-President and responsible for Inter-institutional Relations and Communications Strategy, in her speech at the European Youth Summit mentioned the challenges of the EU, one of which is identity. She argued that "perhaps you will become the transforming generation for the European identity, an identity which is built from the bottom-up."¹⁰⁶¹ She also added that "I want a Europe you could easily fall in love with."¹⁰⁶² She emphasized the importance of bottom-up initiatives in construction process of European identity and the role of young generations in this process. She is also in favour of construction of a Europe, which is not considered as too bureaucratic and far away from its citizens.

During the interviews conducted by the author, some of the MEPs criticized the Commission in terms of marketing. Resetarits stated that:

¹⁰⁵⁶ P. Taylor, *The EU in the 1990's*, p.143.

¹⁰⁵⁷ D. Dunkerley, L. Hodgson et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.117.

¹⁰⁵⁸ A. Wiener, & T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p.170.

¹⁰⁵⁹ D. Jacobs & R. Maier, "European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction", pp.19-20.

¹⁰⁶⁰ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.52-55.

¹⁰⁶¹ Margot Wallström, "A Vision for Europe", European Youth Summit, Rome, March 24, 2007.

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid.*

...most of the people do not know anything about the Commission. They do not know what they are doing...Commission has a real big marketing problem. This can not help to build up European identity a lot.¹⁰⁶³

It has to be emphasized that although the citizens of the EU do not know much about the Commission, its initiatives have had important roles in the construction process of European identity. Sommer pointed out that:

Citizens have no imagination about what the Commission or the ECJ does. The Commission tries to take some initiatives...to realize common market. This is part of growing European identity...Citizens can not see.¹⁰⁶⁴

She admitted the importance of the initiatives of the Commission in construction of European identity, although many people do not know much about what the Commission does.

During the interviews, the Commission officials emphasized the role of the Commission in the construction process of European identity. One ex-Commission official from DG Education argued that, the Commission is the motor of European integration.¹⁰⁶⁵ One of the Commission officials from DG Justice Freedom and Security argued that “Commission officials work for European interests. They believe in this project. They think that, what is good for Europe is also good for our countries.”¹⁰⁶⁶ He also claimed that “Commission should be effective. It should not be popular. There is not a necessity for the Commission to be popular.”¹⁰⁶⁷ He implied that it is not so important, whether the EU citizens know much about what the Commission does or not, the important thing is its effectiveness. The Commission has made a lot of initiatives to bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens. One ex-Commission official put forward that “The Commission has a crucial role to play in feeling of belonging among citizens...”¹⁰⁶⁸ He asserted that “...the Commission should intensify dialogue with citizens...should pay attention to things, which are important for citizens, such as education...”¹⁰⁶⁹ He also mentioned the importance of other institutions, such as the EP and the ECJ in this process. He stated that “these three

¹⁰⁶³ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Interview with a Commission official from Germany, DG Education, at one of the Commission buildings in Brussels, on September 5, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview with a Commission official from Spain, DG Justice Freedom and Security, on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁸ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

institutions work together. None of these can make a difference alone.”¹⁰⁷⁰ Another Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry, also argued that all institutions of the EU have complementary roles. He stated that:

The Commission, the EP, the ECJ all have their own roles. Some of them are strong in some respects, some in others. The ECJ interprets EU law, it has an integration friendly position, the EP represents society interests, individual influence can be more easier (lobbying), the Council of Ministers represents national identity, national interests.¹⁰⁷¹

Thus, all institutions of the EU have influenced the construction process of European identity. One Commission official emphasized the importance of the political will in the construction process of European identity. She stated that:

...construction of European identity demands a political vision...heads of Member States...It is not for EU bureaucrats, the Commission officials...it is more to do with political will...now the EU is at crossroads...Shock of ten new members...negotiating with other states... having a long list of potential candidates, the public opinion confused not only about expansion of the EU, but also about what the EU means to them...mostly the Commission reacts to situations and tries to propose tools to arrive a result, after the shock of French and Dutch results...the Commission is working on a ‘communication plan’ to bring citizens closer to Brussels or vice versa...the Commission is tool, it is not necessarily the driving force...¹⁰⁷²

About the Commission officials she argued that “...not every EU official is here because they believe...there is a number of people, who really believes...”¹⁰⁷³ in the EU project. She implied that not all of the Commission officials work at the Commission, because of believing in the EU project. About the role of the EU institutions in construction of European identity she argued that they have complementary roles. She stated that:

The Commission and the EP have to work together. The Commission is first, it is less political than the EP, more technical...Open expert body...fully devoted to EU policies...The EP brings in the voice of people...number two is the EP, they can not do too much without the Council of Ministers and the European Council, without political force behind them...Third the ECJ, alone it can not really take its part. It works as a safeguard institution, but not as a driving force.¹⁰⁷⁴

Thus, most of the Commission officials emphasized the complementarity of the roles of the EU institutions in the construction process of European identity.

Consequently, the Commission has a very important role in the construction process of European identity, because it initiates legislative process, also it has direct

¹⁰⁷⁰ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁰⁷¹ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on September 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁷² Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁰⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

contacts with the EU citizens through conferences, giving funds to the EU projects and it has many initiatives to increase communication with the citizens and to provide different ways of involvement of the citizens to the EU.

III.1.2.2. The Role of the European Parliament (EP)

The EP has had an important role in construction process of European identity, because it is the only institution of the EU, which is directly elected by the citizens since 1979. Direct elections to the EP every five years bring its members into direct contact with the public and provide an opportunity for participation of the citizens to the politics of the EU. The turnout rate of the EP elections has been steadily declining, but it changes from one Member State to another. For example, in 1999 turnout rate was 90% in Belgium with the effect of compulsory voting, but 23% in the UK.¹⁰⁷⁵ It is argued that the EP with its periodical elections could stimulate European identity, but because of the low turnout rates and the “second-order” status of these elections,¹⁰⁷⁶ its effects have been limited. The competencies of the EP within the institutional structure of the EU have been increased the most, compared to other institutions of the EU since its foundation, with the transition to direct elections and amendments of the founding treaties since the SEA. It is composed of multinational party groups, which represent major political groups in the Member States, such as the European Peoples’ Party (EPP-Christian Democrats), the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens, who have different visions of the EU and have different priorities.

The EP makes references to both cultural and civic understandings of European identity. According to a Resolution issued by the EP, “Europe is not only an association of economic interests but also a cultural unit.”¹⁰⁷⁷ It was also stated that “the integration of Europe...must be built on the common foundations of European culture.”¹⁰⁷⁸ In one of the EP reports, it was stated that:

¹⁰⁷⁵ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, pp.94-95.

¹⁰⁷⁶ K. Reif (ed.), *Ten European Elections: Campaigns and Results of the 1979 First Direct Elections to the EP*, Gower, Aldershot, 1985; cited in Stefania Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity : From Treaty Provisions to Public Opinion Attitudes” in Edward Moxon-Browne (ed.), *Who are the Europeans Now?*, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub., 2004, pp.24-25.

¹⁰⁷⁷ EP, “Resolution on the Founding of a Centre for European Culture and Civilization”, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. C 262 10.10, 1988; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.60.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

The cultural dimension is becoming an increasingly crucial means of giving effect to policies seeking to foster a union of the European peoples founded on the consciousness of sharing a common heritage of ideas and values.¹⁰⁷⁹

During the interviews which were conducted by the author, many MEPs emphasized the importance of the EP in construction of European identity. Most of them stated that it is the most important institution in construction process of European identity. Especially they emphasized that it is the only institution of the EU which is directly elected by the citizens. El Khadrouri stated that:

...I think the EP can play very important role. The EP becomes more and more important. It is considered by many people as democratic institution that represents people of Europe. If you compare the power of the parliament in the end of the 1970s...to the power it has now, there is a big difference. Beginning with only a place, where people talk together about very interesting issues, but they can not decide anything. Right now on many issues...including environment, transport, employment...the EP has an important role to play...¹⁰⁸⁰

Sommer argued that the EP is the most effective institution on construction process of European identity. She stated that:

...We are representing our citizens. We are kind of bridge for them, to this European level. If we can explain them what is going on here, what is the task of European political level...otherwise citizens will get lost.¹⁰⁸¹

Some of the MEPs mentioned the deficiencies of the EP. Özdemir argued that “...although the competencies of the EP have been extended, there are still some deficiencies. It does not have the right of initiative. They have to be solved as soon as possible...”¹⁰⁸² He also pointed out that as an individual you may be more effective at the EP, instead of a member of a national parliament. He stated that:

The EP has an increasing power but it is at the level, which can be compared with national parliaments. But here it is more possible to work with different parties. If you want to be successful about anything, you have to do this. Parties are so heterogeneous, so you are freer as an individual. I see it as an advantage...I worked as a deputy before, that is why I have a chance to make a comparison. If you work hard as an individual here and you know your file well, you can be more successful as an individual.¹⁰⁸³

¹⁰⁷⁹ R. Barzanti, “New Prospects for Community Cultural Action Draft Report”, EP: Brussels, 1992; quoted in C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.476.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Interview with S. El Khadrouri, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁸¹ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹⁰⁸² Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁰⁸³ *Ibid.*

Resetarits criticized the lack of time which they can spend for direct communication with their citizens. Because there is a lot of committee work in Brussels and once a month they have to go to Strasbourg. She stated that:

...I go to schools, companies to talk with people but it is not enough...I am sure most of the people ask, what are they doing all the time? Our politicians in the Parliament...because, there is no connection.¹⁰⁸⁴

She criticized the effectiveness of the EP, she stated that:

...We should do less, but more effective...we should concentrate on big issues, which are important for people...Barroso said last time in Strasbourg, when we are discussing future of Europe, we should build up Europe of special projects...then we try to communicate these projects to people.¹⁰⁸⁵

She also criticized national media. She argued that “the MEPs are not so often mentioned by national media, the Commission is not mentioned also.”¹⁰⁸⁶ The role of media in construction of European identity will be discussed in this chapter. Prets argued that the Commission is the most important institution in construction process of European identity. She also asserted that there should be more co-decision in different policy fields to increase the role of the EP. She stated that:

...what we need is the new treaty so that the EP has more co-decision...more direct democracy...It is very difficult because the Council does not want to give its powers to the EP...the Commission is the most effective in terms of European identity, because people deal with the Commission. If they have some projects...if they have a question. The Commission is the partner, the relations between the citizens and the Commission is directly...The MEPs are going to the Member States, they have to collect all critiques...we have to give answers and convince the people...¹⁰⁸⁷

During the interviews many MEPs argued that all of the institutions of EU, especially the Commission, the EP and the ECJ have complementary roles in construction of European identity. Weber argued that “...first the EP, second the ECJ...”¹⁰⁸⁸ are effective on construction of European identity. Stubb stated that:

The EP is a symbol of European identity, we are here to serve European peoples...the Council, the Commission and the EP we should not exaggerate its importance in terms of identity building, we are more European than the Council of course...¹⁰⁸⁹

El Khadrouri argued that all of the institutions have complementary roles in this process. He stated that:

¹⁰⁸⁴ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸⁷ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

I think all of these institutions have a role to play... the Commission is now quite weak, in comparison to the Commission of Delors, visionary man who was able to make a lot of progress in the European integration process... the EP... the ECJ is very important because it checks the rules...they all have their own role.¹⁰⁹⁰

Duff pointed out that:

The Council, the Commission and the EP, in order to do anything, we have to work in partnership. The ECJ is very good at interpreting Treaty in an integrationist direction which has been very helpful. Political impetus in cultural policy has always been from the Commission and the EP.¹⁰⁹¹

Hatzidakis also emphasized the complementary roles of the institutions of the EU. He asserted that:

Institutions are complementary...we need all of the institutions... the Council...the EP is a body directly elected by people, we need the Commission as a think tank and as a guardian of treaties, also we need the ECJ, took from time to time some decisions...¹⁰⁹²

Badia i Cutchet stated that:

The EP is one that goes more directly to the citizens, we are representing people... the Council build Europe, they are thinking the interests of their countries...the most common interest is the EP, then the Commission, then the Council...the ECJ must be there, when the Court of Justice in the countries can not work properly, then we need to have the ECJ...¹⁰⁹³

Thus, most of the MEPs who were interviewed stated that all of the institutions of the EU have complementary roles in construction process of European identity.

On the other hand, Deprez argued that the EU institutions can not be effective on construction of European identity. Instead, the national leaders have primary role in this process. He stated that:

If you consider the citizens' point of view, the most important and effective thing...is probably the political attitude of the national governments towards Europe and the involvement of national leaders in the European construction or the attitudes of national parties towards the European construction...if they tend to explain to people what we intend to do by creating Europe everyday, the citizens of their country will probably understand better and follow them...I do not think that, the most important thing for construction of a European identity would be the role of the European institutions...it seems too far from people and their identity...for example, citizens usually do not know anything about what the Council is doing...¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹⁰ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁰⁹¹ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

¹⁰⁹² Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

¹⁰⁹³ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

Even among the MEPs, there are some who are totally against the idea of construction of European identity. Fajmon asserted that:

There is an effort to create a European identity by the political elite...They would like to create... the basis for the European super state. This is what I am against...I do not think that, European identity exists and I do not think it can be created in short time. I do not think that, it is a positive problem that we should have as an objective to create such identity...absolute majority of the European people have national identities and they are happy with that. They do not want any other identity which is against that...¹⁰⁹⁵

He perceives construction of European identity as unnecessary and against national identities; but as it will be discussed in Chapter IV; construction of European identity in the EU has not replaced national or regional identities.

Consequently, there are different perceptions among the MEPs about the role of the EP in construction of European identity. Although all the Commission officials and the MEPs do not have a common goal of construction of European identity, some of the initiatives of these institutions, the discourses of the political elites and officials of the EU about European identity have been effective on the construction process of European identity. The EP is the only institution of the EU which is directly elected by its citizens. If the role of the EP increases in decision making process, the EU identity will strengthen which will lead to strengthening of European identity.

III.1.2.3. The Role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)

In addition to its economic and political nature, the EU is based on law. The EU has been also perceived as a “legal community”.¹⁰⁹⁶ The *acquis communautaire* has important role in construction of European identity within the EU.¹⁰⁹⁷ The important part of the *acquis* is composed of decisions of the ECJ. The fundamental principles of the EU law which are “**direct effect**” and “**supremacy of EU law**” were developed by the ECJ.¹⁰⁹⁸ The ECJ which is an active integrationist institution of the EU, contributed to the transformation of the EU into an “area of freedom and mobility for Community workers

¹⁰⁹⁵ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, on September 13, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁰⁹⁶ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.6.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.10.

¹⁰⁹⁸ H. Voogsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, *POLIS 2005 Plenary Conference-European Identity and Political Systems*, Paris, 17-18 June 2005.

and their families, professionals and providers of services”.¹⁰⁹⁹ The ECJ has adopted an active role in extending the provisions of the Treaty and the application of Community law over culture and education.¹¹⁰⁰ Thus, it has increased the competencies of the EU in different fields which are closely related with the construction of European identity.

Judicial interpretation and development of the ECJ’s jurisprudence are very important for legitimacy of the EU. The ECJ developed fundamental European rights which provide the citizens better legal protection than their basic rights within their Member States.¹¹⁰¹ Through preliminary ruling mechanism, it contributes to homogeneous implementation of the EU law throughout the Member States. Delanty argues that “the ECJ has an important role in democratic Europeanization.”¹¹⁰² The ECJ refers to general principles of the common constitutional tradition of the Member States and to a common European legal tradition as shared roots of a European legal culture.¹¹⁰³ Möller contends that “democracy and fundamental freedoms form a considerable common pillar of European law and European identity.”¹¹⁰⁴ The ECJ has not dealt directly with European identity. But as Voogsgeerd argues, law and identity are interrelated with each other. Its decisions have implications in the long term. It influences identity indirectly but deeply. For example, the right of free movement which has been accelerated by the case law of the ECJ, has been affecting on construction of European identity. The decisions of the ECJ create new boundaries. Its decisions show who are included in a certain treatment and who is excluded. Non-discrimination and four main freedoms within the EU have affected “boundary creating process”¹¹⁰⁵ which is closely related with the construction of European identity. According to Mayer and Palmowski, the institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of the EU have enabled Europe to invent a new identity by overcoming its historical divisions. The new identity is based on justice and the “legalization of intra-European conflict”. They argue that the EU law and the decisions of the ECJ reflect “what Europe is and what it aspires to be.”¹¹⁰⁶ They point out that the ECJ has a crucial role in

¹⁰⁹⁹ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.42.

¹¹⁰⁰ S. Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?”, p.388.

¹¹⁰¹ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.29.

¹¹⁰² Interview with G. Delanty, at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007, at 16.00.

¹¹⁰³ ECJ Case 4/73 *Nold KG v. Commission*, 1974, ECR 491, note 13=28 NJW 518, 1975; quoted in T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.28.

¹¹⁰⁴ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.38.

¹¹⁰⁵ H. Voogsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, 17-18 June 2005.

¹¹⁰⁶ F.C.Mayer and J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, pp.587-591.

construction of “substantive aspects of a European identity.”¹¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the ECJ through its case law has deeply influenced the national identities of Member States. Especially the case law about the internal market and the competition policy have affected the Member States and their citizens.¹¹⁰⁸ Thus, through the case law, the ECJ has been effective on daily lives of citizens of the EU, which have affected the construction process of European identity on utilitarian basis. As Ash argues, even the strongest governments and companies have to follow the rulings of the ECJ. He states that “it is thanks to the judicial enforcement of European laws on the ‘four freedoms’ that Europeans can now travel, shop, live and work wherever they like in most of Europe.”¹¹⁰⁹ The ECJ has an important role in protection of individual rights. As Voogsgeerd argues, European identity which has been affected by the ECJ is still a “thin” identity. Only the EU citizens who move to another Member State can benefit from the four freedoms of the EU and provisions of the EU citizenship. Only around 3% of the working population moves to another Member State for working.¹¹¹⁰

According to the interviews conducted by the author, the ECJ is usually perceived as important and effective in terms of construction of European identity. Schöpflin argued that the ECJ is the most effective institution, in comparison to the Commission and the EP in terms of construction of European identity.¹¹¹¹ Ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education, emphasized the role of the ECJ in implementation of the EU citizenship. He stated that:

In many cases the best defender of the European citizenship has been the ECJ...It has defended the European citizenship in many respects. Interpreting treaties in such a way that the rights given to citizens, actually mean something.¹¹¹²

Resetarits argued that the ECJ is effective on construction of European identity. She stated that “...it is the only way, where the European citizens have the feeling of, if there is something not fare done to me and my national system of justice is not doing a very good job, I will go to the ECJ.”¹¹¹³ Thus, the ECJ can complement the deficiencies of the

¹¹⁰⁷ F.C.Mayer and J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, pp.587-591.

¹¹⁰⁸ H. Voogsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, 17-18 June 2005.

¹¹⁰⁹ T. G. Ash, “Europe’s True Stories”, February 2007.

¹¹¹⁰ H. Voogsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, 17-18 June 2005.

¹¹¹¹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹¹¹² Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹¹¹³ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

national judicial systems. She added that “...very few people go to the ECJ...”¹¹¹⁴ One Commission official from DG Enlargement argued that “the ECJ is important in terms of its decisions on free movement.”¹¹¹⁵ Stubb mentioned the importance of the ECJ in terms of some case laws. He stated that:

...especially in economic terms we have more in common than differences, such as *Cassis de Dijon* case, good example of, if one product is approved in one country, it should be approved in another...¹¹¹⁶

Thus, the primacy of the EU law over national laws, its protection by the ECJ and also interpretation of the treaties by the ECJ in an integrationist way, have important role in construction of European identity particularly in civic terms. In addition to these, through some of the case laws, it has affected daily lives of the citizens of the EU which have affected construction of European identity on utilitarian basis that will be discussed in this chapter.

III.1.2.4. The Position of the European Council and the Council of Ministers

The European Council and the Council of Ministers are the most important institutions of the EU in terms of decision making which provide regular interaction atmosphere for the Member States. At the European Council meetings the heads of the states or the heads of the governments, at the Council of Minister meetings, the ministers of the Member States try to reach a compromise on different issues.

During the interviews conducted by the author, the European Council and the Council of Ministers are criticized by some of the MEPs especially in terms of lack of transparency. Also they argued that the representatives of the national governments usually talk differently in their countries and in Brussels. Resetarits stated that:

... the EU does not have a very good reputation, a lot of people thinks it is very bureaucratic because of the Council...they sit together behind closed doors. Nobody knows what they are talking about, what they are doing...In democracy you have to meet in public...¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹⁴ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹¹¹⁵ Interview with Commission official from France, DG Enlargement, on July 13, 2006 at 17.30.

¹¹¹⁶ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

¹¹¹⁷ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

She also criticized the national politicians, because they usually blame the EU for many problems in their national governments. She finds the attitudes of some national ministers not so sincere. She stated that:

...if the Council of Ministers did something very good, they go out and tell the national media and the people, I did it...It is not Europe, it is me...if there is something not working out very well...they say Brussels, they are doing that...¹¹¹⁸

Özdemir criticized the Council in terms of transparency. He pointed out that:

...at the European level there is a democratic deficit problem. It is being solved partly, the transparency problem in the Council...When a decision is taken at the Council of Ministers, we do not know which ministers or which countries opposed to that decision...It is not like that in the nation-states. We know that, which party is supporting that decision, which is against...Transparency is part of democratic structure...¹¹¹⁹

El Khadrui also mentioned the transparency problem in the Council. He stated that:

... the Council of Ministers should reform itself because for many people, it is not clear what they are doing, they always meet behind screens, they say something different maybe in public than in the meeting rooms, so there is a lack of transparency... the Council of Ministers should be controlled by the national parliaments, but the national parliaments are not equipped enough to do the job well... transparency issue is very important.¹¹²⁰

The transparency of the Council is one of the main problems, which has been mentioned frequently by the MEPs during the interviews.

Some of the interviewees emphasized the role of the Council in construction process of European identity, because of its dominant role in decision-making process. Öger emphasized the role of the Council in construction of European identity. He stated that:

I think these works should be done at the level of the Council. If the duty to the Commission is given by the Council, the Commission will focus on this subject. I think the railways should be built; the goals should be created by the Council.¹¹²¹

He emphasized that the goals of the EU are decided by the Council, if it does not open the way to other institutions of the EU, they can not be so effective in this process. Hieronymi also mentioned the importance of the role of the Council. She argued that “the Commission and the EP can be so effective, if the Council allows...”¹¹²² Thus, the Council has a role in construction of European identity in terms of creating the goals of the EU and opening the

¹¹¹⁸ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹¹¹⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹¹²⁰ Interview with S. El Khadrui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹²¹ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

¹¹²² Interview with R. Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

way for other institutions. On the other hand, some of the interviewees see the Council as a challenge to the construction of European identity. Stubb asserted that:

The Council is sort of anti-European identity building, because five minutes after meeting, a national minister goes in front of his national media to tell how fantastic his national position was and how much better they are than anyone else...¹¹²³

National interests are primary concern at the Council meetings. Thus, the Council balances the construction of European identity by providing an atmosphere for maintenance of national identities. The institutional balance among the institutions of the EU leads to construction process of European identity, without replacing national and regional identities.

Consequently, among the institutions of the EU, the Commission has involved most in the construction process of European identity through its initiatives, programmes and funding projects. The EP which is the only institution directly elected by the citizens of the EU, has been effective in this process to a lesser extent. The MEPs have different perceptions about construction of European identity. There is a lack of consensus among the elites of the EU on the goal of construction of European identity and which instruments should be used in this process. In addition to these, the ECJ has been effective on this process, because of protecting and widening the legislation of the EU through interpretation of its treaties and establishing the principles of the primacy of EU law over national laws and direct effect of the EU law. On the other hand, the European Council and the Council of Ministers help maintenance of national identities by providing interaction atmosphere to reach a compromise among different national interests. Thus there is a balance among the institutions of the EU in terms of construction of European identity and maintenance of national identities which have been under Europeanisation process.

III.2. The Effects of Working at the EU Institutions on Identity of the EU Elites and Effective Factors on the Level of European Identity of the General Public

III.2.1. The Effects of Working at the EU Institutions on the Identity of the Commission Officials and the MEPs

“Institutional socialisation” can be mostly seen among those who are directly involved in the institution and its functioning, such as institutional elites and employees.

¹¹²³ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

The degree of identification is closely related with experiencing its effects in daily life. The more daily life is affected by the institution; there is a greater tendency to be identified with that institution.¹¹²⁴ As political elites of the EU become involved in the daily management of European integration, they usually have more Europeanized identifications.¹¹²⁵

It is widely accepted that the political elites tend to be more open to the idea of Europeanisation than the general public; because they have higher level of education and they have much more cross-border interaction.¹¹²⁶ Thus, they can experience better aspects of Europeanisation in their daily lives more. The EU officials and some intellectuals within the Member States have stronger level of European identity.¹¹²⁷ The greatest effects of the EU institutions may be observed among the officials, because of “interpersonal socialisation”. This can be observed especially among the officials of the Commission and some of the MEPs. By making a reference to Wendt and Ruggie, some constructivist scholars argue that “membership matters in altering the preferences and even the identities of national elites involved in the process of European integration.”¹¹²⁸ With the effects of the working atmosphere, their European identity usually increase, they have also started to focus more on common European interests. The EU officials once appointed usually become progressively more “European” with the effect of working together in a “European” environment.¹¹²⁹ Usually the EU officials start to identify themselves as more European, without giving up their national, regional identities. Eurobarometer surveys reflect the huge gap between the elites and the general public in terms of level of their European identity.¹¹³⁰ Even after the Maastricht Treaty, when there was a popular opposition, a survey found that more than 90% of the elites supported moving further toward political union.¹¹³¹

¹¹²⁴ R. Herrmann & M. B. Brewer, “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU”, p.14.

¹¹²⁵ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 16.

¹¹²⁶ T. Flockhart, “Critical Junctures and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Gap Between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization”, p.252.

¹¹²⁷ C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.488.

¹¹²⁸ Quoted in M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.226. For further detail see W. Sandholtz, “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.3, 1996, pp.403-29.

¹¹²⁹ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.5-6.

¹¹³⁰ Jacqueline M. Spence, “The EU: ‘A View From The Top’- Top Decision Makers and the EU”, Wavre: EOS Gallup Europe, 1998.

¹¹³¹ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.161.

There is a huge gap between the growing but still small number of intellectuals, politicians, civil servants, some academicians, who are pro-Europeans and the public opinion of the Member States.¹¹³² As Risse argues, “different degrees of socialisation in terms of direct experience with the EU would explain the huge gap between elite identification and that of the mass public.”¹¹³³ Another reason of this gap is that the elites usually see more advantageous aspects of the institutionalisation process.¹¹³⁴ In addition to these, the general public learn the information about the EU usually through the national media and the national politicians that usually blame the EU for the problems in their states. This gap between the elites and the general public has not been overcome till the beginning, even before the establishment of the EC which has been one of the main challenges of the EU. Its negative effects can be observed in different cases, especially in the ratification of the treaties by referendums and the turnout rate of the EP elections.

III.2.1.1. The Effects of Working at the Commission on Identity of the Commission Officials

The social context has pushed toward stronger identification with the EU, which may help explaining the difference between the identities of the Commission officials and those of the general public.¹¹³⁵ The Commissioners have to exercise “European role” because of the Commission’s powers of policy initiation and guardianship of the treaties. As Laffan argues, the Commissioners do not lose their national identity, while working in Brussels. They still have a special concern about their home country. When a Commissioner makes an intervention about his/her home country, he/she usually uses the expression “the country I know best”. If they want to be effective in the College of Commissioners, they have to balance carefully their “European role” and “the country they know best”.¹¹³⁶ Those who started to work at the Commission at a relatively younger age, are likely to be socialized in support for the EU, while others usually come to Brussels with already positive attitudes towards the European integration.¹¹³⁷ The work of Hooghe about the people who work at the EU institutions, also shows the effects of “living Europe”

¹¹³² J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, p.188.

¹¹³³ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, pp. 266-267.

¹¹³⁴ R. Herrmann & M. B. Brewer, “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU”, p.15.

¹¹³⁵ A. Wiener, & T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p.168.

¹¹³⁶ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, pp.87-88.

¹¹³⁷ L. Hooghe, “The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance, Themes in European Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, 2005.

everyday and its effects on European elites' identity. As she found out, the Commission is not a unitary actor; there are different perceptions within the Commission¹¹³⁸ which are closer to each other, in comparison to the perceptions of the MEPs about European integration.

According to the interviews, working at the Commission has usually made the Commission officials' European identity stronger. One Commission official from DG Justice Freedom and Security stated that "working at the Commission has increased my European identity. It is an honour to work here."¹¹³⁹ The Commission officials usually have multiple identities. One ex-Commission official stated that "I feel French, Occitan and European."¹¹⁴⁰ He also added that "working at the Commission affected my identity. My European identity has become stronger."¹¹⁴¹ One of the Commission officials from DG Education argued that "It depends on situations. In Germany I feel German, in Brussels I feel European, when I go to USA, I feel European. When you travel outside Europe, you feel yourself European."¹¹⁴² He added that he has been working at the Commission since 1999 and his European identity has become stronger.¹¹⁴³ One of the Commission officials who is working at the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency stated that:

...I was doing my masters in Washington in 1990 and 1991, when the Berlin Wall fell...I felt that something great is happening...Europe start to become in one and I was too far away...being in the USA, I felt European...at the same time...I am Greek and I come from the northern part of Greece...I felt European at that time and I still maintain that...I feel primarily European, secondarily national, thirdly regional.¹¹⁴⁴

One Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry stated that "I am a German who is working in the Commission. I do not define myself European. I do not know what it is."¹¹⁴⁵ He admitted the effects of working at the Commission. He stated that:

¹¹³⁸ Liesbeth Hooghe, "Serving Europe: Political Orientations of Senior Commission Officials", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol.1, No.8, retrieved on September 7, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-008a.htm>

¹¹³⁹ Interview with Commission official from Spain, DG Justice Freedom and Security, at one of the Commission buildings in Brussels, on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹⁴⁰ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴² Interview with a Commission official from Germany, DG Education, on September 5, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁴ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹¹⁴⁵ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

Of course it has important effects, one day you may be nationalist, one day you are European. Your horizon has broadened after working here. You have come into contact with wide range of cultures, languages... You have to work in different languages in one day. You become more open, you try to understand others.¹¹⁴⁶

As he argues, working at the Commission usually widens the horizons of the Commission officials, because of working in an international atmosphere and working for European interests. One ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education, argued that he has already had a European identity. He stated that:

I have worked for five years at the Commission; I had worked for Europe at least twenty years before. My whole career has been sort of European...I do not think my identity is only dependent on working at the Commission. I would feel extremely unhappy working in a national context...¹¹⁴⁷

It may be concluded that working at the Commission usually increases the level of European identity of the Commission officials. It also depends on their personal backgrounds. Some of them have already felt European before working at the Commission which may be one of the reasons for their preference to work at the Commission.

III.2.1.2. The Effects of Working at the EP on Identity of the MEPs

The MEP is a new type of politician who is different from the nationally elected politician and the international politician, appointed to an international organisation. The MEP has to represent both the national interests of his/her country and the European interests.¹¹⁴⁸ The MEPs usually have cross-cutting identities, including European identity, national identity and political party identity. National identity of the MEPs affects their “choices of committee, speaking interventions and voting.”¹¹⁴⁹ Scully argues that the MEPs views on integration are little different from the views of those who are members of national parliaments. He also asserts that there is no evidence that, the MEPs have become more “Euro-minded” than national level representatives. He found no connection between length of service in the EP and the view of the MEPs. He points out that the MEPs who

¹¹⁴⁶ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹⁴⁷ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹¹⁴⁸ N. Kauppi, “Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics and of European Integration”, will be published in *Theory and Society*.

¹¹⁴⁹ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, pp.94-95.

have worked for long periods, do not identify to a greater extent with the EU. He also argues that there is no change in loyalty towards the European party group.¹¹⁵⁰

According to the interviews which were conducted by the author, working at the EP has usually changed the way of looking of the MEPs towards different issues. Many of them argued that after working at the EP they have started to look from a wider, European perspective to many issues. It can be also argued that there is a tendency to have multiple identities among the MEPs. Usually they stated that they have primarily national identity, or regional/local identity then European identity. Sommer stated that “firstly I am German, very close to this I am European...”¹¹⁵¹ She also added that working at the EP makes her European identity stronger.¹¹⁵² Hieronymi stated that “Cologne, German, European...I have been working at the EP since 1999, it has made my European identity stronger.”¹¹⁵³ Coveney stated that:

I am Irish and I am European...firstly Irish. I would find very strange, if somebody said they are European first...I think most of the people are proud of where they come from...When I am in Ireland, I am proud of Cork...these things are complementary...If I am in a holiday in South Africa, if someone asks me, where I am from...I will say I am an Irish person.¹¹⁵⁴

He stated about the effects of working at the EP on his European identity that “I have been working for two years at the EP, it does.”¹¹⁵⁵ Many MEPs mentioned the complementarity of different identities. Kauppi argued that:

This depends on the context where you are. When traveling to places outside Europe such as the Americas or Asia, I feel very European. When in Europe, I would define myself as a Finn...when in Finland, I feel connected to the region of Oulu, where I originally come from.¹¹⁵⁶

Regarding the effects of working at the EP she stated that she has been working at the EP since 1999 and added that “...my identity has definitely developed and grown a lot stronger than before...”¹¹⁵⁷ Schöpflin stated that “I am Hungarian European, my Hungarian identity is a very strong part of me...working at the EP makes my European identity

¹¹⁵⁰ Roger Scully, *Becoming Europeans? Attitudes, Behavior and Socialization in the EP*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.135

¹¹⁵¹ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵³ Interview with R. Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

¹¹⁵⁴ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

¹¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁶ Interview with P. Noora Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

¹¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

definitely stronger...”¹¹⁵⁸ When it was asked to Prets, whether working at the EP has made her European identity stronger or not, she replied that “I have been working since 1999. Yes, because I know the background, the internal procedure, how the EU is working...”¹¹⁵⁹ Thus most of the interviewees admitted that, working at the EP has made their European identity stronger.

Most of the interviewees primarily have a national identity, secondarily European identity. Stubb stated that:

I come from a bilingual family in Finland we have two official languages: Finnish and Swedish...I am very much Finnish, Nordic, Scandinavian, also very European and international. Some people in Finland probably think that my identity is firstly European, but I think, it is firstly Finnish and after that European. It is very difficult to deny your roots, no matter how much you try.¹¹⁶⁰

He also added that:

I first worked as a diplomat for Finland. I worked for the Commission for three and a half years. I am an MEP for two years...gives more we feeling...your national prejudices grow, when you work here, but they grow in a positive sense...you become more European, but at the same time you become more...aware of national identities very much.¹¹⁶¹

He implied that working at the EP makes his European identity stronger, simultaneously interactions with other MEPs from different Member States, have also affected maintenance, even strengthening of national identities. Hatzidakis stated that “I feel Greek and I am proud of it, but at the same time, I feel European, I am proud of it as well. I work for a strong Greece in a strong and effective EU.”¹¹⁶² When it was asked to him, whether working at the EP makes his European identity stronger or not, he replied that:

...to some extent, living with other people from other countries...you understand that, your state is not alone, you are living in a continent, which has become a neighbourhood, technology is helping very much to it. In order for your country to be strong...it has to cooperate, work together with other European states...¹¹⁶³

He emphasized the complementarity of nation-states and the EU, thus being part of the EU does not imply that national identity has weakened.

It can be seen that the personal background of the MEPs are also effective on their identity. Bozkurt stated that:

¹¹⁵⁸ Interview with G.Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹¹⁵⁹ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

¹¹⁶⁰ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

¹¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶² Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

¹¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

I feel European. I think we were already European, before my father came to the Netherlands. He comes from İstanbul, which is Europe. My grandfather was born in Bulgaria, which was part of the Ottoman Empire at that time...I feel myself European, Dutch, Turkish...¹¹⁶⁴

It can be argued that the MEPs who have different origins generally have a tendency to have multiple identities. When it was asked that, whether working at the EP makes her European identity stronger or not, she replied that:

My European identity is in change. I really care about Europe, I think Europe is very important, it is influencing our lives. Here I am more confronted with what it means to be European. In Netherlands you are more Dutch, or Dutch Turkish. But here you have to talk with different people from other Member States. You have to talk in different languages. You see more in practice, what it means to be in communication with all other peoples of Europe...you see a lot of cultural differences...You all belong to the same union...It depends on the subject, sometimes you feel yourself more Dutch, sometimes more Turkish, sometimes more European. It depends on the situation...¹¹⁶⁵

Thus, in different circumstances the MEPs may act in accordance with their different identities. Öger argued that:

I am a person of Europe who has a Turkish origin. I am really European, I feel it that way, live it that way, I share those values...they are complementary. I feel very happy in Paris, London...I love Barcelona, Madrid, Istanbul so much. I see every part of Europe as my house, but of course...my heart is Turkish and it will stay that way. It is so natural. My motherland is Turkey.¹¹⁶⁶

Some of the MEPs have already had a strong European identity which affected their preference to work at EP. When it was asked to Öger that whether working at the EP makes his European identity stronger or not, he replied that “no way. I do not need that. To be an MEP is not a necessary coat to wear for me. Without that I was already European.”¹¹⁶⁷ El Khadroui argued that:

I am from Leuven...I am very proud of my city. I feel also European, Belgian and Flemish; but at the same time my father is from Morocco, I feel also a little bit Moroccan. Actually I am a citizen of the world...I believe in Europe, I believe this construction can create peace, stability and growth.¹¹⁶⁸

About the effect of working at the EP on his identity, El Khadroui stated that:

I have been working at the EP since October 2003. I felt European already. When you live here, you see how it works...you meet interesting people from all over Europe...No I do not think so. It **has affected my way of thinking, but not my identity.**¹¹⁶⁹

¹¹⁶⁴ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁶ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁸ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Özdemir defined his identity as:

...I was born in Germany, I have a Turkish origin, from my father's side I am partly Chercecian, my mother's grandmother is Greek...I am from the Greens, I am environmentalist. All of these are part of my identity...I believe in republicanism, I believe in civil methods, I am against violence...I think that they are well defined in Europe and I live all these in Europe.¹¹⁷⁰

About the effects of working at the EP on his identity, he stated that:

I have learned to look to the events more with European glasses. It was not like that much before...You looked to the events like "us" and "those" in Brussels. Now I am also part of the group who is from Brussels, so I try to look at events with the glasses of Brussels. If you asked me, one day if you will be part of Federal Assembly, anything will change; will you take off glasses of Europe and take on national glasses? The goal should be, if you are in the Federal Assembly, you should think Europe, if you are in Europe, you should think nation-states.¹¹⁷¹

Thus, working at the EP has usually widened the horizons of the MEPs and they have usually started to look at different issues through European glasses.

Very few interviewees stated that, he/she is only European and did not mention their national or local identity. Deprez stated that "I am European. That is a mix of Greek, Roman civilisation, Christianity, laicism...I am a sort of this mix..."¹¹⁷² He defined himself only as European and he defined European identity on cultural basis. He also stated that "I have been working here for more than twenty years..." and working at the EP has made his European identity stronger.¹¹⁷³ Resetarits stated that "I feel first European then I do not know..."¹¹⁷⁴ F. Schwalba-Hoth stated his European identity before his national identity. He stated that "I am a global citizen, European and German".¹¹⁷⁵ About the effect of working at the EP on the level of his European identity, he replied that "sure it makes my identity stronger".¹¹⁷⁶

According to the interviews conducted by the author, some of the MEPs already had strong European identity before working at the EP, thus working at the EP has not changed their identity much. About the effect of working at the EP on the level of his European identity, Rocard stated that "I do not really think so...because my European

¹¹⁷⁰ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷² Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁴ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹¹⁷⁵ Interview with F. Schwalba-Hoth, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 17.00.

¹¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

identity has been already extremely strong as a French politician...¹¹⁷⁷ He implied that as a French politician he was already European. He also added that:

According to the mass...the refusal of foreign policy...and no to the Constitution, there is no European identity concretely. I am a French man, with a huge European desire; I am a world citizen...¹¹⁷⁸

He has multiple identities including national, European and being a world citizen. Some of the MEPs primarily have a European identity. Duff stated that “I define myself firstly as European. I am British, but that is not such a great thing for me...”¹¹⁷⁹ About the effects of working at the EP he argued that “no I have always felt very European. I have been working at the EP for seven years...It has been confirmed, but not changed.”¹¹⁸⁰ When it was asked to Guardans, whether working at the EP has made his European identity stronger or not, he replied that “ I have been working since 2004...I was working at the Spanish Parliament for eight years, dealing with EU affairs...No.”¹¹⁸¹ Some of the MEPs have already had a strong European identity, some of them had a career mostly related with Europe before working at the EP thus, their level of European identity have not been affected by working at the EP.

Some regions of Europe have strong regional identities thus the MEPs who are from those regions usually have a stronger regional identity than their national identity. Badia i Cutchet stated that “my first identity is Catalan. Then I am Spanish, but I do not feel like a Spanish feeling as identity. The feeling of culture is close to Catalan, then European.”¹¹⁸² In cultural terms she feels primarily Catalan, in terms of citizenship she is from Spain, then European, whether it is civic or cultural is not stated. When it was asked to her that, whether working at the EP has made her European identity stronger or not, she replied that:

No I do not think it has affected my identity. But I know more about other identities...my party in Catalonia, sometimes in discussions I think they are looking at one point...all the topics should be looked from a little bit outside. It is the difference since I am here.¹¹⁸³

She implied that she has started to look from a wider perspective, since she has been working at the EP, but it has not made her European identity stronger.

¹¹⁷⁷ Interview with M. Rocard, Socialist MEP of France, on September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

¹¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁹ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸¹ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

¹¹⁸² Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

¹¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

Few of the MEPs stated that they have only national identity and working at the EP has not changed their identity. Wise, who is against the idea of the EU, stated that “I am British.”¹¹⁸⁴ He added that “I have been working for two years and my British identity has been reinforced everytime...”¹¹⁸⁵ Thus, working at the EP may sometimes make national identities of the MEPs stronger.

In the fieldwork made by Wodak, the Commission officials seem to feel attached to “Europeanness” more than the MEPs. The Commission officials generally speak of themselves in terms of “we”, referring to the Commission. On the other hand, most of the MEPs who were interviewed, responded to the question “do you consider yourself to be European?” as “I am European.”¹¹⁸⁶ According to the interviews conducted by the author, the Commission has affected the identity of the Commission officials more than the MEPs. The Commission officials are more sensitive about making interviews, because they do not want to be perceived as reflecting the views of the Commission; but the MEPs expressed themselves more openly and usually started replying with “I”. The Commission officials are the bureaucrats who work for the interests of the EU, on the other hand, the MEPs are politicians who are directly elected by their citizens, thus, they can express more easily their perceptions.

Consequently, working at all of the EU institutions has affected their officials identity to a certain extent, which depends on the role and functions of the institution. If we compare the effects of working at the Commission and working at the EP, it may be argued that working at both of these institutions have usually increased the level of European identity of those people who are working there; but it is more obvious among the Commission officials, who work for European interests and do not represent their country. The MEPs usually have multiple identities. They usually have primarily national identities. At the EP interaction takes place among different political party groups which are composed of the MEPs from different Member States. With the effect of working at the EP, the MEPs usually start to look to different issues through European glasses. Also during the interviews it was observed that at the EP building in Brussels, the offices of the

¹¹⁸⁴ Interview with T. Wise, MEP of the UK from Independence Democracy Group, on July 12, 2006, at 10.00.

¹¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸⁶ Ruth Wodak, “National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials” in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & Marilynn B. Brewer, *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, p.96.

MEPs from the same party group and same country are at the same hall which does not provide a suitable atmosphere for close interaction with the other MEPs who are from different Member States. On the other hand, the officials of the Commission always work in an international atmosphere which have affected their level of European identity.

III.2.2. The Gap Between the Elites and the General Public: Effective Factors on the Level of European Identity of the General Public

The gap between the elites and the general public has been one of the main challenges of construction of European identity.¹¹⁸⁷ The national elites are more likely to support the EU than the general public.¹¹⁸⁸ Scepticism to the EU is more widespread among the general public. Euroscepticism can be distinguished between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism. “Hard Euroscepticism” refers to rejection of the integration project totally, on the other hand “soft Euroscepticism” is related with how the EU functions and effectiveness of its policies. Especially “hard Eurosceptics” try to show the EU as a pan-European super state, they referred to the EU as “...a dangerous Leviathan that would subsume Europe’s nation-states.”¹¹⁸⁹ If Euroscepticism will become widespread in the EU, it may threaten the ongoing integration process.

III.2.2.1. Effective Factors on the Level of European Identity of the General Public

The Eurobarometer surveys are used to observe the level of support of the general public which are supplemented by “flash Eurobarometers” and some other special surveys.¹¹⁹⁰ The “Autumn Standard Eurobarometer” which was presented on 20 December 2005 shows that an average of 50% of the EU citizens consider the EU membership of their country as “a good thing” which is less from 54% in spring 2005. Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström, who is responsible for the EU’s communication strategy, stated that perceptions of the citizens had been negatively affected from the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005 and breakdown of the 2007-2013 budget at the June Summit. Among the Member States, the UK and Austria are

¹¹⁸⁷ C. Hersom, “European Citizenship and the Search for Legitimacy: The Paradox of the Danish Case”, p.44.

¹¹⁸⁸ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.53.

¹¹⁸⁹ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.147.

¹¹⁹⁰ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.12.

the most Eurosceptic ones. 32% of Austrians and 33% of British stated that, the EU membership is a “good thing” for their country. The greatest supporters of the EU are Luxembourg (82%) and Ireland (73%). It is interesting that in Netherlands where the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by the referendum, 70% of citizens stated that the EU membership is a “good thing”.¹¹⁹¹ Thus, there is not a correlation between rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and support for the EU membership of their country.

One of the important factors which is effective on the level of support to the European integration is the level of information people have about the EU. Those who are better informed, are more likely to support the EU project.¹¹⁹² The founding fathers tried to inform the public and they supported measures which enhance knowledge about the EC.¹¹⁹³ In 1955 Jean Monnet stated that “our Community will only come to true realization, if the actions it takes are made public and explained publicly...to the people of our Community.”¹¹⁹⁴ Thus, the founding fathers were aware of the importance of giving information to the public. This necessity has been realized more in recent years, especially it has been emphasized by the Commission and new measures have been introduced to inform the citizens of the EU. As Franklin, et al. argue, people are likely to express their unhappiness about their national governments indirectly through the referendums of the EU. Also most of the people know more about what their national governments do, rather than what the EU does.¹¹⁹⁵ People who are not satisfied from their national government, usually reflect their thoughts about their national government through the referendums of the EU.

During the interviews conducted by the author, Sommer argued that:

...they do not know enough about the EU...they are not aware of they are benefiting from the EU. If you ask a citizen...are you an EU citizen?...first region, then their country, then we are members of the EU...very small number of people feel as European citizen.¹¹⁹⁶

¹¹⁹¹ Teresa Küchler, “Irish Most Happy, Brits Most Unhappy With EU”, *euobserver.com*, retrieved on December 20, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/?aid=20597&rk=1>

¹¹⁹² L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.94.

¹¹⁹³ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.661.

¹¹⁹⁴ Quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.664. For further detail see J. Monnet, *Les Etats-Unis d’Europe ont Commence*, Robert Laffont Pub., 1995, p.68; J. Monnet, *Memoires*, p.506.

¹¹⁹⁵ Mark N. Franklin, Michael Marsh & L. M. McLaren, “The European Question: Opposition to Unification in the Wake of Maastricht”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.32, 1994, pp.455-472; quoted in L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.15.

¹¹⁹⁶ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

Guardans emphasized transparency of the institutions of the EU and he argued that giving information about the EU to the general public is effective on their level of European identity and support to the EU. He stated that:

...transparency...would be the first thing...citizens understand better what the EU does, they see it as an institution that helps them to solve their problems...if we are able to make the EU understandable...¹¹⁹⁷

Hieronymi emphasized informing national elites. She stated that:

First we have to inform our elites, they are not informed about the European law, decision-making in the EU, they are not informed enough, they have so national thinkings...to convince the elites...not only our citizens...the newspapers, TV, they do not inform.¹¹⁹⁸

The consultant of the MEP of Southern Cyprus argued that there is no dialogue between the technocrats, the politicians and the public opinion; we should start a dialogue between them.¹¹⁹⁹ Thus, the MEPs emphasized the necessity to inform the citizens and the national elites and the role of media in this process. Fajmon argued about the gap between the elites and the general public in terms of support to European integration. He asserted that the EU elites have very high goals for the EU which are not supported by the general public. He stated that:

...political elite, those who sit in the EU have absolutely contradictory views...European level is too far for people in Europe, so they do not care too much about that...they do not expect Europe to be primary instrument for political decision-making process...They expect Europe to do only limited amount of tasks...they do not think that, Europe should do everything like education, roads...in all these things they rely on nation-states...and this is correct...the source of gap between the elite and the people in Europe is starting from the fact that, majority of the political elite try to create more ambitious European agenda, they want to do more at the EU level...people do not want that. That is why they voted against the Constitution...not because that they do not understand. They understand but they do not want that.¹²⁰⁰

He claimed that citizens of the EU are usually against transferring more competencies to the EU level; but it usually depends on, whether they are satisfied from the implementation of that policy by the EU or not. As McLaren argues, if people satisfy from the implementation of that policy by their national government, they usually do not support the transfer of that policy to the EU level.¹²⁰¹

¹¹⁹⁷ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

¹¹⁹⁸ Interview with R. Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

¹¹⁹⁹ Interview with M. Charalampidis, Consultant of Y. Yiannos the MEP of Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

¹²⁰⁰ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, on September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

¹²⁰¹ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.147.

European identity and support for the integration process are closely related with each other. People, who have stronger European identity, are more likely to support the European integration. Political identities influence citizens' beliefs and behaviours.¹²⁰² According to Bruter, both civic and cultural understandings of European identity are conceptually and empirically different from support for European integration, but there is an important correlation among them.¹²⁰³ As Risse argues "...strong identification with the EU might increase the support for and legitimacy of the EU."¹²⁰⁴ Thus, if the citizens of the EU have a stronger European identity, this will probably lead to an increase in their level of support to the EU.

Construction of European identity among the general public is closely related with legitimacy of the EU. As McLaren argues, the opinions of the EU citizens have direct effect on the EU. The construction of a European identity may probably lead to increase in support to integration process and the general public accept decisions of the EU more easily, even when that decision is not directly related with their own interests. Thus, construction of European identity is closely related with support for the EU and willingness to transfer more competencies to the EU.¹²⁰⁵ Bruter argues that there is a linkage between average level of European identity and the dominant character of the European project at the time of their accession.¹²⁰⁶ He states that "the style of integration at the time of entry explains the expectations of citizens on European integration."¹²⁰⁷ He asserts that this explains why levels of support are higher amongst those Member States who are founders of the EC and those who joined the EC in the 1980s, than those who joined in 1973 and 1995.¹²⁰⁸ He puts forward that joining the EU at a time when there is a focus on political integration, is more suitable atmosphere for strengthening of European identity, than joining at a time, when the EU focuses on economic issues. For example, Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EC in its "**EU identity and citizenship phase**", during the project of a "People's Europe". Countries with the lowest levels of European identity mostly joined the EC in its "**technical phase**" which affected their "starting level of political identification with the EU." Moreover, they have not been part of some of the

¹²⁰² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.3-4.

¹²⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp.120-121.

¹²⁰⁴ T. Risse, "Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration", p.298.

¹²⁰⁵ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.10.

¹²⁰⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.172.

¹²⁰⁷ Michael Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.36, No.10, December 2003, pp.1148-1179.

¹²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.1148-1179.

important civic projects and symbols of the EU, such as the Schengen agreement (the UK, Ireland) and Euro (the UK, Denmark). Thus, the peoples of the countries who joined the EU in 1973 and 1995 still do not identify with the EU that much.¹²⁰⁹ It can be argued that it is one of the factors which have been effective on this process.

The personal experience of citizens about the EU also influences their level of European identity. Bruter puts forward that years of membership will make citizens recognize the EU as a more obviously relevant political system in their life, as they have experienced the European integration process more. He asserts that “increased length of membership reinforces European identity.”¹²¹⁰ According to this idea, peoples of founding Member States should have the highest level of European identity. Also Kritzinger claims that the longer the EU citizens experienced the European integration process; their experiences could affect their perceptions towards the EU and their identities more. For example in Italy, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands, people usually have higher level of European identity. On the other hand, in Denmark, the UK, Austria, Finland and Sweden who joined the EC later, people usually have stronger national identities.¹²¹¹

The accountability of the EU institutions and trust of general public to them also affect their level of European identity. Bruter argues that when corruption was found in the Santer Commission in the mid-1990s, the progress of average levels of European identity in most of the Member States temporarily stopped, which started to increase again from 1999 onwards in most of the Member States.¹²¹² Thus, transparency and effectiveness of the EU institutions have also affected the level of European identity of the general public. However, increases in the powers of the EP, did not generate increased public interest in the EP. This could be observed in turnout rate of the EP elections, which has declined gradually but steadily, since direct elections has been introduced in 1979.¹²¹³

¹²⁰⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.136-148.

¹²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.134-148.

¹²¹¹ S. Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, pp.55-57.

¹²¹² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.141.

¹²¹³ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.225.

The level of education and social class are influential in terms of level of European identity of the general public.¹²¹⁴ Also income level and ideology affect the level and type of European identity¹²¹⁵ of the general public. According to surveys of Bruter, the right-wing respondents are most likely having a high level of “cultural European identity”.¹²¹⁶ The general trend is that people, who have a stronger European identity increases with income, education and professional status.¹²¹⁷ Workers tend to be more sceptical; on the other hand, people who have a middle class status, usually have a tendency to have a positive attitude towards the EU.¹²¹⁸ Lloyd argues that “most people, who think of themselves as Europeans, probably have at least a Master of Arts degree.”¹²¹⁹ People who have different job skills and higher levels of education can find better paying jobs and move to another Member State. On the other hand, people who do not have capital and who are not well educated, do not care much about free movement of people and capital.¹²²⁰ It is argued that people in urban areas feel more European than those in rural areas.¹²²¹ Support to Europe also varies across countries, depending on their domestic politics¹²²² and also the position of their state vis-a-vis the EU. On the other hand, speaking different foreign languages and living in another Member State also positively affect support to European integration and may increase the level of European identity of the general public. Bruter asserts that:

Travelling abroad regularly makes them more likely to perceive the concrete significance of a People’s Europe, whose citizens can travel without border control and therefore increases their civic identity.¹²²³

The surveys show that increases in the number of people who live in urban areas and whose parents have migrated from one Member State to another, will lead to increase in the number of people who have multiple identities. Thus, we can expect more EU citizens

¹²¹⁴ M. Jakobsen, R. Reinert, S. Thomsen, “Afstemningen om den faelles mont-social baggrund og holdninger”, *Politica*, Vol.33, No.1, pp.66-88; quoted in T. Flockhart, “Critical Junctures and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Gap Between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization”, p.254.

¹²¹⁵ T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, p.170.

¹²¹⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.120-121.

¹²¹⁷ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.151.

¹²¹⁸ M. Jakobsen, R. Reinert, S. Thomsen, “Afstemningen om den faelles mont-social baggrund og holdninger”, pp.66-88; cited in T. Flockhart, “Critical Junctures and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Gap Between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization”, p.254.

¹²¹⁹ Trevor Lloyd, “Union and Division in Europe”, *International Journal*, Vol. LII, No.4, Autumn 1997, p.548; quoted in P.van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, p.16.

¹²²⁰ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.32.

¹²²¹ Eurobarometer 50; quoted in M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, pp.124-126.

¹²²² J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.172.

¹²²³ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.120-121.

who have multiple identities in the future, because probably the social groups who have such characteristics will increase.¹²²⁴

It is argued that age can be also effective on the level of European identity of the general public. Contemporarily young people are more internationally socialized. They have more chances to participate in exchange programmes¹²²⁵ and summer schools. Thus, younger Europeans are more likely to have European identity in addition to national ones.¹²²⁶ The Commission usually targets young people who are twenty five years old and under.¹²²⁷ At the Youth Summit for tomorrow's Europe in 50th Anniversary of signing of the Treaties of Rome, Bettina Schwarzmayer stated that:

The EU...will all always remain an unfinished story...and we, the young people of Europe, are the ones to write the next and crucial chapter of this tale...The EU needs to listen to its citizens, in particular its young citizens.¹²²⁸

Thus, the young generations want to be involved more to the European integration. If younger generations will be better informed and will be given a chance to involve more to the EU, this will maintain the ongoing integration process. On the other hand, for young generation it is harder to consider the benefits of the EU, because they did not experience the difficulties of war and post-war era. Özdemir argued that:

...they see it natural, what the previous generation before ours had achieved successfully...they see having no war, solving of problems by civil methods so natural. These are not exciting things anymore for them...It is too hard to provide them sufficient things...we are facing a serious problem of public support...at the European level; because people blame here. Politicians who are working at the national level, when they can not be successful in anything they blame Brussels...when there is high unemployment, support to Europe decreases. If there are big social problems in that country, support to Europe automatically decreases.¹²²⁹

Prets emphasized that young generations of Europe are not aware of the importance of peace. She stated that:

The EU has to convince people what it means to live in peace; because we are living fifty years in peace...young generation do not know having war...they are not aware of which great value it is living in peace and working for peace...¹²³⁰

The young generations found peace as already given, thus they expect different benefits from the EU.

¹²²⁴ W. Lutz, S. Kritzinger & V. Skirbekk, "The Demography of Growing European Identity", p.426.

¹²²⁵ P. I. Nanz, "In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity", p.288.

¹²²⁶ W. Lutz, S. Kritzinger & V. Skirbekk, "The Demography of Growing European Identity", p.425.

¹²²⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.78.

¹²²⁸ Bettina Schwarzmayer, President of the European Youth Forum, "Your Europe, Your Future", Speech at the Youth Summit for Tomorrow's Europe, Rome, 23-25 March 2007.

¹²²⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹²³⁰ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

It is argued that people who live in small Member States usually have a tendency to identify more with the EU; because the EU is perceived as supplementing the deficiencies of these states. These people are aware of the limited capacity of their governments, especially in terms of providing security. In such states there is a tendency to support supranational approach to European integration, because in an intergovernmental structure large states are likely to dominate the EU. This may explain high levels of European identity of people who are from Belgium, Luxemburg; but some of the Scandinavian countries which are also small in terms of population, have Eurosceptic perceptions. It is also argued that support for European integration is usually stronger among the more internally divided Member States, minority communities and in states, where state formation has been imperfect such as Belgium. Support for European integration is higher than the national average in Scotland and Wales in the UK, also in the Basque and Catalonia regions in Spain.¹²³¹ These regions usually perceive the EU as an instrument to make indirect pressure on their states to gain more autonomy within their state.

It is argued that the public support to the European integration has declined also with the effect of the eastward enlargement.¹²³² According to Cederman, relatively European identity was “thick” when it has fifteen members; but it becomes “thin” after taking new members especially with the last enlargement.¹²³³ During the interviews conducted by the author, many MEPs were a bit pessimistic about decreasing the gap between the elites and the general public. Deprez argued that “...I am a bit disappointed, because of the diminishing support for the European construction among citizens. I feel that everyday and it is really disappointing.”¹²³⁴ He claimed that the support of the citizens have decreased, because of their reaction to the eastern enlargement and the possibility of further enlargements. As a solution to decrease the gap, he stated that:

The first thing would be to stop the EU enlargement. That is one of the biggest problems in the EU now...We are now on a road that accepts a kind of Europe without boundaries, cultural heterogeneity, different kinds of religious beliefs...When I discuss with people on the street, they tell me ‘...We will have Turkey, Bulgaria, I do not know those people.’ We should tell the European citizens that what we are building is something not only they can accept, but they want...unfortunately at this moment it is absolutely not the case...Especially in a globalized world, people want Europe to be more protective...they want some kind of boundaries, also

¹²³¹ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, pp.51-52.

¹²³² Stephanie Anderson & Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation-Building and Identity in the EU”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 33, No.1, October 2006, p.32.

¹²³³ Lars-Erik Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Tradeoffs” in *Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2001.

¹²³⁴ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

economic boundaries to protect the rights of workers...I would propose first to stop the enlargement process and second to give the European citizens a sense of protection against, what they feel as the aggression of globalisation...at this moment, I am afraid we are just doing the opposite and that is why support for the European construction is decreasing nowadays in all of the European countries.¹²³⁵

He perceives further enlargements as the most important reason of declining support of the EU citizens to the European integration. El Khadroui argued that before further enlargements, the EU has to reform itself and solve its problems to maintain support of its citizens. He stated that:

...to maintain enough support of the citizens, we need first of all reform Europe; make it efficient, democratic, transparent and more easy to make decisions. That is the first important step to regain confidence and then...to enlarge again. What we saw in the referendums in France and the Netherlands, people do not believe in Europe anymore...first of all we need to create confidence again...we have to explain European project, we have to define what Europe is...¹²³⁶

He also emphasized the importance of the national elites in this process and realisation of the goals. He states that:

...we need the political leaders to sell this message, to do what they say. This is a problem also...we have a lot of good ideas like Lisbon process, but results are not there; because the goals are not binding...we have to create new criteria for Europe, that everybody has to achieve...to oblige the Member States...to work on Europe. This is important in coming years to have this project, to find ways to build confidence of European people, to find ways to be more efficient.¹²³⁷

He also emphasized the importance of bottom-up approach in this process. He stated that:

...you need also a bottom-up approach, but you have to be aware that it is never possible to close the gap completely. The more distance there is between the citizen and the level of decision, it is more difficult to explain what you are doing...in local politics...when you want to explain...people understand it, because they see and they know what it is about when you are speaking with...regional, national levels...at European level it becomes increasingly more difficult to explain what you are deciding; because many of these decisions made at European level become reality only few years after. Still many things can be done to rebuild confidence. In the Constitutional Treaty, there are some ideas like, giving people possibility when there are one million signatures to put something on the agenda of Europe. I think many trade unions, the NGOs... are able to find one million signatures. This could be an idea to start a debate on some very important issues...¹²³⁸

He mentioned the importance of communication with the citizens and role of media in gaining support of the citizens to the EU. He stated that:

...there is also a problem of communication...people are not always aware of the decisions of Europe...in the news, newspapers they are not often on the agenda...new ways of communication with the people should be find to inform them and also let them react. So that

¹²³⁵ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹²³⁶ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹²³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²³⁸ *Ibid.*

we can have a debate about some very important issues...we also need European institutions to talk a lot with the trade unions, the NGOs...that is what we do at the EP, when we are discussing legislation...we do it after talking with different opinions...to understand what could be the best solution for the European citizens.¹²³⁹

In the last years communication with citizens has become one of the main concerns of the EU. A new approach to communication has been trying to be developed which puts citizens at the heart of policies of the EU on the basis of some principles: Listening to the citizens, communicating with the citizens about how the EU policies affect their everyday lives and communicating with the citizens by “going local”.¹²⁴⁰ Wallström focused on proposing actions, which tried to inform people more about the EU and enable them to express their opinions. To achieve these goals, one of the proposed actions of the Commission is an inter-institutional agreement which provides a shared communication agenda between the Commission, the EP and the Council. The Commission also offers to work with national governments through “management partnerships” on a voluntary basis. This cooperation will help to “adapt communication on the EU to national circumstances”.¹²⁴¹ Contemporarily this kind of partnerships exists in Germany, Hungary and Slovenia. There have been negotiations also with the others. The Commission proposes setting up “Pilot Information Networks” with the EP and the national parliaments to improve communication between the European and the national politicians. The Commission also proposes creating “European Public Spaces” which are meeting places where citizens can get information and attend conferences. The Commission will also support the NGOs to establish a network of websites, where there may be discussions on the European issues. In addition to these, the Commission will adopt a new “Internet Strategy” to use Internet more to give information to the people about the EU and allow the people to discuss on issues related with the EU.¹²⁴²

Wallström argued that the EU has to find innovative ways to bridge gap between the citizens and the EU. She emphasized the importance of communication with the

¹²³⁹ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹²⁴⁰ European Commission, Margot Wallström, “Communication Policy”, retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/wallstrom/communicating/policy/index_en.htm

¹²⁴¹ Margot Wallström’s Blog, “Communicating Europe in Partnership”, October 3, 2007, retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/wallstrom/communicating-europe-in-partnership/>

¹²⁴² *Ibid.*

citizens.¹²⁴³ Plan D (debate, dialogue, democracy) was introduced in 2005 after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands to involve the citizens in discussions about the future of Europe. In the spring of 2008 the Commission will present the follow up of plan D. One of the goals of that plan will be, to encourage people to vote in the EP elections in 2009.¹²⁴⁴ Especially the young people and the women are encouraged to express their opinions on the future of the EU. For its implementation, many officials visited Member States to stimulate wider public debate about issues related with the EU. The online discussion forum “Debate Europe” was introduced which was awarded the “European e-Democracy Award” in 2006. The other initiatives of the Commission are increasing transparency of the institutions of the EU through the “European Transparency Initiative of the Commission” and promoting the EU citizenship through supporting projects of the citizens.¹²⁴⁵

According to Spring 2007 Standard Eurobarometer survey, “support for membership of the EU is at its highest in over a decade.” 57 % of EU citizens think that their country’s membership of the EU is a “good thing”. It is highest especially in Netherlands (77%), Ireland (76%) and Luxembourg (74%). Significant minority opposition can be observed in the UK (30%), Austria (25%), Finland and Sweden (24%). New Member States of the EU were mostly neutral, such as Latvia (46%) and Hungary (43%) think that their country’s membership is “neither good nor bad”. In terms of socio-demographic factors, support for the membership is higher amongst the young who has the longest education and who are usually among higher-earning occupational groups.¹²⁴⁶ “Absolute majority of citizens (52%) hold a positive view of the EU” which has increased from 46% in Autumn 2006. Trust to the Commission has increased from 48% in Autumn 2006 to 52% in Spring 2007. Trust to the EP has also increased from 52% in Autumn 2006 to 56%. Trust to the EP is the lowest (24%) in Turkey. Trust to the Commission is also low in Croatia (36%) and Turkey (22%).¹²⁴⁷ The Commission is the leading institution during the negotiation process with candidate countries, which may be effective on the level of support to the Commission. In the case of support to the EP, usually the opinion of

¹²⁴³ M. Wallström, Speech at “Europe for Citizens Forum”, at the Commission, 28-29 September 2006.

¹²⁴⁴ M. Wallström’s Blog, “Communicating Europe in Partnership”, retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/wallstrom/communicating-europe-in-partnership/>

¹²⁴⁵ European Commission, M. Wallström, “Communication Policy”, retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/wallstrom/communicating/policy/index_en.htm

¹²⁴⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 67, Spring 2007, published in June 2007, pp. 11-17.

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-29.

one of the MEPs is perceived as the opinion of the EP by the citizens, which affect the level of trust to the EP, especially in Turkey.¹²⁴⁸ On the 50th anniversary of the EU, 69% expressed optimism about the future of the EU. It is more in the new Member States (74%) compared to the former Members (68%). It was also found out that “the majority of the citizens see the EU of the future, playing a strong role diplomatically, with its own army and having a directly elected President.”¹²⁴⁹ This shows that the EU citizens mostly want a stronger EU identity in the world.

III.2.2.2. Utilitarian Approach to Support to the EU and European Identity

In public opinion analysis which tries to find out the level of support to the EU, two main approaches are usually used: “**Utilitarian support**” and “**affective support**”. Utilitarian support emerges because of common or individual benefits that are expected from the integration. Affective support refers to emotional support, which may be based on common identity¹²⁵⁰ it is usually valid in the case of national identity. The level of affective support to the EU is low, thus utilitarian support is one of the important factors in order to maintain support of the general public to the European integration.

Utilitarian approach explains the level of support to the EU according to the perceptions of people about the benefits they have and expect from the EU.¹²⁵¹ The citizens usually support policies of the EU from which they personally or collectively benefit and oppose those which have negative effects on their daily lives.¹²⁵² Recent studies of Gabel and some other scholars have adopted a theory from Easton’s work which is based on a cost-benefit approach to support for the European integration. According to their research, as material gains within a country increase through the liberalisation of trade in the EU, support for the EU will probably increase. The citizens who benefit more from the EU, generally have a tendency to support the EU. For some people, the European integration is

¹²⁴⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 67, Spring 2007, p.30.

¹²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.39-42.

¹²⁵⁰ Stefania Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity: From the Treaty of Maastricht to Public Opinion Attitudes”, JMWP, December 1996, p.5; quoted in T. Görgün, *The Impact of the EU Upon European Identity*, 2004.

¹²⁵¹ L. N. Lindberg & S.A. Scheingold, *Europe’s Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the EC*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970; cited in S. Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity : From Treaty Provisions to Public Opinion Attitudes”, p.25

¹²⁵² S. Kritzing, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, p.53.

seen as preferable to national political corruption or an undeveloped welfare state.¹²⁵³ Gabel refers to this perspective as “utilitarian model” of public support for the European integration.¹²⁵⁴ According to the utilitarian approach, a political system, which is expected to be efficient, can gain identity. Kritzinger asserts that construction of a European identity is closely related with the EU’s ability to provide policy outcomes in accordance with citizens’ expectations. If the EU is able to be efficient, the construction of European identity is more possible.¹²⁵⁵ On the other hand, low welfare spending, poor economic performance and low quality of democracy at national level, would make citizens more likely to feel more European.¹²⁵⁶ Kritzinger argues that if the EU can convince the citizens that European solutions are more effective than the national ones, European identity may develop more easily.¹²⁵⁷ The establishment of more effective EU institutions will probably strengthen the citizens’ civic European identity.¹²⁵⁸

According to “egocentric utilitarianism”, people who benefit more from the European integration are usually more supportive of the EU. For example, professionals and executives are usually the most supportive, because they benefit from the increased cross-border trade and easier movement of labour.¹²⁵⁹ Thus, some activities of the EU may be perceived as beneficial by some of the citizens of the EU, but they may be perceived as against their interests by some others.¹²⁶⁰ Walkenhorst asserts that “the development of European identity will largely depend on the degree to which, the EU citizens consider the EU policies successful...”¹²⁶¹ According to the Eurobarometer survey in 1996, the perceived benefits from the membership showed a huge gap between the elite and the

¹²⁵³ S. Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?”, pp.389-390.

¹²⁵⁴ Cited in L.M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.17. For further detail see Matthew J. Gabel, *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and EU*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998; M. Gabel & Harvey Palmer, “Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol.27, No.1, 1995, pp.3-19.

¹²⁵⁵ Cited in S. Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, pp.50-51. For further detail see I. Sanchez-Cuenca, “The Political Basis of Support for European Integration”, *European Union Politics*, Vol.1, No.2, 2000, pp.147-171.

¹²⁵⁶ Cited in F. Decker, “Governance Beyond the Nation-state: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the EU”, p.3. For further detail see M. J. Gabel, *Interest and the Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and EU*, 1998; M. J. Gabel & H. D. Palmer, “Understanding Variation in Public Support for the European Integration”, pp.3-19.

¹²⁵⁷ S. Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, pp.68-72.

¹²⁵⁸ O. Waever, & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, pp.82-90.

¹²⁵⁹ L.M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.31-35.

¹²⁶⁰ E. Castano, “European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective”, June 2000; cited in S. Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, p.52.

¹²⁶¹ Heiko Walkenhorst, “The Construction of European Identity and The Role of National Educational Systems: A Case Study on Germany”, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Workshop on Political Cultures and European Integration”, Edinburgh, 28 March-2 April 2003, p.9.

general public. 90% of the top decision makers of the EU felt that their state had benefited from membership, on the contrary only 45% of general public supported this idea¹²⁶² which is related with their level of education and information about the EU, also the entitativity of the EU is much stronger for the elites. According to Spring 2002 *Eurobarometer* survey, the respondents answered the question about what the EU personally means for them, 50% answered as “freedom of movement and travel”, 32% answered as “peace”.¹²⁶³ The EU usually concerns the general public for practical reasons, such as using of Euro or the absence of borders in the Schengen area. A survey was made on the project, which is called “Orientations of Young Men and Women to Citizenship and European Identity”. According to this survey, youth of Europe seem to be interested in Europe usually because of the jobs and training opportunities (86.5%) or the content and quality of education (78.8%). Europe is usually perceived “...as bringing the opportunity of living in a fairer society, reducing social inequalities and sexual discrimination and achieving a sustainable environmental policy.”¹²⁶⁴

During the interviews conducted by the author, Coveney argued in favour of utilitarian approach to increase support to the European integration. He stated that:

...if you are living in Brussels...European identity thing is fine, because everybody here is committed to the EU and they all know about the Council, the Commission...but if you go to Dublin, Madrid...they do not know what it is...most people say EU is a good thing, because it helped us to create more wealth...peace...as long as the EU continues to support what is happening in Europe...prosperity and standards, I think people would support it...we should not try to explain to every citizen...what the Commission does...the challenge for us is to explain people all of the positive things...for me...what Ireland would look like, if we were not in the EU. We would be much more poor place, with far less influence, we would not able to export 80% of everything we produced...The EU is not perfect, but it provides huge opportunities and a lot of stability...creating a European identity, it is working in Brussels but when you go out to different countries, they do not talk about that level of complexity about the EU...keep the message simple and the same in Turkey...If you wanna convince somebody in Istanbul...that joining the EU is a good thing, I do not think you should start by saying this is how it works, the Commission...Instead you should start by saying, if we can join this club...we can export to twenty five countries...and the problems are...if we join the EU, we are not gonna be allowed to do this from an environmental point of view...we have to give up certain amount of sovereignty on certain issues, European law will have primacy over national law...there is a need to continue to promote the positive elements...¹²⁶⁵

¹²⁶² Cited in P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.145.

¹²⁶³ European Commission, *Eurobarometer 57*, Spring 2002, “EU 15 Report”, Brussels: European Commission, 2002; quoted in T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.493.

¹²⁶⁴ “Identity: To Be Twenty in Europe”, *Magazine on European Research*, retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/rtdinfo/special_ms/04/article_2315_en.html

¹²⁶⁵ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

He asserts that emphasizing the benefits of the membership to the EU have been effective on increasing the level of support of the general public. Kauppi argued that to decrease Euroscepticism, the EU has to do things that positively affect daily lives of the citizens. She stated that:

...Euroscepticism is still very common, even increasing in some countries. Sometimes people, who are closely involved with the EU get so intertwined in the system that they forget what it is like in the ‘outside’...the best thing the EU can do to increase the feeling of belonging of ordinary citizens is simply to take decisions that people feel in their everyday lives such as introduction of Euro, facilitating travelling and working abroad, new telecoms regulation bringing prices down...¹²⁶⁶

In recent years the Commission has focused on this kind of initiatives, such as decreasing the prices of mobile phone charges. The EU roaming regulation which entered into force on 30 June 2007 and called “Eurotariff”, sets a maximum per minute limits for calls made and received in different Member State.¹²⁶⁷ The goal of these initiatives are to affect daily lives of the citizens positively, increasing contacts among them and ultimately increasing the level of support to the EU. According to Kritzinger, the EU citizens firstly have to experience the beneficial outcomes to trust the EU as an efficient actor, later policy competencies can be transferred to the EU level.¹²⁶⁸




Figure 1: Identity developing process from instrumental to affective orientations

Source: Sylvia Kritzinger, “European Identity Building from the Perspective of Efficiency”, *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 3, 2005, p.55.

According to this approach, firstly people have to experience benefits of the EU which will lead to increase in their level of support to the European integration and then more competencies in different policy fields will be transferred to the EU which will lead to increase in the peoples’ level of European identity. In Spring 2000 Eurobarometer 53

¹²⁶⁶ P. Noora Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.
¹²⁶⁷ “Europe’s Information Society-Thematic Portal”, retrieved on September 23, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/roaming/consumer/better_deal/index_en.htm
¹²⁶⁸ S. Kritzinger, “European Identity Building From the Perspective of Efficiency”, pp.54-55.

survey, people who feel more advantaged are, the top managers who are followed by employed professionals, students and some farmers. People with high income levels feel that they have personal advantages from their country's membership. Only a very small minority feel disadvantaged by the EU membership. People usually see a balance of advantages or disadvantages or some of them do not know, whether they have benefited or not. McLaren argues that it is better to differentiate between "winners" and "non-winners", instead of "winners" and "losers" of the EU membership.¹²⁶⁹ Usually people do not lose because of their country's membership, but some may have more benefits, or aware of their benefits more than others, because of their level of information about the EU and the level of education. In Spring and Autumn 2000 Eurobarometer surveys, the "students" category shows the most consistent results. Students tend to support the European integration as much as professionals and executives. One of the main reasons is that students can move across the Member States freely for studying.¹²⁷⁰

"Sociotropic utilitarianism" refers to the idea that benefits received by the Member States affect levels of support to the EU. In countries, where there are fewer benefits than costs, there is usually less support. For example, richer Member States such as Germany and France pay more to the EU budget than they received. In these states citizens usually think that group resources are taken away. People, who fear that immigrants may take some of their resources, are usually hostile toward the European integration. Thus, in the Member States where the number of immigrants is high and where they have to pay to the EU budget more than they received, opposition to the EU is usually high. According to Eurobarometer survey in Autumn 2000, poorer Member States usually do not relate loss of group benefits to the European integration. For example, citizens of Spain, Portugal are less likely to connect the EU to the loss of group benefits; because they have benefited more from the EU than their costs. Moreover, these countries do not have many immigrants and they do not have to support economically other Member States.¹²⁷¹ Construction of European identity is also crucial for sharing of financial resources with

¹²⁶⁹ Cited in L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.40-44.

¹²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹²⁷¹ Richard C. Eichenberg & J. Dalton Russell, "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration", *International Organization* 47, No:4, 1993, pp. 507-534; quoted in L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.44-68.

poorer Member States.¹²⁷² If understanding of “we” will be constructed among the peoples of Europe, people will have a more tendency to share their resources with the others.

During the interviews conducted by the author, the interviewees usually criticized some of the top-down approaches of the EU and offer utilitarian approach to increase the feeling of belonging of the citizens to the EU. Resetarits stated that:

The mobility is not very high in Europe. It is still very complicated to find a job in another country...if you can not speak the language of that country, tax, pension paying...you should try to increase the mobility in Europe to make it easier for people to look for a job in another country, sending their children to school there...a lot of young people are interested in knowing different cultures within Europe, but it is still very hard, especially for the new Member States; because there is also financial gap within Europe. It is very expensive for them to go to the western European countries. There should be more help. Then people would get to know each other better...¹²⁷³

She added that “...the EU should not be only a political union; it should also be a ‘**union of the hearts**’. You have to do something also emotional...but right now they do not do anything...”¹²⁷⁴

Usually uneducated and long-term unemployed people perceive European integration as a threat,¹²⁷⁵ thus it is much harder for them to identify with the EU. As Delanty argues, for the success of the European project, there should be more emphasis on social justice and solidarity.¹²⁷⁶ Haas claims that those who profit most from the European integration are more likely to shift their loyalties toward the EU than the others. It may be also expected that women would be generally more supportive of European integration than men, because the EU supports gender equality, especially equal treatment and payment in the workplace;¹²⁷⁷ but according to the surveys, men are usually more supportive of the European integration than women.¹²⁷⁸ Thus, support to the EU and identification with the EU can not be explained only by utilitarian factors. Bruter argues that in recent years in Eurobarometer surveys, there has been an increasing level of support

¹²⁷² Joachim Schild, “National v. European Identities? French and Germans in the European Multi-Level System”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, No.2, June 2001, p.335.

¹²⁷³ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁵ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p. 229.

¹²⁷⁶ G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

¹²⁷⁷ J. A. Caporaso & J. Jupille, “The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policy and Domestic Structural Change” in M. Green Cowles, J.A. Caporaso & T. Risse (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001; cited in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.297.

¹²⁷⁸ U. Liebert & S. Sifft, *Gendering Europeanisation*, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang Pub. 2003; quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.297.

to the European integration, although they think that they and their country do not benefit that much from the EU. This shows that utilitarian factors can not always explain the level of support to European integration. In the earlier periods support to the EU and perceived benefits from the EU were more strongly correlated with each other.¹²⁷⁹ Marks and Hooghe assert that “identity is a stronger predictor for support to the European integration than economic rationality”.¹²⁸⁰ Thus, perceived individual or collective benefits from the EU is one of the effective factors on the level of support to the EU, but not the only one. The effects of utilitarian factors have decreased since the foundation of the EC. One of the reasons is that the “entitativity” of the EU has increased for the general public. With the ongoing construction process of European identity, probably the effects of utilitarian factors on the level of support to the EU will decrease more in the future.

Contemporarily, unlike national identification, it is more difficult to maintain identification with the EU, if there are major policy failures.¹²⁸¹ If the EU is unsuccessful in its institutional project, a stronger European identity is harder to construct. If either unrepresentativeness or inefficiency of EU institutions is too much, it will probably cause an increasing support for the national governments¹²⁸² which will lead to construction of stronger national identities. Thus, efficiency of the EU has to be increased in order to have a higher level of support to the European integration, which will lead to construction of a stronger European identity.

Consequently, the EU elites and the institutions of the EU have crucial roles in construction process of European identity. The Commission has the primary role in this process. Especially in recent years, it focuses on communication policy, which tries to inform citizens of the EU more and provide platforms to express their opinions. Working at the institutions of the EU has been usually effective on the identity of the people, who are working at those institutions. Usually the Commission is the most effective one in this respect. Working at the Commission, usually makes those people’s level of European identity stronger. The MEPs usually start to look from wider perspective, with the effect of working at the EP. Both the Commission officials and the MEPs have a tendency to have

¹²⁷⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.174.

¹²⁸⁰ L. Hooghe & G. Marks, “Does Identity of Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?”, *PSOnline*, www.apsanet.org, July 2004; quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.295.

¹²⁸¹ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.228.

¹²⁸² O. Waeber & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, p.82.

multiple identities. They usually primarily have national or regional identities, rather than European identity. There is a huge gap between the elites and the general public in terms of level of European identity and support to the EU which are closely related with each other. The factors like their level of information about the EU, education level, income level and age are effective on the level of European identity. Utilitarian factors are also effective on the level of support of the citizens for the EU, but which have decreased since the foundation of the EC. If European identity will be constructed more strongly within the EU, it will lead to a decrease in the effects of utilitarian factors on the level of support of its citizens to the EU.

III.3. THE ROLE OF THE POLICIES OF THE EU IN CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In this part, the effects of the education policy, audiovisual and cultural policies on construction process of European identity will be discussed. These policies are chosen, because they are closely related with construction of collective identities. None of these policies are under the exclusive competence of the EU. The EU only has a coordination role and has some initiatives to increase cooperation among the Member States in these policy fields.

III.3.1. The Role of the Education Policy of the EU

Education has a very important role in construction of collective identities, especially in nation-building.¹²⁸³ One of the main functions of an education system is constructing and reproducing national identity. Education is also one of the effective factors on the construction process of European identity. It may provide at least more understanding among Europeans. Especially a curriculum which is common for all European peoples, would be very effective on construction of European identity.¹²⁸⁴ However, to have a common curriculum among all the Member States, is not probable in the medium-term, because Member States are so sensitive about this issue which is closely related with maintenance of national identities.

¹²⁸³ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.108.

¹²⁸⁴ J. R. Llobera, "What Unites Europeans?", pp.185-188.

The discussion of the “European dimension in education” started in the 1950s.¹²⁸⁵ At the beginning the EC involved in education policy through vocational training (EEC Article 128), Community wide recognition of educational and professional qualifications (EEC Article 57) and the promotion of scientific research (EURATOM Articles 7, 9).¹²⁸⁶ The Commission did not wait for Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty to involve in education. It started to deal with education even in the 1950s and the 1960s. Although it had not been directly authorized by the treaties, it had already taken initiatives especially in higher and post-graduate education.¹²⁸⁷ Also in primary and secondary education the Commission supported some initiatives such as the “Europe in the schools” competition. Monnet offered the winners of the competition a study tour to the Member States.¹²⁸⁸ In the 1950s and the 1960s the Commission tried to develop cooperation with the cultural and the professional organisations such as the European Association of Teachers (AEE) whose members were working to Europeanize the national school systems.¹²⁸⁹ For higher education it was possible to make reference to articles on professional training and achievement of the Common Market. In 1958 it started working with the Council of Europe. The Commission also participated in a think-tank on the importance of expanding courses on “European society and culture” in which the importance of expanding European studies in the Member States, if not at primary school at least at the secondary level and obstacles of Europeanization of the contents of some courses were tried to be found out.¹²⁹⁰

In the 1950s and the 1960s the Commission was supporting the establishment of the European schools. It saw them not only as institutions where the children of European officials were going, rather as a teaching model which meets the demands of the new Europe.¹²⁹¹ Henderson argues that the European Schools have been perceived by the EU

¹²⁸⁵ Maitland Stobart, “Preface” in M. Shennan (ed.), *Teaching about Europe*, London: Cassel Pub., 1991, p.xiii; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.115.

¹²⁸⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.113.

¹²⁸⁷ Guy Neave, *The EEC and Education*, Trentham Books, 1984; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 669.

¹²⁸⁸ The website of Jean Monnet for Europe Foundation, <http://www.jean-monnet.ch/pConcours/cond-histoire.htm>; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.672.

¹²⁸⁹ EC Information Service, *European Community*, May 1968, p.20; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.672.

¹²⁹⁰ P.J. O’Connell, “Bringing Europe into the Classroom”, *European Community*, July-August 1968, pp.18-19; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.671.

¹²⁹¹ J. L. Henderson, “The Schools of the Six”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.3, 1966, p.180; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 673.

authorities as instruments to develop awareness of the children that although they have several differences, they belong to one single civilisation, Europe.¹²⁹² In the 1970s the Commission stated that the Community established the European Schools to develop a European identity,¹²⁹³ also added that “the children in these schools are being taught to think of themselves as European first and as Dutch, French...second...”¹²⁹⁴ This objective was stated at the building of the schools. It was stated that:

The young pupils educated in contact with each other, freed from their...prejudices, which divide one nation from another and introduced to the value...of different cultures, will have a growing sense of their common solidarity. Retaining their pride in and love for their own countries, they will become Europeans in spirit, ready to...consolidate the work that their fathers have undertaken for the advance of a united and prosperous Europe.¹²⁹⁵

Thus, the goal of these schools is to construct European identity among the students, without replacing their national identities. The Commission supported these schools. Larger proportion of the schools revenue came from the Communities. The Commission also involved in setting the European School policies through its representatives.¹²⁹⁶

In the 1960s the institutions of the EC were supporting initiatives at universities of the Member States to develop teaching and research related with the European integration. Since 1959 the “European Community Prize” has been given every year to the authors of the best theses on issues related with European integration.¹²⁹⁷ In the early 1960s the EC institutions found two ways to disseminate their publications to the universities. First way is to grant the label of “official depository” of the EC publications to certain libraries, the other way is to set up documentation centres which were sent publications of the Communities free of charge.¹²⁹⁸ The institutions of the EC were supporting the establishment of higher education institutions with a “European orientation” and tried to maintain close ties with them. They also supported the project to set up a European

¹²⁹² J. L. Henderson, “The Schools of the Six”, p.78; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.676.

¹²⁹³ Commission of the European Communities, *Background Report*, ISEC/B51/78, July 11, 1978, p.2; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.676.

¹²⁹⁴ *Bulletin from the European Communities* 85, 1965, p.6; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 676.

¹²⁹⁵ This is a translation of the Latin inscription, *Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*, Vol.17, 1956, p.12; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.677.

¹²⁹⁶ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 674.

¹²⁹⁷ OJ C 892 02/07/60; OJ C 312 21/12/67 ,p.669; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.669.

¹²⁹⁸ Community information service, “EEC’s 124 documentation centres”, *European Community*, June 1969, p.17; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.670.

University which was perceived as the initial attempt for a “common education policy for Member States”.¹²⁹⁹ Even before the establishment of the EC, the College of Europe was established in 1949 in Bruges. Prof. Hendrik Brugmans was its first rector who was one of the leaders of the European Movement. “It was the world’s first university institute of post-graduate studies and training in European affairs.”¹³⁰⁰ The objective was to “give students the opportunity to live and study together...to prepare them to live and work in an increasingly integrated Europe”.¹³⁰¹ In the post-Cold War era, with the invitation of the Polish government and with the support of the EU, its second campus was opened in Warsaw in 1994.¹³⁰² It has received subsidies from the Commission; also several representatives from the EU institutions are part of the College’s Board of Governors. Each year the class that graduates has been given the name of a “founder of the common civilisation that Europe represents.” For example, the name of Schuman was given to the graduates of 1964-1965; Monnet was given to those of 1980-1981.¹³⁰³ The Treaty of Rome which set up the EURATOM, provided for establishment of a European university which is limited to teaching and research on atomic-energy subjects.¹³⁰⁴ This idea was realized in 1972, with the establishment of the European University Institute in Florence.¹³⁰⁵ It is a doctoral and post-doctoral institution, which is “European in its structure and composition”.¹³⁰⁶

In the 1970s one of the Commissioners emphasized that, education plays a crucial role in the development of the Member States. It can not be considered only as an instrument for achieving economic objectives.¹³⁰⁷ The Commission set up two working parties, which were responsible for educational issues. They collected data on educational

¹²⁹⁹ OJ C 383 14/02/61, p.61; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.670.

¹³⁰⁰ The website of the College of Europe, retrieved on July 18, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=history>

¹³⁰¹ <http://www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=introduction> ;quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.669.

¹³⁰² The website of the College of Europe, retrieved on July 18, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=history>

¹³⁰³ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.671.

¹³⁰⁴ OJ C 679 8/06/59, p.59; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.670.

¹³⁰⁵ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.670.

¹³⁰⁶ European University Institute, retrieved on February 3, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.iue.it>

¹³⁰⁷ Statements of Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf, “Notes for the Commissioner’s Presentation on Education to the Council and Conference of Ministers of Education”, Brussels, May 29, 1974, p.4; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 675.

issues and stated the necessity for greater Community effort in the field of education.¹³⁰⁸ The Commission emphasized that education is an independent sphere of activity which should not be considered as part of economy. If any “rapprochement is needed, it is with the field of culture”,¹³⁰⁹ rather than economy. The Commission has emphasized the relation between education policy of the EU and construction of European identity. In the early 1970s, the Commission stated that “only in this way (by interventions in education) can we capture the hearts and minds of men and women to participate in this exciting European adventure...build the bridges between our peoples.”¹³¹⁰ Thus, the Commission considers education policy as an important instrument of construction of European identity. The institutions of the EU have also tried to provide teachers with information on Europe. “Information sessions” were organized; brochures and audiovisual instruments were given to teachers. In the late 1960s the EC Information Service formed a new scientific journal which was called *European Studies (Teachers’ Series)* that included articles on Europe-building, which were written by the teachers.¹³¹¹ In addition to these, trips to Brussels and Luxembourg were organized.¹³¹²

The Ministers of Education met within the Council in 1971 for the first time.¹³¹³ The Commission asked the former Belgian minister of education Henri Janne to prepare the goals of future education policy of the EC. “Janne Report” was prepared by experts in 1973. It did not have a status of official EC statement, but it was influential especially in terms of developing “the European dimension of education.”¹³¹⁴ It tried to broaden the Community capacity in public education, especially in terms of curricular contents; but it was seen that this is the most difficult area to make improvements. The only reason is not the national governments, but also Europeanization in education has low popular support among the citizens (Eurobarometer 45).¹³¹⁵ The citizens of the EU are usually against the

¹³⁰⁸ Erik Beukel, “Educational Policy: Institutionalization and Multi-level Governance” in Svein S. Andersen & Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.), *Making Policy in Europe*, London: Sage Pub., 2001, p.127.

¹³⁰⁹ I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.675.

¹³¹⁰ Commission of the European Communities, *Elements for Mr. Brunner’s Speech*, Brussels, September 5, 1979, p.1; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.677.

¹³¹¹ OJ C 382 14/02/61, p.61; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.672.

¹³¹² I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, pp.672-673.

¹³¹³ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.116.

¹³¹⁴ Joseph A. McMahon, *Education and Culture in EC Law*, London: The Athlone Press, 1995, p.7; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 117.

¹³¹⁵ L. E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.158.

idea of transferring the competency of education to the EU. In the Janne Report, the promotion of foreign language learning, measures to enhance student and teacher mobility were recommended. Also adoption of a European charter of education as a “framework for the whole of educational thought” was recommended. The timing of this report was interesting, which coincided with the “Declaration on European Identity”.¹³¹⁶ In this declaration education was not mentioned. But since the mid-1970s “discursive links have been established between education, culture and identity.”¹³¹⁷ In 1973 the Commission created a new Directorate for Education and Training integrated within the new DG for Research Science and Education.¹³¹⁸ An action programme in education was passed in February 1976. After this programme, the Commission and the EP continued to lobby on behalf of the “European dimension” in school curricula. Country-by-country survey was made which reflected absence of “European content” from national school curricula. This initiative of the Commission faced with strong resistance, especially from some Member States such as Denmark and France.¹³¹⁹ It shows that Member States are very sensitive about especially their national curriculums. The resistance to the Commission’s attempts to have a legal competence in education and opposition to the efforts of the Council of Europe to create a “European history” show the sensitivity of the Member States about this issue.¹³²⁰

Education policy was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, but it was not included among the exclusive competencies of the EU. In Article F (now Article 6) it is stated that “the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.”¹³²¹ It is stated that the Community role in education is limited to enhancement of “cooperation between Member States” and “supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems.”¹³²² As McMahon argues, the goal of the EU in the field of education

¹³¹⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 115.

¹³¹⁷ CEC (Commission of the European Communities), “Declaration on the European Identity”, *Bulletin of the EC*, 12, 1973; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.118.

¹³¹⁸ General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1973; quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 115.

¹³¹⁹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.117.

¹³²⁰ W. Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, p.30.

¹³²¹ H. Walkenhorst, “The Construction of European Identity and The Role of National Educational Systems: A Case Study on Germany”, pp.17-18.

¹³²² Council of the European Communities, CEC, *Treaty on European Union*, signed in Maastricht, on February 7, 1992, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.114.

was “cooperation, rather than harmonisation of existing policies and systems.”¹³²³ The main goal of education policy of the EU can be summarized as “**introducing the European dimension into education.**” Primarily “Europeanization of higher education” is wanted to be achieved.¹³²⁴ The university and higher education have been in the process of Europeanization to a certain extent, but the primary and secondary education still remain as very sensitive areas and they are mainly under control of the ministries of national education.¹³²⁵ It is much harder to Europeanize primary and secondary education in the Member States. After the Maastricht Treaty, a separate DG for education was established, which was called DG XII “Education, Training and Youth”.¹³²⁶

The Commission has emphasized the role of education policy in construction of European identity especially since the Maastricht Treaty.¹³²⁷ According to the “Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education” “teachers in the Member States should learn to share and pass on the wealth of European cultures” to “develop a European perspective alongside national and regional allegiances”.¹³²⁸ In the “White Paper on Education and Training” it is stated that “education and training provide the reference points needed to affirm collective identity”¹³²⁹ which implies the relationship between education and construction of collective identity. The EU tries to “**strengthen in pupils and students a sense of European identity**” through the promotion of an education policy.¹³³⁰ Hansen argues that the EU education discourse prioritize the exclusive or ethnocultural model of community formation. He states that “...the European dimension of education has been moving in an ethno-cultural direction...”¹³³¹ In 1994 the EP and the Council stated that the European dimension in education is “based on the cultural heritage of the Member States” that “should contribute to strengthening in pupils and students a

¹³²³ J. A. McMahon, *Education and Culture in EC Law*, p.7; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.117.

¹³²⁴ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.56-59.

¹³²⁵ H. Walkenhorst, “The Construction of European Identity and The Role of National Educational Systems: A Case Study on Germany”, p.18

¹³²⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.127.

¹³²⁷ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.34.

¹³²⁸ CEC, *Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education*, COM(93), 457 final, Brussels, 1993; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.62.

¹³²⁹ CEC 1995, p. 51; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.113.

¹³³⁰ EP and the Council of the EU, “Common position EC No 33/94 adopted by the Council on 18 July 1994 with a view to adopting EP and Council Decision 94/.../EC of...establishing the Community action programme Socrates”, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 244, 31,8, 1994; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 62.

¹³³¹ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, pp.128-130.

sense of European identity.”¹³³² The Council of Ministers in its meeting on 24 May 1998 emphasized increasing awareness of being European among children. Some of the objectives which were accepted are:

-Strengthening in young people a sense of European identity and emphasize the value of European civilisation.

-Making them aware of the advantages of the EU and the challenges it causes.

-Improve their knowledge about the EU and its Member States.¹³³³ Thus, construction of European identity especially among young people was stated as one of the goals of the education policy of the EU. Two articles of the Amsterdam Treaty are directly related with education. Articles 149 and 150 are on “Educational, Vocational Training and Youth” which shows the goals of the institutionalisation of education at the EU level.¹³³⁴

The Commission tried to promote the mutual recognition of university diplomas and certificates which were taken from another Member State; also it took some measures to harmonize European curricula. It tried to promote the establishment of University Chairs which is open to the professors from the other Member States. It also tried to convince the national authorities to take into consideration the period of time which was spent in another Member State, when the pensions of retired professors or researchers were calculated.¹³³⁵ The Commission produced some promotional material for children and it has tried to convince schools and teachers to integrate these materials into the curriculum.¹³³⁶ Thus, the Commission has an important role in education policy of the EU and it has taken many initiatives to increase the awareness of students and teachers about the EU. The use of the material in school which was produced by the EU requires the support and cooperation of relevant authorities of the Member States, such as national education ministries, local educational authorities, head of the schools. The Commission’s promotional material for

¹³³² EU, “Common Position...establishing the Community action programme Socrates”, 1994; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.123.

¹³³³ “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹³³⁴ E. Beukel, “Educational Policy: Institutionalization and Multi-level Governance”, p.125.

¹³³⁵ OJ C 2127 16/08/62 ,p. 62; OJ C 312 21/12/67,p.6; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p.669.

¹³³⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.135. For further detail see *The Raspberry Ice Cream War: A Comic for Young People on a Peaceful Europe without Frontiers*, Luxembourg, OOEPEC, 1998. This book was published by the Commission. It is on the story of Christine, who has friends all over Europe, Max, who wears a baseball cap with the EU flag and Paul, who wants to study languages and travel to as many countries as possible across Europe.

children faces hostility in some Member States, primarily the UK.¹³³⁷ Thus, only the initiatives of the Commission are not enough, they have to be supported by the Member States. The Commission also set up the “European schoolnet”, which is used as an instrument for its school-centred public relations campaigns.¹³³⁸ The Commission also sponsors websites such as the “European youth portal”¹³³⁹ and “myEUROPE” whose goal is to help teachers raise peoples’ awareness of what it means to be a young citizen in Europe.¹³⁴⁰ In spite of these initiatives, “Euro-socialization is not occurring” at a sufficient level.¹³⁴¹ The main reason is that education systems in the Member States continue to play a key role in transmission of national identities.¹³⁴² There is not enough teaching about other countries of Europe or Europe as a whole. Hettlage argues that “the identity management of Europe needs a new organization of the system of education.”¹³⁴³ At least more cooperation among the Member States have to be achieved in the field of education. In Rome Youth Declaration which was published on 25 March 2007, it was stated that:

European awareness and understanding have to be ensured by including the European history and the European issues in formal national curricula, including human rights education, intercultural learning and active citizenship.¹³⁴⁴

Also at the end of the Declaration it was stated that “listen to what we have to say, ask us what we need and then act!”¹³⁴⁵ It shows that young peoples of Europe wanted to be more informed and consulted about the issues related with the EU.

The role of the education policy in the construction of European identity was frequently emphasized during the interviews which were conducted by the author.

¹³³⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 137.

Because of resistance of the UK, the Commission had to withdraw 75.000 English-language copies of its comic “*Raspberry Icecream War*”.

¹³³⁸ “European Schoolnet”, retrieved on July 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.eun.org/portal/index.htm>

¹³³⁹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.134.

¹³⁴⁰ “myEUROPE”, retrieved on July 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

<http://myeurope.eun.org/ww/en/pub/myeurope/home.htm>

¹³⁴¹ M. Mann, “Is There a Society called Euro?” p.203; quoted in R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.258.

¹³⁴² “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

<http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹³⁴³ R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.258.

¹³⁴⁴ “Rome Youth Declaration”, March 25, 2007.

¹³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Hatzidakis stated that:

...we can not talk about...a political union, which would be effective and efficient without working at the level of conscience and education. You need an education which will promote, what unites us...not focus on what divides the Europeans.¹³⁴⁶

He emphasized that through the education policy common historical background should be emphasized, instead of rivalries and wars among the Member States. About the influence of education policy on construction of European identity, Resetarits argued that “of course, it has an impact, very high one...also there is a lot of difficulties and a lot of things which are not done.”¹³⁴⁷ It is too hard for the EU to take new initiatives in the field of education, because of sensitivities of the national governments. Özdemir argued that “when developing Europe, we have to take into account culture, research and education...I do not perceive these as initiatives which are against nation-states...”¹³⁴⁸ Ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education, stated that:

Of course education is key to this all. It shapes our attitudes, our vision about what the world is and it shapes our priorities. I do not mean only school education. Also education in family, through media...education at work place...Qualified teacher should be automatically considered as a qualified teacher in another country. You should not say to a teacher, you are German, but you want to become a teacher in Spain, you can not, because you do not have a Spanish degree...¹³⁴⁹

This is related with the acceptance of diplomas of different Member States. Also more facilities have to be provided for people who want to work in another Member State. Importance of acceptance of degrees and diplomas of different Member States were frequently mentioned during the interviews. This will lead to increasing mobility of students and teachers among the Member States which will positively affect construction of European identity. Özdemir stated that:

There is Bologna initiative...The acceptance of credits...we need further development of these. An exam which was passed at a school in France, should be accepted here and its opposite should be valid in all of the Member States...the goal is, a student can start a school in country A, go on its education in country B and go to university in country C has to be considered as natural one day.¹³⁵⁰

Some of the interviewees emphasized the lack of information about the EU among the citizens. To solve this problem introduction of compulsory courses at high schools and

¹³⁴⁶ Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

¹³⁴⁷ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹³⁴⁸ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹³⁴⁹ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹³⁵⁰ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

universities in all of the Member States which explain what is the EU, was suggested by many MEPs. Kauppi stated that:

Education is a highly important way of informing people about the EU. Many people are unaware of the importance of the EU...it is important to tell them how decisions are made...letting young people know from the beginning, how the EU affects the lives of its citizens is vital. More courses to schools, more field trips to EU institutions...are examples of tools that could be used.¹³⁵¹

As she argued, field trips to the EU institutions should be encouraged, because it gives students and teachers the chance to observe the functioning of the institutions of the EU, which lead to increase the entitativity of the EU for those people that may strengthen their European identity. Kauppi added that "...in Finland there is now a high school course on EU issues...the young generation is hopefully much more aware of the influence of the EU than older people."¹³⁵² One Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry argued that "there is a huge gap between elites and the ordinary citizens"¹³⁵³ in terms of identification with the EU. He added that "this is the problem of the Member States. It is related with education from primary school to the end of university."¹³⁵⁴ Thus, one of the main reasons of the gap between the elites of the EU and the general public is their level of education. He recommended that "main courses on the EU should be part of national exams. There should be courses on core items of the EU to have a certain understanding of EU."¹³⁵⁵ Resetarits argued that:

...in 8th grade people learn about the European institutions in a very boring way...then they forget it...We should do more projects in schools. So that students really get involved...Emotional ways are very important.¹³⁵⁶

El Khadroui emphasized the necessity of teaching European history at schools. He stated that:

Education is still national issue...we need also more cooperation on education...the diplomas have to have the same value...to teach about European history, why we are here working together, in most of the countries it is in the curriculum but not enough...even more important than national history, because Europe is the future, not the nations I think.¹³⁵⁷

¹³⁵¹ P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

¹³⁵² *Ibid.*

¹³⁵³ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵⁶ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹³⁵⁷ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

Even many elites do not know much about the EU, if they did not study international relations, European studies or working at the institutions of the EU. Bozkurt asserted that:

...I have done European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, but before that, at schools, nowhere there was not very much information about Europe. At university for me the first occasion where I could get information and education about it...¹³⁵⁸

She emphasized also the necessity of teaching of teachers on EU related issues. She stated that:

Europe should be a main subject in schools...There should be more lessons about Europe. More people should meet each other. I think the best way to learn another country is to meet those people, to learn about their lives...There should be a database on the basic information about Europe...people, teachers can use them in their lessons, because a lot of teachers are also not very well educated in the subject of Europe.¹³⁵⁹

Sommer also mentioned the importance of teaching teachers. She argued that "...teachers are not very well educated...they do not know much about the EU..."¹³⁶⁰ Thus, many interviewees argued that more information about the EU should be given to primarily to teachers and students especially at high schools and universities.

Some of the MEPs emphasized the necessity of increasing the role of the EU in the field of education. Duff emphasized the limited role of the EU institutions in the field of education. He stated that:

...much greater part to play than it actually...being allowed to play...Not just the education policy, the cultural policy is also important. The competence of the EU to interfere in education and cultural policies of the Member States is very small. We can complement what happens inside the Member States, but we are not able to substitute for it. We do not design curriculum of schools in the Member States. We can encourage civic education with European dimension...We have programs like exchanging students...They are very successful...Demand for them is far greater than supply. If we were able to afford more, we would.¹³⁶¹

Weber also emphasized the importance of exchange programs and the importance of teaching teachers. He argued that "very necessary, very important...exchange programs, they are very successful...it is necessary to go to the teachers, not only explain, they must feel it..."¹³⁶² On the other hand, most of the MEPs and the Commission officials argued that education should stay under national competence of the Member States. One Commission official, who is from DG Enterprise and Industry argued that "the education

¹³⁵⁸ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁰ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹³⁶¹ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

¹³⁶² Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

policy can stay at national level, but some lectures on EU should be obligatory.”¹³⁶³ Prets argued that education should stay under national competency of Member States. She stated that:

We need at schools, universities special lessons for the European policy, activities...students are aware that they have a lot of advantages, there is a possibility for exchanges...we should have fix lessons during high schools...what is the aim of the EU. It would be very helpful...education policy should be a policy for Member States, not the EU, but we need the possibility to come from one Member State to another, having studied at one high school, it should be accepted, all the exams should be accepted in all of the Member States. We should have a basis...module...around the modules, we can have other systems...it is good that this is different, if the education system would be the same in all Member States, it is not necessary to go from one country to the other...but some modules need to be common...we need...acceptance of studies...yes of course, the **education policy has a positive impact on construction of European identity. It is one of the basic tools...**¹³⁶⁴

Education policy's role in construction of European identity was admitted by most of the interviewees, but it was also argued that education policy should stay as the competency of the national governments. None of them argued that, education policy should be a competency of the EU.

During the interviews, also some critiques were stated to improve the education policy of the EU, especially in terms of funding. Resetarits criticized the level of budgetary allocation to education by the EU. She stated that:

Although a lot of politicians say, we should have more children, society is getting older...I have the opinion, educate those children we have very well, use all the money you can get for them...then you will have a real treasure; but do not tell people to have more children, if you do not have money for these children. There is not enough money for schools, universities, if you compare it with the 'other's, like China, the USA. They are much more successful in doing this.¹³⁶⁵

Sommer argued that more money should be spent for education in order to cope with globalisation. She asserted that “...we need to survive in the process of globalisation...the Member States do not want to pay more to the budget...so we do not have a chance to establish more educational programmes...”¹³⁶⁶ Badia i Cutchet stated that:

...the governments do not want to transfer this responsibility to the EU...I think it is successful, the problem is that...in the US education is much more concentrated it is less humanistic...building people much more competitive...here we want to prepare people to be competitive, but we also want people to know each other, to be critical...we want both things.¹³⁶⁷

¹³⁶³ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on 19.07.2006 at 15.00.

¹³⁶⁴ Interview with C Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

¹³⁶⁵ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹³⁶⁶ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹³⁶⁷ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

According to the Eurobarometer surveys, a large proportion of highly educated people stated that they consider themselves as European. In Denmark educational level produced variations of only 6-10%, but in Spain, Greece and the UK there were variations of 20-40%.¹³⁶⁸ This is a very huge difference, which reflects the importance of education in terms of construction of European identity. As it was argued, usually people who are more educated have a tendency to support the EU more and they usually have a tendency to have a stronger European identity.

III.3.1.1. The Exchange Programmes

The exchange programmes for students, researchers and professors have a crucial role within the education policy of the EU. In the 1960s the Commission was actively involved in “providing its support to every initiative aimed at enhancing exchanges of professors and students”¹³⁶⁹ in the EC. It offered financial and technical support to students, especially for those who were making their research on the issues related with the European integration and wanted to take courses in any other Member State.¹³⁷⁰

Especially with the increase in the competence of the EU in the field of education with the Maastricht Treaty, several exchange programmes have been introduced. The youth exchanges in the EU contributed to the “ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe” and promoted the “identity and image of the Community in the minds of its citizens.”¹³⁷¹ Between 1986 and 1989, three education programmes were introduced, one of which was ERASMUS (European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) programme. ERASMUS I was covering the period 1987-1989 which was adopted by the Council in 1987. ERASMUS II covered the period 1990-1994. LINGUA which was introduced to promote foreign language training was adopted by the Council in 1989 for the peiorid 1990-1994.¹³⁷² SOCRATES was introduced in 1995 for a five year period which is based on Articles 126 and 127 of the Maastricht Treaty. In 2000 it was

¹³⁶⁸ H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹³⁶⁹ OJ C 312 21/12/67, p.6; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 669.

¹³⁷⁰ OJ C 2127 16/08/62, p.62; cited in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 669.

¹³⁷¹ OJ C 329 28/05/85, p.24; quoted in I. Petit, “Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity”, p. 678.

¹³⁷² E. Beukel, “Educational Policy: Institutionalization and Multi-level Governance”, pp.129-130.

renewed for a seven year period and its funding was raised. In addition to ERASMUS and LINGUA programmes, SOCRATES also includes adult education, distance learning, etc. It also includes the EU's first programme in primary and secondary education which is called COMENIUS. It offers financial and logistical support for transnational school partnerships and sponsors teacher mobility programmes.¹³⁷³ Two major "framework programmes" were established by the EU, which are SOCRATES for educational exchanges and LEONARDO for vocational programmes. Through SOCRATES and Jean Monnet funding programmes, the Commission has promoted teaching of the European integration at university level. The choice of the names Socrates, Leonardo and Erasmus is meaningful.¹³⁷⁴ ERASMUS programme takes its name from Erasmus, who was the critical European humanist of 1500. He is a symbol of European traveller, who travelled Europe from the north to the south to spread his thoughts.¹³⁷⁵ The goal of choosing such names was to make references to important figures of the European history, through which common cultural and historical heritage have been tried to be constructed.

With the Maastricht Treaty through the SOCRATES programme, the EU has increased its influence from higher and vocational education into the whole of school and university. In all of its protocols of the SOCRATES programme, there are some references to a common European identity, culture, and history.¹³⁷⁶ The main goals of the SOCRATES are:

To enable all European citizens to reach their full potential and display initiative and creativity, so that they can participate...in the building of Europe, to establish an open European area for education and training, to widen access to education and training and to rally citizens particularly young people around the **building of a European culture, a European identity and a European citizenship.**¹³⁷⁷

Thus, construction of European identity is one of the goals of the SOCRATES programme. The main goal of the ERASMUS programme was to enable the university students to study for one semester or two semesters in another Member State, through the mobility grants and the exchange agreements between the universities.¹³⁷⁸ This programme also

¹³⁷³ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.129.

¹³⁷⁴ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.56-59.

¹³⁷⁵ D. de Villepin, "Avrupa İnsanı", p. 19.

¹³⁷⁶ David Coulby & Crispin Jones, "Post-modernity, Education and European Identities", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 32, No.2, 1996, p.182.

¹³⁷⁷ Bryan T. Peck, "Socrates: The Next Step toward a European Identity", *Phi Delta Kappan*, Vol. 76, Issue 3, November 1994, p.258.

¹³⁷⁸ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.119.

encourages transnational curriculum development.¹³⁷⁹ The motto of the ERASMUS programme is “**bringing students to Europe, bringing Europe to all students.**”¹³⁸⁰ One of the goals of the ERASMUS is developing a shared sense of identity among students of the Member States.¹³⁸¹ It can be considered as an instrument of construction of European identity. ERASMUS programme has increased the flow of students within Europe and to an extent changed the flow from across the Atlantic to within the EU.¹³⁸² Thus, it helps to decrease brain draining from the EU, especially to the USA. The new generation who can participate to the ERASMUS programme is sometimes referred to as “Generation Erasmus”.¹³⁸³ As van Ham argues, one of the biggest successes of the Commission is the European student and teacher exchange system.¹³⁸⁴ Wallström emphasizes that the ERASMUS programme makes “us” the citizens of the EU.¹³⁸⁵ ERASMUS also supports multilingualism and tries to increase international understanding among the peoples of Member States and the candidate countries. It is criticized, because only %1.5 of university students can participate.¹³⁸⁶ The budget of this programme is still very small. Moreover, in Turkey which is part of this programme, it takes a long time to get residence permit for the students who participated to this programme that is against the mentality of this programme.

During the interviews conducted by the author, the importance of the exchange programs in construction of European identity was frequently emphasized by the interviewees. Most of the interviewees find the ERASMUS programme very beneficial. El Khadroui stated that:

There should be much more exchange of students in order to know each other, what we share and what are the differences...Every student should be obliged to go six months or one year abroad to meet other people, to learn languages. ERASMUS programme is very good, but it is only for a small group of people...it should be increased a lot. This can create European identity. As long as you are in your own community, you do not meet other people; you can not create European identity...¹³⁸⁷

¹³⁷⁹ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p. 78.

¹³⁸⁰ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.19.

¹³⁸¹ H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹³⁸² W. Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, p.32.

¹³⁸³ B. Schwarzmayr, Youth Summit for Tomorrow’s Europe, March 23-25, 2007.

¹³⁸⁴ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.19.

¹³⁸⁵ M. Wallström, Speech at Europe for Citizens Forum, September 28-29, 2006.

¹³⁸⁶ A. Caviedes, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.256.

¹³⁸⁷ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

ERASMUS is very beneficial for students to widen their horizons, to be in interaction with students from different cultures. Schwalba-Hoth argued that “every student has to spend at least three months in a different country.”¹³⁸⁸ However, funding creates problems in sustainability of such programmes. One ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education argued that “ERASMUS is probably one of the biggest factors to build the EU citizenship.”¹³⁸⁹ Even Fajmon who is sceptical about the idea of construction of European identity, supports the exchange programmes. He stated that:

...I support the idea of the free movement of the students and the professors. The program of EU to create open space for education...that is good. It is good that students can go anywhere in the EU and seek for scholarships...what I support. This is one of the programs which are positive.¹³⁹⁰

Thus, the exchange programmes, particularly the ERASMUS are generally supported by most of the interviewees. Many MEPs argued that the budget of the ERASMUS programme should be increased. Schöpflin asserted that “...ERASMUS, Marie Curie... are important. Secondly money, is the EU prepared to devote much more money to education and research?”¹³⁹¹ Resetarits stated that:

...exchange programmes are very important. People are very interested in, but a lot of people can not participate. There is not enough money for that... We always talk about how important the young people are, how important education is, but if you compare how much money is put in education, it is a shame.¹³⁹²

Özdemir also criticized the ERASMUS programme in terms of its budget. He stated that:

The most negative aspect of the ERASMUS is that it is usually for the middle class and the rich families. Poor families can not be part of this process...In the case of Europe; we do not have a problem with well educated classes, but the rest of society do not feel that they are part of this project. They feel that they are discriminated. To put them in Europe is so important.¹³⁹³

The EU has introduced also other programmes in the field of education. TEMPUS program links universities by promoting joint research projects. COMETT encourages universities and industry to work together on training projects and the goal of PETRA is to

¹³⁸⁸ Interview with F. Schwalba-Hoth, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 17.00.

¹³⁸⁹ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹³⁹⁰ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, on September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

¹³⁹¹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹³⁹² Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹³⁹³ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

At the beginning of the ERASMUS programme, fixed money was given to students for each month that they study in another European country, but in the last years, the money depend on the level of living expenses of that country, where they study. But still the money is usually not enough especially for the Western European states, which makes participation of students, who are from middle and lower class families difficult.

modernize vocational training.¹³⁹⁴ These programmes are helpful in increasing interactions among people from different Member States by providing chances to be part of the common projects.¹³⁹⁵ All of these programmes are helpful in increasing exchanges among the students, the researchers and the professors from different Member States which have positively affected construction process of European identity.

III.3.1.2. Rewriting European History

Like identity, history is also constructed. History is selective which has included some parts of the past and excluded some others.¹³⁹⁶ To construct a “usable” past is crucial in all collective identity constructions. Elites try to use such a past¹³⁹⁷ to construct a collective identity, such as national identity. As Cohen argues, “**history is the centerpiece of identity.**”¹³⁹⁸ History instruction in schools has been conducted by the authorities of nation-states since the 19th century. Professional historians have invented national narratives which are used especially in textbooks in the elementary and the secondary schools. Traditional narratives were dominant since the post-war era, but after the 2nd World War, history of nations have been tried to be rearranged in a European framework. There has been reconceptualization of nations of Europe in textbooks. For example:

German texts have de-emphasized the nation, nationalism and national heroes since 1945. The French...continue to stress the nation. French ideals and values...are approximated with Europe; to be a good French citizen, is also to be a good European.¹³⁹⁹

As Andreani argues, Europe has a history but not memory. Memory is the mixture of historical truth and lies, remembrance and forgetting which binds a community on the basis of great things that were achieved in the past and the desire to achieve such things more in the future.¹⁴⁰⁰ As Barnavi argues, it is with the help of history books, that young students

¹³⁹⁴ J. Mc Cormick, *Understanding the European Union*, pp.151-152.

¹³⁹⁵ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.119.

¹³⁹⁶ N. Renwick, “Re-reading Europe’s Identities”, p.168.

¹³⁹⁷ Klas-Göran Karlsson, “Historia som vapen: Historiebruk och Sovjetunionens upplösning 1985-1995”, Stockholm, 1999; quoted in B. Petersson & A. Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, p.238.

¹³⁹⁸ Shari Cohen, *Politics Without a Past : The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism*, Durham, NC:Duke Univ. Pres, 1999; quoted in B. Petersson & A. Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, p.238.

¹³⁹⁹ Brian M. Puaca, book review, Hanna Schissler & Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition* April 2006, retrieved on June 8, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/%7Egerman> For further detail see Hanna Schissler & Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, New York:Berghahn Books, 2005.

¹⁴⁰⁰ G. Andreani, “Europe’s Uncertain Identity”, p. 14 .

learned how to be French, English. Thus, European history books should be written to make young people feel European,¹⁴⁰¹ to create a common memory by emphasizing some events which is not so easy to achieve because of national sensitivities.

Robert Bartlett is a medieval historian who applied the theories and models of state formation to Europe in the high Middle Ages in his book “The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350”. He mentions “Europeanization of Europe” which means that Europeans have become aware of their European identity.¹⁴⁰² Thus, there were attempts to write European history before the European integration, which goes back to the inter-war period. In the 1930s there were bilateral consultations between German and French, also between German and Polish historians. After the 2nd World War, these efforts have had an institutional basis which went on within the framework of the Council of Europe and UNESCO. A lot of NGOs and teachers’ unions have taken part in redefining Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the activities about textbook revision have been extended to countries of the CEE and the Balkans. These initiatives also include the Baltic, the Caucasian, the Black Sea history textbook projects and the Southeast European history teachers’ education project. The goals of these projects are to harmonize teaching of historical relations between neighboring countries and to create a rapprochement among former enemies.¹⁴⁰³ The European Standing Conference of the History Teachers’ Association (EUROCLIO) organizes teacher training seminars to disseminate “European historical consciousness” and organizes workshops on teaching of conflicting periods and personalities of the European history.¹⁴⁰⁴

Since 1951 from France and Germany and since the 1970s from Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic, committees of historians under the auspices of UNESCO started to work on teaching of history. Then the Council of Europe took up this task and it is contemporarily working on reconciling histories in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In this project the key concept is “multiperspectivity” which reflects the aim of making students aware of different points of views. The *Georg Eckert Institut* in Braunschweig made a

¹⁴⁰¹ E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It”, p.93

¹⁴⁰² For further detail see R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350*, London: Allen Lane Pub., 1993.

¹⁴⁰³ Quoted in Y. N. Soysal, “Locating Europe”, pp.270-271. For further detail see also the websites of the Council of Europe, www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Cooperation/education and the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, www.cdsee.org

¹⁴⁰⁴ Y. N. Soysal, “Locating Europe”, p.271.

research on the teaching of Europe in the textbooks of twenty countries of Europe. It was found out that less than 10% of textbook content deals with the European history. The deputy director of the Institute, Falk Pingel argued that “the longer the countries have been members of the EU, the higher this percentage...” On the contrary in the Newly Independent States textbooks focus on a national history.¹⁴⁰⁵ Recent revisions in the textbooks of Greece and Turkey reflect friendlier relations between these countries and Greece’s sense of security in the EU.¹⁴⁰⁶

The EU officials have emphasized “the importance of rewriting European history from a European perspective.”¹⁴⁰⁷ Many Commission officials argue that there is a necessity of rewriting school textbooks and syllabuses from the European perspective.¹⁴⁰⁸ The historiography of the EU “...represents European history in a progressive linear fashion in which contemporary European identity is portrayed as a kind of moral success story, the end product of a progressive ascent through history.”¹⁴⁰⁹ There is a discussion within the EU about preparing a common European history book as a model for textbooks which are used in all of the Member States. This was a German initiative which is similar to the project between France and Germany, including a book called “*Historie Geschichte*”. Even this version caused national differences which led to preparation of separate paragraphs in French and German versions on communism and the role of the USA in Europe. The Commissioner who is responsible for education, Jan Figel is in favour of this idea, he states that “we can learn and remember where we started and what we have overcome on the way.”¹⁴¹⁰

The Commission supported a project which involved the construction of a “Eurohistory” in the late 1980s. The first stage of the project was preparation of a book on

¹⁴⁰⁵ “Collective Memory: The Prism of National Memories”, *Magazine on European Research*, Special Issue, April 2005, retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/rtdinfo/special_ms/04/article_2317_en.html

¹⁴⁰⁶ B. M. Puaca, book review, H. Schissler & Y. Nuhoğlu Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, retrieved on June 8, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/%7Egerman> For further detail see H. Schissler & Y. Nuhoğlu Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*, 2005.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Quoted in C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, p.483. For further detail see W. De Clercq, “Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the EC”, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1993.

¹⁴⁰⁸ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.56-59.

¹⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.57.

¹⁴¹⁰ Lucia Kubosova, “Germany to Present Plans for EU History Book”, *euobserver.com*, February 23, 2007, retrieved on February 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/23559>

the European history which was written for a general audience. Second goal was the adoption of this book into TV series. Third goal was the production of a European history survey which would be used as a textbook in schools throughout the EC.¹⁴¹¹

The European history book for a general audience was written under the leadership of French historian Jean Baptiste Duroselle who was assisted by a multinational panel of advisers.¹⁴¹² It was sponsored by the Commission and it was “promoted as essential reading for all Europeans”¹⁴¹³. The aim was to prepare “one-volume history of Europe set in overall European as opposed to national perspective.”¹⁴¹⁴ It is called “**Europe: A History of Its Peoples**” which was published in 1990 in eight different languages. In this book a common history of Europe is tried to be constructed. The shared European past is emphasized, “European history is presented as a gradual coming together. A moral success story of reason and unity, triumphing over disunity and nationalism.”¹⁴¹⁵ In this book the integration of Europe is referred to as the last successful period of Europe’s history. Different national cultures are mentioned as contributions to construction of a common cultural heritage of Europe. There is a reference to Charlemagne period. But neither Great Britain, nor Scandinavia, nor the new members from the CEE experienced this period.¹⁴¹⁶ The Greeks vetoed the distribution of this book by the Commission; they claimed that it does not mention enough the Hellenic influence on the European civilisation.¹⁴¹⁷ It was criticized for being Francophile and not covering the totality of Europe. It was also criticized that Duroselle only emphasized the positive aspects of European history;¹⁴¹⁸ because of such criticisms, the Commission stopped supporting this book.¹⁴¹⁹ Another book was written by French historian Frederic Delouche, which is called “The Illustrated History of Europe” in 1992.¹⁴²⁰ It was prepared by the authors from eleven Member States and Czechoslovakia to prepare a balanced history of Europe, but they did not reach a

¹⁴¹¹ N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, pp.43-44; cited in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.122.

¹⁴¹² T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.122.

¹⁴¹³ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only?: Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.2.

¹⁴¹⁴ Quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.122.

¹⁴¹⁵ Quoted in C. Shore, “Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe”, pp.485-486. For further detail see J.B. Duroselle, *Europe: A History of Its Peoples*, London: Viking, 1990.

¹⁴¹⁶ B. Petersson & A. Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, p.240.

¹⁴¹⁷ M. Z. Wise, “Idea of a Unified Cultural Heritage Divides Europe”, p. B 9.

¹⁴¹⁸ “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹⁴¹⁹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.123.

¹⁴²⁰ J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, p.186.

compromise on a European format. It was published in sixteen languages, which had some differences in content.¹⁴²¹ It was published in most of the official languages of the EU, which was prepared both for the students and the general public.¹⁴²² All of these attempts show that it is too hard to reach a compromise on a common history book of Europe; because all Member States have different national sensitivities and they want to teach their national histories from the perspective of themselves.

In spite of the failures in terms of preparing a common European history book, in the recent school history books, Europe is reflected as a more “peaceful land” than what its history actually is. As Soysal argues, “what holds Europe together in textbooks is a set of **civic ideals...**”,¹⁴²³ but important part of history teaching in schools still focuses on primarily national history.¹⁴²⁴ After the collapse of the Soviet Union the returning to Europe of peoples from the CEE were wanted to be emphasized which was reflected in the book of Norman Davies “Europe: A History” that was written in 1996.¹⁴²⁵

During the interviews conducted by the author, the importance of teaching common European history at schools was mentioned by some of the MEPs. Öger argued that:

...in every country, their own history is taught. I think in every school European history and general history should be taught. National history should be a small part of it. Reading a common history can unify people in many respects...Also there should be a serious course on the EU which starts from primary schools, institutions of the EU should be explained in this course...this should be explained to people, when they were young.¹⁴²⁶

The EU has also produced films and videos to distribute to the schools and the local authorities, such as “Jean Monnet, Father of Europe”, “A European Journey”, which tells the various stages of the European integration and “The Tree of Europe” which try to make all Europeans aware of the common roots of their past. One of the most effective films was “The Passion to be Free” which won the Commission’s award. The main idea of the film was that although there are many differences, the unifying element which binds all Europeans is “the passion to be free”. This spirit was born in ancient Greece, carried

¹⁴²¹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 123.

¹⁴²² “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹⁴²³ Y.N. Soysal, “Locating Europe”, pp. 274-275.

¹⁴²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 274-275.

¹⁴²⁵ “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹⁴²⁶ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

forward by the Roman, the Carolingian Empires and the Renaissance.¹⁴²⁷ Thus, there have been some efforts of the EU to reconstruct European history through history text books or films, but there has been still resistance from some Member States.

In “Let’s Explore Europe” which was published by the Commission for the students who are around 9-12 years old, Europe is tried to be constructed as “our home”.¹⁴²⁸ Wallström, during her speech to an audience composed of the secondary school students at the European School in Brussels, emphasized the importance of discussion on the future of Europe by young people. She stated that “Europe is our common home: We have to design and build it together.”¹⁴²⁹ In this book the concepts of “European” and “our” are frequently used. Greek heritage and the contributions of the Roman Empire are emphasized. There are also references to the Renaissance period and the Industrial Revolution. Some famous people from different states of Europe and their contributions to culture and science are stated. How to say “hello” in different languages are stated which reflects diversity but also similarities among different languages of Europe. The term “a family of peoples” is used for the peoples of Europe. It is stated that “we Europeans belong to many different countries, with different languages, traditions, customs and beliefs. Yet we belong together, like a **big family** for all sorts of reasons.”¹⁴³⁰ As a reflection of the principle of “unity in diversity”, it is stated that “we enjoy what is different and special about our own country and region, but we also enjoy what we have in common as Europeans.”¹⁴³¹ The historical background of the EU is summarised as “**bringing the family together**”.¹⁴³² The accession of countries from the CEE on 1 May 2004 is referred to as a “real family reunion”.¹⁴³³ The historical background of Europe is explained to the children as an interesting, adventurous story which has a happy ending. The contributions of the EU in terms of peace, environment and Euro are explained in a simple way. About the debates among the Member States it is stated that “...that is normal. Do people in your family always agree on everything?”¹⁴³⁴ Thus, the debates among the Member States are

¹⁴²⁷ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.56-59.

¹⁴²⁸ *Let’s Explore Europe* (Book for children 9-12 years old), Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005, pp.1-31.

¹⁴²⁹ Europa Easy Reading Corner, Young People, “Let’s Explore Europe!”, retrieved November 6, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/publications/young/index_en.htm

¹⁴³⁰ *Let’s Explore Europe*, p.1-31.

¹⁴³¹ *Ibid*, p.31.

¹⁴³² *Ibid*, p.32.

¹⁴³³ *Ibid*, p.35.

¹⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, p.38.

normalized. Lastly it is stated that “we are today’s European children, before long we will be Europe’s adults.”¹⁴³⁵ Here the Europeanness of children and their role in the future of Europe are emphasized. With the help of this kind of books, European identity has been tried to be constructed since childhood.

III.3.1.3. The Lack of a Common Language of the EU

One of the most important problems in construction of European identity within the EU is the lack of a common language which makes interaction among the Member States much more difficult. There is not even a common working language which is used at the institutions of the EU. During the interviews conducted by the author, Schöpflin emphasized the linkage between language and the education policy. He argued that “...one can construct education policy, in which the language problem has been solved...”¹⁴³⁶ Without a common language, it is too hard to have a common education policy of the EU.

Linguistically we can distinguish between three major groups in Europe, which are Romance, Germanic and Slavonic languages. There is a correlation to a certain extent between religion and language groups. There is an overlap to a certain extent between Catholicism and Romance languages, Protestantism and Germanic languages, Orthodoxy and Slavonic languages.¹⁴³⁷ Greek was the *lingua franca* under the Roman Empire; Latin had the same role among the highly educated people in the Middle Ages until the 1600s. In the 16th century it was challenged by French and Italian.¹⁴³⁸ Many of Europe’s languages belong to the Indo-European family, but there are several languages in Europe which do not belong to this group, such as Basque, Finnish and Hungarian.¹⁴³⁹ The absence of a *lingua franca* and a common curriculum make the emergence of common way of thinking and common attitudes among Europeans more difficult.¹⁴⁴⁰ In 1600 French was having a leading role in Europe. It had maintained its position as the language of international diplomacy till the end of the 1st World War, when American influence improved the position of English. Before the establishment of the EEC, France had tried to convince

¹⁴³⁵ *Let’s Explore Europe*, p.44.

¹⁴³⁶ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁴³⁷ “Who are Europeans?”, retrieved August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

¹⁴³⁸ J. Hale, “The Renaissance Idea of Europe”, pp.46-63.

¹⁴³⁹ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.134-135.

¹⁴⁴⁰ J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, pp.188-189.

acceptance of French as the official language, but other Member States insisted on the principle of equality for all national languages.¹⁴⁴¹ When a nation-state became a member, its official language “has been given the status of official and working language of the EU.”¹⁴⁴² Officially all national languages of the Member States have equal status in the EU, but in practice small number of languages has been frequently used as working languages,¹⁴⁴³ primarily French, English and occasionally German.¹⁴⁴⁴ French was frequently used *de facto* as a working language within the institutions of the EC. During 1973 enlargement French officials were very worried about the future of their language. French was dominant language also during the Presidency of Delors. In some periods some anglophones claim that while working alongside permanent officials, “if you do not speak French, they make you feel even more that you are not one of them.”¹⁴⁴⁵ M. McDonald argues that there are some stories about non-French officials who are from same nationality, but they speak French to each other in the corridors.¹⁴⁴⁶ These examples show the dominant position of French in the EC, especially before the accession of the UK in 1973.

Since the EC was enlarged towards the UK, Ireland and Denmark, English has been started to be used more frequently as a working language at the EC institutions. Thus, English has been developing as a *de facto lingua franca* of the EU. The main reason of increasing predominance of English is the status of English globally,¹⁴⁴⁷ rather than the position of the UK within the EU. There is “*de jure* linguistic equality” in the institutions of the EU, but there are *de facto* two *lingua francas* which are English and French.¹⁴⁴⁸ A survey on language use within the Commission showed that, English is used for 47% of oral communication and French is used 38%. In written communication within the Commission, English is used 49% and French 45%.¹⁴⁴⁹ In academic, commercial, political,

¹⁴⁴¹ Robert Phillipson, *English-Only Europe: Challenging Language Policy*, London: Routledge Pub., 2003; cited in Mairead Nic Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2006, p.47.

¹⁴⁴² M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, p.40.

¹⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Maryon McDonald, “Identities in the European Commission” in Neill Nugent (ed.), *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission*, London: Macmillan Press, 2000, p.61.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁷ M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, pp.47-48.

¹⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.52.

¹⁴⁴⁹ A. Caviedes, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.253.

and social fields, English has a dominant position in the EU.¹⁴⁵⁰ Although English is the common second language of the EU, there has been strong resistance especially from France and increasingly from Germany.¹⁴⁵¹ With the eastern enlargement, the CEE have become a new linguistic battleground between English and German. Especially Germany has been trying to increase the use of German in the CEE.¹⁴⁵²

Contemporarily a compromise may be possible on English as a *lingua franca* of the EU;¹⁴⁵³ but for political and cultural reasons, there is a strong resistance to official acceptance of any language as a *lingua franca*. One reason is the fear of Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony. Also some of the Member States emphasize that the UK was not a founding member of the EU. Delanty argues that “as long as Europeans do not share a common language, the possibility of a common European culture is limited.”¹⁴⁵⁴ The lack of a common language in the EU also makes it difficult for a common European party system to emerge;¹⁴⁵⁵ it has also negatively affected development of policy fields such as education and audiovisual policies of the EU.

Although English is widespread among the peoples of Europe, foreign language knowledge is still very low especially in the southern Europe.¹⁴⁵⁶ There is still a huge diversity in terms of language, but contemporarily most of the Europeans understand each others’ language more than the non-European ones. According to the Eurobarometer survey in 2005, half of the citizens of the EU speak at least one other language than their mother tongue. The number of people who can speak English keeps on increasing and it is still the most widely spoken foreign language which is followed by German and French.¹⁴⁵⁷ Multilingualism is given a central role in European integration by the EU. The

¹⁴⁵⁰ Christina Julios, “Towards a European Common Language Policy” in Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella & Michael Newman (eds.), *European Integration in the 21st Century: Unity in Diversity?*, p.182.

¹⁴⁵¹ Stephen Barbour, “Language and National Identity in Europe: Theoretical and Practical Problems” in Charlotte Hoffman (ed.), *Language, Culture and Communication in Contemporary Europe*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1996, pp.28-45; cited in H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹⁴⁵² H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹⁴⁵³ Ludger Kühnhardt, “Towards Europe 2007 Identity: Institution Building and the Constitution for Europe”, *Journal of Ankara European Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Fall 2001, pp.128-129.

¹⁴⁵⁴ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.132.

¹⁴⁵⁵ L. Dobson & A. Weale, “Governance and Legitimacy”, pp.167-168.

¹⁴⁵⁶ L. E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.150.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Eurobarometer, “Europeans and Languages”, September 2005.

LINGUA programme includes educational exchanges, the European Translation Fund and training of linguists and translators.¹⁴⁵⁸ It supports using of different languages in educational and training programmes.¹⁴⁵⁹ In the “Action Plan 2004-2006”, the principle of “mother tongue plus two other languages” was stated as a goal for the citizens of the EU.¹⁴⁶⁰

During the interviews conducted by the author, Deprez emphasized the importance of common language for education policy of the EU and construction of European identity. He stated that:

To reinforce European construction and to create a common feeling among the Europeans, the best solution would be to have a common language in Europe. The lack of a common language makes it harder to build a feeling of European community among the European citizens. My proposal would be to achieve a kind of language agreement between all the European countries, in which each European citizen would have the right to be educated in his ‘**home language**’ (the ‘language of identity’), then he could learn and practice a ‘**common language**’ for all Europeans (I do not see another possibility than English, but this proposal seems to be difficult to accept by some people) and then you would have the ‘**language of choice**’...having a common language for all Europeans would be the most important step to make education from a European perspective.¹⁴⁶¹

The EU emphasizes the importance of foreign language learning. It was stated that “building a common home in which to live, work and trade together means acquiring the skills to communicate with one another effectively and to understand one another better.”¹⁴⁶² It was also added that “learning and speaking other languages encourage us to become more open to others, their cultures and outlooks.”¹⁴⁶³ Thus, learning foreign languages are encouraged by the EU to increase communication among the citizens of the EU. Currently the EU has twenty three official languages. This imposes a heavy financial burden on the EU, because of high translation costs. Around two billion US dollars was spent for language services in 1989.¹⁴⁶⁴ The EU documents for external use and court proceedings have to be translated into all of the official languages and speeches which are

¹⁴⁵⁸ J. Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?”, pp.268-269.

¹⁴⁵⁹ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.19.

¹⁴⁶⁰ M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, pp.54-55.

¹⁴⁶¹ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁴⁶² CEC, “Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004-2006”, Brussels: European Commission, 2003; quoted in M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, p. 187.

¹⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁴ Paul P. Gubbins, “Sense and Pence: An Alternative Language Policy for Europe” in Charlotte Hoffman (ed.), *Language, Culture and Communication in Contemporary Europe*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1996, pp.124-131; quoted in H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

made in official meetings at the institutions of the EU have to be simultaneously translated when they are open to public. These are too expensive and takes a lot of time, thus they decrease the efficiency of the EU institutions. W. van Gerven suggests that the EU may select a few working languages or it may limit the number of official languages to the languages of the most populated Member States. He adds that in many services of the EU institutions English is already used unofficially as a working language.¹⁴⁶⁵ However, it is not so easy to reach a compromise on a working language for the institutions of the EU officially.

Some of the MEPs mentioned the problem of the lack of a working language of the EU during the interviews conducted by the author. One Commission official from DG Enlargement stated that in practice “English is nearly the working language in the Commission until the UK joined, before that French was the working language.”¹⁴⁶⁶ Badia i Cutchet asserted that:

There is a necessity...to make a difference between the official languages and the working languages...to make clear rules when you can use the official languages, when the working languages. If we do something like this, we could have more official languages...for example Catalan...we should have three, four working languages, how to decide which, we have to see how many people use these languages...¹⁴⁶⁷

She supports choosing of working languages according to the number of people, who speak those languages and she is also in favour of increasing the number of official languages of the EU, including regional languages. Catalan is recognized as an official language at the regional level, thus it was not accepted as an official language of the EU. Catalans have lobbied so much for the acceptance of Catalan as an official language of the EU. They emphasize that the number of people who speak Catalan, is more than the population of some Member States such as Denmark. Although the EU supports multilingualism, it includes its official languages, rather than regional or minority languages.¹⁴⁶⁸

The EU does not have a legal competence to shape the European language regime; but regulations have been enacted to protect minority languages, primarily for those which

¹⁴⁶⁵ Walter van Gerven, *The EU: A Polity of States and Peoples*, Oxford: Hart Pub., 2005, p.51.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Interview with Commission official from France, DG Enlargement, on July 13, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, on 11.07.2006 at 10.00.

¹⁴⁶⁸ M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, pp.42-44.

are recognized by the Member States.¹⁴⁶⁹ According to Bloomfield, multilingual European language programme should include most of the languages spoken in Europe, including the minority languages.¹⁴⁷⁰ To protect minority languages, the Bureau for Lesser Used Languages within the EC was established in Dublin in 1982. It has distributed funds to “worthy” cultural and educational projects which promote the development of minority and regional languages. It is also responsible for research about the status of minority languages within the Member States. About 10% of EU citizens speak regional or minority languages, but they receive less financial support. Thus, the effectiveness of this Bureau is limited.¹⁴⁷¹ Protecting and supporting different languages within the EU is in accordance with the “unity in diversity” principle. To increase interaction among the peoples of Europe, foreign language learning should be promoted more by the EU.

III.3.2. The Role of the Cultural Policy of the EU

Culture is closely related with collective identities. Culture determines the value system of a polity.¹⁴⁷² In *The Magazine* which is a publication of the Commission DG for Education and Culture, culture is defined as an “expression of national, regional and local identities, a means of self-expression, communication and sharing.”¹⁴⁷³ The cultural policy is usually used by the nation-states as an instrument to promote solidarity, unity and its legitimacy.¹⁴⁷⁴ In spite of enthusiasm in the early post-war European unification movement for bringing a “cultural dimension” to European integration, neither in the Paris Treaty nor in the Rome Treaty, the EC was given any powers in cultural policy. The only reference to culture in the EEC Treaty was in Article 36. According to this article, the EC may suspend its free trade provisions in exceptional cases for the “protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value.”¹⁴⁷⁵ There is not any reference to

¹⁴⁶⁹ L.E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.150.

¹⁴⁷⁰ J. Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?”, pp.268-269.

¹⁴⁷¹ A. Caviades, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.259.

¹⁴⁷² “European Culture, European Identity”, *Centre for the Study of Democracy Bulletin*, Vol.9, No.2, Summer 2002.

¹⁴⁷³ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), Issue 21, EU Publication, European Commission, DG Education and Culture, 2003, p.14.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Juan M. Delgado Moreira, “Cohesion and Citizenship in EU Cultural Policy”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.3, September 2000, p.449.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.54.

“European cultural heritage”; but there has been an increasing recognition that “culture lies at the heart of the European project” and has a unique role to play.¹⁴⁷⁶

Culture was primarily perceived as closely related with economics in the EC. The Commission stated that “new impetus for Community measures in the cultural sector is also an economic necessity”.¹⁴⁷⁷ Since the 1970s it has been acknowledged that the creation of the common market affects cultural life; cultural and artistic activities have been considered under the framework of services. Since the 1970s the EP has been asking for some degree of cultural action. In the 1980s some institutional decisions were taken at the meetings of the Council, the Ministers of Culture and the DG for Culture was established in the Commission. In the 1980s there were some actions in cultural field, such as protection of architectural and archaeological heritage.¹⁴⁷⁸ With the increase of the EC’s powers in the field of culture, formal and informal cultural cooperation networks started to emerge during the 1980s. They encourage exchanges among the cultural organisations in different countries of Europe; they also participate in the debate on cultural issues in Europe.¹⁴⁷⁹ In the Commission report after the first informal meeting of the Ministers of Culture in 1982, it was stated that there were differences in opinions of the Member States about the opportunity for a European cultural action.¹⁴⁸⁰ It is hard to reach a consensus among the Member States in the field of culture. Since the mid-1980s, there have been conscious attempts of the EU institutions “to redefine the EU as also constituting a cultural community.”¹⁴⁸¹ The Commission proposed a cultural policy in its communication on 10 February 1988. Before that, the EU dealt with culture only in terms of its relations with peoples from different regions outside Europe. A cultural symposium of the Euro-Arab dialogue was held in 1983; there were cultural provisions in the Lome III Convention in 1984 which was signed with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) states.¹⁴⁸² Thus, culture was taken into consideration in terms of the EC’s relations with the outside world to increase cultural cooperation with different regions or countries outside Europe.

¹⁴⁷⁶ European Commission Official Website, “The 2007 Communication on Culture”, retrieved on November 6, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/communication/comm_en.html

¹⁴⁷⁷ CEC, “A Fresh Boost for Culture in the EC”, COM (87), 603 final, Brussels, 14.12., 1987; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 60.

¹⁴⁷⁸ E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.160.

¹⁴⁷⁹ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), pp.3-4.

¹⁴⁸⁰ E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.162.

¹⁴⁸¹ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 60.

¹⁴⁸² C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, “Fresh Interest in European Civilization” in Christopher Joyce (ed.), *Questions of Identity: A Selection from the Pages of New European*, London: I.B. Tauris Pub., 2002, p.121.

The Council of Ministers of Culture, which began to meet regularly till 1984, approved new initiatives such as choosing a “**European City of Culture**” annually. Each year since 1985, the EC has chosen a city to organize cultural events such as music, cinema and conferences.¹⁴⁸³ The EU sponsors these events for “bringing the peoples of Europe closer together. It tries to promote “the richness and diversity of Europe’s cities, while highlighting their shared cultural heritage.”¹⁴⁸⁴ In 2004 it was shared between Lille in France and Genoa in Italy, in 2005 Cork in Ireland was chosen, Greek city Patras was chosen for 2006.¹⁴⁸⁵ Istanbul was recommended as a “European Capital of Culture” for 2010, which will be the last year when a city outside the EU can carry this title. Istanbul and Kiev were the main candidates. The number of “European Capitals of Culture” after 2010 will be limited to two each year and they will be chosen within the EU. In 2006 Istanbul was chosen as a “European Capital of Culture” for 2010. The expert panel’s chairman stated that, Istanbul won over Kiev, because of its more detailed preparations and its candidacy emerged from civil society.¹⁴⁸⁶ An EU official argued that “the EU only contributes symbolically to the financing of European Capitals of Culture...”¹⁴⁸⁷ Thus, the competition among Istanbul and Kiev reflects the symbolic importance, rather than economic concerns. A Turkish diplomat argued that “...the European capital of culture is very important...sometimes we face prejudices...by this way we can show our values, which are European values...”¹⁴⁸⁸ These kinds of events are symbolically more important for candidate countries or countries which have aspirations to join the EU one day; because they usually perceive such things as a way to show their Europeanness.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has become responsible for “flowering of European culture” and taking cultural dimension into consideration during the implementation of different policies.¹⁴⁸⁹ It provided the EU with a legal basis for dealing with a wider range of cultural matters. According to the Article 128, paragraph 4, the

¹⁴⁸³ M. Pantel, “Unity in Diversity: Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy”, p.53.

¹⁴⁸⁴ European Commission DGX, *Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual Media*; quoted in P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, pp.19-20.

¹⁴⁸⁵ *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples) , p.20.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Mark Beunderman, “İstanbul Recommended as a European Capital of Culture”, *euobserver.com*, April 11, 2006, retrieved on April 12, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/21369/?print=1>

¹⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸⁸ Andrew Rettman, “No Politics Please, It is the Eurovision”, *euobserver.com*, May 18, 2006, retrieved on May 24, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/21646/?print=1>

The Eurovision song contest is usually considered as a project of the EC, but actually it is organised by the independent Swiss based European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The Eurovision also has a symbolic importance for Ukraine and Turkey.

¹⁴⁸⁹ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), pp.3-4.

“Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its actions under the provisions of this Treaty; in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.”¹⁴⁹⁰ According to Article 151 of the Maastricht Treaty:

1. The Community shall contribute to the **flowering of the cultures of the Member States**, while **respecting their national and regional diversity** and at the same time **bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore**.

2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and if necessary supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

-improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples

-conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance

-non-commercial cultural exchanges

-artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.¹⁴⁹¹

In this article both protection of national and regional diversities and making people aware of a common cultural heritage are emphasized. The expression of “**bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore**” implies that there has been already a common European cultural heritage, but people should become aware of it. The emphasis on a common cultural heritage is one of the instruments to construct a collective identity in cultural terms. Heritage refers to a collection of objects with symbolic values, which have links to a common history. This article does not mention cultural policy of the EU; instead it mentions supporting action by the EU to the flowering of cultures of its Member States.¹⁴⁹² The EU considers as its role to “improve the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples”.¹⁴⁹³ Especially since the 1990s the principle of “unity in diversity” has been the main emphasis of the EU in terms of culture.

Actions in the field of culture are adopted by the EP and the Council according to the co-decision procedure and unanimity is required in the Council. The COR is also consulted.¹⁴⁹⁴ In the Amsterdam Treaty a “new obligation of the Community to respect and promote diversity” to the chapter on culture was introduced.¹⁴⁹⁵ Respect for cultural diversity within the EU was also emphasized at the “Charter of Fundamental Rights”

¹⁴⁹⁰ Robert Senelle, “The New Cultural Policy of the EU” in Leonce Bekemans (ed.), *Culture: Building Stone for Europe 2002*, Brussels: College of Europe, European Interuniversity Press, 1996; quoted in P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁹¹ Quoted in *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples), p.5.

¹⁴⁹² E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, pp.161-164.

¹⁴⁹³ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.78.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Official website of the EU, “Culture 2000: Presentation”, retrieved December 28, 2005 on the World Wide Web: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/cult_2000_en.html

¹⁴⁹⁵ E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.161.

(Article 22).¹⁴⁹⁶ The Commission's DG which deals with culture is not only responsible for arts; it also deals with information and communication campaigns and "Europe Day" celebrations.¹⁴⁹⁷ In the mid-1990s the EU introduced some programmes to support cultural projects in the fields of performance and visual arts, literature and cultural heritage.¹⁴⁹⁸ "Ariane" was created for books and reading, "Raphael" was created for protecting cultural heritage and "Kaleidoscope" was created for various actions which were organized by partners from different European countries. With the funds dedicated to culture, archives are supported, cultural month is organised, grants are given to train cultural advisers and professionals, including those who are dealing with theatre and music are promoted, European literature and translation awards are given, the European Youth Orchestra and the Baroque Orchestra are financed, exhibitions of young artists are promoted and library cooperation is supported.¹⁴⁹⁹ The Commission opened a portal which is dedicated only to culture in 2002 and available in five languages.¹⁵⁰⁰

"Culture 2000" is one of the Community programmes which was established on the basis of a Council Resolution of September 1997. It was introduced in response to growing pressure of initiatives in this field¹⁵⁰¹ and was established as a cooperation programme for culture for seven years (2000-2006) with a total budget of 236, 5 million Euros. It provides grants to cultural cooperation projects in artistic and cultural fields, such as literature, cultural history, performing arts, plastic and visual arts. Its main goal is "to promote a common cultural area, characterized by its cultural diversity and shared cultural heritage."¹⁵⁰² With the introduction of Culture 2000 programme, all previous programmes related with culture are put within this framework; it is a "single financing and programming instrument for cultural cooperation".¹⁵⁰³ It tries to "encourage cultural creation and mobility, access to culture for all, the dissemination of art and culture, intercultural dialogue and knowledge of the history of the European peoples."¹⁵⁰⁴ It was established to contribute to "the promotion of a cultural area common to the European

¹⁴⁹⁶ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), p.11.

¹⁴⁹⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 31.

¹⁴⁹⁸ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe) , pp.3-4

¹⁴⁹⁹ E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", pp.160-161.

¹⁵⁰⁰ *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples) , p.23.

¹⁵⁰¹ E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.160.

¹⁵⁰² "Culture 2000: Presentation", retrieved on September 23, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/cult_2000_en.html

¹⁵⁰³ E. Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity", p.161.

¹⁵⁰⁴ "Culture 2000: Presentation", retrieved on September 23, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/cult_2000_en.html

peoples” through innovative, integrated actions and special cultural events which have a European dimension.¹⁵⁰⁵ It supports artistic and cultural projects with a European dimension at the level of their creation, organization and their implementation. Activities such as festivals, exhibitions and conferences are supported by this programme. There are three main categories which are specific annual activities, multiannual activities that form the subject of cooperation agreements and special cultural events such as the “European Capital of Culture”.¹⁵⁰⁶

Culture 2000 program gives culture a role in social integration and socio-economic development. The Commission implements this programme. It selects projects according to the opinions of a panel of independent experts. So far the participants have been from the Member States, countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) which are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and the candidate countries.¹⁵⁰⁷ The inclusion of the candidate countries since 2001 has contributed to their integration process in cultural terms. Culture 2000 also sponsors the EU prize for contemporary architecture (the “Mies van der Rohe” prize), the EU prize for cultural heritage (the “Europa Nostra” prize) and the European Heritage Days.¹⁵⁰⁸ The “Europa Nostra” prize is awarded to restorations of European architectural heritage, cultural and archeological sites, private and public collections accessible to the public. It contributes enhancing European heritage and supports international exchanges in this field. The “Mies van der Rohe” prize is co-financed by Culture 2000 programme and the *Mies van der Rohe Foundation* in Barcelona. It rewards and publicises a work which was created in the last two years in Europe by a European architect to show the quality of contemporary architecture in Europe.¹⁵⁰⁹

Other programmes of the EU are concerned with the dissemination of cultural products in Europe. For example, the EU has funded the translation of 1300 titles such as novels, plays and poetry since 1997. The Culture 2000 programme spends approximately %11 of its annual budget for literary translations.¹⁵¹⁰ The new Culture Programme was

¹⁵⁰⁵ Commission Document, 6 May 1998; quoted in E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.161.

¹⁵⁰⁶ “Culture 2000: Presentation”, retrieved on September 23, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/cult_2000_en.html

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰⁸ *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples) , Education and Culture in Europe, Issue 21, European Commission, DG Education and Culture, 2003, p.5.

¹⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.20-21.

¹⁵¹⁰ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), p.10.

introduced for seven years from 2007 to 2013. The objective of the programme is to enhance the cultural area common to Europeans through development of cultural cooperation between the creators and the cultural institutions. Other objectives of this programme are to promote the transnational mobility of people who work in the cultural sector, to encourage transnational circulation of cultural and artistic products and to encourage intercultural dialogue.¹⁵¹¹ European artists usually find it difficult to perform outside their country. Primarily there is a language barrier, also there are social security, professional status problems, different tax systems and it is also difficult to have an access to professional networks. The other problems are non-recognition of diplomas and training.¹⁵¹² These obstacles have to be overcome in order to accelerate cultural exchanges.

More links have been tried to be established between education and culture. For example, museums and cultural centres have started to provide educational activities for the schools and the general public.¹⁵¹³ Barnavi suggests that museums should be created, in which citizens of Europe can learn what unites them. A network of museums of Europe has been created, such as the Berlin Museum of European cultures; there are also some more in Brussels and Strasbourg, whose establishment are still ongoing. The “Museum of Europe” is still under construction process in Brussels which will be a history museum and the main purpose is to show how European civilisation has evolved and to present the EU as the result of a long history and an old idea. The idea of this museum emerged with the initiative of civil society which is also supported by Belgian and European public authorities. None of these European museum projects is an EU initiative.¹⁵¹⁴ The initiatives of the EU show that there has not been any attempt to create a “melting pot”. For the Commission “unity in diversity” is the main principle of cultural policy of the EU. It was stated that:

European culture is marked by its diversity: Diversity of...architecture, language, beliefs...Such diversity must be protected...It represents one of the chief sources of the wealth of our continent; but underlying this variety, there is an affinity, a family likeness, a common European identity...a source of the greatness of the best elements of our civilisation.¹⁵¹⁵

¹⁵¹¹ Official website of the European Commission, “The New Culture Programme”, retrieved on March 13, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/culture2007/cult_en.html

¹⁵¹² *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples), p.8.

¹⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, p.14.

¹⁵¹⁴ E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It”, pp.93-94.

¹⁵¹⁵ CEC, “The Community and Culture”, *European File*, 5/83, 1983; cited in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.61.

According to the qualitative study on “The Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values” which was made in twenty seven European countries in 2006, it was found out that “cultural diversity” is usually seen as a distinctive European characteristic. Long standing common roots, freedom of thought and expression, intellectual curiosity, respect for others, tolerance, solidarity, artistic and cultural heritage and the value of progress are considered as common values of Europe. In addition to these, many participants mentioned dynamic nature of European culture. It was found out that the feeling of belonging to a “European culture” is usually expressed in comparison to the USA. While comparing Europe with the USA, the participants used “we” and they expressed feelings of pride. Compared to the “European culture”, the USA is usually seen as representative of “liberal Western culture”. The USA is seen as less democratic, more materialistic, less tolerant and it is thought that there is less solidarity in the USA. The UK and Ireland are in the middle between European and American culture. Participants from the UK usually associate European culture with France and they think that they have more in common with the USA than continental Europe. The participants from Ireland also do not feel completely involved in a “continental European culture”, but contrary to British participants, they are more willing to “Europeanize” rather than “Americanize”. The participants are not widely aware of the initiatives of the EU in the field of culture. Culture is considered as a key element in construction of a European identity and the participants expected from the EU to play a key role in this field. Their main expectations are protecting diversity and promoting cultural exchanges. Two main things that they want the EU to avoid is “supranational uniformity” and the risk of initiatives which focus on an “elitist” culture, that general public can not participate in.¹⁵¹⁶

According to the Special Eurobarometer Survey on European Cultural Values which was done from 14th February till 18th March 2007, 67% stated that European countries share some common cultural characteristics, compared to other continents. 76% believes that **diversity** gives European culture its uniqueness and enhances its value. 44% stated that the EU and its institutions are important in promoting cultural exchange.¹⁵¹⁷ It shows that the citizens of the EU mostly see diversity as a unique characteristic of European culture, but they also think that there are similarities among different cultures of

¹⁵¹⁶ European Commission, DG Education and Culture, Qualitative Study in 27 European Countries Summary Report on “The Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values”, June 2006, pp.6-70.

¹⁵¹⁷ Special Eurobarometer, *European Cultural Values Summary Report*, Fieldwork: 14 February-18 March 2007, published in September 2007, pp.3-4.

Europe. The findings of this survey were presented at the first “European Culture Forum” in Lisbon on 26-28 September 2007. Jan Figel who is the Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth emphasized that:

...this passion for our culture and cultures confirms the central place that ‘culture’ has in the European project. For policy makers in the Member States, the message is also clear: More means should be made available to facilitate cultural exchanges on our continent to promote mutual understanding, tolerance and respect among our peoples. This is all the more important as we approach 2008, the ‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’.¹⁵¹⁸

According to this survey, 89% of Europeans think that there is a greater need for culture to be promoted by the EU. 88% think that cultural exchanges are important and they expect from the EU to promote intercultural dialogue.¹⁵¹⁹ 2008 was chosen as a “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”¹⁵²⁰, during which some conferences, projects and competitions will be made.

During the interviews conducted by the author, one of the Commission officials from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency argued that:

...in the field of culture. If you read treaties, you would see that until very recently we did not have the intention of putting our forces together to start some activities at EC level until 1992 with Maastricht Treaty. It is very late policy which entered the EC field. Even with the Nice and later on with co-decision procedure...Member States have to have unanimity. This is very sensitive area for the Member States, mostly because culture is also part of national identity...language plays a role there, religion plays another role...¹⁵²¹

The funding which is dedicated to culture from the EU budget is too little. It is less than the level of spending for culture by public authorities in the Member States. Community activities in the field of culture have been gradually increased since the end of the 1980s. Most of the cultural spending is given to the regional and the local levels.¹⁵²² During the interviews, it was emphasized by some of the MEPs that, money devoted by the EU in the field of culture is not enough. Schöpflin argued that “I am generally in favour of subsidizing culture, there are counter arguments...market will provide...but it is not

¹⁵¹⁸ Special Eurobarometer, *European Cultural Values Summary Report*, Fieldwork: 14 February-18 March 2007, pp.3-4.

¹⁵¹⁹ *European Cultural Values Summary Report*, published in September 2007.

¹⁵²⁰ For further detail see Official website of the EU, “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”, <http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/>

¹⁵²¹ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁵²² E. Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity”, p.160.

true...market is always imperfect particularly in terms of culture...”¹⁵²³ Bozkurt stated that:

The cultural policy is more based on exchanging ideas. So it is good, because we can influence each other on cultural level. Culture is a good instrument...to get people closer to each other. There should be more money. The EU is not giving a lot of money from its budget to culture...¹⁵²⁴

Hieronymi asserted that “...financial support must be much stronger...we give money in agriculture, but not in culture...%1 to the culture and education.”¹⁵²⁵ Thus, the money devoted to culture is too small which should be increased in order to increase cultural exchange and cooperation projects. One Commission official from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency stated that:

You need a central approach...at the same time you need an approach that will reach local communities...media campaign...education...the funds devoted to culture are minimal compared to other policies, mostly media and education, programs for the citizens, mobilizing the local communities could be a way...softer policies...diffuse the message of common vision, common identity, a sense of belonging, at least bringing...the ordinary citizens closer...¹⁵²⁶

The role of the cultural policy in construction of European identity was rarely mentioned by the interviewees. Among the three policies (education, audiovisual and cultural policy of the EU), in terms of their effectiveness in construction process of European identity, the Commission official from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency stated that:

Among the policies education is more vital...if the EU really manage to finance films that would reach general public, I would put audiovisual policy second...to fight against American films is hard, if you look at cinemas around Europe, you would see seven, eight out of ten films are American. That is sad. Even if you finance European films, it is only indirectly that you pass messages about what Europeans are...which problems they face...how effective this is, how much broader public it reaches...if it is only for films that nobody wants to see...then you have a problem. Cinema, the image is much stronger than theatre or art exhibition. Especially in countries with not a long tradition...maybe in Brussels culture would have more to say...in a small village in Greece, it is not the same...it is very relative. Third, the cultural policy.¹⁵²⁷

In January 1998 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Hillary Clinton argued that “American culture is America’s biggest export” especially in term of fashion, music

¹⁵²³ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁵²⁴ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁵²⁵ Interview with R. Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

¹⁵²⁶ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

and movies.¹⁵²⁸ During the interviews conducted by the author, some of the MEPs criticized the EU, because of its deficiencies in promoting and disseminating European culture. Resetarits stated that:

...we always say we are much better than Americans, because Americans do not have culture...we Europeans have so much culture...it is not true at all...we have it...we are not interested in European culture, diversity of these cultures.¹⁵²⁹

She criticized the EU and whole Europeans because of not promoting European culture enough. Deprez asserted that "...we lack what the Americans have, the ability to build a strong cultural message that we can send to the world. The cultural policy of Europe is a bit disappointing from this point of view."¹⁵³⁰ Usually the interviewees found cultural policy of the EU unsuccessful.

Although there has been an increase in initiatives of the EU in cultural field to promote the cultural exchanges and increase cooperation among the Member States, it is still not developed at a sufficient level. It is too hard to talk about a cultural policy of the EU. Therefore, its influence on construction process of European identity within the EU has been very limited.

III.3.3. The Role of the Audiovisual and Media Policy of the EU

Information is necessary for construction of collective identities and media has a crucial role in this process.¹⁵³¹ In today's world mass communication plays an important role in development of collective opinion and media is replacing traditional socializing institutions. People, who are separated by national boundaries, are connected by mass media.¹⁵³² The media is essential for construction and dissemination of shared symbols and perceptions. The paradox of mass media is that it is strongly national in character, but at the same time, it is one of the main ways for transnational influences on ideas and culture.¹⁵³³ Contemporarily media is able to influence perceptions of people about different

¹⁵²⁸ Quoted in David Puttnam, "European Film" in Dick Leonard & Mark Leonard (eds.), *The Pro-European Reader*, New York: Palgrave Pub. , 2002, p. 236.

¹⁵²⁹ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁵³⁰ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁵³¹ Vian Bakir, "An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media" in Michael Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, p.181.

¹⁵³² Ayseli Usluata, "The Creation of the Enemy Image and The Media" in Nedret Kuran Burçoğlu (ed.) *Multiculturalism: Identity and Otherness*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Univ. Press, 1997, p.108.

¹⁵³³ Dennis Mc Quail, "The Media in Europe" in M. Guibernau, *Governing European Diversity*, p.203.

issues. It chooses and highlights certain issues; also it sets the framework of political agenda.¹⁵³⁴ The media informs people about the achievements and failures of the national governments. The media also affects the level of attachment of the citizens to that political system.¹⁵³⁵

The media is one of the most important sources of “images” of Europe.¹⁵³⁶ The media voluntarily or involuntarily affect people’s perceptions of Europe. The media presents European integration mostly as a technical project.¹⁵³⁷ According to van Ham, the “new Euro-polity can only exist by using the means of communication to make such a collective imagining feasible”.¹⁵³⁸ The media provide a forum for public debate on political matters; it has a legitimizing function in the evolution of a European civil society and enhances the feelings of community.¹⁵³⁹ The media is crucial for construction of European identity and formation of a European public sphere, in which people can exchange opinions on subjects of common concern. Good and bad news about the EU have affected construction of European identity¹⁵⁴⁰ especially on civic basis.

The Evolution Process of the Audiovisual and Media Policy of the EU:

In addition to economic importance of the audiovisual sector, it also has social and cultural roles. Especially “TV is the most important source of information and entertainment” in the EU, 98% of homes have a TV.¹⁵⁴¹ Until the early 1980s, neither the Commission nor the EP tried to involve the EC in the audiovisual policy. The idea of a publicly funded pan-European TV channel was firstly suggested by the EP in 1980. They prepared a resolution on “Radio and TV broadcasting in the EC”. It was argued that “reporting of EC problems by national radio and TV companies and the press...has been inadequate...”¹⁵⁴² It was suggested to establish a “European radio and TV company with its

¹⁵³⁴ Boyd-Barrett, “The International News Agencies” & Bennett, “Theories of the Media”; cited in V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.182.

¹⁵³⁵ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.129.

¹⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.151.

¹⁵³⁷ M. Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, p.27.

¹⁵³⁸ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU” , p.16.

¹⁵³⁹ P.van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.79.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Eugenia Siapera, “EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State” in R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, p.129.

¹⁵⁴¹ EUROPA, “Audiovisual and Media Policies”, retrieved on December 25, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm

¹⁵⁴² Quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, pp.89-90.

own channel.”¹⁵⁴³ The Commission and the EP started with ambitious goals such as “denationalizing” audiovisual content. They expected that this would lead to construction European identity and increase support for European integration.¹⁵⁴⁴ The idea of a “European audiovisual policy to lay the foundations of European identity” can be traced back to the SEA.¹⁵⁴⁵ The intervention in the audiovisual field tries to protect European cultural products from imports of the USA, especially from the dominance of Hollywood productions. The EC believes that a common market in broadcasting will help to develop a “people’s Europe”, by increasing the sense of belonging to the EC.¹⁵⁴⁶ The audiovisual policy deals with film and programme production, dissemination of audiovisual content through radio and TV broadcasting, CDs, DVDs and Internet. The audiovisual policy includes organizing a film festival, subsidizing TV and film productions and setting content quotas for broadcasters. Economic and technological concerns have more importance than cultural policy.¹⁵⁴⁷ The audiovisual policy of the EU has primarily economic goals such as enlarging and harmonizing the European media market, encouraging competition, promoting audio-visual industries and new technology. A secondary goal has been to promote European self-sufficiency in media and indirectly contributing construction of European identity.¹⁵⁴⁸ The media has a very important impact on its audience, if media is directed appropriately; it may lead to increased integration.¹⁵⁴⁹ It is expected that pan-European TV services can make important contributions to the greater unification of Europe in social and cultural terms.¹⁵⁵⁰ Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty mentions the audiovisual sector as an area of potential EU intervention,¹⁵⁵¹ but many Member States and national publics resist involvement of the EU in the audiovisual policy.¹⁵⁵²

Constructing a real European-wide media will be a difficult process, because of the presence of many different languages and cultures within the EU. There is an area of German influence which is the largest language group that extends into Austria and

¹⁵⁴³ Quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, pp.89-90.

¹⁵⁴⁴ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.109.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Juan M. Delgado-Moreira, *Multicultural Citizenship of the EU*, Aldershot: Ashgate Pub., 2000, p.143.

¹⁵⁴⁶ J. Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?”, p.268.

¹⁵⁴⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.31.

¹⁵⁴⁸ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.217.

¹⁵⁴⁹ V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.179.

¹⁵⁵⁰ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.217.

¹⁵⁵¹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.105.

¹⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p.112.

Switzerland, especially with the last enlargement; it has also included most of the countries of the CEE. Second one is the UK who has wide influence because of the widespread knowledge of English and success of the UK as a producer and exporter of audio-visual media to rest of Europe. Third one is the Mediterranean media cultural area which includes Spain, Italy and Portugal. France is more or less autonomous and it tries to extend its influence by international transmissions and partnerships. Lastly the Scandinavian countries share common cultural and linguistic characteristics also in terms of media, except Finland.¹⁵⁵³ Thus, it is too hard to talk about the presence of a European media.

The Programmes of the EU under the Audiovisual and Media Policy:

The EU has introduced some programmes to support cooperation among the Member States in the audiovisual field. EUREKA programme was founded in 1989 with the initiative of the French government. Twenty six countries signed its charter, its membership had grown to thirty five countries, the Council of Europe and the Commission also became its associate members. The EU's policies about cultural production are expressed in the EUREKA programme which tries to set up a unified "**European cultural space**". In 2003 the participating countries decided to stop this programme, because of policy agreements and some of its activities had been incorporated into the new MEDIA programme.¹⁵⁵⁴ The EU has introduced other initiatives to support European cultural production in the audiovisual field, such as MEDIA I (Measures to Encourage Development of the Industry of Audiovisual Production) and MEDIA II programmes. Subsidies were given for film and TV productions which meet cultural and artistic criteria, including cooperation between countries and across sectors.¹⁵⁵⁵ MEDIA programme started at the end of 1986; its main priority was "the creation of a European film distribution system which will make it easier for national productions to move more freely throughout the Community."¹⁵⁵⁶ Some MEDIA funds go to subsidies for European film distributors. It has supported some initiatives to encourage domestic audiovisual productions and their circulation throughout the EU and beyond. It supported the establishment of the "European Film Distribution Office" which gives loans to low-cost European films that are distributed to at least three Member States. MEDIA has also supported some initiatives to sponsor

¹⁵⁵³ D. Mc Quail, "The Media in Europe", p.198.

¹⁵⁵⁴ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.104.

¹⁵⁵⁵ D. Mc Quail, "The Media in Europe", p.217.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Commission, "A fresh boost for culture in the EC", Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament transmitted, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement No. 4, in December 1987; quoted in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 101.

market independent productions and a “European Film Academy” which gives annually European film awards. The main goal of MEDIA is not the Europeanization of audiovisual content by subsidizing multinational coproductions, instead the main goal is to increase the output of national productions and support its circulation throughout the EU and beyond.¹⁵⁵⁷

There are some other initiatives and offices which have been introduced under the audiovisual policy of the EU, such as SCRIPT (Support for Creative Independent Production and Talent), BABEL (Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Languages), EUTRO-AIM (The European Organisation for an Independent Audiovisual Market) and EFDO (The European Film Distribution Office).¹⁵⁵⁸ The BABEL Programme was started in 1988, later it was integrated into MEDIA II. The goal was to support multilingualism in the audiovisual field.¹⁵⁵⁹ Through EFDO a distribution network was set up for European low-budget films which enables them to realize a European-wide audience potential and through the SCRIPT fund, new writing is encouraged and rewarded.¹⁵⁶⁰ MEDIA prize was introduced in 2000 which is awarded every year to a first or second full-length film that was supported by the MEDIA and has been distributed to countries outside its country of origin in the highest number and becomes popular there.¹⁵⁶¹

Attempts for Europeanization in the fields of TV, newspapers, journals and cinema can be considered as part of the audiovisual policy of the EU. Until fifteen years ago TV in Western Europe consisted of national monopolies. For example in the UK, the BBC emerged as a relatively autonomous institution. French TV was dominated by the Gaullists and their allies. The national broadcasting systems developed because of technical, political and commercial reasons to defend national interests. TV became the most important everyday means of expressing national culture. It has been in transition from being a series of national public institutions to an international culture industry. National TV networks both public and private are still more important commercially and culturally. Transnational broadcasts have expanded more slowly than expected, because of

¹⁵⁵⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 102.

¹⁵⁵⁸ H. Davis “Cultural Implications of the Single European Market for TV Programmes”, pp.25-26.

¹⁵⁵⁹ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.217.

¹⁵⁶⁰ J. M. Ferry , “*Pertinence du post national*”, *Esprit*, November 1991; cited in J. Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?”, p.267.

¹⁵⁶¹ *The Magazine* (Europe: About Cultures and Peoples), p.21.

advertising problems and cultural differences of audiences.¹⁵⁶² International programming via satellites and cable is growing. The channels which it includes are mainly specialized in sports, music and other forms of entertainment that represent a global rather than a European culture.¹⁵⁶³

In Europe there is a fear of Americanization of national cultures through TV. It is also too hard to maintain smaller language communities, because of dominance of programmes in English. Mitterand emphasized these fears in 1989 in his statement that “American images, together with Japanese technologies greatly dominate the European market...if we do not act now...European unity will start to crumble.”¹⁵⁶⁴ France has defended Europe’s public TV channels to protect against, what it perceives as the “Americanization” of its culture by the USA media. Contemporarily Internet is another battleground between the EU and the USA. Thus, the EU tries to defend its culture from the influence of the USA,¹⁵⁶⁵ also in the audiovisual field. American films and series have been imported since TV was established in Europe, but the growth of private channels and enhanced competition faced by the public channels have increased demand. The share of European programming on national channels in Europe is below 10%, except in the smaller countries. The EC strategy for production industry is too small in scale to engage in transnational projects. Thus, co-production is also relatively rare.¹⁵⁶⁶ The conflict between the USA and the EU can be also observed in terms of TV programming in the context of the Uruguay Round.¹⁵⁶⁷ The president of the EP’s Culture Committee Castellina stated the following about the EP’s majority vote in favour of accepting quotas for requiring over 50% European content in TV programming: “... this is not a victory over the USA, but a victory for our own culture. Something must be done in a situation when

¹⁵⁶² Howard Davis, “Cultural Implications of the Single European Market for TV Programmes” in N. K. Burçoğlu (ed.) *Multiculturalism: Identity and Otherness*, pp. 13-17.

¹⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.31.

¹⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.22-23.

¹⁵⁶⁵ Ben Vickers, “Europe Defines Itself Against U.S. on the Internet”, *Wall Street Journal*, New York, April 2, 2001, p. B 9F.

¹⁵⁶⁶ H. Davis “Cultural Implications of the Single European Market for TV Programmes”, pp.27-29.

¹⁵⁶⁷ H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

82% of programmes aired in Europe are produced in the USA.”¹⁵⁶⁸ The EP’s decision was not accepted by the Council; particularly opposition of the UK was an important factor.¹⁵⁶⁹

Since the 1980s the influence of TV on peoples’ lives has increased. It has become their main source of information about local, national, European and international news.¹⁵⁷⁰ The Commission which acted on the basis of the increasing role of TV in shaping peoples’ perceptions, published the Green Paper which was called “**Television Without Frontiers**” in 1984. The aims of this paper were: To promote common European standards for new media, promote research and development in the new systems, liberalize the markets for TV, extend existing competition policies into this area and construct a framework of regulation for the content of TV and advertising.¹⁵⁷¹ The goal was to guarantee minimum quotas of European produced programmes for national networks. It was stated that TV would play an economic role by opening up the advertising market and creating jobs in TV industry and also a cultural role by creating a European identity.¹⁵⁷² It was stated that:

European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it, if there is such a thing as European identity. A European identity will only develop, if Europeans are adequately informed. At present information via the mass media is controlled at national level.¹⁵⁷³

Thus, the media still has mainly national or regional structure.¹⁵⁷⁴ The Directive on “Television without Frontiers” is the main instrument of European media legislation and it is composed of the main principles of a common European policy for the electronic media. The goal was to ensure for TV the same freedom of communication across the Member States, which is enjoyed by print media and to lay the foundation for a single market in media goods and services. The clause which caused most controversy was that minimum 50% of European content except news and sports was required, but only “where practicable.” This rule may be considered as a protectionist measure in the audiovisual field against the USA.¹⁵⁷⁵ Europe’s reliance on the USA films and TV programmes was perceived as costly not only in economic terms, also as a source of cultural damage to

¹⁵⁶⁸ Paola Buonadonna, “Demands for More Euro TV”, *The European*, 15 February, p.2; quoted in H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

¹⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷⁰ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p.169.

¹⁵⁷¹ H. Davis, “Cultural Implications of the Single European Market for TV Programmes”, p.23.

¹⁵⁷² V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.178.

¹⁵⁷³ For further detail see “Television without Frontiers”, CEC, p.2.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Cited in V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.191.

¹⁵⁷⁵ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.215.

European audiences and a threat to the survival of the European culture. Thus, “anti-Americanization” had become the predominant discourse of the EU’s audiovisual initiatives.¹⁵⁷⁶ Actually at the level of the EU, few precautions have been taken in order to prevent “American cultural imperialism” especially through TV and cinema. Usually France complains about this.¹⁵⁷⁷

The “Audiovisual Media Services Directive” was adopted in December 2007 for the realization of an effective single market for broadcasting. This new Directive amends the “Television without Frontiers Directive” which is a less detailed and more flexible regulation; also it modernizes rules on TV advertising to better finance audiovisual content. Thus, it provides a “comprehensive legal work” which includes all audiovisual media services. It “reaffirms the pillars of Europe’s audiovisual model which are cultural diversity, protection of minors, consumer protection, media pluralism and fight against racial and religious hatred.”¹⁵⁷⁸ Another goal of the new Directive is to ensure the “independence of national media regulators”.¹⁵⁷⁹ Another type of action in order to implement audiovisual and media policies are external measures. Especially with the help of these measures, European cultural interests are tried to be defended in the World Trade Organization (WTO).¹⁵⁸⁰

The first real test of the pan-European potential of TV was made for commercial reasons by Rupert Murdoch’s *Sky Channel* which started broadcasting in 1983 for a multinational audience, but it was not very successful. Because there are limitations on cross-border advertising, there is a lack of common language and only small group of audience have a satellite TV. Another attempt was made by a group of public broadcasting organisations in 1984 and 1985 to establish a pan-European satellite channel which was *Europa TV* and it was tried to be financed by its own resources, primarily through advertising; but after a short period of time, this attempt also failed because of similar reasons. Since then there have been more attempts for transnational TV in Europe, with the

¹⁵⁷⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 97.

¹⁵⁷⁷ P. Schlesinger, “From Cultural Defence to Political Culture: Media, Politics and Collective Identity in the EU”, *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 19, 1997; cited in J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p.170.

¹⁵⁷⁸ *EUROPA*, “Audiovisual and Media Policies”, retrieved on December 25, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/index_en.htm

¹⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

relaxation of media policy by the introduction of TV Directive.¹⁵⁸¹ In the 1980s other channels were introduced to offer at least partially “denationalized” programmes to the European audience. Instead of broadcasting in different languages like *Europa TV*, they broadcasted in English and they tried to specialize in programmes for which language is less important.¹⁵⁸²

The Swiss based “European Business Channel” was established in 1988, which gave financial news across Europe, but in 1990 because of financial problems, it had to be closed.¹⁵⁸³ Public service broadcasters tried to provide pan-European news service with the establishment of *Euronews*, as an alternative to *CNN* and *Sky News* of the USA.¹⁵⁸⁴ It was established on 1 January 1993 with the cooperation of seventeen public television stations of Europe. Instead of creating a new one, *Euronews* adapts the *CNN* format to European context to cope with the challenge of growing American influence in Europe in the audiovisual field.¹⁵⁸⁵ It tries to construct a sense of Europeanness among its viewers.¹⁵⁸⁶ It is a satellite TV station which broadcasts across Europe. It provides the European audience a European-wide view of news from all around the world. It was primarily a French idea in order to prevent the domination of American culture. Headquarter of *Euronews* is in Lyon, France. Main reason of its establishment was to become “audiovisual arm” of an emerging Europe. One of its objectives was constructing a European identity and the other is destructive which was to defend Europe’s culture from *CNN* and to resist its growing influence. It has between 67-91 million viewers from all over Europe. At the beginning broadcasting was made in five languages at *Euronews*, but today broadcasting is mostly in English and French. It was semiprivatized in April 1995 which was seen necessary for its economic survival. The French company Alcatel bought 49% of its shares; but after its semiprivatization, commercial goals started to have priority. Thus, the goal of constructing

¹⁵⁸¹ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, pp.218-219.

¹⁵⁸² T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.95.

¹⁵⁸³ Eli Noam, *Television in Europe*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; cited in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.96.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Stig Hjarvard, “Pan-European Television News: Towards a European Political Public Sphere?” in Phillip Drummond, Richard Paterson, & Janet Willis (eds.), *National Identity and Europe: The TV Revolution*, London: British Film Institute Pub., 1993, p.71.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Andreu Casero, “European-wide Television and The Construction of European Identity: The Case of Euronews”, retrieved on January 7, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.iaa.upf.es/formats/formats3/cas_a.htm

¹⁵⁸⁶ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, pp.170-171.

European identity has lost its importance.¹⁵⁸⁷ During the interviews conducted by the author, one Commission official from DG Enlargement stated that “Commission is giving 20% of the budget of *Euronews* ”.¹⁵⁸⁸

The main obstacle to cross-border TV was great differences in national legislations of broadcasting which affect advertising.¹⁵⁸⁹ Richeri states four obstacles that have been faced by *Euronews* which are technical, financial, cultural and linguistic problems. The technical one is that until March 1999 the broadcasts have been changed to a digital format which prevented large numbers of people from watching the channel; because each family has to pay for the installation. The second problem is economic which is related with advertising problems. Widely diverse audience who have cultural differences cause problems about advertising; because of the differences among national markets, it is very difficult to prepare advertising campaigns for whole Europe. The companies which manage advertising campaigns are usually local or national, thus they are most familiar with their own markets which make cross-country campaign more difficult. To overcome this obstacle, some European-wide channels have joined together to attract more advertisers. The third obstacle is cultural. The viewing habits vary in different countries; especially differences are obvious between the southern and the northern Europe. The last obstacle is about language. Viewers usually prefer to watch TV in their own language. Only specialized channels such as those which focus on music or sports can overcome language barriers more easily.¹⁵⁹⁰

Euronews is criticized by some scholars from different respects. Casero argues that it has become a European copy of the *CNN*. Another critique is about its level of neutrality in reporting the news and differences among cultures are ignored. Presentation of the news is usually very monotonous for the audience. Thus, audiences usually prefer their own national news reports. The profile of the average viewer of *Euronews* is people from the upper middle to upper class who watch the least amount of TV.¹⁵⁹¹ Thus, its effectiveness

¹⁵⁸⁷ A. Casero, “European-wide Television and The Construction of European Identity: The Case of *Euronews*”, retrieved on January 7, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.iaa.upf.es/formats/formats3/cas_a.htm

¹⁵⁸⁸ Interview with Commission official from France, DG Enlargement, on July 13, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁵⁸⁹ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.216.

¹⁵⁹⁰ A. Casero, “European-wide Television and The Construction of European Identity: The Case of *Euronews*”, retrieved on January 7, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.iaa.upf.es/formats/formats3/cas_a.htm

¹⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*

on construction of European identity is limited, because it can not reach many peoples of Europe. Machill argues that the topics relating to the construction of Europe lack images, also they are complicated and difficult to transmit to the audience. He claims that *Euronews* has provided a more negative view of Europe. According to Majo, the process of constructing European political unity and the development of European TV channels go hand in hand. When the EP and the Commission have more political power, the European channels will be more effective. Also it is argued that *Euronews* failed in its attempt to construct European identity, because of a lack of support from governmental institutions which led to semiprivatization.¹⁵⁹² The privatization of the audiovisual sector has made it harder to Europeanize mass media.¹⁵⁹³ *ARTE* was established by a Franco-German consortium in 1991 as a cultural channel. The broadcast is made in French and German, it is made available through cable or satellite across Europe. It was perceived as an alternative to the dominant mass culture of American TV. Its aim was to offer the European intelligentsia different products of high culture from classical music and arts.¹⁵⁹⁴

National channels invest more money on programming than European-wide channels which often have to face with financial difficulties. Moreover, news stories are generally interpreted from a national standpoint. Dramas, comedy shows and the weather reports usually have a national basis. The programmes of national channels are usually found more interesting by the audience who usually feels closer to these programmes which are more closely related with their daily lives. Thus, they usually prefer to watch national channels. In the medium-term, it is too difficult for the projects on European-wide channels to be successful, because of language and cultural differences.¹⁵⁹⁵ For the Commission and the EP, support for pan-European broadcasting was seen as an important way to instrumentalize TV to increase the public support for the EU. When it had become clear that it was hard to establish pan-European TV channels, they tried to encourage a

¹⁵⁹² A. Casero, "European-wide Television and The Construction of European Identity: The Case of Euronews", retrieved on January 7, 2006 on the World Wide Web:http://www.iaa.upf.es/formats/formats3/cas_a.htm

¹⁵⁹³ L. E. Cederman, "Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos", p.160.

¹⁵⁹⁴ J. R. Llobera, "The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force", p.171.

¹⁵⁹⁵ A. Casero, "European-wide Television and The Construction of European Identity-The Case of Euronews", retrieved on January 7, 2006 on the World Wide Web:http://www.iaa.upf.es/formats/formats3/cas_a.htm

partial Europeanization of the audiovisual sector.¹⁵⁹⁶ During the interviews conducted by the author, about the audiovisual policy Deprez argued that:

I am a bit sceptical...contrary to the USA; Europe has not been able to communicate efficiently to deliver a cultural product to the rest of the world. If you watch French films, they are mostly for French public; they do not really interest Turkish people; because they are made for French citizens. We are too self-oriented; we address our countries, our citizens...¹⁵⁹⁷

The internal disputes among the Member States and their inability to reach a common position cause much more public attention than news about a successful agreement.¹⁵⁹⁸ Pre-planned events such as the regular meetings of the European Council provide a routine focus of attention. The news about the EU has tended to increase gradually, because of the continuing extension of activities of the EU institutions. There is more news related with the EU and about European countries in today's media, compared with twenty five years ago. It has increasingly become harder to distinguish "European" from "home" political news. On the other hand, the news about the other countries of Europe and about the EU are still presented according to the perspective of the "home" media.¹⁵⁹⁹ Thus, the issues related with the EU are usually reflected through national or regional perspective, when they are reported in national or regional media.¹⁶⁰⁰

It is difficult for the institutions of the EU to address the European public without the help of the media, in which newspapers and journals are crucial components. Siapera asserts that:

For most European citizens the voice of the EU is the one they encounter in the press...European journalism is essential for the construction of a European public opinion and through this of a united Europe.¹⁶⁰¹

The activities of the institutions of the EU are transmitted mostly through print media. Most of the "European quality daily and weekly periodicals have resident correspondents, who report on the EU..."¹⁶⁰² As Siapera argues, European journalism is essential for the "construction of a European public opinion."¹⁶⁰³ The Commission and other EU institutions address the press corps as a European public. Thus, the opinion of the press

¹⁵⁹⁶ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.96.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁵⁹⁸ E. Castano, "European Identity: A Sosial-Psychological Perspective", p.43.

¹⁵⁹⁹ D. Mc Quail, "The Media in Europe", pp.224-225.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Richard Bellamy, "Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship" in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione & Jo Shaw (eds.), *Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context*, p.248.

¹⁶⁰¹ E. Siapera, "EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State", pp.134-139.

¹⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, p.133.

¹⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.139.

corps is the first European public opinion.¹⁶⁰⁴ The role of newspapers in construction of European identity is limited. The consumption of daily newspapers across Europe varies across Member States. For example, the total circulation varied from 21,447 in the UK to 2,696 in Spain in 1990.¹⁶⁰⁵ There have been some attempts to publish a newspaper across Europe. *The European* was initiated by Robert Maxwell in 1985, but it was only published in English¹⁶⁰⁶ and it is mostly read by international and business elites.¹⁶⁰⁷ Maxwell argues that this newspaper “will support all those, who are in favour of European unity and oppose all those, who are against.”¹⁶⁰⁸ He also sees this newspaper as an instrument for the construction of a “new United Europe” and a European identity.¹⁶⁰⁹ Some English newspapers which have readers across the EU are the American *International Herald Tribune*, London-based *Financial Times* and *The Guardian*. They are printed and published in European editions, but without a European content.¹⁶¹⁰ They have a moderate Eurosceptic outlook. They are usually read by the business and the professional elites.¹⁶¹¹ *The Financial Times* has also started to be published in German (*FT Deutschland*). Some magazines which are published in English circulate to a limited extent in the capitals of Europe. However as Mc Quail argues, this reflects the cosmopolitanism of a certain class, rather than development of a European identity.¹⁶¹²

In terms of cinema while the EU and the USA produce approximately same number of movies, there are national markets for the films made in the EU. 93% of the movies which are made in the EU do not go beyond the countries where they were produced. On average two million people watch an EU movie, on the other hand, an American movie is watched by around 200 million people.¹⁶¹³ *Eurimages* programme was introduced in 1988 which was based on the Council of Europe’s Cultural Convention. Most of the EC members, also several Council of Europe members participated. Its goal is to support the co-production, distribution, broadcasting creative cinematographic and audiovisual works;

¹⁶⁰⁴ E. Siapera, “EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State”, pp.134-139.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Quoted in V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.191.

¹⁶⁰⁶ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.219.

¹⁶⁰⁷ J. Bloomfield, “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?”, p.260.

¹⁶⁰⁸ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, pp.19-20.

¹⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹⁰ D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.219.

¹⁶¹¹ R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, p.248.

¹⁶¹² D. Mc Quail, “The Media in Europe”, p.219.

¹⁶¹³ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p.169.

but its funding has remained small, although the Commission has supported *Eureka* and *Eurimages*.¹⁶¹⁴ Puttnam states that:

European film-makers, along with all those working in the media can help us develop cultural identity...by helping us understand exactly where we have come from and...where we might be going.¹⁶¹⁵

The role of the media in construction of European identity is quite limited; because as de Grazia argues, there is no European cinema or TV.¹⁶¹⁶ Although there have been some attempts to cope with American film industry, it is still difficult to talk about a European cinema. National productions of European countries have been increasingly supported. In 2002, 933 million cinema tickets were sold in Europe, but 71% of these were for American films. The main reasons of domination of the American film industry are international distribution network, production and advertising budgets that are ten times higher than in Europe which are still growing. In the field of music, only 40% of disks which are sold in Europe are European. The presence of different languages and cultural diversity of Europe and differences in national tax systems are the main obstacles of developing European film and music industry. To encourage the export of European music, the Commission started a project in 2002 to analyze different national policies on aid for the music industry and to collect more information at the European level about the training and movement of the artists and the export of products and services.¹⁶¹⁷

The EU has been planning to introduce a new audiovisual strategy in early 2008 which will support networks of broadcasters in Europe to produce and broadcast programmes on European issues. The Commission also wants to give better support to the regional media and the audiovisual media which are accredited to the institutions of the EU.¹⁶¹⁸ According to surveys of Bruter which were held in the Netherlands, France and Britain, the participants mentioned heavy bureaucracy, focus on tiny questions and internal dissent between Member States among the negative images of the EU, reflected by the media. The participants stated that economic development and cultural initiatives are

¹⁶¹⁴ Council of Europe, "Resolution (88) 15 setting up a European support fund for the co-production and distribution of creative cinematographic and audiovisual works (Eurimages)", Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1988; cited in T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.104.

¹⁶¹⁵ D. Puttnam, "European Film", p.238.

¹⁶¹⁶ Victoria de Grazia, "European Cinema and The Idea of Europe" in M. Haller and R. Richter (eds.), *Toward a European Nation?*, Armonk, NY: Sharpe Pub., 1998; quoted in J.R. Llobera, "The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force", p.169.

¹⁶¹⁷ *The Magazine* (Education and Culture in Europe), p.12.

¹⁶¹⁸ M. Wallström's Blog, "Communicating Europe in Partnership", retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/wallstrom/communicating-europe-in-partnership/>

reflected by the media as the good aspects of the EU. They stated that areas of negative presentation by the media include competition policy, agricultural policy (only for the French group) and the CFSP (particularly emphasized by the British group). On the other hand, areas of positive presentation include cultural and educational cooperation (particularly emphasized by Dutch sample), industrial policy, regional development (particularly emphasized by the French sample) and scientific cooperation. The Dutch sample also mentioned positively environmental policy. They argued that the news stories which are told by the media on Europe has been predominantly negative, particularly in terms of politics as opposed to economic ones.¹⁶¹⁹

On the basis of his surveys, Bruter argues that the media usually present European integration mostly as a technical project and emphasize its diplomatic failures.¹⁶²⁰ Participants of the survey were conscious of communication received firstly from authorities of the EU through symbolic campaigns and development of official symbols of European integration by the EU elites and from the media through good and bad news about the EU. In France the respondents stated that TV is generally more negative towards Europe than most of the newspapers. In Britain the respondents were asked, if differences existed in terms of the information on Europe by media, they answered that major differences can be observed about the general perception of newspapers towards the EU, such as Eurosceptic *Daily Telegraph*, moderate *Times* and relatively pro-European *The Guardian*, *Independent* and *Financial Times*.¹⁶²¹ According to the surveys of Bruter, the mass media has an important “identity-building power” over the EU citizens through disseminating good or bad news on the EU. He found out that European identity may vary over time with the effect of media. He argues that “persistent good news on Europe, on its achievements and its successes modifies citizens’ perceptions of the unification process and...influences their likelihood of identifying with Europe.”¹⁶²² He also claims that the effects of news are stronger on the “civic component of European identity” than on its “cultural component.”¹⁶²³

¹⁶¹⁹ M. Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, p.28.

¹⁶²⁰ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.153.

¹⁶²¹ M. Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, p.36.

¹⁶²² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.124-127.

¹⁶²³ *Ibid.*, pp.124-127.

Consequently, there is neither a commercial nor a cultural base for European media. Still little progress has been achieved in this field, because of language barriers and cultural differences within the EU. There is a limited source for advertising revenue and a limited willingness among consumers to pay more for TV. The audiences generally prefer to watch the national issues in their national language primarily; Hollywood content is their second choice especially for fiction and drama; but there are some examples of partial success in cross-border transmission, including Franco-German arts channel *Arte* and the French satellite channel *TV 5*. According to Mc Quail, not only *Euronews*, other international news services such as *CNN* and *BBC World*, do not have much audience too. The main exceptions of the unsuccessful international broadcasting are the channels on sports and music, such as *Eurosport* and *MTV Europe*.¹⁶²⁴ During the interviews conducted by the author, Stubb argued that:

Euronews is doing a good job. I know people criticize it...but still...more people watch *Euronews* in Europe than *CNN*, which is quite important. I know it is boring, but it is the only one that takes things from European perspective. The problem is we do not have a European media, apart from *Financial Times*, the *International Herald Tribune*...the media reports European things through their national lands. You take the main newspapers in Turkey, they report it completely from a Turkish perspective, same thing in Finland, completely from a Finnish perspective...we need to overcome. The only way we can do it, is through the English speaking media...¹⁶²⁵

It is too hard to establish European media which reflect the events in Europe from a European perspective.

The media has limited effects on construction of European identity, because there are few EU symbols to choose which are relevant to all peoples of Europe. Whatever symbol is chosen, the audience may interpret its meaning differently from what the producers intended. Thus, it is quite difficult for the media to disseminate meaningful EU symbols. The most important problem is that the mechanisms for producing a unified media output do not exist. The media in Europe is still mainly based at national or regional level.¹⁶²⁶ Resetarits argued that "...emotional approach is also very important...TV companies' big task and responsibility is not only promoting national feelings, also European feelings..."¹⁶²⁷ However, it is too difficult to achieve without a European media. Resetarits criticized the dominance of the USA in film industry. She stated that:

¹⁶²⁴ D. Mc Quail, "The Media in Europe", p.219.

¹⁶²⁵ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁶²⁶ V. Bakir, "An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media", pp.193-194.

¹⁶²⁷ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

...if you are interested in European movies, where do you see them? Nowhere. You can see American movies on TV, cinema. You can go to European film festival, if you are really interested...but not in a regular cinema...You do not find also European music, Italian, French music...It exists, but we can not listen to it. Radio stations are not playing them...we are really neglecting our culture...I am sure, if these radio stations, TV stations, cinemas...will start to be more interested in each other, people also would be...It has been like this in the 70s...there was a lot of French, Italian movies in the cinemas. It has gone, not here anymore.¹⁶²⁸

She is critical and pessimistic about the decline in the presence of European films and music. Bozkurt asserted that:

...audiovisual policy is less related with cultural identity. One thing which is important in this program is that certain amount of European productions should be broadcasted throughout Europe...We also have European productions...if you leave it only to the market, the American industry will win...then we will not have a lot of original European created products. I think it is very important to have that too.¹⁶²⁹

She emphasized the necessity of support for production and distribution of European productions especially in order to compete with the USA. On the other hand, Fajmon argued that “the EU is trying to construct European identity also through such means like audiovisual policy...I am against that. I do not support that at all.”¹⁶³⁰ He perceives audiovisual policy as an instrument of constructing European identity and he is against the idea of using these policies as an instrument of this goal.

Although there have been some efforts to develop an audiovisual policy of the EU, mainly the media including TV, newspapers are still predominantly national. The main reasons are differences in language and culture, which make producing advertisements for the whole Europe much harder. In film and music industry, although there have been some efforts to support national productions in Europe, the USA is still the dominant actor. It seems that, it will be hard to change in the medium-term; because of these obstacles, the chances of establishing a European media are limited. The EU may introduce new initiatives in order to increase cooperation between national media of the Member States and support to establish some European TV channels and newspapers.

Consequently, all of these policies of the EU have affected construction process of European identity within the EU to a certain extent. During the interviews conducted by the author, Resetarits argued that “audiovisual, cultural, education policies are very

¹⁶²⁸ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁶²⁹ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on 21.09.2006 at 15.00.

¹⁶³⁰ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, on September 13, 2006, at 14.00.

important...to reach people, you have to do it in schools, in leisure time, by cultural things...”¹⁶³¹ She perceives these policies as instruments of construction of European identity. They are not perceived as very effective in terms of construction of European identity by most of the interviewees. One Commission official argued that “cultural policy is not so effective. Audiovisual policy has very little effect.”¹⁶³² He also argued that “if CFSP could be developed, it will positively affect.”¹⁶³³ The development of the CFSP and the ESDP would affect primarily construction of EU identity which would positively affect construction of European identity. Prets mentioned the importance of regional policy in terms of construction of European identity. She put forward that “regional and education policy are too important. Regional policy... is one of the most important policy and best financed policy...it could increase the feeling of belonging of people...”¹⁶³⁴ Regional policy has an important role in terms of maintaining regional identities, which helps implementation of the principle of “unity in diversity”. Özdemir stated that:

Common border policy towards the immigrants from Africa, common visa policy, establishment of a common diplomatic service in mid-term are all part of important developments in construction process of European identity...¹⁶³⁵

It can be argued that most of the policies of the EU have direct or indirect effects on construction process of EU identity and European identity. During the interviews conducted by the author, among education, audiovisual and cultural policies the importance of education policy was mostly emphasized in construction of European identity.

As a result of this chapter, it can be argued that the political elites of the EU have had important role in construction of European identity even before the establishment of the EC, they have crucial role also during the ongoing integration process. The general public usually followed the political elites in the first years of the EC with the effect of the priority of establishing peace in Europe; but after the establishment of peace, the general public have not always followed the elites. Construction of European identity is crucial in order to maintain support of the general public to the EU. The Commission has been the most important institution of the EU in this respect. The Commission is in direct

¹⁶³¹ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁶³² Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁶³³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶³⁴ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁶³⁵ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

communication with the NGOs and the citizens; it usually distributes funds for the projects of the EU and in the last years through the communication policy more involvement of the citizens has been tried to be encouraged. The EP is the only institution which is directly elected by its citizens, thus it reflects the opinions of the citizens through different political parties. The ECJ has crucial role in terms of interpretation and adjudication of EU law, through its judgements on different cases, it widens the competences of the EU in different fields. It has affected construction of European identity on civic basis. Working at the institutions of the EU has influenced identities of the officials who are working at those institutions. It is obvious especially in the case of the Commission which represents European interests. There is a wide gap among the level of European identity of the elites and the general public. Different factors have been effective on the level of European identity of the general public. People who are well educated and have higher income usually have tendency to have a stronger European identity and support the European integration more. Utilitarian factors are also effective on construction of European identity and maintaining support to the European integration. If European identity will be constructed more strongly, the role of utilitarian factors will decrease in gaining public support to the EU.

Most of the policies of the EU have affected construction process of European identity, but in this thesis, education, cultural and audiovisual policies are chosen which are closely related with construction of European identity. All of these policies are primarily under the competence of national governments, thus the EU has only some initiatives to increase cooperation among the Member States. Among these policies, education policy is the most effective one in terms of construction of European identity. The exchange programmes, which are widely supported by the MEPs and the Commission officials, are particularly crucial in this regard. There is a high level of demand for these programmes among the general public; thus the funds allocated to these programmes, have to be increased, so that peoples of Europe can benefit much more from these programmes. These policies have influenced cultural values, patterns of interaction, dominant images, norms and codes of conduct. They also influence perceptions and information of citizens of the EU. Thus, the creation of European networks, education programmes, media and other communication instruments as well as the Europeanization of national education, culture and media have a vital role in the strengthening of European consciousness and a sense of belonging to the EU.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF STATE-LIKE INSTRUMENTS OF THE EU IN CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND ITS COMPARISON WITH NATION- BUILDING

IV.1. The Role of State-Like Instruments of the EU in Construction of European Identity

The political structure and the end point (*finalite politique*) of the EU are not clear. The EU has been using some state-like instruments, such as construction of symbols of the EU, the EU citizenship and the Constitutional Treaty that have affected the construction process of European identity within the EU.

Introduction of direct elections to the EP, using of the European Courts as a means of appeal against national authorities, introduction of exchange programmes, also using of everyday objects to create permanent reminders of the presence and authority of the political system, such as the single currency have been all effective factors on construction process of European identity. Some of these measures are instruments of “purposeful identity formation”.¹⁶³⁶ As Scharpf argues, “...just as playing together can create teams, living under a common government and participating in common political processes can create political identities...”¹⁶³⁷ In the case of the EU all of the citizens of the EU and the Member States are not living under a common government, but they have been participating in some common political processes and institutions, forming a system of EU governance, which have been effective on construction process of European identity.

¹⁶³⁶ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.39.

¹⁶³⁷ F. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.4, No. 1, 1997, p.20; quoted in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, 1998.

IV.1.1. Construction of Symbols by the EU

Symbol is a “physical element” which is used to represent a political or social collectivity. Symbols have been used by political entities for a long time. It can be a flag, or an anthem which can be used “to attach a physically apprehensible signifier to a nation, a state or any other human collectivity”.¹⁶³⁸ Symbols do not just transmit social reality;¹⁶³⁹ they have also contributed to its construction. Symbols explain complex things in a simple way which make those things much more understandable by the general public. They also have a strong emotional effect. Usually visible subjects are used as symbols to represent the nation or ethnic group to mobilize people. Symbols are used to provide feelings of uniqueness and loyalty. They were used especially in the process of nation-building.¹⁶⁴⁰ Schöpflin argues that “an institution creates its symbolic dimension and is reproduced in part by reference to those symbols.”¹⁶⁴¹ Thus, symbols such as flags and monuments are important instruments of construction of a collective identity and its maintenance.¹⁶⁴²

In ancient times flags, anthems or clothes were used to differentiate armies. In feudal societies emblems were usually used by monarchs to represent their power. A symbol is also used to “personify” a social or political entity.¹⁶⁴³ One of the main symbols was the “monarchs” who represent their countries. Kings’ faces were used on the coins. By this way citizens were given “the illusion of superimposition of an image (the King) on an abstract concept (the state).”¹⁶⁴⁴ Symbols make it easier for citizens to identify with the political community, regardless of their levels of knowledge about the community and their capacity for abstraction. They identify with the state or nation indirectly through a “symbolic object.”¹⁶⁴⁵

The role of symbols in construction process of identities, the relationship between the intended message and the perception of symbols were started to be analyzed at the end

¹⁶³⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.75-77.

¹⁶³⁹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 35.

¹⁶⁴⁰ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.18.

¹⁶⁴¹ G. Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, p.29.

¹⁶⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴³ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.76.

¹⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.76-77.

of the 18th century.¹⁶⁴⁶ It is argued that “loyalty is a question of identity, identity is a question of culture and culture is created by disseminating symbols and propaganda.”¹⁶⁴⁷ As Bruter argues, political systems have the power to influence the emergence of new political identities with the help of symbols.¹⁶⁴⁸ Thus, symbols have had crucial roles in construction of political identities.

According to social constructivism, symbols are treated as markers that contribute to internalisation and legitimisation of political institutions.¹⁶⁴⁹ Symbols do not represent only political reality; they are also influential on its construction process. According to Shore, it is through symbols that people know about the structures which unite and divide them. It is very hard to choose or construct a symbol which would mean something to everybody in that society.¹⁶⁵⁰ The symbols which are used by political systems are chosen to “transmit certain values and meanings that are consistent with the idea of the community that institutions want to convey”.¹⁶⁵¹ Symbols emphasize the specific values, associated with a political project.¹⁶⁵²

The symbolisation of Europe began in the Ancient times. The Greeks were the first, who consider Europe as an entity and attach the image of the “semi-goddess Europa” to it.¹⁶⁵³ The problem of the symbols of Europe began when the first Greek geographers tried to draw maps of Europe.¹⁶⁵⁴ It is paradoxical that the continent which has made the strongest attempts to define its identity is the only one which is not considered as a real continent according to many geographers. The problem of geographical symbolisation of Europe has been observed throughout history.

Europe has had many symbols throughout history. As Bruter argues, “probably no continent was ever attached to so many symbolic representations and images as Europe throughout history.”¹⁶⁵⁵ Europe has been tried to be constructed through symbols, even

¹⁶⁴⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.77.

¹⁶⁴⁷ O. Waever, & M. Kelstrup, “Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities”, p.66.

¹⁶⁴⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.126.

¹⁶⁴⁹ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.4.

¹⁶⁵⁰ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.36.

¹⁶⁵¹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p. 28.

¹⁶⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵³ For further detail see M. Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, 1996.

¹⁶⁵⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.81.

¹⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

before the establishment of the EC. A lot of symbols were used during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to personify Europe, such as Japheth (one of three sons of Noah). Also Europe was personified by a virgin or a queen on many maps of Europe during the Renaissance period. All of these symbols refer to a religious, spiritual or abstract Europe, they have not referred to Europe as an institutional power.¹⁶⁵⁶

Since the foundation of the EC, it has constructed symbols in order to increase peoples' feelings of belonging. Shore asserts that "the binding force of symbols is also recognized by the EU"¹⁶⁵⁷ and they have been used to establish a "sense of solidarity and feelings of involvement among European citizens". It is argued that "**having made Europe, it is necessary to make Europeans**".¹⁶⁵⁸ Symbolic form and content have to be socially constructed to create a collective consciousness. Firstly symbolic form has to be accepted as embodying the abstract notions and it has to be an instrument for experiencing the symbolic message. Secondly abstract notions such as Europe have to be meaningful for people.¹⁶⁵⁹ To really understand the message, it is not sufficient to understand the symbolic meaning intellectually. To understand deep meaning of symbols, you have to be an acculturated member of that community, also you have to share the social beliefs and values which are expressed by those symbols. The role of the media is crucial in this process in creating common understanding among people. The symbolic form has to be seen meaningful by people and there has to be consensus on what the symbol refers to. Thus, people from different backgrounds can be united and mobilized by the same symbol. A sense of European identity may emerge, but it may have different meanings for people from different Member States.¹⁶⁶⁰ According to surveys of Bruter, symbols are very effective on framing of citizens' perceptions about what their political community is and who is included. He argues that symbols play a greater role in construction of European identity than news on the EU.¹⁶⁶¹ He makes a distinction between symbols of "community" vs. "unity". "Community" refers to an international organisation; "union" refers to an integrated power. The founding fathers of the EU determined to lead Europe towards a

¹⁶⁵⁶ For further detail see M. Wintle, (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, 1996.

¹⁶⁵⁷ C. Shore, "Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy", pp.779-800.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵⁹ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, "Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe", p.19.

¹⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.19-20.

¹⁶⁶¹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.128-129.

union.¹⁶⁶² According to Bruter, the EU has to prove that European identity exists which is compatible with national and regional identities to achieve its democratic legitimacy. The EU institutions need to fight against its images such as “bureaucratic, non-democratic and inhumane organisation” which most Eurosceptics try to attach to them. Thus, it needs symbols to assert its originality more than any other political project;¹⁶⁶³ but it is too hard for the EU to find such symbols which reflect its unique structure and are meaningful for the peoples of all of the Member States.

Symbols have played important role in construction of European identity within the EU. In the early periods of the European integration process, political actors did not pay much attention to the symbolic representation;¹⁶⁶⁴ but it has been recognized that some symbols have to be constructed to stimulate European identity among peoples of Europe.¹⁶⁶⁵ One of the main instruments used by the EU institutions for constructing European identity has been a “systematic effort to provide the EU with symbols that would enable citizens to characterize more easily their new political system”.¹⁶⁶⁶ Shore asserts that especially the Commission’s attempts to mobilize popular support for the EU by creating new symbols are important.¹⁶⁶⁷ These symbols have focused on the integrative aspects of the European integration and tried to reinforce both civic and cultural identity of the EU citizens. The symbols of the EU do not target only the citizens; they also try to modify the perceptions of people and other actors outside the EU.¹⁶⁶⁸ Thus, these symbols have been also effective on construction of EU identity in the world. Many different interpretations can be made about the “intended representation of Europe as perceived from its symbols”. The main values which are usually common and visible in most of European symbols are “**peace, friendship and harmony**”.¹⁶⁶⁹ Especially “peace” is the primary value which legitimizes the project of construction of a “United Europe”. In addition to these, many symbols of the EU refer to the values such as openness, tolerance, humanism, human rights and democracy.¹⁶⁷⁰ The symbols of the EU were mostly

¹⁶⁶² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.86-87.

¹⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.80.

¹⁶⁶⁴ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

¹⁶⁶⁵ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.37.

¹⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.95-98

¹⁶⁶⁷ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.36.

¹⁶⁶⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.95-98

¹⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.88-91.

¹⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

constructed in the 1980s and the 1990s which are not intended to replace national symbols, rather they were constructed as additional to national ones.¹⁶⁷¹

In the official website of the EU the symbols of the EU are stated as: The European flag, the European anthem, Europe day (9 May) and the motto of the EU which is “united in diversity”.¹⁶⁷² In the post-war era, the first major symbol of Europe was introduced by the Council of Europe¹⁶⁷³ which is the European flag, “twelve golden stars forming a circle against the background of blue sky”. It was introduced in the 1950s to symbolize all the European institutions and Europe as a whole.¹⁶⁷⁴ It was described as “the emblem of European unification”.¹⁶⁷⁵ The European flag was adopted by the Council of Europe when it had more than twelve members. It encouraged other European institutions to adopt the same flag. It was adopted by the EC in 1985 as the official emblem when they were nine members. Thus, twelve stars on the flag do not refer to the number of Member States. The Council defines it as “a symbol of perfection, harmony and entirety”.¹⁶⁷⁶ Twelve is traditionally the symbol of perfection and unity. It is also the number of months in a year and the number of hours on a clock. The European flag is the symbol of Europe’s unity and identity.¹⁶⁷⁷ The European flag was raised for the first time at Berlaymont building of the Commission on 29 May 1986 and also the European anthem “Ode to Joy” was played for the first time there.¹⁶⁷⁸ The European flag is one of the most visible symbols of European identity which can be seen in front of the public buildings; also it is used during festivals and official meetings. It usually flies next to the national flags. It is also put on the license-plates of cars which are registered in the EU.¹⁶⁷⁹ The number of European flags is not the same in all of the Member States. In Brussels which has the main headquarters of the EU institutions, there are many European flags in front of most of the public buildings, hotels,

¹⁶⁷¹ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

¹⁶⁷² *EUROPA*, “The Symbols of the EU”, retrieved on May 18, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/index_en.htm

¹⁶⁷³ Council of Europe was founded in 1949, which is an international organisation. The seat of the Council of Europe is in Strasbourg. Its main functions are protection of democracy, rule of law, human rights and promotion of cultural cooperation. The Council of Europe shares the same European flag and anthem with the EU.

¹⁶⁷⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.83.

¹⁶⁷⁵ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.47.

¹⁶⁷⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.87.

¹⁶⁷⁷ “The Symbols of the EU: The European Flag”, retrieved on May 11, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/emblem/index_en.htm

¹⁶⁷⁸ I. Karlsson, “How to Define the European Identity Today and in the Future?”, p.65.

¹⁶⁷⁹ Jose Antonio Jauregui, “The ECU as Vehicle of European Culture and Feelings” in Louis le Hardy de Beaulieu (ed.), *From Democratic Deficit to a Europe for Citizens*, Namur: Presses Universitaires de Namur, No.4, 1995, p. 225, quoted in P.van Ham, “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, p.18.

which is not the case in many Member States. Usually many government ministers, while addressing a national audience on TV have both their national flag and European flag on their backside. When some Austrians made demonstrations at the streets of Vienna in 2000 against the Freedom Party which was in power and its leader Haider; many people among the demonstrators were carrying the European flag. For those people, it represents the European values which are perceived as the “other” of that party.¹⁶⁸⁰ According to Spring Eurobarometer survey in 2007, nearly all citizens are aware of the European flag. 95% stated that they recognize it which has increased from 92% in Spring 2006. It is least recognized in Turkey (75%), but it increased from 63% one year ago; but it is interesting that the number of European flags in Istanbul is more than some cities of the Member States. It was also found out that the European flag is “widely considered to stand for something good” (78%). It is highest particularly in Belgium, Germany and Poland (all 86%). It is lowest in Turkey (46%), Finland (62%) and Austria (63%). In the case of Turkey it is partly because of lower awareness of the flag, because 29% of Turkish respondents stated that they “don’t know” whether it stands for something good or not.¹⁶⁸¹

During the interviews which were conducted by the author, for some of the MEPs the symbols have crucial role in construction of European identity. Hatzidakis stated that:

Symbols...are factors which can have a unifying role for the Union. I am in favour of these ...symbols are sometimes the essence of what is uniting us; but I do not care about symbols themselves, if we have twelve or fifteen stars...¹⁶⁸²

Among the symbols of Europe, most of the interviewees mentioned the importance of the European flag and Euro. Bozkurt argued that “European flag is the most effective symbol. I think it is important to have that symbol. I think it is a beautiful flag. A lot of people know the flag.”¹⁶⁸³ But she added that:

In some countries you see the European flag everywhere, you see the flag of the country itself and the European flag next to each other, which is very nice...saying we are also part of the EU. In Netherlands you see it nowhere. So it differs from country to country.¹⁶⁸⁴

¹⁶⁸⁰ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

¹⁶⁸¹ Standard Eurobarometer Survey, Spring 2007, pp. 45-46.

¹⁶⁸² Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006 at 16.15.

¹⁶⁸³ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Prets asserted that "...European flag is visible. More and more you have the national and European flag...that is very good..."¹⁶⁸⁵ The MEPs who were interviewed, emphasized the importance of using national and European flags simultaneously. El Khadroui stated that:

I think everybody know the European flag, so this is effective...depends on what importance you attach to these kind of symbols...I will not cry before European flag. I will not cry before Belgian flag neither.¹⁶⁸⁶

For Sommer, European flag and Euro are the most important symbols. She asserted that "people experience that Euro brings a lot of benefits. They get used to Euro...The flag is very very well known symbol."¹⁶⁸⁷ Coveney stated that:

The flag, is the one thing everybody associates with the EU, blue flag with the yellow stars...if you ask people what the European anthem is, maybe if %5 of people knew the answer, I would be surprised.¹⁶⁸⁸

Some of the MEPs emphasized that Euro is not used in every Member State. For them, the European flag is the main symbol of the EU. Öger argued that "I think the flag is a symbol, because Euro is not used in every Member State...that flag explains a lot of things. It shows that Europe...is a union of values...I can not see a better symbol."¹⁶⁸⁹ The interviewees emphasized the importance of the European flag, because it is well known symbol, but it does not have emotional significance both for the political elites and the citizens of the EU. The interviewees also emphasized the role of Euro, because of its practical benefits in daily lives of the citizens. The consultant of the MEP of Southern Cyprus contended that always the symbols are effective. But he added that "to respect the symbol you should fight for it. Every national symbol includes history of each nation".¹⁶⁹⁰ The symbols of the EU are artificial constructions, the peoples of Europe did not fight for them and they are not based on common cultural heritage. Some interviewees argued that these symbols are not so effective, because of these reasons. Deprez claimed that the European flag is not so effective on construction of European identity. He stated that:

The European flag could play an important role, if we had a real European army. But for the moment, when soldiers are sent to Lebanon, they are not going with the European flag, they are going with their national flags...If we could relate it with a common army, it could mean something...It will take a long time before people consider it as really important...when you have a football match in Europe, nobody sings the European anthem. That is a pity.¹⁶⁹¹

¹⁶⁸⁵ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁶⁸⁶ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁶⁸⁷ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

¹⁶⁸⁸ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

¹⁶⁸⁹ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Interview with Y. Charalampidis, Consultant of Y. Matsis the MEP of Southern Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

¹⁶⁹¹ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

According to this approach, both the European flag and the anthem are superficial constructions, instead of representing common historical and cultural heritage. On the other hand, Stubb contended that he is against the idea of symbols. He admitted that they are helpful in construction of a collective identity, thus they differentiate “us” from “them”. He stated that:

I have a problem with symbols...I am very pro-European, I am a federalist...I understand the importance of it. Even for national symbols. They are efficient, but I do not like them. I think they are more divisive than anything. I am not a big fan of Finnish national symbols...or Turkish national symbols. It is good for identity building...but the basic thinking is always “us” against “them” in all symbols...the flag is all right, Euro is good, but it is not a symbol, it is a fact.¹⁶⁹²

Although symbols contribute to construction of a collective identity, it divides people as “us” and “them”. He does not perceive Euro as a symbol, but as a fact of everyday life. He is against the idea of symbols, but even for those who oppose symbols, they have a meaning. When they see a symbol, it refers to something.

Also for the Commission officials who were interviewed, the most important symbols are the European flag and Euro. One Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry stated that “European flag is important, Euro is very important”.¹⁶⁹³ One Commission official from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency stated that “I think of the EU, when I see the flag, blue with yellow stars. Anywhere you go, in Greece, in Turkey...you know that is the common reference...”¹⁶⁹⁴ She added that at least we can understand that organisation is financed by the EU.¹⁶⁹⁵ According to the interviews conducted by the author, the European flag was perceived as the most important and widely known symbol of the EU.

The anthem is not only of the EU, also of Europe in a wider sense. The melody comes from the Ninth Symphony which was composed by Beethoven in 1823. Its lyrics were written by Schiller in 1785 which expresses “idealistic vision of the human race becoming brothers”. In 1972 the Council of Europe adopted Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” as

¹⁶⁹² Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

¹⁶⁹³ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁶⁹⁴ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

the European anthem which expresses the ideals of “freedom, peace and solidarity”.¹⁶⁹⁶ In 1985 it was adopted as the official anthem of the EC. According to one Commission report, the European anthem is “representative of the European idea” and should be “played at appropriate events and ceremonies” and wherever “the existence of the Community needs to be brought to public attention”.¹⁶⁹⁷ During the interviews conducted by the author, Resetarits put forward that “in Olympic Games the European anthem should be played...for example in the World Cup firstly Italian, then the European anthem should be played.”¹⁶⁹⁸ Özdemir argued that “the anthem...it is known only by the elites, men on the street do not get excited from it, if they whistle, they whistle another song, but not that...”¹⁶⁹⁹ He also added that “in Olympic Games and sport activities there is no European team, instead there are national teams. It will stay the same like this for a long time...”¹⁷⁰⁰ Bozkurt asserted that “a lot of people do not know even their own national anthem. So how should they know the European anthem? But it is good that we have one at least...”¹⁷⁰¹ Thus, European anthem is not considered as very important symbol of the EU, mainly because it is not widely known by the peoples of Europe.

New Community-wide public holidays were proposed, which refer to important events in the history of European integration, such as the birthday of Jean Monnet and the date of the signing of the Paris Treaty, which created the ECSC. “9 May” was officially accepted as a “Europe day”, which is the anniversary of the Schuman Plan (9 May 1950). All of these dates of celebration were introduced to construct a European historical memory¹⁷⁰² and as Bruter argues, to “provide the EU with the closest possible equivalent to its own Independence Day, traditional feature of a proud liberated nation”.¹⁷⁰³ Kauppi asserted that “...celebrating the EU day is also a good way to get people closer to the institution...”¹⁷⁰⁴ In March 2007 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome was celebrated in Member States by various events, such as concerts and exhibitions.

¹⁶⁹⁶ “The European Anthem”, retrieved on April 24, 2006 on the World Wide Web:

http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/anthem/index_en.htm

¹⁶⁹⁷ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, pp.789-790.

¹⁶⁹⁸ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁶⁹⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰¹ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁷⁰² C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.49-50.

¹⁷⁰³ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.84-96.

¹⁷⁰⁴ Interview with P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

The introduction of the EU passport or gradual extension of using the European flag symbolically increased the differences between the Europeans and the outsiders.¹⁷⁰⁵ The EU passport was considered as one of the benchmarks towards the creation of a “People’s Europe” by the Delors Commission.¹⁷⁰⁶ The EU passport, on which the information is written in all official languages of the EU, is common for all of the EU citizens. Although the EU passports have standardized cover, the Member States have given its interior a national design.¹⁷⁰⁷ Thus, even on the EU passports European identity has been tried to be constructed, while maintaining national identities. In addition to these, at the airports of the Member States, peoples are differentiated as the “EU citizens” and the “non-EU citizens”.

The authorities of the EU have tried to draw parallels to historical situations or “outstanding” personalities, while they are choosing symbols for the EU. The acronyms which are chosen usually refer to the Ancient times, the Renaissance, etc. They refer to main elements of the shared European heritage and try to show a connection with “European openness, cross-culturalism and transnationalism”. References to the Ancient times can be seen in the name of the programmes such as SOCRATES which is also an example of personification. References to the Ancient times can be seen in the name of the programmes such as EUREKA, TEMPUS and LINGUA which are respectively dedicated to scientific cooperation, educational exchanges with countries of the CEE and learning of different languages. In addition to these, other programmes’ acronyms refer to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For example, the ECU (European Currency Unit) was the currency of Charlemagne’s empire, ERASMUS who is the name of the philosopher of the Enlightenment, was given as a name to the exchange programme. In spite of the preferences of most of the Europeans, ECU was not chosen as a name for the single currency, instead Euro was chosen which is a new name without any reference to anything in the past.¹⁷⁰⁸ Through the most widely known symbols such as the European flag and Euro, the emphasis is on the common future of Europe, instead of common historical and cultural heritage. Bruter suggests that increase in the number of symbols introduced by the EU, has positively affected construction of European identity. He argues that the levels of European identity show the greatest increases when there was an introduction of new

¹⁷⁰⁵ P. Taylor, *The EU in The 1990’s*, p.142.

¹⁷⁰⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.84.

¹⁷⁰⁷ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.17.

¹⁷⁰⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.89-90.

symbols of the EU. For example, the periods of introduction of important symbols such as the European flag, start of the project of a “People’s Europe”, introduction of a common EC passport and the “day of Europe” in 1986 caused increases in the average levels of European identity across Member States.¹⁷⁰⁹ They are not the only reasons of increase in the level of European identity, but it can be argued that the symbols have been effective on construction process of European identity within the EU.

IV.1.1. The Role of “Euro” as a Symbol of the EU

Actually Euro is not an official symbol of the EU, but practically it is one of the most visible symbols of European identity and EU identity in the world. Most of the symbols of the EU are additional to national symbols, except Euro, which replaced national currencies of some of the Member States that were important symbols of national sovereignty. Thus, for the first time national symbols were replaced by a European symbol.¹⁷¹⁰ The choice of the name for the new European currency and the design of the Euro bank notes and coins were made at the Council of Madrid in 1995. A large majority of citizens preferred the name ECU, only a few of them supported “Euro” as the name of the single currency, but at the end “Euro” was accepted by 69% at the Madrid Summit. Rather than Euro-mark, franc, as many politicians wanted, Euro was chosen which is much more neutral.¹⁷¹¹

Firstly eleven Member States met the convergence criteria and adopted Euro on 1 January 1999, on 1 January 2002 Euro notes and coins started to be used in Greece. Slovenia met the convergence criteria in 2006 and it has started to use Euro since 1 January 2007. “Money is not only about economics and finance”,¹⁷¹² it also represents state’s sovereignty. From 1 January 2008, Malta and Southern Cyprus also started to use Euro.¹⁷¹³ It is expected from the EMU that it will provide impetus for a common identity, because monetary sovereignty is one of the most important components of state sovereignty. With

¹⁷⁰⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.138-141.

¹⁷¹⁰ A. Caviedes, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.262.

¹⁷¹¹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.84-96.

¹⁷¹² T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.487.

¹⁷¹³ European Commission, “Economic and Financial Affairs”, retrieved on January 5, 2008 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/index_en.htm?cs_mid=2946

the introduction of Euro, it was expected to lead to a shift in conscious as well as subconscious identification of the citizens with the EU.¹⁷¹⁴

The symbol of Euro was inspired by the Greek letter “epsilon” which refers to the European civilisation and to the first letter of the word “Europe”. The parallel lines on the Euro-symbol represent the stability of Euro. On the front side of the banknotes, mostly there are windows and gateways which symbolize the spirit of openness and cooperation in the EU. On the other side of the banknotes, there are bridges which represent communication among the peoples of Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world.¹⁷¹⁵ The symbols on the Euro banknotes emphasize the future. Unlike most of the other currencies, on the Euro banknotes there are imaginary and non-existent monuments. This is also valid for the European flag which does not refer to any historical event.¹⁷¹⁶ For eight Euro coin denominations, each Member State was allowed to decorate one side with its own national symbol, but the other side has to carry a common European image, a map of Europe, against a background of transverse lines and the European flag.¹⁷¹⁷ It shows that a balance between national and European identity is tried to be maintained which reflects the motto of the EU “united in diversity”.¹⁷¹⁸ It shows that although national currencies were replaced with Euro, national identities are respected. The 1, 2 and 5 cent coins emphasize Europe’s place in the world. The 1 and 2 Euro coins represent “Europe without frontiers.” The 10, 20 and 50 Euros present the EU as a gathering of nations. The designs on Euro banknotes are symbols of Europe’s architectural heritage. According to Shore, Euro is the most important symbol of European integration and identity. He criticizes Anderson, because of not mentioning the role of currencies in imagining the nation-state. Currencies are symbols of state sovereignty and their value reflects their power. Shore argues that the “national currencies are recharging the batteries of nationalism.”¹⁷¹⁹ Thus, currencies have important role in construction and maintenance of national identities. In 1998 Jacques Santer stated that “Euro is a powerful factor in forging a European identity. Countries which share a common currency are countries ready to unite their destinies as

¹⁷¹⁴ A. Caviades, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.262.

¹⁷¹⁵ P. van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, p.18.

¹⁷¹⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.89-90.

¹⁷¹⁷ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.112-113.

¹⁷¹⁸ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, pp.143-144.

¹⁷¹⁹ P.van Ham, “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the EU”, pp.17-18.

part of an integrated community”.¹⁷²⁰ According to Shore, “Euro in your pocket” will help to transform the EU from a set of supranational institutions into a fact of everyday life. It is also a symbol of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s authority and economic sovereignty of the EU. He made a reference to Mitterrand’s statement in 1989; the EU’s goal is “one currency, one culture, one social area...”¹⁷²¹ One of the political goals of introducing Euro was to make Europe more visible to its citizens.¹⁷²² The ECB which is responsible for the management of the single currency, had spent 80 million Euros by the end of 2001 for advertising campaigns to increase public awareness of Euro, the campaign’s slogan was “The Euro, Our Money”.¹⁷²³ Thus, people who are using Euro are constructed as “us”.

While travelling in the Member States who adopted Euro, you do not have to change your money. Because of the increasing prices after the introduction of Euro, public opinions of some of the Member States are against Euro. As in most other cases, according to Eurobarometer surveys, the elites support Euro much more than the general public;¹⁷²⁴ but the UK who has not adopted Euro, is exceptional. Its former Prime Minister Thatcher was strongly opposed to a single European currency. “She saw abandoning the British pound as abandoning national sovereignty; to her, the pound was the nation.”¹⁷²⁵ It shows that the national currencies are important symbols of national identity. Contemporarily many EU citizens consider Euro as one of the most important symbols of European unity.¹⁷²⁶ Between November 2001 and January 2002, the number of those agreeing with the following statement increased from 51% to 64%: “By using Euro’s instead of national currencies, we feel a bit more European than before.”¹⁷²⁷ A larger proportion of the EU citizens believe that a single currency indicates a new step in the process of building a united Europe. Support for Euro was 54% at the end of 1995, 37% were against. By 2003 support increased to 66%, while opposition declined to 28%. The main reasons of positive attitudes were mainly related with the deepening of the Single Market and the emergence

¹⁷²⁰ Suzanne Shanahan, “Currency and Community: European Identity and the Euro” in Luisa Passerini (ed.), *Figures d’Europe: Images and Myths of Europe*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2003, p. 175.

¹⁷²¹ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.90-92.

¹⁷²² *Ibid.*

¹⁷²³ D. Dunkerley, L. Hodgson, et al. , *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.118.

¹⁷²⁴ European Commission, “European Public Opinion on the Single Currency”, DGX/A2, Special Edition, January 1999; quoted in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.355.

¹⁷²⁵ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.19.

¹⁷²⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.84.

¹⁷²⁷ EOS Gallup Europe(2002b) “Flash Eurobarometer 121/4: Euro Attitudes-Euro Zone”, Brussels: European Commission; quoted in T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.487.

of a “People’s Europe” which have provided facilities for people who cross borders (84%). Shopping around Europe has become easier (80%) and currency exchange costs disappeared. The main reasons for the people who are against Euro are, price increases and their governments’ loss of some ability to control economic policy (39%).¹⁷²⁸ Müller-Peters asserts that there is a negative impact of nationalism on attitudes toward Euro. Strong attachment to national currency generally leads to negative feelings towards Euro.¹⁷²⁹ The Eurobarometer data shows that Euro has increased the “realness” (entitativity) of the EU for its citizens. Italy is the most enthusiastic Member State about Euro. Italians perceive it “more as a symbol of European identity than others”. German public’s acceptance of Euro has increased, but Germans still consider Euro as a weaker currency than *Deutsche Mark*.¹⁷³⁰ Support for the single currency among most of the German political elites can be understood with reference to their Europeanized nation-state identity. Identification with national symbols in the British political discourse is much more than identification with European symbols.¹⁷³¹ Thus, there are different perceptions about Euro among the Member States.

During the interviews conducted by the author, many MEPs mentioned the importance of Euro as a symbol of the EU. Deprez contended that “Euro is important, because it has created a sense of community between Europeans”.¹⁷³² Bozkurt stated that:

Euro is more than money...It is very handy that we can go with Euro to a lot of countries and we do not have to exchange money. You see that you are still in the same region. It is relatively very new. It may affect more in the longer term...Before Euro we had old different coins...A lot of people were not very happy that their coin was going to disappear in Germany, Netherlands...Money can have that impact. The British people want to keep their pounds.¹⁷³³

For example, Denmark is still sensitive about protecting Danish Crones. Özdemir argued that “Euro is important definitely...Few years before everybody said a lot of things about Euro, but today it is very successful. Even other states in Europe also want to adopt Euro...”¹⁷³⁴ Thus, Euro is usually perceived as successful by the interviewees. It will

¹⁷²⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.92-94.

¹⁷²⁹ Anke Müller-Peters, *Psychologie des Euro: Die Wahrung Zwischen Nationaler Identität und Europäischer Integration*, Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers, 2001; quoted in T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.496.

¹⁷³⁰ European Commission, “*Standard Eurobarometer 58: Public Opinion in the EU*”, Brussels: European Commission, 2003; quoted in T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.495.

¹⁷³¹ M. Marcussen, T. Risse, et.al., “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities”, pp.624-626.

¹⁷³² Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁷³³ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁷³⁴ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

probably have more positive effects on construction of European identity in the longer term.

Other Symbols of the EU:

In 1997 at the Amsterdam Summit, it was decided to appoint Solana as “**Mr. CFSP**”. This new position can be considered as a symbol of EU identity. The “Charter of Fundamental Rights” which was accepted in 2000, is also widely perceived as a symbol of common values of Europe. The joint operational force of the EU is a symbol of an emergence of a European military.¹⁷³⁵ A constitution which is one of the important symbols of a state is also tried to be created for the EU. Although it was prepared, it was rejected in the French and Dutch referendums, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

In addition to political and economic symbols, there are many other symbols that can be observed by the EU citizens in their daily lives, such as the blue flag for clean beaches or the EU product tag.¹⁷³⁶ There are also “EU shops” in Brussels, which sell pencils, umbrellas, etc. that have yellow and blue logo of the EU on them and also “I love Europe”, “Brussels: The Heart of Europe” t-shirts.¹⁷³⁷ Thus, the symbols of the EU have been also put on the materials which are used by people in their daily lives to increase the “entitativity” of the EU. According to surveys of Bruter, which was held in France, Netherlands and Britain, no respondent claimed that they do not know the European flag. The common passport and the elections to the EP are also known by the majority of the respondents. Unlike Britain, in France and Netherlands majority of the respondents also knew the European anthem; but in all three cases, very few respondents knew Europe Day, which is 9th of May. In France more people knew this, in comparison to the other countries.¹⁷³⁸ Bruter argues that there is generally a good knowledge about the main symbols of the EU.¹⁷³⁹ He adds that the citizens of the EU are also aware of their political and symbolic nature.¹⁷⁴⁰ Thus, it can be argued that symbolic construction of European identity in the EU has been generally successful. The introduction of symbols has tried to

¹⁷³⁵ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.84-85.

¹⁷³⁶ B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

¹⁷³⁷ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, pp.789-790.

¹⁷³⁸ M. Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, p.29

¹⁷³⁹ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.155.

¹⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.95.

increase peoples' feeling of belonging to the EU.¹⁷⁴¹ According to some scholars, symbols may be effective on construction of European identity, if they are connected to related phenomena in the past or to common visions of the future.¹⁷⁴² In the case of the EU, it is better to make references to the future. The difficulty of introducing common symbols which is based on common cultural and historical heritage of Europe, could be seen in the debates during the planning process of the Museum of Europe. The organizers of the museum, view the origin of European unity in the early medieval unifying attempts of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire, but Greece who is regarding itself as the origin of European democracy, made an official protest to this idea.¹⁷⁴³ Thus, it is too hard to reach a consensus among the Member States about the symbols of the EU which refer to the common historical heritage.

Bruter classifies symbols such as direct elections to the EP, introduction of Euro and the EU passport as “**civic**” symbols which represent the authority of the EU. He classified symbols such as the anthem, the design of the banknotes as “**cultural**”, because they refer to a shared historical and cultural European heritage. It is hard to classify the Euro banknotes as cultural, because there are usually neutral architectures on them. Some symbols fit hardly into either category such as the European flag or the Day of Europe. They are related with the idea of nation-state which makes them closer to the category of civic symbols.¹⁷⁴⁴ It is not so easy to categorize symbols of the EU as civic or cultural. Most of the symbols of the EU, such as the EU citizenship, the EU passport, direct elections to the EP and Euro may be considered as civic symbols. On the other hand, choosing the names of important historical figures of Europe for some of the EU programmes, such as ERASMUS, SOCRATES can be considered as cultural symbols. Bruter argues that the chronology of European symbols has showed an alternation of cultural and civic symbols. The European leaders started with mixed symbols such as the European flag. The first wave of civic symbols was produced in the 1970s. Both civic and cultural symbols were produced again in the mid-1980s which were closely related with the project of “People’s Europe”. In the 1990s new cultural symbols became a necessity;

¹⁷⁴¹ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.144.

¹⁷⁴² B. Petersson & A. Hellström, “The Return of the Kings: Temporality in the Construction of EU Identity”, p.236.

¹⁷⁴³ M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, p.121.

¹⁷⁴⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.85.

because after the Maastricht debates,¹⁷⁴⁵ the European integration process was facing an important crisis of identity. After the Nice Treaty, the institutional crisis of the EU caused a necessity for civic symbols primarily the Constitution. Thus, during the process of European integration both cultural and civic symbols have been constructed¹⁷⁴⁶ according to different circumstances. Although it is hard to classify the symbols of the EU, it can be argued that the civic symbols have been constructed more by the EU. During the interviews conducted by the author, mostly the European flag and Euro were mentioned as the most effective symbols on construction of European identity. Both of these symbols do not refer to common cultural or historical heritage of Europe, instead both of them refer to the main successes of the EU which are peace and welfare.

Consequently, there are no fixed European symbols, they have been continuously constructed and reconstructed throughout history. One of the main political ideas behind the introduction of the symbols of the EU is “to gradually modify the consciousness of the peoples of Europe of the political entity to which they belong.”¹⁷⁴⁷ Especially the European flag and Euro have been the most widely known and effective symbols in this process. The symbols of the EU were mentioned in the Constitutional Treaty which was rejected in the referendums in France and Netherlands in 2005. It was decided in June 2007 that the symbols of the EU will not be mentioned in the new Reform Treaty. It shows that the state-like instruments of the EU cause anxiety among some people, because of challenging national sovereignties. The main reason of this change is most probably to show the citizens of the EU that the goal of the EU is not to replace national identities.

IV.1.2. The Role of the EU Citizenship

The concept of “citizen” has different meanings in different periods of history. The meaning of being a citizen has changed, in accordance with being a member of the Greek *polis*, the Roman Empire, early modern monarchies, the nations of the 18th and 19th

¹⁷⁴⁵ Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty in the first referendum, in France it was accepted hardly and Britain rejected some aspects of the Treaty.

¹⁷⁴⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.86.

¹⁷⁴⁷ Quoted in P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.76. For further detail see M. Gottdiener, *Postmodern Semiotics: Material Culture and the Forms of Postmodern Life*, Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 1995.

centuries or present democratic states.¹⁷⁴⁸ The concept of “citizenship” refers to political belonging and membership to a polity.¹⁷⁴⁹ Citizenship can be defined as “the legal expression of belonging to a particular state.”¹⁷⁵⁰ “Citizenship” refers to political dimension of membership. The idea of citizenship as a political membership was originated from Greek political thought. Citizens were considered as members of a political society whose equality was recognized by the constitution. The idea of the equality of all members of a political community has continued as one of the basic characteristics of the idea of citizenship throughout history. The more definite meaning of citizenship emerged with the socio-economic transformations which occurred with the French and American Revolutions.¹⁷⁵¹

The most recent model of citizenship is provided by the nation-state.¹⁷⁵² Democratic citizenship emerged as a result of the processes of state-building, nation-building and emergence of a commercial and industrial civil society.¹⁷⁵³ Since 1789 the concept of “citizenship” has been directly related with the nation-state and it has been an important instrument of nation-building and governing the masses. In terms of international law, citizenship shows the rights and duties of an individual, because of belonging to a state.¹⁷⁵⁴ As Bauböck argues “citizenship is not only a formal status and the legal rights and duties...also a symbolic expression of membership in a self-governing political community.”¹⁷⁵⁵ Habermas contends that “citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers, binding together a group of individuals with

¹⁷⁴⁸ J. G. A. Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times”, *Queen’s Quarterly* 99, No.1, pp.33-55; M. Ignatieff, “The Myth of Citizenship” in R. Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Citizenship*, New York: Suny Press, pp.53-77; cited in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.2.

¹⁷⁴⁹ Massimo La Torre, “European Identity and Citizenship: Between Law and Philosophy” in Ulrich K. Preuss & Ferran Requejo (eds.), *European Citizenship, Multiculturalism and the State*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998, p.88.

¹⁷⁵⁰ C. Hersom, “European Citizenship and the Search for Legitimacy: The Paradox of the Danish Case”, p.40.

¹⁷⁵¹ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, pp.2-3.

¹⁷⁵² Klaus Eder & Bernhard Giesen, “Conclusion: Citizenship and the Making of a European Society” in Klaus Eder & Bernhard Giesen (eds.), *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.253.

¹⁷⁵³ R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, pp.246-247.

¹⁷⁵⁴ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, pp.71-72.

¹⁷⁵⁵ Rainer Bauböck, “Three Conceptions of a European Political Identity, retrieved on March 10, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04--4.html>

no pre-political ties into a highly artificial kind of civic solidarity.”¹⁷⁵⁶ Citizenship has an important integrative function; it contributes to hold the community together like social glue.¹⁷⁵⁷ On the other hand, according to the communitarian theory of citizenship a strong collective identity is a prerequisite for citizenship in the world of modern societies.¹⁷⁵⁸

There are three main characteristics of citizenship: Firstly citizenship is a juridical status that grants civil, political, social rights and duties to the members of a political entity, traditionally a state. Thus, citizenship provides citizens some rights because of being part of a political system, but also citizens have some duties such as paying taxes or making military service. Secondly citizenship refers to a set of specific social roles such as a voter, through which citizens express their choices about the management of public affairs and participate in government. Citizenship provides different ways of access to the political system. Thirdly citizenship refers to a set of moral qualities which are characteristics of a good citizen.¹⁷⁵⁹

There has been a political integration process of Europe since the 1950s that has led to the emergence of the EU citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in 1993. The EU citizenship requires a different model of citizenship from historical models, including the model of nation-state.¹⁷⁶⁰ The EU citizenship can be traced back to the EEC Treaty, particularly its provisions on free movement of workers (Articles 48 and 51) and secondary legislation which consists of measures related with the rights of workers and their families to take advantage of free movement. On this basis the ECJ gradually developed a broad case law. It also extended the educational rights of workers and their families. The ECJ used the EEC Treaty article on non-discrimination on grounds of nationality as the basis for extending the protection of citizens of the Member States when visiting or getting residence permit in another Member State.¹⁷⁶¹ The cases of *Cowan* and *Gravier* can be given as examples. In *Cowan* the Court decided that a British who visited

¹⁷⁵⁶ Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, *New Left Review*, Vol. 11, 2001, pp.5-26; quoted in Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, “Civic Competence and Identity in the European Polity” in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw (eds.), *Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context*, p.225.

¹⁷⁵⁷ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.6.

¹⁷⁵⁸ K. Eder & B. Giesen, “Conclusion: Citizenship and the Making of a European Society”, p.265.

¹⁷⁵⁹ Marco Martiniello, “Citizenship in the EU” in T. A. Aleinikoff & D. Klusmeyer (eds.), *From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p.345.

¹⁷⁶⁰ K. Eder & B. Giesen, “Conclusion: Citizenship and the Making of a European Society”, p.255.

¹⁷⁶¹ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, pp.9-10.

Paris and was mugged on the metro, had access on the same basis as French citizens to the French criminal injuries compensation fund. In *Gravier* the Court decided that French who is studying in Belgium had the same chance to access to higher education on the same basis as nationals. A student who is from another Member State, do not have to give a fee which was not imposed on nationals who were studying in Belgian universities. It was contrary to the non-discrimination principle.¹⁷⁶² Some scholars argue that citizenship has already existed under EC law which was mainly based on the free movement provisions, that may be referred to as “market citizenship”.¹⁷⁶³ The Rome Treaty was criticized that, the rights of the citizens were restricted to the free movement of goods, capital, labour and services. They only referred to the rights of the “citizens as workers”, rather than considering people as citizens. That understanding of citizenship did not usually take into consideration women and those who were unemployed. Although the jurisprudence of the ECJ expanded the scope of rights and limited anomalies within and across states until the 1980s, the legal instruments and enforcement mechanisms to realize rights that were common in practice across the EC are limited.¹⁷⁶⁴

In the 1970s Aron stated that “there are no such animals as European citizens. There are only French, German or Italian citizens.”¹⁷⁶⁵ The first important attempt to involve the citizens of the Member States in the European integration process and the idea of “**Citizen’s Europe**” dates back to the Paris Summit in 1974 which occurred after the “Declaration on European Identity” in 1973.¹⁷⁶⁶ The idea of Community citizenship was firstly mentioned in the Tindemans Report in 1976 which resulted with the creation of a working party to explore ways of extending social rights to the nationals of the Member States. With the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979, some additional rights were introduced for the peoples of the EC. The EU citizenship was promoted as the Spanish Presidency’s “big Idea” for “maintaining momentum towards further integration” and increasing popular support to the integration.¹⁷⁶⁷ The concept of “citizenship” came to

¹⁷⁶² Case C-186/87 *Cowan v. Le Tresor public*, 1989, ECR 195; Case 293/ 83 *Gravier v. City of Liege*, 1985, ECR, 593; cited in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.10.

¹⁷⁶³ M. Everson, “The Legacy of the Market Citizen” in J. Shaw & G. More (eds.), *New Legal Dynamics of EU*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; quoted in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.10.

¹⁷⁶⁴ Elizabeth Meehan, “Europeanization and Citizenship of the EU” in *Europeanization: Institution, Identities and Citizenship*, Yearbook of European Studies, Vol.14, 2000, p.166.

¹⁷⁶⁵ Aron, 1974; cited in M. Roche, “Citizenship and Modernity”, p.727.

¹⁷⁶⁶ M. Martiniello, “Citizenship in The EU”, p.346.

¹⁷⁶⁷ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.74.

the agenda of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political union with a Spanish memorandum which suggested special rights for the citizens of the Member States.¹⁷⁶⁸ The Member States generally supported the idea, because the EU citizenship would be additional to national citizenship, in accordance with the principle of “**additionality**”. The EU citizenship would be supplementary to the rights and obligations of an individual as a citizen of his/her own Member State.¹⁷⁶⁹ With the inclusion of a chapter on “Citizenship of the Union” in the Maastricht Treaty, political rights were added to economic and social rights which transformed the “EC workers” to the “EU citizens”. In the 1980s European citizenship developed mainly in the economic field by creating a “welfare citizenship”, in the early 1990s the Maastricht Treaty focused on political rights by constitutionalizing some rights which were already part of the *acquis*, it also introduced some new rights.¹⁷⁷⁰ Thus, the “European citizenship” was transformed to a political concept with the Maastricht Treaty which introduced the “Union citizenship”, because of the necessity for greater public awareness and a sense of belonging to the EU. With the Maastricht Treaty, a new part (Part Two: Citizenship of the Union) was added to the amended Treaty of Rome. In Article 8 it was stated that: “Every person holding the nationality of Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”¹⁷⁷¹ Thus, the EU citizenship is dependent on national citizenships. With the introduction of EU citizenship, the “people’s Europe” started to be referred to as “**citizen’s Europe**”.¹⁷⁷²

EU citizenship was invented by European political elites primarily in order to cope with legitimacy crisis of the EU.¹⁷⁷³ The main reasons of introducing the EU citizenship are: Firstly the mobility of qualified workers and executives among various branches of the international companies is a necessary condition for efficiency of the internal market. Secondly the EU citizenship is crucial to solve the democratic deficit problem. Thirdly the EU citizenship will contribute to attempts to build a European culture and to promote a European identity.¹⁷⁷⁴ La Torre argues that European identity may be achieved through the consolidation of the EU citizenship.¹⁷⁷⁵ Meehan perceives development of a “Europeanized

¹⁷⁶⁸ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.10.

¹⁷⁶⁹ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.75.

¹⁷⁷⁰ S. Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity: From Treaty Provisions to Public Opinion Attitudes”, pp.19-20.

¹⁷⁷¹ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.75.

¹⁷⁷² C. Bretherton, & J.Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.233.

¹⁷⁷³ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.83.

¹⁷⁷⁴ M. Martiniello, “Citizenship in The EU”, pp.357-361.

¹⁷⁷⁵ M. La Torre, “European Identity and Citizenship: Between Law and Philosophy”, pp.88-104.

citizenship” as more democratic than “national citizenship”.¹⁷⁷⁶ The EU citizenship has opened up ways for redefining political community. As Meehan points out, the importance of the EU citizenship does not depend on what it is, rather than that what it might be.¹⁷⁷⁷ As Bruter argues, the EU institutions developed the EU citizenship, thus “citizens of the EU might develop a greater sense of identification with the EU.”¹⁷⁷⁸ Voogsgeerd argues that “...more distinctive European citizenship and more supranational institutions would strengthen European identity.”¹⁷⁷⁹ The EU has considered the question of legitimacy as related with a lack of common identity and has tried to construct European identity through creating the EU citizenship.¹⁷⁸⁰ Thus, the EU citizenship may be considered as one of the instruments of the EU for constructing European identity on civic basis. With the introduction of the EU citizenship, citizens of the Member States have gained these rights:

- Freedom of movement and residence on the territory of the Member States,
- the right to vote and stand in municipal and the EP elections in the Member State, in which he/she resides,
- the right of petition and the right to apply to the European Ombudsman,
- diplomatic or consular protection for the EU citizens in the territory of a non-EU country.¹⁷⁸¹

In the articles related with the EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, “the EU citizen is primarily perceived as a worker, rather than a cultural being”¹⁷⁸² which reflects the “primary focus of European integration on the economic sphere.”¹⁷⁸³ The rights and duties associated with the EU citizenship may encourage more engagement of peoples with the European project. It can encourage Europeans to play a more active role in EU affairs and participate in governance process. Thus, it can play an important role in establishing a common European public space.¹⁷⁸⁴ The introduction of the EU citizenship has increased the case law on the equal treatment of the nationals of the Member States when they are residents or when they visit another Member State. For non-economically active categories

¹⁷⁷⁶ E. Meehan, “Europeanization and Citizenship of the EU”, p.166.

¹⁷⁷⁷ E. Meehan, “Political Pluralism and European Citizenship” in Lehning & Weale (eds.), *Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe*, London: Routledge Pub., 1997; cited in Dora Kostakopoulou, “EU Citizenship: Writing the Future”, p.17, retrieved on July 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/kostakopoulou-d-10b.pdf>

¹⁷⁷⁸ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.73.

¹⁷⁷⁹ H. Voogsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, 2005.

¹⁷⁸⁰ C. Hersom, “European Citizenship and the Search for Legitimacy: The Paradox of the Danish Case”, p.40.

¹⁷⁸¹ Wolfgang Ullman, “Identity, Citizenship and Democracy in Europe” in J. Andrew, et.al. (eds.), *Why Europe? Problems of Culture and Identity*, Vol. 1, *Political and Historical Dimensions*, Mac Millan Press, 2000, p.51.

¹⁷⁸² M. N. Craith, *Europe and The Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders*, p.17.

¹⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸⁴ J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, p.190.

such as students and children, the Court has applied the equal treatment principle with regard to access to some main social benefits and also the right of residence in another Member State for children who are not EU citizens but whose parents are.¹⁷⁸⁵

Some scholars argue that the EU has promoted the emergence of a “new and superior basis for citizenship” which is referred to as “**post-national citizenship**” that is based on rights and the rule of law.¹⁷⁸⁶ For some, the EU citizenship has been perceived as an instrument of the formation of a “transnational *demos*”, but many people see it as related with the free movement of people within a single economic area.¹⁷⁸⁷ Introduction of the EU citizenship is primarily a necessity because of the establishment of the single market, but at the same time it is an important instrument to construct European identity on civic basis. Habermas and Meehan argue that in the post-Cold War era, emergence of a new “**post-national form of citizenship**” at the European level is possible. Habermas is optimistic about the emergence of Europe-wide public sphere and new kind of “differentiated common European political culture” which emerge through new communication networks. Habermas perceives Europe as a potential “multicultural republican political culture”.¹⁷⁸⁸ Meehan focuses on the social dimension of citizenship, rather than political and civil dimensions. She focuses on EU social rights which are more developed than political rights. She also mentions relevant case laws of the ECJ which may “promote a common civil society at the European level.”¹⁷⁸⁹ She criticizes the weaknesses of the EU citizenship, but she mentions the positive developments in the field of social rights, especially in terms of the rights of migrant workers and she is optimistic about the development of the EU citizenship in the longer term.¹⁷⁹⁰ Meehan’s analysis of the EU citizenship shows the changing nature of “nation-state-based citizenship” and development of a “post-national perspective” on citizenship. Meehan agrees with Aron that if the idea of the EU citizenship is considered as a membership in an emerging super-state, it is almost

¹⁷⁸⁵ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship, pp.14-15.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Cited in R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, pp.246-247. For further detail see J. Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe”, *Praxis International*, Vol. 12, No.1, 1992, pp.1-9; Y.N. Soysal, “The Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

¹⁷⁸⁷ D. N. Chrysochoou, “Civic Competence and Identity in the European Polity”, p.223.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Habermas, 1994; quoted in M. Roche, “Citizenship and Modernity”, p.728.

¹⁷⁸⁹ Elizabeth Meehan, *Citizenship and the European Community*, London: Sage Pub., 1993, p.96; quoted in Maurice Roche, “Citizenship and Modernity”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.46, No.4, December 1995, p.729.

¹⁷⁹⁰ E. Meehan, *Citizenship and the European Community*, 1993; cited in M. Roche, “Citizenship and Modernity”, p.729.

impossible. As Meehan argues, in the context of the EU “**new kind of citizenship**” has been emerging which is “neither national, nor cosmopolitan”. It is a “multiple” form which has been constructed through complex interactions between the institutions of the EU, the Member States, the NGOs and through the emergence of a new European “public space” and “civil society”. This multiple form of citizenship provides the atmosphere for acting on the basis of multiple identities, through combination of “vertical channels” which are related with national governments and new “horizontal channels” that refer to transnational networks and the institutions of the EU.¹⁷⁹¹

The EU citizenship is dynamic which has been progressively evolving in accordance with the evolution of the EU. The current goal of EU citizenship is to break down barriers among citizens of Member States. Third country nationals can not benefit from these provisions, but according to Article 22, the development of citizenship provisions is guaranteed. Thus, the rights of the EU citizens may be widened in the future with the acceptance of the European Council. The Council may unanimously agree on changes to these provisions, with a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the EP. These changes would need to be ratified by all the Member States.¹⁷⁹² In spite of the proposals which were stated at the 1996 IGC for strengthening of its scope with extension of the rights of the EU citizens and residents, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not make important amendments.¹⁷⁹³ Some amendments were made to Article 8, such as the adoption of an anti-discrimination clause and the adoption of articles for better protection of human rights and fundamental liberties.¹⁷⁹⁴ The main problem about the EU citizenship is that the power to confer EU citizenship is not at the EU level. It is not independent; instead it derives from the Member State citizenship. The EU citizenship is complementary to national citizenship which was emphasized with the amendment made by the Amsterdam Treaty.¹⁷⁹⁵ According to Article 17, “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. **Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.**”¹⁷⁹⁶ With this change, opening of the EU

¹⁷⁹¹ E. Meehan, *Citizenship and the European Community*, p.155; cited in M. Roche, “Citizenship and Modernity”, p.730.

¹⁷⁹² R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.12.

¹⁷⁹³ T. Kostakopoulou, “EU Citizenship as a Model of Citizenship beyond the Nation-State: Possibilities and Limits” in Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich (eds.), *Political Theory and the EU*, London: Routledge Pub., 1998, p.158.

¹⁷⁹⁴ M. Martiniello, “Citizenship in The EU”, p.349.

¹⁷⁹⁵ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, p.11.

¹⁷⁹⁶ C. Bretherton, & J.Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.233.

citizenship to third-country nationals who reside in the territory of the EU, was prevented.¹⁷⁹⁷ Thus, the main condition to be an EU citizen is to be a citizen of one of the Member States. People who have a permanent residence permit, do not have the option of obtaining the EU citizenship, unless he/she has taken a national citizenship of one of the Member States. Non-EU nationals have no free movement between Member States of the EU and national labour markets. They enjoy none of the educational opportunities or political rights of the EU citizens.¹⁷⁹⁸ Another problem is that the EU citizenship confers rights, but imposes no duties to the EU citizens, such as paying taxes and performance of military services.¹⁷⁹⁹ These kinds of duties usually increase people's feeling of belonging to that entity. The EU citizenship is criticized, especially because of its discrimination against non-EU nationals, which may lead to a "Fortress Europe".¹⁸⁰⁰ Möllers argues that "...in the long-term Europe can not afford to live with millions of second class citizens...Everyone who lives in Europe permanently, should be a European."¹⁸⁰¹ If people who have permanent residence permit, will have a chance to have an EU citizenship, he/she will no longer feel foreigner and the EU citizens will see them as equal, if they will be treated as the EU citizens.¹⁸⁰² In the future the EU will probably need much more immigrants, because of aging of its citizens. The EU citizenship may contribute to integration of immigrants by giving at least some of them to obtain an EU citizenship after a certain period of time or on the basis of certain criteria.

The practice of the EU citizenship has not been impressive so far. A lot of EU citizens have not used their new citizenship rights much; because many EU citizens still do not know exactly which rights EU citizenship includes. Secondly for technical and political reasons, some elements of the EU citizenship have not been available yet, because of differences in national implementations. Thirdly most of the rights are valid usually for the citizens of the Member States who live in a different Member State. Thus, only small number of mobile EU citizens can benefit from most of the EU citizenship rights.¹⁸⁰³ For the majority of the EU citizens who are living permanently in their states of origin, the EU

¹⁷⁹⁷ M. Martiniello, "Citizenship in The EU", p.349.

¹⁷⁹⁸ J. Bloomfield, "The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?", p.276.

¹⁷⁹⁹ C. Bretherton, & J.Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.233.

¹⁸⁰⁰ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.79.

¹⁸⁰¹ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.46.

¹⁸⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰³ M. Martiniello, "Citizenship in The EU", p.367.

citizenship¹⁸⁰⁴ does not affect much their daily lives. Bruter argues that the citizens of the EU would become more European through increased travelling and living abroad. Europeanness can develop, if they contact more with the other Europeans and if they become more aware of their similarities or by seeing the differences with non-Europeans.¹⁸⁰⁵ Thus, mobility of the citizens, especially the students have to be supported more by the EU. Citizens of the EU usually become more aware of their European identity, when they are outside Europe.

During the interviews conducted by the author, one ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education argued that “we need a much more open definition of what EU citizenship is. The European citizens are those, who feel they are citizens of Europe for whatever reason”,¹⁸⁰⁶ but contemporarily being an EU citizen is restricted to those who are citizens of the Member States. He also added that:

I would welcome top-down initiatives to strengthen the rights of citizens to travel throughout EU. Schengen is top-down, but it is good for citizenship...What is important for European citizens is, they should be confident that if they want to go and work in another EU country, or study in another country they actually can. If they want to change their career, start in Italy then go to Germany...(in terms of pension rights, etc.) It is a pity you lost all your rights while you are working in Germany...These are important. I talk with citizens. They say, I do not care whether it is done by bottom-up or top-down.¹⁸⁰⁷

Thus, the citizens usually deal with the results of the initiatives of the EU; if they make their life easier, they generally support those initiatives. Usually the MEPs argued that the EU citizenship has not been so effective on construction of European identity. Deprez stated that:

...I do not think it is by creating citizenship...you will create a feeling of European, it would be more important to have a common language...citizenship is a concept for some bureaucratic or intellectual leaders who do not have contact with people, they are trying to find theoretical solutions to real problems...¹⁸⁰⁸

Schöpflin argued that “...the EU citizenship would mean more, if there are more opportunity to live it...engagement of citizens...”¹⁸⁰⁹ Thus, if new rights will be introduced for the EU citizens and they will feel their effects on their daily lives more, it will lead to construction of a stronger European identity. Özdemir argued that the EU citizenship may

¹⁸⁰⁴ Rainer Bauböck, “Citizenship and National Identities in the EU”, retrieved on March 7, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04-.html>

¹⁸⁰⁵ M. Bruter, “On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderlessness”, p.32.

¹⁸⁰⁶ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

¹⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰⁸ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁸⁰⁹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

be effective on construction of European identity in the longer term. He asserted that “the EU citizenship and the Constitutional Treaty are not effective in short-term, but they will be in the medium and long-term. These are important milestones in the construction of Europe.”¹⁸¹⁰ As he argues, the effects of the EU citizenship on construction of European identity within the EU will be probably more in the longer term, especially by extending rights and by giving some duties to the citizens of the EU. In addition to these, if the criteria of being an EU citizen will become independent from being a citizen of a Member State which is hard to achieve in the near future, it will affect construction process of European identity on civic basis much more.

IV.1.3. The Role of the Constitutional Treaty

The political community is mainly constructed by the constitution. A constitution is the main document of a state which shows the main characteristics of that state and division of the competencies among different institutions. The functions of a constitution in terms of identity formation of a polity are:

It lays down the basic characteristics of a polity through the identity referents of its political community in the form of largely shared principles and values in a legal text which has a supremacy over other laws and it shows institutional and procedural mechanisms which would provide maintenance of those principles and values that may sometimes lead to reshaping the identity of that community.¹⁸¹¹

Although the EU is not a state, because of its ongoing political integration process, a necessity to create a Constitution for the EU has been debated in recent years. Constitution has a symbolic importance, political function and it has an identity generative potential. By having a Constitution, the peoples of the Member States would become a “European people” which will increase legitimacy of the EU.¹⁸¹² Thus, the Constitution may be considered as an “identity building device” and a “public sphere building instrument”.¹⁸¹³ There is a debate in the context of the EU, whether “*demos*” or the “constitution” comes

¹⁸¹⁰ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁸¹¹ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.59.

¹⁸¹² *Ibid.*, p.31.

¹⁸¹³ Miguel Poiaras Maduro, “How Constitutional Can the EU Be?” The Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Constitutinalism in the EU” in Weiler & Eisgruber (eds.), *Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper*, No: 5/04, 2004, pp.39-40; quoted in S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.32.

first.¹⁸¹⁴ According to the proponents of the idea of the “European Constitution”, the main goal of the constitutionalisation process was that:

To reinforce the mutual trust and solidarity of the European citizens and their attachment to the EU by way of the symbolic force and the democratic mechanisms of a constitution prepared and enacted by a democratic, inclusive and transparent process.¹⁸¹⁵

According to the communitarian approach, only nation-state would enable and sustain democratic governance of popular legitimacy, because of its definite political and geographical boundaries and thick collective identity. For legitimate democratic rule and constitution making, only “people” who have thick cultural, historical and social identity, can have a constitution. It is also argued that political identity may be adapted to the peculiarities of the European polity.¹⁸¹⁶ Herzog puts forward that especially with the effect of the last enlargement, the EU needs to clarify its goals, its common values and it needs to simplify the decision-making process with the help of the Constitution.¹⁸¹⁷ On the contrary Grimm argues that there is no European public sphere, no public discourse and no media that would result in a consensual agreement on legitimizing the political rule, thus the EU can not have a constitution.¹⁸¹⁸ So there are different perceptions about the necessity of a Constitution in the context of the EU.

The European Council meeting in Laeken adopted a “Declaration on the Future of the EU” on 15 December 2001 to make the EU more democratic and effective. The Laeken Declaration focused on the division of competencies, simplification of treaties, the institutional setup and a Constitution for European citizens. It proposed convening a Convention.¹⁸¹⁹ In the “Convention on the Future of Europe” “bottom-up” approach was used. It was composed of the representatives of the national governments of Member States and the applicant states, representatives from national parliaments, the EP, the Commission and the civil society. It began in February 2002 and concluded its work on 10 July 2003.¹⁸²⁰ The Convention method was also used during the preparation process of the “Charter of Fundamental Rights” which was proclaimed on 7 December 2000. Especially

¹⁸¹⁴ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.35.

¹⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.32.

¹⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁸¹⁷ P. Herzog, *Travelling Hopefully: Ethics, Action, Perspective for a Revival of Europe*, 2006.

¹⁸¹⁸ Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?”, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 1, No.3, 1995, pp.292-297.

¹⁸¹⁹ *EUROPA* Glossary, “Laeken Declaration”, retrieved on May 23, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://euramis.org/scadplus/glossary/laeken_declaration_en.htm

¹⁸²⁰ J. Peterson, E. Bomberg & A. Stubb, “Conclusion”, p.224.

in recent years the EU has felt the necessity to use bottom-up approaches to increase participation of its citizens to the EU and to increase communication with the citizens.

The goals of the Constitution were stated as “to improve the functioning of the institutions, to clarify the distribution of powers and to bring the Union closer to its citizens.”¹⁸²¹ The preamble of the Constitutional Treaty refers to a “reunited Europe” and to the determination to “forge a common destiny” only. There is not an explicit reference to European identity or EU identity.¹⁸²² In the preamble it was stated that :

...while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and united ever more closely to forge a common destiny.¹⁸²³

Thus, maintaining national identities, but overcoming national rivalries to establish a common peaceful and prosperous future were emphasized.

During the Convention some countries lobbied for a reference to God and the EU’s Christian origins in the Constitutional Treaty. Similar attempts were also seen before, for example, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam and during the Convention that prepared the Charter of Fundamental Rights; but such attempts were not accepted. Only a Declaration was adopted on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations in addition to the Treaty of Amsterdam. It was stated that the EU respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.¹⁸²⁴ The churches insisted on the necessity for a reference to Christian heritage of Europe during the Convention.¹⁸²⁵ Especially after some statements of Pope John Paul II, the churches received support from Catholic countries such as Poland, Italy, also from German and Spanish members of the Convention.¹⁸²⁶ Weiler argues that a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe in the Constitutional Treaty is necessary to differentiate Europe. He accepts that there has been

¹⁸²¹ “Fit at 50?” , *The Economist* , March 17-23, 2007.

¹⁸²² F. C. Mayer, & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, p.576.

¹⁸²³ Quoted in P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p. 131.

¹⁸²⁴ Youri Devuyst, *The EU Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution From the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe*, Brussels, 2005, p.181. For further detail see Amsterdam Declaration 11 on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations.

¹⁸²⁵ For further detail see the Conference of European Churches, “First Submission to the Convention on the Future of Europe”, May 2002; Conference of European Churches, “Churches and Communities in a Constitutional Treaty of the EU”, September 2002.

¹⁸²⁶ Y. Devuyst, *The European Union Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution From the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe*, p.182.

political and cultural presence of Islam in European history, but he contends that the impact of Christianity is dominant in the evolution process of Europe.¹⁸²⁷ On the other hand, the European Humanist Federation was against such references. It was stated that to make a reference to religion in the Constitutional Treaty, would create discrimination between citizens and it would negatively affect the separation between religion and public authority. France and Belgium supported this idea.¹⁸²⁸ Thus, there were contradictory arguments about, whether there is a necessity to make a reference to Christian heritage in the Constitutional Treaty or not.

This debate during the Convention shows that the EU has affected all aspects of life, including ethical questions. This debate was also stimulated by the participation of the new Member States from the CEE in the Convention. Especially Poland “sees Christianity as its main national characteristic.”¹⁸²⁹ Seven states¹⁸³⁰ led by Italy stated that they were unsatisfied with the preamble of the draft Constitutional Treaty which referred only to the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”; but there was strong opposition from other Member States who have a secular political system or Protestant heritage such as France, Sweden and Denmark. They argued that this would exclude Jews and Muslims.¹⁸³¹ Britain’s foreign minister Jack Straw argued that “if there were to be reference to one religious tradition, we would have to make reference to others.”¹⁸³² As it was argued, there are many religious divisions within Christianity, also Jewish and Muslim cultures have contributed to construction proces of Europe. Moreover, there are many immigrant communities who are living within the Member States. This debate was also closely related with the debate about the membership of Turkey.¹⁸³³ During the interviews conducted by the author, one Commission official from the DG Justice, Freedom and

¹⁸²⁷ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.55. For further detail see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35, No.1, 1997.

¹⁸²⁸ For further detail see European Humanist Federation, “Contribution to the Convention: The Future of Europe”, June 2, 2002, p.6.

¹⁸²⁹ Y. Devuyt, *The EU Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution From the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe*, p.184.

¹⁸³⁰ The Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia.

¹⁸³¹ Cited in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.342. For further detail see also report by Anthony Browne, “Seven Hold out for a Christian Constitution”, *Times Online*, May 25, 2004.

¹⁸³² Quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p. 342.

¹⁸³³ Y. Devuyt, *The European Union Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution From the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe* , p.184.

Security argued that “during debates for Constitution, artificial debate ‘to put Christian roots in Constitution’ was made to exclude Turkey.”¹⁸³⁴ He asserted that the references to Christianity wanted to be put in the Constitutional Treaty in order to exclude Turkey from the EU. If there would be any reference to Christian heritage, it would not only affect Turkey’s membership to the EU, also other future possible candidates which have predominantly Muslim population such as Bosnia, would be excluded from the EU, also Muslim immigrants of Europe would feel more excluded. Consequently, a secular approach was adopted in the Constitutional Treaty, where the main values of the EU are defined as:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society, in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.¹⁸³⁵

Part two of the Constitutional Treaty incorporates the “Charter of Fundamental Rights” to the EU *acquis* which makes it binding. There are references to civic values in the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, European identity was tried to be constructed on civic basis.

In the EU there are no laws, but regulations and directives; there is no government but a Commission; the entity was referred to firstly as a Community, later as a Union, but not as a federation or a state.¹⁸³⁶ Although there are a lot of similarities between structure of a state and the EU, the concepts which are related with states, have not been usually preferred to be used for the EU. The Constitutional Treaty renamed the regulations and directives as “European laws” and “European framework laws” and introduced a European minister of foreign affairs.¹⁸³⁷ These changes show that some state-like instruments were tried to be introduced with the Constitutional Treaty.

¹⁸³⁴ Interview with Commission official from Spain, DG Justice Freedom and Security, on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁸³⁵ For further detail see Official Journal of the EU, C 310, Vol. 47, December 16, 2004, retrieved on January 12, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

<http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:en:HTML>

¹⁸³⁶ Cited in F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, p.583. For further detail see G.F. Mancini, “Europe: The Case for Statehood”, *European Law Journal*, Vol.4. No. 1, 1998, pp.29-42; J. H. H. Weiler, “Europe: The Case Against The Case for Statehood”, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp.43-62.

¹⁸³⁷ F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, p.583.

The Ratification Process of the Constitutional Treaty:

In the referendums for the Constitutional Treaty French voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty on 29 May 2005 by 55% and Dutch voters rejected it by 62% on 1 June 2005.¹⁸³⁸ There was a high turnout rate of 69% in France. The post-referendum survey was held by the Commission to understand the reasons of people's abstention and which factors were effective on how they voted. The main reasons for abstaining stated by the respondents from French voters were: Being prevented from voting by material reasons (66%), the complexity of the text (60%) and the lack of information (49%). Only 14% of the people who abstained, stated that they abstained because of their opposition to the EU. The reasons stated for rejection of the Constitutional Treaty were: The potential negative effects of the Constitution on employment (31%) was most frequently emphasized, also France's poor economic situation (26%), the perception of the Constitution as being too liberal from an economic point of view (19%), their opposition to the President of the Republic or the government (18%).¹⁸³⁹ Thus, especially economic concerns and particularly reactions to the transformation of social, welfare state to a more liberal one were mostly effective on rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Media and political discourses in Europe expressed opposition towards enlargement, particularly towards Turkey as the main reason of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.¹⁸⁴⁰ As Öniş argues, the issue of Turkey's membership was an integral part, but not the major factor of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Especially in France the public reaction to the Constitutional Treaty was mostly against the idea of a neo-liberal Europe.¹⁸⁴¹

The claim that, no new Member State will be accepted without the constitution is political, not legal. It is usually argued by those who are against the membership of Turkey and use the absence of a constitution as an excuse.¹⁸⁴² It was claimed that the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums was an end to the deepening process of Europe

¹⁸³⁸ "Constitutional Conundrum", p.10.

¹⁸³⁹ *Flash Eurobarometer 171*, "The European Constitution: Post-referendum Survey in France", June 2005.

¹⁸⁴⁰ Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez & Jose I. Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against", WP 20, May 23, 2007, p.1, Retrieved on August 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_in/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/DT+20-2007

¹⁸⁴¹ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol 8. No.3, December 2006, p. 293.

¹⁸⁴² "Europe's Mid-life Crisis", A Special Report, *The Economist*, March 17-23, 2007, p.11.

and to Turkey's membership aspirations.¹⁸⁴³ It was also argued that construction of a European political identity by constitutionalisation was collapsed by rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.¹⁸⁴⁴ Although the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty negatively affected the political integration of Europe, it has to be emphasized that the EU has overcome such crisis since its establishment. The integration process of Europe is not a linear process; instead it has many ups and downs.

During the interviews conducted by the author, Resetarits stated that "...when people were asked yes or no, like in France and Netherlands, they said no because of other reasons..."¹⁸⁴⁵ The main factor which motivated the majority of the "yes" supporters is their general perception of the EU. Despite the "no" victory, French citizens are still in favour of the EU and 88% of the respondents consider that France's membership of the EU is a good thing. This view is supported by not only the "yes" voters (99%), also by a large majority of the "no" voters (83%). Moreover, three quarters of respondents stated that the Constitution is indispensable for European construction (75%). 52% of the respondents stated that the rejection of the Constitution will make it more difficult for new countries to join the EU.¹⁸⁴⁶ Thus, voters usually did not reject because they are against the European integration, rather they admitted that there is a necessity for a Constitution to go on political integration. Despite the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, support for a Constitution has been increased in the EU.¹⁸⁴⁷ In Spring 2007 Eurobarometer survey, it was found that the level of support to the Constitution had increased from 63% in Autumn 2006 to 66%.¹⁸⁴⁸ Thus, there has been a slight increase in the support to the Constitution.

At the end of the German Presidency to solve the problem of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, it was suggested that there is a necessity to prepare a document which seems different from a Constitution. In the new "Reform Treaty" the concepts which are related with a state were left out. It was decided that the term EU laws will not be used, current "regulations" and "directives" are maintained which are perceived as less

¹⁸⁴³ Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p.293.

¹⁸⁴⁴ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p.5.

¹⁸⁴⁵ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

¹⁸⁴⁶ "The European Constitution: Post-referendum Survey in France", June 2005.

¹⁸⁴⁷ T. Küchler, "Irish Most Happy, Brits Most Unhappy With EU", retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/?aid=20597&rk=1>

¹⁸⁴⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 67, Spring 2007, published in June 2007, p. 34.

symbolic of statehood. It was also decided not to mention the symbols of the EU such as the “flag” and the “anthem” in the new treaty and the concept of the “constitution” was not used, instead “Reform Treaty” was preferred. According to German Chancellor Merkel, “much of the substance has been maintained.”¹⁸⁴⁹ Thus, the main content of the Constitutional Treaty was maintained, but the concepts which bring into mind connotations of a state-like entity were tried to be deleted. Instead of an “EU foreign minister” who was proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” was decided to be used. It is stated that the EU should not get any more foreign policy powers. The UK gets an opt-out not to take part in cooperation in judicial and police cooperation affairs.¹⁸⁵⁰

On 13 December 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon was signed as a result of the negotiations between Member States in an IGC. It will change the way of functioning of the EU institutions. Its goals are more democratic EU and better protection of its values. It will come into force when it will be ratified by all of the Member States. The procedure for ratification will depend on the national constitution of the Member States. The target date for the completion of the ratification process is 1 January 2009, before the next EP elections.¹⁸⁵¹ The Treaty of Lisbon amends the EC and the EU treaties, without replacing them. It will provide the EU with the legal framework and instruments which are necessary “to meet future challenges and to respond to citizens’ demands.” It will help construction of a more “democratic and transparent Europe”. To achieve these, the role of the EP and the national parliaments will be strengthened, the sharing of competencies between European and national levels will be clarified and there will be more opportunities for the citizens to have their voices heard. One million citizens from a number of Member States will have a chance to ask the Commission to bring forward new policy proposals. For the first time, this treaty recognizes the possibility for a Member State to withdraw from the EU. The “Charter of Fundamental Rights”, which includes civil, political, economic and social rights, will be introduced into European primary law. It is also emphasized that the EU and its Member States act jointly if a Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack or victim of a disaster. The EU will have a legal personality which makes it more effective on

¹⁸⁴⁹ Honor Mahony, “EU Leaders Scrape Treaty Deal At 11th Hour”, *euobserver.com*, June 23, 2007, retrieved on June 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/24343>

¹⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵¹ “Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century”, retrieved on December 18, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm

the world stage and the EU will have a stronger voice in relations with its partners worldwide.¹⁸⁵² Denmark and Ireland are legally obliged to have referendums, if their sovereignty is affected, the rest of the Member States will probably ratify through their national parliaments.¹⁸⁵³ Thus, the Treaty of Lisbon was an important turning point for construction process of European identity. The content of the Constitutional Treaty was tried to be maintained, but some symbolic concepts which may be perceived as instruments of state-building or nation-building in the context of the EU were deleted, such as symbols of the EU, the term constitution, etc. These were considered as a challenge to nation-states and national identities by some peoples of Europe.

During the interviews which were conducted by the author, nearly all of the interviewees mentioned the importance of the Constitutional Treaty for the future of EU. Bozkurt asserted that:

During the discussions on the Convention in France and Netherlands, there are questions like where is EU going? What will happen to our national identity? Is the EU enlarging forever and we will lose our power...in years to come the problem should be solved and we have a better idea of where we are going as Europe and what we want by a new Convention or by defining at least, what we want to be and where we want to go...¹⁸⁵⁴

During the preparation process of the Constitutional Treaty different parties of the EU had a chance to discuss on the future of the EU. Duff who supported the idea of the Constitution and wrote a book on it,¹⁸⁵⁵ argued that "...the product is excellent. What is not good is marketing."¹⁸⁵⁶ He criticized marketing of the Constitutional Treaty. He emphasized the incorporation of the "Charter of Fundamental Rights" to the Constitutional Treaty. He argued that the Constitutional Treaty and the EU citizenship are closely related with each other. He stated that "...they are part of the same thing...by having the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrined in it. It is very crucial step forward, the Charter will have a binding effect..."¹⁸⁵⁷ Resetarits contended that "...if you want to be very effective, you have to have a common Constitution..."¹⁸⁵⁸ She perceives acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty as closely related with the effectiveness of the EU. One Greek Commission official

¹⁸⁵² "Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century; The Treaty at a Glance", retrieved on December 18, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm

¹⁸⁵³ Honor Mahony, "EU Leaders Scrape Treaty Deal At 11th Hour", *euobserver.com*, June 23, 2007, retrieved on June 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/24343>

¹⁸⁵⁴ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁸⁵⁵ For further detail see Andrew Duff, *The Struggle for Europe's Constitution*, The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005.

¹⁸⁵⁶ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

¹⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵⁸ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency argued that the Constitutional Treaty and the EU citizenship are closely related with each other. She stated that:

... I believe in it and very disappointed that we did not go further, a framework for our policies, mostly the external policies, we can not really be effective. We need to give framework for the EU to have a stronger voice in international field...that is a big challenge...then Constitution hopefully will lead to the notion of the European citizenship...¹⁸⁵⁹

She puts forward that the introduction of the Constitutional Treaty will lead to the development of the EU citizenship.

Some of the interviewees criticized the Constitutional Treaty because of its complexity. Badia i Cutchet stated that:

...I am in favour of the European Constitution, not because I think this is the most fantastic constitution. I do not believe it at all. It is too long, complicated like the EU...It is a **controlled chaos**...if you want to respect differences then things are more complicated, but I think it is a very good idea.¹⁸⁶⁰

She argued that it is better than nothing, although it is complex. The main emphasis of the EU is respecting diversities¹⁸⁶¹ which makes it harder to arrange everything. One German Commission official who is from DG Enterprise and Industry, asserted that “Constitution is too abstract.”¹⁸⁶² Even the interviewees found the Constitutional Treaty too complex and abstract. He added that “ordinary citizens can not understand it; we have to explain it to them.”¹⁸⁶³ He also claimed that, “if Constitution will fail again, it will lead to ‘two-speed Europe’.”¹⁸⁶⁴ Some Member States want further integration, but some of them are in favour of an intergovernmental structure for the EU. Instead of official acceptance of a “two-speed Europe”, it has been tried to be overcome by giving the chance to opt-out in certain policy fields to some Member States such as the UK and Denmark. About the effects of the Constitutional Treaty on construction of European identity, Öger argued that “a Constitution which is practiced very well in terms of democracy, law...if people on the street will benefit from this, European identity may emerge gradually.”¹⁸⁶⁵ He emphasized that if the Constitutional Treaty will be practiced well and affected positively daily lives of the EU citizens, it will probably lead to construction of European identity. On the other

¹⁸⁵⁹ Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

¹⁸⁶⁰ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain, on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

¹⁸⁶¹ Interview with Commission official from Germany, DG Enterprise and Industry, on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁸⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶⁵ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

hand, Bozkurt does not see the Constitutional Treaty as an instrument to construct European identity. She stated that:

...I have seen during the discussions in Netherlands, people were very afraid of their identity, because of the Constitution. If it was one of the things which should be done by the Constitution, it fails; because people are very afraid of losing their national identity. They do not want to be overruled by such a European...far institutions in Brussels...I think European identity should evolve, developed from the people themselves...¹⁸⁶⁶

She argued that the Constitutional Treaty can not contribute to construction of European identity, because usually the citizens of the EU perceive it as a threat to their national identities. In the Lisbon Treaty, the terms which may be perceived as a threat to national identities by citizens of the EU, such as symbols of the EU are not mentioned. Deprez asserted that the Constitutional Treaty is not effective on construction of European identity, but it has different important roles, especially in terms of functioning of the EU. He stated that:

...the Constitutional Treaty is really important and necessary for the functioning and decision-making process in the European system, but probably not for building a feeling of European citizenship.¹⁸⁶⁷

Schöpflin emphasized the importance of the Constitutional Treaty, but he is a bit pessimistic about it. He argued that “I am very strongly in favour of the Constitution, but it is not going to happen...I think discourse of the Constitution is important, but clearly Europe is not ready for this.”¹⁸⁶⁸ As Schöpflin argues, the discourses on the Constitution were very crucial in construction of European identity on civic basis, but they failed after its rejection in the referendums in France and Netherlands.

IV.1.3.1.The Debates on “Constitutional Patriotism” in the EU

Discourse of the Constitution is closely related with the future structure of the EU. Without having a Constitution, it is too hard for the EU to be a political union. Habermas argues that if the EU will have a Constitution, it refers to a supranational integration which may lead to “**constitutional patriotism**”. During the preparation process of the Constitutional Treaty, several scholars argued that it might lead to “constitutional patriotism”¹⁸⁶⁹ which refers to identification with constitutional norms, rather than a state,

¹⁸⁶⁶ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁸⁶⁸ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

¹⁸⁶⁹ For further detail see J. Habermas, “A Citizenship and National Identity” in Bart van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*, New York: Sage Pub., 1994.

nation, territory or cultural traditions. Habermas asserts that political identity does not have to be based on a cultural identity. Cultural identity is particular and exclusivist, but political identity offers the possibility of a limited universalism. “Constitutional patriotism” refers to a “post-national legal identity”.¹⁸⁷⁰ The idea of “constitutional patriotism” (*verfassungspatriotismus*) was introduced by Van Steenberghe and it was used related with the European integration by Habermas.¹⁸⁷¹ According to Habermas, “constitutional patriotism” means an attachment that arises through participation in shared institutions and liberal political principles.¹⁸⁷² Mc Cormick asserts that “a constitutionally integrated Europe will generate a post-national citizenship”.¹⁸⁷³ Habermas contends that only a political identity is suitable for the requirements of multicultural societies. Members of such societies are not expected to give up their cultural traditions, but they are expected to accept the democratic political culture of citizenship.¹⁸⁷⁴

Constitutional patriotism in the context of the EU refers to construction of an inclusive European political identity. “Othering” is not necessary for “constitutional patriotism”, but “distinguishability” and “distinctiveness” are needed. A group of people have to be aware of their distinctiveness, they have to be able to differentiate themselves from “others”, but these “others” do not have to be “opponents”. Habermas argues that for the EU such “other” may be considered as the USA, to differentiate Europe’s social model and to differentiate EU identity in international arena as a normative civilian power.¹⁸⁷⁵ The idea of “constitutional patriotism” is criticized on the grounds that it is too inclusive, thus it does not provide a clear demarcation between who belongs to that political entity and who do not.¹⁸⁷⁶ Weiler argues that “constitutional patriotism” explains the process in statal terms, thus its goal is to construct a nation-state at the European level by constructing a European *demos*. For Habermas, “the values are universal, whereas their interpretation

¹⁸⁷⁰ Cited in G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.135.

¹⁸⁷¹ N. Prentoulis, “On the Technology of Collective Identity: Normative Reconstructions of the Concept of EU Citizenship”, p.202.

¹⁸⁷² For further detail see J. Habermas, “A Citizenship and National Identity”, 1994.

¹⁸⁷³ J. P. McCormick, “Habermas, Supranational Democracy and the European Constitution”, p.398.

¹⁸⁷⁴ J. Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’”, *European Law Journal*, Vol.1, No. 3, 1995, pp.303-307; quoted in P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, p.296.

¹⁸⁷⁵ For further detail see Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, Cambridge: Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998.

¹⁸⁷⁶ John P. McCormick, “Carl Schmitt’s Europe: Cultural, Imperial and Spatial Proposals for European Integration, 1923-1955” in Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds.), *Darker Legacies of Law in Europe*, Oxford:Hart Pub., 2003, p.141; cited in S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 46.

and application are context bound, for example European.”¹⁸⁷⁷ Weiler claims that “the values that shape the European community should also be specifically European.”¹⁸⁷⁸ Habermas is against the idea of construction of European political identity based on the model of nation-building. He tries to separate political membership in a community (*demos*) from ascriptive identities (*ethnos*). He argues that there has been a construction of European political identity and he perceives citizenship as the main integrative instrument of the EU.¹⁸⁷⁹

It is questionable, whether European identity is a precondition for the creation of the Constitution or the Constitution may lead to construction of European identity. Grimm argues that “...a European identity is a precondition for a more developed EU and a European Constitution.”¹⁸⁸⁰ It is argued that Europe is unable to have a constitution, because of not having *demos*. *Demos* in nation-states usually coincides with *ethnos*, the ethnic and cultural group which has to abide by constitutional principles. It is obvious that there is no European *ethnos* and will not emerge in the future.¹⁸⁸¹ There is also no *demos* in the context of the EU, but it has been in a construction process. Habermas supports the idea of a European Constitution which would lead to “post-national collective identifications”. Nanz asserts that “according to such a constructivist perspective, European identity is conceived of as an overarching normative ideal which comprises national and socio-cultural identities.”¹⁸⁸² As Nanz argues, “identification with the constitutional order alone might not be enough to sustain such a post-national political culture.”¹⁸⁸³ She claims that a political community can be created, if mutual bonds between people have already existed. According to this approach, political and cultural elements of a collective identity are interdependent. She also criticizes Habermas, because of underestimating the complexity of collective identity formation and the reality of multiple identifications in contemporary societies.¹⁸⁸⁴

¹⁸⁷⁷ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 53. For further detail see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, 1997.

¹⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷⁹ J. Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on The Future of Europe”, pp. 1-19; cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.31.

¹⁸⁸⁰ D. Grimm, “Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?”, *Juristenzeitung* 12, 1995, pp.581-91; quoted in P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, p.296.

¹⁸⁸¹ F. Cerutti, “Towards The Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction”, p. 25.

¹⁸⁸² P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, pp.296-297.

¹⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Supporters of the “constitutional patriotism” see European integration as a unique historical chance “to create within the framework of modernity a post-national political community”¹⁸⁸⁵ without cultural homogenisation. Those, who are in favour of building a common European nationhood, usually consider “constitutional patriotism” as a second best solution. There are some critiques about the application of “constitutional patriotism” in the context of the EU. The most important problem is that there has not been a Constitution of the EU yet.¹⁸⁸⁶ The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty at the referendums in France and Netherlands showed that “constitutional patriotism” will be too hard in the context of the EU. It is also argued that the content of the Constitutional Treaty has many deficiencies which make the emergence of a Habermasian “constitutional patriotism” in the context of the EU too hard. Actually it was not a constitution, instead it may be considered as another treaty.¹⁸⁸⁷

During German Presidency of the EU (1st half of 2007), Germany’s Chancellor Merkel focused on how to revive the draft Constitution of the EU. She argues that the EU can not function properly without a constitution.¹⁸⁸⁸ It was decided to create a new “Reform Treaty”, the term “constitution” was not used. Wallström argues that “the new treaty will improve how democracy and transparency work in the EU.”¹⁸⁸⁹ Thus, it will help to overcome some of the functioning problems of the EU and it will decrease its democratic deficit, but it is too hard to consider such a treaty as a constitution of the EU which may lead to “constitutional patriotism” among the citizens of the EU. It has been rather constructed as an instrument to overcome current crisis of the EU.

The “Maastricht Decision” of the German Federal Constitutional Court stated that “...the EU need not functionally nor should normatively take on state-like characteristics.”¹⁸⁹⁰ Although the EU was warned about taking state-like characteristics, the EU has used some state-like instruments which have had direct or indirect effects on

¹⁸⁸⁵ R. Bauböck, “Three Conceptions of a European Political Identity”, retrieved on March 10, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04--4.html>

¹⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸⁷ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 43.

¹⁸⁸⁸ “Europe’s Mid-life Crisis”, p.11.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Margot Wallström, “Communication Policy”, retrieved on October 16, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/wallstrom/communicating/policy/index_en.htm

¹⁸⁹⁰ The Maastricht Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2159/92, *Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift* 429, 1993; quoted in J. P. McCormick, “Habermas, Supranational Democracy and the European Constitution”, p.405.

construction of European identity within the EU. According to Castells, the EU institutions should be able to monitor its development and a “European Identity Observatory” should be established.¹⁸⁹¹ It has not been established yet, but the level of European identity of the EU citizens has been monitored regularly by Eurobarometer surveys.

According to the surveys of Bruter, there is a high level of correlation between levels of European identity and symbols of the EU and news about the EU. He also argues that his surveys confirmed the impact of the institutions and institutional messages on the citizens’ political identity. He asserts that European identity has progressively emerged in the EU over the past thirty five years under the influence of the EU institutions; also it has been affected by the news about the EU and symbols of the EU.¹⁸⁹² He also argues that the symbolic and imaginary reality of the EU is constructed and reconstructed under the interaction between the political elites, the mass media and generations of citizens who have been socialized differently, which is arranged by the EU institutions and the elites.¹⁸⁹³

Consequently, construction of European identity is not a linear process which has been totally under the control of the institutions and the elites of the EU. European identity has been under construction process through the interactions between the media, the NGOs, the elites and the citizens. The EU has constructed some cultural and civic symbols especially since the mid-1980s. Most of these symbols are civic, some of which may be considered as partly civic, partly cultural which have been effective on construction of European identity. Introduction of the EU citizenship and discourses on the Constitution have been also effective on construction of European identity on civic basis. The EU citizenship is dependent on national citizenships which decreases its effects on construction of European identity, but it may be more influential in the longer term. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected by the peoples of two founder states of the EU, which led to the creation of the Lisbon Treaty. Longer time is needed to see its effects on construction of European identity. Although the content of the Constitutional Treaty is mostly maintained, discursively it will probably have less influence on construction of European identity, in comparison to the Constitutional Treaty.

¹⁸⁹¹ M. Castells, “The Construction of European Identity”, retrieved on September 25, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.chet.org.za/constructionei.html>

¹⁸⁹² M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.143-150.

¹⁸⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.172.

IV.2. Comparison of Construction of European Identity within the EU with Nation-Building Process

During European identity construction process within the EU, similar instruments to those which were used during nation-building process have been used. Nation-building usually occurred within the framework of the state. As Theiler argues, a limited analogy may be made between the process of state-building and European integration process. It does not imply that they are same in terms of process and “end product”.¹⁸⁹⁴ “The EU is not a nation-state, not even a federal one in the making.”¹⁸⁹⁵ In accordance with this approach, a limited analogy can be made between construction process of European identity within the EU and nation-building process.

As it was argued, before the establishment of the EC, European identity had been already in a construction process, but with the establishment of the EC in the 1950s, European identity has been in a construction process for the first time within the institutional framework of the EU which provides a suitable atmosphere for application of the initiatives of the EU elites, also it increases and regularizes interactions among the Member States and the citizens of the EU. In this part construction of European identity within the EU is compared with nation-building process, particularly in terms of their instruments. Although some similar instruments to nation-building process have been used by the EU elites, such as introduction of the EU citizenship, construction of symbols and attempts to introduce a constitution, the construction process of European identity within the EU has unique characteristics.

IV.2.1.State Building and Nation-building

“State-building” process consists of administrative, military and cultural unification at elite level, territorial consolidation and creation of state-wide bureaucratic and legal infrastructure. During state-building process a sovereign political body is constructed which has the supreme authority over all activities within a certain territory and people who resides within that territory, become its legitimate subjects. After the phase of state-

¹⁸⁹⁴ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 28.

¹⁸⁹⁵ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.36.

building, in the second phase, commercial and industrial economies emerged. The third phase is “nation-building” which refers to a socialisation process of the masses, whereby national consciousness has been constructed through compulsory education, linguistic standardisation, national media and army. They help to create bonds among the members of the nation and between the nation and their state. With nation-building process, the citizens started to consider themselves as a people who share some common values and obligations towards each other. As a result of this process, “people” is constructed who are treated as equal before the law, under the control of sovereign political authority and share a national identity.¹⁸⁹⁶

“State-building” is based on establishing a common political institutional structure. It refers to efforts to establish a centralized government and to extend its authority over the territory where that state has sovereignty. “Nation-building” is based on constructing the feeling of belonging among people to a common nation. It is related with providing legitimacy and it refers to the formation of a national identity among the people who are living in a certain territory. It tries to establish collective self-awareness among people which is a very long process.¹⁸⁹⁷ The primary aim of nation-building is to facilitate communication within the state.¹⁸⁹⁸ Although the processes of state-building and nation-building seemed to occur as a result of top-down processes, in accordance with the wishes of the national elites, they actually emerged as a result of the dialectic between actors both from the “bottom” and the “top”.¹⁸⁹⁹ Thus, both state-building and nation-building occurs through the interaction between the elites and the general public.¹⁹⁰⁰ In many modern states, the processes of state-building and nation-building had gone simultaneously¹⁹⁰¹ which leads to the emergence of a nation-state. In this chapter, nation-building process is focused on, which is compared with construction of European identity within the EU.

¹⁸⁹⁶ R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione & J. Shaw, “Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship”, pp.4-5.

¹⁸⁹⁷ S. Anderson & T. R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation-Building and Identity in the EU”, p.30.

¹⁸⁹⁸ A. Caviedes, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.252

¹⁸⁹⁹ Thomas M. Wilson & Hastings Donnay, “Identity and Culture at Europe’s Frontiers” in E. Moxon-Browne (ed.), *Who are the Europeans Now?*, p.3.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Michael Wintle, “Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience” in Michael Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, pp.17-22.

¹⁹⁰¹ Josep R. Llobera, “The Role of the State and the Nation in Europe” in S. Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, p.66.

IV.2.1.1.Nation-Building Process and Its Instruments

The concept of “nation” sometimes refers to peoples; sometimes it refers to states such as in the expressions: UN and international relations. It is usually used to refer to people who have shared the sense of common ancestry. A nation usually stems from diverse ethnic groups. Nation-building theory was used to describe the national integration processes which led to establishment of the modern nation-state. It refers not only to conscious strategies which are initiated by state leaders; it also includes unplanned societal changes. It is used for historical and sociological dynamics which have produced modern state.¹⁹⁰²

The emergence of a nation in Europe was the product of a long and complex historical process. Hroch defines nation as a large social group who are integrated by a combination of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, and religious) and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. The main ties that bind nations are: A memory of a common past, a density of linguistic or cultural ties that enables a higher degree of social communication within the group and equality of all members of the group. He argues that “intellectuals invent national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist.”¹⁹⁰³ Deutsch asserts that “for national consciousness to arise there must be something for it to become conscious of.”¹⁹⁰⁴ The main conditions for nation-building have been “geographical territory, economic and political integration, cultural and linguistic proximity.”¹⁹⁰⁵ According to Smith who is sometimes referred to as an “ethno-symbolist”, “a nation is a population who share a historical territory, common memories, myths, a mass standardized public culture, a common economy, territorial mobility, common legal rights and duties for all of its citizens.”¹⁹⁰⁶

¹⁹⁰² Pal Kolsto, *Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States*, Translated by: Susan Hoivik, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000, pp.16-18.

¹⁹⁰³ Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe” in Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming National*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.61.

¹⁹⁰⁴ Quoted in M. Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe”, p.61.

¹⁹⁰⁵ S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethos or Demos”, p. 13.

¹⁹⁰⁶ A. D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, pp.58-60.

The major debate in the theory of nationalism is between “primordialists” and “modernists”. The main question is whether the identification with a nation is something old and present throughout history or it is something modern.¹⁹⁰⁷ Primordialists argue that nations are natural units of history, based on common language, religion, race, ethnicity and territory,¹⁹⁰⁸ or at least some of these. They argue that many components of national identity such as language, religion and symbols have had older historical background than nation-states. Nation-states firstly emerged in the 18th century in the Western Europe.¹⁹⁰⁹

Smith and Hutchinson may be considered as representatives of primordialists. On the other hand, the “modernists” perceive the emergence of nations as a construction which emerged with the effect of modernisation process. Modernists include Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm. Anderson interprets “imagination” as a metaphor in terms of “invention” and “fabrication”. Smith agrees with the modernists that nations are recent phenomena, but he insisted that they have a long prehistory which has evolved from ethnic groups.¹⁹¹⁰ Smith asserted that nations emerged recently but he emphasized that they have been evolved from pre-existing ethnic groups. For Anderson, with the decline of religion and the rise of globalism, it became possible and necessary to imagine the nation. Print capitalism and creation of the daily ritual of newspaper reading are the main instruments to imagine national identity. According to Anderson, all communities larger than primordial villages, where there is face-to-face contact are imagined.¹⁹¹¹ Gellner argues that nations and nationalism are products of an industrial society. Its complexity and specialisation required a large, uniformly literate and technologically equipped workforce which could be provided by modern state and its support for a compulsory and standardized education system. He also mentions the necessity for a state communication system to maintain the nation’s culture.¹⁹¹² According to Gellner and Anderson, national identity is an artificial construction which is also affected by politic, economic and social conditions. Boxhoorn asserts that “national identity is no more and no less than a shared and usually artificially constructed historical experience, memory or myth or a combination of the three.”¹⁹¹³ According to Hobsbawm, the formation of national identities is closely related with the

¹⁹⁰⁷ For further detail see Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Pub., 1997.

¹⁹⁰⁸ V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, pp.180-181.

¹⁹⁰⁹ A. Caviedes, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building Within The EU”, p.250.

¹⁹¹⁰ P. Kolsto, *Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States*, pp.18-19.

¹⁹¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, İstanbul: Metis Pub., 1995.

¹⁹¹² E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp.48-52.

¹⁹¹³ Bram Boxhoorn, “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, p.140.

creation of nation-wide symbols and “invented traditions.”¹⁹¹⁴ For Renan, forgetting was important for nation-building, as much as remembering. Selective memory is necessary for the survival of nations.¹⁹¹⁵ He asserts that nations are made of former enemies who agreed to forget about killing each other.¹⁹¹⁶ Thus, history of a community is reconstructed during nation-building process, by emphasizing the victories and forgetting the defeats. Sometimes even former enemies may be part of the same nation through forgetting some part of their history.

In nation-building process, usually top-down nation-building mechanisms were employed by the leaders of that nation who issued standard coins and charters, established universities and administrative structures of the state.¹⁹¹⁷ Nation-building process includes the creation of a common language and uniform system for weights and measures, industrial standards and common education system. In addition to these, infrastructural investment was made especially in transport. These are instruments of consolidation of a unitary market and *demos*.¹⁹¹⁸ There are two ideal types of nation-building, which are **ethnic** and **civic** types of nation-building. In ethnic theory of nation-building, membership of national community is ascriptive. It is thought that nations are constituted by ethnic groups. On the other hand, civic nation-building is based on common values and institutions. Anyone can be a member of the nation, without looking to his/her ethnic origin or place of birth. It is based on territorially defined community. There is a necessity of structured political and social interactions on the basis of common values.¹⁹¹⁹ The ethnic theory of nation-building is based on a common ancestry and the consciousness of shared identity. National stories, myths and monuments were used by nation builders to determine, who were part of “us” and who remained outside as “them”. Civic nation-building is based on citizenship and legal equality.¹⁹²⁰ Smith argues that “the theory of the national state has generally assumed a civic form of nationalism.”¹⁹²¹ Most of the modern

¹⁹¹⁴ For further detail see Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions” in E. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

¹⁹¹⁵ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.132. For further detail see Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Wolf Stuart (ed.), *Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to Present: A Reader*, London: Routledge Pub., 1996.

¹⁹¹⁶ Cited in F. Cerutti, “Towards the Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction”, p.20.

¹⁹¹⁷ M. Wintle, “Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience”, pp.17-22.

¹⁹¹⁸ R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, p.241.

¹⁹¹⁹ Michael Keating, *Nations Against The State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, New York: Palgrave Pub., 2001, pp.3-6.

¹⁹²⁰ B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, pp.84-85.

¹⁹²¹ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.97.

nations consist of both civic and ethnic elements.¹⁹²² Two ideal types of nationalism may be referred to as “**ethno-cultural**” and “**republican nationalism**”. For “ethno-cultural nationalism”, cultural community is prior to the political one, for “republican nationalism” the political community is prior to the cultural one.¹⁹²³ Thus, the main division about the emergence of nation is between those who argue that the roots of the nation are based mostly on ethnicity and those who see the role of the state and citizenship as more important factors.¹⁹²⁴ Hroch contends that the crucial elements for nation-building process are: “A memory of common past, a density of linguistic or cultural ties, which enable a high degree of social communication within the group and equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.”¹⁹²⁵ According to Smith, nation-building process includes:

- The growth and transmission of common memories, myths and symbols of the community,
- the growth and transmission of historical traditions and rituals of community,
- the transmission of “authentic” elements of shared culture such as language, customs, religion,
- the transfer of these “authentic” values, knowledge and attitudes to the population through standardized methods and institutions,
- the transmission of symbols and myths of a historic territory or homeland,
- the definition of common rights and duties for all the members of the community.¹⁹²⁶

He points out that nations can not be built only by top-down initiatives of the national elites and their emergence can not be perceived only as a result of the modernisation process. Instead, that social group has to have certain common historical and cultural characteristics in order to build a nation. According to Habermas, the nation-state has faced “tension between the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a cultural community joined by origin and fate.”¹⁹²⁷ He argues that there is a tension between these two models within nation-state which can be referred to as tension “between inclusive and exclusive model of community formation.”¹⁹²⁸ Schöpflin

¹⁹²² A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.97.

¹⁹²³ R. Bauböck, “Three Conceptions of a European Political Identity, retrieved on March 10, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04--4.html>

¹⁹²⁴ Cited in G. Schöpflin, *Nations , Identity , Power: The New Politics of Europe*, p.3. For further detail see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Power: The Rise of Class and Nation-States 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1993; M. Mann, “ A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses” in Sukumar Perival (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995, pp.44-64.

¹⁹²⁵ M. Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe”, p.79.

¹⁹²⁶ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.89-90.

¹⁹²⁷ Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: Its Achievements and Its Limitations, On The Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship”, *Ratio Juris*, Vol.9, No.2, 1996, p.131; quoted in P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.124.

¹⁹²⁸ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p.124.

asserts that his position is a synthesis of these views.¹⁹²⁹ He points out that all social phenomena are constructed, or imagined such as class or gender. He adds that "...both ethnic origins and state construction played a role in the rise of the modern nation-state."¹⁹³⁰ As he argues, ethnicity, state, citizenship and dynamic interaction among them are effective on construction of national identity. Even in Western states ethnicity was one of the important factors which was effective in nation-building; but ethnicities have been successfully contextualized by constructing institutions of the state and civil societies.¹⁹³¹ Thus, nations are constructed through interactions between the national elites and the peoples; top-down initiatives of the elites and instruments of the state like common education system, common currency, army and national media were all effective on nation-building process.

During nation-building process, the subjects of the monarch were gradually turned into the citizens of the nation-state. Members of the local communities were integrated with larger society through common education system and political participation. Sub-state cultures and loyalties lost their political importance and they were superseded by loyalties toward the state. The first phase of nation-building is economic and cultural unification at the elite level. In the second phase, masses were integrated with the state system through conscription, going to compulsory schools, etc. Media provides contact between the central elites and periphery populations which led to a widespread sense of identification with the political system. In the third phase, the masses started to participate actively in political system. In the last phase, the administrative structure of the state expanded. Public welfare services were established and nation-wide policies for the equalisation of economic conditions were made. In the oldest nation-states of Europe, the earlier stages of these processes occurred in the Middle Ages and lasted till the French Revolution.¹⁹³² Thus, primarily unification at the elite level emerged which spread to the masses through common education, media, conscription and participation to the political system.

¹⁹²⁹ Cited in G. Schöpflin, *Nations , Identity , Power: The New Politics of Europe*, p.3. For further detail see E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, 1983; B. Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, 1995.

¹⁹³⁰ G. Schöpflin, *Nations , Identity , Power: The New Politics of Europe*, pp.3-6.

¹⁹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹³² P. Kolsto, *Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States*, p.17.

Several scholars see nations, like other social identities as human constructions. They argue that most of the national identities in Europe are conscious constructs.¹⁹³³ For them, the nation-state is also a European invention, then it was exported to other parts of the world.¹⁹³⁴ Usually firstly states have become the “standard unit” for political authority in Europe, then nationalism constructed a collective identity which may be referred to as national identity within the national territory.¹⁹³⁵ Barnavi argues that “the French nation is a collection of peoples, forged into a nation by the strong arm tactics of kings and later on even more effectively by those of the Republic.”¹⁹³⁶ A royal policy which was implemented over several centuries combined these peoples into a coherent whole and made their elites members of a common nation. This policy consisted of a successful combination of “violence, persuasion and ideology”. Without this policy, only the natural characteristics of nations such as common territory, language and a feeling of belonging to a common history and culture are not enough to establish a nation-state. Germans and Italians also more or less had these characteristics, but they did not have a common political framework.¹⁹³⁷ After the unification of Germany or Italy, the emergence of national consciousness was necessary. As Mabel argues “gradually by a series of successive awareness, the people become a nation.”¹⁹³⁸ In Germany and Italy, nation-building occurred after state-building process. The feeling of belonging that people have towards their nation led to a community feeling which provides the legitimate basis of representative democracy in the modern state. This feeling of belonging to a common nation makes people more willing to make economic and personal sacrifices for their nation, such as paying taxes or going to a war for their nation.¹⁹³⁹

The elites had an important role in nation-building. Some scholars argue that identity is easy to manipulate by the elites. On the other hand, several scholars argue that

¹⁹³³ R. Grew, “The Construction of National Identity” in P. Boerner (ed.), *Concepts of National Identity- An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986, pp.31-43; cited in H. Walkenhorst, “The Construction of European Identity and The Role of National Educational Systems: A Case Study on Germany”, p.9

¹⁹³⁴ M. Spiering, “National Identity and European Unity”, p.105.

¹⁹³⁵ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p. 67.

¹⁹³⁶ E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It” , p.90.

¹⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹³⁸ Didier Musiedlak, “Political Formation and National Identity in Italy: The Unity of Fascism” in Ilvo Diamanti et al., *Italie une nation en suspens*, Brussels, 1996, pp.24-25; quoted in R. Frank, “European Identities, Consciousness and Construction: Harmony and Disharmony Between Politics, Economics and Imagination”, p.45.

¹⁹³⁹ C. Hersom, “European Citizenship and the Search for Legitimacy: The Paradox of the Danish Case”, p.38.

identities are not so easy to manipulate and major external developments are necessary to change current identities.¹⁹⁴⁰ Marcussen and Roscher argue that the elites can not construct new collective identities only by their will. They argue that “new ideas about social order and the nation-state need to resonate with previously embedded and institutionalised values, symbols and myths.”¹⁹⁴¹ Thus, the will and instruments of elites are crucial in nation-building, but they are not enough. The circumstances, historical background and characteristics of that community are also effective on this process.

During the establishment process of nation-states, states imposed common values, culture, historical identity and common language on their populations.¹⁹⁴² National stories, myths and symbols were used by nation-builders to determine, who are included in “us” and who are excluded and referred to as “them”. The main elements that constituted “us” are: A historic territory or homeland, common myths, historical memories, a common political culture, legal rights and duties for all members and a common economy.¹⁹⁴³ Symbols are crucial to achieve a peaceful process of national identity formation and legitimisation. In France after 1789, the *Fleur de Lys* and the head of the king had to be removed from people’s minds and they had to be replaced by new Republican and Revolutionary symbols. During the French Revolutions and Republics which were launched in 1792, 1848 and 1871 “...the building of a new identity was attempted by political regimes which pretended to be opposed to the symbolic cults of the past monarchic times.”¹⁹⁴⁴ A single currency has been an important symbol of national sovereignty for centuries. As Risse argues “money has always been a symbolic marker in nation-building efforts...”¹⁹⁴⁵ Billig states that:

...daily the nation is indicated or flagged in the lives of its citizenry...in the established nations, there is a continual flagging or reminding of nationhood...image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved...it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building...nationhood is still being reproduced...daily its symbols and assumptions are flagged.¹⁹⁴⁶

¹⁹⁴⁰ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.5-6.

¹⁹⁴¹ M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.331.

¹⁹⁴² W. Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, p.29.

¹⁹⁴³ Anthony Smith, “The Myth of the Modern Nation and the Myths of Nations”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol 11, January 1988, p.14; cited in B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, p.85.

¹⁹⁴⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.78-80.

¹⁹⁴⁵ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.501.

¹⁹⁴⁶ For further detail see Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Pub., 1995, pp.8-9.

Through symbols, national identity is reproduced everyday in the daily lives of the citizens. Usually national symbols refer to a historical figure, such as the founding father of a nation or an important historical event such as a war which was won by that nation. History is the raw material for national claims and it provides legitimacy to these claims. History also provides continuity of that nation. Without a history, a nation is only “present day construction” which can disappear one day.¹⁹⁴⁷ During nation-building process emphasis was usually on ancient history which might be reflected as more glorious. Thus, history of a nation can be reconstructed during its nation-building process, especially its ancient history may be exaggerated in order to make people more proud of their history and to give them a feeling of superiority towards the “others”.

Standardisation of language is the main instrument of nation-building and state-building. In Western Europe in nation-building and state-building processes, language and religion were used as instruments of political unification.¹⁹⁴⁸ Most of the EU states still do not want to lose the control of their language policies which were important instruments of the 19th century project of constructing the nation-state.¹⁹⁴⁹ Conscription and creation of national armies are also instruments of nation-building which increase the feeling of belonging to a nation. The national governments had to create armies and citizens who would defend their state, even ready to die for this aim. To create such loyalty, myths have to be created in a common language. Compulsory education is one of the main instruments to create such loyalty among the citizens. It played a very important role in shaping and strengthening of national identity. The curriculum is one of the important instruments of “political socialisation.” The greatness of the nation is emphasized through school books, national symbolism and collective action such as singing the national anthem regularly.¹⁹⁵⁰ Thus, schools and universities were the central institutions of nation-building, not only in terms of teaching of a common language, also in terms of creation of national heroic histories.¹⁹⁵¹ For some scholars, public education is a central instrument for the production

¹⁹⁴⁷ For further detail see E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since the 1780's: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

¹⁹⁴⁸ Colin H. Williams, “Room to Talk in a House of Faith: On Language and Religion” in B. Graham(ed.), *Modern Europe: Place, Culture, Identity*, London: Arnold Pub., 1998, p.191.

¹⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.199-200.

¹⁹⁵⁰ Cited in H. Walkenhorst, “The Construction of European Identity and The Role of National Educational Systems: A Case Study on Germany”, pp.10-11. For further detail see S. Rokan, “State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe” in P. Flora (ed.), *The Theory of Stein Rokan: Based on His Collected Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; R. Dawson, et. al., *Political Socialization: An Analytic Study*, Boston: Little Brown, 1977, p.147.

¹⁹⁵¹ D. Coulby & C. Jones, “Post-modernity, Education and European Identities”, p.183.

of a high literate culture and a nation. Most governments since the end of the 19th century have seen it as one of their primary duties to establish a system of public education which is compulsory, hierarchical and standardized to create an efficient labour force and loyal citizens. The media also played an important role which enables state to create social consciousness among its citizens. Although in the West there is more press freedom and liberal tradition of state intervention, there is a high level of state regulation on radio and to a lesser extent on TV. In the 20th century, cinema was another important instrument to reflect cultural policies of the state and transmit national ideals¹⁹⁵² to its citizens.

The case of Belgium is interesting in terms of its nation-building. It is a federal state which is composed of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. When there were demonstrations in Belgium for its independence in 1830, it did not have a common language, flag or anthem. The people, who were walking on the streets of Brussels, were holding a French flag which was not the wish of revolutionary leaders who wanted to escape from the Dutch rule, but they came under the influence of France this time.¹⁹⁵³ Bruter argues that in the new constructed Belgium, nationalist demonstrators walked on the streets of Bruges and Brussels carrying French flags till the new Belgian flag was distributed to demonstrators.¹⁹⁵⁴ It was argued that young revolutionary leaders came together to make a Belgian flag one evening in a bar and wrote Belgian national anthem in few hours.¹⁹⁵⁵ While nations of Europe were choosing their flags in the 19th century, they usually took inspiration from existing flags. For example, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, even Germany were inspired by the French flag; Denmark and Norway were inspired by the Swedish one.¹⁹⁵⁶

National identities are strong, because they satisfy human psychological needs such as belonging to somewhere and collective immortality. The strength of national identity is not based on objective characteristics; rather it is based on discourses.¹⁹⁵⁷

¹⁹⁵² A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.91-94.

¹⁹⁵³ M. Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity", pp.1148-1179.

¹⁹⁵⁴ Daniel Louis Seiler, *La Vie politique des Européens: introduction aux pratiques démocratiques dans le pays de l'Union Européenne*, Paris: Collection U, 1998; cited in M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.78.

¹⁹⁵⁵ M. Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity", pp.1148-1179.

¹⁹⁵⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.90.

¹⁹⁵⁷ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU*, pp.23-25.

Nation-state identities are not usually questioned. According to Marcussen and Roscher, “nation-state identities tend to be sticky rather than subject to frequent change.”¹⁹⁵⁸ It is argued that national identity is a “frozen political identity” which is capable of dominating public loyalties, even after the changes in the conditions that led to its emergence. It continues to control key institutions, by which collective identities are reproduced such as the education system and language standardisation.¹⁹⁵⁹ Nation-states may be challenged by “**critical junctures**” which may be defined as perceived crisis situations that occur because of policy failures or triggered by external events.¹⁹⁶⁰ Thus, national identities are usually maintained through controlling key institutions, but after “critical junctures” national identities may be questioned or even transformed.

IV.2.2. Different Perceptions of Member States about the EU and Interactions between European Identity and National Identities

The construction process of European identity has been still ongoing in the Member States of the EU. European identity has been in interaction process with the national identities which lead to construction of European identity variously in each Member State. As Schmidt argues, the EU is “imagined mostly through different lenses of national identity.”¹⁹⁶¹ There is a “plurality of nationally-imagined Europes”.¹⁹⁶² The EU is composed of various national *demos* which reflects plurality of the EU. “There is no European *demos* in the statal sense and there should not be one...”¹⁹⁶³ As it was argued, the EU is a *sui generis* entity.

There have been different perceptions of Member States about the EU since the establishment of the EC. France saw united Europe as a way to protect national security by Europeanizing the German problem. Germany saw it as a way to return back to the

¹⁹⁵⁸ S. Fiske & S.E. Taylor, *Social Cognition*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991, pp.150-151; quoted in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.330.

¹⁹⁵⁹ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p. 37.

¹⁹⁶⁰ J.P. Olsen, “Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics” in S.Gustavsson & L. Lewin (eds.), *The Future of the Nation-State*, Stockholm, Nerenius & Santerus, 1996, pp.245-286; cited in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, pp.330-331.

¹⁹⁶¹ V. A. Schmidt, “The EU: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?”, pp.981-982.

¹⁹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶³ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 51.

international stage and England tolerated the emergence of the EC for economic reasons and political stability.¹⁹⁶⁴ Each Member State has different preferences for the EU's institutional structure and its *finalite politique*.¹⁹⁶⁵ In each Member State people have different perceptions about European identity, some are more inclusive, some are totally attached to their national identities and some prefer having multiple identities. For England, Europe is a civic community of communities sharing a common market; for France, Europe is a union of sovereign nation-states, based on shared values; for Germany, Europe is a federal union with a constitution which shows sharing of competencies between regions, nation-states and the EU.¹⁹⁶⁶ Different perceptions of these actors about the European integration have negatively affected the construction of European identity. With the accession of ten new members from the CEE, different perceptions about the EU among the Member States have highly increased. Wallace argues that “what Europe you see depends on where you live. Europe is a movable set of myths and images, both positive and negative, embedded in national histories...”¹⁹⁶⁷ The governments and the peoples of each Member State have different expectations from the European integration.¹⁹⁶⁸

Construction process of European identity has not occurred commonly in all Member States. The interaction processes between European identity and national identities may be explained by a “marble cake model”.¹⁹⁶⁹ According to this model, European identity means different things to different people. European identity interacts with national identities, thus the overall effect will not be a homogeneous generalised EU identity. EU has enmeshed with different national identities which leads to diverging identity outcomes.¹⁹⁷⁰ Europeanness is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities.¹⁹⁷¹ Kurzer asserts that there is some convergence towards common

¹⁹⁶⁴ K. Orluc, “Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the 1st World War”, p.155.

¹⁹⁶⁵ T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.301.

¹⁹⁶⁶ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.197.

¹⁹⁶⁷ William Wallace, “Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion” in Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the EU*, London: Routledge Pub., 2002, p. 79; quoted in S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.15.

¹⁹⁶⁸ Max Haller, “Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? European Integration and the Relation Between National and European Identity” in H. Kriesi, K. Armingeon, et al. (eds.), *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, pp.263-265.

¹⁹⁶⁹ T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.305.

¹⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.296.

¹⁹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.291.

European values in certain policy fields. Marcussen and others argue that there is no convergence among different national identities in Europe, but some national identities have integrated “ideas about Europe and the European order”.¹⁹⁷² In some cases “Europe” has been perceived as an integral part of national identities, sometimes it competes with alternative “macro-regional” identities such as Mediterranean and Nordic.¹⁹⁷³

In the case of France, the values of the French Revolution became European values. As Frank argues “Europe became a self-reflection of France.”¹⁹⁷⁴ Mitterrand recommended his compatriots not to “separate the glory of France from the European construction.”¹⁹⁷⁵ For Member States which had totalitarian systems before, such as Germany, Italy and Spain, the EU helped to redefine their national identities within the EU through democratization and Europeanization. Some Member States such as the UK and Denmark already had a long democratic tradition, thus it was harder for their citizens to have a European identity.¹⁹⁷⁶ In 1953 Churchill stated that “...we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire.”¹⁹⁷⁷ “...British democracy does not need Europe for its own legitimation.”¹⁹⁷⁸ More than thirty years after its entry into the EU, England still sees itself as “of” rather than “in” Europe. “Europe” is still seen as the “friendly other” in contrast to “Englishness”.¹⁹⁷⁹ Still most of the members of its main political parties support the idea of “Europe of nation-states”.¹⁹⁸⁰ Thatcher states that:

...to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the center of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely, because it has France as France, Spain as Spain and Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.¹⁹⁸¹

¹⁹⁷² Quoted in H. Voogtsgeerd, “Do EU Institutions and Policies Produce European Identity?: Does the ECJ Produce Identity?”, 17-18 June 2005. For further detail see M. Marcussen, T. Risse et al, “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of Nation-State Identities” in Thomas Christiansen, et al (eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, London, 2001, p.118.

¹⁹⁷³ Mikael af Malmberg & Bo Strath, “Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe” in Mikael af Malmberg & Bo Strath (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, Oxford: Berg Pub., 2002, p.10.

¹⁹⁷⁴ Robert Frank, “The Meanings of Europe in French National Discourse: A French Europe or a Europeanized France?” in M. af Malmberg & B. Strath (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, p.13.

¹⁹⁷⁵ Quoted in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.50.

¹⁹⁷⁶ T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.3.

¹⁹⁷⁷ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.500.

¹⁹⁷⁸ T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.301.

¹⁹⁷⁹ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.500.

¹⁹⁸⁰ R. Bailey, *The European Connection: Implications of EEC Membership*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983; quoted in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, pp.344-345.

¹⁹⁸¹ M. Thatcher, “European Family of Nations”, pp.208-209.

She is against the idea of construction of European identity by replacing national identities. In the UK identification with national symbols and institutions is much more than identification with European ones.¹⁹⁸² Britain is an island nation, also its identity is too strong because of memories of its past as an imperial power. It has had very close relations with the USA. Moreover, the UK still has a goal to play a leading role in the world.¹⁹⁸³

National unity was closely related with European integration in Germany, France and Italy after 1945 and in Spain after 1975. For these states, Europe "...is incorporated as an element of national self-understanding."¹⁹⁸⁴ Spain has a similar history to the UK, including foreign conquests and wealth, except experiencing dictatorship. Jauregui argues that in Spanish collective memory, becoming European represented "...the opportunity to abandon...backwardness."¹⁹⁸⁵ "Europe emerged as an instrument of demarcation against Franco."¹⁹⁸⁶ When Franco's dictatorship fell, Spanish people shouted in the streets that "we are Europeans now".¹⁹⁸⁷ At the end of the 1970s democratic Spain was portrayed as a European Spain. Thus, "Europe was a key instrument in the search for a new legitimate Spanish nationhood."¹⁹⁸⁸ EU membership was perceived as a confidence in the young democracy and a commitment to goals of modernity and freedom. In 2000 Eurobarometer survey, 65% of citizens said that they felt "Spanish and European".¹⁹⁸⁹ In Spain multiple identities are widespread among its citizens. It is one of the highest among the Member States, because of its historical background and institutional structure. In the post-World War II era, while Germany and Italy were reconstructing their national identities, they incorporated Europe as part of their national identities. During construction process of

¹⁹⁸² M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, "The Social Construction of 'Europe': Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain", p.346.

¹⁹⁸³ "Collective Memory: Intertwining Roots", *Magazine on European Research*, Special Issue, April 2005, retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/rtdinfo/special_ms/04/article_2316_en.html

¹⁹⁸⁴ J. O. Moller, *The Future European Model*, Westport CT, Praeger: Greenword Pub., 1995; quoted in B. Strath, "Introduction: Europe as a Discourse", p.32.

¹⁹⁸⁵ *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member States : Media , Elites and Civil Society- The Collective State of the Art and Historical Reports*, European Commission Pub.; quoted in "Collective Memory: Intertwining Roots", retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/rtdinfo/special_ms/04/article_2316_en.html

¹⁹⁸⁶ Pablo Jauregui, "Europeanism versus Africanism: Europe as a Symbol of Modernity and Democratic Renewal in Spain" in Mikael af Malmborg & B. Strath (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, Oxford: Berg Pub., 2002, p.18.

¹⁹⁸⁷ "Culture Wars", April 2, 2006.

¹⁹⁸⁸ P. Jauregui, "Europeanism versus Africanism: Europe as a Symbol of Modernity and Democratic Renewal in Spain", p.18.

¹⁹⁸⁹ "Collective Memory: Intertwining Roots", retrieved on February 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/rtdinfo/special_ms/04/article_2316_en.html

German identity, its “other” was Germany’s own past. Support to the European integration refers to overcoming of the country’s militarist past.¹⁹⁹⁰ Thomas Mann asserts that “we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany.”¹⁹⁹¹ He stated that:

...Germanness can not be understood without reference to Europe...modern Germany is identified with supporting Europe and European integration as the ultimate proof that the country has overcome its nationalist and militarist past.¹⁹⁹²

As Risse argues, federal states such as Germany more easily incorporate Europe¹⁹⁹³ in their collective identities. In contrast to German public opinion, German political elites supported the idea of leaving *Deutsche Mark* and accepting Euro which can be understood by their Europeanized nation-state identity.¹⁹⁹⁴ Italians usually perceive the EU more beneficial than their own political system. For them, “Europe” refers to “good governance”, its “other” became its own “bad governance.”¹⁹⁹⁵ Usually if the state is not trusted because of not being effective, the EU may be welcomed more easily.¹⁹⁹⁶ In such cases, the EU is usually perceived as a way to overcome deficiencies of the nation-state.

During the interviews conducted by the author, Coveney emphasized different perceptions of European identity in different Member States. He stated that:

...if you ask an Irish person, what is European identity, they will probably tell you something different from a German person...the EU as a project is seen as countries working together. Most Europeans have a national identity, before European identity. People are Irish first, European second...¹⁹⁹⁷

He emphasized the primacy of national identity for most of the citizens of the EU.

Consequently, European identity has been in interaction with the national identities. European identity has been under construction process in all of the Member States. It has been affected by that Member State’s history, political structure and efficiency of its

¹⁹⁹⁰ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, pp.498-500.

¹⁹⁹¹ Quoted in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.340.

¹⁹⁹² Quoted in T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.301. For further detail see T. Risse & D. Engelmann-Martin, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany” in A. Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the EU*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

¹⁹⁹³ T. Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and The Puzzles of European Integration”, p.291.

¹⁹⁹⁴ Thomas Risse, et al., “To Euro or Not to Euro?: The EMU and Identity Politics in the EU”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.5, No.2, 1999; cited in M. Marcussen & K. Roscher, “The Social Construction of ‘Europe’: Life-Cycles of Nation-State Identities in France, Germany and Great Britain”, p.344.

¹⁹⁹⁵ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.497.

¹⁹⁹⁶ G. Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, pp.31-33.

¹⁹⁹⁷ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

political institutions. As Spohn argues, the time of entry of a Member State in the EU and the length of its membership are also effective on their citizens' national identities and their level of European identity. For the citizens of the founding members of the EU, national and European identities are usually perceived as complementary with each other and¹⁹⁹⁸ they usually have stronger European identity compared to the new members.

IV.2.3. Comparison of Construction of European Identity within the EU with Nation-Building Process

The instruments which have been used by the EU in construction process of European identity are similar to the instruments which were used during nation-building. Although the EU and states have different institutional structures, even states are differentiated among themselves as nation-states, federal states and quasi-federal states; there are some similarities between construction of the EU and state-building process, thus, there are some similarities between construction of European identity and nation-building. This comparison helps to find out the unique characteristics of construction process of European identity. The EU has been using some instruments of state-building in construction of the EU. It has been also using some nation-building instruments not to build a European nation, but to construct a European political identity in addition to national and regional identities to increase the citizens' feeling of belonging to the EU, to provide its legitimacy and to maintain the ongoing integration process. In this part construction of European identity will be compared with nation-building process, in order to clarify the unique characteristics of construction of European identity within the EU.

IV.2.3.1. Comparison between State-Building and Construction of the EU

The EU has always been in an evolution process since its establishment in the 1950s.¹⁹⁹⁹ The nation-states have an evolving structure like the EU; but the evolution process of the EU has been much more rapid than the nation-states.²⁰⁰⁰ The EC was transformed to the EU with the Maastricht Treaty which does not have a legal personality.

¹⁹⁹⁸ W. Spohn, "National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe", p.10.

¹⁹⁹⁹ The EU is based on three communities which are the ECSC, which was created with the Paris Treaty in 1952, the EEC and EURATOM were created with the Rome Treaty in 1957.

²⁰⁰⁰ Philomena Murray, "The European Transformation of the Nation-State" in P. Murray & L. Holmes (eds.), *Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries*, p.44.

It has already acquired a lot of state-like characteristics such as a single currency, a central bank, a parliament, a supreme court, a military staff, even a flag and an anthem.²⁰⁰¹

Statehood can be defined as sovereignty over key functions within a certain territory. The EU may be regarded as “state-like” in terms of its regulatory functions.²⁰⁰² According to Schlesinger, the construction of the EU is similar to the administrative-bureaucratic mode of state formation, rather than an attempt of an ethnic group to create a state for itself. He asserts that political union and a common economic space are similar to some instruments of statehood.²⁰⁰³ According to Bruter, introduction of a European flag and a European anthem reflects part of the attempt to develop the EU along traditional model of the state;²⁰⁰⁴ but as Schöpflin argues, the EU lacks huge regulatory capacity of the state.²⁰⁰⁵ The main distinguishing characteristics of the EU from the nation-state are the absence of a shared language, a uniform media, common education system and a central state structure.²⁰⁰⁶ The political power in the EU is still based on national parties and national constituency. For nation-building and state-building, textbooks, museums, celebrations of memorial days, public monuments were crucial instruments.²⁰⁰⁷

The EU has passed beyond intergovernmental stage and has some state-like characteristics.²⁰⁰⁸ As it was mentioned by Stubb, the EU is more than an international organisation, less than a state.²⁰⁰⁹ The EU is much larger, abstract and complex entity than any nation-state. The EU can not rely on a common history as nation-states.²⁰¹⁰ D. de Villepin argues that we did not refuse the heritage of nation-state, but we constructed a new structure, thus we did not leave that model, rather we transcended it.²⁰¹¹ Laffan argues that the EU has used some symbols which are similar to traditional state-building

²⁰⁰¹ “Europe’s Divided Union” (A survey), *The Economist*, Vol. 372, No. 8394, September 25-October 1 2004, p.14.

²⁰⁰² P. Schmitter, *How to Democratize the EU... And Why Bother?*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp.15-19; cited in R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, p.247.

²⁰⁰³ Philip Schlesinger, “A Question of Identity” in C. Joyce (ed.), *Questions of Identity: A Selection from the Pages of New European*, p.193.

²⁰⁰⁴ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.128.

²⁰⁰⁵ G. Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, p.30.

²⁰⁰⁶ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.64.

²⁰⁰⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.8.

²⁰⁰⁸ T. Christiansen, K. Jorgensen & A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, pp.528-544; cited in R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, p.241.

²⁰⁰⁹ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

²⁰¹⁰ M. Haller, “Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? European Integration and the Relation Between National and European Identity”, p.291.

²⁰¹¹ D. de Villepin, “Avrupa İnsanı”, p.25.

instruments such as a flag.²⁰¹² The discourse about Europe appears that it “...tries to translate the national symbolism into a transnational symbolism.”²⁰¹³ R. Smith refers to symbols of the EU as “quasi-state symbolism”.²⁰¹⁴ Neumann argues that “building a European identity by means of the same symbols in competition with national ones invited competition, with nation-states being the home team.”²⁰¹⁵ He finds such attempts unsuccessful. In Lisbon Treaty there was not any reference to symbols of the EU which shows that the EU started to avoid constructing symbols which are in competition with national symbols. The EU law has never made explicit reference to the concept of stateness; but the principles of “direct effect” and “supremacy of EU law” are reminiscent of stateness²⁰¹⁶ and they reflect higher status of EU law over national law in certain fields. The *acquis communautaire* include some instruments of state-building, such as a common market, citizenship, a common monetary policy, increasing transfer of sovereignty in the field of security and justice. There is governance beyond the nation-state in Europe.²⁰¹⁷ It is rather difficult for the EU to transform to a federal state one day. As Llobera argues, the EU can not be built on the model of the nation-state.²⁰¹⁸

The EU does not have a monopoly of power in all policy fields like states. The EU has exclusive competences in certain policy fields and shared competences with Member States in some policy fields. For example, all of the Member States are not part of EMU. The CFSP is mostly under the control of national governments. Only some Member States are part of the Schengen area. The absence of statehood and nationhood at the EU level is reflected in the lack of EU-wide public sphere.²⁰¹⁹ Thus, the institutional structure of the EU has many different characteristics from a state. Wolton and Perez-Diaz compare the national public spheres and the European one, which has been subject to ongoing

²⁰¹² B. Laffan, “The EU and Its Institutions as Identity Builders”, p.83.

²⁰¹³ Klaus Eder, “Integration Through Culture? The Paradox of The Search for a European Identity” in K. Eder & B. Giesen, *European Citizenship Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, p.230.

²⁰¹⁴ Rachael Craufurd Smith, “Article 151 EC and European Identity” in Rachael Craufurd Smith (ed.), *Culture and EU Law*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.283.

²⁰¹⁵ I. B. Neumann, “European Identity and Its Changing Others”, p.9.

²⁰¹⁶ J. Shaw & A. Wiener, “The Paradox of the ‘European Polity’”, retrieved on June 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991001.html>. For further detail see K. Armstrong, “Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European Integration”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1998, pp.155-174; J. Shaw, “European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic”, *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1996, pp. 231-253.

²⁰¹⁷ M. Jachtenfuchs, “Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance”, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 1, No.2., pp. 115-133; cited in J. Shaw & A. Wiener, “The Paradox of the ‘European Polity’”, retrieved on June 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991001.html>

²⁰¹⁸ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p.168.

²⁰¹⁹ R. Bellamy, “Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship”, pp.248-250.

construction process. They argue that the national public spheres have developed over a long period of time, but construction process of European public sphere did not start long time ago. Secondly, national public spheres were constructed within clear-cut boundaries, but the EU has ambiguous boundaries. Thirdly, there are certain common national values, but it is harder to reach a consensus on common European values which are becoming universal with the effects of globalisation. Fourthly, the majority of national public spheres were constructed through communication in a common language. In the case of the EU the lack of a *lingua franca* makes it difficult to participate in a political dialogue, emergence of common ways of thinking and common attitudes more difficult. The development of English as a *de facto lingua franca* can be explained on instrumental basis.²⁰²⁰ Although some of the characteristics and instruments of the EU resemble states, the EU is a *sui generis* entity which has been in an ongoing construction process.

IV.2.3.2. Comparison between Construction of European Identity within the EU and Nation-Building

Nation-building and construction of European identity emerged in different circumstances; they have different dynamics and characteristics from each other; but the EU has been using some similar instruments to those of nation-building which have been effective on construction of European identity within the EU. Some scholars argue that construction of European identity is similar to nation-building process. Höjelid asserts that construction of European identity within the EU “resembles in many respects the propoganda campaigns of the nation-states” in the 19th century.²⁰²¹ Habermas argues that the “extremely artificial” construction of national identity in the 19th century shows that something analogous may be created at continental level.²⁰²² Kostakopoulou puts forward that during integration process of Europe, some assumptions from the national-statist paradigm has been borrowed. She argues that Euro-nationalist approach is based on the application of nationalist framework of analysis to European identity. According to this approach, the EU is “modelled on the patterns set by the formation of national

²⁰²⁰ Cited in “Who are Europeans?”, *Open Learn*, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm> For further detail see V. Perez-Diaz, “The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society” in J. Alexander (ed.), *Real Civil Societies*, London: Sage Pub., 1998.

²⁰²¹ S. Höjelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity”, p.7.

²⁰²² Jürgen Habermas, “Die Postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie” in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, Vol. 43, 1998; cited in L. Niethammer, “A European Identity?”, p.101.

communities in the 19th century.”²⁰²³ As Wintle proposes, to define European identity on civic or cultural basis, the concepts which were used in the literature about nations and states, are usually used.²⁰²⁴ At first sight, the discourse about Europe appears as it “tries to translate national symbolism into a transnational symbolism.”²⁰²⁵ The discourses of the EU are usually similar to those which were used at the national level. States used many symbols and instruments to establish a sense of loyalty with the national political community. Panebianco asserts that a parallel can be made between the process of nation-building and construction of European identity within the EU;²⁰²⁶ but as Spiering argues, nations are deeper and more essential entities than Europe. Europe still remains as an idealistic unit.²⁰²⁷ As Bauböck argues, there is no political will or capacity to make nation-building on a European scale.²⁰²⁸ Thus, construction of European identity is not a nation-building project on a European scale.

In 1860 after the unification of Italy, Italian nationalist Massimo D’Azeglio stated that “having made Italy, we must now make Italians.”²⁰²⁹ Mabel argues that a session of the EP may also begin with “having remade Europe, we must now make Europeans.”²⁰³⁰ As Anderson argues, national identities are the result of a centrally-engineered process of nation-building. Nation-states are constructed through print capitalism, mass communication, mass education, historiography and conscription.²⁰³¹ Laffan asserts that official policy of the EU is to construct Europe as an “imagined community”.²⁰³² Delanty contends that “cosmopolitan imagination” may be more suitable in the context of the EU. He recommends “the idea of **European Commonwealth**” as a new kind of political community. He emphasizes that collective goals are needed to be created for the EU. He recommends creating a European model of society which is based on recognition and

²⁰²³ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.27.

²⁰²⁴ M. Wintle, “Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience”, p.16.

²⁰²⁵ K. Eder, “Integration through Culture? The Paradox of the Search for a European Identity”, p.230.

²⁰²⁶ S. Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity: From Treaty Provisions to Public Opinion Attitudes”, p.32.

²⁰²⁷ M. Spiering, “National Identity and European Unity”, 1996.

²⁰²⁸ Rainer Bauböck, “Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union”, *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, Vol.8, No.2, July 2007, p.465.

²⁰²⁹ Quoted in Mabel Berezin, “Territory, Emotion and Identity: Spatial Recalibration in a New Europe” in Mabel Berezin & Martin Schain (eds.), *Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003, p.5.

²⁰³⁰ M. Berezin, “Territory, Emotion and Identity: Spatial Recalibration in a New Europe”, pp.5-6.

²⁰³¹ For further detail see B. Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, 1995.

²⁰³² B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, p. 96.

solidarity.²⁰³³ Although the EU has used some instruments to construct European identity, which are similar to nation-building process, it is too hard to establish a European educational system and European media. Contemporarily the official policy of the EU is not to construct “imagined community of Europeans”. In nation-building process ethnic and local identities were tried to be replaced by national identities.²⁰³⁴ European identity has not been constructed in the context of the EU for replacement of national and local identities with European identity.

In terms of national identities, common culture, customs, traditions, language, ancestry and common history are related with “**cultural**” understanding of identity; common rights, duties, common political and legal system are related with the “**civic**” understanding; a common system of social security is related with the “instrumental” or “**utilitarian**” basis of identities. In terms of European identity, common civilisation, history refers to an understanding of European identity on “cultural” basis. Common political, legal system, common rights and duties are related with European identity on “civic” basis. A common system of social protection, the right to freedom of movement and residence refer to a European identity on “utilitarian” basis.²⁰³⁵ The attachment to a nation is mostly based on cultural terms, but civic and utilitarian factors are also effective on the citizens’ feeling of belonging to a nation. The attachment to the EU is mostly based on civic or utilitarian terms. Eder argues that there are two main perceptions about construction of European identity. According to the “maximalist conception” of a European identity, it is perceived as being analogous to national identity; it would be constructed on the basis of its difference to neighbouring cultures. According to “minimalist conception” of a European identity, the boundaries are constructed through inclusion or exclusion on legal basis; this would make construction of boundaries flexible.²⁰³⁶ First one may be referred to as cultural understanding of European identity and the latter may be referred to as civic understanding of European identity.²⁰³⁷

The EU has been seen as the main instrument to end conflicts in Europe to establish peace and prosperity. As Llobera argues, nations were invented by using many instruments

²⁰³³ G. Delanty, Seminar at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007.

²⁰³⁴ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.6.

²⁰³⁵ F. Decker, “Governance Beyond the Nation-state: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the EU”, p.6.

²⁰³⁶ K. Eder, “Integration Through Culture? The Paradox of The Search for a European Identity”, pp.237-238.

²⁰³⁷ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.127-128.

such as media, literature, education, national language, construction of national myths, etc. On the other hand, the European cultural commonalities such as Greco-Roman tradition, Judeo-Christian ethics and Renaissance humanism are not sufficient to construct European identity, because language, religion, national myths and symbols divide Europeans.²⁰³⁸ National identities have much more essential characteristics than European identity. Thus, it was easier to build nations than constructing European identity. In comparison to nation-states, Europe lacks a pre-modern past which provides nation-states historical depth and emotional loyalty.²⁰³⁹ European identity “lacks the hundreds of years within which European nation-states were consolidated.”²⁰⁴⁰ The EU is a relatively young social construct which lacks unique identity characteristics.²⁰⁴¹ According to the communitarian approach to European identity, “the thin universal values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights are not sufficiently strong to sustain the legitimacy of a democratic polity at the post-national level.”²⁰⁴² On the other hand, the cosmopolitan understanding of political membership is too inclusive; it can not clearly differentiate who belongs to that political community.²⁰⁴³ The cosmopolitan collective identity is inclusive and pluralistic. There is no need for an “other” to determine who constitutes “us”. By having a constitution, peoples of Europe may have a collective political identity. According to this perspective, definite political and geographical boundaries of a nation-state and thick common characteristics are not prerequisites for legitimate democratic rule.²⁰⁴⁴

States play the role as primary “identity-carrying organisational vessel”.²⁰⁴⁵ The EU lacks most of the “nation-state-like-identity shaping tools” to construct its identity.²⁰⁴⁶ According to Gellner, “it is the state, more than any other political institution that offers

²⁰³⁸ J. R. Llobera, “The Concept of Europe as an Idee-Force”, p. 165.

²⁰³⁹ V. Bakir, “An Identity for Europe? The Role of the Media”, p.190.

²⁰⁴⁰ A. Caviades, “The Role of Language in Nation-Building within the EU”, p.263.

²⁰⁴¹ G. M. Breakwell, “Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of EU Institutions”, p.31.

²⁰⁴² Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, “Between Cosmopolis and Community: Three Models of Rights and Democracy within the EU” in Held Archibugi & Kohler (eds.), *Transnational Democracy*, Cambridge Polity Press, 1998, pp. 152-178; quoted in S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.40.

²⁰⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴⁴ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 42.

²⁰⁴⁵ L. E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p.16.

²⁰⁴⁶ Anthony Smith, “A Europe of Nations or the Nation of Europe?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.30, No.2, 1993, p.134.

the prime means of cultural reproduction in the modern world.’’²⁰⁴⁷ The most important instrument of state is state-organized education.²⁰⁴⁸ The “European dimension of education” supports multilingualism; whereas the 19th century nation-states chose one language as the official language.²⁰⁴⁹ The high degree of linguistic diversity decreases the possibility of the emergence of feelings of belonging to a common entity. As argued by Anderson, the elites gradually stop using elite language such as Latin and they began to speak different national languages in their newly formed nation-states. At the beginning of the development process of nationalism, the decision was taken by the elites to provide mass education for people living in their states.²⁰⁵⁰ On the other hand, in the EU the primary goal is to “introduce European dimension into education” and make cooperation among the Member States to increase exchanges among students and professors. European identity has been tried to be constructed through creation of European-wide educational, academic and political fields. Although there are some efforts towards Europeanization of the media, public opinions are mostly formed through the national media.²⁰⁵¹ The European public sphere is different from the national public spheres. The European public sphere is multilingual and multinational. It is a “public sphere of experts” and it is less open to the general public in comparison to the national public spheres. The signs of an emerging public sphere are: The debates on European civilisation and European identity, growing public sphere of experts, the formation of a European civil society and increasing number of interest groups, since the 1980s there has been a growing importance of European themes in election campaigns. Thus, European public sphere has been under construction and it has peculiar characteristics.²⁰⁵²

In the case of the EU, there is a lack of political leadership, the EU-wide election campaigns²⁰⁵³ and European political parties. As Fossum argues, the Member States still have the most important traditional mechanisms for socializing their citizens, such as their school systems and military,²⁰⁵⁴ but national conscription programs which are important

²⁰⁴⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983, p.34.

²⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴⁹ P. Hansen, *Europeans Only? Essays on Identity Politics and the EU*, p. 130.

²⁰⁵⁰ For further detail see B. Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, 1995.

²⁰⁵¹ D. Jacobs & R. Maier, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction”, pp.19-20.

²⁰⁵² Hartmut Kaelble, “European Symbols, 1945-2000: Concept, Meaning and Historical Change” in Luisa Passerini (ed.), *Figures d’Europe: Images and Myths of Europe*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2003, pp.55-57.

²⁰⁵³ V. A. Schmidt, “The EU: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?”, p.981.

²⁰⁵⁴ John Erik Fossum, “Identity Politics in the EU”, *European Integration*, Vol. 23, No. 4, July 2001, pp.400-401.

instruments for transmitting national identity to nation's young men, have been abolished in France, Germany and Italy²⁰⁵⁵ which shows that the nation-states have been also in an ongoing transformation process.

The elites had a crucial role in construction of national identities; without their systematic efforts, national consciousness would have hardly developed.²⁰⁵⁶ Most national movements were initiated by the national elites. The EU is also an elite-driven project.²⁰⁵⁷ Neumann argues that regions emerge after the emergence of region-builders who “imagine certain spatial and chronological identity for a region and disseminate this imagined identity to others.”²⁰⁵⁸ According to Shore, as the nation-state was forged by the elites whose goal was to give nationalist consciousness to the masses, European consciousness is also being developed from above by the EU politicians, bureaucrats and marketing professionals.²⁰⁵⁹ European integration still remains as an elite-driven project. High politics in the EU is mostly conducted by the national governments.²⁰⁶⁰ Contemporarily there are important differences between ideas of the political leaders of the Member States, political parties, as well as between the economic, political and cultural elites,²⁰⁶¹ in terms of their perceptions about the EU. There are not enough indications of the presence of European intellectual elite who have been playing a role similar to those, who worked during nation-building process.²⁰⁶²

The nation-states have practiced a complex policy of both remembering and forgetting to create a feeling of belonging to that nation. The constructed “German” or “Italian” had to actively forget his regional and ethnic identities by adopting a national identity. They usually do not totally forget their past, but at least primacy of national identity over all other collective identities was emphasized. As van Ham argues, the EU

²⁰⁵⁵ “Commentary: A Common Identity for Europe? You Better Believe It”, *Business Week Online*, November 20, 2000, retrieved on March 8, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.businessweek.com/2000.../b3/08227.htm?scriptFrame>

²⁰⁵⁶ M. Haller, “Epilogue: Europe as a New Nation or a Community of Nations?”, p. 233; cited in S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos”, p.15.

²⁰⁵⁷ R. Herrmann & M. B. Brewer, “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU”, p.15.

²⁰⁵⁸ Iver Neumann, “A Region Building Approach to Northern Europe”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, 1994, p.58.

²⁰⁵⁹ C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, p.64.

²⁰⁶⁰ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 74.

²⁰⁶¹ M. Haller, “Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? European Integration and the Relation between National and European Identity”, 2004.

²⁰⁶² S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos”, pp.15-30.

has not used such a collective process of forgetting.²⁰⁶³ During construction process of European identity, national and regional identities are respected and protected. From the 1970s onwards, there was a Commission campaign for adoption of the slogan of “unity in diversity”.²⁰⁶⁴ In the Maastricht Treaty it was stated that the national identities have to be respected. This is one of the main differences between nation-building and European identity construction. It is easier to build something, if you erase the older one. In the case of the EU, the national identities are being protected through nation-states, national media, national education systems and national languages. Thus, European identity does not replace national identities, but it has led to blurring of the boundaries which divide national identities.

A “new European historiography” has been tried to be constructed for construction of European identity.²⁰⁶⁵ Some books on European history have tried to reconstruct the past. They were sometimes published simultaneously in different European languages which do not present history from the perspective of one nation. Instead of conflicts among different nations of Europe, shared European heritage was emphasized and histories of local and regional communities are also mentioned.²⁰⁶⁶ As it was argued, it is too hard to prepare such common history books. During construction of national identities, Charles V was described by German historians as German, by Spanish historians as Spanish and by Belgian historians as Belgian. In the 20th century, he started to be referred to as the ancestor of Europe like Charlemagne. The area which was controlled by these two emperors mostly coincided with the territory of the Common Market. C. de Gaulle in his speech on 3 July 1962, referred to the EU as a dream of Charles V. Today he is still presented as a symbol of Europe and as part of its common cultural heritage.²⁰⁶⁷ It is an example of reconstruction of history according to different perspectives. It shows that the same symbol can be used during nation-building process of different nations and also during construction of European identity.

²⁰⁶³ P. van Ham, , “Identity Beyond The State: The Case of the EU”, p.13.

²⁰⁶⁴ For further detail see J.T. Leerssen & M. van Montfrans (eds.), “Borders and Territories”, *Yearbook of European Studies*, Vol.6, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.

²⁰⁶⁵ K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.20. For further detail see E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since the 1780’s: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 1990.

²⁰⁶⁶ T.H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Pluto Press, 1993; quoted in K. von Benda-Beckmann & M. Verkuyten, “Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development in Europe”, p.20.

²⁰⁶⁷ P. Burke, “Foundation Myths and Collective Identities in Early Modern Europe”, p.122.

Memory is an important factor for nation-building. There are few European-wide memories. As Delanty argues, the EU is “relatively memoryless”. For example, there is no uprising which includes all Europeans in the history of Europe. Delanty argues that the founding fathers of the EU were not so charismatic figures. The EU has been usually seen as a problem solving organisation by people, instead of having a cultural memory like nation-states.²⁰⁶⁸ Renan perceived nations as a community of shared memory. He also adds that what one nation wishes to forget, another wishes to remember. Thus, “the more nations there are in the EU, the more diverse the family of national memories, the more difficult it is to construct shared myths about a common past.”²⁰⁶⁹ Instead of emphasizing a shared past, identification with the EU may emerge through emphasis on common goals, the existence of a ‘common space’ within which, people, goods and capital can circulate freely and the emphasis on necessity to act together to respond to shared economic and environmental challenges.²⁰⁷⁰ New common goals of the EU have to be found out. Collective efforts to realize common goals and interests will be much more effective on construction of European identity within the EU.

The nation’s flag and memorials are everywhere within the state which always remind the citizens of their common past. Smith argues that it is very hard for the peoples of Europe to feel European, without shared memories, common symbols, myths and monuments. He asked “who will die for Europe or the EU?”²⁰⁷¹ He perceives national identity as a construction on the basis of a pre-modern ethnic core. Because of “rootedness of national identities”, they are strong and permanent. Smith sees the integration project of Europe through the lens of the nation-states. He perceives nation-building as a model of construction of European identity. He criticizes the civic understanding of European identity; he finds it “artificial” and “memoryless”. According to him, European identity should be constructed as a “collective cultural identity, for which Europeans should make sacrifices...”²⁰⁷² Although it will be too difficult and long process, he is in favour of construction of European identity on cultural basis. According to him, currently a united Europe which is based on a European identity could only emerge slowly through the

²⁰⁶⁸ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.133.

²⁰⁶⁹ Quoted in T. G. Ash, “Europe’s True Stories”, February 2007.

²⁰⁷⁰ M. Roche, “Citizenship, Popular Culture and Europe”, in N. Stevenson(ed.), *Culture and Citizenship*, London: Sage Pub., 2001, p.74; cited in R. C. Smith, “Article 151 EC and European Identity”, p.282.

²⁰⁷¹ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.139.

²⁰⁷² A. D. Smith, “A Europe of Nations: Or the Nation of Europe?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.30, No.2, 1993, pp.129-135; quoted in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, pp.28-29.

formation of European memories,²⁰⁷³ myths and symbols. According to him, national identity derives from a deep-rooted sense of ethnic community; on the contrary Europe appears as a relatively superficial and a utopian dream of intellectuals. Thus, Europe is deficient in comparison to national identities which are “vivid, accessible and well-established”.²⁰⁷⁴ He argues that the attempts to construct European identity on the basis of shared cultural elements have to compete with the deeply rooted myths, symbols and memories of the nations.²⁰⁷⁵ Smith has doubts about, whether the EU leaders have the capability to construct European identity on the basis of a “memoryless” artificial culture.²⁰⁷⁶ Smith sees nation-building and construction of European identity similar to each other; he perceives them as competing processes. Smith is pessimistic about European identity, if it stays as a “patchwork, memoryless, scientific culture held together solely by political will and economic interest.”²⁰⁷⁷ He argues that the EU is deficient in terms of “levels of affective attachment and identification”. In spite of its deficiency in terms of identity, many people recognize it as a framework for politics alongside national level.²⁰⁷⁸

The idea of a ‘nation’ has stronger roots among the peoples of Europe than the idea of ‘Europe’. In many fields of “everyday experience, such as the media, sports and even sense of humour, help to reproduce awareness of ‘us’ as a nation.”²⁰⁷⁹ Stavrakakis argues that the main deficiencies of European identity are things which are crucial in reproduction of social and political identification such as enjoyment and passion.²⁰⁸⁰ The European project lacks an emotional dimension, it is usually perceived as too cold and bureaucratic.²⁰⁸¹ There is no European equivalent of ritual and ceremony of collective identification of a national community. There is neither a European ceremony for the fallen in battle, nor a European political mythology.²⁰⁸² Without these it is too difficult to construct European identity among the peoples of Europe especially in cultural terms. Only emphasis on the material benefits of integration will not guarantee continued commitment

²⁰⁷³ A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991, p.152.

²⁰⁷⁴ For further detail see A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, 1991.

²⁰⁷⁵ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.139-142.

²⁰⁷⁶ A. D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, pp.65-66.

²⁰⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.245.

²⁰⁷⁸ T. Banchoff & M. Smith, “Introduction” in T. Banchoff and M. Smith(eds.), *Legitimacy and the EU*, London: Routledge Pub., 1999, pp.1-2; cited in Y. Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity”, p.83.

²⁰⁷⁹ D. Dunkerley, L. Hodgson, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.122.

²⁰⁸⁰ Y. Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity”, p.89.

²⁰⁸¹ J. R. Llobera, “What Unites Europeans?”, p.192.

²⁰⁸² A. Smith, “National Identity and The Idea of European Unity”, pp.73-74.

of the peoples of Europe to the EU. Political communities are based not only on material benefits, also on sentiment, loyalty and solidarity.²⁰⁸³ During European identity construction process, “identification with the EU as a political and economic entity” has been emphasized.²⁰⁸⁴ Cederman argues that “without the clear boundaries and identity (re)producing processes of the nation-state...” construction of a European political identity is almost impossible.²⁰⁸⁵ “The factors that produced national identities are non-repeatable...”²⁰⁸⁶ The construction of European identity and nation-building emerged in different contexts. As Cederman argues, European identity is still very “thin” and national identity is “thick”; but even it is “thin”, it is necessary for minimal political communication within the public sphere²⁰⁸⁷ which has been under construction.

Another difference between nation-building and construction of European identity is that, in nation-building the “other” is crucial. As Barnavi argues, nations were constructed against other nations. A 19th century German historian stated that the French made the English, the English made the French; the French will make the Germans.²⁰⁸⁸ Identities in the nation-state system are based on the construction of clear inside/outside and self/other distinctions.²⁰⁸⁹ On the other hand, the EC was not established against a concrete “other”. Bauböck argues that the major obstacles of building a common European nation are the absence of vital threats and the constitution. Bauböck states that:

Heterogeneous cultures were melted into homogeneous nations in revolutions against ancient regimes or colonial powers and in war efforts against external powers threatening to invade the territory.²⁰⁹⁰

Especially in the post-Cold War era, there is not a common concrete “other” of the EU. If there were different supranational integration processes similar to the EU in different parts of the world, or if the EU had a common threat such as communism during the Cold War, it would be easier to construct European identity.

²⁰⁸³ B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, pp.95-96.

²⁰⁸⁴ M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p.125; cited in Y. Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity”, p.83.

²⁰⁸⁵ L. E. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos”, p. 152.

²⁰⁸⁶ D. Beetham & Christopher Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.37.

²⁰⁸⁷ L. E. Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs”, p.5.

²⁰⁸⁸ Quoted in E. Barnavi, “European Identity and Ways of Promoting It”, p.92.

²⁰⁸⁹ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 27.

²⁰⁹⁰ R. Bauböck, “Three Conceptions of a European Political Identity”, retrieved on March 10, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-04--4.html>

In the EC Treaty there is a reference to the “European peoples”.²⁰⁹¹ On the contrary, in nation-building one nation was constructed, although there may be various ethnic groups within that nation. Most nation-states include more than one ethnic community, but one common nation was constructed. Thus, even within a plural society there is one core group such as the English in Britain and Castilians in Spain.²⁰⁹² National identity is based on a core group; on the contrary there is not any core nation in the EU which makes construction of European identity more difficult.

There is no internal border controls in ‘Schengenland’, which includes Norway, who is not an EU member, but the UK who is a member, is not part of the Schengen area. Some of the Member States have not started to use Euro, because of not meeting the convergence criteria or some of them like the UK and Denmark do not prefer to leave their national currencies. The Member States may have opt-outs in certain policy fields. The participation of different Member States in different policy fields has negatively affected construction of European identity. In the case of nation-states, national governments have sovereignty over all territory and in every policy field which makes nation-building easier than construction of European identity.

One of the problems of the construction of European identity within the EU is, what Gilroy calls “cultural racism”. European identity which has been constructed within the EU does not make any reference to the contribution of people of non-European origin.²⁰⁹³ The position of immigrants, especially the Muslim immigrants and their contributions to construction of European identity has not been mentioned. In a study of how EC populations define foreigners which was based on Eurobarometer data from 1988 to 1992, it was found that the “other” refers to the non-national immigrant groups in their own states, particularly those who have non-Western origin such as Arabs, Asians and Turks.²⁰⁹⁴ This kind of exclusivist European identity may cause some problems. These immigrant groups may feel that they are excluded and discriminated. Instead of common cultural characteristics, common civic values and goals of the EU should be emphasized to

²⁰⁹¹ Quoted in T. M. J. Möllers, *The Role of Law in European Integration: In Search of a European Identity*, p.86.

²⁰⁹² J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.182.

²⁰⁹³ For further detail see P. Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, London: Hutchinson, 1987.

²⁰⁹⁴ D. Fuchs, J. Gerhards & E. Roller, “Nationalism versus Eurocentrism?: The Construction of Collective Identities in Western Europe” in M. Martiniello(ed.) *Migration, Citizenship and Ethno-national Identities in the EU*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, pp.165-178; cited in M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, p.128.

construct an inclusive European identity. Another problem which has been effective on construction of European identity is “scapegoating” which can be defined as the “populist rhetoric of conscious blame shifting” that refers to “Brussels made me do it”, cause construction of the EU as a “remote bureaucracy”.²⁰⁹⁵ The national governments can easily blame the EU about the activities which are not supported by their national electorates. The institutions of the EU have often been blamed by the national governments for the policies which are least supported by their public. Usually the national governments have used the EU institutions to take credit for good policies and as an excuse for bad ones.²⁰⁹⁶

Some scholars argue that European identity can not be compared with national identity. According to Kohli, “the study of European identity can not take its clues from national identity, neither in form, nor in substance.”²⁰⁹⁷ P. van Ham argues that construction of European identity do not have to be modeled on construction of national identities.²⁰⁹⁸ Pantel asserts that European identity can not be compared with national identity; because the EU is a polity which is so different from the nation-state. According to her, Europe must be imagined, but in new ways and the principle of “**unity in diversity**” is the only suitable way for construction of European identity.²⁰⁹⁹ As Cerutti argues, Europe will not be a ‘melting pot’ of cultures. The European citizens have been in interaction and cooperation with each other, rather than merging into one culture.²¹⁰⁰ If the EU is able to maintain its cohesion, while having a dynamic structure, it will go on being an attractive regional entity. One of the main challenges of the EU is to construct unity, while maintaining diversities. It has to balance dynamism and stability, cohesion and plurality. To realize these, European identity has to be constructed as a flexible identity which is based on mutual recognition and respect to national, regional identities and it has to be negotiated constantly.²¹⁰¹ According to “futurists” the vision for a common future has an important role in construction of European identity. They argue that the European project should not be based on the 19th century format of nation-state building.²¹⁰² In the

²⁰⁹⁵ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p. 262.

²⁰⁹⁶ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, pp.68-69.

²⁰⁹⁷ M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, p.113.

²⁰⁹⁸ P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, p.73.

²⁰⁹⁹ M. Pantel, “Unity in Diversity: Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy”, p. 58.

²¹⁰⁰ F. Cerutti, “Towards The Political Identity of the Europeans: An Introduction”, p.23.

²¹⁰¹ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 77.

²¹⁰² S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos”, p.16.

case of the EU, instead of constructing European identity on the basis of a common history and a culture, common future and goals should be emphasized.

The EU can not be constructed on the basis of model of nation-state building. As Blavoukos and Sigalas argue, it is almost impossible to construct a pan-European nation.²¹⁰³ It is unlikely that European identity will lead to the emergence of the sorts of passions and loyalty that people feel towards their nations;²¹⁰⁴ because construction of European identity has many different characteristics from nation-building. Ash argues that European identity will not be constructed in the way nations had been constructed.²¹⁰⁵ Ash states that:

Our sense of European togetherness should not be achieved by the negative stereotyping of an enemy or ‘other’, as Britishness was constructed in the 18th and 19th centuries, by contrast with a stereotyped France.²¹⁰⁶

He argues that “negative stereotyping of others” and “myth-making about our own collective past” are attempts of “Euronationalism” which refers to using of nation-building methods at the European level.”²¹⁰⁷ He emphasizes that construction of European identity is different from nation-building. He states that:

Our new story will never generate the kind of fiery allegiances that were characteristic of the pre-1914 nation-state...Our enterprise does not need or even want that kind of emotional fire. Europeanness remains a secondary, cooler identity. Europeans today are not called upon to die for Europe.²¹⁰⁸

He emphasizes that European identity do not have to be constructed on emotional basis. If we compare state-building with construction of the EU, there are many differences, in accordance with this; nation-building has many differences from European identity construction. The EU is much bigger and complex entity than nation-states. Thus, institutional framework of a state, in which nation-building occurs, is different than institutional structure of the EU, where construction of European identity has been still ongoing. Moreover, the perceptions of Member States about the EU are very different from each other, which have also negatively affected construction of European identity. Even the elites of the EU have different perceptions about the EU. Thus, it is too hard to agree

²¹⁰³ S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, “The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos”, pp.16-30.

²¹⁰⁴ D. Dunkerley, L. Hodgson, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, p.121.

²¹⁰⁵ T. G. Ash, “Europe’s True Stories”, February 2007.

²¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

on the necessity to construct a European identity.²¹⁰⁹ According to the interviews conducted by the author, it can be argued that to construct a European identity is not the common goal of the EU elites, which makes this process more difficult.

Using some similar instruments to nation-building by the EU can not provide the same result. The main reason is that their construction process occurs in different institutional frameworks and under different circumstances. European integration is not a European state-building, thus construction of European identity within the EU is not a European nation-building. Primarily the degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in the EU is much more than in any nation-state. Although there are some similarities, the instruments of European identity construction have been much weaker than those which were used during nation-building. Moreover, European integration process has been driven primarily by economic aims.²¹¹⁰ Thus, it is very difficult for the EU to have a common identity, which is equivalent to Member States' sense of "nationhood".²¹¹¹ The nation-state model is based on the existence of *demos*. It is too hard to construct European *demos* in the traditional sense; but the necessity to create a "people's Europe" and to strengthen the public's identification with the European project has been debated since the 1970s.²¹¹² Weiler states that:

The conceptualization of a European *demos* should not be based on real or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities of shared histories, nor on the construction of a European 'national' myth of the type which constitutes the identity of the organic nation.²¹¹³

Thus, during construction of European identity within the EU, some similar instruments to those of nation-building have been used, but construction process of European identity has many unique characteristics and it can not be based on the model of nation-building.

IV.2.4. Compatibility of National Identities and European Identity: Contradictory or Complementary?

European identity has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU, which has been affected by many factors that are unique to this process. European identity

²¹⁰⁹ L.M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.7.

²¹¹⁰ G. Marks, "Territorial Identities in the EU", p.86.

²¹¹¹ V. A. Schmidt, "The EU: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?", p.982.

²¹¹² B. Laffan, "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe", pp.95-96.

²¹¹³ J.H.H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.344.

has been in interaction with national and regional identities which have affected the ongoing construction process of European identity which has also led to transformation of national and regional identities. There are two main perceptions about the interactions between European identity and national identities. One of them is that European identity may replace national identities; the other one is that European identity supplements national identities.²¹¹⁴ The second option fits the current trends in the EU much more.

On the one hand, Europe supports and reinforces national identities; on the other hand, it is perceived as a challenge to them.²¹¹⁵ Bruter mentions two hypotheses about compatibility of European identity and national identities. According to the first hypotheses, “people with weaker national and sub-national identities would be more likely to identify with Europe.”²¹¹⁶ According to second hypothesis, identities are complementary, people who have strong regional and national identities, generally have strong European identity simultaneously. There is no contradiction between political identities; instead there is a “positive correlation between different territorially defined political identities.”²¹¹⁷ According to his surveys, “...European, national, regional and local identities of citizens are positively rather than negatively correlated...”²¹¹⁸ He argues that the citizens who identify civically or culturally to Europe, may also feel closer to their nation.²¹¹⁹ According to his surveys, positive correlation is strongest between closest territorial levels, such as European and national identities or national and regional identities. For example “...France has the lowest average levels of regional and local identifications, but the highest levels of European and national ones...”²¹²⁰ Usually people primarily have stronger national identities and perceive European identity as complementary to their national identities. According to the public opinion surveys, the main division is between people who only have national identity and those who have primarily national and secondarily European identity.²¹²¹

²¹¹⁴ B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.13.

²¹¹⁵ J. O. Moller, *The Future European Model*, 1995; cited in B. Strath, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse”, p.32.

²¹¹⁶ M.Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.115-116.

²¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.169.

²¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.115-116.

²¹²¹ T. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration”, pp.166-167.

The statist model is based on central political institutions and a national identity; but this model does not fit the structure of the EU, which is a multi-level polity. Thus, European identity can not be a substitute for national identity. National identity and regional identity are still the primary focus of cultural identity for most of the peoples of Europe.²¹²² Increasing numbers of empirical research, some of which were conducted by constructivists show that European identities, discourses and public spheres are still dominated by their national counterparts.²¹²³

Construction of European identity is not opposed to national identities. European identity and national identities differ in both “intensity and nature” and they are complementary with each other.²¹²⁴ Duchesne and Frogner argue that there is no contradiction between national and European identities. “People, who fully identify with their country, will tend to identify with Europe as well...”²¹²⁵ Thus, strong identification with a nation does not have to be an obstacle to support for European integration.²¹²⁶ According to Delanty, national identities and European identity are inseparable. He tries to find out distinctive characteristics of European identity. He argues that national identity is “particularistic”, on the contrary European identity is “universalistic”.²¹²⁷ The universalistic character of European identity makes it harder to differentiate “European” from “global”. As Delanty argues, because of recognition of diversity, European identity can not be an alternative, even a challenge to national identities.²¹²⁸ He asserts that expressions of European identity can be observed in national or regional contexts²¹²⁹ which have been enmeshed with each other. He states two perceptions about European identity. Post-nationalists believe that the EU can construct a post-national identity which is based on a “transnational or supra *demos*”. On the other hand, Eurosceptics argue that European identity can not compete with national identities, Europeanization should be limited to economic and political management and identity should be left to nation-states. According

²¹²² M. Pantel, “Unity in Diversity: Cultural Policy and EU Legitimacy”, p.47.

²¹²³ J. T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics, p.10.

²¹²⁴ T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.36.

²¹²⁵ S. Duchesne & A.P. Frogner, “Is There a European Identity?” in O. Niedermayer & R. Sinnott (eds.), 1995, p. 203; quoted in J. Schild, “National v. European Identities? French and Germans in the European Multi-Level System”, p.340.

²¹²⁶ J. Schild, “National v. European Identities? French and Germans in the European Multi-Level System”, p.341.

²¹²⁷ Gerard Delanty, “The Transformation of National Identity and the Cultural Ambivalence of European Identity: Democratic Identification in a Post-national Europe”, *European Journal of Media and Culture*, 1995, pp. 23-29.

²¹²⁸ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.132.

²¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.141.

to this perspective, the EU is only seen as a “problem-solving entity”.²¹³⁰ Contemporarily, the EU is not only an economic entity and European identity has been under construction process within the EU, without replacing national identities.

The official doctrine of the EU is that national identities and European identity are complementary with each other.²¹³¹ During the Europeanization process national identities have been transformed. During this process, national memories have been reconstructed, but they have not been substituted by European collective memory.²¹³² Lord Plumb who was one of the MEPs states that “I do not think that anyone could argue that since 1958 the French have become less French, the German less German, the Italians less Italian or the British less British.”²¹³³ As some scholars argue, the identification with European integration does not have to be necessarily same or intense like national identities.²¹³⁴ Weiler asserts that European civic public can coexist with national publics. As he argues, within the EU there may be a double membership of a “national ethno-cultural community” and a “supranational, civic and value-driven *demos*.”²¹³⁵ According to Weiler, the EU preserves the originality of the nations; it does not create a European nation as a “melting pot”, as in the case of the USA. European political identity is “...coming together on the basis of shared values, a shared understanding of rights and societal duties and shared rational, intellectual culture which transcends organic-national differences.”²¹³⁶ As Weiler argues, the ideal is preserving national identities while constructing a European identity for legitimacy of the integration, to increase solidarity and trust among the citizens without transforming the EU into a state.²¹³⁷ According to Habermas, construction of a

²¹³⁰ G. Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity”, p.128.

²¹³¹ M. Haller, “Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? European Integration and the Relation Between National and European Identity”, p.270.

²¹³² W. Spohn, “National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe”, pp.3-4.

²¹³³ Lord Plumb, Carole Tongue & Florus Wijsenbeek, *Shaping Europe: Reflections of Three MEP's*, London: Federal Trust Pub., 2000, p.57.

²¹³⁴ P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.148.

²¹³⁵ J. H. H. Weiler, “Fin-de-siecle Europe” in R. Dehousse (ed.), *Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?*, Munich: Beck, 1994, pp. 203-216; cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, p.32.

²¹³⁶ J.H.H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35, No.1, 1997, pp.117-121.

²¹³⁷ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p.53. For further detail see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, 1997.

European post-national civic community, co-existing side by side with national or local identities is the goal.²¹³⁸

The type of identity needed for a legitimate Union is related with the type of political system of the EU. Its functioning as a non-state political system would decrease the challenge of identity formation.²¹³⁹ If the EU has no need to command a monopoly of violence, get taxes from its citizens or to be the final rule-making authority in all policy fields, it will demand less loyalty from the EU citizens than the nation-states.²¹⁴⁰ Thus, what kind of European identity should be constructed is closely related with the structure of the EU. Fossum contends that the European integration provides a suitable platform for having a national and European identity simultaneously.²¹⁴¹ As Fossum argues, the EU is a complex entity with supranational, transnational and intergovernmental characteristics which provides a suitable framework for having a wide range of identities.²¹⁴² Political symbolism of the EU is complementary to national symbols.²¹⁴³ In the Maastricht Treaty, the relationship between European identity and national identities is based on the principle of “respect and compatibility”.²¹⁴⁴

Contemporarily, identities become complex and overlapping. Beetham and Lord argue that people may identify with the EU, because it provides a framework in which all other identities that people have stronger emotional attachments such as ethnic or national, can be managed and prevented from conflicting with each other.²¹⁴⁵ Thus, the framework of the EU provides conciliation of ethnic or national rivalries within Member states by providing a supranational framework. Constructivist scholars like Hopf and Zehfuss see identities as multiple and fluid.²¹⁴⁶ The framework of the EU provides a suitable atmosphere for the presence of multiple identities. During the interviews which were conducted by the author, none of the interviewees mentioned the possibility of replacing

²¹³⁸ For further detail see Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, Cambridge: Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996.

²¹³⁹ J. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, p.260; cited in D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.38.

²¹⁴⁰ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.38.

²¹⁴¹ J. E. Fossum, “Identity Politics in the European Union”, pp. 375-376.

²¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p.75.

²¹⁴³ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p.52.

²¹⁴⁴ Quoted in S. Panebianco, “European Citizenship and European Identity : From Treaty Provisions to Public Opinion Attitudes”, p.29.

²¹⁴⁵ D. Beetham & C. Lord, *Legitimacy and the EU*, p.42.

²¹⁴⁶ J. T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics, p.4.

European identity with national identity. Few of them stated that they prefer to have an “imagined European community”, but they admitted that it is almost impossible. When it was asked that “do you think that there will be an imagined European community one day, which is complementary to nations of Europe?”, Duff replied that “I hope so. That is what we are trying to achieve.”²¹⁴⁷ When it was asked that whether he is optimistic about it or not, he replied that “no, I just said I hope so.”²¹⁴⁸ He implied that he is pessimistic about the emergence of a European imagined community one day which is complementary to nations of Europe.

There is scepticism among the public opinions of the Member States about the EU. Discourses of the national elites, the national media and the education systems have been all effective on their perceptions. During the interviews conducted by the author, Özdemir stated that:

...recently religion is removed from identity cards in Greece. The response of the Orthodox community is, we endured against the Ottomans, but the EU is deleting Greek, Orthodox identity...²¹⁴⁹

It shows that the EU is perceived as a threat to their national and religious identity by some Greeks.

Most of the MEPs who were interviewed see national and European identity as complementary with each other. Coveney argued that:

...for some people there is a clash between national identity versus European identity, for me it is the opposite. The more Irish we are...the more European we have become. Before we join the EU, we were totally dependent on Britain for imports and exports... but we now see Britain in the same way as we see Spain, France...we have developed as a small country... independently of a dominant neighbour. It is the same for other countries, like...Slovenia, Slovakia...they are now developing in their own right as independent European countries, as opposed to being in the shadow of Russia...**European identity can actually promote national identity**, as opposed to take away from it...I think the same can be the case for Turkey...I do not accept that, by joining the EU, you become less Turkish. You become more European...the British are they less British? No...they reinforce that all the time on the international stage through the EU...there would be many people who will say in Turkey, if we will join the EU, we will give up our independence...but our experience is the opposite, **we become more independent**, we have our national voice through the EU and more people listen it, because you are speaking as part of the union of 450 million people, if Turkey will join, it will be over half a billion people and Turkey will be part of that voice, but it will be Turkish voice...Turkey will have a more say in international affairs, increasing Turkey’s importance internationally as a member of the EU...²¹⁵⁰

²¹⁴⁷ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

²¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²¹⁵⁰ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

He emphasized that being an EU member has not decreased the strength of national identities; instead it has strengthened them, such as in the case of Ireland who has developed so much since being a member of the EU, it has become more independent and has a stronger voice in international relations. Coveney added that:

...the EU will never replace Britain for British people, France for French people...you need to emphasize that all the time in Turkey, because people are afraid that they will lose their identity, their religion, culture...Turkey is a very large, very proud country. But it is no larger and no more proud than some of the other big countries in the EU...they have absolutely kept their national identity...the EU budget go into that...language, culture and heritage are important to most of the Europeans. If Turkey will join, from human rights and fundamental rights point of view, they have to change; probably they do not have to change in Istanbul...but in rural parts. Turkish culture, music would be actively supported by the EU...Irish people living in America are more Irish than Irish people living in Ireland...when you leave home...you become more proud of where you come from. It is the same in the EU, so the more you pool your sovereignty and work together with other countries, the more proud you become of your own history and own roots...as you involved in something bigger or...abroad, you attach even more importance to where you come from originally...as the EU gets bigger, as Ireland...more involved in this...promotes Irish pride as well...²¹⁵¹

As Coveney argues, European identity and national identities are not contradictory with each other. Even in some cases, it may strengthen national identities, such as Ireland.

The nation-states are in a transformation process within the EU. They have to transfer some of their competences to the EU level and some other to the lower regional or local level which have led to transformation of national sovereignties. El Khadroui argued that:

They would be complementary...nation-states were not used to be as they are now...nation-states will be less important, because we see that many problems have to be resolved at a higher level...environment...immigrants, foreign affairs...everybody becomes aware that we have to resolve these at European level. So we have to give power to the European initiatives...I do not think, we will end by giving all national powers. We will not end something like the USA...²¹⁵²

He also added that national identities and European identity are complementary with each other. Prets argued in favour of transferring competencies of nation-states to the EU, when the Member States are not capable of doing those things by themselves. She stated that:

...I do not like that, one day we should have only EU and Member States which are very weak. They should be very strong. They should give some power to the EU which they can not solve alone.²¹⁵³

²¹⁵¹ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

²¹⁵² Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

²¹⁵³ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on 29.08.2006 at 14.00.

She also emphasized that national identities and European identity are complementary with each other. She stated that:

...being European does not mean that you are not good Austrian. That is what we have to explain...there is a fear that power is in Brussels, but not in the Member States...we have to explain that, there is co-decision...²¹⁵⁴

About her identity she stated that:

...I am very happy in a village, being in my region of Austria, I am an Austrian...you need all these...then you have the European house. I think it is good to be responsible for your region; it is also good to be responsible for the EU... If we have peace in Europe, I have peace in my village.²¹⁵⁵

She implied that regional, national and European identities are complementary with each other.

Weber argued that, Bavarians have strong regional identity, with the effect of globalisation; they will have stronger European identity. He stated that:

...in my own region, they have strong regional identity, feeling Bavarians, they are German citizens, for the future they would say, in globalisation we need Europe, then they would say I am European.²¹⁵⁶

He perceives regional, national and European identities as complementary with each other. He defined his identity as “first of all I am Bavarian, secondly European and German.”²¹⁵⁷ Thus, he has strong regional identity, then European and lastly national identity. Most of the MEPs, who were interviewed, argued that construction of European identity is not contradictory to national identities, instead they complement with each other.

Özdemir argued that European identity has been constructed differently in various Member States. He stated that:

It is a question of time, it is unrealistic to think that European identity can emerge everywhere at the same time...it is emerging step by step. It may take longer time in Poland, England; but in France, Germany and Mediterranean countries, it has already developed partly. It changes from one country to another.²¹⁵⁸

The level of European identity construction is not the same among the Member States. It depends on their historical background, internal factors and political structures. Özdemir added that “Europe will not probably replace nation-states for a very long time; maybe it

²¹⁵⁴ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on 29.08.2006 at 14.00.

²¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵⁶ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

²¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵⁸ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

will never replace them.”²¹⁵⁹ He implied that construction of European identity has been ongoing which will not replace national identities.²¹⁶⁰ Bozkurt argued that European identity has been already constructed to a certain extent. She stated that “I think European identity is already there...People firstly feel themselves Dutch or Italian and they also feel themselves European.”²¹⁶¹ Stubb argued that “...the **EU will always be more than an international organisation, but less than a state...the nation-state is still alive...but it is very much under pressure from below and above.**”²¹⁶² As he argues, nation-states have been transformed under the influences of globalisation and Europeanisation from above and sub-national regionalism from below. He also added that “...I am a federalist, I believe that identity is first and foremost local, then it is national, then regional, after that it is European...”²¹⁶³ He is in favour of multiple identities as a federalist.

Many MEPs mentioned the primacy of national identities. Öger argued that “...a German is primarily German then European; a French is primarily French then European. Nobody says firstly I am European, then Polish.”²¹⁶⁴ A few people have stronger European identity than their national identities. Resetarits emphasized the growing importance of national identities in recent years. She argued that there is a trend towards protecting national sovereignty much more among the Member States. She stated that “...more power to nation-states, not too much to the EU...also in economy it is like that...different Member States try to protect their national economy”.²¹⁶⁵ She added that “I would be in favour of “United States of Europe”, but the chance is like 1%.”²¹⁶⁶ She is pessimistic about the possibility of construction of a “united states of Europe”. As it was discussed, integration process is usually supported among the professional and the business elites and the educated young Europeans; but the ordinary citizens usually perceive it as a threat to their national identity.²¹⁶⁷ People have stronger feeling of belonging to their closer environment than more distant places. Resetarits stated that:

²¹⁵⁹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶¹ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

²¹⁶² Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

²¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶⁴ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

²¹⁶⁵ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

²¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶⁷ P. I. Nanz, “In-between Nations: Ambivalence and the Making of a European Identity”, p.288.

...most of the people firstly have local, then national, then perhaps they think about Europe, in Austria and in a lot of countries it is perceived as very bureaucratic...it is not something which they really like.²¹⁶⁸

She emphasized that people usually perceive the EU as cold and bureaucratic. People usually define their cultural identity on the basis of their local or national identity, but politically feeling of belonging to a post-national level may be constructed. The consultant of the MEP of Southern Cyprus argued that he has “Greek identity and Cypriot citizenship which is similar to having a national identity and European citizenship”.²¹⁶⁹

Few of the MEPs who were interviewed see the EU against the nation-states and perceive European identity and national identities as contradictory with each other. When it was asked that, “do you think that, there will be an imagined European community one day?”, Wise replied that:

No...it will not happen. That is what they are trying to do. They do not want twenty five countries. They want one Europe, one country, one nation, one passport, one currency, one flag, one anthem...they are not complementary...you are European or German, or Turkish...²¹⁷⁰

He claimed that the goal of the EU is to construct imagined European community to replace nations. It might be considered as a goal of the founding fathers of the EC, but contemporarily it is too hard to talk about such a common goal among the EU elites.

When it was asked to Delanty, “do you think that there will be an imagined European community one day which may complement national identities?” He replied that “I do not think it can or should challenge nation-states, it can exist alongside it, both can develop.”²¹⁷¹ Delanty asserted that European identity may be constructed on civic basis which does not necessarily have to be in opposition to national identity. He mentioned the idea of “**Europeanised national identity**”. He contends that it is impossible to say that “this person’s identity is purely national and this person is purely European...”²¹⁷² He implied that national and European identities have been in interaction and they have been affected from each other. He added that “the most important impact of Europeanization is

²¹⁶⁸ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

²¹⁶⁹ Interview with M. Charalampidis, Consultant of Y. Yiannos the MEP of Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

²¹⁷⁰ Interview with T. Wise, MEP of the UK from Independence Democracy Group, on July 12, 2006, at 10.00.

²¹⁷¹ Interview with G. Delanty, on March 22, 2007 at 16.00.

²¹⁷² *Ibid.*

Europeanization of national societies...²¹⁷³ As Delanty argued, instead of construction of a uniform European identity in the EU, there has been construction of “Europeanized national identities”.

Thus, European identity and national identities are sometimes seen as contradictory, sometimes complementary with each other. Construction of European identity has not led to a transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level, as neofunctionalists foresaw. The growth of European identity does not imply simultaneous decrease in national identities; it does not have to be a zero-sum process.²¹⁷⁴ As Eder argues, “European and national identities are always fluid and contextual, contested and contingent.”²¹⁷⁵ So “the adjectives ‘European’ and ‘national’ are not alternatives, but they may be components of multi-identification.”²¹⁷⁶ Contemporarily the trend among most of the EU citizens is having national and European identity simultaneously. According to Bruter, the level of European identity has increased over the past thirty years throughout the EU;²¹⁷⁷ but the peoples of Europe still prefer maintaining their national identities.

It is still too hard to talk about a European public sphere. Even Eurobarometer surveys focus on comparison of national public opinions, rather than the Europeanization process of public opinion.²¹⁷⁸ From 1975 to 1979 in Eurobarometer surveys, the question about identity was asked as a mutually exclusive choice between different levels of belonging such as “to which one of the geographical units would you say you belong to first of all: Locality, region, country, Europe or the world?” According to the results of these surveys, “Europe” and “the world” were marginal, in all cases “country” and “town” were the first or second preference of among two-thirds of the respondents. Over the years the questions which are asked by Eurobarometer have changed which allow for combining national and European identities. It is obvious that, exclusively European identity is not able to compete with national or regional identity.²¹⁷⁹ In the last decade a new type of

²¹⁷³ Interview with G. Delanty, on March 22, 2007 at 16.00.

²¹⁷⁴ R. Münch, *Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities*, p.183-184.

²¹⁷⁵ M.A. Malmberg & B. Strath, “Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe” in M.A. Malmberg & B. Strath (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, Oxford, Berg, 2002, pp.5-6.

²¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷⁷ M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.138.

²¹⁷⁸ Slavko Splival, “In Search of a Strong European Public Sphere: Some Critical Observations on Conceptualizations of Publicness and the (European) Public Sphere”, *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol.28, No.5, 2006, p.708.

²¹⁷⁹ M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, p.122.

question has been preferred that asks whether respondents prioritize their identities as nationals or Europeans. It has been asked that “in the near future, will you see yourself as nationality only, nationality and then European, European and then nationality or European only?”²¹⁸⁰ Most of the respondents have chosen “nationality only” or “nationality and European”. Over time the percentage of people who choose “nationality and European” have increased and “nationality only” has decreased. Increasing proportion of people choose “nation first but Europe too”. These surveys show that for an important number of peoples of Europe there is not an incompatibility between national and European identities.²¹⁸¹ Luxembourg has the highest level of Europeanness, more than a quarter of the respondents view themselves as only or primarily European. Generally still the sense of belonging to the EU is far behind that of belonging to one’s nation-state.²¹⁸² As Reif argues, many people are against an EU which “puts their national identity at risk”²¹⁸³. They are against an EU, where their national government has no voice.²¹⁸⁴ Thus, the initiatives of the EU for construction of European identity which are perceived as challenge to national identities, negatively affect construction process of European identity.

According to Eurobarometer 54 which was conducted in 2001, in the UK national identity has the primary importance. In several Member States, “people are more and more likely to have a shared sense of identity with their own nationality on the one hand and Europe on the other hand.”²¹⁸⁵ According to the Eurobarometer survey which was conducted in 2002, in Italy only 20% of the sample declared an exclusive attachment to their country. In the UK, 62% stated such an attachment. Italians are one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the European integration. In accordance with this, they also have one of the highest identifications with Europe. Also in Italy the difference between level of support among the elites and the general public is very little.²¹⁸⁶ Duchesne and Frogner argue that 6-26% of respondents selected Europe as their first or second choice of identity in Eurobarometer surveys. The highest percentage can be seen in Italy, where 20-25% chose Europe as a first or second choice. Lowest support can be observed in Denmark,

²¹⁸⁰ J. Citrin & J. Sides, “More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe”, p.166.

²¹⁸¹ Cited in P. Gillespie & B. Laffan, “European Identity: Theory and Empirics”, p.146.

²¹⁸² Eurobarometer 50; quoted in M. Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, pp.124-126.

²¹⁸³ R. Karlheinz “Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity”, p.150.

²¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸⁵ Una Mc Cormack, “Being in Europe: Pluralism and Patriotism in England and Scotland” in Richard Robyn (ed.), *The Changing Face of European Identity*, London: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.70.

²¹⁸⁶ European Commission, *Eurobarometer 57*, Spring 2002, “EU 15 Report”, Brussels: European Commission, 2002; cited in T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.497.

where less than 1% chose it as a first choice.²¹⁸⁷ Citrin and Sides analyze the Eurobarometer surveys and found out that "...complementary attachments to nation and Europe are increasing over time..."²¹⁸⁸ Thus, increasing number of people in Europe perceive national identity and European identity as complementary with each other.

Consequently, people still identify primarily with their nation-states, but there has been an increase in identification with the EU to a certain extent. Eurobarometer surveys show that in most of the Member States only a very small percentage of people (about 5%) stated that they have an exclusive European identity. Up to 50% do not have any sense of European identity.²¹⁸⁹ The Editors of Eurobarometer 38 summarized the views of the public opinion about the EU after the Maastricht debate. According to this analysis, peoples of the EU are against an EU which threatens their national identity, to be governed by an enormous Brussels bureaucracy which is out of touch with the citizens.²¹⁹⁰ Thus, the peoples of Europe are usually against construction of European identity which would replace national identities. A lot of people across Europe see the EU as a threat to their national symbols.²¹⁹¹ Perceiving the EU as a symbolic threat to national identity is effective on the peoples' perceptions about the EU. According to Autumn 2000 Eurobarometer survey, in terms of loss of identity and culture, especially Greeks, British and Irish people expressed considerable fear which was over %60. They fear that their national identity is negatively affected from the European integration project.²¹⁹² In Eurobarometer surveys in 2001 and 2003, Turkey had the greatest concern for the potential loss of national identity. In Autumn 2003 survey, 60% of Turks stated that the EU means loss of national identity.²¹⁹³ One of the main arguments of Eurosceptics in Turkey is that there will be loss of national identity, if Turkey will be a member of the EU. Although some of the competencies of nation-state will be transferred to the EU, being an EU member does not mean losing national identities. As Hedetoft argues, respondents who expressed a strong European identity could also express a strong sense of national

²¹⁸⁷ Sophie Duchesne & Andre-Paul Frogner, "Is There a European Identity?" in Oskar Niedermayer & Richard Sinnott (eds.), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1998, pp.193-226.

²¹⁸⁸ J. Citrin & J. Sides, "More than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe", 2004.

²¹⁸⁹ J. R. Llobera, "What Unites Europeans?", p.176.

²¹⁹⁰ P. Taylor, *The EU in The 1990's*, pp.157-158.

²¹⁹¹ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p. 191.

²¹⁹² Cited in L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, pp.88-91.

²¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.178.

identity.²¹⁹⁴ As Risse argues “...willingness to grant the EU authority requires some identification with Europe, but not an identification that actually prioritizes Europe over the nation.”²¹⁹⁵ An attachment to the EU which is constructed mostly on civic basis can go on simultaneously with national identities.²¹⁹⁶ Thus, construction of European identity as primary identity of the EU citizens is not necessary in the context of the EU.

“Multiple identities” are based on the model of peaceful coexistence of different identities, some may have more importance or priority than the others,²¹⁹⁷ usually national identity has primacy for most of the peoples of Europe. Wallace argues that:

The emergence of a sense of European identity has not led to a transfer of loyalties from national to the European level...what we have observed across Western Europe over the last two decades is a shift towards multiple loyalties, with the focus on the nation supplemented by European and regional affiliations above and below.²¹⁹⁸

The general tendency is having multiple identities among the peoples of the EU. A group of Austrian sociologists found out that older generations of the EU citizens who only feel attachment to their nation, are dying. The sociologists analyzed the Eurobarometer surveys from 1996 to 2004, focusing on the question about whether someone feel only national, both national and European or only European. The number of respondents who have “multiple identities” have risen, while those who feel only national identity have declined. In 2004, 58% of respondents had some sense of feeling European, which may rise to 68.5% by 2030, if the current trend continues. The sociologists stated that:

The younger generations...of Europeans are more likely to have a European identity in addition to their national one...since the younger citizens will eventually replace the older...the European *demos* will likely change accordingly.²¹⁹⁹

About the reasons of this trend they argued that:

Expanding media impact coming from and reporting about the European level, the increasing free movement of people across European borders either for tourism or work, the increasing number of students in university exchange programmes, as well as the fast growing day-to-day communication across borders.²²⁰⁰

²¹⁹⁴ H. Field, “EU Cultural Policy And The Creation of a Common European Identity”, retrieved on May 18, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>

²¹⁹⁵ T. Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?”, p.250.

²¹⁹⁶ M. Haller, “Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? European Integration and the Relation Between National and European Identity”, 2004.

²¹⁹⁷ Y. Stavrakakis, “Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment and European Identity”, p.84.

²¹⁹⁸ W. Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, 1990; quoted in Jeffrey J. Anderson (ed.), *Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on The European Experience*, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 1999, p.71.

²¹⁹⁹ Quoted in Mark Beunderman, “Feeling of ‘Europeanness’ on the Rise, Study Says”, *euobserver.com*, October 23, 2006, retrieved on October 30, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/22701>

²²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

They also added that the tendency to feel more European has not emerged against national identities.²²⁰¹

According to the interviews conducted by the author, most of the interviewees have multiple identities. Guardans stated that:

I hate to have to choose...My way of being European is being Spaniard, my way of being Spaniard is being Catalan. They are complementary; they are part of a whole. I am Catalan, Spanish and European.²²⁰²

Because of its political structure and historical background, especially among Spanish people there is usually have a tendency to have multiple identities. One ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education argued that:

I am proud of my own culture, my own region which is different from the rest, but **not against** the rest. My regional identity is much stronger than my national identity. I was born in Alsace which has a strong regional identity. Language is different from rest of the country. Cuisine is different, but it is **not against**...I feel firstly European, then regional, then French.²²⁰³

He emphasized the complementarity of different identities. He asserted that differentiation does not have to be constructed as “otherness”. He also added that:

To me European identity is probably the most important one...being French does not mean a lot to me...I do not feel as a European citizen against the rest of the world. Many Europeans are Europeans because they are anti-Americans...I feel European. I love Europe, because Europe is my country, where I travel, I have friends...I have also friends in Australia...²²⁰⁴

As it was discussed, one of the ways of defining multiple identities of the EU citizens may be referred to as the “marble cake model”. In this model, different components of an individual’s identity blend into each other. As Medrano and Gutierrez ask, “to what extent can one separate a Catalan from a European identity?”²²⁰⁵ Most of the surveys on European identity do not take into consideration the “marble cake” model. Risse contends that:

If the historical and cultural understandings of one’s national community already contain aspects of Europeanness as an intrinsic component, then loyalty to one’s national community would imply some identification with Europe too.²²⁰⁶

²²⁰¹ Quoted in Mark Beunderman, “Feeling of ‘Europeanness’ on the Rise, Study Says”, *euobserver.com*, October 23, 2006, retrieved on October 30, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/22701>

²²⁰² Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

²²⁰³ Interview with Ex-Commission official from DG Education, from France, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

²²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁰⁵ Juan Diez Medrano & Paula Gutierrez, “Nested Identities: National and European Identity in Spain”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.24, 2001, pp.753-78.

²²⁰⁶ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.491.

As Theiler argues, "...being national and being European are in permanent negotiation..."²²⁰⁷ As it was argued, there has been Europeanization of national identities which implies that even having only a national identity includes European identity to a certain extent. The EU membership interacts with national identities which will not lead to construction of a homogeneous generalized European identity.²²⁰⁸

The construction of a pan-European nation is unlikely in the context of the EU. It lacks crucial structural prerequisites such as having clearly defined boundaries, a common language and a common history. Moreover the elites of the EU have not been working in similar way to those who worked during nation-building process.²²⁰⁹ The national elites had more concrete common goals. European identity has been in an ongoing construction process not as an alternative of national identities.²²¹⁰ In the medium-term, it is unlikely that national identities will be replaced by European identity, which is also not the common goal of the political elites of the EU. During the interviews none of the interviewees stated that, there will be an "imagined European community" one day, which will replace national identities. There has been an ongoing construction process of European political identity during the ongoing integration process within the EU, while national and regional identities have been maintained, but Europeanized to different extents.

Consequently, the EU has used some instruments of nation-building process during construction process of European identity within the EU in order to establish legitimacy of the EU and to go on the political integration process. The nation-building process emerged in a different historical context and usually within the framework of the states. On the other hand, the structure of the EU is *sui generis*, thus the construction process of European identity has unique characteristics. European identity, which has been under construction process, has been in interaction process with national identities, which lead to construction of "Europeanized national identities" to different extents in each Member State which depends on the structure of the state, its historical background, the way of interactions with the EU and the length of membership.

²²⁰⁷ T. Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, p. 160.

²²⁰⁸ T. Risse, "The Euro Between National and European Identity", p.491.

²²⁰⁹ S. Blavoukos & M. Sigalas, "The Telos of the EU: Ethnos or Demos", p.30.

²²¹⁰ "Who are Europeans?", *Open Learn*, retrieved on August 20, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/file.php/2634/formats/print.htm>

CHAPTER V

THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU ON CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In this chapter, the interactions between Turkey and Europe are analysed in terms of European identity and the effects of interactions between Turkey and the EU on construction of European identity within the EU is focused on. The question of Turkey's membership to the EU has many different aspects including economics, political, geostrategic, social and cultural. Especially in the post-Cold War era Turkey's membership has been discussed mainly on cultural basis, particularly in terms of European identity.

Turks and Europeans have been in interaction process throughout long periods of history which have affected construction of both European and Turkish identities. Especially in the last two hundred years, Turks have constructed their identity in interaction with Europe. As Yurdusev argues, Turkish and European identities are mutually “**constructive others**” of each other.²²¹¹ European identity has been affected by its interactions with Turks, but the nature of interactions and their position vis-a-vis each other have changed in different periods of history. They have been in a closer interaction process especially since the candidate status was given to Turkey in December 1999. The interactions between Turkey and the EU have not occurred only between Turkey and the EU, there are also interactions between each Member State and Turkey at different levels. Neither Turkey, nor the EU is static entities. On the one hand, the interaction process between Turkey and EU affect the identity of Turkey, on the other hand, construction process of European identity has been also affected by its interactions with Turkey, especially through questioning Turkey's membership in terms of its Europeanness which has led to questioning of European identity itself.

²²¹¹ A.N. Yurdusev, “Türkiye'nin Medeniyet Aidiyeti AB'ye Engel Midir?”, *Söylem*, No:3,1996; A.N. Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliği'nin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in A. Eralp(ed.), *Türkiye ve Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, İstanbul: İmge Pub., 1997; quoted in Hüsamettin İnaç, *AB'ye Entegrasyon Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Kimlik Problemleri*, Ankara: Adres Pub., 2005, p.7.

V.1. The Interactions between Turks and Europe: Europeanness of Turkey

As it was discussed in the 1st Chapter, the concepts of “Europe” and “European identity” do not have a common concrete definition. Europe can not be considered as a monolithic, fixed entity. As Çapan and Onursal argue, situating Turkey within or outside Europe has always been closely related with how Europe is defined which changes according to different circumstances.²²¹² Both the concepts of “Europe” and “European identity” are not static and what they refer to depend on different circumstances.

Turks have been in Europe “geographically since their arrival in Asia Minor in the 11th century, economically since the 16th century as trade routes expanded and politically since 19th century when the Ottoman Empire was included in the Concert of Europe.”²²¹³ There has been a widespread stereotype of Turks in Europe which can be traced back to the Crusades and long struggles with the Ottoman Empire. This stereotype has negatively affected the relations between Turkey and the EU, despite Turkey has a secular system and a democratic regime since the 1920s.²²¹⁴ During the Ottoman era, Europeans mostly considered the Turks as not being European, but rather “being in Europe”.²²¹⁵ Weisband asserts that “the Turks are within Europe, but never of Europe. They become part of the institutional structures of Europe, but never European.”²²¹⁶ Some scholars perceive Turks inside Europe, some of them exclude. In 1693 William Penn suggested an organized European society of states to maintain peace and stability. He recommended that the Ottoman Empire may be included, only if it renounced Islam.²²¹⁷ Emeric Cruce included Ottoman State, Persia, China, India and Africa in his proposed UN. He was the first European who included Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism in an ideal world order.²²¹⁸ Freeman’s book on the Ottoman Empire presents it as an alien to Europe in terms of

²²¹² Z. G. Çapan & Ö. Onursal, “Situating Turkey within the EU”, p. 99.

²²¹³ Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, pp.26-27.

²²¹⁴ A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.136.

²²¹⁵ Quoted in Hasan Ulusoy, “The Importance of Identity Building in Avoiding the Clash of Civilisations in the Age of Globalisation (With Some Reflections on Turkey-EU Relations)”, *Perceptions*, Autumn 2004, p.112.

²²¹⁶ Edward Weisband, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: The Social Construction of Otherness in Reverse Images”, 2nd Pan-European Conference, *Standing Group on EU Politics*, Bologna, 24-26 June 2004, retrieved on February 22, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna>

²²¹⁷ Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the “Other”: “The East” in European Identity Formation*, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 40.

²²¹⁸ Wayland Young, “Disarmament: Thirty Years Failure”, *International Security*, Vo.2, No.3, Winter 1978, p.33.

religion, culture, politics and social life.²²¹⁹ He argues that the Ottoman Turks were excluded from European identity not only in terms of its ethnicity; also they did not share the history and the “literary and intellectual possessions of the Europeans”. He also claims that they did not share common ideas and feelings of European nations. They had no Greek or Latin languages, so they could not share the Classical heritage of Greece and Rome. According to him, the main difference between Turks and Europeans is that Turks do not have the common religion of Europe. He argues that “the Turks entered Europe as Mahometans and they still remain as Mahometans.”²²²⁰ He adds that “no Mahometan nation can become part of the same community of nations as the Christian nations of Europe.”²²²¹ Thus, he defines European identity mainly on the basis of Christianity.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was officially accepted as part of the European state system.²²²² It was admitted to the Concert of Europe in 1856, with the Treaty of Paris as a reward for aligning with France and Britain against Russia. “The Ottoman Empire was admitted to the European society of states.”²²²³ It was officially recognized for the first time as a member of the European balance of power. Thus, it became part of the European state system. During the declining process of the Ottoman Empire, the West was the main inspiration of the Ottoman elites to modernize their state.²²²⁴ In the late Ottoman era, Westernisation was used firstly as an instrument in order to cope with the decline of the state. Westernisation occurred as a top-down process which was initiated by the Ottoman elites. Europe was seen as a threat, in order to cope with this threat, the Ottoman State preferred to adopt the technology of Europe. Especially after the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923, European standards in political, legal system and in different fields of social life were tried to be adopted to the Turkish political system and to the daily lives of Turkish society. Atatürk, who was the founder of Turkey, defined

²²¹⁹ Edward A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe: Its Nature, Its Growth and Its Decline*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1877, p. 3; quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.265.

²²²⁰ E. A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe: Its Nature, Its Growth and Its Decline*, p. 56; quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.266.

²²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²²² Mustafa Aydın & Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, “To Be or Not To Be with Turkey: December 2004 Blues for the EU”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2004, p.50.

²²²³ E. Weisband, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: The Social Construction of Otherness in Reverse Images”, retrieved on February 22, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna>

²²²⁴ David Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.32, No.2, April 1997, p.231.

the goal of Turkey as “to reach to the level of contemporary civilisation.”²²²⁵ The transformation of Turkey from a “sick man of Europe” to a reborn and young nation-state made the “Turk” less central as a constitutive “other” of Europe.²²²⁶

Turks have been excluded from Europe in different periods of history according to different criteria. H. Yılmaz argues that Turkey has been discriminated by Europe on three main bases. Firstly from early modern times till the end of the 19th century Turkey was excluded on the basis of religion (Christianity). Secondly Turkey was excluded on the basis of “civilisation” from the end of 19th century till the period between two world wars. Lastly it has been discriminated on the basis of “culture” from the end of the Cold War till now. During the Cold War era, Turkey was not excluded from Europe because of security concerns.²²²⁷ After the 2nd World War, clear constitutive “other” of the EU was the Soviet Union and Turkey started to be perceived as an ally of Europe²²²⁸ which shows that the way of interactions between Turkey and Europe have been affected from the international conjuncture. In the Cold War era, Turkey was accepted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as one of “us”; but here “us” refers to West, not to “Europe”.²²²⁹ In this era, Turkey was NATO’s key southeastern flank.

Europe may be considered as a “hopeful travel”, as Herzog argues.²²³⁰ The EU has been constructed as a project whose end point is not clear. One of the main reasons of Turkey’s efforts for joining the EU is to be part of this “hopeful travel”. Despite some breaks, Turkey has been seeking membership to the EU for more than forty years. Although it has a predominantly Muslim population, it is committed to Western values and has been trying to adopt European standards in many fields of life.²²³¹ According to the Rome Treaty Article 49, only European countries may become members of the EU. Thus, Europeanness is a precondition for the EU membership; but the question of Turkey’s

²²²⁵ Metin Heper, 1985, p.51; quoted in E. Fuat Keyman & Ahmet İçduygu, “Introduction: Citizenship, Identity and The Question of Democracy in Turkey” in E. Fuat Keyman & Ahmet İçduygu (eds.), *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, London: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.5.

²²²⁶ I. B. Neumann, *Uses of the “Other”*: “The East” in European Identity Formation, p. 60.

²²²⁷ H. Yılmaz, “Giriş: Türkiye’yi Avrupa Haritasına Sokmak”, pp.3-4.

²²²⁸ I. B. Neumann, *Uses of the “Other”*: “The East” in European Identity Formation, p. 62.

²²²⁹ Udo Steinbach, “Die Türkei zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart”, *Informationen zur politischen Bildung* 223, No.2, 1989, p.43; quoted in Rob Kroes, “Imaginary Americas in Europe’s Public Space” in Alexander Stephan (ed.), *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism after 1945*, New York: Berghahn Pub., 2006, p.342.

²²³⁰ P. Herzog, *Travelling Hopefully: Ethics, Action, Perspective for a Revival of Europe*, 2006.

²²³¹ D. B. Sezer, “Turkish Identity, A Test for Europe’s Soul?”, p. 280.

membership was not discussed on these grounds, when an Association Agreement was made with the EC in 1963, or when Turkey officially applied to the EC in 1987. Hallstein, who was the president of the Commission, declared in 1964 that “Turkey is part of Europe.”²²³² It shows that if security concerns are at stake, Turkey may be considered as part of Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union and ending of the Cold war era may be considered as “critical juncture”s, which lead to reconstruction process of European identity within the EU. In the post-Cold War era, the interactions between the EU and Turkey have been constructed on different grounds. The question of Turkey’s membership has been started to be discussed on the basis of discussing Turkey’s Europeanness, especially after the candidate status was given to Turkey with the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The discourse about question of Turkey’s membership to the EU is constructed on the basis of the question of Europeanness of Turkey.²²³³ Thus, with the collapse of the “Soviet Union”, who was the common “other” of West and Turkey, Turkey has not been considered as part of “us”. Even during the interviews conducted by the author, one of the MEPs argued that if it is still the Cold War era, the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU would be much more different. It shows that the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU has been affected strongly from the international circumstances. Thus, the interactions between Turkey and the EU will not go on the same basis during all the negotiation process. Any other “critical juncture” which may emerge in the future, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union may change the dynamics of the interaction process between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey has not been constructed as the “other”, during construction process of European identity within the framework of the EU, since the foundation of the EC in the 1950s; but it has not been constructed as European neither. It has been constructed as a state in-between Europe and Asia which negatively affects Turkey’s membership. Mümtaz Soysal who was a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, states that:

...Turkey is a country with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia. The same thing can be said of our geography and culture. We must realize and accept this as such and we must turn this embarrassment into a sense of superiority.²²³⁴

Usually this “in-between” position of Turkey causes the emergence of the question “who are we?” so frequently in Turkey. In geographical terms, if de Gaulle’s definition of

²²³² U. Steinbach, “Die Türkei zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart”, p.43; quoted in R. Kroes, “Imaginary Americas in Europe’s Public Space”, p.342.

²²³³ R. Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, 2000.

²²³⁴ *Milliyet*, 3 January 1981; quoted in D. Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey”, p.232.

Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is accepted, then Turkey belongs to Europe as a whole. If the Eastern borders of Europe are considered as Turkish Straits, this would exclude Asia Minor.²²³⁵ There is not a concrete criterion to include or exclude Turkey in geographical terms because of the ambiguous boundaries of Europe. One of the former Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, argued that “Turkey is naturally a European country...but it has a unique strategic characteristic: It is Asian as well as European.”²²³⁶ It is both a challenge and an asset. He stated that “...for over 700 years of its history, Turkey has lived in Europe as a European power.”²²³⁷ He added that Turkey has shared its history and culture with Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus and Central Asia. The interactions with all these regions have affected identity of Turkey.²²³⁸ Thus, it has a complex identity.

In the context of the EU, the Member States are constructed as a “family”, thus, the possibility of Turkey’s membership is constructed as a question of becoming a member of the “family”²²³⁹ which makes the integration process of Turkey with the EU more difficult. The EU is still in favour of close relations with Turkey especially in terms of security, economics and energy resources, but usually Turkey has not been perceived as part of “us” or a “European family” especially in the post-Cold War era. Aybet asserts that “the Turkish elite is surprised and angry that...Turkey’s place in Europe was not questioned during the Cold War, when it was of strategic importance vis-a-vis the Soviet threat...”²²⁴⁰ In the context of the EU, as Hülse argues, Turkey is constructed as “not truly European”; but it has not been constructed as clearly non-European, or as the “other” of the EU, instead it has been constructed as occupying a “**hybrid**”, “**in-between space**”. Since the hybrid entities are relatively similar to the “self”, the “self” has to make a special effort to construct some differences discursively from the “other”. The discourse which has constructed Turkey as a “hybrid” entity, constructs Europe as proper.²²⁴¹ Thus, in order to differentiate itself, the discourses of the EU elites usually focus on differences of Turkey from the EU. In the case of Turkey, the Europeanness of a candidate country is questioned for the first time in history of the EU. Öniş argues that Turkey is a unique case which

²²³⁵ Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, pp. 275-281.

²²³⁶ İ. Cem, “Turkey in Europe”, p.98.

²²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²²³⁹ R. Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, 2000.

²²⁴⁰ G. Aybet, “Turkey and European Institutions”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No.1, January-March 1999.

²²⁴¹ R. Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, 2000.

appeared to differ from the core of Europe in civilisational terms, although it has tried to develop close relations with Europe.²²⁴² D. Sezer asserts that “Turkey is not a ‘normal’ country by the standards of most Europeans...first...because of its cultural identity.”²²⁴³ According to Weisband, what has always made the question of Turkish accession different is its Turkish and Islamic cultural identity and their perceived impacts.²²⁴⁴ Some opponents of Turkey’s membership argue that “its history and culture make it inherently non-European”.²²⁴⁵ According to le Goff, Turkey is not part of European identity. He argues that he does not exclude Turkey because of having predominantly Muslim population or having problems in its democracy, rather in terms of geographical borders and common history.²²⁴⁶

Turkish Europeanness has been questioned on different basis. According to Nicolaidis, there are mainly three types of arguments against Turkish “Europeanness” which are based on geography, history and religion. G. d’Estaing locates Turkey in the Middle East. Nicolaidis points out that Turks have more in common with the Greeks or Italians than their neighbours such as Syria or Iran. She also adds that when we analyze the modes of living and birth statistics, “...Turks are sociologically European, poorer, less urbanised and more religious, but European.”²²⁴⁷ She also argues that:

...modern Turkey is the inheritor of the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires which have shaped Europe...if Turkey is not European then the Balkan states are not European either...their Muslim or Slavic-Orthodox characters and their history ‘at the margin of Europe’...with Atatürk’s modernist agenda in the 1920s, Turkey chose Europe, its political institutions and the idea of a secular state.²²⁴⁸

There are different responses from different parties of Europe about Turkey’s membership in terms of Europeanness of Turkey. According to Nicolaidis, there are mainly four kinds of responses towards Turkey’s membership to the EU. One of them is “‘no’ to Turkish membership, because Turkey is not European.”²²⁴⁹ According to this perspective, Turkey has a different culture which is the more explicit argument or they

²²⁴² Z. Öniş, “Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead”, p. 279.

²²⁴³ D. B. Sezer, “Turkish Identity, A Test for Europe’s Soul?”, pp.267-277.

²²⁴⁴ E. Weisband, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: The Social Copnstruction of Otherness in Reverse Images”, retrieved on February 22, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna>

²²⁴⁵ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 40.

²²⁴⁶ J. Le Goff, “The Roots of European Identity”, p.167.

²²⁴⁷ Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Turkey is European...For Europe’s Sake”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.63-64.

²²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.62.

emphasize that it has a predominantly Muslim population which is the more implicit argument. They claim that Turkey's membership would cause important problems for the EU, because of Turkey's size, huge population and its level of development. This is mainly the position of Christian Democrats. Also some Social Democrats and the European federalists support these ideas. Second response to Turkey's membership is " 'yes' to Turkish membership , in spite of the fact that Turkey is non-European"²²⁵⁰ They support Turkey's membership because of some geostrategic, economic and political reasons (utilitarian factors). This is the position of the Liberals and the Social Democrats and some supporters of the idea of a "Europe of Nations". Third response to Turkey's membership is " 'no' to Turkey's membership, even if Turkey can be considered as European."²²⁵¹ For the people who support this position, the advantages that would emerge by Turkish membership will be more than disadvantages. "The only way the original spirit would survive with Turkey in the EU would be, the creation of a core Europe based on the original founding members."²²⁵² A number of European federalists support this position, especially in France. The last way of response to Turkey's membership is "yes" to Turkey's membership, Turkey is European but there are important obstacles to its membership. Nicolaidis states that she is also supporting this position which refers to a Europe that gains its strength from its diversity. In this model of the EU, the goal is not to reproduce a national model at the level of Europe, rather constructing another way for people to live together and share a common project. This vision of the EU is not based on an exclusive European identity. This will be "the result of a process of social, cultural, economic and political convergence between countries and citizens who for many different reasons are capable of thinking of themselves as Europeans."²²⁵³

According to the interviews which were conducted by the author, it can be argued that usually among the Christian Democrats Turkey's Europeanness is highly questionable. Some of the MEPs considered Turkey as a European country, some of them emphasized the gap between the Eastern and the Western parts of Turkey, some of them emphasized the gap between the elites and the general public of Turkey and some of them perceived it as a unique civilisation. Resetarits stated that "...for me, it is a European country...its

²²⁵⁰ Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Turkey is European...For Europe's Sake", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.4, Winter 2004, p.62.

²²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²²⁵² *Ibid.*

²²⁵³ *Ibid.*

coming into the EU is richness. I think this is something we really should be proud of, if we succeed in coming together.”²²⁵⁴ Here the possibility of Turkey’s membership is constructed as a unique and unexpected success story. According to the interviews it can be argued that Turkey is usually constructed by the MEPs as “not clearly European”, or a “unique entity”, rather than the “other” of the EU.

V.2. The Role of European Identity in Turkey-EU Relations

The basic values of the EU are stated in the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 6 Par. 1 of the Amsterdam Treaty states that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”²²⁵⁵ This definition of the EU as a political-civic union of values prevents using of cultural and religious characteristics to exclude potential Member States.²²⁵⁶ Sanguineti excludes Turkey from the EU even on the basis of European values. He referred to Turkey as an “alien” culture which should be left outside. He argues that Turkey should not join the EU, because it is too different. He claims that there is a lack of respect for human rights and military intervention in politics. He also added that Turkey’s history, political and institutional evolution are rooted in a value system which are quite different from the European political values.²²⁵⁷

The question of identity has been the primary concern in the relations between Turkey and the EU since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, the opponents to Turkey’s membership have based their arguments on cultural identity with regard to Turkey, although its eligibility for membership was confirmed in Ankara Agreement in 1963. Turkey’s eligibility has been formally reconfirmed also in the Commission’s Opinion which was stated in 1989 after Turkey’s membership application in 1987.²²⁵⁸ However, in the Agenda 2000 which was published in 1997 and at the Luxembourg

²²⁵⁴ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

²²⁵⁵ The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; quoted in Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, *The EU, Turkey and Islam*, WRR, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004, p.26.

²²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.27.

²²⁵⁷ Vittorio Sanguineti, *The Enlargement of the EU: Turkey, The Controversial Road to a Wrong Candidacy*, Firenze: Biblioteca della Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 1999; cited in Leda-Agapi Glyptis, “The Cost of Rapprochement: Turkey’s Erratic EU Dream as a Clash of Systemic Values”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, September 2005, p. 407.

²²⁵⁸ C. Bretherton, & J. Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, p.241.

Summit, Turkey was discriminated from the other twelve candidate countries.²²⁵⁹ At this summit the candidate countries from the CEE were separated into two waves and a clear perspective was accepted for their enlargement process, but Turkey was excluded from both of these waves. Arguments against Turkey's membership on the basis of its identity have started to be discussed more frequently since the Luxembourg Summit in 1997.

At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 Turkey was given an official candidate status. At the conclusions of this Summit it was stated that "Turkey is a state, destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states."²²⁶⁰ For the first time the European Council used the term "pre-accession strategy". It implies that Turkey would be granted a candidate status, but without a specific timetable for the accession.²²⁶¹ Cem, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Helsinki Summit, stated that:

The Turkish candidacy is important, perhaps more important than actual membership which confirms that we have always been European for six centuries. We are European because of our geographical position, because our history was moulded in Europe.²²⁶²

In December 2002, the EU took a decision of not giving a date for entry talks to Turkey before late 2004. At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 it was stated that:

If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.²²⁶³

As a response to this decision, on October 8, 2002, a spokesman from the Turkish Foreign Ministry argued that "Turkey had not been granted even a start date for accession to the EU, as evidence that the Union wanted to remain an exclusively Christian Club."²²⁶⁴ As a response, the European Commission's DG for enlargement in that period, Eneko Landaburu argued that the main objection to Turkey was political, not cultural or religious. He stated that "the EU is not a club of Christian peoples and if a country shares the EU's

²²⁵⁹ Z. Kütük, "Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity", pp. 275.

²²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²²⁶¹ E. Weisband, "Turkey's Accession to the EU: The Social Construction of Otherness in Reverse Images", retrieved on February 22, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna>

²²⁶² "EU Candidacy Changes Turkey's Image", *Associated Press*, from "New York Times on the Web", February 2, 2000; quoted in Effie Fokas, "Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity", retrieved on November 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW2/Fokas.PDF>

²²⁶³ For further detail see EU, The European Council, *Conclusions of the European Council in Turkey Since Luxembourg December 1997*.

²²⁶⁴ Quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.279.

democratic values and is European, there should be no obstacle to it joining the family.”²²⁶⁵ Usually the Commission officials emphasize that the EU is a political project and Turkey’s membership is evaluated on the basis of the same criteria with the other candidate countries.

Turkey’s reform process before opening of accession negotiations on 3rd October 2005 was impressive. Especially starting from August 2002, the Turkish Parliament has made some important legal and constitutional changes²²⁶⁶ which had important effects on the transformation of the Turkish political and legal system. Important reforms have been made in these fields:

Human rights, fundamental freedoms, freedom of thought and expression, non-Muslim religious foundations and their rights of acquiring and disposal of property, broadcasting and education in languages and dialects that are traditionally used in daily lives of Turkish citizens...²²⁶⁷

In addition to these, some necessary arrangements were made to prevent torture and ill-treatment and to promote gender equality. From February 2002 till July 2004 to fulfill political criteria of the EU, eight reform packages have been adopted by Turkey.²²⁶⁸

In October 2004 the Commission announced that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended to the Council to open accession negotiations with Turkey. At Brussels European Council in December 2004, it was decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. Most of the EU elites did not expect such reforms from Turkey.²²⁶⁹ After fulfilling of the Copenhagen criteria, the question of Turkey’s membership has been started to be discussed mostly in terms of “Europeanness of Turkey”. Vaner contends that:

²²⁶⁵ A report by Oana Lungescu, BBC correspondent in Brussels for BBC Radio 4, October 16, 2002; quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.279.

²²⁶⁶ For further detail see EU, The European Council, *Conclusions of the European Council in Turkey Since Luxembourg December 1997*.

²²⁶⁷ *Turkish Embassy.org*, “Turkey and EU”, retrieved on September 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.turkishembassy.org//index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57...

²²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁶⁹ Mouna Mejri, “Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference” in Armand Clesse & Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), *Turkey and the EU: 2004 and Beyond*, Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2004, p. 283.

...the integration into the EU is a delusion, not only for socio-economic reasons or the lack of democracy, but also for the cultural obstacles raised by many Europeans who use technical reasons as pretexts to oppose the admission of this country into the club.²²⁷⁰

As Casanova argues, the more Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria and adopts the EU acquis to its legislation, the more unstated cultural criteria of already belonging to European civilisation tend to be important in the debate on Turkey's membership.²²⁷¹ At the beginning of the relations with Turkey, the reasons for delaying Turkish accession were mainly based on economic and political factors, but after it was decided that Turkey has mostly fulfilled the political criteria and the accession negotiations will be started on 3 October 2005, cultural and identity factors have been emphasized much more frequently by some important political figures of Europe. The head of the Commission's delegation to Turkey, Kretschmer stated that "the beginning of accession talks does not necessarily imply that Turkey will enter the EU. There is a long and tough road ahead for Turkey."²²⁷² Such expressions did not reflect support and encouragement about the membership of Turkey. When the possibility of accession of Turkey has become clearer, questioning of Turkey's membership on the grounds of identity has increased in the EU. During the interviews conducted by the author, one of the Commission officials argued that "when Turkey's membership has become a possibility, question of identity has come to the fore and started to be discussed more frequently."²²⁷³

At Brussels European Council Summit in 2004, the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey was taken with major restrictions. In the European Council Presidency Conclusions it was stated that "the shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which can not be guaranteed beforehand."²²⁷⁴ Moreover, the possibility of permanent restrictions in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies and agriculture were mentioned and the extension of the Customs Union to cover ten new Member States

²²⁷⁰ Semih Vaner, "Turkey and the EU: The Common Otherness" in Michel Dumoulin & Genevieve Duchenne (eds.), *L'Europe et la Mediterranee*, Brussels: Peter Lang Pub., 2002, p.108; quoted in M. Mejri, "Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference", p. 283.

²²⁷¹ J. Casanova, "The Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization", p.236.

²²⁷² www.turkishpress.com, 1 May 2005; quoted in Leda-Agapi Glyptis, "Which Side of the Fence? Turkey's Uncertain Place in the EU", *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.4, No.3, Fall 2005, p.120.

²²⁷³ Interview with Commission official from Spain, DG Justice Freedom and Security, on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

²²⁷⁴ Quoted in Leda-Agapi Glyptis, "Which Side of the Fence? Turkey's Uncertain Place in the EU", pp.120-121.

including the Republic of Cyprus was stated as a prerequisite for full membership.²²⁷⁵ Also it was stated that:

In the case of a serious and persistent breach in a candidate State of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption.²²⁷⁶

Thus, there is a possibility of suspending the negotiations, if Turkey will fail to maintain adequate progress in the reforms.

In recent years suggestions such as offering Turkey a “privileged partnership” or being part of the “Mediterranean Union”, instead of the EU led to the emergence of questions among the Turkish elites and the public opinion about discrimination of Turkey in cultural and religious terms. Moreover, any possible accession date for Turkey has not been mentioned by any of the EU officials, the politicians or in any document of the EU yet. The question of Turkey’s membership is considered as an “open-ended process”; because of these, Turkish politicians have usually accused the EU of discrimination on the basis of cultural differences.²²⁷⁷ Stating at least a possible accession year for Turkey by the EU officials or the political leaders of Europe will probably decrease the perception of discrimination towards Turkey among the Turkish elites and the general public.

In December 2006 Turkey refused to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots, because nothing had been done to abolish isolation of the Northern Cyprus, although it was promised after the acceptance of the Annan Plan by the majority of the Turkish Cypriots. The EU suspended negotiations with Turkey on eight of thirty five chapters. The EU has made explicit for the first time that it may suspend negotiations.²²⁷⁸ Lastly after the election of Sarkozy as the new President of France, negotiations on the chapter on Monetary Union were rejected by France on the grounds that it implies the full membership of Turkey. Sarkozy explicitly argues that Turkey has no place in the EU.²²⁷⁹

²²⁷⁵ Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, pp. 279-280.

²²⁷⁶ Presidency Conclusions of Brussels European Council, 16-17 December 2004, 16238/1/04 REV 1, Brussels, February 1, 2005, p.8.

²²⁷⁷ Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, pp. 275-288.

²²⁷⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4107919.stm>; quoted in Mehmet Ögütçü, “Turkey and the EU: How to Achieve a Forward-looking and ‘win-win’ Accession by 2015?”, p. 53.

²²⁷⁹ “The Ins and Outs”, A Special Report “Europe’s Mid-life Crisis”, *The Economist*, March 17-23, 2007, p.15.

In the case of Turkey's membership the terms such as "permanent safeguards" and "**privileged partnership**" have started to be used which are discourses that reflect the perceived uniqueness of the case of Turkey's membership. It is argued that to have a "privileged partnership" with Turkey would be more beneficial for the EU in order to prevent importing cultural incompatibilities to the EU.²²⁸⁰ Through such discourses, Turkey has not been constructed as the "other" of the EU, but it has been constructed as culturally different from other Member States and as a "unique" candidate. The case of Turkey's membership is perceived as a unique case, especially because of the impact of religion on its culture and Turkish identity. In some daily newspapers of Europe and in some speeches of the politicians of Europe, the case of Turkey's membership has started to be usually discussed on the basis its Europeaness, rather than fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and adoption of the *acquis*. "Is Turkey European?"²²⁸¹ was one of the topics of *Le Monde*. As Koenig, et al. argue, if we overview how the mass media mentioned Turkey's accession to the EU, exclusivist perceptions of Europe are still alive especially towards Turkey²²⁸² which shows that European identity is still trying to be constructed in cultural terms by some groups in the EU.

At one of the Council meetings, the President of the EP Nicole Fontaine stated that the EP was divided on the issue of Turkey's membership. She claimed that Turkey's accession to the EU would be advantageous economically and politically to the EU, but she added that "it would not be possible to evade the problem of cultural integration."²²⁸³ Turkey's membership was regarded as "culturally problematic".²²⁸⁴ As Weisband argues, "the result is a diplomatic strategy to delay but without rejection."²²⁸⁵ Thus, the EU still tries to have close relations with Turkey and wants to go on cooperation in different fields, but tries to delay the accession of Turkey to the EU.

²²⁸⁰ W. Pfaff, "The Europe Needs a Third Way", *Herald Tribune*, Translated in *Radikal*, "Avrupa'nın Üçüncü Yola İhtiyacı Var", December 17, 2004.

²²⁸¹ Laurent Zecchini, "La Turquie Européenne?", *Le Monde*, October 12, 2002; quoted in M. Mejeri, "Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference", p.282.

²²⁸² T. Koenig, S. Mihelj, et al., "Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process?", p. 150.

²²⁸³ Quoted in Asa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?" in Helene Sjørnsen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, New York:Routledge Pub., 2006, p.137.

²²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁸⁵ E. Weisband, "Turkey's Accession to the EU: The Social Construction of Otherness in Reverse Images", retrieved on February 22, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna>

Supporters of Turkey's membership defend its membership mostly on utilitarian basis. They focus on geostrategic importance of Turkey, its positive effects on security and defense of Europe, including energy security. In addition to these, they mention economic potential of Turkey, young Turkish population. On the contrary, people who are against Turkey's membership usually argue that Turkey is not a European country in geographical, historical and cultural terms. It is not considered as part of European civilisation. Moreover, they argue that acceptance of Turkey would open the door for other non-European countries as well and lead to an unlimited enlargement which would overload the policy-making capacity of the EU and reduce the EU to a free trade area.²²⁸⁶ Another reason which is stated against Turkey's membership is that if Turkey will be a member of the EU, it will negatively affect deepening of the EU. It is obvious that after the accession of ten new members from the CEE in 2005 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, the possibility of establishing a federal structure within the EU collapsed. As Rocard argues, even with the accession of the UK, the possibility of establishing a federal EU collapsed.²²⁸⁷ Thus, this argument is not only valid for the case of Turkey's membership; instead it was valid also for the previous enlargements. As Öniş argues, from the perspectives of the elites as well as the ordinary citizens of the leading European states, the possibility of membership of countries such as Greece and Spain or Poland and Hungary was not perceived as a threat to European identity²²⁸⁸ which is not the case for Turkey's membership. He asserts that:

Christianity is a key component of European identity, even though it may not be its principal or overriding constituent...it would not be possible to explain the differential treatment of the CEE and Turkey, countries broadly at the same level of economic and political development, without reference to this factor.²²⁸⁹

Thus, it can be argued that the attitudes of the EU towards Turkey and the attitudes of the EU towards the countries from the CEE are not the same during their candidacy.

²²⁸⁶ Heinz Kramer, "Turkey and the EU: The EU's Perspective", Lecture given at Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki, November 27, 2006 in Senem Aydın Düzgit, Hakan Altınay et al. (eds.), *Seeking Kant in the EU's Relations With Turkey*, İstanbul: TESEV Pub, 2006, pp. 7-10.

²²⁸⁷ Interview with M. Rocard, Socialist MEP of France, on September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

²²⁸⁸ Z. Öniş, "Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", p. 116.

²²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

V.2.1. Comparison of the Relations between the EU and Turkey with the Relations between the EU and Countries from the CEE in Terms of European Identity

The accession process of all candidate countries has different dynamics. The interactions between each candidate country and the EU have different characteristics. It depends on the priority concern of the EU in that process and the position of the candidate country vis-a-vis the EU. In 1981 Greece, in 1986 Spain and Portugal were accepted to the EC mainly for political concerns, such as the encouragement of democratization in these countries which was a priority concern of the EC. They had not satisfied the economic requirements at the time of their accession.²²⁹⁰ Piedrafita argues that Spain supported the Eastern enlargement despite its negative impact on Spanish interests, on the grounds that it had a moral duty to do so. Just like Spain who was admitted in 1986 to be brought back into Europe, Spanish policy makers argue that “it was now the turn of the CEE people to return to Europe.”²²⁹¹ Thus, both the accession of Spain and Portugal in the 1980s and the accession of the countries of the CEE in 2004 accelerated on the basis of the discourse of “returning to Europe”.

When Morocco applied for membership to the EC in 1987, its application was not even forwarded to the Commission for an opinion which is the regular procedure. The EU excluded for the first time a state, on the basis of its inherent characteristics. By marking Morocco as inherently non-European, there is no possibility for Morocco to become a member of the EU one day.²²⁹² Thus, Morocco was constructed by the EU as inherently different, also in terms of acquired characteristics, because of its monarchical rule, maltreatment of prisoners, etc.²²⁹³ For years Morocco has defined itself as a bridge between Europe and Africa,²²⁹⁴ like Turkey situated itself as a bridge between the West and the East. In spite of some of the attempts of Morocco, it has not been successful to

²²⁹⁰ R. Hettlage, “European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion”, p.249.

²²⁹¹ S. Piedrafita, F. Steinberg & J.I. Torreblanca, “Twenty Years of Spain’s Membership in the EU (1986-2006)”, Elcano Royal Institute of International Affairs, Madrid, 2006; cited in A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez & J. I. Torreblanca, “European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against”, p.5, retrieved on August 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_in/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/DT+20-2007

²²⁹² B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 42.

²²⁹³ “Europe’s African Dimension”, *The Middle East*, April 1993, p.8; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 43.

²²⁹⁴ “M&M: Morocco”, *The Economist*, 9 January 1993, pp. 37-39; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 42.

resist the construction of its identity as non-European in geographical terms. Morocco recognizes the construction of its identity as different in terms of acquired characteristics and has taken some measures to improve it which were not sufficient to construct Morocco as a European state.²²⁹⁵ The self/other interaction between the EU and the countries of the CEE is based on discourses of acquired difference, association and recognition by the other which is not characterized by a relationship of “othering”. The maintenance of this interaction is dependent on the continued recognition by the countries of the CEE their acquired differences from the Member States of the EU. The interactions between Morocco and the EU is also not based on a relationship of “othering”, rather it is based on discourses of inherent difference, dissociation and recognition. The lack of relationship of “othering” is dependent on the continued recognition by Morocco of construction of its identity as inherently different from the EU.²²⁹⁶

In the post-Cold War era, the governments and intellectuals of the countries of the CEE tried to push the cognitive boundaries of Europe to the East to be part of the EU. They used successful “**identity politics strategies**” by emphasizing their common history and civilisation with Europe. The community-building discourse of the EU has also helped recognition of their claims of being part of European identity. According to this discourse the Eastern enlargement was constructed as “long awaited unification of Europe”.²²⁹⁷ In the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 it was agreed that “the associated countries in CEE that so desire shall become members of the Union.”²²⁹⁸ The enlargement towards the CEE was accelerated by the discourses of “shared identity”.²²⁹⁹ The countries from the CEE are constructed as similar on the basis of inherent characteristics such as geography and culture, but difference with those were constructed on the basis of acquired characteristics, such as democracy and capitalism. In its relations with the countries from the CEE, the EU constructs interaction with these countries on superior/inferior basis. The

²²⁹⁵ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, pp. 43-44.

²²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²²⁹⁷ I. B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus”, 1998; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 40.

²²⁹⁸ Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, retrieved on April 12, 2007 on the World Wide Web: www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm

²²⁹⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the EU” in Lars Erik Cedermann (ed.), *Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 41.

EU claims to have the superior identity of having stable, mature democratic and capitalist institutions. The recentness of their transition to democracy and market economy were emphasized, in contrast to the stability and maturity of the institutions in Europe. Thus, the countries of the CEE are constructed as similar in terms of inherent characteristics, but different in terms of acquired ones which secured the European identity in relation to the countries of CEE through association. The countries from the CEE have accepted this way of construction of their identities. They have accepted their deficiencies in terms of acquired characteristics. As it was the case in the Cold War era, there is always a potential for “othering”,²³⁰⁰ even with the countries of the CEE, although it is unlikely in the near future.

The EU emphasized the common cultural heritage in its relations with the CEE states in the post-Cold War era and their belonging to the common “European family”. The enlargement towards the CEE was considered as unification of two parts of the same entity.²³⁰¹ “Cultural proximity” was emphasized frequently during the relations between the EU and countries of the CEE. The closeness among them was emphasized, because of having a common history, culture and values. It is argued that they both “share the same past” and “have the same roots”.²³⁰² The arguments of a sense of a shared destiny and a “**kinship-based duty**” were frequently used for the enlargement towards the CEE.

The case of Turkey’s membership is neither like Morocco, nor like the countries of the CEE. Its application for membership was not rejected on the grounds that it is not part of Europe in geographical terms; but unlike the countries of the CEE, the EU hesitated about declaring Turkey officially as a candidate country. As Rumelili argues, Turkey is differentiated from Europe on the basis of both inherent and acquired characteristics. European identity which has been in an ongoing construction process within the EU has both civic and cultural aspects that lead to emergence of competing discourses on Turkey’s membership in terms of European identity. The discourses which emphasize cultural aspects of European identity construct Turkey as inherently different from Europe. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasize the civic aspects of European identity construct

²³⁰⁰ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 41.

²³⁰¹ Helene Sjurson, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No.3, 2002, pp.491-513.

²³⁰² Quoted in A. Lundgren, “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?”, pp.135-136.

Turkey as different from Europe only in terms of acquired characteristics, such as having an unstable political system and human rights problems. According to this perspective, when Turkey develops its economy, political institutions and will reach European standards, it will become a member of the EU; because of these competing discourses the “EU has kept a **fluctuating social distance towards Turkey**.”²³⁰³ Zurcher and van der Linden argue that “**Turkey’s alleged un-European character is a construction**, based on a very shaky definition of a European or Western civilisation and on a poor understanding of Turkish reality.”²³⁰⁴

Turkish governments have resisted “construction of Turkey’s identity as inherently different from Europe, by producing counter-arguments that construct Turkey as sharing Europe’s collective identity.”²³⁰⁵ Turkey’s resistance to construction of its identity as “non-European” makes it more difficult for the EU to construct a certain social distance with Turkey.²³⁰⁶ Turkey’s resistance makes it harder to construct clear boundaries between Europe and non-Europe.²³⁰⁷ Thus, the resistance of Turkey towards construction of its identity as non-European in terms of inherent and acquired characteristics have led to the construction of ambiguous social distance between Turkey and the EU.

In contrast to its interactions with the countries of the CEE and Morocco, the interactions between the EU and Turkey have made European identity more insecure. The main characteristics of these interactions are: The hybrid nature of European identity, contradictory social distances between the EU and Turkey and resistance of Turkey to construction of its identity as different which leads to increasing emphasis on the differences of Turkey by the EU.²³⁰⁸

²³⁰³ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 44.

²³⁰⁴ Erik-Jan Zurcher & Heleen van der Linden, *Searching for the Fault-line: A Survey of Turkish Islam in the Accession of Turkey to the EU in the Light of the “Clash of Civilizations”*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004, p. 170.

²³⁰⁵ İsmail Cem, “Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical Perspective”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/01.htm>; cited in B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, p. 45.

²³⁰⁶ B. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, pp. 44-45.

²³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

The Eastern Europeans were considered as the “kidnapped West”.²³⁰⁹ The Eastern enlargement was referred to as “Europe’s other half finally coming home” by the EU.²³¹⁰ These kinds of perceptions led to a “sense of duty” in the EU. This kind of duty that the EU was said to have towards the countries of the CEE, has not been valid for Turkey. As Öniş argues “Turkey is seen not as part of the broader European family or civilisational nexus, but as an important non-member, with which relations primarily of an economic nature need to be developed.”²³¹¹ Thus, Turkey is not wanted to be taken inside the EU as a “family member”, rather it is usually perceived as a neighbour with whom good relations should be preserved, especially in economic and security terms.

Lundgren argues that Turkey has not been treated on an equal footing with the other candidate countries. She compares the cases of Romania, Poland and Turkey in terms financial assistance during their accession process. She argues that Turkey has not benefited from all the pre-accession funds and pre-accession strategies which other candidate countries benefited during their preparation process for full membership. She asserts that preparing the CEE countries was the priority for the EU, so only after their preparation process was largely completed, the financial assistance and pre-accession aid for Turkey were increased.²³¹² She puts forward that firstly the decision to enlarge was taken, then the financial issues were solved. The decision about accession of a candidate country is not based only on the estimation of costs and gains.²³¹³ Lundgren argues that the CEE countries have been given much more moral support than Turkey during their preparation process for the EU membership. This moral support includes providing incentives for reforms, expressing solidarity, encouraging, cooperating, sending positive signals and giving advices to the candidate country in a constructive way.²³¹⁴ On the other hand, contradictory responses have been given to Turkey which has increased Euroscepticism in Turkey both among the general public, even among the Turkish elites.

²³⁰⁹ H. Sjurgen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy”, *ARENA Working Papers*, No. 01/6, 2001; quoted in S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 26. For further detail see also Marise Cremona, “EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality”, *European Law Review*, Vol. 30, 2005, pp.6-9.

²³¹⁰ Quoted in A. Lundgren, “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?”, pp.134-135.

²³¹¹ Z. Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization”, p. 129.

²³¹² A. Lundgren, “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?”, p.125.

²³¹³ *Ibid.*, p.130.

²³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.125-127.

From a utilitarian perspective, the EU would act according to its economic and security benefits in the enlargement process. It should try to enlarge towards the countries, where it has more benefits in economic and security terms. From a rights-based perspective, the EU wants to enlarge towards primarily to those states which protect human rights and have a consolidated democracy. As Lundgren argues, Turkey was in a much better position than Romania, according to economic and democratic indicators before the EU's decision to enlarge towards the CEE in 1993. Another factor has been effective on the enlargement strategy of the EU which is a particular sense of "kinship-based duty". Thus, "cultural dimension" is one of the effective factors on the enlargement process.²³¹⁵ In terms of its military strength, Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952 and if the geostrategic position of Turkey was taken into consideration, Turkey has much more importance than Romania. Thus, the decision to take Romania before Turkey can not be explained also in terms of security.²³¹⁶ Thus, in the enlargement process of the EU, although it is not part of the official criteria, cultural factors such as "kinship based duty" have affected the attitudes of the EU towards the candidate countries.

In demographic, economic, political and geopolitical terms the costs of integration of Turkey is huge; but as S. Baykal argues "if Turkey had constituted an essential ingredient of the definition of 'Europeanness', in the perception of 'Europeans', the policy makers and the public opinion would have considered that cost as tolerable."²³¹⁷ As Keyman and Öniş argue, the question of identity with regards to Turkey's membership have influenced the EU policy towards Turkey and caused relatively unfavourable conditions faced by Turkey in comparison with the other candidate countries.²³¹⁸ Thus, scepticism about cultural integration of Turkey and questioning its "Europeanness" have been effective on slowing of the integration process of Turkey with the EU. The costs of accession of the countries of the CEE to the EU in financial, social and political terms were tolerated more easily. On the other hand, integration of Turkey has not been perceived as a duty of the EU.²³¹⁹ Lundgren asserts that Turkey's Europeanness is defended in terms of its ties with the European institutions and its adoption of values such as democracy and

²³¹⁵ A. Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?", p.122.

²³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.131-133.

²³¹⁷ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p. 26.

²³¹⁸ Fuat Keyman & Ziya Öniş, "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State", *Paper presented at the 44th Annual ISA Conference*, Budapest, June 24-28, 2003, p. 26.

²³¹⁹ Quoted in A. Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?", pp.135-136.

respect for human rights.²³²⁰ There has not been any reference to common cultural or historical heritage with Turkey. The long period of candidacy of Turkey has been reflected in the discourses about Turkey, as someone knocking at the door or as someone who has been sitting for a long time at the waiting room.

Mutual interdependence between the EU and Turkey has been usually perceived in economic and strategic terms. The possible positive impacts of Turkey's membership in terms of culture have recently been mentioned, in terms of improving relations between the predominantly Christian population of the EU and Muslim immigrants who are living in the Member States; also Turkey is usually perceived as a bridge between the West and the East. There has not been any reference to common history or shared culture with Turkey. Turkey still represents different culture and Islam for many citizens and even for many political elites of the EU.²³²¹ Turkey's different cultural background has been regarded as a threat to European unification by those who consider the EU as a "civilisational project". As Kütük argues, Turkey has to overcome the opposition of the EU elites who consider European identity in civilisational terms to become a full member of the EU.²³²² Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan stated on 5 December 2002 that:

We are waiting at the door of the EU for forty years. Even though Turkey is more than ready, you (the EU) provided discussion dates to states that had applied only within the last ten years, but you kept postponing ours. We do not see any sincerity in these actions.²³²³

He added that "the EU is neither a religious nor a geographic community. It is a community of collective political values."²³²⁴ He emphasized the importance of construction of European identity on civic basis. He argued that the EU is more a union of values, not "a narrowly defined geography or a union of rigidity."²³²⁵ He argued that if you do not accept us, our public will say that "we already knew they were a Christian club. We are a Muslim country. Our population is large. They will not accept us."²³²⁶ This reflects

²³²⁰ Quoted in A. Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?", p.137.

²³²¹ *Ibid.*, p.136.

²³²² Z. Kütük, "Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity", pp. 275-276.

²³²³ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, December 5, 2002, retrieved on August 22, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²³²⁴ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, December 13, 2002, retrieved on August 22, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²³²⁵ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Why The EU Needs Turkey", Speech at Oxford University, May 28, 2004, retrieved on April 18, 2005 on World Wide Web: <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areasteastudies/lectures/Erdogan.pdf>

²³²⁶ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, retrieved on August 22, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

the perceptions of many Turkish citizens who usually argue that they are discriminated by the EU especially on the basis of religion. Former Turkish Foreign Minister, contemporarily the president of Turkey, Gül argued about the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. He stated that:

It is a historic and wise step. Its positive effects will be felt far beyond the borders of the EU and Turkey...A powerful message will be sent to the whole world that Europe is defined not by a narrow understanding of geography and religion, but by common values.²³²⁷

He implied that the membership of Turkey will show that European identity is constructed on civic basis.

In terms of social constructivism, the decisions of the EU about enlargement are highly influenced by collective identities and its interactions with different national identities. In some cases, the decisions of the EU about enlargement have not been based on utilitarian approaches; rather they may depend on normative reasons that lead to the construction of the EU as an entity which has a moral and historical duty to welcome European countries who share its values.²³²⁸ Thus, how the countries from the CEE had become a member of the EU more quickly and why they had been supported much more during their accession processes to the EU rather than Turkey can be analyzed on the basis of social constructivism.

V.2.2. Perceptions of the Main Political Parties and Some of the Political Elites of the EU about Turkey's Membership in Terms of European Identity

The perceptions of the EU elites and their discourses about Turkey's membership have affected Turkey-EU relations. The Member States such as the UK, Germany and France have different visions about the future of Europe which affect their perceptions about Turkey's membership to the EU. The UK is in favour of Turkey's membership. The supporters of Turkey also include Spain, Italy and Portugal which believe that Turkish membership would contribute to the position of Mediterranean region vis-a-vis the other regions in the EU. Sweden, Finland and Ireland also support Turkey, because of political and strategic reasons and they believe that the EU has to act according to its stated

²³²⁷ Abdullah Gül, Address at Bloomberg, London, on 14 March 2005; quoted in Leda-Agapi Glyptis, "Which Side of the Fence? Turkey's Uncertain Place in the EU", p.116.

²³²⁸ Nuria Font, "Turkey's Accession to the EU: Interests, Ideas and Path Dependence", February 3, 2005, p.3, retrieved on April 17, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/2072/4260/1/43_Nuria_Font.pdf

commitments to maintain its international credibility. Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia believe that the EU has to stick to its initial commitments. Three Baltic republics and Poland are in favour of Turkey's membership, because of their general support to further enlargement, since they have an interest in accession of the countries in their neighbourhood to shelter them against Russia. On the contrary, Germany, France and Austria are mostly against Turkey's membership. In addition to these, opposition can be also seen in Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark.²³²⁹

The leaders of the Member States and the political elites of the EU have not sent always clear signals to Turkey. They usually send contradictory signals which have negatively affected the speed of reforms in Turkey; these also have led to increase in Euroscepticism and strengthen the anti-EU groups in Turkey. The ex-Commission President Prodi criticized the duplicity of the heads of Member States. On 30 April 2004 he stated that "they are giving different messages to Turkey. When they are together with Turkish officials they say, Turkey will become a member of the EU, but they say to me in Brussels, please do not hurry about Turkey's membership."²³³⁰ This statement reflects the dichotomy of the political elites of the EU about Turkey's membership and the problem of openness and honesty towards Turkey about its membership to the EU.

Some of the EU elites think that there are some problems within the EU which have to be resolved before Turkey's accession. Some of them argue that if Turkey will be taken before they are resolved, decision-making process of the EU will be negatively affected. The term "**integration capacity**" has been used recently, especially after the accession of the countries from the CEE. It refers to how many Member States; the EU can expand to without losing its ability to function.²³³¹ The Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn used the term "integration capacity", which has several dimensions: "Institutional, financial, quality-related and democratic".²³³²

²³²⁹ H. Kramer, "Turkey and the EU: The EU's Perspective", , pp.4-5.

²³³⁰ Quoted in *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2004.

²³³¹ "Rehn Says EU Borders are not Fixed", *ABHaber.Com*, April 12, 2006, retrieved on May 25, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.abhaber.com/news_page.asp?id=2465

²³³² Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement, *EUROPA* Press Releases, Speech at the European Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, November 21, 2006, retrieved on December 9, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/727&type=HT...>

The full membership of Turkey to the EU and its Europeanness are sometimes questioned in terms of geographical location, religion and culture. According to people who define European identity on cultural basis, Turkey's membership will negatively affect European identity and the ongoing integration process. According to former French President G. d'Estaing, "the capital of Turkey is not in Europe, 95% of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country, so Turkish accession to the EU would be the end of Europe."²³³³ He defined European identity especially in geographical and cultural terms and excluded Turkey. Former German Chancellor Kohl stated that the EU is a "**civilisational project**" in which "Turkey has no place".²³³⁴ Here again Turkey is considered as out of European civilisation. Poettering who is the Chairman of the EP argues that he sees Turkey's membership related with culture and identity. He stated that "religion is not the biggest factor...The most important factors are cultural differences". He claimed that if Turkish accession will be realized, European consciousness would be lost.²³³⁵ All of these statements show that culture and identity have been effective factors on Turkey's membership to the EU.

In 2004 Dutch EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein argued that "Europe would implode, if Turkey's membership was realized" and "the success of Vienna at the Turkish siege in 1683 would be in vain."²³³⁶ Here there is a reference to history. What is highlighted is important, because collective identity construction is about forgetting as well as remembering. He also argues that "Ukraine and Belarus were more 'European' than Turkey" and added that "Europe with prospective Turkish membership now risked becoming predominantly Islamic."²³³⁷ He equated Turkey with Islam and considered Turkey's membership as a threat to European identity which is defined by him on the basis of Christianity. Although Ukraine and Belarus are less developed in socio-economic terms than Turkey, they are considered as more European. Moreover he states that "it is clear that before Turkey can enter, it will certainly have to go through a transformation. At the time of its accession, it will have to possess a completely different identity."²³³⁸ Here

²³³³ For further detail see *Le Monde*, November 8, 2002.

²³³⁴ For further detail see *The Guardian*, March 7, 1997.

²³³⁵ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, September 15, 2003, retrieved on September 3, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²³³⁶ "EU Will Not a Withstand a Turkish Invasion", *Timesonline*, September 8, 2004, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1251637,00html>; cited in Z. Kütük, "Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity", pp. 279.

²³³⁷ For further detail see *Turkish Daily News*, 8 September 2004.

²³³⁸ *Ibid.*

Turkish identity is perceived as something which has to be transformed to accommodate to the EU. It is obvious that if Turkey will enter the EU one day, the EU will not be the same with this one and Turkey will not be the same either. Both European identity and Turkish identity have been in an ongoing construction process, interactions among these two parties have also affected these processes.

Different political parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Socialists have different perceptions about the political structure of the EU. Usually the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens have a much broader understanding of European identity and define it usually on civic basis; on the contrary the Christian Democrats usually define European identity on cultural basis. Fear of a loss of European identity and the necessity to have clear boundaries for the EU are the main arguments of the Christian Democrats. The Socialists and the Greens are usually in favour of Turkey's membership; on the other hand, the Christian Democrats frequently indicate their reluctance to accept Turkey as a full member, although it fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Religion, demography, culture and geography are stated as factors against Turkey's membership.²³³⁹ The extreme right parties are also against Turkey's membership. Right-wing political discourses usually call for a "Europe for the Europeans". They usually perceive immigrants from outside Europe as a threat to the "relative ethno-cultural homogeneity of Europe".²³⁴⁰

At the meeting of the EPP in March 1997, Helmut Kohl and the other Christian Democrat leaders including Prodi, Aznar, Junker and Schüssel declared that "they did not see Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. They stated that "they supported strengthened cooperation between the EU and Turkey, but without membership."²³⁴¹ The reason was stated as, "the European project" was based on a specific civilisation and "there would be no room for Turkey, as it did not belong to this civilisation."²³⁴² Here, Turkey is excluded from the EU in civilisational terms. Especially German Christian Democrat Party "the CDU prefers to anchor Turkey to the EU's institutional structure by a special

²³³⁹ Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey's Strategic Future: Anchoring Turkey to Europe, The Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead", *Readings in European Security*, Vol. 2, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004, pp.88-89.

²³⁴⁰ E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein, *Race, Class, Nation: Ambiguous Identities*, London: Verso Pub., 1991, cited in T. Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU*, p.26.

²³⁴¹ *Recontre des Chefs de gouvernement a Bruxelles, Sommet PPE*, March 4, 1997; quoted in Z. Kütük, "Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity", pp. 282.

²³⁴² Michael Emerson, *Redrawing the Map of Europe*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 15; cited in Z. Kütük, "Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity", p. 282.

partnership, rather than granting it full membership, because they consider Turkey's identity, history and social structure as incompatible with the EU's values.²³⁴³

The Christian Democrats usually have a vision of the EU as a civilisational project which is based on a common history, religion and culture with rather definite boundaries. For them, Turkey is an important country, with whom relations in terms of economy and security should be developed, but they are against the full membership of Turkey. They consider Turkey as an “**important outsider** rather than a natural insider” of the European integration. On the other hand, the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens who define European identity usually on the basis of civic values, evaluate Turkey's membership mostly on the basis of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and adoption of the EU acquis. Thus, they are not usually against Turkey's membership, if Turkey will abide by the European norms especially in the fields of democracy and human rights.²³⁴⁴ Because of different perceptions of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats about Turkey's membership, when the balance of political powers in the EU is in favour of Social Democrats, it usually provides an atmosphere which is in favour of Turkey; but there are some exceptions, former West German Chancellor and Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Helmut Schmidt argued that Turkey should be excluded from the EU because of its unsuitable civilisation and “by opening the door to EU admission for other Muslim nations, Turkey's accession could result in the political union degeneration into nothing more than a free trade community.”²³⁴⁵ He perceived Turkey's membership as a threat to European identity and establishment of a political union which may lead to transformation of the EU to a free trade area. On the other hand, when the official candidate status was given to Turkey in December 1999, the Social Democrats were in power in Germany and Britain²³⁴⁶ who supported the candidacy of Turkey. Especially German Social Democrats under the leadership of Chancellor Schroeder were one of the main actors who supported the candidacy of Turkey. Schroeder stated that:

²³⁴³ Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, p. 280.

²³⁴⁴ Z. Öniş, “Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead”, p. 290.

²³⁴⁵ Helmut Schmidt, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2000; cited in Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.32, 2006, p. 406.

²³⁴⁶ Z. Öniş, “Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead”, pp. 290-294.

It will be very beneficial to have Turkey as a member, because it represents a gain to Western security to initiate a process of accommodation between Western Enlightenment and non-radical Islam.²³⁴⁷

He is in favour of Turkey's membership on utilitarian basis. Former German Foreign Minister Fischer called for the "reconstruction of the West" which includes Turkey. He added that if Europe wishes to represent itself as a Christian club, it should "say so and accept the consequences."²³⁴⁸ Thus, they are in favour of construction of European identity on civic basis which does not exclude Turkey.

"Privileged partnership" has been suggested by some of the EU leaders as a potential way of integration for countries like Turkey and Ukraine. It would establish closer ties than they currently have with the EU, without offering full membership.²³⁴⁹ Firstly German Chancellor Merkel suggested this idea. She stated that "I belong to those who are very sceptical."²³⁵⁰ She encouraged her fellow European politicians to inform Turkey that she has "little chance of joining".²³⁵¹ On 30 April 2004 she stated that "I am tired of giving promises to Turkey that will not be fulfilled."²³⁵² This expression reflected the problem of transparency and firmness of the EU towards Turkey about its membership. She argued that Turkey should be offered a "privileged partnership", instead of a full membership in her election campaign in 2005; but after the elections, she had to form a government with the Social Democrats who support Turkey's membership.²³⁵³ Merkel emphasized that Turkish accession was a matter not only for the Turks, but for the Europeans.²³⁵⁴ It shows the importance of the effects of Turkey's membership on construction process of European identity.

²³⁴⁷ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2004, retrieved on September 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²³⁴⁸ Quoted in J. Vinocur, "Fischer's Shifting Vision of Europe's Grand Future", *International Herald Tribune*, May 7, 2004, p. 2.

²³⁴⁹ L. Kubosova, "Sarkozy Calls for Definition of "Borders of Europe", retrieved on March 31, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/9/21278/?print=1>

²³⁵⁰ A. Cowell, "In Debate Over Turkey, Europe Defines Itself: A Christian Club vs. Geopolitical Union", *International Herald Tribune*, January 26, 2004, p. 3.

²³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²³⁵² *Anadolu Agency* cited in *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2004, retrieved on September 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²³⁵³ "Merkel Says Germany Continues to Support Turkish EU Talks", *The New Anatolian*, July 2, 2007, retrieved on August 24, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.thenewanatolian.com/tna-27450.html>

²³⁵⁴ *Anadolu Agency* cited in *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2004, retrieved on September 27, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

In France the leaders of the French ruling center-right political party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) have emphasized in recent years that “there is no question of Turkey’s entry in the middle or short term.”²³⁵⁵ They assert that “Turkey is not European, neither geographically, or culturally, or historically.” They argue that there is a civilisational conflict which has lasted over 1000 years that will be continued in the future.²³⁵⁶ Here again European identity is defined on the basis of culture and civilisation, from which Turkey is excluded. During his election campaign, Sarkozy who is the leader of the UMP argued that if he will be elected, he will “launch a debate on Turkey’s membership”.²³⁵⁷ He stated that “Turkey is in Asia Minor. Those who want Turkey’s membership are against a political Europe.”²³⁵⁸ He added that “I prefer to say Turkey that ‘you are going to be partners with Europe, we will have a common market, but you can not be an EU member, because you are in Asia Minor.’”²³⁵⁹ He excludes Turkey, by constructing European identity mainly on geographical basis. He emphasized that cooperation with Turkey as partners will continue, but he excludes Turkey from the EU family. In his article on “who is European?” Sarkozy states that:

...some non-member countries are part of Europe and have the right to full EU membership. This group includes Switzerland, Norway and eventually the Balkans. Then there are other countries whose right to join the union is debatable or who, although neighbours, are clearly non-European.²³⁶⁰

He adds that:

Of all the countries with which the EU should have preferential relations, foremost is Turkey, our neighbour and friend, sharing many of our security concerns and many of our values. These are good reasons for strengthening our ties with Turkey, without going so far as offering full membership.²³⁶¹

Here “**non-European neighbour**” discourse was used for Turkey. He constructed Turkey as a neighbour or a friend, with whom close relations should be established. Common security concerns were emphasized as a reason to have close relations with Turkey. He suggested that Turkey should play a central role in a Mediterranean Union instead of a full

²³⁵⁵ “Turkey isn’t Fit For EU, French Say”, *International Herald Tribune*, April 9, 2004, p. 3.

²³⁵⁶ *La Nouvelle Republique du Centre Ouest*, December 21, 2004, p.2; quoted in T. Koenig, S. Mihelj, et al., “Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process?”, p.159.

²³⁵⁷ “Sarkozy, Royal Debate Turkey’s EU Bid”, *Turkish Daily News*, May 4, 2007, retrieved on August 28, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=72308>

²³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁶⁰ Nicolas Sarkozy, “Who is European? This is What We Must Define”, October 8, 2006, retrieved on October, 16, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/...>

²³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

membership even during his election campaign.²³⁶² However Turkey has repeated that it will never accept this option as an alternative to full membership to the EU. Also François Bayrou who is from the Independent Center Right Party (UDF), argued that “it is a very large Muslim country that does not belong to Europe. Can anyone really imagine that the EU’s largest country should be the least European...?”²³⁶³ Here Turkey is constructed as the “**least European**”, even if it will become an EU member. On the other hand, former French President Chirac stated that “Turkey absolutely has its place in Europe.”²³⁶⁴ Chirac and former French Foreign Minister Barnier are in favour of delay, but not rejection of Turkey. Chirac argued that “Turkey’s entry into the Union is certainly not desirable in the short-term. My conviction is that it is in the long term.”²³⁶⁵ He was also using not rejection, but delaying strategy about Turkey’s membership to the EU.

Austria is also one of the main opponents of Turkey’s membership. Ursula Plassnik who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, while Austria had the EU presidency, a journalist asked that “where are the frontiers of Europe?...and who belongs to Europe? Turkey, for instance yes or no?” She replied that “...they can not be drawn by geographers or historians. Europe was always a political project. That does not mean there will be a Europe without frontiers...”²³⁶⁶ About the case of Turkey’s membership she only stated that “we started EU membership talks with Turkey...on October 3rd as we did with Croatia...The outcome of these negotiations is uncertain. This is written in the negotiation mandate...”²³⁶⁷ She emphasized that the negotiations with Turkey is an open-ended process.

Some important political figures of Europe support Turkey’s membership. Öniş argues that the “pro-Turkey coalition” in Europe has been gathering momentum at the elite

²³⁶² “Club-Med Gains Supporters; Turkey Puts Fears to Rest”, *Turkish Daily News*, August 4, 2007, retrieved on August 24, 2007 on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80117>

²³⁶³ *The Guardian*, November 27, 2002; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.280.

²³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁶⁵ Quoted in K. Bennhold, “Chirac Praises EU Expansion”, *International Herald Tribune*, April 30, 2004, p. 2.

²³⁶⁶ “Interview by Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik with *Euronews*”, *Euronews*, February 4, 2006, retrieved on October, 16, 2006 on the World Wide Web:

http://www.uealc.at/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/0402PlassnikEuronews.html?mont...

²³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

level, if not at the popular level.²³⁶⁸ Delanty asserts that Turkey's membership complements the EU. He also argues that:

...It would be a positive step forward...in the context of different kind of relations with rest of Asia...Turkey could be a mediator...it would be a stabilizing force in the world...in terms of culture and identity, Turkey would contribute, it would bring different dimensions to Europe.²³⁶⁹

Thus, he perceives Turkey's membership to the EU as richness in cultural terms and emphasizes the positive impact of Turkey in terms of stability in the world. Former British Prime Minister Blair states that:

The accession of Turkey would be a proof that Europe is committed not just in word but indeed to a Europe of diverse races, cultures and religions all bound together by common rules and a sense of human solidarity and mutual respect.²³⁷⁰

He implies that Turkey, who has a different culture, can be part of the EU and emphasized that Turkey's membership will prove the principle of "unity in diversity". A.V. Quadras who was the ex-vice-president of the EP, in his speech at the Bosphorus University he stated that:

The EP...recognizes that, the political values of the EU are chiefly based on the Judeo Christian and humanist culture of Europe, but no one has a monopoly on these universal values of democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights and freedoms of religion and conscience, values which can perfectly well be accepted and defended by a country, where the majority of the population is Muslim...²³⁷¹

Thus, he is in favour of construction of European identity mainly on civic basis and he emphasized that Turkey, who has a predominantly Muslim population, can adopt the European values and become a member of the EU.

According to the "European Elites Survey" which was made in 2006, the responses of the MEPs showed greater variance than those of the Commission officials; because the thoughts of the MEPs were affected by partisan, territorial and national perspectives. 75% of the MEPs from the leftist parties stated that Turkish membership in the EU would be a "good thing", while 24% of the MEPs from the political right parties thought like that. 59% of the MEPs who are from the right parties, stated that Turkish membership would be a "bad thing". On the other hand, the view of the Commission officials was not affected

²³⁶⁸ Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p. 286.

²³⁶⁹ Interview with G. Delanty at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007, at 16.00.

²³⁷⁰ "Statement by Blair" on March 24, 2004, retrieved on October 29, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.eubusiness.com>

²³⁷¹ Alejo Vidal Quadras, "EU-Turkey: A Good Match?" *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.4, Winter 2004, p.27.

much from their political views. Among the Commission officials who defined their political views as on the right, 75% stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”. Among those who are from the left, 68% stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”.²³⁷² 60% of the Commission officials support Turkey’s membership in the EU. They stated that it would be a “good thing”. 47% of the MEPs stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”. 36% of the MEPs stated that Turkish membership would be a “bad thing”, only 13% of the Commission officials stated that Turkish membership would be a “bad thing”. The responses of the general public are closer to the MEPs. 23% of the general public stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”, 34% stated that it would be a “bad thing”. 43% of the general public stated that it would be “neither good nor bad”.²³⁷³ According to the “European Elites Survey” which was made in 2007, the general public is mostly neutral to Turkey’s membership to the EU, 42% of them stated that Turkey’s membership is “neither good nor bad”. The Commission officials were mostly positive, 60% of them stated that it would be a “good thing”. The MEPs tended to occupy a middle space between the general public and the Commission officials. 44% of the MEPs stated that it would be a “good thing”. When it was asked that “whether Turkey’s joining the EU was likely to happen”, the majorities of all groups stated that it is likely to happen except the MEPs. 54% of those were “less likely to feel that Turkey would eventually join the EU”. Compared to results of 2006, in terms of perceptions about the membership of Turkey, there was not important change at the public level, but there was only a slight change at the elite level, who see Turkey’s membership a bit more desirable compared to the last year. In terms of feelings towards the other countries, Iran ranked the least warmly by the MEPs, the Commission officials and the general public. All these groups rated Turkey less warmly than the USA. The general public rated Turkey less warmly than China and Russia; on the contrary the MEPs and the Commission officials feel closer to Turkey than those countries.²³⁷⁴

The Commission officials usually perceive European identity in civic terms. Thus, they do not usually question Europeanness of Turkey on cultural basis. The former

²³⁷² *European Elites Survey*, Survey of the MEP’s & top European Commission officials, A Project of Centre for the Study of Political Change, Key Findings 2006, p.20.

²³⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp.15-16.

²³⁷⁴ *European Elites Survey*: Survey of the MEP’s & top European Commission officials, A Project of Centre for the Study of Political Change, Key Findings 2007, pp.7-21.

Commission President Hallstein stated that Turkey was “part of Europe”.²³⁷⁵ Current Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn argues that “there is no doubt that Turkey is part of Europe and has been part of our European political project from the beginning.”²³⁷⁶ He warns that those who proposed a “privileged partnership” to Turkey were turning Turks against Europe and negatively affect the credibility of the EU.²³⁷⁷ He also argues that how many new Member States the EU can accept is dynamic. He stated that “...certainly geographical borders set out the framework, but values define the borders.”²³⁷⁸ He emphasizes that the boundaries of Europe are constructed on the basis of common civic values. He states that:

Any European country that respects values like democracy, human rights and rule of law can apply to be a member of the EU. That does not mean that we have to accept every country; but it would also be wrong to close the door forever by drawing a line in a map that forever sets the borders of Europe.²³⁷⁹

The metaphor of “**door**” has been frequently used in Turkey-EU relations. It is usually referred to as, it is halfly open which may be closed one day. As a counter argument to the idea that the EU will become simply an economic area without political integration, if it accepts too many Member States, Rehn states that “the history of the EU shows that enlargement and political deepening are not opposites”, by making references to the introduction of Euro and the Schengen area²³⁸⁰ during the ongoing widening process of the EU. He emphasizes that:

The unique geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans, the wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond, its importance for the security of Europe’s energy supplies and its political, economic and military weight...²³⁸¹

Thus, Turkey’s membership has been usually justified on utilitarian basis, particularly by emphasizing its geostrategic importance and its contributions to security of Europe. On the other hand, people who are against membership of Turkey usually exclude Turkey in terms of European identity.

²³⁷⁵ Quoted in Amanda Akçakoca, “EU-Tukey Relations 43 Years On: Train Crash or Temporary Derailment?”, EPC Issue Paper, No. 50, November 2006 in S. Aydın Düzgit, H. Altınay, et al. (eds.), *Seeking Kant in the EU’s Relations With Turkey*, p.5.

²³⁷⁶ Olli Rehn, “The EU and Turkey: Call for a Virtuous Circle of Credible Commitment”, Lecture at Helsinki University, November 27, 2006; quoted in *The Reflection Cafe*, retrieved on December 12, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://reflectioncafe2.blogspot/2006_12_01_reflectioncafe2_archive.html

²³⁷⁷ *Financial Times*, October 4, 2006; quoted in A. Akçakoca, “EU-Tukey Relations 43 Years On: Train Crash or Temporary Derailment?”, p.18.

²³⁷⁸ “Rehn Says EU Borders are not Fixed”, retrieved on June 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.abhaber.com/news_page.asp?id=2465

²³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²³⁸¹ Quoted in A. Lundgren, “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?”, p.131.

V.2.2.1. The Interviews with Some of the MEPs and the Commission Officials: The Perceptions about Turkey's Membership in terms of European Identity

During the interviews which were conducted by the author, the questions related with Turkey's membership focused on the effects of Turkey's membership on construction of European identity. Turkey's membership to the EU is generally perceived as a “**challenge**” by the interviewees. Sommer perceives Turkey's membership as a “big challenge”; but she added that “it will make the EU **more colourful**.”²³⁸² She implied that Turkey has a different colour than the Member States, especially in terms of identity. Also scepticism about Turkey's membership can be observed among many MEPs. Hieronymi argued that “Turkey's fulfilling of EU *acquis*, I can not imagine.”²³⁸³ It can be observed that she was even sceptical about the possibility of adoption of the EU *acquis* by Turkey. Prets asserted that:

I am not really in favour of Turkey's membership; because my doubts are: Turkey is a very big country, second country after Germany. Turkey has a very **strong national identity**... **Turkey is not Istanbul, Istanbul is separate, it is European; but that is not Turkey**... We should have **another relation with Turkey**. We have now good relations in economics... we should enlarge it... until we do not have finance system of the EU, we do not have a treaty... it is impossible to bring Turkey... The system we have at the moment, can not work with Turkey.²³⁸⁴

Thus, increasing relations with Turkey is seen necessary, but different type of relationship with Turkey is preferred, rather than a full membership. She emphasized that Istanbul is not Turkey which implied the gap between Istanbul and the rest of Turkey. She perceived Istanbul as European, but not the rest of Turkey. Some of the MEPs do not see Turkey as part of European civilisation. Depez stated that:

...it is impossible for me to be a federalist and to support a further enlargement; especially to Turkey... Most of our citizens have already big difficulties to accept the last enlargement. Are we really willing to go further and that fast? Citizens complain to me: ‘We have now Romania, Bulgaria in the European community next year and then Turkey? Are you sure we have to do that?’²³⁸⁵

He also claimed that:

I clearly see the interest for Turkey to be part of EU, but I do not see the interest for the EU, if Turkey will be part of the European construction. We have now a Customs Agreement with Turkey. We also have a military alliance in NATO and we may cooperate in different fields, for example in the fight against terrorism... supply of energy... but I do not see the interest for the European community, if Turkey will be a member... it will be **dangerous**, because it would

²³⁸² Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

²³⁸³ Interview with R. Hieronymi, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

²³⁸⁴ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

²³⁸⁵ Interview with G. Depez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

mean...decreasing support of public opinion, biggest difficulties to finance European policies...Turkey is a big country, with great necessity of money...especially the Anatolian region. Turkey is a state which is currently **unable to understand the functioning of the European institutions**. Turkey has always been part of international organisations where each state has the possibility to say 'yes' or 'no'. **Turkey can not understand the nature of the European integration, the functioning of the European institutions. The culture of the Turkish state seems incompatible with the functioning of the European system.**²³⁸⁶

He questioned the capacity or ability of Turkey to adopt the system of the EU. He claims that it will be too hard for Turkey to accommodate to the functioning of the EU institutions, because of its supranational aspects. Some of the MEPs implied that Turkey is so sensitive about its national sovereignty, so it is too hard for Turkey to accommodate to functioning of the EU; but it can be argued that many Member States are also very sensitive about their national sovereignty and there is a high level of Euroscepticism in some Member States.

During the interviews the effects of the cultural differences on the relations between Turkey and the EU was usually mentioned by the Christian Democrats. Sommer argued that:

There are cultural differences between the EU and Turkey, it takes a long time to bring them closer together...we need more time to integrate than other Member States...If Turkey will become a member...it would be more difficult perhaps to work together with Turkey than new members; but cultural differences will never be the reason to say 'no'. Never.²³⁸⁷

Thus, she perceived cultural difference between Turkey and the EU as an effective factor on this process, but she emphasized that Turkey should not be excluded on the basis of cultural factors. If Turkey will become a member of the EU one day, Turkey is perceived as a country which is hard to work with, because of cultural differences.

Some of the MEPs usually the Christian Democrats find widening and deepening processes contradictory with each other, especially with regards to Turkey's membership. Weber asserted that:

...I am fighting for a political union...if we take Turkey to the EU...what will we say to Israel? Cyprus is in the EU, not far away from Israel...or Morocco...if we want to build a political union, then I have to deal with the feeling of people...we have to find a way to work with our partners for example Ukraine, Russia, at very different levels...the last years the only way for Europe to develop human rights, democracy...was to say you could be member of the EU...but this could not be the only way to develop democracy...²³⁸⁸

²³⁸⁶ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

²³⁸⁷ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

²³⁸⁸ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

By emphasizing the importance of feelings, he made a differentiation between mind and feelings. He implied that he is in favour of different options for relations with Turkey such as “privileged partnership”. He also argued that “...at the beginning of the process we were an economic union, now we want to build a political union...if we only have economic field, making trade, then Turkey is not a problem...”²³⁸⁹ Thus, he perceived Turkey’s membership as an obstacle to a political union. On the other hand, Özdemir argued that widening and deepening processes are complementary with each other. He stated that:

If we want widening of Europe, we have to defend the deepening of Europe...Someone who really believes in widening, should simultaneously support deepening. We have a difference from the Christian Democrats. They also want deepening, but they do not want partly widening. I believe that they can go together simultaneously.²³⁹⁰

Some of the Christian Democrat MEPs argued in favour of Turkey’s membership such as Coveney. He stated that:

Unlike some other Christian Democrats, I am very supporter of... the **accession of Turkey** to the EU **one day**. I hope that happens, but we need to be very strong and firm...Turkey need to meet these standards, every other country that joins has to meet. It is **more difficult for Turkey to do that**, because the **history, traditions and religious belief make some of the changes more difficult**...even though it is a small minority of people, who have fundamentalist thinking...That type of political faction does not exist in most of the European countries, so something new for us...because of frictions between the Islamic world and the Western world, many people in Europe are nervous of that, because **Turkey would be very large and be the first Muslim country to join the EU**. I actually see it as an opportunity not a problem, to build **links between two worlds** that is one of the **new exciting opportunities** for the EU; but other people see it as a **risk**...they argue that we should **develop close relations with Turkey but we should not give them a membership**...We now opened accession talks...**we need to be honest and fair with Turkey**...we need to be firm. If they do not meet the human rights, economic standards, we have to help them trying to change, but we should not ignore for example the treatment of women, Kurds, Cyprus, these are difficult political problems, but they need to be resolved.²³⁹¹

He added that:

...who would have thought fifty years ago France and Germany would become such close partners, but they are, in one generation, we need a new vision now for Europe, what is the target for next ten, twenty years, we need to be ambitious...²³⁹²

He emphasized focusing on the future of the EU and finding new common ambitious goals for the EU. He also argued that because of its historical background, the effects of Islam on its culture and its traditions, the transformation of Turkey’s political and legal structure are too hard. He implied that Turkey’s membership is possible, but its time is indefinite. With

²³⁸⁹ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

²³⁹⁰ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²³⁹¹ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

²³⁹² *Ibid.*

the expression of “links between two worlds” it can be argued that Turkey is perceived as a bridge which may provide a linkage between the West and the East. He also emphasized the importance and necessity of honesty and fairness of the EU in its relations with Turkey which shows that these attitudes of the EU are even questioned by the political elites of the EU.

Some of the Christian Democrat MEPs perceive the enlargement of the EU as spread of the common values and they evaluate Turkey’s membership on this basis. Stubb argued that “the idea of enlargement is not to create a common European identity, but to expand and broaden the basic principles that we believe in...through peaceful means...”²³⁹³ He stated that:

...those who are against say, cultural differences, a Muslim state... those who are in favour say no we should have universal values. I think it has a value added to our whole culture and identity base...We are not a Christian club. We are not a club of a middle aged Catholic man...It is much broader than that. If we can bring in forms of Turkish identity into European realm, I think it is a plus...techniques of negotiations. Turkey must also understand that it is Turkey joining the EU, not the EU joining Turkey...²³⁹⁴

He criticized the mentality of Turkey’s way of looking towards the negotiation process. Also some of the Commission officials criticized Turkey in these terms. They emphasized that Turkey has to understand that the negotiation process is not bargaining; Turkey has to adopt all of the EU acquis; only the adoption process, timing and the adoption techniques are negotiated.

Some of the MEPs perceived Turkey’s membership as a contribution to the EU, but they also mentioned the difficulties of this process. El Khadroui argued that:

It would be **challenging**...first of all we have to resolve our problems. We have to build a good efficient EU. We need adaptation of treaties. We need a way of creating majorities...It was a very good decision to start negotiations with Turkey...it has been on the agenda since fifty years, Turkey has changed a lot...we have to answer that appeal...It can be a ‘**win-win situation**’ both for Europe and Turkey, under certain conditions...it will not be easy. Turkey has lots of works to do. **You can not compare the region of İstanbul with Anatolia**...many problems to resolve, we need to take time. At the end, the balance will be positive; but maybe **fifteen or twenty years**...²³⁹⁵

²³⁹³ Interview with A. Stubb, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

²³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁹⁵ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

He emphasized the gap between İstanbul and the rest of Turkey. It was also stated that for the transformation of Turkey and its integration to the EU long period is needed. There is an ambiguity in some of the expressions of the MEPs, such as firstly stating that “we have to answer that appeal”, but later it was argued that Turkey’s membership may be realized after fifteen or twenty years. Fajmon argued in favour of Turkey’s membership. He asserted that:

I am supporting the EU membership. I do not think we need to create something like European identity. I think about the EU as a confederation of nation-states...I do not ask myself, whether Turkey is helping to create such identity or not...I do not think Turkish people are ready to say in foreseeable future, we are not Turks anymore we are Europeans...Turkey is willing to share...the European values and implement them and Turkey has an interest to join...²³⁹⁶

Having exclusively European identity is very rare among the citizens of the Member States. They do not perceive European identity as a substitute for their national identities. As it was argued, the citizens of the EU do not usually say we are Europeans, not Frenchs, Germans, etc. anymore, after their country’s membership. If one day Turkey will become a member of the EU, Turkish people do not have to say that too. They are not contradictory to each other; in contemporary world it is so natural to have multiple identities simultaneously. Fajmon also argued that:

...the only negative impact is connected with the question...whether Turkey is really willing to implement the European values. Some people think that willingness of Turkish political elite... is not satisfactory...in minds of some people **Turkey can bring into EU some “non-European behaviour”**. I do not share that...This is only negative aspect which is discussed...Some people say Turkey is not Christian country, so it can not be included on this basis...I do not share that, but many people think like that, especially the Christian Democrats...²³⁹⁷

Within the same political party, there may be different point of views among different MEPs. Fajmon emphasized that with the accession of Turkey, some people fear that it may bring into the EU non-European behaviour.²³⁹⁸ This reflected the perception that Turkey is considered as non-European by some of the MEPs, for whom it is too hard for Turkey to accommodate to the EU. This perception also implies that Turkish identity is perceived as fixed, rather than dynamic.

²³⁹⁶ Interview with H. Fajmon, Christian Democrat MEP of the Czech Republic, on 13.09.2006, at 14.00.

²³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Hatzidakis emphasized that the decision about Turkey will be political. He stated that:

Decision, concerning Turkey will be political, many sciences can be used in order to choose this future or the other future for Turkey, you can use geography, history, economy and political science. The final decision will be taken by politicians, probably by citizens. The decision will be political.²³⁹⁹

He added that:

It is a **challenge**, we have to make sure that Christians and Muslims can live together...in practice they must live together. They do not have any other choice...From this point of view, Turkish membership is a real **challenge both for the EU and Turkey**...to be successful we have to work hard...we have to **overcome all prejudices**...You have to also **work hard in order to transform your state to a “real European state”** where the rule of law prevails, the army will be a real army without any intervention in politics, you **have to understand Union is something different than other European organisations** where Turkey participates like NATO, OSCE or the Council of Europe where there are some declarations concerning democracy, human rights...but the structures of these organisations are not so strong...the EU is a serious organisation, is open or at least should be open to Turkey for various reasons...It is **not the EU which adopts Turkey’s standards, Turkey will adopt the European standards**...of course we **should avoid any double standards for you**, what exists for the other Member States should exist for you...the same obligations.²⁴⁰⁰

He emphasized that “Turkey has to work hard to transform itself to a real European state” which constructs Turkey as “non-European” or “semi-European” that should work hard to transform itself to be a real European state. He also emphasized that “Turkey has to understand that the EU is something different than the other European organisations” which implied that Turkey is incompetent to know and understand the EU, how the EU is functioning. He also perceived Turkey’s membership as a challenge both for the EU and Turkey. He asserted that Turkey will adopt all the EU standards which implies that Turkey should not bargain about the EU standards.

Bozkurt, who has a Turkish origin, emphasized the impact of Turkish immigrants who have been living in the EU. She argued that:

We already have in Europe for ages people living from Turkish background. Four or five million Turks are already living in Europe...they are living for thirty or forty years in Europe. They have had their impact on Europe...²⁴⁰¹

She implied that Turks are already part of Europe, because of the presence of many Turkish immigrants who have been living in different Member States. She added that:

Turkey will have a lot of time, ten years, fifteen years. I think **Turkey should work hard to make itself known by the European people**. There is a paradox at this moment. Millions of

²³⁹⁹ Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

²⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰¹ Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

people are going every summer to Turkey to have nice and cheap holidays. They love the country, they say Turkish people are nice, warm people...On the other hand, people are **afraid of that country becoming a member of their own EU. Turkey should work harder on cultural exchange**...It is not based on information. It is based on a lot of **prejudices. What you should do to take those prejudices away is to make yourself known, to have more exchange**...Germany has a Goethe institute, why does not Turkey have a Turkish institute? A lot of people are really interested in Turkey. So why don't you use that? **Turkey should do more with those four or five million Turkish people who are living in the EU. They can be used as sort of ambassadors.** More efforts should be made to have projects...I have done a project with students from Turkish background to make them more involved in the debate about Europe. In Netherlands there is a lot of debate about Turkey and the EU, but I did not see many Turkish participants...I thought there is a lot of intelligent people who can very well debate. Where are they?...Recently we started a newsletter with some students to do interviews, articles on Turkey and spread them among other Turkish students in Netherlands. We have a sort of forum...They can really participate in debates...²⁴⁰²

She emphasized the importance of overcoming prejudices about Turkey. To achieve this goal, she recommended making more exchanges between Turkey and the EU, more active involvement of Turkish citizens and Turkish immigrants who are living in the EU to the projects about the EU. As she argues, they can be used as ambassadors of Turkey. She also emphasized that Turks who have been living in Europe, have already affected construction process of European identity.

Some of the MEPs emphasized that if Turkey will adopt all of the EU acquis, it will be one of the most important contributions of the EU to world peace. Rocard also argued in favour of Turkey's membership. He asserted that the possibility of a federal EU already collapsed since the enlargement towards the UK, so membership of Turkey is beneficial, even necessary for the EU. He stated that:

If my former dream, European restricted federation would have been realised, I would oppose very fiercely Turkish addition. The British have won...there will not be any centralized state in Europe...national identities are preserved in this system...then Turks are necessary, not only useful, even necessary to contribute to another vision of the relations between Christians and Muslims...Turkey has had very skilful diplomacy between Israel and Arabs and has a strong army...Turkey can undoubtedly be a member of the EU, an active component of peace-making policy...it is a **fantastic accelerator of prosperity and growth** which is a contribution to the solution of other problems...²⁴⁰³

Although he is in favour of a federal Europe, as he argued, this possibility has already collapsed since the accession of the UK. He is in favour of the membership of Turkey on utilitarian basis; especially he emphasized the possible contributions of Turkey's membership to world peace and other problems of the world.

²⁴⁰² Interview with E. Bozkurt, Socialist MEP of Netherlands, on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁴⁰³ Interview with M. Rocard, Socialist MEP of France, on September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

Some of the MEPs argued that Turkey's membership is a "**win-win** situation". They emphasized Turkey's geostrategic, economic importance and its position in terms of energy routes. Resetarits argued that:

...I think it is a **win-win situation** for both Europe and Turkey...I believe that it is better for Turkey to be part of the EU, than being part of an Islamic Union...but I also have very big fears...national politicians...because of their elections, they want to be populist...they do not tell people, it is necessary, it is win-win situation...²⁴⁰⁴

Here it can be seen that being part of Europe is tied to EU membership. She is sceptical about national politicians' attitudes. She is afraid that even they believe that Turkey's membership is a "win-win situation", they will not talk about this with their citizens. She recommended Turkish politicians to focus on marketing, she stated that "...they really should do better public relations job on their political positions..."²⁴⁰⁵ She added that the debatable issues in the international arena like the Cyprus question and particularly the position of Turkey should be explained again and again; because most of the people do not know, what is Turkey's position in different fields.²⁴⁰⁶ When there is a lack of information, this will lead to scepticism about Turkey and the interactions between Turkey and the EU are based on prejudices. As she argued, Turkey has to focus on marketing; the politicians, academicians and the NGOs of Turkey have to inform the citizens of the EU much more about Turkey and its positions about different international issues.

According to one of the MEPs from the Independence Democracy Group, Wise, who is totally against the idea of the EU, claimed that "I do not have a vision of the EU...I want Turkey in the EU, because if Turkey will enter, the EU will collapse..."²⁴⁰⁷ This idea is similar to the idea of Giscard d'Estaing. It was asked to Wise, whether he has been to Turkey or not before, he replied that he has not. While replying another question he admitted that "...I do not know enough about Turkey..."²⁴⁰⁸ but he argued that "...I believe that Turkey will not accept the rules or regulations, the restrictions the EU imposes..."²⁴⁰⁹ Although he admitted that he does not know much about Turkey, he claimed that Turkey will not accommodate to the regulations of the EU which shows that he was making his arguments on the basis of prejudices about Turkey.

²⁴⁰⁴ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

²⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰⁷ Interview with T. Wise, MEP of the UK from Independence Democracy Group, on July 12, 2006, at 10.00.

²⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

During the interviews especially the Commission officials mostly focus on the negotiation process and they criticize the approach of Turkish officials towards the negotiation process with the EU. Some of them argued that Turkey does not know how to negotiate; it usually perceives negotiation as bargaining. During the negotiation process, the goal is adoption of the EU acquis and in which time period they will be adopted is only negotiated. Rather than focusing on the question of European identity, they emphasized technical aspects of the negotiation process and adoption of the acquis by Turkey. One of the Commission officials from DG Justice Freedom and Security argued that:

With Turkey there are problems of **techniques**, especially about **bargaining mentality**...Internal reforms should be done in Turkey, without need for bargaining...To eliminate all critiques, Turkey should incorporate the EU acquis.²⁴¹⁰

Thus, lack of understanding of Turkey about the mentality of the negotiations was emphasized. As he argued, if Turkey will successfully adopt all of the EU acquis, it will be clearly seen to what extent cultural and identity factors are effective on the relations between Turkey and the EU. He also argued that “Turkey has a lot of problems in education...There is a need for knowledge about Turkey. Some people still think that Turkey is an Arabic country.”²⁴¹¹ As he argued, there is a lack of knowledge about Turkey which leads to the emergence of many negative perceptions about Turkey. To overcome prejudices about Turkey, more efforts have to be done in order to inform citizens of the EU about Turkey and more exchange of people, especially among the students have to be made between Turkey and the EU.

One of the Commission officials who is working at the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency argued that Turkey is a unique, uncommon candidate and she perceived its membership as a challenge to the EU. She stated that:

...the question of Turkey is a **challenge for the EU**, because it is an “**uncommon**” **candidate...it will be a good test to see resistance of the EU construction and its strength, how far we can go and how far we can be still together**...it also depends on how far Turkey will go on its own path...the country’s size, population, state of economy...**it is different partner in terms of cultural and religious background**...I never traveled to the eastern part of Turkey...in the West of Turkey, I can see the people that I have met there where do they belong? **They do not belong to Asia, they do not belong to Europe** in strict terms. Links with Europe as well...I hope that your internal policies and public opinion bring you closer to

²⁴¹⁰ Interview with Commission official from Spain, DG Justice Freedom and Security, on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*

Europe...I would see Turkey as a “**bridge**”... **in terms of culture**, it is a **window**...to another area, to another world...²⁴¹²

The metaphors of “**bridge**” and “**window**” reflect the understanding of Turkey as something which is functional, but has an ambiguous identity. Turkey is perceived by her as a partner, but different than the previous candidates in terms of culture and religion. In her observations about Turkey, she emphasized that Turkey is neither Asian, nor European and she also perceives Turkey as a “bridge”. One of the Commission officials from DG Education also emphasized Turkey’s role as a “bridge” between East and West, Christianity and the Muslim world.²⁴¹³ Thus, Turkey’s position is usually constructed as a “bridge” which implies that Turkey is not perceived as part of Europe nor the Middle East, rather it spreads over the space in between.

About the effects of Turkey’s membership, one ex-Commission official who was working at DG Education argued that:

This depends on the outcome of the negotiations...also on Turkey...**If** the European citizens feel the threat that there might be an Islamic power one day, they will see Turkey’s joining as a **threat**... **if** they knew Turkey better, **if they are better informed about Turkey**, **if** the rest of the world was more peaceful, **if** the image seen by religion by some countries were different...so this is not under control %100 neither of Turkey, neither the EU.²⁴¹⁴

In his expressions, if clauses were frequently used which shows that the case of Turkey’s membership is dependent on many external factors. His answer also reflects the perceptions of some of the EU citizens about Turkey that there is a fear of the possibility of an Islamic power coming to power in Turkey. When it was asked, whether Turkey’s membership is a contribution, challenge or a threat, he replied that:

Challenging, definitely yes. It will be a challenge. A threat? Maybe, maybe not. A **contribution? Yes**, Turkey will be a contribution...because it is a big, powerful and diverse community. These could be the contributions...**A lot will depend on, how it will be perceived by the EU citizens**...The real danger is that people usually vote against for reasons which have nothing to do with real situation in Turkey and nothing to do with real situation in the EU...²⁴¹⁵

He perceives Turkey’s membership both as a challenge and a contribution. He emphasized the importance of the role of public opinion in this process which is closely related with their level of information about Turkey.

²⁴¹² Interview with Commission official from Greece, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁴¹³ Interview with a Commission official from Germany, DG Education, on September 5, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁴¹⁴ Interview with Ex-Commission official from France, DG Education, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

²⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Consequently, both the MEPs and the Commission officials perceive the membership of Turkey as challenging; but the MEPs are usually more sceptical about the membership of Turkey, especially the Christian Democrats, although there are some exceptions. The Commission officials usually perceive Turkey's membership in technical terms. Some of them criticized the mentality of Turkey during the negotiation process. They argued that Turkish officials usually perceive the negotiation process as bargaining. Actually during the negotiation process timetable and way of adoption of the EU acquis are negotiated. Generally Turkey's position is constructed as a "bridge", between the West and East, or between Europe and the Muslim world.

V.2.3. Public Opinions in the Member States of the EU about Turkey's Membership

As it was discussed, ensuring popular support for further integration has become one of the main challenges of the EU. Euroscepticism has grown especially since the Maastricht Treaty which was considered as the end of "permissive consensus" that characterized the public attitudes in the earlier decades of the integration.²⁴¹⁶ In terms of enlargement, the public opinion is also important. Every enlargement has to be ratified by all of the Member States. In some of the Member States this ratification takes place in the national assemblies, in others the decision of enlargement is subject to a public referendum, because of their constitutional arrangements such as in Denmark and Ireland. In the case of Turkey's accession also France and Austria announced that they will have a referendum about Turkey's membership after the finishing of the negotiation process. Thus, the citizens of the EU have an important leverage on the enlargement process.²⁴¹⁷

One of the main obstacles of Turkey's accession to the EU is perceptions of the peoples of the Member States about Turkey. The membership of Turkey is the least desirable one, compared to the other candidates, even possible candidates such as Ukraine and countries in the West Balkans. There is generally scepticism in public opinions of

²⁴¹⁶ M. Franklin, M. Marsh & L. McLaren, "Uncorking The Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.32, No.4, 1994, p.455; cited in A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez & J. I. Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against", p.1, retrieved on August 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_in/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/DT+20-2007

²⁴¹⁷ Başak Yavcan, "Turkey: EU's Significant 'Other' "?", *New York Consortium for European Studies*, May 2007, pp.4-5.

many Member States towards Turkey's membership. Fontaine argues that Turkey has an “**image deficit**”.²⁴¹⁸ Contemporarily Turkey still suffers from an image problem.²⁴¹⁹ Many citizens of the EU think that Turkey is unable to conform to the European ideal and practice.²⁴²⁰ *Reuters'* European affairs editor Paul Taylor asserts that “on TV, Turkey means minarets, headscarves and the Bosphorus Bridge.”²⁴²¹ He added that “in the newspapers a ‘secular state with a predominantly Muslim population’ gets edited down to a ‘Muslim country’.”²⁴²² Public opinions in many Member States see Turkey as “too big, too poor, and too far away and too Islamic”.²⁴²³ As long as this perception goes on, it will be hard for Turkey to become a full member of the EU. The negative perceptions of their elites and their statements against Turkey's membership have affected the maintenance, even worsening of the level of support among the public opinions in some Member States. According to the qualitative study on “The Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values” which was made in twenty seven European countries in 2006, it was found out that Europe's Christian and Judeo-Christian heritage are mentioned as one of the main basis of European culture, especially in comparison to the Muslim world and especially in some lower-middle groups in some countries such as Greece, Austria, in relation to Turkey's potential membership to the EU.²⁴²⁴

According to the Eurobarometer surveys, the EU citizens who opposed to further enlargement has increased since Spring 2005 from 38% to 39%; people from Austria, Germany and France are generally against; Greece, Slovakia and Poland are mostly in favour. The Autumn *Eurobarometer* poll in 2005, shows that the number of people supporting Turkish membership is about 31%, while resistance among the EU citizens is about 55%. Support for the EU membership among Turks has also decreased from 66% in spring 2005 to 52% in Autumn 2005.²⁴²⁵ Turkey is the least wanted candidate to join the

²⁴¹⁸ Mario Telo (ed.), *L'Union Europeenne et les Defis de L'elargissement*, Bruxelles: Universite de Bruxelles, 1995, p. 263; quoted in M. Mejri, “Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference”, p. 296.

²⁴¹⁹ Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, p. 284.

²⁴²⁰ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 74.

²⁴²¹ Quoted in Katinka Barysch, “What Europeans Think about Turkey and Why?”, *Centre for European Reform Essays*, September 2007, p.1.

²⁴²² *Ibid.*

²⁴²³ John Redmond, “Turkey and the EU: Troubled European or European Trouble?”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2, 2007, p.310.

²⁴²⁴ European Commission, “The Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values”, June 2006, p.36.

²⁴²⁵ Quoted in T. Kuchler, “Irish Most Happy, Brits Most Unhappy With EU”, retrieved on December 20, 2005 on the World Wide Web: <http://euobserver.com/?aid=20597&rk=1>

EU. The EU citizens' support for Turkey's accession to the EU is lowest among recent EU enlargement processes and even decreasing. The supporters of Turkey's accession have been stable since 2000 (around %29-33%), but people who are against, have risen. For example in Autumn 2001 Eurobarometer survey (56.2), the opposition towards Turkey's membership is 46% among the EU-15 Member States, it increased to 52% in Spring 2005 (Eurobarometer 63) and to 57% in Autumn 2005 (Eurobarometer 64). It shows that many "don't know" respondents have passed to the opposition group; because of the decreasing support for Turkey's membership, the Commission has introduced a detailed set of questions in Eurobarometer survey to find out the reasons of support or rejection of the EU citizens towards membership of Turkey. It was found out that the judgements about Turkey are mostly based on issues which are related with its compatibility with geography, history and culture of Europe. The most of the citizens of the EU think that the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too much for the membership of Turkey.²⁴²⁶ Although the role of Turkey in terms of increasing mutual cultural understanding among different cultures is emphasized by some of the important political figures of Europe, they are not usually supported by the public opinions of the Member States which shows that there is a high level of scepticism among the citizens of the Member States and lack of information about Turkey.

According to March-May 2006 Eurobarometer survey, 48% of the EU citizens are against Turkey's membership and about 39% are in favour. Turkish membership is supported more among the citizens of the new Member States (44% are in favour), than among those of the EU-15 (38% are in favour). The Austrians are strong opponents of Turkey's membership (81% are against), the Swedes have the highest level of support (61% are in favour). Many EU citizens do not see Turkey as a European country. Many people have scepticism because of admitting a large Muslim state to the EU, with the effect of the difficulties many Member States are facing in integrating the Muslim communities who are living in their country. The supporters of Turkey's membership argue that much of the scepticism among the citizens of the EU is because of prejudices about Turkey. Thus,

²⁴²⁶ A. Ruiz-Jimenez & J. I. Torreblanca, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against", pp.7-19, retrieved on August 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_in/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/DT+20-2007

an effective communication strategy is needed for the citizens of the EU²⁴²⁷ which will be made especially by Turkey and the Commission of the EU. During the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, Turkey and the Commission should act in coordination with each other to inform the EU citizens about Turkey. They also have to inform Turkish citizens more about the EU.

Both the EU governments and the citizens of the EU are divided on the question of Turkey's membership. The governments of the Member States usually do not prefer to put the issue of Turkey's membership visibly on the public agenda, till positive public perception of Turkey might be generated. Thus, most of the leaders of the Member States would prefer to leave the "...task of preparing and conducting the negotiations mainly to the European Commission".²⁴²⁸ The question of Turkey's membership has been discussed related with the other political developments in many Member States. For example, during the last elections in Germany, there were debates about Turkey's position in Europe. The main competition was between Merkel who supports "privileged partnership" for Turkey and Schröder who supports Turkey's membership to the EU.²⁴²⁹ At the end, Merkel won the elections.

"Turco-sceptics" mention many reasons for their opposition such as sharing of structural funds with Turkey which has huge regional disparities, the possible impacts of Turkey's membership on CAP, fear of increasing immigration of Turks to the Member States, fear of being neighbour with unstable countries and scepticism of the percentage of representation of Turkey at the EP.²⁴³⁰ Thus, there are many utilitarian reasons of negative perceptions about Turkey's membership. Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca argue that the likelihood of supporting or opposing Turkey's membership mostly depends on, whether citizens have an utilitarian perspective (based on costs and benefits), identity-based (Turkey being part of Europe or not) or post-national (civic understanding) perspective. They found out that support for Turkey's membership is mostly based on post-national

²⁴²⁷ Quoted in A. Akçakoca, "EU-Turkey Relations 43 Years On: Train Crash or Temporary Derailment?", p.18.

²⁴²⁸ H. Kramer, "Whither Turkey's EU Accession?" Perspectives and Problems After December 2004", http://www.aicgs.org/c/kramer_turkey.shtml; quoted in M. Ögütçü, "Turkey and the EU: How to Achieve a Forward-looking and 'win-win' Accession by 2015?", p. 51.

²⁴²⁹ Zeynep Dağı, "Avrupa Kimliği'nin Sınırları ve Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliği", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.11, No.1, 2005, p.54.

²⁴³⁰ E. S. Hurd, "Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession", pp.405-406.

arguments; on the other hand, opposition to Turkey's accession is mainly based on identity-related arguments. Utilitarian approach plays a less relevant role in the case of Turkey's membership. They argue that support or opposition to Turkey's membership among the citizens of the EU is closely related with their preferences about the European integration. Thus, at the public opinion level, the attitudes towards Turkey's membership will depend on whether post-nationalist vision (civic) of the EU or essentialist vision (cultural) of the EU will be stronger.²⁴³¹ If European identity is constructed on the basis of civic values, this will lead to the increasing support of Turkey's membership among the public opinions of the Member States.

“Utilitarians” conceive the EU in pragmatic terms; they see it as a problem solving entity which may be supported depending on a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the more they think they benefit from policies of the EU, the more they support it. They are also in favour of or against enlargement on this basis. According to the cultural understanding of the EU (identity-based), EU is a geographically delimited entity, has a common history, identity and traditions. Their attitudes towards enlargement usually depend on “we feelings”. Thus, the more the candidate is perceived as similar to the Member States in terms of geography, culture and history, the more likely its membership would be supported. According to the supporters of civic understanding of the EU, “post-national” EU, they would be in favour of or against that candidate, whether they thought that the candidate country share common values of the EU or not.²⁴³² Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca also found out that the Member States who have the highest popular support for Turkey's membership (50-55%) are, the current beneficiaries of the EU funds, so they would be the biggest losers, if Turkey will join the EU. It shows that the public attitudes towards Turkey's membership do not usually depend on utilitarian approaches; instead the role of identity has much more importance. Since the utilitarian dimension is not so effective on the public opinion towards Turkey's membership, emphasizing the possible benefits of Turkish membership will not probably change the attitudes of those who are against the membership of Turkey.²⁴³³ As Yavcan argues, a candidate country who has a predominantly Muslim population which is thought to pose a threat to the European way of life, is one of the most important factors which

²⁴³¹ A. Ruiz-Jimenez & J. I. Torreblanca, “European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against”, p.1, retrieved on August 27, 2007 on the World Wide Web: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_in/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/DT+20-2007

²⁴³² *Ibid.*, pp.2-3.

²⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p.23.

affect their attitudes towards Turkey's membership.²⁴³⁴ Thus, one of the most important challenges that Turkey has to face during the negotiation process is, to change these perceptions about Turkey in people's minds and try to promote a different image of Turkey. During the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, the two parties have to engage in an intensive political and civil society dialogue to prepare the public opinions of the Member States and Turkish public opinion about Turkey's membership.

Utilitarian factors such as fear of immigrants and Turkey's participation to CAP are also effective on the public opinions of the Member States; but as Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca argue, identity-based arguments have also important effects on the public opinions about Turkey's membership. Baç mentions some factors which have been effective on the public opinions in the Member States about further enlargements. These are immigration, increase in xenophobia/racism, distribution of funds, especially in the case of Turkey, its relative backwardness in economic terms, its population, size and potential weight in the decision-making process of the EU, its unstable neighbourhood and cultural differences may trigger xenophobic tendencies in European societies.²⁴³⁵

Turkish immigrants living in the Member States have also important influence on the public opinion of the Member States about Turkey's membership. Nicolaidis argues that "...Turkish immigrants are its primary ambassadors in the EU..."²⁴³⁶ The integration problems of "Euro-Turks" to the European society are sometimes generalized and it is argued that Turkey's integration with the EU will lead to more integration problems in cultural terms.²⁴³⁷ According to the stereotypical judgements about "Euro-Turks", they do not integrate to the European way of life; Turks are religious, conservative, nationalist, non-integrative and violent. According to the surveys of Kaya and Kentel, that were made in Germany and France, "Euro-Turks" are diversified; there are three major groups of Euro-Turks which are "bridging groups" who do not lose their connection with their homeland and trying to integrate their host-land; "breaching groups" who have strong connection with their homeland and "assimilated groups". The majority of Euro-Turks have become politically, economically and socially integrated. Having multiple identities is

²⁴³⁴ B. Yavcan, "Turkey: EU's Significant 'Other'?", p. 5.

²⁴³⁵ For further detail see M. M. Baç, "Enlarging the EU: Where Does Turkey Stand?", 2002.

²⁴³⁶ K. Nicolaidis, "Turkey is European...For Europe's Sake", p.65

²⁴³⁷ Ayhan Kaya, "EU, Europeanness and Euro-Turks", *Eurozine*, pp.6-10, retrieved on September 9 on the World Wide Web: www.eurozine.com

also general tendency among Euro-Turks, such as being German, Muslim and Turkish. Their survey also shows that European identity is not pre-given; instead it is an “ongoing process of being and becoming”. Euro-Turks are in favour of construction of political Europe, rather than construction of European identity in cultural terms. They contribute to reconstruction of European identity,²⁴³⁸ through being in interaction with host societies. Contemporarily societies in Europe mostly lack some essential values such as respect for the older people, solidarity among family members and relatives. Euro-Turks usually maintain those values. In cultural terms Euro-Turks contribute cultural richness and moral values. Thus, they also affect construction process of European identity and national identity in the host societies. The general trend among “Euro-Turks” is that they are in favour of Turkey’s membership to the EU which is clearer in France (57%) than in Germany (31%).²⁴³⁹

According to Volkan and Itzkowitz, one of the reasons of unfavourable attitudes of the public opinion in many Member States towards Turkey’s membership is the history books. In many of these books, Islam appears in connection with the Crusades. Turkish culture is perceived as agrarian and characterized by Islamic and non-European traditions. The image of the Turks in the 19th and early 20th centuries was reflected as uncivilised, lazy and undisciplined people.²⁴⁴⁰ In Europe the fight against the Ottoman Empire was usually reflected as a fight for Christianity against Islam. Christian society was represented as a free society, on the contrary Turkish society was represented as despotic who has opposite values to the Western civilisation. In terms of economics, the Ottoman Empire represented backwardness which is contrary to the progressive Christian bourgeoisie world. In social terms the Empire represented lack of respect for individual rights and a tyrannical state.²⁴⁴¹ All of these representations of Turkey in history books have influenced peoples’ perceptions about Turkey.

²⁴³⁸ Ayhan Kaya & Ferhat Kentel, *Euro-Turks, A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the EU? (A Comparative Study of German-Turks and French-Turks)*, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2005, pp.2, 49-71.

²⁴³⁹ A. Kaya, “EU, Europeanness and Euro-Turks”, pp.6-10, retrieved on September 9 on the World Wide Web: www.eurozine.com

²⁴⁴⁰ Vamik D. Volkan & Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict*, Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1994, p.68; cited in Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, p. 284.

²⁴⁴¹ Pettifer, *Turkish Labyrinth*, pp. xxii-xxiii,124; cited in Z. Kütük, “Turkey and the EU: The Simple Complexity”, pp. 284.

Lack of information or misinformation has the effect of maintaining negative perceptions and images.²⁴⁴² There is a considerable lack of information about Turkey within the EU among the public opinions of the Member States, even among the political elites which have led them to evaluate Turkey's membership on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes. According to H. Yılmaz, the attitudes of the ordinary citizens towards Turkey can be explained with the concept of "**hesitation**", instead of totally acceptance or exclusion.²⁴⁴³ They do not perceive Turkey as part of "us", they do not perceive Turkey as the "other" of Europe neither. Thus, **hesitation** and **scepticism** are the main attitudes of the EU citizens towards Turkey. They have many questions in their minds about Turkey, because of having lack of information. As Hettlage argues, "...it is not so long ago that the other Europeans were perceived as culturally distant, as it is the case now with the Turkish population."²⁴⁴⁴ Thus, it may be overcome one day, but it will probably take a long time. Kauppi argues that "...once Turkey progresses, people's views about it will change for the better."²⁴⁴⁵ Although it is not so easy to change the perceptions of the citizens of the EU about Turkey, it can be changed in the longer term as a result of the efforts of both parties about giving more information about Turkey, higher level of interactions between two parties and changes which are made in the history books. On the other hand, the Turkish public opinion and its perceptions about the EU and Turkey's membership will be also effective on the interactions between Turkey and the EU.

In Turkey the elites and the general public have generally converged on the common ideal of full membership,²⁴⁴⁶ but there has been an increasing Euroscepticism among both groups in the last years. There has been an increase in the anti-EU sentiment among Turkish public opinion which does not mean anti-Europe.²⁴⁴⁷ To decrease negative perceptions about the EU among Turkish people and to overcome scepticism about the objectivity and fairness of the EU towards Turkey, their trust to the EU has to be established again. Usually mixed and divergent messages have been expressed by the EU political elites which have led to increase in Euroscepticism in Turkish public opinion. Eurosceptic groups in Turkey are usually not against the idea of the EU membership of

²⁴⁴² A. E. Akyürek, *Changing Conceptions of European Identity and Shifting Boundaries*, p.21.

²⁴⁴³ H. Yılmaz, "Giriş: Türkiye'yi Avrupa Haritasına Sokmak", p.15.

²⁴⁴⁴ R. Hettlage, "European Identity: Between Inclusion and Exclusion", p.259.

²⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Piia Noora Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

²⁴⁴⁶ Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p. 293.

²⁴⁴⁷ Leda-Agapi Glyptis, "Which Side of the Fence? Turkey's Uncertain Place in the EU", p.131.

Turkey. There is a huge scepticism in Turkish public opinion about the possibility of Turkey's full membership to the EU. They argue that Turkey has been discriminated and new criteria are put in front of Turkey in order to prevent its membership. Thus, they consider the arguments of the EU political elites on Cyprus question, Armenian question and minority rights in this regard. They see these debates as instruments of the EU to undermine national sovereignty of Turkey, even which may lead to division of Turkey. The Commissioner Verheugen who was responsible for Enlargement in the previous cabinet, warned that "Europe is sending Turkey almost exclusively negative signals...a dangerous spiral of negative signals could undermine the key geostrategic goal of future Turkey membership."²⁴⁴⁸ He was aware of the fact that exclusive negative discourses about Turkey's membership have increased the level of Euroscepticism in Turkey which also negatively affect the integration process of Turkey with the EU.

V.3. Compatibility of Islam and European Identity: The Debates on Turkey's Membership in Terms of the Idea of "Clash of Civilisations"

In the post-Cold War era, with the decreasing importance of ideological rivalries, ethnic, national and religious identities have gained importance. The polarity between Christianity versus Islam has been revived especially after September 11. Islamic fundamentalism has been perceived as a direct threat to all values of the Western civilisation, such as freedom and value of individual, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.²⁴⁴⁹ Turkey's membership is also discussed on the basis of compatibility of Islam and European identity, because of having predominantly Muslim population. Especially after September 11, increasing Islamophobia in Europe has led to discussions of Turkey's membership in terms of compatibility of Islam and European identity.

The problems in the integration process of some Muslim groups in the Member States, the growing assertiveness of second-generation Muslims and world-wide rise in fundamentalism and terrorism have placed Islam in an increasingly controversial position. Especially since the terrorist attacks in September 11, there has been an increasing concern with Muslims in the Member States. The objections to Turkey's membership on cultural

²⁴⁴⁸ *euobserver.com*, October 9, 2006; quoted in A. Akçakoca, "EU-Tukey Relations 43 Years On: Train Crash or Temporary Derailment?", p.16.

²⁴⁴⁹ M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p. 272.

and religious grounds have increased, even among the political elites of the EU.²⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, the murder of Dutch film maker Theo van Gough, the terrorist attacks in Madrid, the failure of the French state and society to integrate successfully poor and marginalized immigrants which led to violence in France in late 2005 and the publication of the Muhammad cartoons in some newspapers in Denmark in early 2006 were perceived as offensive to Muslims²⁴⁵¹ have increased “Islamophobia” in Europe that has led to increasing scepticism about Turkey’s membership which is the first candidate country of the EU who has a predominantly Muslim population.

Islam can not be perceived as something which has been in isolation from Europe. The contributions of Islam to the historical and cultural heritage of Europe and construction process of European identity have to be taken into consideration. It did not only have a role as the “other” of Europe. Arnold and Sardar assert that:

Not only did Islam introduce classical Greek civilisation to the Europeans, but without Islam, Europe would never have been able to manufacture its supposed Greek roots...Few of the great European philosophers of the Middle Ages could actually read Greek; what they read in fact was not Plato and Aristotle in the original but Latin commentaries on Plato by al-Farabi and the Latin translations of Ibn Sina’s commentaries on Aristotle...For Muslim scholars the translation of Greek texts was a major intellectual undertaking from the 8th to the 12th century.²⁴⁵²

Ramadan emphasizes the contributions of Islam to the construction process of Europe. He argues that “...Muslims have been part of the building of the European conscience and of the European mind.”²⁴⁵³ As he argues, time is needed to establish mutual trust between Muslims and the native populations of European countries and this process should “...rely on better understanding stemming from genuine dialogue, joint activities, especially in the field of education and necessarily dynamic coexistence.”²⁴⁵⁴ Brown argues that:

It is a pity that the EU project defined itself at the outset around the definition of Europe as a white Christian entity and around assumptions of a shared culture based on Graeco-Roman

²⁴⁵⁰ Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy *The EU, Turkey and Islam*, pp.5-16.

²⁴⁵¹ E. S. Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession”, p.407.

²⁴⁵² John Arnold & Ziauddin Sardar, *Europe: A Double Legacy*, pp.16-19, it was published by the Action Centre for Europe Ltd., London, 2003; quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.281.

²⁴⁵³ Tariq Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe”, *Islam, Europe’s Second Religion*, in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), *Islam, Europe’s Second Religion*, Westport, Ct.: Praeger Pub., 2002, p.213; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.282.

²⁴⁵⁴ T. Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe?”, p.217; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p. 276.

roots and Judaeo-Christian ethics and Beethoven's 9th Symphony. It is a pity too that so many Muslims in Europe have a view of themselves only as outsiders.²⁴⁵⁵

Thus, Islam has had contributions to construction of European identity, but they have not been usually mentioned during construction process of European identity within the EU.

In the last decades, the EU has begun to recognize and highlight the contributions and influence of Islam on the shaping of EU. Through such discourses, the relationship between Islam and European identity also has been in a reconstruction process. In May 1991 the Committee on Culture and Education of the Council of Europe held a colloquium in Paris on the contributions of Islamic civilisation to European culture. In its conclusions it was stated that "in addition to Christianity and Judaism, Islam in its different forms has over the centuries had an influence on European civilisation and everyday life."²⁴⁵⁶ It was also argued that there is an incompatibility in some areas between Islam and "the principles which are at the basis of modern European society (secularism and democracy) and of European ethics (human rights and freedom of expression)". It was also stated that "this incompatibility was not representative of Islam as a whole."²⁴⁵⁷ Javier Solana stated that "the developing culture in Europe encompasses all civilisations. We have in the EU millions of citizens or residents who recognize...both the values of Europe and those of Islam."²⁴⁵⁸ Especially since September 11 and the terrorist attacks in Spain and England, "Islam is becoming the synonym of fundamentalism."²⁴⁵⁹ There has been an increasing fear about fundamentalist Islam. Among the citizens of the EU, the prejudices such as "Islam and fundamentalism is the same thing" has increased after September 11.²⁴⁶⁰ Turkey's position vis-a-vis the EU has been also affected from this process. The acceptance of Turkey as an official candidate country to the EU with the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and beginning of the negotiation process with Turkey on 3 October 2005 have

²⁴⁵⁵ Yasmin Alibhai Brown, "Islam and Euro-Identity: Muslims, Diversity and Inclusion" in Dick Leonard & Mark Leonard (eds.), *Pro-European Reader*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Pub., 2002, pp. 214-219; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.282.

²⁴⁵⁶ Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education, Report on the contribution of Islamic culture to European civilisation, adopted text of assembly debate, September 19, 1991, <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA91/erecl162.htm>; quoted in M. A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.278.

²⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, OIC-EU Joint Forum, "The Civilisation and Harmony: The Political Dimension", İstanbul, 12-13 February 2002, Ankara: Etki Pub., 2002 ; quoted in Ali Tekin, "Future of Turkey-EU Relations: A Civilisational Discourse", *Futures*, Vol.37, No.4, May 2005, p.290.

²⁴⁵⁹ M. Mejri, "Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference", p. 291.

²⁴⁶⁰ D. Rohtus, "Turkey and the EU", pp.149-150.

increased discussions on the accession of a country which has a predominantly Muslim population for the first time in the history of the EU.

For hundreds of years, the Ottoman Empire was the only Islamic power which was directly confronting Europe.²⁴⁶¹ Being a Turk was perceived as being synonymous with being Muslim and being a Muslim was perceived as the opposite of being European. Those who are against Turkey's membership, usually have an understanding of European identity on essentialist grounds. Girard contends that Islam is not only a religion, it is also a culture, a civilisation as well as an identity and this identity would be foreign to Christian Europe whose values are thought to be different. He states that "...Europe has been built on the double legacy of Christianity and the Enlightenment..."²⁴⁶² For many Europeans the Ottoman Empire represented the worst aspects of Islam. Hegel claims that "the Turks are 'uncontrolled', 'savage' and 'piratical' in nature."²⁴⁶³ Thus, Turks were constructed as the "others" of Europe during the Ottoman Empire. For some groups in Europe, Turkey's Islamic identity had been still identified as a source of difference which provides a reason for exclusion of Turkey from the EU.²⁴⁶⁴ Many arguments against the membership of Turkey assume that Islam and the EU are completely different monolithic entities.²⁴⁶⁵ As in Christianity, plurality is also characteristic of Islam. Islam has many different sects and Turkish Islam has also its own unique characteristics.²⁴⁶⁶

The Republic of Turkey was established as a secular constitutional state. Although it has been a secular country officially since 1928, Hurd argues that the key decision makers in Europe and the majority of the European public do not believe that Turkey is sufficiently secular in the European sense. The reason may be explained as the perception that Turkey does not share the common cultural and religious ground to have European forms of secularism and European democracy.²⁴⁶⁷ Roy asserts that:

²⁴⁶¹ Erik-Jan Zürcher & H. van der Linden, *Searching for the Fault-line: A Survey of Turkish Islam in the Accession of Turkey to the EU in the Light of the "Clash of Civilizations"*, p. 87.

²⁴⁶² Renaud Girard, "Le Danger de L'admission Turque", *Le Figaro*, November 27, 2002; quoted in M. Mejri, "Turkish Membership of the EU: The Centrality of Cultural Difference", p. 292.

²⁴⁶³ Hegel, "Introduction", *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, pp.122, 154, 174; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p. 261.

²⁴⁶⁴ Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p. 288.

²⁴⁶⁵ Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, *The EU, Turkey and Islam*, p.68.

²⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶⁷ E. S. Hurd, "Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession", pp.409.

Turkey would be rejected from the EU not because the Turkish state fails to satisfy the EU's demands to democratize...because Turkish society is not European, meaning that it does not share...Christianity that serves as the foundation of laicism.²⁴⁶⁸

Thus, even Turkey has established a secular structure, because of having a predominantly Muslim population; it is not considered as a real secular state by some people.

The freedom of thought, conscience and religion are integral part of the basic rights of the EU. Thus, in terms of basic values of the EU, there is not a reason to exclude a country on the grounds of the dominant religion among its citizens. The Member States have different historically determined relationships between religion, church, state and society and they have different legal, institutional and political arrangements. Thus, there is no fixed European standard, in terms of which the current situation in Turkey can be evaluated in terms of secularism. Although all Member States are officially secular and recognize freedom of religion, they do not always remain neutral towards religions. For example, some of the Member States have a state church. Thus, there is not a single model of separation of church and state among the Member States to test the secularism in Turkey. France's laicism was taken as the model for the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey; but unlike the French state, the Turkish state have a strong control and influence over religion.²⁴⁶⁹

As it was discussed, there was a debate during the Convention about making a reference to "Europe's Christian heritage" in the Constitutional Treaty. Especially Vatican and Poland supported a reference to Christian heritage in the Constitutional Treaty. At the end this proposal was refused. If it would be accepted, this will be discrimination towards the EU citizens who are Muslim. Contemporarily, there are more than ten million Muslims who are living in the Western Europe.²⁴⁷⁰ The accession of Turkey would increase the percentage of Muslim population in the EU from 3% to approximately 20%²⁴⁷¹ Muslims are the most numerous of the new immigrants and in terms of their culture they are more distinctive than the others. Their adaptation to the host society is usually difficult. However, as Kumar argues, Islam has been a constituent part of European civilisation.

²⁴⁶⁸ Olivier Roy, *Vers un Islam Europeen*, Paris: Editions Esprit, 1999, p.10; cited in E. S. Hurd, "Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession", p.409.

²⁴⁶⁹ Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, *The EU, Turkey and Islam*, pp.6-38.

²⁴⁷⁰ For further detail see Joel S. Fetzer & J. Christopher Soper (eds.), *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

²⁴⁷¹ J. Redmond, "Turkey and the EU: Troubled European or European Trouble?", p. 313.

European identity has been in a construction process through interaction with different civilisations.²⁴⁷² Thus, immigrants who are living within the Member States, have also affected the construction process of European identity.

The incompatibility of the different civilisations and potential for conflicts among them has been emphasized especially by Huntington in the post-Cold War era. In his famous article which is called the “Clash of Civilisations”, he claims that:

The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or ...economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The ‘clash of civilisations’ will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future.²⁴⁷³

He contends that:

... a civilisation is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have...It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people.²⁴⁷⁴

He divides the world into “the West and the rest” and he states that some non-Western countries such as Turkey and Russia have sought to redefine their identities. He argues that a country can succeed in joining the West, if they meet three criteria:

The move must be supported by the country’s elite, the general public must at least accept the move and the dominant elites in the recipient civilisation (here the West) must be willing to embrace the convert.²⁴⁷⁵

Huntington argues that the first two conditions mostly exist in the case of Turkey. The elites of Turkey usually define Turkey as part of a Western society and the Turkish public opinion is generally in favour of the EU membership, but some political elites of the EU do not see Turkey as part of Europe.²⁴⁷⁶ He also argues that there is a hierarchy of civilisations in terms of their chances of moving closer to the West. He claims that it is easier for the Latin American and East European countries, but it is harder for the Islamic, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. He supports incorporating Latin American and Eastern European civilisations to the West and cooperation with Russia and Japan. He emphasizes

²⁴⁷² K. Kumar, “The Idea of Europe: Cultural Legacies, Transnational Imaginings and The Nation-State”, pp.34-38.

²⁴⁷³ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p.22.

²⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.23.

²⁴⁷⁵ Quoted in Leslie Holmes, “Europe’s Changing Boundaries and the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis”, in Philomena Murray & Leslie Holmes (eds.), *Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries*, Aldershot: Ashgate Pub., 1998, p.22.

²⁴⁷⁶ S. P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, pp.22-49.

the threats which may come from the Confucian and Islamic states. He refers to Turkey as a “**torn country**” or “**semi-European**” country.²⁴⁷⁷

Huntington asserts that Turkey is in the faultline between civilisations. He asserts that in the Cold War era, Turkey was belonging to the West, but after the Cold War it belongs to the Islamic world.²⁴⁷⁸ He constructs the place of Turkey through the discourses such as “faultline” or “liminality” in the post-Cold War era which means that Turkey is neither in the West nor in the East, instead it is at the margin. Huntington also argues that the Eastern Europe is part of the Western civilisation which is in accordance with the attitudes of the EU towards the CEE, during their accession process. Huntington puts forward that “economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilisation. The EC rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity.”²⁴⁷⁹ Huntington cites Delors, as support for his civilisational approach: “Future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology.”²⁴⁸⁰

Some scholars argue that²⁴⁸¹ Huntington revives the stereotype of Islam as barbaric, irrational, fundamentalist and violent. Salter argues that Huntington “portrays the West as the only truly civilised...civilisation”²⁴⁸² and by identifying Islam as the main “other” of Europe, he revives the identification of “Christendom” with “civilisation”.²⁴⁸³ This perception of Huntington is similar to Eurocentric approach. Holmes also criticizes Huntington. She argues that he might have contributed to a more civilised world, if he had more constructive proposals for increasing respect, tolerance and mutual understanding between different civilisations.²⁴⁸⁴ Instead, he emphasized differences, rivalries and potential conflicts which may emerge among different civilisations. Edward Said who was

²⁴⁷⁷ Quoted in L. Holmes, “Europe’s Changing Boundaries and the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis”, p.22.

²⁴⁷⁸ S. P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, pp.22-49.

²⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

²⁴⁸⁰ S.P. Huntington, “If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntingto Responds to His Critics”, *Foreign Affairs*, November, December 1993, p.194; quoted in E. Fokas, “Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity”, retrieved on November 21, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW2/Fokas.PDF>

²⁴⁸¹ Quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.272. For further detail see Wasif Shadid & Sjoerd van Koningsveld, “The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West” in W.A.R. Shadid & S. Van Koningsveld (eds.), *Religious Freedom and The Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the EU*, Leuven: Peeters Pub., 2002, p. 179.

²⁴⁸² Quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.272.

²⁴⁸³ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 213; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p.273.

²⁴⁸⁴ L. Holmes, “Europe’s Changing Boundaries and the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis”, p.38.

the main representative of Orientalism, criticized the idea of “clash of civilisations” on the grounds that “cultures and civilisations are so interrelated...” He is against the polarity of civilisations.²⁴⁸⁵

There is a wide gap between the elites and the general public in terms of their perceptions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. On the one hand, 66% of the respondents from the general public stated that the values of Islam were not compatible with democracy, on the other hand, 31% of the MEPs and 23% of the Commission officials thought this way. It was found out that for both the MEPs and the general public, there is a relationship between their feelings about Islam and their opinions about Turkey’s membership. Among those who stated that Islam was compatible with democracy were more likely have stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”. The Commission officials had a tendency to support the membership of Turkey which was not in correlation with their opinions about Islam. It shows that the Commission officials see Turkish membership from a “professional rather than ideological perspective”.²⁴⁸⁶

Especially after September 11, the question of Turkey’s membership to the EU has started to be discussed on the basis of the idea of “clash of civilisations” both by supporters and by those who are against Turkey’s membership. The opponents of Turkey’s membership see Turkey as part of another civilisation. For them, Turkey can not be a member of the EU because of not being part of European civilisation. Among German political elites, the arguments on “clash of civilisations” related with Turkey were usually stated by representatives of the CDU. This may be perceived as a “continuation of the CDU’s long-standing tradition of associating Europe with Christianity.”²⁴⁸⁷ As it was argued, usually the Christian Democrats oppose the eligibility of Turkey for the EU membership “on the grounds that Turkey is a Muslim country.”²⁴⁸⁸ On the other hand, people who are in favour of Turkey’s membership perceive its membership as one of the instruments to prevent the “clash of civilisations”. It is argued that it would help to

²⁴⁸⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin Pub., 1978, pp.348-349; quoted in M.A. Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative Since 1789*, p. 271.

²⁴⁸⁶ *European Elites Survey*, Key Findings 2006, p.18.

²⁴⁸⁷ T. Risse & D. Engelmann Martin, “Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany”, pp.287-316; quoted in T. Koenig, et al., “Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process?”, p.159.

²⁴⁸⁸ H. Ulusoy, “The Importance of Identity Building in Avoiding The Clash of Civilizations in the Age of Globalisation: With Some Reflections on Turkey-EU Relations”, p.101.

establish peace among different cultures.²⁴⁸⁹ Especially after September 11, the supporters of the membership of Turkey have usually emphasized its role as a “bridge” between the West and the Muslim world. Verheugen argued that “in the aftermath of September 11, it is clearer than ever that the EU is indispensable for Turkey and Turkey is indispensable for the EU.”²⁴⁹⁰ He added that “when we have Turkey firmly at our side, the chances are growing to avoid such a conflict or to solve it in a peaceful way.”²⁴⁹¹ He added that, “for decades, Turkey has been told that it has prospects for becoming a full member. It would have **disastrous** consequences, if we now tell Turkey that actually we did not mean this at all.”²⁴⁹² Here it can be observed that exaggerated subjectives have been used such as “disastrous” or “fantastic” to explain the impacts of membership or non-membership of Turkey. It shows that in both cases the question of Turkey’s membership have a huge impact on the construction process of European identity.

After the decision was taken in December 2004 to begin accession talks with Turkey on October 3, 2005, Blair argued that “this decision shows that those who believe that there is a ‘clash of civilisations’ between Christians and Muslims are wrong.”²⁴⁹³ He implies that Turkey’s membership to the EU will be a proof against the idea of the “clash of civilisations”. Nicolaidis argues that:

Turkey’s EU membership would be the most powerful signal that the EU is a new kind of global normative power, instead of constructing the Muslim world as Europe’s “other” who is capable of taking on the challenge of having a country whose population is predominantly Muslim.²⁴⁹⁴

She implies that the accession of Turkey is a challenge for the EU; but she adds that the EU which is capable of including Turkey will primarily send a message to the rest of the world about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. It will also show that the EU is such a powerful integrative political project that can accept Turkey as one of its biggest members which has a predominantly Muslim population. She claims that “by becoming one of the most powerful voices of Europe in the Muslim world, Turkey will contribute to

²⁴⁸⁹ W. Duisenberg, “Barış için Türkiye”, *Financial Times*, translated in *Radikal*, November, 21, 2005, retrieved on February 15, 2006 on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=161199>

²⁴⁹⁰ Quoted in M. Müftüler Baç, “Enlarging the EU: Where Does Turkey Stand?”, p.49.

²⁴⁹¹ Interview with Gunter Verheugen on November 4, 2003,

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,272482,00.html>; quoted in D. Rohtus, “Turkey and the EU”, p.150.

²⁴⁹² Quoted in M. M. Baç, “Enlarging the EU: Where Does Turkey Stand?”, p.14.

²⁴⁹³ *Sunday Express*, December 19, 2004, p.19; quoted in T. Koenig, et al., “Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process?”, p.162.

²⁴⁹⁴ K. Nicolaidis, “Turkey is European...For Europe’s Sake”, p.68.

a highly political project for the EU...²⁴⁹⁵ Thus, the accession of Turkey will prove that the EU is a political project. Weiler argues that Turkey can not be excluded from the EU , on the grounds that it has a predominantly Muslim population, for him, this is an “artificial problem”. He argues that:

There could be valid reasons to reject Turkey, but to do this only on the basis of its religious identity would impair the commitment pledged by Europe to tolerance, plurality and human rights.²⁴⁹⁶

As it was argued, the Social Democrats have a vision of the EU as a political project and a multi-cultural Europe, especially in the context of post September 11, while civilisational dialogue has gained much more importance, not only in terms of external relations of EU, also to integrate its own Muslim minorities.²⁴⁹⁷ According to Karlsson who is the Consul General of Sweden in İstanbul, if the EU will refuse Turkey on the basis of culture and religion, it will give a message to the Muslim population living within the Member States that they will always be considered as second-class citizens.²⁴⁹⁸

Rehn stated that “the greatest challenge of our time is the relationship between Europe and Islam, or more widely between the West and Islam.”²⁴⁹⁹ He added that “Turkey is an anchor of stability in the most unstable region of the world, in the wider Middle East. It is a benchmark for democracy for the Muslim world from Morocco to Malaysia.”²⁵⁰⁰ He added that “a clash of civilisations between the West and Islam would be the consequence, if French President Sarkozy succeeds in blocking Turkey’s EU membership.”²⁵⁰¹ He argued that “Turkey is not only in rhetoric but in reality a **bridge** between civilisations.”²⁵⁰² Here again the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU is constructed as a “bridge” between the West and Islamic world. He perceives Turkey’s membership to the EU as a solution to prevent the “clash of civilisations”. He argued that

²⁴⁹⁵ K. Nicolaidis, “Turkey is European...For Europe’s Sake, p.68.

²⁴⁹⁶ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 53. For further detail see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, 1997.

²⁴⁹⁷ Z. Öniş, “Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead”, p. 292.

²⁴⁹⁸ I. Karlsson, “Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heritage”, p.45.

²⁴⁹⁹ “Rehn Warns of Clash if Sarkozy Blocks Turkey”, *Today’s Zaman*, June 12, 2007, retrieved on August 24, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=print&link=113803...>

²⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰² *Ibid.*

“as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the EU, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe’s relations with the Islamic world.”²⁵⁰³ He added that:

...a Turkey, where the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will prove that contrary to prejudices, European values can successfully coexist with a predominantly Muslim population. Such a Turkey will be a most valuable crossroad between civilisations.²⁵⁰⁴

He also stated that:

It is an opportunity to demonstrate that Islam, the second biggest religion on our continent is compatible with Europe and its values...democracy, human rights and modernity...democratic Turkey integrated into the EU would be a powerful example against fundamentalist claims of an essential incompatibility between democracy and Islam...the accession of Turkey could pave the way for lasting peace between Europe and Islam.²⁵⁰⁵

He emphasized the unique position of Turkey as a country who has a predominantly Muslim population, but practicing the values of Europe which will positively affect the relations between the EU and Islam.

Turkish politicians also emphasized that “the EU should accept Turkey, if it is not a Christian club, or if it really wants to deny the ‘clash of civilisations.’”²⁵⁰⁶ In an interview with a German magazine, former Turkish President Özal stated that “why are we not yet in the EC?...The answer is simple. You are Christians and we are Muslims.”²⁵⁰⁷ One of the main reasons of exclusion of Turkey from the EU has been perceived by some of the Turkish elites as difference of religion. Derviş argues that:

Giscard D’Estaing and the Christian Democrats approach against Turkey do not have any reference to economic, political or human rights issues. Their approach is totally based on Christian Europe...Modern, secular, contemporary Turkey and with a mostly Muslim population will demonstrate to the world that religious wars and religious borders are no longer possible.²⁵⁰⁸

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan also emphasized the role of Turkey in preventing “clash of civilisations”. On 25 November 2002 he stated that:

²⁵⁰³ Quoted in A. Lundgren, “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European Than Others?”, p.137.

²⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰⁵ Olli Rehn, “ The EU and Turkey: Call for a Virtuous Circle of Credible Commitment”, Lecture at Helsinki University, November 27, 2006; quoted in *The Reflection Cafe*, retrieved on December 12, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://reflectioncafe2.blogspot/2006_12_01_reflectioncafe2_archive.html

²⁵⁰⁶ H. Ulusoy, “The Importance of Identity Building in Avoiding The Clash of Civilizations in the Age of Globalisation: With Some Reflections on Turkey-EU Relations”, p.101.

²⁵⁰⁷ *Der Spiegel*, 14 October 1991; quoted in D. Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey”, pp.231-232.

²⁵⁰⁸ *Anadolu Agency* cited in *Hürriyet*, December 7, 2002, retrieved on July 25, 2006 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1,,,00.asp>

When we enter the EU, we are not going to represent the ‘clash of civilisations’ and cultures, instead, Turkey by being the ‘**bridge**’ will help to achieve the merger of different cultures and civilisations.²⁵⁰⁹

He also uses the “bridge” metaphor to explain the position of Turkey like the political elites of the EU.

Interactions between Turkey and the EU can not be generalized to represent interactions between the EU and other countries that have a predominantly Muslim population. The interactions between Turkey and the EU have a unique historical background. If Turkey will successfully integrate to the EU, it will show that there is not only one way of interaction between the EU and the countries which have a predominantly Muslim population. Thus, the accession of Turkey to the EU does not mean that the Turkish model can be exported to other countries which have a predominantly Muslim population. The case of Turkey has been determined by specific historical factors. Some Arab countries still see Turkey mainly as their former ruler and as an ally of the West,²⁵¹⁰ but Turkish membership will show that Muslims, who are living in the EU, are already part of European identity. So Turkey could be an inspiration, but not a model for other Muslim states. It shows that Islam and democracy are compatible with each other.²⁵¹¹ It may also help smoothing the growing dichotomy between the West and the Islamic world and decreasing Islamophobia in Europe.

As some social constructivists argue, “underlying ideas and discourses change only at rare ‘**critical junctures**’ which arise in response to political crises”²⁵¹². Especially after September 11 which may be considered as a “critical juncture”, the possibility of Turkey’s membership has been increasingly discussed on the basis of the idea of “clash of civilisations”. Thus, emergence of a new “critical juncture” in the future may change the discourses on the question of Turkey’s membership to the EU which may lead to a change in the nature of interactions between Turkey and the EU.

²⁵⁰⁹ *Anadolu Agency* quoted in *Hürriyet*, November 25, 2002, retrieved on June 25, 2006 on the World Wide Web. <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1...00.asp>

²⁵¹⁰ Erik-Jan Zürcher & H. van der Linden, *Searching for the Fault-line: A Survey of Turkish Islam in the Accession of Turkey to the EU in the Light of the “Clash of Civilizations”*, p. 166.

²⁵¹¹ Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, *The EU, Turkey and Islam*, , p. 74.

²⁵¹² For further detail see T. Christiansen, K.E. Jorgensen & A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, 1999.

According to the “European Elites Survey” which was made in 2007, it was found out that considering Islamic fundamentalism to be a threat, affected opinions about Turkey’s membership to the EU. Larger percentages of the MEPs (47%) and the general public (38%) than officials of the EU who were concerned about Islamic fundamentalism thought that Turkey’s membership to the EU would be a bad thing.²⁵¹³

During the interviews conducted by the author, some of the MEPs argued that because of having a predominantly Muslim population and a different culture which has been affected by Islam, the integration process with Turkey will be much more difficult than the last new members from the CEE, even the other candidate countries. The role of Islam in Turkey-EU relations was frequently mentioned. Coveney stated that:

...it is important to be honest with Turkey...people are **afraid** of a country of **70 million Muslims**...because they do not understand what is going to happen, they are afraid, because there is a growing radicalisation of many Muslim communities in our own countries, in Britain, Germany... there is a **problem about integration with many Muslim communities**, particularly in Germany with Turkish communities, they are genuine social problems...getting worse, people tell their politicians, we can not even deal with people who came from Turkey to work here, what we will do, when Turkey will join the EU?...the **fear factor with Turkey** is related with its big size, **the first Muslim country that has a potential to join**...a **growing friction between Islamic world and the Western world**, it is **important to be honest**... because a lot of people say, it is not to do with religion, but it is. **I do not believe that Europe is a Christian club** and a Muslim country should not be allowed in...the honest answer is...about **cultural and religious issues**...**Islam has become a frightening concept for many non-Muslims** unfortunately...you need to remind people, Turkey was a victim...as well. They had victims of terrorism more than we had, they face the same problems from the radical forms of Islam...unfortunately there is a **growing connection between terrorism and all forms of Islam** and that is the **danger**...in my view probably that is **the biggest threat to Turkish membership**. **People look for excuses to deny Turkey**...people like me we have to keep saying...religion is irrelevant, the issue is related with the criteria, human rights...if they will do, they should join...²⁵¹⁴

Here “the necessity for **honesty of the EU**” was emphasized which shows that the EU is hesitant about reflecting its scepticism about Turkey’s membership especially on the grounds of culture and religion. He is in favour of evaluating the question of Turkey’s membership on the basis of civic terms. Problems of integration with Muslim communities, particularly Turkish immigrants in Europe have increased the scepticism about Turkey’s membership. The expression “afraid” was frequently used which reflects the perceptions of the public opinions about Turkey and Turkey’s membership is usually perceived as a threat by them. There is a fear of unknown, unpredictable and unexpected

²⁵¹³ *European Elites Survey*, Key Findings 2007, p. 18

²⁵¹⁴ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

which is closely related with the lack of knowledge about Turkey. It can be seen that the growing gap between Christians and Muslims especially after September 11 and the increasing tendency to equate Islam and terrorism have also negatively affected the perceptions of the peoples of the Member States about Turkey's membership. The expression of "people look for excuses to deny Turkey" shows the increasing importance of identity factor, including religion during the integration process of Turkey with the EU. Thus, there is a deeper problem of perceptions about Turkey which is not a rational issue, instead it concerns emotions and feelings of people, such as fear and anxiety.

Resetarits also mentioned the fears of some groups in the EU about Turkey's membership. She argued that:

...a lot of people, also here at the EP...very **afraid** of the possibility that...when Turkey becomes a member of the EU, it will probably be the biggest nation in the EU, they will have the largest number of members sitting in the EP and a lot of them will sit in the EPP and this is a 'Christian club'. The Greens, the liberals and the social democrats do not care about religion...Turkish Muslims sitting in the Christian club. They are so afraid of it...They always say, it is not part of the EU, it **does not fit really in our EU**...Privileged partnership they say all the time.²⁵¹⁵

Here again it can be seen that Turkey is perceived as awkward, not fitting with the EU. The possibility of Turkey's membership is perceived as something which causes even the political elites of the EU to be afraid; because Turkey is a big country also in terms of population which will be reflected in the number of the MEPs of Turkey. It was also argued that if Turkey will become a member of the EU, members of AK Party (AKP) will be part of EPP as Muslim Democrats.²⁵¹⁶ The AKP already has an observer status within the EPP; but as Resetarits argued, it will be hard for the AKP to integrate to the EPP as Muslim Democrats; rather it may integrate more easily with the Liberals at the EP.

Some of the MEPs mentioned the influence of religion on cultures. Sommer stated that "I have nothing against Islam. Islam also affects cultural differences."²⁵¹⁷ She emphasized the effects of Islam on the daily lives of Muslim people. The consultant of the MEP of Southern Cyprus also emphasized that religious identity affects daily lives. He also

²⁵¹⁵ Interview with K. Resetarits, Liberal MEP of Austria, on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

²⁵¹⁶ Jose Casanova, "The Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization", *Constellations*, Vol.13, No.2, 2006, p.237.

²⁵¹⁷ Interview with R. Sommer, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

differentiates Muslim system of values and European system of values.²⁵¹⁸ Here again it can be seen that differences in the way of living of Muslim and Christian peoples are emphasized, rather than similarities. Muslim system of values is constructed as different and in contradiction with the European system of values.

Schöpflin emphasized the differences between Turkey and the EU in terms of modernity. He claimed that democratic deficit in the EU will increase with Turkey's membership. He asserted that:

...to have a *demos* you need a certain degree of **cultural homogeneity**. Part of the problem with Turkey is not that it is Islamic, but significant part of it is **pre-modern** and **semi-modern**. A process which is completed in Europe; in Turkey not. How do you bring modernity to sections of Turkish society?...is it possible for Turkish society to become a part of this wider European discursivity? I do not think it is yet. Maybe twenty or thirty years later...²⁵¹⁹

Here European identity is constructed as the main representative of modernity. Modernity was emphasized as another reason of exclusion of Turkey: Excluding significant parts of Turkey in terms of modernity. One of the impacts of Turkey's membership is perceived as causing an increase in cultural heterogeneity of Europe. During the interviews, the gap between the west and east of Turkey, particularly between İstanbul and the rest of Turkey were frequently emphasized. Thus, this gap is also perceived as one of the main obstacles of Turkey's membership by the political elites of the EU.

Some of the interviewees are sceptical about the way of secularism which is practiced in Turkey. One French Commission official from DG Enlargement stated that "Turkey is **not a real secular country** yet."²⁵²⁰ Turkey is perceived as imitating a modern secular structure of European states, but it is not usually perceived as a "real" European, modern and secular state.

On the other hand, some of the MEPs argued in favour of Turkey's EU membership in order to prevent "clash of civilisations". Öger argued that Turkey's membership will prove that there may not be "clash of civilisations" and it will be a good model for other Muslim states. He stated that:

Turkey's membership will be both a challenge and a very big contribution. People who see the EU as a 'Christian club', are 'people of yesterday'. Having a religious criteria in the future of

²⁵¹⁸ Interview with M. Charalampidis, Consultant of Y. Yiannos the MEP of Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

²⁵¹⁹ Interview with G. Schöpflin, Christian Democrat MEP of Hungary, on 20.09.2006 at 11.00.

²⁵²⁰ Interview with Commission official from France, DG Enlargement, on 13.07.2006 at 17.30.

Europe means returning to the past...in the history there was a lot of religious wars, they suffered from them too much. Turkey's accession to the EU will be one of the factors which prove that Europe is not a Christian club. It is very important in this respect. Europe is a unity of values. Accession of Turkish society which shares the same values with the EU, will again prove that Europe is a **unity of values**. Secondly Turkey has a secular structure, it is a country in which democracy and Islam, free market economy and Islam are compatible with each other...to **prevent a possible 'clash of civilisations'**, Turkey's membership to the EU with sharing all these values, will be a goal to the Muslim world. After Turkey will prove this, elites and bourgeoisie in other Muslim countries may take Turkey as a model; they can make similar reforms in their society... **Turkey may be a benchmark** for them...They may **prevent fundamentalism** which is widespread in the Muslim world, with the help of Turkey.²⁵²¹

Here European identity is constructed on civic basis which is reflected by the discourse **"unity of values"**. Turkey's membership is perceived as an example of counter-argument to the idea of "clash of civilisations". Also the case of Turkey is referred to as a model to other Muslim countries; but as it was argued, rather than being a model, it may be an example of constructing different way of interactions between the EU and the Muslim world. Thus, Turkey is constructed in relation to others, such as a "bridge", as a tool to integrate Muslim immigrants and as a model for Muslim world, so Turkey's construction is serving multiple functions.

Özdemir emphasized the increasing importance of religion in Europe after September 11. He argued that "after the recent terrorist attacks, identity is started to be based on religion. You are in Muslim bloc, so your Muslim identity is primarily emphasized..."²⁵²² He also emphasized the importance of secularism for both Turkey and the EU. He argued that:

Turkey's accession may transform Europe to a real secular Europe...there are some subjects waiting to be solved in Turkey such as state-religion, individual-state relations, Alevi, non-Muslim communities...there is one way to solve these in Europe, separation between state and religion...State has to stay away from every religious communities, the same distance and closeness. Turkey's accession will force us to do this and it will force Turkey to do this...²⁵²³

Here the importance and necessity of secularism for both Turkey and the EU is emphasized and it is argued that the interaction process between Turkey and the EU, will positively affect consolidation of secularism both in Turkey and the EU. Özdemir, Öger and Bozkurt are the MEPs who have a Turkish origin; the discourses of such people who prefer construction of European identity on civic basis, have important role in construction process of European identity and the way of interactions between Turkey and the EU.

²⁵²¹ Interview with V. Öger, Socialist MEP of Germany, on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

²⁵²² Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁵²³ *Ibid.*

El Khadroui emphasized the symbolic importance of Turkey's accession to the EU. He stated that:

...it will be a very symbolic accession. It will give a message that Europe is a political project, not a cultural religious project. It is not a Christian Europe. It is an open Europe, it is open-minded...it gives also possibility to **many Muslim people who live in Europe to consider themselves as really Europeans...**we are all Europeans, whatever the religion, or background. We all have to believe in Europe, create Europe and work for it and make it better...²⁵²⁴

Here symbolic importance of accession of Turkey is emphasized especially for Muslim immigrants living in Europe (which is referred to as "European Muslims" by Tariq Ramadan²⁵²⁵) which will give them the message that a country that has a predominantly Muslim population is also part of European identity. Hatzidakis argued against the idea of excluding Turkey on the basis of its religion. He stated that:

The role of Christianity in shaping the character of the entire continent as a whole is used by some to exclude Turkey from the EU. I do not think we have to use Christianity as criteria; because we believe in the same God...Turkey can be a member of the EU...if it fulfills all preconditions agreed between the EU and the Turkish state.²⁵²⁶

He differentiates between Europe and the EU and emphasized that religion is not one of the criteria to be a member of the EU.

Duff emphasized the positive effects of Turkey's membership on EU identity. He argued that "...if we can successfully integrate Turkey, the **prize** for Europe in creating democratic Islam will be **fantastic**. The EU will be a global leader..."²⁵²⁷ Here the possibility of Turkey's accession to the EU is perceived as a challenge, but if it will be achieved successfully, there will be a big prize for the EU. It was emphasized that Turkey's membership may make EU identity much stronger in the world. In the discourses of the MEPs it can be observed that they used the expression "fantastic" so much. The concept of "fantastic" means extraordinarily good, unrealistic, or unbelievably great.²⁵²⁸ He implies that the integration of Turkey successfully to the EU is too hard, but if it will be achieved, it will have enormous prizes for the EU. Badia i Cutchet stated that:

...the entrance of Turkey would be a **very rich thing for the culture of the union**, but the EU in this moment is not prepared, digestion of the last enlargement, we have problems with this digestion...the EU is not ready to accept more enlargements until we have a new Treaty, we have clear rules how to manage...Turkey is a very large country...**for the EU it is much better Turkey looking at us, rather than looking on the other side**, for Turkey too, much

²⁵²⁴ Interview with S. El Khadroui, Socialist MEP of Belgium, on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

²⁵²⁵ For further detail see Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim*, 1999.

²⁵²⁶ Interview with K. Hatzidakis, Christian Democrat MEP of Greece, on September 13, 2006, at 16.15.

²⁵²⁷ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

²⁵²⁸ *eLook.org*, "fantastic: definition", retrieved on August 23, 2007 on the World Wide Web: <http://www.elook.org/dictionary/fantastic.html>

more for us...we need Turkey closer to us. The most important thing, **if a country like Turkey, with a different culture and religion enter the EU, with all the rules of law, democracy, that would be the best thing we could do for peace in the world...**that would be **fantastic**, it would be a message sent to the Middle East...the EU is not constructed on the basis of Christianity or religion, there are many religions in the EU. You can not find in any paper of the EU, the word Christianity...It is something which is in private life and it must remain there. When religion is mixed with government, it never works...²⁵²⁹

Here again the possibility of Turkey's membership to the EU is perceived as "**fantastic**". It was emphasized that "for the EU it is much better Turkey looking at the EU, rather than looking to the East" which indirectly constructs the position of Turkey outside the EU. It is also preferred for Turkey to be closer to the EU, but not inside the EU as a member of the family. Thus, most of the MEPs mentioned the effects of religious and cultural factors on Turkey-EU relations, but they usually argued against discrimination of Turkey in these terms. Most of the interviewees argued that the question of Turkey's membership has to be evaluated according to civic criteria, in terms of common values.

V.4. The Effects of the Interactions between Turkey and the EU on the Construction of European Identity within the EU

The interactions between Turks and Europe have been effective on construction of the identities of both parties, even before the establishment of the EU. Usually the debates about Turkey's place in Europe lead to questioning of Europe itself. The debate on European identity in the post-Cold war era has been triggered by the possibility of Turkey's membership to the EU. While Turkey's membership has been discussed within the EU, simultaneously European identity has been in an ongoing construction process. Öniş argues that:

During the successive waves of enlargement of the EU, there has not been a case comparable to Turkey that has generated such heated debate about the nature of European identity and the boundaries of Europe.²⁵³⁰

Nobody questioned the "Europeanness" of the new Member States from the CEE who were part of the "other" of the West during the Cold War era.

The debate on Turkey's membership to the EU has been effective on construction of European identity within the EU and construction of EU identity in the world. The main

²⁵²⁹ Interview with M. Badia i Cutchet, Socialist MEP of Spain , on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

²⁵³⁰ Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p.279.

division in the EU about Turkey's membership is between those who focus on internal issues of the EU and who focus on the role of the EU as a global actor. Those who want more active EU in the global arena, usually argue in favour of Turkish membership.²⁵³¹ While the EU has been influencing the transformation process of Turkey, the accession of Turkey will have an important effect on the future shape of the EU, particularly in terms of establishing an inclusive, multi-cultural society and increasing its influence in the world as a global actor.²⁵³² The former Chairman of the EP Pat Cox stated that "Turkey is the most difficult question of all...It is about how we define Europe."²⁵³³ The membership of Turkey is usually considered as a contribution to the construction process of EU identity in the world as a global player. On the other hand, it is usually perceived as a challenge to the construction process of European identity within the EU, especially by those who define European identity on cultural basis.

According to Wendt, interaction with other states may lead actors to redefine themselves.²⁵³⁴ In terms of social constructivism it can be argued that the interactions between the EU and Turkey have affected the construction process of European identity. The collapse of the Soviet Union can be referred to as a "critical juncture" which forced the EC to reconstruct itself as the EU. In this reconstruction process, the enlargement towards the CEE accelerated whose accession was referred to as "returning to Europe". The question of Turkey's membership was differentiated from the other candidates from the CEE at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 which has been resisted by Turkey. As Rumelili argues,²⁵³⁵ when Turkey tries to resist construction of itself as "non-European", it blurs the boundaries between Turkey and the EU and also blurs European identity which makes the question of Turkey's membership more difficult. According to Ulusoy, horizontally Turkey and the Member States should form a "common self" against a jointly defined new "other". Identifying the "self" against a common "other" would help bringing

²⁵³¹ U. Guerot, "Europe Could Become the First 'Post-Modern' Superpower", http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2004_fall/2004_fall_36.php4; quoted in M. Ögütçü, "Turkey and the EU: How to Achieve a Forward-looking and 'win-win' Accession by 2015?", p.43.

²⁵³² Z. Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and The Challenges Ahead", p. 280.

²⁵³³ "Turkey's EU Bid: Resistance is on the Rise", *Business Week*, February 9, 2004.

²⁵³⁴ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism" in Stefano Guzzini & Anna Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, London: Routledge Pub., 2006, pp.5-7.

²⁵³⁵ It was discussed in detail in the 1st Chapter. For further detail see B. Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", pp. 37-38.

Turkey and the EU together.²⁵³⁶ In the future whether they will have a common “other” such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War era or not, will depend on the international conjuncture which will affect construction process of European identity and the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU.

Especially since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, when Turkey was given a candidate status, European identity has been discussed on the basis of the question of Turkey’s membership. Thus, the interactions between Turkey and the EU and questioning Turkey’s membership have affected the construction process of European identity within the EU and EU identity in the world. As Wendt argues “identities may be hard to change but they are not carved in stone”,²⁵³⁷ they may change with the effects of internal and external dynamics. Thus, European identity and Turkish identity has been in an ongoing interaction and construction process which have been affected by their internal and external dynamics.

There are two main perspectives within the EU about the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU. According to the first perspective, there is a geographical, cultural and historical identity of Europe which relies on the past. According to this perspective, Turkey can only be a privileged partner. The supporters of this perspective claim that Turkey does not have the vocation to become a member, because it does not belong historically and geographically to Europe, only a small part of Turkey’s territory and population is geographically in Europe. Some people use this argument “to mask their refusal to accept a country with a predominantly Muslim population within Europe.”²⁵³⁸ The second vision of the EU is based on the future. According to this perspective, the definition of the EU’s borders can not be based on historical, geographic or religious criteria; instead the EU is perceived mainly as a political project. Strauss-Kahn argues against exclusion of Turkey on cultural grounds, he asserts that the EU is a political entity which can not be based on religious criteria. A lot of Member States already have important numbers of Muslim people among their populations.²⁵³⁹ These two main visions of the EU are in accordance with two main understandings of European identity which are cultural and civic understandings of European identity that were discussed in the 1st Chapter. Thus, on which

²⁵³⁶ H. Ulusoy, “The Importance of Identity Building in Avoiding the Clash of Civilisations in the Age of Globalisation (With Some Reflections on Turkey-EU Relations)”, p.113.

²⁵³⁷ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.21.

²⁵³⁸ D. Strauss-Kahn, “What Borders for Europe?”, p.29.

²⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

basis European identity is constructed has been effective on the perceptions about Turkey's membership.

The identity crisis of the EU is reflected in the debates on the question of Turkey's membership. The debate on Turkish Europeanness and the question of Turkey's membership have been effective on the construction process of European identity and EU identity. The discourse on Turkey's membership has become closely related with the discourse on European identity. Every enlargement processes have affected the construction process of European identity and EU identity. The most challenging one until now has been the last enlargement in May 2004 with the accession of ten CEE states at the same time; but Turkey's possible membership is perceived as an ever more challenging one which is reflected in the discourses of some officials of the EU, the politicians of the Member States and widespread scepticism among the public opinions of many Member States about Turkey's membership. The identity of Turkey has been strongly questioned in the EU which led to questioning of European identity through the discussions on the boundaries of Europe and common values of the EU.

The discourses of the EU on the question of membership of Turkey are closely related with the discourse on European identity and Turkey's Europeanness. As Hülse argues "for the EU the discourse on Turkey's suitability for EU membership, functions as a means to reconstruct its own identity."²⁵⁴⁰ When Turkey is excluded in terms culture and identity, European identity is constructed as fixed, on an exclusive basis and it is differentiated on the basis of inherent characteristics.²⁵⁴¹ The narrower construction of European identity on the basis of culture will negatively affect construction of a dynamic and multicultural EU. Turkish membership would demonstrate that broader political identity has been in a construction process within the EU. As Kubicek argues, Turkish membership will have a much more transformative impact on the EU than the eastern enlargement.²⁵⁴²

Plurality, continuous appropriation of values and practices would create dynamism for the European project. When diverse identities are reconcilable, it is easier to construct

²⁵⁴⁰ R. Hülse, "The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference: Turkey as Europe's Other?", p.17.

²⁵⁴¹ B. Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", p.39.

²⁵⁴² P. Kubicek, "Turkey's Place in the New Europe", pp.57-58.

a functioning political collectivity on the basis of mutual recognition. If the divergences are perceived as fundamental, it is hard to maintain stability and solidarity of the polity. On the other hand, stability, solidarity and social cohesion are crucial for the survival of the “flexible open-ended European polity”. There has to be at least minimum understanding on defining common values for the survival of the polity. Turkey’s membership to the EU has been usually perceived as a challenge for the EU in terms of establishing a balance between “diversity/dynamism/plurality” and “unity/cohesion/solidarity”, “while aspiring to become a normative civilian power, a sufficiently democratic and efficient system of governance.”²⁵⁴³ This is closely related with the question of how much diversity is acceptable, the “**limits of diversity**”. According to Mayer and Palmowski, European identity is not based on a common historical memory, thus Turkey should not be excluded on these grounds. They argue that:

As long as Turkey can fulfill the institutional, economic and legal requirements for membership, Turkey should not be excluded from European identity which has been shaped mainly by the institutions and the law of the EU.²⁵⁴⁴

During construction of collective identities similarities are emphasized and differences are tried to be forgotten; but in the case of the relations between Turkey and the EU, usually differences have been emphasized which leads to exclusion of Turkey in terms of European identity. If European identity is constructed on civic basis, there are no grounds for excluding Turkey, because of its culture and identity. Hurd argues that the opposition to Turkey’s membership on cultural grounds reflects the “unsettled nature of the relation between religion, politics and European identity.”²⁵⁴⁵ It causes questioning the politics of religion within Europe.²⁵⁴⁶ Thus, the debate on the question of Turkey’s membership has been also effective on interaction process between religion and politics in Europe.

There is not any reference against Turkey’s membership in any previous official EU documents in terms of Europeanness; but as it was argued, some scholars and some politicians from different political parties exclude Turkey on cultural grounds which has

²⁵⁴³ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, pp. 50-51.

²⁵⁴⁴ F. C. Mayer, & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe”, p.593.

²⁵⁴⁵ E. S. Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and The Prospects for Turkish Accession”, p. 407.

²⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

led to construction of European identity on cultural basis. The public opinions of the Member States about Turkey's membership have been also usually determined by their perceptions of European identity in cultural terms. It can be argued that although the EU has been constructed European identity mostly on civic basis, the discourses of some of the political leaders of the Member States and some other political elites of the EU construct European identity on cultural basis which has led to construction of European identity in hybrid terms, that have led to **ambiguities** in discourses about Turkey's membership in terms of European identity.

The beginning of the negotiations between Turkey and EU shows that the two parties accept each other with whom, it might be possible to reach an agreement.²⁵⁴⁷ Some sceptics about Turkey's membership within the EU argue that the Turkish membership will endanger "the identity and workability of the Union."²⁵⁴⁸ On the other hand, Eurosceptics in Turkey argue that the membership of Turkey will negatively affect national identity and sovereignty of Turkey. Thus, there is a mutual scepticism between Turkey and the EU about membership of Turkey to the EU in terms of identity and culture. Both sides perceived each other, not as the "other", but rather as a **challenge** to their identity.

During the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, both parties should have a "constructive problem-solving approach".²⁵⁴⁹ Habermas uses the term "**communicative actions**" which refer to the actions of the participating actors that is based on acts of understanding, rather than acting on the basis of egocentric calculations of success. Thus, in "communicative action", participants are not primarily focused on their own success. The goal of a "communicative action" is "to seek a reasoned consensus". During the arguments, actors try to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs to reach a reasoned consensus. Communicative processes which are oriented toward achieving mutual understanding, presuppose an "ideal speech situation" which means that the better arguments count and actors try to persuade each other and they are open to being

²⁵⁴⁷ Harald Müller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No.3, 2004, p.421.

²⁵⁴⁸ M. M. Baç, "Enlarging the EU: Where Does Turkey Stand?", p.30.

²⁵⁴⁹ M. Ögütçü, "Turkey and the EU: How to Achieve a Forward-looking and 'win-win' Accession by 2015?", p.50.

convinced.²⁵⁵⁰ Risse points out that arguing presuppose that actors no longer have fixed interests during their “communicative interaction”, instead they are open to persuasion, challenges and counter challenges to reach a reasoned consensus.²⁵⁵¹ During the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, the interactions among two parties have to be based on this kind of “communicative action”, to have a win-win situation.

During the interactions between Turkey and the EU, the EU has been usually constructed by Turkey as a uniform actor, rather than differentiating between different Member States and the political groups in the EU which leads to consideration of the EU as a nation-state like entity.²⁵⁵² As it was argued, this is not the case for the EU. The Member States and different political groups in the EU have different perceptions about the structure of the EU and the question of Turkey’s membership. Thus, it has to be emphasized that the EU has not been in interaction with Turkey as a monolithic nation-state like entity. Turkey has bilateral interactions with different Member States, it has been in close interaction with the Commission and it has been in interaction with other institutions, political parties and the NGOs to different extents.

According to the “European Elites Survey” in 2006, 73% of the Commission officials and 64% of the MEPs “strongly” agreed that further enlargement would make development of common European identity more difficult. 66% of the MEPs, who did not see enlargement as an obstacle to construction of European identity, stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”. On the other hand, from the MEPs who thought that enlargement is an obstacle to construction of European identity, 38% stated that Turkish membership would be a “good thing”. The relationship between thoughts of the MEPs about the effects of enlargement on construction of European identity and about Turkey’s membership is also valid for the general public. This relationship was not so strong for the Commission officials, whose opinions were less affected by their thoughts about the effects of enlargement on construction of European identity.²⁵⁵³

²⁵⁵⁰ J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, p. 385; cited in T. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, pp. 9-10.

²⁵⁵¹ T. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, p. 33.

²⁵⁵² R. Hülse, “The Interpretation of Meaning: Analysing the Discourse on Turkey’s Europeanness”, May 12-13, 2000.

²⁵⁵³ *European Elites Survey*, Key Findings 2006, pp.15-17.

During the interviews conducted by the author some of the MEPs argued that successful integration of Turkey to the EU is a challenge, but if it will be achieved, it will be one of the most important success stories of the EU. When it was asked, whether Turkey's membership will have contributing, challenging or negative impact on construction of European identity within the EU, Coveney replied that:

Contributing...Europe is perceived in the Middle East...as the Western world and Christian... **Turkey will help to break down that image of being a Christian club.** Even though the values, fundamental rights, human rights are very much based on Christian values...those values are also important to people out of Islam, Christianity...It will help to change the image of the EU, into a union that is broader, more multicultural, tolerant, particularly in the Arab world...if you look at the new challenges that Europe is facing in Africa...a lot of conflicts are based on religious grounds...Islam versus Christianity. If Europe can show that they can work together...that gives us much more credibility...to create peace and stability...²⁵⁵⁴

He perceived Turkey's membership as contributing, especially in terms of showing the compatibility of Islam and democracy and breaking down the image of the EU as a "Christian club" in the Muslim world.

Duff emphasized the positive effects of Turkey's membership on the CFSP and the ESDP. He argued that "...if we get Turkey inside that will force us to have a serious CFSP and Defense Policy..."²⁵⁵⁵ During the interviews the effects of Turkey's membership on EU identity are usually perceived positively by the MEPs, especially in terms of the CFSP and the ESDP. On the other hand, scepticism could be observed, in terms of effects of Turkey's membership on construction of European identity especially for those who define it on cultural basis. Deprez asserted that:

My position as a federalist...the **membership of Turkey will increase cultural heterogeneity of Europe** and will **increase tensions**, instead of building some kind of 'new synthesis'. I do not see the possibility of a synthesis...I am a friend of Turkey...Turkey will be tomorrow one of the most important states of the planet...and **I do not see that compatible with the kind of Europe I want**...it is a very '**specific model of civilisation**'. I consider Turkey as a **unique** case. Turkey is neither Arab, nor Persian and has a very specific, great history like Russia. They are very **specific** states."²⁵⁵⁶

He perceives Turkey's membership as a threat to his goal of a federal EU which shows that the position of Turkey vis-a-vis the EU is closely related with the future structure of the EU. He perceives Turkey neither as part of European civilisation, nor part of the Arab world. By using the term "specific", he constructs the identity of Turkey as unique. He argues that Turkey's membership to the EU will increase cultural heterogeneity which

²⁵⁵⁴ Interview with S. Coveney, Christian Democrat MEP of Ireland, on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

²⁵⁵⁵ Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

²⁵⁵⁶ Interview with G. Deprez, Liberal MEP of Belgium, on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

shows that he perceives the identity of Turkey much more different than the other cultures of Europe. He also claims that instead of establishing dialogue and synthesis between different cultures, Turkey's membership to the EU will lead to increasing tensions. Weber argued that "...for my citizens in my home region, I could say clearly, **if Turkey comes to Europe, then we are far away from European identity...**"²⁵⁵⁷ He also considers Turkey's membership as a threat to European identity. He perceives Turkey as a force that will take the EU out of the realm of Europeanness. He thinks that Turkey will bring into EU too much diversity that Europeanness can not accommodate or contain within the notion of common identity. Schwalba-Hoth argued that affects of the membership of Turkey on construction of European identity is "very challenging, difficult".²⁵⁵⁸

Guardans emphasized the gap between the elites and the masses in Turkey. He argued that:

...Turkey's membership in the EU would change completely European identity from the outside, not an internal change...I do not support that idea...there are negative effects on Europe...as a political project, cultural project, as an identity project. I do not think we can share an identity with Turkey, more than we can have it with Canada. If we bring in Turkey, we have things in common of course, at the UN we also have things in common...that would make it very very difficult to build a real European identity...geography is also part...we should not confuse Turkey's elites with Turkey. Turkey is Turkey and Turkey's elites is something different...I think the gap between Turkey's diplomats and academics and the masses in Turkey is thousands of times bigger than the gap between the elites and the masses anywhere in the world, except perhaps Iran...²⁵⁵⁹

He perceives the effects of Turkey's membership as negative on construction of European identity. The things in common between Turkey and the EU are considered as too little. He differentiates between the elites of Turkey and the masses. By emphasizing the huge gap between the elites and masses of Turkey, he implied that the elites of Turkey may accommodate to the EU in cultural terms, but it is too hard for the rest of Turkey.

Prets argued that Turkey can not be excluded on the basis of European identity; because there has not been a finished concrete European identity yet. She stated that:

...at the moment it is a process to find European identity...**Most of the people around the EU do not have a European identity.** Why should Turkey have it? They can not, because we do not have it. We have to work together, what does it mean being in the EU? Is it only to fight for money or is it more? This is more. That is what we have to explain...we are working on this...we can not demand that Turkey would have a European identity, we do not have it

²⁵⁵⁷ Interview with M. Weber, Christian Democrat MEP of Germany, on July 12, 2006, at 11.30.

²⁵⁵⁸ Interview with F. Schwalba-Hoth, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 17.00.

²⁵⁵⁹ Interview with I. Guardans, Liberal MEP of Spain, on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

already...for most of the people, the European idea is how much money...how many projects...this is that at the moment...that is the process...²⁵⁶⁰

She emphasized that excluding Turkey in terms of Europeanness is meaningless, because European identity has been in an undergoing construction process within the EU. Even the peoples of Europe do not have a strong level of European identity yet, although it has been strengthening.

Özdemir asserts that Turkey's membership may contribute to construction of European identity, if it fulfills certain conditions. He stated that:

I see **Turkey's membership as a contribution to European identity construction process**, but **only with one condition, changes that are waited to be done by Turkey should be done**...This slowed down a little bit...If these will be made, it will be a gain for both Turkey and Europe. It is a classical **win-win situation**...It will not be easy for both Europe and Turkey...²⁵⁶¹

He argued that if Turkey will adopt all of the EU acquis to its legal structure successfully, Turkey can make contributions to construction process of European identity. Also he supported the idea of Turkey's membership on utilitarian basis which is beneficial for both Turkey and the EU. Duff argued that "...if Turkey is not going to contribute to integration, then it will be a **disaster** for the EU to let Turkey in..."²⁵⁶² The concept of "disaster" is another exaggerated expression. Through this discourse, he emphasized the importance of Turkey's accommodative and contributive approach during the integration process with the EU.

For successful integration of Turkey with the EU, the attempts of rewriting history books in Europe and new projects have to be introduced on rewriting history books in Turkey and the EU. This will lead to changes in the public opinions about the membership of Turkey in the longer term. Unless feeling of commonness can not be constructed between Turkey and the EU, on the basis of shared projects and objectives, the accession of Turkey will be hard to realise,²⁵⁶³ even if it will adopt all of the EU acquis. During the negotiation process of Turkey with the EU, they have been in a closer interaction process; they will go on mutually constructing their identities. During this process, lack of mutual trust and scepticism among two parties has to be overcome. Rohtus argues that the main

²⁵⁶⁰ Interview with C. Prets, Socialist MEP of Austria, on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

²⁵⁶¹ Interview with C. Özdemir, MEP of Germany from the Greens, on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

²⁵⁶² Interview with A. Duff, Liberal MEP of the UK, on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

²⁵⁶³ S. Baykal, "Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey's EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case", p. 31.

reason of the fear of the EU elites is based on the argument that the EU lacks its own identity which is strong enough to cope with the accession of Turkey that has a “highly developed self-consciousness”. It is not related with the EU, being a Christian club.²⁵⁶⁴ Turkey’s membership to the EU is usually perceived as a challenge to European identity, because of the scepticism about the strength of European identity. As Cem argues “Europe has to decide on its identity, its vision and its mission”,²⁵⁶⁵ especially in the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, as H. Yılmaz argues, Turkey is not a foreigner, who wants to move to a finished house. Instead it should be seen as a contributive component of that house, who wants to participate in its construction process who will have a say about, who should sit in that apartment and how will be its interior decoration. Turkey should clarify its unique contributions to this process.²⁵⁶⁶ Thus, Turkey has to find out its contributions to the construction process of European identity within the EU and emphasize them during its interactions with the EU in order to overcome prejudices and scepticism about Turkey. It is too hard to construct the feeling of “us” between Turkey and the EU on an essentialist basis, but it may be constructed on the basis of common civic values, through “communicative action”, making common projects and finding common goals.

²⁵⁶⁴ Dirk Rohtus, “Turkey and the EU” in Christiane Timmerman and Barbara Segaert (eds.), *How to Conquer the Barriers to Intercultural Dialogue-Christianity, Islam and Judaism*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2005, p.149.

²⁵⁶⁵ İ. Cem, “Turkey in Europe”, p.96.

²⁵⁶⁶ H. Yılmaz, “Giriş: Türkiye’yi Avrupa Haritasına Sokmak”, p.13.

CONCLUSION

The idea of Europe has been in a construction process throughout history. One of the main characteristics of Europe is that it has a dynamic structure and it can adapt itself to changing circumstances. The “other”s of Europe have changed throughout history. There is no fixed understanding of Europe, thus, there is no fixed “other” of Europe. Also the boundaries of Europe have not been fixed throughout history; especially the Eastern boundaries have always been ambiguous.

There had been unification attempts for Europe before the integration process of Europe, but they had failed. The integration process of Europe since the 1950s within the institutional framework of the EC, which transformed to the EU since the 1990s has been affecting the identities of the Member States, the identity of the EU and identities of the citizens of the EU. There has been an ongoing construction process of European political identity during the integration process within the EU, while national and regional identities have been maintained, but Europeanized to different extents. There has been a tendency to identify Europe with the EC since the 1960s which has become more obvious after the Maastricht Treaty, with the transformation of the EC to the EU. The EU has been increasingly seen as equivalent to the geopolitical construct “Europe”. The EU has a unique structure which is beyond an international organisation. It is a “*sui-generis*, multi-layered, flexible and open-ended” entity.²⁵⁶⁷ As Mc Laren argues “...the EU is a construct like no other in the international system.”²⁵⁶⁸ Boundaries of the EU have not been fixed, because of the widening process since the 1970s. In the post-Cold War era, one of the main questions is that where are the end points of Europe? The “other” of the EU was the Soviet Union during the Cold War; it became blurred in the post-Cold War era. Currently, although there is no concrete “other”, especially after September 11, fundamental Islam and terrorism have been discussed as the “other”s of Europe.

The question of “identity” has an increasing importance for social scientists, as well as for the EU policy-makers.²⁵⁶⁹ Since the 1970s the process of European integration has

²⁵⁶⁷ S. Baykal, “Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity, Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey’s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, p. 74.

²⁵⁶⁸ L. M. McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p.1.

²⁵⁶⁹ C. Shore, “Inventing the People’s Europe: Critical Approaches to European Community Cultural Policy”, p.781.

been linked with the question of identity.²⁵⁷⁰ There has been a growing concern with identity politics in Europe, with the effects of the politicization of immigration, regionalism and the revival of the extreme right parties.²⁵⁷¹ Security concerns had the primacy for the EC during the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War era there has been an increasing concern with the question of identity in the EU.

European identity has been under construction process throughout history, as one of the interviewees argued; it may be referred to as an “ever-evolving concept”.²⁵⁷² Since the 1950s it has been under construction process for the first time within the institutional framework which is a unique case in world politics. On the other hand, EU identity among its Member States has been also under construction process. It is obvious that the EU contemporarily has a new and stronger EU identity compared to the EC of the 1950s. If EU identity in the world will become stronger, it will probably lead to construction of a stronger European identity among the peoples of Europe.

European identity refers to citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU, mainly with reference to its institutions, values and the EU citizenship (civic) or it may refer to citizens’ sense of belonging to Europe with reference to common cultural characteristics (cultural). Although cultural references of European identity such as Greek heritage, Christianity and Roman Empire have been effective on construction of Europe and European identity, they can not be main references of European identity in the context of the EU; because all Member States have not passed through all these processes and there are many cultural and religious diversities among them, even within the Member States. The EU policy makers have sometimes used cultural, sometimes civic references during construction process of European identity and sometimes utilitarian measures have been used.

With the acceleration of the political integration process, the question of democratic deficit and legitimacy of the EU have started to be debated much more which are closely related with construction of European identity. Construction of European identity within the EU is also related with constructing the limits and boundaries of the EU and it is also crucial to go on the political integration process.

²⁵⁷⁰ I. B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation*, p.68.

²⁵⁷¹ B. Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe”, p.100.

²⁵⁷² Interview with P. N. Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

Social constructivism is the most appropriate theoretical approach that helps understanding the process of European identity construction. It also helps to understand the dynamics of interactions among different actors within the EU and their effects on identities. Social constructivism focuses on construction of norms and identity shaping effects of the EU. It deals with the construction process of identities and their change through interaction. For social constructivist scholars, the EU institutions have effective roles on socializing and constituting the actors' identities and interests.²⁵⁷³ The institutional framework of the EU provides close and dense interaction atmosphere among the Member States and their citizens which have affected identities of the Member States, the EU elites and the citizens of the EU. According to social constructivism, cooperation for a long period of time within the framework of the EU may have transformed interdependence among its members into a collective "European identity". According to social constructivists, European identity is not given; instead it is a specific construct in time and space whose content changes depending on the social and political context.²⁵⁷⁴ Instead of the outcome, the dynamics of the ongoing construction process of European identity within the EU and effective factors on this process are focused on. Dynamic approach is tried to be used in the thesis, by taking into consideration the simultaneity of construction processes of identities at individual, national and European levels.

The elites of Europe have had an important role in construction of European identity even before the establishment of the EC. The EU may be also considered as a "European elite project". At the elite level, there has been the idea of "reconstruction of Europe" from the beginning of the EC. The founding fathers wanted to establish an "ever closer union of peoples". Risse argues that "we would expect a complex transformation of the EU together with people's identities."²⁵⁷⁵ The construction of European identity is not a linear process which has been only under the control of the elites of the EU. The construction of European identity can not be achieved only by top-down initiatives of the EU elites. Bottom-up initiatives of civil society have been also influential in this process.

Among the institutions of the EU, the Commission which is the main representative of supranational aspirations of the EU has played a key role in the construction of

²⁵⁷³ M. A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration", p.237.

²⁵⁷⁴ T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.171.

²⁵⁷⁵ T. Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?", p.263.

European identity. It initiates legislative process, it is in direct communication with the NGOs, it gives funds to the EU projects and it has many initiatives to increase communication with the citizens. The Commission has made references to both cultural and civic understandings of European identity in different periods of European integration process. The EP is the only institution which is directly elected by its citizens, however turnout rate to the EP elections is very low and it has been declining. If citizens of the EU have stronger civic European identity, there will be more tendency to participate to the EP elections. Although all the political leaders of the Member States do not have a common goal of construction of European identity, some of the initiatives of the Commission, the growing role of the EP in decision making process, the discourses of the political elites about the EU and European identity have been effective on the construction process of European identity within the EU. In addition to these, the ECJ has a crucial role in construction of European identity on civic basis. Interpretation of the treaties by the ECJ in an integrationist way and establishing the principles of “primacy of EU law” and “direct effect” have important effects on construction process of European identity in the EU. Among the institutions of the EU, the Commission has involved the most in construction process of European identity through its initiatives, programmes and projects. On the other hand, the European Council and the Council of Ministers help maintenance of national identities, by providing interaction atmosphere to reach a compromise among different national interests. Thus, there is a balance among the institutions of the EU in terms of construction of European identity and maintenance of national identities which have been under Europeanization process within the framework of the EU.

Working at all of the EU institutions usually influenced the identities of people who are working at those institutions to a certain extent. It mainly depends on the functions of the institution and its position in the EU. Usually the Commission is the most effective one in this respect. Working at the Commission usually increases the level of European identity of the Commission officials. It also depends on their personal background. Some of them have already felt European before working at the Commission which may be one of the factors that was influential on their preference to work at the Commission. If we compare the effects of working at the Commission on identity of the Commission officials and working at the EP on identity of the MEPs, it may be argued that working at both of these institutions have usually increased their level of European identity; but it is more obvious among the Commission officials who work for European interests and do not represent

their country in the Commission. Both the Commission officials and the MEPs have a tendency to have multiple identities. They usually primarily have national or regional identities, then European identity. At the EP, interaction takes place among different political party groups which are composed of the MEPs from different Member States. With the effect of working at the EP, the MEPs usually start to look to different issues from a wider perspective, through European glasses.

The general public usually followed the political elites of the EC at the beginning of the European integration process with the effect of the priority of establishing peace. The EC had a primary role in stabilization of European states and societies. After a process during which peace and stability had gradually been taken for granted by the peoples of Europe, they have not always followed the elites. There is a huge gap between the elites and the general public in terms of level of European identity and support to the EU which are closely related with each other. This gap is one of the main reasons of steadily declining turnout rate of the EP elections and rejection of some of the EU treaties in referendums, such as rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark. All these examples showed the importance of the support of the public opinion to go on the European integration process. The factors such as their level of information about the EU, education level, income level and age are all effective factors on the level of European identity of the general public. In the last years, the EU communication strategy has been developed in order to close the gap between the elites and the general public, but there is still a lot to be done. Utilitarian factors are also effective on the level of support of the citizens to the EU, but their importance has decreased since the establishment of the EC. If European identity will be constructed on a stronger basis, the effects of utilitarian factors on the level of support of the general public to the EU will probably decrease.

Education, cultural and audiovisual policies of the EU are closely related with the construction process of European identity; but they are mostly under the control of the Member States, the EU only has a coordination role and it tries to increase cooperation among the Member States. Although the EU has an increasing role in these fields, they are not so effective on construction of European identity. Among these policies, education policy is the most effective one in terms of construction of European identity. Usually people who are more educated, have a tendency to support the EU more and have a stronger European identity. The main goal of education policy of the EU is “introducing

European dimension into education” which has led to Europeanization of education to a limited extent, but it has faced with resistance from the Member States which are generally so sensitive about their national education systems. The exchange programmes of the EU, such as ERASMUS have an increasing importance which affects construction of European identity through increasing interactions among the students and the professors. There is a high demand for these programmes, thus the funds allocated to them should be increased. To increase interaction among the peoples from different Member States, foreign language learning should be promoted more and to make the interaction process easier within the institutions of the EU, working languages should be officially decided which seems too hard to realize in the medium-term. Although there have been some efforts to develop an audiovisual policy of the EU, the media in Europe including TV, newspapers, etc. are still predominantly national. The main reasons are differences in language and culture which make producing advertisements for the whole Europe too difficult and people usually prefer to watch national or regional TV, or read national newspapers. In film and music industry, although there have been some efforts to support national productions in Europe, the USA is still the dominant actor. It seems that it will be hard to change in the medium-term. On the other hand, in the field of culture, some programmes and projects have been introduced by the EU, in order to increase cultural cooperation among the Member States. However, the national governments are also so sensitive about cultural policy, thus cultural initiatives of the EU affect the construction of European identity to a very limited extent.

Through introduction of symbols such as the European flag and anthem, emotional bonds to the EU have been tried to be constructed. With the introduction of the EU citizenship and the efforts to introduce the Constitutional Treaty, European identity has been tried to be constructed on civic basis. The EU citizenship which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty is dependent on Member State citizenship. Currently there are twenty seven Member States, thus, there are twenty seven ways of obtaining the EU citizenship. The EU citizenship gives some rights but does not include obligations, such as paying taxes or performance of military services. Moreover, the mobile citizens of the EU can benefit from most of the EU citizenship rights. The effects of the EU citizenship on construction of European identity within the EU will be probably much more in the longer term, if rights of the citizens will be extended and some duties will be given to the citizens of the EU. Moreover, if the criteria of being an EU citizen will become independent from being a citizen of a Member state which seems so hard to achieve in the medium-term, it

will affect construction process of European identity on civic basis much more. During discussions on the Constitutional Treaty it was argued that it might lead to “constitutional patriotism”; but its rejection at the referendums in France and Netherlands showed that it is too hard in the context of the EU. Thus, the leaders of the Member States decided to prepare a Reform Treaty, instead of the Constitutional Treaty in June 2007. It was one of the turning points of the construction process of European identity. It was decided that the symbols of the EU will not be mentioned in the Reform Treaty, even the word “constitution” was not used this time which is reminiscent of a state. The main reason of this change is most probably to show the citizens of the EU that the goal of the EU is not to replace nation-states and national identities. The peoples of Europe are mostly against construction of European identity which would replace national identities. Instead of this, people prefer maintaining their national identities while European identity has been in an ongoing construction process. The initiatives of the EU for construction of European identity which are perceived as challenge to national identities are not usually supported by the peoples of Europe. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007 by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States which has been still under ratification process. Thus, longer time is needed to see the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on the construction process of European identity.

European integration process is not a European state-building process, thus the construction of European identity within the EU is not a European nation-building process. The world of the 19th century while nation-building process occurred was much more different than today’s world, while European identity has been under construction process within the EU. Increasing globalisation process, increasing transparency, consolidation of democracies, increasing transportation and communication facilities, especially through internet provides different ways of interactions which have led to different ways of collective identity building. The comparison between construction of European identity and nation-building was made in order to show peculiar characteristics of the construction process of European identity. They are both collective identity formation processes within an institutional framework, but they occurred in different circumstances, within different institutional frameworks, thus they have different characteristics. The EU has been using some similar instruments to those of nation-building, not to build a European nation, but to construct a European identity, in addition to national and regional identities to increase the citizens’ feeling of belonging to the EU, to provide its legitimacy and to maintain the

ongoing integration process. The end point of the European identity construction process within the EU is indefinite, like the end point of the political structure of the EU. The political elites of the EU have different perceptions about the future structure of the EU which is closely related with their perceptions about construction of European identity. It is too hard to construct European identity within the EU, because of the lack of a consensus on the EU's *finalite politique*. There are competing thoughts about the future structure of the EU, thus there is not a consensus on the construction of European identity in the EU. There are two main perceptions about the future structure of the EU; one of them is inward looking EU which may lead to "fortress Europe", the other one is in favour of the EU as a global actor.

Increasing number of citizens of the EU has a European identity, without giving up their national identities. The growth of European identity does not imply simultaneous decrease in national identities. It does not have to be a zero-sum process. If European identity will be constructed mainly on civic basis, it will be more compatible with national identities. According to the Eurobarometer surveys "nation first, Europe second" identification is the general tendency among the peoples of Europe. Construction of European identity as primary identity of the EU citizens is not necessary in the context of the EU. If the EU will become a totally supranational institution one day, then construction of European identity as primary identity of its citizens may be necessary. The "marble cake" model is the most suitable way to analyze identity of the citizens of the EU. "If the historical and cultural understandings of one's national community already contain aspects of Europeanness as an intrinsic component, then loyalty to one's national community would imply some identification with Europe too."²⁵⁷⁶ According to the "marble cake" model, being European might refer to various things to different people. The identity of the Member States have been affected by that Member State's history, political structure, efficiency of its political institutions, location within the EU, the time period, when that state became a member of the EU and the length of its membership.

Turkey was seen as the "other" of Europe in some periods of history. Although it is not so easy to change, as Wendt argues "identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone."²⁵⁷⁷ The other's of Europe have changed throughout history. European

²⁵⁷⁶ T. Risse, "The Euro Between National and European Identity", p.491

²⁵⁷⁷ Quoted in M. Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison", pp.318-335.

identity has been under reconstruction process in the post-Cold War era. The enlargement towards the countries of the CEE in the 1990s was part of the reconstruction process of the EU and European identity. Their memberships were justified on the grounds of construction of the rhetoric “returning Europe” which refers to the idea that they already have a European cultural identity. Their memberships were reflected as returning of old family members. This idea was emphasized by the intellectuals and the politicians of these countries from the CEE and by their supporters in the West.²⁵⁷⁸ These examples show that identities can be reconstructed according to different circumstances.

The interactions between Europe and Turks have been always effective on construction of European identity and Turkish identity. The EU has not been in interaction with Turkey as a monolithic nation-state like entity. The debates on Turkey’s membership in terms of its Europeanness, have been also effective on the construction of European identity. In the case of Turkey’s membership, identity politics have been observed especially since the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, when Turkey was discriminated from the other candidate countries from the CEE. For some of the opponents of Turkey’s membership, even Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and will adopt all the EU acquis one day, Turkey should not be a member, because of not being part of European identity in geographical and cultural terms. The interactions among these two parties have intensified especially since the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 when Turkey was given official candidate status. During the negotiation process of Turkey with the EU, they have been in a closer interaction process, thus they will go on mutually constructing each other’s identities.

In terms of social constructivism, the decisions of the EU about enlargement are highly influenced by collective identities; they usually depend on normative reasons that lead to the construction of the EU as an entity which has a moral and historical duty to welcome European countries who share its values.²⁵⁷⁹ Thus, the EU usually acts on the basis of “logic of appropriateness”, rather than “logic of consequences”. It explains why the countries from the CEE had a priority and had been supported much more during their accession processes to the EU, rather than Turkey. Exclusive negative discourses of the

²⁵⁷⁸ C. Bretherton & J. Vogler , *The EU as a Global Actor*, p. 244.

²⁵⁷⁹ N. Font, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: Interests, Ideas and Path Dependence”, p.3, retrieved on April 17, 2006 on the World Wide Web: http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/2072/4260/1/43_Nuria_Font.pdf

political elites of the EU about Turkey's membership in terms of cultural understanding of European identity have increased the level of Euroscepticism in Turkey.

According to the interviews conducted by the author, there is not a common understanding of European identity among the officials of the Commission and the MEPs. There is a lack of consensus and common references about European identity even among the officials of the Commission and the MEPs. The Commission officials defined it mostly on civic basis, some of the MEPs, especially many Christian Democrats defined European identity on cultural basis, they referred to a common European cultural and historical heritage, they emphasized the impacts of Greek heritage, Roman Empire and Christianity on the construction of European identity. The interviewees did not want to mention any "other" of the EU. Few of them mentioned the USA and China only as competitors of the EU in economic terms. Most of the interviewees argued that it is too hard for the EU to have clear-cut boundaries, but some of them; mostly the Christian Democrats stated that there should be clear-cut boundaries of the EU to prevent the transformation of the EU to the UN. During the interviews, generally pessimism about the future of the EU can be observed, because of the low level of support of the EU citizens to the EU. Moreover, the MEPs and the Commission officials do not have a common goal of construction of European identity within the EU. According to the interviews, both working at the EP and at the Commission affect the identities of people who are working at these institutions which is more obvious in the case of Commission, because of the position of the Commission vis-a-vis other institutions of the EU. Some of the MEPs already have strong European identity and they have not been affected much from working at the EP and some of them have a strong national identity who have not been affected much from working at the EP neither.

Among educational, cultural and audiovisual policies, the interviewees found educational policy the most effective in terms of construction of European identity. Especially the ERASMUS programme is seen as very successful, some of them emphasized that money allocated to it should be increased. Some of them also emphasized the necessity to add a common EU course in the curriculums. Among symbols of the EU, the European flag was frequently mentioned which is widely known among the citizens of the EU, but it does not have an emotional aspect. Euro was also frequently mentioned as a

successful symbol of the EU in practical terms. Most of the interviewees were in favour of introduction of the Constitutional Treaty.

About the case of Turkey's membership, Turkey is usually constructed as a "unique entity", rather than the "other" of the EU. Honesty and openness of the EU towards Turkey is questionable which was even criticized by some of the MEPs. Nearly all of the interviewees found the membership of Turkey as challenging, because of its huge population, regional disparities within Turkey, etc. Some of them also perceive integration of Turkey to the EU as challenging in terms of European identity, especially those who defined European identity on cultural basis. The Commission officials emphasized fulfilling of the Copenhagen Criteria, adoption of the EU *acquis* and some of them criticized Turkey in terms of the negotiation techniques and argued that Turkey sometimes perceives the negotiation process as bargaining. The MEPs are more sceptical about Turkey's membership, in comparison to the Commission officials. Some of the Christian Democrats argued that Turkey is not part of common European cultural, historical and religious heritage, even not part of Europe in geographical terms. Few of them argued that Turkey's membership will increase cultural heterogeneity of the EU which will negatively affect construction of European identity. Most of the interviewees argued that the question of Turkey's membership has to be evaluated according to civic criteria. Some of the MEPs emphasized that the EU has some internal problems like accommodating to the last enlargements towards the CEE, adoption of the Constitutional Treaty and argued that "we are not ready for Turkey's membership." On the other hand, some of the MEPs see the membership of Turkey as a good test case for the EU and argued that it would be one of the most important developments in the history of Europe, if Turkey will be successfully integrated to the EU; because it will show that a country who has a predominantly Muslim population, can adopt the values of the EU. Some of the MEPs who support Turkey's membership, perceive Turkey as a "bridge" between Europe and the Muslim world.

Consequently, European identity has been under construction process throughout history but it has been under construction and reconstruction process for the first time within the institutional framework since the 1950s. The post-national identity construction without replacing national and regional identities within a unique political structure like the EU is the first and unique case in world politics. The institutional framework of the EU provides a highly dense and close interaction atmosphere among the Member States and

the peoples of Europe which have affected the identities of the Member States, the citizens of the EU and the EU identity in the world. Contemporarily, even among the political elites of the EU, there is not a common goal of constructing an “imagined European community” which will replace national identities. European identity has been under construction process within the EU which has been in interaction with national and regional identities that blend into each other. The EU interacts with different national identities and these interactions will not lead to construction of a homogenous generalized one common European identity,²⁵⁸⁰ rather they have led to construction of “Europeanized national identities”.

It is too hard to construct European identity in the context of the EU on cultural basis. The reason may be that there is much cultural diversity even within the Member States, there are religious and ethnic differences and also there is an increasing number of immigrants from outside Europe. The main emphasis of the EU project should be the common peaceful and prosperous future. European identity can be constructed within the EU on the basis of common civic values and as a future oriented identity. The EU may construct a “forward-looking identity”, based on shared commitments to termination of conflicts and continued democratisation of the European continent.²⁵⁸¹ In addition to maintenance of peace and consolidation of democracy, new common goals of the EU have to be found out, such as fight against global warming, terrorism, etc.; because, the past of Europe included many conflicts and long wars among different nations of Europe.

The attitudes of the EU towards Turkey’s membership also affect the construction of European identity within the EU. For integration of Turkey to the EU, European identity has to be constructed within the EU mainly on civic or utilitarian basis, or both of them. If Turkey can be integrated to the EU, this will positively affect construction of European identity on civic basis and realisation of the motto of the EU “united in diversity”; but if European identity will be constructed mainly on cultural basis, Turkey will be probably perceived only as a crucial partner of the EU, rather than a family member. Contemporarily Turkey is not perceived as part of the European family by many citizens of the EU, even by many political elites of the EU which has negatively affected the relations between

²⁵⁸⁰ T. Risse, “The Euro Between National and European Identity”, p.491

²⁵⁸¹ David Beetham & Christopher Lord, “Legitimacy and the EU” in Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich (eds.), *Political Theory and The EU: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship*, London: Routledge Pub., 1998, p.22.

Turkey and the EU and led to differentiation between countries of the CEE and Turkey. Turkey's membership has been usually justified on utilitarian basis, particularly by emphasizing its geostrategic importance and its contributions to security of Europe both by the political elites of the EU and Turkey; but in order to achieve a successful integration of Turkey to the EU, its contributions in terms of construction of European identity and future of the EU also have to be emphasized primarily by Turkish elites, the NGOs, etc. Turkish elites have to construct new discourses and metaphors in order to show possible contributions of Turkey in construction process of European identity. Turkey's membership to the EU is usually perceived as a challenge to European identity which shows that there is still scepticism about the strength of European identity. The interaction process between Turkey and the EU will positively affect construction of European identity within the EU which may decrease exclusivity of European identity. On the other hand, Turkey needs to internalize the values of the EU and has to adopt the infrastructure of the EU.

There is a lack of knowledge and mutual understanding between the EU and Turkey which leads to acting on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes. If during the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, this challenge of widespread stereotypes especially among the peoples of Europe about Turkey can not be overcome and mutual understanding among Turkey and the EU can not be constructed, it will be too hard for Turkey to integrate to the EU, even it will adopt whole EU acquis. Thus, they need time and more interaction at different levels, not only at governmental and elite levels, also at civil society and individual levels, face to face interactions, especially among young people through exchange programmes. Contemporarily, the general tendency of the political elites of the EU is that they prefer Turkey to be closer to the EU, but not inside the EU as a member of the family. Their attitudes and the way of interactions among the EU and Turkey may change after a long period of time, with the effect of close interaction processes at different levels. Also the way of interactions between Turkey and the EU may change after a "critical juncture", such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or September 11 which may lead to reconstruction process of European identity.

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APPENDIX I

The Interviews with the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs):

*Interviews were made at the offices of the MEPs at the EP building in Brussels.

Karin Resetarits (Liberals and Dem.-Austria) on July 10, 2006 at 14.30.

Maria Badia i Cutchet (Socialist-Spain) on July 11, 2006 at 10.00.

Andrew Duff (Liberals and Dem.-UK) on July 11, 2006 at 18.30.

Thomas Wise (Independence Democracy Group-UK) on July 12, 2006 at 10.00.

Manfred Weber (Christian Democrat-Germany) on July 12, 2006 at 11.30.

Said el Khadraoui (Socialist-Belgium) on July 18, 2006 at 15.00.

Christa Prets (Socialist-Austria) on August 29, 2006 at 14.00.

Gerard Deprez (Liberals and Dem.-Belgium) on September 8, 2006 at 11.00.

György Schöpflin (Christ. Dem.-Hungary) on September 20, 2006 at 11.00.

Cem Özdemir (Greens-Germany) on September 20, 2006 at 16.00.

Michel Rocard (Socialist-France) on September 13, 2006 at 09.30.

Konstantinos Hatzidakis (Christ. Dem-Greece) on September 13, 2006 at 16.15.

Emine Bozkurt (Socialist-Netherlands) on September 21, 2006 at 15.00.

Simon Coveney (Christ. Dem.-Ireland) on September 11, 2006 at 11.30.

Ruth Hieronymi (Christ. Dem.-Germany) on September 11, 2006 at 13.30.

Ignasi Guardans (Liberals and Dem.-Spain) on September 12, 2006 at 12.00.

Vural Öger (Socialist-Germany) on September 13, 2006 at 12.30.

Hhynek Fajmon (Christ.Dem.-Czech Rep.) on September 13, 2006 at 14.00.

Alexander Stubb (Christ. Dem.-Finland) on September 18, 2006 at 14.00.

Renate Sommer(Christ. Dem.-Germany) on September 20, 2006 at 12.00.

Yiannos Charalampidis, Consultant of Yiannakis Matsis the MEP of Cyprus, on September 21, 2006 at 12.00.

Piia Noora Kauppi, Christian Democrat MEP of Finland, answers received by e-mail on October 23, 2006.

The Interviews with the Commission Officials:

One Ex-Commission Official from DG Education-France, at Bahçeşehir University, on May 8, 2006 at 17.30.

*The other interviews were made at different Commission buildings in Brussels.

One Commission official from DG Justice Freedom and Security-Spain on July 13, 2006 at 15.00.

One Commission official from DG Enlargement-France on July 13, 2006 at 17.30.

One Commission official from DG Enterprise and Industry-Germany on July 19, 2006 at 15.00.

One member of the Cabinet of Commissioner Jan Figel (DG Education)-Germany on September 5, 2006 at 15.00.

One Commission official from Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency - Greece on September 18, 2006 at 16.00.

Interview with a Professor:

Interview with Gerard Delanty, at Marmara University EU Institute, March 22, 2007, at 16.00.

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How do you define European identity? On which basis should it be defined? On civic (common values and ideals), cultural basis (common European culture) or both of them?
2. Do you think contemporarily there is an “other” of the EU? If so, who is that?
3. Do you think there should be clear-cut boundaries of the EU (especially the Eastern boundaries)?
4. Do you think that European identity has been in a construction process within the EU?
5. Do you think top-down approaches and initiatives of the EU are enough to construct European identity within the EU? What kind of initiatives can be done?
6. What is the importance of the education policy in this process? Does it have a goal of constructing European identity within the EU? Which improvements should be done to increase effectiveness of education policy in this regard?
7. In terms of construction of European identity within the EU, which policies (among education, audiovisual and cultural policies of the EU) and institutions of the EU are more important and effective? Why?
8. Do you think that there will be an imagined European community one day which is complementary to nations of Europe? Do you think European community may replace nations one day?
9. In which fields do you think membership of Turkey is beneficial and in which fields it may have negative impacts on the EU?
10. What do you think about effects of the possible membership of Turkey on the construction of European identity within the EU? Do you think it will have a negative, challenging or contributing effect on European identity construction process? Why?

Personal questions:

11. How do you define your identity? (Only European, primarily European secondary national and regional, primarily national secondary European, only national, only regional, etc.?)
12. For how long have you been working at the Commission/EP? Do you think that your European identity has become stronger since you started working at the Commission/EP?