T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI

SECURTIY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Doktora Tezi

HALİT BURÇ AKA

Danışman: PROF.DR. BERİL DEDEOĞLU

İstanbul, 2009

To my Grandfather Dr. Halit Fikret Aka

PREFACE

Composers make music by using notes, and are successful to the extent that the music they produce is an original interpretation that penetrates into the soul. Contrary to the common belief that a great distance lies between science and art, I believe when one considers the careful 'scoring' that every academician must engage in, their work is really quite similar to composers. I find scientific studies that are original and contribute to the literature are the hallmark of success, and I feel confident this dissertation, being an original study, will contribute to further advancement of the field of international relations. I would also like to mention that any mistakes which may have occurred in the study are mine and mine alone.

Of course this study is not the product of a single-handed effort. It would be nothing without the wonderfully wise guidance of my advisor Prof. Dr. Beril Dedeoğlu. Words are insufficient to express my gratitude. It was only through her incredible mentoring that I was able to develop the academic skills necessary to finish this work. I would like to make it known that the highest honour I will possess in the academic life is the fact that I have been her student.

I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. Ercüment Tezcan, one of the members of the thesis monitoring committee, for the close attention and support he has shown to my thesis and his contribution in helping me finish it. Finally I thank Yrd. Doç. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır for the role he played in ensuring my dissertation was a mature, professional piece of work.

I believe your family is a prerequisite for success in academic studies. I am grateful to my Mother Ayfer Aka, my Father H. Kale Aka, and my brother Tunç Aka. They have not spared their moral and material support. They became sad when I was worried and joyful when I was happy. In turn I want to thank my sister Esin, my niece Zeynep and my nephew Kale for embellishing my life.

And, I owe such great gratitude to my dearest wife Songül Aka and my children A. Burcu and Yiğit, who have made my life complete for the unlimited understanding and love they give.

<div style="text-align: right">H. Burç Aka</div>

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ABBREVITIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APC	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
BND	The Bundesnachrichtendienst
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFC	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EDC	European Defence Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EDSI	European Security and Defence Identity
EDSP	European Security and Defence Policy
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Community
EPoC	European Political Cooperation
ERM	Exchange Rate Mechanism
ERP	European Recovery Program
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FGR	Federal German Republic

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAR	International Authority for Ruhr
IGC	Intergovernmental Conferences
IRA	Irish Republic Army
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KGB	Komitet Gosoedarstvennoj Bezopasnosti
MOSAD	HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim Meyuchadim
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
PSC	Political and Security Community
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
QMV	Quality Majority Voting
R&D	Research and Development
SALT II	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAVAK	Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar
SDECE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to elucidate to what extent the general security understandings which have come to the forefront work in conjunction with the changes which have occurred in the international system since World War II and up to the present; how have these changes influenced the security dimension of European integration. In order to realize this goal, the security understandings dominating the international system since the World War II are explained. Later the security understanding coming forth in the international system is measured in the context of European integration. This study allows both the large picture (the security concept of the international system) and the small picture (the security approach of the European integration) to be compared.

*European Union *International Relations Theory *Security * EU Integration

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, ikinci dünya savaşından günümüze kadar uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen değişimlere bağlı olarak öne çıkan genel güvenlik anlayışlarının, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin güvenlik boyutunu ne ölçüde etkilediğini ortaya koymaktır. Amacı gerçekleştirmek için, öncelikle ikinci dünya savaşından itibaren uluslararası sisteme hakim olan güvenlik anlayışları tespit edilir. Sonrasında, uluslararası sistemde öne çıkan güvenlik anlayışı Avrupa bütünleşmesi bağlamında ölçülür. Kısacası, çalışmada büyük fotoğrafla (uluslararası sistemin güvenlik anlayışı) küçük fotoğraf (Avrupa bütünleşmesinin güvenlik anlayışı) karşılaştırılmıştır.

*Avrupa Birliği, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri, *Güvenlik, * AB Bütünleşmesi

INTRODUCTION

The Gospel according to John starts with the following verse: "In the beginning was the Word."[1] If European integration had a holy book, it would start with: "in the beginning was Security". It is no wonder then that Howorth stated: the story of European integration began with defence."[2] Expanding his definition, one may argue that the story of European integration begins with security.

States involved in European integration attempted to launch several security projects following the inception of their integration with the hope that they could solve their security problems. For example, The Schumann Plan, which led to founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), argued that any war between European countries, particularly France and Germany, becomes unthinkable and materially impossible. The Paris Treaty (1952) not only founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), but also heralded a new security project. "After the establishment of the ECSC in 1952, defence was the next item on the integration."[3] However, the European Defence Community (EDC), which was proposed as one such project, and the European Political Community (EPC), which would have coordinated the operation of the EDC, was not enacted due to the disapproval of the French Parliament.

Charles de Gaulle, the eminent figure of the European Community at the time, had Christian Fouchet proposed a plan that coordinated the member states' foreign and defence policies. Nevertheless, the Fouchet plan was rejected by most of the member states. Based on the Luxembourg Report, European Political Cooperation (EPoC) was established without any formal institutional setting, and

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[1]   **Gospel According to John**, London: Trinitarian Bible Society
[2]   Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge", **Chaillot Paper**, No. 43, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union , 2000, p. 1
[3]   Antonio Missiroli and Gerrard Quille, "European Security in Flux" In Fraser Cameron (Ed.) **The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 114

the EPoC aimed to harmonize their external relations. Actually, "the EU, since the early 1970s, had been attempting to coordinate a common foreign policy – mainly under the guise of EPoC. However, there was no serious attempt among the then EU 12 to coordinate security policy."[4] In the context of European, integration, one could argue that states of European integration distained traditional security projects during 1960s and 1970s.

The Single European Act (SEA) left its seal on integration in the 1980s, at which time the Cold War became severe. Part of the reason for this severity was because the SEA could be seen as a security project; it reordered the balance of power in European integration. Besides, another important development of the era was that EPoC was able to gain its institutional base thanks to the SEA in 1986.

Numerous security problems have also appeared after the end of the Cold War. "All these developments in different ways served to underline the inadequacy of EPoC and the consequent need for a new structure."[5] In this context, "the Political Intergovernmental Conferences in 1990 was charged with transforming EPoC into a foreign policy system capable of meeting the challenges of the post-Cold War period."[6] As a result, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established by the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993 as a second pillar for the common defence. In June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched as a defence entity, and European military and political autonomy became an aspiration widely accepted

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[4] Jolyon Howorth "From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP", In C.Hill and M. Hill (Ed.) **International Relations and the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.180

[5] Brain White, **Understanding European Foreign Policy**, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 95

[6] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, **The European Union as a Global Actor**, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p.178

by European Union (EU) member states as both legitimate and necessary.[7]

In the light of the developments summarized above, it can be seen that the security dimension of European integration has not advanced in a manner that shows real continuity. It is worth debating why those wishing to put in place the EDC in the 1950's have neglected to support a similar project in the 1960's and 1970's, or why the ESDP, which was established at the end of the 1990's, was not put on the agenda in the 1980's.

Literature Review

Looking at the studies tackling the security dimension of European integration, it can be observed that studies centred on the above debate are very limited. Indeed, the studies on the security dimension of the European integration can be easily grouped in three categories.

In the first group, there are studies thematically analyzing the security formations that appeared within the framework of the EU integration, such as the CFSP and the ESDP. For example, Howorth analyzes the motivations lying behind the establishment of the ESDP, the decision-making mechanism of the ESDP, and the relationships formed within the framework of the ESDP.[8] Smith, on the other hand, explained how cooperation among member states was institutionalized within the framework of the CFSP, and also explained the operation of this institutional structure.[9]

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[7]   Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, "The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy" In J. Howorth and J.T.S. Keeler (Ed.) **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 1

[8]   Jolyon Howorth, **Security and Defence Policy In the European Union**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007

[9]   Michael E. Smith, **Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation**, Cambridge and et. al.: Cambridge University Press, 2004

The second group of studies deals with the security of European integration in the context of other thematic issues, such neighbourhood policies, enlargement, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Transatlantic relations.[10] The third group includes studies which consider the EU as a security actor.[11] Among them, the study of Marsh and Mackenstein is worth noting. They examined "the development of integration and of the European community as a security actor in the context of international systemic change"[12] in the first chapter of their book. However, the analysis they have made that assumes the EU as a security actor has many pitfalls.

As a consequence, an important segment of the studies so far conducted have not examined the changes which were observed or the reasoning behind the security dimension of the European integration. On the other hand, those who approach the issue by accepting European integration as a system and not as a security actor contribute in a limited manner to understanding the changes in the security concept of the EU. Furthermore, it is problematical to accept the EU as a security actor because the EU is not a legal entity.

Research Aim and Major Argument

The purpose of this study is to elucidate to what extent the general security understandings which have come to the forefront work in conjunction with the

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[10]   Roland Dannreutherv (Ed.), **European Union Foreign and Security Policy, Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004; Howarth M. Hensel (Ed.), **The United States and Europe: Policy Imperatives in a Globalizing World**, Hants and Burlington: Ashgate, 2002; Frank Schimmelfenning, **The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe**, Cambridge et.al.: Cambridge University Press, 2003, Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke (Ed.) **EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance: A Security Relationship in Flux**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008

[11]   Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein, **The International Relations of the EU**, Essex: Pearson - Longman, 2005; C. Hill and M. Smith (Ed.) **International Relations and the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling, **EU Security Governance**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007

[12]   Marsh and Mackenstein, **op.cit.**, p. 1

changes which have occurred in the international system since World War II and up to the present; how have these changes influenced the security dimension of European integration. In order to realize this goal, the security understanding dominating the international system since the World War II are explained. Later the security understanding coming forth in the international system is measured in the context of European integration.

The main argument of the study is as follows: European integration as a sub system is a passive element of the international system, and the security approach of the international system is affecting the security concept behind European integration. While against this argument lies the objection that the subsystems cannot have characteristic that differ from the upper systems, it can be stated that at present there is nothing available for measuring or verifying these objectives. However, regarding these matters from the standpoint of security, it can easily be said that subsystems such as North America, Middle East and Far East Asia do not carry the characteristics of the system.

The first of the supporting arguments of the study is separated into four sub-periods. Each sub period is divided according to the changes in the characteristics of the international system. The period of 1947 – 1963 is referred to as the first Cold War period and the 'power relations' of the system have been centralized. During the détente period between 1963- 1979, the system is under the influence of 'neo-imperialist' policies. Between 1979 -1989, when Soviet-USA tension created the second Cold War period, the 'capacity distribution' of the international system has a critical importance. In the post Cold War period from 1989 till 2008, 'interdependency' in the international system is the determining factor.

The second supporting argument of the study is during the four historical sub-periods national security, inter – state security, international security, and transnational security concepts have dominated respectively. The study also maps

the evolution of this security. This security concept alignment is also valid for the passive sub-system of European integration.

The third of the supportive arguments, the historical development of the European integration, conforms to the changes in the international system mentioned above. Some consider the European integration being put into practice in the first period of the Cold War as contradictory to the historical development of the international system. Yet the first premise of European integration was to prevent a German military revival. In addition, the most attractive aspect is that it serves the national benefits of the actors of integration. The European institutions which have been founded, within the scope of integration, foresee continual and greater sectoral cooperation. In summary, the historical development of the European integration has advanced in line with systemic change internationally.

The last supportive argument states that the security concept dominating the sub-periods of the international systems did not disappeared in any subsequent period. An example of this is the military threats at play during the détente phase did not decrease, and measures to increase national power during this time were not checked. In each of these distinct periods, new security concepts have been developed and new definitions regarding security have been created.

The Use of Theory

What security is or should be has always been the crux of security studies for international relations scholars. It is because "in principle there is no limit to definitions of security"[13] Whilst thinking of the definition of security, the critical question is: "how one approaches the question of the meaning of security."[14]

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[13]   Jef Huymans, "Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 4. No. 2 (Jun., 1998), p. 230
[14]   **Ibid.**, p. 229

Some argue that security is about "survival,"[15] others assert that it is "being or feeling safe from harm and danger,"[16] while still more contend it is "the threat, use and control of military force."[17] Still others claim that security means "negation of insecurity as it is specifically experienced by individuals and groups in concrete situations."[18] Hence, national security, inter-state security, international security and transnational security and even global security, all of which appeared in the wake of different understandings of the concept of security, "refer to different set of issues and have their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts."[19] It is possible here to state that almost all approaches related to the concept of security include influences stemming from the characteristics of the international system.

To better understand the changes in the international system after World War II, it is necessary to read the era through the lenses of approaches specific to the circumstances of that era. This is because each period in the international system brings about its own rules and changes and concept of security is not an exception.

At this point which concept to adopt according to the selected periods becomes important. In this study the security concept of the Cold War era has been interpreted with classic realism. The reason is because after wars that affect the system, the main motivation of states is focused on maximizing national power. Hence, the period in question was analyzed with classical realism.

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[15]   Barry Buzan, Ole Weæver, and Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1998, p. 21

[16]   Terry Terrif and et.al., **Security Studies Today**, Oxford and Malden: Polity Press, 1999, p. 1

[17]   Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 35, No.2 (Jun., 1991), p. 212

[18]   Richard Falk, **On Human Governance: Toward a New Global Politics**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 146

[19]   Helga Hafterdorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 35, No.1 (Mar., 1991), p. 3

During the détente phase states gave priority to both the financing of their national forces and economic development. The détente experienced after the first phase of the Cold War brought forth an implicit agreement between the two blocks involved. The purpose of this détente was to implement neo-imperialist policies. As a consequence, the security concept which came forth during the détente period can be identified with a structuralist approach.

The second phase of the Cold War started with increased tension between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA). By its very nature, the international system is sensitive to the ability of the large powers to distribute the capacity of their accumulated force. During this period, it can be concluded from the attitude of the Reagan administration that the USA wanted a new arrangement in the distribution of this capacity. As a consequence, the second Cold War phase was analyzed with a neo-realistic approach, which focused on the capacity distribution between large powers.

The end of the Cold War system began the transition to an international order. Two primary characteristics of the system are the increased influence of non-state actors and the intensification of interdependency between the actors. As a consequence, the security concept of pluralism has become a hallmark of this era.

The four approaches selected in the study are known as rational approaches. In turn the constructive and critical approaches have been consciously neglected. For instance, for the post Cold War period, constructivism could have been used instead of pluralism. However, this choice would have caused three main problems for the study: First, none of the theories included in the study are among post positivist theories. If they had been selected, the study would not have had epistemological consistency. Second, these alternative approaches would not have been suitable with the model developed for the study. Third, whether the

post positivist theories are really international relations approaches is a controversial issue.

Research Model

For the sake of scientific consistency in the study, European integration has been accepted as a system. The scientific benefit of this acceptance is its enables the comparison in this study between the two systems. Thus the interaction between the sub-system and the upper-system can be tested. In fact this allows both the large picture (the security concept of the international system) and the small picture (the security approach of the European integration) to be compared. We may thus view the 'forest' and the 'trees' at the same time and compare how the viewpoints of the two are structured.

In the research model the international system has been divided into four historical sub-systems: The first Cold War period, détente, the second Cold War period, and the period after the Cold War. Dividing the historical process into such artificial periods may cause certain objections. However, there is no more consistent way to explain the changes in the international system after World War II.

Both the international systems as well as European integration have been studied in four historical sub periods with four different variables. These variables are respectively: security actor, referent object, threat and means of security. A subject variable must be indicated before being defined so that each of these four variables of each security concept are clearly defined and differentiated from each other.

The security actor is an actor which has the capacity of taking measures to ensure the security of the target against existing or probable threats directed against them. The security actor determines the security actors, and by using or manipulating them when necessary tries to ensure its security. The security actor furthermore determines the definition and content of the threat. During the post Cold War period, with states accepting terror as a threat to security, transnational terror is now listed as a threat on the security agenda. Of course each international relations actor is not a security actor. Although international companies are defined as international relations actors in this study, they have not been designated as security actors.

A referent object is accepted as an object at which a threat is directed or guided. Though the referent object is a concept deriving from constructivist security literature, in this study it is defined as an object open to threat and whose security must be ensured. It cannot be expected than a security actor has the capacity to ensure the security of each referent object. For instance, the neo-imperialist states who were the security actor of the détente period have not provided for the security of third world countries which were referent objects.

In the study, threat has been defined the as risks and dangers that cause insecurity. The tendency to expand is accepted as part of this definition of threat. In addition, in parallel with the traditional definition of threat to the international system, health and environmental issues have also been accepted as threats during the post Cold War period.

In this study, the means of security has been defined as tools that the security actor has recourse to and can use to eliminate a threat or control it. It is not possible to accept tools which do not have the ability to restrict, control or disable the threat as a means of security.

Research Methodology

The study utilized the case study as a strategy of inquiry to explore the security dimension of European integration in the context of a changing international system. As a matter of course the data used for the thesis was obtained from primary sources, such as official documents, speeches, and reports. In addition, books, articles, interviews and other data were used as secondary sources.

It is necessary to clarify two matters regarding sources. As a requirement of the theories used in the study, important sources in the security literature have deliberately not been used. The lack of Ken Booth's "Security and Emancipation", articles of Ole Weaver etc. is not a result of failing to study the literature. This deliberate disregard is a requirement for the study's consistency.

Another important point regarding the use of sources is that the analysis uses sources predominantly published during that period they refer to. For instance, during both the analysis of the security concepts of the second Cold War period of European integration and that of the international system, books, articles, reports, and speeches from that time have been used. Thanks to this method, the security approach of that period was more clearly revealed. Furthermore, by this means certain contradictions were averted. For instance, if Simon Collard-Wexler's article published in 2006, "Integration Under Anarchy: Neo-realism and the European Union," had been used while analysing the security dimension of European integration in the second Cold War period, many mistakes in judgment could have ensued. Because this article takes a historical perspective from 2006, the author perceives the EU as both a hierarchical as well as an anarchic system. In contrast, the predominate viewpoint from 1979 – 1989 was that it was that the European integration was in no manner a hierarchical system. A historical context is invaluable because perceptions of past events are constantly changing. I have focused on looking at how writers at the time the events occurred and how the various states reacted to them.

The study consists of two parts. The first part reveals the general security concept of the international system. These in turn are separated into four historical sub periods. The first chapter of the first part studies the security concept of the first Cold War period. In this period states are both security actors as well as referent objects. This period uses the concepts of objective and subjective threats. The objective threats are those that are directed at the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, and subjective threats are those that are in conflict with the national interests of the states. While defining subjective threats to the states, it must be indicated that an absolute variable such as national interest is utilized. Maximizing power, military alliances, and establishment of foreign intelligence services are means of security which make it possible to control objective and subjective threats.

The second chapter reveals the security concept of the détente period. The security actors in this case are neo-imperialist states. Under the influence of behavioralist studies of the period, the leaders of this time have influenced the security concepts of the states as security actors. However, the influence of the leaders on the security concept of the time is not in contradiction to the general security concept. During this period the referent object is the third world countries, which are faced with a new system of exploitation by neo-imperialist policies. The threat that came forth during this period is the disruption of the economic order. Neo- imperialist states embarked on creating security communities for the continuation of the economic order.

In the third chapter the security concept of the second Cold War period has been studied. In this realm great powers are security actors because large states have the capacity to influence the international system. Each state in the system is a referent object. The threat of the period is the transition of the system

from bipolarity to multipolarity. The security means is the preservation of the bipolar characteristic of the system.

In the last chapter of the first section of this dissertation the security approach of the post Cold War period has been emphasized. The security concept of the period can only be revealed by explicating the increasing interdependency between the state and non-state international actors. In turn, states as security actors must take into account the non-state actors in the arena of international relations. States are again referent objects. Terrors of a transnational nature, such as organized crime syndicates, and issues like environment and health are new threats. Democratization and international institutions are the new security mechanism used to fight these threats.

The second section of this chapter consists of four sub chapters. This part reveals the security dimension of European integration according to the evolution of the general security concept in the international system. The first chapter reflects on the security dimension of European integration during the first Cold War period. In this period six states (France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy) are the security actors. On the other hand, the USA and the UK are the system's supporting security actors. The original six are also referent objects. The revival of the military power of Germany and the Soviet threat are threats defined by the member states. While communism is a subjective threat in the upper system, it is an objective threat to European integration. In addition to NATO and WEU, the institutions of European integration, much the same as in the economic alliance, are security tools which maximize the power of the states taking part in the integration.

In the second chapter the security dimension of European integration in the détente period is discussed. Because the imperialist roots of the states taking part in the integration are security actors, their former colonies become referent objects. The original six see the disruption of the order where neo-imperialist

policies dominate as a threat. As a consequence, after first completing their customs union, a security community is formed after The Hague summit to protect the existing economic order.

In the third chapter, the security approach dominating European integration after the second Cold War period has been studied. Accordingly, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are security actors, and all other states taking part in the integration are referent objects. The participation of the UK in the integration caused multipolarity.. By putting the SEA in place as a security tool, France and West Germany create a bipolar structure between each other.

In the last chapter of this section the security dimension of European integration in the post Cold War era has been analyzed. According to this concept, states are both security actors and referent objects. The scope of international integration creates new security threats, such as transnational terror and organized crime syndicates. Health and environmental issues also come to the forefront. While organizations like Europol and ESDP are security tools that draw attention as security means, the democratization criteria directed to former communist states during the expansion phase is another security tool.

This study is important from two angles. First and foremost it reveals the evolution of security and threat within the context of European integration. These experiences, which are the bi-product of systemic changes internationally, provide a new and original contribution to the literature. Furthermore, the model which is used in the study shall provide an alternative to traditional models for those wanting to analyze the security concept of a state or a system.

1. PART:

SECURITY UNDERSTANDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM SINCE SECOND WORLD WAR

1.1. SECURITY UNDERSTANDING IN THE FIRST COLD WAR, 1947-1963: NATIONAL SECURITY

The security understanding of the first Cold War has been influenced by power politics which is the core focus of classical realism. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze security understanding of that period to seek for answer to the question: How can one explain security of the first Cold War via classical realism?

1.1.1. OVERVIEW OF THE ERA

World War II is still historically the world's bloodiest and most devastating war. In its aftermath, the ensuing treaties that ended the war led directly to a new war with different actors, commonly referred to as 'the Cold War', though a distinction must be made between the Cold War and the Cold War system, which are two different concepts.

> "The former lasted from 1946-47 until about 1963, when the political freeze of East and West relations began to melt. However the structural features of system remained until 1989: the role of superpowers and politico-military blocks, the high peacetime level of military confrontation in Central Europe."[20]

The major reason behind the international system that emerged and was labelled the first Cold War was that the diplomacy which had regulated relations between nations and had sought to limit their use of power had in fact been replaced by power relations.[21] Therefore, the first and most significant characteristic of the first Cold War period was the participant states that followed power-based policies in their relations with one another between 1947 and 1963.

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[20] Pekka Sivoven, "European Security: New, Old and Borrowed", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 27, No.1 (Nov. 1990), p. 385
[21] See Appendix I: Wars and Issues 1945-1961

The second characteristic of that era was the emergence of the USA and the USSR as two superpowers in the arena of world policy. Gathering around these two superpowers during that era, the European states emerging from World War II formed ideological and military cliques that created a strict bi-polar system. None of the Western European States – including the UK- were principle actors in international policy. However, the most notable project serving to bring Western European States into closer relations with each other was without doubt European integration.

Thirdly, it was during this period that ideology was fused to the causes of military conflicts. The USA and the USSR tried to convey their ideologies to the states around them with the aim of creating a sphere of influence in areas they regarded as strategic. For this reason, ideologically-based wars and conflicts such as Korea arose during the Cold War.

The fourth characteristic of the Cold War was the failure of colonialism. After the end of World War II liberation movements around the world began to achieve their goal of independence from their colonial masters. They in turn created Non-Aligned Blocs. Though these blocks did not necessarily work in unison, they provided a counterbalance to the blocs led by the USA and the USSR.

Another feature of the era was the race to acquire traditional armaments and nuclear weapons. The continental USA never felt the destructive effect of war during World War II. However, in parallel with the development of nuclear weapon technology, one may argue that there was no country left in the world which could not be targeted and hit, including the USA, as "the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons has fundamentally altered the relationship

between costs, risks and advantages in the relationships"[22] among states on the stage of world politics.

Finally, when one considers the political history of the world from the Peace of Westphalia until the aftermath of World War II, there is little evidence to dispute the claim that Europe had been the focus of international relations. The great powers affecting world politics all came from Europe and the developments which transformed and modified the system were of European origin. During the first Cold War era, South America, Asia and Africa proved to be areas requiring consideration in international politics as "almost all wars since 1945 have taken place in what we generally call the Third World"[23]. These regions bore witness to the proxy wars behind which lay the fierce military and political competition between the USA and the USSR.[24]

1.1.2. SECURITY ACTOR: SOVEREIGN STATES

The idealist approach had been effective in maintaining order following World War I. The idea of leading the system with an idealist approach was understandable, because World War I had been the most brutal war in history up to that time, let alone the negative military, political and financial losses incurred. The main purpose of the international order anticipated by the idealists was to prevent conflicts caused by the competition between states. Although no one objected to the position of any state as a principal actor in the international system, it was a fundamental principal of the idealists that the leading actors of world politics should be international organizations, which would regulate the diplomacy, cooperation and dialogue between states. The League of Nations derives from this approach. Founded with the aim of preventing devastating wars

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[22]   Kalevi J. Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 286
[23]   **Ibid**., p. 285
[24]   Proxy wars are instigated by a major powers of the system that does not themselves participate. Since the USA and the USSR did not want to fight each other directly, they used proxy wars as a security strategy during the Cold War system.

like World War I from recurring, the League of Nations, working with various states, was among the security mechanisms at work during that post-war era in international relations.[25]

However, as World War II was even more brutal and devastating than the first, a new international system emerged based on a traditional power approach, namely realism. Since the discipline of international relations was considered as the security studies due to a realist approach in the first Cold War, the principal actor of international relations and security was the same: the "State".

According to the ideas behind realism, states are the principal and unitary actors of international politics and are considered as the basic units of analysis. They are supposed to be rational actors since "state strategies are understood as having been decided rationally, after taking costs and benefits of different possible courses of action into account."[26] States also became a single security actor in this period because the aim of states is to attain, to preserve and to enhance their own power to achieve security.

> "…all states claim to be the ultimate authority in resolving conflicts between them…. They are induced to find ways to support this claim by acquiring sufficient material capabilities by their own means or to increase their power alliance with other states."[27]

One of the most explicit examples that illustrate how states were unparalleled security actors during the Cold War is the "Berlin Crisis". Following

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[25]   It should be implied that every non-state actor is not a security actor as well in international relations.

[26]   Colin Elman, "Realism", In M. Griffiths (Ed.) **International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction**, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 13

[27]   Edward A. Kolodziej, **Security and International Relations**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 27

the end of World War II, Germany was occupied by Allied states on the basis of partition such that

> "...the northern part of what would later become West Germany was occupied by British forces, the southern part of future West Germany was controlled by American forces, and the remaining eastern parts of Germany were to be occupied by the Russian army.… The protocol was modified in 1945 to create a small French zone in the very South-Western corner of Germany, which was achieved by reducing the size of the British and American zones of occupation."[28]

However, the occupation of Berlin (which is situated in the east of Germany) on the basis of partition was exceptional. The western sector of the city was occupied by the USA, the UK and France, while the Soviets controlled the eastern sector.

Although the Allied states had agreed on "the foundation of a democratic regime in Germany in Potsdam"[29], there were clear-cut differences of opinion among them as to what a future Germany might look like. The USA, the UK and France took common action regarding the political future of Germany primarily based on stipulations by the USA that Germany have full access to the international system and be involved in the Marshall Plan.

In February, 1948, "to reach a comprehensive German settlement, the USA, the UK, and French representatives, later joined by representatives from the Benelux countries, met in London to decide what to do about Germany."[30] After

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[28]   Stephen Redding and Daniel M. Sturm, "The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German Division and Reunification", **Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper** No. 688 (May, 2005), p. 7. Retrieved May 23, 2007 from http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0688.pdf

[29]   Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918 – 1994 (9ᵗʰ ed.),** Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2001 p.216

[30]   David S. Painter, "German Question and the Cold War", 1995, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, p.2. Retrieved Jan. 6, 2007 from http://userpages.umbc.edu/~simpson/Hist%20725%20Summer%202006/German%20Question%20and%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf

the London Conference, "the Western occupation powers also decided to finalize plans to set up a liberal democratic West German state and to reform the economy of West Germany and West Berlin by means of the introduction of a new currency".[31] Discomforted by these developments, the Soviets tried "to delay the implementation of the London Program by applying pressure to the vulnerable western enclave in Berlin."[32] Seeing that they were not able to attain their intended outcome, the Soviets blockaded the section of Berlin located in their occupation zone, and put a stop to "all highway and railway traffic to and from the western parts of the city."[33] The two million people living in western Berlin as well as the occupation powers controlling the western sector were determined to thwart the Soviet plan. Despite the blockade, the Western powers supplied West Berlin with water, food and other services through the use of an air corridor.

In order to solve the crisis, Western occupation powers initiated "discussions with the Soviets looking toward a diplomatic solution of the crisis.[34] However, the Soviets obstructed the diplomatic communication and a possible solution. "In response to the worsening situation in Berlin, President Truman agreed not just to a massive airlift operation to supply the city, but also to the deployment of three medium bomb groups of B-29 Superfortresses to airbases in England."[35] Since the Soviets did not have the power to resist the advantage of nuclear weaponry held by the USA, they retreated and lifted the blockade.

The Berlin Crisis reinforced the idea that diplomatic initiatives not based on a power policy were meaningless. This security problem was solved not through the intervention of an international organization but by a show of strength on the part of the USA. When one studies the political history of the first Cold

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[31]   Klaus Larres, "International and Security Relations within Europe", In M. Fulbrook (Ed.) **Europe Since 1945**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 202

[32]   Avi Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War", **International Affairs**, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 1983-1984), p. 3

[33]   Sander, **op. cit**., p. 251

[34]   Painter, **op. cit**., p.1

[35]   Ken Young, "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War", **Journal of Contemporary History,** Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), p. 117

War era, there is enough evidence to show that the states themselves cause wars, conflicts and security crises, and that these wars, conflicts and security crises are terminated by the willpower of the states which are the security actors of that period.

One cannot claim that international organizations made notable contributions to the termination of conflicts and wars during the first Cold War era because non-state actors did not have the capacity to establish security during that time. For instance, the United Nations (UN), officially founded to replace the moribund League of Nations on October 24, 1945, was not *the* security actor of the first Cold War era. Though it did intervene in some local conflicts, the UN was serving as a "'forum' where international problems are negotiated" [36] rather than an organization that established security through force of arms. In addition, one could rightly question whether NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), both founded during first Cold War era, had become security actors. It is controversial to label allied organizations founded by states worn-out by the war in this manner. To regard allied organizations themselves as a self-serving alliance which would increase and maintain their own security seems more appropriate.

The development of the power policy and the realist approach also affected the concept of political ethics. The realist approach insisted that states who were security actors (should) make a strict distinction between moral ethics and political ethics. "Political ethics allows some actions that would not be tolerated by private morality".[37] The nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was ethically legitimized in terms of politics because, according to USA experts of the time, if the war had continued there would have had been very heavy losses, greater indeed than those the bombs created. While analayzing the security understanding of the first Cold War, one should not overlook the political ethics of the states who were security actors.

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[36]   Sander, **op. cit**., p. 205
[37]   Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, **Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches**, New York: Anchor Books, 2003, p.77

Therefore for realists, any decision maker acting on behalf of the state is expected to operate in accordance with maxims of political reality, not with moral virtue. As Machiavelli suggested "a prince cannot observe all those things which give a man a reputation for vitue, because in order to maintain his state he is often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion"[38] States are often not concerned with ethics while carrying out their policies and decision-makers, when necessary, may not remain faithful to their promises and pledges made in treaties. These are among the risks which posed a threat to security during first Cold War era.

An example of the political ethics of the realist approach is as follows. After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on July 22, 1941, the allied states decided to help the Soviets. However, as the Germans controlled entry to the North, Baltic, and Aegean Seas, as well as the Balkans, there was only a single point of entry into the Soviet Union left: the Persian Gulf and Northern Iran.[39]

In order to ensure that assistance could be provided, allied troops occupied Iran. Nevertheless**, "**on January 29, 1942 a treaty of alliance was signed by Iran with the USSR and Great Britain, by which the latter parties jointly agreed to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Iran".[40] This principle was specified in article 5 of in the Treaty. According to the article, "Soviet and British soldiers will evacuate Iranian lands within 6 months following the date which marks the end of the war." [41] However,

> "although the Allied forces were bound by treaty to evacuate Iran six months after the conclusion of the World War II, the Russians

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[38]   Niccollo Machievelli, **The Prince** (trans. by. G. Bull), London: Penguin Books, 1995, p. 56

[39]   Fahir Armaoğlu, **20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (12ᵗʰ ed.)**, İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, w.date, p. 424

[40]   Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 263, The Soviet Union Since World War II (May, 1949), p. 184

[41]   Armaoğlu, **op. cit.**, p. 425

had used their presence in Iran to promote communist rebellions which culminated in the establishment of two puppet regimes in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan by the end of 1945."[42]

The USA and the UK were naturally disturbed when the Soviet Union refused to evacuate Iran. Considering that the new international order established after World War II had just been founded, the USA and the UK preferred to adopt a wait-and-see policy rather than immediate confront the Soviets. The mood of these allies changed when a new treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union, agreed upon to reduce tensions between the two states, "gave Russia a 51 percent share in the joint company which was to be established."[43] Choosing to immediately pursue a barbed diplomatic approach, the USA stated that "Iran had the right to restore its sovereign presence in Azerbaijan, and … to ratify or not ratify any oil agreement it had concluded, according to its best interests."[44] By also indicating that war was a possible solution to the problem, the USA forced the Soviet Union to take a step back. The agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union was never ratified.

As can be seen here, the Soviets were in breach of the international agreements and commitments they had made. This was a common characteristic of all the political players during this time as national interests trumped diplomatic obligations States and decision-makers acting on behalf of the states were pragmatic; they were not able to abide by the agreements that had been signed and promises that had been made. These were typical ways of protecting a state's interests during the security environment of the first Cold War.

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[42]   Kuross A. Samii, "Truman against Stalin in Iran: A Tale of Three Messages", **Middle Eastern Studies,** Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1987), pp. 96-97
[43]   George Lenczowski, "United States' Support for Iran's Independence and Integrity, 1945-1959", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 401, America and the Middle East (May, 1972), p. 49
[44]   **Loc. cit.**

1.1.3. REFERENT OBJECT: STATES

According to the real-politic which dominated the first Cold War era, states, which were the basic actors of international relations, were also the referent objects of security. It therefore becomes essential at this point to explain what made a state a referent object during this period.

States are referent objects, compatible with the sense of security they had or lacked during the Cold War era because, according to real politik, the reasons for war and conflict are rooted in human nature. Humans, having a sinful and corrupt nature, are power-seekers because "they possess an animus dominandi, a natural, animal-like instinct"[45]. According to these principals, there are three motives leading to war and conflict: "Competition leads to fighting for gain, diffidence to fighting to keep what has been gained, glory to fighting for reputation".[46] These three elements, which put humans in conflict with each other, are also valid for states. Likewise, states are prone to fight with each other for reasons of competition, diffidence and glory because states are nothing more than institutions formed by human beings. Hence, for realists the state is said to be a referent object. However, it is useful to provide a little more justification for why, and this can be done by looking at the relation between nation and state.

A nation is described as

> "...a set of people with deeply shared fundamental identification. Different factors might constitute the basis of such identification: shared descent (belief in a common kinship or history), shared

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[45]   Kenneth W. Thomson, **Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory**, Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, p. 79
[46]   Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol.44, No.1 (Spring 1990), p. 35

culture, shared geographic space, shared religion, shared language, or shared economic order."[47]

It is the state that assumes responsibility for sustaining and maintaining the shared fundamental identification established by any means and protecting it against another group of people because: "the state is an organizational form which is founded by a set of people living on a certain land with common willpower and agreement and ensures its own security or the security of those dependent on it against internal or external threats."[48] The definition of state obviously indicates that state is a security actor, and implies that it is also a referent object in the security realm.

According to opinion leaders and policy-makers of the Cold War era, states are not only responsible for protecting the land identified with it or the nations living on it against threats, but all states have to take the necessary precautions to get rid of the policy of expansion of the other states.[49]

States are under obligation to perform their security-related duties in and out of their homeland. When compared to domestic security, external security is more difficult because it refers to international relations, which are by nature anarchic. After all, "international relations is conducted in a "state of nature" and thus characterized by anarchy".[50] "States are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities"[51] to provide for their security because there is no restrictive superior authority above that of the hegemonic state whose interests they defend. Anarchy is "significant because it failed to impose constraints, not because [of] imposed behavior".[52] This means that anarchy is an explanatory

[47]   James N. Danzinger, **Understanding the Political World (7ᵗʰ ed.)**, New York: Pearson Longman, 2005, p. 116

[48]   Esat Çam, **Siyaset Bilimine Giriş** (7ᵗʰ ed.), İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000, p. 336

[49]   **Ibid**., p. 358

[50]   Keith L. Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism and American Liberalism", **The Review of Politics**, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 294

[51]   Elman, **op. cit**., p. 12

[52]   Andrew Heywood, **Politics**, New York: Palgrave, 1997, p. 143

element which points to yet another reason why states are seen referent objects in the Cold War era.

Accordingly, "the most significant characteristic of the nation-state system is the relative irresponsibility of one state toward another:"[53] States chart their course driven by their own interests. In this context states become objects of security and need to be protected; they are apt to fight each other for their interests according to the anarchic composition of international relations.

To sum up, since the state is expected to protect the shared fundamental values and interests of the nation living in, it has to perform its security-related duty in an anarchic environment of international relations. In this context, "the primary concern of each state is security from attack against its physical integrity and its interests."[54] Reinow's assessment reminds one that the state is both security actor and referent object. "The key point to note is that when the state is both referent object and the principal provider of security, the state becomes framed by a strong territorial and state-centric concept that defines both threat and the provision of security"[55]

National security is the greatest concept affecting literature about the Cold War era and shows the state as both subject and object. This concept came to the fore because the idea of collective security proved insufficient for the establishment of peace. Struggling through the aftermath of World War II, the politically powerful forces felt they had an obligation to develop a different and new sense of security in a bipolar system, one compatible with realistic international policies. National security is

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[53]   Robert Reinow, **Contemporary International Politics**, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961, p. 12
[54]   **Ibid.**, p. 17
[55]   Barry Buzan, "What is National Security in the Age of Globalisation?", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2008 from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaign/refleks/innspill/sikkerhet/buzan.html?id=493187

> "...about the survival of the state against military threats posed by other states. ...the rhetorical force of 'national security' can be used to justify exceptional measures (use of force, suspension of civil liberties, secrecy, increase of executive powers, extra-legal activity) in a way that other types of security (principally social security) cannot. Note that national security in this sense presupposes a strong state (where government and society enjoy a high degree of consensual integration)."[56]

Although national security "has long been used by politicians as a rhetorical phrase and by military leaders to describe a policy objective,"[57] national security was first the expression of the states' sense of security when protecting their national integrity, sovereignty and national interests during the Cold War era. If we recall how the concept has evolved, it will be easy to understand the difference brought about by national security to a sense of overall international security.

That the phrase national security is a product of the Cold War is due in large part to the USA because

> "in his messages to Congress in December 1945, US President Harry S. Truman asked for the creation of a unified military establishment along with a 'national defence council', and by May 1946 both the US Army and the US Navy were advocating a 'Council of common defence'. Yet, by 1947, 'common defence' had been dropped and replaced with 'national security'."[58]

Breaking away from its narrow, defensive definition, national security gains a broader meaning. National security is not only a formula to protect national integrity and sovereignty, but also a security approach stipulating the protection of national interests.

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[56] **Ibid.**
[57] P.C. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, "The Emerging Field of National Security", **World Politics**, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Oct., 1966), pp. 122-136
[58] Mark Neocleous, "From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sept., 2006), p. 363

"The advance of Soviet influence in Europe and sharpening tension over Germany compelled the United States to begin revising its policy in Europe."[59] This reconsideration is driven by the idea of national security. Even if there were no military threats directly posed by the USSR to USA's national integrity and sovereignty, the USA considered the potential destruction of its interests in Europe within the context of national security. Therefore,

> "America committed herself under the Truman Doctrine (March, 1947) to the economic reconstruction and protection of Greece and Turkey against Communism…. [Besides] to keep the disrupted and discouraged democratic nations of Europe from falling, one by one, into hands of communism or other dictatorial parties, the United States would supply the money and materials necessary to revitalize the European economy."[60]

Once the USA realized that security was beyond the capabilities of national defence, she made no distinction between its national interests in Europe and national security. If the Soviets had somehow dominated Western European States, one would not be able to argue that the USA would then be unchallenged in terms of external security. In short, when the national interests of states are disrupted, this is a problem of national security and the state is referent object.

1.1.4. THREAT: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE ONES

Arnold Wolfers, the most important realist of the era, argued that "security, in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[61] In this sense security involves two meanings in itself. The objective dimension of security denotes concrete threats which may gravitate to core values, including survival,

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[59]   W. Friedman, **An Introduction of World Politics (5th ed.),** London, Melbourne, Toronto; New York: Macmillan and St Martin's Press, 1968, p. 103

[60]   George B. De Huzar and Alfred De Grazia, Jr, **International Relations (2nd ed.)**, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953, pp. 120-121

[61]   Arnold Wolfers, " 'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), p. 485

territorial integrity, and political independence. These fundamental values owned by the states also act in their primary national interests because primary interests "include protection of the nations' physical, political and cultural identity and survival against encroachment from outside."[62]

Defining the actions taken to destroy the fundamental values held by states in the Cold War era is not problematic because survival, protecting territorial integrity and political independence are the least common denominator for all states. Under no circumstances do states make concessions from their primary interests. Indeed, states are "making sacrifices to protect and preserve what to them appear as the minimum national core values, national independence and territorial integrity"[63]. In other words, when these values are targeted by another state, a clear and objective threat is created. This in turn provides justification for the use of force by the state towards the threat. During that era, many wars were fought in order to suppress the demands of colonies for independence. France fought wars in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria during this time to maintain the integrity of the state and its colonies.

Arnold Wolfers also noted that security has a subjective dimension. A subjective dimension is defined as the perception of fears. This may differ from actor to actor and from conjuncture to conjuncture. It is inadequate to asses the threats targeting the states in accordance with their fundamental values, since "survival has only exceptionally been at stake, particularly for major Powers" throughout history, and "if nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states, most of them, most of the time, would not have had to be seriously worried about their security."[64]

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[62]   Hans Morgenthau and Graham Hutton, "The Crisis in the Western Alliance", **Commentary**, Vol. 35, (Mar., 1963), p. 973
[63]   Wolfers, **op. cit.**, p. 489
[64]   **Ibid.**, p. 488

When defining subjective threats during Cold War era, national interest is an independent variable. States determine their agenda in accordance with their national interests. For example, during that era, the USA's interests conflicted with communist expansion. Communist ideology took a place as a threat on the US national security agenda because

> "...the government in Moscow was viewed as a significant threat to the promotion of liberalism and representative democracy which, by virtue of America's own revolutionary heritage and geographical isolations, had come to be regarded in Washington as the chief aims of a righteous foreign policy."[65]

Despite not being included among the values to be protected and maintained primarily by states, ideology was considered a threat and one of the key causes of wars/conflicts during that era. However, one cannot expect ideological threats to enjoy the same level of importance for all states. Since Turkey's bordered the Soviet Union and was a historic enemy, their relationship to the threat of communist ideology was different. Canada borders the USA, but because both share forms of liberal democracy, the threat of communist ideology was minimal to nil.

Historical evidence suggests that states have sometimes made inappropriate predictions about the importance, size and degree of threats targeting them. "Some tend to exaggerate the danger while others underestimate it."[66] When Hitler had come to the power in Germany in 1933, nobody could imagine his invasion of Poland that started World War II. Threats should be clearly identified so as to calculate the actual probability of damage to security and to determine what policies may be implemented for safety. For instance,

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[65] G.R. Berrdige, **International Politics States, Power and Conflict since 1945 (3rd ed.)**, New York and et.al.: Prentice Hall Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997, p. 64
[66] Wolfers, **op. cit.**, p. 485

"vague references to the Communist threat to national security during the Cold War often failed to specify whether they referred to ideological threats, economic threats, military threats or some combination thereof, thus impeding rational debate of the nature and magnitude of the threat."[67]

It is necessary here to further define the identifiability and predictability of threat in the strict bipolar international system. During this era the international system was faced with the potential use of nuclear weapons. Having dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that ended the war in the Pacific theatre, the USA had a monopoly over nuclear power for a short time. However, this absolute advantage was "undermined on August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union conducted its successful test of atomic bomb."[68] Five months after the successful Soviets' attempt to detonate a bomb, the USA began "work to construct what eventually come to be known in popular parlance as the 'hydrogen bomb'. With the end of the USA monopoly over nuclear weapon, the world felt the threat of a nuclear war was even greater because the race for nuclear armament had begun.

The second important event regarding the identifiability and predictability of threat in the strict bipolar international system was the Soviet launch of the world's first satellite, Sputnik I, on October 4th, 1957. "The launching shocked much of the world, not only for its scientific importance, but also because of the implications of this technology for American and Free World security."[69] That technological advances the Soviets achieved alarmed other states because it was difficult to predict how and to what extent their security would be affected by the ensuing space race. In the light of these events, identification

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[67]   David A. Baldwin, "The Concept Of Security", **Review of International Studies**, Vol.23 No.1 (Jan., 1997), p. 13

[68]   William R. Keylor, **A World of Nations International Order Since 1945,** Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 43

[69]   **The Cold War and National Armament**. Retrieved Oct. 10, 2008 from http://www.nps.gov/mimi/historyculture/upload/The%20Missile%20Plains%20Chapter%201.pdf. As William R. Keylor conveys that a Soviet spy "supplied the plans of atomic bomb to Soviet intelligence in New York City."

and/or prediction of threats by states during the Cold War era were important in a ways that no one could ignore.

1.1.5. MEANS OF SECURITY

Maximizing national power, forming alliances and foreign intelligence activities provided states with security during the first Cold War period.

1.1.5.1. National Power

Since states desire power in order to achieve national aims such as security, prosperity and international prestige, they search for ways to gain more power, which means "the ability to move others by the threat or infliction of deprivations."[70] Sustaining their presence was directly proportional to their national power and of critical importance in the context of security, for national power is "the physical, social, economic, cultural, spiritual and scientific powers and the total efficiency of managing and applying these powers in order to reach the national targets and to provide national benefit"[71]

States are expected to trust their national power (self help) while providing their security, because

> "first there is a little room for trust among states because a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed. Second, each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its security. All other states are potential threats, and no international

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[70] Arnold Wolfers, **Discord and Collabouration: Essays on International Politics**, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University, 1962, p. 103

[71] Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Sekreterliği, **Devlet'in Kavram ve Kapsamı**, Ankara: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1990, p. 95

institution is capable of enforcing order or punishing poweful agressors."[72]

If a state wished to establish their security with the power they had accrued during the first Cold War, the state had to maximize their power as much as possible. The maximization of the military power is the top priority among others because

> "...military power is seen as having a wide variety of uses, including demonstrating strength, breaking up threats, instigating or intervening in civil wars, deterring attack, supporting allies, acquiring territory and resources, subjugating foreign populations, acquiring prestige, and peace keeping and peace enforcement, among others. Military power is also seen as the shield, behind which all the other tools of influence can be wielded, such as diplomacy, economic instruments, propaganda and so on."[73]

On the other hand, it is very difficult for states to have the power they desire and to maximize this power. Even to attempt to secure this degree of power carries some risks because "if states depend on power for their existence and achieve their national objectives through the application of power, the management of power is the main problem to be solved in international affairs."[74] Even if states have "plenty of power and were secure in its possession, more power is nevertheless wanted".[75] All these attempts to fulfil a state's ambitions create a "security dilemma' during the management of power.

> "Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the

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[72]   John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War", In S. M. Lynn-Jones, S. E Miller. (Ed.) **The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace**, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 5

[73]   Micheal Sheehan, **International Security: An Analytical Survey**, Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005, p. 13

[74]   Terry Terrif and et.al., **op. cit.**, pp. 62-63

[75]   Waltz, **op. cit.**, p. 35

impact of the powers of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on."[76]

If the security dilemma is not managed properly, then war is inevitable, since "wars are fought to secure, retain, or prevent the foe from acquiring components of power which are deemed decisive for the future balance of fighting capacity."[77]

1.1.5.2. Alliance

"National power must also be supported with alliances and cooperations and it must be habilitated"[78] because the nuclear and space technologies developed during the Cold War era made it difficult for states to get rid of objective threats on their own. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the most concerte examples of this difficulty.

On the other hand, no state, including superpowers, were able to finance its security on its own during the first Cold War. Furthermore, the diversity of subjective threats formed with the variable of national interest limits the states' challenge against these threats on their own. For those reasons, states sealed alliances during Cold War era so as to eliminate their concerns for security. "Alliances are coalitions of states, usually involving formal, long-term commitment,"[79] which propose pooling military power against a state or states outside the alliances. "They are grounded in the belief that through alliances a

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[76]   John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", **World Politics**, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1950), p. 157

[77]   Frederick L. Schuman, **International Politics (6ᵗʰ ed)**, New York, Toronto, London; Tokyo: McGraw-Hill; Kögakusha, 1958, p. 284

[78]   Milli Güvenlik Sekreterliği, **op. cit.**, p. 93

[79]   Paul R. Viotti and Mark Kauppi, **International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy and Identity (3ʳᵈ ed.)**, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001, p. 183

state can increase its own power, either by adding increments from other states or by withholding the power of other states from its competitors"[80]

No single Western European states had the capacity to challenge the Soviet threat on its own. The anxiety among Western European states brought about by the Soviet's overthrow on Czech government in 1947 convinced a few European states to form the Brussels Pact with the aim of creating a common defence.[81] However, it is clear that the Brussels Pact proved insufficient for preventing Soviet expansion. According to Kissinger, this insufficiency led directly to the creation of NATO via the Washington Treaty of April 1949. This treaty, which was the foundation for NATO and created to defend the interests of Western Europe,[82] included the United States and Canada. NATO was "a traditional alliance agreement in which the 12 NATO Allies promised to take adequate measures in the event of attack against any member by an external enemy."[83]

Another important military alliance of the era is Warsaw pact. The establishment of NATO and the fact that West Germany became a member of on May 6 1955 was considered a threat to the socialist block by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. In reaction, the Soviet Union urged Eastern European socialist states to create a deterrent military alliance. Eight east block states[84] held a conference in Warsaw on May 11, 1955. These participant states reached a consensus that "the ratification of the Paris agreement means that a new military group, the Western European Union, in which a remilitarized West Germany would participate, increased the danger of war and created a threat to their

[80]   Charles O. Lerche Jr. and Abdul A. Said, **Concepts of International Politics (2nd ed.)**, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972, p. 118
[81]   Henry Kissinger, **Diplomacy**, New York: Simon & Schuster's, 1994, p. 458
[82]   **Ibid.**
[83]   Helga Haftendorn, "Germany's accession to NATO: 50 years on", **NATO Review,** Vol.2 (Summer, 2005). Retrieved Sept. 1, 2008 from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/contents.html
[84]   Albania, Bulgaria, Chezchoslovakia, the German Democratik Republic, Hungary, Polland, Romania and the U.S.S.R.

national security."[85] In response, all participant states concluded the meeting by signing the Warsaw Treaty Organization on May 14, 1955, to ensure for their mutual defence from aggressors.

1.1.5.3. Intelligence Service

Besides the states' attempt to seal alliances and increase their power, we need to mention another means of security during that era: the Intelligence Services. States used "spying to try to uncover the secret of potential enemies."[86] As the states tried to predict the size of threats directed towards them, the importance of intelligence services during the Cold War era increased because "services which perform intelligence and assessment tasks transfer their results to decision-makers."[87] In this way, the states acquire invaluable data for predicting the threats directed towards them.

That the intelligence service of a state is able to intervene in another state's affairs through secret and destructive actions is a protective function which can reduce the feeling of a threat to the state that initiates the actions. For instance, the Soviets' made concerted efforts "to enable the communist parties to seize power in Eastern Europe following the World War II…. USA's activities carried out in order to overturn Musaddak government in Iran in 1953 and Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954"[88] were typical of work by the USA intelligence services. In this manner both states laid a foundation for the defence of their national interests through the creation of intelligence services. The point was to prevent what many believed were existential threats to their country.

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[85]   "Warsaw Collective Security Pact", **International Organization**, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1955), p. 445

[86]   Sheehan, **op. cit.**, p. 10

[87]   Feridun Ergin, **Uluslararası Politika Stratejileri**, İstanbul: İstanbul İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları, w.date, p. 48

[88]   Faruk Sönmezoğlu, **Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi (2ⁿᵈ ed)**, İstanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 1995, p. 415

In essence, intelligence services were not a new means of security, but rather had become institutionalized the during Cold War era. As an extension of this institutionalization, intelligence services were primary a means of sate security during Cold War era.

Table 1
Some Intelligence Service Established during the Cold War

Intelligence Service	Establishment Year
SDECE (France)	1946
CIA (U.S.A)	1947
MOSAD (Israel)	1947
KGB (U.S.S.R.)	1954
BND (FRG)	1956
SAVAK. (Iran)	1957

1.1.6. EVALUATION

It can be argued that the characteristics of the international system which came into view following World War II are in harmony with a realist political approach. It is inevitable that notions regarding the discipline of international relations will be discussed in parallel with this approach. It is quite natural that the concept of security has been affected by the political approach of this era.

The primary security actor was the state during the Cold War era. It is therefore no surprise that the strict state-centred approaches taken to international relations affected security operations. It would not be misleading to argue that states both caused the security problems of the era and contributing to the solutions. When one studies the political events of the era individually, it can be observed that states were the security actors in almost all of them.

The fact that states were a referent object is an extension of the prevailing perception of the era. During this era, it was believed that the state that should protect itself from threats as the existing international organizations dedicated to keeping peace had been ineffective. In turn this is why national security became the dominant idea at this time.

For all states, their survival, territorial integrity and political independence are objective values to be protected. The sense of threat in the era was a response to the desire to protect these values. In this era, there were also subjective threats coming into view in parallel with the variable national interest. Therefore, the desire of state security of a state moved beyond the boundaries of the state itself. The idea of defence gave way to the concept of national interest. We should note here that the capacities of states to identify threats- whether they are objective or subjective- was vitally important.

When this era is analyzed, the attempt by the involved states to increase their power, especially in military terms, can be easily deduced. The monopolisation of nuclear weapons by the USA ensured its security but was regarded as a threat on the part of Soviet Union, which in turn caused it to focus on nuclear weapon technology. The end result was a nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. It was also during this period that states sealed alliances to maintain their security. To establish their security the states counted on their intelligence services to intercept potential threats and generally work towards their national interests.

1.2. SECURITY IN THE AGE OF DÉTENTE, 1963 – 1979:

INTER-STATE SECURITY

In the first Cold War period, the détente observed in the international system brought about a new security perception. The aim of this chapter is to investigate this security perception.

1.2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE ERA

The détente era is characterized by negotiations and compromises in the international system. Contrary to the first cold war period, this period represents "an attempt by both superpowers to manage their relations with each other within a framework of negotiation and agreement."[89] However, it is incorrect to characterize the détente era as the only time in which the tensions in American-Soviet relations were low.

Détente was also an era in which diplomatic relations between the Western and Eastern European states were high. Détente in Europe resulted in a "series of comprehensive agreements that ranged from such 'traditional' security issues as respect for the post-war borders of Europe, to increased economic and cultural links, as well as such 'intangibles' as personnel and human security."[90]

Nineteen sixty-three is considered the starting point for détente. A few years before the superpowers were on the verge of a nuclear war because of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both quickly recognized that a nuclear war gave rise to total

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[89]   Len Scott, "International History, 1945 – 1990", In J. Baylis and S. Smith (Ed.) **The Globalization of World Politics (3rd ed.)**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 101

[90]   Antony Best and et.al., **International History of the Twentieth Century**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.266

destruction of both sides and "peaceful coexistence was the only reasonable strategy in the atomic age and that alternatives to the arms race must be found."[91] As a first step, the USA and the Soviet Union agreed in 1963 to establish a 'hot line' enabling direct communication between them with a view to reducing the risk of nuclear war. This can be considered the keystone in the foundations of the détente era. 1979 was the year détente collapsed. There were two primary causes. By refusing "to sign SALT II to limit strategic nuclear weapons, the USA ushered in the dangerous decade of 1980s."[92] In addition, the occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR in this same year also created profound tension between both the superpowers and their respective allies in the East and West Blocks.

The first of the major confrontations that killed détente was part of a long line of negotiations by the two superpowers in an attempt to get the nuclear armaments race under control. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, the US, USSR and the UK "did agree the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)". This prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater."[93] The states that signed the treaty pledged to only conduct nuclear test underground. This treaty, which truly signalled a new era of cooperation, was one of the first and most important moments of the détente era. It paved the way for the negotiation and signing of many bilateral or multilateral treaties[94] designed to prevent a possible nuclear war.

Moreover, the détente era brought concrete consequences not only through military, but also through political, economic and cultural agreements. Such agreements, by increasing the communications between states, contributed to the establishment of regional security groups. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

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[91]   Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary and, Patricia O'Brien, **Civilization in the West Volume II: Since 1555 (2nd ed.)**, New York: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 929
[92]   **Ibid.**, 953
[93]   Darryl Howlett, "Nuclear Proliferation", In J. Baylis and S. Smith (Ed.). **The Globalization of World Politics (3rd ed.)**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 512
[94]   See Appendix II: Major Arms Control Agreements

Singapore, and Thailand in 1967 "with the objective of furthering economic and social cooperation in the region and providing a measure of collective security from outside interference"[95] CSCE was another important example. CSCE, the final product of Helsinki Accords in 1975, was signed by thirty-five countries, including the USA and Canada and all the European states with the exception of Albania.

Mehmet Gönlübol argues that "the development and imbalance problems between the North and the South… were first echoed in the détente era."[96] Support for this idea comes from the structuralists. Structuralist theory sees international politics as "an extension of an economic system which is structured at a global level, and which is more important than the political relations between states."[97] This method questions the uneven economic gap between world states and focuses on the "structural means of exploitation, in which class dominates another, or rich Northern states at the centre of the core of the global economy dominate poorer Southern states on the periphery."[98]

Another remarkable feature of the era was the loosening of the bi-polar in-block structures. "Centrifugal tendencies within both blocks presented new challenges to Soviet and American leadership."[99] The People's Republic of China became a power to be reckoned with after her first nuclear test in 1964, and a compelling alternative to the Soviets as a leader of communism. Similarly France, which performed its first nuclear weapon test in 1960, refused to join PTBT, which she considered "a way for the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets to maintain their nuclear superiority." [100] This was a clear sign of cleavage within the Western

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[95] Jeremy Rıfkın, **The European Dream**, New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher / Penguin, 2005, p. 360

[96] Mehmet Gönlübol, **Uluslararası İlişkiler: İlkeler, Kavramlar, Kurumlar (5ᵗʰ ed.)**, Ankara: Siyasal Kitapevi, 2000, p. 58

[97] Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, **Kabileden Küreselleşmeye Uluslararası İlişkiler Düşüncesi**, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998, p. 200

[98] Theodore H. Cohn, **Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice (2ⁿᵈ ed.)**, New York: Longman, 2002, p. 119

[99] Best, **op. cit.**, p. 266

[100] Gönlübol, **op. cit.**, 468

Block. [101] These developments affected the absolute superiority of super powers within their blocks and triggered the loosening of the bipolar system.

The emergence of the Third World Block showed the formal erosion of the firm bipolar system. Although the Bandung Conference, a meeting of primarily post-colonial states in 1955, had first marked the existence of the third world, it was the meeting of 25 non-aligned countries in 1961 in Cairo that underpinned the existence of the Third World Block. At this meeting these states agreed that "they should form a pressure group that would focus attention on political problems, such as lowering Cold War tensions, opposing colonialism and apartheid, and that they should lobby on economic development issues."[102] Third World countries would now be an actor to be reckoned with in international politics, even though they did not form a unified bloc like the Western or Eastern blocks. Moreover, the substantial effect of the emergence of the Third World was the continuation of the inter-block rivalry through the Third World.

It can be concluded that personal understandings between the leaders of countries were dominant during the détente era. For example, Khrushchev in 1958 "assumed the both positions of general secretary of the party and prime ministry by unseating Bulganin. As a result, Soviet foreign policy exclusively reflected the personal ideas of Khrushchev until his resignation in the end of 1964." [103] The personal leadership of such oversized figures as De Gaulle, Kennedy, Nixon, Khrushchev, Mao and Tito. The understanding that grew between them played important roles in determining their countries' foreign and security policies.

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[101] "France was a founding member of the alliance in 1949 but it left the military structure in 1966 amid frictions with the United States. France has continued to contribute his troops to NATO missions and to participate in NATO's political bodies. … That decision meant no French Forces could be under permanent allied command and that France would have no participation in defence planning. In 1995, France rejoined NATO's military committee, which advices NATO's political authorities on military policy and strategy and provides guidance on military matters to NATO's strategic commanders." –"France Rejoined NATO command", **CNN.com/Europe**. Retrieved Aug. 1, 2008 from http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/06/17/france.nato/index.html

[102] Best, **op. cit.**, p.315

[103] Sander, **op. cit.**, p. 488

When compared to the first Cold War era; détente existed in a time when the tension in the international system was low and interstate communication had increased. Just as importantly, economic and social matters -along with military and political issues- achieved a new level of prominence. None of this would have been possible without the foundation of understanding that had been built between the critical leaders of this time. Their summit meetings were the apex of decisions that then guided world politics. Détente was an era in which these new approaches, along with the classical approaches, had a dramatic impact on the field of security.

1.2.2. SECURITY ACTOR

Whereas the first Cold War era was based on power relations, the expectations of the state as a security actor were different during the détente era. In terms of structural theory, the state as a security actor directly depends on whether the state is considered an imperialist state or not. On the other hand, the personal understandings and practices of state leaders regarding governance in the détente era played effective role in the maintenance of national and international security. The state therefore is no longer the sole security actor but the primary one. One place to look at for the new concepts about what a security actor was during the détente era is in the area of capitalist states and their leaders.

1.2.2.1. Neo-Imperialist States

As has been established previously, states during the Cold War era played their roles based on power relations. In the détente era the state's position as the security actor is not contested, but new interpretations about this position emerged. The most important one came from the structuralists. [104] They

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[104]   Structuralist's interpretation of international politics is mainly based on the works of Karl Marx and Lenin.

understood "the world system primarily in economic terms: as capitalist in nature and composed of two major classes or regions, centre and periphery. These are separated by a gap in wealth."[105] The structuralists also maintain that "the essential feature of the world system is its exploitative nature."[106] As a result of these basic premises, they focused on the economic problems, particularly structural obstacles to the development in the Third World.[107]

According to the structuralists and in opposition to the realists, all states are not necessarily considered security actors in the international system, but all imperialist states are, because only imperialist states are able to conduct the international system in accordance with their economic interests. Likewise, the security of international system has been determined by imperialist states.

It should be pointed out that the consideration of only capitalist states as imperialist states would be a limited approach. Those states who adopted socialist economic system can also be considered imperialist states.

> "Economic dependencies are nominally independent states whose major economic activities are heavily under the control or influence of a great power, while satellite states are nominally independent states whose political life and foreign policies are in varying degrees under the control of direct influence of a more powerful states."[108]

According to Karl Marx, who inspired the structuralists, the imperialist international system and the capitalist states that lean on this system should have dissolved because, according to his theory of dialectical materialism, capitalism would develop internal weaknesses which would "contribute to the …eventual collapse of capitalist system."[109] In this manner capitalism would eventually be

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[105]   Torbjorn L. Knutsen, **A History of International Relations**, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 236

[106]   **Loc. cit.**

[107]   The economically less developed or undeveloped states of Asia, Africa and Latin America are named Third World states

[108]   Lerche and Said, **op. cit**, p. 148

[109]   Cohn, **op. cit.**, p. 120

displaced by socialism. "When the working class [becomes] armed with a revolutionary ideology that fostered its class consciousness, it would overturn the existing social order and establish one that would pursue human goals."[110] Nevertheless, Marx had envisaged that the capitalist system would not decay. "Capitalist societies were faced with three basic interrelated problems: overproduction, underconsumption by workers and other classes, and oversavings by the capitalists."[111] These three structural problems might well unbalance the capitalist system. However, in order to break the vicious circle these problems create, capitalists decide to invest their surplus capital abroad to gain more profits. This process is called imperialism, "the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to market or use goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home."[112]

For Lenin, "imperialism explained why Marx's prediction of proletarian revolution in Europe had failed to come about. Economic contradictions inherit in the capitalist mode of production still existed, but imperialism allowed the capitalist breathing space."[113] In *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* Lenin argued that imperialism was not a new phenomenon. It emerged "as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general."[114] Lenin believed that World War I was not created by power politics, but was "brought on by the clash of the two most powerful groups of multimillionaires, Anglo-French and German, for the redivision of the world."[115] Lenin argued that the security atmosphere of the world is shaped

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[110] Vander James W. Zanden, **Sociology the Core**, New York: McGraw Hill- Inc, 1993, p. 11

[111] Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and Globalism (2nd ed.)**, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 452

[112] John. A. Hobson **Imperialism: A Study**, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965, p. 85

[113] Viotti and Kauppi, **op. cit.**, p. 454

[114] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, **Imperialism, The High Stages of Capitalism**, 1917. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2004 from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/index.htm

[115] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, **Revolution At The Gates: A Selection Writings from February to October 1917** (trans. by. Slavoj Zizek), London and New York: Verso, 2002, p. 50

through wars which result from the rivalry between imperialist states. According to him, the security actors are imperialist states, and these imperialist states are in conflict with each other.

Though Lenin inspired the structuralists, the approach they developed during the détente era brought new ideas that differed from Marxist-Leninist ideology. The structural school conceived "of the capitalist state system as fundamentally non-competitive."[116] For proponents of the dependency school, the pattern of capitalism, as Lenin had argued it, had changed. Competition between imperialist states that lead to wars had been superseded by cooperation against undeveloped countries. In this context, one may argue that imperialist states[117] established a neo-imperialist system by compromising between themselves. According to structuralists, the imperial states had learned important lessons from the world wars and the Cold war: Communism or Capitalism had become less important that the world-wide hegemony they established and divided among themselves.

The structural approach thus eliminates the possibility of the Third World states taking a role as security actors. There were good reasons the structuralists took this view. Despite the desire of African and Asian states who gained their independences in the second half of 1950s to become a new focal point in the world politics in the age of détente, they were not able to become influential actors. The Third World as a competitive block remained a dream rather than a reality. No wonder the convergence between the two blocks was seen by Third World countries as nothing but a compromise by the imperial powers created for their own gain.

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[116] Charles Reynolds, **Mode of Imperialism**, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1991, p. 81
[117] Sisir Gupta, "The Third World and the Great Powers", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Protagonists, Power, and the Third World: Essays on the Changing International System, Vol. 386, No.1 (Nov., 1969), p. 55 -56

1.2.2.2. State Leaders

It can be argued that in the détente era the personal understandings of state leaders played important roles in governance and the maintenance of security. In the first Cold War era the prevalent viewpoint, especially among realists, was that decision-makers are postulated to be rational. However, it was observed that decision-makers deviate from rationality because of the differences between them, such as their psychological attributes, life experiences, ideological positions and so forth. It is evident that the leaders who had personal charisma played prominent roles in determining the security environment in the détente era.

Khrushchev was certainly one of the most prominent of these charismatic leaders. Beginning in 1959 he brought change to the security politics of the Soviet Union. "Some of Khrushchev's doctrinal contributions are explicitly and forthrightly proclaimed departures from past principles"[118] such as inevitability of war and capitalist enrichment because, for Khrushchev, "the Soviet Union and its associates are so powerful that whether or not capitalist world recognizes the inevitability of its demise, it still will not dare to risk war."[119] The real question is why did Khrushchev believe this?

First and foremost he believed that the Soviet Union's army and military capacity dominated the globe. After all, the Soviet Union had caught up with the USA in terms of nuclear technologies and surpassed the USA in the space race by launching Sputnik. For another thing, during the second half of the 1950s, the Soviet economy had rapidly grown. Allen Dulles, director of CIA at the time, warned that "the gap between the United States and Soviet economies by 1970 will be "dangerously" narrowed unless the American industrial growth rate is

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[118]   Paul Marantz, "Prelude to Detente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), p. 510
[119]   Joseph G. Whelan, "Khrushchev and the Balance of World Power", **The Review of Politics**, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr., 1961), p. 136

"substantially" increased from its present pace."[120] Besides, when Khrushchev evaluated the communist regimes which had been established after World War II, he could see the expansion of the power of both the Soviet Union and communism had been successful. For Khrushchev, Soviet foreign policy was conditioned by a belief, 1) that the era of 'capitalist encirclement' had come to an end; 2) that Soviet supremacy was undeniable; and 3) that the balance of forces in the world had shifted decisively, and thus irrevocably, in favour of 'the socialist camp.'

As a result of the "unimpeded progress of the march of communism"[121], Khrushchev suggested a peaceful coexistence policy. He argued that "recent changes in world politics were so great that it might be possible, even while capitalism still existed, to create a stable international order which precluded the possibility of a new world war."[122] It is clear that the Soviets, who were one of two super power of that time, adopted a new security policy as a result of the Khrushchev's personal perceptions and understanding of governance. Khrushchev is a striking example for the leaders who were started to be considered security actors.

In the détente era, the leaders of not only the big states but also the relatively small states were influential in determination their countries' security politics. Nicolae Ceausescu, the new leader of Romania in 1965, became an important security actor for his country. After Ceausescu came into power, the security policies of Romania started to change dramatically. Mingst summarizes the security politics of Romania which changed after Ceausescu as follows:

> "Romania's security policy became more independent of the Soviet Union, often in defiance of that larger and more powerful neighbour. Much to the Soviets' disdain, Romania maintained diplomatic relations with Israel following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. That the same year, Romania established diplomatic relations

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[120]   **Ibid.,** p. 140
[121]   **Ibid.,** p. 151
[122]   Marantz, **op. cit**. p.511

with West Germany before Soviet Union agreed to reconciliation with the West. Ceausescu strongly denounced the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and soon thereafter the strengthen ties to another maverick Eastern European state, Yugoslavia."[123]

Using leaders such as Ceausescu as a model, leaders of other countries that had been in monolithic, block-like formation changed their countries' hitherto existing security policy preferences. Policies once based on the hard core security concerns of a state were softened, and interstate communication channels between erstwhile enemies increased. State leaders became security actors of considerable importance, creating the security climate of détente.

1.2.3. REFERENT OBJECT: THIRD WORLD STATES

In the first Cold War era, each state was both a security actor and a referent object. This understanding prevailed in the détente era. However, there was an alternative to the definition of referent object in the détente era. While structuralists included only the imperialist states in their category of security actors, the Third World countries exploited by the former were placed in the referent object category.

The concept of the Third World, a product of the Cold War era, was "originally coined by the French economist Alfred Sauvy in the 1950s. It referred to the underdeveloped world and gained widespread popularity during the Cold War."[124] The common denominator of the Third World state was that they belonged neither to the Eastern Block under the influence of Soviet Union nor the Western Block under the influence of the USA.

Third world states were referred to as referent objects in the security realm of détente because of the huge economic gap that existed between

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[123]   Karen Mingst, **Essentials of International Relations (2nd ed.)**, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001, p.132

[124]   Karin M. Fierke, **Critical Approaches to International Security**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p.38

developed and undeveloped countries. A school of thought therefore emerged to analyze the structural obstacles blocking the development of the Third World countries, using a framework of centre/periphery; north/south relations. The world system theory of Wallerstein is also notable. For him, a world system based on capitalism involves a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery. As a result,

> "there emerges an international economic division of labour consisting of a central core of powerful, industrially advanced states; a periphery made up of weak states, kept on a level of technological underdevelopment and subordinated to the status of provider of raw materials for the core; and a semiperiphery of states, the economic activities of which are a mixture in between those of core and periphery."[125]

The economic development of the periphery is obstructed and the development of semi-periphery is restricted so that capitalist economic relations can be maintained in the interests of the imperialist states. For example, the natural and energy resources of the Third World countries served to advance the affluence of capitalist states instead of assisting the Third World states' economic development. Wallerstein stated that "capitalism involves not only appropriation of the surplus value by an owner from a labourer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole economy by core areas."[126] The periphery states becomes referent objects because the world economic system, which serves to the interests of the centre, produces uneven and unjust economic welfare which is disadvantageous to the periphery.

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[125]   James E Dougherty, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, **Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (4ᵗʰ ed.)**, New York: Longman, 1997, p. 247
[126]   Immanuel Wallerstein, **The Capitalist World-Economy**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 18 - 19

Table 2
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980, current prices

Country Group Name	Units	Scale	1980
World	US dollars	Billions	11,805.344
Advanced Economies	US dollars	Billions	8,152.126
Emerging and developing economies	US dollars	Billions	3,653.218

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008

Lerche and Said summarized the economic imbalance in the world with following data:

> "While the industrial state constitutes about 28.4 per cent of world population, they enjoy about 83 per cent of its annual GNP… In many less developed states, the average annual per capita income is $184, compared to $3.775 in the United States."[127]

Likewise, at the beginning of the second Cold War era, 70% of the world production was provided by the developed states. This is a clear indication of the economic welfare imbalance in the world. The world economic system, according to Wallerstein, is based on the exploitation of the periphery, and it is clear that the security of Third World countries was prone to being threatened. Within the political borders of the Third World countries, whose economic development is obstructed and whose resources are exploited by the centre, the political, economic and social domestic threats, such as famine, poverty, racism and terror were as important as threats from an international source. In this context one may argue that "insecurity is also function of ongoing exploitation by foreign powers."[128] Substitute 'imperialist states' for 'foreign powers' and the insecurity that is spoken of in the above passage remains the same.

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[127]   Lerche and Said, **op. cit.**, p. 256 - 257
[128]   Fierke, **op. cit.**, p. 39

The uneven distribution of the international economic system was not the sole reason for Third World countries' being considered referent objects. The superpowers, which exerted primary control over the international system, encouraged conflicts on the periphery, rendering the Third World states referent objects for the sake of the balance of power in the centre. "To protect themselves from direct confrontation with each other, [the superpowers] interfere in the civil wars of others, an opposite sides and with an intensity that frequently belies their declared interest in avoiding general world war" [129] The reasons these conflicts in the Third World were encouraged may be summarized as follows:

> "These conflicts (a) keep the arms industry of the developed world in business, pay for substantial proportion of R&D investments, and help recycle petrodollars into developed economies; (b) provide convenient testing grounds for new weapons systems which can than be improved upon in the light of combat experience; (c) provide a relatively safe instrument for testing the limits of adversary's tolerance and a rough and ready measure of its 'will' to resist political and military encroachments; (d) provide opportunities for 'linkage' between issues, thereby allowing a superpower which finds itself in a disadvantageous position in one context to choose another point, where it is more favourable placed, to put pressure on its adversary; (e) provide the superpowers with the opportunity to demonstrate their 'credibility' to those allies (in Europe and the Pacific) which are considered vital to superpowers' own security: and (f) provide one way of ensuring access to strategic raw materials, such as oil and minerals, which are considered essential for the security of the superpowers and their vital allies."[130]

In sum, in the age of détente the security of the Third World countries was under threat because the international system was based on imperialist relations. However, contrary to the Lenin's argument, the imperialist states were exploiting their former colonies by compromising instead of fighting with each other.

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[129]   Robert L. Lenner, Standish Meacham, and Edward McNall Burns, **Western Civilizations (11th ed.)**, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1998, p. 1070
[130]   Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?", **International Affairs**, Vol. 60, No.1 (Winter 1983 -1984), p. 48

1.2.4.   THREAT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The activities which endanger a state's existence, political independence, territorial integrity and national interests were considered a threat in the détente era. These threats, elucidated by realist school, were touched on in the previous section. In this part the new threats which emerged in parallel with the structuralists' definition of threat will be discussed.

Lenin argued that wars were the natural birthright of the imperialist international system as "once the developing markets have been subdivided among capitalist states, then war among capitalist states over control of those markets becomes inevitable."[131] According to Lenin's analyses, the international economic order was a threat to the imperialist states because the supply of cheap, raw materials was necessary for capitalist states which were in the process of industrialization. Therefore, imperialist states fought with each other in order to preserve and/or expand their economic interests. In fact, a "military strategy serves global economic interest rather than national security interests. Wars are fought to preserve or maintain exploitative economic systems."[132] While the winner in the war of imperialist states varies, the loser is always the exploited countries. It is a correct assumption to consider the wars between non-imperialist states as proxy wars being directed by the imperialist states. It can be argued that Lenin had a reductionist approach when he proposed that war only exists between the imperialist states.

For Lenin, the elimination of imperialist states "was the essential precondition to abolishing international conflict."[133] With the elimination of these conflicts the world economic order, which is based on the exploiter-exploited relationship, would come to an end. Structuralists however, adopted an approach different from Lenin. They emphasized a world economic system in which neo-

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[131]   Mingst, **op. cit.,** p. 74
[132]   Peter Hough, **Understanding Global Securities**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 5
[133]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, **op. cit.**, p. 223

imperialist relations are dominant, and argued that imperialist states make military, political and economic regulations consistent with their interests. Multinational corporations and international banks are principal vehicles for this new form of imperialism. They constitute the 'ties that bind' between capitalist and non-capitalist states.

> "This new vehicle of capitalist enterprise has rendered redundant the institution or rival 'national capitalism', and replaced the capitalist state as the principal agency spearheading the struggle for markets, investment outlets and raw materials with the world capitalist system."[134]

According to the structuralists, threats emanate from imperialistic economic relations between capitalist and non-capitalist states because "advanced capitalist states are getting rich and Third World countries are getting poor. This is done through mutual trade relations in which advanced capitalist states sell technology and capital intensive goods and buy labour intensive goods."[135] Therefore, security can only be provided once unfair economic relations (capitalist system) will be eliminated. In this context, an international economic order based on imperialism was a prime cause of conflicts within / among Third World states during the détente period.

> "Uneven economic development, great, growing and glaring disparities in wealth and income, communal ethnic tensions – all these factors contribute to the lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues, and to the unrepresentative and repressive character of most Third World regimes and, therefore, to the internal threats to their security and the security of the state structures over which they preside."[136]

The inequality created by the international economic order is disadvantageous for the hitherto colonized Third World countries because, as many economists have assumed, a side can only benefit from international trade if

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[134] Berridge, **op. cit**., 61
[135] Beril Dedeoğlu, **Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji**, İstanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2003, p. 48
[136] Mohammed Ayoob, **op. cit**., p. 46

that side has a developed economy. In turn it is impossible for a Third World country to reap the benefits of international trade because Third World states "export mainly primary commodities and import finished goods from the core."[137] Such a trade balance means impoverishment for the Third World states, contrary to the liberals' assumption. This international economic system fed the political, social and economic domestic threats which damaged the security of Third World states. In other words, the international injustice of income distribution played the primary role in the rise of famine, overpopulation, terror, racism, and health and environmental problems. Rising domestic problems because of these security-threatening elements became as important as external security threats.

In addition, the imperialist international system rendered Third World states –as compared to Western or Eastern Block countries- more vulnerable to external threats because their economic underdevelopment did not allow them to establish their own defence industries. In addition, "during the Cold War, the superpowers fought out their battle by proxy, as they funded different sides in Third World struggles."[138] The Western and Eastern Blocks preserved the international system through proxy wars because they served as safety valves, preventing the rivalry between the two blocks at the centre from going to war. Such wars were also important outputs during the neo-imperialist era. Such proxy wars are tools by which the imperialist powers empowered their economies. The defence and pharmaceutical industries of these developed countries made considerable profits thanks to these wars.

1.2.5. MEANS OF SECURITY

In the détente era, the contributions of different approaches held by the security actors are remarkable. The structuralists, for example, believed that security could be ensured through the economic system they proposed for states that were

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[137]   Cohn, **op. cit.**, 127
[138]   Fierke, op. cit., p. 39

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negatively affected by the international economic system. On the other hand, the security community proposed by Deutsch and lauded by those who accepted the realist definition of threat also had great influence.

1.2.5.1. Economic Development

According to Arthur Lewis, aiding the poor countries in the world is an ethical responsibility which is embraced by the USA.

> "The under-developed countries are not important to the United States from the economic point of view. U.S. trade is very small relative to national income, and trade with Asia and Africa is a still smaller fraction. The under-developed countries are important not on the economic but on the moral plane."[139]

The contributions of citizens, technical aid, trade, foreign investment, and government aids are all tools used by the USA to support the development of Third World economies. According to structuralists such as Paul Baran, Raul Prebisch and Gunder Frank, the so-called ethical aid of the USA is a tool for economic exploitation. For these structural theorists, the uneven income distribution between states is caused by the international system based on neo-imperialist economic relations. To end the inequity in these relations have created, they "prescribe a breaking of linkages with the core countries and / or a socialist revolution to bring about more social justice and equality."[140] Structuralists have two suggestions to limit the negative effects of the international economic system on Third World states. The first is for these states to develop an autonomous economy. This measure removes the state's dependency on the developed / centre economies. The other method is to build a socialist regime.

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[139]   W. Arthur Lewis, "Helping Under-developed Countries", In H.C. Harlan (Ed.) **Readings in Economics and Politics (2nd ed.),** New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 672
[140]   Cohn, **op. cit**., p. 129

The structuralists opposed the integration of "poor states… into the world market and favoured a doctrine of autonomous development"[141] because the imperialist states extract cheap raw materials from the Third World. These materials supply industrial-end products, which in turn helps maintain the current international economic order. The structuralists also opposed Third World participation in the world market because these countries with their young, underdeveloped industries are unable to compete with the states that have advanced industrial economies. They advised Third World countries to follow autonomous development policies because they believed it was the only way that underdeveloped countries on the periphery of the world marketplace could develop. "Once domestic industry and commerce gained some momentum, these efforts would stimulate the growth of a new bourgeois class which would then support national interests in the face of foreign penetration."[142]

In Third World states, natural resources are abundant compared to many developed countries. For example, "nations in the Middle East, Venezuela in South America, and Nigeria in Africa possess oil in quantities sufficient to make their every move of vital importance to the West."[143] The structuralists reasoned if Third World countries adopted economic policies which would save them from dependence on the centre; their natural resources would be an important advantage for the development of their economies. It was, they believed, the one of three possible ways to keep the natural resources of the Third World states from falling under the control of the imperialists.

The other method the structuralists supported was creating a socialist regime. This solution was a more pointed way to provide social justice and equality when compared to the idea of autonomous economies. Radical structuralists first suggested that Third World states change their economic order through revolution. "When the working class became armed with a revolutionary

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[141]   Knutsen, **op. cit.**, p. 233
[142]   Knutsen, **op. cit.**, p. 232
[143]   Lerner, Meacham, and Burns, **op. cit.**, p. 1070

ideology that fostered its class consciousness, it would overturn the existing social order and establish one that would pursue human goals."[144] They reasoned Third World countries who achieved domestic revolution should unite and abolish the current international economic order.

In addition to two above mentioned suggestions, some structuralists "call for a redistribution of resources from core to periphery."[145] Even though it seems too idealist an approach at first glance, some structuralists rightly argued that the centre states should redesign the international distribution of income with a more egalitarian principle because:

> "The continued existence of weakness and poverty in much of the world is likely to produce other forms of tension that may possibly constitute a more serious threat to the world stability than a direct clash between the rich and the poor states would."[146]

In conclusion, it is evident that any way the structuralists cut it, the Third World is not safe without achieving economic development. These exploited states have to struggle with not only external threats, but also the political, economic and social threats within the underdevelopment spiral.

1.2.5.2. Security Community

Firstly suggested by Richard Van Vagenen in 1952, "Political Community and North Atlantic Area," an empirical study by Karl Deutsch, proposed the concept of a security community as a means of security. For him, a security community is one in which "there is a real assurance that the members of that community will

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[144]   Zanden, **op. cit.,** p. 11
[145]   Cohn, **op. cit**., p. 376
[146]   Lucian W. Pye, **Aspect of Political Development**, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966, p. 196

not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way."[147] According to Deutsch, those states which create and participate in a security community pave the way for stable peace. He carries his argument to some length: In the event a security community is established in the world, this spells the end of wars.

Deutsch divides security communities into two groups: The first group is composed of amalgamated security communities. An amalgamated security community may be created when at least two or more independent states merge into a new state with a common government. In addition, an amalgamated security community may be more effective if its aim is not only maintenance of peace among the integrated actors, "but also-even more urgently- the acquisition of great power for general purposes, or the attainment of some specific task or, the acquisition of some common role identity, or some combination of all these."[148] The USA is a good example of an amalgamated security community. Again, at least two or more states form a pluralistic security community with the aim of keeping the peace in their geography area. "Pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and to maintain, and hence often are a more effective means to keep the peace among their members."[149] The USA and Canada constitute a fitting example of pluralistic security community.

Three conditions are required for establishing pluralistic security communities:

> "Compatibility of major political values; Capacity of governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one another's messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence; mutual predictability of

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[147]   Deutsch and et. al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", In **International Political Communities: An Anthology,** New York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Company, 1966, p. 2

[148]   Karl W. Deutsch, **The Analysis of International Relations**, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968, p. 193

[149]   **Loc. cit.**

relevant aspects of one another's political, economic, and social behaviour."[150]

Some points about pluralistic community may be added since this study is concerned with pluralistic security communities rather than their amalgamated counterpart. For one thing, those states which belong to a pluralistic security community must make decisions collectively in some limited areas. Otherwise each of them continues to hold their autonomy for a wide range of issue within their territories. For another thing, in comparison to their amalgamated counterpart, "pluralistic security communities have shown themselves capable of a long, fruitful existence over long periods of time, as is the case of the United States and Canada."[151] Deutsch found pluralistic security communities are "a more likely, more viable, and because of their greater durability, more effective way promoting international peace than political unions."[152] Besides, as a result of Deutsch's study, war becomes unattractive and improbable among the members in pluralistic security communities "because of the danger of international complications that might engulf the contestants."[153] Finally, "while two similar regimes such as Britain and Netherlands might be able to form such a community, a democracy and a fascist dictatorship would not be able to do."[154]

The creation of security communities depends on the principle that "international transaction – communication, migration, mutual services, military collaboration, even tourism- triggers a process of social psychological learning, which in turn produce common identity and trust among social actors."[155] Communication, which is "the cement of social groups in general and political

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[150]   **Ibid.**, p. 196
[151]   Deutsch and et. al,, **op. cit.,** p. 47
[152]   Deutsch and et. al, op. cit., p.?
[153]   Deutsch, **op. cit.**, p. 90
[154]   Sheehan, **op. cit.,** p. 28
[155]   Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni "Pre-theories of International Integration", In M. E. Sangiovanni (Ed.) **Debates of European Integration,** Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 29

communities in particular,"[156] is highly embedded in the concept of security communities. It enables people in a group to think and act jointly, which leads to sense of community. A sense of community is a

> "matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling," trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self images and interests; mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and cooperative action in accordance with it-in short, matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs and responsiveness in the process of decision making. Peaceful change could not be assured without this kind of relationship."[157]

To sum up, Deutsch proposes an integrative process triggered by transactions between states. Moreover, he claims that "economic and cultural cooperation is a far better route toward the formation of a security community than is common membership in a traditional military alliance such as NATO."[158] Meanwhile, the Deutschean empirical model shows that integration and security communities, either an amalgamated or pluralistic one, may not be overlapped. The distinction between integration and security communities remains. While the former may be based on another core issue, the latter aims to eliminate wars within the community. Finally, to form a security community, transactions at individual and system level, such as communication, economic interdependence, and conscious political elites, are necessary.

Exploring the world history in this period, regional cooperation played major roles in international security. Using the security communities approach, the relationships between the member states of The Association of South East Asian Nations and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) are worth discussing.

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[156] Emanuel Adler, and Micheal Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspectives",In E. Adler and M. Barnett (Ed.) **Security Communities**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 7
[157] Deutsch, **op. cit.**, p. 17
[158] Sheehan, **op. cit.**, p. 25

ASEAN was established by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in 1967. That the ASEAN member states aimed to promote a security community in their region in the Deutschian sense was certain. The founders of ASEAN perceived more or less same threats. Communism was common threat for ASEAN members. For example, once Cambodia was occupied by Vietnam, Thailand felt threatened by Vietnam. In response Indonesia and Malaysia

> "...out of defence to Thailand 's immediate security concerns and to preserve the unity of regional organization, endorsed ASEAN condemnation of Vietnamese invasion and supported it diplomatic campaign to dislodge the Vietnam army from Cambodia."[159]

Yet it was not a fully fledged pluralistic security community as Deutsch suggested because transactions between ASEAN members were rather limited. Nonetheless, the fact that ASEAN states have never been involving in a military conflict with each other since 1967 should be appreciated.

1.2.6. EVALUATION

In the détente era, new alternatives to the classical realist approach emerged in the realm of security. The most important of them came from the structuralists. In addition, the contributions of liberal approaches to the realm of security as an anti-thesis are important.

The classical realists' monistic and totalitarian approach was challenged. According to structuralists, each state was not a security actor. The imperialist states who determine the international system, along with the leaders of these states were the security actors in this era.

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[159]   Keylor, **op. cit.**, p. 373

According to the structuralists, Third World states were the referent objects of security because neo-imperialism brings an international system which put an end to their interstate conflicts and encourages cooperation between them. The imperialist states compromised to exploit the resources of the Third World states for their economic interests. The imperial states also continued the rivalry between each other through proxy wars.

The Third World states became impoverished because the international economic order creates an uneven economic distribution. The result of this imbalance is that the Third World states also have to struggle with internal threats, such as famine, poverty, racism and terror. According to structuralists, the Third World states could save themselves from the threats caused by the world economic order by either a socialist revolution or adopting an autonomous economy.

The Deutsch's proposed pluralistic community is indeed the transition point from national security to inter-state security. One may argue that a pluralist economy based on reciprocal interactions between politically and economically similar states who maintain their sovereignty have the capacity to end interstate conflicts and wars. Thus, the imperialist governments would provide for the survival of the new system of exploitation via security communities. Security communities are also the facilitating constituents used by Third World countries to establish their own economic development models.

1.3. SECURITY UNDERSTANDING IN THE SECOND COLD WAR, 1979 – 1989: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Owing to the tense relations among super powers following détente, the world witnessed the second Cold War. The purpose of this chapter is to present the security understanding prevailing during the era.

1.3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE ERA

Although there is a lack of consensus among political historians on the second Cold War, the year 1979 is generally accepted as the start when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the USA Senate put off ratification of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) treaty. The Malta Summit in 1989 can be said to end the second Cold War and the Cold War system.

Arms control and disarmament agreements signed during détente decreased the likelihood of a nuclear war; however, the second Cold War revived the possibility of a nuclear war. NATO forces once again carried out "test procedures for using nuclear weapons in the event of war."[160] The military exercise conducted in November 1983 brought the two superpowers on the edge of a nuclear war for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis because "the Soviet intelligence misinterpreted a NATO training exercise (codenamed Able Archer) and led the Soviet leadership to believe that NATO was preparing to attack them." [161] This nuclear crisis provides dramatic proof that the world was not as safe as it had been during détente.

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[160] Barbara Farnham, "Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), p. 232
[161] Scott, **op. cit.**, p. 102

This era, unlike the first Cold War era, also added an economical dimension to the military and political polarization among blocs. The global economic crises the world experienced in the 1970s proved the importance of economic power for states. Thus, the growing economic imbalance between the USA and the USSR continued to grow until the economy of the Soviet Union and the east block collapsed with the end of the Cold War system.

Other states and even the EC proved to be factors that must be taken into account during that era whether the superpowers liked it or not. For example, while Japan threatened the western world, especially the USA, as an economic power, China displayed its determination to become a great power through the new economic system it established in 1982, which was inspired by liberal economy. On the other hand, the common market which was founded to achieve European integration, had been suffering from a significant inactivity starting with the second half of 1970s.

The neo-realism presented in the 1979 study "Theory of International Politics" by Kenneth N. Waltz quickly came into prominence as the theory he developed was specially formulated for the discipline of international relations. Using neo-realism to analyze the international relations system influenced many academicians of the time.

1.3.2. SECURITY ACTOR: GREAT POWERS

As already stated before, according to the classical realist both the primary actor of international politics and the security actor are states. Waltz agrees with the classical realist assumption that states are the main actors of international politics. However, he claims that not all states are security actors in the security realm. He only views great powers as the only security actors in international system because it is the wars among great states that lead to radical

changes in the system. Put differently, "the fate of all states…. in a system are affected much more by the acts and interactions of the major one than of the minor ones." [162] According to the neo-realists, great states, being rational security actors, are responsible for the stability of international security. The power competition between these great powers shapes international security and determines other states' security. As Bull states, "during the Cold War period the general character of any country's foreign policy was determined by its attitude to the first two." [163]

There is not a single viewpoint among the neo-realists on the security actor role of the great states. According to defensive realism, "it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power" [164] Therefore, great states pose a threat to international security if they increase their powers in a way that will disrupt the balance of power. According to defensive realists, the existing balance of power should be maintained. To maintain international security, great powers that function as security actors can be summarized as such:

i)   preserving the general balance of power,

ii)   seeking to avoid or control crisis in their relations with one another,

iii)   seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. [165]

In the event that the great states cannot fulfil these functions, they can lose their privileged status. An example of defensive realism at work existed right before WWII. The aggressive attitude of Hitler's Germany was tolerated by the

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[162]   Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, New York and et.al: McGraw Hill, 1979, p. 72

[163]   Hedley Bull, **Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics**, New York: Colombia University, 1977, p. 198

[164]   John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism", In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and S. Smith (Ed.) **IR Theories Discipline and Diversity**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 72

[165]   Bull, **op. cit.**, p. 207

United Kingdom before the War because she feared that a great war might disrupt its own status.

For offensive neo-realists, great powers seek "opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favour…. The structure of the system forces great power – even those that would otherwise be satisfied with the status quo- to think and act when appropriate like a revisionist state"[166] Hence, contrary to defensive realists, offensive neo-realists argue that "great powers fear each other, that they cannot rely on each other for their security, and that the best strategy for states to ensure their survival is maximization of relative power"[167] In terms of offensive neo-realism great powers should maximize their power and, if possible, pursue hegemony in the international system.

It can be observed that the USA tried to establish hegemony during the second period of the Cold War. By following an aggressive security policy after 1980, the USA fomented tension between the two superpowers because she desired an international system in which the Soviet threat would be eliminated. She would be the sole super power left standing. The USA thought that both her national security and the international security could be stabilized.

In this context, "President Reagan entered office determined to restore US credibility and increase military capability after the perceived malaise of the Carter years." [168] The Regan administration thought that a policy based on consensus and concession toward the Soviets would be dangerous because the intervention of the Soviets in Afghanistan was unacceptable in terms of both international security and US national security. Besides, the USSR had already

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[166]   Mearsheimer, **op. cit.**, p. 74
[167]   Colin, **op. cit.**, p. 18
[168]   Garry Williams, "Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983", **Journal of Latin American Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), p. 134. The article provides detailed analysis on the USA intervention in Grenada.

irritated the American administration in 1974 by deploying SS-20 rockets in Eastern Bloc countries and targeting Western Europe.

In response to these perceived aggressions the USA "unveiled the Strategic Defence Initiative, often referred to as Star Wars, in 1983. The moniker was derived from the then-futuristic nature of the program. Various ground-based and space-borne systems would be built and engaged to protect the USA from an all-out nuclear attack."[169] This led the Soviet Union to worry the USA was preparing for a nuclear war. This defensive project, seemingly developed against a potential nuclear war, "would end reliance on offense-dominated deterrence ('Mutually Assured Destruction') through a balance of terror."[170] As anticipated by the offensive realists, the USA chooses to increase their power during the second Cold War era so as to sustain her existence in the international system and to be *the* hegemonic power.

The USA also considered neighbouring states governed by communism as dangerous for its own security. That is why the USA overthrew the regime of the Marxist-Leninist Maurice Bishop in Grenada in 1983. (Actually it was no different from the intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan, which regarded Afghanistan as an extension of its near abroad). The USA gave full support to guerrillas attempting to topple the leftist administration in Nicaragua. Sometimes those who were looking saw the hand of the USA pulling the strings. "In 1986, the International Court of Justice found the United States guilty of violating international law for the CIA's covert attacks on Nicaraguan harbours."[171] These were indications of the sort of hegemony the USA wanted to establish during the era of the second Cold War.

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[169] "Operation Able Archer", 9 February 2007. Retrieved Mar. 1, 2008, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A19142200

[170] "Strategic Defence Initiative". Retrieved from Mar. 1, 2008 from http://www.thehistorychannel.co.uk/site/encyclopedia/article_show/Strategic_Defence_Initiative/0007138.html

[171] Scott, **op. cit**., p. 102

According to the neo-realists, the way great powers' maintain their status in the international system is directly proportional to their economic powers.

> "The shifts in the balance of military power in the world followed the changes in balance of productivity; moreover, the rise and fall of various empires and states within the international system were confirmed by the results of wars among the great powers which were always won by the one that had the greatest resources."[172]

It is likely that great powers will collapse unless they keep a balance between their military and economic powers. For example, "the Soviet Union could no longer support a first rate military establishment on the basis of a third rate economy."[173] As a matter of fact, "the mounting costs of the war in Afghanistan, as well as the policy of helping various other Third World revolutionaries threatened to bankrupt to Soviet State"[174] It was difficult for the Soviet Union to be compete with the aggressive foreign policy of the USA under the existing economic conditions. Even though Gorbachev endeavoured to take precautions with the aim of covering this gap through economic measures during final years of the Soviets reign, he was not able to do so. History notes the fall of a superpower which could not manage to balance its power factors.

Neo-realists regard states other than great ones as minor powers. In their opinion, minor powers cannot be considered as security actors since they lack the ability to organize international security or to have an influence on it. Neo-realists do not overlook the possibility of a war expanding among minor states in the multi-polar international system. This exceptional case will be discussed later.

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[172] Paul Kennedy, **Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Ekonomik Değişim ve Askeri Çatışmalar** (trans. by Birtane Karanakçı), İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, p. 519

[173] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", **International Security**, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), p. 50

[174] Best, **op. cit.**, p. 466

Last but not least, according to neo-realists non-state actors are also important to the system, but non-state actors cannot be security actors in the security realm because they do not "play determinative roles in the state's pursuit of its security and survival"[175] The ability of non-state actors to effect the change in the system is almost non-existent.

1.3.3. REFERENT OBJECT: STATES

According to Waltz, "the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system"[176] This definition presumes that states are referent objects whether they are great powers or not. Just like classical realists, neo-realists argue that states are referent objects, while at the same time grounding their argument differently than classical realists. Although both forms of realism agree on a definition of security as "the state's capacity to protect its territorial boundaries and its sovereign ability to act as it sees fit,"[177] Waltz's structural-systemic analysis indirectly introduces 'international security' as a new concept, which in turn heavily influenced the security of the era.

As is well known, Waltz's approach to international relations "is heavily influenced by positivist models of economics"[178] Accordingly, one may argue that "The systemic use of economics as a model of explanation for International Relations is the defining contribution of neo-realism."[179] Neo realists exclude unit level theories because "they attempt to explain the whole by examining the interactions of its parts."[180] Neo realists claim that the foreign policies of states can be understood by a proper analyses made at system level. According to them

[175]   Kolodziej, **op. cit.**, p. 137
[176]   Waltz, **op. cit.**, p. 126
[177]   Terrif and et. al., **op. cit.** p. 63
[178]   Jackson and Sorensen, **op. cit.**, p. 84
[179]   Stefano Guzzini, **Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy**, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 129
[180]   Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", In S. Burchill and A. Linklater (Ed.) **Theories of International Relations**, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, p. 86

"a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units,"[181] so it is extremely important how the structure that forms the system and units are defined.

A political structure is taken into account in international politics and domestic politics by neo-realists, and they are defined according to the situations of i) ordering principles, ii) the character of the units iii) the distribution of the capabilities.[182] States' become referent objects according to the ordering principles of the structure of international relations and the character of the units.

The structure of domestic politics where there is order and binding authority is hierarchic. "Hierarchy describes how politics is organized within states –with a clear centre that has a monopoly on legitimate use of power and distribution of labour among various branches of government."[183] In brief, with a hierarchic structure there is a regulating upper authority to which the units are subjected and a difference of functionality among the units. For instance, the functions of Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a country are different, but the regulating authority on which they depend is the same.

However the structure of international politics is anarchic. The units in this structure are "the equal of all the others. No one is entitled to command; none is [are] required to obey."[184] It must be highlighted that the binding matter that makes domestic and international politics hierarchic or anarchic is the relation between the units.[185]

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[181]   Waltz, **op. cit.**, p. 79
[182]   **Ibid.**, p. 81
[183]   Cynthia Weber, **International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction**, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 20
[184]   Waltz, **op. cit.**, p. 88
[185]   Even though the hierarchy and anarchy are thought to be different structures, one may argue that that the EU incorporates both structures.

In this anarchic milieu, neo-realists understood "the international system as a self-help system and treats states as defensive actors inasmuch as their primary, though not exclusive, intention is self-preservation."[186] In fact, for neo-realists, all states are expected to rely on a self-help mechanism in international system because "no state can ever fully trust another to resist encroaching on its vital interests, nor can it rely on other states to come to its aid when their own vital interests, security and survival are put in peril."[187] The states' perception of security on the basis of self-help brings the problem of power management.

> "Excessive weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would have dissuaded an adversary from launching. Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state. Because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it."[188]

When looked at from a neo-realist point of view, it is necessary for states to maintain power at an optimum level rather than maximize it in order to maintain their existence and ensure their security.

Besides, "anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's unit, and that implies their sameness."[189] States exhibit similar behaviour in the realm of foreign politics despite their different political systems, economic levels, power and ideologies. This is because the binding feature of the international system is its anarchic structure. Thus the anarchic structure of the international system compels states' security behaviour to become alike.

> "States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound. Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them

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[186]   Chatterjee Shibashis, **"**Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism and Security", **International Studies** Vo. 40, No. 2, (May 2003), p. 129

[187]   Kolodziej, **op. cit**, p. 135

[188]   Waltz, **Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory**, p. 36

[189]   **Ibid.**, p. 93

become a way of life. Relations remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though by nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility."[190]

As can be concluded from this quotation, if states depend on the self-help system in order to maintain and carry on their existence, a security dilemma is created. For example, if the state (A) increases its power in order to ensure its security against potential threats from other states, this will justify the armament of the states (B) because states can never be sure of the intentions of other states. "Even if states do not choose war, they may find themselves embroiled in one either because other states attack them or because they stumble into a security dilemma"[191] Neo-realists suggest that the security dilemma that arises in this context cannot be solved since it is a problem that is endemic to the system. (A nuance should be noted here: Neo-realists think that security dilemma results from the nature of the international system while realists maintain that it is a result of the competition of states which want to maximize their powers.)

The anarchic structure of the international system makes the states referent objects. In an anarchic structure, the states are not aware of the other's political objectives and intentions which serve such objectives. Therefore, each state regards itself also as a referent object and wants to ensure its security through increased power.

One particular reason why states other than great powers are referent objects is that international security is shaped in accordance with relations among great powers. Any war or conflict among great powers may disrupt the attempt of other states to maintain their existence and ensure their security. Thus, middle or

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[190]   Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", **Journal of Interdisciplinary History**, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988), p. 619
[191]   Karen Ruth Adams, "Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Powers, In In J. Sterling-Folker (Ed.) **Making Sense of International Relations Theory,** Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, p. 19

minor powers become referent objects depending on the willpower of great powers.

1.3.4. THREAT: MULTIPOLARITY

Neo-realists agree with classical realists that threats directed towards the objective and subjective values of states pose a threat to its security. However, since neo-realists introduce a structural perspective to international relations, they define the threat through the nature of the system.

According to neo-realist theory, the true threat to the system is a war among its great powers, which will affect the distribution of capacity, i.e., power, among the units that make up the system. A change in capacity leads to a change in the international system. A "system structure is composed of the most powerful states, for only these determine whether the system is bipolar, multipolar, and so on." [192] By causing a shift in capacity, wars among great powers have a direct impact on the quality of the international system.

The danger in this case is if the system becomes polarized, in which case the international system may become the source of wars between great powers. Neo-realists more or less agree that "the multipolar world was highly stable, but all too war-prone. The bipolarity world has been highly peaceful, but unfortunately less stable than its predecessors."[193] One can argue for a period of multi-polarity which is long and full of wars from the beginning of the system of modern states (the Westphalia Treaty, 1648) to World War II. On the other hand, the Cold War system, which was dominated by bipolarity, proved to be a period during which serious crises were experienced but there were no wars among the great powers. "Europe saw no major war and only two minor conflicts [the 1956

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[192]   Terrif, and et. al., **op. cit.** p. 35
[193]   Waltz, **The Emerging Structure of International Politics**, p. 45

Soviet intervention in Hungary and the 1974 Greco-Turkish war in Cyprus]. Neither conflict threatened to spread to other countries."[194]

According to neo-realists, multi-polarity, brought about by three or more states dominating the international system, creates a distribution of power which is favourable for the creation of war. First, "in the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty."[195] For example, the fact that great states acted cautiously with regard to the political existence of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century was a result of this characteristic of the multi-polar system. In brief, the possibility of a war was increased by conflicts among great powers because of the definition of a threat and how to cope with it in the multi-polar system.

Second, unlike the bipolar international system, wars among minor powers should be taken into consideration in multi-polarity because "local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that small war will trigger a general conflict."[196] According to neo-realists, the wars among states other than great powers in bipolarity result from the anarchic structure; they will never cause the system to change. In multi-polarity, however, it is possible that even the smallest-scale war could lead to a change in the international system.

Third, for neo-realists states are rational actors. However, they may make serious miscalculations. From a neo-realist perspective, multi-polarity provokes the risk of miscalculation.

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[194]   John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold warCold warCold war", **International Security**, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), p. 10
[195]   Waltz, **The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory**, p. 622
[196]   Mearsheimer, **op. cit.**, p. 15

> "Miscalculation by some or all of the great powers is a source of danger in a multipolar world; overreaction by either or both of the great powers is a source of danger in a bipolar world. Which is worse: miscalculation or overreaction? Miscalculation is the greater evil because it is more likely to permit an unfolding of events that finally threatens the status quo and brings the powers to war. Overreaction is the lesser evil because at worst it costs only money for unnecessary arms and possibly the fighting of limited wars. The dynamics of a bipolar system, moreover, provide a measure of correction."[197]

Fourth, in the multi-polar system, if the distribution of capacity among great powers is unbalanced, this may trigger a war. Ideally, when the distribution of capacity between the two most powerful states in the system is compared they will yield a balanced conclusion. "If there is a lopsided gap, the number one is a preponderant power simply because it is so much powerful than the others."[198] In that case two scenarios may present themselves. First, a preponderant power displays a peace-fostering attitude since its status in the system makes it feel secure. However, wars might break out among great powers that are lesser powers. A preponderant state generally avoids participating in such wars unless the winner's power increases to such an extent it threatens their power. In this scenario they are expected to go to war in order to guarantee their status in the system. According to this scenario, a preponderant state takes on the risk of war to maintain its status as a hegemonic power.

Fifth, neo-realists consider any shift in power capacity beyond the polarization in the system as a threat. A state which is on the way to becoming a great state can shift the distribution of power in its favour by managing its power factors in a rational way. Consequently, a candidate to become a great state takes on the risk of war in order to gain a place in the international system. Historical evidence shows that candidate states wishing to become great powers can be prevented through a war affecting the structure of the system. Germany's motive

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[197]   Waltz, **op. cit.**, p. 623
[198]   Mearsheimer, **Structural Realism**, p. 80

in starting both of world wars was that she sought to reach the status of a great power. And indeed she did if only for a time.

Finally, "a multipolar system has many potential conflict situations; major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential conflict."[199]When compared to other international systems, multi-polarity not only increases the possibility of a war among great powers but also creates them, such as a guerrilla war or a traditional confrontation between nation-state armies. This creates a serious problem in terms of international security. At present there are 24 different possibilities of war in a multi-polar system consisting of five great powers. Multi-polarity is a risky condition for the stability of the international security.

As a result, according to neo-realists, there is a strong parallel between the threat to international security and the demand to change the distribution of the capacity of the structure. The distribution of capacity in the structure is generally caused by wars among great powers and determines the polarity of the international system. It should be noted that multi-polarity is more inclined to give birth to a war than bipolarity.

1.3.5. MEANS OF SECURITY: BIPOLARITY

According to neo-realists, national power is essential for states to ensure their security. "All forms of power pivot on "the state's success in achieving a competitive position in the incessant struggle of states to survive and to preclude any state or group of states from challenging their security interests"[200] The main element which separates neo-realists from classical realists is that the former

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[199]   Mearsheimer, **op. cit.**, p. 14
[200]   Kolodziej, **op. cit.**, p. 137

group attaches importance not only to military power but also political and economic power.

Neo-realists agree with classical realists that national power alliances and foreign intelligence activities that will prevent states from making miscalculations are a means of security which enables threats to be avoided. Therefore, states are "engage in internal efforts to increase their political, military and economic capabilities and to develop strategies. They also undertake external attempts to align, realign with other actors."[201] To sum up, it is hard to claim that the neo-realists are different from the classical realists in terms of the means of security. On the other hand, their main difference from realists is that they perceive cooperation as an anomaly.

Nevertheless, it would be unfair to argue that neo-realists did not introduce original contributions to the means of security. They believe the stability of the balance of power is what guarantees international security because its main purpose is to preserve the state system, and thus international stability."[202] What will activate this security mechanism are great states.

Without descending to details, it is necessary to say that classical realists have a different concept about the balance of power than neo-realists. According to classical realists, "balances occur because of the consciously directed policies of the governments of the states that make up the system, which do not wish the system to be dominated by a single state or alliance that would be in a position to dictate them."[203] According to classical realists, the balance of power is a situation which results from the willpower of states. The neo-realists, however, reason that this is a counterbalancing brought about by the international system itself.

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[201]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, **op. cit.**, p.82
[202]   Berridge, **op. cit.**, p. 166
[203]   Sheehan, **op. cit.**, p. 18

Neo-realists mostly think that the balance of power is achieved by bipolarity in its actual sense. In bipolarity "with only two world powers there are no peripheries." [204] Two major powers are responsible for international security. Because that the international system that appeared following World War II was bipolar, international security became sensitive to tensions between the USA and the USSR, either of which had a fairly equal distribution of capacity.

Since there were no other countries, except for the USA and the USSR, that dominated the international system, "the minor powers find it difficult to remain unattached to one of the major powers, because major powers generally demand allegiance from lesser states."[205] During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were founded under the leadership of both great states and they expected compliance to their strategies from member states. Although détente witnessed some conflicts, it was observed that other states were cautious about raising dissenting voices during times when the relations between the USA and the USSR were tense. Since "allies add relatively little to the superpowers' capabilities"[206], any increase in dissenting voices among the members of the two blocs is against the interests of the minor states.

Another "distinguishing factor in the bipolar balance, "…is the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises."[207] However, the small-scale wars that broke out owing to crises had a preventive effect on the large-scale wars. These small-scale wars of the bi-polar world did not escalate into large-scale ones that were part of the world of multi-polarity.

Donelly stated that in bipolarity "general wars [are] almost always foolhardy: bipolar superpowers have too much to win by peace, too much to lose

[204] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World", **Daedalus**, Vol. 93, No. 3 Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism (Summer, 1964), p. 882

[205] Mearsheimer, **Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war**, p. 14

[206] Waltz, **Theory of International Relations**, p. 171

[207] Waltz, **The Stability of a Bipolar World.**, p 883

by war, and little hope of gain in fighting one another"[208] A potential war between two great powers is expected to cause the system to go to total war as well as to bring more damage .

In sum, bipolarity is a type of international system that restricts wars and conflicts. The quality and origin of a threat is clear in bipolarity; there is no third power in the system. By its nature, small-scale wars serve as pressure valves for large-scale wars. Since, in bipolar international system, it is not rational for great powers to fight with each other, the system is more favorable for peace. As a matter of fact, in the bipolar system established following World War II, the USA and the USSR did not experience a hot war despite pushing each other to the edge of war during several serious crises.

1.3.6. EVALUATION

Appearing with the birth of the second Cold War, neo-realism can be said to have been the approach most commonly resorted to at that time for studies on international relations. Naturally, studies on security took their share from the influence of neo-realism, which left its mark on issues related to security.

Neo-realists are more concerned with great powers in international politics than states. The basic reason why neo-realists focus on great power states is that international system can only be altered by the rise or fall of these great powers. Therefore security actors for neo-realist are great powers.

Neo-realists argue that the structure of the system is an anarchic one and this leads to a similarity in the perception of security embraced by the states. As a result of the anarchic structure, the states, being referent objects, maintain their

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[208]   Jack Donnelly, **Realism and International Relations.**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 108-109

existence, their main function, through a self-help system. Since the way all states behave is similar, self-help results in a security dilemma.

Owing to the fact that a change or shift in the distribution of capacity directly affects international security, it is a considerable threat. When compared to other international systems, multi-polarity paves the way for changes or shifts in the distribution of capacity among great states.

Neo-realists attach importance to not only the military and political aspect of national power but also its economic dimension. Like classical realists, they maintain that national power, alliances and foreign intelligence are the means of security. In addition to these resources, neo-realists may find co-operation between states appropriate tools for their security. They also suggest that bipolarity is a structural means of security in terms of international security. Finally, the concept "international security" became established in the literature of international relations as a result of the structural/systemic analyses.

1.4.   SECURITY UNDERSTANDING IN THE POST-COLD WAR, 1989- 2008: TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY

The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism put an end to the Cold War system. The aim of this chapter is to present the security approach of the post-Cold War era.

1.4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE ERA

Although the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the beginning of the end, the Cold War era came to an end after Malta Summit in 1989, and a new era, called the post-Cold War era, started. This study also considers the year 2008 in which Russia attacked Georgia. This invasion is seen as the sign of a major change in the post-Cold War system.

While some argue that the post-Cold War international system has the characteristics of a multi-centred structure, others assume the USA is the most powerful state of the world. These individuals assert the international system has evolved into a hierarchic system, and the USA stands at the top of it, both militarily and politically.

In the post-Cold War era, new states entered into the international system, and the ideological factors which had shaped the system lost their prominence. Countries, which were hitherto ruled by communist/socialist regimes, started to seek integration into the international community. It is also clear that the uncertainty created by these states, which gained their independence or were freed from Soviet influence, worried the international community.

Interdependence is an important phenomenon of the post-Cold War era. Even though interdependence did not start in this era, its pace and its influence have increased after the end of polarization in the international system. Multinational companies, foundations, associations and non-state organizations were the missionaries of interdependence and became the subjects of international relations.

Moreover, the effects of technological development, such as the introduction of internet, the invention of mobile phones, and increased utilization of software started eroding the traditional structure of international relations. Increased communication and transportation channels increased the flow of information between the actors. This important development rendered the distinction between domestic and foreign politics meaningless.

1.4.2. SECURITY ACTOR: STATES

Pluralists consider only states as security actors in the field of security because non-state actors such as international organizations, multinational companies, religious groups, trade unions and individuals do not have determining role. However, states cannot fully function as security actors if they choose to ignore the security problems caused by other international relations actors, or the potential solutions they may contribute to security problems.

According to pluralists it is therefore necessary to explain why and how non-state actors become prominent in international relations. In this way the pluralists' interpretation of the state as security actor can better be understood.

For pluralists, the international system is "a system in which power is distributed erratically among some centralized whole systems (States) and

numerous subsystems at various levels."[209] Pluralists argue that the states' absolute importance in international relations has decreased and non-state actors have the capacity to deeply influence the international system. They believe that international relations should be analyzed by taking non-state actors into consideration. For example, that the role of Pope Jean Paul II was among the factors putting an end to the Cold War cannot be ignored. "Lech Walesa said following the fall of communism in Poland that 50 percent of the work was done by the Pope, the rest by the Poles, Kohl, Bush, Mitterrand and Thatcher."[210]Also, major international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and regional development banks have played a role in the security field.

> "The multilateral development banks – the World Bank and its affiliates and the four regional banks – support economic and social development by providing financial and technical assistance to member governments… Because of the broader developmental mandate of development banks, they can become involved in a wider range of activities in the security sector as well as specific projects to restructure that sector, such as demobilization and reintegration programs, efforts to improve civil-military relations, privatization and conversion of defence producers, and postconflict rehabilitation and reconstruction." [211]

International relations are constituted by matrix relations between states and state actors. Similarly, the international system does not only consist of states but also transnational actors, such as international foundations and multinational companies, and it is a structure based on the relations of "complex interdependence."[212] Complex interdependence "in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in

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[209]   James Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisted: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence", **International Studies Quarterly,** Vol.28, No. 3 (Sept., 1984), p. 264
[210]   Şükrü Gültas, "Pope and EU", **Todays Zaman**, 5 April 2005
[211]   Nicole Ball, "International Economic Actors", In E.Kolodziej and R. E. Kanet (Ed.) **Coping with Conflict After the Cold War**, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 176
[212]   Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, **Power and Interdependence (2nd ed.),** New York and et. al.: Longman, 1989

different countries."[213] The characterization of the concept of interdependence as complex is noteworthy. The feature that renders interdependence complex is the matrix relations between states and non-state actors. In the international system, interdependence can be observed not only between states but also between states and non-state actors.

With the help of global interactions such as communication, transportation, finance and travelling, complex interdependence has become powerful today. The main reason for this is the multiplicity of communication channels.

> "Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecommunications (such as multinational banks or corporations)."[214]

Rosenau characterized international relations via the concept of transnationalism.[215] He argues that due to the increase in transnational relations, states are no longer determining actors alone. Since transnational relations created different actors at different levels, international relations have become a field which is not comprehended only through interstate relations.

The salient factor which increases transnational relations is that state is not a unitary actor for pluralists. The state consists of interest groups, bureaucracy, and individuals. International relations have gained a transnational character after the establishment and intensification of relations between these

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[213] **Ibid.**, p. 8
[214] **Ibid.**, p. 24-25
[215] Transnationalism is described as "the process whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and have important consequences for the course of event."James Rosenau, **The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs**, New York: Nichols, 1980, p. 1

units.

Burton points to the type of international relations in which non-state actors have place. His "world society" approach is more extensive than the state-centred approach which is dominant in international relations, since "the study of world society is not confined to relations among states or state authorities. There are important religious, language scientific, commercial and other relationships in addition to a variety of formal non-state institutions that are world-wide.[216]

According to Morse, the question can be answered through the concept of modernization, which is defined as "the social, political and economic prerequisites for, and consequences of, industrialization and technological development"[217] because

> "…modernization has depended upon the scientific revolution and would not have occurred without it… The application of scientific i.e., well-tested and reliable, knowledge with its technological implications to economic affairs, then, seems to be major source of change in contemporary societies."[218]

Technological developments, which are the driving forces of modernization, began to disrupt the traditional structure of interstate relations. The advances in transportation and communication not only decreased the distances between these fields but also created security problems. For example, "computers and the internet disseminate and process highly useful information, but they also facilitate the activities of 'cyber-criminals' and 'cyber-terrorists'."[219] Utilization

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[216]   John W. Burton, "World Society", In P. R. Viotti and M. V. Kauppi (Ed.) **International Relations: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (2nd ed.),** Boston and et. all.: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, p. 375
[217]   Viotti and Kauppi, **op. cit.**, p. 240
[218]   Edward L. Morse, **Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations,** New York and London: Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1976, p. 4-9
[219]   Paul J. Smith, "Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?", **Parameters**, Autumn, 2000, p. 2. Retrieved May 3, 2009 from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_3_30/ai_67502104/?tag=content;col1

of technology was an important part of Al-Qaeda's achievement in the attacks of September 11th

On the other hand, an international money transfer may be conducted in a matter of seconds via electronic channels. States can no longer fully control money market within their territories because of these technological advances. "Most governments no longer make any serious attempt to impose currency controls."[220] If a state wishes to control the money market, she will have to take multinational companies, financial groups and individual speculators into consideration.

Rosenau and Singh argue that information technologies, which "refer to all technologies that help to produce, gather, distribute, consume, and store information,"[221] have changed the traditional way of thinking in international relations because "information technology enhances the capabilities of traditional global actors, like states and firms, but it also empowers other actors (like transnational social movements or terrorist groups)."[222] Thus, international relations gained a pluralistic structure which includes non-state actors.[223]

According to the pluralists, the introduction of non-state actors, such as international organizations, multinational companies, trade unions, associations, foundations and individuals into the area of international relations has removed the distinction between foreign and domestic politics. In other words, the hierarchy between high politics and low politics has been abolished. The reflected

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[220] Jonathan Aronson, "Global Networks and Their Impact", In J. N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (Ed.) **Information Technologies and Global Politics: the Changing Scope of Power and Governance**, Albany: State University of New York, 2002, p. 42

[221] J. P. Singh, "Information Technologies and the Changing Scope of Power and Governance", In J. N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (Ed.) **Information Technologies and Global Politics: the Changing Scope of Power and Governance**, Albany: State University of New York, 2002, p. 2

[222] **Ibid.**, p. 7

[223] See more details J. N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (Ed.) **Information Technologies and Global Politics: the Changing Scope of Power and Governance**, Albany: State University of New York, 2002

light of this new view of security issues also looks towards the end of the distinction between domestic and foreign security, and the development of the concept of military/non-military security. For example, according to the security approach of the post-Cold War era, health and environmental issues are considered non-military security issues, and transnational organized crime and terror groups have became issues which have put an end to the distinction between domestic and foreign security. States as security actors became obliged to define both military and non-military threats, and to think of non-state actors in international relations in order to take measures against these threats.

If the variety of non-state actors seems large and unwieldy this is because it is. In the Cold War system states were able to perform their security tasks clearly because "the enemy was known. The challenges were clear. The dangers seemed obvious. The appropriate responses could readily be calculated."[224] The security environment in the post-Cold War era has become much more complex. For example, even information technologies that we discussed before caused a change in security in two ways.

> "First, information technologies were deployed to enhance capabilities in tasks ranging from making of 'smart weapons' to organizational ones like defend preparedness. Second, protecting national information infrastructures against varied threats become a regular concern of states."[225]

Al-Qaeda's ability to utilize and mobilize information technologies enabled it to realize the September 11th attacks. The USA noticed that Al-Qaeda successfully infiltrated the Pentagon's and CIA's intelligence information. The inability of the responsible people to identify the threat was the result of the density of the information flow because, "the glut of information flows may clog

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[224]   James Rosenau, "The Dynamism of a Turbulent World", In M. T. Klare and Y. Chandrani (Ed.) **World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security (3rd ed.)**, New York: St. Martin Press, 1998, p. 18
[225]   **Ibid.**, p.8

the system and may not lead to better policy."[226] States as security actors in the complex international system have to decrease the information pollution which may be caused by dense information flow in order to be able to analyze the available information accurately.

In summation, according to a pluralist the state is a security actor which must consider international relations as a field in which non-state actors must be taken into consideration. Peace and security cannot be obtained via a traditional way of thinking. Pluralists believe that a unilateral and competitive security system cannot resolve security concern in the world because the relations between states have increasingly become interdependent.

1.4.3. REFERENT OBJECT: STATES

Generally, pluralists define states as referent objects of the security realm. However, there exist vital nuances that must be explored when comparing this approach with other potential avenues. First, states are referent objects not only because of the threats caused by states. Many threats "are driven by non-state actors--such as international criminals, terrorists, or alien smugglers--who have little concern about international governance or legal norms."[227] In short, after the Cold War, threats caused by non-state actors have become more prominent.

Second, the threats that render the state referent object do not only have military characteristics. In the new system, issues such as environment and health are also a threat to the security of states and the system. Bill Clinton, the President of the USA, defined non-state actors as potential threats in his speech delivered for the 50th Anniversary of the UN. In this speech he pointed out that new types of threats have replaced the traditional threats.

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[226]   Aronson, **op. cit.**, p. 46
[227]   Smith, **op. cit.**, p. 1.

Today the threat to our security is not in an enemy silo but a briefcase or a car bomb. Potential enemies are also the international criminals and drug traffickers who threaten the stability of new democracies. The forces of natural destruction -- encroaching deserts that threaten the Earth's balance, famines that test the human spirit, deadly new diseases that endanger whole societies – are powerful adversaries.[228]

Third, "interdependence has drawn attention to two key features in the contemporary international system: the growing relevance of the global 'commons' and the rapidly increasing interconnectedness between states."[229] The global commons, which includes the ecosystem, space, oceans and seas, has become a security threats which no state can overcome alone. Hence, "security can no longer exclusively or predominantly be realized unilaterally. The provision of security necessitates cooperation rather than confrontation between states. Some challenges, such as 'greenhouse effect,' can only be met on a global scale."[230] For example, environmental and health problems cause more death than military wars, and have the capacity to negatively affect the whole ecosystem of the earth. It is impossible for states to cope with the non-traditional threats they face in terms of material capacity. Thus, as Clinton pointed in the speech mentioned above:

> "… in this increasingly interdependent world, we have more common opportunities and more common enemies than ever before. It is, therefore, in our interest to face them together as partners, sharing the burdens and costs and increasing our chances of success."[231]

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[228] William Jefferson Clinton, "**Assessing the United Nations At 50"** Address at the United Nations Fiftieth Anniversary Charter Ceremony, San Francisco, 26 June 1995. Retrieved April 24, 2009 from http://www.defencelink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=933

[229] Richard Little "The Growing Relevance of Pluralism", In S. Smith, K. Booth, abd N. Zalewski (Ed.) **International Theory: Positivism and Beyond**, Cambridge, and et. al: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 76

[230] Haftendorn, **op. cit.**, p. 14

[231] Clinton, **op. cit.**

The pluralist security needed to establish these interdependent relationships has existed for some time. A report entitled 'Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival' and prepared by Independent Commission Disarmament and Security Issue seeded the ground for this new era in 1992. According to the report, "security cannot be attained through military superiority"[232] because there cannot be a winner in a nuclear war. The essence of common security is "the notion of 'security with' as opposed to 'security against' the adversary"[233] because

> "…in the event of a major world war, which would escalate inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons, all notions would suffer devastation to a degree that would make 'victory' a meaningless word. The only realistic way to avoid such a catastrophe is to quickly develop a process toward disarmament and to establish a system of political and economic cooperation among nations such that all gain an important and equitable stake in its continuance."[234]

This understanding which, in the early 1980s, initially suggested that states cooperate in the field of security against traditional threats, transformed its discourse by staying loyal to its substance after the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, cooperation is needed not only for military threats but also, as Clinton suggested, for non-military threats. This is because, according to pluralists, the globalization which gathered pace after the end of the Cold War has exposed states to non-traditional and transnational security threats. That is why the security understanding of the post Cold War can be explained with a new concept: Transnational security.[235]

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[232] Independent Commission Disarmament and Security Issue, **Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival,** New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982

[233] David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security**",** In B. Buzan and L. Hansen (Ed.) **International Security Vol. II: The Transition to the Post-Cold war Agenda**, Los Angeles and et. al: Sage, 2007

[234] Independent Commission Disarmament and Security Issue**, op. cit.**, pp. 7 -11

[235] Transnational security and global security are the concepts which are often used as synonyms. This study considers the distinction between these two concepts as follows. Transnational security suggests that states face threats from not only states but also non-state actors. Global security proposes that both states and non-state actors such as human, individual, society face security threats either military or non-military.

Fourth, even though pluralists consider the state as the referent object, they also acknowledged the non-state actors. For example Ullman foresees two sorts of threat whose effects are confined within state:

> "An action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of a state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to government of a state, or to private, non governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within state."[236]

This also implies the acknowledgement of the threats which are directed against actors at the different levels interacting each other. However, the status of the state as the main referent object is unquestionable.

1.4.5. THREAT

After the end of the bipolar system, which had been based on ideological and military polarization, non-traditional threats entered the security agenda, even though military threats did not lose their importance. For pluralists, "threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non military."[237] In this context, transnational terrorism, transnational organized crime, and environment and health problems are seen as new threats.

1.4.5.1. Transnational Terrorism

One may define terrorism as "acts of violence committed against innocent persons or non-combatants that are intended to achieve political ends through fear and

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[236] Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", **International Security**, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer, 1983), p. 133

[237] Buzan, Weæver, and de Wilde, **op. cit.**, p. 5

intimidation,"[238] or as "the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims."[239] According to Combs, there are four basic features of terrorism: i) it contains violence ii) has a political objective iii) is directed against innocent people and iii) is presented to an audience which can be frightened by the terrorist act.[240] Even though "there is not a common definition of terrorism that has been adopted by states and the majority of the community in international platforms, what defines actions that are considered terrorism and which actors are terrorists"[241], there is a wide agreement that terrorism may be defined as a security threat which is implemented by non-state actors.[242]

Looking at the stream of history, "terrorism has existed for 2.000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to changes"[243] Terrorist organizations have continually adapted their techniques, weapons, propaganda techniques and targets to the changing conditions, and thus became powers threatening the local and international community. "Terrorists are operating increasingly on an international level, not just in one region or country. The dawn of the modem age of terrorism can be dated at September 5, 1972, with the Palestinian terrorist attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich."[244] After the end of the Cold War, terrorism began to gain a transnational character. Today,

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[238]   John Deutch, "Terrorism", **Foreign Policy**, No. 108 (Autumn, 1997), p. 12
[239]   B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism", **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 49, No. 2, The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism (Apr., 2005), p. 172
[240]   Cindy C. Combs, **Terrorism in the 21st Century**, New Jersey: Prenctice Hall, 1999, p. 15
[241]   Taner Tavas, "Terörizm: Psikolojisi ve Hedefleri", In Ü. Özdağ and O. M. Öztürk (Ed.) **Terörizm İncelemeleri: Teori, Örgütler, Olaylar**, Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2000, p. 16
[242]   State terrorism is not included in this definition.
[243]   Bruce Hoffman, "The Emergence of the New Terrorism," in A. Tan and K. Ramakrishna (Ed.) **The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies**, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002, p. 46
[244]   Deutch, **op. cit.**, p. 11

terrorism "almost always goes beyond the national boundaries".[245] In this context, it is necessary to point to the distinction between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism.

> "Domestic terrorism is home-grown and home directed, with consequences for just the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. For domestic terrorism, the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country. Most terrorist incidents are domestic. Countries are anticipated to be self-reliant to address domestic terrorism because derived benefits and costs from antiterrorist actions are fully experienced at home."[246]

Enders and Sandler define transnational terrorism as follows: "Whenever a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, or targets, or institutions of another country, then the incident is characterized as transnational."[247] The September 11 attacks were *the* example of transnational terrorism that now defines the rest:

> "The attacks in 2001 were followed by other major attacks, including the one against the tourist facilities on Bali in 2002, the siege of a middle school in Breslan, Russia in 2003, the attack against the Spanish commuter trains in Madrid 2004, the London transit system in 2005 and others."[248]

The above mentioned terrorist attacks caused trauma in the international community. They supported the belief that there is not a state the world over which cannot be attacked. The biggest threat that transnational terrorist organizations can direct towards the international community is their capability of attacking with weapons of mass destruction. For example, "bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network were making efforts to obtain such weapons and had made contact

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[245]   Sertaç Başeren, "Terörizm: Kavramsal Bir Değerlendirme", In Ü. Özdağ and O. M. Öztürk (Ed.) **Terörizm İncelemeleri: Teori, Örgütler, Olaylar**, Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2000, p. 1
[246]   Rosendorff and Sandler, **op. cit.**, p. 172
[247]   Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), p. 149
[248]   James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, **Global Terrorism (2ⁿᵈ ed.)**, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 1

with scientist working in Pakistan's nuclear program."[249] According to Tuğtan, this is because the Islamist terror rising today desires the death of the system.[250] It is highly likely transnational terrorist organizations, which are asymmetrical powers, will attempt to use nuclear weapons in the near future. Therefore, the international community should prioritize taking the necessary security measures against the nuclear weapon threat of terrorist organizations.

It is necessary to point to the three most distinctive features of transnational terrorism. First of all, after the end of the Cold War, transnational terror organizations are no longer political tools for states; they have became international actors which have their own bureaucratic organization structures and which are able to create their own financial resources.[251] Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former chief of staff, claimed in his book entitled 'Great Hatred, Little Room: making Peace in Northern Ireland' that the UK, during Blair's premiership, attempted to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to sustain the peace treaty and to persuade it to disarm.[252] This example shows how a transnational terror organization, even though it is included in the list of terrorist organizations, is acknowledged by the state as an actor.

Moreover, transnational terror organizations can behave as tools for state A to destabilize and depreciate state B. Thus, the interdependence between states and transnational terrorist organizations is established, and this is important for transnational terrorist organizations to sustain. It is true that the international community should cooperate in the fight against transnational terrorism.

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[249] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., **Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History (4th ed.)**, New York and et. al.: Longman, 2003, p.249

[250] Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, "Terörün Evrimi ve Devletler Sistemi", **Foreign Policy**,Vol: 17-18, (Sep.-Oct./Nov.-Dec., 2001), p. 47

[251] Mehmet Ali Tuğtan asserts as a counter argument that terrorist organizations do not want to be international actors in the post-Cold war era because they desire a total destruction of the international system per se. See Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, "Terörün Evrimi ve Devletler Sistemi" pp. 40-49

[252] Excerpts from the book were published in The Guardian. See Nicholas Watt, "Revealed: Blair's offer to meet masked IRA leaders", **Guardian,** 17 March 2008. Retrieved May 3, 2009 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/17/northernireland.peaceprocess1

However, the identification of and fight against domestic terrorist groups is easy when compared to the identification and fight against transnational terror organizations. Determining the proper strategy to fight against them is more complicated than with domestic terrorism, because one man's terrorist and spawn of evil is another's freedom fighters. It is extremely difficult to control the flow of money and arms in this transnational world. Therefore, "the same measures are not taken against all terrorist groups; while states consider those terrorist groups which conform to their political objectives as legitimate, they see others acting contradictory to their policies as the enemies of peace."[253] For example, while even Al Qaeda is the source of evil for the USA and the West, it is the freedom fighter for those groups which feel alienated from the current system.

Finally, transnational terror organizations make use of tools such as drug trafficking to fund their activities. The Illegal drug trade is probably the most important financial tool for transnational terror organizations. Therefore, terror organizations end up working hand in hand with transnational crime organizations. Transnational crime organizations benefit from the terrorists' martial methods, weapon supplies and the methods they use to infiltrate secret organizations. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, utilize the drug trade as a means of income, and make maximum use of drug traffickers' methods and abilities to launder illicit money accumulated.[254]

In summation, terrorist organizations, which have gained a transnational character after the Cold War, are increasingly accepted as actors in international relations. However, these actors when viewed as asymmetrical threats are different from the traditional security threats for the international community.

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[253] Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, **Globalleşme Senaryosunun Aktörleri: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Mücadelesi (2nd ed.)**, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1997, p.245

[254] Ahmet Pek, "Narko Terrörism", **Türkiye Uyuşturucu ve Uyuşturucu Bağımlılığı İzleme Merkezi**, w.date, p.1-2. Retrieved May 3, 2009 from www.tubim.gov.tr/Dosyalar/Makaleler/Makale_Narko.pdf

1.4.5.2. Transnational Criminal Organizations

In the preface of 'Transnational Organized Crime: Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity, which was published in 2009, the chair Terje Rod-Larsen states that "criminal and violent organizations are gaining control over territory, markets, and populations around the world, complicating peacemaking and generating insecurity."[255] A transnational criminal organization (TOC) is described as a "structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit."[256] The end of the Cold War created a suitable environment in the international system to allow criminal organizations to gain a transnational character.

It can be argued that TOCs today are powerful organizations capable of influencing political as well as economic life, and thus are becoming important actors in international relations. These criminal organizations, which are also referred to as the "mafia" in the language of the street because they "became organizations worthy of a state's attention after they became transnational 'empires' and began to play important roles in the global system."[257]

The main features of transnational crime organizations are summarized by Turkish Public Prosecutor H. Kale Aka as follows: i) Unlike transnational terror organizations, transnational crime organizations do not have a clear organization structure. ii) Within these organizations; individuals capable of

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[255]　International Peace Institute, **Transnational Organized Crime: Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity (Blue Paper No . 2)**, New York, 2009

[256]　Article 2(a), **United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime**, 2000. Retrieved May 6, 2009 from http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf

[257]　Arıboğan, **op. cit.**, p. 239

influencing national and international agenda from the state bureaucracy, judiciary, business world and media can be found. iii) The primary objective of these organizations is economic profit. iv) Their main field of activity are; illegal drug and arms trafficking, trafficking of chemical and biological materials, sexual slavery, the organ trade, illegal trade, the black market, hot money speculation and counterfeiting. v) Transnational organizations use international networks to launder the money that they earn illegally. vi) They interfere in politics to survive, especially in non-democratic countries. Moreover, they can form alliance with states that are expected to fight against them.[258]

How can transnational criminal organizations increasingly grow stronger in spite of international legal restrictions and regulations by the UN? Aka argued that transnational crime organizations have continued their existence and veil their activities under legal institutions (associations, foundations, sports clubs, companies etc.).[259] For example, Colombian drug baron Pablo Escobar managed to become a member of the Colombian Parliament as a member. The efforts of transnational crime organizations to maintain their activities in a respectable way blur the source of the threat.

On the other hand, a "TOC amplifies and transmits other security challenges, such as armed conflict, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and even disease, while undermining the capacity of states, societies, and the international system to respond."[260] A TOC can easily maintain their activities in militarily, politically, economically or socially unstable environments.

Today, it is increasingly becoming difficult to differentiate between transnational criminal organizations and terror organizations. For example, "many

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[258] H. Kale Aka (R. Public Prosecutor), Interview on "Transnational Crime Organizations", Istanbul: 27 April 2009

[259] **Ibid.** Besides Pino Arlacchi, **Mafya Ahlakı: Kapitalizmin Ruhu (3rd ed.),** Fatoş Gencosman (trans.), İstanbul, 2000 provides rich analysis for this argument.

[260] International Peace Institute, **op. cit.**, p. 6

terrorist movements… turned to organized criminal activity to raise funds, typically drug smuggling and protection racketeering."[261] Both organizations' activities to launder money they illegally earn pose a problem for the healthy operation of the international economy. Moreover, due to the off-the-books money, a state's economy becomes prone to the influence of these organizations.

Moreover, these two transnational organizations hold the ability to challenge the state's monopoly over the use armed force. Thus, they can even become alternatives to state force in the case of a failed state's sovereignty. They have even assumed sovereignty in the safe zones they create.[262] For example, the PKK,[263] a terrorist organization active in Turkey, controlled some rural areas in the Southeastern Region between 1992-1995. Similarly, Beyoğlu's Hacı Hüsrev District in Istanbul is known as the mafia's free zone in which drug trafficking is conducted.

1.4.4.3. Health and Environment

Health and environmental problems are not security issues unique to the post-Cold War era. However, they gained prominence as security issues after the end of the Cold War. The primary reason is that states which were not able to overcome in the military and ideological polarization of the Cold War era now

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[261]   Mark Galeotti, "Under World and Upper World: Transnational Organized Crime and Global Society", In W. Wallace and J. Daphne (Ed.) **Non-state Actors in World Politics,** New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 205

[262]   Serdar Akinan, **Kan Uykusu**, Turkye: SkyTurk Televizyon (23 Ocak 2007). See more details in Osman Pamukoğlu, **Unutulanlar Dışında Yeni Bir Şey Yok**, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi, 2004

[263]   The head of PKK revealed the transnational dimension of PKK during his trial: "The relations of Greece with PKK are more or less similar to the relations of Syria with PKK. These relations were started in 1988 with the visit of Badovas and Nagazakis when I was in Lebanon. A couple of years after the establishment of these relations, PKK camps were established in Greece probably in the year of 1994. The youth of PKK were given mostly ideological training in Lavrion Camp". T.C. Ankara Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi Başsavcılığı, "III. Bölüm: Terör Örgütü PKK'nın Bugüne Kadar Gerçekleştirdiği Eylemleri ve Nitelikleri, **Abdullah Öcalan Hakkında İddianme**, Dosya No: 78, 1999.

found they had an opportunity to deal with these problems.[264]

Such threats are of international character and exceed a state's' political borders. Therefore, threats posed by health and environment have become a transnational issue.

5.4.3.1. Health Threats

Formidable numbers of human losses have historically been caused by epidemics and terminal illnesses.

Table 3
The Ten Deadiest Disease Epidemics and Pandemics of All Time

Epidemic/pandemic	Location	Date	Death toll
Black Death	World	1347- 51	75 million
AIDS	World	1981-	23 million
Influenza	World	1918 – 20	21,64 million
Plague	India	1896 – 1948	12 million
Typhus	Eastern Europe	1914 – 1915	3 million
Plague of Justinian	East Mediterranean	541-90	Millions
Cholera	World	1846-60	Millions
Cholera	Europe	1826 – 37	Millions
Cholera	World	1893 – 94	Millions
Smallpox	Mexico	1530-45	1 up to million

Source: Russel Ash, **The Top Ten of Everything 2001**, NewYork: Dorling Kindersley, 2001, p. 31

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[264] It is necessary to note that different approaches conceptualized health and environmental problems in different ways. For example critical approach securitizes environmental and health problems in terms of human security.

Increasing numbers of deaths associated with health problems are accepted by states as a security issue. For example, "Public health issues are discussed in six of the nine chapters of The Strategy and… the introductory letter by President Bush. HIV/AIDS specifically garners six mentions in The Strategy and one in the introductory letter"[265] in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

According to pluralists, it was inevitable that the international community would consider health problems as security issues because "microbial pathogens have particular advantages in terms of invisibility, mobility, adaptability, and silent incubation periods that render national borders meaningless."[266] Health problems are not the types of threat which can be overcome through national security agendas. International cooperation is necessary to cope with these transnational health threats.

The reasons for the transformation of health problems' into transnational problems can be summarized as follows. Firstly, free trade, which was developed as a result of increased interdependence between states, has increased the international flows of goods, services, finance, technology, information and human. This increase in the flow of human and goods has also caused the rapid contagion of diseases such as AIDS and pyrexia. According to UN data:

> "The number of people living with HIV continues to grow, as does the number of deaths due to AIDS. A total of 39.5 million [34.1 million–47.1 million] people were living with HIV in 2006—2.6 million more than in 2004.This figure includes the estimated 4.3 million [3.6 million–6.6 million] adults and children who were newly infected with HIV in 2006, which is about 400, 000 more

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[265]   Harley Feldbaum and et. al., "Global Health and National Security: The Need for Critical Engagement", **Medicine Conflict and Survival**, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul.-Sept., 2003), p. 193

[266]   David L. Heymann, "The Evolving Infectious Disease Threat: Implications for National and Global Security", **Journal of Human Development** Vol. 4, No.2, (Jul., 2003), p. 192

than in 2004."[267]

On the other hand, the transmission of diseases is possible during tourist outings, which can be regarded as short term mobility. Several diseases including AIDS have spread geometrically, particularly because of sex tourism.

In addition, many people migrate to other countries in order to find better living conditions. People coming from different countries are potential transmitters of viruses-causing diseases which hitherto have not witnessed by the people in the country they have immigrated to. These viruses-causing diseases may mutate in new environments and become more dangerous and resistant to medicine. This makes treatment more difficult and may seriously affect the patients. More importantly, it accelerates the spread of incurable contagious diseases throughout the globe.

5.4.3.2. Environmental Threats

The international community now attaches greater importance than ever before to environmental problems because of the drought, floods and heat waves, severe hurricanes, etc., have created global climatic change. The "approximately 40% decrease[268] in the earth's forest cover from 1990 to 2010" is a problem that the international community faces and has to find a solution for.

Environmental issues have earned popularity when discussed in the security context of the post-Cold War period. Michael Sheehan classifies environmental problems arising from security threats into four sub-groups. The first group of threats posed by environmental problems is related to the disruption

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[267] "AIDS Epidemic Update", **UNAIDS,** (Dec., 2006). Retrieved February 1, 2009 from http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf
[268] Marison Touraine, **Altüst Olan Dünya: 21. Yüzyılın Jeopolitiği** (trans. by Turhan Ilgaz), Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997, p. 188

of ecosystems. The second group stems from the depletion and uneven distribution of scarce (renewable or non-renewable) natural resources. The third is the result of the effects of human population growth, such as the pressures caused by major population movements, excessive consumption and waste, pollution, and overuse of natural resources. The fourth group is linked to food scarcity.[269] Needless to say, environmental threats are the causes of both environmental degradation and scarcity either of which may lead to competition and conflicts between states.

Environmental degradation may produce social, economic or political stabilities in a given state, or may generate conflicts between states. "The most salient environmental effects in this context are the degradation of agricultural land, deforestation, and overuse of water and other renewable resources."[270] Environmental degradation may also happen because of "the mass production of greenhouse gases or chemicals such as CFCs that erode the protective ozone layer, or exploitative or polluting activities that diminish the supply of oxygen to the atmosphere by killing off forests and plankton."[271] The loss of agricultural land because of climate change or acid rain in undeveloped countries will result in the immigration of the population which cannot provide for their livelihood. In the early 1990s, one of the reasons for the mass immigration of Haitians to the U.S was the negative impact of forest loss and ensuing erosion on the agricultural life of the country.[272] In the medium term this slow process of coming to terms with these issues will likely produce distrust in the international community. Environmental degradation may also cause in-state instabilities. Although the Philippines has suffered from "serious internal strife for many decades, its underlying causes may be changing: population displacement, deforestation and land degradation appear to be increasingly powerful forces driving the current

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[269]   Sheehan. **op. cit.**, p. 102-103

[270]   Terrif and et. al., **op. cit.**, p. 122

[271]   Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", **International Affairs**, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 431-451

[272]   Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "Çevre Sorunları ve Uluslararası Politika", In **Uluslararası İlişkiler Yıllığı Özel Sayı: Prof. Dr. Esat Çam'a Armağan**, İstanbul: İstanbul İktisat Fakültesi Rektörlük Yayınları, 2000, p. 190

communist-led insurgency."[273]

On the other hand, environmental scarcity may be "contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity."[274] For example, Sudan and Egypt may have a conflict due to the Nile water. This issue between Sudan and Egypt is seen throughout the whole Middle East.

Efforts by the international community to cooperate against both health and environmental threats are necessary because the nature of health and environmental problems is a natural point of conflict between states.

1.4.6. MEANS OF SECURITY

Pluralists proposed non-military security tools in the post-Cold War era because interdependence has increased, although they acknowledge the existence of military security tools.

1.4.6.1 Democratic Peace

The 'democratic peace' proposed by pluralists and inspired by Immanuel Kant is based on the assertion that security can be achieved through non-military methods. The Democratic Peace Theory argues that democracies are "inherently more peaceful than autocratic states… although democracies seem to fight wars as

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[273] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", **International Security**, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Autumn, 1991), p. 83

[274] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases", **International Security**, Vol. 19. No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 6

often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another"[275] and are also "more likely to settle mutual conflict of interest short of the threat or use of any military force"[276] These arguments are valid when posed between democratic states.

The UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in her speech addressed to the Czechoslovakian Parliament in 1990, stated "If we can create a great area of democracy stretching from the West coast of the United States right across to the Soviet Far East, that would give us the best guarantee of all for security because democracies do not go to war with each other!"[277]

It is noteworthy that the Iron Lady asserted that the formula of for a secure world depends on the formation of a wide area of practicing democracy, even though it was difficult to estimate how the post- Cold War era would be formed. Likewise, Clinton blessed the democratic regime in terms of security: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.[278] According to Thatcher and Clinton, democracy could be the norm of compromise between states, because the arms race during the Cold War eroded states' economies, and even caused the collapse of the USSR's economic system. Moreover, wars or fights were likely to erupt during the post-Communist states' reconstruction period. Therefore, it was attractive for many people to maintain the security of the international community through the norm of a democratic regime rather than by using traditional tools.

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[275] Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", **Foreign Policy**, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), p. 39
[276] Baylis, **op. cit.**, p. 309
[277] Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Czechoslovak Federal Assembly", Czechoslovakia, 18 September 1990. Retrieved Jun. 7, 2009 from http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/thatcher-speech-9-18-90_9890abc557.pdf
[278] William Jefferson Clinton, **State of the Union**, Washington D.C., 25 January 1994, p. 132

How do democratic regimes operate in such a way that they create a norm of compromise between states and put and end, as much as possible, to wars between democratic states? Doyle answers this question with the following three components: "Republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence"[279]

In democratic regimes, the existence of a free and just election mechanisms and the possibility for the opposition to attain power are preserved. "This encourages a reversal of disastrous policies as electorates punish the party in power with electoral defeat."[280] Besides, "power dividing institutions prevent democracies from waging war."[281] In authoritarian regimes, the fact that the division between legislative, executive and judiciary powers does not function as it does in democratic regimes, removes the checks and balances between institutions. The decision to go to war depends on the will of only one individual or a specific group.

Democratic regimes also favour liberal states that respect human rights. "Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war."[282] In democratic regimes, the individual participates in the decision-making mechanisms directly or through civil society organizations. The possibility of becoming an authoritarian regime decreases in direct proportion to the participation of the individuals in the decision-making process of the state.

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[279] Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace", **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), p. 463

[280] **Ibid.**, p. 464

[281] Dianne Panke and Thomas Risse, "Liberalism", In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and S. Smith (Ed.) **IR Theories Discipline and Diversity**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 96

[282] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), p. 1151

Finally, more intense free trade between democratic societies increases the interdependence between states. This "creates incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war."[283] Since the increased trading relations between democratic states create reciprocal benefits, traditional habits to ensure security start to lose their ground.

"Political dictatorship and economically closed societies, the administration has consistently maintained, pose a grave threat to international security because they are incubators for transnational terrorism."[284] For this reason the democratic peace theory considers the democratic states' fight against authoritarian regimes, which are sources of asymmetrical threats, a legitimate response. However, it must be noted that democratic peace is not a recipe which brings and end to transnational terrorism. Eubank and Weinberg present evidence that democracy do not reduce the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a country.[285] In democratic communities, the principle of limiting the individual's rights and freedoms as little as possible gives transnational terrorism fertile ground in which to grow. On the other hand, Quan Li concludes that

> "democratic participation reduces transnational terrorism in ways in addition to those conceived in the literature. It increases satisfaction and political efficacy of citizens, reduces their grievances, thwarts terrorist recruitment, and raises public tolerance of counterterrorist policies."[286]

In sum, no war has been observed between truly democratic states since 1945. However, it is very difficult to consider the pluralist recipe of democratic

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[283]   Doyle, **Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace**, p. 465

[284]   James A. Piazza, "Do Democracy and Free Markets Prevent Us From Terrorism?", **International Politics**, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), p. 72

[285]   "The articles of William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg in which they drew the same conclusion through different data are noteworthy." Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol. 6, No.4, (Winter, 1994), pp. 417-43. and "Terrorism and democracy: What recent events disclose", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.10, No.1, (Spring, 1998) 155-64

[286]   Quan Li "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 49, No. 2 The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism (Apr., 2005), p. 294

peace as a means of solution to transnational threats.

1.4.5.2. International Institutions

Pluralists believe that cooperation between states is inevitable to control and cope with security threats. The first reason is a state's capacity to fight these threats are limited. The second is a state's feeling of obligation because "political systems owe their viability and legitimacy to their effectiveness in servicing the public order, commercial, ecological, cultural and justice needs of communities."[287] The inability of states to produce solutions to threats means their sovereignty will be questioned. As a result, "effective decision making for both domestic and international affairs now requires centralization or collaboration between governments in an increasing numbers of areas."[288] At this point, the pluralists propose international institutions which encourage cooperation between states.

Pluralists "treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, and that they expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant common interests."[289] However, even if states wish to cooperate, "they often worry about the potential for others to cheat…. But they also face the problem of coordinating their actions on a particularly stable cooperative outcome."[290] However, the security climate of the post-Cold War era necessitated states first to communicate with each other and then cooperate. The advantage presented by international institutions in coping with transnational terrorism, transnational organized crimes and similar threats is, according to the pluralists, irrefutable for each state.

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[287] Seyom Brown, "Security: Challenges for a New Century", In M. T. Klare and Y. Chandrani **World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security (3rd ed.)**, New York: St. Martin Press, 1998, p.4

[288] Morse, **op. cit.**, p. 3

[289] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutuonalist Theory", **International Security**, Vol. 20, No.1 (Summer, 1995), p. 39

[290] **Ibid.**, p. 45

Although international institutions are regarded as non-functional, especially by realists, "even powerful states have an interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since general conformity to rules makes the behaviour of other states more predictable"[291] Consequently, the tension of the power struggle caused by uncertainties between states will be eased. The transaction cost of cooperation will decrease after an increase in information sharing and communication between the parties, thanks to these international institutions. Moreover, institutions create an environment which enables non-state actors to contribute to solving security problems.

Besides, "institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time." [292] Pluralists specifically point to the functionality of international institutions because they highlight the idea of absolute gain instead of relative gain. In this context, a state's capability to negotiate becomes important. However, pluralists did not argue that the negotiations conducted through the agency of international institutions are independent from the current distribution of power.

On the other hand, Pluralists argue that, "rather than imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfil their own purposes."[293] This pluralistic approach, which encourages the existence of a higher power binding states or cooperation instead of authority, has proven suitable for the developments of the post-Cold War era.

In conclusion, the security agenda of the post-Cold War era indicates that transnational threats have become prominent. Since a state's singular capacity to

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[291]   Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", **Foreign Policy**, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), p. 86
[292]   Keohane and Martin, **op. cit.**, p. 45- 46
[293]   Keohane, **op. cit.**, p. 87

cope with such threats alone are limited, the benefits of international institutions for states can not be ignored. Moreover, they can benefit from the contributions of non-state actors to solve security problems.

1.4.6. EVALUATION

It is unquestionable true that pluralists consider the state as *the* security actor; however, the state should take into consideration the contributions or solutions of non-state actors, which have the capacity to influence the international system, to solve security problems.

Pluralists consider states, which are the main actors of the system, as referent objects. States are potentially threatened by the activities of non-state actors, and are open to threats not only of a military but also a non-military character. These threats are of a transnational character and may affect more than one state at the same time.

Among the most important transnational threats are transnational terrorism, transnational crime organizations, environmental and health problems. It is very difficult for states to cope with these threats alone.

Pluralists consider a democratic regime the norm which should be adopted by states in order to maintain security in the international community. According to pluralists, international institutions are the mechanisms which can contribute to the international actors' on security issues.

2. PART:
SECURITY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE CONTEX OF CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

2.1. SECURITY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FIRST COLD WAR

In the first chapter, the characteristics of the first Cold War, within which a strict bipolar international system was current, were summarized. Not surprisingly, European integration was influenced by the international system in which states seek power and the determining factor in interstate relations is power in so far as European integration was introduced as a security project.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the security dimension of European integration from a realist security perspective and to answer the following question: To what extent does the security dimension of European integration overlap with the national security approach that is prominent in the international system?

2.1.1. SECURITY ACTOR: MEMBER STATES

According to classical realism, the state is the security actor. Therefore, the original six founding members should be taken as the security actors within the perspective of European integration. Since the USA and the UK played an important role in the realization of European integration, the consideration of these two states as (indirect) security actors will render the study more meaningful.

2.1.1.1. France

France can be considered formally prominent in European integration since Jean Monnet, who set the theoretical foundations of European integration, and Robert Schuman, who presented the principals of the integration to world politics with a declaration bearing his name, were both French citizens. Also, France was again coming into prominence in terms of the content because

"France correctly perceived that its long-term strategic interests lay primarily in the European continent. France led the process of integration with the political field largely free of serious competition since Germany and Italy could hardly take a lead in the immediate postwar period, while Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands could not match French economic and military power."[294]

France, which was more powerful than the other Western European states, did not want conditions in Europe to decay until European security was threatened. This is the main France acted jointly with the USA and the UK in the reconstruction of postwar Europe. Also, however, France was not in a position to conduct the postwar reshaping of Europe alone.

In the postwar era, it was necessary for France to form a strategic alliance with the USA and the UK, but this was not enough. France had to recover her national power because France intended to play a leading role in the region. In this context, the Monnet Plan for Modernization and Re-equipment of the French Economy was launched in 1946. The plan aimed to

"reconstruct and modernize the French economy and to enable French exports to compete in international economy. By concentrating six basic sectors of the economy the plan aimed to replace the products of German heavy industry and in markets formerly supplied by Germany…The government was committed to an ideology of growth which would both raise living standards and provide France with a greater measure of security vis-à-vis Germany; a security which would not depend on international agreement but on French strength."[295]

[294] Phlip Ruttley, "The Long Road to Unity: The Contribution of Law to the Process of European Integration Since 1945", In A. Pagden (Ed.), **The Idea of Europe From Antiquity to the European Union**, Cambridge and et.al.: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 230

[295] Frances M. B. Lynch, "Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction", **The Economic History Review**, New Series, Vol. 37, No. 2 (May, 1984), p. 232-233

In fact, even though France's attempts as a security actor to maximize her power through stalemating policies against Germany can be considered consistent with the principles of the realist approach, it is doubtful that these policies were called for by the framework of this approach. It was evident that France would not be able to maximize her power by ignoring the interests of other security actors (the USA and the UK) with which she allied. Moreover, it became depressingly clear that the international system, which was formed after the First World War and caused the Second World War, did not work out. The most important objective of the new international system formed after the war was that it did not pave the way for another world war.

One of the key issues concerning the realization of this objective was the position of Germany in the postwar era. The USA and the UK "always remained aware of the perceived failure of the Versailles peace treaty for peacefully integrating Germany into the community of nations following the First World War." The USA and the UK believed that a pseudo-peace order that could make Germany hostile would present a threat to the security of Western Europe.

Because of this fear, the USA and the UK, in the London Conference (1948), pioneered the decision to found West Germany, which would be based on a liberal democracy. France had no choice but to approve the foundation of West Germany. "If France opposed the emergence of a West German state, the British and Americans could go ahead anyway in their Bizone and France would appear as an adversary of German democratic revival."[296] Moreover, France would not have been able to preserve its national interests against Germany and the USSR in the postwar period without the support of the USA and the UK. As a result, even though France was always apprehensive of Germany's aggression, politics that had been built on "the traditional view that French political and economic strength

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[296]   Martin Dedman, **The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95: A History of European Integration**, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 60

lay in German weakness"[297] had to be revised in the context of international system.

"Following the 1948 London Conference, Robert Schuman recognized the urgent need for a radical change in French policy towards Germany."[298] France was still defining West Germany as a potential threat for its security and had to find another tactic in accordance with the strategy of power politics to provide its security. In this context, France announced the Schuman Plan on 9 May 1950. According to the plan "the reassemblement of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any actions taken must in this first place concern these two countries."[299] The Schuman plan hoped to create a situation in which "any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible."[300] When The Schuman Plan was declared, it created a stir in the public opinion and brought an idealist approach to ensure peace on the continent. At first glance, it can be argued that France, as a security actor with an idealist approach, intended to put an end to the traditional enmity in continental Europe by proposing Franco-German cooperation in a sector that caused the war. The fact that "the plan was designed to serve both national and wider interests"[301] substantiated the argument that France developed an idealist approach for the construction of post-war Europe.

However, after a careful analysis of the Schuman Plan, it can be seen that French national interests were plainly protected. For example: "France feared that its steel industry would not be able to compete with its German counterpart"[302] and she thought that if France fell behind West Germany in the coal and steel

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[297]   Frances M. B. Lynch, **op. cit.**, p. 242
[298]   Dedman, **op. cit.**, p. 60
[299]   "The Schuman Declaration", 9 May 1950, In C. Hill and K. E. Smith: **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 13 - 15
[300]   **Ibid.**
[301]   Robert A. Jones, The **Politics and Economics of the European Union (2nd ed)**, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2001, p. 11
[302]   **Ibid.** ,p. 11

sectors, which formed the basis of economic development at that time, Germany would recover her strength and once again become a military threat to France. Therefore, with this plan, France was "keen to end the dual pricing of coal (with German domestic coal prices lower than for exported coal) and discriminatory freight rate that in 1950 made the price of German coke in Lorraine, France, 46 per cent higher than the Ruhr".[303] France wanted to boost her economy and have indirect control over West Germany with the Schuman Plan. Moreover, according to Robert Jones, thanks to the plan, France was to be provided with an opportunity to play a leading role in European developments.[304] Hence, the Schuman Plan was written according to the national security and economic interests of France and was consistent with the realist approach of the time. Furthermore, the author of this plan, France, was the most important security actor of the European integration.

2.1.1.2.   Other member states: West Germany, Italy, Belgium the Netherlands, Luxembourg

West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg agreed to join the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) offered by the Schuman Plan, but "the negotiations between the six states that did wish to participate were marked by hard bargaining in defense of national interests."[305] In order to understand European integration's security perspective at that time, it is necessary to know why the other five member states approved the Schuman Plan, which was to serve the national interests of France..

[303]   A. S. Milward, **Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51,** London: Methuen, 1984, p. 378-379, quoted from Dedman, **op. cit.**, p.61
[304]   Jones, **op. cit.,** p. 11
[305]   Stephen George and Ian Bache, **Politics in the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 57

2.1.1.2.1. West Germany

Although West Germany was founded in 1949, it was not considered a fully sovereign state because the USA and other allied states were closely involved with West Germany's foreign policy decisions. "The Occupation Statute prohibited full responsibility for foreign affairs, defense and or foreign trade and ownership and decartelization of Ruhr industries".[306] For this reason, West Germany was not considered a real security actor.

West Germany aimed to maximize its advantages by signing the Treaty of Paris (1951) and becoming a future security actor. First of all, Germany wanted "the removal of irksome constraints and to obtain full sovereignty for this fledgling state."[307] For instance, through the ECSC West Germany would be able to get rid of IAR, which was a major obstacle to her political and economical sovereignty.

> "Politically it was important….that the region be integrated into the Federal Republic. Economically, the Ruhr had always been one of the powerhouses of the German Industrial economy, so it was important to the prospects of economic recovery that it be unchained from the restrictions that the IAR placed on its industrialists."[308]

According to the Agreement for an International Authority for Ruhr (IAR), the agreement shall "continue in force until the coming into effect of a peace settlement for Germany and thereafter as provided in such peace settlement."[309] The West German policymakers considered the ECSC a framework which would be able to terminate the IAR. They were even promised

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[306]   Dedman, **op. cit.**, p. 63
[307]   **Ibid.**, p. 63
[308]   George and Bach, **op. cit.**, p. 60
[309]   Article 32, **Agreement for an International Authority for Ruhr**, Retrieved Mar. 5, 2008, from http://www.ena.lu/

this during the negotiations. As a matter of fact, the members[310] of the IAR were to agree on a protocol terminating functions of IAR on 21 December 1951.[311]

Secondly, West Germany needed to gain international acceptance. The German nation was almost a pariah because of the heritage of the Nazi era. West Germany was eager to integrate with the international community as a new peaceable state embracing Western values. This agreement was to pave the way for West Germany to obtain a respectable place in the international community and to be considered as a peaceable nation. Finally, the Federal Chancellor Adenauer was a strong anti-communist. Therefore he wished West Germany to articulate the capitalism of the West.

According to some, Federal Chancellor Adenauer wanted West Germany to become a party to this agreement because he was a federalist who believed in European integration. Contrary to popular belief, the foreign policies of states were not shaped according to ideal motives in the first Cold War. In fact, the Federal Chancellor showed an interest in the Schuman Plan on realist grounds and signed the Treaty of Paris, just as French foreign policymakers had proposed the Schuman Plan according to motives consistent with their country's interests.

2.1.1.2.2. Italy

Italy was not a fully functioned security actor because political regime in Italy was threatened by communism. "At the end of the war there had been a serious risk that Italian Communist Party would take over the country in democratic

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[310]   Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherland, the Northern Ireland, the U.K. the U.S.A.

[311]   "Six-Power Protocol Relating to The Proposed Agreement for Termination of the Ruhr Agreement", **Information Bulletin**, (January, 1952), University of Wisconsin, Madison Libraries, Retrieved March 14, 2009 from http://images.library.wisc.edu/History/EFacs/GerRecon/omg1952Jan/reference/history. ommg1952jan.i0023.pdf The protocol turned into the international agreement once it was officially signed by parties in Paris on 25 July 1952. The Agreement was registered by the U.K. and Northern Ireland on 15 June 1959. See Appendix for details given by Ali Soysüren, Ph.D. candidate at Law Faculty of Marmara University.

elections, and it remained the largest single party in terms of support."[312] Communism was a serious security threat for Italy both externally and internally. "Geographically, it had a land frontier with the Communist state of Yugoslavia, and only the Adriatic Sea separated it from Albania."[313] Accordingly, "Italy did not so much choose Europe as get chosen by the United States to participate in the construction of (Western) Europe."[314] Although Italy became a member of NATO, ECSC membership would also allow Italy to establish a relationship with the capitalist West. Besides, Italy had lost her international prestige due to the Second World War. Italy hoped to be accepted as a prestigious state in the international society. Italian Prime Minister Di Gasperi believed that Italy gained much political credit thanks to being member of the ECSC.

According to Irwing, "whereas European integration has aroused little interest (with the exception of European Defense Community), the opposite has been true of…. NATO."[315] Italy considered the European integration, not as a new formation the philosophical grounds of which she embraced, but as a complementary tool which would secure her security.

2.1.1.2.3. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg

Most of the resources which cover the issue of European integration argue that these three states looked on the Schuman Plan with favor upon more or less the same grounds. First of all, all three states wanted to be a part of the Plan due to the fact that the Plan had an argument which would preclude war in continental Europe. For instance, Belgium is

> "located between France, England, and the Germanic world, whose rivalry has been the main cause of conflict in Europe. She also

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[312]   George and Bach, **op. cit.**, p. 60
[313]   **Ibid.**, p. 60
[314]   F. Roy Willis, **Italy Chooses Europe**, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, quoted from R. E. M. Irwing, "Italy's Christian Democrats and European Integration", p. 400
[315]   R. E. M. Irving, "Italy's Christian Democrats and European Integration" **International Affairs**, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 1976), p. 401

occipies a key position which the great powers seeking to dominate Europe fight over to perpetuate their hegemony."[316]

Lagenhove stated that "a European war means destruction, plunder, enemy occupation, blockade, the stoppage of economic life, and ruin"[317] for Belgium. Lagenhove's argument was also valid for the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were attracted by the promise of the Schuman Plan to put an end to the power struggles between Germany and France because another war between Germany and France would threaten the security of these three states. Since they considered the integration as suitable for their national security interests, they wanted to join the ECSC.

On the other hand, coal and steel were "essential to the economies of the three states, and there was a high degree of interdependence between industries in the border regions of France and Germany."[318] The three states therefore could not have been indifferent to the integration between their cross-border neighbors, France and West Germany, in the coal and steel sectors.

2.1.1.3. The USA and the UK

The USA and the UK were indirect security actors in the context of European integration. The main reason of the two states' support for European integration after World War II hinged on their security concerns.

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[316] F. van Langenhove, "Belgium's Role in Europe", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 247, Belgium in Transition (Sep., 1946), p. 160
[317] **Loc.cit.**
[318] George and Bach, **op. cit.**, p. 60

2.1.1.3.1. The USA

According to Morgenthau, USA policy with regard to Europe has traditionally been "to maintain or, if need be, to restore the balance of power."[319] The USA, throughout its history, has always been concerned about its security if the balance of power in Europe changed in favour of any European state. The USA joined both of the world wars in order to prevent any possible change in the balance of power in favour of Germany. In a parallel situation with the USSR, "when Germany's defeat appeared assured, the United States tried unsuccessfully at Yalta to prevent the expansion of Russian Power in the Eastern and Central Europe."[320] The USA comprehended Soviet power and influence. Therefore, the USA attempted to hinder Soviet the hegemony on the continent because the USA considered the balance of power which was developing in favour of Soviets in postwar Europe as a potential threat to its security. The USA was aware of the fact that the way of preventing the balance of power from changing against its interests was through an increase in the power of the Western European states.

Western European states were experiencing economic problems because of the effects of the war. Famine, poverty, health problems, and destroyed infrastructure fed political instability. US Foreign Minister George Marshall stated unless the USA gave economic aid to Western Europe, they would "face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character."[321] Without a doubt, this condition would have increased the risk of Western European political regimes being controlled by pro-Soviet communist parties.

Furthermore, it was impossible for Western European states to resist Soviet expansion. In general, the war substantially damaged the Western

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[319] Hans J. Morgenthau, **A New Foreign Policy for the United States**, New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, p.157
[320] **Ibid.**, p. 163
[321] George C. Marshall, "Commencement address at Harvard University", Cambridge, Massachusetts, 5 June 1947, In T. Salmon and Sir W. Nicoll (Ed.) **Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis**, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 28 - 30

European states' military capabilities. In particular, Western Germany had no armaments. The militaries of Belgium and Luxembourg, which had better economic situations than other Western European states in the postwar era, were not powerful enough to pose a deterrent force against the Soviets. Under these circumstances, it was likely the Soviets would achieve hegemony in continental Europe.

In order to balance power in Europe, the USA "had to become a European power by adding its resources in vital permanence to those of the European nations threatened by Soviet hegemony."[322] In order to prevent Soviet domination of Europe and to maximize the powers of Western European states, "the United States promoted the economic unification of Western Europe thorough the Marshall Plan and support for the European Communities and its military unification through NATO."[323] The USA considered European integration in the reconstruction era of Europe an important tool to maintain the balance of power on the continent. For this reason, the USA supported European integration for its own security interests.

Another important reason for the USA to support European integration was that the USA did not want another power in the Western Hemisphere to challenge its own hegemony. Through integration the member states' economic welfare levels would increase and communist ideology would lose its magnetism. Moreover, the member states of integration would naturally prevent any country among them from growing stronger in a way that would damage the balance of power.

2.1.1.3.2. The UK

Although she was not a member of the ECSC, the UK became an indirect security actor of European Integration. The UK stood aloof from European Integration

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[322] Morgenthau, **op. cit.**, p. 164
[323] **Loc.cit**

because British policymakers believed that "it would terminate Britain's close relationship with the United States and prevent any special British influence over American policy."[324] The UK's influence over the superpower, the USA, enabled it to have an effective role in the Western Hemisphere. The UK would not have relinquished such a privilege by joining European integration, which it considered of a federative nature. However, the UK supported European integration from the outside in order to maintain its influence over the USA and increase its power with the assistance of the USA.

It should also be pointed out that the UK was not ready for devolving (partial) sovereignty rights to a supranational organization. The nation-state already seemed a proper political model for the UK, "whose frontiers have remained unchanged since the Act of Union of 1707 – than it does to residents if a continent where states have been constantly revised, created or destroyed by war and treaty."[325] Therefore, the British people had usually felt secure for many decades compared to the people of continental Europe. Moreover, the fact that "the British people emerged from the last war undefeated and unoccupied"[326] strengthened their loyalties to their state.

Besides, the UK "cannot afford to submit her political and economic relations with the dominions and Empire to the decisions of European system in which Britain would be a minority."[327] The UK was not a superpower in the post-war era; however, it maintained its imperial character and attitude through the Commonwealth. The UK didn't endorse sacrificing its privileged position in the Commonwealth in exchange for an uncertain adventure in Europe's future integration.

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[324]   Carol Edler Baumann, "Britain Faces Europe", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Sep., 1959), p. 361
[325]   Allan Hovey, Jr., "Britain and the Unification of Europe" **International Organization**, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1955), p. 333
[326]   **Ibid.**, p. 333
[327]   Hovey, **op. cit.**, p. 332

Finally, the economic reason for the UK's staying outside of the European integration was its rich coal mines. British policymakers didn't want to give up their coal mines, which they considered an important tool to stimulate their industries, to continental Europe, and they did not want the continental European states to intervene in the decision-making processes in this crucial sector. This attitude of the UK is consistent with real politics.

How did the UK serve as a security actor in the early period of European integration? To answer this question, one should follow the chronology of security initiations among Western Europeans. First of all, the UK and France "mutually promised automatic military assistance in the event of an armed attack by Germany" in The Treaty of Dunkirk (1947). With this treaty the UK and France identified Germany as a threat. One year later, the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty (1948). The treaty "extended to the Benelux countries the promise of automatic military assistance. While …. it explicitly mentioned the contingency of renewed German aggression, its main purpose was to organize against the Soviet menace."[328] It can be argued that the security threats (another attack by Germany, the expansionist policy of Soviets) that paved the way for European integration were defined by these treaties which were pioneered by the UK. Furthermore, the UK laid the groundwork for NATO (1949) for those states which would be united under the umbrella of the USA.

In sum, the UK believed that

> "the strengthening and maintenance of Western Security could be achieved through an organization in which Canada and the United States played their full part; Western Europe could not stand alone. Therefore, the formation of federal Europe in itself would not help to solve the basic problem of British and European Security."[329]

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[328]   **Ibid.**, p. 328
[329]   Baumann, **op. cit.**, p. 362

The UK thought that European integration would propose a solution to the security problems of continental European countries. Speaking at Zurich University, Sir Winston Churchill initiated European integration. In his speech, he stated "We must build a kind of United States of Europe…The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe."[330] The UK supported an integration of Europe from outside for its own security. It is notable here that the UK was prominent in Europe inasmuch as it acted as the spokesman for European integration.

2.1.2. REFERENT OBJECT: MEMBER STATES

Adolf Hitler's aggressive role had been key in making the Second World War the most destructive in history. Hitler, in his book, "My Struggle", had advocated the superiority of Aryans over other races, and had envisaged a territory that reached to the Ural Mountains. In his book, he had argued that the Aryan race was supposed to expand to the East in order to grow up, and he believed it would be necessary to invade Europe. Hitler's passions and aggressive character had threatened the European states. Moreover, the Western European states were also threatened by Stalin, who was even more passionate and aggressive. It should be kept in mind that Stalin started the Great Terror in order to establish his domestic rule, and was responsible for the death of more people than Hitler's holocaust. Stalin showed his character by not hesitating to enter the war in order to make the Soviet Union a superpower. The Soviets, with an evil leader like Stalin, posed a clear threat to the security of the Western European states.

Another reason states can be considered the referent object according to the realists is that interstate relations take place in an anarchic environment. It is highly likely that states can clash or fight as they are pursuing a course to assure

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[330]   Winston Churchill, "Tragedy of Europe", Zurih University, 19 September 1946, In T. Salmon and Sir W. Nicoll (Ed.) **Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis**, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 26 - 28

their security and achieve their objectives in an anarchic structure. The anarchic environment within Europe, which is fuelled by the military, political, economic and social problems of the states, renders the Western European states referent objects. As a matter of fact, the Marshall Plan, which was prepared by the USA, was nothing but the product of an understanding which considered the member states as referent objects.

In his speech at Harvard University, George C. Marshall pointed to the communist threat in Europe, expressed the urgency of economic aid for the European security, and implied that the European states had no power to resist the communist threat without external assistance. It was evident under these circumstances that the European states were unable to fulfill their main functions, including safeguarding their own security.

The European Recovery Program (ERP), which was projected by the Marshall Plan, was put into action after negotiations with the states which would benefit from the aid. The ERP would lead to "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."[331] The USA, by making availability for aid contingent on having a liberal economy, made the first move of the Cold War's polarization.

In the context of ERP "from 1948 to mid-1952, more than $13 billion was distributed to fourteen countries in the form of direct aid, loan guarantees, grants and necessities from medicine to mules."[332] Besides, the plan "tried to encourage European policy-makers to boost consumer spending (in order to reduce discontent and the likely spread of the communist virus), and break free to rigid social hierarchies of the past in a kind of New European Deal."[333] The Marshall Plan hoped allow Western European society to maintain its economic habits. Consequently, Western European society would stay loyal to a

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[331]   Marshall, **op. cit.**
[332]   Best et. al., **op. cit.**, p. 222. See more details in Appendix
[333]   Mark Mazover, **Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century**, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, p. 295

consumption economy and communist or socialist regimes would lose their attraction. Besides, the USA in accordance with her medium-term aim believed that

> "the multilateral European arrangements were a prerequisite for the continent's economic recovery. A joint plan would eliminate duplication and waste, maximize intra-European trade and transfers, and increase efficiency. The more fundamental consideration was whether the ERP should set Western Europe on a path that would lead from integration to economic and / or political Union."[334]

Through the Marshall Plan, the USA promoted a culture of cooperation among the Western European states, believing that a messy, partite political structure in Western Europe would be unable to eliminate the Soviet threat. As for the Western Europeans, they needed the Marshall aid in order to fulfill their basic functions because they were not able to combat either internal or external threats.

2.1.3. THREAT

Within the perspective of European integration, two important threats during the era of the first Cold War should be mentioned. The first one is the expansion of Soviet communism, which can be classified as an objective threat. The second, a subjective threat, is the revival of Germany as a political power.

2.1.3.1. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union can be considered an objective threat within the perspective of European integration. The Soviets aimed to be the hegemonic power in Europe and saw European integration as a US-aided threat to her own security. Therefore the Soviets Union sought "to oust United States forces and bases and to destroy all

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[334] Diane B. Kunz, "The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 76, No. 3. (May – Jun., 1997), p. 169

the organizations and institutions established to promote Western unity." [335] The withdrawal of the USA from Western European security would result in the absolute Soviet hegemony on the continent. France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would probably fall into the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Soviet Union desired one Germany under her control. She tried to "dissolve the ties between Western Germany and its allies, and to incorporate Western Germany into a unified Germany under Soviet rule, which would enable the Soviet Union to control all of Europe."[336] The Soviets explicitly manifested this attitude in the process of EDC Treaty. "On March 10, 1952, the Kremlin dispatched a note to the other three occupying powers posing free elections throughout all of German to select a government for a reunified, rearmed neutral state."[337] One Germany with a neutral status would be more proper for Soviets' national interests in Europe. The proposal was not taken seriously since it was incongruous with the security interests of the USA, the UK and France.

The problem of Germany being controlled caused the second Berlin crisis in 1958. The member states felt the immediacy of the Soviet threat. The split among the NATO states during the Suez crisis and the launching of a Soviet satellite into the space (January 1958) increased the political prestige and self-confidence of the Soviets. The international consensus was in favour of the Soviets. They once again put the "policy of establishing a security cordon in Middle Europe"[338], which resulted in failure on the agenda because in the mid 1950s USA decided to accept West Germany into NATO and provide atomic weapons to this state. In this context, on account of the fact that the invasion of West Berlin violated the security of East Germany, on 27 November, 1958 the

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[335] Robert F. Byrnes, "Soviet Policy toward Western Europe Since Stalin", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 303, Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems (Jan., 1956), p. 167
[336] **Ibid.** p. 167
[337] Keylor, **op. cit.,** p. 52
[338] Sander, **op. cit.,** p. 312

Soviets delivered a note to the USA, England and France demanding that they withdraw their soldiers in 6 months. They announced that unless this was done, all authority in Berlin would be assigned to East Germany, implying that the West would have to recognize East Germany officially.[339] De Gaulle maintained a nonconciliatory attitude regarding the Berlin issue and did not want to leave the matter to the USA—Soviet initiative. West Germany's Chancellor Adenaur thought in the same way as De Gaulle. In fact, this crisis was the start for the strategic association to be established between brothers.

The diplomatic negotiations carried out from 3 - 4 July, 1961 did not achieve any results. Moreover, the decisive attitude of the Soviets during the Kennedy-Krushchev summit led to a deeper crisis. Finally the problem was partially solved by building the Berlin Wall, which separated East and West Berlin (13 August 1961). The Soviets thereby separated East Berlin from the rest of Berlin and brought it under the control of East Germany.[340] In a sense, they created a Middle Europe security corridor.

The second menace emanating from the Soviet Union was communism, which threatened the Western political regimes.

> "Every government in Western Europe, particularly the weak and unstable governments of France and Italy, is sensitive to the various forms of pressure which the Soviet government generates through its network of organizations and its vast propaganda system."[341]

Western European communist parties and the organisations influenced by Soviet communism posed a threat to the Western regimes. Communists took part in the governments formed in the post-war era in the Western European states.

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[339] Armaoğlu, **op. cit.**, p. 592
[340] **Ibid.**, 599
[341] Byrnes, **op. cit.**, p. 168

Among Western European societies, there was a feeling of sympathy towards communists since they played an important role in resistance movements during the war. Western European society, which was struggling with political, economic and social problems, would appeal to communist regimes.

However, the communist parties in Western European states were threatening the security of these states whether or not they were a part of the governments. "The parties whose loyalty to the Soviet Union was unquestioned, both by the hostile foreign observers and the Soviets themselves, were also available for spying, sabotage, resistance to mobilization, and other covert activities."[342] For instance, West German communist parties sought to forestall the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty to which the Soviet Union was opposed. The possibility that the Soviets might change regimes with military coups after creating the appropriate conditions by means of the communist parties' effects on member states, unions and other organizations, was disturbing to the member states. Their concern was not irrational because

> "the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which had previously accepted the rules of parliamentary democracy and participated with non-communist parties in a governing coalition, staged a coup d'Etat that transformed that once proudly democratic country into a one single party state subservient to Moscow."[343]

In conclusion, as far as the member states were concerned, communism was nothing more than the threat of being invaded by the Soviets.

2.1.3.2. Revival of Germany

Historical evidence suggests that Germany has always been the crux of European security because while a unified and powerful Germany poses a threat to the

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[342]   Bogdan D. Denitch, "Eurocommunism: A Threat to Soviet Hegemony?" **Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science**, Vol. 33, No. 1, The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities (1978), p. 148
[343]   Keylor, **op. cit**., p. 37

Western European states' security, a weak and scattered Germany creates problems for the establishment of balance of power in Europe. For example, Catholic Chief Minister of France Cardinal Richelieu considered a unified and powerful Germany a threat to the security of France, and thus supported protestant German princedoms during The Thirty Years' War in order for Germany to maintain her disorder. On the other hand, "the national security goals of the United States required the creation of a revitalized and strong [German] state" because the USA thought that it was necessary for Germany to continue her political existence; firstly against the Soviet Union and secondly for the establishment of a balance of power between Western European states. The US State Secretary Byrnes argued that

> "Germany needed to be restored quickly, that its economic resources were necessary for the reconstruction of Western Europe as a whole, and that a reconstructed Western Europe was necessary to limit the influence of local communist parties and the Soviet Union."[344]

Germany's need and desire for political unity caused the uptrend of radical nationalism in Germany as compared to the other European states. "The delirium of nationalistic fever which accompanied the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 betokened a new era of popular hysteria in international relations:"[345] Two world wars also had their source in the rivalry between France and Germany.

Towards the end of the World War II the Allies agreed on the termination of Germany in the international arena. However, "Germany's total destruction, the high purpose of Allied wartime policy, had permitted the Red Army to challenge the traditional European balance of power."[346] The expansionist foreign policy of

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[344] David A. Messenger, "Dividing Europe: The Cold War and European Integration", In D. Dinan (Ed.). **Origins and Evolution of the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.36

[345] David Thomson, **Europe Since Napoleon**, London and New York: Penguin Books, 1990, p.322

[346] Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), p. 124

Stalin disturbed the USA and Western European states. "The communist challenge spurred the triumph of the American position on Germany's future."[347] According to the USA, it was necessary to integrate Germany into the international system. Otherwise, the hegemonic power in Europe would be the Soviets.

In the London Conference, the USA, the UK, and France approved the establishment of West Germany in their zones. However, in order to eliminate France's concerns, the three states agreed that they would stay loyal to the policies that they embraced in Potsdam Conference. "In order to prevent the rise of a future German threat to European peace and security, the Allies agreed on denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and decentralization."[348] With reference to this agreement, the Nazi-era education curricula in West Germany would be abolished, Germany would be disarmed, German firms in the coal and steel sectors would be prevented from cartelization, and a federative administration would be established instead of a centralized government. Additionally, Germany's halved status and the Eastern part's being under the Soviets' thumb decreased the potential of Germany to pose a threat.

However, the USA had a different opinion on the disarmament of West Germany because the Korean War erupted in June, 1950. The USA placed an army in the field in order to support anti-communists in the Korean Civil War. The Korean Civil War was the first inter-block proxy war of the first Cold War era. Centers of battle spread outside Europe, and it was highly likely that Soviet-American antagonism would diffuse to other continents too. In this context, it was necessary for the USA to efficiently utilize her resources in the security field. The USA's military, economic, and human resources were inadequate to assure the security of the Western Europe alone. Moreover, "the North Atlantic Treaty did not envision the deployment of the US military forces in Western Europe."[349] The USA insisted that "the Europeans had to make a bigger contribution to their own

[347]   Kunz, **op. cit.,** p. 169
[348]   Best and et. al., **op. cit.,** p. 214
[349]   Keylor, **op. cit.,** p. 45

defense."[350] Under these circumstances, according to the USA, "West Germany should contribute its vital industrial and man-power potential to the common defense effort."[351] It should be underlined that the Eastern Germany had already been armed by the Soviets.

The USA's support for the armament of West Germany concerned France because France thought that West Germany would pose a threat to her security if she were allowed to be armed. Besides "a swift German military build-up could lead to Germany, not France, being seen as the leader within Western Europe and America's closest ally on the continent."[352] Such a situation would be the main security concern of France. However, the involvement of the USA in the Korean Civil War and her unwillingness to undertake the responsibility of the security of the Western Europe, along with the armament of East Germany under the sponsorship of the Soviets, legitimized the demand of West Germany to be armed. France, however, would not accept an army controlled by West Germany herself. In the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in September 1950, France "categorically refused to agree to German rearmament and the integration of a German army into NATO"[353] However, if France could not produce a formula for the defense of Western Europe, she would contradict the USA. At this point, French Prime Minister Pleven's proposal stepped in: The plan envisaged "the creation of a European army under the direction of a European Minister of Defense, who would be nominated by the governments concerned and be responsible to a European assembly."[354] The name of the security cooperation proposed by Pleven was the EDC which can be seen as the adaptation of the Schuman Plan into the security field. In the context of EDC, West Germany was not allowed to have her own national army. As a matter of fact, EDC "was designed to enable Germany to furnish her contribution to putting Western Europe

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[350] George and Bache, **op. cit.**, p. 69
[351] Gerhard Bebr, "The European Defence Community and the Western European Union: An Agonizing Dilemma", **Stanford Law Review**, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Mar., 1955), p. 172
[352] Messenger, **op. cit.**, p. 42
[353] Larres, **op. cit.**, p. 205
[354] C. G. D. Onslow, "West German Rearmament", **World Politics**, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jul., 1951), pp. 450-485

in a state of defense."[355] In May 1952 the EDC treaty was signed by six member states of European integration. Before the treaty was signed, the USA and the UK guaranteed that "a threat to any member of the community would be considered a threat to their own security."[356] In this way, the other member states safeguarded themselves under the USA and the UK against the possible threat from West Germany. It should also be emphasized that

> "the EDC member states intended only to integrate part of their army into the EDC while retaining a substantial number of forces as separate national armies for fighting the rising number of nationalist uprisings in the colonies, as for example in French Indo-China and the Belgian Congo."[357]

The purpose of the EDC was to disburden the USA of the responsibility for the defense of Western Europe, and to reduce the possibility of West Germany, which would be allowed to a limited armament, posing a threat in the future.

The interesting point was that the French National Assembly rejected the EDC hatched by the French government. The UK's not joining the EDC was met in the French public with hesitation and the EDC was perceived among the French as a tool that would allow Germany to form her national army again. Under these circumstances, the French government avoided open support for the EDC because of the approaching general elections. The EDC was rendered ineffective since it was not approved.

2.1.4. MEANS OF SECURTY

National power and alliances are the means of security against the threats defined within the frame of European integration. However, although it appears to be

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[355]   **Ibid.**, p. 468
[356]   Keylor, **op. cit.**, p. 50
[357]   Larres., **op. cit.**, p. 206

contrary to the security perception of the period, the institutions of European integration established among member states were also a means of security.

2.1.4.1. National Power of Member States

The original six countries never completely getting rid themselves of destructive influence of World War II. After the war, none of these states was in a position to effectively function as a state because their national powers were limited. Instead of examining the national powers of each of the states comprising the original six, the examination of France, which is the main security actor of the integration, will provide representative example opinion of the states of the original six.

In his study which provided information about the France's national security elements in the postwar era, George W. Kyte stated that while France lost more in terms of manpower in the World War I, in World War II, France experienced greater loss in terms of cities and buildings. "Many cities, such as Brest, Caen, Dunkerque, Falaise, and St. Lô were almost completely destroyed… Over 1.200.000 buildings were demolished or sustained major damages, and more than 1.000.000 people were made homeless."[358] It is obvious that those people who had lost their cities and homes contribute less to national power because of the damage in their psychology. In addition to this, "Tuberculosis, pneumonia, and syphilis are believed to have become more widespread in France during the war than ever before in modern times."[359] Moreover, France lost around 300.000 people in prison camps. Around 230.000 people who returned from these camps to the country were unable to work. In sum, France did not have adequate resources in terms of manpower physically or psychologically.

Unemployment, inflation, and black markets were among the serious economic problems which France had to combat. More importantly, "tremendous damage was inflicted upon industrial plants. Many thousands of acres of the best

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[358] George W. Kyte, "War Damage and Problems of Reconstruction in France, 1940-1945", **The Pasific Historical Review**, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec., 1946), p. 417

[359] **Ibid.**, p. 418

arable land were rendered unproductive."[360] In addition, an important portion of the ways of transportation was seriously damaged during the war. "Paralysis of ports, railroads, and roads of France made it impossible to revive commerce or industry during the years 1944-1945." In brief, France's economic power, which is one of the elements comprising her national power, was crippled.

However, the political power of France was more promising than other elements.

> "On the eve of liberation there thus existed two related political organizations ready to take over: that in France overwhelmingly weighted to the left and mobilized not only for liberation but for the remaking of France along variants of the plan adopted as the C.N.R. program of March 1944; that in Algiers predominantly conservative, despite its coalition character, but headed by the man whose claim to leadership was to be unchallenged during the transition era."[361]

Two political centers of power were present in the process of the reconstruction of France after the occupation. "Despite all the fears, there had been no Commune, no seizure of power by the resistance, no Gaullist dictatorship, no postponement of elections. Republican legitimacy had prevailed."[362] The expected struggle for power between two poles of power, both of which campaigned against the occupation--one externally while the other one was domestically centered--did not occur in the transition period, and this was advantageous for France in the foreign politics field.

However, there were also some problems in the sustainability of foreign policy because of the coalition government which was formed after the war. For example, France and the USA, in the negotiations on the Marshall Plan, had to

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[360]   **Ibid.,** p. 417
[361]   John E. Sawyer, "The Reestablishment of the Republic in France: The De Gaulle Era, 1944-1945", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Sep., 1947), p. 356
[362]   **Ibid.,** p. 366

take the following fact into consideration: "The French Cabinet was dependent on the votes of Socialist deputies who favored cooperation with Communists."[363]

As mentioned above, the national power of a state is the aggregation of the powers which it possesses and is able to employ in order to promote its national interests such as the national security. It can be generalized from the example of France that member states were unable to effectively support their national interests, especially national security. For this reason, they needed cooperation and solidarity.

2.1.4.2. NATO and WEU

NATO was a "multilateral alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets."[364] Member states of European integration aimed to protect themselves through NATO against the Soviet threat and communism.

Member states considered the foundation of NATO necessary to deter the Soviet threat and other communist regimes because

> "when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which had previously accepted the rules of parliamentary democracy and participated with non Communist parties in a governing coalition, staged a coup d'Etat that transformed that once proudly democratic country into a one party-state subservient to Moscow."[365]

Czechoslovakia caused trauma among member states. There was sympathy towards communists among people since communists had dominated

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[363] William C. Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan: A Study in Policy Formation and National Leadership", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Dec., 1958), p. 488 - 489

[364] Arnold Wolfers, "Europe and the Nato Shield", **International Organization**, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1958), p. 425

[365] Keylor, **op. cit.**, p. 37

the resistance movement during the Second World War. Therefore, Western Europe, especially the member states, felt it necessary to define themselves as anti-communist. Moreover, Soviet armed forces were about "3 million in a 175 division peacetime army."[366] This military power was worrying Western Europeans. For example, the combined military power of member states was inadequate to counter the Soviets. For these reasons, Western European security was in need of an anti-communist military alliance in which the USA was included.

"Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which declared that 'an armed attack against one … shall be considered an attack against them all' enunciated the first basic principle and the criterion for an alliance organization."[367] Even though Article 5 assured the Western European states against the Soviet threat, the way that the members of the alliance would help each other was a question mark. For example, in contrast to the Brussels Treaty, the NATO treaty did not envisage that if any member state was attacked by a third party, other member states would respond immediately with theirmilitary forces. Providing military support to an attacked state was left up to the constitutional procedures of member states.

This was threatening to the security of member states. According to estimates, Russia, which had 175 divisions on the continent, was able to mobilize 50 of its divisions within 30 days. On the other hand, the USA's dispatching of troops to the continent would last at least 60 days after the constitutional process.[368] To remove this handicap,

> "the US chose to rely on the American nuclear monopoly, which it confidently expected to last for the foreseeable future. By threatening the prompt use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet

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[366]   **Ibid.,** p. 41
[367]   Alfred J. Hotz, " NATO: Myth or Reality", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences**, Vol. 228, NATO and World Peace (Jul., 1953), p. 127
[368]   Keylor, **op. cit**., p. 42 - 43

homeland, the United States could effectively deter a Communist attack against Western Europe."[369]

After the Soviets' breaking of the US monopoly on nuclear weapons, the balance of a terror system was formed. "Years without any war in Europe were a result of the deterrent effect of these gruesome weapons."[370] It seemed that the threat of Soviet expansion, which was an objective threat for member states, was controlled by nuclear weapons.

It can be argued that member states had lived in a confident and stable atmosphere from the foundation of NATO till the end of the Cold War. The Soviet expansionism in the first Cold War era could not spread to the Western Europe, thanks to the formidable deterrent power of NATO.[371]

However, "NATO until June 1950 consisted of an American obligation to Europe in Article 5, and its defense rested upon America's nuclear power under the Strategic Air Command."[372] Because of Korean War, the USA declared that she could not pledge to continue her contribution to European security without more support from the member nations. In this context, the USA proposed that West Germany be allowed to remilitarize.

France and other integration actors who were desperate accepted not only the rearmament of Germany but also to disburden NATO, and thus the USA, of the responsibility for Europeans' defense. The problem of West Germany's rearmament was not solved because of the ineffectiveness of the EDC in 1954. However, The UK proposed a new solution to the problem within the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organization. According to the proposal, prior to joining

[369]   **Ibid., 43**
[370]   Onur Öymen, **Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi**, İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2002, p. 103
[371]   **Ibid.,** 102 - 103
[372]   Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO Retrospect", **The Review of Politics,** Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), p. 448

NATO on an equal footing with all other member states, [West Germany] would join (together with Italy) the revived and reformed Brussels Treaty Organization, renamed the WEU. The WEU would be used to organize the defense procurement of its member states and thus give each member state a veto over the purchase of arms of any of the member states. [373]

Through the WEU, France would be able to control the armament of West Germany, and West Germany would find the opportunity to become a completely sovereign state. "By October 1954 London agreements on WEU and West German accession into NATO were signed."[374] Hence, on May 9, 1955 West Germany entered into NATO as a full sovereign state.

2.1.4.3. ECSC, EEC, EURATOM

According to the realist approach, European integration came on the scene because of member states' desire to increase their powers in world politics, not for idealist reasons. For example, "France can only regain its traditional position of influence in the world by joining and fostering a united Europe. The desire to make Europe powerful is here identical with a desire to make a particular nation powerful."[375] As mentioned above, those states who participated in the European integration considered the communities which were formed within the framework of integration tools which would increase their national powers.

"The treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in 1951, and the Community of the Six began functioning in July 1952." ECSC was established to restrict the German threat. The economic utility which would result from the cooperation in coal and steel sectors would serve for the member states to increase their national powers. For instance, "The Community came through the recession of 1953 without great difficulty" thanks

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[373]   Larres, **op. cit**., p. 207
[374]   Messenger, **op. cit.,** p. 49
[375]   Murray Forsyth, **op. cit.,** p. 484

to ECSC. The successful cooperation at the sector level encouraged member states to form coalitions in different fields. Foreign ministers of the member states, who met in 1955 in Messina under the chairmanship of Belgian foreign minister Paul Henry Spaak, negotiated the proposal that suggest a customs union among them. As a result,

> "Spaak's report on the Messina Conference, presented at a foreign ministers' meeting in Venice in May 1956, proposed the creation of a common market and an Atomic Energy Community. This led to the signing of the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community."[376]

According to the realist approach, it is evident that the member states did not sign Rome Treaty, which would form the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), for idealist reasons. For example, France thought that "a common market might provide a platform for the reassertion of French regional leadership in Western Europe."[377] In this way, France would be able to become a big power in the West Hemisphere as the military and economic leader of the integration.

The establishment of EURATOM was probably the most important mechanism involved in enabling the member states to preserve their powers because "nuclear power seemed to be the fuel of the future. West Europe appeared short of energy resources at this time, a fact demonstrated vividly by the Arab oil embargo in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis."[378] The decision of the member states to establish EURATOM in order not to be dependent on Arab oil in the future is a requirement of their national interests.

When the interests of the member states are examined closely, the reasons France's desired to stockpile nuclear weapons become clear: West Germany's rearmament and the USA's and the UK's dominant position in NATO's

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[376]   Jones, **op. cit.**, p. 15
[377]   Dedman, **op. cit.**, p. 103
[378]   **Ibid.**, p. 98

defense strategy. The research and resources required for nuclear weapons were absent in France. By cooperating with the other member states, however, France would be able to eliminate her handicaps in terms of nuclear technology and resources.

In sum, the communities of European integration were established in accordance with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[379] One of the aims of the communities was to control German military revival. The other was to strengthen military and political alliances in NATO because "closer economic integration can ease NATO's political and military problems,"[380] such as financing common military efforts. The last one was that the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM served the member states' searching for power.

2.1.5. EVALUATION

European integration started in the first Cold War era in which power-based interstate relations were dominant. The motivation behind the integration was security concerns.

After the war, none of the Western European states was able to combat the objective or subjective threats directed towards themselves because of their inadequate national powers. France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg as a security actors formed a coalition referred to as European integration in order to secure their national securities and to increase their national powers. On the other hand, the USA and the UK supported the

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[379]   Article 2 - The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. Retrieved   Jan. 8,   2008 from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
[380]   Lincoln Gordon, "Nato and European Integration", **World Politics**, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jan., 1958), p.230

cooperation based on security concerns among these states. The USA in particular considered Western European security important since she did not want Soviet hegemony over Europe. She thought that a lack of unity among Western European states along with the permanence of traditional antagonisms would create security problems. According to the USA, it was necessary for the Western European states to overcome these impediments through integration.

According to the realist paradigm, a state that is a security actor is a referent object at the same time. Therefore, the original six countries, as the states towards which the threats directed, are referent objects. The objective threat for these states was the Soviets' support of the communist regimes in Western European states and the Soviets' expansionist attitude. On the other hand, the fear of Germany's resurrection was the subjective threat for France and the other states of integration.

The original six, whose national powers were limited, considered NATO a security tool against the Soviet threat, and they found the opportunity to limit the German threat through the European communities and the WEU. At the same time, the European communities were important tools for maximizing national powers. The contribution of intelligence activities to the security within the context of the European integration, however, is not significant.

In conclusion, European integration, which was born in the first Cold War era, is a security project. When its dynamicsare analyzed, it can be argued that these dynamics were consistent with the international security understanding of the time.

2.2. SECURITY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE AGE OF DETENTE

Security understanding of European integration dominated by the understanding of national security was replaced by new approaches in the détente period. The most outstanding of these approaches was an inter-state security approach presented by structuralism. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the security dimension of European integration and to answer the question: How can one explain European integration through a structuralist approach in détente?

2.2.1. SECURITY ACTOR

When the security dimension of European integration in détente is discussed, two important security actors present themselves: The first is imperialist member states, and the other one is de Gaulle, who left his mark on European integration.

2.2.1.1. Neo-Imperialist Member States

When interpreted from a structuralist perspective, détente can be said to be a period during which center states agreed with each other on neo-imperialist policies. The center consisted of different imperialist power groups. These included the USA, the UK, and the neo-imperialist coalition established by member states: 'European integration'. In addition, although the Soviet Union did not embrace a capitalist economy, she should be taken into consideration as an imperialist power as well. In order to gain a strong and active position in the center, member states of European integration were, through the imperialist coalition they established, in competition with both of its capitalist rivals (the UK, the USA) and with the Soviets, who had a socialist economy. It should be noted

here that the competition never resulted in a face-to-face conflict between central powers. It is possible to look at the shift to multi-polarity through this perspective.

A look into the level of European integration during détente can allow one to argue that the likelihood of a war among member states was eliminated. Member states, according to structuralists, realized that fighting against each other in order to acquire and/or control colonies and markets was not 'profitable'. The reason for this was that member states[381] seemed to have lost their imperialist powers and international economic system, which they had established in the wake of two world wars.

It was not a chance event that European integration was "coterminous not only with the beginnings of the Cold War, but also the collapse of Western Europe's colonial empires"[382] because the objective of member states was, especially starting with 19th century, to regain their imperialist powers, which they had acquired through the colonization of settlements outside Europe. Vembulu maintains a similar view: For him the main cause of European integration "came from the colonial powers' desperate attempt to keep their colonial territory and perpetuate their hold over them."[383] Thanks to European integration, member states would be able to adapt their relations with ex- and existing colonies to changing international conditions. In short, old colonization would be replaced by new colonization.

Member states started neo-imperialism by founding the EEC (1957). Galtung stated that member states "do collectively what they used to do singly and in competition regulated by the division of the world into empires or 'spheres

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[381]   Except for Luxembourg, the other founding member states having colonies under their sovereignties were imperialist powers before the world wars .

[382]   József Böröcz and Mahua Sarkar, "What is the EU?", **International Sociology**, Vol. 20, No.2 (Jun., 2005), p. 163

[383]   R. Pavananthi Vembulu, **Understanding European Union: History, Culture and Political Identity**, Delhi: Aakar Books, 2005, p. 226

of influence'."[384] Forming a new coalition for a system of exploitation through European integration, the member states aimed to establish and maintain an international system dominated by neo-imperialist economic relations.

From the point of the member states, maintenance of European integration was a security matter of utmost importance. Development of member states and their gaining strong positions in the center following World War II depended on the creation of surplus value. An extension of neo-imperialist politics, European integration would enliven and strengthen the economy of member states. Member states hoped, through integration, to form a common market among themselves and obtain cheap raw material from periphery. In this way, member states would experience rapid economic growth and prove to be among important power actors of the center.

As a matter of fact, they enjoyed increased economic growth following the foundation of EEC. "Trade in industrial product between the Community member states doubled in four years and the average growth among the economies of the Six in the 1960s reached between 5 and 6 per cent."[385] Member states established the customs union (1968) and adapted their relations with ex-colonies to changing circumstances. The achievement of a neo-imperialist coalition of the member states appealed to the UK and aroused her interest in joining this coalition.

However, in 1970s, the neo-imperialist coalition under the name "European integration" experienced a kind of recession because

[384] Johan Galtung, **The European Community: A Superpower in the Making**, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1973, p. 73

[385] David Weigall, and Peter Stirk (Ed.), **The Origins and the Development of the European Community**, Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1992, p. 135

> "1970s were times of turbulence and flux in the international economic system. Three factors were particularly important: the collapse of the international monetary system (1971); the OPEC oil crisis (1973); the onset of stagflation producing economic divergence in the EC."[386]

The neo-imperialist coalition established by imperialist states was facing a global economic crisis for the first time. In the classical imperialist era, it would not be a surprise if such a crisis resulted in a war among imperialist powers. However, the member states that had already agreed on the policy of 'no war with each other' "chose national solutions to common problems rather than joint activity via the EEC."[387]

To sum up, it was imperialist characters that determined the attitude of member states as security actors. They tried to determine the sense of security prevailing in the period within the framework of neo-imperialist policies.

2.2.1.2.   De Gaulle

As previously mentioned , security policies of states during détente used to be determined by the personal preferences of many leaders. When security dimension of European integration in détente is analyzed, it is clear that Charles de Gaulle cannot be ignored as a security actor.

In the context of European integration one can say that "de Gaulle's action had their roots in a deep desire to preserve and promote French power."[388] It is not surprising that de Gaulle, who was a staunch nationalist, valued French interests in foreign policy over anything else. As argued by most, de Gaulle was a real politiker. He supported integration insofar as it served French interests.

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[386]   George and Bache, **op. cit.**, p. 97
[387]   Alex Warleigh, **European Union: The Basics**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 24
[388]   **Ibid.**, p.21

Nevertheless, this study, despite acknowledging de Gaulle as one of the security actors of European integration, argues that what he presented as a security actor was not independent of the general sense of security rising over the neo-imperialism of European integration.

The French Revolution (1789) is without doubt one of the world's most important historical events. The discourse legitimizing the revolution was based on nationalism, and it is evident that its leaders were staunch French nationalists. A clear examination of the issue revels that the revolution was a project of the bourgeoisie. The revolution had three objectives: i) to turn France into an imperialist state, ii) to generate a nation state model for economic integration, iii) to enable the bourgeoisie, governing the economy, to gain political rights. It was not a coincidence that power conditions prepared the way for Napoleon Bonaparte to emancipate France from the chaos appearing soon after the revolution. The nationalism he identified himself would make France an imperialist power; the markets would get larger through his conquests; and these markets would be safe under the control of a strong France.

According to Marxist approaches, "the establishment of coal-steel/Common Market Europe was nothing but the formation of a super-fortress of capitalism"[389] and its purpose was to make member states imperial powers again and to offer a larger market than the one offered by the individual nation state. The common characteristic of these two concurrent historical happenings was the need for nationalist leaders to make the project successful.

As is well-documented, the Fourth French Republic, the leading state of the neo-imperialist coalition during the foundation of the European Economic Community, was in chaos. This chaos can be said to resemble the terrorism that followed the French Revolution. De Gaulle returned to power as the saviour of

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[389]   Edgar Morin, **Avrupa'yı Düşünmek (2nd ed.)** (trans. by. Şirin Tekeli), İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1995, p. 153

French democracy following an attempted coup by French army officers who feared that the government in Paris was on the verge of 'selling out' to nationalists in Algeria.[390] De Gaulle, like Napoleon, had been called out in order to end the chaos.

Nevertheless, the reverse side of the medal was different. The willpower which presented European integration as a neo-imperialist project was in need of a nationalist leader in order to ensure the integration. The reason for this was that the USA and the UK were shadowing European integration and wanted to determine the course of integration in accordance with their own economic interests. De Gaulle was a leader who could move the continental neo-imperialist coalition to a position that could compete with other imperialist groups. It was not a coincidence that such a leader came from France. The reason for this was that France, a state with nuclear weapon and more national power when compared to other member states, was in a position to lead this coalition. Moreover, it is interesting that "the Socialists and Christian Democrats who entered de Gaulle's government in June 1958 insisted that the General accept French membership in the ECC."[391] The leading groups of this neo-imperialist Project were social democrats and Christian Democrats.[392] They were able to make de Gaulle do what they wanted him to do. This fact should not be overlooked when considering de Gaulle as a security actor.

The biggest role played by de Gaulle as a security actor was to veto the membership of the UK to preserve the vital interests of the neo-imperialist coalition. The UK had been aware of the contributions made by European communities, which it opposed, to the economic growth of member states. The UK "needed easy access to Western European markets and could get it only by entering the EC. Neither the Commonwealth nor the European Free Trade Area

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[390] Jefrey Vanke, "Charles De Gaulle's Uncertain Ideas of Europe", In D. Dinan (Ed.). **Origins and Evolution of the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 148
[391] Vanke, **op. cit.**, p.149
[392] Morin, **op. cit.**, p. 153

(EFTA) was an adequate alternative."[393] However, de Gaulle turned down applications from the UK twice (1963,1967). If the UK had joined the integration when it was still in infancy, this could have put an end to European communities. President of the commission of the era, Hallstein, also confirmed the fear that a UK with relatively more economic power might put an end to European integration[394].

In sum, there is a consensus among many works on de Gaulle that he was a realpolitiker. However, de Gaulle made a great contribution to the protection of the inner structure of the existing economic system of the neo-imperialist coalition. For instance, he could have leaned towards the proposal put forward by the UK for a free-trade area. He also enabled the EEC to be the neo-imperialist power of the center by resisting the leading role of Anglo-Saxon coalition in European integration.

2.2.2. REFERENT OBJECT

When one analyzes the security dimension of European integration in détente through the structuralist approach, the ex-colonies of member states and European communities can be defined as referent objects.

2.2.2.1. Ex-Colonies

According to the structuralists, "European integration would be a means to perpetuate basically traditional relations with ex-colonies under a new guise."[395] In other words, European integration is a European neo-imperialist project which

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[393]   Desmond Dinan, **Europe Recast: A History of European Union**, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p. 98
[394]   **Ibid., 102.**
[395]   Peter Cocks, "Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration", **International Organization**, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter, 1980), p. 28

allowed ex-colonies that had gained or were gaining independence to be exploited by ex-masters. Vemboli draws a parallelism between classical European imperialism and the new European imperialism under the guise of European integration. According to Vemboli

"European imperialism did indeed begin with the matters of economics – trade and investment in the colonized areas – and gradually turned into politics with the uniting of the colonies more and more with the metropolitan core. The process was known as 'empire building'. To protect their economic interests and promote profit, the colonizers constructed an empire whereby the centralized, excessively bureaucratic control and undemocratic colonial state were set up to mediate the metropolitan centre and the peripheral colony…

European integration, too, like the imperial project, started with issues of economic matters; and gradually transferred to a political character by trying to unite some discreet nationalities into a common political umbrella. Like the empire building of imperial phase, the union building of the integration has created an institution which is equally undemocratic, centralized, and completely managed and manoeuvred by bureaucracy. In this sense, there is not much difference between colonial state and the European Commission." [396]

"The European nations, especially France, still want to retain certain areas, especially in Africa, within their spheres of influence if not domination." [397] We can also conclude how important ex-colonies were from the speech delivered by Macmillan at the House of Commons during the application made by the UK for EEC membership. If a closer relationship between the UK and EEC were to disrupt Commonwealth ties, the loss would be greater than the gain."[398] The UK

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[396] Vembulu,**op. cit.**, p. 222
[397] Sidney Morgenbesser, "Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions", **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn, 1973), p.43
[398] Harold Macmillan, "Speech to the House of Commons: His Government's Decision formally to apply for the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community", 31 July 1961, In T. Salmon and Sir W. Nicoll (Ed.) **Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis**, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 69 - 73

therefore would not accept an EEC membership that was going to disrupt relations with ex-colonies.

Member states demanding to be an important imperialist power of the center had no choice but to maintain their old imperialist traditions in a new form, and they "created a free trade area for the EC and the overseas territories"[399] with Part IV of the Rome Treaty (1957). It can be deduced form Part IV of the Rome Treaty that "colonialism defined as basic characteristic of imperialism has shifted from classical stage to neo stage"[400] An examination into related articles of the Rome Treaty suggests that overseas member states were in favor of a free- trade area in which they would give equal status to ex-colonies. However, it is difficult to talk about a common trade between equals and, according to structuralists, the Rome Treaty was an attempt to trick the ex-colonies because "tariffs are essential to protect infant industries from competition with the already industrialized countries"[401] Otherwise, in the event that developed and underdeveloped nations undertake trade relations with each other, the losing side will be the underdeveloped ones. For that reason, if ex-colonies undertake trade relations with EEC without first completing their industrialization, this will make them even poorer as well as exposing their security to both internal and external threats.

As stated before "the center expropriates the economic surplus from the periphery through the mechanism of international market. This process produces simultaneously development in the center and underdevelopment in the periphery."[402] As a result of this argument, while the member states--an important part of the center—exploit their ex-colonies through neo-imperialist policies (i.e. the EEC) and develop their own economic growth, they also "block African

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[399]   Dinan, **op. cit.**, p. 113.
[400]   Zeynep Göğüş, "Emperyalism ve Anti-Emperyalist Mücadele", **Marxist Tutum**, 2   August   2003,   Retrieved   April   3,   2006   from http://www.marksist.com/zeynep_gunes/emperyalizm_ve_anti_emperyalist_mucadele.h tmin
[401]   Anna K. Dickson, **Development and International Relations: A Critical Introduction**, Cambridge, Oxford and Malden: Policy, 1997, p. 37
[402]   **Ibid.,** p. 40

development by co-opting African leaders into an international social structure that serves the world capitalist economy."[403] The cooperation between member states of European Community and African leaders also "creates unequal society, with a local capitalist or bourgeois class and a subordinated mass of impoverished people."[404]

The inequality in both international and national income distribution resulted in problems related to internal security such as poverty, racism, and terrorism in ex-colonies. This, in turn, required ex-colonies to cope with not only external but also internal security problems.

2.2.2.2. European Communities

When analyzed from a structuralist perspective, European communities rather than member states are referent objects. The reason for this is that maintenance of the neo-imperialist coalition under the name of European integration depended on the proper operation of European communities. Internal and external problems affecting the operation of European Communities could have meant the end of the neo-imperialist collation. This was the least-desired scenario on the part of member states, which were endeavoring to be imperialist powers again in that center.

Another reason underlying the definition of European societies as referent objects is that the labor unions, youth movements, and leftwing parties which are the elements of the class movements in member states, remained distant from European integration. For example, the first clause of the legislation that was renewed in 1969, belonging to CGT, the biggest labor union in France, said: "CGT, which is inspired by democratic population unionism and class struggle in

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[403]   I. William Zartman, " Europe and Africa: Decolonization of Dependency?", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 54, No.2 (Jan., 1976), p. 326
[404]   Dickson, **op. cit.**, p. 42

its management and activities, aims at ending the capitalist exploitation by expropriating the production tools."[405] The CGT, which was the inspiration of the social movements in the other member states, "rejected the European Economic Community" as a "Europe of monopolies", and instead put forward the thesis of a "Europe of laborers."[406] On the other hand, the CFDT, which is the second biggest union of France and adopted democratic socialism, argued that class struggle must also be performed at the level of multi-national companies. FGBT, one of the two largest and most effective union organizations in Belgium, was a member of socialist common action and asked European integration to be organized so as to "direct the management of economy to a direction which is entirely in contrast with the political activities which have been applied by the employer cartels up until today."[407] Likewise, the biggest union of Italy, CGIL, did not lean to European integrity.

In short, left-leaning unions, most of which were either the biggest or the most effective unions of their countries, considered supporting the free market economy mandated by the EEC and establishing a customs union which would increase the profitability of the multi-national companies.

On the other hand, the leftwing parties leaned toward the idea of a Europe without boundaries due to their ideology. However, the leftwing parties asked--particularly the EEC--to add a social dimension to integration. They were strictly against a process of integration which favored the bourgeois class, and the opinion that communities were serving this idea was widespread in those years. They called for structural reforms that would transform existing economic relations such that   that class exploitation would no longer be possible.

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[405]   Uğur Ökten (Ed.), **Avrupa'da Sendikalar**, ?: Avrupa Topluluğu Yayınları, 1970, p. 70

[406]   Alpaslan Işıklı, **Sendikacılık ve Siyaset (6th ed.)**, Ankara: İmge, 2005, p. 450

[407]   Ökten, **op. cit.**, p. 41

With the exceptions of France and the Netherlands, "the forces of the left, which had been excluded from power during the 1950s, staged a comeback… the left achieved far better results in the 1960s than in the 1950s."[408] For example, the Social Democratic Party as a coalition partner was a ruling party in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Generally speaking, however, the Italian, West German and Belgian left parties came to power because they formed coalitions with parties on their right.

Nonetheless, "the gains made by the left were not translated into radical structural reforms. This disappointed many of its most committed supporters, who had expected substantial change in economic policy."[409] The reason why leftwing parties caused disappointment might be that their power opportunities were limited since they were coalition partners and/or the member states were building their political systems on liberal values. However,

> "after the stability and development period, which capitalism provided following the 2nd imperialist sharing war, had reached its own limits, the conflicts that cumulated and sharpened throughout this period, ...confronted it with the struggle against capitalism, which arose in the developed capitalist countries."[410]

It was in such an environment that student movements arose as a wave of social opposition. Students demanded a Europe where the boundaries were abolished and which was an egalitarian Europe freed from American imperialism. However, since they considered European societies as a tool to serve the bourgeoisie, they took them as a threat to the ideals they espoused.

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[408]   Donald Sassoon, "Politics", In M. Fulbrook (Ed.) **Europe Since 1945**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 34 - 35
[409]   **Ibid.**, p. 36
[410]   Nazım Yıldırım, "68 Salt bir Öğrenci Hareketi miydi?", **Marksizm ve Gençlik**, 22 August 2004. Retrieved May 14, 2009 from http://www.marksist.com/TRH/68.htm

To sum up, the unions, student movements, and leftist parties regarded European integration as one of the new neo-imperialist policies of the bourgeois class and its institutions; this made integration into a force that was considered a threat. The European communities, which the social dynamics class regarded as a threat, were the ones that had to be protected bythe imperialist member states.[411]

2.2.3. THREAT: DISSOLUTION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ORDER

European integration was a neo-imperialist coalition that would enable the member states to grow economically and regain the imperial powers they had left behind before World War II. The objective of the coalition was to bring about a European Economic Order that would strengthen the member states of the center.

Any event that might be defined as an internal or external threat in détente could have meant the end of the economic order the member states were endeavoring to establish. There were internal problems that might hinder this process and the most important of them was the empty chair crisis.

The empty chair crisis started because "France produced more food than the country could consume… France therefore either export products with guaranteed high-demand markets or make generous export subsidies to bridge the gap between higher French prices and lower international prices."[412] With the aim of preventing European integration from being hindered and preserving the economic balance among the member states, France was provided with a high price-guaranteed market and an incentive to be used for exports to third countries by the member states via the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

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[411]   See Richard Ivan Jobs, "Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968", **The American Historical Review**, Vol. 114, (April 2009), pp. 376–404,
[412]   Dinan, **op. cit.**, p. 94

Pleased with this acquisition, France was discomfited by the proposal put forward by the Commission in 1965 on financing CAP. This proposal led to a crisis in the neo-imperialist coalition. The Commission proposed that member states "transfer considerable budgetary authority to the European Parliament, away from the national parliaments"[413] and the Council would approve the budget by qualified majority instead of by unanimity.

De Gaulle found the proposal unacceptable and withdrew French delegates from the council. During elections in France, the business world and farmers gave de Gaulle, who had won presidential elections in the second tour, the message that he should compromise with the EEC. As a matter of fact, de Gaulle reached an agreement with EEC and saved the neo-imperialist coalition.

The external threats to European economic order, on the other hand, were liberation movements in overseas lands of the member states and international economic crises. "By 1960 the rising tide of decolonization had reached flood crest with the entry in that one year of seventeen new Members – sixteen of which were from Africa."[414] Most of the states that gained their independence were ex-colonies of the member states. This was a serious threat to the member states that had demanded to be part of the imperialist power in the center because, while the percentage of states which gained their independence and joined UN was 13.2 in 1955, "by the end of 1966 this figure had leaped to 45 percent."[415] Ex-imperialist powers had been weakened in terms of military and political controls. It was essential that the member states should connect ex-colonies that regained their independence to the center through economic and cultural ties.

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[413]   Vanke, **op. cit.**, p. 158
[414]   David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process", **International Organization**, Vol. 21, No.4 (Autumn, 1967), p. 786
[415]   **Loc.cit.**

2.2.4. MEANS OF SECURITY

According to the structuralist perspective on the security of European integration in détente, the Yaoundé and Lomée Conventions protected the economic order of the neo-imperialist coalition. On the other hand, the member states considered forming a security community and maintaining their existing economic systems.

2.2.4.1. Association Treaties with ex-Colonies

Because of the increasing momentum of liberation movements, the member states wanted the relations with ex-colonies to continue in a way that was "dependent on themselves". A partnership agreement other than the Rome Treaty with newly-independent colonies was unavoidable. Hence the first Yaoundé Conventions were signed in July 1963 between the EEC and African ex-colonies[416] that had become independent states. The first Yaoundé Convention ended in 1969. However, its provisions were renewed via the Second Yaoundé Convention and would expire in 1975.

The objective of the Yaoundé Conventions was to make the periphery (ex-colonies) remain dependent on the center (ex-masters). "Its provisions lacked the necessary drive to alter the historical relationship. Whilst the free trade principle was seen assisting development, in practice the limited concessions tended to maintain, even strengthen, the dependency relationship."[417]

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[416]   African states were composed of Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivoy Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Voltai Zaire. Madagascar and Mauritania were included in Yaounde Convention II.
[417]   Martin Holland, **The European Union and Third World**, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p. 31

According to some, the fact that exportations from African states to the EEC were exempt from taxation and benefited from the European Development Fund (EDF) was a great advantage for the development of ex-colonies. African nations were no longer ex-colonies but became partners of the EEC. This seemingly acceptable view was not an accurate one according to structuralists because "the Yaoundé Conventions were very protectionist; needed raw materials were allowed into the EC, but competitive food and agricultural products were not."[418] It would be naive to argue that ex-colonies really benefited from trading with the EEC. For example, one indicator of the paucity of benefits gained by the associates was that over the 1958-1969 period, the average rate of increase in exports to the EEC was greater for the non-associated Third World countries than for the associated states.[419]

As shown in Table 3, Yaoundé states had a small foreign trade share in the year the EEC was founded. The volume of trade between the EEC and ex-colonies was shrinking even during the years following the first Yaoundé Convention because "Europe's internal production has grown more rapidly than it needs for imports, some of the previously imported raw materials can now be produced within its frontiers."[420] The advancing technology of the member states allowed for the substitute of certain raw materials they needed from Africa. This fact was a threat to African states. Mazrui pointed out this threat just before Yaoundé Convention: "If Western technology has already produced a number of substitutes for raw materials, the African has no means of knowing how many other Afro-Asian products will become dispensable in the wake of a stronger Europe."[421] Unsteady trade between ex-colonies and the EEC was a threat to African states.

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[418]   Michael B. Dolan and James A. Caporaso, "The External Relations of the European Community", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 440, The European Community after Twenty Years (Nov., 1978), p. 146

[419]   **Loc. cit.**

[420]   Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community", **International Affairs**, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 1963), p. 29

[421]   **Ibid.**, p. 30

Table 4
EEC Imports from and Exports to the Developing World 1958 -1967

	1958 % imports	1967 %imports	1958 % exports	1967 % exports
Yaoundé States	5.6	4.2	4.4	2.9
Latin America	10.2	8.9	10.1	6.5
Africa*	9.4	10.3	12.3	6.5
Middle East	11.2	9.5	4.4	4.1
SE Asia/ Oceania	4.8	3.7	6.5	4.9

* Non Yaoundé States

Source: Commission Report 1969, cited from Martin Holland, **The European Union and Third World**, New York: Palgrave, 2002

So that EEC's partnership agreement could cover the ex-colonies of the UK, which had joined the EEC in 1973, in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (APC), the first Lomé Convention was signed between the states of the EEC and ACP[422] in 1975. "Simple extension of the Yaoundé provisions was contemplated and explored, but ultimately a specifically tailored and integrated Convention was produced that sought to protect French sensitiveness yet meet British demands"[423] According to some academicians, the Lomé Convention presented a new perspective on North-South relations. Accordingly, an exploitative relationship was replaced by partnersh relationship. Also, "the official EC view is that the Lomé Convention, and its development policies in general, are the result of a desire to assist Third World development, and the EEC's need for Third World resources, trade, and investment markets."[424] According to structuralists, the Lomé Convention was a revised neo-imperialist agreement as a result of the UK, a long-time imperialist, joining European integration.

> "In contrast to the benign official view, the economic imperialism perspective emphasizes the EC's tactics and its resultant gains at the expense of the Third World. In the most critical

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[422]   The 19 Yaoundé State, 6 new African State, 21 less developed Common Wealth countries
[423]   Holland, **op. cit.,** p. 33
[424]   Dolan and Caporaso, **op. cit.,** , p. 145

pronouncement, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana labeled the EC's development policies collective colonialism."[425]

In sum, both the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions were not an initiative to resolve welfare inequality in relations between the center and periphery but rather agreements which included a larger geography into neo-imperialist policies. In this respect, they are means of security serving the maintenance of the economic order of the neo-imperialist coalition.

2.2.4.2. Custom Union

The member states were well aware that establishment of a custom union served their purposes of economic growth. They had learned from past experiences that fighting with each other weakened their own imperial powers. The establishment of the EEC was the first step towards realizing the objective of becoming an imperialist power by founding a neo-imperialist collation instead of fighting with each other.

Increased communication channels between the member states as a result of a custom union led to leaving old hostilities behind. According to Morin, "dissolution of national chauvinisms becomes clear between 60s and 80s and it can be seen that mutual sympathy was aroused between the French and Germans"[426]. In fact, member states not only predicted that joint competition would provide economic growth for the member states, but also realized that they they could exploit the rest of the world without fighting with each other. Thus, they initiated the custom union.

"A public opinion study conducted by SOFRES indicates that 22 percent of the French people had sympathy for the German and this figure increased to 57

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[425] **Ibid.**, p. 146
[426] Morin, **op. cit.**, p. 155

percent in 1984.[427]" How could a positive opinion be formed among the people of the member states as well as in business circles and in the bureaucracy?

> "Such reasons as business, meeting, congress and probation leads to the spread of the habit of traveling among businessmen, entrepreneurs, managers, engineers and university professors, and provides the Europeans with the opportunity to interact with each other. In addition, tourism penetrates into the increasingly larger part of European people who are moved from the west to east and north to south via buses, vans, automobiles, trains and planes."[428]

The economic buoyancy fueled by the Custom Union, as stated by Morin, was indirectly affecting larger spheres of the society. Even the common bureaucracy generated in European societies increased the ability of the member states to have empathy with each other. The foundations were being laid for the pluralistic security community thanks to the Custom Union.

2.2.4.3.   The Hague Summit

Organized in December 1969, the Hague Summit put forward certain proposals to enable European integration, which was still in its infancy, to continue in a safer manner. The common purpose of the proposals was to prevent the collapse of the neo-imperialist coalition, to limit potential areas of conflict between the member states and to reinforce the security community.

Paragraph 5 of the Hague Summit Declaration declared that social financing would be supplied in accordance with the terms specified in article 201 of the Rome Treaty, and the European Parliament (EP) had been granted the authority to make amendments to the budget. Under this Declaration,

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[427]   Morin, **op. cit.**, p. 155
[428]   Morin, **op. cit.**, p. 156

> "whereas hitherto the budget had been financed by direct contributions from the member states, which were renegotiated annually, the community would now receive its own resources, comprising import levies on agricultural products and all other custom duties as well as a small proportion of (not to exceed 1 per cent) of national revenues from value added tax (VAT)."[429]

Debates over the budget during the era of de Gaulle brought European integration to a halt. A crucial problem among the members of the neo-imperialist coalition thus had been overcome. What mattered was the strengthening of the role of member states as central imperialist powers.

Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Hague Summit gave a green light to the membership of the UK. How did the veto exercised by de Gaulle, which had been justified as being for the sake of European integration, change? "British accession, providing terms were satisfactory, would open to up an additional market, and offer a counterbalance to Germany."[430] Also, in the late 1960s, West Germany was economically more advanced when compared to other member states. Having a budget surplus, West Germany frightened France, whose economy was undergoing a modernization process. For other member states, the likelihood that West Germany might withdraw from the neo-imperialist collation as a result of economic growth was an alarming one. Moreover, the fact that Socialist Chancellor Brandt prioritized Ostpolitik in foreign policy justified this concern.

> "Pompidou resented Germany's behavior during the exchange rate crisis in late 1969. Far from deferring France, Germany acted unilaterally, first by floating the mark and then by revaluing it. "Loud German criticism of the CAP, with its runaway budget and rising food surpluses, also irritated the French."[431]

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[429]   Richard T. Griffiths, "A Dismal Decade? European Integration in 1970s", In D. Dinan (Ed.). **Origins and Evolution of the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.173

[430]   David Weigall, and Peter Stirk (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 141

[431]   Dinan, **op. cit.**, p. 128

To put it briefly, UK membership would bring balance to European integration. Among the things that can be considered as an outcome of The Hague Summit is European Political Cooperation. The visible objectives of EPoC are the following:

> "to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems; to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonization of their views, the coordination of their positions, and where it appears possible and feasible."[432]

The implied objective of EPoC, on the other hand, was to get informed about priorities of the member states of the neo-imperialist coalition regarding foreign policy. For example, the policy of West Germany to approach Eastern Bloc states caused other member states to require more coordination in the field of foreign policy. Furthermore, the member states needed a mechanism which would prevent certain problems experienced in international policy from crippling European integration.

The EPoC can be seen as an advancement deepening the integration. "One of the successes was the formulation of a common position on the Middle East, which allowed the EC to pursue its clear interest in improving trade with the Arab OPEC states in 1970s, through the Euro-Arab dialogue."[433] In addition, the member states were able to display a common stance on CSCE thanks to the EPoC.

Finally, paragraph 8 of the Hague Summit proposed the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) among the member states.

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[432] "Luxembourg Report**,**" Luxembourg, 27 October 1970, In C. Hill and K. E. Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 75 - 80

[433] George and Bache, **op. cit.**, p. 101

"They are of the opinion that the integration process should result in a Community of stability and growth. To this end they agreed that …. a plan in stages should be worked out during the 1970s with a view to creation of an Economic and Monetary Union. The development of monetary co-operation should depend on the harmonization of economic policies."[434]

The neo-imperialist coalition aimed to reinforce economic growth, the reason for which it was founded, through the EMU. The purpose was firstly to facilitate coordination in economic policies of the member states and then to avoid losses related to foreign exchange rates caused by the use of different currencies by the member states. Another goal of the EMU was to ensure that the member states would get over global economic crises with the least damage possible. "Soaring inflation, rising unemployment, the widening trade deficit, and oil shocks made a mockery of the Community's commitment to the EMU, a commitment reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit in October 1973."[435]

To sum up, the precautions taken by the neo-imperialist coalition in order to avoid corporate conflicts and fears which could disrupt the coalition and eliminate any potential external negative effects also made it a security community.

2.2.5. EVALUTION

According to the structuralist approach, security can be comprehended in terms of economic relations rather than military ones. In this context, the member states of the European community regarded being and maintaining themselves as a power group in the international economic system dominated by neo-imperialism—as opposed to classical military imperialism--as a security issue of the utmost

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[434] "The Hague Summit Declaration", The Hague, 2 December 1969, In C. Hill and K. E. Smith **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 72 - 74

[435] Dinan, **op. cit.**, 101

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importance. Therefore, the economic powers of the member states rather than their military prowess are decisive in the role they play as security actors. For instance, despite not being a former imperialist power, Luxemburg was able to be a part of neo-imperialism through European integration.

Within the framework of European integration, leaders have a decisive role in the issue of security. As a leader, de Gaulle played a key role in defending European integration. He especially limited Anglo-Saxon dominance over European integration. De Gaulle vetoed the membership application of the UK twice in order not to let another neo-imperialist power disrupt European integration. With the foundation of the European Economic Community, European integration proved to be a threat to ex-colonies, a part of the Third World. Needing the market and inexpensive raw materials in ex-colonies for their growth, the member states limited the development of ex-colonies owing to their own economic interests. Such internal security problems as poverty, hunger, racism, and terrorism appeared in ex-colonies that had not completed their economic development.

For the neo-imperialist coalition established under the title of European integration, the largest threat to their security was prevention or disruption of the economic system they were founding. Therefore, it can be seen that many precautions were taken to protect the neo-imperialist coalition against instability in the 1970s. Certain corporate structures and mechanisms like EPoC were put into practice in order to overcome internal problems in partnership agreements with ex-colonies and to limit external effects. Furthermore, the role of the custom union in generating a security community led to an increase in communication channels and empathy among the member states. Such that, by 1980s, the prejudice felt by the French and German against each other had been halved. Since security community is a proposal of a liberal approach, it is consistent and understandable that the member states of EC demand to establish a security community.

Finally, European integration proceeds with the idea of inter-state security in accordance with the sense of security prevailing during the era. The security dimension of EU integration is also defined in terms of economic relations with the system. According to the sense of security prevailing during the era, the EU had not been faced with internal security problems such as terrorism, racism, environment and hunger.

2.3. SECURITY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE SECOND COLD WAR

This chapter aims to examine the security dimension of European integration from a neo-realist perspective and to answer the following question: To what extent did the security dimension of European integration in this period overlap with the international security approach presented by neo-realism?

2.3.1. SECURITY ACTORS: FRANCE, WEST GERMAY, the UK

In accordance with neo-realist axioms, this study claims that security actors of European integration were France, West Germany, and the UK in that they were the great powers of the integration. There exist two main reasons for this argument.

Firstly, conflict among these three states may have resulted in radical changes in European integration during the second Cold War . British budgetary rebate set a good example. "Thatcher's demand for a British budgetary rebate dominated five years and 15 European summits."[436] If the issue hadn't been resolved at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984, the integration would probably have been debilitated because the UK threatened "to paralyse the Community, which still functioned according to the unanimity rule."[437] The conditions of European integration in which institutional structures and policies deepening integration had not matured yet were suitable for the individual challenges of France, West Germany and the UK. However, they either avoided or tried to

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[436] Desmond Dinan, "The European Community, 1978-93", Annals of the **American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 531, The European Community: To Maastricht and beyond (Jan., 1994), p. 15, pp. 10-24

[437] Jacques Le Cacheux, **European Budget: The Poisonous Budget Rebate Debate**, Notre Europe, p. 7, Retrieved Apr.6, 2009 from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/contributions/us/20080414_US_29_contrib_2_en.pdf

control crises in their relations with one another. As a matter of fact, "the long standoff ended with a compromise at the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984, when the governments of the other member states, led by Germany and France, agreed to a UK budget rebate."[438]

Secondly, these three states had the political capacity to determine the fates of other member states involved in European integration. Even though Mitterrand was elected president of France in 1981, had adopted socialist view, and was a passionate advocate of state intervention and regulation, he had no option but to apply neo-liberal economic policies because of international economic trends. The interesting point is that "Mitterrand's U-turn influenced other socialist leaders, notably Gonzalez in Spain, and Soares in Portugal, two countries then on their way to Community membership."[439] Greece's membership was another example to be considered in this context.

> "Germany's position was rooted in its concern about the geopolitical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean; France viewed itself as the link between northern and southern Europe and so supported Greece membership. Concern over the issue of Cyprus played a role in Britain position."[440]

In short the great powers of European integration had the capacity to directly and indirectly influence other member states. By doing so, they could preserve the general balance of power in the EU system.

The powers of the big three needs to be discussed. In terms of military power, France, Germany and the UK had the highest expenditures in NATO after

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[438]   **Loc. cit.**
[439]   Dinan, **op. cit.**,., p. 16
[440]   Kristen Williams, "The Influence of the European Union", In R. Rosecrance (Ed.) **The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations,** Lanham and et. al.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p. 167

the USA.[441] This is an important indicator of their military strength. Moreover, France and the UK were international nuclear powers. In short, a security or defense mechanism within the framework of the integration could not have been imagined "in defiance of" or "without" them.

Figure 1
Shares of Military Expenditure in GDP

Source: NATO[442]

The statuses of France and the UK as permanent members of the UN Security Council supported their political powers. As for West Germany, she gained considerable political power through her influence area in the Eastern Bloc, which she gained thanks to Ostpolitik.

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[441]   Military expenditures of West Germany were within the scope of its NATO liabilities.
[442]   Quated from Jacques Fontanel, Ron Smith and Patrick Bolton, "A European Defense Union", **Economic Policy**, Vol. 6, No. 13 (Oct., 1991), p. 396 pp. 393-424

Thirdly, as indicated before, the economic powers of the big states were the deciding factors in maintaining their positions in the international system. France, West Germany, and the UK, as the most powerful states of integration, were producing more than half of the GDP produced within the integration area.

Table 5
The Three's GDP current prices*

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Germany	826.142	695.074	671.155	669.573	630.853	639.695
France	691.196	607.467	575.855	550.080	521.821	547.870
UK	542.452	519.709	491.938	466.031	440.874	468.958
FGR+FR+UK	2.059.790	1.822.250	1.738.948	1.685.684	1.593.548	1.656.523
Total	3,226.921	2,856.409	2,743.462	2,665.280	2,548.012	2,645.101
Country	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Germany	913.641	1.136.929	1.225.728	1.216.796	1.547.026	1.815.061
France	761.305	923.622	1.004.377	1.009.774	1.248.488	1.249.148
UK	570.884	702.540	852.399	861.294	1.017.792	1.059.257
FGR+FR+UK	2.245.830	2.763.091	3.082.504	3.087.864	3.813.306	4.123.466
Total	3,621.112	3,339.041	4,988.747	5,070.079	6,327.192	6,773.906

- US Dollars, Billions

Source**:** IMF, World Economic Database, April 2009.[443]

Moreover, Germany as a trading state had the most powerful economy of the European integration because "cutting back on military, trading states would devote their surplus to investment, attaining high rates of economic growth and social equity."[444] France restructured her relationships with former colonies for her advantage, and the UK gained economic privileges from the Common Wealth; thus the economic powers of France and the UK benefited from their relationships with their former colonies. Moreover, the G-7 memberships of France, West

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[443]   Retrieved   June   1,   2009   from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1980&ey=1991&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=137%2C124%2C138%2C128%2C182%2C132%2C134%2C174%2C184%2C178%2C112%2C136&s=NGDPD&grp=0&a=&pr.x=41&pr.y=10

[444]   Richard Rosecrance, "Emulation in International History", In R. Rosecrance (Ed.) **The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations,** Lanham and et. al.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p. 285

Germany, and the UK gave them important economic advantages, since the G-7 was determining world economy and trade.

Finally, when the institutional structure of the integration is considered, it is obvious that France, West Germany, and the UK were unquestionably prominent. Vote weights of countries in the Council of Ministers were determined through the SEA as follows: "Belgium (5), Denmark (3), France (10), Greece (5), Ireland (3), Italy (10), Luxembourg (2), the Netherlands (5), Portugal (5), Spain (8), the United Kingdom (10), and the FR of Germany (10)."[445] Qualified majority voting (54 votes out of 76) was the method used to make decisions in the absence of unanimity. Since their vote weights were high, it was impossible to pass a decision without the confirmation of the big three. Moreover, two big states could block decisions by influencing a small state. It is known that France and West Germany became effective in decision mechanisms--especially in the process of completion of the single market--by taking the support of Benelux countries.[446]

It is important to note the following in order to better understand the big three's functions as security actors: Germany was in favor of deepening the integration because "as Europe's leading exporter, dependent on the EC for nearly half of its exports, Germany profits directly from economic integration."[447] West Germany hoped to become the determining power of Europe by backing up its economic power with its political influence area. For Germany, transformation of integration into a federative organism did not mean conveying the sovereignty to a higher authority because a political regime was a federative system.

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[445]   John Palmer, **1992 and Beyond**, Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1989, p. 26

[446]   Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market", **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 548-553

[447]   Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community", **International Organization**, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), p. 29

Similarly, France had aimed to become the leader of Europe since de Gaulle era. Therefore, France took the necessary steps during the integration process to maintain its leadership and did in fact become the dominant actor of the system. For example, France approved the membership of the UK, which she had rejected two times before, in order to counterpoise Germany in the system.

The UK, on the other hand, considered European integration a tool which would increase its economic and political power and was against erosion of political independence through integration. Thatcher's speech in College of Europe is thus important.

> "Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality…. Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour. Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic community—that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic—which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength."[448]

The UK, which was sensitive to independence issues, did not attach less importance to Anglo-Saxon and Commonwealth relations than to the integration. For the UK, integration was nothing more than deepening the cooperation among European states.

The common trait of France, Germany and the UK as security actors was that they did not attempt to achieve their objectives through force. . In accordance with neo-realism, they believed that they should maximize their security, not

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[448] Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to College of Europe (The Bruges Speech)", 20 September 1986. Retrieved Jun., 7 2009 from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107332

power. Therefore, for them, European integration was nothing but an institution facilitating cooperation to achieve security.

Last but not least, it is useful to deal with the reason why this study excluded Italy as a security actor of European integration in this period. Although Italy was a member of NATO and G-7, had the same voting weight as the big three, and had a better economy than the UK, European integration was never a central issue for Italy. Thus she was never as effective as the big three in the European integration.[449]

2.3.2. REFERENT OBJECT: MEMBER STATES

According to neo-realists, the main objective of states is to maintain their existence within the system; in other words, to protect their securities. The anarchic structure of international relations and the security dilemma caused by the similar actor behaviors (self-help) in this anarchic system cause states to become referent objects no matter how big or small their power is.

Whether or not the European integration between this period was seen as an anarchic system is the crux issue. When integration between the years of 1979-1991 is reviewed, no authority or institution had the powers unique to states such as enlistment, imposing/collecting taxes, starting a war, or legitimate use of power. However, it is argued that

> "the drift towards hierarchy can be seen in five examples — the jurisprudence of the ECJ; the growing use of qualified majority voting (QMV); the increasing number of Commission regulations

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[449] During its presidency, Italy strove for putting the EU Constitution into practice because it aimed to prove that it was the influential state of the integration.

and directives; direct democracy within EU institutions; and most visibly in the efforts to draft a European Constitution."[450]

Based on this argument, it is problematic to argue that European integration was of an anarchic structure. First of all, "although the EJC has considerable power to impose EC laws on recalcitrant states, most of the legal decisions about the implementation of rules are likely to accord with the interests of powerful states."[451] Also, in the second Cold War era, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had no power to enforce its sanctions, which were already very limited.

Secondly, although "the SEA confirmed the use of qualified majority voting in areas related to the single market, in order to allow for the speeding up of decision making,"[452] the adaptation of general principles of new policy areas was subjected to unanimity in the Council. Additionally, qualified majority voting was not enforceable in many areas "including political cooperation, social legislation, monetary policy, further procedural reform, and fundamental constitutional issues such as enlargement of EC members – are subjected to neither new approaches nor majority voting."[453] The QMV system in the Council was supported by France and West Germany because while simple majority enabled small states to become dominant in the system, the veto system could enable the UK to block the functioning of the SEA.

Thirdly, the SEA introduced new powers to the EP such as cooperation procedure and assent. "The SEA gave the EP assent powers …. over matters like association agreements with non-EU States, and the accession of new members to

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[450] Simon Collard-Wexler, "Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union**", European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Sep., 2006) , p. 407

[451] Garret, **op. cit.**, p. 537

[452] Michelle Egan, "The Single Market", In M. Cini (ed.) **European Union Politics**, Oxford: Oxford and New York, 2003, p. 36

[453] Moravcsik, **op. cit.**, p. 19 pp. 19-56

the Union."[454] As a matter of fact, cooperation procedure power was more important than assent power because it permitted the EP to amend or reject the proposals.

> "This power, however, was significantly constrained. The Parliament had to vote to amend or reject a proposal by an absolute majority of its members; the Commission could choose not to integrate parliamentary amendments into its revised proposal to the Council; and the Council could overturn the Parliament's amendments or rejection by a unanimous vote. Consequently, the Parliament only very rarely rejected proposals under the cooperation procedure, and only about 40 per cent of its amendments, many of which are only minor changes to the substances of the text, ended up in directives."[455]

Fourth, increasing regulations and directives of the commission was not a factor in evading the hierarchic structure of the system. Even though the effectiveness of the commission in integration increased after the introduction of 1992 program, this was not the case in 1980s. In these years, the commission was surrounded by member states because "senior members of the commission are political appointees of limited tenure (four years), and hence their governments may choose not to reappoint them if they do not act in their governments' interests."[456] For example, Thatcher nominated Lord Cockfield for the commission in order for him to enable the UK to dominate the integration. However, Cockfield was not nominated again since he did not completely accomplish the mission.

Fifth, the fact that members of the EP were directly elected and granted new importance does not mean that member states relinquished their sovereignty rights to an overarching authority in the context of European integration because

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[454]   Roger Scully, "The European Parliament", In M. Cini (ed.) **European Union Politics**, Oxford: Oxford and New York, 2003, p. 36
[455]   Alasdair R. Young and Helen Wallace, "The Single Market", In. H. Wallace and W. Wallace (ed.) **Policy Making in the European Union (4th ed.)**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 98
[456]   Garrett, **op. cit.**, p. 552

the EP was not only a parliament which did not have legislative power, but also it gained its legitimacy from states not from people. Moreover, the SEA also proposed the European Council, which formalized "the conferences or summits of the Heads of States and Government."[457] On the other hand, even though the European Council did not have coercive power over the institutions of the European integration, it had an implicit effect which shaped the integration. Thus, it is paradoxical to argue that the institutions of integration operated in a democratic way.

In summation, since the institutional innovations of the SEA did not transform the integration into a hierarchic structure, it can be concluded that European integration between the years of 1979-1991 was of anarchic character.

The factors out of the system which fostered the anarchic structure of integration are also worth mentioning. There was a crisis of confidence between the USA and EC countries in the second Cold War era concerning European security. The reason for this is the different approaches of the USA and Europe towards the Soviet politics. The Reagan administration (1980 -1988) "did not hesitate to return to the intensive cold war attitudes of the 1950s and the early 1960s, though Washington habitually overlooked consulting or even informing its allies."[458] The current administration in the USA adopted an aggressive approach towards the Soviets since they thought that détente and arms control agreements enabled Soviets to become more powerful.

On the other hand, most of the EC member states were not apt to adopt aggressive attitudes toward the Soviets because EC member states thought that while the USA's offensive security policy would give rise to increasing military

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[457] "The Single European Act", 17 February 1986 and 28 February 1986. Retrived June 1, 2009 from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm

[458] Larres, **op. cit.**, p. 223

expenditure in the USA, it limited the expenditure on the defense of Western Europe. Moreover,

> "the Reykjavik Summit meeting between Regan and Mr. Gorbachev in November 1986 also excited fears among some of America's NATO allies in Europe that Washington was becoming less sensitive to European views about Alliance defense and arms control strategy."[459]

It was obvious that the European continent would have suffered more if the tension between the USA and the USSR had transformed into a clash. Therefore, with the exception of the UK, EC member states rejected American advice to "criticize openly the Eastern bloc's violation of human rights, terminate economic deals such as aid for the Soviet oil and gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, and embark on rearmament programmes."[460] In this context, most of the EC member states (except the UK) started to discuss the inadequacy of a Western European security system which is dependent on the USA and a new structure complementing NATO.

"Between 1973 - 1980 employment inside the EU actually decreased by three million…. investment fell by 20 per cent."[461] In the first half of the 1980s, problems causes by the economic crises of 1970s had not been solved; on the contrary, the situation was becoming worse. Furthermore, actors external to the system had improved in the economies of Japan and the USA, and they were becoming stronger in world markets. The primary objective of the countries taking part in European integration was to ensure economic improvement and thus become competitive in world markets because the capacity shift in the international system would arise from the transformation of the economic

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[459]   Palmer, **op. cit.**, p. 9
[460]   Larres, **op. cit.**, p. 224
[461]   Ernest Wistrich, **After 1992: The United States of Europe (New and Revised Ed.)**, London and New York: Routledge, p. 8

structure, and the member states of European integration had to get ready for economic wars that would transform the economic structure.[462]

Table 6.
Growth Rates, 1968 – 1985*

	1968 – 1973	1974 - 1979	1980 – 1985
Belgium	5.3	2.2	1.4
France	5.2	2.8	1.5
Germany	5.0	2.4	1.4
Italy	4.9	3.7	1.9
Luxembourg	5.5	1.3	2.2
Netherlands	5.1	2.6	1.3
Denmark	4.0	1.9	2.1
Ireland	5.2	4.9	2.6
United Kingdom	3.5	1.5	1.3
Greece	8.4	3.7	1.4
Portugal	7.6	2.9	1.5
Spain	6.7	2.3	1.5
EC – 12	4.9	2.6	1.5
Japan	9.3	3.6	3.7
United States	3.2	2.5	2.1

*The average annual per cent change of real GDP at constant prices
Source: Loukas Tsoukalis, **The New European Economy Revisited**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 16

In sum, the anarchic structure of integration was supported by the economic, military, and political tensions of the second Cold War. Big states within the European integration sought to maintain their existing positions, and small ones aimined to maintain their existence through the strategy referred to as "bandwagon" by neo-realists. Their common interest was to make Europe the center of the international system, which was shifting towards the Far East.

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[462] See more details Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, 1992: Recasting the European Bargain, **World Politics**, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Oct., 1989), pp. 95-128

2.3.3. THREAT: MULTI-POLARITY IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

According to neo-realists, the threat stems from the capacity shift between the units within the system. The capacity shift is caused by clashes or wars between great powers. The multi-polar character of the international system increases the possibility of war/dispute between great powers.

France was the leader of integration in the first 20 years, and West Germany was the second biggest power of integration after the first 10 years. De Gaulle and Adenauer signaled in 1963, by signing the Elysée Treaty, that integration would be dominated by a Franco–German axis. Pompidou, who was the successor to de Gaulle, was feeling uneasy about Chancellor Brandt's determination to increase West Germany's political influence through Ostpolitik. Therefore, France, who had vetoed the UK's membership two times before, approved the UK's full membership in 1973 since

> "the UK might serve as a useful counter weight to the increasingly strong and self-confident Germany; UK governments would lend support to France's opposition to pressures from within the Community for increased supranationalism; and France would probably gain economically by virtue of having better access to UK markets."[463]

Consequently, the European Integration gained a multi-polar character in 1980s after the UK's accession. In addition to France and Germany, "by the 1980s, in terms of policy outputs, Britain was gradually becoming a more mainstream player in Community affairs."[464] Besides, the UK went beyond being a power balancer and became a power which could influence the progress of integration.

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[463]   Neill Nugent, "Previous Enlargement Rounds", In N. Nugent (Ed.) **European Union Enlargement**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.23

[464]   Brain White, **Understanding European Foreign Policy**, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 135

The UK's stance about the European Monetary System (EMS) was the indicator of the role it would play in integration. "The EMS project was immediately viewed by large sections of the Labour Party as a threat to national economic and monetary sovereignty"[465] The Conservative Party, which came into power after the general elections in 1979, embraced the approach of its predecessor, the Labour Party, towards the EMS. The Conservatives "were to withhold sterling from the EMR[466] for the next 11 years"[467] because, "the British decision was based upon a view of sterling's role as both a petro-currency and an international investment currency."[468] However, this meant that the UK saw the integration in the context of "economic enterprise."[469]

Additionally, "in the aftermath of the second oil shock, the UK failed to signal a willingness to be an emergency energy provider to the Community at large."[470] It can be argued that the UK's decision not to supply its energy resources to the member states would have provided an advantage to the UK and would have affected the balance of power in the case of deepening oil shock.

The UK was complaining about its large contribution to the budget and demanding its excess payments back. The UK aimed to permanently solve the budget problem through the CAP. The CAP, in fact, was a problematic area. For instance, "although milk production was less than one fifth of the EC total agricultural output, by 1980 it was consuming more than two fifths of CAP

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[465]   David Gowland and Arthur Tuner (Ed.), **Britain and European Integration 1945 -1998: A Documentary History**, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 155
[466]   "The centerpiece of EMS was ERM, which, like the earlier ill-fated snake system that had briefly included sterling in 1972, was designed to limit fluctuation between the currencies of the member states." **Loc. cit.**
[467]   **Ibid.**, p. 156
[468]   Derek W. Urwin, **The Community of Europe: History of European Integration Since 1945**, London and New York: Longman, 1991, p.184
[469]   Stephen George, "Great Britain and the European Community", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 531, The European Community: To Maastricht and beyond (Jan., 1994), p. 45 pp. 44-55
[470]   Richard McAllister, **From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey**, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 142

funds."[471] The UK was determined not to finance those countries that benefited from the advantages of the CAP such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland. The British budget problem and the CAP created tension in the integration. "The atmosphere soured further two years later, in May 1982, when Britain sought to block agreements on price levels for the CAP, invoking the Luxembourg Compromise."[472] If Mitterrand had not provided a satisfying solution to the problem in the Fontainebleau Summit, the UK's CAP challenge would have caused a serious dispute in the integration.

Meanwhile, some argued that the UK's attempt to solve the problem through the CAP was also intended to serve the interests of the USA. The "CAP was especially sensitive not only because of the vested interests of the various farming lobbies but because it was a contentious issue in Euro-American relations."[473] The USA favored giving the CAP a market-oriented character.[474] A traditional Anglo-Saxon relationship as well as the overlapping neo-liberal economic approaches of the USA and the UK caused these criticisms.

"During the early 1980s, while the budgetary dispute dominated the agenda of the Community, there was growing concern about the inability of Europe to recover from the effects of the 1979 rise in the price of oil."[475] Most of the EC countries, who thought that an institutional reform was necessary to achieve economic recovery and not to leave the fate of integration to the caprice of a single state, were not disappointed by the UK because the UK, "supported by Denmark and Greece [even Ireland],[476] was opposed to institutional reform"[477] in

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[471]   Urwin, **op. cit.,** p. 187
[472]   Peter M. R. Stirk and David Weigall (Ed.), **The Origins and Development of European Integration: A Reader and Commentary**, London and New York: Pinter, 1998, p. 245
[473]   **Ibid.,** p. 244
[474]   Joseph Hormats, US – European Economic Relations, 1981, 16 December 1982 In Peter M. R. Stirk and David Weigall (Ed.), **The Origins and Development of European Integration: A Reader and Commentary**, London and New York: Pinter, 1998, pp. 258 - 259
[475]   George, **op. cit.,** p. 46
[476]   Ireland is added to the quotation.
[477]   Stirk and Weigall, **op. cit.,** p. 247

that each of them, particularly the UK, was opposed to the transfer of sovereignty to the central institutions of European integration. This stance of the UK played an important role in keeping institutional reform in the SEA more limited than it had been envisioned.

Finally, in 1983, the Eurobarometer conducted a survey about whether citizens of member states saw integration as beneficial for themselves or not, and it became evident that most of the citizens of the UK were not happy with it. . The UK's approach towards integration, which was in line with its traditional foreign policy, overlapped with the expectations of the citizens, and this situation favored the UK during the integration process.

Table 7
Opinion Poll about the Membership of the Community

Country	National Results %
Belgium	90.7
Netherlands	87.6
Luxembourg	86.0
Italy	83.0
Germany	76.5
France	72.0
Ireland	66.7
Greece	63.7
Denmark	62.5
United Kingdom	36.0

S
ource: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission[478]

The UK started to become the great power of integration beginning from its accession. It was understandable for the UK to stay partially isolated from the integration process under the stressful circumstances of the second Cold War era. However, the UK's insistence on dominating the fate of the integration caused questioning of the multi-polar structure of integration because this multi-headedness did not provide security for member states. Each of the big three

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[478]   **Ibid.**, p.165

approached the integration in different ways.   For example, "the Community is not an end in itself"[479] for the UK. The UK believed that European integration should not be different from a regime that would provide members with the ability to effectively maintain their existence in the international system. However, for France the integration was a tool which provided it with the ability to become an independent voice in the international system, staying away from the USA and NATO. West Germany considered the integration a blessing which legitimized it and complemented its Ostpolitik.

Under these circumstances, the member states should have been careful in their definitions of threat, risk, and opportunity. Multi-headedness meant ambiguity. Moreover, great powers adopted a strategy of maintaining power contestations amongst themselves through small states. Thus, the UK became the big brother state of Denmark, Greece, and Ireland. France was the big brother state of Latin Mediterranean, and West Germany became the big brother state of Benelux.

The multi-polarity in integration was also the cause of miscalculations as was the case in the UK's energy politics. The UK, who did not agree to supply oil to the member states during the second oil shock, supported the energy treaty with the Soviets in defiance of the USA.

Finally, the UK's partial isolation from the integration limited the predictability of changes in power capacities between great powers, and this worried the member states in the negative atmosphere of the second Cold War.

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[479]   Thatcher, **op. cit.**

2.3.4. MEANS OF SECURITY: THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

The Single European Act was the formula of transforming the tripolar structure of integration into a bipolar structure. In other words, the SEA was a security tool that limited the effect of the UK's military, political, and economic power in the context of integration.

As Wexler notes, "the increasing power of Germany within the EC and EU during the 1980s and 1990s presents a major challenge to the European balance of power."[480] In addition to her being an economic giant and her reinforcement of political influence via Ostpolitik, German unification could lead to a major shift in the balance of power in European integration. Nevertheless, most of the member states, particularly France, anticipated that European integration under Franco–German leadership would best serve their national interests. As a matter of fact, "EMS, the decisive proposals for political union, and the expansion of the EC's international profile were all attributable to the Franco-German friendship."[481] Franco-German rapprochement strengthened the functioning of the SEA.

The root of Franco–German rapprochement dates back to the Elysée Treaty (1963). As mentioned above, this agreement created the impression that integration would progress along a Franco–German axis. Because member states were disconcerted by the priority West Germany gave in foreign policy to Ostopolitik, the bipolar structure ceased to exist after the UK gained membership. Nevertheless, since the UK went beyond its stabilizing role, Franco-German relations became closer. The tripolar structure threatened the existence of

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[480]   Wexler, **op. cit.**, p. 405
[481]   Lily Gardner Feldman, Germany and the EC: Realism and Responsibility, **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 531, The European Community: To Maastricht and beyond (Jan., 1994), p. 27 pp. 25-43

integration and the member states' national interests. "That thoughts of trilateral directoire of the FGR, France and the UK were a delusion and aberrant, and consequently a reversion to seeing the bilateral Franco–German relationship as the core of the Community and the locomotive of further progress."[482]

In this context, a protocol that was added to 1988 Elysée Treaty was one of the important steps to limit the UK's power in the integration and to give the integration a bipolar character. Hence,

> "with a view to giving effect to the common destiny which links the two countries and to developing their cooperation in the field of defense and security, there shall be established…. a Franco-German Council on Defense and Security."[483]

In addition, the Economic and Financial Council between France and West Germany was established in the second protocol signed the same date "to strengthen cooperation between the two countries and make it closer, to harmonize their economic policies, as far as possible, and their positions on international issues of an economic and financial nature."[484] Military and economic cooperation between France and West Germany would help put EU integration on the road to a bipolar system.

Mitterrand proposed "a Europe of different speeds or variable geometry" to lessen the UK's influence because the attitudes and behaviors of the UK worried most of the member states, which desired to protect their national interest

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[482]   McAllister, **op. cit.**, p.141

[483]   Article 1, "Protocol to the Treaty of 22 January 1963 between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Establishment of a Defense and Security Council", 22 January 1988, **UN Treaty Series**, Vol. 1546, A-11763, 1989, p. 372 1989 Retrieved Dec., 14, 2007 from http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/25/22/00049053.pdf

[484]   Article 1, "Protocol to the Treaty of 22 January 1963 between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Establishment of an Economic and Financial Council", 22 January 1988, **UN Treaty Series**, Vol. 1546, A-11763, 1989, p. 370 1989 Retrieved Dec., 14, 2007 from http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/25/22/00049053.pdf

through the integration. Mittrerrand had made an extraordinary effort to solve the UK's budget problem at the Fontainebleau Summit. However, he was aware of the fact that the UK must be pacified. Therefore he initiated the establishment of the Dooge Committee, which would work on institutional, political, and economic reforms. Consequently, Dooge Committee submitted a report to the Council at the Luxembourg summit of March 1985. Notable recommendations of the report were the necessity to increase the areas that the council decides by majority vote and the necessity for a single market that is appropriate to the spirit of a market economy. "France and Germany supported an initiative, largely based on the Dooge Report, to relaunch the EC by limiting the Luxembourg compromise, extending EC competence in foreign affairs, and completing the internal market."[485] The UK wanted to take advantage of the report, which had been supported by West Germany and France and would be opened for discussion in the same year at the Milano Summit. However, during the summit, an intergovernmental conference was assembled by a joint Franco-German initiative despite the reluctance of the UK. "The IGC opened in Luxembourg on 9 September 1985 and submitted a draft treaty to the Luxembourg European Council meeting on 2 and 3 December of the same year."[486] As a result, the SEA was signed by the member states of European integration in 1986 and entered into force in 1987. "The agreements which formed the SEA covered the areas of the single market, EPoC, and institutional reform."[487]

It can be said that institutional changes that occurred with the SEA were configured in accordance with the interests of France and Germany.[488] The Franco-German initiative had increased its activity in the Council with the support of the Benelux countries. Moreover, transforming the EPoC from an informal structure into a formal one with the SEA was a part of the attempt to downgrade the UK, which put emphasis on Atlantic ties, because

[485]   Moravcsik, **op. cit.**, p. 40
[486]   Fabio Pappalardo, **The Single European Act**, Retrieved Apr. 3, 2008 from http://www.ena.lu/
[487]   Urwin, **op. cit.**, p 231
[488]   See Garret.

"The Member States undertook to lay the foundation for a European foreign policy based on cooperation. They agreed to inform and consult one another on any foreign policy matters of general interest, with a view to seeking a common position, and they made a further commitment to the ongoing development and definition of common objectives."[489]

In fact, the UK considered NATO the mechanism which enabled it to build cooperation with other member states. Furthermore, the influence of the Franco–German axis, which became the leader of integration in the new era, would increase thanks to the EPoC

2.3.5. EVALUATION

In the second Cold War era (1979–1991), the security actors of European integration were France, West Germany, and the UK. These were the most powerful states of the integration in terms of their total capacities (military, political, economic). However, unlike the USA, these security actors did not adopt an offensive security strategy.

In this era, it was impossible for integration not to be affected by the negative atmosphere of the Cold War. In such circumstances, integration was a subsystem with an anarchic structure in which member states were referent objects. In this anarchic system, states could be expected to desire an increase in their powers in order to maintain their existence. However, this situation could have created serious security problems among member states.

The system gained a tripolar character after the capacity distribution associated with integration. The developments of the era confirm the fact that the

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[489]   Papalardo, **op. cit.**

tripolar structure threatened the system and the members' national interests. Thus, there was a quest for stability in the integration.

The leading states of integration, France and West Germany, projected a system, or a bipolar structure within the system, which would limit the ability of the UK's political attitudes to destabilize the system. In line with this objective, firstly Franco–German relations were revitalized, and then the UK's power status became questionable after the institutional and structural innovations which were put into practice through the SEA.

To sum up, the idea of international security, which left its mark on the era, was also pertinent for the issue of integration.

2.4. THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The security approach after the Cold War has been influenced by a pluralist security understanding. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the security dimension of European integration and to answer to the question: How can one explain European integration via a transnational security concept in the post-Cold War period?

2.4.1. SECURITY ACTOR: MEMBER STATES

It was impossible for the integration to stay unaffected by the transformations in the international community which had been prompted by the end of the Cold War. Thus, interdependence, which was projected by pluralists, can be intensively observed within the context of European integration. Therefore, it can be argued that member states signed the Maastricht Treaty, which formed the European Union, in order to accommodate themselves to this increasing interdependence.

After the completion of the Single Market (1992), it can be argued that interdependence between member states started to advance because "the single market program involved the removal of three kinds of trade barriers: physical barriers to trade; technical barriers to trade; fiscal barriers to trade."[490] Member states, through the Single Market, expected an increase in prosperity, a decline in production costs, an increase in profitability, growth in the volume of trade and the ability to penetrate a wider market. They also expected that interdependence, which would become stronger through the Single Market, would decrease the atmosphere of insecurity among member states. However, as Padoa-Schioppa claimed,

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[490]   Egan, **op. cit.**, p. 37

"the Community's economy was endangered by an 'inconsistent quartet.' The four points of this quartet were (1) free trade; (2) stable exchange rates within exchange rate mechanism; (3) autonomy of domestic monetary policy; and (4) the end of restrictions upon the movement of capital within the space created by the SEA"[491]

It was impossible for the above-mentioned four elements to consistently coexist in the case of a failure to establish a monetary union. For example, it was likely difficulties would occur "in terms of the operation of the mechanism of the current exchange rate of the EMS after entirely freeing capital flows beginning from 1 July 1990."[492] The Council charged the committee under the presidency of Delors with solving this problem. "The report was completed on 12 April 1989. The report projected the total establishment of economic and monetary union in the EC after three steps."[493]

The principles constituting the EU treaty were determined in two IGCs organized in 1991. One of them was about the EMU while the other was about political union. Whereas the IGC concerning political union was plagued with difficulties, "the IGC on EMU, which could work from the template of the Delors report, was relatively smooth going"[494] since there was a common opinion among member states about the necessity of monetary union for integration. As a result of this process, the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and became effective on 1 November 1993.

The treaty turned "the community into a Union built on three pillars, the central one of which compromises the existing Community treaties amended to include a commitment to EMU and a number of new policies and institutional

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[491]   Mark Gilbert, **Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European Integration Since 1945**, Lanham and et. al.:Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 189
[492]   Nahit Töre, " Avrupa Birliğinde Parasal Entegrasyon: Avrupa Para Sistemi ve Ekonomik ve Parasal Birlik1, In **AB El Kitabı**, Ankara: T.C. Merkez BankasıYayınları, 1995, p. 110
[493]   **Loc. cit.**
[494]   Gilbert, **op. cit.**, p. 203.

adjustment."[495] The second pillar named the Common Foreign and Security Policy was related to external security. The third pillar involved "cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, including such matters as illegal immigration, police cooperation, combating narcotics trafficking, and so on."[496]

The Maastricht Treaty brought about novelties that intensified transnational relations.

> "The treaty covers monetary union, enforcement mechanisms to strengthen EC oversight of economic policy and budgetary management, safeguards for a single market, the maintenance of equity between rich and poor states, the extension of civil rights, and the creation of a framework for a common foreign and defense policy."[497]

Another novelty that intensified relations was the citizenship of the Union. According to the treaty, "every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States."[498] Thus, the communication and, consequently, the interactions between individuals living in member states would increase.

Member states as security actors took non-state actors into consideration in the context of security. The most important non-state actor may be the EC,[499] of which the "most notable contribution to peace and prosperity stems from the creation of an integrated market, disciplined by common rules and regulations, to

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[495]   Christopher Pienning, **Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs**, Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner, 1997, p. 39
[496]   **Loc. cit.**
[497]   Edward Kolodziej, "The European Community", In E. Kolodziej and R. E. Kanet (Ed.) **Coping with Conflict After the Cold War**, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,, p. 207
[498]   Article G-8a/1, **The Maastricht Treaty**, 7 February 1992, Retrieved Nov. 3, 2007 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html
[499]   While the EC was considered an actor, it is difficult to say the same for the EU. The EU is a structure which is illegal and refers to the framework of a three-columned structure. The EC is an organization which is legal and is the first pillar of these columns.

promote free circulations and services as well as the factor production among member states."[500] Moreover, the EC "negotiates and acts within the WTO as a single body"[501] although each member state has seats in the World Trade Organizations (WTO). The EC was the guard of the economic interests of member states as a result of the deepened interdependence among them.

It can be argued that the EC, the power and authority of which was increased by the Maastricht Treaty, strove to contribute to the security of member states which were the security actors of integration. For example, "The community offered to serve as a broker between the central government in Belgrade and breakaway republics, sending a delegation of three foreign ministers repeatedly to mediate conflict"[502] during the Yugoslavian crisis.

In brief, when member states defined their security roles in the context of European integration, they could not underestimate the role of the EC in the security realm because the EC strengthened the complex interdependence and minimized the threats stemming from traditional sources of conflicts.

It can also be asserted that companies and banks indirectly contributed to the field of security. For example, "the Bundesbank's influence was also evident in the objective criteria which would be used to determine the fitness of individual member states to market the final transition to a single currency."[503] The insistence of the Bundesbank on these criteria was directed at establishing stability in a market which did not have internal borders. Otherwise, deviation of

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[500]   Kolodziej, **op. cit.**, p. 201
[501]   "The EU and the WTO: Defending the Rules of International Trade", Trade Issues,   Retrived   Mar.,   15,   2009   from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/index_en.htm
[502]   Jefferey J. Anderson, "The EU, The Soviet Union, and the End of the Cold War", In D. Dinan (Ed.) **Origins and Evolution of the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 265
[503]   Stirk and Weigall, **op. cit.**, p. 276. According to these criteria, the debt of a member state can not exceed 60% of its GDP, and the budget deficit can not be more than one third of its GDP.

member states from economic stability might have created a threat which could spread to the whole of integration.

Last but not least, member states were faced with non-governmental actors' security demands. For example, "Pope John Paul II has urged the European Union to include recognition of Europe's Christian heritage in its first constitution."[504] There was no reference to Christianity in the draft of the EU Constitution; the reason for this stemmed from security concerns. Any reference to Christianity might have created the impression that the integration positioned itself against the Muslim world, and furthermore, might have become the focus of terrorist acts of transnational Islamic terrorist organizations.

In summation, the Maastricht Treaty was a founding treaty which intensified transnational relations that had increased parallel to the changing international system. As the treaty increased interdependence, member states could no longer ignore the influences of several non-state actors, including the EC, on the security dimension of European integration.

2.4.2.   REFERENT OBJECT: MEMBER STATES

"The European periphery is viewed by EU member states as the primary source of many of the non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, migration, and transnational organized crime"[505] because member states were uncomfortable with the uncertain statuses of Central and Eastern European countries that had gained their independence after the end of the Cold War and the civil war that had erupted in Yugoslavia. Unstable political systems and wars in the region created an environment in which traditional and non-traditional security threats posed by

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[504]   Liz Blunt, "Pope presses EU on constitution", **BBC News**, 29 June 2003, Retrieved Aug 14., 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3029456.stm
[505]   Roland Dannreuther, " Introduction: Setting the Framework", In R. Dannreuther (Ed.) **European Union Foreign Policy and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy**, London and New York: Routladge, 2004, p. 3

non-state actors could flourish. Furthermore, member states were becoming more fragile in terms of security in the post-Cold War era in which the distinction between domestic and external security had disappeared.

For example, the EU diplomatically anathematized Serbia due to its irreconcilable and offensive attitudes during the Yugoslavian conflict. Germany opposed this because Germany claimed that "diplomatic isolation of Serbia would stem the flood of Yugoslavian refugees into Germany, which had tripled in 1991 over the previous year."[506] This situation might have prompted domestic and external threats to Germany's security.

The interdependence between member states and increased significance of transnational issues demonstrate that the security dimension of European integration cannot be limited to the traditional security understanding. Thus, member states included two columns: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). These organizations in conjunction with the Maastricht Treaty, complemented each other because

> "after the end of bipolarity, external security agencies (the army, secret service) are looking inside the borders in search of an enemy outside… Internal security agencies (national police force, police with military status, border guards, customs) are looking to find their internal enemies beyond the borders and speak of networks of crime (migrants, asylum seekers, diasporas, Islamic people who supposedly have links with crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime"[507]

Many member states, especially France and Germany, focused on the field of security because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independent

[506] Anderson, **op. cit.**, p. 266
[507] Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe", In M. Keltsrup, M.C. Williams (Ed.) **International Relations Theory and Yhe Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community**, London and New York: Routladge, 2000, p. 171

but uncertain statuses of a number of Central and Eastern European states. "Europe was expected to use its increased weight to achieve more political influence and ensure stability around its borders."[508] As an outcome of this goal, the CFSP became effective with the Maastricht Treaty for the following purposes:

> "i) To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways.
> ii) To preserve world peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles and objectives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which were laid down in Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Paris Charter of 1990.
> iii) To promote international cooperation.
> iv) To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of laws, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."[509]

An interesting event is worth mentioning at this point. The European Council demanded foreign ministers to prepare a report in order to define the working areas of the CFSP in 1992. "Foreign Ministers therefore drafted over the next few months a report establishing a general framework in which CFSP could operate, and identifying some areas suited for joint actions"[510] This report, which was approved by the European Council in June 1992 Lisbon Summit, projected specific targets in six articles related to the CFSP.

> "i) strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights…iii) Contributing to prevention and settlement of conflicts…v) strengthening existing co-operation in issues of international interest such as fighting against arms proliferation, terrorism, and the traffic in illicit drugs; vi) promoting and supporting good government."[511]

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[508] Fraser Cameron, **The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future**, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, p. 24
[509] **European Union,** The Publication Units of European Union, Brussells, 1993, p.
[510] Simon J. Nuttal, European Foreign Policy, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 236
[511] **Ibid.**, pp. 236 -237

The report pointed to the necessity of providing the CFSP with an understanding suitable for the transnational security approach that affected the international system of the post-Cold war era. The report, which attached importance to democracy as a security tool, saw the necessity of good political administrations for stability and peace in the region and for awareness of threats such as transnational organized crime, suggested that member states take measures against transnational security threats within the framework of the CFSP. Therefore,

> "even though drug policy resided in the JHA portfolio, many of the instruments by which the EU could conduct counter-drug activities with other countries resided within the first and second pillar… Similarly, terrorism remained outside of JHA because some member states were concerned about the implications for their sovereignty and counter-terror policies were conducted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy."[512]

Likewise, in the following years several security issues in the field of JHA were included in the scope of the first pillar along with various regulations, while juridical and police cooperation in criminal issues remained within the scope of the third pillar.

JHA should be examined carefully even though it has been considered inefficient since its establishment.[513] Most of the member states agreed on collectively fighting the transnational threats to which they had become vulnerable at the internal level of integration at the IGC which was related to political union. As a result, JHA became a part of the integration with the Maastricht Treaty.

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[512] Wyn Rees, External Face of Internal Security", In C. Hill and M. Smith (Ed.) **International Relations and the European Union**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 215

[513] **The Intergovernmental Conference: Prospects for Building a More Democratic and Effective European Union**, London: Stationary Office, 1996, p.28

The aim of cooperation in the field of internal affairs was to define the conditions for citizens of non-member states to enter, to move within, and to reside in member states. The policies related to visas, asylum, immigration, and free movement were transferred to the first pillar with the Amsterdam Treaty. Cooperation in the field of justice was based on fighting against terrorism, human trafficking, illegal drug and arms trafficking, corruption, forgery, organized crimes, racism, and xenophobia.[514]

The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed on 19 June 1997 and came into force on 1 July 1999, revised the cooperation among member states in the field of JHA. While the treaty left criminal matters in the third pillar, it "brought number of third pillar issues into the first pillar,"[515] such as

> "a common regime for carrying out persons control at the external borders, the development of a common visa policy, conditions for free movement of third-country citizens living in the Union, common strategies for illegal immigration, and a common policy on asylum and the treatment of applications for asylum."[516]

Thus, the third pillar was thematized as police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This shows member states' determination to take measures in the internal body against transnational threats.

The CFSP and JHA cannot be considered security tools against traditional threats. However the establishment of the CFSP and JHA shows that member states were vulnerable to new security threats as well as traditional security threats.

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[514] Atalay Bahar, "Avrupa Polis Teşkilatı (EUROPOL) ve Avrupa Birliği Bütünleşmesi İçindeki Rolü", (Unpublished Master Thesis, Kadir Has University Institute of Social Sciences, 2003), p. 11
[515] Emek M. Uçarer, "Justice and Home Affairs", In M. Cini **European Union Politics**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 305
[516] Ellen Ahnfelt and Johan From, "Policy On Justice and Home Affairs: From High to Low Politics", In S.S. Andersen and K.A. Aliassen (Ed.) **Making Policy in Europe (2nd ed.)**, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2001, p. 156

2.4.3. THREAT

While discussing the future security role of European integration, Hunter stated that "threats to future security systems can be defined not only just in military terms – or the need to be able to discipline a rogue state – but also in political, economic, and social terms."[517] The international system, which became ambiguous after the end of the Cold War system, faced non-traditional threats which were caused by global economic and social crises; and European integration was not an exception. It is necessary to note here that pluralists do not ignore traditional threats while focusing on transnational threats.

2.4.3.1. Transnational Terrorism

Member states are not unfamiliar with the notion of terror. They suffered spiritually and materially for long years due to terrorist acts. That is why, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom "had specific legislation in the field of counterterrorism."[518]

Paralleling the change in the international system, member states have considered terror a major threat since the beginning of 1990s.[519] This is primarily because terror gained a transnational character. It is impossible to say whether they could have reached a common conclusion if the September 11 Attacks had not happened.

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[517]   Robert E. Hunter, "The Future of European Security", In A. Cleese and R. Vernon (Ed.) **The European Community After 1992**, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991, p. 170

[518]   Europol, **TE_SAT: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007**, The Hague: Corporate Communications, 2007, p.9

[519]   See Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.

Quoting from Paul Wilkon's a report published in 2007 by Europol, transnational terrorism is defined as "terrorist activities in more than one country, while domestic terrorism is confined within the borders of one country, sometimes within a particular locality in the country." [520] The report classified transnational terrorist organizations as Islamist, ethno-nationalist, left wing, and right wing according to their acts, and defined the general philosophy of fighting against terrorism. "In addressing domestic terrorism, a country can be self-reliant if it possesses sufficient resources, whereas in the case of transnational terrorism, countries' counter-terrorism policies are interdependent."[521] In fact, terror lost its local dimension after the abolition of physical borders in European integration. It was now possible for the ETA, which wanted to scare the Spanish, to attack a Spanish origin firm in Germany since there is no longer any obstacle in front of individuals, firms, and even civil society groups to move within the borders of the European Union.

The September 11 Attacks created alarm in the EU and created a new breakpoint in the EU's approach towards terror. The EU Commission presented a new plan to the council about the fight against terrorism just after this horrible event.

> "Terrorist actions are liable to undermine the rule of law and the fundamental principles on which the constitutional traditions and legislation of Member States' democracies are based. They are committed against one or more countries, their institutions or people with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of those countries."[522]

The main objective of the plan was to provide a basis of cooperation among member states about fighting against terrorism. In line with this objective,

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[520] Europol, **op. cit.**, p. 9
[521] **Loc. cit.**
[522] **COM (2001) 521 Final**, 19.9.2001, p. 2

on 21 September 2001 the European Council declared an action plan to fight against terrorism. The plan was based on five main topics.

     i)   Enhancing police and judicial cooperation

     ii)   Developing international legal instruments

     iii) Putting an end to the funding of terrorism

     iv) Strengthening air security

     v)   Coordinating the European Union's global action[523]

Just after the action plan, "the European Commission proposed that the Member States freeze all funds belonging to 27 organizations and individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities."[524] The Commission declared the necessity to take in line with their own regulations.

The European Security Strategy issued in 2003 stated that terrorism "poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe."[525] The paper, as a reflection of the September 11 Attacks, pointed to the gravity of terrorist acts which are legitimized through religion. In addition, "the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies." [526]

The attacks committed on 11 March 2004 and 7 July 2005 in Madrid and London transformed the panic among member states into a form of trauma. The

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[523] "Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting", 21 September 2001, SN.140/01, Retrieved May 22, 2009 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf
[524] The EU Fights Against the Scourge of Terrorism, Europe, March 2006, Retrieved May 22, 2009 from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/fsj_terrorism_intro_en.htm
[525] "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", 12 December 2003, p.3 Retrieved Jan., 13, 2004, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
[526] European Security Strategy, p.4

fact that "eleven Member States were targeted by 498 terrorist attacks in 2006"[527] and "nine member states reported a total of 583 failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks"[528] in 2007 added to the trauma.

The Third Article[529] in the outline plan of the commission "details terrorist attacks but is unable to define the main indicators which would differentiate terror from ordinary crimes. Moreover, the assessment related to whether any act should be considered as a terror crime or not is left to member states."[530]

In conclusion, the September 11 Attacks were the turning point for member states to take common measures against terrorism. During this period, member states considered terror as a transnational threat but they did not produce a common and binding definition of it.

2.4.3.2. Transnational Criminal Organizations

After the Cold War, the source of the most important security problems of Europe was transnational criminal organizations. The ESS mentioned that "Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism."[531]

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[527]   Europol, **op. cit.**, p. 13
[528]   Europol, **TE_SAT: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008**, The Hague: Corporate Communications, 2008, p.9
[529]   See Appendix
[530]   Beril Dedeoğlu, "Terörism Üzerine Karşılaştırmalar: Bermuda Şeytan Üçgeni", In B. Dedeoğlu (Ed.) **Dünden Bugune Avrupa Birliği**, İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2003, p. 457
[531]   European Security Strategy, p. 4

There are three factors facilitating activities of transnational criminal organizations for the European integration: free physical and financial movement, failed states, and disunity of penal codes of member states.

The Schengen Treaty, signed in 1985, contributed to the free movement of individuals. All EU countries except Ireland and the UK joined this treaty. The negative aspect of this development is that controlling the activities of criminal organizations at the national level became more difficult after the abolishment of controls in internal borders.

In addition, the abolishment of financial borders provides advantages to transnational criminal organizations. For example, the laundering of money "flows across several financial jurisdictions then it becomes extremely difficult to trace."[532] Prosecutor Bernard Bertossa says the following while complaining about Europe's status as a financial haven for transnational criminal organizations: "The financial paradise in Europe, the disgrace for justice, is caused by hypocrisies of member states, because they allow this by retarding penal processes."[533]

In addition, the "collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism."[534] Thus, the independent statuses of Central and Eastern European countries did not mean that they would be well-governed. These countries are used as bases by transnational criminal organizations to maintain their activities. Albania and the former Yugoslavia, in which regional clashes have been observed, are especially suitable states for transnational criminal organizations.

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[532]   Rees, **op. cit.**, p. 210

[533]   Le Monde Economie, 23 May 2000 quoted from Philippe Marchesin "Yeni Tehditler Karşısında Avrupa" (trans. by. Beril Dedeoğlu), In B. Dedeoğlu (Ed.) **Dünden Bugune Avrupa Birliği**, İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2003

[534]   European security strategy, p. 4

Transnational criminal organizations cannot be effectively fought due to different penal codes and their applications in member states. Although the Tampere Summit concluded that "enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and the necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights,"[535] member states have not effectively co-operated in fighting against transnational criminal organizations

2.4.3.3. Health Threats

At the integration level, contagious diseases and especially AIDS are considered among health threats. The outline plan, prepared by the Commission after the SARS epidemic and titled "strengthening coordination on generic preparedness planning for public health emergencies at EU level", was a caution for member states to approach health problems in a security context. The Commission reported that

> "a previously unknown disease with features similar to influenza and the common cold was spreading rapidly causing high mortality and morbidity, fast travel and global trade facilitating transmission in the absence of relevant vaccines and drugs."[536]

It is also necessary to note that member states are strategically prepared for the avian flu and swine flu epidemics.

> "The European Centre for disease prevention and control headquartered in Stockholm pools and shares knowledge on current and emerging threats, and works with its national counterparts to develop Europe-wide disease surveillance and early warning

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[535]   Tampere European Council 15 – 16 October, Presidency Conslcusion Retieved Apr. 9, 2009 from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#c
[536]   "COM (2005) 605 Final", 28.11.2005 Retrieved Jun.2, 2009 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2005&nu_doc=605

systems. By having a central agency, the EU can respond quickly to threats. That can make the difference between a minor outbreak and a serious epidemic."[537]

On the other hand, the inclusion of AIDS in ESS is an indicator of its character as a security threat. "AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats"[538] and this "has negative implications for national economies."[539]

More evidence for member states' consideration of AIDS and other contagious diseases as "transnational threats" is that the Council and the Parliament decided to assist developing countries in fighting AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. According to the Regulation (EC) No 1568/2003, Community support involved:

> "(a) financial assistance;
> (b) technical assistance, training, including of doctors and paramedics, or other services;
> (c) supplies, such as medical supplies, commodities, and works;
> (d) audits, evaluation and monitoring missions;
> (e) transfer of technology and know-how, where possible, for the purpose of local pharmaceuticals production"[540]

In sum, member states and institutions of integration confirmed that health problems are among transnational security threats on the level of European integration.

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[537]   "Public Health: Good Health For Everybody", **Europa**. Retrieved Jun. 2, 2009 from http://europa.eu/pol/health/overview_en.htm
[538]   European Security Strategy, p. 2
[539]   "Preventing HIV/AIDS (Council conclusions of 2005)" Retrieved Jun. 2, 2009 from
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/public_health/threats_to_health/c11533a_en.htm
[540]   Article 4 / 1, "Regulation (EC) No 1568/2003" of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on aid to fight poverty diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) in developing countries Retrieved Jun., 12, 2009 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type _doc=Regulation&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=1568

2.4.3.4. Environmental Threats

Member states developed a common environmental policy through the SEA into action and this shows their sensitivity to environmental threats. In addition to this, it is not surprising that the water problem, a major environmental problem, was included in the ESS as a security threat. "Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions."[541] The EC, in order to prevent water pollution, developed standards determining attributes of water and "adopted the EU sustainable water use approach beginning from 1995."[542] Correct, efficient use of water resources is important for the agricultural fields of member states.

On the other hand, environmental degradation is seen as a problematic area for member states, because "over 300.000 potentially contaminated sites have been identified in Western Europe, and the estimated total number in Europe is much greater."[543] The information about the size of soil erosion is undetermined since member states do not have a common definition of soil erosion. However, what is certain is that "soil erosion and salinisation have increased the risk of desertification in the most vulnerable areas, particularly in the Mediterranean region."[544] The Mediterranean is the agricultural region, or the food repository, of the integration. Only this fact renders the consideration of soil erosion as a security threat meaningful.

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[541]   European Security Strategy, p. 3
[542]   Selcan Serdaroğlu, "Avrupa Bütünleşmesine Katkıda Bulunan Bir Faktör Olarak Çevre Politikası", In B. Dedeoğlu (Ed.) **Dünden Bugune Avrupa Birliği**, İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2003, p. 307
[543]   "Conclusions Per Environmental Problem", European Environmental Agency. Retrieved Jun.1, 2009 from http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-9167-087-1/page014.html
[544]   **Ibid.**

Since member states are aware of the fact that security threats related to the environment are of transnational character, in addition to taking necessary measures on the integration level, they also pioneered ways to raise environmental consciousness in the international community.

For example, "the EC/EU has been a major participant in the attempt to create an international climate change regime since its inception in the late 1980s."[545] The Community supported nearly 30 agreements in order to fight environmental problems in the international arena.

Finally, the EU, contrary to the USA, has tried to get the measures proposed by the Kyoto Protocol accepted, regardless of the scientific evidence. Greenhouse gases cause global climate change and thus enhanced drought and floods. "These developments, which will affect especially agricultural production, could threaten security and stability in various regions of the world."[546] The hidden motivation behind the admitting that environmental problems are security threats on the integration level is directly proportional to the capacity of the problem to negatively affect agricultural, economic, or immigration policies.

2.4.4. MEANS OF SECURITY

As indicated before, democracy is defined as a security tool of international institutions against novel threats in the international system. It can also be argued that these security tools gained priority on the integration level.

[545]   Bretherton and Vogler, **op. cit.,** p. 103
[546]   Serdaroğlu, **op. cit.**, p. 316

2.4.4.1. Democracy Promotion

The political regimes of CEECs, which lack democratic traditions, were serious security threats for the EU states because problematic fields, which had been postponed during the Soviet patronage, might have appeared. These problems might also have caused internal disputes or wars between states. The civil war which stemmed from ethnic origins had already started in the former Yugoslavian territories. The risk of this clash spreading to the whole of Europe and the possibility of new disputes between states or internal clashes were beyond what Europe could bear. Moreover, post-communist states, due to the deficiencies in their political regimes, were suitable places in which terrorist or criminal organizations could get established.

Moreover, after gaining their independence "most CEECs were soon openly expressing the hope that, as they established liberal democratic and market-based system and as East-West relations were transformed, the way would be eased for their accession to the EU."[547] Member states did in fact mandate that the CEECs, which they considered sources of traditional and new threats, acquire democratic values before being accepted to the EU. Thatcher's speech delivered in the Czechoslovakian Parliament, in which she argued that war between democratic regimes is not a solution, was a historic reference to the necessity of the CEECs to acquire democratic values.[548]

The EU council agreed in Copenhagen in June 1993 that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and

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[547] Neill Nugent, "The Unfolding of the 10 + 2 Enlargement Round", In N. Nugent (Ed.) **European Union Enlargement,** New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.34

[548] See Chapter 5

protection of minorities."[549] States who did not meet these criteria, also known as political criteria, would not be negotiated with. In short, democracy is a prerequisite to becoming a member of the EU. It is necessary to note that democracy is a must not only to become a member but also to remain a member of the EU. For example, in 1999, 14 EU members declared that "Austria would be isolated and bilateral relations with Austria would remain at the technical level as long as Haider's party, which does not acknowledge the essential values of Europe, participated in government."[550]

As will be remembered, far-right Nazi sympathizer Haider's FPÖ finished second in general elections in 1999. However, experiences showed that extremist parties, which had gained power through democratic means, put an end to democracy and caused a bloody war in Europe. Thus, member states attach great importance to ensuring democracy within themselves.

In summation, member states thought that it was necessary to render democracy the essential character of political regimes, based on the contention that war was impossible between states that had democratic regimes.

2.4.4.2. Institutions

Member states established cooperation, through international organizations such as the ESDP and Europol, to deal with the threats that they faced in the post-Cold war era. The common policies produced in line with the first pillar and the institutions under these policies, both of which were created to fight against the threats caused by health and environmental problems, are also security tools.

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[549] "Conclusions of the Presidency", The European Council, Copenhagen 21- 22 June 1993, SN 180/1. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2008 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf
[550] İlter Tükrmen, "Değerler ve Demokrasi", **Hürriyet**, 3 February 2000

2.4.4.2.1. ESDP

Member states established the ESDP as a security tool against traditional threats in Europe. The objective of the ESDP was to establish cooperation among member states against traditional threats as well as to prevent dispersal of new threats by intervening in conflicts in the region. As indicated before, geographies, in which clashes or wars exist, facilitate the activities of terrorist and organized criminal organizations.

The European Defense and Security Identity (EDSI) appears when we look at the historical background of the ESDP. The EU countries formed a new security strategy with the EDSI, which had been developed as part of NATO after the establishment of the EU. According to this, the WEU, by using the resources of NATO, would function as the security wing of the EU as part of the CFSP. "NATO acknowledged the designation of the European defense by the Europeans and rendered this a territorial base for NATO."[551] Thus, the following paragraph was expressed in the NATO Summit on January 1994:

> "Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defense matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty."[552]

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[551]   Beril Dedeoğlu and Mesut Hakkı Caşın, "Yeni Avrupa Güvenlik Kimliğinde Stratejik Arayışlar" Avrasya Dosyası, Vol. 5, No.4 The European Union Special Issue (Spring 1999), p.171

[552]   "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government", Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. Retrieved Mar. 17, 2009 from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm

The members of NATO supported the decision of EU members to take responsibility in the area of security through the CFPS. However, they emphasized the superiority of NATO in the European security structure. The main features of the new security strategy in the context of the EDSI are as follows:

"NATO is responsible for the threats that could be directed against Europe from outside, and BAB is restricted to those which cover only Europe. . Secondly, NATO is responsible for deciding what a threat is; in other words, a decision about defining something as a threat could not be taken independently of the US."[553]

The WEU's Council of Ministers determined the Petersberg Tasks, which encompassed "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking"[554] in 1992. The Amsterdam Treaty directed that EU decisions should be implemented by the WEU in the context of Petersberg Tasks.

The foundations of the transition from the ESDI to the ESDP, or from theory to practice, were laid in two summits in 1998 between France and the UK. Blair and Chirac declared that "the EU should have the capacity for autonomous action, and suggested the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force."[555] In 1996, the dispute between separatist Kosovans and the Serbian state transformed into a serious regional clash. "When refugee Albanians began to flee into neighbouring Macedonia, raising the possibility that a civil war that might spill over into neighbouring countries, including EU member Greece, it became clear that the EU had a direct interest in the conflict."[556] The following was stated in the Cologne Summit organized in 1999 about initiating the ESDP, the foundations of which had been laid in St. Malo:

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[553]   Dedeoğlu and Caşın, **op. cit.**, p. 172
[554]   "Petersberg Declaration", WEU's Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June, 2009, Retrieved Nov. 14, 2007 from http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf
[555]   John McCormick, **The European Superpower,** New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 74- 75
[556]   **Ibid.**, p. 75

> "We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense"[557]

In the Helsinki Summit, the issue of forming the institutional structure that would politically and strategically shape the military operations that Europe would carry out in the future was also covered. The novelties that were brought about by the Helsinki Summit are briefly as follows:

> "The nomination of Javier Solanna to the post of High Representatives for CFSP; the creation of a Political and Security Community (PSC), consisting of ambassadors of each member state meeting twice a week in Brussels; the creation of an EU Military Committee (EUMC), officially made up of chiefs of defense staff of member countries but in practice attended by their military delegates, which is responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the PSC and the European Council; the creation of an EU Military Staff (EUMS) that provides expertise for the ESDP, in particular in the conduct of any Union military crisis management operation, and is responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg missions."[558]

When we look at the motivations behind the formation of the ESDP, we can conclude that the reduction in the USA's strategic need to provide European security after the end of the Cold War is the first reason because Europe had lost its position as the center of gravity in terms of security strategies. Moreover, the USA's power to finance European security was limited. The USA was unwilling to bear such a financial burden.

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[557] **European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence**, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. Retrieved Sept. 3, 2007 fromhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/koln en.htm

[558] Jean-Yves Haine, "An Historical Perspective", In N. Gnesotto and J. Solana **European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999 -2004)**, Paris: Institute for Secuirty Studies, 2004, p. 44

Another motivation "was the reappearance of military conflict on the continent of Europe."[559] After the collapse of Yugoslavia, the ESDP was planned as a measure against the threat of clashes in that region spreading to the whole continent. Member states did not have any alternative but to prevent regional clashes which would threaten their own security.

The last motivation was related to the European defense industry.[560] This supports our argument that security actors cannot ignore non-state actors in the security field. The Fourth Article of the St. Malo Declaration, according to which the ESDP was founded, is worth noting. "Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology."[561] The desires of the arms companies, which operate in member states, to produce and sell all kinds of military equipment, from rifles to aircrafts, could only be satisfied by forming new and bigger markets. Thus, arms dealers pushed for the establishment of the ESDP.

Briefly, a means of cooperation was created among member states to ensure the security of the region through the establishment of the ESDP. The main contribution of the ESDP was that it functioned as a security tool against traditional security threats and created a means of confidence and cooperation among member states in combating new threats.

2.4.4.2.2. EUROPOL

European Police Office (Europol) is "the European Union Law Enforcement Organization that handles criminal intelligence. Its mission is to assist the law

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[559]   Howorth, **Security and Defense Policy in the European Union**, p. 55
[560]   **Ibid.**, p. 56
[561]   "Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense", Saint Malo, 4 December 1998. Retrieved Sept. 3, 2009 from http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html

enforcement authorities of Member States in their fight against serious forms of organised crime."[562] Europol was an organization which was founded against transnational threats directed against the internal borders of European integration.

Europol was organizationally based on the TREVI[563] work group, which had been established in 1975 by member states. Initially, TREVI focused on fighting terrorism and dealing with security issues, and then its scope (police training, organized crime, and ssafeguarding nuclear power plants) was extended. Finally, the job to eliminate the problems which could be caused by the abolishment of physical borders between states through the SEA was added to its framework. The TREVI ministers proposed the abolishment of TREVI and the establishment of EUROPOL, which was designed to be a more effective system.

Article K-1/9 of the Maastricht Treaty describes a European police organization at the integration level:

> "[P]olice cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol)."[564]

This article of the Maastricht Treaty paved the way for Europol to be founded in 1995. Its most important duty was to "provide cooperation between

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[562]   Rob Wainwright, "Director's Introduction", **Europol,** Retrieved Jun. 4, 2009 from http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=introduction

[563]   TREVI is an abbreviation derived from the first letters of Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence and International

[564]   Article K-1/1, "The Maastricht Treaty"

institutions during investigations, which had started in a country and then spread to other member countries."[565]

Even though Europol initially focused on drug smuggling, after a while, issues such as radioactive and nuclear smuggling, refugee trafficking, terrorism, child pornography, counterfeiting, illegal migration connections, illegal vehicles and their registration, and money laundering have been included within its scope. "With the council decision on 6 December 2001, crimes such as serious environmental crimes, illegal trade with cultural pieces, copyright violations, and organized robbery"[566] started to fall within its sphere of duties.

Member states were aware of the fact that the fight against transnational threats within the region would become increasingly more important as a result of the Central and Eastern European countries' accession to the union. Therefore, a summit in Tampere, Finland, was organized on 15 – 16 October 1999.

At the Tampere Summit, decisions related to the necessity of working against transfrontier and organized types of crime, taking precautionary measures, and establishing research groups were made. Member states agreed that "the operational role of Europol was strengthened in relation to fighting organized crime…., the joint investigate teams could be established in relation to terrorism, drugs, and the trafficking in people,"[567] as well as the creation of "a unified EU police academy."[568] It was intended to increase the power and personnel quality of Europol and thus render the fight against transnational threats more efficient.

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[565] Philippe Marchesin "Yeni Tehditler Karşısında Avrupa" (trans. by. Beril Dedeoğlu), In B. Dedeoğlu (Ed.) **Dünden Bugune Avrupa Birliği**, İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2003

[566] Bahar, **op. cit.**, p. 11

[567] Rees, **op. cit.**, p. 216

[568] Ahnfelt and From, **op. cit.**, p. 141

At this summit, it was decided to create "a new body – 'Eurojust'. This was to be composed of national prosecutors, magistrates and police officers and would aid national prosecuting authorities in their criminal investigations of organized crime."[569] With the establishment of Eurojust, Europol's informative and police activities became easier to synchronize with the judicial authorities. Thus, the fight against crime became more effective.

In summation, member states considered Europol a security tool in fighting threats which they confined to the third pillar, and they intended to make the fight against crime more effective by increasing the exchange of information. Moreover, they intended to increase the effectiveness of Europol by establishing support institutions such as Eurojust.

2.4.5. EVALUATION

After the Cold War, we see member states again as the security actors of European integration. However, member states are security actors which take the non-state actors at the integration level into consideration. The ESDP's establishment as a result of arms manufacturers' lobbying is an example of this.

Member states are referent objects, too. They made the columns of the CFSP and the JHA parts of the structure of the union since they see themselves as being threatened by traditional and non-traditional threats. Transnational terror organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and health and environmental problems were considered new threats on the security agendas of member states after the Cold War. Institutions founded at the integration level (Europol and ESDP) and encouraging democratic regimes are the security tools used by member states.

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[569]   Uçarer, **op. cit.**, p. 305

In sum, it can be argued that the security dimension of European integration was shaped according to the transnational security understanding. Therefore, the security approach of the integration matches the dominant security approach in the international system.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the study, the answer to the question of whether the security understanding of European integration overlaps with the general security understanding in the international system was explored. In order to answer this question, it was necessary to summarize the security approaches which have become prominent in the international system in their historical contexts.

Historical events demonstrate that the international system has been restructured after large-scale central wars (the Thirty Years' War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II). Those states which maintained their sovereignty in these periods have become the absolute security actors in the system. The process in which the international system started to be restructured after World War II was the first Cold War era. The security actors of this era were sovereign states. The international organizations-- especially the UN--which had been founded during or after World War II were unable to provide security. The League of Nations, which had been expected to ensure security after World War I, was unsuccessful. Therefore, there was a problem with legitimacy for international organizations that endeavored to be security actors in the system after World War II.

The states that were security actors in this era gave priority to ensuring their own security because the dominant security understanding suggested that each state is a referent object per se. Hence, they were in favour of all kinds of solutions that would maximize their national powers without forcing them to sacrifice their sovereignty or national unity.

Activities which endanger a state's existence, unity and political independence are threats. Whether such activities are threats or not is constant from one state to another. In the first Cold War era, concerns about objective

threats increased due to the fresh memory of World War II and uncertainties in the formation process of the international system. On the other hand, there are also subjective threats. The criterion in this era about the definition of subjective threats was the degree of damage to national interests. Ideologies were the most prominent subjective threats. Thus, ideologies were first defined as security threats in this era.

Sovereign states not only tried to maximize their national powers but also attempted to form military alliances in order to remove or control perceived threats. However, it is not possible to say that cooperation among states in terms of security was considered acceptable. In addition, many states concentrated on foreign intelligence activities in order to determine the threat at its source and ensure security.

In brief, the first Cold War era was consistent with the national security approach, which was based on classical realism. It can also be argued for this era that an understanding of the security dimension of European integration was parallel to the national security approach. However, it is necessary to note developments which seem like deviations.

Member states who formed the European integration were the security actors of this sub-system. Also, the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) influenced the system as indirect security actors. It was normal because designing a European sub-system in line with the interests of the states of the upper-system was necessary since the international system was of a bipolar character. For example, France supported integration to maximize its power in the upper-system.

Member states were also referent objects. The Soviet expansion and communist regimes were objective threats for member states. While communist regimes were subjective threats in the upper-system, they had an objective

character at the level of integration. This shows that European integration was a supportive sub-system of the Western Bloc, which was a part of the upper-system.

It was considered an anomaly for member states to cooperate through integration to ensure their security. However, integration was a security tool which was suitable for member states' national interests and would maximize their national powers. None of the member states abandoned their sovereignty rights. European integration is an economic alliance, the duration of which has been determined by treaties (50 years). The fact that it is an economic alliance means that it began as a temporary alliance in the fields of coal and steel, which formed the basis of military power. This way, member states developed a security model different from the upper-system. On the other hand, we do not have adequate information about how member states benefited—if any did—from intelligence activities as means of security.

In the détente era, the inter-state security approach, which was based on economic relations and class struggles rather than power relations, became prominent. The security understandings of the international system and European integration largely overlapped in this era.

As indicated before, the international system entered into a restructuring period after World War II. States concentrated on maximizing their national powers in this period because states attached importance to the role of power in ensuring security since the inter-state relations were taking place in a highly anarchic atmosphere.

There appeared two main problem areas against which states had to fight in this period. The first was the shortage of resources in financing national power and the second one was the ignored economic development and concomitant prosperity due to the prioritized national security.

There was an implicit agreement to ease tensions in order to devise solutions in these problem areas in the bipolar system. Historical experiences showed that colonial wars had harmed center states more than the periphery. Therefore, the détente was a kind of break in the tension between the western and eastern blocs allowing the exploitation of the Third World.

The states with imperialist traditions initiated neo-imperialist policies to finance national power and ensure economic development. The main philosophy of neo-imperialist policies was based on transferring the economic resources of the Third World countries that had won their independences in Africa and Asia to states in the center.

In the détente era, the economic system envisaged by neo-imperialist economic relations was a threat; the imperialist states were security actors; and the Third World states were referent objects. In order to maintain the international system which they formed in line with their interests, imperialist states considered security communities--especially regional organizations--which would put an end to the struggles between them as security tools. It was inevitable for that Third World countries would abandon the model of dependent development and create their own model of development in the economic system that was paving the way for their exploitation by the center.

Another security actor of the détente era was comprised of several state leaders. The individual preferences of some state leaders dramatically changed their countries' security policies. However, the softening of the strict bipolar system encouraged the appearance of these leaders as security actors. In general, it can be argued that these state leaders stayed away from security policies that would increase the tension in the system. Meanwhile, it can be said that de Gaulle, who was one of the major security actors of the era, followed a security policy in line with the neo-imperial policies of France. It should not be forgotten that de Gaulle's rule was desired by French capitalists.

In the détente era, security came to be a concept which was defined through economic relations, and this was valid for the security dimension of European integration too. In this era, a security project in line with the traditional security approach was not put into practice at the integration level.

For the member states which had imperialist traditions, European integration was a coalition which would enable them to follow neo-imperialist policies. The aim of this coalition was to accelerate the member states' economic development and increase their prosperity by reorganizing relations with their former colonies. The former colonies become referent objects within the context of this economic relationship.

However, the referent object for European integration was the European Community (EC), which institutionalized the economic system of the process. The maintenance of the coalition of exploitation among member states was dependent on the existence of the EC. However, it can be argued that the EC was seen as a threat when the demands of trade unions demands, youth movements, and social events in member states are taken into account because the EC was in favour of the interests of the bourgeoisie in class struggles.

The collapse of the economic system brought about by integration was a threat for member states. In order to maintain this system, partnership agreements were signed primarily with former colonies. The European security community, which became effective with the completion of the Customs Union, would be consolidated with the roadmap proposed by the Hague Summit.

It can be argued that the inter-state security understanding was functioning better at the Europeanintegration level than it was in the international system, and thus, in the era of detent, the security understanding of the

international system overlapped with the security dimension of European integration.

The security understanding of the second Cold War era was shaped within the framework of the international security approach which concentrates on the distribution of power in a system. According to this approach, states are expected to rely on their own powers since their main objective is to protect and maintain their existence in an anarchic international system. However, each state in the system becomes a referent object since the above condition creates a security dilemma.

The international security approach considers great powers as security actors. Thus, the security actors of the second Cold War era were the USA and the USSR because a war or clash between these two superpowers would fundamentally affect the system and would dissolve the status quo. However, the following question can be asked at this point: Why did the USA, which was expected to protect the status quo, develop discourses that could cause a war with the USSR? In the détente era, China, the EC, and even Japan started to become centers of power in the international system. The USA, believing the bipolar system was better than a multipolar system, sought to maintain the status quo by increasing the tension with the USSR. This way, the international system would not evolve into multipolarity.

In this era, the security dimension of European integration, too, proceeded in accordance with the international security approach. France, West Germany, and the UK, the great powers of the integration, were the security actors of the system and possible struggles between them had the potential to dissolve the integration. However, it should be noted that the security actors of European integration, contrary to the USA, did not adopt offensive security strategies. For this study, which has argued that integration was of an anarchic character in the second Cold War era, each member state was a referent object per se.

The study on the era indicates that there were three big instabilities or even insecurities in the system. Thus, France and West Germany took the decision to transform the system into a bipolar structure again. The project of single market that they proposed was a formula to transform the system into a bipolar structure.

With the end of the Cold War system, a new era began in the international system. This period's security concept corresponded to the transnational security approach. According to this approach, states were security actors, but they could not fulfill their functions if they ignored the non-state actors' indirect effects on the security field because non-state actors in the international system had increased their impact by the end of the Cold War system.

Besides the military and economic threats, new threats were defined by the security agenda of the system. Terrorist organizations and criminal organizations gained transnational characters. Also, environmental and health problems had the ability to threaten security. The common point among these threats is that it was not possible to confine them to specific boundaries.

According to transnational security, which is the extension of the pluralist understanding of security, democratization of states in the new international system is essential for maintaining security between states, since a war between democratic states has not been observed. On the other hand, international organizations had great importance in the fight against new threats. They also developed a culture of cooperation between states and provided an opportunity to jointly combat new threats.

After the end of the Cold War, European integration's security understanding did not deviate from the transnational security approach, which became prominent in the international system.

Member states, as security actors, are in communication with non-state actors. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that weapon companies were involved in the formation of the ESDP. The establishment of the CFSP and JHA in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty indicated that member states were referent objects against new threats. It can be seen that these columns were added to the structure of integration against transnational terror and criminal organizations or against the derivative threats caused by them.

While combating these threats, member states adopted democratization as a criterion to become a member and to maintain membership to prevent regional conflicts. In addition, with organizations such as the ESDP and Europol, they showed the determination to jointly fight against new threats.

To sum up, the post-World War II international system's security rhythm began to beat in time with national security, which was developed in the framework of hardcore power relations. Asoftening in the strict bipolar system highlighted the inter-state security approach, which prioritized economic and social relations. In the second Cold War era, the international security approach was adopted and concentrated on the distribution of capacity in the system. The end of the Cold War system brought about the transnational security approach, which defines new threats in addition to military, political, and economic threats in the system. Therefore, the thesis question can be answered with the following judgment: the security understanding of European integration has followed a path largely parallel with the overall security mentality of the international system.

Finally, it could have been predicted that the security understanding after 2008 would evolve into inter-state security. The international financial crisis led states to become single actors in terms of economic management. For example, even insurance companies were nationalized in the USA. When the state is the only actor in an economy, the effects of non-state actors in the security field will be very limited. On the other hand, government and state leaders participated for

the first time this year in the G-20 Summit, which is usually carried out with the participation of ministers of state for economic affairs and chairpersons of central banks, because it seemed impossible to provide solutions for the international financial crisis without political intervention. The G-20 Summit means the acknowledgement of the threat to the economic order in the international system. The generation of neo-imperialist policies as measures against this threat would not be surprising. Thus, it seems that the inter-state security approach will be the new route of the international system after 2008.

APPENDIX I: Wars and Issues 1945-1961[570]

Wars/Major armed interventions	Issues for original combatants
Indonesia (rebels) - Netherlands (1945 - 1949)	1.national liberation/state creation (I.) 2.maintain integrity of empire (N.)
Vietminh - France (Bao Dai) (1946-1954)	1.national Liberation/state creation (V.M.) 2.Ideological liberation (V.M.) 3.maintain integrity of state (F.)
India - Pakistan (Pathans) (1947-1948)	1.ethnic/religious unification (P.) 2.territory 3.national consolidation (I.)
Jewish Settlers - Great Britain (1946-1948)	1.national liberation/state creation (I.) 2.maintain integrity of mandate (G.B.) 3.population protection/peacekeeping (G.B.) 4.strategic territory (G.B.)
Malay Insurgency (1948-1960)	1.national liberation/state creation (M.) 2.Ideological liberation (M.) 3.ethnic unity (M.) 4.population protection/peacekeeping (G.B.)
India - Hyderabat (1948)	1.national consolidation (I.) 2.state survival (H.)
Israel - Arab League (1948-1949)	1.national liberation/state creation (I.) 2.national survival (A.) 3.protect ethnic /religious confreres (A.)
North Korea - South Korea (1950-1953)	1.national unification (N.K.) 2.Ideological liberation (N.K.) 3.state/regime survival (S.K.)

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U.S.A. - North Korea (1950-1953)	1.meet treaty obligation (collective security) (U.S.A) 2.defend/support ally (U.S.A) 3.maintain balance of power (U.S.A)
People's Republic of China - U.S.A. (1950-1953)	1.national security (P.R.C.) 2. defend/support ally (P.R.C.)
China - Tibet (1950-1951)	1.national consolidation (P.R.C.) 2.Ideological liberation (P.R.C.) 3.state/regime survival (T.)
Morocco – France (1953-1956)	1.national liberation/state creation (M.) 2.maintain integrity of state (F.)
F.L.N. – France (1954-1962)	1.national liberation/state creation (F.L.N.) 2.maintain integrity of state (F.)
E.O.K.A - Great Britain (1955-1960)	1.national Liberation/state creation (E.O.K.A.) 2.strategic territory (G.B.)
U.S.S.R – Hungary (1956)	1.autonomy (H.) 2.national security (U.S.S.R) 3.preserve alliance unity (U.S.S.R) 4.government composition 5.protect ideological confreres (U.S.S.R)
Israel (France, Great Britain) - Egypt (1956)	1.strategic territory (I. ; G.B.) 2.commerce/navigation 3. Autonomy (E.) 4.enforce treaty terms (G.B.) 5.prevent regional hegemony (G.B.)
Nicaragua - Honduras (1957)	1.territory 2.enforce treaty obligations (H.)

U.S.A. - Lebanon (1958)	1.defend/support ally (U.S.A) 2.government composition
North Vietnam - South Vietnam (1958-1975)	1.national unification (N.V. ; S.V.) 2. Ideological liberation (N.V. ; S.V.)
Kantanga (Belgium) - Congo (U.N.) (1961)	1.secession/state creation 2.protect national/commercial interest abroad (B.) 3. main integrity of states (C. ; U.N.)
India - Portugal (Goa) (1961)	1.national consolidation (I.) 2.colonialism (I) 3.maintain integrity of empire (P.)
U.S.A – Cuba (1961)	1.government composition (U.S.A.) 2.ideological liberation (U.S.A.) 3. regime survival (Cuba)

APPENDIX II: Major Arms Control Agreements[571]

Treaty / Agreement	*Signed*	Type	Provision
Limited Test Ban Treaty	1963	U.S.A. U.S.S.R. U.K.	Prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America	1967	Multilateral	Obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries
Outer Space	1967	U.S.A. U.S.S.R. U.K.	Prohibit placing in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction. limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies ; prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.
Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty	1968	U.S.A. U.S.S.R. U.K.	Prohibit transferring to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
Seabed Arms Control	1971	U.S.A. U.S.S.R. U.K.	prohibits parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)	1972	U.S.A. U.S.S.R.	Limits of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms
Biological Weapons Convention	1972	U.S.A. U.S.S.R.	prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological)

(BWC)		U.K.	weapons and their elimination, through effective measures
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)	1969-1972	U.S.A. U.S.S.R.	Prohibits deployment of Anti- Ballistic Systems for territorial defence (ABM Treaty 1972) – Prohibits construction of additional fixed and, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile
Treshhold Test Ban Treaty	1974	U.S.A. U.S.S.R.	Prohibit tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions	1976	U.S.A. U.S.S.R.	Reaffirmed 150 kilotons limit yield for non weapons or peaceful nuclear explosion
Environmental Modification Techniques	1977	Multilateral	Prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party

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Halit Burç Aka, born in Ankara, 1975, graduated from Political Science Department of Bilkent University in 1999. Supervised by Prof. Dr. Esat Çam, he prepared the thesis "Political Integration Models for the EU in the Light of the Maastricht Treaty." Since the thesis was approved by Jury, he received his master's degree from Social Science Institute of Kadir Has University in 2002. After that, Halit Burç Aka attended to the Ph.D. Programme launched by European Union Institute of Marmara University. He defended his Ph.D. thesis "Security Dimension of European Integration in the context of Changing International System" supervised by Prof. Dr. Beril Dedeoğlu As a result, the jury unanimously approved the thesis and granted Ph.D. degree to Halit Burç Aka in September 2009. Halit Burç Aka has been working for International Relations Department of Kadir Has University since 2000. He is married and has two children.

1975 yılında doğan Halit Burç Aka Bilkent Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi bölümünden 1999 yılında mezun oldu. Danışmanlığını Prof. Dr. Esat Çam'ın yaptığı "Maastricht Antlaşması Işığında AB için Siyasal Bütünleşme Modeli" tezi ile Kadir Has Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsünden 2002 yılında yüksek lisans derecesini aldı. Ardından Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü tarafından hazırlanan doktora programına katıldı. Prof. Dr. Beril Dedeoğlı danışmalığında hazırladığı "Security Dimension of European Integration in the context of Changing International System" tezini başarıyla savunarak Eylül 2009'da kendisine juri tarafından oybirliğiyle doktora unvanı verildi. 2000 yılından beri Kadir Has Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler bölümünde çalışan Halir Burç Aka evil ve iki çocuk babasıdır.