THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC TREND IN THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ZEYNEP HAZAL GÖNÜLTAŞ

İstanbul-2009

T.C.

MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

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AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ÖZ

Bu yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı, Hristiyan Demokratların Avrupa Birliği bütünleşme sürecindeki etkinlerinin araştırılmasıdır. Hristiyan Demokrat akımının Avrupa Birliği'nin oluşum sürecinde etkilerinin olup olmadığı, etkileri olduysa bunların ne yönde ve ne derecede etkili olduğu, tarihsel süreç takip edilerek, neden sonuç ilişkisi içinde incelenmiştir. Son olarak ise Hristiyan Demokrat parti, European People's Party'nin Türkiye üyeliğine bakış açısı ele alınmıştır.

Bu amaçla ilk bölümde Hristiyan Demokrat akımın Avrupa'da ortaya çıkışı ve zaman içinde geçirdiği dönüşümler incelenmiştir. Özellikle ortaya çıkışları, kimliksel dönüşümleri ve uluslarüstü özellikleri üzerinde durulmuştur. İkinci bölümde ise Hristiyan Demokratların AB'nin bütünleşmesinin ilk adımlarındaki etkileri incelenmiştir. Üçüncü ve son bölümde ise Avrupa Birliği'nin yapısı ve gelişimini temelden etkileyen anlaşmakardaki, etkileri üzerinde durulmuştur.

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this thesis is the exploration of the influence of Christian Democrats on the EU integration process. This research approaches in a historical context and analyses in a causal relationship the question whether the Christian Democrats as a political movement have been influential in the formation of the European Union, and if they have to what extent this influence has been effective. As a final point, it also dwells on the issue of how the Christian Democrats, European People's Party, evaluates Turkey's possible membership to the European Union.

With this objectives in mind, the first chapter of this study focuses on the emergence of the Christian Democrats as political movement in Europe, and traces the transformation that it went through during its historical development. It especially dwells on the transformation of the movement's political identity and its supranational quality. The second chapter is concerned with the influence of the Christian Democrats on the initial steps of the EU integration. The third and the last chapter, on the other hand, covers their involvement in the treaties that determined the structure and development of the EU.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	**Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi**
CDU	**Christlich-Demokratische Union / Christian Democratic Union**
CFSP	**Common Foreign and Security Policy**
CSU	**Christlich-Soziale Union/Christian Social Union**
CVP/PSC	**Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chrétien**
DC	**Democrazia Cristiana**
ECSC	**European Coal and Steel Community**
EDC	**European Defence Community**
EEC	**European Economic Community**
EP	**European Parliament**
EPC	**European Political Community**
EPP	**European People's Party**
EU	**European Union**
EUCD	**European Union of Christian Democrats**
IFCTU	**International Federation of Christian Trade Unions**
MRP	**Popular Republican Party**
NATO	**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**
NEI	**Nouvelles Equipes Internationales**
ÖVP	**Österreichische Volkspartei/ Austrian People's Party**
PDP	**Parti Démocrate Populaire/Popular Democratic Party**
PPI	**Partito Popolare Italiano/ Italian Popular Party**
PSP	**Partido Social Popular**
SEA	**Single European Act**

SIPDIC	**Sêcretariat International des Partis Dêmocratiques d'Inspiration Chêtienne**
SPD	**Social Democratic Party**
WEU	**Western European Union**

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INTRODUCTION

The starting point for this thesis has been Christian Democrat parties in Europe and their role in the formation of the European Union. Political parties have developed alongside democracy, and it is commonly assumed that democracy cannot survive without them. 'Christian Democrats', as opposed to what their name indicates, are not religious in politics, and they do not fit into the conservative slot either. Although they are the product of a state-church conflict they have changed throughout time and they have gained a very different identity to the one they had at the beginning. They are democrats in the widest sense of the word, and played an important role in the formation of a larger democratic structure being a vehicle facilitating the establishment of the European Union The questions that shaped this research are as follows: Who are the Christian Democrats? Have they played an important role in the EU integration? And how far did they influence extend?

The first chapter of this study deals with the historical development of the Christian Democrat parties from mainly being 'the arm of the church' onto being liberal political entities furthering the formation of a democratic structure all around Europe. It was mainly concentrated on how they became liberal and secular parties, and what happened to them from their emergence till today. Therefore, the first chapter presents an overview of the history of Christian Democrats in Europe.

In this paper, both functionalist and essentialist views that see Christian Democratic Parties as inevitable and obvious consequences of industrialization and secularization were taken into consideration. However, this study essentially relies on Kalyvas's analysis of the establishment of Confessional Parties throughout the 19th century, which suggests that these parties are the unintended and unexpected results of actors' behaviors.

This research, therefore, seeks to build on the work of Kalyvas (1996) in an attempt to explain the formation and development of Christian Democrats as political parties. Kalyvas discusses how the confessional parties emerged despite the resistance spreading from the Church, and argues that politicians involved in those parties choose

to organize as independent entities although they took advantage from the organizational ability of the church. Kalyvas also argues that politicians chose to organize as they did based largely on their relationship to key resources such as secondary organizations. Therefore, I emphasized the Kalyvasian view that the choice of the actors has been crucial for the development of the Christian Democrats in Europe. As a final note to this chapter, it is also underlined that the 'transnational' quality of the Christian Democrats which later facilitated the arguments for the formation of the European Union. This chapter hopes to summarize the Kalyvasian approach by also mentioning other perspectives to the theory concerning the rise of the Christian Democrats.

Chapter 2 focuses on how the emergence of the Christian Democrats affected and facilitated the process of the formation of EU. The chapter covers a period of time from the first attempts for the establishment of the union, and follows the influence of the Christian Democrats in the efforts for the unification of Europe around certain ideals and principles. It intends to show how effective and indispensably functional the Christian Democrats have been in the arguments that lead to the EU. In fact, it emphasizes the point that the basic ideals upon which the EU has been established are essentially Christian Democrat principles and beliefs. This chapter follows the emergence of the Christian Democrats starting from the aftermath of the WWII, and deals in great detail and chronological order how they took part in the process as it developed step by step from EEC to EU.

Chapter 3 is mainly about the deepening process of the European Union and treaties that played a key role in actualizing this. The focus was mainly on the Single European , on the Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty and briefly on the Lisbon Treaty which were unarguably the critical turning points in the deepening EU integration. In this chapter the views and articles of several authors, especially that of Johannsson's article titled "Another Road to Maastricht: The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for European Union" has been especially useful in understanding how the Christian Democrats have played a key role in the integration process. According to Johansson, Christian Democrats have been major facilitators of

the process in that they made it easier the formation and acceptance of the Treaty on European Union because their ideological identity was based on a federalist understanding, which was largely shared by the union.

Although it was not part of research questions, it is briefly studied that the relationship between the Christian Democrats and Turkey's candidacy for EU at the end of the research it is tried to focus on the issue of whether EEP poses a handicap or offers support for Turkey in its long-lasting effort of becoming a part of the union. The question that remains to be answered is of course whether a union based on Christian Democrat foundations and principles would be open for the involvement of non-Christian elements. Interestingly enough, the answer to this question heavily relies on the 'democratic' nature of the Christian Democrats rather than their religious concerns. Turkey's candidacy, for instance, may involve several problems as the opponents claim. Turkey, holding a population that is almost the same as Germany poses many problems to its integration to EU. The economic concerns and lack of democratic regulation on par with the standards of the EU are also other issues that are seen as problematic in Turkey's integration. However, the attitude of the Christian Democrats towards Turkey has hardly been influenced by the country's Islamic cultural background. On the contrary, after AKP took power and became the governing party, the European Christian Democrats tend to appreciate their efforts for the implementation of the democratic principles which were considered as one of the most important steps towards candidacy. Although there is a certain amount of suspicion shared by the parliamentarians, the Christian Democrats in Europe largely believe that the existence of an Islamic Democrat Party in Turkey might facilitate the integration process, since they share similar value judgments and organizational structure.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the methodology it is used and the difficulties that is encountered in the writing of this thesis.

As it is already mentioned above, it is chosen to concentrate on the development of the Christian Democrats as political entities and their influence on the formation of

the EU in a defined framework. This is one of the reasons why it is prefered to move chronologically so that it can be traced the events that lead to the development of these parties, and the process of the union that comes to a turning point with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

That is probably why the thesis has a more historical perspective rather than a purely argumentative one. Although my initial question has always remained the same (Who are the Christian Democrats who occupy 265 seats in the European Parliament and what has their influence been in the history of the European Union?), It have also been remained loyal to this historical perspective that helped present in a causal relationship the events that demonstrated the involvement of the Christian Democrats in the European integration.

A historical approach usually attempts to "tell the story" of causation in a consistent manner. What the research did was telling the story or tracing the process of the European integration from the perspective of the Christian Democrats while employing an analytical look. It should be admitted that this does not pose a strong academic stance as the rigorous application of the comparative method or statistical analysis, but a historical approach has its strong points in that it poses linear understanding of the "causal effect" of several variables that give rise to a political development.

For instance, this method helped understand the mechanism behind the formation of the Christian Democrat parties (how they were the product of the historical conjecture and came into being despite the resistance coming from the Church). In short, the historical perspective of this thesis proved to be useful in acknowledging the correlations between several political developments, and how they led into the European integration.

The most serious hardship that was encountered in the writing of this thesis was the difficulty of finding primary and secondary readings concerning the subject was worked on. In addition to the limited variety of articles related to the subject, also suffered while trying to reach the material that was recently published.

I. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

'Christian Democrats' do not stand for religious view in politics despite their name, nor do they fit into the conservative slot.[1] Even though they are the product of a state-church conflict they have changed throughout time and they have gained a very different identity to the one they had at the beginning. At the beginning of their emergence they were the arm of the church. How did they become liberal and secular parties? What happened to them from their emergence till today? In this chapter it is intended to provide an overview of their history.

1.1 Emergence of Confessional Parties

According to functionalists the emergence of Christian Democrats is only an automatic response to liberalism and secularization. From an functionalist view their emergence is a natural process; "their ancestry goes back to the Catholic movements of the nineteenth century, when industrialization and constitutional government were becoming the characteristic features of modern Europe."[2]. Both Functionalists and Essentialists see Christian Democratic Parties as inevitable and obvious consequences of industrialization and secularization. Yet *Kalyvas* has a different analysis of the establishment of Confessional Parties throughout the 19th century. He emphasizes the importance of actors and their choices throughout the process and he explains the Confessional Parties as unintended and unexpected results of actors' behaviors. I will analyze the establishment of Christian Democratic parties by using *Kalyvas'* way.

Between 1870-1920 Europe was industrializing and a working class was emerging, liberalization and democratization had been launched. The church was the most indisposed institution because of these evolutions. Secularization was a harmful attack to its power. That is why the church had to define some strategies against the

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[1] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996

[2] Lyon Margot, "Christian-Democratic Parties and Politics", in Journal of Contemporary History.1967; 2: 69-87

challenges it faced. "The Holly See and the ecclesiastical hierarchy were intent on preventing the defense of the Church's rights against the anticlerical laws from developing into an open opposition to overall policies."[3]

At the beginning the church tried to compromise with the liberal governments. But educational reforms exasperated the church.

"The objectives of the school reforms were to professionalize school supervision by the by the appointment of educators as full-time school inspectors in place of the clergy, to weaken clerical influence in the schools by curtailing the Church's right to direct the instruction of religion, and to merge Catholic and Protestant public schools into interconfessional schools."[4]

Therefore it had to find another way to fight against anticlerical reforms. It started to create mass organizations to protect its privileges and to help re-establish its ancient regime. The third step was participation strategy. Mass organizations became politicized and electorally oriented institutions. The church now had lost its hope for taking back the monarchy and that is why it started to use mass organizations to elect conservative coalitions. Yet, it had never wanted these organizations to be permanently politicized. "There was, in other words, neither intention nor plan to create Confessional Parties. Such parties were unwanted by the church because they would end its monopoly of the representation of lay Catholics and undermine its universalistic claims. The church intended to keep Catholic mass organizations under its strict control and depoliticize them after this struggle ended."[5]   Conservative elites also did not plan a Confessional Party.[6] The reason was that they preferred not to be dependent on the Church as this would constrain their transaction area. Yet even though both Conservative Elites and the Church did not intend to form Confessional parties, these parties were formed and

[3] Jedin, Hubert; Aubert Roger; Dolan, John; *The Church in the industrial age*, Burns and Oates Publish, London,1981, pg 101

[4] Lamberti, Marjorie, "State, Church, and the Politics of School Reform during the Kulturkampf", Central European History, 19:1, 1986, pg 63-81

[5] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 23

[6] Definitions of Confessional parties vary. For Boutry and Michel a confessional party is "a political organization with a recruitment, an electorate, a program and goals which depend on a confession." Irving defines Christian Democracy as "organized political action by Catholic democrats." Alzaga'a more restrictive definition requires the presence of the use in its label of terms such as 'Christian', 'Catholic' or derivatives, inspiration from the doctrine of the Church submission to the directives of the hierarchy and the profession of the Catholic religion as a prerequisite for membership.

became very successful. Neither the church nor the Catholic elites could abort the process which had begun with their choices. To understand this variance we should analyze the choices of actors and their reflections on the scenery.

During the second half of the nineteenth century liberal attacks began to intercept the church in ways to influence the government. Anticlerical legislations started to take from the church hands its tools for controlling the society. From now on the sole priority of the church was to get back its privileges. It discovered a new way to influence decision making. The new way was organizing the masses. Yet this way disturbed its hierarchical conformation." Although the church is willing to sacrifice a measure of its control in order to expand (or retain) its influence in society, it is unwilling to sacrifice too much control." [7]   Creating mass organizations meant that the church accepted the lay Catholics as a part of its structure which it had not previously done. The church had previously had an asymmetrical hierarchy but the creation of mass organizations caused the formation of parallel hierarchy which also covered lay people.   These situations also threatened the monopoly of the church in its representation of the Catholic World.   In contravention of all of these costs to organizational strategy the church had to take these risks in order to retain its power despite the liberal attacks.[8] The church took some precautions. Still, "The creation of mass organizations pushes priests to become increasingly active in political action, a domain that lies outside the realm of their traditional duties. As a result, priests grew increasingly independent of their hierarchical superiors. They dare 'to transfer institutions with a secular political aura into the realm of ecclesiastical authority' and even use their new role as mass organizers to rebel against episcopate." [9]   The church created some mechanisms to hinder rebellious priests; there were now heavy penalties

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[7] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 35

[8] Jedin, Hubert; Aubert Roger; Dolan, John; *The Church in the industrial age*, Burns and Oates Publish, London,1981, pg 67

[9] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 40

for them which even included anathema. "Its internally centralized structure facilitated control over its clergy though that structure was itself constructed."[10]

Table 1 The formation of confessional parties[11]

	Belgium	Netherlands	Austria	Germany	Italy
Church support for Liberals	1830 - 1847	1850 - 1864	N/A	1860s	N/A
First Threats	1850 - 1860	1857 - 1878	1866	1866 - 1870	1850 - 1861
First National Catholic Congress	1864	1883	1874	1871	1874
Orginazitonal Strategy	1864 -1878	1868 - 1878	1868 - 1874	1867 - 1870	1874 - 1913
Anticlerical Attack	1878	1878	1867 -1874	1870 -1878	1861 - 1890
Participation Strategy	1878 - 1884	1878 - 1888	1887 -1890	1870 - 1871	1913 - 1919
Electoral Success	1884	1888	1887	1870 - 1871	1913 - 1919
Participation in government	1884	1888	1880s (Vienna)	N/A	1916
Formation institutionalization centralization of party	1910s	1926	1906	1880s	1919

While the church was facing these choices, Conservative politicians were suffering from a lack of support. While liberals were fighting for religious equality, freedom of speech, international trade and state rationalization, in contrast, conservatives supported the old regime, thus preservation of the rights of the church was one of the issues that conservative politicians were fighting for. That is why their views crossed.[12] Conservative elites needed support, but they did not have an organized structure[13], and they could not win elections because of that, while the church had organized masses. But both the church and conservative elites were not eager to cooperate. They had reasons for this. As we have discussed before, even organizational strategy had disadvantages for the church. That is why participating in politics was

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[10] Warner ,Carolyn M., *Confessions of an interest group : the Catholic Church and political parties in Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, pg 72

[11] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 25

[12] *Ibid*, 51-57

[13] Gould, Andrew, *Origins of liberal dominance : state, church, and party in nineteenth century Europe*, Ann Arbor Univ. of Michigan Press 1999, pg 60

more controversial for them. First of all, being explicitly involved in politics would harm the religious belief. It would also harm the church representation, because the church would lose its monopoly in the religious space. There was another important risk which Tocqueville explained clearly as "When a religion chooses to rely on the interests of the world, it becomes almost as fragile as all earthy powers" [14]

Conservative elites also had some doubts about cooperating. They did not want to go under the control of the church and they were not willing to be dependent on it. Still they had to find a way against the liberals to gain votes again. "The advent of the liberal attack against the Church caused many changes. Conservatives realized that for the first time religion appeared to have the potential for mobilization across class and region and to promise electoral victories." [15]

As *Kalyvas* mentioned, the cooperation between the church and conservatives was a mandatory negotiation which was undesirable but also necessary.[16] It was necessary because, despite the church trying to compromise with the liberals, the liberals were decisive in implementing their anticlerical program, especially on areas such as education, health care and relief for the poor, areas which the church were very sensitive about. The liberals did not retreat. On the other hand the conservatives did not want to accept a religiously oriented political program but they welcomed the electoral victory that was given by the church's support.

Firstly, the church spread the rumor about godless state schools, in the second step they imposed religious sanctions to parents who sent their children to state schools, and they also excommunicated the liberal politicians.[17] Then the last step was organizing the masses to take back its privileges. "Catholic organizations were now officially sponsored by the church, their structure duplicated the church's by following the parochial and diocesan levels, and they lost whatever autonomy of action they

[14] Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Democracy In America*, Harper and Row Press, New York, 1988, pg 298
[15] Kalyvas, Stathis N., The *Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 54
[16] *Ibid*, pg 51-57
[17] Jedin, Hubert; Aubert Roger; Dolan, John; *The Church in the industrial age*, Burns and Oates Publish, London,1981, pg 108

previously had: the Catholic movement was born." [18] Still, the church and supporting organized masses did not get involved in politics, they stayed outside of politics. The Catholic Organizations established themselves all over Europe, and at first they only held a defensive role for the church, but through the passage of time they grew rapidly. They became offensive organizations which gained great support from society and started to shape society from outside the parliament. The church spent a great deal of effort in keeping these organizations outside of politics, because it did not want to lose control over them and put its faith into the hands of lay Catholics or politicians. "Conservative clerical organizing within the Catholic church, produced more effective political action than any effort of the liberal movement."[19] Yet priests and lay activists thought that the organizational strategy had reached its limits, so they wanted to participate in politics. They believed that they could gain more than before if they could fight in the parliament. In the beginning the church saw the liberals as short term threats, and that is why it did not plan a long term, comprehensive strategy. "The fundamental difference between the organizational and the participation strategies was their scope. The participation strategy consisted of fighting against anticlericalism with allies and within the political sphere. It was a break with the previous practice of unsystematic support for independent individual Catholics or divided Conservative factions." [20] After moving from organizational strategy to participation strategy the relations between the church and the conservatives became bilateral instead of unilateral. Now, while the church was using its organizational ability for electoral support for conservative politicians, they worked in defending the church's rights in parliament. These relations were usually established by secret pacts between the church and anti-liberal forces. The church's control over the organizations decreased but the church saw the planned alliance between conservatives as temporary because it was still opposed to the formation of Confessional Parties. By participation strategy the church aimed to return to the past rather than institutionalization of political Catholicism and it wanted to make all decisions alone.

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[18] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 64
[19] Gould, Andrew, *Origins of liberal dominance : state, church, and party in nineteenth century Europe*, Ann Arbor Univ. of Michigan Press 1999, pg 68
[20] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe, Cornell University Press*, London, 1996, pg 76

Despite all of the church's efforts, the Confessional Parties were launched. The reasons for their emergence were the electoral success[21] that was brought about by participation strategy and the actors of the organizational strategy. The lay activists and priests initiated the formation of the confessional parties autonomously, in other words independently from the church. In some cases they were even contrary to the orders of their hierarchical superiors. Yet their success became possible by electoral victories. So the church's strategies caused, unintentionally, the emergence of the Confessional parties. Priests were one of the main actors because they were closer to the people than the bishops; they were a part of education. Lastly, the participation strategy gave them more room for action because they could even disregard the instructions that were given by the Church. The second actors were lay activists. By organizational strategy the layman had gained his consciousness and realized his autonomy regarding his engagement in temporal matters. Laymen were impatient about the church's actions and they wanted to intervene more effectively. They did not understand why the church told them to remain outside of politics while liberals could use politics to harm the church. "Consequently, lay activists started pressing, timidly at first and more aggressively later, for political participation and autonomy of action." [22] As we have mentioned before, beside the actors, electoral success of the pro-church coalitions made the formation of confessional parties possible. With electoral success lay activists saw that they had the power for being autonomous and the issue of religion proved its power to everyone. That is why electoral success was the turning point for the creation of the Confessional Parties.

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[21] Jedin, Hubert; Aubert Roger; Dolan, John; *The Church in the industrial age*, Burns and Oates Publish, London,1981, 75-80

[22] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe, Cornell University Press*, London, 1996

Table 2 Breakthrough elections for antilberal coalitions[23]

Country	Year	Results
Belgium	1884	Catholics: 86 Seats Liberals: 52 Seats
Netherlands	1888	Catholics and Calvanists: 54 Seats Liberals: 44
Austria	1887	Local Viennese Elections
	1895	Municipal elections, Vienna
Germany	1871	Catholics: 61 Seats Liberals: 125 Seats
Italy	1913	Gentiloni Pact (228 out 0f 310 Liberals elected with Catholic votes
	1919	Catholics: 100 Seats Various Liberal Groups: 197 Seats Socialists:156 Seats

These results were seen as an indicator for the future potential of catholic votes. Mobilization was triggered by issues such as taxation, agricultural tariffs, military service, regional autonomy and especially education. The Catholic Organizations were powerful both in rural and urban areas. Also workers who had previously voted for Socialists supported them. There were several reasons behind the success of the Catholic Organizations. For instance, these were the initial examples of mass organization in their countries; priests had already had a reachable mass of voters, lay activists already had the needed experience and contrary to the traditional electoral campaigns, Catholic Organizations continued their activities after electoral season. "In essence, the church became the victim of the success of its own strategy." [24] It had never intended to form a Confessional party, but its defense strategies resulted in the formation of powerful Confessional Parties. The Confessional Parties were formed in spite of the Church, but how did they give up their religious oriented structure?

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[23] *Ibid* pg 95
[24] *Ibid,*pg 112

1.2 Transformation of the Confessional Parties

The impulsive force of the Catholic Organizations was the re-establishment of monarchy.[25] The founders of the Confessional parties were the enemies of the democracy. Yet "political identities are not static. They are fluid, continually and dynamically shaped by competing social and political forces." [26] Religion was only a limited issue for developing a political party. "Christian Democracy is distinct from its competitors by virtue of its specific model of social and economic policy and because religion accords the movement an unparalleled opportunity to adopt to changing circumstances."[27]

In the second half of the nineteenth century liberal attacks which aimed to abolish the church's rights and to increase the state's authority in the areas that had belonged to the Church's influential space, caused the creation of Catholicism as a political identity. As it was mentioned before the church had never intended to create Confessional Parties, but after their formation the logical choice for the Church was to accept them. The Church knew that the formation of Confessional Parties could not be stopped and it also needed to control them, and to guarantee that anticlerical attacks would not occur in the future, the Church accepted the formation of Confessional Parties. Lastly, the socialists were a bigger problem than unintended Confessional Parties. "The main fear that the first social encyclical deals with concerns the danger of socialism."[28] But Confessional Parties did not think the same things as the church, they did not want to integrate with or be controlled by the church.

"Christian Democrats had a complex relationship with the Catholic Church itself because, while they accepted the Church's social teaching in principle, in practice they did not always see eye to eye with Church authorities. Christian Democrats were

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[25] Jedin, Hubert; Aubert Roger; Dolan, John; *The Church in the industrial age*, Burns and Oates Publish, London,1981, pg 516-523
[26] Kalyvas, Stathis N.*, The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996 ,pg 167
[27] Van Kersbergen, Kees "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy" in Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, by David L. Hunley
[28] Van Kersbergen, Kees ,*Social capitalism: a study of Christian democracy and the welfare state*, Routledge Publish, Canada, 1995, pg 222

instructed to limit their action to the social sphere. Through a process of maturation that led them go beyond set ecclesiastical limits, some Christian Democrats preferred to define themselves as nonconfessional and to exclude any religious reference from their names, while retaining the Christian inspiration from their program."[29]

That is why the church and confessional parties now had a dilemma which they had to resolve.

Conservative party leaders traditionally came from the bourgeois, but after the Catholic organizations came into the political scenery a replacement began. Now the leaders of Confessional Parties came from working class organizations. After World War II, the leaders of the Confessional Party became people who were concerned about a social programs or were opposed to communism instead of busying themselves with state-church conflict. "The leaders of the new confessional parties quickly realized that the identification of their parties with religion, which they had themselves engineered, was a double edged sword. For all its proven advantages, religion also entailed very serious dangers." [30] First of all, Catholicism was a universalistic issue which was controlled from Rome so catholic parties in their countries could be understood as tools of Rome. Another important issue was that the catholic identity really restricted their transaction area. They wanted to serve more citizens rather than only serving Catholics. "In order to broaden their appeal, they loosened their ties to the Church and carefully declined to give the party a Catholic name; they risked reduced support and increased criticism from part of their core constituency." [31] And after anticlerical attacks had ended they had to find another way for electoral success so that the leaders of the confessional parties would chose to claim a confessional, declericalized party organization. They did so for not only electoral success, but also for independency from the church.

Still, moving away from the church would not be easy for Confessional Parties. First of all they lacked organization and organizational building would take time. They

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[29] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 2
[30] Kalyvas, Stathis N., *The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe*, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 232
[31] Grew, Raymond, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy" in *European Christian Democracy* edited by Thomas Kselman and Joseph A Buttigieg, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 2003, pg 19

had to take support from the church directly, especially after the socialists had emerged and they had to fight more intensely for the votes. Certainly in order to get the church's support, they could not give up the slogans which included defense of the church. And these situations became a vicious circle because "dependence on the church was also reinforced by an initial laziness that led to organizational inertia." [32]   Yet they had to break this circle because the church's interventions in party decision making came at a stiff price. The church started to use policy issues, which were out of the clerical area, to gain the bargaining power on clerical issues. As a result, the intervention of the Church grew rapidly. For instance, the Vatican's pressure on the Zentrum about Bismarck's military budget was an exchange for concessions in Germany's religious policy and diplomatic relations with Rome. In brief, despite the needed church support the religious orientation for the confessional parties caused the church's interventions and limitations on both secular and clerical policy areas.

The question was how could they de-emphasize religion while remaining on the base line as confessional? They could not lose the unity of the party which was created by catholic character or electoral support of Catholic Organizations. The first step was building their own organizations to rescue the party from the church through organizational support. The second step was redefining the meaning of religion for politics and society. For building its own organizations they replaced low clergy men with the laymen and their new organization structure had allegiance and loyalty directly toward the party without any interruption. Naturally the clergy protested their exclusion from the party but they could not abort the process. This success of confessional party leaders would continue to help them in the long term. Now they had to redefine the meaning of Catholicism for their party. They had to gain power to break the church's monopoly on defining religion in the political area. "Confessional party leaders reinterpreted Catholicism as an increasingly general and abstract moral concept, controlled and mediated by them rather than the church. Concepts such as 'Christian', 'moral', 'religious inspiration', 'values of Christian civilization' even 'humanism' replaced Catholic doctrine and the interests of the church as the foundation of the

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[32] Kalyvas, Stathis N., The Rise Of Christian Democrats In Europe, Cornell University Press, London, 1996, pg 238

party's ideology and the program." [33] After this reinterpretation they could be both Catholic and secular. After these developments the parties were very different than they had been at the beginning. The church's interests were not basic issues for them. To sum up they became the Christian people's parties instead of Catholic parties. They did not disregard the values of the church completely. They wanted to consider Christian values while building a democratic society. Thus paradoxically they contributed secularism because they allocated religion and politics as different fields. They also avoided serving bishops or priests daily wishes, while freeing themselves from the church they could provide the religion against manipulation. They were interested in issues such as conditions of middle class, migration or housing. "The effect of this increased awareness led Christian Democrats to propose specific social measures and then campaign for them. That gave them a distinctive voice and facilitated their turning attention away from symbolic issues that traditionally preoccupied Catholic politics." [34] But these efforts also required sensitivity, and their actions could not send mixed messages to the public. They had to abstain to be seen as opportunists.

Consequently, the process which began with the church defending itself against the liberal attacks, ended with the establishment of secular, democratic, autonomous and non-clerical confessional parties. Even those who were previously monarchy supporters "accepted representative democracy as the only political system that respected human rights and guaranteed political freedom." [35] That is why it was stated at the beginning of the chapter that they are very different from how they seem. They are not in the conservative slot, on the contrary; they even contributed towards the democratization process of Europe. "Christian Democratic Parties were at last truly non-confessional, genuine political parties." [36] They became one of the parties which were socially engaged, committed to liberal procedures and more accustomed to the national bureaucracy than most parties of order.

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[33] *Ibid,* p 244
[34] Grew, Raymond, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy" in European Christian Democracy edited by Thomas Kselman and Joseph A Buttigieg, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 2003, pg 27
[35] Conway, Martin, "The Age Of Christian Democracy" in European Christian Democracy edited by Thomas Kselman and Joseph A Buttigieg, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 2003, pg 52
[36] Suffert, Georges, Les Catholiques et la gauche, François Maspero, Paris, 1960, pg 36-36

Their differences from other parties gave them both power and vulnerability at the same time. At the beginning of the democratization process their vast electoral body which included right and left, confessional and non-confessional or Catholics and non-Catholics brought them electoral victories. Christian Democrats were the defenders of Christian values while they were the guarantoors of the material interests. That is why they had supporters from a wide range of masses. They were also the most sympathetic party in the eyes of other parties who were looking for coalitions or negotiations. This gave Christian Democrats another liability which made them the leading part of semi secret political deals. At first, all of these multiplicities resulted in a Europe which was shaped mainly by Christian Democrats. But the most important variable of this formula, which put Christian Democrats in the centre of the formation of a new Europe was their transnational nature.[37]

1.3 Trans Nationalism in History of Christian Democrats

1.3.1 Prewar Period

From the very beginning of their history, the clerical world all over Europe, shared the same fears and obstacles. The modern world was a mutual problem, which was shared by Europe's Christian world. However, Rome created a defense system against this situation and transformed itself into "a European political force challenging liberalism and anticlericalism outright in a coordinated fashion in the conflict over its temporal powers lost in 1870 and more importantly in the battles of the culture wars in different states over hotly contested political issues from civil marriage to schooling."[38] For instance, Pope Pius IX contributed to the Catholics in their battle by making them capable for mobilization and creating an area which they could transgress the borders on political and social issues for installing organizations. Pius IX succeeded in that by starting organizational and doctrinal centralization. He put Rome in the centre of all

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[37] But as time passed by, their vulnerability became more pronounced than their power. Charismatic leaders from liberal side neutralized their power and stole their votes. So a decline phase began for Christian Democratic Parties.

[38] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 pg 13

religious practice and generated uniformity in Catholicism. His central position, which mobilized clerical Europe for transnational defense of the Church and the rights of Rome, stood against liberalism, capitalism and socialism.[39] Certainly the Italian occupation of the Vatican and other attacks of liberal powers helped Pius IX to make Rome the supranational focal point of Catholic resistance. Although liberal attacks and political battles were happening in national areas the transnational network was running every other case. The core battle was between clerical Europe and liberal Europe, not between national dynamics. Peter's Pence Movement[40] was an explicit example for two sided Europe. In this movement Catholics all over Europe fought against even their own citizens to defeat anticlerical forces. This movement started in the United Kingdom and encompassed Austria, Ireland and even Dutch Catholics at the cost of losing their citizenship. Now there were two Europes. Namely the impulse which created the Confessional Parties which also gave the European Catholics the traditional structure, and the liberals who were attacking the former for a changing world.

Pope Pius IX's contribution to the transnational Catholic world were not only organizational and doctrinal centralization, the mobilization of Catholics also caused cultural transfer. After Pius IX this centralization and cultural transfer resulted in a power commanded by the Church all over Europe, resulted in an institutionalized organization which wanted the monarchy back. The organization was the same with the structure which brought Confessional Parties electoral victories, it also created transnational links between Europeans. Pius IX tried to create a Church which would be a more coherent European political actor with a coordinated public relations and a press policy aimed at influencing national politics. The Geneva Committee was a product of this press policy. Propagandas of this Committee aimed to regain the temporal powers of the Church. "It also propagated the ultramontane agenda more generally, to boost intransigent, militant organizations within European Catholicism and to strengthen them in competition with their liberal and anticlerical political competitors."[41] However by 1872 it was clear that this Committee could not realize the reestablishment of monarchy

[39] Conway, Martin, *Catholic Politics in Europe,1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, Canada, 1997, pg 21-28
[40] Clark, Christopher, Kaiser, Wolfram , *Culture wars: secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-century Europe*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, pg 21-22
[41] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 21

or regain Pope's temporal powers. Therefore, in 1876 Pope stopped supporting the Geneva Committee. Still, Pope Pius IX was the beginning of the transnationalization of European Catholicism. He designed a political actor, which could resist the storm of nationalism and liberalism, from the confessional world. At least he established formal and informal transnational networks in the Catholic World.

However when we came to the end of the nineteenth century, the other side had changed and the Church had a bigger problem than liberals. This problem was socialism, which was largely atheist oriented, and was taking workers' support from the Church. That is why Christian Trade Unions[42] were the first formal transnational networks. But these unions were created against Pope's preference and they did not have the Church's support. The church was looking for more anti republican and monarchical organizations, but its attitudes resulted in confusion between confessional Europeans. Before and after World War I, Rome became an enemy of nationalism and this situation caused strong counter reactions between liberals and Protestants. That is why European Confessional Parties gave up emphasizing transnationalism and supranational character of religion. They had to prove their reliability to their nation, so they could manage being leading national political actors. Even, in Poland, "loyalty to Catholicism became a symbol of nascent nationalism and the rejection of foreign domination."[43] In any case their battles were in the national arena, namely, the Church's Schools, marriage…etc. These are the issues which are not included in EU policy areas to this day.

Confessional Parties were also suffering from the absence of a domestic and economic social policy. They did not have an internationalist ideology like socialism. Their political programme and policies were directed at the protection of Church rights. That is why "despite the transnationalisation of Catholicism as a religion and of the centralization of the Catholic Church as an institution, Catholic political parties thus remained quite nationally introspective until World War I."[44] Still, before World War I

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[42] *Ibid*

[43] Conway, Martin, *Catholic Politics in Europe,1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, Canada, 1997, pg 13

[44] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 32

Catholic workers organized themselves within the parties and they succeed to influence Party programmes and policies. Especially Dutch, Belgian and German Catholic workers were well organized within Confessional Parties. They started trade unions which initiated transnational cooperation in 1908. They also covered the socio-economic policy need of Confessional Parties. Yet, most of Confessional Parties were not sufficiently integrated at the national level before World War I. That is why we could not talk about realized transnational organizations before World War I. Despite lack of coordination,

"When one has followed through the history of Christian Democracy, soaked oneself in its literature, and caught the atmosphere of its meetings, one is left with the feeling not of divergence but fundamental, impressive, and growing unity between people and movements who do indeed share one world of ideas."[45]

1.3.2 Interwar Period

After World War I, Confessional Parties did not lose their leading roles in their governments. Even as new opportunities aroused, the Vatican started to tolerate modern democracy. "In the first decade after 1918 political Catholicism was more emphatically modern and democratic."[46] This development gave Confessional Parties a much freer hand in the political arena. The Church's radical wars were not their primary concern now. The Church had a bigger enemy than liberals. Socialism was the biggest problem. That is why they had to redefine themselves and become compatible for the war against socialism. Thus international enemy brought international issues in front of the Confessional Parties. The barriers between transnational contacts and cooperation were reduced. "In addition, the structures of domestic party competition and the contestation of the dominant domestic and foreign policy issues also changed after 1918."[47]

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[45] Fogarty, Michael Patrick, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1974, pg 15

[46] Ellen L. Evans, *The German Centre Party: 1870-1933. A Study in Political Catholicism*, Carbondale, 1981

[47] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 , p 45

They also proved themselves as nationalists throughout the war, so they no longer refrained from the accusation of a lack of national reliability. All of these developments resulted in more integrated Confessional Parties. After World War I, they began to be engaged in general political issues. They turned their face to the transnational networks without fear of non-material resources. "These resources potentially included improved access to nationally formulated programmatic ideas and policies from abroad, a strengthened ideological profile and the easier transfer of ideas and policies across borders adjusted to the respective national circumstances."[48]

Another change after the War was in Catholic workers. Now, they had more independence and a greater role in party organizations. The numbers of associations and trade unions among Catholic Workers increased. This was an important opportunity for Confessional Parties because with these unions, parties bound workers to themselves. Workers provided Confessional Parties moderate reform programmes and alternative coalition options. Most importantly they supported Confessional Parties to become more professional organizations, better decision makers and helped them become institutionalized. "Christian Democratic parties operating in the centre enjoy considerable working class support and are commonly backed by powerful Catholic unions."[49]

Unlike before World War I, Confessional parties had opinions about foreign policy. Therefore, transnational policy networks also included foreign policy. For instance with the Locarno Treaty of 1925, they aimed for a more durable peace within institutionalized international order. This new search for peace in the international area would provide cross border party cooperations and stable transnational societal links. Even neutral countries and their Confessional Parties saw the advantages of transnational cooperation such as the Locarno Treaty. The three barriers against transnational party cooperation, namely the national reliability problem, lack of domestic integration and international policy, decreased after 1918.

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[48] *Ibid,* p 46
[49] Van Kersbergen, Kees,Social *Capitalism:A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Routledge Publish, Canada, 1995, pg 24

Throughout the interwar period most of all Confessional Parties strengthened themselves. Most importantly, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) was established in 1924 in France. This was the first serious improvement in France. Catholic and confessional masses found themselves an interlocutor at the political party level. As Kaiser emphasized, PDP was an indispensable precondition for transnational Catholic Party cooperation, which had to include French and German partners to be meaningful.[50] Even in Spain, Spanish Partido Social Popular (PSP) was established. It was strongly clerical and anti republican, but with PSP, Spain also joined the mainstream of European Catholic parties. It also played a role model for Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Catholic and Christian democratic parties. So all of these countries and their Christian Democrat Parties created the basis of structural conditions for Catholic party cooperation.

"The Italian popular parties had established direct contacts with their counterparts in other countries. A number of party members traveled to Germany and then France. They went to Germany to establish useful contacts and cooperation with the German leaders especially Catholics."[51]

One of the results of these improvements was the PDP's secretariat position among the European Christian Democrat Parties with the leading role of the Centre party. They created organizational potential for the party cooperation. Finally after these transnational contacts were established, all Christian Democrat Parties gained a stake in governmental policy making including foreign relations.

In the interwar period, transnational cooperation conditions were more appropriate than they were before World War I, however there were still some obstructions. The Vatican's approach was on a shaky ground because the Church still did not believe in democracy or parliamentary regimes.[52] Its priorities were always the protection of the rights of the Church, not democratic governance or Catholic parties. Therefore, the Church was an unreliable partner for Christian Democrats. When the fascists emerged, the church saw them as a better guarantee for its privileges, so the

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[50] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 52
[51] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 22
[52] Conway, Martin, *Catholic Politics in Europe,1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, Canada, 1997, pg 30-47

Church supported Mussolini and Hitler. These changes on Vatican's behaviors also affected the Catholic society. After Great Depression in the 1930s younger Catholics started to be confronted with the capitalist economic system and gave up belief in parties. They saw parties as a barrier for their sectoral and social interests. As a result, parliamentary regimes and Christian Democrat Parties suffered by the end of the interwar period. Christian Democrats realized that they could not depend on the Church for support.[53]

After all, the interwar period was not a deterioration period for transnational cooperation. After the war, the search for stable conditions and durable peace brought about transnational organizations such as the Locarno Treaty. Informal cross border links between politicians, intellectuals and unionists gained formalized grounds. "For politicians with an interest in European politics, these institutionalized and partly overlapping networks presented many new opportunities for personal contacts and the exchange of information and views in different, more or less politicized contexts, within their own political party family and across party divides."[54]

Before the war, internationalism was seen specifically as a socialist phenomenon or for Christian Democrats, internationalism was an accusation of not being reliable. But after the war it was accepted as a natural process for democratic parties to share ideologies and to provide themselves with an additional incentive of party competition. We could say that Catholic Party cooperation gained legitimacy after World War I.

Another important development after World War I in the name of transnationalism, was the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU)[55]. In 1919 the trade unions from Western Europe and Central Powers met for minimizing national conflicts after the war experience. The IFTCTU organized seven major congresses until the start of World War II. The 1920s also witnessed some other

[53] Di Maio, Tiziana, "Between the Crisis of the Liberal State, Fascism and a Democratic Perspective: The Popular Party in Italy" in Kaiser, Wolfram, Wohnout, Helmut, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, New York,2004, pg 146
[54] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 60
[55] Pasture, Patrick, *Christian trade unionism in Europe since 1968 : tensions between identity and practice,* Aldershot Publish, Avebury, 1994, pg 80-85

transnational organizations which resulted in important connections between Christian democrats and improved lay religious and publishing activities. Moreover, the bilateral links between France and Germany were established. There were two Franco-German Catholic Congresses; in Paris in 1928 and Berlin in 1929. Although the exchanges at the two congresses were dominated by nationalist claims and counter claims, the biggest obstacles between the two countries for transnational organizations was overcome. Meeting in formal transnational organizations became possible for French and German politicians, however societal networks could only have limited influence on the bilateral relations.

1.3.2.1 Popular Christian Democratic Cooperation (Sêcretariat International des Partis Dêmocratiques d'Inspiration Chêtienne)

After World War I, Italian PPI planned a peaceful European order by creating transnational cooperation between Catholic parties. In 1919, PPI party congress proposed that they should initiate transnational contacts.[56] At the beginning, the aim was some cooperation like trade unions. After the elections they began to realize bilateral contacts with other Catholic or "Popular" parties, but the purpose changed, now they were looking for establishment of a "popular international". PPI, especially Sturzo, had opinions about Germany; they supported the reconstruction of Germany. They saw Germany's need for a stable democracy as a crucial element for a peaceful Europe and the Centre Party would be leery to this process. That is why PPI demanded the revision of the Versailles Treaty to the advantage of Germany. The main aim was the establishment of Popular International.[57] During 1920-1, most of the participants of the PPI made contacts with other Christian Democrats. More traditional Catholic Parties did not agree with PPI, they thought that creating an international Catholic Parties Union could be seen as competing with the Church and would be disrespectful to the Church. The Vatican shared this approach, as well. The Vatican wanted to be the only

[56] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997 pg 21
[57] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007,pg 70-85

representative of Catholics' interests and it did not want anything that could cause confusion. In spite of this skepticism, PPI members did not give up trying to convene a congress, but they could not succeed. Then they concentrated on bilateral relations with the Centre Party. Naturally, France also was indisposed about these developments. Sturzo continued to argue for the creation of popular international and he believed that if they could establish such a party cooperation in the long term it would evolve into a political federation in Europe. However, in domestic affairs, PPI had more serious problems. They had to define their plan against Mussolini, so they should put their plans for transnational party cooperation on hold. But informal meetings were continued about this subject. The main problem was the lack of a French Christian Democrat Party who accepted cooperating with German Catholics on equal footing.

After the war, at the beginning, Franco-German relations were basically tense. Nationalism was the leading figure on both sides' behaviors. Elites of both countries were using "the other" as an important constitutive element. In Germany, France was important for national integration as being the enemy. In France, Germany was an important element of political consolidation of the Third Republic after the war of 1870-1. Then relations between Germany and France began to get better, but did not magically change. In 1924 the two governments agreed to the Dawes plan which was a provisional reparation agreement for five years.

After PDP was established, the dreams of Sturzo were seen as more possible. PDP was ready to accept Germany's full integration to European politics on the basis of equality, yet it was against consolidation of existing treaties. PDP did not want a France which was isolated from European politics. They aimed for international reconciliation. This was an opportunity for Sturzo's popular international and he expounded from that. He immediately restarted the contacts for cooperation and he reached the leaders of PDP.[58]

Sturzo's proposal for an international parliament included a fairly integrated organization where each national delegation would have one vote and an assembly

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[58] Papini, Roberto, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 37

would convene annually. There would be a president and a secretary general who would work as information brokers. Member parties would be free to follow their own policies. PDP supported a more modest design for an international bureau of Christian Democratic Parties. PDP avoided to use the term of international policy cooperation because of the fear of nationalist attacks. They wanted a confidential change of views without any publicity.

Consequently, PDP from France, ACW from Belgium, Polish Christian Democrats, Centre Party from Germany and PPI from Italy met in France in 1925. The party representatives resolved to create SIPDIC (with a provisional secretariat in Paris) as a permanent alliance (entente), in a form to be determined between the parties and their parliamentary parties. The institutional structure and procedural rules were only fixed at the second congress in Brussels on 22-3 May 1926.[59]

"After the initial meeting in Paris, annual meetings were subsequently held in Brussels, Cologne, Bois le duc, Paris, Anvers, Luxemburg and Cologne. Each conference followed a regular format that included a summary of the activities of each party during the previous year and a debate and vote on the conclusions reached by the study commission. Henri Simondet has noted that while each party retained its independence, the parties worked together to address common issues such as the organization of the modern state, family policy, the economic crisis, and relation between authority and freedom in the state."[60]

But in all stages of the developments, they emphasized that this cooperation was not an international federation of the represented parties, their aim was only creating a communication network. Even at the first meeting some troubles aroused, the Centre Party had complaints about Franco-German relations they asserted that the discussions came to a dead end. Still Centre Party believed that the contacts with PDP would be important because PDP was a unique French party which was looking for exchanging ideas with a German party. However, the meetings did not result with viable resolutions. The French politicians avoided releasing any information about the meetings because they feared nationalist attacks. Furthermore, "the institutional

[59] Müller, Guido, "Anticipated Exile of Catholic Democrats: Sêcretariat International des Partis Dêmocratiques d'Inspiration Chêtienne" in Kaiser, Wolfram, Wohnout, Helmut, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, New York,2004, pg 256
[60] Papini, Roberto, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 24

arrangements for SIPDIC as they were confirmed in 1926, actually looked more comprehensive and binding than they were in practice. Only thirteen representatives of only four parties participated in the second congress in Brussels."[61]

SIPDIC secretariat started to work as an appendix of PDP secretariat, PDP covered all costs but could not efficiently support it in the name of human resources. It could only organize the annual congress and send irregular letters about national party developments. These conditions and Franco-German relations made SIPDIC unstable and irregular. PPI wanted to change the structure and become closer to its first action plan. After all, the SIPDIC members decided on a moderate reform of the SIPDIC structure in their fourth congress. They chose a secretary general who would work only for SIPDIC. Another decision of the fourth congress was regular financial contributions to the SIPDIC budget from all member parties. They also appointed "correspondents" from all member parties who would provide information to the secretary general about national party developments. Moreover, they discussed annual publicities, but some of the members still were not convinced about possible nationalist attacks to they wanted the bulletin and their congress to not share this information with the general public. PPI tried to deepen the cooperation. Luigi Ferrari, who replaced Sturzo, proposed that it becomes an international organization of social democracy. However, the parties could only agree on authorizing the secretary general to call the congress for special meetings. The Dutch Christian Democrats supported technical reforms but they against deepening of the organization. The French, German and Belgian members were also agreed with the Dutch members.[62]

Although, Christian Democrats proceeded in the area of formal international institutionalization between 1928 and 1932 with SIPDIC, they could not establish a comprehensive and binding organization. Six countries, Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, were regularly represented in the first seven years at SIPDIC congresses and they tried to establish common positions in the early

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[61] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, p 88

[62] Müller, Guido, "Anticipated Exile of Catholic Democrats: Sêcretariat International des Partis Dêmocratiques d'Inspiration Chêtienne" in Kaiser, Wolfram, Wohnout, Helmut, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945,* Routledge Publish, New York,2004, pg 252-265

years of transnational party cooperation. At the congresses, they usually debated on national political developments and these debates could include domestic policy issues. Even in the early stages of SIPDIC they shared a common view about the challenges of fascism and bolshevism. At the second congress in Brussels with Sturzo's initiative, they agreed on joint resolution about whether the Vatican could support fascism. Parliamentary democracy had the great advantage that no majority or minority could permanently exercise all power. They had also agreed on a peace resolution which advocated conflict resolution through the League of Nations, which would coordinate disarmament and European economic reconstruction.

After Mussolini's power increased, Sturzo and then Ferrari applied to SIPDIC for support against Mussolini, but they could not get any results. In 1931 Simondet suggested a public peace declaration under the impression of the sensational election result for National Socialists. This time Simondet succeeded and eight SIPDIC members signed the declaration, however the declaration strayed too far from Simondet's draft. The Swiss members did not want to join for their neutrality. The Dutch members did not agree on the wording of the declaration as they found it too strong. French and Belgian members thought Popular Democrats had to show they were working for peace and socialists were not the only one for fighting for peace in Europe, that is why they supported the declaration. "It emphasized the need to maintain peace in Europe and for all states to adhere to the principles of the League of Nations including peaceful conflict resolution, but its wording was vague."[63] After all, the declaration did not have any significant impact beyond the Catholic or Popular parties.

PDP also had an issue which they attempted to get on SIPDIC agenda. The issue was Briand Plan. PDP believed that the European Union was an essential solution. Although Italian members were keen on United States of Europe, the Dutch and Belgians were opposed to such an issue which they believed should be discussed in the government's level on SIPDIC. The Dutch and Belgians might only be interested in an economic union, however Briand Plan lacked such a dimension. Neutrality was also another barrier for The Dutch members. German members officially had to give a negative

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[63] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 104

reaction despite their interest in the plan. The discussion of the Plan was continued from 1930 to 1932 without any result.

Subsequently, the members of SIPDIC decided to prepare the Cologne Congress on the theme of European economic cooperation in 1932. In the end of the congress they signed a resolution which suggested a European common market which would include free exchange of the goods, capital and people. The resolution also included Europe-wide measures to stabilize the income of the farmers. "The 1932 SIPDIC resolution outlined European integration with its emphasis on market integration and support for farmers as it actually happened under Christian Democratic influence after World War II."[64] The idea was borrowed from liberals because Christian Democrats were more concentrating more on national social policies to increase the lot of workers under the circumstances of economic crisis; their focus was not on the industrial middle classes. However, the Franco-German relations made the realization of this resolution impossible before the war. The relations began to deteriorate in 1928, and again became a barrier for deepening cooperation in Europe. " The theme of Franco-German reconciliation ran as leitmotif throughout the activities of SIPDIC."[65]

After Hitler came into power and the Centre Party dissolved, the members of SIPDIC had to talk about the future the cooperation because their initial aim was fostering European reconciliation and Franco-German relations through Christian party cooperation. Consequently, they decided to continue in a more modest way without annual congresses and with more limited policy discussions. Briefly, after the end of the Center Party, SIPDIC became irrational until its dissolution in 1939.

France wanted to transform SIPDIC into an instrument of support for its French alliance policy against Germany. Pezet worked for this policy by having bilateral meetings. He succeeded after many meetings, to get the Czech People' Party to join SIPDIC in 1934. Pezet and Schmitz also signed under the last meaningful SIPDIC initiative. They applied to the Vatican to start a peace action against possible war. After Mussolini and Hitler cooperation, French politician started to contemplate on a possible

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[64] *Ibid*, p 107

[65] Van Kemseke, Peter, Towards an Era of Development: The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945-1965, Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2006, pg 28

war. Even they accepted revisions on the Versailles which they had not accepted before despite Sturzo's efforts. Sturzo continued to work for his first purpose, which was creating a popular international. He tried to make British Labour Party join SIPDIC and he strongly rejected the entry of Schmitz into SIPDIC. He saw Schmitz as a representative of a clerical dictator. However he could not obstruct his participation and after that he claimed that SIPDIC was no longer a democratic organization.

Although SIPDIC was an influential organization among Christian Democrats and domestic politics at the beginning; it could not achieve what was expected. Some members saw the reason for this failure as the fear and ineffectiveness of French members. PDP feared the reaction from the nationalists every step of the way, and this was unable to act boldly on the issue of German integration into European politics. In Kaiser's opinion, "the main problem of the Catholic and "popular" parties in interwar Europe was that they could not agree on these core strategic objectives. This concerned both the functional role of party cooperation and its policy concern."[66] On SIPDIC, there was the shadow of the Versailles from the beginning till the end. PDP wanted to use SIPDIC to foster alliances against revisions of the Versailles Treaty. The Centre Party planned and acted against the interests of France. Although, they were successful in discussing different forms of corporatism, they could not achieve cross border transfer of policy concepts. Briefly, they could not overtake the boom.

After World War I, Christian Democrats improved in the field of transnational cooperation. They gained secularization in an international context. SIPDIC was an important precondition for Christian Democratic integration policies after 1945. That was an experience which was a collective learning process for all parties. This experience proved that if only democratic parties, which shared core strategic interest cooperated, it would be an effective endeavor. "Between the two World Wars Christian Democrats, especially in SIPDIC, already spoke of a European Union and even of a common market."[67] Finally, SIPDIC was the arena where the functionalist approach was discovered by politicians like Adenauer and Schumann, who were in both processes

[66] Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 p 116

[67] Papini, Roberto, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 43

of SIPDIC and European integration. They learned from their experiments that only socio-economic integration had the chance for long term potential and for political cooperation. However, before World War II, this economic integration could not be achieved because SIPDIC, was realized in the shadow of nationalist interests and fear of nationalist attacks.

II. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

It was believed that Christian Democrats would lose most of their support after World War II, because before the war they could not deal with the economic crisis and also during the fascist regimes the Vatican supported clerical dictatorship unconditionally. That is why after World War II socialism seemed like a victory over these circumstances. It had a new offer for an economy against the ills of industrial capitalism. "Fascism and Nazism outlawed Christian Democratic parties, which were only revive in Western Europe after World War II."[68] However, contrary to expectations, Christian Democratic Parties who were renamed or reestablished finished the elections as the winner. They started to dominate governments in Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy and Germany. In Germany, CDU and CSU incorporated against Social Democratic Party (SPD) and in the 1949 elections they gained 1.8 percent more votes than the SPD. In France, the newly established Popular Republican Party (MRP) achieved a breakthrough with 28.2 percent of the votes in the national elections of June 1946 on the contrary of former PDP results. However, after de Gaulle appeared on the scene, they lost most of their votes. Still from 1945 to 1953 MRP had a strong influence over French European and foreign policy. Also, although Switzerland and Austria were not involved in the European integration process in the begining, they had important roles in establishing transnational Christian Democratic party contacts after 1945. "This phenomenal success was a crucial precondition for the translation of Christian Democratic ideas and policies for "Europe" into effective coordination and decision making at the party and governmental level."[69]

Socialism could not achieve what was expected from itself because it could not surpass class problems and it could not reach middle class or rural society. At the same time Christian Democrats profited from the decline of liberal parties. "All Christian

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[68] *Ibid*, pg 9
[69] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 166

Democrats began with a belief that a middle way could be found between capitalism and socialism in the spirit of the catholic social doctrine."[70] Confessionally oriented workers, rural voters and the middle class chose Christian Democratic parties over communism. Christian Democrats wanted Europe as the third power cooperating with United States against Stalin. We could say that Stalin gave assistance to Christian Democrats after World War II in order to easily establish hegemony over continental Europe.

Christian Democrats, by uniting different segments of society under one roof, contributed to the societal stability of postwar Western Europe, and they also provided a more open climate for integration. Moreover, they accomplished another precondition for successful transnational cooperation. They totally accepted parliamentary democracy as the best regime which was harmonic with confessional values and societal interests. They gave up the search for an alternative regime, and strongly refused to accept any non democratic political membership in the ECSC and EEC. They also fulfilled their internal organizations and institutionalized the internal representation of the interests of Christian workers; young members, women and other social groups. They aimed to integrate Europe through welfare state policies by formal and informal inputs especially from social group employers and unions. They did not work to rescue nation states. They wanted a Europe which would wrestle against the Soviet Union with the United States, and they planned a Europe which had confidence and independence. Christian Democrats believed that all of these would be possible if Europe were to unite their powers. "A European federation was often seen as a way out of the seeming malaise of the nation state and a solution to rivalries and security dilemmas."[71] Besides, unlike inter war period, Christian Democrat leaders were more efficient on national European policy making than they were before.

The Secular approach, did not lose ground for Christian Democrats, while Catholic votes remained important, the party leaders became more secular after the war.

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[70] Van Kersbergen, Kees, "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy" in Hanley, David L., *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 1994, pg 36
[71] Masala, Carlo, "Born for Government: The Democrazia Cristiana in Italy" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 109

"Christian Democratic party leaders like Adenauer, De Gasperi and Bidault were typically middle class liberal conservative Catholics."[72] For instance, Adenauer especially emphasized that his belief was only a part of his private life. Beliefs should never be used for legitimizing political aims. The Vatican also learnt to be respectful to Christian Democratic Parties and after the War its direct intervention in party politics was less frequent. We can also see secularism in the new founded party's names. They did not use any confessional context and they replaced "Catholic" with "Christian".

Consequently, Christian Democratic parties united in their support for a mixed economy and their opposition to socialist centralization. The conditions for their transnational cooperation were much more appropriate than they were before the war. Unlike in SIPDIC, German and French relations were not a difficulty for cooperation. Germany did not try to use cooperation for taking back territories and France did not try to extend its alliances to isolate Germany. The Vatican also gave support for Franco-German reconciliation. Briefly, conjuncture after World War II totally allowed a healthy cooperation among Christian Democrats. "For Christian Democrats in core Europe the early postwar years provided a window of opportunity for the first time to develop and implement their own concept for European cooperation and integration."[73]

2.1 A NEW MOVEMENT: NOUVELLES EQUIPES INTERNATIONALES (NEI)

World War II broke off the links between Christian Democrats in Europe. Relations were interrupted and organizations were destroyed. After World War II, Barbara Barclay Carter "who had coordinated contacts between Catholic politicians in exile in London, during the second World War"[74], started to work for reestablishing connections between Christian Democrats. She visited many continental European

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[72] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 173
[73] *Ibid*, p 179
[74] Kaiser, Wolfram, "Transnational Christian Democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People's Party" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 223

Countries, and she tried to refound SIPDIC. However, Christian Democrats did not want same thing as she did. They wanted a fresh start, they were aware of the faults of SIPDIC and they would not repeat these faults. For instance, they did not want to accept anti democratic or more clerical parties into the membership such as Schmitz in SIPDIC.

Christian Democrats had also already started to rebuild their relations before the Carter's trial. Christian Democrat leaders for example; Bidault, Bichet, Müller and Schumann began bilateral meetings for contemplating on plans for the future of Christian Democratic international relations. Finally they met in Lucerne in 1947. "They urgently demanded the creation of a committee of leading Christian Democratic politicians to devise a common political programme that would be binding for all parties."[75]

In Lucerne, French and Belgian parties, MRP and CVP/PSC, started with hesitations, French politicans' fears were the same as they were before the war. They did not want to receive attacks from nationalists. That is why the options for organizational form of party cooperation were limited in 1947. On the other hand, Austrians, Italians and Swiss were opposed to attitudes of their French and Belgium colleagues. They even prepared a statute for the formation of an international association of parties of Christian orientation which would aim to achieve a peaceful and democratic Europe. Still, MRP was strongly opposed to the creation of party international. Another reason for France's hesitation was that in the early postwar period MRP had not yet made a decision about the German question. That is why they did not commit any placement in the international area. After all, they succeed in a compromise, if we could name it as compromise, because Belgian and French representatives did not leave any real choice to other participants. Belgian Lamalle proposed cooperation with a new group, Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), which was ideologically neutral.[76] "Although the Christian democratic parties continued to diverge over the desirable

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[75] *Ibid*, pg 223
[76] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat Internationa*l, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 50-57

institutionalization they did agree on the rationale for closer transnational links and cooperation."[77]

"The birth of NEI took place in 1947, a development strongly encouraged by Sturzo"[78] and it was based on the lowest common denominator. "A Belgian Christian Democrat, Jules Soyeur, became its first secretary general."[79] France, again in NEI, was an obstructive element, although French politicians were opposed to deepening organization, a slightly greater degree of formalizations became inevitable. NEI had an executive committee which was led by a president with the help of four vice presidents. The President had an administrative function and he was working in the MRP office in Paris. "The NEI also instituted committees for political, cultural and socio-economic matters as well as for parliamentary affairs when the Council of Europe was formed in 1949."[80] In NEI meetings CDU/CSU, the DC and ÖVP continued to land a hand on French and Belgian participants to strengthen ideological as well as institutional cohesion. After the creation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, they also started preparing themselves for formulating joint proposals. In 1949, during the period when the other members were complaining about French and Belgian representatives' delaying tactics over the membership issue, Dutch Labour Party applied for membership, but this application was not accepted. This experiment also proved that NEI had a profile of Christian Democratic Party organization.

In 1947, Bidault also initiated the secret meetings which were named as the Geneva Circle. He aimed at reconciliation of relations with Germany. MRP adopted a policy of German decentralization within an integrated Europe. MRP wanted Franco-German relations to settle. NEI also helped in this process to fulfill facilitating networking across borders, the formulation of major shared policy objectives and the socialization

[77] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 198

[78] Keating, Joan, "The British Experience: Christian Democrats without a Party" in Hanley, David L., *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 1994, pg 175

[79] Lucardie Paul and Napel Hans-Martien ten, "Between Confessionalism and Liberal Conservatism: The Christian Democratic Parties of Belgium and the Netherlands." in *Christian Democracy in Europe : A Comparative Perspective* by David L. Hanley pg 52

[80] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, p 201

of future leaders in the emerging integrationist consensus. However, NEI congresses were not effective on the strategy of Christian Democratic governmental actions yet. The Geneva Circle meetings took place regularly every three months from 1948. They were not only between French and German politicians, other NEI participants also attended to the meetings. Moreover, after Adenauer's election as chancellor, the meetings moved into Christian Democratic cooperation at the intergovernmental level. However, the Geneva Circle meetings still retained its confidential character.

After 1945, by NEI's formal relations and Circle's informal meetings, Christian Democratic cooperation was extended beyond formalized cooperation. Future Christian Democrat leaders got in with high level transnational networking early on. These younger participants were Tindemans who later became the secretary general of the European Union of Christian Democrats and the first president of European People's Party, Giulio Andreotti who later became Italian prime minister seven times, Hans August Lücker who later became a Member of European Parliament. The European Movement was another factor which brought Christian Democrats together. To some rumours Schumann and Adenauer became close friends after they met in the Hague Congress.[81] At least through these Congresses and meetings, Christian Democrats developed direct private contacts. More importantly all of these efforts were utilized for reconciliation of Franco-German relations. This issue was not only on the agendas of the French and German people, but other European Christian Democrats also saw the crucial role of Germany in Europe's politics. That is why they wanted Germany to integrate again. Even CSU and ÖVP thought about recognition of a collective national guilt for German war crimes for full participation of the CDU/CSU in transnational cooperation in advance of the NEI congress.[82] That was an idea which was totally rejected by Adenauer. Adenauer believed that there were two Germanies, one of them was guilty Protestant Prussian east and the other was Catholic Roman west which should be reintegrated into new Europe. This idea of two Germanies would be ended with deepening division of Germany into a democratic west and communist east. This division "assisted Christian Democrats in becoming the hegemonic political force in

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[81] *Ibid,* pg 212
[82] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 73

continental western Europe as the main bulwark against Soviet communism and also made it easier to overcome the Franco-German antagonism."[83]

Another issue which was as important as Franco-German relations for Christian Democrats, was having a strong economy. Christian Democrats saw economy as an instrument while fighting against socialism. Economy was accepted as the solution of political problems. Both in NEI congresses and Geneva Meetings they contemplated on an economic integration. After the Brussels Pact, Bidault pushed hard for creating a customs and economic union. Subsequently coming of the Schumann Plan was seen as a prototype for the European Common Market by Christian Democrats.[84] Although they believed in economic unity, they did not intervene in any treaty clauses because they believed that it should be solved at the governmental level, which was largely controlled by them. However, they had three expectations from economic integration. Firstly, full reintegration of German economy into the European market again. Germany was the provider of both agricultural and finished industrial products and their integration facilitated the prevention of any possible Soviet-German partnership. Secondly, rising welfare would also obstruct the diffusion of Socialism in Europe. Thirdly, such an economic integration would be market based, but also it would have a strong social dimension. That is why Christian democrats totally supported the Schumann Plan.

2.2 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The founders of the plan were Jean Monnet (the architecture of the plan) and Robert Schumann (Foreign Minister of France), who was a Christian Democrat. Jean Monnet was the head of the French state Planing Comission, had a business background, was also a diplomat who worked in League of Nations, and was an internationally known personality. After World War II, he was responsible for the

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[83] *Ibid,* pg 218
[84] Gehler, Michael, "13 The Geneva Circle of West European Christian Democrats" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006,pg 216

recovery of the French economy. He saw integration useful for the economy of France. Schuman came from the north east of France (German location) and his parents were German citizens. His mother came from Luxemburg. He was personally understood the importance of integration among countries, especially the integration between Germany and France. "The Schuman Plan was discussed intensively by the European Christian democrats, primarily in the Geneva Circle, before being made public."[85] Schumann Plan came out in 1950, architected by Monnet and announced by Schumann.

"Schuman understood immediately the economic but also the ideological and political implications of such a plan, which would allow the birth of a Europe that conformed to the wishes of the leaders and the activists of the MRP. Having taking care to obtain the approval of Chancellor Adenauer, Schuman proposed on 9 May 1950 the creation of such a Coal and Steel Community, within precise institutional structures open to other European Countries."[86]

They chose coal and steel for the first integration step due to their strategic importance in wars, so in that sense it was important to keep them under a supranational structure. It was also important because countries would pool their resources for their industrial and economic recovery. It was both important to keep militarization in check and also to support the industrialization efforts of participating countries. As a result of this six, countries (Federal republic of Germany and France -both of which were essential members for the project- Italy and Benelux countries) participated in this coal and steel community. "The Prime Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the six countries involved at the time were all Christian Democrats: P. Van Zeeland in Belgium, R. Schuman in France, K. Adenauer in Germany, A. De Gasperi in Italy, J. Bech in Luxemburg, and C.P.M. Romme in Holland."[87] After the negotiations, the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951. Benelux countries had always supported integration, and had an existing customs union between each other.

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[85] Kaiser, Wolfram, "Transnational Christian Democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People's Party" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 231

[86] Bethouart, Bruno, "Entry of the Catholics into the Republic: The Mouvement Republicain Populaire in France" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, p 94

[87] Papini, Roberto, *The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 58

There would be a common market (free trade) in the coal and steel sectors between the members of Paris Treaty. The management regulation of the coal and steel sectors would be run by a joint supranational authority, the high authority of the ECSC. The institutions of ECSC were High Authority which was a supranational body composed of the Court which would judge the disputes among the countries, the Council of Ministers which would be the decision making body and the Assembly which would be only a consultative power. Coal and steel industries would be regulated within this new community, and also the markets for these goods would be regulated by the community, including for instance social provisions for workers who were working in this sector, or common rules of prizing...etc. So there would be a supranational regime for the regulation of the coal and steel sectors and the markets in the six member states. [88]

Paris Treaty was signed by mostly Christian Democrats. The CDU/CSU dominated German foreign and European policy after the creation of the Federal Republic, and the MRP as a leading party in French centrist and centre right coalition governments controlled the foreign ministry during 1945-1953. That is why the CDU and MRP leaders Heinrich von Brentano and Pierre Henri Teitgen played crucial roles in planning the constitution for ECSC and EPC.

Although, the attempt was based on limited sectors of the economy, there were political aims. It was a part of attaining some greater aims like peace and security cooperation and eventually political integration in Europe. First of all, in a neo functionalist approach, it was seen as a part of a greater plan for economic integration, and this would be a limited first step. It was like two strategic sectors were chosen to start a much broader integration process. It was just the beginning of further integration. Also, two rival forces, France and Germany which were essential for a powerful Europe, came together with this plan. With one shot all of these aims could be accomplished by Rome treaty, so this was quite a creative approach planned by Monnet. "Monnet's concept might have ended up in a binder without the bold decision by Schuman to assume the political responsibility for proposing it to Adenauer and the

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[88] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 46-57 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007

French government. Yet, he could only take this step with a reasonable chance of success in May 1950 because transnational Christian Democracy had discussed this option for a long time and was immediately able to garner strong political support and to construct domestic and transnational alliances with other parties and socials groups to make the Schuman Plan a success."[89]

While the European Movement was evaluating the Schuman Plan in the light of functionalist approach, in the other sense, they saw the plan as the first step of a vertical integration process. Christian Democrats saw such an integration as a prevention against reconstruction of German heavy industry, as a caution against another Hitler case. While supporting ECSC, Christian Democrats were not totally functionalists they wanted only limited political integration along with strongly integrated economies or were not totally constitutionalists who advocated European Federation. They supported both economical and institutional integration, and they had different prospects for the delegation of sovereignty to new European Bodies. These prospects were based on confessional and ideological reasons. Firstly, a supranational order was seen as more natural to Christian Democrats because of the similarities with the Pope's authority. Secondly, like Carolingian Empire, supranationalism would be the ideal and historically traditional order for Europe. Thirdly, in Christian Democrats' view integration would also be useful for societal structure by the principle of subsidiarity.[90] That is why we can also see in the Hague Congress in 1948, NEI's political resolution which advocated federal or confederal integration. Moreover, for long term solution they proposed a bicameral system which had a chamber of member states and a chamber of deputies who would be elected directly.[91] This was the constitutional design which was also inserted into EPC Treaty by Christian Democrats and which still effects European constitutional debates. Mainly, Christian Democrats preferred the solutions at the supranational level, because they believed that people were betrayed by fascism and national socialism after 1945 if Christian Democrats could achieve to offer them something totally different then they would be successful and the difference was

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[89]Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 , p 224
[90] *Ibid*, pg 228
[91] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat Internationa*l, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 61-62

supranational integration which would be far from nationalist conflicts and interstate negotiations.

2.3 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE EDC EXPERIMENT

How could Germany rearm and defend itself against eastern block was a unresolved problem at that time. European Defense Community was a proposal which was put forth to solve the problem of the rearmament of Germany. Germany was not included in NATO because it had no army, so it was not equal to the others. About the rearmament of Germany, France wanted to do this in another way rather than creating a new German army. They were looking for a solution that Germany could defend itself without an independent new army. EDC was the solution. The idea of German security was urgent because the Korean war had started. There was an alarming situation in the Western World about the Korean War because the North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union, was invading South Korea. People began to think this could happen to Germany (east Germany could invade FRG), so the rearmament of Germany became an urgency.[92] The European Defense Community aimed at solving this issue. In 1950, France proposed the Pleven Plan. This project was this time aiming at a military integration among the ECSC states. In 1952, EDC Treaty was signed by the six countries. The solution proposed was that EDC and ECSC would be parts of a general political structure: European Political Community. It would be based on the integration in economy, defense, foreign policy and security matters. It was like the final step of the integration. In this project, each of the member states would have their national armies with one exception, the exception would be Germany which would not have an independent army. There would be German forces but they would be under a supranational command. Each of the countries would join the European army and contribute 20 thousand troops except Germany would contribute 8 thousand. There were also other provisions to limit the German military power. It could not be materialized because in the ratification there were problems. It was ratified by all the other member states except France. For example Adenauer supported this because he saw this as a means of normalization for west Germany. He said shared sovereignty is

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[92] Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: the CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976, Croom Helm, London, 1977, pg 65-66

good enough for German industry, if it is good for industry (regulated by a high authority), why would not it be good for the German army. He thought that Germany's rearmament could be realized under a supranational structure. [93]

The French parliament did not ratify the treaty because there was a governmental instability in France. The international conjuncture had changed. Korean War had finished and Kruscev who was more supportive of international peace had resumed power. There were some problems in the project, and it was not very workable. Military issues are related to sovereignty and even if they were implemented it would not be workable to have different soldiers under a supranational command. Such a structure was contrary to the nature of the military. There were technical issues which made it unworkable. Although MRP voted for EDC, it was not enough to alleviate the French sensitivity regarding sovereignty. The MRP was accused of being a Catholic inspired preference for a supranational core of European integration. The MRP had to fight too many fronts simultaneously. It lost its controlling influence over French European policy, which had facilitated the implementation of the Schuman Plan so much during 1950-1. "Clearly, informal negotiations between party leaders could only succeed if the participants, like Adenauer, had sufficient authority to turn the results into governmental policy. In the fragmented French coalition politics before the EDC vote however, MRP was no longer able to do so."[94]

Unlike Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan was overshadowed from the beginning due to its timing. The Korean War was finished and the MRP did not have an argument to convince the coalition government, due to their lack of fear of the Soviet Union, which proposed Détente. Also, a functional economic integration did not create opposition, but a military integration so shortly after the war created strong opposition from the public. Besides, MRP emphasized that the alliance of coalition would not accept such an integration without discriminatory features.

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[93] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 57*61 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007
[94] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 269

Although MRP support was not enough for the ratification of EDC, they had a crucial role in the realization of the Western European Union, which was a strictly intergovernmental replacement solution for German rearmament with British membership. This plan was designed by Mendes France and MRP was strongly opposed to this plan. However Adenauer gave support and worked for convincing MRP leaders, and he succeeded. This was another example of the power of transnational party cooperation and the trust between politicians. "Their decision reflected the strength of cross border political integration and the accumulation of substantial social and political trust during the eight years of intensive Christian Democratic networking since 1947."[95]

Adenauer did not give up working for deepening integration. "Adenauer went to some extraordinary lengths to ensure support for his policy of joining the proposed EDC."[96] He arranged the NEI congress, in the German spa Bad Ems, in September 1951. He also worked for closer bilateral relations between the CDU and Democrazia Cristiana (DC) for Christian International, which was a desired name change to reflect ideological orientation. Adenauer strongly believed that the best option for standing against the Soviet threat was European integration, and he saw Stalin's détente initiatives as an effort to postpone the EDC treaty." Transnational Christian democracy also pointed out the growing need to conceptualise the legitimacy of supranational governance with a parliamentary dimension, albeit in the form of ECSC Parliamentary Assembly with delegates from the six national parliaments and initially only consultative function."[97]

After all, Germany joined the Brussels Treaty in 1954. This organization has an automatic security guarantee that if any one of the members come under attack by an outside power, the other members will come into assistance. Brussels Treaty turned into a Western European Union because it became an intergovernmental security organization. After the Brussels Treaty, Germany joined NATO. It was the solution to Germany's rearmament issue which was supported by the USA. So German army was

[95] *Ibid*, 281
[96] Pridham, Geoffrey, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: the CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition*, 1945-1976, Croom Helm, London, 1977, pg 85
[97] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007,p 259

formed, but still under restrictions that, they could not be a part of any out of border operations or develop a nuclear capability. There were some additional restrictions. In West Berlin there were British troops. These were alleviating French concerns.

The next step of integration should be an economical one. There were two approaches in Messina Conference sectoral approach and a wider general approach. The Sectoral approach belonged to Jean Monnet. He formed an action committee and he was working for further integration of Europe. He said that integration should proceed with transport and energy sectors, especially atomic energy. One respect of general approach was that rather than integrating each economic sector step by step, it aimed to integrate all sectors of the economy. Benelux countries were supporting the general approach they already had, a customs union between each other since 1948.

"Christian Democrats have displayed the greatest diversity on questions of detailed economic, military and political steps: while easily agreeing on the need to base the new Europe on Christian social and economic principles, their concrete decisions have been confined to supporting first EDC, then WEU and finally the common market and Euratom."[98]

Meanwhile, some positive developments for integration appeared. After the efforts of the Geneva Circle, the most important development was related to France and Germany. There were security issues for France in the Ruhr and Saar regions.[99] In 1955, after the referendum hold in Saarland resulted in them becoming part of Germany, relations were improved between France and Germany. In 1955 Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak sent a memorandum to member states of ECSC and proposed negotiations on further progress of integration. Messina Conference was a meeting among the representatives of the six members of ECSC. They came together to discuss some important issues within the community, for example the next president of the high authority and Spaak memorandum was negotiated. The Netherlands and Luxemburg's representatives tried to push forward the idea of a united Europe. They proposed the formation of the common market which would be based on a customs union. Based on

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[98] Haas, Ernst B., *The Uniting Of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, pg 392

[99] Gehler, Michael, "13 The Geneva Circle of West European Christian Democrats" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 207-221

the records of the Spaak committee, an intergovernmental conference began among the countries. It was a process of compromise and bargaining as each of the countries had their own priorities. For example, for the Germany liberal, economic relations were important as was having a customs union, France was a bit more hesitant on this liberal approach because France was industrially protectionist. [100] During the first half of the 1950s, Christian Democrats determined supranationalism was a constitutional concept for the core of Europe. The EPC draft, which was basically planned by Christian Democrats, also reflected the supranational approach by them.[101] They also achieved insertion of article 38, which charged the future EDC Assembly with submitting proposals for a political community into EDC Treaty. Shortly, after the demise of the EPC project, which was planned as having bicameral system with two parliamentary chambers, one consisting of national parliamentarians and the other directly elected, Christian democrats united behind deeper integration and the long term goal of the European federation. The two Parliamentary chambers proposal was not expected to be accepted without changes, and the direct part was replaced by the Council of Ministers, but implemented in the EEC treaty. The failure of EDC and EPC contrarily strengthened the supranational cause. If the EDC would have been accepted as it was, the discriminatory factors which were included by the EDC would hurt all integration processes and they would became chronic problems. Even a temporary inequality of rights in the EDC could not be reconciled with the federal principle. Moreover, the failure of the EDC allowed Christian Democrats to shift the integration process to the economic sphere in which compromises would be easier and would bring more benefits in the name of supranationalism. "Christian democrats agreed on the need to base the new Europe on Christian social and economic principles their concrete decisions have been confined to support first EDC, then WEU and finally the common market and Euratom."[102]

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[100] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 61-64 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007
[101] Buffotot, Patrice, "The Security and Defense Policies of European Christian Democracy" in Hanley, David, *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Pinter Publishers, New York, 1997, pg 206-209
[102] Haas, Ernst B., *The Uniting Of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, pg 392

While all of these plans were negotiated, Britain was not involved in the plans of Christian Democrats. Bidault once said that "Three kinds of Europe are possible an English Europe, which means no Europe at all, a Russian Europe, which means Asia. As for a Europe for everyone, the basis for this is a Franco-German rapprochement."[103] Also, Adenauer warned that if SPD was to be elected, Germany would come under British influence. They did not want British inclusion at the beginning of the integration process, because they believed that Britain would boycott further deepening and expansion into meaningful policy making. That was because continental Christian Democrats had little contact with British Catholics. Also Britain would reject any economic integration proposal because an economic integration in continental Europe, such as a customs union with external tariffs, would destroy the Commonwealth preference system.

France and Germany were like minded on the noninclusion of Britain and the crucial importance of Franco-German relations on the process of European integration. Certainly Geneva Circle and the NEI had important effects on bringing Christian Democrats to this point. Party cooperation in the NEI and Geneva Circle brought further trust and informal relations such as Bidault and Adenauer relation which resulted in CDU and MRP linkage. These informal relations also convinced Christian Democrats about European policy making as an emerging supranational political system. Secondly, they converged their world views and developed common ideas. Their ideas had no direct influence on developments of integration such as ECSC and EDP, however their cooperation gave overall direction to European policies. Still, MRP participated in the NEI with individual politicians, not with the party participation and this situation did not change until the creation of the EEC.

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[103] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 232

2.4 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPROACHES TO THE EEC TREATY

At the conclusion of the intergovernmental conferences, the member states of the ECSC were able to agree on major issues. Basically there were three priorities for the French which were included by the treaty. One of them was the creation of the atomic energy community, so France would be able to get support from other member states for the development of nuclear energy. "France sought maximum supranational powers and institutions for Euratom and the possibility of giving it jurisdiction over atomic arms."[104] Second was agricultural, the new project would not only be based on industry it would also include agriculture. The last issue was the French overseas territories. The overseas territories and former colonial countries would have preferential access to the common market. This was not only beneficial for France, but also beneficial for other countries like Belgium and the Netherlands that also had former colonial countries. This led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

When you look at the contents of the economic community treaty, there is no mention of a federal union or any type of confederation. However, the term "ever closer union" is used with a future reference. There is also the mention of integration moving further but in the beginning it was not defined as the final target. It was also important they talked not about states of Europe, but about people of Europe. It was beyond the state level and it also aimed at integrating the people of Europe. It was a framework policy oriented treaty. It was different from a constitution, because it just included the areas of cooperation, the institutions and the main principle of each policy area. But it had the framework, the main principle and the main target but it led to the member states and the institutions implementing things. So it gave the legal basis but it did not really bind the member states. Yet "traditional demands of Christian Democrats: a fusion of the European Communities and autonomy of the Commission, support for majority rule within the Council, election by direct vote for the European Parliament"[105]

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[104] Haas, Ernst B., *The Uniting Of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, pg 515
[105] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat Internationa*l, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 94

were same in all discussions. Economic aspects, liberal trade, cooperation and integration in economic area were the most important aspects of the treaty. The social provisions were more limited than economic aims of the treaty. There was one provision regarding the social aspect, and it was related to the social security benefits of workers who enjoyed free movement in the community. Although, the commission was less powerful than the high authority of the Coal and Steel Community, it had less supranationality. Council was where the compromising and negotiating took place between the member states. Assembly, which was representative of member state's parliament at that time, did not have the power that it has today. There was a gradual increase in the powers of the assembly in the future years. It was given the right to make plans for a transition to a system of election. So in that sense, the direct election to the Assembly that took place in 1979, and although it was not formed as an elected institution, there was the possibility for it. The main judicial body was the Court of Justice, which would both rule on disputes among member states and institutions of the community.

The EEC Treaty basically was based on general economic integration. This was not only limited to the economy but included some political aims, as well having security and prosperity in Western Europe. It was also part of a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union, and of limiting the influence of Soviet ideology in Western Europe. Beginning from 1951, economic growth and falling unemployment across ECSC shepherded Christian Democrats toward reliance on market forces, and they decreased the level of planning state interventions. MRP, which was more interventionist, was also influenced from this new stream. However it still insisted on an agenda of economic rights and social policies. Consequently, more liberal market oriented Christian Democrats commanded European economic integration policy. Moreover, in the NEI Congress in Sorrent, they decided to support a common market which included free movement of people, goods and capital. The private property issue was still the corner stone of their economic plans and they still supported state intervention which would only be used for only balancing common wealth. "At this stage all parties supported horizontal economic integration in an industrial customs union, the complete abolition of quantitative restrictions, freedom of movement, goods and capital, convertibility of

currencies and a broadly liberal foreign trade policy."[106] Subsequently, NEI parties publicly released their ideal European Economic integration plan, which also covered supranational institutional structure. For instance, a European parliament that was directly elected. After the Spaak and Monnet, Christian Democrats continued to push for a common market, and succeed in influencing the process.

Common market in the EEC treaty would be based on a customs union. Customs Union would be achieved gradually through three stages over a period of 12 years and by 1970 they would have a functioning customs union. It also included a common commercial policy and a common customs for the third countries. It had the same arrangements for both industrial and agricultural products. The creation of another type of integration in Western Europe, the European free trade association which was a loose type of integration, was based on only free trade among the states but had no common trade policy against third countries. In a common market, the in terms of economic production would include free movement not only for food but also for the other factors of production such as workers, services, capitals. During the discussions Christian Democrats supported "the creation of fully fledged common market."[107] "NEI demands economic integration and wishes soon to promote the freeing of trade, the harmonization of economic, financial and social policies and all other measures constituting progress along the road indicated."[108] This was a framework treaty, it just gave the legal basis and the main principles, and competences of the community. But of course it was up to the institutions and the member states to achieve those policy areas. Free movement of workers was not a reality at that time, but as the community started to function the mechanism began to enable free movement, and becoming gradually active by the member states. Regarding services, it also included all commercial and professional activities, including employed people like doctors, architects…etc. It had a common agricultural policy. This was very important for the French and for the other

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[106] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 292
[107] Kaiser, Wolfram, "Transnational Christian Democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People's Party" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 233
[108] Haas, Ernst B., *The Uniting Of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, pg 24

member states as well. In 1961 they made progress in the area of agricultural policy, and agriculture became one of the truly common policies of the EC. It was still a sign of solidarity that the member states were able to agree upon a common policy of agriculture. The same type of success could not be attained in the area of transport. A common transport policy could not be realized until the 1980s after the Single Act. Transport policy remained mainly national. The legal basis was not sufficient by itself, but in addition to a legal basis, there had to be the will of the member states. There had to be a consensus among the member states. There were also policies related to the functioning of the common market like competition and dumping policies. All practices that could damage free and fair competition rules were also prohibited. We had approximation of laws with regard to the functioning of common market. There could be further legislation which would harmonize national legislations of the member states. Also, they would try to coordinate the different national economic policies of the member states. In the 1970s this was not an area of success for the EC because the member states engaged in totally different economic policies. Finally, social policy was more limited compared to the economic aspect of the common market. But there was a fund which was created the European Social Fund. The main aim of the social fund was to support workers in the community who were enjoying the fight of free movement. There were some additional policy areas which were linked to the functioning of the common market. The main social aspect was to try to equalize the social standards in the member states so that this could not be a force of competitive advantage for states.[109]

The formation of the EEC led to an upgrading on the NEI Bureau, the number of vice presidents increased to six. The Bureau was charged with decision making between the occasional meetings of Executive Committee called Comite Directeur, however it which was a European regional organization located in New York and received strong support from American organizations. At that time, the younger generation who grew up in the transnational tradition, such as Tindeman, came to the scene and developed a strongly federalist European programme and also supported party integration.

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[109] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 64-80 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007

"The development of the NEI reflects in large part the movement toward European integration. Many important decisions were arrived at during its meetings, but these sessions also had an indirect influence. They created a climate favorable to the democratic rebuilding of Europe. For example they supported European Movement and their best leaders committed themselves to community action."[110]

Shortly after the creation of the EEC, the MRP opponents to NEI membership also decreased. They saw the negative conduct of MRP at the French elections. De Gaulle put the Christian democrats off. This attitude brought Christian democrats together behind the MRP throughout the EEC. However, the MRP's attempts at dominance through party cooperation were not accepted by other Christian Democrats. Moreover, the protestant enlargement of the NEI was a part of the decentralization of NEI activities and the beginning of party cooperation at the level of secretary generals outside of the NEI network. This enlargement was also a response to the accusations of Vatican control. "It was also the first step in the evolving CDU/CSU's strategy to transform the NEI into a broadly based inter-confessional European level people's party in its own image."[111] On the other hand, Bichet proposed an increase in the budget of NEI to employ several staff to fulfill the organization's supranational mission, such as, developing a common political doctrine and coordinating relations with international bodies, such as NATO. In 1954, they agreed on this proposal. In 1954, with NEI's resolution they also claimed their immediate objectives as: "In the economic realm, increases in production and in productivity, as well as maintenance of full employment . In the social realm the equitable distribution of productive wealth, implying the growing access to property of all"[112] At this stage Christian Democrats started using the network not only to affect European policy making, but also to exchange political ideas and practices across borders for use in domestic political context. They also shared the experiences about sociological methods for analyzing the composition of the electorate and changing mass opinion. These reforms which transformed the NEI Bureau into a decision making forum for the EEC parties resulted in the absorption of the Geneva

[110] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 58
[111] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 263
[112] Haas, Ernst B., *The Uniting Of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, pg 24

Circle by NEI.[113] Another reason for the absorption of Geneva Circle was that it accomplished its mission, which was reconciliation of Franco-German relations. Governmental and political relations between Germany and France were smooth, and the Saar problem was resolved. However, until its demise Geneva Circle had a crucial role in the informal network between Christian Democrats.

MRP had a crucial role in the period after EDC. With the support of its voters it determined its party policy was achieving European Economic Integration through the Common Market project. Seventy five percent of its voters saw the issue of European integration as indispensable. In all of its political bargaining, MRP put European integration, Euratom and common market issues on the table as the most important condition for giving its support. In brief, the European integration was at the top of the MRP's strategic or specific policy preferences.[114] Consequently, Rome Treaty was ratified by the full support of MRP. Otherwise, no ratification would be possible for the Rome Treaty, similar to what happened to EDC.

In opposition to the liberal approach national interests were not the starting point for Christian Democrats; their calculations were not totally about national issues. However, Christian Democrats and others were motivated by trade statistics and predictions about sectoral and regional effects of horizontal economic integration. After the Schuman Plan, Christian Democrats accepted that European integration, as a political project, would provide them with economic benefits, especially for the middle class and farmers. They also worked hard to convince interest groups of these economic benefits. Above all of these expectations and interests, for Christian Democrats, European integration process was a chance for shaping a new Europe harmonically with their own image, which was Europeanised nation states embedded in a supranational constitutional system. Their basic emphasis was supranationalism and "they at least partially succeeded with the insertion of the federalist objective in the preamble to the EEC Treaty of 'ever closer union', the introduction of majority voting in the Council of Ministers from stage two of the integration process at the start of 1966, the sole right of

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[113] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 265
[114] Hörber, Thomas, *The foundations of Europe European integration ideas in France, Germany and Britain in the 1950s,* Wiesbaden VS, Wiesbaden, 2006, pg 55-59

initiative for the European Commission and the provision for the direct election of the Parliamentary Assembly."[115]

Consequently, transnational Christian Democrats and their governmental coordination shaped the origins of the European Union and created the overall structure. However they could not succeed in imposing their image totally, but they sowed the seeds of supranationalism, both in minds of society and in constitutive treaties.

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[115] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 302

III. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN THE DEEPENING EU INTEGRATION

After the European Commission was established and started to function in 1958, Christian Democrats were in power in Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxemburg. MRP also had a role in the French government. In the EP, Christian Democrats had a dominant hegemony. "During the 1960s, five of six EP presidents were Christian Democrats."[116] The EEC treaty was also on Christian Democrats' side, and it promised to allow further integration and deepening. At that time, Christian Democrats were also successful in mobilizing societal networks. Farmers and workers gave great support to Christian Democrats in their countries and at the European level.

However, begining in the 1960s, Christian Democrats were having problems with declining electoral support. In 1972 CDU/CSU came second in the national election, while DC was losing support simultaneously. In 1967 MRP dissolved.[117] This decadence had some reasons. First of all, in the 1960s Europe began to secularize rapidly. This development made Catholic solidarity and organizations ineffective. The respectability of the Catholic Church had also declined. Secondly, at the same time, Social Democrats emerged as really strong rivals for Christian Democrats. Social Democrats got attention from all classes, that was something which no other party had succeeded in before, except for Christian Democrats. Besides, all of these left parties moderated their anticlericalism, therefore Christian Democrats were not the only representatives of Catholic workers. Thirdly, liberal attacks started again with more neoliberal, socio-economic and cultural policy profiles. Lastly, the youth and student movement in 1968 totally rejected values such as family and religion, which were essential parts of Christian Democratic ideology. This youth movement was also opposed to EEC institutions because they saw the European integration process as a tool of capitalism.

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[116] *Ibid,* p 304
[117] Elgie, Roberst, "Christian Democracy in France The Politics of Electoral Constraint" in Hanley, David L., *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 1994, pg 155

"Christian Democracy's trouble is double. On the one hand, it consists of the declining significance of religionwhich is decreasing the ideological importance of the politics of mediation. On the other hand, the politics of mediation is losing its potential for success in any case as the terms and goods upon which a stable accommodation of conflicts of interests could be based are increasingly becoming scarce."[118]

Whereas, after the short economic downturn in 1966, Christian Democrats played a crucial role in the establishment of welfare states. On the other side, they gave importance to private ownership and enterprise, since they believed in limited state intervention. At the same time, their anticommunist claims were not effective on votes like they were before.

De Gaulle and his policies were another important challenge for Christian Democrats and their supranational integration plans. Contrary to expectations, De Gaulle was not a threat for the EEC. He saw custom unions as useful for his policies, which were controlled liberalization and convertibility of the French Franc. French industry and agriculture flourished as a result of the EEC. That is why de Gaulle did not ignore the EEC. However, he was strongly opposed to the deepening integration within the supranational EEC framework. "Following the formation of the EEC, discussions in the NEI about integration were soon overshadowed by the controversy within the Community brought on by de Gaulle, about the further development of the EEC institutions and its foreign policy directions."[119] He wanted all developments to be realized on an intergovernmental basis. His approach contrasted Christian Democrats in all policy areas. "Not only was de Gaulle's strictly intergovernmental approach diametrically opposed to the supranational preferences of transnational Christian Democracy, but his foreign policy of establishing Western Europe as a third force in global politics under French leadership also ran counter to their policy of close transatlantic defence cooperation in NATO."[120] In this line he also rejected the membership of Britain. Consequently, de Gaulle's intergovernmantalist agenda made Christian Democrats supranational federalist approach impossible to realize.

[118] Van Kersbergen, Kees „Social capitalism: a study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, Routledge Publish, Canada, 1995, pg 239
[119] Kaiser, Wolfram, "Transnational Christian Democracy: From the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales to the European People's Party" in Gehler, Michael, Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945, Routledge Publish, New York, 2006, pg 232
[120] Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 309

In 1975, the Christian Democrats lost their traditional hegemony in the European Parliament. Now, they had only 53 seats compared to the 66 seats of socialists. Still, these defeats pushed Christian Democrats to make a decision about their ideology. They decided to modernize their party ideology since they wanted to be able to respond to the changing social norms and preferences. They began to work for it under the NEI umbrella. Even though, in the postwar period, NEI was the most relevant platform for doing this, these efforts were resulted in disappointment. That was because of the NEI's outdated form which involved many traditional, but useless ceremonies. Besides NEI was still controlled by MRP which did not provide any further profit in the account of transnational Christian Democratic cooperation. The CD group in the EP worked hard for modernizing NEI. After all efforts, the NEI were transformed into the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD).[121] However, the changes were less modest than what was needed. As a rule, the participation should be at party level, and they would not accept individual politicians. "Moreover the leaders of the CD groups in the EP and in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as two more MEPs were represented in the reorganized EUCD leadership. Christian Democratic commissioners also had a right to attend meetings" [122]

After the Hague congress, the European integration was totally out of Christian democratic control, and they could not achieve catching the new world or maintain order despite their modest transformations. That is why they thought about more radical changes to relaunch transnational Christian Democracy. In 1970, the EUCD gathered a congress between EC parties with the aim of creating a European political party. After the British, French and Danish governments finally agreed on direct elections for the EP, the European People's Party was established in 1976. Their party programme aimed at a federal Europe. In 1990, EPP enlarged from Scandinavia to Eastern Europe. Keith Middlemas has called the period between 1973-83, the stagnant period for European integration. That changed once the Single European Act was signed.

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[121] Papini, Roberto,*The Christian Democrat International*, Rowman and Littlefield Publ, New York, 1997, pg 85-87
[122] Kaiser, Wolfram, *Christian Democracy and The Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, pg 314

3.1 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE SEA (SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT)

EC is a project which did not have a definite end point, so in that sense it was an ever closer union. For deeper integration or to give new spirit to integration, there was always a need for this project. In the 1980s there was a search for a single market provided by this Act. In 1968, the Customs Union was achieved among the member states, so there would no longer be tariff or any quantative barriers. But common market is more than a customs union since it includes free movement of goods in addition to free movement of the other factors of production. In the difficult conditions of the 1970s, member states resorted to protectionist measures. They tried to protect their internal national markets from competition from the other member states. The Commission or Council could not find any effective ways to deal with this protectionism. Technical standards provided an especially big problem. The Commission was engaged in harmonizing these different technical regulations and production standards. There was an attempt to adopt common standards, but mainly due to the slow decision making process, it was very difficult to legislate common standards for each different product. The way out of this dilemma was provided by the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice, in two important cases, wrote down a new principle which was later adopted by the Commission. This was the principle of mutual recognition, and the cases were Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon. The decision was, " products which are produced and marketed legally in one member state, can be sold in another member state, and technical standards can not be used to hinder this." Nearly impossible to adopt common standards for all the different product categories, the member states would have to recognize each market's rules and regulations. However, there would still be common minimum standards. They would not be common uniform standards, they would just be standards that would guarantee a minimum equivalent in terms of health and safety requirements. This principle was later adopted by the Commission and

formed one of the basic pillars of the Commission's new program for completing the internal market.[123]

To be able to legislate these measures there had to be an acceleration of the decision making process. If unanimity would be required for these new measures, then, it would be very difficult to enact them in a reasonable period of time. The Commission took the initiative and proposed a work program. Some of the most important proposals for action in White Paper were: firstly having a truly working internal market that is free of boundaries, and free of borders. There should be general liberlization regarding free movements. There should be an abolition of intra EC frontier controls. Physical barriers should be eliminated among members. There should be a liberal system of capital flow. Capital controlled bureaucratic procedures should be reduced. The public procurement market should be liberalized, and discrimination in favor of national companies should be abolished. Monopolies should be removed, and there should be competition between private enterprises. Regarding free movements of services and professionals, there should be mutual recognition of qualifications. Basically these changes in Commission approach made Single Market program possible.

Rather than try to harmonize all the regulations and standards, there was a new approach which was called as "the mutual recognition of national goods". However, there was still a level of harmonization, but this was restricted to minimum essential requirements. The Commission would just give the guideline and then it was up to the private bodies to make the standards in different product categories.

This project was embodied in the White Paper of the Commission. So the Commission again became one of the major players of European Integration. However, we should not assume that the Single Market project was only advocated by the Commission. In fact, there were many different groups who supported a single market initiative. The Commission was only leading a coalition of forces that demanded the creation of a single market.

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[123] Urwin, Derek W., *The Community of Europe: A History of Euorpean Integration since 1945*, Longman Publish, London, 1991 pg 195-230 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007

There would no longer be a limit an economic production. Companies were producing for a wider market, so they would be able to specialize their production, and their competitiveness would increase, so marginal thought of production would decrease. Therefore, it would be easier to attract foreign investment.[124] Christian Democrats "were strong supporters of the Single Euorpean Act and and the Maastricht Treaty, calling for the full opening of markets, greater integration of banking systems and the creation of an economic and monetary union with a single currency".[125]

On February 1986, the first revision of the treaty, The Single European Act, came into force. EPC, which was started on an intergovernmental basis in the 1970s, now required a treaty basis. It was said that the member states would coordinate their foreign policy positions closely and they would work together on political and economic aspects of security. They would try to, formulate and implement a common foreign policy. As the EPC mechanism, European Council was also given a treaty basis. It was also incorporated in the institutional structure of the EC, and in the 1970s developed as a political body outside the treaty framework. One of the major achievements of the Single European Act was the adoption of the legislative procedure. The main effect of this new procedure would be to accelerate the decision making process. There was an increased role for EP in cooperative procedure. This decision making procedure would especially be used for issues which were related to the single market. The Luxemburg compromise, which said that on major issues of national interest of member states, member states could exercise veto, could now be exercised only in areas linked with the single market. There were also new policy areas which were added to the treaty. For the first time in a treaty, the aim of achieving an economic and monetary union was also expressed, and there was also a reference to the idea of the European Union. So the target of attaining a European Union in the future was also included in the SEA. So basically we can say the SEA emerged out of the necessity to have an effective decision making mechanism in the EC, and to attain a truly common (single) market in the EC. There was a change in the institutional structure, changes in

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[124] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 206-209 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007
[125] Gaffney, John, *Political parties and the European Union,* Routledge Publish, New York, 1996, pg 145

legislative procedure, introduction of a new procedure (the cooperation procedure) and also the expansion of the policy dimension of the EC.

Single Market program had many economic benefits, so we may see it as a purely economic project. On the other hand it had a political face due to its importance in revitalizing the integration process. This is a project where member states agreed upon and were linked to, a reform of the institutional structure and the decision making process of the EC. Even today we cannot talk about a truly common market since today there are differences among the member states. Even today we do not have exactly the same conditions regarding free movement of labour or free movement of capital, but it is an ongoing project, so single market is still not complete, but it is more or less a single market. To get a single market initiative, the Commission president Delors also gave importance to the social dimension. He talked about the European Social State, creating a Europe not only for production for companies, but also the people who are working in these companies. So he gave importance to some supplementary policy initiatives. In 1988 there was a reform of the structural fund. To deal with structural problems in the common market's social and regional problems, the funds that already existed were now combined under certain objectives. We had the European Social fund, European Regional Development Fund, the guidence European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidence funds and an instrument related to the fisheries sector as well. So these were now combined under the structural funds to deal with the structural problem of the European economy (to deal with unemployment, labour market problems, less developed regions) Rights of workers was another new issue, so the member states adopted the Community Charter for the fundamental social rights of workers. It was not a legal text, but a political text including some guidelines (of worker rights valid for workers in the single market) for action in the social area. Britain did not sign it because of considerations for basically a free market economy and the desire to keep the social policy area based in the nation. This was a fundamental initiative which tried to also develop the social dimension of the EC. Shortly thereafter, at the Luxemburg European council in 1985, there was progress on a number of issues, including the environment and decision making procedures. They also agreed on a deadline for completing and internal market on the basis of the Commission's White Book. They took the initiative

for a single currency. Monetary union and single currency required further treaty amendments and thus another IGC.

The SEA was not a process which was unprecedented or unprompted. At the Milan European Conference, member states decided to convene an IGC to discuss the treaty's framework. Yet, this decision in Johansson's opinion was "a turning point and crucial step forward in the history of European Integration."[126] Johansson also emphasized that this step forward was the result of Christian Democratic pressure for deepening integration.

The EPP played a leading role and, it brought the party elites from different nations together. It did not only create assemblies. The existence of the EPP, and before it the transnational Christian Democrat party cooperation, made possible informal relations between key politicians. The EPP's priorities were also very different from other political trends. Their main emphasis was on the institutional developments towards a European Union. Moreover, it was successful in influencing Europe's agenda. For instance, in the EPP's joint meeting in Dublin in 1984, which was convened just before the Milan Summit, it was stated that the European Parliament should work for a draft treaty for the European Union without for the waiting minority government's will. They also stressed in Dublin that the first step should be a proposal for an IGC; where the starting point of a union would be. EPP leaders also met just before the Milan Summit. EPP proposed to convene an IGC before the treaty. They also demanded that representatives of future member states should be invited to this IGC. In their declaration, they also stated clearly that after the resolution of the IGC, "a new treaty must be established for the European Union, in particular to organize effective cooperation in relation to foreign and security policy. Under the heading of new areas of activity, the declaration called for the completion of the internal market and for the EC to have the necessary powers, in particular for the sectors of research technology and the protection of the environment"[127] The consistency between EEP's declaration and the results of the SEA also was more proof of the EPP's impact on the SEA process.

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[126] Johansson, Karl Magnus, "Party Elites in Multilevel Europe: The Christian Democrats and the Single European Act", Party Politics, 8,2002, p 428
[127] *Ibid*, p 431

"Once again, Christian Democrats had taken the lead in driving the process of European integration forward."[128]

This leading role became successful because of Christian Democrats obtaining power in their national governments. In 1985, the German, Irish and Benelux countries' governments were led by Christian Democrats. They were the leaders who, after years of informal contacts under the umbrella of transnational party cooperation, knew each other well. EPP led to the SEA by providing convergence of preferences of these German, Irish and Benelux leaders' politic priorities. Moreover, Kohl had the key role, and thought that they had an opportunity for going forward, and he worked for it.

3.2. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ROAD TO THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

In December 1991, under Dutch Presidency, the European Council was held in Maastricht in the Netherlands. The IGC's came to a conclusion and presented the new treaty to the European Council, and it's representatives of the member states. They proposed a new structure for the European Integration process. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992, and then opened for ratifications by the member states. "In the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty, all Christian Democratic parties were unanimously in favour of the treaty."[129] Because of the nature of some of the new policies, a three pillared structure was introduced. The homogenous method of integration now turned into a new method (3 pillars structure) where decision making and institutional structure differed among the different policy areas. For the most federalist states, including the Dutch who actually criticized this new structure, it was considered a fragmentation of the integration process. The Community method was abandoned in new policy areas, and a new more intergovernmental method was being applied to the two new policy areas.

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[128] *Ibid,* p 432
[129] Hix, Simon, Lord, Christopher, *Political Parties in the European Union*, MacMillan Press, London, 1997, pg 32

Maastricht Treaty created the European Union. So, The EC also gained a political identity as well, allowing it to go on. The existence of European Community would form the first pillar of the EU. So the EU would be a higher structure of a political organization, which would embody economic integration, and in addition, two new policy areas, CFSP and Justice and Home affairs. This was a very important and fundamental step in the direction of political integration, but it was not possible to include the two new areas into the decision making of Community method, so more intergovernmental perspective was adopted to the new policy areas. When we look at the Rome Treaty there is no talk about political values or political principles, it was all about policies and economic integration. However, now in introduction of political integration we also have in the Maastricht Treaty the list of values for the EU. So political values are also mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty. To be the in line with the French approach, European Council, where the highest representatives of the member states meet, will be the guiding institution for the EU. It would be the place which would formulate the three pillars, and it will have a fundamental role especially in the second and third pillars. With the Maastricht Treaty, the transition to a political integration process emerged, including new concepts in institution, such as EU citizenship. The citizens of the member states are also going to be citizens of the EU, and will gain benefits from the EU concept. They have already the right of free movement, so they can move freely, and now they can vote on European and national elections. They can vote and they can nominate candidates as well. They can apply to the ombudsman, or ask the institutions for an explanation of certain issues. For some, this is an artificial citizenship, because national citizenship determines your status and your rights, including any social rights, and social security is still based in the nation states level. Still, even in terms of symbolic importance, because the EU borrowed the concepts of the national states like citizenship, democratic values belong to the ground of national states. This was also an important direction in the progression of political integration.[130] And also as Johansson and Raunio has emphasized "The Maastricht Treaty assigned political parties a specific role in the political system of the European Union. According to the Treaty's Article 138a 'Political parties at the European Level

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[130] Desmond, Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union,* Houndmills Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004 pg 64-80 in Nas, Ciğdem, Lecture Notes, 2007

are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of citizens of the Union.'"[131] "The constitutional recognition in the form of the Party Article in the Maastricht Treaty is directly linked to the subsequent development of Europarties. With the exception of the European People's Party (EPP) that had already been founded in 1976."[132]

In the process of European integration if someone looks at the role the parties played in the ongoing and deeper European integration. The process obviously seems to be working both ways. On one hand, there is a gradual institutionalisation of Europarties and a transnationalisation or even supranationalisation of party politics, and on the other hand these parties become instrumental on the ideological and theoretical ground in determining the future of the European Union. The Christian Democrats have played a key-role in this process in that they made it easier in the formation and acceptance of the Treaty on European Union because their ideological identity was based on a federalist understanding and was shared by the union. When politicians seek transnational coalitions (as in the case of the Christian Democrats), a chance emerges to go beyond the governmental channels. Other communication channels are activated in order to form strategic alliances, such as the relationships between interest groups.

However, transnational channels of communication are very important in the sense that they form a bridge between the European and domestic levels of analysis. One has to regard the structure of EU as a complex system, "where private, governmental, transnational, and supranational actors deal with each other in highly complex networks of varying density, as well as horizontal and vertical depth"[133].

Political parties are one component of these networks, although they have not fully been integrated into the overall administrative framework. As actors of such networks, political parties possess unique characteristics, which tell them apart from other components of the network. They have less freedom of movement/action because

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[131] Johansson, Karl Magnus and Raunio, Tapio, "Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts" in Party Politics, 11:5, 2005
[132] Tapio, Raunio, "Political Parties in the European Union" in Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, Mark A., Rosamond, Ben, *Handbook of European Union Politics,* Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007 pg 250
[133] Johansson, Karl Magnus and Raunio, Tapio, "Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts", in Party Politics, 11:5, 2005

they may form governments. The amount of free movement on the side of the political parties also depends on the type of the political system they are functioning within. Johansson refers to Risse for the following distinction: "A more centralized political system invites transnational strategies targeting the state directly, whereas a more decentralized political system invites a coalition strategy that seeks to influence the state through societal actors"[134].

Transnational coalitions play a crucial role with regard to constitutional politics and "history making" bargains. Therefore, European political parties are not simply planes upon which actions are carried, they also become active agents in their own right that determine the future of the European Union by shaping its policies and driving the process of European integration.

Regarding the ideological construction of Europe, a common goal unites the Christian Democrats all over the continent and helps them unite around an ideal. In general, political parties and individuals within an ideological movement are in a bondage of a common sentiment and purpose. Politicians who have occupied the political arena for years know each other's positions and tendencies very well. However, when they come together and act in the form of a coalition across nation-state borders, there emerges the need to come up with a broader definition for European integration, which cannot be confined to the conventions of domestic polity-making system.

If someone asks what role ideas and corporate identities play in redefining interests, shaping preferences and promoting convergence. The answer is that the "preference-convergence" thesis has been widely accepted as the main factor that explains the treaty reform. Yet, the question of how and why national policies converged on the specific solutions remains unanswered.

It has been assumed that the European political parties played a key-role in promoting the idea of European unity. Quoting Risse and referring to Cameron, Johansson says that one would "expect processes of argumentation and persuasion, the

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[134] Risse, T. "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union". Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 1, 1994, pg 53–80.

more informal transnational and transgovernmental networks are involved in preparing and implementing decisions. One would also assume that the internal cohesion of such networks and coalitions depends to a large degree on collectively shared beliefs and understandings."[135].

These "collectively shared beliefs and understandings" among the Christian Democrats was crucial in the road that led to the formation of the European Union. These shared ideological outlooks (such as the belief in the possibility of federalist union) have been instrumental in the decisions reached through the Maastricht treaty.

As Johansson's subtitle "The Christian Democrat Road to Maastricht" he dwells onto the idea that the Christian Democrats stood out among the other political parties in Europe and became especially influential in the formation of the union because of the collectively shared beliefs that determined the ideological construct of their network.

As a significant step towards the European Union, Christian Democrats were fighting for a true treaty reform in the direction of a federal union. However, this effort was blocked by the anti-federalist attitude of the conservative British government at the time of Thatcher. During that period, six of the twelve prime ministers (namely Giulio Andreotti, Helmut Kohl, Ruud Lubbers, Wilfred Martens, Jacques Santer, and Konstantin Mitsotakis) belonged to the ideological family of the Christian Democrats, and they largely determined the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit held on 9-10 December, 1991.

Although it might be argued that the EPP meetings held by those prime ministers prior to the Maastricht summit were intergovernmental rather than transnational, it cannot be denied that the political collaborators of these meetings co-ordinated closely to achieve a common ground for European Union, and to ensure that there was an agreement on the Union Treaty Project: "The meetings became a way to cultivate

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[135]Cameron, D.R. "Transnational Relations and the Development of European Economic and Monetary Union". in Risse, T. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*,Cambridge University Press, Madrid, 1999, pg 56

personal trust, to exchange views, not least in order to avoid unpleasant surprises, and to broaden the knowledge of other countries and their domestic politics"[136]

Hence, transnational connections have been established between political parties and politicians, who most of the time preferred to put statesmanship before party politics. This is how EU emerged as a collective political entity.

The importance of the ideological construct that lies behind this attitude of leaving simple party politics behind and looking for a broader vision that would cover all Europe. From the very beginning, the Christian Democrats have always been acting in favor of a federal Europe. They came from a federalist background and they initiated a federalist movement that would go beyond borders and lead in to the resolutions taken in Maastricht.

According to Johansson, there were two main perspectives of the Christian Democrat ideological construct: 1) the formation of a Europe along federal lines, and 2) the Christian vision of man. The concepts of subsidiary, personalism, and the social market were all based on these two basic understandings shared by all the Christian Democrats of Europe.

This federalist sentiment for instance can be felt in the declaration issued in connection with the EPP conference meetings held on April 13, 1991. They all emphasized the belief in "a federal democratic union" and the hope for its later enlargement: "The evolution of the EC into a federally structured union, including a common currency and common security, was said to be a high priory goal for the EPP"[137]

With Maastricht approaching, the governments with Christian Democrat ideological construct stressed the "federal vocation" and the "federal character of the union." The fact that the main items on the agenda of the meeting "concerned the structure and finalite of the treaty, the powers of the European Parliament, extension of

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[136] Johansson, Karl Magnus, "Another Road to Maastricht: The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for European Union", JCMS, 40:3, 2002, pg 879-80
[137] *Ibid*, pg 881

Community competences, social policy, cohesion, justice and police, and the CFCP and EMU," which were all the vital ingredients of European union which the EPP always has defended.[138] For instance, Thatcher went to the Hague and Rome for talks with leading Dutch and Italian Christian Democrats and called for their involvement in the preparations for a European Organization."[139]

The main aim of these pre-Maastricht conferences was to establish a common line for the approaching summit and promoting the Christian Democrat agenda: "monetary and political union tied to a federal structure; more Community involvement in social and labor policy; and greater power for the European Parliament."[140]

The EPP conference held in Hague (December 7, 1991) decided on a number of objectives for the European Council at Maastricht. They came up with an ambitious vision of European Union based on the principle of subsidiary, democratic legitimacy, and economic and social cohesion.

The Maastricht treaty gets signed on February 7, 1992 at Maastricht in the Netherlands, where the final negotiations had taken place during December 1991.

The common guidelines of the treaty, mentioning the creation of the Euro, and the details of the cooperation in terms of not only economic but also political affairs such as foreign policy, law enforcement, criminal justice, civil judicial matters, and asylum and immigration.

After listing the guidelines of the Maastricht treaty, the Christian Democrats put their stamp on the meeting and laid the foundations of the principles upon which the union was formed. "Christian Democrats reached a comparable success during the 1990-1991 IGC that led to the Maastricht Treaty. From the Summit in October 1990 until the Maastricht Summit in December 1991, Christian Democratic leaders were able

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[138]*Ibid,* pg 881
[139] Kaiser, Wolfram, Straie, Peter, *Transnational European Union Towards A Common Political Space,* Routledge Publish, New York, 205, pg 138
[140]Johansson, Karl Magnus, "Another Road to Maastricht: The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for European Union", JCMS, 40:3, 2002, pg 883

to dominate the negotiation process.[141] Ruud Lubbers saying in an interview that the Christian Democrats were like one big strong family at the time of Maastricht and that they did a lot together. Lubbers says that the Christian Democrats "stressed subsidiary very much" and that it is a Christian Democratic principle.

Britain opted out and Lubbers believes Major blocked the social chapter because of political reasons (probably referring to domestic political affairs in England). Germany's Helmut Kohl had second thoughts about Maastricht, and he was generally pessimistic about the possible outcomes of the meeting. The French had hesitations about intergovernmentalism. However, despite all these difficulties and disagreements and clashes between different political agendas, it was clear to all these leaders that they were creating a historical moment, the responsibility of which lied heavily on the shoulders of the Christian Democrats.

The employment of a single currency (that is to say, the creation of Euro), a view which Chancellor Kohl was advocating strongly, and suggests that this was probably the most important decision taken at Maastricht. Like many other complicated issues discussed during Maastricht, this was also achieved in the end thanks to the efforts of the Christian Democrats.

As conclusion, the road to Maastricht had two tracks leading to the same end-point, namely the intergovernmental and the non-governmental. The non-governmental actors included political parties moved by ideological constructs, and the federalist movement of the European Christian Democracy has been the most significant among these parties. The Christian Democrats of Europe have been crucial in setting the agenda for the Community and shaping the policies in the making of the European Union.

The interaction between governments on the road that leads to Maastricht has taken place on a more informal level. The pre-summit meetings are an indication of how countries have interacted in the Community before the formation of the Union. Aside

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[141] Van Hecke, Steven, "Christian Democratic Parties and Europeanisation" in Van Hecke, Steven, Gerard Emanuel, *Christian Democratic Parties Since The End of The Cold War* Leuven University Press Leuven, *2004,,* pg 50

from the governmental level, political parties found a way of communicating on a broader scale, and this is largely achieved by the Christian Democrats.

The EU treaty reform cannot be understood if one does not take this "informal politics" into account. Besides, Johanssons's research proves that a transnational approach is more explanatory than the intergovernmentalist approach in understanding the structure of EU.

3.3 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPROACHES AFTER MAASTRICHT TILL TODAY

After Maastricht Treaty the EU has three main developments: Amsterdam Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, Nice Treaty and finally Lizbon Treaty.

3.3.1 Amsterdam Treaty

There was an article of the treaty of the EU, the article N which was about the progress of the Maastricht Treaty agenda. It envisaged the convening of a new IGC in 1996. The aim of IGC was to revive the progress of the Maastricht Treaty, to evaluate the Maastricht Treaty whether or not all the agendas were accomplished and made the provisions of the Maastricht treaty. In IGC in 1996, these issues were discussed: basically there were priority issues; one of the aims was to prepare the union for enlargement. The decision making should be efficient, the institutional system should be working effectively before enlargement. Second area was related with the especially CFSP. It was seen as a result of Yugoslav War that CFSP was not working effectively. The institutional mechanism was not successful. So one of the aims was to give the EU greater capability for action in the area of CFSP, to make it more effective and for strengthen the institutional basis for action in CFSP. Third aim was related with the legitimacy problem especially the Danish referendum result and the low positive votes in the French referendum it was seen that the EU needed popular support. There should be a mechanism which could involve the citizens into the EU. So making the EU more relevant to its citizens was one of the aims of the IGC. Basically it was more limited

compared to the Maastricht agenda and it aimed to correct the working of the Maastricht treaty.

In the conclusion of the IGC the Treaty was signed in Amsterdam in 1997. In the IGC all the member states and the institutions presented their reflection and each member states and institutions presented their approach to treaty amendment. Finally the text was signed by the member states. It is said that this was a treaty of consolidation after Maastricht. Maastricht was a treaty which made a major reform in the integration process, established two new pillars and included many new policy objectives for the EU. Amsterdam did not have such a comprehensive agenda it was mostly about revising Maastricht Treaty. It was trying to correct the Maastricht Treaty trying to work better. We should say that in Maastricht when we go back to the SEA has a major objective (single market), in Maastricht we have again a major project (EMU) but in Amsterdam we do not have such a major project or major new step in integration so it is less ambitious more limited. When we look at some important provision of Amsterdam. We see firstly a creation of an area of freedom, security and justice. So this is a continuation on the JHA pillar created in Maastricht Treaty. It aimed as an area of without borders where everyone can move freely but it also involved common rules, common policies in the area of security. This is not external security but internal security in the area of free movement. And also some policies which regard to justice. This was a major step. A new chapter on employment. Employment until than was a mostly a national policy but with Amsterdam we have also the creation of an employment policy. This policy is supposed a bit different, there are no common policies but it have method of coordination. To coordinate national employment policies of the all the member states. There is no obligatory mechanism it is based on voluntary cooperation but the member states establish their national employment strategies each year and the Council adopts guideline for employment policy. And the member states are to implement this guideline into their employment strategies. Especially with economic and monetary union the member states governments aligned their monetary policies with each other in accordance to the Maastricht Criteria. They no longer have the tool of monetary policy to create new employment. Because they will not able to make government investments at the economy to give some dynamism and to create

some new jobs. So EMU created an unemployment problem in the member states. We have seen especially countries like Spain unemployment rates was going up, so unemployment became one of the major problems in the 1990s. It became an issue of common concern to the member states so that is why it was also within the policy competences of the EU.

"Arguably, however, neither the French nor the German government was likely to block the employment title. The German coalition government was not as opposed to the employment title as was generally believed and reported. Kohl himself said, in the context of the Dublin summit in December 1996, that he was 'pragmatic', and the German Christian democrat MEP in the reflection group, Elmar Brok, who had the ear of Kohl, supported the idea. In fact, Brok said that he had obtained 'a green light from the chancellor himself for the employment chapter'. Given the strong pressure from both within Germany, with one of the parliamentary chambers controlled by the social democrats, and the European Council for such a chapter, Kohl sensed that it was unstoppable. All in all, the German government's stance was more of a 'bargaining chip' than an outright rejection. Officially, it may have been against; unofficially, it was not.
However, the issue of an employment title was one of the most difficult for the transnational Christian democrat coalition. Although the Belgian and Luxembourg prime ministers had no ideological objections, they had to take account of chancellor Kohl's more pragmatic reasoning."[142]

With Maastricht we have seen the introduction of values and principles into the integration process. It is said that the EU is based on common values such as democracy, human rights...etc in Amsterdam we see a further strengthening of these norms. There was an article which says that in case of serious persistence infringement of these values than will be a process. A process will be started against the member states which may result with suspension of some membership rights. So human rights mechanism was strengthen. After the election in Austria there was a government which was under the Christian Democratic Party, but it formed a coalition with a quite ultra national a racist party so the other member states this infringe basic values of the EU. So there were some plan about placing some sanction against Austria, and initiating this mechanism (based on Maastricht) but then the Austrian government resigned this crisis resolved. Closer cooperation, in further integration a number of member states may initiate deeper integration among them this could not involve all the member states but

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[142] Johansson, Karl Magnus, "Tracing the employment title in the Amsterdam treaty: uncovering transnational coalitions", Journal of European Public Policy 6:1 March 1999: 85Ð 101

it could involve a majority of the member states. This was called as closer cooperation than in Nice the termology was changed to enhanced cooperation. So a majority of member states may decide to go ahead with further integration, if not all the member states can agree on new steps in integration. There are some limits of closer cooperation. It should be use only as a last resort so only when agreement among member states is impossible, there are countries which would not participate in further integration and there is a need to go further integration so it may use as a last resort. It should involve a majority of member states and in any of the excluded member states should have the chance to participate in the future whenever they want to. It is always open to all the member states. For the first time we see an introduction of a flexible integration mechanism. This is contravening the old methods of integration which said that all the further steps of integration should include all the member states. This is a deviation from this norm, this include the possibility of flexible integration. It is linked with the advanced nature of integration and integration process as new area as deepen it is impossible to include all the member states, there is a need to invent some new more pragmatic solutions to the problem of deeper integration.

Christian Democrats were one of impulsive force of the process which had started with Amsterdam Treaty and lasted with Constitution of European Union. " On 1 September 1994, two leading politicians from the major fraction in the German Bundestag (Christian democrat CDU/CSU) Wolfgang Schauble and Karl Lamers presented a paper entitled "Reflections on European Policy" which became known as the "Lamers paper"[143]. The paper addresses the idea of a European Constitution with a fixed list of competences for the EU, the Member states and regions based on federal principles and subsidiarity."[144] Throughout the process they advocated "genuine freedom of movement for people and stressed the need for the security of European citizens to be guaranteed at EU level by means of Community procedures."[145]

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[143] Variable Geometry: The EU should separate into a core group of members willing to broaden and deepen European economi c and political integration quickly and a non core group of more reluctant members.
[144] Griller, Stephan, The Treaty of Amsterdam : facts, anaylsis, prospects, Springer WienNewYork, Austria, 2000, pg 9
[145] http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/pinfo/info37_en.asp

EPP group assesses Amsterdam Treaty as: "The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) made progress on citizens' rights (notably the protection of fundamental rights), cooperation on security and justice, the common foreign and security policy (with the creation of a High Representative for the CFSP) and strengthening democracy. With regard to the institutions, it increased the number of issues for which the Council of the European Union could use qualified majority voting and strengthened the European Parliament's role in decision-making."[146] However Amsterdam treaty did not respond Christian democratic aims entirely. "The EPP Group considers that the changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty have not provided an adequate response. The next revision of the Treaties should take account of this, in order to build up a Europe which is not so remote from its citizens, in view of the major challenge of enlargement."[147]

3.3.2 Nice Treaty

The Treaty of Nice was signed by European leaders on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003. It amended the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome . The Treaty of Nice reformed the institutional structure of the European Union to withstand eastward expansion, a task which was originally intended to have been done by the Amsterdam Treaty, but failed to be addressed at the time.

The entrance into force of the treaty was in doubt for a time, after its initial rejection by Irish voters in a referendum in June 2001. This referendum result was reversed in a subsequent referendum held a little over a year later.

The Nice Treaty was attacked by many people as a flawed compromise. Germany had demanded that its greater population be reflected in a higher vote weighting in the Council; this was opposed by France, who insisted that the symbolic parity between France and Germany be maintained. One proposal made by many, which would have greatly simplified the current system, was to introduce a double majority of both member states and population, to replace the current Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system. This was also rejected by France for similar reasons. "The call to

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[146] http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/50years_treaty_rome-en.pdf
[147] http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/pinfo/info37_en.asp

improve efficiency and the belief that this was absolutely essential for the future of the EP as a whole were vocally supported by a number of members of the EPPED."[148]A compromise was reached, which provided for a double majority of Member States and votes cast, and in which a Member State could optionally request verification that the countries voting in favour represented a sufficient proportion of the Union's population.

The Treaty provided for an increase after enlargement of the number of seats in the European Parliament to 732, which exceeded the cap established by the Treaty of Amsterdam. EPP also believed that " this Treaty is necessary for the enlargement of the European Union to proceed on an equitable and effective basis."[149]

The question of a reduction in the size of the European Commission after enlargement was resolved to a degree — the Treaty providing that once the number of Member States reached 27, the number of Commissioners appointed in the subsequent Commission would be reduced by the Council to below 27, but without actually specifying the target of that reduction. As a transitional measure it specified that after 1 January 2005, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain would each give up their second Commissioner.

The Treaty provided for the creation of subsidiary courts below the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to deal with special areas of law such as patents.

The Treaty of Nice provides for new rules on closer co-operation, the rules introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam being viewed as unworkable, and hence these rules have not yet been used.

In response to the failed sanctions against Austria following a coalition including Jörg Haider's party having come to power, and fears about possible future threats to the stability of the new member states to be admitted in enlargement, the Treaty of Nice for

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[148] Kreppel, Amie, "Necessary but not sufficient: understanding the impact of treaty reform on the internal development of the European Parliament" Journal of European Public Policy 10:6 December 2003: 884–911

[149] http://www.epp.eu/dbimages/pdf/encong02_res4.pdf

the first time adopted formal rules for the application of sanctions against a Member State.

The Treaty also contained provisions to deal with the financial consequences of the expiry of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) treaty (Treaty of Paris (1951)).

It was widely accepted that the Treaty of Nice has failed to deal with the basic question of wide-ranging institutional reform, the European Union institutions being widely viewed as overly complicated, and hence the establishment of the European Convention, leading to a new IGC in 2004, was agreed at Nice.

The Commission and the European Parliament were disappointed that the Nice IGC did not adopt many of their proposals for reform of the institutional structure or introduction of new Community powers, such as the appointment of a European Public Prosecutor. The European Parliament threatened to pass a resolution against the Treaty; although it has no formal power of veto, the Italian Parliament threatened that it would not ratify without the European Parliament's support. However, in the end this did not come to pass and the European Parliament approved the Treaty.

Many argue that the pillar structure, which was maintained by the Treaty, is overly complicated, that the separate Treaties should be merged into one Treaty, and that the three (now two) separate legal personalities of the Communities should be merged, and that the European Community and the European Union should be merged with the European Union being endowed with legal personality. The German regions were also demanding a clearer separation of the powers of the Union from the Member States.

Nor did the Treaty of Nice deal with the question of the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Treaty; that was also left for the 2004 IGC after the opposition of the United Kingdom. EPP did not get the result that they expected form treaty of Nice and they came back with a new offer. "We wish to create a federal

Europe on the basis of principle of subsidiarity. Immediately after the bad Treaty of Nice, we demanded the creation of the Convention and of a European Constitution."[150]

3.3.3 Lisbon Treaty

It entered into force in 1 December 2009. The EU celebrates the treaty as follows: "Hailed as the foundation for a more democratic, efficient and transparent union, the treaty brings to fruition a long quest to rewrite the EU's internal rules - all the more pressing after 10 more countries joined in 2004.

"The treaty of Lisbon puts citizens at the centre of the European project," president Barroso said. "I'm delighted that we now have the right institutions to act and a period of stability."

The milestone was marked by a ceremony in Lisbon, where the treaty was signed two years ago.

For the charter to become a reality, all EU countries had to ratify it, a process only recently completed. In October, Irish voters returned to the ballot box - and this time endorsed the treaty. The Czech president subsequently dropped his opposition, removing the final hurdle.

Gearing up for the big day, EU leaders met late last month to fill two posts created by the treaty. They appointed Belgian prime minister Herman Van Rompuy as the EU's first full-time president, and commissioner Catherine Ashton as foreign policy chief.

For Mr Barroso, the treaty's debut means he can get on with the job of putting together a new commission, having announced the nominees last week. Likewise, 18 MEPs elected in June under Lisbon treaty rules can now claim their seats in the European parliament.

That's merely the start.

Among many other changes, the treaty redistributes voting weights between member countries, removing national vetoes in a number of areas. It expands the commission's powers and greatly increases parliament's involvement in the legislative process.

A new petition process will give citizens the opportunity to directly influence EU policy. The human rights charter becomes legally binding."

Lisbon amends the Rome and Maastricht treaties, giving the EU a new legal framework and tools to tackle challenges in an increasingly interlinked world."[151]

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[150]http://www.epp.eu/ssspagina.php?hoofdmenuID=5&submenuID=51&subsubmenuID=101&sssmenuID=110
[151] http://ec.europa.eu/news/eu_explained/091201_en.htm

EPP has worked too hard fot the ratification of Lisbon treaty, so they welcomed the treaty as follows: "The Lisbon Treaty marks an important turning point in the evolution of the European institutions and the relations they will now have with each other. It is clear that it is the Parliament that comes out stronger from the Lisbon Treaty, because it becomes a co-decision maker, equal to the Council of Ministers, on all topics that fall under EU jurisdiction,"[152]

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[152]http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showpr.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=8969&PRContentID=15518&PRContentLG=en

CONCLUSION

The scope of this thesis is limited to the formation and influence of the Christian Democrats in the process of the European integration. While it is only a limited space, I could not and did not dwell on a detailed analysis of how the Christian Democrats emerged in each country on their own. I preferred to consider among their qualities only those related to their effect on the formation of the EU. My main intention was to concentrate on not political figures as individuals but organizations as unique political entities. Therefore, I chose to focus on those formations as mass organizations, political parties and finally as transnational political cooperations.

The analysis so far has shown that the Christian Democrats played an undeniable influential role in the formation of the European Union. The Christian Democrats are organically linked to the confessional parties that were formed as a reaction by the political actors against the liberal attacks to the church at the time when monarchy was being abandoned in Europe. Although their formation stems from the need to protect the church and the king, in time they have transformed and assumed a different political identity. Oddly enough, the former supporters of monarchy turned out to be the building stones of democracy during this transformation.

What tells the Christian Democrats apart from the other political trends is their transnational quality. This quality which has evolved parallel to their development from the very beginning is crucial in understanding both the structure of their organization and their contribution to the EU integration process. It is possible to say that the Christian Democrats, who have displayed a transnational character, have been indispensable in the EU integration. Possessing an intergovernmental and transnational character, the Christian Democrats have played a key role in most of the crucial moments concerning the relationship between the European leaders during the formation of the union. It can be suggested that the official and unofficial relationships established on the Christian Democratic platform have determined the direction of the decisions to be taken in the next step of the integration process.

During the IGC's held before the treaties, the Christian Democrats have also been very influential. Always being ardent supporters of federalism and subsidiary, the Christian Democrats influenced the other political actors in the same direction. They worked very hard to persuade their opponents, and have been successful occasionally. However, they never gave up the idea of a federalist Europe and voiced it from the very beginning of the process reminding the actors of the EU that what lies in the foundations of the union is nothing but this ideal.

In short, the Christian Democrats always acted as a unifying element in the integration process, stretching out the most difficult moments including the improvement of the tight relationship between Germany and France, and securing the movement from ECSC to EEC, from SEA to Maastricht, and from Maastricht until today. From time to time their influence weakened relying on the elements that determined the political conjecture of the time. Yet, all in all we can claim that they have constituted one of the major effects in the formation of the union, and their influence on the integration process cannot be denied. This influence unquestionably has always been in favor of the deepening and strengthening of the integration. We can maintain as a final verdict that the Christian Democrats who favored monarchy at the very beginning ended up as a political movement that supports democracy, and that they chose the EU platform to be able to actualize this ideal.

Today, EPP has a great support again and it evolves a wider sphere in Europe "with 74 member-parties from 38 countries, 20 Heads of Government (13 EU and seven non-EU), nine European Commissioners (including the President), and the largest Group in the European Parliament with 265 members"[153]. EPP's hegemony in the European Parliament is a prescriptive situation for today. In French and German governments, Christian Democratic Parties have the leading roles. These are the countries which also have key roles in the European integration process. In 2007, EPP had administrations of three main EU institutions which were the Council with the German Presidency headed by Angela Merkel, the Commission with José Manuel Barroso, and the Parliament with Hans-Gert Poettering. Finally, in the 2009 European

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[153] http://www.epp.eu

elections they were again victorious. "Organizationally, EPP has used the widening of the party to develop more centralized, efficient machinery; here is a technical gain in addition to numerical progress."[154]

There is no shift in their political approach, and they are still providing further integration and their final target is a federal Europe. They explain themselves as follows:

"The EPP is the political family of the centre-right, whose roots run deep in the history and civilization of the European continent and has pioneered the European project from its inception.

The EPP is committed to a federal Europe, based on the principle of subsidiarity – a democratic, transparent and efficient Europe. Our vision is one of mutual respect, of inclusion of all free citizens, encompassing all European countries and regions, no matter how diverse – a Europe for all.

We want a Europe that upholds a prosperous and peaceful future for all its citizens."[155]

In 2007, when EPP led the EU and institutions, they succeeded in taking another step forward towards further integration. This resulted in working for restoration of the treaty, and the Lizbon Treaty was signed. The Lizbon Treaty did not cover real supranationalist or federalist elements, but this development is proof of EPP's efforts and of its influence.

Their priorities are basically the same as they were in the beginning. Subsidiarity , family and a federal and welfare Europe for all citizens. The one exception is that they do not mention religion. They had started to avoid the issue of religion in the 1960s, after it lost its advantages. Although they gave up claiming religion, their identity was formed on religion, and the federalist claim is a product of the thought of a Christian Europe. Instead of their Christian roots, they feel close to Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), because they share the same basis.

They evaluate Turkey as a country which tried to become a modern western country without any real transition.[156] EPP is still at the point of questioning whether

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[154] Hanley, David, "Christian Democracy and the Paradoxes of Europeanization: Flexibility, Competition and Collusion", Party Politics, 8, 2002, p 479
[155] http://www.epp.eu

Turkey is a part of Europe or not. We can also see that in their view in following expression about Turkey clearly.

"Turkey is not sure of its identity yet and 85 years after the abolition of caliphate and the proclamation of the Republic, deep dividing lines are still acute:

Secularism against religion, modernism and reform minded forces against tradition, pro Western and European forces against nationalists. The antagonism is marked within the geographic space itself with a European modern West part and traditional poor eastern regions of Anatolia. This blurred identity makes it difficult to clarify whether Turkey is a member of Europe or not. The answer depends largely on which side you stand and what elements you decide to take into account. Therefore this is more a problem of political will rather than anything else."[157]

EPP group has different views about Turkey's membership. It can be seen clearly in Hans-Gert Poettering, the Chairman of the EPP-ED Group speaking to the European Parliament:

"As far as Turkish membership is concerned, they are not of one opinion. He added that the one point they agree on is that Turkey is an important, strategic partner with which they need to foster close relations. The most prominent campaigner in the PPEDE Group against Turkish accession is the CDU/CSU delegation from Germany. They were actually the first in Germany to take up this issue as a major element of their campaigning strategy against the SPD and the Greens that have a favourable attitude towards Turkey's entry into the EU."[158]

While they are discussing Turkey's membership, they consider five main arguments to dismiss Turkey's membership, and they reject the first, which is the geographic issue. They say that if Turkey should not be a member because of its geography, the same should have applied to Cyprus. "Is the EU based on geographic standards? If that was the case, Cyprus would probably not have entered the EU. The EU is much more than a mere alliance based on geographic standards. I believe that the European Union is a community of values rather than a space; a constantly evolving idea rather than a simple aggregate of lands."[159] Supporters of Turkey's accession are on another side of this discussion. They refer to article 49 of the European Treaty and

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[156] Martens, Wilfried (2007), 'Dondeyne Huis, KUL, Louvain' available at:
www.epp.eu/.../Turkey%20member%20of%20Europe-%20draft-21%20March%202007-EN-lg.doc
[157] *Ibid*
[158] Aydın, Senem, "Views of the European Parliament on Turkish Accession"
[159] Martens, Wilfried (2007), 'Dondeyne Huis, KUL, Louvain' available at:
www.epp.eu/.../Turkey%20member%20of%20Europe-%20draft-21%20March%202007-EN-lg.doc

from this article they give more importance to the provision of respecting the principles of European Union. They believe that this is a more divisive issue.

The second argument is the historical one. Opponents of Turkey's membership claim that Turkey was a permanent enemy throughout history, and they believe that such antagonism should prevent Turkey from entering the European Union. However, other Christian Democrats, again reject this claim. They believe that the Ottoman Empire always had freedom of religion and it was respectful of other religions.

"The Sultans used to fight on behalf of Islam, they also proclaimed themselves the protectors of the Greek Orthodox Church and there was higher freedom of religion at that time than in Europe itself. The Ottoman Empire had Turkish origins and Islamic foundations, it was based on diversity; it was a heterogeneous mixture of ethnic groups and religious creeds. Non-Muslim peoples, including Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, were recognized and even granted a certain level of autonomy and could participate in the state service."[160]

Moreover, they believe that when they look back at history, they see that Europe owes Turkey:

"Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations, and a member of the NATO (since 1952), the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1961) and an associate member of the Western European Union (1992). As longstanding member of NATO, Turkey had a key role in defending Europe against the Soviet threat. We therefore shall not forget what we owe to Turkey."[161]

The third issue is about population. Some Christian democrats reject this argument as well. They believe that Turkey's presentation in parliament will not be a threat for the European Union. They trust in voting and the representing system of the European Union. "The EU is a system especially shaped to avoid any country to impose its views on the others; everything is made upon compromise, whatever the size of the country."[162]

However these answers do not reflects opinions of all EPP's representatives. For instance while Wilfred Martens is believing in democratic principles as the solution of Turkey's membership Matthias Wissman, talks about Turkey's membership as:

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[160]*Ibid*
[161] *Ibid*
[162] *Ibid*

"We have nothing against Turkey but we are of the opinion that the Union is at risk of breaking if one stretches it too far. When one makes it so big that it is no longer governable, can no longer be efficient. Turkey would soon be the largest country in the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU."[163]

In addition, as was previously stated, the AKP government as a religion based democratic party , shares the same values with Christian Democrats. "a vast majority of group's members agreed that the AK Party is very similar to most of the Christian democratic parties in Europe and it is important for the group to have a strong partner in Turkey,"[164] They believe that AKP can spread the democratic values in Turkey, as they succeeded in Europe. As we can see in Martens talk:

"This result confirms that the majority of the Turkish people support the reforms implemented by the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It also confirms that the AK Party is a viable political force with a clear European orientation," the EPP President stated.

"I am confident that this electoral result will mark the start of a new phase of European transformation for Turkey. Needless to say, the EPP will continue to support the reforms implemented for strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Turkey," President Martens concluded."[165]

Moreover, the AKP is a member of the EPP. That is why, if Turkey's membership will eventuate, EPP's seats in European Parliament will increase in a good share. Moreover, one can say that, AKP's effect on EPP's approach to Turkey's membership is considerably determining. On the other hand, other voices in the EPP declared that "The European Union is a civilisation project and within this civilisation project, Turkey has no place."[166]

The fourth issue is about institutional system. This states that institutions of the European Union can not carry out Turkey's membership, which is a country with a huge population successfully. EPP also thinks it will be a chance for the European Union to reform its institutions and to solve its own problems.

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[163] Pahre Robert, Uçaray, Burcu, "The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union"
[164] Kubosova, Lucia. 2005. "Turkish AKP gets observer status in EU's largest political family." EUObserver.com, 31 January, http://euobserver.com/?aid=18285&rk=1
[165] http://www.epp.eu/newsdetail.php?newsID=266&hoofdmenuID=4&submenuID=49
[166] Müftüler-Bac, Meltem and Lauren McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy- Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey." European Integration

The last argument is about Turkey's economy. The EPP does not refute this issue. However, they say that Romania and Bulgaria have bigger problems in their economies and Turkey has the time to consolidate its economy before the accession.

Besides all of these issues, EPP believes that another question mark about Turkey's membership is about its religion. However, interestingly the EPP sees making religion a problem as default.

"The EPP does not have any reservat ions about I slam, or any other religion for that matter. There are millions of European citizens who adhere to Islam. The EPP has welcomed democratically elected representatives of Muslim origin within their own ranks and has granted observer status to two parties with an almost excusive Muslim electorate: the SDA of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the AKP of Turkey. At the same time, the EPP is vehemently against Islamic fundamentalism or any other religious extremism that can poison European societies."[167]

Briefly, EPP is not completely an opponent to the membership of Turkey. They even defend Turkey on some issues against the others. This situation seems inconsistent with Christian Democratic ideology. On the other hand, it was previously said, if Turkey becomes a member of the Union, the EPP would double its power in the European Parliament, and it would have another governing party within its members. Still, EPP also has doubts about Turkey's economy and more importantly, they are still examining the consistency to its European values. They also emphasize some other issues as real obstacles, such as Cyprus. On that issue they think the Turkish side has reflected its willingness to solve the problem with the Annan Plan. They also advocate that Turkey does not hold full responsibility. The Greek side and the European Union also share the responsibility on an equal basis. EPP criticizes the European Union about the membership of Cyprus. They believe that before the membership, the problems should have been solved. On the other hand, they still push Turkey about this issue. "The chairman of the biggest group in the European Parliament, EPP-ED, Hans-Gert Poettering, stated that EU negotiations with Turkey are impossible as long as the question of the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey is not settled."[168] They see the Kurdish issue and Turkey-Armenian relations also as critical issues. Consequently, one can say

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[167] EPP's Blue Book, Draft version 15.03.2006
[168] http://www.euexpands.com/mb/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=36

that Turkey has support from EPP, but not a permanent or absolute one, it is more a suspicious and divided one.

What place to offer Turkey in a Union of the future has the EPP deeply divided. Group leader Hans-Gert Pottering, of Germany's opposition CDU party, touched on the following:

"The mandate for negotiations should be a double mandate, in the sense that (it) can lead to membership or it can lead to another form of partnership; So, the negotiations should be open-ended."[169]

The aim of this thesis was to analyze Christian democrats through the course of the time; from their inception, to their contributions to the formation of the European Union, and their ideas on the integration of Turkey into the European Union. This paper also aimed to shed light on the ideas that Christian Democrats are Christian only in name. As any political entity, they have made decisions based on their interests and evolved accordingly. Their evolution meant laying aside their Catholic identity and embracing the ideal of democracy – an ideal that they once considered an enemy. The interests that guide Christian Democrats today is the creation of a Europe based on Christian social values, an administration based on subsidiary and welfare states and most importantly, the creation of a federal European Union which allows for further integration.

While writing this thesis, I felt obliged to think on how the Christian Democrat influence on the European Union might affect Turkey's candidacy, and whether it might be one of the reasons that gives rise to the postponement of its membership. Although it is very hard to come up with a definite and precise answer for this question, I think it is hardly acceptable that the Christian Democrat domination of the union and its federative principles pose some problems against Turkey's acceptance to the union. As I mentioned earlier, the tendency seems to be just the opposite. The emergence of an Islamic Democrat Party in Turkey seems to give the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament the feeling that history might repeat itself, and democratic values of the union once again might be spread through the hand of a conservative party. Despite cautious evaluation of the developments in Turkey, the Christian Democrats

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[169] http://www.euronews.net/2005/09/02/epp-divided-on-turkey-meets-in-poland/

appear to support the efforts of AKP for the implementation of a more democratic understanding, especially issues concerning human rights violations, which have been haunting Turkey's EU ambitions for a while.

As a last note, I would like to add that in the process of writing this thesis I had to abandon several ideas I earlier possessed concerning the EU and the processes involving the role of the Christian Democrats in the formation of the union. The study of this question alone broadened my perspective on the issue, and helped me understand the process much better and deeper.

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ANNEX I
List of EPP Member Parties

Name	Country	Type
Democratic Party of Albania	AL (Albania)	Observer Member
Austrian People's Party	AT (Austria)	Full Member
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Observer Member
HDZBiH	BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Observer Member
PDP	BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Observer Member
centre democrate Humaniste	BE (Belgium)	Full Member
CD&V	BE (Belgium)	Full Member
United Civil Party	Belarus	Observer Member
Belarusan Popular Front	Belarus	Observer Member
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria	BG (Bulgaria)	Full Member
Union of Democratic Forces	BG (Bulgaria)	Full Member
GERB	BG (Bulgaria)	Full Member
Democratic Party	BG (Bulgaria)	Full Member
Agrarian People's Union	BG (Bulgaria)	Full Member
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei	CH (Switzerland)	Associate Member
Democratic Rally of Cyprus	CY (Cyprus)	Full Member
Krestanka a demokraticka unie	CZ (Czech.)	Full Member
Christlich-Soziale Union	DE (Germany)	Full Member
Christlich Demokratische Union	DE (Germany)	Full Member
DET KONSERVATIVE FOLKEPARTI	DK (Denmark)	Full Member
Kristendemokraterne	DK (Denmark)	Full Member
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	EE (Estonia)	Full Member
Partido Popular	ES (Spain)	Full Member
Unio Democretica de Catalunya	ES (Spain)	Full Member
Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit - Christian Democrats in Finland	FI (Finland)	Observer Member
Kansallinen Kokoomus	FI (Finland)	Full Member
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	FR (France)	Full Member
VMRO-DPMNE	FYROM	Observer Member
United National Movement	Georgia	Observer Member
NEA DEMOKRATIA (NEA ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ)	GR (Greece)	Full Member
Demokratski Centar/Democratic Centre	HR (Croatia)	Observer Member
Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka	HR (Croatia)	Associate Member
Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	HR (Croatia)	Associate Member
Christian Democratic Peoplees Party	HU (Hungary)	Full Member
Fidesz - Magyar Polgeri Szevetseg	HU (Hungary)	Full Member
Fine Gael	IE (Ireland)	Full Member
Sedtiroler Volkspartei	IT (Italy)	Observer Member
UDC - Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	IT (Italy)	Full Member
POPOLARI UDEUR	IT (Italy)	Full Member
Il Popolo della Libertà	IT (Italy)	Full Member
Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	LT (Lithuania)	Full Member
Chreschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei	LU (Luxembourg)	Full Member

Name	Country	Type
New Era	LV (Latvia)	Full Member
Tautas Partija	LV (Latvia)	Full Member
Christian Democratic People's Party	Moldova	Observer Member
Partit Nazzjonalista	MT (Malta)	Full Member
Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA)	NL (Netherlands)	Full Member
Kristelig Folkeparti	NO (Norway)	Observer Member
HOYRE	NO (Norway)	Associate Member
Platforma Obywatelska	PL (Poland)	Full Member
PSL	PL (Poland)	Full Member
Democratic and Social Centre - People's Party	PT (Portugal)	Full Member
Partido Social Democrata	PT (Portugal)	Full Member
Democratic-Liberal Party	RO (Romania)	Full Member
Romeai Magyar Demokrata Sz?s騈 size=	RO (Romania)	Full Member
Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat	RO (Romania)	Full Member
Kristdemokraterna	SE (Sweden)	Full Member
Moderaterna	SE (Sweden)	Full Member
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party	SK (Slovakia)	Full Member
Strana Madarskej koalecie	SK (Slovakia)	Full Member
Christian Democratic Movement	SK (Slovakia)	Full Member
Slovenian Democratic Party	SL (Slovenia)	Full Member
Slovenian People's Party	SL (Slovenia)	Full Member
Nova Slovenija - Krscanska ljudska stranka	SL (Slovenia)	Full Member
Partito Democratico CristianoSammarinese	SM (San Marino)	Observer Member
Justice & Development Party (AKP)	TR (Turkey)	Observer Member
People's Movement of Ukraine	UA (Ukraine)	Observer Member
People's Union	UA (Ukraine)	Observer Member
Batkivshchyna	UA (Ukraine)	Observer Member
Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina	Y1 (Serbia)	Observer Member
Democratic Party of Serbia	Y1 (Serbia)	Associate Member
G17 PLUS	Y1 (Serbia)	Associate Member