

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP COMPARED TO
BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE:
COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTARY PROJECTS?**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Aylin ÜNVER NOI

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Danışman: Yrd. Doç Dr. Deniz ILGAZ

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Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü

ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Doktora öğrencisi Aylin ÜNVER NOİ'nin "EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP COMPARED TO BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE: COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTARY PROJECTS?" konulu tez çalışması ile ilgili 13 Kasım 2009 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

Onaylayan:

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Deniz ILGAZ	Danışman
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Armağan E. ÇAKIR	Jüri Üyesi
Doç. Dr. Çiğdem NAS	Jüri Üyesi
Yrd.Doç.Dr. E. Münevver CEBECİ	Jüri Üyesi
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Yonca ÖZER	Jüri Üyesi

Deniz Ilgaz
.....
Armağan E. Çakır
.....
Çiğdem Nas
.....
E. Münevver Cebeci
.....
Yonca Özer
.....

Onay Tarihi
Prof. Dr. Muzaffer DARTAN
Müdür
[Signature]

11.12.2009.....tarih ve 2009/KK/1.. sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Deniz Ilgaz for her academic guidance and her continuous support for completing this study. She did not only read and correct my drafts, but also gave me several precious ideas.

I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. iđdem Nas and Assist. Prof. Dr. Armađan Emre akır for their precious ideas and suggestions and continuous support for the improvement of my thesis.

I would also like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr Mnevver Cebeci and Assist. Prof. Dr. Yonca zer for serving on my thesis committee and for their precious recommendations.

Finally, I also wish to express my special thanks to my husband for his patience and support, and my parent for their endless encouragement and support during my whole education life.

Aylin nver Noi
İstanbul, 2009

ABSTRACT

Following the ideological failure of Communism and rise of Islamic fundamentalism east-west axis of the Cold War period shifted to North-South axis and led to change in security concerns of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) in the post-Cold War era. Some projects thus developed by the EU and the USA to enable them to maintain their economic interests from the Middle East and North Africa region and to tackle with new security threats such as terrorism, failed states, organized crimes, spread of weapons of mass destruction etc. stemming from this region. The September 11th terror attacks to the USA and the following Al Qaeda terror attacks in Madrid, London and Istanbul enhanced processes such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that were already under way on the one hand, led to change in the USA foreign policy and the emergence of Bush Doctrine of 2002, which is based on “fight against international terrorism” and initiation of the new multilateral initiative the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), on the other hand.

In this thesis, the EU-led project, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and The US-led project, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) are evaluated shedding light on their historical evolutions, their political and security objectives, their economic and financial objectives, their social, cultural and human objectives, their weaknesses and strengths. Moreover, these two projects are compared according to their efforts to achieve objectives set by them. In this respect, all meetings, conferences, seminars, working groups held and projects initiated are analyzed. In addition to this, The EU’s and the USA’s overall approach to the Middle East and North Africa region, Transatlantic relationship, the EU and the USA rivalry concerning the Middle East and North Africa region, these two powers’ aims and interests in the Middle East and North Africa region, and finally foreign policy instruments used by the EU and the USA in the Middle East and North Africa region with a special focus on concepts ‘civilian power’ and ‘military power’ are compared since the aim of this study is to compare these two projects to find out an answer to the following question: Are the EMP and the BMENA competing or complementary projects? To realize this aim, the study makes parallel analysis of both projects.

ÖZET

Komünizmin ideolojik olarak başarısızlığa uğramasının ve Köktendinci İslamın yükselişe geçmesinin ardından Soğuk Savaş'ın doğu-batı eksenini kuzey-güney eksenine döndü ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneminin Avrupa Birliği'nde (AB) ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde (ABD) güvenlik kaygılarında değişikliklere yol açtı. Bu dönemde, Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesindeki ekonomik çıkarlarını koruyabilmek ve terörizm, başarısız devletler, organize suçlar, toplu yıkım silahlarının yayılması gibi yeni tehditlerle başa çıkabilmek adına AB ve ABD bazı projeler geliştirdi. ABD'de 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde gerçekleştirilen terör saldırıları ve onu takiben Madrid, Londra ve İstanbul'da El-Kaide'nin gerçekleştirdiği terör saldırıları bir taraftan zaten yürürlükte olan Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı gibi süreçlerin güçlendirilmesine neden olurken, diğer taraftan da ABD'nin dış politikasını değiştirmesine ve 'uluslararası terörizme karşı savaş' anlayışına dayalı Bush Doktrininin 2002 yılında ortaya çıkmasına ve bununla beraber yeni çok taraflı bir inisiyatifin Geniş Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika İnisiyatifi'nin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur.

Bu tezde, AB'nin projesi Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı (AAO) ve ABD'nin liderliğinde geliştirilen Geniş Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika İnisiyatifi (GODKA) tarihsel gelişimleri, siyasi ve güvenlik amaçları, ekonomik ve finansal amaçları, sosyal, kültürel ve insani amaçları, zayıf ve güçlü yönleri de ele alınarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu iki proje kendileri tarafından belirlenen amaçlarına ulaşmak için gösterdikleri çabaya göre kıyaslanmaktadır. Bu yüzden, yapılan tüm toplantılar, konferanslar, seminerler, çalışma grupları ve ortaya atılan projeler ortaya konulmaktadır. Bununla beraber, AB'nin ve ABD'nin Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesine genel yaklaşımları, Transatlantik ilişkileri, bu bölgede AB'nin ve ABD'nin arasındaki rekabeti, AB'nin ve ABD'nin bölgedeki amaçları ve çıkarları, ve son olarak özellikle 'sivil güç' ve 'askeri güç' kavramlarına dayanarak AB ve ABD tarafından kullanılan dış politika enstrümanları kıyaslanmaktadır. Bu kıyaslamaları yapılmasının ardında yatan neden bu çalışmanın amacı olan aşağıdaki soruya bir cevap bulmaktır: AAO ve GODKA yarışan mı yoksa tamamlayıcı projeler midir? Bu soruya cevap bulabilmek adına çalışma her iki projenin de paralel analizini yapmaktadır.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Association Agreements
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCM	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DAD	Democracy Assistance Dialogue
EC	European Communities
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
EUROFOR	European Operational Rapid Force
FEMIP	Facility for the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment

FTA	Free Trade Agreement
G8	Group of Eight
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSP	General System of Preferences
HRITC	Human Rights Information and Training Center
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILSA	Iran Libya Sanctions Act
KADEM	Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MCA	Millenium Challenge Account
MEDA	Mesure d'Accompagnement (EU's financial assistance program for the Mediterranean Partners)
MEFTA	Middle East Free Trade Area
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MP	Mediterranean Partners
NAP	European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPJW	No Peace Without Justice
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEP-MENA	Private Enterprise Partnership for the Middle East and North Africa
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RTDI	Research, Technological Development and Innovation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEMCs	Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreements
QIZ	Qualified Industrial Zone
UFM	Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom

UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War II

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INTRODUCTION

Disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the major changes in the Middle East through enlarging the definition of the Middle East (Greater Middle East) including the Central Asian Muslim states which are normally not part of the traditional geographical boundaries of the Middle East and making possible extension of the United States of America's (hereinafter referred to as USA) influence into the republics of Central Asia. This development also had numerous implications for regional politics particularly in terms of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as EU)-USA relations (Satloff, 1997, p. 8) such as loosening Cold War constraints that had previously restricted European activity and emergence of new threats such as ethnic conflicts, bloody civil wars, organized crimes and terrorism stemming from the EU's Eastern and southern neighbors (the North Africa and the Middle East region) and their potential destabilizing effects on the EU member states like immigration due to their geographic proximity. Such processes led the EU to focus on the development of its own policy towards its southern neighbors as well as Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in order to transform the regions concerned into an area of peace, stability and prosperity. The result was the CEECs enlargement and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs).

The emergence of the Greater Middle East independent from Soviet intervention and emergence of relatively weak Russian Federation created opportunity for the USA to establish its hegemony over the region. The September 11th terror attacks to the USA provided an opportunity for the USA to justify their arguments to transform the countries of the region into democratic countries to prevent emergence of new threats from this region. In other words, all these developments led to emergence of Bush Doctrine of 2002 (Fight against international terrorism); military operations of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq; establishment of USA's military bases in some Central Asian countries to fight against Taliban forces of Afghanistan; the USA's political (bilateral) approaches like Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) and its multilateral approach like Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA).

The attempt in this study is to compare the EU's and the USA's approach to this region with a special focus on the EU led initiative Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the USA – led initiative the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) within the theoretical framework of “civilian power” concept and “military power” concept, respectively. The EU's approach through the EMP and the USA' approach through the BMENA to this region is analyzed to find out whether these two projects are complementary or competing projects.

The main reason for choosing these two projects is to show the relationship between the growing importance of this region in terms of changing security concerns and energy needs of the West in the post-Cold war period and the EU's and the USA's aim of taking this region under control by transforming authoritarian regimes into democratic ones, their economies to liberal economies, in other words, imposing and exporting their Western values, norms and standards to the countries of this region due to the belief that ‘more democratic world is the guarantee of more secure world’ as French Foreign Minister of the time, Michel Barnier said in one of his interviews in 2005.

Moreover, this dissertation is also important to show Sarkozy's plan to create Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) to reinforce existing cooperation among the EMP member states by giving a new impetus to the Barcelona Process of 1995 and to increase French sphere of influence in the Mediterranean on the one hand, and the intentions of France and Germany to include Turkey to this Union instead of accepting her to full EU membership.¹ Although Turkey expressed his unwillingness to become part of this project at the beginning, it accepted to become part of it when the EU made a commitment, “Union for the Mediterranean will be independent from the enlargement policy, accession negotiations and the pre-accession process” (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008, p. 13).

In this dissertation, these terms – Middle East, Broader Middle East, Mediterranean, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, Broader Middle East and North Africa, Mediterranean and the Middle East - are used to define the specific area covered by them in

¹ The original plan of Sarkozy for the Mediterranean was interpreted by Germany as a plan which only harms the EU's core since the plan proposed the establishment of Mediterranean Union only for the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. However, Sarkozy and Merkel reached an agreement on the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean including all EU member states and the Mediterranean countries built upon the existing Barcelona process through a summit held in Paris on 13-14 July 2008 (Nethaber, 2008).

order to enable the reader to make the distinction of these terms from the term defining traditional Middle East which is divided into the following regions: 1) the Maghreb, which is referred to usually as North Africa in the West; 2) the valley of the Nile, which comprises Egypt and Sudan (and to some extent Eritrea and Somalia); 3) the Mashrek, North Africa in the East; 4) the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf; 5) the non-Arab Middle east, comprising Iran and Turkey (Agha, 1994, p. 241).

In this study, the term 'Broader Middle East' refers to the states of the traditional 'Middle East' (the Mashreq, the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula) plus the Arab states of North Africa (the Maghreb). Depending on the context, the term 'Broader Middle East' is also used to refer to other Muslim states which are not part of the EMP like Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Chad, which is covered by only the BMENA. On the other hand, the term 'Mediterranean' refers to the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean Sea plus Turkey and Israel. Also, the term Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCS) is used to refer to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, which are partners of the EMP. The term 'SEMCS' does not cover the states of the Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia which are covered by the BMENA.

The area which is covered by the BMENA is greater than the area which is covered by the EMP. Since the geographic area in which these two projects are implemented is not totally the same, the geographical area, which is covered in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project, is named as 'Mediterranean'; the geographical area, which is covered in the BMENA Project is named as 'Broader Middle East and North Africa'; and some parts of this study where the comparison of these two projects are made and the references are made to both of the areas, the term 'Mediterranean and the Middle East' (MME) is used to refer to the area which is covered by these two projects in this study.

In the first chapter, historical backgrounds of the EU and the USA in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region by making assessment of events from 1945 to the present are given in order to enable the reader to understand developments in this region today. In addition to this, the theoretical backgrounds of the EU and the USA in this region are presented with a special focus on 'civilian power' and 'military power' concepts. Emergence of "civilian power" concept, its main characteristics which differentiate it from the "military power", different arguments of scholars about "civilian power" Europe concept and

its applicability to the EMP are analyzed. In theoretical Approach to the explanation of US foreign policy part, analysis focus on shift from USA foreign policy actions of the Cold War period and the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks to the USA, which is “deterrence” and “containment” to Bush Doctrine of 2002, which is based on “pre-emptive war” and “preventive war”. Along with the USA’s “political power” - BMENA especially its earlier and bilateral version MEPI is part of it, the USA’s “military power” is examined in this section.

In the second chapter, the emergence and the historical evolution of the EMP are analyzed. The EMP’s main objectives namely political and security; economic and financial; social, cultural and human and migration are given. Weaknesses and strengths of the EMP with a special focus on European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) are discussed by presenting views from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs).

In the third chapter, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) is examined. The emergence, historical evaluation and the three main objectives of the BMENA are given in this section. Weaknesses and strengths of this Project with an emphasis on the MEPP are also analyzed.

In the fourth chapter, political and security dimensions, economic and financial dimensions and social, cultural and human dimensions of these two projects are compared in order to indicate the competing and/or complementary aspects of these two projects. In this respect, these two projects’ achievements in terms of political and security; economic and financial and finally social, cultural and human dimension are given. Promotion of democracy - good governance, political participation and elections, legal environment for civil society, judiciary development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of the media-, fight against terrorism, promotion of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation, functioning of market economy, free trade area initiatives - Euro-Med Free Trade Area and Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) -, financial aids - Mesure d’Accompagnement (MEDA), European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Foundation for the Future, entrepreneurship and investment, enhancement of social development and poverty reduction, empowerment of women, youth engagement and literacy and educational opportunity are

topics which are discussed in this chapter. This chapter is longer than other chapters since it is the heart of the study where comparisons of these two projects are made in detail to find out the answer of main research question: Are these projects complementary or competing projects?

In the fifth chapter, the EU's and the USA's overall approach to the Mediterranean and the Middle East (MME) region by focusing on the past and future of transatlantic relationship, interests, aims and the foreign policy instruments which are used by these two powers are compared. The reasons which shape the different approaches of the USA and the EU towards Mediterranean and the Middle East region are evaluated. In this study by focusing on the EU's "civilian approach" and the USA's "military approach" such points are evaluated: Which foreign policy approach will be successful to obtain the desired effect in this region: The EU's "civilian approach" or the USA's "military approach" or both of them? Does the EU's civilian approach and USA's military approach work together? Is "military approach" part of the USA's civilian approach (MEPI, BMENA)? In this respect, is it possible to say that the EMP and the BMENA are complementary projects? Do these projects work for cross-purposes? If so, Why? Does this make them competing? What are the interests of the EU and the USA in the region? Do their interests converge or diverge? Which project in terms of foreign policy instrument used (EU's engagement policy as a carrot or the USA isolation policy and pre-emptive military strike as a stick) will be successful to reach the final aim (to bring peace and stability in this region)? Do carrots and sticks work together? Can the USA manage various challenges of this region more or less on its own, without the political and economic support of the EU? Is Transatlantic cooperation necessary to reach common goals specified above? Is it possible to reach common goals while the USA and the EU have significantly different views on the use of force, legitimacy, and the right way to solve problems in the Middle East? (USA emphasis on the importance of a rapid transformation of the region contrasts with EU preference for more gradual change and an immediate focus on conflict resolution.) Can implementation of sanctions or use of military force (stick) as the only way of dealing with issues of the region be productive?

This research was conducted using a two-projects (EMP and BMENA) based comparative method, with a special focus on the developments in the region in the post-Cold War period. The comparison was useful to understand the reason of their commonalities and diversities in terms of their policies and approaches to the region. This study was conducted

by reviewing books, articles in professional journals, magazines, periodicals, newspapers and websites. Although a large quantity of literature existed on the EMP, there was relatively small quantity of literature on the comparison of the EMP and BMENA on the basis of their competing and complementary aspects. In addition to examination of written resources, research results were included, based on interviews with individuals involved in these policies. In this connection, views of the Turkish Ministry of foreign affairs officials working in this field were tried to be obtained. Moreover, an interview was made with the Department of State official of USA, working for the MEPI Political Pillar, Laura-Abraham Schulz. In addition to this, views of professors, ministry of foreign affairs officials and non-governmental organizations' representatives participated at the 2008 Annual Conference of EuroMeSCo entitled "Euro-Mediterranean Relations between Continuity and Reinforced Cooperation. *Quo Vadis Barcelona?*" held in Amman, were obtained (see Annex IV).

I. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In the Post-Cold War era, the EU adopted new approaches to foreign and security policy-making, especially with regard to its 'near abroad' in order to enable itself to cope with new challenges which comes from its neighbors. Stabilization through cooperation and partnership was the new formula combined with an attempt to export the European Union security model based on democracy and the market economy (Jünemann, 2004, p.2). Hence, the EU aimed to promote liberal-democratic principles such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and to promote relatively less-common social-democratic principles such as equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance to its 'near abroad' – Central and Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. In addition to promoting these principles, "the EU seeks to encourage institutions which ensure the attainment of these principles – supranationality through international law and regional organizations; multilateral cooperation and good global governance; and respect for the United Nations Charter". The EU uses civilian means in order to spread these principles. Physical force in other words "military power", in the imposition of these principles is absent in the EU principle diffusion which is mainly shaped by "informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter" (Manners, 2002, 244- 5). That is why, conceptual category applied to the EU's international role is the notion of 'civilian power' Europe.

Although the USA also aimed to promote these principles in the above mentioned regions, the means which are used by the USA are mainly military. The USA foreign policy of the Cold War period and the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks to the USA which is "deterrence" and "containment" was replaced by "pre-emptive war" and "preventive war" with the initiation of Bush Doctrine in 2002. After September 11th terror attacks on the USA, tackling terrorism became the highest priority in the USA's foreign policy agenda. The argument was that to deter terrorist in the same way as states is impossible.² Hence, the USA started to use pre-emptive and preventive military

² Deterrence theory is a military strategy developed after and used throughout the Cold War and current times. It is based on Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions or any combination of these. Containment is a foreign policy strategy of the USA of the Cold War period to stop the domino effects of nations moving politically towards USSR based communism.

action instead of deterrence and containment. With this development, new foreign policy actions of the USA as a “military power” are based on military preemption, unilateral action, military superiority, in its commitment to “extending democracy, liberty, security to all regions”. In addition to “military power”, the USA uses “political power” through introduction of Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) to promote democracy in this region due to the belief that “the advance of freedom leads to peace” (Monten, 2005, p. 112).

In this section, historical background of the EU’s and the USA’s approaches to the Mediterranean and the Middle East region commencing from 1945 to the present along with theoretical approaches to the explanation of foreign policy of the EU and the USA in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (MME) region with a special focus on “civilian power” Europe and “military power” USA concepts are presented in order to clarify these two powers’ different approaches to the region.

1.1. Historical Background: A Descriptive Assessment from 1945 to the Present

The bipolarism of the Cold War, which emerged after World War II, had created two blocs dependent on ideological allegiances. During the Cold War, the USA and the EU had common global security interest which was to halt the expansion of Communism. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, except in some cases, the USA was the decisive leader and the West European countries were the followers (Hersh, 2000, pp. 209-210). Following the ideological failure of Communism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the debate on civil society and the prospects for democracy in the Middle East and in the North Africa has reemerged in the West, as well as in the Arab world (Chartouni-Dubarry, 2000, p. 53). In this new international system, the triumph of liberal-democratic values started to be challenged mainly by economic hardship, environmental degradation, population growth, a veritable “clash of civilizations” due to growing anti-Western tendencies and the Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world and the reemergence of xenophobia and Islamophobia in the West (Caplan & Feffer, 1996, 4, Nas, 2005, 223). All these new developments led to change in security concerns of the EU and the USA. “The red Communist peril” of the Cold

War era therefore has been replaced by a “green Muslim threat” (Schlesinger, 1994, 45). NATO Secretary General of that time Willy Claes explained this situation with these words: “Militant Islam is the Western world’s number one menace. This is a view which has been shared by think tanks and government circles throughout the West” (Vertovec & Peach, 1997, 3, 4).

After the September 11th terror attacks to the USA and the following El Qaeda terror attacks in Madrid, London and Istanbul, this perception gained pace. September 11th terror attacks to the USA have also enhanced processes such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that were already under way. Mass immigration flow from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe and the current existence of Muslim populations in the EU member states started to be analyzed within this framework and forced the EU to take some measures and to initiate new strategies to prevent further terror attacks, illegal immigration, organized crimes from the South. Immigration became the fourth key issue of the EMP in 2005. The EU makes links not just between terrorism, illegal immigration and drug-trafficking, but also between fighting international crime and the wider agenda of promoting equitable and sustainable development, poverty reduction, the rule of law, democracy and conflict prevention (Smith, 2003, p. 192).

In this new international system, states are faced with new security threats transcending national borders and have to be coped with innovative and transnational approaches since the threats of post-Cold War period are more diverse, less visible, less predictable and transboundary in nature. The single state is not able to tackle these new threats it faces today on its own. In order to cope with these new threats that emerged in the post-Cold War period, the EU adopted new approaches by focusing on to its ‘near abroad’. This new approach is based on stabilization through cooperation and partnership (Central and Eastern European countries enlargement, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European/New Neighborhood Policy are outcomes of this new foreign policy approach of the EU) (Jünemann, 2004, p.2). With this new formula, the EU aimed to export its values, norms and standards based on democracy and the liberal economy to its neighbors due to the belief that “a more democratic world is the guarantee of a more secure world” as French Foreign Minister of the time, Michel Barnier stated in one of his interviews in 2005.

In addition to security concerns, the importance of the North Africa and the Middle East region for both the EU member states and the USA lies in the region's abundant energy resources and its strategic location linking Europe, Asia and Africa (Hamilton, 2004, p. 83-84).³ In this connection, stability and prosperity of this region to maintain easy access to energy resources for both EU and the USA as main oil importers from the region is significant. Besides these reasons, increasing dependency on Russia's natural gas engender the EU to seek new alternatives. Moreover, Russia's new role as energy supplier and energy transportation route gradually helps Russia to re-establish its hegemony in the region. As Brzezinski (1998) argued, "Eurasia has been the centre of the world power which wanted to dominate this landscape."⁴ With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Eurasia again became the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and the strategy involves geo-strategy- the management of geo-political interests". Euroasia, which has the majority of underground riches, thus became the chess board for future fights among great powers when Soviet Union lost its hegemonic power in this region (Brzezinski, 1998). Terrorist activities in that region created opportunity for China and Russia to establish its hegemony particularly through the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on the one hand, the September 11th terror attacks to the USA and the following war in Afghanistan created opportunity for the USA to enter into the region through the establishment of military bases in four oil rich Muslim Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Ünver Noi, 2006, p. 24). Being a hegemonic power in this region gained enormous importance. Brzezinski argues (as cited in Fouskas, 2003), "if USA lacks the proper strategy to streamline the development of key Eurasian actors according to her national interests, then Eurasia will be lost and the USA's primacy in world politics will wither away too" (p. 1). All these new developments which emerged in the post-Cold War era led to a new hegemonic rivalry between Russia and the USA in this region on the one hand, led to the EU to seek new alternative energy routes like Algerian gas pipeline to prevent energy dependency to Russia, on the other hand.

³ The U.S. Department of Defence issued a report in May 2005 outlining the enduring American strategic interests in the Middle East. The study points out that the world will become even more dependent on Gulf oil in the early twenty first century than it is today (Aliboni, Said Ally, 2000, p. 221). According to the forecasts of the American Energy Information and the European Commission, European requirement for oil imports in the period 2000-2020 will increase by about 180 million tons. This is because the European oil consumption will increase and on the other hand the European oil production will decrease (Göetz, 2005, pp: 86, 87).

⁴ Brzezinski (1998) defined the Eurasia as "a landscape ranging from the French shores of the Atlantic down to the Persian Gulf, and from the Chinese land mass to Central Asia, the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits and the Suez". Greater Middle East is part of the "Eurasia" region.

However, on the other hand, Russia plays a key role in lessening European dependence on Middle East OPEC oil imports since Russia is one of the most important individual oil and gas supplier of Europe although its share will slightly decrease from 30% to 27%. According to current plans and forecasts, Russia will only contribute to the increase in European imports by less than 20%. Consequently, more than 80% of additional European import requirements must be covered from other world regions. While the slight decrease of the share of Russian oil in European imports is not a cause of concern, the foreseeable distinct decrease of the share of Russian natural gas in European imports raises some questions⁵: how to satisfy Europe's additional demand of natural gas in the future? Apart from deliveries of liquid gas, suppliers can only include Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Caspian region, since, for geographical reasons, gas pipelines are only economically efficient at a maximum length of 4000-5000km (Göetz, 2005, pp. 86-87).

Algeria, next to Russia the main natural gas supplier of Europe, will probably be able to raise its deliveries by 2020 from approximately 60 to 120 billion cubic meters, provided that new fields are opened up and new export pipelines to Europe are built. Libya, too, will be able to raise its thus far small exports from one billion cubic meters to a possible volume of 30-40 billion cubic meters, by using the new Green Stream pipeline. Future gas exports from Egypt to Europe will go via the Jordan pipeline to Turkey, and will be realized by liquid natural gas (LNG) projects, thus reaching a possible volume of 30 billion cubic meters in 2020 (Göetz, 2005, pp. 86-87).

In order to meet their global security and economic interests, USA and EU developed some projects jointly and unilaterally. Barcelona Process or with its other name Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (hereinafter referred to as EMP), which has been initiated by the EU, is a good example of projects which has been taken by the EU unilaterally since the USA was not invited to the meeting.

With the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU aimed to create a common area of peace and stability through political basket in the long term; to establish a common area of prosperity through the economic and financial basket, to promote communication among cultures as well as exchanges among civil societies through the social, cultural, and human

⁵ While in 2000 about 70% of European gas imports came from Russia, this share will reach only 50% in 2010 and less than 30% in 2020.

basket. However, the core of Partnership policy is economic in nature.⁶ One of the reasons which make the economic and financial basket core of partnership is due to a generalized perception in the EU that economic failure in the region has become a major European security concern because of its implications for Mediterranean security (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 16- 17). This basket of the EMP is also a topic on which EU member states find it easiest to agree unlike security, political, social and cultural issues where national foreign policy concerns tend to produce more acute divergence due to some EU member states' historic links with the individual countries in the region. The EU's lack of a single responsible foreign policy actor comparable to the USA Secretary of State or the USA President makes the political basket weak. There is only agreement among member states on these following three fundamental guidelines of the European Greater Middle East policy: 1) to create greater social and economic stability in the Mediterranean region; 2) to establish peace and cooperation between Israel and the Arab world; 3) to secure Europe's long-term energy supply (Rhein, 1997, pp. 42- 43).

However, to establish peace and security in this region seems difficult without resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict although the Barcelona framework became the only institutional set up in which Israel and its Arab neighbors freely discuss issues (Rhein, 1997, p. 45). In addition to conflict resolution, building mutual confidence and trust within a context of political change and economic success also seems necessary since SEMCs are highly skeptical about the EMP (Vasconcelos & Joffé, 2000, p. 3). They believe that the EMP reflects the hegemony that Europe has established over the Mediterranean region. They also complain of the existence of restrictions on agricultural trade and prohibitions on the free movement over people. Also, they were irritated with the establishment of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR as a rapid reaction forces in 1996 since they wonder against whom the reaction would be directed. Moreover, people of this region feel that little effort is expended on trying to understand the region and its problems in its own terms. In this connection, the EMP is perceived as a project which offers little guarantee of a solution to their social, political and economic problems (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 18, 21, 28).

On the USA's side, the USA National Security Strategy, which was "free and safe access to the energy resources" during the 1990s, changed as "fighting against international

⁶ The EU is the primary economic player in the region.

terrorism” after the September 11th terror attacks to the USA to prevent asymmetric threat towards the Western, American or allied citizens, their possessions and interests by the radical and the fundamental terrorist networks became number one priority for the USA. UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society), which defined the three deficits of the region as knowledge acquisition, freedom and good governance, the empowerment of the women and the reason of these deficits, provided the ground for the preparation of Middle East Initiative (UNDP-Arab States). The USA and the EU agreed that lack of democracy and modernization throughout this region engender problems for regional stability and international security. Hence, the Group of Eight (G8) countries namely USA, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan and Russia officially launched the USA led initiative - Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (hereinafter referred to as BMENA) - in June 2004 in Sea Island, USA to promote the political and economic transformation of the region (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, p. 1; Erhan, 2005, 161). However, the Greater Middle East project (earlier version of the BMENA) came to world attention when it was first mentioned in London based Arabic newspaper – Al Hayat’s 13 February 2004 issue which published the draft version of the “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper” (Al Hayat, 2004).⁷ BMENA thus emerged as a US-led multilateral project which would help to diminish the risks targeting USA and other western interests by creating better humanitarian environment for the people of this region (Erhan, 2005, p. 161). This USA led initiative mainly aims to protect USA’s interests in the region. It is complementary to the Bush Administration’s military approach which aimed to ‘fight against terrorism’ (Afghanistan operation) and ‘spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ (invasion of Iraq) by making rapid transformation of this region through rapid regime changes.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, the USA Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) are main projects initiated by the EU and/or USA to engage the region. All these projects demonstrate that there is a common interest in promoting positive change in the region. Common interests of the USA and the EU

⁷ The Greater Middle East region ranging from Israel to Lebanon and Syria to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan is the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, fragile and failed regimes exist (Hamilton, 2004, p. 83, 84)

from this region are as follows: 1) ensuring the reliable flow of oil at reasonable prices; 2) slowing the introduction of weapons of mass destruction; 3) avoiding the spread of Islamic extremism, which would undermine the political stability in the region and seriously threaten the first two interests (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 299). Europeans are accepting America's democratic agenda (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, p.221).

As Gompert and Larrabee (1998) said "these two powers' ability to advance those interests depends heavily on the willingness of Europe to take on greater responsibilities on the one hand, and the willingness of the USA to share leadership on the other hand" (p. 232). Willingness of both sides seems to determine whether the projects, which were developed by them, will be competing or complementary in the future. Although the problems specified in both the European Security Strategy 2003 and the September 2002 USA National Security Strategy are quite similar, the foreign policy tools and strategies of these two powers in dealing with these threats are different. In other words, the EU and the USA follow dissimilar strategies to attain the same objectives. The major reasons for this split are their different perceptions, divergent and sometimes complementary interests (Ünver Noi, 2005, p. 92). Although the EU and the USA security interests were more or less the same during the Cold War period, it was possible to witness differences in perceptions and divergent interests. We can give the USA-France tensions particularly as follows: at the time of the presidency of De Gaulle and his persistent suspicions about the USA; British Missile Deployment Crises; EU's Middle East approach after the first Oil Crises of 1973; EU's Iran approach after the first decade of the Iranian Revolution (USA policy of "to join American embargo and politically isolate Iran" was abandoned by the EC and time to time became source of friction between the USA and the EU) as examples to these different perceptions and divergent interests (Ünver Noi, 2005, pp. 79- 83).

Europe both as individual states and as a Union can claim a longer, closer and more organic connection with the Middle East and North Africa than can the USA. For instance, North Africa is an area of great strategic interest to Europe and relatively marginal interest to the USA. Therefore, it makes little sense for the USA to compete with Europe when the two parties' interests are complementary and the USA's stake is comparatively small. Since the Six Days War of 1967 and the British withdrawal from Aden in 1971, The USA and Europe have maintained an informal division of labor regarding the Middle East. Hence, the USA has been recognized as a leader with two main regional projects; promoting Arab-Israeli

peacemaking and maintaining Gulf security, whereas Europe has limited roles such as supporting and financing USA initiatives, pursuing particularistic economic and political interests in the region. In other words, Europe has a secondary status in the Middle East in spite of its geographic proximity, historical connection and organic economic and demographic links to the area. The following factors hindered Europe to have the primary status: 1) Cold War competition with the USSR; 2) the legacy of European colonialism in contrast with the USA; 3) European weakness and divisions and the ability of the USA to project political, economic and military power in the region (Satloff, 1997, pp. 7-8 and 35).

Their different approaches to the region first emerged after the oil crisis of 1973. The outbreak of the first oil crisis in 1973 and the other developments such as collapse of the Bretton Wood system (1971-73) led Europe to take measures against a prospective crisis and made their approaches to the Middle East different from those of the USA (Ünver Noi, 2005, pp. 83, 96).⁸ Regional stability has become a matter of increasing priority for the EU due to Europe's dependence on the Middle East's energy resources. EU wishes to see the Mediterranean and the Middle East progressively transformed into a zone of peace, stability, prosperity. Its major instruments to that end are trade liberalization, cooperation, and policy dialogue (Rhein, 1997, p. 45).

There is also a strategic clash between the USA's and the EU's policy - isolation and engagement - in the Middle East. For instance, the USA policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran was not supported by the EU while the USA worries that European engagement will undermine Western deterrence of these two "rogue states". Moreover, there is no transatlantic consensus on the role of military force in coping with the problems of this region. The USA continues to develop increased military options through technological advances and enhanced military force projection capabilities. At the same time, Europe falls further behind in military proficiency as it cuts defense budgets and develops a political culture within the EU that excludes military option and concludes that the use of force is not only a last resort, but no resort at all. Contrary to the EU, the USA believes confrontation and possibly the use of force are necessary in this region. However, the EU member states believe that diplomacy can

⁸ Today, if the eight countries of the Gulf that hold 40% of known global oil and 25 % of known global gas reserves were to stop their exports to the rest of the world for just two months, the global system would nearly collapse: oil and gas price would increase tremendously due to energy scarcity (Rhein, 1997, p. 41).

produce the desired result and military action will only make the situation worse (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, pp. 4- 5 and 302).

USA sometimes preferred to coordinate its policy with individual European countries rather than with the EU as a whole. However, this policy of the USA changed and started to seek support of the EU as a whole especially to coordinate policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 2002 when the violence intensified in this region. Moreover, the USA has looked to the G-8 as well as to the EU as appropriate partners for promoting the economic and political transformation of the Broader Middle East and North Africa. In 2005, President Bush declared in Brussels: “America supports a strong Europe, because we need a strong partner in the hard work of advancing freedom in the world.” (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, pp. 231- 239- 240 and 241).

The reality is that it is unlikely to solve the problems of this region when the world’s two greatest military powers, economic resources and democratic legitimacy work at cross purposes (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, p. 2). There will always be a certain level of competition between the EU and the USA. This was the case with ‘EU’s refusal to invite USA to the Barcelona Conference (which irritated the USA because of its implications for the peace process, especially the Syria-Israel track) and with lack of USA-EU consultation prior to the October 1996 Arafat-Netanyahu summit in Washington (in response to which the EU decided to name its own Middle East envoy and to approve anti-Israeli communiqué)’ (Satloff, 1997, p. 35).

Comparing the EU and the USA interests in the region, we can say that they largely converge rather than diverge at least as far as core interests such as energy security are concerned. Major divergence between the EU and the USA interest in the Middle East is the security of Israel since it is not normally considered a core European interest. On the other hand, European interests in the North Africa and Middle East are influenced by specific national preferences shaped by geography, history and economic links. Geographic proximity or distance shapes the national preferences. For instance, countries like Finland and Sweden which are geographically distant from the Mediterranean do not feel the same intense interest in the Mediterranean as do France or Spain. Moreover, different EU member states do not share the same focus when it comes to individual Mediterranean countries. For instance, Lebanon and Algeria have a higher priority for France than they do for any other EU member

state. These national components of European Mediterranean policies constitute an obvious contrast to the USA (Rhein, 1997, pp. 47- 51,-52 and 56).

Considering the basic convergence of interests, The EU has rarely pursued policies without taking into account the USA interests or views. This is not to say that the EU has not also occasionally competed with the USA or politely refused certain USA requests, but compared to the USA, the EU has been only a minor player or a second-class actor. In the strategic field of security and defense, the EU is a “non-actor”. It is obvious to say that the EU will not be capable, at least for other ten or fifteen years, of any preventive military action in the Gulf region or anywhere else in the world. This makes the EU dependent on USA military power when there is a need to securing energy supply by military power. The EU has neither the necessary political authority due to its sui generis nature nor the military or financial means to become active on its own although it no longer wants to play the role of “paymaster” for USA inspired policies. On the other hand, the USA can no longer be successful without the political and the economic support of the EU (Rhein, 1997, pp. 47- 51,-52 and 56).

1.2. Theoretical Approach to the Explanation of Foreign Policy of the EU in the Mediterranean and Middle East

The EU is an unusual and distinct actor on the international scene since it lacks the formal sovereignty enjoyed by states, and it is more than an international organization. The EU’s international identity has often been characterized as unique, or sui generis. The EU has been described as a ‘gentle power’(Padoa-Schioppa, 2001), ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), ‘post-modern power’(Cooper, 2003) and ‘civilian power’(Duchéne, 1972). All of these terms broadly refer to the EU’s pursuit of distinct foreign policy principles: the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives such as respect for international law and a concentration on non-military, primarily economic means, to secure goals (Smith, 2003, p.15). It is possible to argue that the experience of ‘European foreign policy’ due to Union’s sui generis nature has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail (Hill, 1993, p. 307).

The concept of civilian power has been widely applied to the EU to describe the

considerable international influence the EU has had without conducting state-like foreign policy and without a military strength of its own. Hill (1990), for example, argued that this concept ‘comes closest...to rendering the truth about the EC (as an international actor)’ (Whitman, 2002).

“Civilian power” Europe has been associated with the characterization and examination of the international role of the EU since 1970s (Whitman, 2002). K. J. Holsti has listed six ways in which an international actor can influence other international actors. According to Holsti, an international actor can use persuasion (elicit a favorable response without explicitly holding out the possibility of punishments); offer rewards; grant rewards; threaten punishment; inflict non-violent punishment; or use force (Smith, 2003, p. 22). In its external relations the EU prefers diplomacy, economic interdependence, regional cooperations and partnerships, multilateralism. It favors persuasion to coercion. It pursues diplomacy and encourages public discussion of foreign policy matters (Çakır, 2003, p. 135). The EU as a “civilian power” relies primarily on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third countries and international issues. Mostly, the EU uses its economic strength through providing technical and financial aids and diplomatic strength through implementation of diplomatic sanctions in pursuit of its own, self-interested objectives. Hill and Wallace (as cited in Smith, 2003) interpreted the EU’s said approach with the following words;

“European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinctive set of principles, which include a preference for diplomacy over coercion, the use of mediation to resolve conflicts, a preference for long-term economic solutions to political problems, and the promotion of human rights” (Smith, 2003, p. 15).

To highlight the EU’s uniqueness, comparisons are often made between it and the USA:

“Europeans prefer to rely on economic, cultural and political tools to meet their global and regional aims, while Americans often employ their enormous military leverage in pursuing their ambitions. Also, Europeans always prefer multilateralism, while Americans are ready to turn to unilateral solutions if the latter seem to suit their needs better. Europeans prefer to engage in a long-term diplomatic process, often with an unclear price and outcome, while Americans have a more instrumental or strategic

approach to diplomacy” (Smith, 2003, pp. 15,16).

Debate on how to categorize the EU, in terms of its international influence, was first conducted from the early 1970s by attempting to construct a new conceptual category. The image of the Community as “civilian power” was introduced to the literature first by Duchéne (1972) with the following words.

‘Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power (p. 43).

Duchéne (1972) argued that Europe’s relative lack of military capabilities would not be a problem, because ‘more and more, security policies today, even for the superpower, consist in shaping the international milieu often in areas which at first sight have little to do with security ...Europe will be a giant middle power...with a frequent interest in promoting international organization to codify its rights and guarantees’ (p. 44).

According to Duchéne (1973), a “civilian power” has two main characteristics. These characteristics were present in the EEC in the 1970s:

- “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces”,
- “a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” (pp. 19-20).

With the second element of his definition, Duchéne emphasized (as cited in Stavridis, 2001) the need for the EEC to promote democratic and civilian standards both internally and externally. Otherwise, he predicted, the EC “will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself” (p. 44).

Duchéne’s conception of a European civil power rested upon the inconceivability of a nuclear-armed European federation and the banishment of war from western Europe: “The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and

relatively short on armed force is to domesticate relations between states as far as possible including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have been in the past associated exclusively with “home” and not foreign, that is alien, affairs”. The Notion of “civilian power” represents a milestone for debates on the international role of the EU because of its feature which is conducting a distinctive form of diplomacy in the absence of the ability to use military force (Whitman, 2002).

But the first element of Duchéne’s definition which is absence of military power led to criticism, mainly from preeminent writer of English School of international relations theory, Hedley Bull. Bull in 1983 labelled the concept of a civilian power “a contradiction in terms”. This was during the so-called “second Cold War”. Bull (1982) argued that the existence of special international circumstances of lessened tension between the superpowers in the early 1970s had led to the mistaken view that military force no longer mattered. For instance, the defeat suffered by the USA in Vietnam War confirmed the view that force was an ineffective instrument of policy for the Western powers in the Third World; in Britain the same theme was taken up to justify withdrawal from east of Suez. Bull interpreted the wars lost by the USA and its alliances in the third World were wars won by their adversaries. Accordingly, it is not possible to argue that these wars demonstrated the impotence of military power (p. 151). He also explained (as cited in Stavridis, 2001) why Western Europe should seek to develop its own military potential. Bull also called for a “European strategic policy” which would include both a conventional and a nuclear dimension. This is to say, a militarising of the EC.

Bull (1982) argued that there is no supranational community in Western Europe but only a group of nation-states; “if there were a supranational authority in Western Europe, this would be a source of weakness in defence policy since it is the nation-states of Western Europe-France, Germany and Britain-their capacity to inspire loyalty and to make war –that are the sources of its power” (p. 163).

Hill, who conceptualized the EU’s unique condition through capability-expectation gap, shares Bull’s argument that defence is the key to the development of the Community’s international influence. Hill (1993) argues, “if the Community does not develop the capacity

to defend itself and to project military power beyond its borders there will remain a great many things which it will not be able to do” (p. 318).

According to Hill (1993), the EC is still some way from being a full international actor, but since 1970 it has steadily progressed towards a considerable presence in the world. As mentioned above, Hill tried to conceptualize the EU’s unique condition. The most engaging assessment of state of affairs which was offered in the capability-expectations gap – the gap between the capabilities of the Union and the expectations made of it - , was first advanced by him in 1993 (Whitman, 2002, Gomez, 2003). This assessment enables us to see that if the gap is to be closed and a dangerous tension relieved in European foreign policy, then either capabilities will have to be increased or expectations decreased. Capabilities, as we have seen, means cohesiveness, resources and operational capacity. Hill (1993) argues “if they are to be increased significantly beyond their present point, then an important political and constitutional leap will probably be necessary. Lowering expectations means both lowering one’s own ambitions in foreign policy and communicating the fact to outsiders, so that the limits of European actorness and intentions are clearly visible” (p. 322).

Hill (1993) conceptualized Europe’s international role by looking at the functions which the Community might be fulfilling in the international system, but also at the perceptions which are held of its role by third parties. He listed certain tasks - such as “the stabilizing western Europe, managing world trade, being a principle voice of the developed world in relations with the South, providing a second western voice in international diplomacy, being a regional pacifier, mediator of conflicts, global intervenor, bridge between rich and poor, joint supervisor of the world economy” - which the Community will certainly be expected to perform by third parties. He argued that these demands pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities of the EC, in terms of its ability, its resources and the instruments at its disposal. These demands, whether for money, preferences or political assistance is often unmanagable for the Community. The Community neither has the resources or the political structure to be able to meet these demands (pp. 306, 315)

However, Hill (1990) also pointed out that power politics had some rather important limitations, too. In this respect, he emphasized the “civilian power” Europe approach’s some useful insight into Europe’s international relations and international security which are dismissed by realists. He has noted:

“Precisely the kinds of attributes possessed by the European Union—the intellectual impact of a new model of interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over the management of the international economy, the possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international system—are those most capable of influencing the very environment which determines whether or not military strength will need to be used” (Hill; 1990).

That is why, he stressed that one should be less critical of the civilian power concept. Moreover, he argued that development in the direction of a superpower would go against the intrinsic nature of the EC. He also contrasted the moral approach taken by the Europeans to the more “power politics” view of the USA (Stavridis, 2001, p. 45).

The ‘civilian power’ concept was applied to West Germany and Japan by Hans Maull. According to Maull (1990), the USA will have to evolve into a new type of international power, of which Germany and Japan are already in a sense prototypes. It must become a “civilian power” which implies the following characteristics: a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on nonmilitary, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (p. 92).

Maull (1990) pointed out that the critical challenges and risks for the future will largely come from socio-economic and cultural problems and their potential for producing political crises. He argued that disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Revolution in Iran are main causes of this broad socio-economic changes which led to new security problems such as migration, drug trafficking, international crimes and international terrorism. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missile technology in the Third World became other challenges added to such concerns. In this context, Maull (1990) claims “although military power has continued relevance of the security dimension for international relations; nuclear deterrence and conventional force still play a role in guaranteeing the state-centered character of the international system, military force is likely to be largely irrelevant in confronting such new challenges as political instability and crises in Eastern Europe or the

Third World, terrorism, drugs or environmental dangers” (pp. 102-103).

Maull (1990) argued that transfer of sovereignty allows the development of the rule of law in international relations and thus helps to push forward the process of "civilizing" international politics. It also offers an important set of values. Solidarity with other societies, and a sense of responsibility for the future of the world are values that will have to be developed to make effective international interdependence policies possible. Paradoxically, the new challenges of international relations will thus require a much more active emphasis on the domestic political side of international relations (p. 106).

Maull (1990) much more focused on Joseph Nye's concept of 'soft power', arguing that civilian powers were committed to multilateral cooperation, institution-building and supranational integration rather than national pride, unilateralism and defence of national sovereignty. They sought to 'civilianize' international relations by constraining the use of military force and strengthening the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes and human rights (p. 106).

According to Manners (2004), it is extremely easy to characterize the EU as a "civilian power" which aims domestication of international relations emphasizing equality, institutions and peace. However, Manners avoids using the terms 'civilian' and 'civilizing' since 'the EU and its actions in world politics demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what it is, does and should do'. Manners used the phrase "normative power Europe" to attempt to capture the movement away from Cold War approaches to the EU (p. 2).

Manners and Whitman emphasized the differences between civilian power, military power and normative power in terms of capabilities, culture and conciliation. According to their view, "civilian power" and "military power" approaches can be differentiated in terms of influence and force. Theoretically, frames of reference of these two approaches are also different. Notions of civilian power are often located in liberal, neo-liberal, or interdependence frames of reference whereas notions of military power are more often located in realist or neo-realist frames of reference. In addition to civilian power – military power comparison, Manner also made normative power – civilian power comparison. According to him, normative power can be differentiated from civilian power since a huge change of political culture away from the Westphalian frames of reference in which many discussions of

civilian power take place are realized. Theoretically, civilian power can be clearly differentiated from normative power theories which emphasize the liberal construction of norms, the critical construction of norms, or the hegemonic construction of norms (Manners, 2004, pp. 2- 3 and 4)

Finally, he has also argued that normative power can be differentiated from military power. Empirically, these two approaches can be differentiated in terms of conflict resolution. According to normative power, conflict is resolved through longer-term conciliation of the parties (i.e. changing the norm of conflict). According to military power, conflict is resolved through shorter-term intervention in the conflict (i.e. changing the conflict itself). Theoretically, notions of military power are often located in realist or neo-realist frames of reference. In contrast, normative power theories emphasize the extent to which physical conflict is a manifestation of more structural violence and often the result of extreme constructions of difference (Manners, 2004, p. 4)

Manners (2004) also laid down the following reasons which explain why EU cannot be a military power like other superpowers: a) Military external action will inevitably involve taking someone's life, but the right to life is a crucial fundamental right of the EU which takes place in the Constitution for Europe (Constitution has not been ratified, yet. However, this is important to show the Union's objectives and its desire to promote it internationally). Hence, it is obvious to say that military external action will inevitably contradict the legal motivations of the EU in international law. b) Peace is the prime norm in the EU and thus military endeavours will inevitably become counter-productive as they become more adventurous. c) To portray the enemy-others with terms like 'threatening', 'evil', and 'killable' must be deconstructed in order to understand the structuring power at work in world politics. Hence, military external action will inevitably become unsustainable under such criticisms (pp.13-14).

Manners (2004) by using Huntington's following words tried to verify the argument that military forces are anti- humanitarian:

"The mission of the Armed Forces is to combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. The military must be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and should, be used for humanitarian and other

civilian activities, but the military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles. A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible. That is why nations have traditionally maintained armies and navies”(p. 14).

This became more evident after the events of 9/11 through establishment of USA’s military bases in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Krygzstan and Uzbekistan to fight against Taliban forces in Central Asia, deployment of ‘special forces’ in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq in the name of ‘war against terrorism’. Manners believes that militarizing the EU will progressively undermine the civilian power of the EU and is ‘contradictory/unjustifiable/unacceptable/unsustainable’ in theoretical terms (Manners, 2004, pp. 15, 18).

Manners argued “sustainable peace has been, is, and should be the central norm that guides the external action of the EU”.⁹ The EU advocacy of the principle of sustainable peace contributed to the UN Secretary General’s report of June 2001, ‘Prevention of Armed Conflict’ which pledged the UN to move from ‘a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’: A broader focus on the nature of sustainable peace and its building-blocks, such as social and economic development, good governance and democratization, the rule of law and respect for human rights, is supplementing the traditional concept of collective security’. For Manners, the military tasks (‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization’) should only be attempted under a UN mandate for genocide. Otherwise, normative power of the EU will be lost (Manners, 2004, p. 29).

Several actors have actively pushed to strengthen the EU’s capacity to prevent conflicts by using civilian instruments. Small states like Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands have been keen to develop civilian instruments alongside new military ones to prevent conflicts. They expect that strengthening the EU’s civilian instruments for conflict prevention could potentially reduce the need for military force. During its 1999 presidency, Finland actively promoted consideration of the non-military management of crises. Sweden also used its 2001 presidency to develop the EU’s civilian instruments, reflecting the strong emphasis on conflict prevention in Swedish foreign policy, as well as its preference for

⁹ Connie Peck (1998) defines sustainable peace as involving both short-term problem solving and long-term structural solutions to conflict prevention through the integration of human security concerns and the promotion of good governance.

civilian over military means. The Netherlands has actively pushed for an EU conflict prevention role, especially during its presidency. As a result of this development, EU took common position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa in October 1997. The larger member states have also pushed for EU conflict-prevention activities. France proposal for the Pact for Stability in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany's support for a similar Stability Pact in South-Eastern Europe, France and the UK support for building African conflict-prevention capabilities and Spain and Italy promotion of the EMP are some examples of conflict prevention activities which were initiated by the EU's larger member states. But the most active promoters of conflict-prevention as an EU objective, and the development of civilian instruments, have been the smaller states (Smith, 2003, p. 154).

The EMP is an EU policy which bears characteristics of a civilian power model. These characteristics listed by Maull are trying to be applied to the EMP: a) In the civilian power model, there is an acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with the third countries in the pursuit of international objectives. The EMP is based on partnership aiming to develop socio-economic structure of the SEMCs in order to enable them to realize transformation from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones, state-dominated economies to liberal ones. The main aim of this cooperation is to eliminate the reasons such as bad socio-economic structure lying behind the security threats coming from this region. b) In the civilian power model, the EU mostly relies on persuasion and negotiation rather than coercion in its relationship with the third countries. It uses economic and diplomatic strength to pursue its own, self interested objectives. The EU as a strong economic power, which has considerable economic influence over the management of international economy, has an economic strength over this region (Çakır, 2003, p. 140). Through MEDA financial aid program (since 2007 European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument -ENPI replaced by MEDA), promotion of investment and entrepreneurship the EU uses its economic strength rather than military means to pursue its objectives. c) In the civilian power model, there is a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. Various kinds of meetings, which are taking place in the EMP process in order to reduce conflicts and misunderstandings inherent in the region, can be seen in this framework. Euro-Mediterranean civil forum, a Parliamentary forum, conferences organized periodically among foreign ministers, meetings of working groups are examples to these meetings (Çakır, 2003, p. 140). With all these meetings, the EMP also provides recognition of equality between the actors involved.

In the context of the Mediterranean, there are both hard security issues such as conflicts in the Middle East, ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict, conflict between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, the problem related to acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by the so-called ‘rogue states’ like Iran and the fear of follow up by other states of this region like Egypt, Turkey, Syria etc., the security of energy supplies and soft security issues such as environmental problems, democratic deficits, minority and human rights violations, drug trafficking, terrorism and the flow of immigration from South to North. The EU has preferred to deal with above mentioned soft security issues by a civilian power approach since these issues are mainly socio-economic in nature and they are more suitable to being managed through civilian approach. However, there are some hard security issues like conflict between Turkey and Greece, and the conflicts in the Middle East (conflict between Israel-Palestinian Authority, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon) which cannot be solved so easily through civilian approach (Çakır, 2003, p. 141). These issues also generate an obstacle in front of the success of the EMP.

The EU pursues a “civilian power” approach, which is based on cooperation, dialogue and assistance towards many of the SEMCs. In the case of the issues where the civilian power approach is short of engendering the desired effect, the EU uses its full membership card as a “carrot”. This strategy worked in the case of the CEECs. However, it is not possible to use this card for the SEMCs since the EU’s strategy towards this region is to offer everything but the membership under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).¹⁰ That is why, the civilian power approach of the EU towards the Mediterranean region under the EMP, which lacks full membership card, is not adequate to resolve all issues of the region such as the conflict in the Middle East. Establishing some institutional mechanism at Euro-Mediterranean level would only serve to provide these conflicting SEMCs having an equal say. Countries which have equal say will not feel coerced and manipulated. Hence, the institution will be a forum where conflicting parties- like Israel, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon- will have the opportunity to come together (Çakır, 2003, pp.151-152). Although the Barcelona Process is the only forum where conflicting parties have the opportunity to come together, “the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East challenged and stretched the Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve the channels of dialogue among all partners” as stated at the Communication from the Commission to the EP and the Council-‘Barcelona Process: Union

¹⁰ The ENP for countries of Union for Black Sea is different since these countries have a prospect of full membership contrary to SEMCs. In this regard, the ENP treats SEMCs different (EP Resolution, 2007).

for the Mediterranean'. Other shortcomings and difficulties in the process of multilateral cooperation, which is trying to be pursued by the Barcelona Process since 1995, led to the establishment of 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' on existing Barcelona Process on 13 July 2008 in Paris in order to enhance the existing Partnership through some new initiatives, projects and institutional arrangements (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008, p. 2).

The most successful foreign policy of the EU is enlargement. Since the enlargement of 1980s, the EU provided assistance to the states to its South and East to move from authoritarian government and state-dominated economies towards democracy and liberal economies. Since 1989, with the CEECs enlargement perspective, the EU has extended the promise of membership to Central and Eastern European states if they meet the requirements of membership. Enlargement process is a dynamic process. Turkey and Croatia are accepted candidates for future membership if they meet the requirements. Some Balkan states are also accepted in principle for future membership (Wallace, 2004, p. 37). The EU developed a strategy which is called European/New Neighborhood Policy for its other neighbors which cannot be a member of the EU at least for the foreseeable future. Through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU offers its neighbours a privileged partnership, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development) and deeper political relationship and economic integration instead of full membership.¹¹ In this respect, the ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement. The main aim of the ENP is avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned. In this way, it also addresses the strategic objectives set out in the December 2003 European Security Strategy. The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's neighbours by land or sea –Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine (European Commission (a), 2007). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is part of European New Neighborhood Policy, which offers everything but membership. When we compare the EMP with the most successful EU's foreign policy –enlargement-, The EMP's success seems

¹¹ ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe in March 2003 and then was published as Strategy Paper in May 2004.

doubtful since it does not have a great reward like full membership which can be used by the EU as a “carrot” to its neighbors.

Stabilizing the wider European region, spreading prosperity and peace across the EU’s neighbors is naturally the first foreign policy priority. But it is not an easy task to realize. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the real problem is in building good relations with neighboring states is to offer them everything except membership. As Commission President of that time Prodi proposed, “such relationships will remain inherently unbalanced, since the EU will loom larger in their priorities than they will matter to the EU” (Wallace, 2004, p. 37).

Briefly, the EU’s international identity is unique. As Smith (2003) argued, ‘it lacks the capabilities to be anything else’. It will never match the military power of the sole remaining superpower because member states are unwilling to transfer national sovereignty in defence to a supranational power. Moreover, they do not want to spend the necessary money or reform the way military budgets are spent. Smith also argues that the establishment of a military force will create more problems than it will solve since Europe is currently considered as an alternative to the USA as a result of its civilian status (p.17). As Jan Zielonka and Richard Whitman stated (as cited in Stavridis, 2001), ‘civilian approach is at the heart of the European integration’. Abandoning civilian approach for the EU would mean to destroy its very soul (p.46). The EU thus has no choice but to use civilian instruments, and to try to change its milieu so that military force is less necessary (Smith, 2003, p. 17).

The EU seems torn between asserting a rather distinctive international identity such as “civilian power”, supporter of international law, multilateralism and regional cooperation, promoter of human rights and democracy, and acquiring state-like attributes such as the capacity to use military force. The EU’s weaknesses in conflict resolution has led to a strengthened collective security and defence capability. The development of military dimension to European integration- particularly the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force - attest to the EU’s perceived need to endow itself with a foreign policy tool of last resort although EU may continue to rely predominantly on trade, aid and non-military diplomacy to exercise influence on international affairs (Gomez, 2003, p. 12). With the development of ESDP, EU’s civilian method of preventing conflict seems to be abandoning. But there is a cost of abandoning civilian power since the EU may lose its legitimacy and authority in the area of conflict prevention as a “civilian power” model for other regions. However, there is an

obstacle in front of the EU's claim of being a "civilian power" in global affairs, particularly its engagement in the SEMCs' political transformation. Maintaining the status quo as well as supporting political change in the region in other words double standard it applied from time to time not only harms the credibility of the EU but also undermines any claim that the EU may have the role as a "civilian-normative power" in global affairs (Reis, 2008, p. 19).

The strength of the civilian power image lies in its challenge to the traditional reliance on military instruments and its attempt to 'domesticate' relations between states, both within and outside the Union. In this sense, the development of an EU military dimension might diminish the civilian power image and thus the unique contribution that the EU could make to conflict prevention (Smith, 2003, p. 170).¹²

There is nonetheless a continuum from persuasion to coercion. The question is that how much the EU is willing to use coercion to achieve its objectives. In many respects, the EU does seem increasingly willing to wield power in pursuit of its objectives. In order to promote certain objectives, it uses both carrots (offering or granting rewards) and sticks (threatening or inflicting non-violent punishment). In other words, the EU is increasingly willing to use both carrots and sticks to pursue the objective of fighting international crime, conflict prevention and terrorism. However, there is reluctance to use negative measures like sanctions because of a general scepticism about the effectiveness of negative measures and an unwillingness to put at risk important commercial or strategic relationships (Smith, 2003, pp. 22-23).¹³ The EU's civilian approach distinguishes it particularly from the USA's approach to fight terrorism and WMD, in which the use of military instruments is prominent. The EU's civilian approach is also distinctive from the USA's military approach, with a much stronger emphasis on nation-building –on assisting weak states rather than combating rogue states.

¹² However, some scholars like Maull (2005) argues that having military power does not mean that the EU will loose its "civilian power". He also argues that the EU is not a power, it is a force (pp. 781, 793).

¹³ For instance, according to Eurostat, exports from the 27 states of the EU to Iran rose to 447 billion euros in the first five months of 2008, up 17,8% compared with the same period in 2007, despite sanctions and increasing tension with Iran on nuclear issue. German firm Steiner-Prematechnik-Gastec signed a 100 million euro deal with Iran in July 2008 to build three liquified natural gas plants in Iran ("EU exports ...", 2008; "Germany urges ...", 2008).

1.3. Theoretical Approach to the Explanation of Foreign Policy of the USA in the Mediterranean and Middle East

The civilian power model is not unique in international relations: small states particularly tend to rely on persuasion rather than coercion. It is not usual for states which have considerable resources to choose to behave like civilian powers. Those states never truly engage in persuasion, which means a recognition of equality between the actors involved (Smith, 2003, pp. 22, 23). As Kissinger (1994) said “for the USA with the capacity to intervene in every part of the globe in the post-Cold War world, this would be the last thing that it wants” (p. 805).

In the post-Cold War era, USA foreign policy agenda is focused on threats to its own security. These are primarily traditional military threats or ‘new threats resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing power of terrorist groups and other non-state actors, and the increasing vulnerability of USA society to direct attack’. The George H. W. Bush Administration entered office with the neo-Wilsonian agenda of waging “democracy” in the Middle East in order to strengthen USA global hegemony. In this period, both President Bush and President Clinton spoke of the “new world order” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 804).

President Bush proclaimed his hope for a “new world order” in those Wilsonian terms¹⁴:

“We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms” (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 804-805).

¹⁴ Following the First World War (1918), the USA, with President Wilson’s the so-called “Fourteen Points”, proclaimed its intention to build a new world order by applying its domestic values such as democracy, free trade to the world. With the “Fourteen Points”, President Wilson introduced mainly the idea of a multilateral international association of nations to enforce the peace (League of Nations), self-determination right, disarmament, open treaties and free trade. “Fourteen Points” still forms the essence of the liberal approach to world politics. Moreover, it represents the first USA contribution to the creation and maintenance of an international order consistent with its domestic values (Evans & Newnham (a), 1998, pp. 181, 182).

On September 11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush addressing a joint session of Congress stated: “Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective, - a New World Order - can emerge: a new era”. With these words he gave the order to start the military action which would later be known as the first Gulf War (Sweetliberty, 1990).

His successor, President Bill Clinton, expressed the USA’s goals on the theme of “enlarging democracy” in similar terms:

“In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 805).

As we have seen in the above mentioned statements of President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton, the USA’s ambitious to build a “new world order” which is based on exportation of USA model democracy and free trade to the rest of the world, particularly to the Greater Middle East region, became prominent policy in the post-Cold War USA foreign policy agenda. Disintegration of the USSR in December 1991 and the emergence of newly established independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus created opportunity for USA to have influence in Central Asia in this respect. As Brzezinski (a former USA National Security Advisor) (1998) said that Euroasia (consists of the Caucasus-Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia-, Central Asia -Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan-, Iran and Turkey), which has the majority of underground riches, thus became the chess board for future fights among great powers when Soviet Union lost its hegemonic power in this region. Brzezinski argues (as cited in Fouskas, 2003), “if USA lacks the proper strategy to streamline the development of key Eurasian actors according to her national interests, then Eurasia will be lost and the USA’s primacy in world politics will wither away too” (p. 1). The neoconservatives in the Pentagon exploited the September 11th terror attacks to the USA to make the USA military presence possible in this region since these attacks provided ground for the preparation of the so-called “Bush Doctrine” which makes “pe-emptive” and “preventive” military action valid. The September 11th terror attacks to the USA and the

following war in Afghanistan created opportunity for the USA to enter into the region through the establishment of military bases in Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to fight against Taliban forces and Al-Qaeda (Ünver Noi, 2006, p. 44).

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the September 11th terror attacks to the USA led to the emergence of Bush Doctrine of 2002. This Doctrine changed the USA foreign policy of the Cold War period and the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks to the USA, which is “deterrence” and “containment”.¹⁵ The argument lying behind this change was that terrorists cannot be deterred in the same way as states. Hence, the USA started to use Bush Doctrine of war – “pre-emptive” and “preventive” military action- instead of “deterrence” and “containment”. Afghanistan and Iraq operations are examples of these new foreign policy actions of the “military power” USA (Bush Doctrine) which is based on military preemption, unilateral action, military superiority, a commitment to “extending democracy, liberty, security to all regions”.¹⁶ Bush also claimed that USA was also threatened by the so-called “rogue states” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) which were aiming to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Hence, Bush administration came with a foreign policy agenda focusing on regime change in these “rogue states”. The USA qualified its shift in its former strategy by declaring that military force was only one of the options for dealing with “rogue states” in order to preempt a possible attack which might come from these states. Occupation of Iraq was realized according to this logic. Bush administration hoped that a convincing victory in Iraq would have a deterrent effect on other “rogue states” (Kreft, 2005, pp. 70-71). Neoconservatives have argued that preventive war is a useful and necessary tool in an age of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), which lays out the Bush Doctrine on “pre-emptive war” in Section V (Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction), argues that deterrence as practiced in the Cold War will not work against “terrorist enemies”. It

¹⁵ Deterrence theory is a military strategy developed after and used throughout the Cold War and current times. It is based on Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions or any combination of these. Containment is a foreign policy strategy of the USA of the Cold War period to stop the domino effects of nations moving politically towards USSR based communism.

¹⁶ Pre-emptive war (preemptive attack) “occurs when an actor commits itself to a course of action that is crucially influenced by anticipation of what another actor intends to do”. It is easier to justify politically than preventive war. Preventive war “is the deliberate decision to initiate military violence because the initiator perceives that he has a preponderance of capability in his favor”. Preventive war is in broad terms illegal under the charters of the United Nations and is out-of-line with the general 21st century trend to sanction the use of force only for individual and collective self-defence purposes” (Evans & Newnham (b), (c), 1998, pp. 448, 449, 450 and 451).

points out that the concept of pre-emptive war in international law has long held that states may take action when enemy forces “present an imminent danger of attack,” such as “a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.” The document then states, “we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” This means that the USA can attack another country “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” In other words, the document simply redefines “pre-emptive war.” The new definition is that of “preventive war.” It then proceeds to refer to de-facto preventive war as “pre-emptive war” (The USA National Security Strategy Report, 2002, pp. 13, 15, 16). It seems clear that from a legal standpoint, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was a “preventive war”, as the case cannot be made that an attack upon the USA by Iraq was clear and imminent, direct, critical, and unmanageable. The National Security Document, however, also stresses that other nations should not follow the USA example. Other nations should not “use preemption as a pretext for aggression”. Thus, the doctrinal concept of “pre-emptive war” in the Bush Doctrine, can be seen as giving the USA the exclusive right to engage in de-facto preventive war (Schröder, 2002).

The Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war, or more accurately preventive war, was announced in September 2002. The USA occupied Iraq in March 2003 without obtaining a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing a military invasion. The occupation and actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority, under Paul Bremer, resulted in the emergence of a strong insurgency in mid 2003. USA forces engaged in urban guerrilla warfare, leading to serious doubts about the future of Iraq as a USA-sponsored neo-liberal capitalist model for the Arab world. The USA invasion and occupation of Iraq was at the same time a pre-emptive strike upon the EU, South Asia and China, in terms of control of global energy resources vital to USA economic competitors. The first pre-emptive war disrupted the Transatlantic alliance for a while and given rise to grave doubts about the future of the international order (Girdner, 2004-2005, pp. 4-5- 6).¹⁷

The “Greater Middle East” as a political term was first invented by the Bush administration to include non-Arabic Muslim countries (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, Afghanistan), Central Asian Muslim countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), some states of Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) to the

¹⁷ However, today it is not possible to say the same things particularly about the transatlantic alliance. When pro-American parties came to power in Germany and France, tensions between the USA and Germany –France were eliminated.

classical Middle East Muslim Arab countries.¹⁸ The term was introduced as a part of a proposal for change in the way the USA and the West deals with the Middle East right before the G8 Summit of 2004.¹⁹

Bush doctrine has centered on the direct application of the USA's "military power" and "political power" with the aim of promoting democracy in the Greater Middle East (Monten; 2005, p. 112). As a part of Bush's administration national security policy, the USA launched its bilateral initiative which is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (2002) in order to realize democratic reforms, which is defined as a moral and strategic necessity for the USA, in this region. This initiative provided a framework and funding for the USA to expand four pillars of MEPI- economic, political, educational and women's empowerment-. Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice described the MEPI as an instrument of transformational diplomacy as it make the use of both diplomatic power and foreign assistance to help citizens better their own lives and build their own nations possible (U.S. Department of State (a), n.d.; Sourcewatch, n.d.). UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society), which defined the three weaknesses of the region as knowledge acquisition, freedom and good governance, the empowerment of the women and the reason of these weaknesses, provided the ground for the preparation of Middle East Initiative (UNDP -Arab States, Erhan; 2005).

Following the USA-led military operation in Iraq, which began on March 19, 2003, the USA officials started to mention a multilateral project to change the economic and political conditions of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region (Erhan; 2005, p. 160). The USA and the EU agreed that lack of democracy and modernization throughout this region engender problems for regional stability and international security. Hence, the Group of Eight (G8) countries namely USA, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada and Russia officially launched the USA led multilateral initiative - Broader Middle East and North Africa

¹⁸ Most of these countries are also part of the region which is called by Brzezinski as Eurasia.

¹⁹ This initiative is promoted by neoconservative think tanks like Project for the New American Century. "We fully support your call for "a broad and sustained campaign" against the "terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them." We agree with Secretary of State Powell that the United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific attack of September 11, and we must, as he said, "go after terrorism wherever we find it in the world" and "get it by its branch and root." We agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but must also target those "other groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies." (Project for the New American Century, 2001). It was outlined around the Helsinki Accords from 1975.

Initiative (hereinafter referred to as BMENA) - in June 2004 in Sea Island, USA to promote the political and economic transformation of the region (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, p. 1; Erhan; 2005, 161). BMENA initiative thus emerged as a multilateral framework for democratic reform in the region since it included G8 countries and the regional partners to this US led initiative. However, the Greater Middle East project (earlier version of the BMENA) came to world attention when it was first mentioned in London based Arabic newspaper – *Al Hayat*'s 13 February 2004 issue which published the draft version of the “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper” (*Al Hayat*, 2004). BMENA thus emerged as a project which would help to diminish the risks targeting USA and other western interests by creating better humanitarian environment for the people of this region (Erhan, 2005, p. 161). This USA led initiative mainly aims to protect USA's interests in the region.

The draft version of the “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper” (draft version of the BMENA) which is published by the *Al-Hayat* revealed the Plan and triggered a large debate in the Middle East region. The Plan was also discussed during the Arab League annual summit in Tunis. Some of the discussants were enthusiastically supporting this USA led initiative whereas a majority of discussants claimed that “democracy can not be imposed from outside. The region should enter a period of transition to democracy depending on its own domestic parameters”. Moreover, most of the Arab intellectuals emphasized that, “without finding a just and peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, and ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, the Plan would reach less of the expected results.” While the debate on this Plan was ongoing in the Middle East, the USA invited representatives of the regional governments to the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, USA, in June 2004. Leaders of the some BMENA countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen participated to the Georgia Summit. However, majority of the regional governments remained reluctant to take part in this initiative (Erhan, 2005, p. 162).

Leaders of the G-8 issued a declaration titled “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa” on June 9, 2004. The declaration was a highly modified version of the draft Plan, which was published by *Al-Hayat* newspaper in February. In this new version, some modifications were made by the USA taking the reactions of the BMENA governments and intellectuals into consideration. Some part of the draft were removed and some phrases about the Palestinian issue were added in this direction. The G-8 leaders also emphasized that their support for

reform in the region would go hand in hand with their support for “a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based upon U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.” Moreover, they stressed that they fully joined the Quartet in its “common vision of two states, Israel and a viable, democratic, sovereign and contiguous Palestine, living side by side in peace and security” (Erhan, 2005, pp. 162-163).

Forum for the Future, which would provide a framework at ministerial level, bringing together G-8 and regional Foreign, Economic, and other Ministers in an ongoing discussion on reform, with business and civil society leaders participating in parallel dialogues to develop partnership on political sphere, the socio-cultural sphere and the economic sphere, was decided to be established (Erhan, 2005, p. 164).

However, the false rationales for launching an illegal and unilateral war in Iraq damaged credibility of the USA (Girdner, 2004-2005, p. 30). The USA has weakened international law with this act. The occupation of Iraq does not serve the ambitious goals of the BMENA initiative. Especially, ongoing instability causing Iraqi civilian deaths on daily basis and widely broadcasted incidents of torture and abuse of the Iraqi prisoners and civilians by American and British soldiers diminished the level of support to the BMENA initiative since it is backed by the USA government. In other words, “military power” of the USA lessened the impact of its “political power” in the region.

Occupation in Iraq and the growing instability in the country thus accelerated anti-American sentiments among the Middle Eastern peoples, diminishing their support for USA’s initiatives like BMENA. As Girdner (2004-2005) said, “Afghanistan remained a hot bed of Taliban activity and Pakistan is a tinder box of anti-Americanism and sentiment for Osama bin Laden” (p. 30). Terrorist activities in the Central Asia created opportunity for China and Russia to establish their hegemony particularly through the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as Russia and China seems the best guarantee for regional security due to uncertainty over future presence of the USA in the region (Ünver Noi, 2006, p. 28, Yom, 2002).²⁰ Applying the general principle of non-interference specifically, the SCO with the July 2005 Communique called for a timetable to be set for the closure of USA

²⁰ One of the important features of the SCO, which is respect for diversity, stated as follows: “Diversity of civilization and the model of development must be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and model of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretext to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs” (Yom, 2002).

military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan that support Washington's operations in Afghanistan (McMahan, 2006; Weinstein, 2006).

The USA policies in the region seem solving some of the western security problems in the short run. However, without securing reliability among the Middle Eastern people, American policies to eliminate the security threats for the long run seems not possible. The lack of frankness behind the BMENA initiative will prevent it to become a new Marshall Plan for the region in the near future although the goals presented in the BMENA were encouraging. Moreover, there still is not a consensus among the G-8 countries on real meaning and targets of the BMENA. The BMENA remained mainly a USA-led initiative, and lack of sustained multilateral support does not facilitate its implementation (Erhan, 2005).

By looking at all these developments, we can say that the USA, like the EU, aimed to promote the so-called “normative principles” such as common liberal-democratic principles; liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and to promote relatively less-common social-democratic principles such as equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance in the Greater Middle East region in order to prevent the reasons of the threats stemming from this region. However, the U.S. preferred to use its “military power” in the imposition of these norms (Afghanistan and Iraq operations) along with and as a complementary to its civilian approach (MEPI, MEFTA, BMENA). In other words, it gave weight to use physical force to reach the final aim in the short run to realize “rapid transformation” in this region contrary the EU’s “gradual transformation”.

II. EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

Collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not only lead to change in the definition of the Middle East by including the oil rich Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, but also lead to provoke a rethinking of European security focusing on its neighbors in the the Central and Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. The main concern of Europe at the time of Cold War which meant the marching of Soviets into Germany was no more valid. End of the Cold War also removed Soviet military support for Arab regimes and moreover allowed massive Jewish immigration into Israel (Satloff, 1997, p. 8; Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 1). With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats, the EU focused on its neighboring countries and tried to produce policy which could help to organize well-established relations with its neighbors. This policy, at that time, primarily focused on the new democracies of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). However, geo-political evolutions and emerging of new threats such as demographic explosion and economic hardships and their result mass immigration from South to North; rise of Islamic fundamentalism; environmental degradation from the South led to the reconsideration of the EU's policy towards its Mediterranean neighbors, as well (Lannon & Van Elsuwege, n.d., p. 26).

The East-West conflict ended when the CEECs started their political and economic transformations in order to become new members of the EU. This development paved the way to a new North-South relationship. In other words, when the EU redefined its links with the CEECs, it also reconsidered the policies towards its southern neighbors. With this decision, the EU created an opportunity for itself to make the balance in favor of its Southern neighbors which had been tilted in favor of its Central and Eastern European neighbors since the beginning of 1990s. Some issues causing concerns and common challenges such as immigration, terrorism, security, energy supply and environment accelerated this process.

Geographic proximity of the Mediterranean to the EU member states and its strategic importance also made this region vital for the economic and political well-being and security of the EU. As Nonneman (1992) stated, 'the potential dangers of anti-Western regimes emerging and of immigration pressures being exacerbated as a result of political instability and economic failure, as well as the necessity of securing predictable oil supplies, mean that

Europe has no alternative to maintaining the keenest interest in its neighbors located in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean' (p. Xi). This can be interpreted as the existence of instability, poverty and chaos due to political instability, emergence of militant movements, economic hardships, scarcities, rise of fundamentalism, underdevelopment, demographic explosion, social problems, ethnic discrimination and other related problems in the Mediterranean region. The transboundary nature of these problems; the existence of large numbers of immigrants in the EU member states originating from various parts of the Mediterranean; and the continuing migratory pressures caused concerns for the EU members states, particularly the EU member states which have geographic proximity to this region. In order to eliminate such threats coming from this region and their potential to spread their destabilizing influence over the whole Union, the EU decided to enhance stability and security in the SEMCs through promoting EU values and standards such as promotion of democracy and respect for human rights along with the conditions such as improved living standards that may contribute to the upholding of these values (Nas, 2007, p. 432).

The following table shows some economic indicators of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, annual GDP growth rate, government debt, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), unemployment rate, imports and exports with share of EU in SEMCs which have effects on SEMCs' economies.

Table 2.1. Euro-Mediterranean Statistics

	<i>GDP</i> <i>Per capita</i> <i>(EUR)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>annual GDP</i> <i>growth rate</i> <i>(%)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>unemployment</i> <i>rate</i> <i>(%)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>government</i> <i>debt</i> <i>(% of GDP)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>FDI</i> <i>(million EUR)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>imports</i> <i>(million EUR)</i> <i>(with share</i> <i>of EU in %)</i> <i>1998</i>	<i>exports</i> <i>(million EUR)</i> <i>(with share</i> <i>of EU in %)</i> <i>1998</i>
Algeria	1443	5.1	26.4	n.a.	6(*)	8314 (57.1)	9033 (63.6)
Egypt	1072(*)	5.6	8.4(*)	n.a.	960	14698(36.3)	2851(38.0)
Israel	14786	2.2	8.6	89.6	1650	24503(58.1)	20771(30.9)
Jordan	1385	1.3(*)	12.6	92.6(*)	318(*)	3416(32.7)	1316(6.6)
Lebanon	2577(**)	n.a.	8.5(*)	85.4(**)	132(*)	6306(53.4)	639(25.3)
Morocco	1143	6.5	17.8(***)	51.6	293	7526(55.7)	4138(59.3)
Syria	1011	7.8	8.9	n.a.	71(*)	867(33.4)	643(50.9)
Tunisia	1922	5.0	15.7(*)	51.3	600	7462(75.0)	5126(80.2)
Turkey	2792	2.8	6.3	22.5	876	40842(52.5)	24138(50.0)
West Bank/ Gaza Strip	1323(*)	n.a.	14.6	1.2(*)	175(*)	1908(7.2)(*)	335(0.2)(*)
(*) In 1997 (**) In 1995 (***) In 1996							

Source: (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, pp. 28, 29).

This table also shows that there is low GDP per capita and high unemployment rates in all SEMCs except Israel. Unemployment provides catalyst for immigration from South to North. For instance, one of the reasons of immigration from Algeria to France is partly the outcome of high unemployment in Algeria.

All concerns and developments mentioned led to the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) - a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the member states of the EU and the SEMCs - on 28 November 1995. The Barcelona Process is a unique and ambitious initiative, which laid the foundations of a new regional relationship. It also represents a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations (EUROPA (a), 2005).

The EMP comprises two complementary dimensions; bilateral and regional. In the bilateral dimension, the EU's relations with each country is carried out, mostly through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (AAs) in which the EU negotiates with the SEMCs

individually. Each AAs contain features specific to the relations between the EU and each SEMCs. In the regional dimension, regional cooperations and regional dialogue which covers the political, economic and cultural fields take place. This is one of the most innovative aspects of the EMP. It has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many SEMCs while it emphasizes the national complementarities (EUROPA (a), 2005).

The EMP has been reinforced by the introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004- following the EU's CEECs enlargement.²¹ Although the ENP builds on objectives and instruments of the EMP, the ENP, with its emphasis on increased EU engagement and prospects of enhanced support and cooperation for its neighboring countries, seems to help advance these objectives further (2005 Year of the Mediterranean, 2005, p. 1-3).

In this chapter, historical evolution of the EMP commencing from colonial period to the present, main objectives of the EMP under three baskets (political and security, economic and financial and social, cultural and human) and weaknesses/failures and strengths/successes of the EMP with a special focus on European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) are analyzed in order to facilitate the comparison of the EMP with the BMENA. For that reason, a parallel entitlement for both projects is carried out.

2.1. Historical Evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

Much of North Africa and the Middle East were under direct European colonial rule or mandate until after Second World War (WWII). For instance, French colony, Algeria gained its independence after the European Community was set up (Rhein, 1997, p. 44).

The institutionalization of relations between the EC and the SEMCs began before and continued through and beyond the events of 1973. The main reason behind this motivation

²¹ The main objective of the ENP is to avoid emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors. To this end, its aim is to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security in its neighbors (European Commission (a), 2009).

was primarily economic in nature since they wished to preserve trade relations and import and export patterns with the SEMCs inherited from the colonial period and to advance this further through the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (Piening, 1997, p. 72).

The EC launched its “global Mediterranean policy” at the Paris summit of October 1972. Global Mediterranean Policy was designed to establish a “global approach in all the Community’s relations with the Mediterranean countries”. In other words, through this policy the EC sought to bring the multiplicity of bilateral relations and agreements that existed between the EC and SEMCs individually into a single and coordinated framework (Piening, 1997, p. 72).

Community signed preferential trade agreements with Lebanon and Israel in 1964. These were followed by association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco in 1969 and a trade agreement with Egypt in 1972, cooperation agreements with Algeria in 1976, with Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1977 and Lebanon in 1978. The Commission claimed that each one would be prepared specifically to the needs of the partner country concerned, but with minor differences they all shared the same characteristics: trade preferences, financial and technical cooperation (aid), common institutions in the form of a council of ministers which holds annual meeting; privileged status given to the migrant workers. In parallel with the negotiation of new agreements with the Arab states of the region, the EC also updated its 1964 preferential trade agreement with Israel. In 1975, the EC signed a free trade agreement with Israel²² (Piening, 1997, pp. 72, 73).

2.1.1. First Oil Crisis (1973)

After Yom Kippur War (the war between Arab states and Israel) and the following Arab oil boycott against the Netherlands in 1973, Europe’s relationship with Israel became a vital determinant in Europe’s overall relations with the Middle East and North Africa countries. Since 1973, the EU carefully balanced its approach to Israel, on the one hand, and its Arab neighbors, on the other hand, particularly when it came to negotiate cooperation

²² In 1995, this was replaced by a Mediterranean association agreement. Similar third-generation agreements have also been negotiated with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt.

agreements with the Mashrak region in 1977-78 (Rhein, 1997, p. 44).

As mentioned earlier, the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbors caused the EC to rethink its political as well as economic relationship with the Arab world. The EC's foreign ministers issued a declaration in November 1973 urging the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank and acknowledging the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Following these events, the idea of Euro-Arab Dialogue was launched and officially entered into force on 31 July 1974 at a meeting between the president and secretary-general of the Arab League and the presidents of the Commission and the Council. An agreement was reached to establish an institutional structure based on a general Commission and a series of specialized Committees for ongoing discussions on the following topics: industrialization, infrastructure, agriculture, financial cooperation, trade, science and technology, cultural and social affairs (Piening, 1997, p. 74; Commission of the European Communities (b), 1985).

However, neither launching a “global Mediterranean policy” nor establishing a multilateral relationship with the all Arab states of the region through Euro-Arab Dialogue served to make multiplicity of bilateral relations of the EC with the SEMCs states single and coordinated. For instance, since its initiation in 1973, the Euro-Arab dialogue has the following problems:

“Different perceptions of both sides related to the nature and purpose of the dialogue; Inability to deliver results due to institutional weaknesses and a lack of consensus and political will of both sides; Inability of both parties to insulate their relationship from the negative influence of external events and political interference, which leads to hold up progress in political areas of cooperation because of the disagreements in the political side of the dialogue” (Miller, 1992, p. 7).

2.1.2. Second Oil Crisis (1979)

In 1978, President of Egypt, Mohammed Anwar Al-Sadat, Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, met with President of USA, Jimmy Carter at Camp David for the peaceful

settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors. However, Camp David Accords did nothing to address the central problem, which is recognition of the Palestinian's right to self-determination (U.S. Department of State (c), 2008).²³ As a result of this development and the following development which is the second oil crisis emerged right after 1979 Iranian Revolution, the nine member states of the EC issued the Venice Declaration on 13 June 1980. With this Declaration, they repeated their call for a "comprehensive solution" to the Israeli-Arab conflict and committing the EC to work "in a more concrete way" toward peace, recognizing the right to existence and security for all states in the region, including Israel, and recognition of the Palestinian's right to self-determination. These principles, which were emphasized by the nine member states of the EC, formed the basis of Community policy towards this issue. Accordingly, the Nine member states of the EC would not accept "any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem". They also stressed the "need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation" since they considered that the Jewish settlement on Palestinian land was a serious obstacle to peace (Piening, 1997, p. 75).

Some developments of the 1980s such as Iran-Iraq war; assassination of Egyptian president Mohammed Anwar Al-Sadat; escalating civil war in Lebanon and Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; growth of terrorism in the form of hijackings and hostage taking and branding of Syria and Libya as "terrorist states", served to make political dialogue with the Arab world quite difficult for the EC (Piening, 1997, p. 76).

Briefly, relations between the EU and SEMCs and the countries in the Middle East from 1973 onwards can be classified as follows:

1. The multilateral relationship with all the Arab states of the region, through the Euro-Arab dialogue; a forum shared by the EC and the League of Arab States launched at the Copenhagen European Council in 1973, right after the "Yom Kippur War" and the oil embargo (MEDEA (a), 1996).
2. Bilateral cooperation agreements under the "global/ overall Mediterranean policy" signed between the EU and the SEMCs during the 1960s and 1970s;

²³ Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, was accused of concluding a peace agreement without demanding greater concessions for Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in the Camp David in 1978. The Palestinian Liberation Organization did not condemn the assassination of Sadat. PLO Official of 1980s Nabil Ramlawi's following words verify above mentioned argument: "We were expecting this end of President Sadat because we are sure he was against the interests of his people, the Arab nations and the Palestinian people" (BBC News, 1981).

3. multilateral agreements with sub-regional organizations of states in the North Africa and Middle East such as the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which is aiming for economic and political unity in North Africa, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was created in 1981 by six Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates);²⁴
4. other group relations between EC member states and states in the region, including such initiatives as the “five-plus-five” cooperation,²⁵ five European countries Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta and five Arab North African countries, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, and Italian proposal for a ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ (CSCM) (Miller, 1992, p. 7).

2.1.3. Post-Cold War Era

Although many initiatives have been taken to establish cooperation between the EC and the Mediterranean countries within the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, it was insufficient to reach the desired goal due to above mentioned problems of the Dialogue. During the Ministerial meeting of the Euro-Arab Dialogue held in Paris December 1989, the Italian Minister of that time, Gianni de Michelis, stated that there is need to extend the spirit of Helsinki to the Mediterranean and the Middle East to foster democracy and economic development in that region.²⁶ On January 1991, “Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean” (CSCM) was published. Its goals distributed into three baskets: security, cooperation and human dimension. CSCM is one of the initiatives emerged with the aim of establishing close cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean countries since 1973 (OSCE, 1975; MEDEA (b), 2002).

²⁴ UMA was established in 1989. Members of the UMA are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The EU relations with the UMA accepted as vital for the development of the entire EMP (EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament, 2002).

²⁵ Five-plus-Five Dialogue was launched in 1988 with the aim of closer cooperation under the following headings: debt, migration, food self-sufficiency, cultural dialogue, technological development and scientific research, transport and communication, environment, and a project to create a specific financial institution (Miller, 1992, p. 13).

²⁶ Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was based on three baskets, cooperation on security; economy; and humanitarian fields, was opened in Helsinki in 1975 (OSCE, 1975).

EC's Mediterranean relations were reviewed and "Renewed Mediterranean Policy", which intended the intensification of relations with the SEMCs, thus was agreed by the Rome II European Council in December 1990. The 'Renewed Mediterranean Policy' like the former one had the following shortcomings in terms of encouraging both regional cooperation and closer integration with the European community:

"The effects of the political tensions and conflicts between the Maghreb countries, Turkey and Greece, and between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the reluctance of states to share resources with their neighbors and their preference for development assistance to be kept within a national framework prevented greater inter-state cooperation in the region; Despite its claims to a 'global' or 'overall' approach, Mediterranean policy did not achieve a uniform approach to the region as whole; EC policy is supposed to make cooperation between the region and the Community more comprehensive and effective, and to assist regional cooperation. However, continuing with the Community's approach which divides the region into national units for the purpose of negotiating trade concessions and aid priorities seems anomalous for the Community" (Miller, 1992, pp. 8-9).

At the same time, the end of the Cold War has lessened the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Until the mid-1980s, there was intense competition between the superpowers for taking this region under their hegemony. To this end, both sides were providing their "alliances" with everything from direct financial support to arms. However, the significance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East not only lies in its place in the East-West conflict it played during the Cold War period, but also energy resources that region has. However, EC's energy dependence on Middle East OPEC oil imports diminished due to the development of North Sea oil and gas, the increased contribution of nuclear power, and the availability of oil and gas from Russia and other sources in the former Soviet Union (Piening, 1997, p. 70).

The following table shows the emerging energy balance between Russia and the EU in the post-Cold War period.

Table 2.2. Energy Balance between the EU and Russia

	<i>Russian Federation</i>		<i>EU 25</i>	
	2000	2020	2000	2020
Oil:Reserves	65 billion brl	/	6,5 billion brl	/
Production	323 Mtoe	500 Mtoe	164 Mtoe	102Mtoe
Export+/Import-	+205 Mtoe	+330 Mtoe	-518Mtoe	-632Mtoe
Trade EU/Russia	+126 Mtoe or 60%	:	-126 Mtoe or 25%	:
Gas:Reserves	47 trillions m3	/	3 trillions m3	/
Production	490 Mtoe	600 Mtoe	197 Mtoe	147 Mtoe
Export+/Import	+175 Mtoe	+216 Mtoe	-186 Mtoe	-450 Mtoe
Trade EU/Russia	+90 Mtoe or 36%		-90 Mtoe or 50%	

Source : (Khristenko, 2005, p. 85).

Table 2.2. can be interpreted that oil reserves and gas reserves of Russian Federation is considerably high in comparison to oil reserves and gas reserves of EU 25. Export/import and trade EU/Russia data also show that the EU 25 is one of the main oil and gas importer from Russia.

The following map shows the existing and planned natural gas pipelines coming from Russian Federation to the EU member states.



Source: (Cohen, 2007)

Table 2.3. Russian Oil on the European Market

	2000	2020	Increase 2000-2020
Net imports (million t)	428	600	180
among this, imports from Russia (million t)	128	160	30
Russian share	30	27	17

Source: (Göetz, 2005, p. 86).

Table 2.3. indicates that Russia's share will slightly decrease from 30 to 27 as of 2020. This means that European oil import requirements must be covered from other world regions.

Table 2.4. Russian Natural Gas on the European Market

	<i>2000</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Increase 2000-2020</i>
Net imports	200	500	300
(billion cubic meters)			
among this, imports	134	165	30
from Russia (billion cubic meters)			
Russian share (%)	67	33	10

Source: (Göetz, 2005, p. 86).

The same degree of decrease is expected in the share of Russian natural gas in European imports. While the slight decrease of the share of Russian oil in European imports is not a cause of concern, the foreseeable distinct decrease of the share of Russian natural gas in European imports from %67 to %33 led to Europe to seek new alternatives such as gas from North Africa in order to satisfy its requirements.²⁷

Besides Russia, main gas regions for European supply are North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Egypt), North Sea (Norway), the Caspian Area and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Gulf (Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen), West Africa (Nigeria, Angola), South America (Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela). North Africa will continue to be the least cost gas supplier for Europe due its geographical proximity and low production cost. Existing and planned gas pipelines from this region are MEG (10 to 20 BCM), Medgaz (10 to 20 bcm), Algeria-Italy via Sardinia-Corsica (10 bcm), LNG Algeria (30 to 35 bcm), Transmed (25 to 30 bcm), WLGP (8-11 to 20 bcm), LNG Libya (1,5 to 5 bcm), LNG Egypt (4 to 15 bcm) (OME, 2002).

SEMCs regained importance as being natural gas suppliers of Europe next to Russia as a result of the potential decrease of the share of Russian natural gas in European imports and the EU's willingness to diversify its gas suppliers in order to prevent its energy dependency to Russia and the possible use of energy as a weapon against it by this country. For instance, Algeria, next to Russia the main natural gas supplier of Europe, will be able to raise its

²⁷ Apart from deliveries of liquid gas, suppliers can only include Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Caspian region, since, for geographical reasons, gas pipelines are only economically efficient at a maximum length of 4000-5000km. While in 2000 about 70% of European gas imports came from Russia, this share will reach only 50% in 2010 and less than 30% in 2020 (Göetz, 2005, pp. 86-87).


deliveries by 2020 from approximately 60 to 120 billion cubic meters when new fields are opened up and new export pipelines to Europe are built. Libya also will be able to raise its exports from one billion cubic meters to a possible volume of 30-40 billion cubic meters, by using the new Green Stream pipeline. Future gas exports from Egypt to Europe will go via the Jordan pipeline to Turkey, and will be realized by liquid natural gas (LNG) projects, thus reaching a possible volume of 30 billion cubic meters in 2020 (Göetz, 2005, pp. 86-87).

The following map shows a new gas pipeline project namely the Nabucco project connecting the Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas markets. The pipeline length is approximately 3,300 km, starting at the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border respectively, leading to Baumgarten in Austria (Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, n.d.).



Source: (Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, n.d.).

The following map shows existing and planned gas routes to the EU member states.



Source: (Spiegel Online International, 2009).

In addition to long-term energy concerns and short term security concerns of the EU, the new trend –the process of regionalization within the broader process of globalization of the world economy– and the new rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have provided further impetus for the EU to review its bilateral agreements with its Mediterranean neighbors. More importantly, the emergence of Central and Eastern countries (CEECs) as a candidate for EU membership with the collapse of USSR engendered the EU to make the balance in favor of SEMCs who cannot accede to the EU. All these developments created an environment to establish the EMP with 12 SEMCs (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9- 10).

In the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Commission policy papers entitled *Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy* (1990) were issued. These policy papers assessed Community policy toward the Mediterranean and stressed the importance of the social and economic development of the region for Community's security. It emphasized the need for horizontal cooperation which would include transport, energy and telecommunications rather than strictly bilateral cooperation (Piening, 1997, p. 78).

The second Commission communication on the future relations between the Community and the Maghreb countries, which proposed establishment of a new regional framework with the Maghreb countries leading to a “Euro-Maghreb Partnership” and a free trade area on expiration of the latest financial protocols in 1996, was issued in 1992. At the June 1992 meeting of the European Council in Lisbon, the Maghreb was declared to be a geographical area of common interest under the newly established Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The proposals were limited to the Maghreb countries. However, it was extendable. In 1993, two further Commission papers dealt with the Middle East. The first of these papers, on future relations and cooperation between the Community and the Middle East, focused on the goal of regional cooperation, possibly “along the lines of the OECD,” and a regional free trade area. The second paper focused on support for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and attempted to situate the EU’s role in the multilateral efforts (Piening, 1997, p. 79).

As mentioned earlier, The EC had a Cooperation Agreement with the SEMCs, namely Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, under Article 133 of the Treaty of Rome as part of its global/overall Mediterranean policy. These agreements were administered by Cooperation Councils. Financial and technical assistance to each country, in the form of both low-interest loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and grants from the budget along with political dialogue, were provided (Bainbridge, 1995, p. 363). Although for several decades the EC had agreements of various types with the SEMCs, the EU did not have a comprehensive policy covering this region as a whole.

The idea of partnership with the Mediterranean region which was officially developed at Lisbon, Corfu and Essen meetings of the European Council created an opportunity for the EU to establish a comprehensive policy covering the region as a whole. The Lisbon European Council of June 1992 stated that ‘the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, as well as the Middle East, are geographical areas in relations to which the Union has strong interests in terms of security and social stability’. At the meeting of the European Council in Corfu in June 1994, the need to strengthen the Union’s Mediterranean policy and to develop the mediterranean region into an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and economic well being led to drawing up a proposal for such a policy, partly as a means of making the balance in the Union’s trade and aid relations with its near neighbors, which had shifted in favor of the countries of CEECs since 1991. It was also believed that financial

assistance and more political contacts would help to stabilize the region and lessen migratory pressures on the Union coming from this region. In this connection, the conclusions of the Corfu European Council gave a ‘mandate to the Council to evaluate, together with the Commission, the global policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short- and medium term, bearing in mind the possibility of convening a conference attended by the EU and its Mediterranean partners’ (Bulletin of the European Union Supplement 2/95, 1995, p. 10).

At the Essen European Council meeting, which was held in December 1994, the necessity for the EU to establish ‘balanced relations with all its neighbors’ was recognized. At the same meeting, the Project for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) between the EU and SEMCs was decided (Habeeb, 2002, p. 12). At the following European Council, held in Cannes in June 1995, ‘an ambitious policy cooperation to the south forms a counterpart to the policy of openness to the east and gives the European Union’s external action its geopolitical coherence’, in other words, the proposal for EMP was adopted (Lannon & Van Elsuwege, n.d., p. 26). At the Cannes meeting European Council also agreed to provide development assistance to the region under the MEDA programme. Hence, the EU developed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to tackle the issues emerging from this region on a broader and firmer basis. The EU and eleven SEMCs including the PLO signed ‘Barcelona Declaration’ on 28 November 1995 and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was established (Hatipoğlu, 2004, p. 121, Bainbridge, 1995, pp. 368, 373, 375). Neither the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nor Iraq nor Iran is covered by EMP. The EMP comprises 27 EU member states and 10 SEMCs (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). Libya has observer status since 1999. An essential feature of the implementation of the EMP has been the negotiation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the EU and nine of its SEMCs²⁸ to replace the 1970s Cooperation Agreements since 1995 (European Commission (b), 2008).

²⁸ Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are not part of this process since they have association agreements since the end of 1960s. Turkey has a Customs Union since 1995. Cyprus and Malta became full member of the EU as of May 2004.

Table 2.5. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans, 1995-2007

<i>Partner</i>	<i>Signature of agreement</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>ENP Action Plan</i>
Tunisia	June 1995	March 1998	March 2005 Concluded
Israel	November 1995	June 2000 April 2004 (extend AA to EU+35)	September 2004 Adopted
Morocco	February 1996	March 2000	March 2005 Concluded
PLO for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority	February 1997	July 1997	2005 Adopted
Jordan	November 1997	May 2002	June 2005 Adopted
Egypt	June 2001	June 2004 (Trade and trade related provisions effective since 2003) September 2004 (extend to EU+35)	March 2007 Adopted
Algeria	April 2002	September 2005	-
Lebanon	January 2002	April 2006	July 2005 Approved
Syria	June 2004 (*) Text initialed	-	-

(*) Negotiations on an EU-Syria Association Agreement were concluded in October 2004, but the agreement has yet to be signed and ratified. Current relations are governed by the 1977 Cooperation Agreement. In the absence of an AA, Syria cannot yet benefit from the ENP. Once the AA signed, the EU and Syria will then negotiate an Action Plan of commonly agreed priorities as well as support for its implementation.

Source: (2005 Year of the Mediterranean, 2005, p. 41, European Commission (b), n.d., European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (a) (n.d.).

This table indicates AAs replaced by the former Cooperation Agreements and the ENP Action Plans builds upon existing AAs in the framework of the EMP signed with the SEMCs. The ENP is not activated for Syria due to the non-existence of AA with this country, yet.

The EMP is based on three baskets: 1) political and security basket; 2) economic and financial basket; 3) social, cultural and human basket. Through these baskets, the EU aimed to have a strengthened and regular political dialogue, the development of economic and financial cooperation and intercultural dialogue with the SEMCs to reach the final aim, which is to bring peace, prosperity and security to this region (Piening, 1997, p. 81).

Compared with the EU's previous bilateral relations with SEMCs, the innovations brought by the EMP are as follows:

“A new spirit in relations by working together in various groups that meet frequently (for example, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process and the senior officials meetings on political and security questions), seeking to secure full cooperation between all of the 27 governments involved in the Partnership and the European Commission was developed; A wider range of issues such as political, economic and financial, social, human and cultural were included in the EMP; Two complementary tracks; regional and bilateral were being employed. In this connection, upgrading the bilateral agreements was determined as a precondition for establishing regional integration through a network of bilateral South-South agreements” (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9- 10).

2.1.4. Post-9/11 Era

The September 11th terror attacks to the USA has triggered a lot of developments. However, it was not the only event that changed everything since there were processes that were already under way like the Barcelona Process. This event just contributed to enhancement of this process. For instance, it increased the importance of previously half-heartedly pursued third basket of the EMP, social, cultural and human affairs. In other words, one of the aims of the third basket which is to reinforce dialogue and cultural cooperation between the EU member states and the SEMCs gained pace. In the post-9/11 era, Valencia Conference (2002) was held and a framework document anticipating a ‘regional cooperation programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organized crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants’ migration and movements of persons’ was issued (Jünemann, 2004, p. 2, Gillespie, 2004, pp.

21-24-28).²⁹

Another important effect of the 9/11 in this region was the postponement of political reforms and violation of human rights with the claim that rapid democratic transformation would most probably lead to an unstable period of transition carrying risk of violent upheavals and civil wars and bringing Islamist parties to power even the rise in terrorist activities. Egypt for instance tried to legitimize its act regarding repression of its domestic opponents, particularly Islamists as part of a fight against international terrorism in the post-9/11 era. The understanding that rapid transformation of democracy in this region might lead to instability through carrying anti-Western Islamist parties to power also effected the EU's approach to this issue by decelerating and limiting its democracy promotion in these countries. For instance, the European Commission has withdrawn its support for many human rights organizations in Egypt which is one of the most important countries of this region and major player in the fight against terrorism (Jünemann, 2004, pp. 7- 13).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the following Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks to Madrid and London made the fight against terrorism one of the priorities of the EU. The countries of the EMP issued "Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism" by agreeing on the fact that terrorism threatens lives of their citizens and terrorist attacks seriously impair the enjoyment of human rights (Council of the European Union (a), 2005).

In addition to these effects, 9/11 terrorist attacks and the following Al-Qaeda terror attacks to Madrid and London also had effect on the EU's immigration policy since the origin of these terrorist assaults was from North Africa. Immigration has always been one of the main problem issues of the EU, even one of the major factors which led to the establishment of the EMP. With these catastrophic events immigration became related to the EU member states' national security and part of "high" politics. All these developments pushed the governments of the EU member states to reconsider their immigration policies. In 2005, immigration became the fourth key issue of the EMP. In order to combat these problems arising from immigration the following steps were taken; Euro Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on migration started to be held since 2007; The European Pact on Migration and

²⁹ Structured cooperation in the field of terrorism was prevented by the lack of common definition of terrorism among partners in Valencia Conference held in 2002. Arab states were unwilling to include the activities of militant Palestinian organizations under this heading (Gillespie, 2004, p. 28).

Asylum (2008) signed; Blue Card (work and residence permit for qualified migrants) decided to be implemented as of 2009 (Council of the European Union (b), 2008, p.2, 14, Blue Card Immigration.com (a), Blue Card Immigration.com (b)).

2.2. Main Objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has ambitious and long-term general objective which was clearly stated in the preamble of the Barcelona Declaration: “turning Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. This general objective requires;

“... a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership” (European Navigator, n.d.) .

The Barcelona Process was modeled on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (third and final stage of the CSCE) which established three main sets of recommendations known as three baskets. Like the Helsinki Final Act, the main objectives of the EMP is distributed into three ‘baskets’; 1) political and security basket, which aims to bring peace and stability through political reforms, 2) economic and financial basket, which aims a zone of shared prosperity through economic integration, and 3) social, cultural and human basket, which aims to create rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural links. In this part of the dissertation, three main objectives of the EMP, namely political and security objectives; economic and financial objectives; social, cultural and human objectives are given in detail.

2.2.1 Political and Security Objectives

With the end of the Cold War, the EU was faced with new challenges such as problems of immigration, security and economic instability emerging in the neighboring

countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to cope with these challenges and to bring stability and prosperity in this region, the EU started its integration process commencing with aid programs (PHARE) and Europe Agreements. Through this policy, the EU aimed to help these countries' economic and political transformations. Like Central and Eastern Europe the Mediterranean basin was defined as "an area of strategic importance for the Community" by the 1994 Commission communication which was entitled *Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*. It continued:

"The peace and stability of the region are of the highest priority to Europe. To consolidate that peace and stability in the region, a number of challenges have to be faced, notably: to support political reform, respect for human rights and freedom of expression as a means to contain extremism; to promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of migratory pressures"(Bulletin of the European Union Supplement 2/95, 1995, p.11).

Accordingly, The EMP was established with the aim of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and stability through a "code of conduct" for the solution of disputes among Mediterranean countries and other confidence-building measures in political and security spheres. A political dialogue which is based on respect for human rights and the principles of democracy and good governance with the SEMCs thus has been developed by the EU (Piening, 1997, p. 80).

The political and security basket of the EMP, which has the aim of bringing stability and peace to the region, consists of three complementary parts: "1) political dialogue on both bilateral and regional level, 2) partnership-building measures and 3) the Charter for Peace and Stability, which was supposed to enable the partners to identify the factors of friction and conflict in the Mediterranean and to agree on certain major norms to deal with them" (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, p. 9; El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 130).³⁰

³⁰ A significant step towards closer political and security cooperation will be adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. The Charter will be the main instrument for the EU's commitment to stability in the region since it will be politically and morally binding agreement for the purpose of preventing tensions and crisis and for maintaining peace and stability by means of cooperative security (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, p. 9). The second Ministerial EMP conference in Malta in 1997 failed to agree on a timetable to adopt a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 130). Plans for a Euro-

In this connection, the following principles were determined as principles, which would help realization of political and security objective of the EMP - to bring peace and stability in the region – in the Barcelona Declaration: “1) to act according to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other obligations under international law; 2) to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political system; 3) to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination; 4) to exchange information on matters related to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia; 5) to have respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, to promote tolerance between different groups in societies and combating intolerance, racism and xenophobia; 6) to respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty; 7) to respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination; 8) to refrain from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner; 9) to respect territorial integrity of their partners; 10) to settle their disputes by peaceful means; 11) to strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism; 12) to fight together with other partners against organized crime and drug smuggling; 13) to promote regional security by supporting nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through complying with international and regional non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreements” (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 3).

As listed above, promotion of democracy and the rule of law, respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights, equal rights of people were set as political objectives whereas respect for territorial integrity, fight against terrorism, organized crime and drug smuggling, promotion of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation were set as security objectives that were expected to be implemented by the SEMCs in the Barcelona Declaration. Political and security partnership also includes the promotion of the Middle East Peace Process.

As a complementary to the security objectives of the EMP, the parties determined the following objectives to create Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems: 1) to prevent excessive accumulation of conventional arms and nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation; 2) to refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements; 3) to promote

Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability have been put on hold since 2000. Arab-Israeli conflict is preventing security cooperation on a fully regional level (Schwarzer & Werenfells, 2008)

conditions to develop good-neighborly relations among themselves and in this respect to support projects aiming stability, security and prosperity through regional and sub-regional cooperation; 4) to attempt confidence and security building measures to establish an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 3).

Briefly, we can say that achieving the political and security objective of the EMP, which is to bring peace and stability to this region, is possible through above mentioned political reforms, particularly to make the countries of this region democratic. In other words, as Islam stated (2004) ‘to tackle the root causes of extremism, Europe must help Arab countries to become more democratic’ (p. 196). However, to realize this political transformation is not an easy task since most of these countries were considerably influenced by political Islam which started to obtain power since 1979 Iranian Revolution and it is seen by them as savior against western type materialist, individualist and secularist liberal democracy (Nas, 2007, p. 428).

2.2.2. Economic and Financial Objectives

There is rising mass poverty and deepening social polarization within and between SEMCs like other developing or less-developed countries. The following table shows some of social indicators of poverty such as low life expectancy, low adult literacy rate, increasing infant mortality, malnutrition etc. experienced in this region (Petmesidou & Paptheodrou; 2006, p. 1). To fight against poverty, which is one of the main economic and social objectives of the EMP, is clearly stated in the context of the Barcelona Process as a principle which should be seen as a common endeavour of the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. (EIRON-LINE, 2006).

Table: 2.6. Poverty and other social indicators in the Middle Eastern and North African countries

Country	expected yrs of Life at birth (2002)	%under- nourished (1999-2001)	%of children under 5 underweight (1995-2000)	% lacking access to sanitation facilities	% under \$ 2 a day*	% under national poverty line *
Morocco	68.5	7	9	32	14.3	19.0
Egypt	68.6	4	11	2	43.9	16.7
Algeria	69.5	6	6	8	15.1	22.6
Jordan	70.9	6	5	1	7.4	11.7
Syria	72	4	7	10
Palestinian Authority	72.3	...	4	0
Tunisia	72.7	...	4	16	10.0	7.6
Lebanon	73.5	3	3	1
Libya	72.6	...	5	3

Source: (Townsend, 2006, p. 378)

Besides this, the following economic facts show the gap between the EU member states and the SEMCs in terms of per capita income, gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the necessity to take urgent measures for their economic transformation to reduce this gap;

“The per capita income in the EU is approximately 10 times higher than that of the Mediterranean partners. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the Maghreb states namely Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia is less than that of Portugal. The GDP of the Mashreq states namely Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria roughly equals that of Greece or Finland. Only 1% of worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) and a mere 2% of European FDI flow into the Mediterranean region” (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, p. 11).

Table 2.7. indicates the unemployment rates, adult economic activity rates and population under the international poverty line of the SEMCs.

Table 2.7. Unemployment Rates and Population under the International Poverty Line in the SEMCs

Country	Unemployment Rates 2000-2003	Adult Economic Activity Rate (%) 2002		Population Under the International Poverty Line (%)	
		Male	Female	HI under \$2 per day	PGI at \$2 per day
		Jordan	13.2	77	28
Tunisia	14.3	78	38	10.0	2.3
Algeria	27.3	73	31	15.1	3.6
Egypt	10.2	79	36	43.9	11.3
Morocco	19.3	79	42	14.3	3.1
Lebanon	18	78	30		
Palestinian Authority	25.6	68	10		
Syria	11.7	77	30		
Israel	10.7	71	49		
Turkey	10.5	82	51	10.3	2.5

Source: (Petmesidou & Papatheodorou, 2006, pp. 6, 7, 22, 23)

Increasing unemployment and poverty in the region leads to mass immigration from these countries to the EU member states. In order to diminish migratory pressure, which is accepted by the EU as one of the main problems, economic reforms are needed to achieve shared prosperity in this region.

Since the economic and poverty indicators were more or less the same during the 1990s, strong need to improve the socio-economic situation in the SEMCs through economic reforms were emphasized in the 1994 Commission communication entitled *Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (Piening, 1997, pp. 79, 80). This economic transformation, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, is necessary in order to achieve the main goal of political and security basket which is to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and stability, on the one hand, to achieve economic and financial objectives of the EMP, which is to create an area of shared prosperity, the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners themselves, on the other hand. Hence, acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of the region's people; increase in the employment level

and reduction in the development gap in the EMP region and the wealth gap between the North and South; encouragement of regional cooperation and integration were set as long-term economic and financial objectives by the participants of the EMP (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 4).

The AAs between the EU and the SEMCs were expected to act as a powerful catalyst for opening up the economies, introducing free market systems and adopting necessary legislative reforms. As Derisbourg stated, ‘these agreements also support economic development, private investment and job creation, while working in favor of less corruption, more transparency and accountability, and an easing of internal social tensions’ (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9, 10, 11). AAs are in force between the EU and Tunisia since 1998, Israel (2000), Morocco (2000), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004) and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority (1997). Agreements were signed with Algeria in December 2001, and with Lebanon in January 2002 (European Commission (b), n.d.). Relations between the EU and the three SEMCs Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are based on first-generation AAs concluded in the 1960s and 1970s. Turkey has Customs Union with the EU since 1996. Malta and Cyprus became full member of the EU as of May 2004. With the introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the ENP Action Plans were built upon existing AAs in the framework of the EMP and signed with the SEMCs. ENP offers these countries a deeper economic integration based on market economy principles and sustainable development with the EU.

In order to achieve the objectives of the economic and financial basket of the partnership the following approaches were adopted:

“the progressive establishment of a free trade area; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and “concerted action” in the relevant areas; a substantial increase in the EU’s financial aid to its partners under MEDA programme” (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 4).

The target date for the establishment of free trade area was determined as 2010. Hence, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured goods on the basis of timetables were agreed by the signatories. The signatories also agreed that investment needs to be encouraged both internally and in the form of FDI and joint ventures and

cooperation between enterprises have to be supported (Piening, 1997, pp. 82, 83). The EU provided the partners with financial support in order to enable them to confront the social and economic challenges created by this economic transition.

At the European Council in Cannes in June 1995, the EU decided to make a major financial contribution in support of economic transformation efforts in the SEMCs. The Mesure d'Accompagnement (MEDA) programme, which is the principle financial instrument for implementation of the EMP governing the transfers made by the EU, was adopted by the Council in July 1996. MEDA programme offers technical and financial support in order to enable the SEMCs to achieve their economic and social transformations (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9, 10, 11). The following table shows the financial cooperation figures made through the MEDA programme:

Table 2.8. Financial Cooperation / MEDA Programme

1995-1999 MEDA 3,435 million euro	2000-2006 MEDA 5,350 million euro
1995-1999 EIB 4,808 million euro	2000-2007 EIB 6,400 million euro
	2000-2007 EIB+1million euro for transnational projects
	2003 committed MEDA funds 600,3 million euro

Source: (European Commission (c), n.d.).

This table indicates an increase in financial assistance given under MEDA programme, particularly for the years between 2000 and 2007. This programme covers all the fields of the partnership and related to both bilateral actions and regional projects of joint interest.

Since 2007, MEDA was replaced by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is financial instrument supporting the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) concrete assistance actions. With the initiation of ENPI, financial assistance which will be given for the SEMCs for the 2007-2013 period was determined as €12 billions (European Commission (c), 2008).

2.2.3. Social, Cultural and Human Objectives

The main objective of the third basket -social, cultural and human basket- is to bring the people of this region closer through promoting an understanding between them and improving their perception of each other. To this end, dialogue between the culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level were accepted as essential factors (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995).

The promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations were decided to be realized through initiatives such as periodic meetings between representatives of religious institutions, academics, etc. Hence, the EMP's third basket focused on the improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of this region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society by means of exchange; particularly encouragement of exchanges between civil societies: youth exchanges, links between media, exchanges of experiences between municipalities and regional authorities; development of human resources through training and education; and the support of civil societies and social development (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, p. 7; Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9, 10, 11).

The necessity of the following principles in the achievement of the above mentioned objectives of this basket were accepted by the participants of the EMP: "1) to increase the role of mass media in terms of reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures; 2) to develop training programmes for young people in the area of culture for the development of human resources and to facilitate human exchanges; 3) to encourage efforts to improve health and well-being which is important for sustainable development; 4) to respect for fundamental social rights; 5) to give greater importance to civil societies for achieving greater understanding and closeness between peoples; 6) to strengthen and/ or introduce necessary instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises; 7) to encourage exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation; 8) to encourage actions supporting democratic institutions and strengthening the rule of law and civil society; 9) to support appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off as a

counterbalance against current population trends which represent a priority challenge; 10) to accept importance of migration in their relationships with each other and to strengthen cooperation to reduce migratory pressures through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation, to guarantee protection of all existing rights of legal migrants; 11) to establish closer cooperation in particular related to readmission of illegal immigrants; 12) to strengthen cooperation to fight against terrorism; 13) to strengthen cooperation to fight against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption; 14) to strengthen a cooperation to combat against racism, xenophobia and intolerance” (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, pp. 7, 8).

Briefly, in order to achieve the major objective of the EMP’s third basket, which is to bring the peoples closer through “Dialogue and respect between cultures and religions”, the necessity for a strengthened program of exchanges of young people, students, teachers, clerics, journalists, scientists, trade unionists, business people as well as political leaders was emphasized (Ilgaz, 2007, pp. 249-251). In addition to this, related to the need for development of human resources, both as regards to education and training of young people in particular in the area of culture, partners agreed that human dimension must be included in economic cooperation if it is to be successful (Piening, 1997, p. 83). Cooperation in other issues such as fight against illegal immigration, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, racism, xenophobia, poverty were also decided as major aims of this basket.

2.2.4. Immigration

Increasing existence of the immigrants from North African states to the EU member states and ongoing immigration, cultural, social and economic disparity between those immigrants and host countries’ citizens and host countries’ citizens perception of them as a burden on their economies and finally emergence of new threats and their result of stigmatization of these immigrants as potential terrorists particularly since 9/11, all pushed the governments of the EU member states to reconsider their immigration policies. Immigration issue thus became related to their national security and this development made it a part of “high politics”. As a result of these developments, they agreed on the necessity to prevent further immigration flow from South to North. Migration has always been one of the main

problematic issue of this region, even one of the factors which led to establishment of the EMP due to security concerns. However, in order to become the fourth key issue of the EMP it waited until 2005. An enhanced cooperation in the fields of immigration, social integration, justice and security was called for at the Five Year Work Programme of the Barcelona Summit (28 November 2005) (Portugal Presidency of the European Union, 2007).

The first Euro Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on migration was held in Algarve in 2007. At this meeting, the EU member states emphasized that “a well-managed migration can contribute to optimize the economic and social benefits of migration, for countries of origin, transit and destination and represents a bridge for the enhancement of mutual understanding between cultures and civilizations”. Moreover, the necessity for strengthening the joint management of migratory flows; the need for facilitating people to people exchanges; promoting legal migration opportunities within the Euro-Mediterranean region; promoting dialogue between cultures; combating discrimination, xenophobia and racism against migrants and their families; providing equal access for the legal migrants to the labor market, education, healthcare, social services to make social integration of immigrants possible; importance of fighting against illegal immigration; avoiding brain drain and skills shortages phenomenon in relevant sectors and promotion of sustainable return of these migrants to their countries of origin; enhancing cooperation to reduce illegal immigration including trafficking and smuggling of human beings were underlined as some important aspects of this issue which should be realized during this meeting once more (Portugal Presidency of the European Union, 2007).

With respect to immigration issue, following projects were decided to be implemented at this meeting: “1) setting up a working group on migration which will explore labor situation, labor market needs for immigrants and possibilities for labor matching; 2) promotion of training courses; 3) promotion of pre-departure professional training and linguistic courses to potential immigrants; 4) providing information about legal migration and labor opportunities available to potential immigrants; 5) making the EU portal technology in the migration and employment fields beneficial to all Euro-Mediterranean partners; 6) making possible to establish centers providing information on job seeking and employment opportunities in the Euro-Mediterranean region while fully respecting national competences; 7) promotion of information packages for newly arrived legal immigrants related to their rights and the importance of respecting national values and legislation” (Portugal Presidency

of the European Union, 2007).

In addition to above mentioned measures, some additional measures were decided to be taken at the same meeting, in particular related to the issues headlined under migration and development, and illegal immigration: “1) to encourage using of financial services by increasing migrants’ awareness of and access to the formal banking system through activities such as financial literacy training programmes; 2) to construct a Euro-med website which may gather all available information on remittances and respective transfer procedures; 3) to study possibility of providing financial support to legal migrants in order to enable them to co-finance their investment projects in their countries of origin; 4) to promote project for better security standards in Euro-Mediterranean partners’ national travel documents such as introduction of biometry and new technologies at security services; 5) to promote training courses on methods for detection and identification of false or falsified and counterfeit identity and travel documents, enhancing capacity building on departure flows, strengthening relationship between countries fighting illegal migration and with respect to the relevant international instrument particularly related to search and rescue at sea; 6) Finally, to organize workshops on voluntary return and readmission issues” (Portugal Presidency of the European Union, 2007).

With respect to immigration issue, some projects were developed within the framework of the EMP. Euro-Med Migration I and II projects were developed with the aim of promoting analysis and cooperation on questions linked to migration and movement of persons, and the social integration of immigrants. The budget allocated for the Euro-Med Migration I is €2 million (MEDA) for the timeframe 2004-2007. Participating countries of this project are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. Since its initiation, the following actions were realized within the framework of this project: “1) Assisted governments and other bodies in the Partner Countries in their migratory policy; 2) Monitored, analyzed and forecasted migratory movement through 4 research programmes; 3) Maintained an updated database with information on migratory flows in the Mediterranean region 4) Published studies on different thematic areas (legal, economic and social), such as the Annual Report on Mediterranean migration, 16 research reports, 37 Analytical and Synthetic Notes” (European Commission (e), n.d.).

The other project which initiated within the EMP framework is Euro-Med Migration II. This project also contributes to the development of a Euro-Mediterranean area of cooperation on migration by assisting partner countries in their efforts to find solutions to various forms of migration. The budget allocated for this project is €5 million (MEDA) for the timeframe 2008-2011. The Participating countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia. The actions which were realized under this project are as follows: “1) Setting up of 4 working groups composed of high level government officials and other relevant decision makers to put forward concrete proposals on legislative convergence and the need for reform of migration law and its institutional framework, labor migration, institutional responses and national strategies to combat illegal immigration, migrant remittances. 2) Organization of around 40 training sessions designed for officials on issues such as legislative convergence and institutional reforms, managing legal migration, strengthening border controls and reducing illegal immigration and migration, and development. 3) Organization of 10 "on-the-job" study visits to EU for officials 4) Conducting a study on women and migration in the MEDA region. 5) Creation of the project internet web site which will give tangible expression to the Euro-Med Migration community and provide a range of relevant information on activities” (European Commission (d), n.d.).

Besides regional meetings of the EMP on this issue, AAs also focus on cooperation of the Parties to tackle this issue. “Reducing migratory pressure, in particular by creating jobs and developing training in areas from which emigrants come” is one of the statements made in the AAs in this respect. AAs emphasize the importance of the regular dialogue on social matters including this issue and to find ways to achieve progress in the field of movement of workers and equal treatment and social integration of SEMCs nationals and Community nationals legally residing in the territories of their host countries. The areas which are covered by this dialogue are determined as migration, illegal migration, actions to encourage equal treatment between the SEMCs nationals and Community nationals, mutual knowledge of cultures and civilizations, the furthering of tolerance and the removal of discrimination (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (a)).

In the Cooperation for the Prevention and Control of Illegal Immigration and Other Consular Issues section of the AA of Egypt states that the agreement is reached by both Parties in order to prevent and control illegal immigration from South to North. For this

purpose, The following commitments were made by the SEMCs: "...SEMCs agree to readmit any of its nationals illegally present on the territory of a Member State, upon request by the latter and without further formalities once such persons have been positively identified as such. The Member States and SEMCs will also provide their nationals with appropriate identity documents for such purposes. In respect of the Member States of the EU, the obligations in this Article shall apply only in respect of those persons who are to be considered their nationals for Community purposes. In respect of SEMCs, the obligation in this Article shall apply only in respect of those persons who are considered nationals of SEMCs in accordance to their own legal system and all the relevant laws concerning citizenship. After the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties, at the request of any of them, shall negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements with each other, regulating specific obligations for the readmission of their nationals. These agreements shall also cover, if deemed necessary by any of the Parties, arrangements for the readmission of third country nationals. Such agreements will lay down the details about the categories of persons covered by these arrangements as well as the modalities of their readmission. Adequate financial and technical assistance to implement these agreements will be provided to SEMCs. The Association Council shall examine what other joint efforts can be made to prevent and control illegal immigration as well as deal with other consular issues" (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (a)).

In addition to this, AA of Morocco's dialogue on social matters part covers "illegal immigration and the conditions governing the return of individuals who are in breach of the legislation dealing with the right to stay and the right of establishment in their host countries" (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (a), 2000). Similar arrangements also made in the AA of Algeria to cooperate with the EU in order to prevent and control illegal immigration (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005).

As Sweden Minister of Integration and Gender Equality, HE Nyamko Sabuni said at the 2008 EuroMeSCo Annual Conference held in Amman, "Europe cannot cope with global competition as well as demographic changes without considerable labor migration..." since the welfare and prosperity of European countries depend largely on immigrants who can contribute (Sabuni, 2008). Hence, we cannot ignore their current and prospective contribution to the economic and social development of Europe. The EU is aware of this fact and promotes legal migration opportunities by the following words which took place in agreed ministerial

conclusions of First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting held in Algarve in 2007: “to facilitate legal movement is one of the key elements of our cooperation” (Portugal Presidency of the European Union, 2007).

As Vaquero stated (2008) in his presentation at the annual conference of EurMeSCo, there is a general perception among the people of SEMCs that “the EU was only interested in the free trade of goods and products and in restricting, controlling and blocking the free movement of people from the South to the North”. In order to cope with this perception, the following measure was taken. On 15 and 16 October 2008, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum was approved by the European leaders (Bertozzi, 2008).

Positive effects of international migration on economic growth of the EU and the EU member states which need migrants were stated in the second paragraph of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. The European Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration which reaffirms its conviction that migration issues are an integral part of the EU's external relations in December 2005. Global Approach to Migration of the European Council and the Commission's communication of 17 June 2008 led to adoption of European Pact on Immigration and Asylum by the European Council. Implementation of the Pact requires changes in the legal framework in certain areas. Accordingly, the European Council made five basic commitments, which will continue to be transposed into concrete measures, in particular in the programme to follow on from the Hague programme in 2010: “1) organizing legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State and encouraging integration. 2) controlling illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit. 3) making more effective border controls. 4) constructing a Europe of asylum. 5) creating a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development” (Council of the European Union (b), 2008, pp. 2, 14).

With regards the fifth commitment, the European Council undertook to support the development of the countries and with them to build a close partnership encouraging the synergy between migration and development. To that end, the European Council agreed to implement the partnership between the EU and Africa agreed in Lisbon (2007), the conclusions of the first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on migration (2007) and the

Rabat action plan. Moreover, the European Council also called on the second Euro-African ministerial conference on migration and development held in Paris in 2008 to decide on practical measures (Council of the European Union (b), 2008, pp. 2, 14).

The European Commission emphasized the necessity for the EU to attract qualified immigrants from all around the world to maintain its economic growth. Decline in the EU member states population growth also makes the need for these immigrants vital. However, to attract the qualified immigrants in comparison to the USA is not an easy task to do under current system for application.³¹ Immigrants wishing to live and work have to deal with 27 different requirements. In order to facilitate this process, the European Commission proposed implementation of Blue Card, which seeks to create a single application procedure for non-EU workers to reside and work within the EU, and to establish a common set of rights for workers in member states, in October 2007 (Blue Card Immigration.com (a), n.d.; Blue Card Immigration. Com (b), n.d.).

With the Blue Card, the EU proposes a single work and residence permit for qualified migrants. This card was inspired by the USA's green card and named after the color of the EU flag. The blue card would also grant a range of social and economic rights, including family reunification. The blue card would be issued for a renewable period of two years. If renewed, the migrant would have an opportunity to move to another EU state. The blue card would also allow a worker to gain permanent residence after five years (Blue Card Immigration.com (a), n.d.; Blue Card Immigration.com (b), n.d.).

In this dissertation, migration issue has only been analyzed within the EMP framework since it has impacts on the EU member states due to geographic proximity of Europe to North Africa and Middle East region, where immigrants largely come. Also, it is the fourth basket of the EMP since 2005. BMENA does not have any project related to immigration. That is why, migration is not included to the section in which comparison of two projects is made.

³¹ The USA attracts roughly twice the number of qualified workers (Blue CardImmigration. com (b), n.d.).

2.3. Weaknesses and Strengths of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The EMP has both weaknesses and strengths to achieve objectives set in the Barcelona Declaration. Its weaknesses hinder it to achieve its objectives, particularly political and security objectives properly. In this part, strengths and weaknesses of the EMP is evaluated.

The EMP displays relatively good institutional performance by comparison with alternative schemes in the region (BMENA) due to the existence and good performance of coordinating bodies, the frequency of the meetings, its openness to new categories of public actors and opportunities to play simultaneously at multilateral and bilateral levels, the leadership role that the EU assumes as financial donor (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 4). For instance, within the framework of the EMP's bilateral tool-AAs, "the Association Council shall have the power to take decisions which shall be binding on the Parties in the cases provided for therein in order to attain the objectives of the Agreement. The Association Council may also make appropriate recommendations and may decide to set up any working group or body necessary for the implementation of the Agreement. It shall be responsible for the continuous and regular evaluation of the implementation of the Agreement or it may delegate any of its power to the Association Committee. Sectoral subcommittees have been set up under the AAs such as committee on "human rights, democratisation and governance". These subcommittees monitors the progress in meeting the priorities contained in the AA, and since 2004 in the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (a), 2000; European Commission (d), n.d.).

However, there is no Euro-Mediterranean institution in the framework of economic and financial basket as a Euro-Mediterranean Bank even though it was proposed several times. In addition to this, there is institutional unbalance between the weight of the EU on the one side and the SEMCs on the other. In this respect, a new institutional structure was proposed by the European Commission in its communication entitled 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'. Accordingly, a rotating co-presidency of the Barcelona Process-Union for the Mediterranean was introduced. Another new element of the new institutional structure was creation of a new secretariat which could have a 'separate legal personality with an autonomous status'. Last new element introduced by the Commission was a Brussels based Joint Permanent Committee composed of permanent representatives

from the respective missions. With the introduction of these new elements ‘more balanced partnership’ in other words enhancement of co-ownership in the EMP, which had been determined as one of the main weaknesses of the EMP, was aimed since this new institutional structure reinforces the sense of ownership required by the full involvement of the SEMCs in the management of the different actions and projects. Another contribution which was expected from this new institutional structure was to make ‘the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ more visible in the daily lives of people of this region which had also been identified as one of the weaknesses of the EMP, particularly creating a Secretariat which has a ‘strong project focus’ (Lannon, 2008, pp. 18, 19).

However, there are arguments like Lannon’s; ‘it is not certain that this new complex institutional structure proposed will reinforce the visibility of the Barcelona Process’. Moreover, he also argues that ‘the creation of Secretariat and Joint Permanent Committee reinforce the intergovernmental dimension of the EMP’. In addition to these comments, he makes this recommendation: ‘this new institutional structure should fully associate the civil society to the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean through creation of new mechanisms of consultation with the new bodies of the institutional structure’ (Lannon, 2008, pp. 15, 16, 21).

Despite its weaknesses, the EMP’s strengths lies on its achievements. As stated in the Barcelona Process; Five Years On 1995-2000, it has led to following achievements:

“It has brought together all the countries of the region at ministerial level, even in very difficult political circumstances; substantial progress in the negotiation and signature of association agreements has been achieved; and significant funding has been mobilized for the region under the MEDA programme” (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,2000, p. 3)

In addition to above mentioned strengths, the EMP’s strengths lies on the EU’s approach to the region in comparison to USA’s since its approach is much closer to the one held by the Arab world. In other words, the EU believes that democratic change and economic modernization must be driven from within the Arab societies and that they cannot be imposed from above without in the absence of any base in the home countries (Gomez, 2003). In this context, civilian power is preferred to be used by the EU to help political and economic

transformations of this region contrary to military power which is preferred to be used along with civilian power by the USA to make regime change in the region. Moreover, its strengths also lie on EU's treatment to the countries of the region. The EU, contrary to the USA's approach to the countries of the region, deals with them individually and never treats them as a whole since the EU is aware of different identities of the region and the necessity of taking these identities into account separately. The EMP contrary to the BMENA supports regional and sub-regional economic integrations between the SEMCs themselves such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), Agadir Initiative and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (Lannon, 2008, p. 5).

However, despite these strengths and achievements, the EMP's weaknesses, which lie on its failure, still exist:

“The Middle East peace process has run into difficulties and affected the general Barcelona process; progress with the association agreements has been slower than expected; trade among the partners themselves is very low; disagreements persist on some sensitive trade issues like agriculture; the record on delivery of financial assistance (the MEDA programme) has suffered from complicated procedures and some lack of focus on strategic objectives; and finally there is the need to raise awareness among the general public of the Barcelona process and to improve the sense of ownership of the southern partners of the process” (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2000, p. 3).

In addition to above mentioned weaknesses, one of the weaknesses of the EMP is related to the EU's security understanding and its repercussions in the SEMCs. The concept of security is a dynamic concept. For that reason, states have to review their security requirements according to changing circumstances. The EU thus carried out this review in the post-Cold War era and added immigration, drug smuggling and disruption of oil supplies to the threats that it has to confront and started a search for measures such as establishment of the EMP to counter such threats. However, this policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean has disturbing effects on the SEMCs since the term security is rarely used in conjunction with friends, allies, or partners. For instance, “if Portuguese workers displace German workers from their jobs, or French fishermen are caught in Spanish waters, such issues would be considered as economic, social, or political issues, whereas if the involved party were a

SEMCs they would most likely become security issues” (El-Sayed Selim, 2004).

In addition to this, some developments like the creation of the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) in 1996 without consultation with the SEMCs reinforced the above mentioned disturbing effects on the SEMCs since these countries wonder against whom the reaction would be directed (Derisbourg, 1997, p. 28).³² This has led to the following interpretation of a top Egyptian strategist:

“The presence of foreign naval power in the Mediterranean constitutes a threat to Egypt’s national security in the light of Western support to Israel” (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 138).

Briefly, this development led to the SEMCs to perceive the Western role in Mediterranean security as mainly one-sided and involving double-standard policies (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 139). Moreover, sometimes peoples of the SEMCs feel that little effort is expended on trying to understand the region and its problems in its own terms. In this connection, the EMP is perceived as a project which offers little guarantee of a solution to their social, political and economic problems. Moreover, in most of the SEMCs, there is perception that Europe was not concerned with establishing a genuine security system, but mainly interested in creating institutions to monitor the South, and Europe’s security policy carries little weight compared with its economic concerns in the SEMCs (Derisbourg, 1997, p. 28).

The problems of this region such as poverty, Islamic fundamentalism, environmental degradation are largely due to poor economic, financial and human conditions prevailing in the SEMCs. If Europe wants to eliminate or at least lessen the effects of these problems, it should avoid to take measures that would worsen those conditions and aggravate the problems that it fears. For instance, worsening economic conditions engender social unrest, and even emergence of governments which is led by the Islamic Fundamentalists who declare the ruling regimes and the supporters of those regimes such as Western powers as their main

³² EUROFOR, a 15,000 troop force of French, Italian, Spanish and Portugese units based on Florence, was formed by the EU with peace-keeping and humanitarian missions in the Mediterranean. The existence of EUROFOR is interpreted by many Arab commentators as a “rapid deployment force” to North African regimes in trouble and to evacuate European nationals in emergencies (Satloff, 1997, p. 24).

enemies. A political struggle, which begins between local rulers and challengers, has been soon transformed into a potential “clash of civilizations” at the world wide level as Huntington claimed. In this context, democracy in this region is started to be perceived as a threat to the interests of the West due to the belief that rapid democratization along with the bad economic conditions might lead to unstable period of transition, violent upheavals, civil wars and the emergence of Islamic Fundamentalists governments in the SEMCs. Democratization process in Algeria, which brought anti-Western Islamist party to power in 1992, is a good example in this respect since it deteriorated Algeria’s relationship with the West, particularly France (Jünemann, 2004, p. 7). However, this understanding and the approaches of some EU member states in the framework of this understanding merely served to damage Europe’s credibility as an entity, which has a mission of promoting democracy in this region. In other words, this reduced the impact of the EU on Mediterranean politics since it called for democracy while acting on the premise that democracy is a threat to their security. On the contrary, some argue that democracy must be viewed not as a threat or barrier to security but as its strong foundation and best guarantee. Chourou (2000) supports this idea with the following words:

“Considering democracy from this angle will require putting less emphasis on the military aspects of security, abandoning or at least revising arguments used to justify the treatment of the Mediterranean as a source of threats or risks, and freezing any efforts aimed at expanding the role of military institutions in Mediterranean politics” (pp. 178-179).

The EMP’s weakness also lies on its incapability to materialize the required improvements at the desired level since the expectations with regards to the EMP, created after the end of the Cold War, have been increasingly evaporating. We can give the failure of the implementation of the Charter of Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean, which was supposed to enable the partners to identify the factors of friction and conflict in the Mediterranean and to agree on certain major norms to deal with them, as an example to this argument (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 130).³³

³³ The second Ministerial EMP conference in Malta in 1997 failed to agree on a timetable to adopt a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 130). Plans for a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability have been put on hold since 2000. Arab-Israeli conflict is preventing security cooperation on a fully regional level (Schwarzer & Werenfells, 2008)

In addition to conflict resolution, building mutual confidence and trust within a context of political change and economic success also seems necessary since SEMCs are highly sceptical about the EMP (Vasconcelos & Joffé, 2000, p. 3). They believe that the EMP reflects the hegemony that Europe has established over the Mediterranean region. They also complain of the existence of restrictions on agricultural trade and prohibitions on the free movement over people (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 18, 21). Public opinion in the SEMCs is keenly aware that the EU does not treat all SEMCs on an equal footing, and that it expects the South to abide by principles that Europeans themselves do not respect. In other words, Europe lacks credibility. The EU's policy should become more coherent, and its actions should become more consistent with its discourse (Chourou, 2000, p. 187).

One of the reasons lying behind the weaknesses of the EMP mentioned in this section is revealed in a survey conducted in 2003-2004 among 19 countries participating in the partnership "from the European point of view [...] integration across the Mediterranean is precluded by lack of political will [...]". The gap between the North and South of the region precludes the emergence of effective understanding and exchange (Nas, 2007, p. 432).

The EMP's weakness also lies in its lack of full membership card it can use for further progress in terms of promotion of democracy and economic liberalization in the SEMCs. Moreover, financial aid given for economic and political transformation of these countries under MEDA and ENPI was also quite limited in comparison to the amount given the CEECs for enlargement process. All these factors under the framework of the EMP made a little impact on the lives of people of this region. This reality was highlighted in *the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council- Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean* by claiming that the EMP has neither tangible nor visible results for the daily lives of citizens of the region (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008, 2008, p. 4).

Institutional weakness, lack of co-ownership and the weak visibility of the Barcelona Process in the daily lives of the people of this region were identified as shortcomings that have to be tackled by the *the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council- Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean* (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008, p. 4). To this end, with the objectives of enhancing multilateral relations, increasing co-ownership of the process, setting governance on the basis

of equal footing and translating it into concrete projects, making it more visible to citizens through introduction of the Union for the Mediterranean, the EMP-Barcelona Process was trying to be revitalized. Despite the efforts of the EU to reinforce the Barcelona Process, there are still weaknesses such as availability and mobilization of the new financial sources of financing in order to meet the running costs of new institutional structures and the new projects proposed by ‘the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ in 2008, which have to be tackled (Lannon, 2008, pp. 15, 16, 21). Moreover, the current global economic crisis might have a great negative impact on the realization of the projects initiated in order to reinforce the Barcelona Process.

In the following section, positive and negative effects of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) on the EMP are analyzed separately to indicate the weaknesses and strengths of the EMP related to these issues.

2.3.1. European Neighborhood Policy

The EMP is based on two complementary dimensions: bilateral dimension mainly based on Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements signed with each Mediterranean partner and multilateral dimension which is Barcelona Process aimed at covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields. The bilateral dimension of the EMP was reinforced in 2004 with the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which offers a country-specific approach providing flexibility and differentiation. The ENP added new positive and negative effects on the Barcelona process.³⁴ The ENP introduced both new instruments such as the ENP Country Reports, Action Plans and Progress Reports and new methodology based on pre-accession methodology together with a benchmarking system with more concrete and precise objectives. The ENP also created Sub-Committees in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (Lannon, 2008, pp. 2, 3).

The ENP Action Plans made vague intentions of the AAs of the Barcelona Process to cooperate more operational by linking them to either domestic policy programmes of the

³⁴ EMP became part of ENP.

partner state or to EU policy norms and standards through prescription of harmonization with EU norms and standards as an external anchor. For instance, there is difference between the draft Action Plan of Jordan and the AA of Jordan (1997): “Democracy and human rights agenda is far more developed in the Action Plan; The Action Plan added Cooperation in foreign and security policy and conflict resolution as a new feature; In the justice and home affairs field, the Action Plan is much more developed, whereas the AA went little beyond vague intentions to cooperate; The transport and energy policy domains are much more detailed and specific; In the internal market domain a lot of prescriptions for policy reform, development and alignment with the EU standards are introduced in the Action Plan”. In addition to this, the ENP also created opportunity for the countries that are willing to reform faster and deeper to have additional financial support from the EU (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 9).

Introduction of the ENP has reinforced trade relations between the EU and the SEMCs. Liberalization of services and investment; establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism; liberalization of agriculture, processed agriculture and fishery goods; approximation of technical legislation are some of the decisions which were taken by the partners of the EMP to achieve one of the main goals of the ENP; “deep and comprehensive integration with our neighbors” (European Commission (e), 2008). Lannon (2008) interpretes the contribution of the ENP on free trade according to the European Commission 2006 Communication with the following words:

‘implementation of the ENP Action Plans on regulatory areas will prepare the ground for the conclusion of a new generation agreements of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with all ENP partners’ and existing Mediterranean free trade agreements should be expanded accordingly to other regulatory areas which implies that there will be a possibility to negotiate with the SEMCs a new generation of agreements” (p. 9).

Beside its positive effects on the EMP, the ENP also has negative effects on it. One of negative effects of the ENP on the EMP was the potential of emergence of new dividing lines between the EU and the SEMCs since there have been some concerns among the SEMCs that the enlargement of the EU, which incorporated CEECs as well as the two Mediterranean Partners – Malta and Cyprus- , might result in new borders being drawn, or in the creation of

new dividing lines which might deteriorate relations between the EU and the SEMCs. As Lannon and Van Elsuwege stated (n.d.) “the worst scenerio would be to see the construction of a new frontier, and for the enlarged EU, to consider the Mediterranean as being a ‘buffer zone’ in-between the enlarged Union on the one hand and Africa and ‘Euroasia’ on the other” (pp. 56, 57). However, the ENP became a response to those concerns since this policy designed to include and integrate neighboring partners into the new, enlarged economy, by offering them many opportunities both within the new expanded market of 27 countries, and in cross-border and sub-regional cooperation as well as eliminating emergence of new dividing lines (2005 Year of the Mediterranean, 2005, p. 4).

The other challenge of the ENP was the risk of lessening importance of the EMP within the broader Neighborhood Policy of the EU. From the point of view of the SEMCs, including countries such as Russia, Moldova, Georgia etc. within a broader framework of the ENP might diminish the importance of a specific and privileged Euro-Mediterranean relationship and its further progress. This argument was verified with the Patten/Solana paper which suggested a new ‘proximity policy initiative’ initially focusing on the ‘eastern neighbors’. On the other hand, Prodi stated in his speech in Brussels in 2002 :

“to build the new Europe but neglect the ‘cradle of Europe’, the Mediterranean, would clearly be a grave mistake” (as cited in Lannon & Van Elsuwege, n.d., p. 56).

This was a view shared by the EU Member States. Therefore, the Barcelona Process remained, ‘completely valid because it is the only attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and with a view to finding a long-term solution’ (Lannon & Van Elsuwege, n.d., p. 56).

In addition to the above mentioned potential weaknesses of the EMP created by the introduction of the ENP, the ENP has positive effects on the EMP. These positive effects are listed as follows;

- Harmonizing an important network of at least 12 bilateral agreements on the basis of new ‘special association’ agreements of proximity (The ENP Action Plans build upon the existing AAs);

- Establishing a clear differentiation of the proximity and the ‘non-proximity external relations’. This could help the EU to clarify the real priorities of the enlarged EU. However, it could also raise important institutional and intergovernmental debates about this new pyramid of privileges;
- Stimulating a more consistent approach of the EU while defining and implementing intergovernmental policies. This area of proximity is a ‘priority zone of action’ for the CFSP and the emerging ESDP;
- The approximation of trade legislation offers considerable potential for the development of trade flows and FDI;
- The implementation of concerted actions financed on the MEDA, PHARE, TACIS or CARDS programmes;
- The progressive adoption of common political standards;
- The reinforcement of the effectiveness of strategies implemented to address transnational and cross-border issues such as drugs and human trafficking, illegal migration flows, terrorism, money laundering, organized crime, etc. (Lannon & Van Elsuwege, n.d., p. 57).

The main challenge of the ENP on the EMP seems the possible dilution of the EMP within the broader proximity policy and the creation of a new frontier for the enlarged EU and the perception of the SEMCs as a ‘buffer zone’, whose primary task would be to safeguard the area of freedom, security and justice inside the EU by means of effective and strict border controls, which would create new political and human barriers. Despite the potential negative effects of the ENP on the EMP, some of which have been listed above ‘it cannot be denied that a well-designed proximity policy has a number of attractive potential advantages’ (Lannon & Van Elsuwege, 2008, p. 84).

2.3.2. Middle East Peace Process

In the eyes of some Arab partners of the EMP, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict (Israel-Palestinian Authority, Israel- Lebanon, Israel- Syria) is another obstacle in front of the success of the EMP since the EU considers Israel as a “Mediterranean State” and part of EMP denying the Arab-Israeli conflict, existence of a national Arab identity, disregarding national Arab links and the commitments of Arab countries to the agreements and conventions signed within the framework of the Charter of the Arab League (Habeeb, 2002, p. 13).³⁵ As HE Frendo stated ‘...Arab-Israeli conflict continue to poison relations between the EU and the Arabs and the Israelis around the table’ (Personal communication; Frendo, 2008; See Annex IV).

Moreover, there is a strong perception among Arab elites that the EU is pursuing Middle Eastern and Mediterranean policies which favor Israel. These perceptions are derived from EU’s two-fold policy in the EMP. While the EU is telling the SEMCs to open up its markets for industrial goods of the EU, it is telling the same SEMCs that the EU cannot open its own markets for the agricultural products of the SEMCs; The EU calls for the barriers in the SEMCs to be eliminated, but it acts as a fortress against human movement from the SEMCs. Arab elites like Amr Moussa, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, also criticize the EU for claiming that Israel is a “special case” and granting Israel a preferential treatment in its AA, which it is not willing to provide to other SEMCs (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 138).

There is also perception among the Arabs that the EU favors Israel by giving it a status of being only nuclear power in the Middle East and North Africa region when the EU explicitly supports nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean region and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East (EUROPA (a), 2005). In this respect, we can say that the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict is an obstacle in front of the non-proliferation in the Middle East. As long as this conflict remained

³⁵ The document ignored the principles of equality and justice and dedicated the regional cooperation relations, the opening of borders, and the diplomatic trust, to the political and economic integration of Israel into the Arab region (Habeeb, 2002, p. 13).

³⁶ This is a view which is also shared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEI) Director General, Mohammed El Baradei with these words published in The Sydney Morning Herald in 2004: ‘This is not really sustainable that you have Israel sitting with nuclear weapons capability there while everyone else is part of the non-proliferation regime’(Hareetz.com, 2004).

unresolved, non-proliferation seems unlikely to be realized. In addition to this, without making Israel party to NPT and removing what Israel already has (nuclear arms), it is not easy to convince the other countries of this region for creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East which is one of the major aims of the Barcelona Declaration.³⁶

Not only ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and commitment made by Arab states within the framework of Charter of Arab League, but also discrimination made between Arab states of the EMP and Israel by the EU hinder the SEMCs to dedicate themselves to achieve the desired goals of the EMP. To achieve the aim of the first basket, which is to establish peace and security in this region, seems difficult without resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Failure of the implementation of a security cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability is good example to show negative effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and unsuccessful MEPP on the EMP efforts to achieve security cooperation in this region. Persistence of Israel in its hardline attitude against its neighbors is incompatible with the basic principles on which the Barcelona Process is based. Its persistence may jeopardize its Membership to the EMP (Rhein, 1997, p. 45).

The role of the EU played in the MEPP is one of the determinants of the success and the failure of the EMP. However, the EU's role in the MEPP is mostly seen as 'payer' rather than a 'player' since it plays a rather more prominent economic role in the region and a somewhat limited political role although the role the EU played in this process gained pace when it became party to Quartet with the USA, UN and Russian Federation.³⁷ However, the EU still has limited political impact on all parties to the peace process since it is not able to challenge the role of the USA in the region.³⁸ (O'Gorman, 2004, p. 146). Since 1973, the USA thus has the leading role in the peace process in the Middle East. The EU has played relatively marginal political and diplomatic role. Europe's lack of influence with Israel also made the EU unattractive to Arabs (Satloff, 1997, p.30).

³⁷ The EU is major financial donor of the Palestinian Authority. The EU has two ESDP operations in the Palestinian Authority; The EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) since 2005 (Council of the European Union (c), n.d.).

³⁸ The USA kept the EU outside 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. The USA and Russia remained the only co-sponsors of the Conference. Union's response to being excluded from the US-led Madrid Conference was not to invite the USA to the Barcelona Conference (1995) which led to establishment of the EMP (O'Gorman, 204, p. 134).

The EMP has suffered from its strategic dependence on the MEPP. As Aliboni stated ‘this negative evolution has prevented the EMP from acting as a security framework and, at the same time, weakened its potential for social, economic and cultural cooperation’ (Aliboni, 2004, p. 13). Hence, the EU’s economic relation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority is not transformed into political influence in the MEPP. The USA is still the most important external political actor in this process although the Roadmap to be used to achieve peace in the Middle East was produced by a Quartet consisting of the USA, the UN, the EU and the Russian Federation in 2003 (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, p. 163; O’Gorman, 2003, p. 144).³⁹ From another angle, which takes the Barcelona framework as the only institutional set up in which Israel and its Arab neighbors freely discuss issues, the EMP is an important opportunity for both sides to exchange their views and to understand each other (Rhein, 1997, p. 45).⁴⁰ Besides the EMP, European Security Strategy (2003) set resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic priority due to the negative effects of this conflict on other problems in the Middle East (p. 7).

Despite the negative effects of ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and the ineffectiveness of the MEPP, Middle East Peace Process and cooperation between Arabs and Israelis within the framework of the EMP were trying to be supported by the EU through the programmes/projects which have impacts on peoples’ lives. The budget allocated for these programmes/projects for the year 2005 and the term from 2007 to 2010 is 20 million euro. Participating countries are Israel, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territory. The aim of these programmes/projects is to support civil society actions in peace building and conflict resolution in order to broaden the ground for the MEPP. One of the important features of these programmes/projects is that it can be undertaken by each of the countries concerned (Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territory) or jointly within and between SEMCs and EU Member States. The aim of these programmes/projects is to build trust between Israelis and Arabs, strengthen the capacity for conflict resolution and empower marginalized parties as well as increasing regional cooperation in areas such as integrated crossborder issues (environment, municipality issues, community development, technical disputes and alike), education, legal matters, media and communication in order to have a direct impact on

³⁹ The Quartet was established as a result of the escalating conflict in the Middle East. The Roadmap was produced with the goal of two states, a sovereign, and independent viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with Israel, achieved through direct and expedited negotiations between the two sides (U.S. Department of State (d), 2006).

⁴⁰ The EU is sponsoring programmes which brings Arabs and Israelis together in social situations, as part of third basket of the EMP (O’Gorman, 2004, p. 137).

peoples' everyday lives and welfare, including practical activities to promote communication and understanding. Educating the communities about the concepts and skills for dealing with conflict and for promoting peace is one of the activities taken in this respect. The major activity of this programme is the "EU Partnership for Peace Programme", which seeks the way to strengthen and increase direct civil society relationships and cooperation, based on equality and reciprocity between Israelis, Palestinians and other Arabs (European Commission (d) , n.d., p. 18).

The EU provided funds (60 million euro) for 138 projects. The "EU Partnership for Peace" programme to reinforce civil society organizations acting in peace building and conflict transformation; regional initiatives aiming at strengthening cooperation between Israelis and Arabs with emphasis on cross-border issues, education, legal issues and media; Israeli-Palestinian Co-operation in Science Education; Good Water Neighbours; Palestine-Israel Journal; A joint Palestinian-Israeli Action for Alternative Public and Media Discourse; Building Trust and Hope; Palestinian-Israeli Peace NGOs Forum; All for Peace Radio; Promoting Dialogue and Mutual Understanding of Shared Heritage; Learning each other's Historical Narrative: A Binational history Textbook for Use in Israeli and Palestinian Schools are some of these programmes/ projects initiated from 1998 to 2007 (European Commission (d) , n.d., p. 18).

Despite initiatives mentioned above to eliminate Arab-Israeli conflict from being obstacle to achieve Barcelona objectives and the process which started with the initiation of 'the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' (UfM) to reinforce existing Barcelona Process, Arab-Israeli conflict seems still hinder 'the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' to achieve its objectives properly. This argument was verified by French Foreign Affairs Minister, Bernard Kouchner's following words:

"...as for UfM, I am sorry to say that it is blocked, apart from a few attempts at ambassador meetings...as long as the situation is not clarified in Middle East, it will be very hard to make progresses (ANIMA, 2009)"⁴¹

⁴¹ He mentioned the postponement of the conference on the environment initially scheduled to take place in Monaco (ANIMA, 2009).

III. BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

With the end of the Cold War, security concerns of the USA changed due to the perception that the “red Communist peril” of the Cold War era has been replaced by a “green Muslim threat” (Schlesinger, 1994, p. 45). Growing anti-Western tendencies and the Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world started to be seen as a main challenge against triumph of liberal – democratic values of the West and led to rise in this perception (Caplan & Feffer, 1996, p. 4; Nas, 2005, p. 223). The September 11th terror attacks to the USA and the following Al-Qaeda terror attacks to London, Madrid, Istanbul and Amman which targeted Western nationals and/or their alliance reinforced this perception. As a result of these developments, the USA National Security Strategy, which was “free and safe access to the energy resources during the 1990s, changed as “fighting against international terrorism” after the September 11th terror attacks to the USA. These developments along with the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Reports of 2002-2003 provided ground for the preparation of Middle East Peace Initiative since lack of democracy and modernization throughout this region is seen as the main reason of problems for regional stability and international security (UNDP - Arab States; Erhan, 2005). The Bush administration’s national security policy thus has centered on the direct application of USA military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas. The reason lying behind this change was the belief that ‘democracy will make the countries in the Middle East stronger and stable on the one hand, make the world more secure by undermining terrorism at its sources on the other hand’, as George Bush said in one of the interviews made with him (Monten, 2005, p. 112).

The BMENA initiative, which was formulated by the USA in Sea Island in 2004, was based on some of the ideas and programmes that could be found also in the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) – a document, which was announced by Secretary of State, Colin Powell in December 2002.⁴² Accordingly, three main areas of concern - promotion of democracy and good governance; building of knowledge society; expansion of economic opportunities - were identified and the whole initiative has been modeled on the 1975

⁴² The MEPI is a bilateral USA initiative founded to support economic, political and educational reform efforts in the Middle East (Sharp, 2005, pp. 1-3). MEPI is supporting some of BMENA initiatives such as establishment of two entrepreneurship training centers, civil society programs under the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), support for entrepreneurs and micro-enterprises, and a region-wide educational portal (U.S. Department of State (b) (2005)).

Helsinki Accords. The initiative aims to link Arab, USA and global private sector businesses, non-governmental organizations, civil society elements, and governments together to develop innovative policies and programmes that support political and economic reform in the region. It determined four reform areas;⁴³ economic, political, education and women and is comprised of two essential elements; the existing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the proposed Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) (U.S. Department of State (e), n.d.).

This chapter analyses the US-led initiative BMENA starting from its historical evolution commencing from WWII to the present. It also analyses main aims of the BMENA which was distributed into three baskets; political and security, economic and financial, and social, cultural and human in order to facilitate making comparison of the BMENA with the EMP. It also gives weaknesses and strengths of the BMENA with a special focus on the MEPP.

3.1. Historical Evolution of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

After the Second World War (WWII), power and influence of Britain and France declined in the Middle East and North Africa region. Urgent need to set up a new security system due to Soviet Union's expansionist policy, which cause a threat to the USA's interests in the post WWII international environment, made the USA a major actor in the region. Hence, the USA filled the vacuum that emerged with decline of influence of Britain. The need for energy to carry out the reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Europe under the Marshall Plan became the second factor which led to this result (Khan, 2004, p. 16).

The first plans had been launched in 1952, during the Truman administration. For the USA, the objective was to create a front against expansion of communism. Although Britain lost its former considerable power and influence in the region, it was still the dominant major power in the Middle East and had considerable strategic, political and economic interests in the area, even after the withdrawal from Palestine in 1948. To some extent, the USA

⁴³ In this dissertation, these four reform areas are distributed into three main areas, namely political and security; economic and financial; and social, cultural and human, in order to facilitate making comparison of the BMENA with the EMP.

perceived the British presence as a factor that contributed to making the countries there more radical, thus making the establishment of a front against communism more difficult. A weakening of the British role could also lead to a strengthening of the USA position (Lundestad, 1999, p. 65).

USA's actual involvement in the Middle East in the Cold War period commenced with the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) following the Suez War of 1956 in which Britain, France and Israel had failed to reverse Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal.⁴⁴ Eisenhower believed that Britain's humiliation with this development had left a "vacuum" in the region that the Soviet Union would fill unless the USA took action. Some developments were verifying his argument: Egypt and Syria had already concluded military and economic agreements with the Soviet Union. There was a danger that Arab countries would soon follow Egypt's and Syria's example. As a result of these developments, the Eisenhower Doctrine was prepared to prevent Soviet expansion by promising military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern country needing help in resisting communist aggression. The doctrine was intended to check increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, which had resulted from the supply of arms to Egypt. USA would now try to strengthen conservative Arab regimes like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Libya and reinforce their pro-Western tendencies. The Doctrine largely failed since Nasser's power quickly rose by 1959 to the point where he could shape the leadership outcomes in neighboring Arab countries including Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Evans & Newnham (d), 1998, p. 146, Kissinger, 1994, p. 549, Yaqub, 2004, pp. 23, 24).

The Soviet influence by providing military and economic assistance to countries such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq was on increase in part as a result of USA ties with Israel. The escalation began when the USSR spread rumors that Israel was preparing an attack on Syria. Troops were concentrated along the Israeli borders. Israel chose to strike first. In the course of six days, Egypt, Jordan and Syria were defeated in 1967. Soviet policy was also active in 1973. It did nothing to prevent Yom Kippur war. The Middle East conflict of 1973 became strain on the policy of detente. After Yom Kippur War, Egypt returned to a pro-Western course since it was disappointed with insufficient Soviet support (Lundestad, 1999, pp. 101, 102). Since 1973, the USA became the leading power in the peace process in the Middle East.

⁴⁴ The Eisenhower Doctrine was a declaration that the Middle East was to be regarded as an area of vital interests to the USA (Evans & Newnham (d), 1998, p. 146).

In 1975 civil war had broken out in Lebanon, and the Syrian troops that advanced across the border maintained their position in the following year. Israel intervened in Lebanon twice, first in 1979 and again in 1982. After the second invasion USA troops were employed as part of an international peace-keeping force. The USA saw USSR behind Syria, as there were 7,000 Soviet advisers in Syria. However, Reagan was forced to withdraw in 1984 after 241 USA soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack in Beirut and the opposition to the USA became so strong (Lundestad, 1999, p. 127).

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Invasion was condemned by nearly the entire world. The USA, and a number of Western European, Arab, and other countries sent troops to the Persian Gulf region under the UN mandate. The USA held the military role. Iraq was defeated. In addition to withdrawing from Kuwait, Iraq accepted its limits to its sovereignty in the Northern and Southern Iraq in order to protect the groups, particularly Kurds in the north, who had fought against Saddam Hussein. The USA and its allies accepted that Saddam Hussein would remain in power. They feared that Saddam's fall could result in a division of Iraq which would have undesirable consequences for the balance of power in the Middle East (Lundestad, 1999, pp. 143, 144).

The end of the Cold War and of the Gulf War contributed to relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in different ways. For instance, with the collapse of the USSR, the PLO lost an important source of support. The Gulf War, during which the PLO supported Iraq, strengthened the moderate Arab countries, made the PLO lose most of its economic support from these countries and emphasized the key role of the USA in the Middle East (Lundestad, 1999, p. 144).

During Clinton's two terms, the USA's foreign policy for the Middle East was based on containment and deterrence. In 1993, the Clinton administration announced its policy which was described as the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq as a result of the assessment that the current Iraq and Iran regimes were hostile to American interest in the region.⁴⁵ With this policy, the USA was aiming an enhanced American military commitment to the Gulf with closer military ties to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In 1995, The US Congress passed the

⁴⁵ Iran's nuclear program and its support for terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad were determined as major reasons behind decision of the USA for the implementation of tightening sanctions to Iran.

ILSA (Iran Libya Sanctions Act) which prohibited investment of US oil companies in Iran and trade and investment with Iran in order to tighten the existing USA's sanctions implemented. The USA insisted on the implementation of sanctions against Iran as part of the USA effort to put pressure on Iran to change its behavior. However, The EU refused to join these economic sanctions against Iran. Moreover, the EU complained about the USA to the WTO due to the USA's insistence that the EU should follow its lead in sanctions and labeled this insistence as illegal in international law and contrary to freedom of international trade (Ünver Noi, 2005, pp. 81, 86). This led to another transatlantic friction in the Middle East issues.

Clinton's first term in comparison to his second term was successful in terms of efforts to promote Middle East Peace Process. However, the negotiations between Israel and the PLO ended between February 1997 and September 1998 and the lack of trust between Netanyahu and Arafat necessitated much more active role for the USA. Contrary to these expectations, the USA could not play this active role during Clinton's second term. The freezing of implementation of Wye agreement by Netanyahu exacerbated the existing situation and raised doubts about capability of the USA in the MEPP (O'Freedman, 1999).⁴⁶

The September 11th terror attacks to the USA became turning point in USA's foreign policy. The USA foreign policy of the cold War period and the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks to the USA which is "deterrence" and "containment" was replaced by "pre-emptive war" and "preventive war" with the initiation of Bush Doctrine in 2002. The attack on American soil by a group of Muslim terrorists of Middle East origin has led to change in the USA security policy and also led to fear which was magnified as it was believed that these terrorists could somehow gain access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The USA National Security Strategy, which was "free and safe access to the energy resources during the 1990s, changed as "fighting against international terrorism" after the September 11th terror attacks to the USA (Erhan, 2005, p. 156). The following words of Rice explains the post 9/11 national security strategy of the USA:

⁴⁶ The Wye Agreement (1998), which was signed between Israel and the PLO in Maryland, USA, is based on the principles of reciprocity and meets the essential requirements of both the parties, including unprecedented security measures on the part of the Palestinians and the further redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank. The agreement also permits the launching of the permanent status negotiations as the May 4, 1999 expiration of the period of the Interim Agreement (MEDEA (c), 2001).

“In fighting global terror, we will work with coalition partners on every continent, using every tool in our arsenal - from diplomacy and better defenses to law enforcement, intelligence, cutting off terrorist financing, and, if needed, military power” (Rice, 2002, p. 6).

The USA declared a “War on Terrorism”. As a result, the USA launched wars against two Muslim countries –Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003) while pursuing Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations on a global level. The war against Iraq was launched by the USA unilaterally without having a UN mandate on the plea that it was in possession of WMD. The new doctrines of defensive pre-emptive strike was presented by Washington to gain universal legitimacy for the Iraqi invasion. The US-led war against terrorism and the subsequent campaign against terrorists in Islamic countries is viewed by many in the developing world as the American ‘global design’ to attain full control over the oil-producing zone of the Central Asia and the greater Middle East since the USA established military bases in Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with the aim of fighting against Taliban forces located in Afghanistan. The main reason which leads to this argument is the USA’s support to armed Islamist forces and ethnic militant groups against the USSR in Afghanistan in the Cold War. It also welcomed the Afghans as the “great Islamic warriors” during the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. However, it is now calling those warriors as “terrorists” (Cheema, 2004, pp. 1-5).

The terms “pre-emptive strikes” and “regime changes” have been openly used. For instance, Bush’s speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002 was a signal which shows the USA’s intention to put “preemptive action” to their national security agenda:

“...Our security will require the best intelligence, to reveal threats hidden in caves and growing in laboratories. Our security will require modernizing domestic agencies such as the FBI, so they are prepared to act, and act quickly, against danger. Our security will require transforming the military into a military that must be ready to strike at a moments notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives...” (Bush, 2002).

Another speech of Bush made on the Future of Iraq, AEI on 26 February 2002 focused on regime change.

“...The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq” (Guardian.co.uk, 2003).

Lack of democracy and modernization throughout the Broader Middle East region is accepted as the root causes of problems for regional stability and international security. The Bush administration's national security policy was centered on the direct application of the USA military and political power to promote democracy in these strategic areas (Monten, 2005, p. 112). In other words, the USA came up with a mission, which claims the USA will help to build democracy in the Middle East (Khan, 2004, p. 27). To this end, its military power focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, its political power focused on introduction of two initiatives to encourage good governance and openness in the Middle East. The first initiative, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (2002), is on a global basis and is framed with an essentially economic development perspective and is tying economic assistance to political reform. The second initiative, which is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (2002), is region-specific and aims at fostering political reform in the region. USA economic aid attached to both initiatives is linked to good governance, and to an expansion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the countries of this region. Progress in these fields is important for the attainment of long-term objectives of sustainable development and security (Aliboni, 2004, p. 10; Asmus, Diamond, Leonard & McFaul 2005, p. 9).

Following the USA-led military operation in Iraq, which began on March 19, 2003, the USA officials started to mention a multilateral project to change the economic and political conditions of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region (Erhan, 2005, p. 160). The motivation for preparing the Project/initiative was mainly the information that was provided by the UN Arab Human Development Reports of 2002-2003 about the Arab world. These reports specified freedom, knowledge and women's empowerment as the areas involving the region's main deficits. The UNDP reports were important in many respects. They were mainly the first UNDP report that dealt with the Arab region as a whole. They were openly critical of the performance of Arab regimes (Hatipoğlu, 2004, p. 121).

As George Bush stated with his following words, there was an expectation that the

advance of freedom in the Middle East leads to peace.

“...The United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.” (The National Endowment for Democracy, 2003).

As mentioned earlier, the USA and the EU agreed that lack of democracy and modernization throughout this region engender problems for regional stability and international security. Hence, the Group of Eight (G8) countries namely USA, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada and Russia officially launched the US-led initiative, Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (hereinafter referred to as BMENA) in June 2004 in Sea Island, USA to promote the political and economic transformation of the region (Daalder, Gnesotto, Gordon, 2006, p. 1; Erhan, 2005, 161). BMENA initiative thus emerged as a multilateral framework for democratic reform in the region since it included G8 countries and the regional partners to the MEPI.⁴⁷ However, the Greater Middle East project (earlier version of the BMENA) came to world attention when it was first mentioned in London based Arabic newspaper – *Al Hayat*'s 13 February 2004 issue which published the draft version of the “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper” (Al Hayat, 2004). BMENA thus emerged as a project which would help to diminish the risks targeting USA and other western interests by creating better humanitarian environment for the people of this region (Erhan, 2005, p. 161). This USA led initiative mainly aims to protect USA's interests in the region.

The draft version of the “G8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper” (draft version of the BMENA) which is published by the *Al-Hayat* revealed the Plan and triggered a large debate in the Middle East region. The Plan was also discussed during the Arab League annual summit in Tunis. Some of the discussants were enthusiastically supporting this USA led initiative whereas a majority of discussants claimed that “democracy can not be imposed from outside. The region should enter a period of transition to democracy depending on its own domestic parameters”. Moreover, most of the Arab intellectuals emphasized that, “without finding a just and peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, and ending the Israeli

⁴⁷ MEPI is supporting some of BMENA initiatives such as establishment of two entrepreneurship training centres, civil society programs under the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), support for entrepreneurs and micro-enterprises, and a region-wide educational portal (U.S. Department of State (b), 2005).

occupation of the Arab territories, the Plan would reach less of the expected results.” While the debate on this Plan was ongoing in the Middle East, the USA invited representatives of the regional governments to the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, USA, in June 2004. Leaders of the some BMENA countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen participated to the Georgia Summit. However, majority of the regional governments remained reluctant to take part in the initiative (Erhan, 2005, p. 162).

Leaders of the G-8 issued a declaration titled “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa” on June 9, 2004. The declaration was a highly modified version of the draft Plan, which was published by *Al-Hayat* newspaper in February. In this new version, some modifications were made by the USA taking the reactions of the BMENA governments and intellectuals into consideration. Some part of the draft were removed and some phrases about the Palestinian issue were added in this direction. The G-8 leaders also emphasized that their support for reform in the region would go hand in hand with their support for “a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based upon U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.” Moreover, they stressed that they fully joined the Quartet in its “common vision of two states, Israel and a viable, democratic, sovereign and contiguous Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.” (Erhan, 2005, pp. 162-163)

3.2. Main Objectives of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

BMENA was launched by the USA with the aim of promoting economic, political and social liberalization of the Broader Middle East region. Objectives of the BMENA like the EMP were classified into three main areas; 1) political and security; 2) economic and financial; and 3) social, cultural and human.⁴⁸ Political and security aspect of the BMENA focuses on to promote democracy and freedom through increasing the role of civil societies, promoting free and fair elections and good governance in the region. BMENA’s economic

⁴⁸ In this dissertation, four reform areas, economic, political, education and women, are distributed into three main areas, namely political and security; economic and financial; and social, cultural and human, in order to facilitate making comparison of the BMENA with the EMP.

and financial aspect focuses much more on bringing and spreading prosperity to the region through promoting liberal economic values, financial aids and the establishment of free trade area. Social, cultural and human aspect of the project focuses on issues like education reform, women empowerment, youth engagement, improvement of health care and social security system.

3.2.1. Political and Security Objectives

Since the end of 1970s, Islamic fundamentalism became an alternative to liberal democracy and gained power gradually. With the collapse of Communism, greater adherence to ethnic and religious identities filled the emerged vacuum. Bad governance, poverty, economic disparity, demographic explosion, all helped to Islamic fundamentalist groups to gain power in Middle Eastern and North African states (Nas, 2005, p. 223). Even, in some Middle Eastern and North African states, fight among various Islamic groups and between governments and Islamic extremist groups led to civil wars (Algeria, Afghanistan).

Islam is the state religion (except secular Turkey) and many Middle Eastern constitutions define the Islamic law (*sharia*) as one source or the major source of legislation. There is no complete separation of state and religion throughout the region (Neugart, 2005). The following table shows the political regimes in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Table 3.1. Political Regimes in the Middle East and North Africa Region

	Defect Democracies	Strongly Defect Democracies	Moderate Autocracies	Autocracies	Transitional Regimes
Republics	Turkey	Lebanon	Egypt Algeria Yemen	Iran Libya Sudan Syria Tunisia	Iraq
Monarchies			Bahrain Jordan	Saudi Arabia	

Source: Neugart, 2005

As we can see on the table 3.1. “Political Regimes in the Middle East and North Africa Region”, autocracy is the prevalent political regime in most of the Middle Eastern and North African states. Among these countries, Turkey is the only democratic country where free and fair parliamentary elections take place. Turkey also has made significant progress in the field of freedoms by increasing press freedom, lifting restrictions on the right of assembly and introducing limited cultural rights for minorities to get rid of democratic defects it formerly had (Neugart, 2005).

Although general elections take place regularly in almost all these states, democratic change of the executive seems not possible. The following examples given by Neugart verify this argument that “in monarchies such as Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco, limited electoral competition under royal manipulation and control has developed. In Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, there are no elections at the national level. In Lebanon, parliamentary elections are manipulated by external influence, particularly Syrian intervention, on the composition of candidate lists.⁴⁹ The moderate government in Iran under the leadership of Hatemi was limited by non-democratic veto institutions, such as the judiciary or the Council of Guardians. In January 2005 Iraq election, a transitional assembly was elected through fairly free elections and it was partly distorted since in some areas voters were intimidated or polling stations failed to open at all” (Neugart, 2005).

Briefly, we can say that the power is in the hands of an unelected elite which also controls the economy. Freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, separation of powers and judicial independence are tolerated only within narrow limits or are not sufficiently implemented in most countries in the region. The executive dominates the legislature and judiciary (Neugart, 2005). The people of these countries suffer from a lack of democracy and transparency, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, inequality and injustice all of which are conducive to terrorism.

The rise of extremist Islamic movements/ Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and North Africa region due to above mentioned reasons is not only major challenge to the governments in the Middle East but also challenge for the West because these Fundamentalist

⁴⁹ A striking example of Syrian intervention in Lebanese politics was Parliament’s decision in September 2004—ignoring the provisions of Lebanon’s constitution—to extend the Syrian backed president’s term in office (Neugart, 2005).

groups are anti-Western. Some Muslim states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan already became training ground for these extremist groups. The possible takeover of states such as Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia by these anti-Western extremist groups created fear since they would have negative implications on Arab-Israeli conflict, the spread of terrorism, oil production and pricing, the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by regional states, in other words for American and the West interest (Khalilzad, 1998, p. 203).

Promotion of democracy is seen as a factor which might lessen the effects of these groups. However, there is another argument that promotion of democracy in these countries might increase the power of these groups by providing them an opportunity to be elected by the people of this region who are incredibly effected by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism since 1979. Contrary to this argument, the USA abandoned its policy which is based on supporting stability offered by an autocratic status quo and instead put the weight of Western influence on the side of positive democratic change, after the September 11th terror attacks on the USA. UNDP's Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP's Arab Human Development Reports of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society), which defined the three weaknesses of the region as knowledge acquisition, freedom and good governance, the empowerment of the women and the reason of these weaknesses, provided the ground for the USA to join forces in a partnership with reformers in the region to promote democratic transformation and human development as an antidote to those radical ideologies and terrorist groups (UNDP- Arab States, Asmus, Diamond, Leonard & McFaul, 2005, p. 7).

The USA with G8 countries launched the BMENA to promote freedom and democracy in this region in order to make the states of the Middle East stronger and stable. Hence, the possibility of emergence of terrorism as a threat to the rest of the world from the Middle East was expected to diminish. Moreover, progress toward democracy and the rule of law also notably imply respect for diversity and pluralism and leads to cooperation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences (U.S. Department of State (f), 2004, Erhan, 2005, p. 164). For that reason, partners of the BMENA aimed at advancing and strengthening freedoms and democratic trends and practices in the countries of this region. Through the BMENA, the USA and the G8 countries aimed to increase the role of and participation of civil societies in order to achieve the desired political reform and democratization in the region. Transparency of governance, legal reform and human rights

were determined as major objectives of the BMENA. In this respect, a vibrant civil society was accepted as a critical partner in the reform efforts undertaken by the governments. Moreover, to promote freedom and democracy in the BMENA region some steps were taken: the Foundation for the Future was established to work to promote freedom and democracy through supporting free, fair and genuinely competitive elections; the rule of law; access to and transparency of information; freedom of association; independent media; access to civic education; the empowerment of women; and human rights (U.S. Department of State (g), 2008).

Also, Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) was established for this purpose. Hence, DAD, led by the governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen in partnership with their civil society organizations namely, No Peace Without Justice, The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and the Human Rights Information and Training Center, focused on advancing dialogue and reform in the areas of women's empowerment and electoral and political processes. Significant activities have taken place in each of the lead DAD countries - Turkey, Yemen, and Italy - emphasizing women in public life and strengthening political parties and electoral processes (U.S. Department of State (h), 2006).

3.2.2. Economic and Financial Objectives

Countries of the BMENA suffer from bad economic conditions such as economic instability, poverty, unemployment, economic disparities and corruption.⁵⁰ Promoting liberal values for raising living standards of the people of this region is seen as a necessary factor, which helps to diminish side effects of bad economic conditions such as social unrest, regional conflicts, security threats as terrorist activities, by the USA. Hence, the need to improve a sustainable socio-economic situation in these countries for transformations of this region into a zone of peace and stability was started to be strongly emphasized. Although the BMENA region has a great deal of human and productive capacity that could rapidly increase

⁵⁰ Poverty is often made worse by corruption. In order to promote economic and social progress of poorer citizens, local communities' governments should provide facilitating elimination of corruption (corrupt free environment) for the development of micro-businesses into medium-sized enterprises (Transparency International, 2005, p. 8).

trade within the region and with the rest of the world⁵¹, there are few economic activities that have equal power to integrate societies, build cooperation between nations, strengthen the rule of law and encourage peaceful resolution of conflicts. To this end, promoting liberal market economy principles, creating jobs, promoting micro-finance, encouragement of investment, increasing international trade and promoting intra-regional trade through establishment of free trade area are determined as essential factors to expand prosperity, which is one of the main objectives of the BMENA, in this region.

The following words of Bush, which were said in launching May 15-21 World Trade Week in the USA, clearly indicate the intention to promote liberal economy for prosperity of this region:

“Free and fair trade creates jobs, raises living standards and lowers prices...It also strengthens our relationships with other countries, helping us to forge new partnerships based on a commitment to generate new prosperity and a better way of life...” (as cited in Wayne, 2005).

To promote liberal economy in the countries of this region is determined as one of the aims of the BMENA to tackle the root causes of threats stemming from this region. In addition to this aim, by promoting liberal economy in this region, the USA aims to open new markets for selling its goods along with creating a kind of economic interdependence. To this end, the following steps were decided to be taken;

- To create new economic opportunities for the region in the global market place
- To promote joint initiatives in trade, infrastructure, human resource development and financial sector development
- to promote conditions in which the private sector can create jobs
- to support efforts to reduce poverty and unemployment
- to promote private sector by encouraging a culture of entrepreneurship
- to support the growth of small and medium-sized businesses

⁵¹ The World Bank estimates that realizing even only half of the region’s trade and investment potential in the next ten years would increase GDP per capita by three percent per year. The World Bank has found that developing countries with the highest trade to GDP ratios grow three to five times faster than their counterparts that do not engage actively in trade (Wayne, 2005).

- to expand trade and investment by reducing obstacles to trade and investment
- to promote intra-regional trade
- to increase access to capital
- to support financial reforms
- to secure property rights
- to promote transparency and fight corruption
- To use international economic cooperation to increase opportunities for all (U.S. Department of State (f), 2004, U.S. Department of State (d), 2006).

All these steps, which are to be taken jointly by the governments and business circles, are considered as factors, which help economic development of the Broader Middle East and North Africa region. Establishment of Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) as of 2013 is one of these steps. MEFTA aims to increase trade with the Middle East region and offers a framework for openness, trade integration, and economic development for the Middle East. In this connection, the government of the USA started to work with countries of the Middle East through a series of graduated steps tailored to their individual level of development to their economic transformations (Office of the US Trade Representative (a) (2009).

In order to help the countries of the region to achieve their economic transformations, financial aids were decided to be provided under the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programmes. Through MEPI, the USA is also working with other countries in the BMENA region committed to economic reform to help prepare their trade and investment regime for eventual Free Trade Agreements (FTA) discussions. The USA also provides trade capacity assistance to the countries of the Broader Middle East (Wayne, 2005). Within the BMENA framework, Foundation for the Future was created in 2006 as an international, not-for-profit entity, which focuses on providing financial and technical assistance directly to local NGOs, academic and research institutions, professional associations, private foundations, private sector organizations and individuals in the region in their activities to advance and strengthen freedom and democracy in this region (U.S. Department of State (i), 2005).

3.2.3. Social, Cultural and Human Objectives

The necessity to improve communication and cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world gained more importance after the September 11th terror attacks to the USA. This is also determined as vital for promoting political, economic and social reforms in the region. To this end, greater role is given to the civil society organizations and business circles of the region.

One of the major aims of BMENA, which is related to social, cultural and human dimension, is to provide freedom of expression, equality between men and women, access to global information and education for all. These are determined as elements which are crucial for modernization and prosperity of the region. For instance, a better educated workforce is key to active participation in a globalized world. However, in most of the Middle East and North Africa countries almost 40% of the population is under age of 16, and do not have access to a proper education. For that reason, BMENA's efforts mostly focused on to reduce illiteracy and to increase access to education, especially for women (U.S. Department of State (f) (2004).

To this end, education reform through increasing literacy, especially female literacy and women's empowerment for regional prosperity in this region were determined as main aims of this basket (U.S. Department of State (j), 2005). In this respect, the following goals were decided to be realized; 1) To allocate funds to expand and improve infrastructure of primary, vocational and higher education; 2) To train more teachers in order to provide a high quality, qualification and skill based education which encourages critical thinking; 3) To reduce the number of illiterates by increasing literacy to additional 20 million people by the year 2015; 4) To strengthen the participation of women in education and training with the goal of higher female participation in the economy; 5) To bring in civil society and private sector into the efforts of educational reform to broaden the bases and developing sustainability; 6) To reform the education sector towards broad participation, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability and maximize employability of graduates (U.S. Department of State (d), 2006).

Education reform is also important to provide young people with the skills needed for a modern economy, to reduce social exclusion and to promote tolerance and understanding.

Besides providing a high quality, broadly based education for all children and young people, developing and encouraging the spirit of learning and critical thinking in all students, in their families, their schools and their communities and encouraging greater mutual knowledge across faiths and cultures became complementary aspect of education reform (U.S. Department of State (d), 2006).

Youth comprises a high percentage of the Broader Middle East and North Africa population. Youth is important in economic development of the region. The promotion of skill-based training to create jobs and underlying problems of youth unemployment are important steps for creating environment in which economy flourishes. Furthermore, establishing mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of youth in the decision-making process along with the role which will be played by civil society in engaging young people in the democratic process and in all relevant civil society activities became one of the social, cultural and human objectives of the BMENA (U.S. Department of State (d), 2006).

Health care and social security systems were also determined as part of social, cultural and human aspect of the BMENA. Some measures were decided to be taken to improve health care and social security systems in this region since low level or absence of health care provisions and other social security systems intensifies the problem of poverty (Transparency International, 2005).

3.3. Weaknesses and Strengths of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

At the beginning of its initiation, BMENA with the aim of promoting democracy and freedom based on liberal democratic values in order to develop sustainable prosperity and peace in the region was welcomed at least by some Middle Eastern and North African states and their elites with enthusiasm. They believed that it might bring the needed peace, stability and prosperity to their region. However, some Middle Eastern and North African states approached the project with suspicion and bias and did not participate in the meeting held in Sea Island, Georgia in 2004 because of Bush's administration's national security policy which centered on direct application of USA military and political power to promote democracy in

these strategic areas at the same time (Monten, 2005, p. 112). Some developments such as the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and military defeat and occupation of Iraq for the purpose of making them ‘more democratic’ and ‘secure’ undermined the credibility of the BMENA as a project which aims to bring peace, prosperity and stability in the region and helped the opponents of the project to justify their claim that the USA has ulterior aims such as changing the map and/or regimes of Middle East according to its interests. Moreover, these developments were perceived as a great humiliation for the Muslim world and the USA’ unilateral military action was criticized harshly.

Iraqi invasion of the USA led to suspicions about the real aim of the BMENA. As Cheema stated ‘while history has seen several military actions over the years, the current American policy of pre-emption differs from what was practiced in the past’. It does not require any tangible evidence for the USA to undertake preemptive military action since to justify a pre-emptive war, a state needs to show that the threat is (a) “clear and imminent,” (b) “direct, that is, threatening ... in specific concrete ways,” (c) “critical,” likely to cause “unacceptable harm and danger” to “vital interests,” and (d) “unmanageable,” that is it cannot be “deterred or dealt with by other peaceful means.” (Cheema, 2004, p. 6; Evans & Newnham (b), 1998, pp. 448, 449). The argument of the USA to legitimize its war on Iraq - Saddam should be removed from power because he had chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and was actively seeking to build a nuclear weapon - could not be verified by the USA (MSNBC, 2006). Iraqi invasion of the USA just contributed to the creation or the rise of an anti-USA sentiments in the region.

Some publications also made negative impacts on the BMENA and led to anti-USA sentiments among the people of this region. An article of Ralph Peters titled “Blood Borders” published in *the Armed Forces Journal* in the USA and the map of “the new Middle East” drawn by Peters overshadowed all positive views of the people of this region towards the BMENA initiative (You can see the map from this web site: <http://www.uruknet.de/?p=m28375>, 2008 (Nazemroaya, 2006; Peters, 2006).⁵²

⁵² It was drawn by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters. It was published in the *Armed Forces Journal* in June 2006, Peters is a retired colonel of the U.S. National War Academy. Although the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been used in a training program at NATO's Defense College for senior military officers. This map, as well as other similar maps, has most probably been used at the National War Academy as well as in military planning circles.

Many countries of the developing world see the new USA policy with nervousness and distrust. Moreover, its policy is perceived as targeted against certain Muslim countries and sometimes even against the Islamic faith (Cheema, 2004, p. 5). BMENA was also criticized due to its harsh and dominating tone, imposing change from above by ignoring internal dynamics, needs and interests of the region itself, in other words insensitiveness to the realities of the region. All these acts contributed to the great rise in anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab world and harmed the image of the USA (O’Gorman, 2003, p. 143). There were also doubts about Bush’s desire to spread democracy to this region. The people of this region believe that Bush had some ulterior intentions and he tried to legitimize his hegemonic designs through manipulation of information provided by UNDP AHDR 2002 and 2003 (Gomez, 2003).

Besides the weaknesses of the BMENA as highlighted above, from its initiation on, the following political and economic developments have been realized in this region;

“Saddam’s regime was overthrown, Iraqi election was held and federal Iraq was established; Syrian troops have departed from Lebanon, free and fair parliamentary election was held in Lebanon; Egypt accelerated its privatization process, reduced tariff rates, increased exchange rate flexibility; Free Trade Agreements were signed between the USA and Morocco, Bahrain, and Jordan; The USA supports Saudi Arabia bid for World Trade Organization (WTO) accession; The USA and Pakistan concluded the second round of negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) which would improve investors’ rights, decrease investor uncertainty, and enhance Pakistan’s investment climate; In Jordan, an ambitious reform programme is underway aimed at creating foundation for long-term prosperity. Jordan’s strong growth in GDP and exports are outcomes of this programme” (Wayne, 2005).

Additionally, some important steps toward freer and more prosperous region have been taken; Governmental representations such as ministers concerned and civil society organizations’ representation and business circles have been brought together to discuss reform efforts in this connection (Wayne, 2005). One of the strengths of the BMENA in comparison to the EMP is that the BMENA much more focuses on civil societies and NGOs in realization of these reforms in this region. However, one of the weaknesses of the BMENA is its “one suit for all” treatment to the countries of this region which is contrary to the EMP’s bilateral track and its tailor-made approach to the countries of this region.

Although the BMENA as the first U.S. initiative of its kind is expecting to be welcomed by the people of the region, it was harshly criticized due to four serious weaknesses: First weakness of project, its prescriptive tone and style, particularly when read in conjunction with the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002, is insensitive and unlikely to be welcomed by the people of the region. Second weakness of the project, its ignorance of similar projects which have more or less same goals such as the EMP. Related to the EMP, it made a one-line reference to the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, notwithstanding the extensive efforts made by the European Union over many years through its “Barcelona Process”. Third weakness of the project is lack of any substantial consultation. Fourth and most serious weakness of the project is its failure to address the Arab-Israeli conflict (ICG (a), 2004, pp. 5,6).

The USA has been actively involved in attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for over thirty years. The USA regarded the security of Israel as an important American interest and has always been strongly pro-Israeli. Mediterranean countries considered that the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the USA would threaten their security since the competition between the two antagonistic superpowers disappeared. The Cold War had allowed Mediterranean countries, along with other third world countries, to use that competition to obtain various benefits, such as economic and military assistance, an urge to resolve Palestinian question and provide protection against present or potential enemies. There was a hope that the balance would not tilt too much in favor of Israel due to Soviet-bloc support to these countries. However, that hope vanished after Camp David, when the USSR showed a growing disinterest for the Palestinian issue (Chourou, 2000, p. 181).

The USA contrary to the EU is the main outside political force and the major political actor in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The USA also does not want another strong political actor in the region. Instead, the USA prefers an economic actor like the EU which shares the economic burden stemming from the region. Madrid Middle East Peace Conference can be given as an example to this intend of the USA since the USA kept the EU outside 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in order to prevent the EU to have a political role to play. The USA and Russia remained the only co-sponsors of the Conference (O’Gorman, 204, pp. 133, 146).

The USA’s pro-Israeli stand has negative impact on the success of the BMENA since

the countries of the region have great suspicion about the USA's policy in the region. For instance, continuing existence of the USA Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean even though the Communist threat has disappeared; all Arab states have granted Israel *de jure* or *de facto* recognition; the out-of-area use of NATO forces which was imposed by the USA; NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and initiation of the BMENA were perceived as part of USA's policy to secure Israel's domination in the Middle East (Chourou, 2000, p. 182; El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 142). This perception hinders most of the Arab states to believe strongly in a US-led project such as BMENA. Some argue that without resolving Arab-Israeli conflict, the BMENA like the EMP cannot be successful. On the other hand, some argue that it might be successful because BMENA might help democratic transformation and overthrow of autocratic regimes of the region, which escalate the tension between Arabs and Israelis by providing support to radical terrorist groups. The latter argument though may be questioned since escalation of tension between Arabs and Israelis lead to increasing support to radical terrorist groups.

IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE PROJECTS

In this chapter, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative are compared on the basis of political and security aspects and achievements; economic and financial aspects and achievements; and social, cultural and human aspects and achievements with a special focus on the following topics: democracy promotion; good governance; political participation and elections; legal environment for civil society; judiciary development; human rights and fundamental freedoms; freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of the media; fight against terrorism; promotion of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation; functioning of market economy; free trade area initiatives (Euro-Med Free Trade Area and Middle East Free Trade Area- MEFTA); financial contributions under MEDA (Mesure d'Accompagnement)1995-2007/ENPI (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument) since 2007 and MEPI (Middle East Partnership Initiative) and Foundation for the Future; entrepreneurship and investment; enhancement of social development and poverty reduction; women empowerment; youth engagement; literacy and educational opportunity.

4.1. Comparison of Political and Security Aspects and Achievements of two Projects

In this part of the dissertation, political and security aspects and achievements of the EMP and the BMENA are analyzed and compared under the following headings: promotion of democracy including good governance, political participation and elections, legal environment for civil society, judiciary development; human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of association, and of expression and pluralism of the media; fight against terrorism; promotion of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation. At the end of each section, final remarks are given related to the comparison.

Furthermore, some answers to the following questions attempted while making these

comparisons: Can Islam and democracy be compatible? How SEMCs react to the imposition of Western democratic values to their countries? In other words, is external democracy promotion legitimate? What are reactions of the SEMCs to the USA's intervention to Iraq for immediate regime change and democracy promotion aim? Is it possible for the EMP to become completely successful without making some regional non-EMP countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, other GCC member states part of some projects like nuclear non-proliferation in the Euro-Med region?

In addition to regional aspect of the EMP, its complementary bilateral aspect- Association Agreements (Euro-Mediterranean Agreements) are also analyzed in this section as they emphasize the importance of human rights, democratic principles, the need to open a regular political dialogue in bilateral and international context on issues of common interest, the need to strengthen peace, political stability in the region by encouraging regional cooperation. In order to indicate the areas where progress has been achieved and problematic areas in each field, comparisons of each SEMCs is made by using Euro-Med Association Agreements (AA) and new instruments which were introduced to reinforce bilateral aspect of the EMP –AA- such as ENP Action Plans, ENPI Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 & National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, ENP Progress Reports. In this part of the dissertation, United Nations Development Program Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP AHDR) are used to indicate whether there is any progress between the year 2002-2003 and after implementation of the BMENA and the EMP since three obstacles to democratization of Arab world are defined as lack of freedom, women's empowerment and knowledge across the region at these reports through contribution of the Arab intellectuals and these reports became one of the starting points for the BMENA initiative to promote democracy in the region.

4.1.1. Promotion of Democracy

Democracy itself is widely regarded as an international norm and the system of government that has the greatest potential to promote participation and protect human rights. It is mostly defined with reference to the liberal democracies of Europe and the USA (Reis,

2008, p. 6). Democratization today has been characterized by two fundamental elements: “1) the presence and diffusion of grassroots democratic movements composed of ordinary people in every culture and region of the globe; 2) the increasing acceptance of democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal throughout most of the international community” (No Peace Without Justice (a), 2009). Hence, promotion of democracy in the countries of this region has been stated to be one of the principal foreign policy priorities by the USA with the “Greater Middle East Initiative” and by the EU with the “Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” since the lack of democracy which represents one of the greatest obstacles to development of this region also contributes to emergence of potential threats from this region which might put the Western interests under risk (No Peace Without Justice (b), 2004).

In the post-Cold War period, the EU adopted a new approach based on stabilization through cooperation and partnership. With this approach, the EU aimed to export its values, norms and standards based on democracy and economic liberalization to its neighbors due to the view that “a more secure world is the guarantee of a more secure world”. The USA with the more or less the same aim used both its military power and political power in order to transform the countries of this region into democratic ones and make possible regime changes. Both the EU and the USA developed new projects like the BMENA and/or reinforced their existing projects like the EMP in order to realize political transformation of the countries of this region since they believed that rise of political Islam and the existence of autocratic regimes in the region only serve to deteriorate their relations with these countries by increasing anti-Western sentiments and providing support to international terrorism. Their continuing existence might lead to other security problems related to organized crimes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, even to failed states as happened in Afghanistan. In this part of the dissertation, some steps which were taken to achieve political and security goals of the EMP and the BMENA by these two projects are analyzed.

Moreover, compatibility of Islam with democracy is analyzed in this section through using some surveys made in this respect since political Islam attained power in this region as a reaction to certain political, economic and social conditions since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Bad governance, poverty, economic disparity, demographic explosion, all helped Islamic fundamentalist groups to gain power in the SEMCs. In addition to above mentioned reasons, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict led to the development of anti-democratic forms

of opposition mostly based on radical ideologies. Moreover, political Islam became an alternative to liberal democracy, which was seen by the people of the region as savior against Western type materialist, individualist and secularist liberal democracy (Nas, 2007, p. 428). Briefly, the political role of Islam is growing in the SEMCs. As Reis claimed, this trend is mostly perceived as a negative trend (Reis, 2008, p. 9).

Besides Political Islam, autocracy is a prevalent political regime in most of the Middle Eastern and North African states. The factors that make autocracy prevalent regime in the region are given below:

“...a patriarchal political culture that values adherence to the ruler, ethnic and sectarian diversity that tend to lead to violent clashes and repression, a political elite that aims to modernize the masses under a tutelary state or that benefits from a clientelistic state far too much to share its prerogatives, post-colonial relations with the former imperial powers that may lead to tensions, the radicalization of politics mostly under effects of growing popularity of radical Islam and such organizations” (Nas, 2007, p. 428).

Main characteristics of these autocratic regimes are repression, limitation of opposition and basic rights and freedoms (Nas, 2007, p. 428). Freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, separation of powers and judicial independence are tolerated only within narrow limits or are not sufficiently implemented in most countries in the region. The executive dominates the legislature and judiciary (Neugart, 2005). Briefly, the people of these countries suffer from a lack of democracy and transparency, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, inequality and injustice all of which are conducive to terrorism. The following table shows political rights and civil liberties ratings in the Middle and North Africa countries.

Table 4.1. Middle East and North Africa: Average Ratings of Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Region/Country	1973	1983	1993	2000	2003
Maghreb	5.9	5.4	6.0	5.6	5.8
Algeria	6.0	6.0	6.5	5.5	5.5
Libya	7.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Morocco	5.0	4.5	5.0	4.5	5.0
Tunisia	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.5
Mashreq(excl. Palestine & Israel)	5.3	5.3	5.6	5.5	5.9
Egypt	6.0	5.0	6.0	5.5	6.0
Jordan	6.0	6.0	4.0	4.0	5.0
Lebanon	2.0	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Syria	7.0	5.5	7.0	7.0	7.0
Israel	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Gulf	5.6	5.5	6.1	5.7	5.7
Bahrain	5.5	5.0	6.0	6.5	5.0
Iran	5.5	6.0	6.5	5.5	6.0
Iraq	7.0	6.5	7.0	5.5	6.0
Kuwait	3.5	4.0	5.0	4.5	4.5
Oman	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.5	5.5
Qatar	5.5	5.0	6.5	6.0	6.0
Saudi Arabia	6.0	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0
UAE	5.5	5.0	6.0	5.5	6.0
Yemen	5.5	6.0	4.5	5.5	5.0
Total Average	5.6	5.4	5.9	5.6	5.8

Note: Country status – 1 to 2.5 = free; 3 to 5 = partly free; 5.5 to 7 = not free.
Source: (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 18).

According to this table, political rights and civil liberties ratings in most of the SEMCs are still high which means that they are ‘not free’ or ‘partly free’. There are factors which affect these results such as bloody civil war of Algeria (1992). Algerian 1993 ratings shows that reality with the highest rating in terms of “not free”. On the other hand, Israel has the best ratings which is ‘free’ in terms of political rights and civil liberties given to its people despite the fact that non-Jewish people suffer from absence of such rights (see annex I).

The following table, which shows political rights ratings in the BMENA region was based on UNDP AHDR Statistics, Building a Knowledge Society (AHDR 2003). Development in Freedom and Good Governance as Reflected by International Databases and UNDP AHDR 2006, is used to make comparison of year 2003 and year 2006. When we look at the following table, we can see a little progress only in two countries of this region, namely Lebanon and Iraq. One of the factors which contribute to this change in Iraq is free elections held in Iraq although its is questionable that it is possible to speak about a free election under occupation.

Table 4.2. Political Rights Ratings

Country	Value (2003)	Country	Value (2006)
Algeria	6	Algeria	6
Bahrain	5	Bahrain	5
Djibouti	5	Comoros	4
Egypt	6	Djibouti	5
Iraq	7	Egypt	6
Jordan	5	Iraq	6
Kuwait	4	Jordan	5
Lebanon	6	Kuwait	4
Libya	7	Lebanon	5
Morocco	5	Libya	7
Oman	6	Mauritania	6
Qatar	6	Morocco	5
Saudi Arabia	7	Oman	6
Somalia	6	Qatar	6
Sudan	7	Saudi Arabia	7
Syria	7	Somalia	6
Tunisia	6	Sudan	7
United Arab Emirates	6	Syria	7
Yemen	5	Tunisia	6
		United Arab Emirates	6
		Yemen	5

Source: Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for political rights and for civil liberties fell between 1 and 2.5 were designated "free", between 3 and 5.5 "partly free", and between 5.5 and 7 "not free", beginning with ratings for 2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3 and 5 are "partly free", and those between 5.5 and 7 are "not free". Political Rights scores are measured on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics(a), 2003, AHDR Statistics (b), 2006).

Although holding of regular elections in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia led to hopes for an advancement of democracy, these positive developments in terms of democratization failed to lead to alternation of power because of restrictions on the participation of the opposition (Nas, 2007, p. 428). Brumberg describes this situation with his following words:

“the phenomenon of the holding of elections and existence of parliamentary assemblies in a milieu of rigidly-controlled and limited liberalization as liberal autocracy” (as cited in Nas, 2007).

Turkey is the only democratic country in the region, unlike the SEMCs which have a problem of weak civil societies and interventionist states. Turkey also takes place in both the EMP and the BMENA projects. As Nas (2007) argues, 'Turkey may play a vital role in the region by providing a model for these countries that are pressed between the demands of their societies, the imposition of the West and regional security problems such as the Iraq war and the Palestinian problem'. The prospective EU membership may enhance Turkey's value as a positive role model in the region. The Turkish experience may provide invaluable insights for SEMCs for their democratic transition under the EMP. Turkey gave support to international efforts for democratization in its region. For instance, the Turkish government expressed its support for the reform initiatives of the USA and G8 within the framework of the BMENA (pp. 429, 431). Turkey became leading country in Democracy Assistance Dialogue (BMENA) along with Yemen and Italy, and became host country for conferences.

Democracy promotion to the countries of this region is one the major aims of the EMP's political and security basket. The overall goal is to establish a Mediterranean region of peace and stability through democracy promotion since the lack of democracy in the region does not only constitute one of the greatest obstacles to development of this region but also serves deterioration of relations with the EU. In order to implement the principles adopted in Barcelona Summit, senior officials meet regularly in Brussels to examine the most appropriate means and methods. The principles adopted in Barcelona are as follows: 1) The signatories pledge to honor the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to respect "human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms." 2) They promise to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems and to ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies by combating "manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia." 3) Each will respect the territorial integrity and unity of the other partners, and disputes will be settled by peaceful means without "recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant," including the acquisition of territory by force. 4) They pledge to cooperate in preventing and combating terrorism and "fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects". 5) The parties also undertake to pursue a verifiable "Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological" and to consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. 6) They will refrain from developing military capacity "beyond their legitimate defence requirements." 7) The main aim is the creation of an 'area of peace

and stability in the Mediterranean’, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end (Piening, 1997, p. 82).

Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are essential elements of AAs signed by the EC and the SEMCs as we can see in the following Euro-Mediterranean Agreement signed between Israel and the EC. These principles and rights shall inspire the domestic and international policies of the Parties according to the Association Agreements.

“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement” (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (c), 2000).

Providing an appropriate framework for political dialogue, allowing the development of close political relations between the Parties is one of the major aims of AAs. In order to strengthen their relations, facilitate the pursuit of joint initiatives, contribute to the development of a lasting partnership and increase mutual understanding and solidarity, a regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties according to the AAs. AAs state that this political dialogue shall take place in particular “at ministerial level; at senior official level between representatives of the SEMCs, of the one part, and of the Council Presidency and the Commission, of the other; through regular briefings by officials, consultations on the occasion of international meetings and contacts between diplomatic representatives in third countries; by any other means which would make a useful contribution to consolidating, developing and stepping up this dialogue”. Moreover, there shall be a political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Parliament of the SEMCs (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (c), 2000).

Three obstacles to democratization of Arab world is defined as lack of freedom, women’s empowerment and knowledge across the region at UNDP AHDR through contribution of the Arab intellectuals and these reports as stated before became starting point for the BMENA initiative to promote democracy in the region. Although democratization is accepted as a key step in ensuring security in the region, there are arguments that liberal democracy and human rights are not appropriate for solidaristic and communitarian cultures

of the East. Such thinking hinders democratic transformation in the region. There are also some arguments that democracy like human rights is a Western model and cannot be exported from the outside (Tesev Paper, 2005; Nas, 2007, p. 427).

As stated by the participants of the BMENA “Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court Report for Thematic Session III: The Role of the Civil Society in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights held in Yemen on 10-12 January 2004”, “the demand for political reform has come from the Arabs before coming from Western countries and in fact any democratic change has to start from within the countries and not be imposed by external actors. Democracy is not a top down process”. Moreover, many participants emphasized that “democracy is definitely not incompatible with Islam as there are several mentions in the Holy Koran on consultations, negotiations and the like” (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

Governments of the BMENA region, other supportive democratic countries and institutions, the USA, together with civil society representatives, announced their political support and financial commitment to launch a Foundation for the Future on November 12, 2005. Hence, the Foundation for the Future was established to work for promoting freedom and democracy in the BMENA region in general terms (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 2). Foundation for the Future has the following aims:

“...to create a mechanism to fulfill the commitments made in the many declarations on reform and democracy; to mobilize funds from inside and outside the region to assist indigenous initiatives for reform and democracy with international support; to bring together existing pro-democracy initiatives into a process that links national, regional and international movements for democratization” (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 4).

The Sana’a Inter-Governmental Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court in January 2004 gathered ministers and civil society representatives together for the first time, to discuss democratization of the region - recognized that “*proper democratic governance and respect for human rights require a freely functioning, well organised, vibrant and responsible civil society*” (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

At the thematic session of the BMENA held in Sana'a on 11 January 2004, entitled "Connections between Democratic Concepts and Human Rights Concepts", the following request related to the Duality in Standards was made by the participants from the international forces lead by the USA:

"...to proceed to dialogue and not to collision as well as to stay away from the duality in standards dealing with the similar affairs with more than one standard and from the partiality toward injustice and occupation and to claim democracy in one place while forgiving the same thing in other place, to call for the trade freedom and exercise at the same time the protection policy, to speak about the human rights and its sublimation while in the other side issuing laws that restrict public liberties taking into consideration the importance of continuing the dialogue, ideas exchange and proposals for the realization of the desired purposes and particularly keep watch that it will not conflict the celestial religion aims and emphasizing the importance and the feasibility of the international and bilateral cooperation" (No Peace Without Justice (d), 2004).

The Duality in Standards as briefly explained above only harms the credibility of the US-led initiative BMENA. In the same report, the following interpretation was also made related to the USA's occupation of Iraq:

"The refusal of the occupation of Iraq by the USA in the name of human rights guaranteeing, which occupation is considered as a flagrant human rights violation and contravention" (No Peace Without Justice (d), 2004).

The participants of the working group entitled "the Role of External Actors in Democratic Transition" under the Second Forum on Democracy and Reform in the Arab World, held in Doha (Qatar) on the 27-29 May 2007, stated that some efforts of external forces mainly the USA and the EU to reinforce democracy in recent years through using violent and non-violent methods created a controversy and particularly violent methods led to negative consequences. The participants therefore agreed to limit discussion on non-violent methods (political, economic, social and cultural). The risk for democracy promotion as a foreign value and foreign-driven priority was mentioned and the need for support of external actors local democracy advocates was stated. Using democracy promotion as a tool for their own political interests and politics was criticized by some participants whereas some participants pointed out that the theme of democracy promotion is still an important topic at

the top of the political agenda of Western countries, notably the USA and the EU. At the same meeting civil society was accepted as one of the key elements of democratization and its importance was emphasized particularly when processes of democratization are at stake (No Peace Without Justice (a), 2007; No Peace Without Justice (e), 2007).

A series of "Roundtables on Civil Society Organizations' strategic planning for democratic reform" were organized by the NPWJ, in partnership with the Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM) and the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in Amman a series of on 17-19 June 2007. In these roundtables international and regional initiatives for promoting democracy in this region were assessed and recommendations related to this issue such as establishment of the Arab Citizenship Movement and the founding of Al-Kawakibi Chair for Democratic Transition Studies in order to achieve the objectives underlying these initiatives were made. The evolution of the Foundation for the Future which was established in Second Forum for the Future held in Bahrain in 2006 and the Arab Democracy Foundation whose establishment announced in Doha in 2007, the activities of DAD partners and the preparation of the Forum for the Future which was held its fourth session in Yemen in late 2007 were other subjects of discussion of these roundtables (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

The lack or absence of coordination among above mentioned initiatives; concrete materialization of these initiatives and the effective implementation of recommendations and concerning follow-up mechanisms were determined as challenging points. Along with these challenging points, the following negative points were discussed:

“1) Local governments have managed to absorb pressure for democratic liberation, and are endeavoring to empty the above-mentioned conferences and forums of their content; 2) The recommendations emanating from the above-mentioned forums were not effectively materialized, in addition to the persisting absence of “accumulation”, which led civil society organizations to concentrate more on conferences and initiatives at the expense of field action; 3) There is little or no coordination between these initiatives, which resulted in scattered forces and capacities” (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

In addition to these challenging points, the participants also highlighted the following positive points:

“1) The conferences held in recent years on the promotion of democracy have managed to draw attention to the issue of democratic transition in the region; 2) They have also attracted wide participation, on the part of civil society forces, in the processes and dynamics they have created around them, and provided an additional framework to strengthen relations and increase coordination; 3) They have offered the representatives of the Governments of the region and civil society forces an important opportunity for meeting and dialogue, which was unlikely to happen in the past; 4) The initiative of establishing the Arab Democracy Foundation provided a regional mechanism to support civil society organizations in the region with Arab funds and capacities” (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

The following recommendations to strengthen the impact of these initiatives on the Arab democratic promotion movement was put forward by the participants:

“1) The necessity to focus on specific issues and on few and applicable recommendations whose degree of implementation can be measured; 2) The necessity to coordinate the various initiatives in order to ensure “accumulation” and avoid duplication. In this context, a recommendation was made for preparing a strategic document to be established by civil society components, which would serve as a framework for the above-mentioned initiatives, and would set priorities and define the follow-up and impact-measuring mechanisms; 3) The necessity to institutionalize the work of the above-mentioned initiatives and to involve civil society forces in these initiatives, in order to make sure action will be sustained and will not be related to circumstantial factors. This can be achieved through establishing permanent secretariats ensuring continuous action and follow-up” (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

Participants also emphasized the consensus developed in the Middle East region on democracy by the political movements whether they are Islamist, nationalist or leftist as the most appropriate system of government and the competition among them to embrace the notion of democracy. Despite this verbal consensus and the little progress achieved in the process of democratic transition in few countries of the region, there is too much tasks for the countries of the region to reach modern international standards and requirements, to meet expectations of the peoples of the region in terms of democracy (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

At this meeting, the participants also stressed the connection between peace and democracy and stated that the persistence of occupation and violence does not facilitate the process of democratic transition. Moreover, they stated that “the absence of democracy does not justify the persistence of occupation in the region, nor waging wars in it” (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

A plan of action with the aim of establishing the Arab democratic trend as a social movement that transcends sector based and ideological divisions, and seeks to bring together divided parties, was proposed. Establishment of an alliance, involving organizations, political parties and personalities from the region, to work for building an Arab democratic movement was part of this action plan. This alliance shall set up a charter for Arab democratic action, which will serve as a common ground binding on all signatories. The charter shall set forth the rules and values of democratic action, and define a set of common objectives to be implemented. As a part of this initiative, establishing a logo for the Arab movement for citizenship; launching a large campaign for signing the charter and adopting a logo; organizing conferences to address issues pertaining to the organization and growth of the movement were proposed. Finally, the participants decided to call for convening a strategic planning meeting to be held in November 2007 in Morocco, to establish a program of action for the building of the movement (No Peace Without Justice (f), 2007).

The Participants announced the establishment of Al-Kawakibi Chair for Democratic Transition Studies as a part of education for democracy. Another important initiative of this meeting was launching the “Zaytuna (Olive Tree) Silver Award for Excellence in Democratic Action” which constitutes a moral recognition of the role assumed by Arab personalities and institutions in the dissemination of democracy, while enduring various forms of pressure and dangers, and offering precious sacrifices. The prizes were awarded to a number of personalities and institutions by President of the Board of Trustees of Al-Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, HRH Prince Al-Hassan Bin Talal (No Peace Without Justice (g), 2007).

In addition to these initiatives, NPJW in partnership with its regional partner Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM), and in cooperation with the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH), the Centre d'Etudes en Droit Humains et Democratie (MARKAZ) and Freedom House organized a workshop to reinforce the transfer and learning

processes of knowledge and skills concerning democracy transition in the BMENA region, to elaborate and test protocols and processes for democratic transition learning programs organized in Rabat on 18-26 November 2007. In this meeting, participants explored non-violent strategies for political dialogue and democratic reform in the BMENA region and assess previous events organised within the framework of the BMENA Democracy program in Rabat (March 2007), Doha (May 2007) and Amman (June 2007) (No Peace Without Justice (h), 2007).

As a part of the BMENA Democracy program, the NPWJ Iraq Project, which contributes to the constitutional and institution-building process in Iraq by promoting negotiation between leaders on the most politically sensitive issues, including in particular the attribution of responsibilities and powers at the various levels of State, Regions, Governorates, Towns and Municipalities, begun in 2006. NPWJ Iraq Special Project is implemented through a strategic partnership with the International Alliance for Justice. The project is currently funded primarily by the Italian Government; additional funds are being sought from other donors. The following conferences and seminars were organized by the NPWJ in cooperation with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and together with IAJ: a) a Conference on “The Status of Armed Forces and Groups in Iraq”, held in Dokan (Kurdistan region, Iraq) from 9 to 10 November 2008; b) a Conference on “Perspectives and Challenges of Building a Federal State in Iraq”, held in Baghdad on 14 March 2008; c) a Conference on “DiverCities - Mixed Cities and Disputed Areas: Local Approaches to Federal Democracy”, held in Venice on 18 to 22 December 2007; d) a Conference on "The Role of the Second Chamber in Federal and Devolved Democracies", held in Rome on 26 - 27 September 2007; e) a Seminar on "Practical Federalism in Iraq", held in Erbil, Kurdistan - Iraq on 10 to 16 July 2007; f) a Seminar on "Practical Federalism in Iraq", held in Venice on 2 to 11 July 2006 (No Peace Without Justice (i), n.d.).

The BMENA report of Venice on Political Pluralism and Electoral Processes (21-23 July 2005) suggested the creation of a network or forum for Arab democrats, where democratic values and practices are actively followed and within which reformers in the region could actively support one another's work. In this report, the importance of regional cooperation and networking in this process was also emphasized. In this context, “the creation and adoption of a democracy charter for the region was raised, particularly as a means for civil society to encourage governments to adhere to democratic principles and to monitor

progress". Another major issue stated in this report was election monitoring. Establishment of an Arab Election Monitoring Network, which could monitor and highlight what is happening before and during elections and make it public in order to facilitate the exchange of experiences and knowledge, was suggested (No Peace Without Justice (j), 2005).

Ministers of the countries of the BMENA together with their G8 counterparts and other partners met together in Bahrain for the second Forum for the Future. At this meeting they reviewed progress made since the Rabat meeting of December 2004. The efforts within the region to promote the true image of Islam and its message of moderation and tolerance, such as the International Islamic Conference held in Amman in July 2005 was welcomed. Ministers recalled the successful national elections that took place in Iraq on 30 January 2005 and applauded the adoption of a new national constitution as marking a major milestone in the development of a secure, democratic, federal and united Iraq. They welcomed the announcement of the establishment of the Foundation for the Future in order to support civil society organizations and democratic process in the region (No Peace Without Justice (k); 2005).

The Sana'a joint conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression was convened by the government of Yemen, in partnership with the Yemeni non-governmental partner Human Rights Information and Training Centre (HRITC), and No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) on 25-26 June 2006, within the framework of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) to assess progress made in dialogue for democratic reform since the Sana'a 2004 Conference, facilitating and reinforcing the various initiatives carried out in the Region in the last years (No Peace Without Justice (l); 2006).

As Sjursen stated that 'values or conceptions of what is good may vary according to cultural or social contexts. They are particular to a specific community or a specific collective identity'. Promoting its own norms in the international system might have a legitimacy problem and the risk of provoking controversy (Sjursen, 2006, p. 89-93). From this perspective, democracy promotion in this region is difficult and delicate balance as H.E. Frendo (personal communication, 2008; See Annex IV) said since it might bring extremist religious groupings to power with anti-Western and anti-democratic agenda. As Obama stated at his Cairo speech 'There are some who advocate for democracy only when they're out of power; once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others' (The White House

(a), 2009). External democracy promotion might have negative impact without having willingness and support of the people of this region. This leads to legitimacy problem as stated by Sjørusen (2006). Related to external democracy promotion, the Gallup made a survey in 2007 on how “Great Powers” were perceived among the people of this region. According to this survey, the lowest level of credibility was given to the USA and UK leadership, relevantly better to Germany and France and even much better to Japan and China. This might be interpreted as the USA intervention in Iraq led to negative view in the Arab world and resistance to westernization since it came with a stick (Reis, 2008, p. 10).

The other issue is related to a wholesale western model of democracy promotion to the countries of this region. The participants of some of the meetings held within the framework of the BMENA focus on the compatibility of Islam with democracy particularly to develop their own model of democracy including *Sharia* rules. A Gallup Survey realized in 2008 reveals this fact with these words ‘people of this region favor their own democratic model that incorporates *Sharia* instead of a wholesale adoption of western model of democracy’. Another survey called Zogby Poll –Six Arab Nation Survey- to the World Economic Forum and Arab Business Council of 2005 conducted showed that except Lebanon, *Sharia* law is seen as one (not only) source of legislation (Reis, 2008, p. 10).

Given UNDP AHDR statistics of 2003 and 2006 for political rights ratings indicate that a little progress has been achieved in two countries of this region, Iraq and Lebanon, in terms of democracy promotion while political rights ratings of other countries of this region remain the same. From this point of view, both projects have quite less impact in democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region.

Regime change was realized after the USA’ occupation of Iraq. However, the democratic quality of elections which were held in Iraq was questionable in terms of how democratic they were since it was realized under the USA’s occupation. Democratic elections in the Palestinian Authority led to Hamas victory in Gaza Strip. However, the election of Hamas has been rejected by the West since Hamas is accepted by the EU and the USA as terrorist organization. There are other examples which shows the little impact of these projects in achieving democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region: Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was replaced by his son Bashir; President Mubarak was re-elected in Egypt; a referendum which allowed President bin Ali of Tunisia presidential

election for a fourth term was held; pluralistic parliamentary elections were held in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Palestine with more or less limited impact on the decision-making centers of power; although Israel is a democratic country of this region, its occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967 and its problematic relationship with the non-Jewish citizens are major shortcomings of its democracy. Finally, Turkey is only democratic country where free and fair elections take place (Reis, 2008, p. 12). Turkey also has made significant progress in the field of freedoms by increasing press freedom, lifting restrictions on the right of assembly and introducing limited cultural rights for minorities to get rid of democratic defects it formerly had as a part of its policy on the way of “full EU membership” (Neugart, 2005).

4.1.1.a. Good Governance

Corruption is one of the problematic areas in the region (See Annex I). It is perceived as one of the main causes of the countries of this region’s economic backwardness. The following table, which is compiled from the UNDP AHDR, shows the degree of corruption perceived among public officials and politicians in the region for the year 2003 and year 2007.

Table 4.3. Corruption Perception Index

Country	Value (2003)	Country	Value (2007)
Algeria	2.6	Algeria	3
Bahrain	6.1	Bahrain	5
Egypt	3.3	Comoros	2.6
Iraq	2.2	Djibouti	2.9
Jordan	4.6	Egypt	2.9
Kuwait	5.3	Iraq	1.5
Lebanon	3	Jordan	4.7
Libya	2.1	Kuwait	4.3
Morocco	3.3	Lebanon	3
Oman	6.3	Libya	2.5
Palestine	3	Mauritania	2.6
Qatar	5.6	Morocco	3.5
Saudi Arabia	4.5	Oman	4.7
Sudan	2.3	Qatar	6

Syria	3.4	Saudi Arabia	3.4
Tunisia	4.9	Somalia	1.4
United Arab Emirates	5.2	Sudan	1.8
Yemen	2.6	Syria	2.4
		Tunisia	4.2
		United Arab Emirates	5.7
		Yemen	2.5

Source: The Corruption perceptions index (CPI) measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Ratings range in value from 10 (least corrupt) to 0 (most corrupt). The survey measures public sector corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain. The CPI measures local and national governments, not domestic and foreign corporations doing business in these countries. The CPI is a composite index compiled from 17 surveys originating from 13 different independent institutions and a country is included in the CPI only if there are data available from 3 or more surveys. These surveys measure the perceptions of local residents, expatriates, business people, academics and risk analysts (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (c), 2003, AHDR Statistics (d), 2007).

Another table, which shows subjective governance indicator aggregated from a variety of sources and measuring perceptions of the following concepts: corruption among public officials, corruption as an obstacle to business, frequency of “irregular payments” to officials and judiciary and perceptions of corruption in civil service, is given below. This table is again compiled from the UNDP AHDR 2002 and 2007. The rates given in this table shows that the countries of this region are not successful to control corruption in their countries.

Table 4.4. Control of Corruption

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2007)
Algeria	-0.76	Algeria	-0.47
Bahrain	0.93	Bahrain	0.60
Comoros	-0.85	Comoros	-0.69
Djibouti	-0.68	Djibouti	-0.48
Egypt	-0.34	Egypt	-0.58
Iraq	-1.46	Iraq	-1.39
Jordan	0.01	Jordan	0.32
Kuwait	1.09	Kuwait	0.49
Lebanon	-0.38	Lebanon	-0.65
Libya	-0.82	Libya	-0.83
Mauritania	0.19	Mauritania	-0.50
Morocco	-0.08	Morocco	-0.24
Oman	0.95	Oman	0.62
Palestine	-0.93	Palestine	-0.77
Qatar	0.88	Qatar	1.00

Saudi Arabia	0.51	Saudi Arabia	-0.10
Somalia	-1.13	Somalia	-1.87
Sudan	-1	Sudan	-1.25
Syria	-0.3	Syria	-0.88
Tunisia	0.45	Tunisia	0.08
United Arab Emirates	1.16	United Arab Emirates	1.00
Yemen	-0.69	Yemen	-0.62

Source: Estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5; higher is better (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (e) (2002), AHDR Statistics (f) (2007) .

In the EMP's AAs, the SEMCs and the EU agree to cooperate, on the basis of the relevant international legal instruments, on action to combat corruption in international business transactions through the following measures: "1) by taking effective practical measures against all forms of corruption, bribery and illicit activities of every sort in international business transactions practised by individuals or corporate bodies; 2) by providing mutual assistance in criminal investigations into acts of corruption". Moreover, "this cooperation shall also cover technical assistance for the training of officials and magistrates responsible for tackling corruption and support for initiatives designed to organize action against this form of crime" (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005).

Within the BMENA framework, some steps were taken to combat corruption. For instance, at the second Forum for the Future summit held on 12 November 2005, Ministers of the BMENA, G8 and other partners agreed to pursue ratification and implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption and to develop practical measures to improve transparency in public financial management that would assist their common goal of achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (No Peace Without Justice (h), 2007). In addition to this, Participants of Roundtables on Civil Society Organizations' "Strategic Planning for Democratic Reform" held in Amman in 2007 recommended priority to the issue of corruption. Launching educative programmes, establishing legal measures to combat corruption in their countries, setting up civil institutions specialized in the fight against corruption and establishing regional networks in this field were subjects discussed in this meeting (No Peace Without Justice (g), 2007).

Although there is progress achieved in terms of combating corruption, there is also long way to go. Making the Anti-Corruption Commission operational, improving weak legal

framework and lack of enforcement measures are some of the areas where progress should be achieved. The progresses achieved related to this issue, which are highlighted in the ENP reports, are as follows:

“1) A National Committee on Transparency and Integrity was established in Egypt in 2007 to support efforts to combat corruption and enhance transparency and accountability in public affairs; 2) Anti-corruption Department was set up in Jordan in 1996; 3) In 2000, a Higher Committee to Fight Corruption was established; 4) Another National Committee for Combating Corruption and Favouritism was set up in 2003; 5) Anti-corruption law was adopted in October 2006; 6) In April 2002, the National Commission of Morocco launched a campaign on the evils of corruption; 7) Morocco is currently drafting an anti-corruption law aimed at codifying all the measures taken in this field in line with the UN convention on corruption, which Morocco has signed but not yet ratified” (See Annex I).

4.1.1.b. Political Participation and Elections

Free and fair elections in which political pluralism takes place is one of the main elements of democratic transformation of this region. Although some progress has been achieved in this area, there are still problems such as restrictions and/or exclusion of certain political parties, movements and groupings from political arena due to state of emergency in some countries in the region (Algeria, Egypt), absence of international electoral observation, existence of foreign interference in elections (Syria’s influence over Lebanon’s political life), existence of some electoral system known as “single non-transferable vote”, which leads to disadvantageous conditions towards the development of political parties and other factors which restrict political pluralism like system to set up a political party, electoral systems which favor the ruling party (Tunisia) (See Annex I).

Despite these problems, some progress has been achieved in this area. For instance, in 2002 general elections held in Morocco was quite free and fair. Moreover, for the first time, 35 women were elected due to a special system of national women-only lists (See Annex I).

Implementation of the objectives, which were underlined at the Five Year Work Plan (10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit -1995), by the partners of the EMP is important to deliver results that will have a positive impact for all citizens in the region. In other words, it contributes the visibility of the Partnership. In this context the following measures were decided to be taken:

“1) extend political pluralism and participation by citizens, particularly women and youth, through the active promotion of a fair and competitive political environment, including fair and free elections; 2) Increase the participation of women in decision-making including in political, social, cultural and economic positions; 3) The EU will co-operate with partners in promoting and supporting their political reforms on the basis of universal principles, shared values and the Neighbourhood Action Plans, in accordance with national priorities, building on the commitment countries in the region have demonstrated to reform, including in the Tunis Declaration; 4) In this context the EU will establish a substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean partners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region; 5) Euro-Mediterranean partners will meet internationally agreed standards in the conduct of elections. In this context they will discuss the possibility of developing, on a voluntary basis and upon request of the country concerned, joint co-operation and exchange of experience in the field of elections” (Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005).

Within the framework of the BMENA, strengthening democracy and pluralism, establishment of elected legislative bodies to represent popular will and ensuring the fair representation of all sectors of society were agreed by the Participants of the Sana'a Intergovernmental Regional Conference on “Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court” and took place in the conclusion of the Conference (No Peace Without Justice (d), 2004).

Moreover, an International Colloquium on Political Pluralism and Electoral Processes in the BMENA was organized by NPWJ and Maroc 2020 in Rabat on 1-3 October 2005 as a DAD initiative. Participants of this Colloquium recognized that “free, public and diversified information represents the best way to open up the public space to debate, which characterizes democratic pluralism”. Moreover, its fundamental role that can be played by the promotion of best practices and information sharing in the view of the promotion of human rights and

fundamental freedoms, political participation for all and the empowerment of women and their full participation in public life was emphasized. The commitments undertaken at the Rabat Colloquium in this respect was decided to be followed up by the NPWJ within the framework of activities of the DAD (No Peace Without Justice (m), 2007). The governmental and non-governmental actors have agreed to facilitate and encourage public participation actively, in particular the participation of young people and women. The opening up of broadcasting space and the promotion of equal access to the media in the region were emphasized as essential to democratic development. They decided to present the results of the Rabat Colloquium during the second meeting of the Forum for the Future held in Manama on 12 November 2005 as an indication of the achievements in the DAD process (Kingdom of Morocco (MFAC) (a), 2005).

In the Rabat Final Declaration, political pluralism was emphasized as a universal value which should be safeguarded and strengthened through the promotion of the widest possible participation of citizens in political life and public affairs and the implementation of democratic legislative measures conducive to freedom of expression and association in the BMENA countries. The importance of access to the media and to free, public and diversified information, necessity to respect the OSCE principles on holding free and fair elections (universality, equality, equity, secrecy, freedom, transparency, and accountability of elected officials towards the voters) were underlined as essential elements to democratic pluralism by the participants (No Peace Without Justice (m), 2007).

Within the BMENA's DAD consultation process, NPWJ in partnership with the *European Inter-University Centre on Human Rights and Democratization* organized a Civil Society Workshop on "Political Pluralism and Electoral Processes in the BMENA" in Venezia on 21-23 July 2005. Specific themes which were discussed in the panels were "Standard, Status and Role of the Political Parties"; "Electoral systems, passive and active electorate, electoral monitoring in BMENA Countries"; "Access to the Media for political parties and civil society organizations". Political and civil society leaders from nineteen countries of the region (Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen) were attended. Recommendations on free and fair democratic participation, electoral systems and rules, electoral monitoring, quotas for women's participation in elections, access to the media for political parties and civil society

(No Peace Without Justice (n), 2005). Concerns expressed related to voting for certain parties simply because they belong to the same ethnic, religious or cultural groups due to absence of sincere and genuine democratic alternatives by the participants. Egypt's influence over the Arab world particularly as a negative model (limiting political parties, civil associations, trade unions, media) was noted by several speakers (No Peace Without Justice (j), 2005). In the report on Thematic Session II: Electoral Systems, Rules and Monitoring, the promotion of registration and the correction of errors on the electoral rolls through use of the internet was emphasized (Kingdom of Morocco (MFAC) (b), 2005).

At the Roundtables on Civil Society Organizations' Strategic Planning for Democratic Reform held in Amman in 2007, the participants stressed the importance of generalizing free elections, as a means to materialize the citizens' will regarding issues of public concern. The Participants called on regional and international forces to respect the results of elections, no matter who wins these elections. Generalizing of electoral education programs, providing training in election monitoring, and instilling the election culture were among the recommendations made by the participants. The lack of power alternation in the majority of Arab states was pointed out by the participants (No Peace Without Justice (g), 2007).

Both governmental and non-governmental conferences, colloquiums, conferences were held within the framework of the BMENA in order to eliminate the obstacles in front of the free and fair elections in which pluralism can take place in this region. Several recommendations were made in this respect. On the other hand, within the framework of the EMP, the Five Year Work Plan (10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit -1995) some measures were decided to be taken in order to "extend political pluralism and participation by citizens, particularly women and youth, through the active promotion of a fair and competitive political environment, including fair and free elections" (Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005). Although some progress was achieved in this area, it is still too early to talk about free and fair elections without any restriction or exclusion of any groupings that take place in most of the BMENA countries (see annex I).

4.1.1.c. Legal Environment for Civil Society

Civil societies are important in the promotion of democracy since they have an important role in monitoring the election process and developing institutional mechanisms for the protection and preservation of the electoral process itself. It advances the process of democratization and the rule of law through promoting the ability of people to know and act upon their rights. Moreover, civil society organizations reduce tension by channelling concerns and issues into forums for dialogue (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

Dictatorial regimes prevent the activities of civil society organizations. For example, for three decades civil society in Iraq has not existed. BMENA Participants from Iraq requested from regional and international civil society to lend their support to Iraqi reform activists who are pursuing the goal of a peaceful transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi people ((No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

In addition to this, many steps were taken to make civil society part of this democracy promotion process. Establishment of Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) within the BMENA framework is one of these steps which were taken at the Sana'a Conference of 2004. Sana'a Declaration on human rights and democracy which was adopted by the governments of the region in full consultation with regional civil society and human rights experts is an important document in this respect. Another important initiative taken in this respect was the proposal for the establishment of an Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum between public authorities and civil society (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

The DAD was established to bring together governments and civil societies from the region and the G8 countries to share experiences and discuss ideas for democratic reform and the promotion and protection of human rights. Main priorities of the BMENA in this respect are “reinforcing existing efforts and NGO networks, promoting cooperation and dialogue between governments and civil society and empowering civil society through advocacy and information sharing on human rights issues: women’s rights, freedom of expression and an independent media, elected legislative bodies, cultural and religious pluralism” (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

A series of advocacy workshops, national and regional conferences and publications on specific issues were realized. Participants of the advocacy workshops were chosen from people who have the potential to implement, lobby for and monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken. The advocacy workshops would also be used to strengthen existing networks or to establish new networks comprised of relevant professionals and civil society representatives for the monitoring of progress in particular areas. Accordingly, each partner would be responsible for preparing periodic reports on their theme with the relevant network. These reports will also guide discussions at the regional intergovernmental conferences (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

Prior to Second Intergovernmental Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law conference, information regarding the progress made and challenges faced by the participating governments from the first Sana'a Conference were requested. This information, together with the outcomes of the advocacy workshops and thematic conferences, were used to produce a "Democracy Report" to provide the basis for discussions at the BMENA Second Intergovernmental Conference (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

At the conclusion of the BMENA Sana'a Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court the Conference, the Participants agreed "to work towards future modalities of democratic consultation and cooperation among themselves, including civil society, and the establishment of an Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum as an instrument for the promotion of dialogue between diverse actors, for strengthening democracy, human rights and civil liberties, especially freedom of opinion and expression, and strengthening the partnership between public authorities and civil society" (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

Importance of the role that civil society can play in the promotion of democracy and human rights was once more accepted by the Participants of the Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court Report for Thematic Session III: The Role of the Civil Society in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights. This conference is the first of its kind since the governments and civil society together took place to interchange their views on the role of the civil society (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

Civil society organizations continue to make impressive gains in advancing their agenda for local reform in the BMENA. The 2005 Forum for the Future, held in Bahrain on November 11-12, marked a dramatic increase in the role and participation of civil society representatives (more than 40 civil society representatives participated as opposed to five at the initial Forum in Rabat in 2004) and focused discussion on democracy and political reform. BMENA civil society representatives outlined priorities and steps that should be taken in the specific areas of the rule of law, transparency, women's empowerment and human rights. Many regional NGOs also participated in a parallel civil society conference held in Manama on November 9-10 as a means to further advance their role and voice in this initiative. For the first time, non-governmental representatives took the floor at the Ministerial meeting (Forum for the Future – the annual meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers from G8 and the BMENA countries held in Bahrain on 11-12 November 2005) in order to illustrate the initiatives undertaken in the framework of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue since No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), together with the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV, Turkey) and the Human Rights Information and Training Center (HRITC, Yemen), NGOs in charge of implementing the DAD program that is co-sponsored by the governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen (No Peace Without Justice (p), 2005).

The governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen presented a concrete plan of action for the DAD program in order to foster productive dialogue between civil society and governments of the BMENA region, integrating participation of non-governmental actors, political leaders, media representatives and civil society and developing specific initiatives on issues relating to political reform, democracy and human rights at the Forum for the Future meeting held in Rabat in December 2004. Making involvement of civil society in this process possible aimed at monitoring and reporting on the accomplishments and failures of democratic transitions and the protection of basic freedoms throughout the region (No Peace Without Justice (q), 2006).

NPWJ organized a meeting in partnership with the “Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center” (KADEM), the “Moroccan Organization for Human Rights” (OMDH) and the “Arab Institute for Human Rights” (AIHR) on 26 – 27 March 2007. This meeting, which gathered democracy activists, selected among academicians and civil society representatives as well as high-level government representatives from this region, provided an opportunity to facilitate partnership and cooperation between civil society and universities and developing the

professional skills necessary for civil society to enter into effective interaction with state structures. Another meeting providing a model of consultation between civil society and institutions, both at a regional and at a national level, also for other countries in the Region was Doha conference organized by the Qatari National Human Rights Committee, together with the Ibn Kaldhun Center of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and NPWJ on 27-29 May 2007. The Conference was also the occasion for the launch and for the first board meeting of the Arab Democracy Foundation (ADF), a non-governmental organization (No Peace Without Justice (r), 2007). Another meeting which had a primarily civil society character was a series of “Roundtables on Civil Society organisations' strategic planning for democratic reform” organized by NPWJ, in partnership with the Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM) and the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in Amman on 17-19 June 2007. The roundtables gathered democracy advocates from the country and the region as well as international organizations in order to exchange opinions and ideas about the current and future activities aimed at reinforcing and strengthening of democratic reform within the region (No Peace Without Justice (b), 2004).

Governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen, in partnership with their civil society counterparts NPWJ, TESEV, and the HRITC, the DAD has pursued an active agenda in its first year, focused on advancing dialogue and reform in the areas of women's empowerment and electoral and political processes. Hundreds of civil society leaders have participated in the DAD's work, which was highlighted at the Bahrain Forum. The DAD is under the auspices of the Forum for the Future. It brings together willing governments, civil society groups and other organizations from the G8, EU and countries in the region to enhance existing democracy programmes and initiate new programs (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

Former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice announced the launch of the Foundation for the Future at the Second Forum for the Future meeting held in Manama, Bahrain on November 2005 in response to the calls from regional civil society for a mechanism to ensure follow-up on its recommendations for action. The Foundation was established with the aim of providing grants to civil society in the BMENA region to advance freedom and democratic values and practices. This is part of the USA government work to advance cooperation and commitment between the region's governments and civil society to promote freedom, democracy and prosperity along with the expanding work of its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In addition to its expanding regional civil society programs, MEPI is

supporting the work of the DAD, both in 2005 and 2006, and also supported the work of the rule of law delegation to the Bahrain Forum (U.S. Department of State (h), 2006).

In 2007, a single text which illustrates guiding principles for G8-BMENA Partnership with Civil Society was issued by consolidating existing consensus texts from previous meetings and fora (Eramo, 2007). In this text, partners of the BMENA recognized that “NGOs are essential to the development and success of democratic societies and the promotion of mutual understanding and tolerance”. Accordingly, G8 and BMENA countries support this role dedicated to the NGOs (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

In addition to this, some principles were suggested for BMENA governments. One of these suggestions was to provide legal and political environment in order to enable NGOs work freely. The other suggestion was related to the permission which should be given all citizens to form, join and participate in NGOs of their choosing and the right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The third suggestion was to allow NGOs to seek, receive, manage and administer financial support from domestic, regional and international sources. The fourth suggestion was to engage with civil society on all aspects of the Forum process and to create a transparent, consultative process for civil society organizations to participate in the domestic reform process. Fifth suggestion was to promote popular participation in public life in particular among young people. Final suggestion was to reaffirm the crucial role of civil society in encouraging the growth of active citizen participation to promote the full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

With this text, some suggestions were also made for civil society organization. These suggested principles for civil society organizations are as follows: “to carry out their activities in a transparent, peaceful, non-violent manner; not to accept funding from terrorists or other violent entities; to encourage openness of membership in NGOs; to participate in both official and unofficial aspects of the Forum process in a constructive way; to seek opportunities to share practices with like-minded organizations; to work with governments to promote tolerance and mutual understanding; finally to work with government participants and NGOs to deliver to the annual Forum for the Future ministerial other proposals for action on reform and specific progress reports on implementation of previous years’ initiatives” (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

Finally, some principles related to this subject were suggested for G8 and other partners. Some of these principles are as follows: “encouraging and supporting development of civil society and their ongoing participation in the Forum process; encouraging G8 civil society organization to work with regional governments and NGOs through the BMENA; supporting BMENA civil society and reaffirming the right to promote and strive for the protection and realization of human rights for everyone according to UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders; assisting to strength national level civil society coalitions and working to advance and implement recommendations through tangible, in-country programming” (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

Some steps were taken at the Rabat meeting. The following initiation took place in the Rabat Final Statement: “Initiation of a dialogue between governments and non-state actors on political issues, with a view to the promotion of political pluralism and electoral governance by transposing to a national level the same type of effective civil society participation in dialogue and joint decision-making”. In this connection, NPWJ and the Italian government, in cooperation with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) within the framework of DAD program, developed a project designed in the field of political pluralism and electoral processes. With this project, strengthening the contribution of civil society to the democratic process; promoting dialogue with decision-makers and state structures; making civil society the legitimate counterpart of dialogue with governments on issues of democratic reform; implementing on a national level the commitments undertaken at the Colloquium on freedom of association and the participation of civil society in the reform process; and finally, facilitating the establishment of a lasting system, practice or habit of consultation between state structures and non-state actors were aimed. For this project, three target countries were decided to be selected according to these criteria: “Each country should be at different stages of democratic development and each represent one of three sub-regions (Gulf, Mashreq and Maghreb); the governments should demonstrate on a regional level a commitment to dialogue between governments and non-state actors and therefore can be expected to adopt a policy of consultation at the national level; and civil society should be sufficiently developed to enable them to interact constructively with their respective governments and to work towards establishing and maintaining a lasting system of constructive dialogue at a national level” (No Peace Without Justice (t), 2006).

As a part of above mentioned project, the following capacity building and training activities were decided to be adapted to the country situation, depending on the existing capacity of civil society to engage in effective dialogue with governments: “1) developing civil society’s professional skills necessary to enter into effective dialogue, interaction and cooperation with state-structures; 2) coordinating civil society’s agenda, advocacy skills, public diplomacy, outreach and communication; 3) mainstreaming and systematizing civil society contribution to the decision-making process and reducing the scope of “redline issues”, which are currently not open for discussion”. Workshops, seminars and training courses were decided to be held related to this project (No Peace Without Justice (t), 2006).

The Rabat International Colloquium on Political Pluralism and Electoral Processes in the BMENA region is recognized as a milestone in constructive interaction between governments and non-governmental actors due to its above mentioned contributions to the efforts for strengthening the civil societies of this region. The Rabat International Colloquium is a good example to show successful civil society participation side-by-side with governments in a multilateral regional forum. This process represents an important achievement since all the parties involved are working together towards the fruitful interaction between state institutions, governments and non-state actors within the region (No Peace Without Justice (s), 2007).

The Partnership Document, which has been acknowledged by the Forum delegates at the Fifth Forum for the Future Ministerial Meeting held on 18-19 October 2008 in Abu Dhabi under the co-chairmanships of the United Arab Emirates and Japan, is the result of a process of consultation promoted by NPWJ in the framework of the DAD Program, involving both governments and civil society from the G8 and the BMENA region. This document represents a tangible accomplishment of the principles and the methods that DAD partners contributed to foster inside the Forum for the Future process as the only intergovernmental BMENA forum where civil society is able to interact directly with regional governments and G-8 countries. NPWJ continues to promote the dialogue and cooperation between governments and civil society during the 2009 Forum for the Future, under the Italian G8 presidency (No Peace Without Justice (u), 2008).

According to the partnership document which laid down the principles of partnership between G8 BMENA governments and civil society, BMENA governments’ principles are as

follows: “1) provide the necessary legal framework and structure as well as political environment which would enable NGOs to undertake their activities and to operate freely to contribute constructively to the societies within which they undertake their activities; 2) Deepen partnerships with NGOs to strengthen a practical framework which would enable NGOs to operate in a peaceful, non-violent, legitimate, open, and constructive environment; 3) Permit all citizens to legally form, join, and participate in NGOs of their choosing, and exercise their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association; 4) Allow NGOs to legally sustain themselves and seek, receive, manage, and administer financial support, in accordance with transparent nondiscriminatory national legislation, from peaceful, non-violent, legitimate, domestic, regional and international sources; 5) Engage with civil society in the Forum process, including endorsing recommendations and initiatives coming from the Ministerial Forum, thus creating a transparent, consultative environment for civil society organisations to substantively participate and support the implementation of the domestic reform process; 6) Work with NGOs to promote tolerance and mutual understanding by promoting popular participation in public life and positive citizenship, in particular among young people and women; 7) Reaffirm the crucial role of civil society in encouraging the growth of active citizen participation to promote the full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (No Peace Without Justice (v), 2008).

In this document Principles for G8 and other democratic partners are also determined as follows: “1) Support and encourage the development of civil society, including through ongoing participation in the Forum process; 2) Encourage G8 civil society to work with governments and NGOs in the region, including through the BMENA process; 3) Support peaceful, non-violent BMENA civil society and reaffirm the promotion, protection and realisation of human rights for all, including those rights and protections set forth in the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and monitored by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; 4) Respect the cultural diversities of the BMENA region and encourage civil society organisations in the G8 to increase awareness in their respective countries of the BMENA region’s cultures, traditions, and history, with a view to develop a better understanding among peoples; 5) Assist in strengthening civil society cooperation in order to address and advocate for recommendations put forward by the official civil society dialogues; 6) Support BMENA governments in strengthening their cooperation with the civil society within the BMENA process; 7) Create a clear and appropriate mechanism to follow-up the initiatives made by the BMENA countries and NGOs during the Forum’s annual

ministerial meetings; 8) Engage civil society representatives in the planning of Forum for the Future annual conferences in close cooperation with governments” (No Peace Without Justice (v), 2008).

The second Civil Society planning meeting was organized with the collaboration of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), NPWJ (No Peace Without Justice) and HRITC (Human Rights Information and Training Center) under the auspices of the Global Political Trends Center at Istanbul Kültür University on 2nd and 3rd August as a last of the planning meetings among the representatives of civil society and government officials. At this meeting, civil society proposals for the ministerial meeting were discussed. The positive role particularly civil society may play in contribution to solving the problems of the region and the need for making civil society specialized on a subject were also discussed at this meeting (Global Political Trends Center (GpoT), 2008).

Some civil society organizations offered some proposals to empower civil society in this region within the BMENA framework. Some of these proposal are: “1) Establishment of Centre Régional des Ressources de La Société Civile – Regional Civil Society Resources Center, which will contribute to strengthen civil society organizations in the BMENA region by making them more capable in performing their institutional mandates and roles; 2) Promoting Dialogue on Millenium Development Goals in Yemen through Budget Priorities as a Tool- the project will facilitate greater engagement of Yemen civil society in the governmental budget process, enhancing dialogue between civil society organizations and governmental institutions on the matter, promoting budget transparency and contributing to the achievement of Millenium Development Goals; 3) Building Stronger Relations between Local Government and the CSOs- the project addresses the need for increased participation of civil society and the youth as well as increased communications between local government officials and local communities, thus enhancing accountability” (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

Within the EMP framework, some civil society organization were involved in EMP. EuroMeSCo, Anna Lindh Foundation are examples of these kind of organizations. EuroMeSCo was established as a network of foreign policy institutes carrying out studies and seeking to create relationships and widen the discussion, especially on the EMP and ENP issues. Euro-Mediterranean Study and Dialogue on Political Cooperation and Security

(EuroMeSCo) network has been adopted by the EMP as an official confidence-building measure. The budget allocated to the study of this organization is €4.9 million (MEDA) for the time frame 2005-2009. Participating countries of EuroMeSCo network are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. It aims at providing a forum for foreign policy institutes to study and debate on policy and security issues in the region, and functions as a source of analytical expertise in the policy and security fields. To this end, it supports a network of 48 foreign policy institutes and 24 observer institutes; offers analytical expertise in the policy and security fields; produces publications, including issue papers, reports, briefs and a regular online newsletter; holds annual conferences and workshops on topics such as human rights, democracy and security in the Mediterranean; organizes crisis management seminars; maintains an updated and active website (European Commission (d), n.d.).

As a part of the EMP's regional cooperation, Euromed Civil Forum - a platform for civil society organizations to network, discuss their role and make recommendations to governments - was formed in 1995. Participating countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. It aims at bringing together representatives of the European and Mediterranean social, economic and cultural spheres, to give civil society a platform and voice. To this end, it offers civil society the opportunity to make recommendations to governments and discuss its place and role in the EMP; consolidates cooperation among civil society organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean area and strengthens networking by bringing together representatives of the social, economic and cultural spheres; meets annually at the same time as the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. In order to reform the EuroMed Civil Forum and establish a permanent interface between Euro-Med civil society and the public authorities the Euro- Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform was launched in 2003. The Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform strengthens the role of civil society in the region and within the EMP through bringing together 140 networks of independent Euro-Med organizations, promoting dialogue, debate and the sharing of experiences, and building synergies. It also helps in the emergence of thematic networks, such as women, youth, migration, etc. Moreover, it gives civil society the opportunity to meet annually, at the same time as the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. It organizes plenary sessions, thematic workshops, a self-conducted workshop, agoras and cultural activities (European Commission (d), n.d.).

Another initiative which is taken by the EMP in order to strengthen the civil society is MED-PACT. MED-PACT encourages dialogue and cooperation between cities and civil societies, improving understanding and promoting cultural and social rapprochement (European Commission (d), n.d.).

As mentioned above several conferences, workshops, seminars were realized under the USA led initiative BMENA and the EU led initiative EMP in order to strengthen the legal environment for the civil society with the aim to facilitate transformation of the countries of this region to democracy. Most of these meetings were organized by civil society organizations such as NPWJ. Contrary to the BMENA, meetings of the EMP are mostly at the ministerial level, senior official level, official level. Its civil society adherence in comparison to the BMENA is absent or limited particularly in the first basket of the EMP-political and security basket- as Aliboni stated in an interview that I made with him: ‘...I must say, though, that the BMENA initiatives were able to involve a great amount of NGOs whereas the EMP initiatives are mostly towards governments and less able to reach out to civil society than BMENA...’ (Personal communication, Aliboni, 2008, See Annex IV). In other words, although the EMP takes several steps to increase the role of civil society in this region, its success is relatively low in comparison to the BMENA’s efforts to make the civil society as a part of its entire process.

4.1.1.d. Judiciary Development

Independence of judiciary is absent in most of the states of this region. Although there are some reform efforts for independent judiciary, there is still lack of independent judiciary from the executive due to political pressure of existing governments (see Annex I). The following table is subjective governance indicator aggregated from a variety of sources and measuring perceptions of the following concepts: legal impartiality and popular observance of the law in the North Africa and the Middle East region.

Table 4.5. Rule of Law

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2007)
Algeria	-0.75	Algeria	-0.72
Bahrain	0.76	Bahrain	0.66
Comoros	-1.04	Comoros	-0.93
Djibouti	-0.76	Djibouti	-0.51
Egypt	-0.06	Egypt	-0.13
Iraq	-1.52	Iraq	-1.89
Jordan	0.24	Jordan	0.51
Kuwait	0.72	Kuwait	0.69
Lebanon	-0.26	Lebanon	-0.66
Libya	-0.87	Libya	-0.62
Mauritania	-0.41	Mauritania	-0.60
Morocco	0	Morocco	-0.15
Oman	0.74	Oman	0.73
Palestine	-0.36	Palestine	-0.84
Qatar	0.73	Qatar	0.89
Saudi Arabia	0.21	Saudi Arabia	0.27
Somalia	-1.98	Somalia	-2.64
Sudan	-1.22	Sudan	-1.46
Syria	-0.36	Syria	-0.55
Tunisia	0.15	Tunisia	0.32
United Arab Emirates	0.93	United Arab Emirates	0.66
Yemen	-1.2	Yemen	-0.94

Source: Estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5; higher is better (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (g) (2002), AHDR Statistics (h), 2007).

As stated in the Final Declaration of the Sana'a Conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression (2006) within the BMENA framework, one of the basic principles of peaceful transition to democracy is the independence of the judiciary since the rule of law is one of the corner stones of democratic transition (No Peace Without Justice (m), 2007). Participants of this Conference also emphasized the necessity to empower the independent judiciary to monitor and evaluate their performance in public life (No Peace Without Justice (q), 2006).

At the conclusion of the Sana'a Inter-Governmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court, the Conference

Delegations declared that they have reached the following principles for the judiciary development in the region: “The effective application of the rule of law is vital to protect democracy and human rights and is the foundation for judicial independence and the application of the separation of powers; the establishment of an independent and fair judiciary and the separation of powers; guaranteeing equality before the law, equal protection under the law and fundamental fair trial” (No Peace Without Justice (w), 2004).

Some proposals were made by civil society organizations for judiciary development in this region under the BMENA; “1) The Arab Focus on the Rule of Law Reform (conference) - project will provide a networking and policy dialogue platform among NGOs in the region; enhancing and coordinating the role for civil society organizations; in the rule of law reform; identifying rule of law priorities from non-governmental point of view; providing an inventory of reform projects and experiences and monitoring progress and set backs; 2) Promoting the Independence of Egyptian Judiciary - the project proposes to address the rule of law issue through a conference, workshops and awareness campaign (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

Within the EMP, some projects were decided to be implemented to empower judiciary in the region. Euromed Justice I and II, which are supporting an open and modern justice system through strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of SEMCs, and setting up an inter-professional community, are projects of the EMP launched in this respect. Budget allocated for these projects are €2 million (MEDA) for the timeframe 2005-2007. Participating countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. In order to achieve objective of establishing an open and modern justice system, the following steps were decided to be taken: “to promote the creation of networks, the Euro-Med judicial training network, to set up a website, hosted by the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht”. A new EuroMed Justice II project was decided to be started early in 2008 with a budget of €5 million for a period of three years (2008-2011). Participating countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia. This project will focus on three themes: “1) Legislative reform in the field of access to justice; 2) Custody and visiting rights in cross-border family conflicts; 3) Reform of criminal and prison law” (European Commission (d), n.d.).

The following actions were taken as a part of EuroMed Justice II project: “setting up of 3 working groups composed of magistrates, legal professionals and high level officials, to discuss and put forward concrete proposals on three different topics (legislative reform in the field of access to justice, custody and visiting rights in cross-border family conflicts and reform of criminal and prison law); organization of 36 training sessions for magistrates and prosecutors, lawyers, court staff and other legal professionals and officials on various topics under the main themes of access to justice, cross border family conflicts and criminal and prison law; organization of 10 study visits in the form of "on-the-job" visits to EU, for magistrates, other members of the judiciary and officials; creation of an interprofessional community of judges, lawyers and other experts in the Euro Mediterranean region; creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Network of Judicial Schools; creation of the project internet web site which will give tangible expression to the Euro-Med Justice network and provide information on the project's activities”. Within framework of these projects, Euro-Med judicial network was also set up and professionals in the judicial and administrative field were trained. Several seminars and conferences were organized (European Commission (d), n.d.).

In comparison to the BMENA, we can witness some concrete actions which were taken for the establishment of independent, open and modern justice system in the SEMCs through EuroMed Justice I and II projects initiated by the EMP. BMENA is just at the level of reiteration of need for judiciary development and making recommendations in this respect. I could not find any documents which mention concrete actions taken and funds allocated for this purpose in the BMENA process.

4.1.2. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are one of the problematique areas which has to be tackled in this region. Despite of the progress achieved, there is long way to go particularly women’s and children’s rights, freedom of association, freedom of expression, pluralism of media, prison conditions, use of torture, fundamental social rights. In this part of the dissertation, these problematique areas and the progress achieved in these areas are given by analyzing decisions, actions plans, progress reports, agreements and meetings of these two

projects in order to to make comparison of the BMENA and the EMP on these areas (see annex I).

The following table indicates Civil Liberties Ratings in the region. Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for political rights and for civil liberties fell between 1 and 2.5 were designated “free”, between 3 and 5.5 “partly free”, and between 5.5 and 7 “not free”. Beginning with ratings for 2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3 and 5 are “partly free”, and those between 5.5 and 7 are “not free”. Civil Liberties scores are measured on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest (AHDR Statistics (i), 2002).

Table 4.6. Civil Liberties Ratings

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2006)
Algeria	5	Algeria	5
Bahrain	5	Bahrain	5
Comoros	4	Comoros	4
Djibouti	5	Djibouti	5
Egypt	6	Egypt	5
Iraq	7	Iraq	5
Jordan	5	Jordan	4
Kuwait	5	Kuwait	5
Lebanon	5	Lebanon	4
Libya	7	Libya	7
Mauritania	5	Mauritania	4
Morocco	5	Morocco	4
Oman	5	Oman	5
Qatar	6	Qatar	5
Saudi Arabia	7	Saudi Arabia	6
Somalia	7	Somalia	7
Sudan	7	Sudan	7
Syria	7	Syria	7
Tunisia	5	Tunisia	5
United Arab Emirates	5	United Arab Emirates	6
Yemen	6	Yemen	5

Source: (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (i) , 2002, AHDR Statistics (j) 2006).

According to the table based on UNDP-AHDR of year 2002 and 2006, we can say that little progresses in some SEMCs civil liberties ratings such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon

and Morocco were achieved whereas Syrian, Tunisian and Algerian ratings remained the same.

In order to tackle with human rights issues some developments took place within the EMP framework. For instance, the Euro-Med Five Year Programme, which aimed to implement the objectives agreed by partners at the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, stated the need to deepen dialogue on Human Rights issues in the framework of the Association Agreements by the SEMCs. It also stated that “representatives in the permanent missions at UN Headquarters shall conduct informal exchanges of views before the meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights and of the UN General Assembly where appropriate”. With these steps, it aims to deliver results that will have a positive impact for all citizens in the region. In this respect, the necessity of strengthening democratic institutions and to promote good governance and accession to international human rights instruments was emphasized in the EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean (EUROPA (b), 2000). This work programme, as well as the implementation of the AAs and the ENP Action Plans, will be supported through technical and financial assistance provided through the MEDA Programme, ENPI, bilateral contributions from Member States, FEMIP and other relevant financial instruments (Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005).

One of the human rights issues which the Union would like to see is the abolishment of death penalty in the region (EUROPA (b), 2000). Children’s right is another problematic issue of this region. In order to enhance protection of children’s rights and eliminate child labour, some measures are taken in the SEMCs. For instance, a study made in Jordan by the Ministry of Labour brought to light an alarming reality of child labour in Jordan's industrial, agricultural and tourism sectors. In order to cope with this problem, initiatives, which aimed at focusing on raising awareness and providing education and training to the children, were taken (Commission Staff Working Document (a), 2008). Besides this, in the AA of Egypt cooperation between the Parties in the social field part, in the area where priority is given, determined as “bolstering and developing Egyptian family planning and mother and child protection” (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2001). Women’s right is also important part of human rights. Projects which contributed to empowerment of women in the SEMCs within the EMP framework are given in women’s empowerment section in detail.

Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the BMENA are important

elements of the BMENAs democracy promotion efforts, as well. In this connection, at the Sana'a Conference of BMENA (10-12 January 2004), the "Sana'a Declaration", which highlighted "the fundamental importance of democracy in the protection of the rights and interests of everybody without discrimination; the necessity for the rule of law in terms of protecting democracy and human rights; and the need for serious efforts to stop violations of international law, particularly crimes under international law", was adopted for many governments in the region (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

The Sana'a Declaration is the most important document of the BMENA on human rights and democracy adopted by governments of the region. As mentioned previously, it is also the only one negotiated document by governments in full consultation with regional civil society and human rights experts. Moreover, it represents a legitimate basis for BMENA organizations and individuals to hold their governments to specific and wide-ranging commitments. After Sana'a conference, a series of NGO meetings were held in Alexandria and Beirut and the Arab League Summit in Tunis. These meetings led to the adoption of documents on democracy, the rule of law and human rights recalled by the Sea Island Summit Agreement on the BMENA initiative (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

The following principles were reached by the conference delegations of the Sana'a Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court: "1) Democracy and human rights are interdependent and inseparable; 2) Cultural and religious diversity is at the core of universally recognized human rights, which should be observed in a spirit of understanding in the application of democratic and human rights principles; 3) Democratic systems protect the rights and interests of everybody without discrimination, especially the rights and interests of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups; 4) In the democratic systems an independent judiciary guarantees fair trial rights and protects the rights and freedoms of the people; 5) The practice of democracy and human rights and enhancing their understanding require overcoming potential threats to the form and substance of democracy, including foreign occupation, imbalances in participation in the international justice system, the concentration and abuse of power, ineffective and unaccountable civil service, poverty, inadequate education, corruption, crimes under international law and discrimination; 6) A free and independent media as well as pluralism in the media are essential for the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights; 7) Civil society should play its role responsibly within the framework of law and the principles

of human rights and democracy; 8) The private sector is a vital partner in strengthening the foundations of democracy and human rights” (No Peace Without Justice (w), 2004).

The participants of this conference agreed to work seriously in order to fulfill these principles. They also agreed to strengthen and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms such as expressing their views and adherence to their religious beliefs and ethnic identity. They agreed that occupation is contrary to basic human rights. For that reason, occupation of Arab territories in particular Palestine should be ended and the civil and political rights of the Palestinian people should be ensured, including their right to self-determination and their right of return according to international resolutions. They also agreed to empower women’s rights, establishment of an independent and fair judiciary in which equality before the law, equal protection under the law and fundamental fair trial guarantees can be applicable. In addition to these principles, they also agreed on the establishment of an Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum as an instrument for the promotion of dialogue between diverse actors, for strengthening democracy, human rights and civil liberties, especially freedom of opinion and expression, and strengthening the partnership between public authorities and civil society (No Peace Without Justice (w), 2004).

The interjectors requested from the international forces lead by the USA to stay away from the duality in standards dealing with the similar affairs related to human rights and fundamental freedoms violations. At the same conference, the Countries were requested to ratify the agreement on the abolishment of capital punishment that was to be submitted to the Human Rights Committee of the Human Rights Organization within March 2004. However, the interjectors emphasized the difficulties that are facing the implementation of some human rights rules such as capital punishment since Kuwait delegations objected to the special recommendation on abolishing the capital punishment sentence due to its inconsistency with the Islamic Sheria provisions (No Peace Without Justice (d), 2004).

In addition to above mentioned recommendations, the following recommendations related to human rights and fundamental freedoms were listed at the BMENA report for Thematic Session II: Connections between Democratic Concepts and Human Rights Concepts (2004): “1) the human rights and democracy field between West and East and all Muslims should be integrated; 2) the occupation of Iraq by the USA in the name of human rights guaranteeing should be ended since the occupation of Iraq by the USA is considered as a

human rights violation and contravention; 3) the information regarding public freedoms and human rights should be published; 4) Child, families and minorities should be protected; 5) the Human Right Arabic Pact should be ratified; 6) the privacy and mondialization in the human rights concept should be confessed; 7) the recognition of multiple legal wives should be objected; 8) the *fatwa* (deliverance of religious advisory opinion) to kill people and partisans and to respect the human rights and the life in tranquility and freedom should be condemned” (No Peace Without Justice (d), 2004).

One of the important suggestions related to human rights and fundamental freedoms issues within the BMENA framework made by the participants of Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court is the establishment of an effective Arab Human Rights Commission, which has real authority to address the balance of power between the government and the rights of the individuals within that state. At the same conference, participants also stated that “NGOs should be encouraged to play a formative role in the initiation, interpretation and application of international human rights agreements and standard setting in general”(No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

Importance of Human Rights Education, which may include non-formal and formal education involving consultations, workshops and special training courses for women, trade unionists etc., in a period of democratic transition was another important subject emphasized along with the necessity of the respect of a Code of Conduct on the rights of religious and ethnic minorities and NGOs by the Participants of this conference (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

In addition to the above mentioned efforts of the BMENA, at the Forum for the Future meeting held in Bahrain in 2005, ministers and civil society representatives agreed to support campaigns that raise public awareness of human rights and reform and mobilize public opinion in this respect (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005). Moreover, the participants of International Conference on Democracy, Political Reform and Freedom of Expression held in Sana’a in 2006 called upon the Arab League to review the proposed draft Arab Charter for Human Rights with a view to promote its acceptance by Arab countries (No Peace Without Justice (x), 2006).

Some proposals were initiated by the civil society organizations of the countries of this region within the framework of the BMENA like Human Rights Information and Training

Center (HRITC) proposal for Regional Network for Human Rights and Press Freedom in Gulf States in order to support HR awareness in the GCC/Yemen and introduce efforts on the issue of linking HR and the media (Foundation for the Future, 2007, pp. 30,31).

In comparison to the BMENA, the EMP through its institutional mechanism to monitor the progress achieved and problems remained in the human rights and fundamental freedoms issues such as the AAs and new instruments of the ENP - ENP Action Plans, Progress Reports etc.- seems as an effective external actor in providing support to the countries of this region. However, the EU's unwillingness to implement sanctions against the countries which violate human rights due to the need to preserve its economic and political interests; and lack of a reward like a full membership card lessen the magnitude of its effectiveness.

4.1.3. Freedom of Association and of Expression and Pluralism of the Media

Problems such as the safety of journalists, xenophobic and racist media, gender inequality and freedom of expression are prevalent in this region although article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression which includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through the media and regardless of frontiers". Attacks to some journalist (Samir Kassir, Lebanese journalist in 2005; Christophe Botanski, Tunisian journalist in 2005) are some examples of these attacks to freedom of expression in this region. Many journalists also were killed, jailed, tortured or kidnapped for doing their job (Ferrero- Waldner, 2005; European Commission (f), 2008).

Media is a fundamental support pillar of Barcelona Process in promoting understanding and tolerance. It represents the pluralism in their society and the richness of their cultures. To this end, Euromed and the Media initiative was initiated in order to extend EMP dialogues to include the media. Joint efforts are made at resolving media and information related problems between the European Commission and the region's media.

Almost 75 recommendations were made in the following areas through a series of regional, national and thematic meetings with the participation of 500 media practitioners from all 39 countries of the Partnership: Information and Communication, Training, Networking, Freedom of the Press / Independent Media, Safety and Security of Journalists, Xenophobia and Racist media, Gender Equality and Reporting Terrorism. A Task Force has been established to assist and advise the Commission on these proposals (Ferrero- Waldner, 2005; European Commission (f), 2008).

Proposals and recommendations, which were made during these conferences and seminars, were given below in detail: “1) to provide access for all Euromed media interests to materials commissioned under EMP activities 2) to create an editorial team of journalists representing the region to produce a publication on Euromed issues important to journalists free from interference at EU, Euromed or single country level 3) to overcome the fact that journalists in some countries cannot find information they need on their own government actions, particularly in respect of their positions and decisions within the EMP 4) to establish Euromed news agency to deal with Euromed issues as resource for North and South alike 5) to allow journalists access to detail of processes that take place before the issue of a communiqué 6) to create a ‘White book’ on journalism, a document on the current state of journalism, covering the region across a range of topics including freedom of expression, gender equality, press regulation, etc. 7) to establish chairs of Euro-Mediterranean studies providing a cost-effective means of developing studies into Euro-Mediterranean matters, specifically in relation to the media, ethics and society 8) to provide a directory of journalist training in the region 9) to evaluate different systems of accreditation/licensing for comparability and possible development of common standards 10) to develop online training modules 11) to continue Euromed and the Media networking 12) to expand journalist knowledge of other approaches/systems/cultures through mutual exchanges of staff 13) to establish means whereby Euromed and the Media participants can maintain contact and exchange information, views and materials on various aspects of operation 14) to establish series of small, informal meetings for exchange of views on specific topics (IPI model already in action in other areas) 15) to create an independent ‘foundation’ for Euromed and the Media process which address the need for impartiality and provide central direction for the process of consultation by establishing an independent body as coordinator 16) to train in journalist safety 17) to prepare a document stating what media professionals should expect in the way of support and protection as they go about their duties (European Commission (g), n.d.).

In addition to above mentioned proposals and recommendations, the following recommendations were also made related to the pluralism and freedom of media: 1) to organize meetings on journalist safety and security to investigate others in this area and possibility for cooperation 2) to assess ‘red lines’ country specific directory of legal frameworks (government) and media codes 3) to assist in disseminating reports on the state of the media in different countries and in originating media country report where they do not exist 4) to create position of press ombudsman to investigate and document misuse of media, from complaints about treatment in media coverage to abuses of press power 5) to provide training in freedom of expression in order to provide regional coverage 6) to examine the challenges faced by women in competing for job in the media related to gender equality in media 7) to produce regular publication by and for female Euromed journalists (Women’s Euromed publication), allowing opportunities to consider matters of professional interest 8) to organize Euromed conference on women in the media 9) To organize specific meetings on gender equality 10) to seek to extend training on gender equality to provide regional coverage 11) to examine the criminal justice system as it applies to racism in the media 12) to investigate the existence of current courses on appropriate depiction of minorities in the media 13) to produce manuals, toolkits, glossaries and other self-learning material on associated matters for journalists 14) to consider language used across region in relation to racist reporting and establish document explaining positive and negative language use as a part of language assessment/training for media 15) to disseminate materials specifically aimed to providing positive images of those seen as stereotypical ‘others’ 16) to arrange specific meetings on Networking on reporting diversity, ethics in practice and ethical journalism 17) to formulate means of ensuring that the public sees and understands what self-regulation exists 18) to report Terrorism Reflection on media position 19) to establish more systematic contact between the media North and South, academics and think tanks, pooled syndication arrangements between North and South 20) to foster a sense of inclusion among minorities by recruiting from minorities and by exchange arrangements between the North and South” (European Commission (g), n.d.).

The following activities were decided to be realized by the EMP: “1) European Training Foundation hosted meeting in Hungary to discuss what the ETF and CEDEFOP could progress to meet the proposals on this theme. 2) Possible Study Visits project in order to examine the potential for expanding the existing Cedefop study visits programme to cover journalist interests was initiated. 3) The TTNNet (Train the Trainers network) is hosted on

Cedefop's (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training) European training Village in helping journalism trainers work together on a variety of topics. 4) International Federation of Journalists initiate an initiative to re-launch international campaign against racism and intolerance. 5) A workshop for editors-in-chief/commissioning editors to discuss xenophobia, etc. at the highest media level" (European Commission (g), n.d.).

With regards to media and journalists of the SEMCs, the following recommendations were also made by the EMP: "1) Journalists should resist efforts to assign them a role on any issue. 2) Journalists must have a clear idea of what they perceive their role to be and not readily take on the positions of government. 3) Media should not label causes but provide contexts for current affairs, promoting understanding. 4) Journalists must oppose censorship in all its forms, even in the guise of 'anti-terror' legislation. 5) Journalists are divided on the need for specific codes of conduct but agree that adherence to any codes should be completely self-regulatory and not enforced through legislation. 6) Journalists are divided on whether they should engage with militant groups and whether this constitutes providing them with 'publicity'. 7) Journalists should be aware of the dangers of stereotyping, understand and respect other cultural/political orientations, and apply norms of common humanity to reporting. 8) Need for greater ethical awareness among photographers and editors about the use of images of victims and the damage inflicted by terrorist attacks. 9) Greater transparency is needed within the media as well as within government. 10) Terrorist groups are very good at propaganda and journalists need to be aware that they can be used for such purposes. 11) Journalists should strive to ensure they are telling all sides of the story or, at least, be honest about which side of the story they are examining. 12) The creation of forums for peer review, so journalists representing northern and southern media can examine each other's work. 13) Development of handbooks, guidelines or information packs on specific issues to act as reporting tools within the news room. 14) More information through various EU programmes, to explore the diversity of the Euromediterranean region. 15) Curricula for journalism schools on reporting diversity. 16) Curricula for journalism training schools to include an awareness of peace journalism, offering a stronger voice to the moderate majority" (European Commission (g),n.d.).

Like their counterparts in the EMP, the participants of the DAD conference on Role of the Media and Political Pluralism emphasized the strategic role and responsibility of the media in building democracy, in promoting transparency in all spheres of social life, leading

public opinion against undemocratic ideas. Moreover, they stated that “free, public and diverse information represents the best way to open up public space to debates that characterise democratic pluralism” (Kingdom of Morocco (c), 2005).

At the Intergovernmental Conference of BMENA on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court held in Sana’a in 2004, the specific recommendations that have been addressed to the governments of this region are as follows: “ 1) Arab media should be freed from the control of the governments since they are not allowed the free flow of information and the exercise of freedom of speech due to control of the Ministries of Information. 2) Emergency laws should be lifted to allow the exercise of civil and political rights including freedom of speech, of assembly, of peaceful demonstrations and the like. 3) Arab governments should release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience” (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

At the DAD panels on Political Pluralism and Electoral Processes in the BMENA, some participants expressed the belief that it is essential for political parties, as well as members of civil society, to own their own newspapers, radios and TVs due to reality that most of the media outlets are in the hands of the regime or members of the families affiliated with it (No Peace Without Justice (j), 2005).

Several participants noted that state control of radio and television, which play dominant role in the creation of public opinion, can distort democratic interaction. In this respect, the opening up and liberalization of media in the BMENA countries is necessary to strengthen the processes of democratic development. Increase in satellite channels has contributed to the diversification of information sources. However, national public television and radio remain as essential vectors of political communication in the countries of this region, particularly within the electoral context. In this connection, the importance of taking and implementing necessary measures to ensure equal access to public media and to encourage it to promote equity among different political groups were stated strongly (Kingdom of Morocco (c), 2005).

The participants of Thematic Session III on “Access to the media and political pluralism” reached the following conclusions: “1) Free, public and diverse information represents the best way to open up the public space to debates that characterize democratic

pluralism; 2) The opening up and liberalization of media in the countries of the region would be an additional guarantee to strengthen the democratization process; The issue of independent media funding should also be addressed; 3) It would be useful to implement measures to ensure equal access to public media and to encourage the media to promote equity among different political groups; 4) The strengthening the capacity of media operators through training can contribute to enhancing the quality of the media; 5) Governments should allow for credible and effective monitoring system to be established in order to assess the progress made in respect of promoting media freedom. The need to protect journalists from all forms of mistreatment should also be addressed by putting all the necessary judicial safeguards in place. There should also be a legal framework to ensure that the media operates responsibly; 6) Dialogue among governments and civil society organizations in sharing their experiences and exchanging best practises on media related issues should also be encouraged. Hence, an effective partnership should be established at the national, regional and international level; 7) Governments and non-state actors in the region should devise together national strategies to identify the problems affecting media freedom and lay out plans of action with clear timelines and benchmarks” (Kingdom of Morocco (c), 2005).

For the peaceful democratic transition removing restrictions from all forms of media and allowing the private ownership of media through breaking of state monopolies were emphasized as necessary mechanisms by the participants of the Sana’a International Conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression which was convened in Sana’a on 25-26 June 2006 (No Peace Without Justice (q), 2006).

Beside this, the Participants of this conference recalled the need for all groups including marginalized groups, such as women, children and refugees, as well as religious, linguistic and cultural groups to be able to access the media and other means of communication. Participants also mentioned the key role of the media and other means of communication in ensuring respect for freedom of expression, in promoting the free flow of information and ideas within the context of professional responsibility, in assisting people to make informed decisions and in facilitating and strengthening democratic reform. They welcomed the willingness of the government of Yemen and HRITC to propose a mechanism of consultation between governments and non-state actors, identifying clearly defined timeframes and benchmarks, to pursue the DAD theme of freedom of expression, including

legislation and practices on freedom of expression, with a view to bringing them in line with international law and standards (No Peace Without Justice (y), 2006).

The participants recommended initiation of a process for the formulation of Arab standards on freedom of expression, consistent with international law and taking into account existing standard-setting documents relevant to the region, including the African Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. They also recommended the following reforms of legislation in the International Conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression held in Sana'a in 2006: "1) Any reform of legislation affecting freedom of expression should be undertaken in genuine consultation with a broad spectrum of interested civil society organisations, including the media, for example through the establishment of government-civil society working groups; 2) Any legislation adopted in the area of freedom of expression should be consistent with relevant international law and standards, as contained *inter alia* in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 32 of the Arab Charter of Human Rights and the Sana'a Declaration on Promoting Independent and Pluralistic Arab Media" (No Peace Without Justice (y), 2006).

Participants of Roundtables on Civil Society Organizations' Strategic Planning for Democratic Reform held in Amman in 2007, reaffirmed the fact that local authorities seek to further suppress freedom of association and expression through various means involving essentially legal restraints. In this connection, they stressed that priority should be given to the promotion of Arab democratic transition including freedom of association and expression which is facing these renewed dangers. Participants also noted that although a number of Arab governments have adopted constitutional amendments for making reforms in freedom of expression, most of the time these amendments constitute a form of backlash. In this context, re-drafting Arab constitutions toward highlighting rights and liberties, as well as the mechanisms for respecting them, and the way to limit power were called for by participants. Participants reached the conclusion that the Arab democratic movement is benefiting from the media revolution in a limited way due to existence of technical and political obstacles. These obstacles hinder them from developing their manner of dealing with the media. Moreover, limited ability to have access to truthful information, the limited and belated use of available information, and the lack of competence in this field are determined as other problematic areas in this field by the participants (No Peace Without Justice (g), 2007).

A proposal was offered by the civil society organization, Samir Kassir Foundation, Beirut, Lebanon in order to contribute media freedoms, establishment of Middle East Center for Media Excellence- the center will support public campaigns for the promotion of media freedoms including improvement of press laws, protections for journalists and media outlets (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

Both projects are more or less same proposals and recommendations on freedom of expression and the pluralism and liberalization of the media. However, the BMENA participants offer a different proposal which is initiation of a process for the formulation of Arab standards on freedom of expression, consistent with international law and taking into account existing standard-setting documents relevant to the region, including the African Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (No Peace Without Justice (y), 2006). Despite technical and political obstacles, some progress related to this issue were achieved in the SEMCs. Detailed information can be found in the ‘Country based Comparison table of the SEMCs for the EMP’s Political and Security Aspect’ (Annex I).

4.1.4. Fight against Terrorism

Terrorism became one of the important issues which has to be tackled internationally due to its new shape, particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA. However, the EU views terrorism as one of the multiple threats contrary to the USA’s perception of terrorism as the main security threat and this threat can only be dealt with through military instruments (Afghanistan operation and occupation of Iraq) (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 232). After the USA invasion of Iraq with the USA’s claim that to prevent acquisition of “chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction” of Iraq in the hands of terrorist groups, the two important countries of the EU, Germany and France harshly criticized the USA because of his unilateral act. Although, the USA National Security Strategy shares with the European Security Strategy a fairly similar analysis of security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failing states, and organized crimes, the methods and approaches that these two powers use are different from each other (European

Security Strategy, 2003; The USA National Security Strategy Report, 2002).

One of the main objectives of the EMP is to fight against terrorism stemming from this region. This objective gained importance right after terrorist attacks to Madrid and London since the origins of these terrorists was from North Africa and Muslim. In addition to these attacks, Al-Qaeda terror attacks in some SEMCs (Istanbul and Amman-2005) became other factors which led to the emergence of “Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism”. The partners of the EMP through “Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism” agreed on the fact that terrorism threatens lives of their citizens and terrorist attacks seriously impair the enjoyment of human rights (Council of the European Union (a), 2005).

Along with the implementation of UN resolutions, conventions related to fight against terrorism, exchange of information to develop effective cooperation in order to disrupt terrorist networks and to bring individuals involved in terrorist acts to justice were accepted as vital with the introduction of Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Counter Terrorism. Moreover, refusing asylum request of terrorist; sharing expertise and practices on counter terrorism; condemnation of terrorism without qualification; rejection of any attempts to associate terrorism with any nation, culture and religion; prohibit and prevent the incitement of terrorist acts through the adoption of appropriate measures; working together to conclude the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism before the end of the 60th session of the UN General Assembly; encouraging tolerance and dialogue amongst societies; coordination of works to identify the factors contribute to the terrorism; improving collective mechanisms to deal with the aftermath of terrorist attacks; sharing experiences on managing the consequences of terrorist attacks; inviting one another to observe their emergency exercises; helping victims of terrorism and providing assistance to the competent authorities in dealing with the consequences of a major attack were confirmed by all parties for the security of this region (Council of the European Union (a), 2005).

Most importantly, they agreed that there is need to address causes of terrorism in order to stop it. In this respect, they recognized the links between peace, security, social and economic development and human rights. In other words, conflicts, oppression, poverty, bad governance, human rights breachments, lack of intercultural and religion understanding, all were accepted as major reasons of terrorism stemming from this region. In order to fight against it, conflicts should be resolved; occupations should be ended; oppressions should be confronted; poverty should be reduced; good governance and human right should be

promoted; intercultural and religion understanding should be improved (Council of the European Union (a), 2005). To this end, political and economic transformation of SEMCs and the EU's mobilization of funds in order to enable the SEMCs less influenced from these transformations are supported and the future of Arab-Israeli conflict is critically evaluated.⁵³

Along with the EMP's regional initiatives regarding the "Fight against terrorism" such as Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, the EMP's bilateral track-AAAs also focus on this issue and state that "In accordance with the international conventions to which they are party and with their respective laws and regulations, both Parties agree to cooperate with a view to preventing and penalising acts of terrorism and cooperate in particular through exchange of information on terrorist groups and their support networks in accordance with international and national law; exchange of information on means and methods used to counter terrorism including experience in the technical and training fields; exchange of experiences in respect of terrorism prevention; joint research and studies in the area of terrorism prevention" (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2009; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (a), 2009).

The EU's approach to this issue which distinguishes it from the USA's is based on the belief that the fight against terrorism requires a long-term approach to tackle the roots of this issue. One of the ways to achieve this as stated in the ENP Policy Action Plan of Jordan is to invest in public education in order to transmit the vision of a moderate Islam. In this connection, the fight against extremist interpretations of Islam and the dialogue between cultures have become very important for Jordan. Moreover, this was illustrated by the Amman Message, particularly after the November 2005 terrorist attacks. The programme initiated aimed to support a public education initiative to disseminate values of the Amman Message. The programme focused on priority areas in Jordan where it can help communities and NGOs in order to organize information campaigns (European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (b)).

The USA in addition to its military force also uses its political force through the US-led initiative BMENA in order to fight against terrorism. In this respect, within the BMENA framework, some conferences, roundtables were organized. Within the BMENA framework, at the International Conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression

⁵³ Ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the major factors which lead to these terrorist activities targeting West.

held in Sana'a in 2006, terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, was regarded as a serious threat to the growth and to the development of democracy, and world peace by the participants since it leads to undermine universal values such as freedom of thought and the freedom of expression. The participants stressed the need to address root causes of terrorism in order to fight against it (No Peace Without Justice (x), 2006).

Participants of the BMENA's Roundtables on Civil Society Organizations' Strategic Planning for Democratic Reform held in Amman in 2007 stated that terrorism threatens the countries and peoples of the region. The war on terrorism has become one of the aspects of globalization that has contributed to the globalization of terrorism on the one hand, and impeded the promotion of liberties on the other hand. Governments of this region make use of this opportunity to impose state of emergency instead of adopting comprehensive strategies for the fight against terrorism whereas, in addition to the security means, the root causes of terrorism needed to be tackled by adopting political, cultural and educational means. More importantly, the participants emphasized the need to establish democracy to fight against terrorism. Participants also recommended the establishment of early warning centers in order to monitor the political violence in all its forms realized in this region. 30% of the world's political violence is practiced in the Arab region. This is quite high percentage since the Arab region accounts for only 6% of the world's population (No Peace Without Justice (g), 2007).

At the Fifth Forum for the Future meeting held in Abu Dhabi in 2008, participants "reaffirmed their commitment to renouncing terrorism, extremism and violence and for supporting joint regional and international efforts to combat such phenomena in the international environment" (No Peace Without Justice (z), 2008).

Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa region is indicated in the following table. In this table, a subjective governance indicator aggregated from variety of sources and measuring perceptions of the likelihood of destabilization (ethnic tensions, armed conflict, social unrest, terrorist threat, internal conflict, fractionalization of the political spectrum, constitutional changes, military coups). Estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5, higher is better (AHDR Statistics (k), 2002).

Table 4.7. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2007)
Algeria	-1.88	Algeria	-1.18
Bahrain	0.22	Bahrain	-0.28
Comoros	0.31	Comoros	-0.40
Djibouti	-0.41	Djibouti	-0.05
Egypt	-0.71	Egypt	-0.77
Iraq	-1.9	Iraq	-2.82
Jordan	-0.43	Jordan	-0.29
Kuwait	-0.01	Kuwait	0.40
Lebanon	-0.69	Lebanon	-2.09
Libya	-0.39	Libya	0.47
Mauritania	0.17	Mauritania	-0.33
Morocco	-0.32	Morocco	-0.52
Oman	0.85	Oman	0.76
Palestine	-1.97	Palestine	-2.07
Qatar	0.67	Qatar	0.81
Saudi Arabia	-0.47	Saudi Arabia	-0.59
Somalia	-2.28	Somalia	-3.01
Sudan	-2.05	Sudan	-2.30
Syria	-0.26	Syria	-0.61
Tunisia	0.1	Tunisia	0.10
United Arab Emirates	0.8	United Arab Emirates	0.76
Yemen	-1.48	Yemen	-1.48

Source: (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (k), 2002, AHDR Statistics (l), 2007).

According to Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism table which makes comparison of AHDR 2002 ad AHDR 2007, most countries of this region seem to suffer from ethnic tensions, armed conflict, social unrest, terrorist threat, internal conflict, fractionalization of the political spectrum, constitutional changes and military coups. Despite the efforts made by these two initiations, this table shows that there is no progress achieved in this respect since in most of the countries there is an increase in political instability and violence/terrorism.

4.1.5. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Middle East and the North Africa region is one of the most dangerous regions of the world for the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) since the existence of conflicts and hostilities between the nations of this region have potential to increase the possibility to use of these weapons against each other (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 133) Moreover, the worst scenario related to this issue is the acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups of failed states of this region. In order to prevent realization of these scenarios both the EU and the USA specified proliferation of WMD as key threat to their security in both the European Security Strategy and the USA National Security Strategy Documents (European Security Strategy, 2003; The USA National Security Strategy Report, 2002).

Some member states of the EMP already have these WMD. Britain and France are nuclear powers under the control of nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some EU member states, which are also member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are under protection of NATO's nuclear power and some of them deploy NATO's nuclear warheads. Israel has 100-200 nuclear warheads and is not a party to the NPT. Iran is trying to be another nuclear power in the region by insisting on uranium enrichment in Iran. Algeria has a nuclear research reactor since 1991 under inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey follow the same path to have their own nuclear power since the possession of nuclear power by one actor in the international scene obliged others, particularly states in competition or in hostility, to do the same due to possibility of using nuclear power as blackmail or compelling others to act in preferred ways. In other words, possession of nuclear power by one actor of the region leads other states in the region to reconsider their own non-nuclear status and motivate neighboring countries to establish their own nuclear programmes (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p.137)

Besides nuclear renaissance of the region which has potential to generate nuclear armament in the Middle East, Israel, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Egypt possess chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iran are a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (El-

Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 133).

Member states of the EMP agreed on the fact that WMD, particularly nuclear weapons are a threat to all actors in the region. They explicitly support nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean region and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East in order to achieve one of the main objectives of the Barcelona Process, which is to promote regional security: “The participants of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 undertook to promote regional security and to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons through adherence to and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation regimes and the various arms control and disarmament agreements. The parties will also pursue a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction” (EUROPA (a), 2005).

To this end, adherence to non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, BWC, CWC and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well as regional arrangements such as weapons free zones are supported by the members of the EMP. However, there are divergences which surface on the interpretation of this objective in terms of whether this involves the removal of WMD or simply their non-proliferation. This leads to disagreements on dealing with WMD issue (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 134).

There are some problems which make it difficult to achieve non-proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Firstly, security insurance perception of WMD by the states and their costly and complicated removal leads to difficulty in persuading states to remove their WMD. Secondly, it is not possible to discuss the future of non-proliferation without taking NATO and the USA into account due to the USA military presence in the Mediterranean, its support for Israel’s nuclear programme and existence of some member states of the EMP under NATO’s nuclear umbrella. Arab-Israeli ongoing conflict is an obstacle in front of non-proliferation in the Middle East. As long as this conflict remained unresolved, non-proliferation seems unlikely to be realized. Without making Israel party to NPT and removing what Israel already has (nuclear arms), it is not easy to convince the other countries of this region for creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Fourthly, existence of other forums in terms of to create regimes for the control of WMD such as the Middle Eastern multilateral negotiations, Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the American-Russian arms control

negotiations, and inclusion of the issue of WMD in the EMP to those fora may lead to duplication and complication in negotiations. Fifthly, Iran is another factor which has a negative impact on non-proliferation in the Middle East due to its possible domino effects on the countries of the region. Hence, successes or failure of the EU's and the USA's approaches towards Iran is very important as one of the main determinant factor of the future of nuclear non-proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. Moreover, the EMP only covers the Middle East and North African states, which have a coast to the Mediterranean Sea. In other words, the EMP keeps Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Cooperation Council member states out of this issue. It is not possible to reach the final aim which is nuclear non-proliferation in the region without making the other countries of this region part of a regional cooperation aiming nuclear non-proliferation (Ünver Noi, 2008). Finally, strategic disequilibrium between the member states that possess the WMD and member states that do not possess WMD hinders the EMP to deal with WMD effectively since countries that possess WMD are not willing to give up due to strategic superiority they obtained through existence of WMD and countries that do not possess the same are willing to have their WMD to reach a situation of equilibrium (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, pp. 135-139).

There are two main approaches to the control of WMD in the Middle East: 1) Non-proliferation and selective elimination 2) Comprehensive elimination. The first approach, 'non-proliferation and selective elimination' was represented by the USA arms control proposals of 1991-1993, the French arms control plan of 1991, the 1991 declaration of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Israel proposal. These proposals call for the establishment of a ban on the acquisition and production of separated plutonium, enriched uranium and other elements used in nuclear weapons, the accession of all Middle Eastern countries to the NPT, the placing all nuclear facilities under control of the IAEA, the accession of all Middle Eastern countries to BWC and CWC, de-nuclearization of the Middle East. According to this approach, Israel would be the only nuclear power of this region. The second approach, comprehensive elimination approach, was supported by Egypt and Syria. According to this approach, Arabs and Israelis should join all global regimes for the control of WMD at the same time; Israel should be party to NPT and should be de-nuclearized (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 140).

Contrary to the EU's civilian approach to deal with questions on WMD, the USA, particularly following September 11th terrorist attacks to the USA, started to implement Bush

Doctrine, which made possible to use of its military power to achieve non-proliferation in the Broader Middle East region. Operations in Iraq started with the claim that this country possess WMD (MSNBC, 2006).

Under the BMENA framework, the fifth Forum for the future has been convened in Abu Dhabi on 18-19 October 2008, and participants of this forum expressed their hopes to resolve Iranian nuclear issue through using peaceful diplomatic ways that will deepen mutual trust and enhance regional and international security and stability. The participants also emphasized the importance of establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including the Arabian Gulf. They stressed the importance of compliance of the countries of this region with obligations under the non proliferation treaty. Furthermore, the participants recognized that countries of this region have the right to acquire peaceful nuclear technology under the framework of relevant international agreements (No Peace Without Justice (z), 2008).

Iran's nuclear programme constitutes one of the major parts of the USA's WMD policy in the Greater Middle East. Up to now, implementing sanctions did not lead to any development in terms of halting uranium enrichment of Iran. Contrary to the EU's approach which is based on incentives, the USA prefers to use sanctions on Iran. Implementation of some sanctions are also accepted by the EU. However, neither sanctions nor incentive packages nor changing roles of the USA and the EU in terms of using carrot and stick tactics, work properly in stimulating any changes in Iran's nuclear stance since Iran's economy is heavily reliant upon its natural gas and oil reserves and this makes implementation of sanctions to this country hardly possible (Ünver Noi, 2008). For instance, EU exports to Iran is on the rise despite UN sanctions that include a clampdown on export credit guaranteed by European governments ("EU exports to Iran", 2008, "Germany urges restraints", 2008).

The EMP with its current structure is not able to achieve non-proliferation in the region since it is not an international body like International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is only responsible for this issue. Furthermore, it lacks political power to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict due to its weak position in the MEPP. This means that nuclear non-proliferation is not possible without making Israel part of NPT and creating a possible regional cooperation like a kind of Euratom of the Middle East including non-EMP member

states like Iran, Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.⁵⁴

Briefly, both the EMP and the BMENA under current circumstances are unable to solve this quite complex and problematic issue. The following approaches might be considered as a remedy for this problematic issue. One of these approaches is to bound global approach as Malta's former foreign minister, HE Frendo said "...in some cases we need a global approach and in this we do not need to reinvent the UN. We may need to improve it..." (personal communication, Michael Frendo, 2008; See Annex IV). The other approach as Vice President of International Affairs Institute (IAI) Aliboni said to create "...a cooperative security cooperation like a Euratom for Middle East for nuclear issue..." (personal communication, Aliboni, 2008; See Annex IV).

4.2. Comparison of Economic and Financial Aspects and Achievements of the Two Projects

In this part of the dissertation, efforts for functioning of market economy, free trade area initiatives, financial aids and other measures taken to increase entrepreneurship and investments to the countries of this region under the EMP and the BMENA are analyzed and compared.

Economic transformation and financial aids, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, is necessary in order to achieve the main goal of political and security basket which is to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and stability, on the one hand, to achieve economic and financial objectives of the EMP, which is to create an area of shared prosperity, the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and SEMCs and amongst the SEMCs themselves, on the other hand. Hence, acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of the region's people; increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the EMP region and the wealth gap between the North and South; encouragement of regional cooperation and integration were set as long-term economic and financial objectives by the

⁵⁴ Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states are also planning to have their own nuclear plants. With regards to Iran nuclear issue, Saudi Arabia made a proposal for making Iran's uranium enrichment in a neutral state (Switzerland) and being part of this consortium with Iran and other GCC member states. Saudi proposal was rejected by Iran (USA Today, 2007).

participants of the EMP (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 4).

The bilateral side of the EMP, Association Agreements emphasize the importance of economic freedom; the need to strengthen economic development in the region by encouraging regional co-operation; the need to open a regular political dialogue in bilateral and international contexts on issues of common interest.

BMENA on the other hand, with the more or less similar goals, proposes the following measures to increase trade and make sustainable growth possible in this region: 1) introduction of standard and harmonized customs procedures to facilitate border trade transactions and stimulate exports for greater economic growth; 2) increasing foreign investment 3) accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide assistance for helping the reform efforts of the countries of this region and to utilize trade facilitation; 4) establishment of Middle East Free Trade Area; 5) making some arrangements with regards to diminishing tariff and non-tariff barriers (Wayne, 2005).

In addition to the above mentioned headings, other projects which take place under the second pillar of the EMP (economic and financial partnership pillar) is also given. These are regional and intraregional projects which are grouped under economy, energy, environment, information society and transport. The projects funded in this pillar are as follows: Agadir Agreement, ANIMA (a Network of Investment Promotion Agencies), INVEST in Med, Euro-Med Quality, Euro-Med Market, Femise, FEMIP, MED-ADR, Medibtikar, MEDSTAT II, EAMGM, Integrated Electricity Market Development, MED-ENEC, MED-EMIP, MED-REG, Avian Influenza and Global Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, EMWIs, Meda Water, SMAP III, natP II, Euromed Transport Programme, Euromed Aviation Project, Motorways of the Sea, Safemed, euro-Med satellite navigation (gnss) (European Commission (d), n.d.).

The EU supports projects that unify the efforts of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, which are party to the Agadir Agreement in order to strengthen south to south cooperation and work towards establishment of a free trade area. Another project funded by the EU is ANIMA (a network of Investment Promotion agencies) aims to strengthen capacity and cooperation, and to increase investment in the Mediterranean. INVEST in Med is another project which is a Euro-Mediterranean Network of organizations committed to investment promotion and

trade facilitation. Euro-Med Quality project is funded to back efforts by the SEMCs to develop and market quality products. Euro-Med Market project is funded with the aim to promote an understanding of the regulatory framework necessary to implement the Association Agreements and achieve deeper economic cooperation. Femise initiated to promote dialogue and research on socio-economic issues through the funding of its network of research institutes, and advises SEMCs on reform. To promote sustainable economic growth efforts in the SEMCs through infrastructure investments and private sectors are supported by the FEMIP facility for investment. In order to facilitate international trade and foreign investment in the SEMCs, MED-ADR was initiated to enhance dispute resolution methods in the commercial field. Medibtikar, which offers the SEMCs new and improved instruments to stimulate innovation in private and public enterprises and encourages networking was initiated. MEDSTAT II was initiated as a project to strengthen the capacity of the relevant authorities in the SEMCs to collect updated, timely and relevant statistics, and ensuring reliability and coherence (European Commission (d), n.d.).

With respect to energy cooperation, EAMGM was initiated to support the development of an integrated gas market between Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria with the aim to create a regional gas market and move towards integrating with the EU gas market. Integrated electricity Market development is another project which was launched to support the development of an integrated electricity market between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and between these countries and the EU. MED-ENEC, which encourages energy efficiency and the use of solar energy in the SEMCs construction sector; the MED-EMIP, which is a platform for energy policy dialogue and exchange of experiences, integration of the energy markets and improved security and sustainability; the MED-REG, which supports the development of a modern and efficient energy regulatory framework in the SEMCs and strengthens their cooperation with EU energy regulators are other energy based projects of the EMP (European Commission (d), n.d.).

Avian Influenza and global Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, which aims at minimizing the socio-economic impact of the avian influenza crisis in Mediterranean Partner Countries; civil protection/disaster Management project, which aims to Support the development of a Euro-Med system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters; EMWIs project, which is used as a tool for the exchange of information and the establishment of cooperation programmes in the water sector, between and within the

Partnership Countries; Meda Water (resource management) which aims to reinforces regional cooperation and develops proposals on water management and finally SMAP III, which aims to promote sustainable development and to support high priority environmental related activities are other projects funded by the EU under the EMP framework for second pillar (European Commission (d), n.d.).

Euromed transport Programme, which improves Euro-Med transport connections, leading to economic and social development, and securing safe transport systems; Euromed Aviation Project, which promotes the emergence of a Euro-Med common aviation area, and supports an open and secure aviation market in the countries of this region; Motorways of the sea (transport connections), which promotes the Motorways of the Sea concept and the creation of better transport connections in the Mediterranean; Safemed, which develops cooperation with the countries of this region in the field of maritime safety and security, and in marine environmental issues and finally Euro-Med Satellite Navigation (GNSS), which defines a common and shared policy towards the implementation of Global Navigational Satellite System (GNSS) services in the countries of this region are other projects of the EMP related to transportation (European Commission (d),n.d.).

4.2.1. Functioning of Market Economy

Functioning market economy is one of the major aims of the EMP and the BMENA. In order to achieve this aim, some measures to improve the conditions of private sector development, enhance the investment climate, and accelerate the privatisation programme were decided to be taken by the governments of the SEMCs (See Annex II). With these measures, increasing the capacity to create sustainable growth and employment were also targeted. The EU also supported improvement of education and training in order to achieve functioning market economy in this region. In this respect, the EU works to accelerate the reform of the financial sector, the restructuring and the privatisation of state banks and the introduction of strong financial market supervision. The EU works to improve the efficiency of public services and accelerate and modernize the procedures which are necessary to set up a new company. Reducing and accelerating judicial procedures which are necessary to enforce contracts; developing cooperation to promote and develop dispute resolution and

exchanging expertise in the arbitration of commercial dispute are other measures initiated in this respect (European Commission (h), n.d.).

As pointed out in the Egypt Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, top-down initiatives, which target privatization and banking reform, critically depending on the government's reform agenda. These initiatives have produced weak outcomes since in some cases the government's action and commitments have remained limited. On the other hand, bottom-up initiatives such as support to the private sector have proved valuable (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (e), 2007)

Association agreements signed between the countries of this region and the EU are one of the significant factors in facilitating opening of the economy. Association Agreements are also one of the main contributory factors on economic modernization/transition of this region. To develop competitiveness and productivity of the private sector in this region is one of the main objectives of the EU. The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprises was launched as a tool to boost enterprise competitiveness in this region. The following areas were included in the Charter: simplifying procedures for enterprises, improving skills, facilitating access to finance and promoting innovation (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (b), 2007).

Liberalization process has potential social impact. For instance, the organization of a second conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of agriculture centred on the potential social impact of the liberalization of the agricultural sector both in the SEMCs and in the EU member states (Lannon, 2008, p. 12). In order to eliminate at least lessen the effects of liberalization process the EU provides transition period and financial aids to the SEMCs. EUMEDIS project was initiated with the aim of helping to develop information society in the MPCs, through promoting information and communication technologies. In order to facilitate the efforts to liberalize telecommunications markets of the countries of this region by assisting the regulatory authorities through technical assistance and study visits, NATP II project was developed (European Commission (d), n.d.).

4.2.2. Free Trade Area Initiatives

Both the EU and the USA aim to establish free trade area in the North Africa and Middle East region. In this part of the dissertation, the EU's initiation within the framework of the EMP, Euro-Med Free Trade Area and the USA's initiation, Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) are analyzed and compared. It is important to mention that the MEFTA is the USA's bilateral initiative.

4.2.2.a. Euro-Med Free Trade Area

Establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010 is one of the major goals of the EMP on the way "to create an area of shared prosperity". This free trade area will be established by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (AAs) (See Annex II). In this respect, the EU concluded AAs with the SEMCs. Along with enhancing bilateral trade through the AAs, regional economic integrations such as The Arab Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (Agadir Agreement), which was signed by Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt and entered into force in 2007, are continually supported by the EU. Moreover, Turkey signed free trade agreements with Morocco (2004), Tunisia (2004), Palestine (2004) and Syria (2004). Preferential Agreements signed with Palestine and Tunisia are in force as of 1 June 2005 and 1 July 2005 respectively. Apart from agreements in force there are FTA negotiations in process with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. Also a draft agreement has been sent to Algeria. There are ongoing negotiations to sign similar free trade agreements between other SEMCs (T.R. Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, (n.d.), European Commission (e), 2008), European Commission (i), 2008). The complete establishment of the free trade between the EU and the SEMCs will only be achieved when the transition periods foreseen in the bilateral AAs will be over (T.R. Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, (n.d.).

At the Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference, which was held in Istanbul on the 21st of July 2004, priority was given to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the target date of 2010 among other economic issues. The Istanbul Framework Protocol as a non-binding document that can provide a basis for economic integration

agreements was endorsed (T.R. Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, (n.d.).

Ministers who participated in this meeting also pointed out the substantial progress that has been made on free trade. The bilateral EU/Mediterranean partner arrangements have been reinforced by the entry into force of the agreements with Jordan and Egypt and of the interim agreement with Lebanon. The Agadir Agreement between Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco also has opened new perspectives for regional economic integration. Ministers emphasized the importance of this agreement in terms of its promising experience that should be pursued and followed by other partners. They agreed on that “the Agadir process should be extended to other Arab Mediterranean partners, without prejudice to their continuing to establish free trade with other partners”. Some significant contributions such as upgrading of the bilateral trade agreements between Jordan and Israel for further liberalization allowing for further diagonal cumulation of origin and the conclusion of free trade agreements between Morocco, the PLO, Tunisia with Turkey were made to this process by the countries of this region (Council of the European Union (d), 2004).

The agreement reached at Palermo on adoption of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean Protocol on cumulation of origin in the framework of AAs was welcomed by Ministers. At this meeting, the following measures were decided to be taken: “promotion of the use of the new framework protocol for the liberalization of services that can constitute an appropriate basis for future negotiations between the EU and Mediterranean partners; addressing the strategy for accelerating the liberalization of trade in agriculture through a meeting at senior expert level, with a view to Ministers agreeing later on measures for reciprocal agricultural trade liberalization within a package containing a specific roadmap including trade in processed agricultural products and non-trade aspects (rural development, etc.); harmonization with the EU Single Market in priority sectors such as customs, environment, industrial standards, health, veterinary and phytosanitary regulations in line with the European Neighbourhood Action Plans” (Council of the European Union (d), 2004).

Establishment of Euro-Med Free Trade Area by 2010 was reconfirmed in Barcelona in 2005 and supported by the implementation of an ambitious road map in accordance with the provisions of the AAs. Tariff dismantling, market access, trade facilitation and regulatory policies between the EU and the SEMCs are part of this road map (European Commission (e), 2008). This road map also includes liberalization of trade in agriculture; “processed

agricultural products and fisheries products, with a possible selected number of exceptions and timetables for gradual and asymmetrical implementation, taking into account the differences and individual characteristics of the agricultural sector in different countries, building on the Euromed AAs and regional free trade agreements, based on the Rabat roadmap". It also includes liberalization of trade in services; it is taking into account the non binding Framework Protocol adopted in Istanbul in 2004, in order to open negotiations on a voluntary basis on agreements on services and establishment of partner countries as soon as possible. The acceleration of the conclusion of free trade agreements with each other, and promoting other regional agreements and bilateral trade agreements; and working for the entry into force of the Agadir Agreement at the latest by the end of 2005 are other steps which will be taken within the framework of this road map. The adoption of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean protocol on cumulation of origin as a step towards promoting intra and inter-regional integration is one of the steps of the road map. The road map also includes the approximation of standards, technical legislation and conformity assessment, and providing support and assistance to that end, in order to pave the way for the negotiations of Acceptance and Cooperation Assessment Agreements on Industrial Products (ACAAs) and the elimination of technical obstacles to commerce at the latest by 2010 (Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005).

To this end, substantial progress has been achieved. For instance, the scope of negotiations has been extended to services and right of establishment and agricultural and fisheries products. All SEMCs has concluded AAs, which constitute the foundation of free trade developing in the Mediterranean region, with the EU. In other words, the EU and the SEMCs decided to establish gradually a free trade area over a transitional period not exceeding twelve years from the entry into force of the AAs, according to the modalities set out in the AAs and in conformity with the provisions of the GATT of 1994 and of the other multilateral agreements on trade in goods annexed to the agreement establishing the WTO. To this end, the SEMCs started to take some measures to upgrade and restructure industry and to enhance their export capacity in order to respond to the economic repercussion for them. The EU through financial aids aimed to lessen the effects of this transformation (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2001).

At the last Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting on Trade, Ministers agreed on some issues; "to continue negotiations on the establishment of a more efficient dispute settlement

mechanism for the trade provisions of the AAs; to encourage the establishment of a network of FTAs in the region; to support the establishment of regional integration (Agadir Agreement, the SEMCs FTA negotiations with Turkey) (European Commission (i) (2008).

Within the EMP framework, many steps were taken to advance the regional trade through adoption of new rules of origin and the convergence of legislation in the field of standards, technical regulation and conformity assessment, during the Euro-Mediterranean Trade Conferences, which were held in Brussels in 2001; in Toledo in 2002; in Palermo in 2003; in Istanbul in 2004 and in Marrakech in 2006. All these trade relations were reinforced with the introduction of ENP. Liberalization of services and investment; establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism; liberalization of agriculture, processed agriculture and fishery goods; approximation of technical legislation are some of the decisions which were taken by the partners of the EMP to achieve one of the main goals of the ENP; “deep and comprehensive integration with our neighbors” (European Commission (e), 2008). Lannon (2008) interpretes the contribution of the ENP on free trade according to the European Commission 2006 Communication with the following words:

“implementation of the ENP Action Plans on regulatory areas will prepare the ground for the conclusion of a new generation agreements of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with all ENP partners’ and existing Mediterranean free trade agreements should be expanded accordingly to other regulatory areas which implies that there will be a possibility to negotiate with the SEMCs a new generation of agreements” (Lannon, 2008, p. 9).

With respect to liberalization of services and investment, some progress has been achieved like starting service negotiations in order to further increase access to the already open EU service sector and open the rapidly developing service markets of the SEMCs. Other negotiations are related to the investment aim at improving market access through specific commitments and at ensuring national treatment. Second achievement of the EMP related to free trade area is the negotiations which are underway to establish a dispute settlement mechanism to solve possible disputes in trade field. These negotiations have moved from a regional format to bilateral format in 2007. With respect to liberalization of agriculture, in processed agriculture and fishery goods, negotiations with Jordan have been completed. Negotiations with Egypt, Israel and Morocco are underway. With regards to

approximation of technical legislation of the SEMCs to the EU's technical legislation, some works including facilitation access to the EU market and removing non-tariff barriers to trade, started on some priority industrial sectors. The objective of this initiative is to negotiate Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Accreditation (ACAAs) (European Commission (e), 2008).

In conclusion, we can say that since the inception of the EMP, there is a continuing growth in trade with the SEMCs. For instance, total SEMCs exports to the EU have grown by 10% during 2000-2006. The SEMCs imports from the EU have also increased 4% during 2000-2006. Total Euromed trade with the EU, except Turkey, reached 120 billion euro in 2006. This is 5% of total EU external trade (European Commission (e), 2008).

The following two table show growth in trade for SEMCs since launch of the EMP by giving export and import data of year 1995 and 2004 of each SEMCs.

Table 4.8. Growth in Trade for Southern Mediterranean Countries since Launch of Barcelona Process 1995

Trade Country	Exports			Imports		
	1995	2004	Average annual growth (%)	1995	2004	Average annual growth (%)
Algeria	4.82	9.45	7.76	4.97	15.25	13.26
West Bank	0.01	0.04	24.41	0.00	0.01	36.65
Egypt	5.20	7.40	3.99	2.23	4.19	7.24
Israel	9.79	12.76	2.99	4.85	8.61	6.58
Jordan	1.08	1.95	6.69	0.14	0.26	7.61
Lebanon	2.60	3.22	2.43	0.12	0.24	8.14
Morocco	4.84	8.88	6.98	4.07	6.56	5.46
Syria	1.48	2.34	5.25	1.78	2.55	4.08
Tunisia	4.22	7.58	6.72	3.38	6.74	7.97
Turkey	13.62	38.01	12.08	9.45	30.94	14.08
All S-Med Countries*	34.03	91.63	5.18	21.54	44.42	8.37

Source: (Lannon, 2008, p. 23).

The following table shows trade between the SEMCs for year 1995 and 2004 and average annual growth as percentage.

Table 4.9. Trade between Southern Mediterranean Countries since Launch of Barcelona Process 1995 (€ million)

Country	1995	2004	Average annual growth (%)
Algeria	157	692	17.92
West Bank	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt	291	670	9.70
Isreal	30	139	18.70
Jordan	106	393	15.72
Lebonon	76 (a)	185(b)	15.98
Morocco	104	147	3.95
Syria	293(c)	420	9.42
Tunisia	211	183	-1.55
Med Countries	899	2644	12.74

Source: (Lannon, 2008, p. 23) Note: a 1997, b 2003, c 2000

Some problems still exist in terms of tariff dismantlement. For instance, tariff dismantlement is proceeding in accordance with the AAs, though a unilateral export tax on rice imposed by Egypt in 2007 remains subject of discussion (Commission Staff Working Document (b), 2008). However, the European Commission Communication entitled ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ stressed that ‘significant progress has been made towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. Progressive free trade with the EU has favored exports and investment, but services and to a lesser extent agriculture are only now being included in the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area’ (Lannon, 2008, p. 13).

4.2.2.b. Middle East Free Trade Area

The USA like the EU supports the liberalization of economies of the BMENA countries. This was also the part of a plan which aims to ‘bring prosperity and democracy to this region through trade’. It is also part of the USA’s policy to fight against terrorism as the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert B. Zoellick said “by spreading message of prosperity and

democracy throughout the world". In other words, the proposal for the establishment of MEFTA came a year and a half after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA's World Trade Center and the Pentagon as a part of a plan to fight against terrorism stemming from countries of this region. With this plan, the USA aimed to increase trade and investment of the Middle East countries with the USA and other states of the world starting through making particularly "peaceful nations" members of the WTO in 2003 with the Bush Administration initiation.⁵⁵ From another perspective, this development might be interpreted as the USA found an opportunity to create market in this region to sell its goods and to create economic interdependence by using the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA.

In this respect, the USA took a series of graduated steps to help these countries' efforts for openness and economic growth. The USA expanded its economic ties through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Furthermore, the USA will enhance the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program for eligible countries (Office of the US Trade Representative (a), 2009).

Establishment of Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), which is part of the USA's bilateral approach to the Middle East and the North Africa region as of 2013, is one of the above mentioned steps. MEFTA aims to increase trade with the Middle East region and offers a framework for openness, trade integration, and economic development for the Middle East. In this connection, the government of the USA started to work with countries of the Middle East through a series of graduated steps tailored to their individual level of development to their economic transformations. MEFTA covers the countries of the BMENA namely, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, the Gaza Strip/West Bank, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen; and four in North Africa: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia (Office of the US Trade Representative (a), 2009; Congressional Research Reports for the People, 2006).

Free Trade Agreements between the USA and Morocco, Bahrain and Jordan respond to those governments' commitment to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, efforts to

⁵⁵ Bush's speech at the American Enterprise Institute on February 27, 2003 was signal of his above mentioned plan "Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater political participation, economic openness, and free trade" (Guardian.co.uk, 2003).

increase the transparency of government decision-making, and the liberalization of trade policies. The USA is also working with Saudi Arabia in support of its bid for WTO accession (Wayne, 2005). As stated by the CSIS “the growing and productive relationship stemming from the USA-Jordan FTA” might make Jordan an example to show the potential benefits of the FTA with the USA to the other countries of the Middle East (Center for Strategic and International Relations, 2005).

The following table shows the USA’s Middle East free trade efforts.

Table 4.10. USA-Middle East Free Trade Efforts

Country	FTA	TIFA	BIT	WTO	GSP
Israel	√	√	√	√	Not eligible
Jordan	√	√	√	√	√
Morocco	√	√	√	√	√
Bahrain	Ratified	√	√	√	Not eligible
Egypt		√	√	√	√
Lebanon				Negotiating Accession	
Algeria		√		Negotiating Accession	√
Tunisia		√	√	√	√
Saudi Arabia		√		√	Not eligible
Oman	Signed	√		√	√
Kuwait		√		√	Not eligible
UAE	Negotiating	√		√	Not eligible
Yemen		√		Negotiating Accession	√
Qatar		√		√	Not eligible
Syria					Not eligible
Iraq		√		Negotiating Accession	√
Libya				Negotiating Accession	
Iran				Negotiating Accession	

Source: (Office of the United States Trade Representative (b), n.d.).

As given above since its initiation, the USA has made substantial progress in working with MEFTA countries to support WTO membership, and to develop TIFAs, BITs, and FTAs. For instance, Saudi Arabia has joined the WTO, and Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, and Algeria are negotiating accession to the WTO. In addition to this, TIFAs have been completed with Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Qatar, and Iraq. Other

TIFA partners are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. BITs have been completed with Jordan. BIT partners became five when Jordan joined to Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Finally, a bilateral free trade agreement has been implemented with Jordan, Israel, Morocco, and Bahrain; signed with Oman (January 19, 2006); and is under negotiation with the UAE. This brings the number of MEFTA FTAs to four implemented, one awaiting congressional action, and one under negotiation. FTA negotiations underway with Egypt have been suspended over human rights issues. This report will be updated as events warrant (Congressional Research Reports for the People, 2006).

Contrary to the EU's efforts to establish a free trade area with the SEMCs which combines it in an interregional context of development of relations such as AGADIR Agreement, the USA's efforts to establish a free trade area with the countries of the Broader Middle East and North Africa region combines its bilateral free trade agreements in the context of the global WTO perspective (Aliboni, 2005, p. 5). The establishment of free trade areas is one of the major issues in which competition between the EU and the USA take place since these bilateral free trade agreements effects the USA's and the EU's economic interests in this region.

4.2.3. Financial Aids

The EMP and the BMENA have their own financial instruments for the implementation of the EMP and the BMENA. The main aim of these financial aids are to enable the countries of the region to achieve their economic and social transformations. In other words, they are used by these countries to cope with the challenges emerged through their efforts for economic transformation. *Mesure d'Accompagnement* (MEDA) was the EMP's main financial instrument between 1995 and 2007. Since 2007, European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) became new budget line instead of MEDA for the SEMCs. On the other hand, Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is the BMENA's main financial instrument along with the Foundation for the Future. These financial instruments are given in this section of the dissertation in detail.

4.2.3.a. **Mesure d’Accompagnement/ European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument**

At the European Council in Cannes in June 1995, the EU decided to make a major financial contribution in support of economic transformation efforts in the SEMCs. The Mesure d’Accompagnement (MEDA) programme, which is the principle financial instrument for implementation of the EMP governing the transfers made by the EU, was adopted by the Council in July 1996. MEDA programme offers technical and financial support in order to enable the SEMCs to achieve their economic and social transformations while providing support for the implementation of AAs signed between the EU and the SEMCs (Derisbourg, 1997, pp. 9, 10, 11; See Annex II).

The first phase of MEDA covered the period 1995-1999, the second phase of MEDA, which increased the budget given to the SEMCs, covered the period 2000-2005. The following table shows the financial cooperation figures made through the MEDA programme to the region as a whole:

Table 4.11. Financial Cooperation / MEDA Programme

1995-1999 MEDA 3,435 million euro	2000-2006 MEDA 5,350 million euro
1995-1999 EIB 4,808 million euro	2000-2007 EIB 6,400 million euro
	2000-2007 EIB+1million euro for transnational projects
	2003 committed MEDA funds 600,3 million euro

Source: (European Commission (c), n.d.).

This table indicates an increase in financial assistance given under MEDA programme, particularly for the years between 2000 and 2007. This programme covers all the fields of the partnership and related to both bilateral actions and regional projects of joint interest.

The EMP became part of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as of 2004. Since 2007, MEDA was replaced by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is financial instrument supporting the ENP concrete assistance actions. The new financial instrument of the EMP -ENPI- supports three strategic objectives similar to the EMP’s: “transition of the SEMCs towards democracy and increase the respect for human

rights; transition towards market economy and sustainable development; promotion of policies of common interests such as fighting against terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, conflict resolution, the rule of international law, anti-corruption initiatives, border management programmes” In this context, the Commission prepared for each SEMCs a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and a Regional Strategy Paper (RSP). These papers show the situation in each sector and the Commission’s response strategy (European Commission (j), 2008). With the initiation of ENPI, financial assistance which will be given for the SEMCs for the 2007-2013 period was determined as €12 billions (European Commission (e), 2008).

The following table shows financial aids given to each SEMCs under MEDA programme between 2000-2006 and ENPI since 2007:

Table 4.12. MEDA and ENPI Commitments (€ millions)

	2000-2006 under MEDA	2007 under ENPI
Bilateral Cooperation		
Algeria	339	57
West Bank and Gaza	522	453
Egypt	593	137
Jordan	331	62
Lebanon	133	50
Morocco	980	190
Syria	180	20
Tunisia	518	103
Israel	0	2
Libya	0	2
Total bilateral	3595	1076
Regional Cooperation	1052	178
TOTAL	4647	1254

Source: (EurActive.com (n.d.), p. 7).

As indicated in the table 4.12. ‘MEDA and ENPI Commitments (€ millions)’, €4,6 billion was made available for eight SEMCs for the period 2000-2006. By including Israel and Libya to the bilateral assistance given to the SEMCs, €1.3 billion became available for ten SEMCs since 2007. Besides financial aids providing to the Palestinian Authority through MEDA and ENPI, Palestinians received additional financial assistance (€2.4 billion) from various other budget lines such as aids for the Peace Process, UNRWA (for providing social

services for 4.5 million refugees), ECHO (humanitarian aid) and the Food Aid and Food Security budget line (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008, pp. 12, 13).

As mentioned above, until 2007 Israel has not received bilateral assistance due to its high level of economic development. EU cooperation with Israel thus has been limited to programmes in support of civil society, mainly in the context of the EU Partnership for Peace programme and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and regional programmes under MEDA. With the creation of the ENPI, a limited bilateral financial allocation for Israel has been set aside for the first time to provide support for the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, mainly institutional cooperation through Twinning/Twinning light. Israel has received and continues to receive substantial bilateral assistance from the USA (\$ 2.28 bn of military aid, (mainly buy-back), \$ 600 m for joint defence projects and \$280 m for civilian aid for the year 2006 (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (c), n.d.).

In addition to MEDA and since 2007 ENPI, there are other sources which provide financial assistance to the SEMCs like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Facility for the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). The EU, through the EIB, another important funding source of the EMP, allocated €4,808 million to the EIB from 1995-1999, and €6,400 million from 2000-2007, plus an additional €1 million for transitional projects. The Facility for the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) was established to enhance existing activities of the EIB in 2002. FEMIP as a main lending institution of the EMP provides finance especially to the private sector with an annual credit amount of €2bn (European Commission (d), 2008). €10,7 bn earmarked for 2007-2013 period by the FEMIP (European Commission (k), (2009).

Although economic and financial dimension of both projects seem much more focused on the target in comparison to political and security dimension, current global economic and financial crisis might have negative effects on funding projects and providing financial aids to facilitate these countries' economic transformations to achieve their economic and financial objectives. For instance, the initiation of new projects like the UFM's six new projects and its new institutional structure like the establishment of a Secretariat etc. thus seems unlikely to

realize under current economic situation.⁵⁶

4.2.3.b. Middle East Partnership Initiative/ Foundation for the Future

In order to help the countries of the region to achieve their economic transformations, financial aids were decided to be provided under the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programmes by the USA. For instance, MEPI programs were given to help Morocco to meet its Free Trade Area (FTA) obligations, and to help Bahrain to close its FTA negotiations in less than six months. Through MEPI, the USA is also working with other countries in the BMENA region committed to economic reform to help prepare their trade and investment regime for eventual FTA discussions. The USA also provides trade capacity assistance to the countries of the Broader Middle East (Wayne, 2005).

The Administration committed \$29 million for pilot education, economic, and political reform projects in 2002. In fiscal year 2003, the MEPI funded \$100 million in programs, and worked to award \$89.5 million with fiscal year 2004 funds. In the Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget, Congress provided MEPI with \$74.4 million. Every year, MEPI funds supplement more than \$1 billion in bilateral economic assistance providing annually to the Arab world (MEPI Regional Office Tunis, n.d.).

Within the BMENA framework, Foundation for the Future was created in 2006 as an international, not-for-profit entity, which focuses on providing financial and technical assistance directly to local NGOs, academic and research institutions, professional associations, private foundations, private sector organizations and individuals in the region in their activities to advance and strengthen freedom and democracy in this region. Political parties, government organizations and religious groups cannot enjoy this financial support. Foundation for the Future supports development of civil society, human rights, rule of law, free, fair and genuinely competitive elections, good governance and accountability, freedom

⁵⁶ Malta Communique mechanisms launched in February 2008 in Malta meeting co-chaired by Michael Frendo-as co-host this meeting with Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia (as in the presidency of the Arab League) and Dimitri Rupel of Slovenia (in the presidency of the EU) in order to help in terms of financing. Gulf states are also involved in that process. The Arab League is also now part of the UFM structure (Personal communication; Frendo, 2008). However, this global crisis also affected their economies and hinder them to help the UFM.

of association, access to civic education, access to and transparency of information, independent media, empowerment of women, empowerment of youth and democracy in the BMENA region through grant making programs, foundation-implemented projects, training and education. Political supporters and financial contributors of Foundation for the Future are the USA, Switzerland, Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Denmark and UK. The Forum continues to seek political and financial support from governments, private foundations, and individuals for the Foundation (U.S. Department of State (i), 2005; Foundation for the Future, 2007, pp. 3-27).

The Foundation operated through the Euroasia Foundation in Washington, DC. It was funding from the US Department of State until June 30, 2007. The Foundation's independent financial management and reporting began on July 1, 2007. Its headquarters office was opened in Amman, Jordan in July 2007. It has a representative office in Washington, DC (Foundation for the Future, 2007).

The Foundation signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOA) with the USA's Department of State in Washington D.C. on July 18th, 2007. On August 2007, USD 21.3 million was given to the Foundation by the USA's Department of State. For the additional funding, talks with the EC reopened for USD 1.45 million and agreements were finalized with the governments of Greece and Hungary. "Grant making" is core component of the Foundation's work. The grants, which awarded money to support the Middle East Media Center (Lebanon) and the Women's Human Rights Education Program (Lebanon), were announced at the Bahrain Board Meeting (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 11).

Preliminary work for the newly-awarded grants was completed by the Foundation during the end of 2007. It expanded its communications with direct beneficiaries (civil society organizations in the BMENA region) and strengthened its links with the donor community and other similar grant-making bodies like MEPI. Funding has come from the governments who made pledges at the Forum for the Future in Manama, Bahrain held in May 2007. In the following table, a detailed description of which countries gave donations and the amounts of these donations are listed (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p.11).

Table 4.13. Amounts given by the countries to the Foundation for the Future

Country	Amount for 2006 (US\$)	Amount for 2007 (US\$)	Total (US\$)
Denmark	500,000		500,000
Greece	300,000	300,000	600,000
Jordan	1,000,000		1,000,000
Spain		1,134,584	1,134,584
Switzerland	750,000	250,000	1,000,000
Turkey	125,000		125,000
United Kingdom		588,238	588,238
Gov. of USA/ Euroasia Foundation		88,057	88,057
Gov. of USA/ Dept. of State		21,300,000	21,300,000
Total	2,675,000		26,335,879

Source: (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 21).

In addition to above mentioned countries which gave donations to the works of the Foundation, governments of Bahrain, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Qatar have expressed interests in giving money to the Foundation. A contract was finalized with the EC for 1 million euros by the end of the first quarter 2008 (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 15).

The following table shows the nine approved proposals (projects) for grant awards at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Foundation for the Future held on November 14, 2007 in Paris, civil society organizations proposed the projects, the amount of grant awarded and the goals of projects (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

Table 4.14. Nine Approved Proposals for Grant Awards on November 14, 2007

Project	Proposed by	Grant Award Authorized	Fit with the Foundation Goals
<i>1)Regional Network for Human Rights and Press Freedom in Gulf States</i>	Human Rights Information and Training Center(HRITC)	398,074 USD	It supports HR awareness in the GCC/Yemen and introduces efforts on the issue of linking HR and the media.
<i>2)Centre Régional des Ressources de LaSociété Civile</i>	Consortium of Moroccan NGOs	1,500,000 USD	Regional Civil Society Resources Center will contribute to strengthen civil society organizations in the BMENA region by making them more capable in performing their institutional mandates and roles.
<i>3) Promoting Dialogue on Millenium</i>	Cultural Development Programs Foundation	36,210 USD	The project will facilitate greater engagement of Yemen civil society

<i>Development Goals in Yemen through Budget Priorities as a Tool</i>	(CDPF)		in the governmental budget process, enhancing dialogue between civil society organizations and governmental institutions on the matter, promoting budget transparency and contributing to the achievement of Millenium Development Goals.
4)Khamer Women Empowerment and Literacy Program. Khamer District of Amran Governorate, Yemen.	SOUL for the Development of Women and Children	17,885 USD	Project aimed at reducing gender gaps. It supports already established literacy and training center for girls and women by expanding its capacity and improving the training of the trainers.
5) Assisting the Development of Good Security Sector Governance and in the Palestinian Territories	Institute of Law (IoL) – Bir Zeit University	205,391 USD	The project will focus on contributing to the establishment of a comprehensive legal framework for the Palestinian security sector; training of Palestinian civilian experts and the media on civil democratic security sector governance and the rule of law; familiarize a wider group of Palestinian civil society actors with the concept of security sector reform and strengthen in this way informal oversight capacity of civil society.
6)Achieving Behavioural Change Towards Women’s Right among Yourth Enrolled in Community Colleges (Amman, Zarqa, Jerash)	Women for Cultural Development (NAMAA)	33,771 USD	The project will contribute strengthening behavioural change on women’s rights issues and gender roles by providing targeted awareness and training to Community (Diploma) Colleges students, most of which are women.
7) Building Stronger Relations between Local Government and the CSOs	Partners Jordan	60,000 USD	Project addresses the need for increased participation of civil society and the youth as well as increased communications between local government officials and local communities, thus enhancing accountability.
8) Défense de Droit de la Jeunesse. Déploiement du Programme DID.	Fondation Suisse Maroc pur le Développement Duarble (FSMD) & Fondation Zakoura Education (FZE)	390,000 USD	Project addresses the need for increased protection of children and youth’s rights. The project will operate in areas that are favorite recruitment grounds for the exploited minors by providing family/ community awareness/ mobilization, educational support and skills training.
9) The Arab Focus on the Rule of Law Reform (conference)	The Arab Center for the Development of Rule of Law & Integrity (ACRLI)	184,950 USD	Project will provide a networking and policy dialogue platform among NGOs in the region; enhancing and coordinating the role of civil society organizations; in the rule of law reform; identifying rule of law priorities from non-governmental point of view; providing an inventory of reform

			projects and experiences and monitoring progress and set backs.
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Source: (Compiled by the author using Foundation for the Future, 2007, pp. 30,31).

The following table shows the other three approved proposals for grant awards at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Foundation for the Future held on May 29-30, 2007 in Bahrain, civil society organizations proposed the projects, the amount of grant awarded and the goals of projects (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 32).

Table 4.15. Three Approved Proposals for Grant Awards on May 29-30, 2007

Project	Proposed by	Grant Award Authorized	Fit with the Foundation Goals
1) Middle East Center for Media Excellence	Samir Kassir Foundation, Beirut, Lebanon	100,000 USD	The center will support public campaigns for the promotion of media freedoms including improvement of press laws, protections for journalists and media outlets.
2) Women's Human Rights Education Programs	Al-Jamiya Al-Khairiyah Al-Islamiya Al-Amlied (Philanthropic Amlied Association)	28,400 USD	The project aims to train and build the capacities of teachers, students, and poor, illiterate mothers on women's rights as human rights and will cover various sects in Lebanon with a focus on Shiite Community.
3) Promoting the Independence of Egyptian Judiciary	United Group: Attorneys at Law, Legal Advisors and Human Rights Advocates	50,000 USD	The project proposes to address the rule of law issue through a conference, workshops and awareness campaign.

Source: (Compiled by the author using Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

BMENA contrary to the EMP much more focuses on civil societies, NGOs. Its financial and technical support is also provided to the NGOs and civil societies rather than political parties, government organizations and religious groups (U.S. Department of State (i), 2005, Foundation for the Future (b), 2007, pp. 3-27). Financial aid provided by the BMENA is much more than the EMP's financial aid provided for this region. However, current economic and financial crisis is mostly likely to have negative effects on funding projects of the BMENA.

4.2.4. Entrepreneurship and Investment

One of the key components of economic liberalization of this region is increasing entrepreneurship and investment of this region. Both projects developed some policies to support entrepreneurship and investment in the countries of this region. In this part of the dissertation, these policies are given in detail.

4.2.4.a EMP

Foreign direct investment trends in the Mediterranean is one of the keys to a successful economic integration in this region. That is why, the SEMCs should make substantial gains from attracting new investments to their countries. The degree of instability associated with investment risk, which is critical determinant of foreign investment in SEMCs, is higher in comparison to developing countries. Foreign investment flows therefore into the Mediterranean region are still very low (See Annex II). For instance, the share of this region in the EU's total direct investment abroad in 2006 was 4.9 billion euro around 2% of EU FDI. However, there is a positive trend since 2005. According to FEMISE report of 2007, 'trade liberalization in goods was accompanied by a significant increase in direct investment flows to all SEMCs without exception' (Lannon, 2008, p. 11).

The aim of Five Year programme is to implement the objectives agreed by partners at the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. It aims to deliver results that will have a positive impact for all citizens in the region. This work programme, as well as the implementation of the AAs and the ENP Action Plans, will be supported through technical and financial assistance provided through the MEDA Programme, ENPI, bilateral contributions from Member States, FEMIP and other relevant financial instruments, at levels consistent with the high ambition of our EMP. According to this program, which is based on the Barcelona Declaration, "Euro-Mediterranean partners will apply the principles of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise and assess together their implementation; They will also take measures to allow a substantial increase in the European investment rate in the SEMCs; They will encourage the

increase of the investment rate in the region by supporting regional programmes and networks; They will establish an ad hoc group to examine ways and means of enhancing investment flows across the Mediterranean region and monitor progress” (Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005).

In order to provide support to investment various programmes were initiated. For instance, an ad-hoc group on investments was created by Euro-Med Ministers in order to “discuss policies and means to generate sustainable investment flows in the Mediterranean region”. At the Conference, which was held in Caserta on 3-4 October 2004, industry ministers adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise. With this initiative, partners of the EMP agreed to put industry and enterprise development high on their political agenda. The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise defines principles to improve the business environment and boost competitiveness. Convergence of regulations and standards of countries of this region towards EU regulations and standards for industrial products was confirmed by Industry Ministers. A discussion on new forms of cooperation (national, regional and sub-regional level) to foster the competitiveness of the SEMCs’ production systems and to stimulate business links and investments in the region also started by the Minister. Cooperation at sectoral level, including a Pan-Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on the future of the textile and clothing industry, was also launched at this Conference (Council of the European Union (d), 2004).

The Commission monitors the Group on Industrial cooperation which has a task of implementation of the Euro-Med Charter for Enterprises. Also, the EC finances the FEMISE and Economic Transition Conferences. FEMISE is a Euro-Med network of economists and academics. The Economic Transition Conferences facilitate networking (European Commission (l), 2008).

Besides the EMP’s regional approach to this issue, its bilateral side AAs also support the promotion of investment in the SEMCs. According to AA signed between Algeria and the EU, protection of investments is determined as one of the main aims of the cooperation in Article 54. According to this article, “the aim of cooperation shall be to create a favorable climate for investment flows, in particular by means of the following: the establishment of harmonized and simplified procedures, co-investment machinery (especially to link small and medium-sized enterprises) and methods of identifying and providing information on

investment opportunities; a legal environment conducive to investment between the two parties, where appropriate through the conclusion by the member states and Algeria of investment protection agreements, and agreements to prevent double taxation; technical assistance to schemes to promote and guarantee national and foreign investments” (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005).

Similar steps were determined in order to promote and to facilitate investments in Egypt in the AA signed between the EC and Egypt: “a) identifying investment opportunities; b) providing information on European investment regimes related to outward investment such as technical assistance, direct financial support, investment insurance and enhancing the possibility for Egypt to benefit from them; c) providing a legal environment conducive to investment between the two Parties through the conclusion of investment protection agreements and agreements preventing double taxation by the EU Member States and Egypt; d) examining the creation of joint ventures; e) establishing mechanisms for encouraging and promoting investments (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2001).

4.2.4.b. BMENA

UNDP AHDR 2002-2003 report is one of the pushing elements of the BMENA. Foreign Direct Investment is one of the fundamental elements of functioning market economy and sustainable economic growth which will contribute for the development of this region. Foreign direct investment is defined as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor in the UNDP-AHDR. Accordingly, it is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. The following report of UNDP-AHDR indicates net foreign direct investment inflows (as % of GDP) in the countries of this region for the year 2002 and 2005 to show whether there is progress in this field.

Table 4.16. Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (as % of GDP)

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2005)
Algeria	1.9	Algeria	1.1
Djibouti	0.6	Comoros	0.3
Egypt	0.7	Djibouti	3.2
Jordan	0.6	Egypt	6
Lebanon	1.5	Jordan	12.1
Morocco	1.2	Kuwait	0.3
Oman	0.2	Lebanon	11.7
Sudan	4.7	Mauritania	6.2
Syria	1.1	Morocco	3
Tunisia	3.8	Oman	0.8
Yemen	1.1	Sudan	8.4
		Syria	1.6
		Tunisia	2.5
		Yemen	-1.8

Source: (Compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (m), 2002, AHDR Statistics (n), 2005).

Sources and measuring perceptions of the concepts such as the incidence of market-unfriendly policies (such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision), and perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development in the countries of this region is given in the following table under the regulatory quality. According to this table, estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5, higher is better (AHDR Statistics (p), 2007).

Table 4.17. Regulatory Quality

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2007)
Algeria	-0.67	Algeria	-0.66
Bahrain	0.97	Bahrain	0.89
Comoros	-1.08	Comoros	-1.43
Djibouti	-0.64	Djibouti	-0.80
Egypt	-0.46	Egypt	-0.31
Iraq	-2.2	Iraq	-1.35
Jordan	0.12	Jordan	0.35
Kuwait	0.38	Kuwait	0.29
Lebanon	-0.37	Lebanon	-0.21
Libya	-1.65	Libya	-0.98
Mauritania	0.22	Mauritania	-0.36

Morocco	-0.09	Morocco	-0.11
Oman	0.73	Oman	0.63
Palestine	-1	Palestine	-1.38
Qatar	0.27	Qatar	0.55
Saudi Arabia	-0.09	Saudi Arabia	-0.10
Somalia	-2.14	Somalia	-2.72
Sudan	-1.2	Sudan	-1.25
Syria	-0.93	Syria	-1.22
Tunisia	-0.06	Tunisia	0.15
United Arab Emirates	1.02	United Arab Emirates	0.70
Yemen	-0.82	Yemen	-0.71

Source: (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (o), 2002, AHDR Statistics (p), 2007).

Before the initiation of the BMENA, the Bush Administration proposed a plan for Middle Eastern countries to increase trade and investment with the USA and other states of the world in May 2003. One of the steps decided to be taken in this respect by the USA as a part of this plan was the introduction of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs). With the introduction of TIFAs, the USA aimed to promote the establishment of legal protections for investors, improvements in intellectual property protection, more transparent and efficient customs procedures, and greater transparency in government and commercial regulations. TIFAs in place can be seen in the table which shows Middle East Free Trade Area Efforts in the MEFTA section of the dissertation (Office of the United States Trade Representative (c), n.d.).

As a part of the G8 countries support to Middle East Reform Plan, a microfinance initiative was launched in order to expand sustainable microfinance in the region and increase financing opportunities for the region's small entrepreneurs, especially women. Establishment of a Microfinance Consultative Group, managed by the World Bank's Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), was decided in order to establish a policy environment conducive to sustainable microfinance institutions, and exchange best practices. This Group would include G-8, regional, and other donors and partners, who would meet regularly to review microfinance progress, coordinate efforts, set benchmarks, help governments in the region. Establishment of Best Practices Training Center, which will concentrate on improving the policy and regulatory framework, disseminating best practice materials, building management capacity, and training a new generation of professional microfinance managers in the region was also decided. Pilot programs were launched in the region to help small entrepreneurs

open or expand their businesses and create new jobs. In this context, helping over two million potential entrepreneurs to pull themselves out of poverty through microfinance loans over five years was decided. With respect to develop microfinance in the region, Jordan has offered to host the Best Practices Microfinance Training Center, and Yemen has offered to host the first microfinance pilot program (America.gov, 2004).

Some programs, seminars and training activities were initiated to enhance support for business, entrepreneurship, and vocational training programs to help young people, especially women, expand their employment opportunities. Carrying out programs which would provide hands-on entrepreneurial training to the 250,000 young people in alliance with business partners in G8 countries and in the region is one of these initiatives. The other relevant initiatives, which were decided to be implemented are “sponsoring or supporting seminars for outstanding executives, especially women, to enhance their skills through short-term business programs and more focused, industry-specific sessions; carrying out or sponsoring corporate apprenticeship programs, in cooperation with local businesses and chambers of commerce, to increase internship opportunities for the region's young men and women; encouraging exchanges of engineers and support for vocational training initiatives”. In addition to these initiatives, Bahrain and Morocco offered sponsoring the entrepreneurship and vocational training initiative (America.gov, 2004).

Creation of a Private Enterprise Development Facility under the auspices of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the establishment of a Task Force on Investment comprising business leaders from the region including from the Arab Business Council and the G8 countries and the establishment of a Broader Middle East and North Africa Private Enterprise Development Facility at the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are part of the plans which seek the way to support efforts at strengthening the region's business and investment climate, identifying and resolving problems related to trade and investment, recommending concrete proposals for change, reviewing and reporting on progress of reform in the region and increasing the financing options for the region's small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) (America.gov, 2004).

Expanding the IFC's two regional facilities to create a new USD 100 million facility that will cover the entire region funded by the contributions from G-8 countries, countries within the region, and other donors was one of the plans to improve the investment and business climate. Providing technical assistance to the countries working on improving their

business and investment climate, encouraging the IFC to increase the focus of its regional investment portfolio on small and medium size businesses, and providing technical assistance and financial instruments are other components of the plan (America.gov, 2004).

Supporting the region's efforts to achieve economic integration, promote intra-regional trade, and expand trade opportunities in global markets, including by: providing technical assistance for accession to the WTO; supporting intraregional trade agreements; sponsoring regional programs on trade facilitation; and facilitating development of local chambers of commerce. Representative G-8 Activities include: France, together with the European Commission, supports the Euro-Mediterranean Action Plan on Trade and Investment Facilitation established in March 2002 that aims to modernize customs, promote foreign investments, assist applicants in the WTO accession process, and support a regional free trade agreement before 2010. Germany is supporting partners in Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Territories in implementing free trade agreements, facilitating WTO accession or supporting local chambers of commerce. Japan is assisting the Foreign Trade Training Center in Egypt, which has been established to provide trade-related capacity building of business people. The USA is providing technical assistance to: reach the goal of a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013; support the accession of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen to the WTO; aid seven countries in complying with Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (America.gov, 2004).

Egypt has reduced tariff rates, accelerated the pace of privatization, introduced legislation that would reduce personal and corporate income tax rates, and increased exchange rate flexibility. All these steps were taken by the Egypt government to attract foreign investors, encourage domestic entrepreneurs and boost growth (Wayne, 2005). According to the table which shows Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (as % of GDP), there is progress in terms of foreign direct investments inflows to Egypt in comparison to UNDP AHDR 2002.

The USA and Pakistan have just concluded the second round of negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). A robust BIT would improve investors' rights, decrease investor uncertainty, and enhance Pakistan's investment climate; In Jordan an ambitious reform program is well underway aimed at creating a sure foundation for long-term prosperity. Jordan's strong growth in GDP and exports show the result (Wayne, 2005).

As a part of the BMENA, two regional entrepreneurship centers in Morocco and Bahrain established with the support of partners in order to provide regional business training up to 5,000 young business people and job creation expertise (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005). In addition to entrepreneurship centers established by Morocco and Bahrain, Pakistan also announced its intention to open a “Center for Entrepreneurial Excellence” in Karachi (No Peace Without Justice (*), 2007). Complementary to the regional entrepreneur centres, a number of partners decided provide a USD 100 million with Foundation for the Future that would further assist in the development of profitable small and medium sized enterprises in the region through the provision of grants and loans (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005).

Since 2005, separately, Japan, Jordan, Germany, and Egypt have taken the lead in vocational training. The G8 asked the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to develop a training center to promote microfinance for the region. CGAP established a regional training center in Jordan and conducted microfinance assessment missions to several countries. USAID's \$125 million microenterprise program should reach 2 million entrepreneurs over the next five years in countries including Egypt, Morocco and in the West Bank/Gaza. International Finance Corporation (IFC) established its regional Private Enterprise Partnership for the Middle East and North Africa (PEP-MENA) to support the growth of small and medium-sized businesses by training employees of businesses, banks and governments. It is active in 13 countries and the West Bank/Gaza. G8 and regional partners have already pledged two-thirds of a three-year funding goal of \$100 million (U.S. Department of State (j), 2005). PEP-MENA has \$65 million in contributions, including \$15 million from the USA (Personal Communication, Schulz, 2008).

Regional and international development institutions established a "Network of Funds" to facilitate cooperation and improve the effectiveness of official financing in the region. Institutional representatives met in September 2005 in Cairo and Washington and agreed to consider joint initiatives in trade, infrastructure, human resource development and financial sector development (U.S. Department of State (b), 2005). Led by the Arab Business Council, the private sector Task Force discusses and analyzes barriers to investment. It advises regional governments and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on reform measures to improve the investment climate, particularly elimination of impediments to investment (U.S. Department of State (b), 2005).

Several participants of the fifth Forum for the future which was held in Abu Dhabi, 18- 19 October 2008 stressed on the negative impacts of international financial crisis on the countries of this region and confirmed the importance of Doha's UN Millennium Conference and Kuwait's Arab Economic and Social Summit Conference. In order to minimize the effects of the consequences of this crisis, the participants committed to continue working together to stabilize the financial market and to support global economic growth (No Peace Without Justice (z), 2008).

4.3. Comparison of Social, Cultural and Human Aspects and Achievements of the two Projects

Some developments since the end of 1990s such as Islamic radicalization of Muslim immigrants and youths living in the EU member states, increase in xenophobia as a reaction to this fact in the EU member states, potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism by taking over governments in their countries, stigmatization of Muslims as potential terrorists particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA led to the EU and the USA to reconsider their policies and to take some measures to eliminate the negative effects of these developments. In this respect, Barcelona Declaration, along with its political and security; economic and financial baskets, added the third basket- social, cultural and human - in order to promote dialogue, cultural awareness and to create mutual understanding, mutual cultural respect through bringing people and organizations closer. In addition to this, the EMP also aimed to prepare people of this region for democracy and economic liberalization by making them part of this process through projects on women empowerment, youth engagement, education.

Like the EMP, the BMENA also focuses on women empowerment, youth engagement and educational opportunity for them since women's rights and illiteracy are weaknesses of this region which was determined specifically by the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society) (UNDP-Arab States).

In this part of the dissertation, social, cultural and human aspect which has positive impact on creating mutual understanding by bringing people and organizations closer and promoting dialogue and to facilitate democratic transition in the countries of this region is given in both projects under the following headings: enhancement of social development and poverty reduction; women empowerment; youth engagement, literacy and educational opportunity.

The following table shows the projects, which were planned to be implemented in order to achieve the objectives of the EMP's third pillar -Social, Cultural and Human Partnership, their aims, achievements and budget allocated for these projects.

Table 4.18. The EMP's Social, Cultural and Human Partnership Projects

Name of Project	Aim of Project	Achievements	Budget Allocated
Euromed Audiovisual, Euro-Mediterranean Audiovisual Co-operation	To enhance the audiovisual and cinema sectors in Mediterranean Partner Countries, thus promoting cooperation and mutual understanding with the EU	Training and development workshops are carried out; 40 events organized in Europe and in the MEDA region since March 2006), 150 film releases were supported in partnership with 200 distributors and cinema managers; 40 films on the go, some of them finalized such as the documentary Magharat Maria, written and realized by Buthina Canaan Khoury and which was awarded a silver "Muhr" in the international film festival in Dubai in 2007; Supported the realisation and distribution of the emblematic movie "The band's visit" by Eran Kolirin; Creates a legal database containing information on copyright and related rights in the Mediterranean Partner Countries and a database for professional and institutional contacts.	Euro 15 million (MEDA, 2005-2008)
Regional Information and Communication	Aims at increasing knowledge and raise awareness and understanding of the Euro-Med Partnership, mainly through working with the media and focusing on civil society and youth	Sets up the EuroMed Info Centre, the first dedicated information portal on EU relations and cooperation with Mediterranean Partner Countries (in English, French and Arabic); Promotes information to a large public through 170 hours of TV programmes, 80 radio programmes on international radio stations, press supplements in Mediterranean country newspapers; Creates a task force of about 400 influential international journalists within the "EuroMed and theMedia" project; Sets up the training programme "Europe For Mediterranean Journalists":130 editors and journalists have participated in one or more seminars, 100 articles and 100 audiovisual subjects have been produced; Launches a journalist training and networking project for the ENPI	Euro 10 million (MEDA), Euro 12 million (ENPI)-(2004-2007, 2008-2011)

		region; Organises "Crossing Glances" photo competition and exhibition in 10 countries; Carries out opinion research in all Mediterranean countries on perceptions about Euro-Med cooperation; Initiates a Middle East Music Award aiming to promote new talents in the Maghreb and Near East countries of the Mediterranean.	
Euromed Heritage	Promotes cultural dialogue and caring about the Mediterranean's heritage, through preservation and awareness raising.	Created a network of 156 museums, cultural institutions, universities, NGOs; Promotes cultural dialogue through 49 exhibitions and festivals, 17 workshops, Info Days, 18 short films; Carries out 69 research programmes on preserving the Mediterranean's tangible and intangible heritage, leading to 146 publications; Facilitates 131 training courses and 21 conferences on Architecture, Archaeology/ Prehistory, Maritime Heritage, Cultural Tourism, Low and High Technology, Labels, Norms, Arts, Music, Oral History; Involves journalists through an annual Euromed Heritage Journalism Award; Conceives and publishes a "Strategy for the Development of Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Heritage: Priorities from Mediterranean countries".	Euro 40 million (MEDA) (2002-2008)
Anna Lindh Foundation for dialogue between cultures	Brings people and organizations closer and promotes dialogue.	Coordinates 37 networks and has over 1,000 member organizations; Grants financial support to cultural initiatives through calls for proposals in education, culture, science and communication; Promotes cultural dialogue through the EuroMed Award for Dialogue between Cultures; Creates a journalism award; Launched a three-year children's literature programme to promote reading in Arab countries.	Euro 5 million (MEDA) (2005-2008)
Training of Public administrations	Provides training to civil servants from the MPCs on European issues and supports their effort to implement the Association Agreements.	Holds 46 training seminars for civil servants from the Partner Countries on European affairs, the EU, management of Community Programmes, etc. Some 1600 officials to be trained; Facilitates transfer of know-how for the implementation of the Association Agreements with the EU; Helps the exchange of information on best practices and good governance through 5 regional conferences, 3 network meetings and 3 evaluation meetings.	Euro 6 million (MEDA) (2004-2008)
MEDA-ETE	Supports MPCs in the design and implementation of technical and vocational education and training policies that can contribute to promoting employment.	Supports career guidance policies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries; Provides technical and vocational training; Creates a "permanent expert network"; Holds regional meetings, study visits, workshops, newsletters and an annual Euro-Med Forum; Harmonises statistical information, develops common indicators and analyses; Sets up Euro-Med observatory producing thematic studies and publications based on common indicators and methodologies.	Euro 5 million (MEDA) (2004-2007)
TEMPUS	Creates opportunities for academics and administrative staff from universities in the MPCs to cooperate with	Supports the modernisation of higher education in the Mediterranean Partner Countries; Organises 134 Joint Projects based on multilateral partnerships	Euro 94.5 million (MEDA) (2003-2007)

	higher education institutions in the EU countries.	between higher education institutions; Offers 416 grants for the mobility of teachers, researchers, trainers, university administrators etc; Promotes 38 structural measures for the development and reform of higher education institutions; Cooperates with the Erasmus Mundus programme that funds higher education students and teaching staff mobility activities between EU and Mediterranean universities.	
Erasmus Mundus	Promotes cooperation between higher education institutions in the EU and partner countries	Encourages partnerships and cooperation between European universities and those from the Neighbourhood countries; Facilitates the mobility of students and academic staff through an exchange programme – over 1800 students and academics already participated; Enhances the role of the higher education sector by exchanging knowledge, skills and expertise; Paves the way to the international recognition of studies and qualifications; Strengthens the international cooperation capacity of universities in partner countries.	Euro 13 million (2007-2008)
Role of Women in Economic Life	Enhances the involvement of NGOs and government institutions in the effort to expand economic opportunities for women	Gave grants to 7 regional NGO consortiums enhancing economic opportunities for women; Published two studies: one on National machinery for the advancement of women and one on the economic situation of women in the region; Built a database for policy formulation; Prepared an annotated bibliography and literature review of gender equality studies and a booklet on Monitoring the implementation of CEDAW; Supported micro credit and SME projects from which 5,645 women benefited; Hold training seminars in which 1,112 women participated, on issues such as economic literacy, leadership and entrepreneurial skills; Strengthened the capacity of Israeli and Palestinian women entrepreneurs; Matched job opportunities with the competencies for rural women in Jordan and Palestine; Creates opportunities in arts and crafts for marginalized home based working women.	Euro 5 million (MEDA) (2006-2008)
Euromed Youth	Promotes intercultural dialogue and understanding among the youth in the Euro-Mediterranean region, through activities and funded projects.	Supports 15 projects promoting youth exchanges (7), voluntary service (2), support measures (6), etc; Holds a Euro-Med Youth Exchange bringing together youth from 5 different countries for two or three weeks; Facilitates the Euro-Med voluntary Service with transnational voluntary community activity for a period between 2 and 12 months; Organises annual meetings and trainings with the Youth Units of the EuroMed Youth Programme and the National Agencies of the Youth in Action Programme; Carries out studies, one by each country, on the evolution of the youth sector; Publishes a compendium of all projects implemented, focusing on innovative projects in each country; Promotes young people's active	Euro 5 million (MEDA) (2005-2008)

		citizenship in fighting racism, achieving gender equality, minority rights, heritage and environment protection.	
Euromed Civil Forum	A platform for civil society organizations to network, discuss their role and make recommendations to governments	Strengthens the role of civil society in the region and within the Euro-Med Partnership; Brings together 140 networks of independent Euro-Med organisations, promoting dialogue, debate and the sharing of experiences, and builds synergies; Helps in the emergence of thematic networks, such as women, youth, migration, etc; Gives civil society the opportunity to meet annually, at the same time as the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers; Organises plenary sessions, thematic workshops, a self-conducted workshop, agoras and cultural activities.	Determined by each EU Presidency ongoing since 1995
Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils	Annual forum that discusses social and economic issues of interest to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.	Operates in an advisory role for the Commission and the Council; Promotes issues in 6 sections of interest: Agriculture; Rural Development and Environment; Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion; Employment; Social Affairs and Citizenship; External Relations; The Single Market, Production and Consumption; Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society; Makes recommendations to Euro-Med Ministerial meetings; Supports civil society organization in the Partner Countries; Establishes autonomous consultative structures, representing a large majority of civil society.	Euro 50.000 per annum (MEDA) ongoing since 1995
TRES-MED (Civil Society Dialogue)	Enhancing the consultative role of economic and social partners and their contribution to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.	Organizes study visits to 17 European capitals for exchange of experiences, discussion, education and awareness-raising; Creates a Forum of participation for organizations representing social and economic interests; Holds 2 regional seminars (Egypt and Turkey) promoting education and awareness; Supports strengthening existing Mediterranean Economic and Social Councils and encourages the setting up of Councils in Partner Countries; Fosters the exchange of experiences of institutionalized dialogue between the North and the South.	Euro 0.907 million (2004-2007)
MED-PACT (Local Authorities)	Encourages dialogue and cooperation between cities and civil societies, improving understanding and promoting cultural and social rapprochement between the EU and the SEMCs.	Supports the joint implementation of 9 projects including over 30 Mediterranean Partner cities and 25 European Cities, thus representing the interests of millions of inhabitants in the Euro-Med region; Stimulates greater dialogue and cooperation between local actors in the Euro-Med region, fostering both North-South and South-South partnerships; Promotes the development of long-lasting strategies for urban development that include: environmental protection, sustainable economic development, transport and mobility, reduction of social disparities and the valorisation of under-	Euro 5 million (MEDA) (2006-2009)

		utilised cultural heritage in the Mediterranean Partner Countries.	
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Source: (Compiled by the author using European Commission (d), n.d.).

One of the important projects which works to provide a framework for close social and cultural relations between parties is Anna Lindh Foundation for dialogue between cultures. This Foundation was established in 2005 with the aim of promoting dialogue and achieving the political objective of shaping the Euro-Mediterranean region as ‘an area of co-operation, exchange, mobility, mutual understanding and peace’. This Foundation reports to the governments of the EMP and acts as a network of civil society organizations working for dialogue in the region. Partners of the Anna Lindh Foundation recognize the essential role of intercultural dialogue to promote coexistence in the region. Each government nominated an institution within their country to build a network of organizations. Today this network forms the basis of the Foundation’s work to support for the activities of the network of civil society organizations and assuming the role of observatory for coexistence in the region (Anna Lindh Foundation (a), n.d.).

As the EMP, the BMENA also has projects related to social, cultural and human partnership financed by the Foundation for the Future. These projects are given below:

Table 4.19. The BMENA’s Social, Cultural and Human Partnership Projects

Name of Project	Responsible NGO	Budget Allocated	Aim of Project
1) <i>Khamer Women Empowerment and Literacy Program. Khamer District of Amran Governorate, Yemen.</i>	SOUL for the Development of Women and Children	17,885 USD	Project aimed at reducing gender gaps. It supports already established literacy and training center for girls and women by expanding its capacity and improving the training of the trainers.
2) <i>Achieving Behavioural Change Towards Women’s Right among Yourth Enrolled in Community Colleges (Amman, Zarqa, Jerash)</i>	Women for Cultural Development (NAMAA)	33,771 USD	The project will contribute to strengthening behavioural change on women’s rights issues and gender roles by providing targeted awareness and training to Community (Diploma) Colleges students, most of which are women.
3) <i>Building Stronger Relations between Local Government and the CSOs</i>	Partners Jordan	60,000 USD	Project addresses the need for increased participation of civil society and the youth as well as increased communications between local government officials and local communities, thus enhancing accountability.
4) <i>Défense de Droit de la Jeunesse. Déploiement du Programme DID.</i>	Fondation Suisse Maroc pur le Développement Duarble (FSMD) &	390,000 USD	Project addresses the need for increased protection of children and youth’s rights. The project will

	Fondation Zakoura Education (FZE)		operate in areas that are favorite recruitment grounds for the exploited minors by providing family/ community awareness/ mobilization, educational support and skills training.
2) Women's Rights Programs	Human Education Al-Jamiya Al-Khairiyah Al-Islamiya Al-Amliih (Philanthropic Amliih Association)	28,400 USD	The project aims to train and build the capacities of teachers, students, and poor, illiterate mothers on women's rights as human rights and will cover various sects in Lebanon with a focus on Shiite Community.

Source: (Compiled by the author using Foundation for the Future, 2007, pp. 30,31).

4.3.1. Enhancement of Social Development and Poverty Reduction

There is rising mass poverty and deepening social polarization within and between SEMCs like other developing or less-developed countries (See Annex III). Some social indicators of poverty such as low life expectancy, low adult literacy rate, increasing infant mortality, malnutrition etc. experienced in this region can be seen in Table 3.6., "poverty and other social indicators in the Middle Eastern and North African countries" (Petmesidou & Paptheodrou, 2006, p. 1). The following table shows the population below the national poverty line for the years 2002 and 2006.

Table 4.20. Poverty: Population Below the National Poverty Line

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2006)
Palestine	60	Algeria	22.6
Somalia	43.2	Egypt	16.7
Sudan	50	Jordan	14.2
		Mauritania	46.3
		Tunisia	7.6
		Yemen	41.8

Source: (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (r); 2002, AHDR Statistics (s), 2006).

To combat poverty, which has been one of the main economic and social objectives of the EMP, was clearly stated in the context of the Barcelona Process as a principle which should be seen as a common endeavour of the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. (EIRON-LINE, 2006);

“... a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership” (European Commission (m), 1995).

In order to achieve the main goal of political and security basket, which is to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and stability and to achieve economic and financial objectives of the EMP, which is to create an area of shared prosperity, economic transformation leading to sustained growth and improved living standards is necessary. Hence, acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of the region's people; increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the EMP region and the wealth gap between the North and South; encouragement of regional cooperation and integration were set as long-term economic and financial objectives by the participants of the EMP (European Commission Directorate General IB External Relations, 1995, p. 4). For instance, cooperation between the EU and the Algeria is determined in the following social fields as necessary: “improving the social welfare and health systems; improving living conditions in poor areas; contributing to the development of the housing sector, especially with regard to low-cost housing (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005).

Some steps were taken in order to enhance social development in some countries like Jordan in the region. Accordingly, a dialogue developed on the fundamental social rights and labour rules to identify potential measures. A decision was taken on the implementation of the relevant International Labour Conventions to which Jordan is party. Commitments were made on effective implementation of relevant core labour standards contained in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and related core ILO Conventions (European Commission (n), n.d.).

One of the important projects of the EMP which partly contributes for the social development and poverty reduction -FEMISE- is a socio-economic research which promotes dialogue and research on socio-economic issues through the funding of its network of research institutes, and advises Mediterranean Partner countries on reform. It organizes discussion and dialogue on the priorities set out in the economic and financial chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It focuses on “economic transition and reforms, agricultural

liberalization and services, development and poverty reduction and social policy, especially public health and work, in order to advise the SEMCs on how to reform their economic, social and administrative structures, adopt common measures that promote the creation of a FTA and intensify exchanges” (European Commission (d), n.d.).

As stated in the Euro-Med Partnership Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004, the Euro-Med Partnership is based on certain basic understandings shared by the EU and the SEMCs themselves. To undertake the necessary economic, social and administrative reforms which linked sustainable and balanced economic and social development to the establishment of a free-trade area, and the promotion of democratic values, good governance, transparency and the rule of law is one of these basic understandings shared by the EU and the SEMCs themselves. Social development must go parallel with economic development and environmental protection. Developing common approaches based at regional level on experience sharing is also as important as measures that have to be taken at national level. This approaches should cover the following fields: linking training policies with employment need; enhancing the role of Mediterranean women in economic development; designing modern social safety nets; methods of co-operating on health matters (European Commission (o), n.d.).

As mentioned earlier, countries of the BMENA suffer from bad economic conditions such as economic instability, poverty, unemployment, economic disparities and corruption.⁵⁷ Promoting liberal values for raising living standards of the people of this region is seen as a necessary factor, which helps to diminish side effects of bad economic conditions such as social unrest, regional conflicts, security threats as terrorist activities, by the USA. Hence, the need to improve a sustainable socio-economic situation in these countries for transformations of this region into a zone of peace and stability was started to be strongly emphasized. To this end, promoting liberal market economy principles, creating jobs, promoting micro-finance, encouragement of investment, increasing international trade and promoting intra-regional trade through establishment of free trade area are determined as essential factors to expand prosperity, which is one of the main objectives of the BMENA, in this region.

⁵⁷ Poverty is often made worse by corruption. In order to promote economic and social progress of poorer citizens and local communities' governments should provide facilitating corrupt free environment for the development of micro-businesses into medium-sized enterprises (Transparency International, 2005).

4.3.2. Empowerment of Women

Women's empowerment, which was identified specifically by the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP's Arab Human Development Report of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society) as one of the deficits of this region, poses serious threat to human development in the Arab world (UNDP-Arab States). Women play minor role in economic and political life (See Annex III). Some countries of this region still have reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The following table indicates the Gender Empowerment Values of the region for the years 2006 and 2007.

Table 4.21. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM Values)

Country	Value (2006)	Country	Value (2007)
Egypt	0.262	Egypt	0.263
Saudi Arabia	0.242	Morocco	0.325
United Arab Emirates	0.353	Oman	0.391
Yemen	0.128	Qatar	0.374
		Saudi Arabia	0.254
		United Arab Emirates	0.652
		Yemen	0.129

Source: (compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (t), 2006, AHDR Statistics (u), 2007).

Women's empowerment is one of the objectives of both projects, the EMP and the BMENA. In order to promote women's rights and further the role and status of the women in the countries of this region, both projects developed some programmes and projects.

Although the Barcelona Declaration does not mention specifically the promotion of women's rights, within the framework of the second and third baskets only the key role of women in development and to promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment and the importance of the role of women in the regular dialogue with the EU on educational policies are mentioned as areas of focus of partnership. Some initiatives were taken by the EMP despite Declaration's non-binding feature which makes difficult to organize initiatives and work toward the practical implementation of

measures to promote women's rights (Akrimi, 2006).

At the 2001 Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting, the first regional programme to promote the role of women in economic life was adopted. However, it came into effect in 2004 and its effects were limited. The Anna Lindh-Foundation also addresses the issue of the empowerment of women (Akrimi, 2006). In 2005, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) created a permanent parliamentary committee on women's rights composed of 40 representatives of parliaments in the SEMCs, EU national parliaments and European Parliament in order to further the role and the status of women in the countries of the partnership (European Commission (p), 2006).

Specific recommendations were developed under the Guidelines for the improvement of women's status and situation in the Euro-Mediterranean area and were included to the Five Year Work Plan adopted at the Barcelona Summit of 2005. A Ministerial Conference on "Strengthening the Role of Women in Society" at Euro-Mediterranean level was held in Istanbul in November 2006 in order to make possible equal participation of women and men in all spheres of life which is essential elements of democracy. This conference was prepared by research analysis undertaken by three leading Euro-Mediterranean Institutes: EuroMeSCo, Femise, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Future Dialogue between Cultures. The main three topics discussed at the conference were women's rights as a guarantee of human rights and deepening democracy, women's access to education and employment and the role of culture and the media as key instruments for changing perceptions of gender (European Commission (q), 2008).

At the Thematic Adhoc Working Group on Participation of Women in Political Life in the EMP held in Brussels on 12 June 2008, participants agreed on the need to have some outputs from the meeting, which could be sent for discussion to the senior official meetings. The following key messages were taken in order to forward to the next meeting of Euro-Med Ministers: "1) There is a need for better dissemination by the EC, by governments, NGOs, media, women's organizations and others involved of the Istanbul Ministerial Conclusions to ensure the widest possible popular participation in implementing and reporting on follow-up; 2) There is a need for greater public discussion of measures relating to enhancing women's political participation such as electoral reform, establishment of quotas in certain contexts as is defined by the CEDAW (Article 4); 3) Media has an important role to play in ensuring

more positive coverage of women's issues and achievements and combating traditional stereotypes which have a negative influence on women's taking a more active role in politics at all levels; 4) It is important to ensure that the content and quality of education promotes gender equality; 5) There is a need for programmes to encourage women's participation at national level and for better documentation of women's participation, and for building upon these achievements; 6) There is a need for building women's capacity to participate in politics and for both men and women to have through comprehension of the importance of balanced representation in the political process; 7) There is also a need for gender awareness training for political parties; 8) The importance of networking and cooperation at national and regional level amongst women's organizations in order to increase political participation of women, their visibility, and to strengthen their political skills and self confidence cannot be over-emphasized" (European Commission (r), 2008).

In addition to this, the following recommendations were made at the EuroMeSCO Annual Report on "Women as Full Participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States": a) the creation of a Euro-Med gender-disaggregated knowledge base; b) the establishment of a Women's Rights Council (WRC), Law and Jurisprudence; c) A Scheduled Commitment to the CEDAW and UN Human Rights Conventions with Stronger Regional and National Monitoring Mechanisms; d) promoting Judicial and Jurisprudential Dialogue and Cooperation, Law Enforcement Dialogue and Cooperation, e) promoting a programme for Women Entrepreneurs, e) promoting the Euro-Mediterranean Literacy Campaign; f) initiating programmes like Gendering Media Programmes, Gendered university exchange programmes, Human Rights Training Courses; g) establishment of Woman of the Year Prize (EuroMeSCo Annual Report, 2006).

All the EMP partners committed themselves to mobilize financial resources to support the implementation of common framework of action to strengthen women's role in political, civil, economic, social and cultural spheres. Besides national funding, the EU will provide adequate resources for its implementation through technical and financial assistance provided through the Europe States, the FEMIP and other relevant financial instruments. Along with providing financial resources for the implementation of measures, regular review of progress in this field was agreed by the Euro-Mediterranean ministers. In this connection, they invite the Euro-Med Committee to convene, at least once a year, a Euro-Med ad hoc meeting at expert senior officials' level to review the implementation of the present measures and to

inform the annual Euro-Med Foreign Affairs Ministers' conference. A new follow-up Euro-Med ministerial conference to discuss the progress made in the implementation of these measures will take place in 2009 (European Commission (s), 2006).

The following projects were initiated to strengthen women's role in this region within the framework of the EMP:

Table 4.22. Women Empowerment Projects of the EMP

Name of the Project (Country)	Objective	Achievements
Girl Friendly Schools (Egypt)	To tackle illiteracy and to include females in education.	-520 girl-friendly schools were established -The EU pledged to fund 200 such "girl-friendly" schools throughout Egypt
Izdihar Project –Social Empowerment and Human Rights (Jordan)	Poverty alleviation project aimed at empowering women and men in Jordan to acquire the skills needed to enter the labour market, eliminating the 'culture of shame' surrounding manual and blue collar jobs for women and become a force of positive change in their communities.	- The extra income generated by Izdihar graduates constitutes a significant contribution to their families' economic stability, often doubling the family's monthly budget. - Izdihar graduates have a reputation for being skilled, dependable employees. - Izdihar graduates also apply their training to their family life, improving hygiene practices and social conditions.
Argan Oil Project (Morocco)	This project aims at providing women involved in the exploitation of the argan forest with a decent income.	-This enables women to gain greater independence and to become more integrated participants in the economic life of the region.
Village Business Incubator (VBI) project (Syria)	The objective of the VBI is to promote women's participation in the labour market by helping them establish micro and small enterprises, service centre for training and technical assistance for the creation of such enterprises, and to start up such enterprises managed by individual women or women's cooperatives.	- Women encouraged to establish small enterprises in Syria.
Protection for Human Rights of Migrant Workers, Refugees and Asylum-Seekers project-Maid in Lebanon	The project aims to protect migrant workers in Lebanon.	-The project organised seminars for 8,500 migrant workers and 2,000 refugees to inform them about their rights and the services available to them in Lebanon. -More than 3,000 migrant workers have benefited from legal assistance and legal counselling. -The project initiated a campaign, promoting best practices and correct behaviour towards migrant workers and enhancing respect for their rights. As part of this campaign, the project provided financial assistance for the making of a film entitled " <i>Maid in Lebanon</i> " which documents the fate of Sri Lankan women seeking better ways abroad to support their families. -More than 2,000 Lebanese have participated in awareness-raising workshops.

		-A committee was set up to draw up a new standard contract for domestic workers, to draft new labour legislation and to write and publish a booklet on “rights and responsibilities” for household migrant workers.
The Project for Eradication of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) (Egypt)	The Project aims to address the mistaken perceptions that justify the practice through dialogue, initiative, interaction and advocacy by targeting not only girls and women but also men of all ages, teachers, community and religious leaders, the media and others.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The FGM Free Village Model Project started in 2003 in 60 villages in six governorates in the south of Egypt, spearheaded by the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM), UNDP and donors. -Hundreds of Egyptian volunteers have been mobilised by the project to work in their communities under the guidance of 24 UN Volunteers. - Many community leaders have signed public declarations calling for the abolition of FGM. -Government newspapers and magazines have published stories presenting the views of prominent figures in medicine and academia who oppose this practice and television programmes condemning the practice have been broadcast.
Women Against Violence (WAV) (Israel)	It aims to promote and publicize women’s rights in the Palestinian community in Israel.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Women Against Violence (WAV) began an EU-funded campaign (€460,000) to raise awareness of women’s rights and services within the Palestinian Community in Israel and of gender-based violence on a nationwide level in 2004. - Women Against Violence plans to conduct an impact assessment three years from the conclusion of the project.
The Moroccan Centre for Information, Documentation and Studies on Women (CMIDEF)	It aims to cooperation between the EU and the SEMCs in the field of gender equality. Its ultimate objective is to help decision-makers take measures to eliminate the genderbased inequalities that still exist.	-It gathers, processes and distributes information and documentation concerning gender issues.
Gender Equality in Employment and Small Enterprises (Egypt, Jordan)	The aim of this project is to advance the economic status of women through micro- and small enterprises and by promoting career development through a combination of financial and non-financial services for women and capacity building programs for eight NGOs.	
Economic Empowerment for Palestinian Women: Turning Business Ideas into Reality (Palestinian Territories, Israel)	It aims to help increase the participation of women in the labour market by facilitating the creation and management of women-owned enterprises through improved vocational training and the creation of sustainable networks, and by facilitating sustainable networks and cross-border cooperation and partnerships between Palestinian and Israeli women entrepreneurs.	
Economic Empowerment of Rural Palestinian Women (Palestinian Territories, Israel)	It aims to enhance women’s participation in and contribution to the growth and development of the Palestinian economy and society	It promotes peaceful co-existence among Palestinians and Israelis through the sharing of practical knowledge and experience and the

	through an integrated training programme of personal empowerment, vocational training, skills enhancement and training in entrepreneurship and basic business skills.	fostering of direct economic cooperation.
Free to Work (Jordan, Palestinian Territories)	To identify the present and future state of the labour market in Amman and Gaza in order to increase sustainable employment possibilities for women and to host, inform, orient and counsel the targeted women on available jobs, the possibilities of vocational training and other accompanying measures.	
Sustainable Economic Opportunities for Women (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria)	It aims to contribute to poverty reduction and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals on equality by improving women's access to economic opportunities, creating new and alternative economic opportunities for women, promoting the participation of women and women's groups in policy debate and formulation, and encouraging debate on promoting and enhancing opportunities for women in economic life.	-The programme focuses on the need to improve women's entrepreneurial skills through a combination of training, creation and dissemination of relevant resources as well as the setting up of local counselling and accompaniment structures.
Creating New Opportunities and Networking Facilities for Marginalised Home-based Working Women (Morocco, Turkey)	It aims to address the need for home-based working women and their organisations to gain access to new employment opportunities arising from the globalisation process, through capacity building in local organisations based in Morocco and Turkey, public awareness campaigns and networking at both sub-regional and regional levels.	
Enhancing Capacities of Women Micro-entrepreneurs (Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia)	It aims to improve women's economic conditions by improving their income generating capacity. Women micro-entrepreneurs are served by a growing number of micro-credit institutions in the region but most are self trained and require support to improve their products and management skills.	

Source: (Compiled by the author using European Commission (p), 2006).

As a result of the request of the European Commission, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures prepared "Culture and Communication Key Factors for Changing Mentalities and Societies" as one of the three background documents for the preparation of the EuroMed Ministerial Conference on Equality of Opportunities, to be convened in November 2006. Focus is on key qualifications which are also important for gender relations such as empathy, the ability to look at things from different perspectives, and appreciation of pluralism and diversity. The need for a coherent Euro- Mediterranean inter-institutional approach to the promotion of gender equality was emphasized by the participants (Anna Lindh Foundation (b), 2006).

In addition to above mentioned projects, strengthening women's role in political sphere and their increased role in public administration is being pursued by the SEMCs through legislation, studies, creating an observatory, training, round tables and developing child care services related to these initiatives. Some countries took initiatives to increase participation of women in decision-making in business world and public life. For instance, Jordan endorsed the CEDAW and its publication in the Official Gazette in 2007. Three studies comparing the CEDAW articles (Articles 2, 9, 15, 16) and national legislation (personal status law, criminal code and nationality code) were prepared by the Syrian Commission for Family Affairs (SCFA) in 2006. Moreover, SCFA wrote a memorandum submitting it to the Cabinet with a request to remove all reservations on the CEDAW at the same year. Draft of the Penal code amendments related to honor crimes, adultery and rape which were proposed in Lebanon is under recognition of the Parliamentary Committee of Justice and Administration. Drafting the law for the protection of family and related regulations became one of the areas the government in Turkey focused on. To this end, some measures were taken: 1) Measures to eliminate violence against children and women and honour killings in 2006; 2) Coordination of measures for elimination of honour killings in 2007 (European Commission (s), 2006).

Briefly, with regards to empowerment of women, regular meetings of departmental ministers are held within the framework of the Barcelona Process. A ministerial conference entitled "Strengthening the Role of Women in Society" held in Istanbul provided an opportunity for ensuring that women's rights would be addressed and recognized as an integral element in political and socio-economic development. Also, the annual revisions of the Istanbul Framework for Action showed that activities have been undertaken to promote women's representation in decision-making and leadership posts. Comprehensive national plans, which address gender-based violence, have been put in place. Some measures, which provide a better work –life balance for both women and men, were taken. The expectation of the EMP is to fully and effectively implementation of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by the countries of the region (Sabuni, 2008).

Beside the EMP's regional approach to the issue, its bilateral side AAs signed between the EC and the SEMCs focus on promoting the role of women in the economic and social development process through education and the media and the access of women to higher education and training (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2001; Euro-Mediterranean

Agreement (b), 2005).

Despite all the progress, gender inequality still maintains its position as one of the major problems in the SEMCs. Although more and more women participate in the labor force, few women hold the powerful positions in society. Despite the fact that most countries have legal systems, domestic violence still exists in every society. In order to review both progress and stagnations, the ministerial meeting of the EMP on empowerment of women is planned to be held in Morocco in 2009. At this meeting, all countries which are party to it present their reports on achievements in the field of women's rights and gender equality (Sabuni, 2008).

BMENA like the EMP also give importance to the empowerment of women living in this region due to the value added effects of these women in their countries' economic and democratic life. Within the framework of the BMENA, several meetings, conferences, seminars were held in this field. Sana'a Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of International Criminal Court, which was held in Yemen on 10-12 January 2004, is one of the examples of these kind of conferences. The participants of this Conference agreed on "to empower the role of women and their participation, protecting women from all forms of exploitation and any reduction of women's rights" (No Peace Without Justice (o), 2004).

Women rights issue is also totally related to full implementation of democracy since "there cannot be democracy without women". As one participant of the BMENA Sana'a Conference said, "there is no peace without justice there is no freedom without women". Some participants of the BMENA Sana'a Conference proposed that women should be included in quota in Parliament and local councils to allow them to be involved in the decision process (No Peace Without Justice (c), 2004).

Themes, which were identified as priorities, were the participation of women in public life and political pluralism and electoral processes for the first year of DAD activities. "The Participation of women in public life" theme was implemented by the government of Turkey and TESEV. In this respect, civil society workshops were held in Istanbul (on the participation of women in public life). In this connection, a symposium entitled "Empowering Women in Public Life and Democratic Development in the BMENA Region" was organized by TESEV in Istanbul 20-21 June 2005 to discuss women's civil, political and socio-

economic rights. They reached a conclusion that “women’s movements represents a central force from which democracy can be cherished, supported and encouraged” since democratization involves a mixture of participation of everyone without any discrimination (TESEV Paper, 2005).

At Forum for the future meeting held in Bahrain on 12 November 2005 the participants discussed the recommendations emerged at the DAD meetings in Istanbul, Venice, and Sana’a. Accordingly, they encouraged further work on these proposals by including the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the countries that ratified it (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005).

The 2nd Istanbul Symposium on ‘Gender Equality and Political Participation’ was organized by the TESEV, in consultation with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the framework of the DAD on the 6-7 February 2006. The participants emphasized that gender equality is still a persistent problem in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. They requested that “both governments and civil society consider and support the establishment of a region-wide gender institute, charged with enhancing civil society and government dialogue with respect to improving women’s status in the region through effective and impartial data collection, gender budgeting and other projects”. In this context, the proposed gender institute might facilitate and support review of CEDAW implementation in the countries of the region (TESEV (a), 2006).

Within the framework of DAD, an Intergovernmental Conference on “Empowering Women in Public Life” was held in Ankara on 22-23 May 2006 in order to review the current situation in the BMENA region and to share experiences on best practices achieved on a national basis with a view to empowering women in public life. The participants agreed on the fact that that there is still way to go especially with respect to the implementation of the national legislations adopted and/or international instruments despite recent improvements. They committed themselves to give further impetus to the ongoing reform efforts for improving women’s status in this region. In this connection, they decided to focus on practical steps that can reduce inequalities based on gender as well as positive actions that can empower women (TESEV (b), 2006).

The participants of Ankara Conference agreed on the fact that there can be no “one size which fits all” model which can be valid for every reform campaign since every country in the region has its own particular conditions and dynamics. At the same time, they emphasized the commonalities that allow for cooperative approaches. The participants thus agreed on the fact that “the imposition of values of the international community in this field should be within the framework of offering their help and experience in the spirit of partnership”. The Ankara Conference highlighted the importance and generated support for projects mentioned below: “1) Networking among women organizations; 2) Effective and impartial data collection on gender issues; 3) Raising awareness on strategies enabling women to assume leadership in society 4) Enhancing self-esteem and self-confidence among women; 5) Studying religious, social and cultural practices and traditions and the impact that they have on women rights; 6) Elaboration of the term 'empowerment' in the context of one's own traditions” (TESEV (c), 2006).

At the Thematic Session on the Role of Women which took place during the Conference on Democracy, Political Reforms and Freedom of Expression held in Sana'a, on 25-26 June 2006, Participants reaffirmed their commitment to advancing the implementation of all recommendations made at the two DAD Symposia in Istanbul, and at the Intergovernmental Conference on Empowering Women in Public Life, held in Ankara, Turkey on 22-23 May 2006. Progresses achieved on this issue were shared and the need of establishing a Gender Institute, which will focus also on gender desegregated data gathered from respective countries and regions for region-specific analysis and case studies, as well as making available scientific references was underlined (No Peace Without Justice (q), 2006).

In addition to these recommendations, they noted the need to encourage public participation of young women and women living in rural areas and to increase attention to be paid to addressing the needs of women with disabilities. They also stressed that a bottom-up approach is essential to addressing these issues and highlighted the importance of training programs. They also recommended that effort be made to draft a set of principles governing the depiction of women in the media. They emphasized the need to utilize the potential presented by some of the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) through effective implementation in the Region by taking all the necessary measures. They emphasized importance of the participation of women in electoral processes and taking steps

to facilitate their further involvement in public life. They also noted that Islam encourages participation of women in public life and does not stand against the empowerment of women. In this connection, the incorporation of gender equality into the 10 year plan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was welcomed by the participants. Finally, the participants welcomed the willingness of the government of Turkey and TESEV to consolidate this process of consultation on empowering women in public life through facilitating the deepening of dialogue within this region (No Peace Without Justice (**), 2006).

The participants of the fifth Forum for the future convened in Abu Dhabi on 18- 19 October 2008 acknowledged the progress achieved in the area of women's empowerment and enhancing women's participation in all sectors of life (No Peace Without Justice (z), 2008).

Some proposals were offered by the civil society organizations aiming to empower women's rights in this region under the BMENA framework: "1) Khamer Women Empowerment and Literacy Program-Khamer District of Amran Governorate, Yemen, project aimed at reducing gender gaps. It supports already established literacy and training center for girls and women by expanding its capacity and improving the training of the trainers; 2) Achieving Behavioural Change Towards Women's Right among Youth Enrolled in Community Colleges (Amman, Zarqa, Jerash)-the project will contribute strengthening behavioural change on women's rights issues and gender roles by providing targeted awareness and training to Community (Diploma) Colleges students, most of which are women; 3) Women's Human Rights Education Programs-the project aims to train and build the capacities of teachers, students, and poor, illiterate mothers on women's rights as human rights and will cover various sects in Lebanon with a focus on Shiite Community (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

Despite efforts made by these two projects in order to enhance the status of women, women of this region still suffer from discrimination in social and economic life, sexual harassment, honour crimes, illiteracy. In other words, there is long way to go to meet the objectives of both projects related to empowerment of women's rights.

4.3.3. Youth Engagement

Youth engagement is one of the vital elements in both projects' future success since young people are the ones who can contribute to the future of the region. In other words, youth will carry the programme of the EMP and the BMENA into the future. Making youth part of civil society activities, providing opportunities for youth to be part of political pluralism and facilitating exchanges of youth are some efforts that take place in both projects (See Annex III). In this part of the dissertation, both projects are analyzed and compared by examining each project's activities in this respect. Improving the employability of young people is one of the strategic interests stated in the AAs which contribute to the achievement of economic pillar of the EMP and the BMENA as well (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (d), n.d.).

As Minister of Integration and Gender Equality of Sweden, Nyamko Sabuni stated at the 2008 EuroMeSCo Annual meeting held in Amman, "the active involvement of the young in the struggle for core values of the EMP –human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy- is crucial. That is why youth policy must remain high on the national agendas of the countries in the region. Countries will not enjoy sustainable development without their young generations' commitment to the shared future and the values" (Sabuni, 2008).

One of the main aims of AAs stated in the cooperation in the fields of education and culture section is to promote the exchange of information and cultural cooperation for greater knowledge and better mutual understanding of the respective cultures. To this end, joint activities in various fields are promoted and youth exchanges schemes are encouraged (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (d), 2001).

The importance of the youth was also stressed in the Barcelona Declaration's third basket by emphasizing that "youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generations for a closer cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. A Euro-Mediterranean youth exchange cooperation programme should therefore be established based on experience acquired in Europe and taking account of the partners' needs". Hence, the projects of the Euromed Youth Programme, Euromed Youth Platform launched with the expectation to strengthen youth dialogue through promoting youth exchanges (Ilgaz, 2007, p.

250, Euromed Five Year Work Programme, 2005).

The third basket of the EMP aims to achieve cultural and social development through enhancement of the civil society. Creating intercultural dialogue among the youth and making youth part of civil society activities are important in this respect. Promoting exchanges and mobility between young people and making them part of civil society activities contributes to the improvement of intercultural understanding, on the one hand, contributes to the establishment of a structure which can make intercultural dialogue to be adopted as voluntary means to “doing together” in order to reach common and positive accomplishments, on the other hand (Ilgaz, 2007, p. 245).

However, the activities to improve dialogue between young people started before the initiation of the EMP in 1992 within the framework of the Community Programme “Youth for Europe” to support establishment of a Dialogue between young people and promotion of youth exchanges in the Euro-Mediterranean. Youth engagement has been first included to the EMP after the conference held in Amman on “Youth Exchanges between the EU and its Mediterranean partners”. Second attempt was related Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in 1997. In 1998, the first Euro-Med Youth Programme was adopted. A system of National Coordinators was set up with the nomination of one coordinator in each SEMCs in order to implement the Euro-Med Youth Programmes. The following table shows Euro-Med Youth Programmes, budget allocated for them, and their aims (European Commission (t), n.d.).

Table 4.23. Euro-Mediterranean Youth Programmes

Name of the Programme	Years and Budget	Aims
Euro-Med Youth Programme I	1999-2001, 9.7 million euros (6 million euros from MEDA and 3.7 from YOUTH)	Three main actions of the EMYP: Youth exchanges, Voluntary Service and Support Measures
Euro-Med Youth Programme II	2002-2004, 14 million euros (10 million from MEDA and 4 million from YOUTH)	Focused on EMYP I three main actions; to facilitate the integration of young people into social and professional life and stimulate the democratization of civil society in the Mediterranean partners countries; to improve mutual understanding and cohesion among young people across the Mediterranean region, based on and committed to mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue among cultures; to increase the importance of youth organizations, developing young people’s active citizenship, especially that of young women, and promoting the exchange of information,

		experience and expertise between youth organizations.
Euro-Med Youth Programme III	2007-2008,	Supporting EMYP I actions; Fostering mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue between young people within the Euro-Mediterranean region; Promoting young people's active citizenship and their sense of solidarity; Enhancing the contribution of non-governmental youth organizations to civil society and democracy; Contributing the development of youth policies.

Source: (European Commission (t), n.d.).

Within the framework of the EMP's youth engagement priority is given to training activities. In this respect, SALTO YOUTH Euro-Med Resource Centre was created. The aim of this Centre is to support the implementation of the programme through training activities. Besides this, Euro-Med Youth Platform was launched in 2003 in order to promote partnerships networking among youth organizations in the EU member states and the SEMCs, the exchange of best practices and the development of new projects (European Commission (t), n.d.).

The projects of Euromed Youth Programme have contributed to promoting active participation of young people. This programme also provided opportunity for the young people to recognize new cultures and ideas, to break down prejudices, to increase their confidences, to reinforce mutual understanding and lastly to be active citizens in their countries (Ilgaz, 2007, pp. 245, 250). Euromed Youth promotes intercultural dialogue and understanding among the youth in the Euro-Mediterranean region, through activities and funded projects (European Commission (d), n.d.).

The Commission envisaged to decentralize the MEDA part of the programme. With decentralization, they aimed to transform of the management of the Programme that is issuing of contracts and financial management of the projects which are introduced by the youth organizations from the SEMCs to new structures called Euro-Med Youth Units (EMYU) which had to be identified by the authorities of the relevant countries. The calls for projects for youth organizations from the SEMCs were realized. Moreover, a Regional Capacity Building and Support Unit (RCBS) was created as a part of the decentralization process (European Commission (t), n.d.).

Directorate General Education and Culture continues to manage the part of the Euromed Youth Programme regarding projects presented by youth organizations from the EU member states through national agencies as well as the centralized selection projects presented by Europe-wide youth NGOs. In this process, the Commission's Cooperation Office Europe Aid (DG AIDCO) is responsible for the implementation of the Commission's external aid (Ilgaz, 2007, pp. 252; European Commission (t), n.d.).

Within the framework of the BMENA, No Peace Without Justice organized a Civil Society Workshop on Political Pluralism on 21-23 July 2005 in Venezia. Three panels resulted in a number of recommendations. One of these recommendations is guaranteeing and encouraging the participation of youth in political life notably election processes by their governments (No Peace Without Justice (**), 2005). At the Forum for the Future Ministerial Meeting held on 12 November 2005 in Bahrain, participants stressed the importance to assist the region's youth in order to enable them to gain business skills and expertise which is also necessary for global economic development. At the same Forum, the Participants welcomed the inclusion of youth as an additional topic in the civil society thematic dialogues for next year (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005). In these meetings, participants suggested recommendations to strengthen the role of youth in the dialogue between civil society and government by increasing youth participation in good governance (No Peace Without Justice (*), 2006).

Some proposals were offered by the civil society organizations for the youth under the BMENA framework: "1) Défense de Droit de la Jeunesse, Déploiement du Programme DID-project addresses the need for increased protection of children and youth's rights. The project will operate in areas that are favorite recruitment grounds for the exploited minors by providing family/ community awareness/ mobilization, educational support and skills training. 2) Building Stronger Relations between Local Government and the CSO Project addresses the need for increased participation of civil society and the youth as well as increased communications between local government officials and local communities, thus enhancing accountability (Foundation for the Future, 2007, p. 31).

BMENA's youth engagement except for a couple of projects is at the recommendation level in comparison to the EMP and its youth programmes. In other words, there is no youth programme which covers entire region as a whole in active implementation within the

BMENA framework. They just stressed on strengthening the role of youth in dialogue between civil society and government, importance of providing assist to the youth of this region to enable them to gain business skills and expertise and encouragement of youth for political participation. Youth exchanges for greater knowledge and better mutual understanding of the respective cultures is absent in the BMENA.

4.3.4. Literacy and Educational Opportunity

Literacy is an important factor to increase employment levels and economic productivity. Moreover, literacy leads to higher levels of family health, personal initiative and ability to participate in society on a democratic basis whereas illiteracy leads to poverty, alienation and insecurity. Illiteracy is defined as one of the major shortcomings of this region by the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (Creating Opportunities for Future Generations) and UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2003 (Building a Knowledge Society). Approximately 65 million Arabs are illiterate and two-thirds of this illiterate population are women. According to a study made by the UNESCO, the concept of “compulsory education” has not yet been introduced in most BMENA countries. The following table shows the percentage of illiterate people living in this region.

Table 4.24. The Percentage of Illiterate people in some BMENA countries

Country	Number of Illiterate adults	Proportion of Illiterate Adults		Proportion of Illiterate Adults	
		Age 15+		Age 15-24	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
Pakistan	48,597,000	35.9	64.6	32.3	46.9
Sudan	7,557,000	28.9	48.2	15.4	28.6
Afghanistan	9,048,000	56.9	87.4	49.2	81.6
Egypt	17,000,000	17.0	40.6	9.9	21.1
Morocco	10,100,000	34.3	60.4	19.2	39.5
Algeria	6,300,000	20.4	29.9	5.9	13.9
Yemen	4,974,000	26.9	65.3	9.3	14.1
Iraq	3,706,000	15.9	35.8	11.1	19.5
Saudi Arabia	2,800,000	12.5	23.7	3.0	5.3

Syria	1,900,000	13.2	26.4	5.4	9.8
Tunisia	1,900,000	16.6	35.7	3.6	7.8

Source: (BMBF (a), 2007).

As indicated in the following table, female illiteracy is considerably high in the countries of this region. Although there are signs of progress in this area, there are still things to do (See Annex III). The EMP and the BMENA are projects which have aim to increase literacy in the region.

Table 4.25. Female Illiteracy Rate (%)

Country	Value (2000)	Country	Value (2015)
Algeria	43.0	Algeria	26.0
Bahrain	17.4	Bahrain	8.4
Comoros	51.3	Comoros	48.4
Djibouti	45.6	Djibouti	27.2
Egypt	56.2	Egypt	42.3
Iraq	76.7	Iraq	70.9
Jordan	15.7	Jordan	6.2
Kuwait	20.4	Kuwait	12.8
Lebanon	19.7	Lebanon	11.5
Libya	31.9	Libya	17.4
Morocco	63.9	Morocco	48.1
Oman	38.4	Oman	17.9
Qatar	16.9	Qatar	9.0
Saudi Arabia	33.1	Saudi Arabia	17.0
Sudan	53.8	Sudan	34.8
Syria	39.6	Syria	25.5
Tunisia	39.4	Tunisia	23.9
United Arab Emirates	20.9	United Arab Emirates	12.1
Yemen	74.7	Yemen	48.9

Source: (Compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (v), 2000, AHDR Statistics (w), 2015).

Strengthening efforts to reduce illiteracy and increasing access to education particularly for women were determined as one of the major aims of the BMENA initiative at the Sea Island in 2004. To this end, they committed to increase by 2015 the number of literate people by 20 million (BMBF (a), 2007).

Some measures are trying to be taken for becoming remedy to this issue. Within the framework of the BMENA initiative, some measures were taken to increase literacy in the

region. Framework of Action, which was agreed at the Education Ministerial Meeting in Jordan to increase literacy by enhancing access to education and improving the quality of education and establishment of Education Task Force to support and monitor works on education and to develop the outcomes from the literacy meetings in Algeria, Egypt and plans for a regional resource facility are some examples to these measures taken in this region (No Peace Without Justice (k), 2005; BMBF (a), 2007).

The potential of education to boost the region's development through providing youth with the skills needed for a modern economy is accepted reality by the people of the region. In this respect, works of Education Ministers on the Framework of Action was welcomed due to its efforts to increase literacy (No Peace Without Justice (k); 2005).

One of the fields the G8 leaders decided to provide supports to the efforts of the governments in the region to halve the illiteracy rate particularly to the target rate stated at the January 2004 Beirut Conference on Education for All. In this respect, the following recommendations were made: "Training teachers in techniques that enhance the acquisition of literacy skills among school-aged children, especially girls, and of functional literacy skills among adults; working to train 100,000 teachers by 2009 with a high-quality literacy skills; providing teacher training through existing institutions and employing guidelines established in the "Education for All" program administered by UNESCO; setting up and maintaining a regional network for sharing experience and best practices; expanding and improving education opportunities for girls and women; supporting community-based, demand-led adult literacy programs and programs outside the formal education system that couple literacy courses with lessons on health, nutrition, and entrepreneurial skills". In addition to these recommendations, Algeria and Afghanistan have offered to sponsor the literacy initiative (America.gov, 2004).

A framework for action towards achieving the Millennium Goal was established at the BMENA workshop on literacy held in Algiers in May 2005. The Framework for Action emphasized the need for local ownership of efforts to reduce illiteracy, improved donor coordination, stronger BMENA partnership and a results-based approach. The governance of illiteracy programmes and their governmental context, capacity building and the engagement of civil society were other key issues of this Framework. Some recommendations were made with regards to BMENA efforts and adoption of an integrated and holistic approach dealing

with both causes and effects through both formal and non-formal approaches. In addition to this, they also agreed that these efforts should be evidence-based with research and assessment. Moreover, they stressed the need to build these efforts on existing initiatives, programmes and experiences and efforts for capacity enhancement which includes curriculum reform, teacher training and provision for the maintenance of literacy skills. The importance of establishing partnerships and other forms of collaboration between sectors and between NGOs and Government was emphasized (BMBF (a), 2007).

Participants of the Forum for the Future meeting held in Bahrain in 2005 welcomed continuing work on the Framework of Action to increase literacy, to enhance access to education and to improve the quality of education and its relevance. The work of the Education Task Force set up under the partnership to support and monitor this work, including developing the outcomes from the literacy meetings in Algeria and Egypt and plans for a regional resource facility was encouraged by the participants of this meeting (No Peace Without Justice (k); 2005).

The Cairo Workshop held in 2006 took forward the Algiers Framework by examining various ongoing approaches to illiteracy eradication in BMENA countries, particularly demand-led, community-based approaches. Priorities for tackling illiteracy in the region were identified. Providing education for women and marginalized groups, monitoring and evaluation of plans related to education, accuracy of qualitative information and qualitative data on literacy for planning, decision-making, monitoring and evaluation, capacity-building for management of illiteracy-eradication programmes, using resources for vocational and life-skills training as basic elements in literacy programs, using ICT, especially for remote areas, post-literacy support for incorporating learners and illiterates into social, economic activities to ensure sustainability, enhancing integration between basic and the respective Ministries and supporting NGOs were determined as priority areas to tackle illiteracy (BMBF (a), 2007).

In addition to above mentioned priorities, the following modalities for action were agreed: “1) Enhancing coordination in establishing a regional resource facility capitalizing on existing systems, establishing a planning sub-group and ensuring coordination between bilateral, multilateral and civil-society activity; 2) Sharing best practice through workshops and the exchange of materials, models and methodologies; 3) Enhancing available resources by raising the national funding priority for literacy within the wider development agenda,

putting literacy on the table in negotiations for European Neighbourhood support in the MENA sub-region, mobilizing BMENA local and regional resources and encouraging private sector support” (BMBF (a), 2007).

Participants of the monitoring workshop on approaches and partnership held in Yemen on February 2007 noted that there are positive progress on a number of aspects of the implementation framework agreed in Cairo. However, they also argued there are countries which give low prioritisation on literacy. They also emphasized the need of government ownership for the progress. They also stressed the need to reiterate adult and youth literacy at the BMENA Education Ministerial and more working group activity and information-sharing between the annual meetings (BMBF (a), 2007).

Jordan, Japan, Egypt and Germany initiated new initiatives to assist vocational education and skills in the region. Japan and Jordan co-chaired the Workshop of TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training). Germany offered to host the next meeting of the Task Force on TVET. The UK offered to support a conference on IT in education next year. They expressed interest in Russia’s consideration of launching an “Education for the Future Programme” in their G8 presidency that would include students from BMENA countries. Egypt also offered to host the Education Ministerial in 2006 to further develop a mutually-supportive, quality-led approach to education (No Peace Without Justice (k); 2009).

The following table shows adult literacy rates for the years 2002 and 2006. These rates which were acquired by AHDR statistics, Comparison of Adult Literacy Rate (% age 15 and above) - 2002 and 2006 indicates the percentage of the literate people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (AHDR Statistics (c), 2002).

Table 4.26. Comparisons of Adult Literacy Rate (% age 15 and above)

Country	Value (2002)	Country	Value (2006)
Algeria	68.9	Algeria	74.6
Bahrain	88.5	Bahrain	88.3
Egypt	55.6	Comoros	74.2
Jordan	90.9	Djibouti	70.3
Kuwait	82.9	Egypt	71.4
Libya	81.7	Iraq	74.1
Morocco	50.7	Jordan	92.7
Oman	74.4	Kuwait	93.3
Qatar	84.2	Lebanon	88.3
Saudi Arabia	77.9	Libya	86.2
Sudan	59.9	Mauritania	55.2
Syria	82.9	Morocco	54.7
Tunisia	73.2	Oman	83.7
United Arab Emirates	77.3	Palestine	92.4
Yemen	49	Qatar	89.8
		Saudi Arabia	84.3
		Sudan	60.9
		Syria	82.5
		Tunisia	76.9
		United Arab Emirates	89.8
		Yemen	57.3

Source: (Compiled by the author using AHDR Statistics (x), 2002, AHDR Statistics (y)).

At the Subministerial meeting held in Berlin on 22-23 October 2007, General Executive Coordinator of El-Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, Mohsen Marzouk stated the following ideas as essential elements of “Education for Democracy”: “1) All Arab education curricula should admit that the democratic system is the most appropriate system in modern times to manage public life in all countries. Contradiction between the contents of curricula should be avoided. For instance, political sciences and religious education should not provide contradictory material; 2) Education should concentrate, in its definition of democracy, not only on the element of elections but also on power alternation, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and legal and constitutional guarantees. Moreover, Education for Democracy should adopt the comparative approach, which allows comparing international and local models in order to benefit from different experiences and to understand democratic transition as a process; 3) Education for Democracy curricula should not only address to non-

local international or historical models, but also the local experience such as political and constitutional systems, and the existing civil society components. They should identify and judge them and assess their evolution; 4) Education for Democracy curricula should include experimental elements to enrich theoretical knowledge with practice. Accordingly, students should be involved in a true democratic practice in the university or should be allowed to participate in national events which enable them to play tangible citizenship role; 5) All education levels, primary, secondary and higher education should be covered by Education for Democracy curricula. Moreover, curricula should touch on various subjects such as literature, history, economics, etc, in a gradual and cross-specialty manner” (No Peace Without Justice (****), 2007).

At the same meeting, Marzouk added the following essential elements for Education for Democracy particularly related to the openness on practice and the environment: “1) Education for Democracy is concerned with promoting the values of citizenship, particularly confidence and respect for the public good, which have been affected by the long years of autocratic rule marked by corruption and lack of transparency and a chronic crisis of confidence between the governor and the governed. Arab educational institutions should, therefore, develop activities that encourage students to undertake voluntary action inside and outside the education environment, in order to instill the value of citizenship in their minds; 2) Educational institutions should be open to other actors in order to promote rich education curricula on democracy. It is necessary for academic institutions and civil society institutions specialized in research and training to join their efforts not only to establish education curricula that are close to reality, but also to identify beneficiaries and the knowledge transfer channels; 3) Dialogue on national issues, the free expression of different opinions, the respect of the students’ dignity should be encouraged”. Marzouk also emphasized the importance of teaching staff training and recommended the establishment of comprehensive programs that concern the training of the teaching staff at level of knowledge, skills and values in order to enable them to properly accomplish their missions (No Peace Without Justice (****), 2007).

The progress achieved in educational reform and the important role of educational and vocational-technical training in development were recognized by the participants of the Fifth Forum for the Future held in Abu Dhabi on 18-19 October 2008 (No Peace Without Justice (z), 2008).

Along with illiteracy, over-supply of graduates unsuited to labor market requirements who are likely to have great difficulty in finding employment is another problem of the region (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (d), n.d.). In this respect, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements establishing an Association between the EU and the SEMCs under the article related to cooperation in the field of education and training make the following recommendations: “1) contribute to the improvement of the education and training system, including vocational training; 2) support the female population access to education, including technical training, higher education and vocational training; 3) develop the level of expertise of senior staff in the public and private sectors; 4) encourage the establishment of lasting links between specialist bodies on the Parties’ territories in order to pool and exchange experience and methods” (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (b), 2005).

The issue of education and Research, Technological Development and Innovation (RTDI) did not receive the sufficient attention in the EMP until Barcelona Summit of 2005. Guidelines for the improvement of Higher Education and Research were included to the Five Year Work Plan adopted at the Barcelona Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2005. For the first time since the EMP’s initiation, Euromed partners recognized the crucial role of education for political, social and economic development and the importance of the research, innovation and Human Resources Development for modernization. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened in Tampere in November 2006 agreed on the EMP work plan which, includes the idea of organizing the First EuroMed Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Research. This Ministerial Conference took place in Cairo on 18 June 2007. Participants of the Cairo Conference recognized the importance of literacy, primary, secondary, higher education and technical and vocational education and training for the development of the human capital of the region. They underlined the necessity of reducing disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean countries under internationally recognized education standards. They also emphasized the necessity of facilitating the mobility and employability of students and researchers and supporting the economic development of the region. They also stressed the urgent need to support a labour market based reform of education, including technical, vocational education and training as well as convergence to frameworks of qualifications. They also mentioned need to invest distance learning and permanent training systems in the Euromed area. They acknowledged the necessity of collaboration between high quality training institutions and Centres of Excellence for the development of a Euro-Mediterranean research area. They stressed the

need to link the industrial and productive sectors through cooperation in the scientific and technological fields, in particular those related to the promotion of innovation and competitiveness. They underlined the importance of Euromed cooperation in supporting the development and modernization processes in higher education, especially through the TEMPUS programme and fostering the RTDI in cooperation with SEMCs, in particular through FP7. They welcomed the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window and the Euromed scholarship scheme for university students and higher education staff from the SEMCs. Participants reaffirmed the commitment to implement objectives of the Five Year Work Programme of the Barcelona Summit and of the Association Agreements of the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans in the field of higher education, research and innovation (BMBF (b), 2007).

The Cairo Declaration, which states the main objective of creation a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Scientific Research Area, was declared at this Conference. Ministers agreed to undertake appropriate measures in the following areas in order to create a Euromed Higher Education Area: “1)The approximation of Euromed Higher Education systems with relevance to the Bologna process and ECTS system; 2) providing support for the implementation of the Euromed University Forum objectives; 3) exploiting the use of innovative methodologies and ICT to enhance Higher Education; 4) enhancing participation in a Euromed Scholarship Scheme in the framework of the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window; 5) providing support for Euromed Higher Education Programmes; 6) integrating the SEMCs into the European Research Area; 7) promoting innovation, knowledge-sharing and its return on the industry and economy in SEMCs; 8) enhancing effective mobility in the Euromed region; 9) attaining brain circulation and knowledge dissemination” (European Commission (u), 2008; BMBF (b), 2007).

At the same Ministerial Conference, Ministers decided to take the following measures towards the creation of a Euromed Research Area: “1) Modernizing Science and Technology, R&D policies in the SEMCs; 2) Supporting Institutional Capacity Building, including human and research infrastructure development; 3) Enhancing the participation of the SEMCs in the Framework Programmes while taking into account their particular needs, as well as areas of mutual interest and benefit between EU and SEMCs; 4) Promoting innovation in the SEMCs and enhancing exploitation of the RTD outputs by society and industry; 5) Favouring mobility of researchers; 6) Enhancing participation of the SEMCs in the “People” Specific Programme

of the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP 7)” (BMBF (b), 2007). An Ad Hoc working group, which consists of experts on this field, has been created with the aim of implementing the conference objectives, deliverables and actions. The first follow-up meeting took place in Brussels on 5 June 2008 (European Commission (u), 2008).

A Monitoring Committee for Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation in the field of research and technology (MoCo), which was established in 1995 with the aim of stimulating the Euro-Med Cooperation in RTD in the wider process of the EMP and the setting-up of ERA opened to the Mediterranean, will be assessing whether the achievements were made in this regard at the second EuroMed Ministerial Conference to be held in 2009. The other two programmes of the European Commission, namely TEMPUS and the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window will be capital in the work towards this objective. With respect to achieving Euro-Mediterranean higher education and research area goal, the First Euro-Mediterranean University was established in Piran, Slovenia on 9 June 2008 (European Commission (u), 2008).

The following projects were also initiated with respect to education; “1) MEDA-ETE supports SEMCs in the design and implementation of technical and vocational education and training policies that can contribute to promoting employment; 2) TEMPUS creates opportunities for academics and administrative staff from universities in the SEMCs to cooperate with higher education institutions in the EU countries; 3) Erasmus Mundus promotes cooperation between higher education institutions in the EU and partner countries (European Commission (d), n.d.).

In addition to above mentioned projects, the EMP also initiated projects to tackle illiteracy and to include females in education. “Girl Friendly Schools” project (Egypt) is one of these projects supported by the EU. As a result of this project, 520 girl friendly schools were established in Egypt (European Commission (p), 2006).

Both projects, the EMP and the BMENA, have great efforts to eradicate illiteracy in this region. In this connection, their aim is converge and their approaches which are implemented to reach this aim complement each other.

V. COMPARISON OF EU'S AND USA'S OVERALL APPROACH TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

The Broader Middle East region has become the central focus of the USA and the EU diplomatic relations; however, the USA and the EU could not achieve forging a common approach to this region due to their respective geographic proximity/distance and their different historic, economic and demographic links with this region. On the other hand, the Middle East is likely to be an area which will determine the future of Transatlantic relations between the USA and the EU (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006, pp. 1, 2).

The scopes of these two powers' approaches to the Middle East and North Africa within the framework of the EMP and the BMENA are different since the EU concentrates on the Mediterranean area whereas the USA concentrates on a much broader area including Mediterranean, Gulf and Central Asian Muslim republics up to Pakistan (Aliboni, 2005, p. 3). Traditional Middle East is divided into the following regions: the Maghreb (North Africa in the West), the Mashrek (North Africa in the East) the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf; the non-Arab Middle East (Iran and Turkey, and but to a much lesser extent Afghanistan and Pakistan). Islam is the only factor which unites the countries of these regions even though each of these regions has its own set of values, cultural identities, political idiosyncrasies, economic specificities, perceptions, aspirations and concerns. There are examples which demonstrate the limits of cooperation among these countries like sad experience of the Arab League (Agha, 1994, pp. 241, 242).

Approaches of the EU and the USA to this region are different in the following respect. The EU approaches the region by taking divergences between countries of these regions into account and treating them separately whereas the USA approaches them by treating them as a whole through "all things to all people" approach (Satloff, 1997, p. 25).⁵⁸ In other words, according to the EU's approach, national sentiments and identities of the region should definitely be taken into account and every country should be dealt with individually. In

⁵⁸ We can give as example Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements signed between the EU and the SEMCs, European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) based on bilateral relations to the EU's tailor-made approach to the countries which shares borders with the Union.

contrast to the USA, the EU's approach to this region is also affected by the specific national preferences shaped by geographic proximity or distance, history and economic links. For instance, countries like Finland or Sweden do not feel the same interest in this region as much as countries like France and Spain do. However, these national preferences have not been a major problem for establishing consensus within the EU (Rhein, 1997, p. 51).

Despite the fact that these two powers share common concerns, interests and aims in this region, their approaches to this region are different. For instance, Europe prefers to pursue a multilateral approach to global security compared to the American emphasis on unilateralism as we have witnessed in the Iraq War. The USA perceives terrorism as the main security threat and this threat can only be dealt with through military instruments whereas Europeans view terrorism as one of the various threats, "placing it at par with unsolved poverty, regional conflicts, epidemic disease and climate changes", as Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP has said (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 232). In addition to this, the USA emphasizes the importance of a rapid transformation of the region as a key to security whereas the EU prefers more gradual change and an immediate focus on conflict resolution (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006, p. 219).

The differences in overall approaches of the EU and the USA towards this region also have reflections on their respective projects, the EMP and the BMENA. In terms of giving importance to regional integrations, the EMP and the BMENA are different from each other. For instance, the EU gives regional and inter-regional integration more importance than the USA. At the roots of the EU's approach there is the argument that regional integration is a pattern of relations as it has been the case with the EU itself. The EU combines its bilateral AAs in an inter-regional context of development relations such as AGADIR Agreement whereas the USA combines bilateral free trade agreements in the context of the global WTO perspective (Aliboni, 2005, pp. 4, 5).

With regards to the promotion of involvement of civil societies to these projects, the BMENA is more successful than the EMP since the BMENA's Forum for the Future summits is civil society-based whereas the EMP's processes are strongly officially managed. In terms of institutional structure, the EMP has superiority over the BMENA. Through the common institutions bringing together political dialogue, migration, cultural cooperation, financial aid and other issues become possible in the EMP contrary to the BMENA's institutional

weakness and less extensive and integrated feature (Aliboni, 2005, pp. 4, 5).

Although the USA and the EU agree that democratization of this region is vital for their security, their democratization agenda and instruments they have used in this respect are different from each other. With respect to democracy promotion understanding, the EU's position seems closer to the one held by the Arab world since "the EU also believes that democratic change and economic modernization must be driven from within the Arab societies that they cannot be imposed from without in the absence of any base in the home countries". Moreover, the EU believes that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main determinant factor of further progress in the region (Gomez, 2003; European Security Strategy, 2003).

In this context, their approaches to the MEPP are different, as well. The EU backs the Palestinians in the same way that the USA government has backed Israel. Although EU's special envoy's mandate, Miguel Moratinos words as "my role is complementary to the USA. It has to be so. My role is not about competing for influence but in striving to help the MEPP", there is a great effort of the EU to become a global actor in this process. We can interpret his words particularly "it has to be" part as there is lack of "hard security" capability and lack of capacity for strategic action in the EU, which hinders EU to become self-reliant foreign policy actor. Moreover, Europe's lack of influence with Israel also made the EU unattractive to Arabs. Since 1973, the USA thus has the leading role in the peace process in the Middle East. The EU has played relatively marginal political and diplomatic role. The EU became main economic donor of the Palestinian Authority (Satloff, 1997, p.30). Its role more or less increased with the creation of the Quartet.

Despite these divergences, there are some arguments that there is considerable convergence between the EU and the USA positions at the political-security level, particularly "maintaining and reinforcing the present strategic imbalance in the region in favor of Israel". In this respect, draft Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean designed by the EU within the framework of the EMP which did not mention the desire to change the territorial status quo is given as an example. In addition to this, the USA's and the EU's approach to the nuclear non-proliferation in this region by keeping Israel outside of this process as the only country which is not party to the NPT and has nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is given to verify this argument (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 237). This argument might be

multiplied by giving as evidence the USA's pressure which backed off the EU (major bargainer of Iran's nuclear issue- EU-3) on Iran's nuclear issue as example.

The partnership established by the EU within the EMP framework has been criticized by the SEMCs due to the existence of political inequality between the EU and the SEMCs. With the objective of increasing the "co-ownership" of the process, 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' signed on June 2008 aimed to inject new momentum to the Barcelona Process and to attenuate inequality between the partners. This feature of the EMP contributes to make it different from the BMENA and might further enlarge the gap between the USA and the EU cooperation (Commission of the European Communities (a), 2008; Aliboni, 2005, p. 6).

However, since President Obama took office, he gives signals of some 'changes' in the USA's approach to this region. In this context, we can give as examples the speeches he made in Turkey (leading country of the BMENA's DAD) and Cairo in which he did not prefer to mention about the BMENA.

"...I also want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree. We will convey our deep appreciation for the Islamic faith, which has done so much over the centuries to shape the world ...above all we will demonstrate through actions our commitment to a better future. I want to help more children get the education that they need to succeed. We want to promote health care in places where people are vulnerable. We want to expand the trade and investment that can bring prosperity for all people. In the months ahead, I will present specific programs to advance these goals. Our focus will be on what we can do, in partnership with people across the Muslim world, to advance our common hopes and our common dreams. And when people look back on this time, let it be said of America that we extended the hand of friendship to all people" (The White House (b), 2009) .

In order to recast the image of the USA harmed by Bush Administration's unilateral acts and military approaches to this region President Obama emphasized "broader

engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect” and “..in partnership with people across the Muslim world...” in his speech made in Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA).⁵⁹

The USA President, Obama’s following speech made in Cairo University on 4th of June, 2009 also gives some signals of possibility of changes in the USA’s approach towards this region which seems different from Bush Administration’s approach based on unilateralism and military power:

“...I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings... Our problems must be dealt with through partnership; our progress must be shared... And so in that spirit, let me speak as clearly and as plainly as I can about some specific issues that I believe we must finally confront together. ... events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible... Now, we also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's why we plan to invest \$1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who've been displaced. That's why we are providing more than \$2.8 billion to help Afghans develop their economy and deliver services that people depend on...”(The White House (a), 2009).

His entire Cairo speech was about making “a new beginning” (The White House (a), 2009, The White House (b), 2009).

“...We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning...”(The White House (a), 2009).”

⁵⁹ Bush’s policies of making rapid democratic transformation of this region through regime changes by using its military power harmed the USA’s image. The USA’s war on Iraq with the claim that it has WMD (Chemical) harmed its political approach to this region (a multilateral initiation the BMENA) with the aim of democracy promotion and economic development as well since it lost its credibility in the Arab world when the reality surfaced that Iraq does not have WMD.

The reason lying behind the change in the USA's approach to this region might be interpreted as the negative image of the BMENA in this region. This might also be interpreted as his unwillingness to revive this initiative which was already accepted by many people as a failed project. This might verify T elo's argument that '...the Bush initiative will be replaced by other ones with Obama' (Personal communication, T elo, 2008; See Annex IV). We can give Obama Administration's new approach to Iran - starting a dialogue without precondition on the basis of mutual respect-; its new approach to Israeli-Palestinian conflict - insisting on two state solution, not accepting the legitimacy of the continued Israeli settlement in the occupied Palestinian territories; its new approach to Israel's nuclear power as a country which is not party to Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) - calling on Israel to sign nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by saying that 'Universal adherence to the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea ... remains a fundamental objective of the United States' - as examples verifying this argument.⁶⁰

Signals of the USA's new approach towards Israel, Palestinian Authority, Arab world and Iran can also be found in the following parts of Obama's Cairo speech:

“...America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied... The only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security... The third source of tension is our shared interest in the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons. This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. I recognize it will be hard to overcome decades of mistrust, but we will proceed with courage, rectitude, and resolve. There will be many issues to discuss between our two countries, and we are willing to move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect.”(The White House (a), 2009).

Although there is possibility of changes in the USA's overall approach to this region due to the failure of former one, this does not mean that the USA will give up using its military instruments. The priorities given in using these instruments are changing and the language they used is softening by much more focusing on conciliatory and multilateral

⁶⁰ With Assistance of Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller's call, an agreement between the governments of Richard Nixon and Golda Meir obliged the USA and Jerusalem to stay silent on the Israeli nuclear program lost its validity (Steingart, 2009).

approach rather than confrontation and unilateral approaches.

In general terms, it is obvious to say that the EU and the USA have similar objectives. However, the divergences, which are quite apparent at the time of Bush Administration between the USA's approach to the MME and the EU's approach to the MME, exist in achieving these objectives. Historical assessment and the future of Transatlantic relationship are given in the following section to provide the reader with information on how different approaches of these two powers towards this region emerged.

5.1. Historical Assessment and the Future of Transatlantic Relationship

Europeans and Americans share common values and maintain close cultural, economic, social and political ties. Successive waves of immigration from every European country to the USA which contributed also to the richness and diversity of American society during the past five hundred years is one of the major factors that have led to this warm and close Transatlantic relations (European Commission (v), 1990). However, this close Transatlantic relations has been interrupted time to time. For instance, during the Yom Kippur War and the following first oil crisis (1973) the USA backed Israel whereas many European states were more equivocal due to their dependence on Middle East oil. These Transatlantic frictions time to time resurfaced during the Cold War period since the USA and the EU disagreed sometimes over the right balance between defense and détente. These disagreements led to Transatlantic crises over issues such as nuclear strategy, missile deployments, trade and political relations with the Soviet Union. However, these disagreements did not lead to deterioration of Western alliance, on the contrary Western alliance held firm and the Cold War was won. The challenge to the West from the Middle East and North Africa today is neither the same as that from the Soviet Union during the Cold War nor entirely different (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon (b), 2006, p. 219).

With the collapse of Communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union, bipolarity and East-West axis disappeared as a defining feature of the international system. In this new system, the EU has become an actor of a more multipolar world and a "New Transatlanticism" emerged. With this new development, political links between the USA and

the EU were deepened and institutionalized. However, the sources of conflict in USA-EU relations also appeared due to the emergence of distinct features of international relations after the Cold War. Disappearance of a Soviet threat as a force for unity in Western foreign policies, which led to Europe's dependence on USA security guarantees, also eliminated the need for Europe towards compromise and conciliation in Transatlantic disputes (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 299). Moreover, emergence of new threats also changed the existing security understanding of the EU since military power is no more effective in solving issues such as environmental degradation, widening disparities between rich Northern and poorer Southern states, terrorism, organized crimes and failed states (Peterson, 1996, pp. 8, 9).

In addition to this, the USA and the EU are challenged by their declining collective power to dictate the terms of global trade and investment. For the economic issues, both the USA and the EU now have more alternative partners with whom they can form alliances. In the defense and security field, the end of Cold War has also encouraged the EU to seek a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which has a potential to undermine the role of NATO in the future if it includes the creation of a European army.⁶¹ The EU's efforts like developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDI which are based on "neo-Gaullist approach" which seek to enhance Europe's identity by distinguishing it from the USA is another factor that contributed to loosening the Transatlantic solidarity in the post-Cold War period (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 299).

In the post-Cold War period, the EU-US Presidential summits came into being as a result of the November 1990 Transatlantic Declaration in order to continue Transatlantic alliance. To assess and develop transatlantic cooperation, the EU and the USA hold regular presidential summits which bring together the President of the USA, the President of the European Commission and the Head of State and Government of the EU member states holding the EU presidency. The Transatlantic Declaration recognized the EU's pivotal role in both the political stability and economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Moreover, it also stated a series of other issues such as the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the situation in the countries of the former Eastern bloc, the war in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, the fragile peace process in the Middle East, and the need to safeguard economic growth and employment and the need for a

⁶¹ ESDP includes the common defense policy which in time lead to a common defence. It is developing in a manner that is compatible and coordinated with NATO (EUROPA (c), n.d.).

joint response by the USA and the EU to solve these issues. In order to meet these challenges, the EU-USA Summit was held in Madrid, in December 1995 and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was adopted. The EU and the USA pledged to work together “to promote peace, democracy and stability, foster economic growth and liberalization world-wide, meet global challenges such as terrorism and environmental degradation, and to build stronger non-governmental links between the people of Europe and the USA”. The NTA provided this ground for the EU and the USA. In other words, NTA provided a forum in which they may discuss and work together constructively to narrow their differences and reach a common basis. This basis was defined in European Union-United States Relations document as “a basis for a mutually beneficial partnership lies not only in their shared values, grounded in the respect for international law and their multilateral commitments, but also in the recognition that despite differences in perceptions or interests, they are stronger acting together than acting separately” (European Commission (w), 1995).

The scope of Transatlantic Partnership was broadened to allow for a dialogue between the EU and the USA on many foreign policy issues and cooperation on international global challenges. Moreover, this dialogue has reinforced the convergence of their analysis and the perception of their common interests. This dialogue also allows them to act jointly and efficiently to enhance global stability and prosperity. However, this does not preclude differences of appreciation and some divergence of policies based on national interest, historical perceptions, or other factors, affecting the EU’s interests. The cooperative spirit and intense dialogue in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) framework helps the EU and the USA to address these differences in a constructive and forward-looking manner. We can give the Quartet (USA, EU, Russian Federation, United Nations) as one of the substantial joint efforts of the EU and the USA working together to revive the MEPP (European Commission (w), 1995).

Hamilton identified four priorities of new Atlanticism that emerged in the post-Cold War era as follows: “1) Transforming the Greater Middle East, 2) New approaches to strategic stability, 3) Transatlantic homeland security, 4) New models of Transatlantic governance”. He also emphasized ‘the necessity for Transatlantic regulatory and parliamentary consultation and coordination, growing role of the private actors’ (Hamilton, 2004, pp. 84-85-86).

Diverging assessments of the impact of some of their policies sometimes overshadow

the prospects of Transatlantic alliance in pursuit of their shared aims. For instance, in Iran case, the EU considered that a policy of constructive engagement has more chance of success than a strategy of isolation and economic sanctions. Hence, the USA's policy of "Dual Containment" of Iran and Iraq was not supported by the EU. Contrary to the USA's policy of "Dual Containment", they preferred policy of engagement through "Critical Dialogue" with Iran due to energy dependency and commercial attractiveness of these countries until Mykonos verdict (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 4). The EU also refused to join economic sanctions against Iran under ILSA (Iran and Libya Sanctions Act). Moreover, the EU complained about the USA to the WTO due to the USA's insistence that the EU should follow its lead in sanctions (ILSA) and labeled this insistence as illegal in international law and contrary to freedom of international trade (Ünver Noi, 2005, pp. 81, 86). This led to another Transatlantic friction.

Fighting terrorism became a priority for the EU and the USA before the September 11th terror attacks to the USA since at June 2001 summit for Transatlantic Cooperation both sides had already identified anti-terrorism as one of the five priority areas. After the September 11th terror attacks to the USA, this has become the overriding priority. The EU has worked with the USA to build a global coalition against terrorism, and to establish joint initiatives designed to combat international terrorism (European Commission (w), 1995). The following statement made by President of the European Commission at that time might help to indicate the EU's and the USA's stance towards international terrorism in the post-9/11 era:

"This is a moment for unity. The international community stands in solidarity in this struggle, resolved to build a future of peace and development for all peoples on Earth" (CNN.com, 2001).

The EU took part in global actions aiming to fight against terrorism such as "freezing terrorist assets, implementing external assistance programmes supporting the efforts of third countries to comply with UNSC Resolution 1373 on the fight against terrorism and supporting political and cultural dialogue with those parts of the world where terrorism comes into being". The processes like the EMP, which was already underway since 1995, gained more importance as an organization that aimed political, economic transformation of the region and establishment of intercultural dialogue to create a peaceful environment in this unstable part of the world (EUROPA (d), 2007).

Invasion of Iraq without having a UN mandate, violating UN resolution and international law led to Transatlantic rift since the war on Iraq was seen as a risky mistake and unnecessary move by many Europeans (Aliboni, 2005, p.1). Germany and France showed anti-US stand throughout the Iraqi crisis. Large public demonstrations were held against USA unilateralism in Italy, Spain and Britain although their governments sided with the USA (Cheema, 2004, p. 9). As Aliboni argued, this region became the most problematic sector in Transatlantic relations. The USA's National Security Strategy, which is based on strong unilateralism and principle of preventive war to impose its values from outside, was opposed to European Security Strategy which is based on the presumption that backward economic, social and political conditions in this region put threats or risks to its security (Aliboni, 2005, p. 2). The Iraq war thus showed that Washington pays little heed to European views on international political issues (Layne, 2004, p. 63).

Different perceptions of security prevented closer Transatlantic cooperation to emerge and moreover led to Transatlantic rifts. Policy differences over the following issues beyond Iraq at the time of Bush administration exacerbated this rift: 1) treatment of suspect individuals in the USA and suspect terrorist fighters held in Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba; 2) the USA's embrace of preemptive military action as a foreign policy doctrine and 3) finally neglect and imbalance in the USA's policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process which has been seen as factor of risk by the EU (Hamilton, 2004, p. 71). Moreover, Lebanon and Syria problem became one of the other factors which contribute to the rift between the Transatlantic partners although both the EU and the USA have the same aims such as to halt Syrian support for Hizbullah, terrorist access to Iraq via Syrian territory, democratization and liberalization. The gap between the EU and the USA is greater on Syria since their approaches towards this country are different. The EU prefers policy of engagement through the AA signed between the EU and Syria whereas the USA prefers policy of isolation. Briefly, the lack of the USA and the EU agreement on specific issues causes failure to coordinate their efforts (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006, pp. 223, 231).

As Aliboni (2004; p.10) stated, 'the Bush administration's programs to promote democracy and economic development in the Arab-Muslim areas are very much in tune with the EMP's own "philosophy"'.⁶² The expectations about these initiatives in terms of closing the

⁶² MEPI is similar to the EMP's MEDA which linking aid to democracy and human rights promotion. The USA's MEFTA initiative is also similar to the EMP's free trade area initiative (Aliboni, 2004, p. 10).

‘Middle East Transatlantic gap’ and to encouraging both Europe and the USA to act more cooperatively in pursuing their shared goals towards this region could not be met despite the USA-EU convergence on promotion of democracy and economic development (Aliboni, 2004, p.10). The divergences between the USA’s and the EU’s foreign policy approaches and perspective on the question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – might be well explained by the Kagan’s (2002) description of Europe as Kantian and America as Hobessian or a phrase “Americans from Mars and Europeans from Venus” which was used by Jervis (2005, p. 96). Kagan states that “The United States is exercising power in the anarchic Hobessian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and the use of military might”. According to Kagan (2002), “Europe is turning away from power, or it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s perpetual peace”.

The USA has been the dominant power in the Middle East since the WWII. The EU wants to be accepted by the USA as a “partner on equal terms”. In this respect, the EU member states emphasized in the European Security Strategy paper (2003), “Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the USA can be a formidable force for good in the world. The EU’s aim is to be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA” (European Security Strategy, 2003).

There are arguments that if the power and resources of these two powers work at cross purposes, it is unlikely for them to resolve the conflicts of this region and to achieve their shared interests from this region since the USA cannot successfully manage without the economic and political support of the EU. They should cooperate closely regarding the challenges of the region. Otherwise, the EU’s and the USA’s national interests might be damaged over time as a result of USA-EU bickering, policy paralysis, mixed signals, conflicting strategies and tactics (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 304)

As stated in the European Union-United States Relations paper, ‘the EU and the USA as two largest economies in the world by working together, can promote their common goals and interests in the world much more effectively than they can separately’ (European Union-United States Relations, sheet 2). As Cheema (2004) said ‘the rift was a temporary

phenomenon since these two powers are trading partners and enjoy considerable economic interaction including investments, strong security linkages and a collective security system like NATO, and finally their societies have common cultural roots and intellectual traditions' (p. 9). When Sarkozy and Merkel were elected as president and chancellor in their countries, France and Germany respectively, the rift, which had emerged at the time of Chirac and Schröder, was bridged.

The changes in the USA's approach towards this region with the Obama Administration along with France's changing stance towards the USA and NATO, may not only contribute to eliminate Transatlantic rifts they have, but also may contribute to open greater collaboration in the Mediterranean area although Transatlantic rifts remained on Turkey's full membership to the EU.⁶³ Besides changing stance of France's towards the USA, the UFM's intergovernmental feature may contribute to converge the UFM more closely with the USA on political grounds contrary to the EMP. Moreover, the UFM projects (energy, civil protection etc.) constitute an opportunity for the participation of the USA in the cooperative web of the Mediterranean (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009, p. 22). From this perspective, there is a possibility that France's new stance towards the USA and the UFM's own structure and projects, contrary to the EMP, might contribute much more complementary aspect of this project rather than competing aspect with the BMENA or new US-led initiative which might be replaced by Obama Administration.

5.2. Analysis of the EU and the USA Rivalry concerning Mediterranean and the Middle East Region

European-American relations in general terms is based on four images: 1) the image of Complementarity 2) the image of Competition 3) the image of Balance of Interests and 4) the image of Divided Europe vis-a-vis the USA (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 227). Although there are arguments that the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative supported by the USA and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership sponsored by the EU, complement each other,

⁶³ The USA supports Turkey's membership whereas France opposes to its full membership. It offers "privileged partnership" instead of full membership.

particularly at the political and security level ‘to redesign the political architecture of the Middle East’(El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 227), there is a kind of competition in this field as well.

The image of competition also exists in European-American economic control of markets. Some argue that the MENA, the US-sponsored project of 1994, was perceived as threat to the EU’s economic interests in the region and led to the emergence of the EU led project the EMP in the same year (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, pp. 227, 235). Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and the USA have been jointly working to spread trade liberalization and privatization to the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East (MME) in order to enable them to open their markets for the EU’s and the USA’s goods. However, this created an environment in which the USA and the EU have been competing (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 234).

In 1993, the USA suggested the establishment of a Middle East and North African system of economic cooperation. The countries of the region were persuaded to take part in the first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) ministerial conference held in Casablanca in 1994 to formulate projects for regional cooperation. The EU was invited to the Casablanca Conference as an observer. They found out that they were being marginalized in the projected MENA cooperation. The same pattern persisted in the following three MENA conferences held in Amman in 1995, in Cairo in 1996 and in Doha in 1997. The American backed MENA project collapsed in 1997 as a result of the election of the hawkish Netanyahu government in Israel. After the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the USA renewed its economic drive in the region. In June 2003 President Bush suggested to establish a free trade area between Middle Eastern countries and the USA. As the Europeans discovered that their economic interests in the region would be threatened by the 1994 the USA-led project, they presented their own project for Mediterranean cooperation in the same year (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 234).

In North Africa, 2003 witnessed European-American competition as the USA and some southern European countries competed over who would have the upper hand in the economic domain of this sub-region. This was reflected in the revival of the European sponsored 5+5 Dialogue and the American economic project for North Africa. In 1990, five European countries Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta initiated a dialogue with five

Arab North African countries, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. However, this dialogue was suspended by the European side after Security Council resolution on the American-Libya crisis was adopted. The Egyptians and the Americans took advantage of the suspension of the Dialogue to pursue their agenda. Because the Egyptians were excluded from the Dialogue, they called for the establishment of a pan-Mediterranean framework for cooperation entitled the Mediterranean forum (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 236). The Americans presented a proposal to establish a partnership with the North African countries entitled the American-Maghreb Partnership in June 1998. After the end of the American-Libya crisis in 2003, European countries expressed an interest in renewing the 5+5 Dialogue. This was because of two factors; a) the American economic drive in the Maghreb countries that began in 1998 b) disillusionment of the EU countries with the EMP. This partnership was plagued by the reluctance of the European to play an active role in the MEPP, and the insistence of the Arab countries to link EMP with the political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Europeans thought that renewing the 5+5 Dialogue would signal to the Arab Mashreq countries that the EU could freeze the EMP and focus on sub-regional cooperation in the west Mediterranean, and to the Americans that North Africa is in the European socio-economic sphere of influence. Under strong French persuasion, 5+5 Dialogue convened a summit meeting in Tunisia in 2003. Two days before the summit, Colin Powell visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to revive the 1998 American proposal. During this visit Powell suggested that Tunisia would be the headquarters of the American office to promote the American democracy project, in addition to the city of Dubai in the UAE. President Chirac denied that the Powell visit was a reflection of European-American competition in the Maghreb countries, arguing that Europe would like to help develop the Maghreb countries and it would be a good idea if the Americans also contributed to the achievements of this goal. Publicly, the EU leaders assert that there is no competition between them and the Americans in the Mediterranean. This statement applies mainly to the political-security sphere, but it is hardly applicable to the economic one (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, pp. 236, 237).

The EU did not invite the USA as an observer to the Barcelona Summit which irked the USA due to implications of this process for the peace process, especially the Syria-Israel track. The EU was not consultant prior to the October 1996 Arafat-Netanyahu summit in Washington as a response to which the EU decided to name its own Middle East envoy and to approve an anti-Israeli communiqué in sixteen years (Satloff, 1997, p. 35).

Establishment of a free trade area between the EU and the SEMCs may affect the USA's interests and as Khalilzad (1998) argues, it could have a detrimental effect on American-North African trade. This explains why the USA officials were unhappy that they were not invited to the Barcelona meeting of 1995 and the USA's Middle East Free Trade Area initiation (MEFTA) (p. 209). Another indicator of rivalry between the USA and the EU in this region is the EU's lack of strong willingness to cooperate in this region within the framework of the BMENA (Aliboni, 2005, p. 7).

The rivalry between these two powers also exists in weapon sales to this area due to the USA's preeminent position for weapon sales in comparison to the EU and in Arab-Israeli peace due to the USA's leading role in the peace process and the EU's secondary role as a "payer" rather than a "player" (Khalilzad, 1998, p. 207).⁶⁴ Since 1973, the USA thus has the leading role in the peace process in the Middle East. The EU has played relatively marginal political and diplomatic role. Europe's lack of influence with Israel also made the EU unattractive to Arabs (Satloff, 1997, p.30). The EU plays a rather more prominent economic role in the region and a somewhat limited political role although the role the EU played in this process gained pace when it became party to Quartet with the USA, UN and Russian Federation.⁶⁵

5.3. Comparison of EU's and USA's Aims/Interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Region

The Mediterranean and the Middle East region has become the central focus of the USA and the EU relations due to their common interests. In this respect, the EU's and the USA's interests in the region largely converge rather than diverge as long as the core interests are concerned, such as energy security, stability and prosperity through democratization and

⁶⁴ The EU was kept outside 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. The USA and Russia remained the only co-sponsors of the Conference. Union's response to being excluded from the US-led Madrid Conference was not to invite the USA to the Barcelona Conference (1995) which led to establishment of the EMP (O'Gorman, 204, p. 134).

⁶⁵ The EU is major financial donor of the Palestinian Authority. The EU has two ESDP operations in the Palestinian Authority; The EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) since 2005 (Council of the European Union (c), n.d.).

liberalization of this region to maintain secure flow of oil and gas at reasonable price, for selling their goods in these liberalized markets, preventing spread of WMD, terrorism etc. (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006, p. 1).

According to the European Commission's European Union-United States Relations document, the global challenges that the EU and the USA have to confront are threats to their security and stability such as environmental degradation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unemployment, drug smuggling, organized crimes and terrorism. The EU and the USA share common concerns in handling effectively a wide variety of political and security issues across the globe (European Union-United States Relations, sheet 2). According to this paper, the EU and the USA have a common belief that democratic government, human rights and market economy contribute to security by creating an environment in which peace and stability flourish. As stated in this document 'both the EU and the USA share common interests in developing coherent strategies in order to promote peace and stability, to create conditions for harmonious economic development in the wider world and to promote the stability of the international trade, financial and monetary systems, as well as the economic integration of countries in transition and developing countries' (European Union-United States Relations, sheet 2).

Besides above mentioned shared security concerns of the EU and the USA, they have economic concerns due to their dependence on the oil of this region.⁶⁶ One of the shared interests between the USA and the EU is thus maintaining free flow of oil from this region at reasonable prices. Moreover, the EU member states are much more dependent on the region for its energy since they import half of their net oil and gas from this region. Importance of the North Africa gas has been increased due to need for balancing gas import from the Russian Federation. Briefly, energy security is one of the shared interests of the EU and the USA in the region. For the EU, energy security is a part of its policy to diversify its energy sources in order to eliminate its energy dependency to Russian Federation (Khalilzad, 1998, p. 198; Satloff, 1997, p. 20; European Security Strategy 2003).

Another shared interest between the EU and the USA is regional stability and prosperity of this region. In this respect, promoting economic liberalization and democracy

⁶⁶ Europe imports more than 30% of its oil from this region whereas the USA imports about 10% of its oil from this region (Khalilzad, 1998, p. 196).

which lead to economic prosperity and regional stability to this region were determined as one of the aims of both US National Security Strategy and the Europe's Security Strategy. These interests are interrelated to each other since internal instability threatens the region's potential economic growth due to reduction in the foreign investment and number of tourists that come to these countries. It also threatens free flow of oil from this region at reasonable prices since conflicts may destroy key oil production and transportation facilities. The worst scenario related to this is that use of oil as a weapon against major importers by the extremist groups which might possess the control of countries of this region. Moreover, internal instability sometimes may harm the relationship of these countries with the EU and the USA. For instance, internal conflict in Algeria in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in targeting of all or some of the western living in this country (Khalilzad, 1998, p. 198).

One of the shared interest between the EU and the USA is slowing down the introduction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and creating a Middle East free zone weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) in order to eliminate acquisition of such weapons by terrorist groups (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 299). In addition to this, acquisition of nuclear power by one of the countries of this region might have domino effects on the countries of this region which is totally controversy for the interests of both the USA and the EU.

Along with above mentioned shared interests such as energy and regional stability between the EU and the USA, the USA also has another core interest which is preserving the security of Israel in this region. The USA and Israel relationship is different from any other the USA has in the world whereas the EU's tie with Israel is not as strong as those between Israel and the USA.⁶⁷ Shared democratic values, a unique historical relationship, close people to people bonds, and overlapping threats such as religious radicalism, terrorism, spread of WMD and their delivery systems might be listed as factors which leads to this close alliance. (Satloff, 1997, pp. 10, 11). Although both the EU and the USA have favored peace between Arabs and Israelis, their approaches have been different and sometimes the Arab-Israeli conflict became a source of contention between the USA and the EU (Khalilzad, 1998, pp. 196- 197).

⁶⁷ Arab oil boycott against the Netherlands following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the first oil crisis made a great change in the Europe's overall relations with the Arab world and the Israel as a community composed of industrialized countries which strongly need oil for their economic prosperity. It thus balanced its approach to Israel, one the one hand, its Arab neighbors, on the other hand (Rhein, 1997, p. 49).

The USA also has a strong interest in preventing any single power (outside this region like Soviet Union during the Cold War period or a potential regional power) from controlling this energy rich region (Satloff, 1997, pp. 10, 11). This also explains the hidden agenda behind the USA's invasion of Iraq. "If Iraq were an island in the Indian Ocean and its main export were pickles, not petroleum, Iraq would not be invaded by the USA" (Chomsky, 2007, p. 162).

Promoting stability is one of the core interests of the EU since geographic proximity of this region to the EU facilitates transformation of Middle Eastern problems into European problems. Another core interest of the EU is preventing further immigration from the countries of this region to EU member states. Along with the instability in this region, regional conflicts, rapid population growth, poor economic growth, spread of Islamic extremism, have great impact on mass immigration flow from this region to the EU member states (Satloff, 1997, p. 19; Khalilzad, 1998, pp. 201-202-203). For that reason, it is important for the EU to enable its Southern neighbors to cope with their massive socio-economic and political challenges which may affect the EU's own internal security through inflow of illegal immigrants, the destabilization of European population of Maghreb nationality or descent or through a further rise of drug smuggling from region (Rhein, 1997, p. 50). Increasing number of illegal immigrants and the increasing differences between the immigrants living in the EU member states and the Europeans and its effects on alienation to each other also affects internal political stability in the EU member states through increasing xenophobia and strengthening the hands of extreme right parties, on the one hand, leading to potential emergence of North African origin immigrants' revolts as we witnessed in France and some other EU member states when two young Algerians died because of the French police, on the other hand (Ünver Noi, 2007, p. 12).

5.4. Comparison of Foreign Policy Instruments used by EU and USA in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Region

The EU member states sometimes perceive the threats of this region differently than the USA. They sometimes have the same perception. The USA National Security Strategy shares a fairly similar analysis of security threats with the European Security Strategy (2003).

Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organized crime are challenges for both sides of the Atlantic. However, the foreign policy instruments used by the USA and the EU for dealing with these common threats are different. In other words, the EU does not share the USA's approach to dealing with these threats since the USA and the EU have significantly different views on the use of force, legitimacy and the right way to solve problems in the Middle East. The USA prefers rapid transformation of the region contrary to the EU's preference for gradual change and immediate focus on conflict resolution. Many EU member states did not share the Bush's administration's approach which is based on necessity of force to make democracy possible for this region (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon (b), 2006, p. 219; Khalilzad, 1998, p. 207). In other words, there is no Transatlantic consensus on making military force part of the democratization process of this region although some EU member states became part of the USA coalition "fight for freedom of Iraq".

The Europeans have often been reluctant to run the risk of instability associated with political change, and they certainly do not share the Bush's administration's belief that force may sometimes be necessary to make democracy possible. However, Transatlantic convergence, which emerged in G8 and NATO summits, exists on to work together with the countries and peoples in the BMENA in order to strengthen freedom, democracy and prosperity throughout the region in order to maintain their common interests. These efforts build and supplement long-standing European and American efforts to engage the region through the EU's Barcelona Process and New Neighborhood Policy, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the USA's Middle East Partnership Initiative (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon (b), 2006, p. 221).

In the current circumstances, in most of the processes related to this region, USA's approach and EU's approach seems complementary since the EU is not a dominant global actor like the USA. The EU uses economic instruments like trade incentives as carrot while the USA uses sanctions and even military options as a stick.⁶⁸

The USA, along with its military power which it used Afghanistan and Iraq, used its

⁶⁸ In Iran's nuclear issue, The EU used trade incentives as a carrot whereas the USA used sanctions and even talk about military attack as a last resort as a stick in order to convince Iran to halt its uranium enrichment activities.

political power (BMENA) to achieve its goals. Besides the US-led international initiative BMENA, the USA launched two other American national programs of civilian cooperation such as Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and bilateral agreements for the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) (Aliboni, 2005, p. 3).

The EU focuses on the problems of this region lying behind the emergence of threats to their security and the ways to eliminate these problems. In order to do that, it uses economic and financial instruments like trade incentives, financial and technical aids along with regional integrations, policy dialogues.

In the post-9/11 era, the EU preferred to use civilian instruments whereas the USA gave priority to using military instruments along with others. In the following section, the reason lying behind that reality explained. In addition to this, some criticism regarding ‘civilian power’ Europe concept and ‘military power’ USA concept by focusing on other concepts such as ‘soft power’, ‘hard power’ and ‘smart power’ was made.

5.4.1. Civilian Power

The EU’s overall strategic perspective towards the MME is similar but not same as that of the USA. The EU and the USA share the objective of secure energy supplies, but the EU gives much more its attention to overall socio-economic stability particularly in the Mediterranean region in order to cope with other threats which might stem from this region such as terrorism, organized crimes, regional conflicts, states failure, immigration. As stated in the European Security Strategy (2003), the EU prefers to confront these new threats by using much more innovative and transnational approaches based on “civilian power” understanding and using civilian instruments rather than by using purely military means due to the feature of these new threats –more diverse, less visible, less predictable and transboundary- and inability of the EU to confront them by using purely military means (pp. 3, 7). In this connection, ‘economic instruments are stressed as important to ensure reconstruction and so is civilian crisis management’. In order to promote reform and ensure stability in this region, the EU focuses much more trade and development policies as powerful tools. In addition to these instruments, assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted

trade measures are also underlined as important elements in the EU's Security Strategy (Sjursen, 2005, pp.4, 5).

Briefly, the EU uses economic and diplomatic instruments like trade liberalization, cooperation, and policy dialogue in contrast to traditional use of military instruments in order to achieve the objective of transforming this region into a zone of peace, stability, and prosperity for maintaining the EU's interests from this region and to confront threats stemming from this region (Elgström & Smith, 2006, p. 3). For example, with the idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, the EMP aimed to encourage competitiveness, efficiency, and socio-economic prosperity in the region. In addition to this, other issues such as water management, transport, fisheries, energy, environmental policies and even security became part of an intensive cooperation between governments and civil societies of the partner countries of the EMP through increasing regional integration (Rhein, 1997, p. 45). The Association Agreements (AA), which were signed between the EU and the SEMCs, is one of the major civilian instrument used in the EMP to realize gradual transformation of this region.

The EU's approach towards the SEMCs through the EMP is civilian and political (Aliboni, 2005, p. 3). The following factors can be listed as factors which contribute to the civilian approach of the EU to this region: 1) The EU lacks a single responsible foreign policy actor like the U.S. Secretary of State or the U.S. President although it has efforts to have one (Javier Solana's position as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy partly satisfies the need for a single responsible foreign policy actor since it gives a single voice and a single face to the European Union in its external relations. This role is trying to be strengthened with the creation of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs through A Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe. However, the problem related to the ratification of this treaty hinder the implementation of the Treaty. The title of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs was dropped in Lisbon Treaty which was replaced by A Treaty Establishing Constitution for European Union). 2) There are scepticism about the EU's capacity for strategic action in the continued presence of a CFSP that equips the EU with a "hard security" capability, military action despite the EU's efforts to develop its own security and defence identity/policy (ESDI, ESDP) which makes the EU independent from the USA. Contrary to the USA, the EU cuts its defense budgets and develops political culture which excludes use of force "not a last resort, but no resort at all" (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 5).

These policies of the EU , which help the EU to be a civilian and soft power, were the result of the EU's limited capability to use its military power and the need for alternative ways to become a global actor which can change the behavior of other actors of the international scene by using its civilian power and/or soft power instead of military power. As Duchéne (1972) stated that 'The one thing Europe cannot be is a major military power' (p. 37). 3) The EU's executive branch, the Commission, has neither the ambition nor the means (in terms of staff or material resources) to develop any policy initiatives beyond matters of low politics such as trade, economic cooperation or development assistance (Rhein, 1997, pp. 42, 43). Issues of low politics are easier to cooperate in comparison to the matters of high politics of this problematic region due to ongoing conflicts between some SEMCs. In addition to this, the EU's own structure does not provide the Commission with a task to handle the issues of high politics.

In comparison to the USA's emphasis on unilateralism, the EU prefers to pursue a multilateral approach to global security. It relies on multilateralism and international law to resolve conflicts rather than on unilateral measures (Elgström & Smith, 2006, p. 3). Multilateralism is at the core of the European Security Strategy and 'civilian power' Europe (2003, p. 9). In this connection, membership in key international institutions is to be encouraged and regional organizations are considered important in the effort to strengthen global governance. According to the European Security Strategy, the cornerstone of a law-based international order is the United Nations (UN). The role of the UN must be strengthened. Also, it must be equipped to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively (Sjursen, 2005, p. 15).

The EU, which has above mentioned multilateralism understanding, has strongly criticized the USA's extraterritorial acts, standing in breach of international law and in violation of state sovereignty (Cheema, 2004, p. 9). The EU prefers persuasion and positive incentives rather than coercion. Also, it prefers constructive engagement rather than isolation (Elgström & Smith, 2006, p. 3). The EU is against the use of extraterritorial sanctions which aim at penalizing companies from third countries like ILSA in order to hit indirectly the targeted country (European Union-United States Relations, sheet 4). For instance, economic concerns and interests of the EU member states and economic attractiveness of Iran market hinder the EU member states became part of these sanctions. Also, the EU views terrorism as one of multiple threats, "placing it at par with unsolved poverty, regional conflicts, epidemic disease

and climate changes”, as Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP has said in 2003. The EU mostly adheres to “soft power” and tries to be a “force of attraction” by using its full membership and/or partnership card (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 228). Contrary to the USA, the EU believes that diplomacy can produce the best result. For them, military action will simply make the situation worse in this region (Blackwill & Stürmer, 1997, p. 6). This policy of the EU might be partly explained by the absence of the EU’s efficient military power to use.

There is a sort of division of labor between the Europeans and the Americans in the Middle East according to which the EU will take care of “soft” security issues and the USA will focus upon “hard” security ones (USA does the cooking, EU does the dishes) like the Middle East Peace Process.

As Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, stated in a speech in Alexandria on October 13, 2003 “the EU is pursuing a “proximity” policy in the Mediterranean”. He defined it as “a policy that prepares the ground for lasting stability and security. That creates the conditions for cooperation and understanding. This approach of the EU is also called as ‘soft security’ which involves economic and cultural relations, and civil society and good governance (El-Sayed Selim; 2004, pp. 239, 240; Asseburg, 2003, pp. 174-193).

In general terms, the EU much more focused on using its civilian instruments and this made it to be defined as “civilian power”. Yet, the end of the Cold War did not provide ground for reinforcing ‘civilian power’ image of the EU. Instead, the EU started to acquire Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in which include the “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”. The Amsterdam Treaty provided for closer EU-Western European Union (WEU) institutional links. Moreover, the EU make the WEU is responsible for the implementation of the so-called Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking) (Smith; 2000, pp. 11, 12). All these initiatives, which were taken under the EU framework, contributed to the ‘military power’ of the EU. Although there are arguments that if the EU develops its “military power”, it loose its “civilian power”, Maull (2005) argues that having military power does not mean that the EU will loose its “civilian power” (p. 781).⁶⁹

⁶⁹ According to Maull (2005), if it is necessary, military power might be applied collectively by obtaining international legitimacy only in the pursuit of ‘civilizing’ international relations (p. 781).

Despite the priority that is given to the use of civilian instruments by the EU in its relations with the SEMCs, the EU also developed some initiatives to reinforce its 'military power' through creation of European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) in 1996 without consultation with the SEMCs. One of the reasons to develop these forces was to protect their citizens when the SEMCs regimes went into trouble as happened in Algeria in the beginning of 1990s. This raised the question among the people of the SEMCs against whom the reaction would be directed (Derisbourg, 1997, p. 28)⁷⁰ since presence of foreign naval power was perceived as a threat to their national security by some SEMCs strategists (El-Sayed Selim, 2000, p. 138). This act also against the nature of "civilian power" concept since it is just based on cooperation, concentration on nonmilitary, primarily economic means to secure their objectives (Maull, 1990, p. 92). In addition to this, whatever the reason (humanitarian and/ or peacekeeping) behind the establishment of such forces, partnership excludes coercion such as military interventions (Aliboni, 2005, pp. 3, 5).

Besides this, some EU member states (13 member states out of the 25 member states) sent troops to fight under 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' whereas the remaining 12 EU member states were either 'oppositionists' or 'neutrals' (Whitman, 2006, p. 113). When its some member states were part of these operations, the EU remained out of this war. From this perspective, the war in Iraq also affected the image of EU in negative way although this unilateral war of USA was criticized harshly by some EU member states and led to mass public demonstrations even in the EU member states which provided military support to the USA for this war. This act of the EU has a potential to harm the EU's effort to transform the region into area of peace, stability and prosperity since this war already led to ethnic and religion based conflicts which has potential to spread neighboring countries. The withdrawal of the USA's military forces from Iraq might exacerbate the existing situation and even divide Iraq into three parts and spread its destabilizing effects to its neighboring countries as claimed by International Crisis Group latest report (ICG (b), 2009). With these acts, the EU is retreating its "civilian power" image based on dialogue, cooperation, economic power.

Although the developments show signal of a shift towards the development of an EU

⁷⁰ EUROFOR, a 15,000 troop force of French, Italian, Spanish and Portugese units based on Florence, was formed by the EU with peace-keeping and humanitarian missions in the Mediteranean . The existence of EUROFOR is interpreted as a "rapid deployment force" to North African regimes in trouble and to evacuate European nationals in emergencies by many Arab commentators (Satloff, 1997, p. 24).

military capability, the EU is not a military power, yet. The weaknesses of CFSP and its effect on military ability of the EU are factors which led to define the EU still as a “civilian power”. Besides this, another important factor which led to this result is its unwillingness to implement sanctions and use of force as a last resort to due to the economic interests of the EU member states in this region. For instance, the Gulf War (1990) and the emergence of Iran as an export market for French industry - a market which compensated for the loss of that in Iraq - played a major role in Mitterrand’s decision to try to build bridges between the two countries and led to the opposition of the EU to the USA laws which punish companies investing in Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). During the “Critical dialogue”, Europe became one of the leading trade partners of Iran (Ünver Noi, 2005, pp. 86, 87)

The EU’s “soft power”, in other words “force of attraction” and the EU’s “civilian power” used to shape the countries in the EU’s own image is the basis of EU’s foreign and security policy although it has efforts to develop its military capabilities through establishment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which also make the EU independent from USA.

5.4.2. Military Power

In the post-Cold War era, the USA was trying to understand its place in a world without defining Soviet threat. In this new international system, threats are different from the threats of the Cold War period. In other words, threats to national security shifted from traditional military threat against territorial integrity to the threats to economy, ecology, human health, human lives such as organized crimes, global warming, epidemics, terrorism, nuclear proliferation (Nye, 1990, pp. 153-157).

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA, the USA perceived terrorism as the main security threat and that threat can only be dealt with through traditional military instruments. The Bush Administration opted for military power in Nye’s term “hard power” strategy over civilian power in Nye’s term “soft power”.⁷¹ The USA’s foreign policy which was based on

⁷¹ When one country gets other countries to want what it wants--might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants (Nye, 1990, p. 166).

“deterrence” and “containment” between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks to the USA thus replaced by Bush Doctrine of war which is based on “preemptive” and “preventive” war. This new foreign policy of the USA was also unilateral since ‘Bush Administration was more skeptical of existing international institutions including the USA’s Cold War alliances and far more willing to –go it alone- in foreign affairs’ (Walt, 2005, p. 31). Briefly, the USA’s foreign policy action was based on military preemption, unilateral action, military superiority and a commitment to “extending democracy, liberty, security to all regions” (Kreft, 2005, pp. 70 71) since the USA’s large and diverse economy gave it a considerable political leverage and enabled the USA to create and equip a powerful military force and make it the dominant military power. In other words, the USA’s military preeminence is both reflected by and enhanced by its global military presence (Walt, 2005, pp. 32, 33, 34).

The USA first used its military power in Afghanistan right after terrorist attacks to the World Trade Centers and Pentagon to fight against terrorism. Afghanistan was the right place to do that since Taliban government had provided bases for Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda terrorists. Second target was Iraq with the claim that it develop WMD. Without having a UN mandate, the USA launched its unilateral war on Iraq in March 2003 by adding that they fight for “freedom of Iraq”. This operation took place after launch of the USA democratization agenda in the Greater Middle East region with the initiation of MEPI (2002) as a part of Bush Doctrine.

The USA believed that there was need to use force in order to cope with the problems of the Broader Middle East and North Africa region. Yet, the USA realized that making externally enforced regime changes using military power is not sufficient to tackle the root causes of the structural problems which engender threat to the interests of the west. Moreover, the USA’s preference for using military power particularly in Iraq harmed the USA’s image and increased anti-USA sentiments in the region. The necessity to have a multilateral civilian approach to this region emerged and led to emergence of the USA-led BMENA project in 2004. With this development, the USA used its military power -“hard power”-, through sanctions and military invasions, as a complementary to its civilian power-“soft power”- based on free trade agreements, financial aids, development projects etc.

through bilateral USA initiatives (MEPI, MEFTA) launched earlier the War on Iraq and multilateral US-led (BMENA) initiative launched one year after the occupation of Iraq. There was a belief that both roles complement each other as the soft security role facilitates the hard security one. In this respect, the USA carried out military agenda as an instrumental to its political goal which is democratization of the region. In other words, the USA used military approach to complement its political/civilian approach. However, military power used by the USA particularly against Iraq with the claim that it develop WMD undercut the effect of its civilian power or in Nye's term "soft power" to transform the countries of this region into "democratic" ones since it could not verify its argument related to WMD (Nye, 2006). It was naturally accused of having a hidden agenda. In other words, using political approach through a multilateral partnership in the BMENA and military approach as an instrumental to each other to reach the final aim could not produce the expected result as we have seen in the BMENA since Aliboni stated 'partnership excludes or keeps at bay harsher forms of conditionality or coercion, such as sanctions and military interventions' (Aliboni, 2005, pp. 3, 5).

One of the reasons lying behind conflicting the USA's and the EU's approach towards the MME was the USA's foreign policy approach focused on "rapid" transformation of this region through using its "military power" contrary to the EU's "gradual" transformation of this region through using its "civilian power". The USA's approach to this region which is mostly based on its "military power" was criticized by the EU as well as Arab world. The conflicting EU and the USA approaches regarding the use of force can be explain as the widening gap between the military doctrine (preemptive and preventive war) and capabilities of the USA and those of the EU. The USA defence expenditures which is almost what three main powers of the EU (Britain, France and Germany) had spent in 2000 facilitating factor of the USA's focus on its military power to make regime changes in unfriendly regimes of the USA in this region (El-Sayed Selim, 2004, p. 228; Walt, 2005, p. 34). The USA is able to deploy its military forces over long distance rapidly. This rapid force projection over long distance ability enable the USA to act unilaterally. Although the USA always prefer the EU's political support for any USA military operation in this region, less allied participation is realized. As stated by Blackwill & Stürmer (1997) 'this leads to late consultation with the Europeans after the event rather than before' (p. 7).

The Bush Administration's foreign policy which opted for "military power" did not work well to achieve the objectives set. The success of USA's military power used in Iraq with the aim of preventing possible emergence of security threats such as use of WMD through making regime change and transforming Iraq into a "democratic" country is questionable since the existence of the USA military presence in Iraq led to conflicts which resulted in deaths of hundreds. The worse scenerio is that the withdrawal of the USA's military forces from Iraq will multiply the bomb attacks and escalate existing ethnic conflicts since Iraq has a potential to be divided. Moreover, this division has a potential to spread its destabilization effects to neighboring countries (ICG (b), 2009). On the other hand, the USA's military presence in Iraq worsened the situation and decelerated stabilization process of Iraq since most of the Iraqi people are against the occupation and favor the end of occupation (Brzezinski & Scowcroft, 2009, pp. 57, 58).

Obama Administration is taking its first steps to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. The time set for withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq is the end of 2011. However, growing tension between ethnic groups (Kurds and Arabs and Turkmens) and religious groups (sunnis and Shiites) of Iraq might belate this decision of Obama Administration since there are scenarios which were produced by International Crisis Group such as withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq might cause a war that the USA should intervene with troops much bigger than today to resolve it. The necessity to leave behind a sustainable peace after the withdrawal of the USA from Iraq, is emphasized and some recommendations were made by International Crisis Group report (ICG (b), 2009).

All these developments indicate that it would be a vague assumption to believe the USA's claim that 'democratic Iraq through the USA military intervention guarantees peace and stability and prevents emergence of threats from this country'. From this perspective, the war in Iraq could not achieve a positive transformation as Aliboni stated at the interview that I made with him '...in the region there could be no rapid and positive transformation as a result of Bush's policies....Both initiatives proved unsuccessful, though..' (personal communication; Aliboni, 2008; See Annex IV). This is clear that the USA will continue its military presence for a while at least until she finds a solution to stabilize Iraq (Brzezinski & Scowcroft, 2009, p. 53).

However, we can witness some signals of change in the USA's foreign policy with the

Obama Administration. The following speech made by the USA President, Obama, in Cairo University can be interpreted that the new USA Administration will focus more clearly on civilian instruments rather than military ones:

“...Now, we also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's why we plan to invest \$1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who've been displaced. That's why we are providing more than \$2.8 billion to help Afghans develop their economy and deliver services that people depend on...” (The White House (a), 2009).

During the Bush Presidency the USA gave much more weight to “military power” (hard power) and unilateralism. The Bush Doctrine which is based on unilateral, preemptive, preventive use of force in his war against terrorism formed “neoimperial vision of in which the USA arrogates itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats and using force” (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 44). However, as Ikenberry stated, “this neoimperial grand strategy triggered antagonism and resistance that will leave the USA in a more hostile, divided and less secure world” (p. 45). In other words, Bush Administration failed to combine “soft power” (civilian power) and its “hard power” (military power) into a winning strategy (Nye, 2006). With the Obama Administration, there are some signals of shift of the USA’s policy from military power to “smart power” which combines “hard power” and “soft power” together, in other words to use a mix of diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural strategies with respect to its foreign policy.⁷² This was first expressed by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, for the USA’s foreign policy approach to the Middle East (IslamOnline.net, 2009). In addition to this, multilateralism seems to be one of the important elements of the USA’s new foreign policy approach to this region: “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on her own, and the world cannot solve them without America” (IslamOnline.net, 2009).

⁷² The ability to combine “soft power” and “hard power” into a winning strategy is smart power (Nye, 2006).

CONCLUSION

The starting point of this study was to find out an answer to this question: Are the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) complementary or competing projects? In this respect, the EU-led project, the EMP and the US-led project, the BMENA were evaluated shedding light on their historical evolutions; their political and security objectives; their economic and financial objectives; their social, cultural and human objectives; and their weaknesses and strengths. Moreover, these two projects were compared according to their efforts to achieve objectives set by them. In this connection, all meetings, conferences, seminars, working groups held and projects initiated were analyzed. In addition to this, The EU's and the USA's overall approach to the Mediterranean and the Middle East region, historical assessment and the future of Transatlantic relationship, the EU and the USA rivalry concerning the Mediterranean and the Middle East, these two powers' aims and interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region, and finally foreign policy instruments used by the EU and the USA in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region with a special focus on concepts 'civilian power' and 'military power' were investigated and compared.

Common values (democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms), close cultural ties between the EU and the USA and their shared aims and interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region which were given in the 'Comparison of EU's and USA's aims/ interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region' part of present dissertation in detail might lead to the perception that the EU and the USA have complementary approaches rather than competing tendencies to the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. The similarities between the threat perceptions given in both the EU's and the USA's National Security Strategies and the aim of transforming the countries of this region into democratic and liberal ones also contribute to the perception that both the EMP and the BMENA are complementary projects. Promotion of democracy, good governance, free and fair elections, pluralism, civil society, judiciary development, civil liberties, freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of media, fight against terrorism, promotion of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation, promotion of functioning market economy, support for increased entrepreneurship and investment, empowerment of women,

youth engagement and promotion of literacy are accepted by both projects as vital and essential elements for transforming the countries of this region into democratic and liberal countries. The similar reasons lying behind this complementarity lead to the belief that shortcomings in these elements are root causes of threats to the Western security and economic interests. Both the EMP and the BMENA play active role to fund the projects through their own financial aid programs; organize meetings, seminars and workshops to find remedy to the above mentioned problems of the region.

Although their projects in terms of interests and aims seem complementary, there is a kind of competition between the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative supported by the USA and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership sponsored by the EU to have a control over this part of the world. In other words, there is a kind of competition in political and security fields as well as economic field since being an effective global actor in international relations is also important for the EU. The establishment of the CFSP and the ESDP which seek to enhance Europe's identity by distinguishing it from the USA is the major indicator of this aim of the EU. With this act, the EU did not contribute to Transatlantic solidarity. In addition to this, the USA's unilateral military approach to the region as a complementary to its political approach (BMENA) for "preventing proliferation of WMD" and rapid transformation of this region into a "democratic" one is another indicator of this competition.

Although their interests and aims converge in terms of political and security issues their approaches to the resolution of problems stemming from this region diverge and sometimes keep the other side out of the process as we have witnessed in Madrid Middle East Peace Conference of 1991 and the USA's efforts to keep the EU outside of this process in order to prevent the EU to have a political role to play; the USA's Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and the EU's refusal to implement those sanctions and its 'critical dialogue' with Iran contrary to the USA's policy of "isolation" and "containment"; initiation of the Barcelona Process without inviting the USA as an observer; the USA's unilateral War on Iraq, its negative impact on dividing the EU member states and weakening the CFSP; initiation of the BMENA by mentioning only one paragraph about the EMP (an initiative launched 9 years before with the similar objectives); and finally the EU's unwillingness to take active part in the BMENA projects.

These events either within the framework of the BMENA and the EMP or outside of

these two initiatives reveal the fact that there is a kind of competition between the USA and the EU in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. Economic concerns constitute the main determinant of this competition. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and the USA have been jointly working to spread trade liberalization and privatization to the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East (MME) in order to enable them to open their markets for the EU's and the USA's goods. However, this created an environment in which the USA and the EU have been competing. Free trade areas, which are trying to be established between the EU and each SEMCs, the USA and the BMENA countries, might serve to kindle the economic competition that has emerged between these two powers. For instance, establishment of a free trade area between the EU and the SEMCs may affect the USA's economic interests in these countries or vice versa.

Moreover, the differences between the EU's and the USA's approaches to this region particularly the USA's use of "military power", which led to Transatlantic rifts, also contributed to much more competing aspects of both projects rather than making them complementary to each other although these two projects' aims are very much in tune with each other. The following factors within the framework of the EMP and the BMENA or outside of these projects might explain these two powers' divergent approaches to this region: 1) The EU's lack of military power in comparison to the USA's military superiority; 2) The EU's unwillingness and incapability to use its military power and even sanctions in the countries which violate the human rights and fundamental freedoms in order not to lose its trade links established with the SEMCs. This argument is also valid for the countries like Iran outside of the EMP. For instance, in the case of Iran the EU member states filled the economic gap which emerged following the deterioration of the USA-Iran relations by Iranian Revolution of 1979. First Iraq War also helped the normalization of relationships between France and Iran due to the need for France to compensate for the loss of the Iraq market with the Iran market (Its preference to use its civilian power can also be explained within this framework-economic concerns). 3) Unwillingness of the EU to take an active part in a US-led initiative the BMENA in order not to be affected by the negative image of the USA due to Bush Administration's false strategies in the region and not to be put in the same basket with the USA in this respect. 4) The USA's willingness to make "rapid transformation" by using its military superiority in this region to have more say in the oil rich countries of this region in comparison to the "gradual transformation" understanding of the EU.

Briefly, we can say that there is a certain level of economic and political competition between the EU and the USA, as given in detail in the “Analysis of the EU and the USA Rivalry concerning Mediterranean and the Middle East Region” part of the present dissertation. In this connection, the EMP and the BMENA are largely competing projects. This is a view which is also shared by many of the people interviewed (see annex IV).

Findings from UNDP AHDR reports, ENPI Strategy papers, interviews conducted by the author with people who were involved in these projects, all pointed to the fact that USA and EU projects failed to achieve their goals of transforming the region into peace, stability and prosperity through promotion of democracy and economic liberalization since little progress was achieved in political rights, civil liberties, judiciary development, political stability and prevention of violence and terrorism. Both projects have had quite little impact in democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. Both initiatives failed to achieve the objectives set by them. Weaknesses of the EMP and the BMENA given in detail in the related sections of the present work and the ongoing regional conflicts, particularly Arab-Israeli conflict hinder both projects to achieve their objectives properly. The USA’s approach based on “military power” also undercut the effects of both projects. In order to revive the Barcelona Process by eliminating the shortcomings of the EMP, the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (UFM) was launched last year at the time of French presidency of the European Union. With the Obama Administration, the BMENA, which was not mentioned by Obama during his visits to Ankara and Cairo, is likely to be recasted.

The USA’s unilateral policy harmed its image in the world. The emerging major economies in the world like BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and their growing economies might be converted into new rivalries in the multipolar world if they achieve to convert their economic power into political power.⁷³ The latest meeting of the BRIC showed that there is a possibility to convert their economic power into the political one to have more say in the world. In this new international system, the USA needs much more conciliatory policies rather than confrontation. Obama Administration gives signals of shift from Bush administration’s clear-cut unilateral policies mostly based on “military power” to

⁷³ According to Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill, these countries would overtake developed states like Britain, Germany and France by 2050. In other words the largest economies in the world may no longer be the richest by income per capita. Brazil, Russia, India and China could become a much larger force in the world economy (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003, p. 2).

“smart power” which combines civilian power/soft power and military power/hard power together. The Obama administration’s new approach along with France’s changing attitudes towards the USA and the NATO and the EU’s economic interests in this newly emerging international system might facilitate Transatlantic cooperation and contribute much more to complementary aspects of the EMP-UFM rather than competing aspects with the BMENA or a new US-led initiative which might be launched and supported by Obama Administration.

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COUNTRY	Promotion of Democracy	Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy	Fight Against Terrorism	Promotion of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Non-Proliferation
Algeria	<p>Areas progress achieved: -Elections were multi-party in 2004 elections. There were signs of improvements in terms of transparency. -A Ministry, which is responsible for detention conditions as a part of prison reform, was created.</p> <p>Problematic areas: -Practical side of fundamental freedoms problematic due to State of emergency situation in the country since 1992. It restricts the action of political bodies and civil society organizations. -Although the constitution states "the judicial power is independent", political pressure makes the independent judicial system impossible. -Justice system is unsuitable with the rule of law and liberal economy. -Government holds monopoly on printers, paper imports, audiovisual sector and broadcasting.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -2005 reform of the Family Code represented progress in the equality before the law without any discrimination.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Women play minor role in economic and political life. In 2004, women accounted for only 17.5% of total working population. -The percentage of women elected negligible (1.09% of women elected to the communal people's assemblies).</p>	<p>-Algeria is very active on the international scene, particularly in Africa. -It has carried out peace initiatives (Ethiopia-Eritrea). -It launched a new partnership for Africa together with Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. -It has border disputes with its neighbors, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco. -Tension with the Morocco on the Western Sahara problem. This problem blocked the development Maghreb Arab Union.</p>	<p>-It has 10 years experience of confrontation armed Islamic groups. -It is very active participant in the fight against international terrorism. It cooperates with Interpol, Europol and NATO. -On the bilateral front, it enjoys relations with the main countries concerned by the threat of terrorism (France, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, etc.). -Relations in the war on terrorism have developed most significantly with the United States. Algeria contributes, for example, to the transsaharian initiative against terrorism the mission of which is to stop Al Qaeda setting up bases there. Algeria is home to the African Centre for studies and research on terrorism.</p>	<p>-It is a member of IAEA and cooperates with the IAEA on the inspection of two experimental reactors of the country. -It has ongoing negotiations with the USA to set up a cooperation on nuclear field. -It cooperates to combat the proliferation of the WMD and has signed the main memoranda of understanding.</p>
Egypt	<p>Areas progress achieved: -First-ever multi-candidate Presidential election held in 2005 -Comprehensive legal reforms are planned to improve judicial efficiency and certainty -Constitutional amendments made in 2007. New powers given to the Parliament; increased control over the budget and a new power to withdraw confidence from the prime minister. -New electoral law, which transfers responsibility for the supervision of electoral process to a new electoral commission, passed. - A National Committee on Transparency and Integrity was established in 2007 to support efforts to combat corruption and enhance transparency and accountability in public affairs.</p> <p>Problematic areas: -Exclusion of certain political movements and groupings from the political arena (Muslim Brothers) - Low participation in political life - Fragile culture of democracy and of recognition of civil and political rights -Centralization of powers and decisions - Continuation of the emergency law since 1981 -Lack of independence judiciary from the executive -The backlog of cases, delays in resolving disputes -The persistence of the Law on the State of Emergency</p>	<p>Areas progress achieved: -Creation of the National Council for Human Rights -Establishment of special departments for human rights within some ministries, the Parliamentary committee for human rights - Inclusion of human rights subjects in schools -In January 2007, the Ministry of Economic Development announced that the national plan of action for the promotion and protection of human rights in Egypt was to be incorporated in the five year economic and social development plan (2007-2012). -In 2007 the National Council for Human Rights made a recommendation to lift restrictions on civil society organizations. -As regards freedom of religion, after the reporting period, in January 2008, Cairo's Supreme Administrative Court issued a ruling in favour of the Egyptian Baha'i community, allowing them to obtain identification documents with no mention of religious affiliation. -Female genital mutilation was officially prohibited in June 2007. -Diversity of media increased. -Egypt is party to a number of international and regional human rights instruments. It made further progress by acceding to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (February 2007) and signing the Convention of Rights of Persons with Disabilities (April 2007). -A number of amendments to the child law of 1996, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child including raising the minimum age of children's criminal responsibility from 7 to 12 years, raising the marriage age for girls from 16 to 18 years, criminalising the exploitation of children, prohibiting the worst forms of child labour and prohibiting all forms of violence against children.</p> <p>Problematic areas: -Use of torture, poor prison condition, gender based discrimination -Special attention will be paid to enforcement of protocols and int'l conventions related to human rights to which Egypt is party. -Egypt has some reservations to the Convention</p>	<p>-In the MEPP, she mediated in the disputes between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and backed EU/Quartet approaches to encourage a return to the Road Map. -Contributed to facilitate the EU's border monitoring presence at Rafah, allowing persons to move between. -Egypt, along with other Arab and European partners, attended the Annapolis meeting in November 2007.</p>	<p>-Egypt and the EU have shared interests in cooperation in fight against terrorism. Particular attention will be paid to implementation of the Code of Conduct on Terrorism adopted in 2005 and to implementation of UN conventions on terrorism. -The government has recently launched two initiatives in the fight against terrorism, focusing on the internet as an arena for terrorist groups and their recruitment activities and to combat incitement in line with the UN 2006 global strategy to fight terrorism.</p>	<p>-EU/Egypt Action Plan set enhancing dialogue on security issues such as non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, including the objective of establishing a zone free of WMD and their delivery systems in the Middle East. -Egypt supported international conventions on nuclear controls, and advocated the peaceful use of nuclear energy, under NPT conditions.</p>

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		<p>on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) including its reservation regarding the right of women to transmit their nationality to their children irrespective of the father's nationality as well as a reservation which conditions the equality of women in matters of marriage and divorce on compatibility with Islamic law.</p> <p>-Egypt has not ratified optional protocols under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and it maintains reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and to CEDAW.</p>			
<p>Israel</p>	<p>-Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Israel is a democratic state with associated political rights, respect for the rule of law and a flourishing civil society.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Israel did not extend Israeli law to the West Bank and Gaza Strip when it occupied them in 1967. Israel does not consider itself as an occupying power in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. According to Israel, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-In 2007, Israel signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.</p> <p>-While restrictions affecting family reunifications of Palestinians living in the West Bank and their Israeli partners have not been eased, a positive step was the decision adopted by the Israeli authorities in October 2007 to grant resident status to 3 500 people seeking reunification with their families.</p> <p>-With regard to equal opportunities, Israel presents a high proportion of educated women and their representation in the public administration has increased over the last few years.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-The UN consider Israel an occupying power in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and, the United Nations Committee for Human Rights reasserted that Israel is responsible under international law for the application of the ICCPR in the occupied territories. In August 2003 the Committee reiterated its concerns at the increasing extent of human rights violations in those territories, particularly through military operations, the obstruction of freedom of movement and house demolitions.</p> <p>-A number of initiatives were launched in the field of justice and education but results were limited. The Arab education system continued to lag behind Jewish education.</p> <p>-In March 2007, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) published a report on the situation of the Israeli Arab minority and asked the Israeli government to take significant measures to promote minority rights.</p> <p>-Issues raised in the framework of the political dialogue included inter alia: the peace process, the situation in the Middle East, the situation of the Arab minority in Israel, restrictions of movement in West Bank and Gaza Strip, the construction of the separation barrier, administrative detentions, the dismantling of outposts, the envisaged expansion of certain Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, more checkpoints. Little concrete progress has however been achieved on the issues as such. In 2007 the fatalities resulting from conflict-related incidents were 377 Palestinians (compared to 643 in 2006) and 13 Israelis (compared to 27 in 2006).</p>	<p>-In 2007 Israel was invited to align itself with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy declarations on a case by case basis but has not yet taken up the offer.</p> <p>-The EU Police Mission in the occupied Palestinian Territory (EUPOL COPPS) re-engaged with the Palestinian civil police after June 2007, focusing its efforts on support to officers from the West Bank (Gaza being beyond reach during this period). The work of EUPOL COPPS contributes to building a modern, professional police force, and to strengthening law and order. In October 2007 EUPOL COPPS convened the first joint seminar of Israeli and Palestinian police officers aiming at discussing accident prevention and building mutual confidence. The mission acts in close cooperation with EC to support the Palestinian institution-building efforts, for example in the area of the judiciary and the rule of law. This work forms an important contribution to help the Palestinians meet their Roadmap obligations in the area of security. In December 2007, after repeated calls from the EU, Israel started to accredit the mission, which will facilitate the completion of its work.</p> <p>-Israel's overall political and economic situation is affected by the continuing conflict with the Palestinians and the state of relations with the Arab world in general. Israel has diplomatic relations with Egypt and Jordan following the conclusion of peace agreements in 1979 and 1994 respectively.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-The bilateral cooperation in this field has continued to progress. In addition to regular contacts among specialists from both sides, an ad hoc "Israel-EU troika ENP seminar on radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists – analysis and prevention" took place in June 2007 in Israel. This bilateral event, attended by Israeli, Member State and European Commission experts, gave the opportunity to exchange views, experience and best practices in countering radicalisation and recruitment.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-A report by the UN Special Rapporteur for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, found a number of incompatibilities between Israel's counter-terrorism laws and practices and the country's international human rights obligations.</p> <p>-Israel is constructing a separation barrier whose purpose, according to the government, is to protect Israeli population against terrorist attacks. Its construction has been criticised for infringing on occupied Palestinian Territory and for the serious economic and social consequences it has for the Palestinian population, including problems of access to land and services.</p>	<p>-Israel is not part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The government neither recognises nor denies the existence of nuclear weapons in Israel.</p> <p>-Topics discussed included inter alia the "universalisation" of non-proliferation treaties and instruments, Israel's participation in export control regimes, multilateral nuclear fuel approaches, arms transfer to terrorists and an ad hoc meeting on weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean region in the context of the Barcelona process.</p>

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		<p>-Although the Declaration of Independence proclaims equality for citizens, Israeli legislation contains laws and regulations that favour the Jewish majority. In this respect, the UNHRC expressed its concern, in its conclusions on Israel's implementation of the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", about the adoption in July 2003 of the "Citizenship and Entry into Israel" Law, in particular, the potentially discriminatory nature of its provisions. As highlighted by an Israeli Commission report presented in 2003 ("Or Commission"), the Arab minority also suffers from discrimination in many areas including budget allocations, official planning, employment, education and health.</p>			
<p>Jordan</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Anti-corruption Department was set up in 1996. In 2000, a Higher Committee to Fight Corruption was established. Another National Committee for Combating Corruption and Favouritism was set up in 2003. -Jordan's rank in the 2006 Transparency International Index is 40, the best performance in the region, and has adopted an anti-corruption law in October 2006. - In 2003, the King announced the Reform, and set out the 4 main orientations : independence of the judiciary, reform of the political parties and elections law, equal treatment of women and development of an independent media. -There are ongoing efforts to improve transparency and good governance (Jordan first program and new reform agenda of the government). -Judicial Upgrading Strategy 2004-2006, which simplifies judicial procedures and improve the speed and the efficiency of the decisions. -Efficiency of public sector has improved by launching Public Sector Reform Strategy in 2004.</p> <p>Problematic areas: -Constitutional monarchy ruled by King Abdullah 2. King has a high degree of legislative and executive power. - No progress can be observed for example on the reform of the elections law, and no international electoral observation was accepted in the November 2007 parliamentary elections. - the electoral system known as "single non-transferable vote" tends to result in votes being cast for individual candidates and is widely acknowledged to be disadvantageous towards the development of political parties. - The Anti-Corruption Commission is not yet operational and at this point lacks the resources to become functional.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -The government as recognised the need for increasing the independence of the media, the initiative to revive the Higher Media Council at the end of 2002 to promote independence, pluralism and professionalism in the media was initiated. -In January 2000, the Government passed a bill that grants foreign media operations "absolute freedom of expression" in the country. -Torture is prohibited by law - the official launch of the National Centre for Human Rights, which has become operational in 2003, and which has been proceeding to impromptu visits of prisons and has also issued recommendations to the government regarding cases of incommunicado detentions. -Jordan has signed the UN Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979) but has not yet transposed it into national law. -Municipal elections were held in July 2007 on the basis of a new Municipalities Law which provides a 20 percent quota for women in municipal council seats. - The law on the right of access to information, of June 2007, guarantees citizens the right of access to any document. - Changes were made so that Jordanian women now can obtain their passport without the authorization of their husbands and legal age of marriage for women was increased to 18. -- The government is working on a new labour law which is expected to include migrant workers and give them the right to strike, of collective bargaining and the freedom of association. In March 2007, it signed a bilateral agreement with Egypt regulating migrant labour issues.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Current legislation puts some restrictions on the freedom of expression and association. - The 1998 Press and Publications Law grants the Government wide discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order shutdowns. -Minimum financial capital requirements for publications and compulsory membership of the journalists' Union. -A series of amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 2001 reinforce restrictions on free speech and allow for the prosecution of any person found to have published, or aired any statements harmful to the state. The amendments give the State Security Court the authority to</p>	<p>-Work with the EU to make multilateral institutions and conventions more effective, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen coordination in combating security threats and address related development issues. -Actively promote the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Peace and Stability Charter. - Jordan sincerely adheres to the principles of the Road Map and has been very supportive of the Quartet's efforts to implement it. The King actively promotes the Arab Peace Initiative that has also been hailed by the EU. Jordan attended and supported the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. Jordan has sent a large number of humanitarian assistance convoys to the West Bank and Gaza.</p>	<p>- Jordan is also a valuable partner in the fight against terrorism. Following the terrorist attacks of 9 November 2005, the Jordanian government is even more determined to develop its cooperation with the EU in the fight against terrorism and to actively promote the <i>Amman Message</i> to counter interpretations of Islam, disrespectful of human rights, in both the country and the region. -Jordan is committed to international co-operation in the fight against terrorism: the amended Penal Law increases the punishments of acts of terrorism and an anti-terrorism law has been adopted. -Strengthen EU-Jordan co-operation on the fight against and prevention of terrorism. - Co-operate to reinforce the role of the UN in the multilateral fight against terrorism, including through full implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1373/01 and 1267/99, and implementation and enforcement of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; -Ensure respect of human rights in the fight against terrorism.</p>	<p>- Cooperate on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and ballistic missiles, including through implementing UNSC resolution 1540/04, ensuring full compliance with and national implementation of existing international obligations and promoting the accession to and implementation of other relevant international instruments and export control regimes. - Further develop co-operation in the prevention of and fight against the illicit trafficking of materials that are used in the manufacture of WMD. - Co-operate on developing effective systems of national export control, controlling export and transit of WMD related goods, including WMD end-use control on dual use of goods and technologies, and effective sanctions for breaches of export controls. - Apply the risk - based customs control ensuring safety and security of goods imported, exported or in transit, and explore possible definitions of standards for certification of operator (exporters and transporters) intervening in commercial exchanges. - Improve overall co-ordination in the non-proliferation area and examine specific threats related to WMD which undermine regional security and the scope of co-operation in addressing them. - Promote the relevant provisions on the political and security partnership of the Barcelona Declaration with the objective to pursue a mutually and effectively veritable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.</p>

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		<p>temporarily or permanently close any media that airs any such statements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - However, Human Rights Organisations report incidents of ill-treatment of political detainees. - Jordan has not ratified the UN protocol of 1989 on the abolition of the death penalty. - Women experience legal discrimination in matters such as the right to obtain a passport, pension and social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the weight of court testimony. - Women's participation in the elections is hindered by the fact that they are registered in the family election card and hence obliged to vote in the same centres as their husbands or fathers. - Jordan has ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979) but kept reservations on three articles (related to nationality rights, right to choose their residence and domicile, rights during marriage and its dissolution, rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of the marital status, right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation). -Violence against women and, in particular, crimes committed in the name of honour, remains a serious cultural issue in spite of government efforts to eliminate legislative loopholes in this field. 			
<p>Lebanon</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lebanon is a presidential republic. political system is characterised by power sharing between religious confessions. - An anticorruption law was drafted in 2002, but has not yet been presented to the Parliament. -The Ministry of Finance signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Lebanese Transparency Association in October 2007. - A project was launched in October 2007 to further support the Judiciary Training Institute and training activities for all judiciary staff. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In 2005, the EU Election Observation Mission of the Parliamentary Elections concluded that a fundamental overhaul of Lebanon's electoral legislation was an urgent priority. -UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which underscored the importance of free and fair elections without foreign interference (Syria's influence over Lebanon's political life) and respect for constitutional rules, and which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, the disbanding and disarmament of all militias, and supported the extension of the control of the Lebanese government over all Lebanese territory. In October 2004, a report by the UN Secretary-General noted that the requirements of UNSCR 1559 have not been met by the parties and requested a timetable for their full implementation. - judges are employees of the Ministry of Justice and are under considerable administrative control. Salaries and the social status of judges are low, in particular when compared to local politicians and ministers which increases the risks of corruption. The government considers the reform of the judiciary as a priority; however, reform proposals 	<p>Areas Progressed Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lebanon has a rich tradition of freedom of opinion, speech and the media is largely privately owned. There is a multiplicity of newspapers and journals, many of them critical of the government. -The Constitution provides for freedom of belief. There is no state religion in Lebanon. -There is a wide and active range of civil society organisations in Lebanon performing important tasks, especially with respect to the provision of social services. -Lebanon has ratified most of the ILO's Conventions on core labour standards (forced labour, freedom of association, collective bargaining, child labour, discrimination) except Convention 87 on the freedom of association and protection of the right to organise. As regards the freedom to organise and form trade unions, all workers except government employees are allowed by law to join labour unions and to strike. -In 2001 the Parliament adopted a new Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for better legal protection during detention, including the right to a lawyer, to medical treatment and information for relatives. Under the Code, arresting officers are required to refer a subject to a prosecutor within 48 hours of arrest, unless there were witnesses to the crime, in which case the suspect may not be held in custody for more than 24 hours without being charged. -Since 1953 women have the right to vote and run for elections. Women may own property, and in court their testimony is equal to a man's. In 1997 Lebanon ratified the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), albeit with some reservations. In 2001, Parliament adopted a law providing equal pay for equal work for men and women. In 2004, the Parliament passed legislation giving women serving in government the same rights as men in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The domestic and foreign political agenda in Lebanon is strongly influenced by Syria, which maintains a military presence in Lebanon and is closely involved in political life. The Taëf agreement, which ended the civil war, foresaw the gradual withdrawal of these forces according to a schedule to be agreed between the Lebanese and Syrian governments, as is also required by UNSCR 1559, the objectives of which are fully supported by the EU. Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in 2005. - As regards the Middle East situation Lebanon supports full implementation of UN resolutions on Israel-Palestine issues, as well as the return of refugees as set out in UNGAR 194. It calls for Israeli withdrawal from the small area of Shebaa farms and supports "resistance" by <i>Hezbollah</i>. - The cease-fire called for in UNSC resolution 1701 of 14 August ended a 34-day military confrontation between Israel and the Lebanese armed militia, Hezbollah. Its problems will continue or become even greater as a result of the conflict with Israel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lebanon is party to 10 of the 12 UN Conventions regarding terrorism. Lebanon condemned the 11 September 2001 attacks and indeed all forms of international terrorism. However, Lebanon was unable to accede to US demands to freeze the assets of <i>Hezbollah</i> – and other extremist Islamic groups – and to locate named terrorists. Since Lebanon considers <i>Hezbollah</i> as an official resistance to Israeli occupation, many Lebanese regard the group's attacks against Israel military targets as legitimate. The EU's own list of terrorist organisations does not include <i>Hezbollah</i>. The Lebanese government has proclaimed its readiness to co-operate with the EU in the fight against terrorism in line with its commitments under an exchange of letters on co-operation on counter terrorism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lebanon is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed the Treaty and the Convention on the banning of the development, production, stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. Lebanon is not a member of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and has not acceded to the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.

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	<p>have so far been rejected by the Parliament. Military justice is active in all sectors of law, including property rights.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the vast size of the public sector has become a major problem. The number of government employs are approximately 260,000 people. - Corruption is widespread in Lebanon. 	<p>terms of medical coverage and hospitalisation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lebanon has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child without reservation. Since 1998, primary education for children is compulsory. - A law creating the office of a human rights Ombudsperson was adopted in 2005. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria contains a provision allowing the prohibition of publication of any information deemed harmful to the security of either state. Human rights groups have shown alarm at the increasingly assertive reaction by the judiciary and certain state agencies against criticism of Syria's presence in Lebanon. Dozens of journalists accused of endangering state security have been tried. -Freedom of assembly is subject to some restrictions. Groups wishing to organize a rally have to obtain prior approval from the Interior Ministry. Opposition groups have been refused permission, and opposition rallies dispersed at times by excessive force. -The freedom of association, new organisations must notify the Ministry of Interior, which acknowledges receipt. However, further administrative requirements are often imposed and there is concern that the notification procedure has turned into an approval procedure where not receiving receipt of notification can be interpreted as denial of permission. -There are few barriers to freedom of movement. -visits to prisons by human rights monitors are not permitted - the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was refused access to all prisons, including those operated by the Ministry of Defence where civilians are held. -The practice of torture and ill-treatment is widespread. -The Constitution allows for the death penalty for crimes such as assassinations and terrorism -In practice, women face discrimination in the workplace. Sexual harassment is punishable by law, but is still reportedly widespread. A number of laws on family and personal status discriminate against women. "Honour crimes" by relatives against women for alleged immoral acts are frequent and the law allows for reduced punishment of such crimes. Citizenship is transmitted by paternity, which is a problem for women who are divorced, widowed or abandoned. -There are no child welfare programmes or state institutions to take care of neglected or abused children. Child labour is common and increasing, particularly among the poor. 			
<p>Morocco</p>	<p>-Morocco is constitutional, democratic and social monarchy.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There has been undeniable progress in the areas of democratic reform and respect for human rights, in particular the adoption of the new family code, the law on political parties, the law outlawing torture, the strengthening of local democracy, the reform (under way but still very 	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -In October 2002, two new laws entered into force concerning the right of association and public assembly. The new legislation simplifies the rules for forming an association and makes them more transparent; it states that associations can be dissolved only through due legal process and only in certain, predefined, circumstances. - The media have become considerably freer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morocco claims sovereignty over the Western Sahara, which is also claimed by the Polisario Front. The conflict, which has been going on since 1975, has a negative effect on Morocco's relations with other countries in the region, particularly Algeria, and affects intra-regional cooperation. The Union Nations, through MINURSO and the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morocco is very committed to the fight against terrorism, particularly since the attacks on Casablanca on 16 May 2003, as a result of which adoption of the special Terrorism Act was accelerated, it entered into force in July 2003. The Act defines terrorism very broadly, makes it a crime in itself, provides for special procedures for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morocco has been a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty from the outset in 1968. In 1993, it signed the Convention on the banning of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

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	<p>slow and problematic) of the justice and prison systems, and drafting of the new electoral code. In order to ensure the long-term success of these reforms, Morocco must have the means necessary to implement them.</p> <p>-The last general election in September 2002, which was reported to be largely free and fair.</p> <p>-For the first time, 35 women were elected, thanks to a special system of national women-only lists. special lists have enabled great progress to be made with regard to general elections but the system was not used for the local elections in September 2003.</p> <p>-A new code of criminal procedure entered into force in October 2003 and progress has been made towards simplifying procedures, improving the legal aid system, reducing the length of trials and execution of sentences.</p> <p>-In April 2002 the National Commission launched a campaign on the evils of corruption. Morocco is currently drafting an anti-corruption law aimed at codifying all the measure taken in this field in line with the UN convention on corruption, which Morocco has signed but not yet ratified.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Corruption thus remains a serious problem and is perceived as one of the main causes of the country's economic backwardness.</p> <p>- Despite this progress Morocco still has a way to go on the path to democratisation, respect for human rights, good governance and consolidation of the rule of law; it needs to complete its legislative framework and adopt the relevant implementing laws. It is also necessary to increase the operational capacity of the specialised agencies set up to protect citizens' rights and to disseminate genuine culture of respect for human rights.</p>	<p>through the reform of the press code in 2002.</p> <p>-Islam is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees freedom of religious worship.</p> <p>- An arbitration committee was set up in 1999 to compensate victims of the "leaden years" (characterised by disappearances and arbitrary detentions) and the victims' families. In January 2004, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was set up to establish what had happened in various cases concerning involuntary disappearances and arbitrary detention, to compensate and rehabilitate victims and to promote reconciliation.</p> <p>- The reforms made to the Code of Personal Status (Moudawana) in February 2004, laid down new rules on the status of women and the family. The reforms urts and the creation of a family aid fund and rely much more heavily on the court system than the previous law.</p> <p>- In December 2000, Morocco ratified the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, albeit with reserves for the articles concerning the status of women, divorce and nationality.</p> <p>- Regarding the rights of the child, the law on the minimum age of employment has recently been amended.</p> <p>- There has also been a considerable increase in the number of NGOs involved in social work and economic development since the beginning of the 1990s.</p> <p>- Trade union rights are guaranteed by the constitution, by legislation and by international agreements ratified by Morocco. Workers are free to form and join trade unions.</p> <p>- there have been a growing number of calls for full recognition of the Berberspeaking community's cultural and linguistic rights. These are starting to be met: October 2001 saw the creation of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, which for the first time in 2004, proposed pilot projects for the teaching of Berber in schools.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Morocco has ratified the core UN Human Rights conventions, except the two Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.</p> <p>-It has ratified most of the ILO's Fundamental Conventions, except Convention No. 87 on the freedom of association and protection of the right to organise.</p> <p>-In practice, the legislation related to the right of association and public assembly is not yet implemented in full. prior authorisation still needs to be obtained from the Ministry of the Interior</p> <p>- the law still imposes major restrictions on press freedom; journalists are still arrested and imprisoned on libel and slander charges.</p> <p>- new cases of torture, especially in cases of arbitrary detention linked to investigations into terrorism, including Islamist terrorism, were reported.</p> <p>- Non-compliance with child labour laws is reported to be common.</p> <p>-Trade Union rights to the agricultural labourers are very limited.</p>	<p>Secretary-General's personal representative, have been seeking a political solution to the conflict since 1990, before which it was an armed conflict. The 1991 cease-fire has held since then but successive UN-sponsored agreements, including the holding of referendum on the final status of the territory, have failed to achieve a result.</p> <p>- As part of the Association Agreement, Morocco and the EU have created a working party to deal with social affairs and migration. The party has identified and holds regular discussions on a number of practical questions relating to migration such as codevelopment, social integration, visas, illegal migration, transit migration and better information, and practical cooperation projects.</p>	<p>terrorist crimes and very severe punishments, and takes account of the international dimension. In 1999 Morocco signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.</p>	
Palestinian Authority	The Areas Progress Achieved:	Areas Progress Achieved:	-The EU resumed normal relations with the	-- Strengthen EU-Palestinian Authority co-	-Intensification of cooperation in the areas of

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	<p>-The Palestinian Reform Programme at that time, which aimed at building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state.</p> <p>-In June 2002, the Palestinian Authority, in response to increasing domestic and international pressure, adopted a wide-ranging programme on reform. A number of important taken, such as the adoption and entry into force of the Basic Law, and legislation on the independence of the judiciary. In February 2003 the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) adopted the 2003 budget which was, for the first time, made public, and more generally, important efforts were made to strengthen financial control.</p> <p>-Some progress was registered in the establishment of an independent, impartial and fully functioning judiciary, although the judicial system faces a continuing case backlog accompanied by a lack of judges.</p> <p>-In June 2002, the Palestinian Authority has set about addressing shortcomings and improving its overall system of public finances. Progress has since been achieved in the area of financial transparency and important achievements have been recognised by the International Monetary Fund.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Palestinian democracy was threatened by violent events in June 2007 resulting in a political divide between the deposed government in Gaza and the newly established and internationally backed government in Ramallah.</p> <p>-The functioning of the judiciary system has regressed in Gaza, e.g. through establishment by Hamas of a parallel prosecution system. No progress was made towards unification of the legal codes of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; on the contrary, since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip there has been a significant divergence in legal approaches between the two areas. There are also major challenges in implementing the newly unified legal framework under current Israeli movement restrictions and closures.</p> <p>-No progress can be reported on the acceleration of constitutional reform.</p> <p>-Corruption continues to be seen as a serious problem in occupied Palestinian territory, due to a weak legal framework and lack of enforcement measures.</p> <p>-Comprehensive public administration and civil service reform has become a priority in the overall reform programme of the Palestinian Authority. There has, however, been limited progress in implementing this programme. The Civil Service Law from 1998 has not been fully implemented.</p> <p>-At least ten largely autonomous police and security forces now operate in the PA, including civil police, criminal investigation, preventive security, general intelligence, and military intelligence. Efforts to unify the various security services have been unsuccessful.</p>	<p>-Freedom of religion is generally respected within Palestinian society.</p> <p>-The participation of women in PA political life has increased, in particular as regards female membership to the Palestinian Legislative Council (from 6 % to 12.9 %).</p> <p>-Civil society organisations play an important role in the Palestinian society. As the worsening situation on the ground impairs the Palestinian authorities to provide basic services, NGO's often are the only organisations capable of delivering these services to the population in a wide range of areas, such as health, education, vocational training, culture, children and youth, women, agriculture, water and small businesses.</p> <p>-the Basic Law which does not permit discrimination on the basis of race, sex, colour, religion, political views, or disability. The Palestinian Electoral law sets a quota of representatives of religious minorities at the PLC.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory suffered further setbacks, in particular as regards the right to life and personal security and the right to personal freedom and safety (especially relating to arrest, detention, search procedures, and torture and ill- during interrogation).</p> <p>-As concerns Gaza, the human rights situation deteriorated, in particular with regards to torture and freedom of expression. The situation of Palestinian journalists dramatically worsened in 2007, notably in the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover.</p> <p>-A raise in cases of "honour" crimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those convicted in such cases receive, on average, disproportionate sentences of no more than six months imprisonment.</p> <p>-Women's participation in economic life remains low, with over 80 % of women in the West Bank and 90 % in Gaza outside the formal labour force.</p> <p>-Female representation at local government level is below 1 %.</p> <p>-Despite legal guarantees, freedom of the press is, in practice, restricted and there is government censorship on the Palestinian mass media. Several journalists and human rights activists have been arrested or interrogated. There are also several cases where newspapers, magazines or TV/radio stations have been closed.</p> <p>-A Law on NGOs entered into force in 2000. Relations however, between the PA and civil society are generally poor, with the PA closely monitoring the activities of several civil society organisations, in particular those promoting greater reform and protection of human rights.</p>	<p>Palestinian Authority in June 2007 and re-established political dialogue.</p> <p>-Security conditions remained unstable during 2007. Palestinian factions continued attacks against Israeli military and civilians launching rockets from Gaza. Israel continued incursions into Palestinian cities, targeted killings and arrests.</p>	<p>operation on the fight against and prevention of terrorism, including the prevention of illicit funding and supply of arms;</p> <p>- Co-operate to reinforce the role of the UN in the multilateral fight against terrorism, including through full implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1373/01 and 1267/99, through implementation and enforcement of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;</p> <p>- Ensure respect of human rights in the fight against terrorism.</p>	<p>non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms trade are agreed priority objectives to be achieved.</p> <p>- Co-operation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and ballistic missiles, including through implementing UNSC resolution 1540/04, ensuring full compliance with and national implementation of existing international obligations and promoting the accession to and compliance with other relevant international instruments and export control regimes - Further develop co-operation in the prevention of and fight against the illicit trafficking of WMD-related materials</p> <p>-Co-operation on establishing effective systems of national export control, controlling export and transit of WMD-related goods, including WMD end-use control on dual use technologies, and effective sanctions for breaches of export controls</p> <p>- Apply the risk-based customs control ensuring safety and security of goods imported, exported or in transit, and explore possible definitions of standards for certification of operators (exporters and transporters) intervening in commercial exchanges</p> <p>- Improve overall co-ordination in the non-proliferation area and examine specific threats related to WMD which undermine regional security and the scope for cooperation in addressing them</p> <p>- Promote the relevant provisions of the political and security partnership of the Barcelona Declaration with the objective of pursuing a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>Tunisia</p>	<p>Tunisia is a constitutional presidential republic.</p> <p>The Areas Progressed Achieved:</p> <p>-Tunisia is the leading Arab country in the Transparency International table. As regards corruption, Tunisia ranked 43rd in the world in</p>	<p>-The Penal Code punishes all ethnic and religious discrimination as well as public incitement to ethnic and religious discrimination. The Constitution lays down that political parties must respect and defend the country's Arab and Muslim</p>	<p>-Tunisia has welcomed and plays an active role within the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean adopted by Council Decision 2000/458/CFSP of 19 June 2000, which sets out the strategic framework of the EU</p>	<p>-Tunisia is generally cooperative and plays an active role in fighting international terrorism, in particular at bilateral level with the EU Member States. The April 2002 Djerba bomb attack claimed 19 victims. The country has</p>	<p>-Tunisia cooperates on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has signed up to and implements the relevant instruments and systems for the regulation of international exports.</p>

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	<p>2005 according to Transparency International. Those found guilty of corruption will be barred from holding public office by the Courts and forbidden to run for or represent public services.</p> <p>-The constitutional reform approved by referendum in May 2002 abolished the limit on the number of presidential mandates and raised the age limit for Presidential candidates from 70 to 75 years.</p> <p>-Tunisia has introduced the function of the "Médiateur administratif" (ombudsman).</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Progress on the political aspects has been low, for some of them - such as freedom of expression or association - very slow. Lack of progress raises in terms of political pluralism. A number of factors continue to restrict the development of political pluralism in Tunisia, for instance the way in which political parties are set up and the electoral system, which favours the ruling party.</p> <p>-Despite the constitutional guarantees on democracy and freedom of association, a number of factors militate against the development of political pluralism in Tunisia, such as unclear rules regarding the criteria for setting up a political party, the conditions governing authorisation of a party by the Ministry of the Interior and the existence of an electoral system favouring the party in power.</p> <p>-The foundations of an independent judiciary are laid down in the law. However, the Supreme Judicial Council and the Public Prosecutor's Office remain heavily under the influence of the Executive.</p>	<p>identity. The Islamic party An-Nahda was dissolved on the basis of this Article in the Constitution.</p> <p>-Despite the Constitutional primacy of Islam, State action is in practice based on secular principles.</p> <p>The Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-It has accepted the establishment of a sub-committee for human rights in the framework of the Association Agreement.</p> <p>-Although the rights of women and their representation in society make Tunisia rank 1st out of all Arab countries, progress is still possible, especially with regard to the law of inheritance.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Despite the constitutional guarantee, the European Union considered in a joint statement made at the fourth meeting of the EU-Tunisia Association Council, "that efforts should be stepped up to ensure respect for human rights, in particular the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. Those freedoms determine the democratic process and are conducive to economic and social development." International observers and NGOs have regularly denounced harassments of human rights activists, and highlighted in particular the need to guarantee respect for the freedoms of opinion and expression in the context of combating terrorism.</p> <p>-Associations are granted legal recognition three months after lodging the required papers. However, in the human rights' domain, some associations have been refused legal recognition, or had their applications rejected, by the Government. The current legal framework does not in fact facilitate the development of an independent civil society.</p> <p>-On the matter of funding, the Tunisian authorities cite Article 8 of the 1959 Associations g Ministry of the Interior authorisation for any external financing of the activities of an association. A number of Tunisian NGOs dispute the grounds for this practice. Some projects financed by the Community in the field of democratisation and human rights are blocked on account of this.</p> <p>-Despite freedom of press and publication, the Press Code strictly regulates the exercise of these freedoms through conditions governing publication and printing, the coverage of periodical publications, concentration of ownership, the circulation of foreign periodicals, subversion and libel. There is wide censorship of the media, newspapers and foreign publications on the basis of this restrictive legislation. In March 2004, the Association of Tunisian Journalists was suspended from the International Federation of Journalists.</p> <p>-All cybercafes (Publinet) are privately run by individuals who are bound by rules restricting their clients' freedom to use the Internet. In Tunisia, Internet access providers cannot connect directly to a foreign site. All requests for foreign connections must go through a centralised agency, the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI).</p> <p>-Acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are practised by way of law enforcement and tolerated by the authorities.</p> <p>-Some discrimination between men and women still exists in law; the practice of Islamic or sharia</p>	<p>towards the Mediterranean. Its aim is to make significant and measurable progress towards achieving the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration.</p> <p>-Tunisia and the EU set up a working party under the Association Agreement to cover social questions and migration. A number of areas were identified in relation to migration, e.g. co-development, social integration, visas, illegal immigration, transit migration, improvements to information and actual cooperation projects, and are now the subject of regular dialogue.</p>	<p>signed and ratified most international conventions, including the UNSC resolutions 1373/01 and 1267/01, and has an antiterrorism law from December 2003.</p>	
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		law as customary law continues to restrict the rights of women, for instance their right to inherit and their family rights.			
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Source: Compiled by the author using Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (a, b, c, d, e, f), Action Plans [European Commission (x, y, z)], European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i), Commission Staff Paper, Commission Staff Working Document (a, b, c, d, e), Commission Staff Working Paper (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). Syria was not included to this table since it newly signed Association Agreement with the EU and it does not have ENP Action Plan and other documents related to the ENP, yet. Turkey also was not included this table due to Turkey's different level of relation with the EU. The Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1963 and entered in force in December 1964. Turkey and the EU formed a customs union in 1995. Accession negotiations with Turkey continued.

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Country	Functioning of Market Economy	Free Trade Area Initiatives	Financial Aids	Entrepreneurship and Investment
<p>Algeria</p>	<p>The Algerian economic sector has undergone a profound transformation since the early 1990s with the transition from a planned to a market economy. This transformation is characterized by more open trade and increasing private-sector participation in all economic sectors.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The Government intends to continue privatizing some of the 1200 public enterprises remaining, especially in the banking sector (ongoing privatisation of <i>Crédit Populaire d'Algérie</i>). -Opening up the fixed-line telecommunications market should lead to further investment by Egypt's <i>Orascom</i> (already present on the mobile phone market), and a minor stake in the fixed-line operator <i>Algérie Telecom</i> will be offered for sale for 2007. This, plus the recent sale of controlling shares in two cement firms and a large fertiliser plant to strategic investors, show good progress on the privatisation front. - The new law reforming the hydrocarbon sector was approved in April 2005. It removes the conflict of interest that prevented foreign firms from competing more effectively with <i>Sonatrach</i>, the Algerian public oil enterprise. It also offers additional incentives to facilitate access to oil exploration for foreign investors. Finally, the law liberalises oil imports and the commercialisation of hydrocarbons, making substantive modifications to the taxation regime of hydrocarbon products. In 2006, important amendments have been made to the law, especially in terms of taxation on foreign investors which aim at a wider protection of the hydrocarbon sector. -Trade liberalization continues in the framework of the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU and of the WTO membership negotiations. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Over the last three years, Algeria has succeeded in accelerating economic growth due to increase in oil prices, while keeping inflation low, but progress in creating a market economy has been slow. - The banking sector is still largely in public hands: public banks hold more than 90% of assets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The Association Agreement provides for the gradual establishment of a free-trade area in accordance with WTO rules, over a 12-year period. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -From 2007 Community assistance will be provided through a range of new instruments. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which has national, regional, crossborder and thematic components, will be the main financial instrument available to Algeria. The introduction of these new external assistance instruments should substantially increase flexibility in the implementation of assistance. -The ENPI regional programme for the southern partners will help achieve the objectives described in this strategy since some of the regional or subregional activities may offer value-added or be complementary to bilateral operations. A regional programme will support investment promotion in the economic development sector. 	<p>EU FDI to Algeria is mainly focused on the hydrocarbon sector.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Algeria has committed itself to implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise and, of the ten action areas included in the Charter, has chosen to target the areas: simplification of procedures, education for entrepreneurship and targeted information for entrepreneurs. -In 2004, foreign direct investment flows more than doubled to EUR 5.8 billion, compared with EUR 2.5 billion in 2003. -The new hydrocarbon law of 2005 has the potential to multiply opportunities for foreign oil investments in Algeria, including in excavation, pipelines and transport as well as in downstream operations such as petrochemical processing. France is the third investor in the country, following the U.S. and Egypt. -New investments were made outside the hydrocarbon sector, particularly in the telecommunications, the agri-food, pharmaceutical, and information technology sectors, which reflects an increase in investor confidence. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The combination of oil price volatility and other economic management difficulties (controls, price distortions, restricted opening to non-hydrocarbon trade and foreign direct investment) had an extremely negative impact on productivity and growth in the past. -The private sector still suffers from multiple barriers to investment, including limited access to finance, dominance of the public sector in productive activity, and heavy bureaucracy.
<p>Egypt</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Financial sector reform, a key aspect of the reform agenda, continued in 2007 with in particular the privatization of a major state bank. -In 2007, Egypt adopted a national five-year plan for socio-economic development, including poverty reduction, aimed at ensuring that the effects of economic growth are well reflected upon the citizens' daily life. The new strategy mainly aims at empowering marginalised groups, improving social benefits and the quality and accessibility of services. -The fight against unemployment is one of the priority objectives of the government. The rate of unemployment remained high despite the acceleration in GDP-growth since 2003, but fell according to the official statistics below 10 % in mid 2007. -Egypt is working with the World Bank on a new sustainable pension system. The new law intends to provide a more comprehensive and unified social security system. -Customs tariffs have been restructured and substantially cut. -Some important subsidies have also been cut, and tax reform is underway. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -There are administrative and economic inefficiencies and impediments to growth and employment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Egypt's exports to the EU have risen consistently since the entry into force of the Association Agreement in 2004, reaching € 7.5 billion in 2006. -Egypt undertook a major tariff reform in February 2007 by significantly reducing its import custom duties on a range of manufactured products and raw materials, bringing the weighted average imports tariff to 7 %. -Association Agreement (AA) entered into force in provides liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital including the completion of a Free Trade Area by 2015 (2018 for a very limited number of industrial goods). - Under the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, Egypt started dismantling tariffs on half of industrial imports from the EU for progressive liberalisation over the first three years from entry into force. The rest will be gradually liberalised over the transitional period of 12 years, while bilateral preferences in agriculture, with major concessions from the EU, are already implemented and will be further extended under the protocol adapting the Association Agreement to EU enlargement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Community assistance to Egypt is increasingly geared towards supporting the key policy objectives outlined in the ENP Action Plan. The National Indicative Programme is consistent with Egypt's reform agenda and the three main priority objectives that have been set under the European Neighbourhood Policy: political reform and good governance; competitiveness and productivity of the economy and socio-economic sustainability of the development process. A total of € 558 mn are allocated in the 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme to support these three priorities. -In 2007 Egypt received € 137 million under the national programme. Within this envelope € 120 million were dedicated to the Education Sector Policy Support Programme (ESPSP) in support of the government's education reform agenda, where emphasis is given to decentralisation, quality improvement and higher efficiency. Further € 17 million were allocated to strengthen the overall administrative capacity of the Egyptian government for implementing the ENP Action Plan. Twinning projects were launched in areas such as maritime safety, postal management and tourism. Egypt expressed also a keen interest in using TAIEX in order to organize the study visits in the EU states and to invite the European experts. -Egypt is eligible for cooperation activities financed under the ENPI multi-country and regional programmes and the ENPI Cross Border cooperation component. -Egypt has a good track record in implementing assistance programmes and absorbing Community funds. -The EIB's operations receive further impetus from its Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) which also led to the opening in Cairo, in July 2003, of the first EIB office in the Southern Mediterranean. -The National Indicative Programme for 2005-2006 involves total funding of €243 million, focusing on three main priorities: i) Support 	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In October 2004, Egypt adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, by which it committed to improving conditions for doing business on the basis of the Charter principles. The ambition of the Charter is to create an environment conducive to investment and enterprise development as well as to define common strategies and projects, both at national and regional level. On enterprise policy, Egypt continued the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise and set up an inter-ministerial structure involving various stakeholders to steer and monitor the process. -In October 2007, the Minister of Investment and the Cairo Stock Exchange (CASE) launched a new market for medium and small enterprises (NILEX). The new market provides medium and small companies with long term access to capital to encourage business growth and increased competitiveness. The exchange will allow companies that do not meet the minimum paid-up capital to have access to finance and raise capital outside traditional lending institutions. - the 1997 Investment Law allows 100% foreign ownership of ventures and guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital. In 2004, the People's Assembly issued a new law which introduces additional incentives for new and existing economic activities and transforms GAFI into a "one-stop shop" for foreign investors. <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There are no restrictions on foreign investment in the stock exchange but foreign-exchange restrictions and the lack of economic reform have deterred foreign investors. - Despite Egypt being party to International Conventions for the

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			for the Association Agreement in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy; ii) support for the process of economic transition in the water sector and in the field of knowledge information society; iii) support for sustainable socio-economic development through social and health reforms as well as good governance, human rights and democratisation.	settlement of investment disputes, dispute settlement remains a significant problem for investors.
Israel	<p>-The Israeli government continues to implement its “Economic Recovery Plan”, which it started in 2003, reducing corporate and income taxes, reforming the capital market, promoting foreign investment in Israel, and preparing tax reform to improve the competitiveness of the Israeli system. It also continues to implement welfare reform. The reduction of social transfers as part of this reform was aimed at increasing participation in the labour market. It has however also contributed to Israel's position as one of the countries with the widest social gaps among developed countries.</p> <p>-The EU and Israel have officially launched the negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services, agricultural products and processed agricultural goods.</p> <p>- Israel, as a partner to the Barcelona Process, endorsed on 7 July 2003 the new Protocol on rules of origin allowing the extension of the Pan-European system of cumulation of origin to the Barcelona Partners. The next stage aims at amending the origin protocol in the relevant Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in order to insert the changes necessary for the application of diagonal cumulation. This could help fostering economic integration and allow for a better use of the complementarities and the economics of scale in the Euro-Mediterranean area.</p>	<p>- The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which entered into force in June 2000, now forms the legal basis of EU-Israel relations. The agreement includes provisions on freedom of establishment and liberalisation of services, free movement of capital and competition rules, the strengthening of economic co-operation on the widest possible basis and the co-operation on social matters, supplemented by cultural co-operation. The Agreement confirms the existence of free trade in manufactured goods and strengthens the arrangements for free trade in industrial products, which have been in force since the late 1970s. Arrangements for importing Israeli products are more flexible in the new agreement than they were under the 1975 Co-operation Agreement. It also calls for progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of trade for agricultural products. Concerning the latter area, a new agreement entered into force in January 2004, liberalising most of the reciprocal agricultural trade.</p> <p>- On free movement of goods and technical regulations, Israel made progress in the preparatory work to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA). Several amendments to the standards law were adopted.</p> <p>- In October 2007 Israel agreed to start bilateral negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement on the liberalisation of services and establishment, at the beginning of 2008.</p>	<p>-To date, Israel has not received bilateral assistance owing to its high level of economic development. Consequently, EC/EU cooperation with Israel has been limited to: programmes in support of civil society, mainly in the context of the EU Partnership for Peace programme and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, regional programmes under MEDA. Given that Israel has not previously benefited from EU support, it does not have experience in the management of EU funding.</p> <p>-With the creation of the ENPI, a limited bilateral financial allocation for Israel has been set aside for the first time to support the implementation of the ENP Action Plan. Given the scope of the allocation, the most appropriate approach seems to be to concentrate on targeted support activities for the implementation of the Action Plan priorities, mainly institutional cooperation through Twinning/Twinning light.</p> <p>- The budgetary allocations for Israel reflect its status as a developed economy. A small envelope (€8 million under the 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme) was allocated to support the implementation of <i>acquis</i>-related activities through twinning.</p>	<p>- On enterprise policy, Israel has continued the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise. In this context, a meeting involving all stakeholders, public and private, was organised with the European Commission in 2007. Israel agreed to participate, together with other Mediterranean partner countries, in a pilot project aiming at assessing progress achieved in the ten sectors covered by the Charter. This project is coordinated by the European Commission in cooperation with the OECD, the European Training Foundation and the European Investment Bank.</p> <p>- Israel is also the first ENP partner country to participate in the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) under which the European Commission promotes innovation, entrepreneurship and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises. Israel formally applied for all three “pillars” under the CIP: the Entrepreneurship and Innovation programme; the Information and Communications Technologies Policy Support Programme; and the Intelligent Energy-Europe Programme.</p> <p>- the business regime is generally non-discriminatory for foreign direct investments. 100% foreign-owned companies are allowed, provided they register with the government. The Israeli Investment Promotion Centre was set up as a one-stop shop for foreign investors.</p>
Jordan	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-Privatization programme started in 1996.</p> <p>- Good progress was made in public finance management, improvement of the business environment and financial sector reforms. The government made limited progress towards ensuring medium-term macroeconomic stability. More efforts are needed however to ensure medium-term macro-economic stability.</p> <p>- The implementation of financial management reform continued in 2007. Focusing on budgetary procedures, the authorities advanced toward the introduction of a medium-term expenditure framework.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- An encompassing poverty reduction strategy is still lacking and the gap between rich and poor has been growing.</p> <p>- Unemployment and, in particular, youth unemployment, remains a major concern.</p> <p>- Progress on structural reforms, such as the privatisation programme and measures to improve the investment climate, slowed down in 2007. Jordan experienced problems with the implementation of the new regulatory framework.</p>	<p>-The <i>Euromed Association Agreement</i> with Jordan was signed in November 1997 and entered into force in May 2002.</p> <p>-The Association Agreement (AA) that entered into force in May 2002 sets the long-term framework of Jordan-EU bilateral relations within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights the Association Agreement provides a framework for political dialogue, liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital including the establishment of a Free Trade Area by 2014, and close economic, social and cultural relations between the parties.</p> <p>-Tariff dismantling continued apace in accordance with the EU-Jordan Association Agreement. Notwithstanding some delays in finalising the dismantling schedule for goods listed in Annex IV of the Agreement, most outstanding issues in this regard have now been resolved.</p> <p>-Under the Association Agreement, the EU and Jordan have begun to discuss measures required to improve Jordan's export competitiveness, its capability to attract foreign direct investment and, eventually, to improve the bilateral trade balance in the long term.</p>	<p>-Under the MEDA programme Jordan has so far received a total of €423 million in Community and macroeconomic assistance (commitments).</p> <p>-The National Indicative Programme for the period 2007-2010 provides Jordan with € 265 million. The priorities for the Community's financial cooperation with Jordan are: political reform and good governance; trade and investment development; institution building and financial stability.</p> <p>-In 2007, the European Commission made available to Jordan € 62 million through the first ENPI Annual Action Programme. Within this envelope € 15 million were devoted to supporting the development of the private sector with a view to increasing investments through a services modernisation programme. Further € 42.5 million were devoted to a budget support the public finance reform programme and in particular fiscal stability and a more efficient allocation of financial resources. Finally, a € 4.5 million were used for a de-mining programme at Jordan's northern border that will make Jordan completely mine-free by 2009.</p> <p>-Jordan is also eligible for cooperation activities, financed under the ENPI multi-country and regional programmes and the ENPI Cross Border Cooperation component. Finally, in 2007 € 26.7 million were provided under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) to support Jordan's public education system following the increase in demand caused by the large influx of Iraqis in recent years.</p> <p>-Jordan should also be in a position to benefit from the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which aims at promoting private sector development, in particular SMEs, and improving the economic and social investment climate in the Mediterranean countries.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-the Investment Promotion Law of 1995, last amended in 2000. It lays down conditions for foreign investment and grants a number of exemptions and facilities (reduction in income and social services taxes) to the following sectors: industry, agriculture hotels, hospitals, maritime transport and railways, any other decided by the Council of Ministers. Jordanian and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing, with no preferential treatment for export performance or domestic content requirements. The main challenges in the area of investment relate to the investment climate in general and the operation of companies. The main obstacles for foreign investment relate to i.a. licensing procedures, accounting and tax laws.</p> <p>-The Investment Promotion Law grants foreign investors the same treatment as Jordanian investors. Under this law, investors in the industry, agriculture and transport sectors, as well as in hotels and hospitals, can benefit from a number of exemptions and facilities, including reductions of up to 100% in income and social services taxes, applied over a period of 10 years, and extendable 4 more years. As a result, FDI represented 55% of total new investment flows by 2000.</p> <p>- The new investment law, incorporating all relevant existing legislations in one comprehensive code with a view to simplifying the regulatory framework and streamlining investment incentives, has been withdrawn from parliament following the amendments proposed. It is now being revised together with the tax law.</p> <p>-On enterprise policy, Jordan continued the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise. In this context, a meeting involving all stakeholders, public and private, was organised with the European Commission in 2007. Jordan has agreed to participate, together with the other Mediterranean partner countries, in a pilot project aiming at assessing the progress achieved in the ten sectors covered by the Charter.</p> <p>-Currently the Jordan Investment Board, the Jordan Industrial Estate Corporation and Jordan Enterprise function relatively well, but without a common strategy or co-ordination.</p> <p>-The country is relatively open to foreign investment and the investment climate can be considered generally favourable compared with the rest of the region, although both domestic and international investment decisions can be very dependent on</p>

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				<p>regional security issues. Foreign investment levels have increased substantially over the last few years. The average annual growth rate in FDI in 2003-04 reached 33%.</p> <p>-In 2005, a new umbrella organisation, JAED (Jordan Authority for Enterprise Development), was created under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to ensure overall coordination of investment, trade and enterprise development operations. JAED should have a key role in defining policies, setting key performance indicators and monitoring results for the new network of related organisations.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- Jordan still lacks a strategy and continuity in the policies for investment promotion and facilitation, export and enterprise developments. There is lack of clear coordination of these policies despite the creation of the Jordan Authority for Enterprise Development (JAED), which was expected to ensure better coordination of private sector development policies and closer involvement of the private sector in the design and implementation of those policies. The effective implementation of the newly designed institutional framework, which includes JAED, continues to be delayed.</p> <p>-despite the implementation of several other laws to improve the investment climate, licensing procedures, accounting and tax laws, customs and location problems remain as major hindrances to FDI, and domestic investment.</p> <p>-the administrative capacity of the Chamber of Controller of the Companies Control Department proved insufficient and the reforms have not led to any increase of foreign investment so far.</p> <p>-As regards the right of establishment, there still exists an equity gap between national and EU investors as foreign investors still have to hold a share of national companies (50 000 JED capital) to enter the Jordanian market.</p>
Lebanon	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-Despite some progress since the beginning of the 1990s, state involvement in the economy remains rather significant and constrains private sector development.</p> <p>-The 2000 Privatization law sets the framework for the privatization of state-owned enterprises, establishing a Higher Council and providing the proceeds from privatization to be applied towards debt repayment.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-In 2004, progress in privatisation has been slow and the government fell short of its Paris II commitments. The sale of the Water Company, Electricité du Liban and Ports have been put on hold. Potential privatisations are further complicated by the low degree of interest from foreign investors, for reasons including the controversial cancellation of the Libancell and Cellis contracts by the government three years prior to their end, the deduction of 40% from the telecom revenues of any new owner, a high degree of corruption and shortcomings in infrastructure and political stability.</p>	<p>-The Association Agreement (AA) provides a framework for political dialogue, co-operation in economic policy, including approximation of laws and application of Community standards to support Lebanon's efforts to achieve sustainable economic and social development and the gradual establishment of a free trade area.</p> <p>-The Interim Agreement with the EU on trade and trade-related provisions establishes conditions for progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of trade in goods with a view to establishing a bilateral FTA, and includes relevant provisions on customs cooperation, competition and protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property. As a result, since 1 March 2003, Lebanese industrial and most agricultural products (within the limits of tariff quotas) enjoy free access to the EU market. The progressive elimination of tariffs on imports to Lebanon will occur between 2008 and 2015.</p> <p>-Preparations for the implementation of the commitments in the framework of the Association Agreement have taken place and the progressive dismantling of tariffs on European industrial and certain agricultural products will start as foreseen from March 2008.</p>	<p>-Lebanon is one of the Mediterranean beneficiaries of community assistance through the MEDA programme (bilateral and regional programmes). The total amount of funds committed under MEDA I (1995-1999) bilateral assistance was €182 million while under MEDA II (2000-2006) the total amount allocated is €74 million.</p> <p>-In the framework of the Barcelona Process, the EIB has strengthened its financial partnership with the Mediterranean Partner countries through the creation of a specialised instrument, the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). Under FEMIP the annual volume of EIB lending to all partner countries will gradually increase. These resources are to support a much broader range of activities with priority given to private sector development.</p> <p>-Since 2007 financial assistance to Lebanon is mainly provided through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Under the 2007 Annual Action Programme, Lebanon was granted € 50 million addressing economic recovery, political reforms, access to finance, de-mining and clearance of unexploded ordnance as well as support to education for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This includes a € 15 million European Commission grant linked to a € 100 million European Investment Bank global loan in support of Small and Medium size Enterprises directly or indirectly affected by the conflict.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-A 2001 Law on Promotion of Investment was enacted to promote investment opportunities and encourage investments in the fields of industry, tourism, agriculture, agroindustries, marine resources, media technology, and information technology. It established a "One-Stop-Shop" service at the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) to facilitate procedures and better assist investors.</p> <p>-In October 2004, Lebanon adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, by which it committed to improving conditions for doing business on the basis of the Charter principles. The ambition of the Charter is to create an environment conducive to investment and enterprise development as well as to define common strategies and projects, both at national and regional level.</p> <p>-Lebanon agreed to participate, together with the other Mediterranean partner countries, in a pilot project aiming at assessing the progress achieved in the ten sectors covered by the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-these measures have had limited impact so far on competitiveness and administrative procedures for doing business are still too lengthy and burdensome. There are no special financial provisions for foreign investors except that certain restrictions exist on foreign ownership of banks and companies involved in media activity, land ownership and the employment of foreign labour.</p>
Morocco	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-Progress in recent years includes, among others, the modernisation of the customs administration, the privatisation of public enterprises, telecommunications reform, and trade liberalisation in accordance with the Association Agreement with the EU.</p> <p>-Privatisation continues, with high annual receipts of between 2.3% et 2.9% of GDP since 2003. After successfully privatising the telecom sector</p>	<p>-The Association Agreement will gradually establish free trade in industrial products, for which the EU has already granted free access, whereas Morocco has committed to a tariff dismantling over a period of 10 years starting in March 2003. As regards agricultural products, new mutual trade concessions entered into force in January 2004. A "rendezvous" clause is established for 2007 to continue the dismantling process for tariffs on these goods.</p>	<p>-Morocco is the leading beneficiary of community assistance among Mediterranean partners. Since 1995, €1.1 billion has been committed. Community assistance is delivered both through traditional projects and sectoral budget support. MEDA funds have been concentrated on a limited number of priority sectors. A <i>Strategy Paper</i> was presented in 2001, focussing on implementing the Agreement, fostering jobs and growth, and reducing poverty.</p>	<p>-The authorities have taken some steps to create a level playing field and to remove obstacles to the creation of new enterprises. These comprised measures to implement the competition law and the establishment of one-stop investment windows at regional level. These measures complement steps taken in 2002 - the launch of the new decentralised investment scheme and the opening of regional investment centres - in order to attract</p>

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	<p>in 2000-01 the government's privatisation efforts were stepped up in 2003.</p> <p>-Morocco is in the process of liberalising a number of banking and other financial services, imposing no limits on private involvement.</p>	<p>Regarding liberalisation of trade in services, negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with EC should start in 2004.</p> <p>-As of March 2003, a number of basic industrial goods originating in the EU, are allowed entry into Morocco, free of customs duty. Progressive tariff dismantling for all the other industrial goods has started with a 10% abatement.</p> <p>-the dismantling of tariffs provided for under the Association Agreement is being applied in line with commitments. However, the tariffs on used products have not yet been dismantled and there are still restrictions on the export of raw and semi-finished bovine hides.</p>	<p>-payments made under the MEDA programme reached a very high level (€217 million) in 2005. The EC has supported major reforms in the areas of transport, water management, slum clearance, public administration management and financial-sector management. Another increase in payments is anticipated for 2006.</p>	<p>foreign direct investments.</p> <p>-Foreign and locally owned investments are treated equally (with the exception of the construction sector) and 100 % foreign ownership is permitted in most sectors.</p> <p>-As regards the provision of services (other than financial services) and right of establishment, certain necessary legislative steps have already been taken to facilitate investment and improve business conditions. Overall FDI flows have remained at a rather low level aside from privatisation. Measures have been taken to reinforce the legal environment for investors and to improve so-called "welcoming services" for foreigners. In January 2002, a new decentralised investment service scheme was launched and regional investment centres are being opened.</p> <p>-Privatisation continues, with high annual receipts of between 2.3% et 2.9% of GDP since 2003. It is these privatisation operations which are behind the strong direct foreign investment inflows recorded for several years now (around 4% of GDP in 2005).</p> <p>-Morocco has made significant progress in improving the business climate and investment conditions, for instance reducing the minimum capital needed to set up a limited company, facilitating the transfer of property and improving the transparency of tax regulations.</p> <p>-Morocco also signed up in 2004 with other Mediterranean partner countries to Euro-Mediterranean Enterprise Charter. Morocco has attached great importance to the Euro-Mediterranean Enterprise Charter owing to the dynamic role of the agency responsible for promoting SMEs (ANPME), which has launched a major information and awareness-raising campaign directed at the public and private sectors.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-The main obstacles for foreign investment relate to i.a. complicated procedures for business registration and a lack of transparency in the regulatory framework.</p>
<p>Palestinian Authority</p>	<p>-Since the beginning of the Intifada at the end of 2000, the Palestinian economy has gone into severe decline. The conflict and Israeli closure policy have hit the Palestinian economy through several channels, including collapse of tourism, the inability of Palestinian workers to work in Israel, and the inability of Palestinians within the territories to undertake basic economic activities.</p> <p>-Since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, implementation of the Interim Association Agreement has proven extremely difficult. A Joint Committee meeting of the Interim Association Agreement was held in Ramallah on 26 June 2003. The meeting discussed ways in which to facilitate trade between the EU and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and means to fully implement the Interim Association Agreement, including provisions related to the Palestinian reform programme.</p> <p>-The Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), established in 1994, has only limited functions, asset out in the Paris Economic Protocol. It is responsible for licensing, supervising and inspecting banks; determining the liquidity requirements on all deposits held by banks operating in the self-rule areas; and managing foreign exchange reserves and foreign currency transactions. The PMA also has the power to regulate and supervise capital activities in the self-rule areas, including the licensing of capital market institutions, finance companies and investment funds.</p> <p>-Despite the stresses caused by the Intifada, the financial system continues to function, and provides basic services to the population.</p> <p>-In June 2002, the PA released a new reform agenda, in which it expressed its commitment to a broad programme of reforms, including the promotion of transparency and accountability in the public sector, and the creation of a supportive environment for private sector development.</p> <p>-No progress can be reported in the revitalisation of the private sector. On the contrary, persistent labour and goods movement restrictions imposed by Israel have resulted in a deterioration of the business environment for the private sector in 2007.</p>	<p>-The Palestinian Authority, as a partner to the Barcelona Process, endorsed the new Protocol on rules of origin in July 2003 allowing for the extension of the Pan-European system of cumulation of origin to the Barcelona Partners. The next stage aims at amending the origin protocol in the relevant Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in order to insert the changes necessary for the application of diagonal cumulation. This could help fostering economic integration and allow for a better use of the complementarities and the economics of scale in the Euro-mediterranean area.</p>	<p>-The European Commission is the largest donor for the Palestinians. In 2007, the European Commission provided € 550 million for the Palestinians. The bulk of Community assistance has been provided for emergency assistance through the Temporary International Mechanism.</p>	<p>-Regarding provision of services and right of establishment, the Law on Encouragement of Investments promotes capital investment in all sectors of the Palestinian economy by both local and foreign corporations registered to do business in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Two other laws govern investment in the Industrial Estates and Free Zones: the 'Industrial Estates and Free Zones Law' and the 'Encouragement of Investment in Palestine Law'. A foreign investor can fully own a company without any local partnership requirements. Investors may invest in any sector of the Palestinian economy under the free admission principle. Transfers of foreign currency are free and there is freedom of repatriation of income generated from investment in Palestine. The Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA) is the implementing agency.</p> <p>-On enterprise policy, the Palestinian side agreed to participate, together with other Mediterranean partner countries, in a pilot project aiming at assessing progress achieved in the ten sectors covered by the Euro- Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise.</p>

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<p>Tunisia</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Some progress can be observed in the energy sector, where British Gas has been authorised to set up a power station with a capacity of 500 MW.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -In 2002-03, the privatisation process moved forward slowly and official privatisation targets were not achieved. Privatisation revenues in 2003 were budgeted at TUD50 million. -The opening of new sectors of the economy to private investment foreseen in the framework of the 10th Plan (2002-2006) has remained slow. This holds true in particular for the transport sector, the waste-management, water and communication sectors. -The restructuring of the public sector (financial sector and public service providers) has also been slow. -Tunisia is strongly committed to modernising and liberalising its economy and to integration with the EU, as laid down in the AA (Association Agreement) and the NAP (European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan) approved in July 2005.</p>	<p>-Association Agreement: Since March 1998 an Association Agreement (AA) has governed bilateral relations between the European Union and Tunisia. It provides for a free trade area (FTA) between the two parties in the longer term. -Tunisia is the most advanced of the Euro-Med partners as far as the introduction of a free trade area with the European Union is concerned. Tunisia started dismantling tariffs in 1996, before the entry into force of the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement in 1998. Tariff dismantling has seen a speeding up of the country's integration into the European market. -Trade in goods with the EU is being liberalised and Tunisian tariffs have been progressively reduced on the basis of the provisions of the Association Agreement (AA). In 2003, 60% of Community industrial products benefit from duty-free access to the Tunisian market, while Tunisian industrial products can access the European market free of charge, since the entry into force of the Association Agreement. -The AA provides for the gradual creation over a twelve-year period of a Free Trade Area for manufactured goods. Good progress has been made on implementing the tariff dismantling schedule; almost 55% of tariff reductions have already been adopted. Customs duty has been totally dismantled. Import duties on consumer goods and on imported goods which are also produced locally have been reduced by almost half and one quarter respectively over five years. -With a view to the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area for industrial goods by 2010, the Tunisian authorities plan to conclude bilateral agreements known as ACAAs (Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products) in the electrical, mechanical and electronic sectors. According to the available information, the project's specific objectives are (i) approximation with EU standards and rules (alignment of horizontal and sectoral legislation), (ii) putting the associated infrastructure in place (standardisation, accreditation, metrology, conformity assessment system and ex post market surveillance and (iii) support for signing an ACAA in priority sectors.</p>	<p>-Tunisia has been one of the major beneficiaries of MEDA. The annual average commitment has amounted to €85 million. The implementation of "third generation" projects (civil society, media, justice), however, has proved difficult. The Commission's financial cooperation strategy with Tunisia (2002-2006 CSP) aims to achieve the right balance between action in the political and in the economic and social spheres. -MEDA II financial resources are focused on a limited number of priority sectors. Since 1988, Tunisia has not required any macro-financial assistance. -Various programmes in the MEDA regional cooperation framework (2002-2004), dealing with transport, energy and migration, touch on aspects relating to neighbourhood and cross-border cooperation. -In total, the Meda programme in Tunisia committed funds to the tune of €946 million between 1995 and 2006, €352 million of which during 2002-2006. -The MEDA Programme³ covers the key areas of the modernisation of Tunisia's economy and society: the macroeconomic dimension, sectoral reforms (customs, ports, privatisation, etc.), the education sector as a whole, financial reform, sickness insurance, the media and the justice system.</p>	<p>-Public enterprises and private firms in sectors such as tourism and textile exports absorb the bulk of subsidised credits and aid provided, while SMEs do not seem to benefit proportionately from the scheme. -Overall FDI flows remained at a rather low level. FDI is subject to authorisation in certain service activities where the foreign participation is in excess of 50%, while the Investment Incentives Code excludes certain sectors which are reserved for the State (unless a concession is granted). Foreign investment in some "strategic" sectors like petroleum refining, the national airline, electricity and water distribution, requires prior authorisation. -With regard to enterprise policy, Tunisia has already implemented most of the principles of the Euro-Mediterranean Enterprise Charter and has taken action to improve the business environment. The most significant measures in 2005 included the creation of a bank to promote the development of SMEs (Banque de financement des PME) and the introduction of online business start-ups.</p>

Source: Compiled by the author using Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (a, b, c, d, e, f), [European Commission (x, y, z)], European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i), Commission Staff Paper, Commission Staff Working Document (a, b, c, d, e), Commission Staff Working Paper (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). Syria was not included to this table since it newly signed Association Agreement with the EU and it does not have ENP Action Plan and other documents related to the ENP, yet. Turkey also was not included this table due to Turkey's different level of relation with the EU. The Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1963 and entered in force in December 1964. Turkey and the EU formed a customs union in 1995. Accession negotiations with Turkey continued.

Annex III: Country based Comparison Table of the SEMCs for the EMP's

Social, Cultural and Human Aspects

Country	Social Development and Poverty Reduction	Improvement of Public Health	Empowerment of Women	Youth Engagment	Literacy and Educational Opportunity
<p>Algeria</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: - The overall poverty threshold fell from 14.1% in 1995 to 12.1% in 2000 and to 6.8% in 2004 (from 4 million to 2.2 million persons) as a result of the introduction of a national social development strategy.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Algeria has made considerable efforts to guarantee access to health services. Health indicators have considerably improved as a result: life expectancy is clearly improving, while infant mortality rates have fallen.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Reforms are nevertheless required in order to improve efficiency, the quality of services in the health sector and fair access to health care. A rapid demographic and epidemiological transition will only increase the sector's financial requirements, while it remains to Algeria to meet the dual challenge of remedying the increased prevalence of chronic diseases that are expensive to treat, while still dealing with the common infectious diseases. -Several structural deficiencies persist in the health sector: the quality of care is not always the best, there are problems with the management and organisation of the system. The financial resources devoted to health are relatively low by comparison with other countries in the region.</p>	<p>Problematic Areas: - In 2001 female unemployment accounted for 31% of the female labour force, i.e. 4 percentage points more than the national average is one of the chronic problems of the Algeria.</p>	<p>Problematic Areas: -Algeria has chronic problems such as high unemployment levels (27% in 2001 and 17% today), particularly for the young and for women.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: - Educational improvements resulted in a decrease in illiteracy from 36% to 22% for men from 1990 to 2002, and from 59% to 40% for women. -The Government's strategy to deal with this situation consists of:rapidly extending access to higher education: doubling university capacity by 2010, the recruitment of 25 000 additional teachers within three years; diversifying the offer by encouraging universities to introduce degree/masters/ doctorate programmes by introducing more flexibility and choice for students; increasing the relevance of the courses of study proposed to the requirements of the business sector; improving the quality of teaching.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -The vocational training system is expensive, badly managed and does not correspond to the real skill requirements of the key economic sectors. -The quality of teaching has decreased and the internal effectiveness of the system has been affected (only 12% of schoolchildren entering primary education graduate from higher education). -there is the specific problem of the mismatch between the current higher education supply and labour market demand. Higher education reform therefore becomes a priority area if Algeria is to respond effectively to the challenges of globalisation and the knowledge economy.</p>
<p>Egypt</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -The fight against poverty is one of the objectives of the fifth Social Plan of the government (FY03-FY08) which includes the development of human resources (literacy and education) and employment.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: - Despite improvements in social indicators over the past decades, in 1990-2002 44% of the Egyptian population was living on less than 2 US\$ a day (upper poverty line). Egypt was ranked 119 in a group of 177 countries according to the 2005 UNDP Human Development Indicators. -Long-term sustainability of growth and poverty reduction strategies could be jeopardised by job creation concentrated mainly in non-tradable public sectors.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Spending on public health care is growing, yet still comparably moderate among lowermiddle income countries. -In 1997, the Egyptian administration launched an ambitious Health Sector Reform Programme (HRSP) aimed at modernising the system. -They improve the outreach and quality of primary health care that had been in the shadows of specialised care. Family Health Funds (FHF) have been created at gubernatorial level to purchase defined services for the non-insured from accredited Family Health Units (FHUs). - In January 2006 PM Nazif announced in Parliament that health (restructuring the health insurance system) would be at the top of his new Government's agenda. - Progress was reflected in health indicators (infant mortality rate, percentage of vaccinated children and the maternal mortality rate).</p> <p>Problematic Areas: - Inequities in health care persist between income groups as well as geographic regions, with serious shortages of healthcare professionals outside urban agglomerations. -The fragmentation of healthcare funding often results in a sub-efficient utilisation of healthcare institutions that work in parallel, contributing to a rather low sectoral performance compared to similar lower-middle income countries. -The absence of a comprehensive action plan for the reform programme remains a constraint on implementing the Health Sector Reform Programme (HRSP) launched in 1997.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -In 2000 the female participation rate in the workforce amounted to 30%, according to the World Bank. This was slightly higher than the regional average but markedly below the average of lower-middle income countries (43%). - Women participation in the labour force increased from 18% to 23.9%, and the female unemployment was 24% in 2004. -The 2007 constitutional amendments allow effective political representation of women in the People's Assembly and Shura Assembly. -Through the efforts of the EU-supported National Council for Women's Ombudsperson's office, greater awareness prevails of the need for wider participation of women in political and public life (31 women judges were appointed to the court of first instance in 2007, for the first time), for ending discrimination against women, and for improved access of women to education and health care.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: - Egypt ranks poorly on women empowerment. Despite improvements in gender indicators, a gap remains between men and women in the field of primary enrolment (100%/93%), literacy (65%/54%), labour force participation (30% for women) and unemployment (female rate is double the average). Enrolment of girls is low at secondary and university level (23%) but increasing at preparatory and secondary stages. In the latest local elections (2002), women represented only 1.7% of the candidates and they obtained only 1.6% of available posts. In civic life, women represent 16% of legislative and</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -The Supreme Council for Youth and Sports coordinates youth policy, which supports youth in various sectors including housing, employment, education and industry. -Egypt devotes special attention to disabled youth, rural youth as well as youth in areas with particular difficulties. -Egypt participates in the Euro-Med Youth Programme which enhances cooperation in the field of non-formal education for young people through, in particular,multilateral youth exchanges, trans-national European voluntary service as well as training for youth workers and capacity building for youth NGOs. - The Tempus and Youth in Action Programmes increased exchange opportunities for Egyptian youth.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Current visa requirements and procedures create certain difficulties for youth mobility.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: - Education reform is one among the three pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. Reform strategies are being implemented across the board. Egypt participates in the Tempus programme for the modernisation of higher education through bottom-up exchange projects and structural measures that aim at reinforcing local reform capacities. -In the central government's draft budget for FY04, 15% of public expenditure is earmarked for education and 5% (1.74% of GDP) for the health sector. Progress was reflected in many education indicators (enrolment ratios in basic and secondary education; adult literacy). -A National Agency for Quality Assurance and Accreditation was formed to cover all education and higher education. -Education Enhancement Program was launched.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: - In the education system overstaffing is widespread, teacher hiring and deployment is inefficient, and educational quality is consequently poor, cost-sharing far from optimal and expenditure not well coordinated, leading to ineffective planning and management, as well as to wide deviation from the allocated budgets. - Challenges regarding education include issues such as quality; governance; institutional organization, the lack of financial means, not least for improving infrastructure and equipment, the need to further improve enrolment rates including for girls, for the poor and for those living in rural areas and to reduce dropouts in particular of</p>

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Social, Cultural and Human Aspects

			<p>managerial staff and 41% of professional and technical staff.</p> <p>- Egypt major challenge will be to improve women's participation in the decision making process and address the serious gender-related health risks, such as genital mutilation (90% of married women) and uncontrolled birth rates.</p>		<p>children from poor families and less privileged areas.</p>
Israel	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-In April 2007 the government launched an anti-poverty plan aiming at reducing the number of poor families to 17.2 % by 2010. This target will be achieved notably by encouraging labour productivity, better integration of the communities - including women - into the labour market and the introduction of an obligatory pension.</p> <p>- The Knesset has approved a 50 % reduction of electricity prices to 300 000 poor citizens.</p> <p>- Based on a 2003 Government Decision, key ministries are developing sustainable development implementation plans. Several of these plans have been completed. Following on from this, government ministries are now working together to promote some areas of common interest, and to formulate a common 'vision' on sustainable development.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- According to the Israeli <i>poverty</i> definition, about 14% of the Israeli households were living in poverty in 2001, and the share is expected to have risen in the following years.</p> <p>-Figures are higher among the Arab minority (where 45% of the families fell in the poverty category).</p> <p>-Despite the relatively rapid economic growth, poverty remains however a major concern, particularly among the groups of the population outside the booming business sector. Up to a quarter of households are below the poverty line. This mainly affects the Arab and ultra- Orthodox communities which constitute 60 % of the poor in Israel.</p>	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- As highlighted by an Israeli Commission report presented in 2003 ("Or Commission"), the Arab minority also suffers from discrimination in many areas including budget allocations, official planning, employment, education and <u>health</u>.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>- Israel and the EU strengthened health dialogue. In December 2007, Israel participated in the Euro-Mediterranean workshop on communicable diseases and health systems, which prepares for a Ministerial Conference.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>- With regard to equal opportunities, Israel presents a high proportion of educated women and their representation in the public administration has increased over the last few years, notably in the top management.</p> <p>- Some new measures and legislation were adopted in 2000 by the Government to improve the status of women in Israeli society with a view to promoting equality, such as the amendment to the Equal Rights for Women Law or the Employment of Women Law.</p> <p>- An Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women has also been established, which bears responsibility for the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment.</p> <p>-In November 2007 a gender law passed its third reading in the Knesset. It states that any bill that passes a preliminary reading should be sent to the authority for the advancement of the status of women for their scrutiny. The authority will be in charge of examining the effects of the bill on gender equality.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Only 18 % of Israeli Arab women work. The government has taken steps to encourage employment of Israeli Arabs in Jerusalem and the periphery, with the aim of having 10 % of state employees from the Arab population.</p>	<p>- Israel participates in Euro-Med programmes such as Euro-Med Youth, which promotes people-to-people contacts and co-operation between actors of civil society, associations and NGOs in the youth field.</p> <p>- Israel participates actively in the Euro-Med Youth III Programme through the Ministry of Education by providing support for the development of informal education, enhanced youth exchanges and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, Israeli young people, youth workers and organisations can benefit from the opportunities offered by the Youth in Action programme.</p>	<p>- Education is compulsory between the age of 5 and 15, and is provided free of charge until 17. The adult literacy rate was over 95% in 2001. At over 7% of GDP, public expenditure on education is above the average of most developed countries</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- As highlighted by an Israeli Commission report presented in 2003 ("Or Commission"), the Arab minority also suffers from discrimination in many areas including budget allocations, official planning, employment, <u>education</u> and health.</p>
Jordan	<p>-In 1990-2001 7% of the population was living on less than 2 US\$ a day, although according to the national poverty indicator the incidence is higher at about 12% of population, and deep pockets of poverty persist.</p> <p>-The 2004-2006 National Social and Economic Plan continues efforts to reduce poverty and unemployment, which should be brought below 8% and 11%, respectively by 2007. The strategy foresees enhancing qualitative investment in rural development, introducing programmes that aim at empowering and enabling citizens, especially youth and women, as well as encouraging more private investment.</p> <p>-An encompassing poverty reduction strategy is still lacking and the gap between rich and poor has been growing.</p>	<p>-With health spending at more than 9% of GDP, the health system performs relatively well in terms of overall access to services and outcomes, as indicated by rates of infant mortality and life expectancy. The health system extends primary and preventive health care at subsidised rates to the entire population through the governmental National Aid Fund (NAF).</p> <p>-Jordan continued its health sector reform which should lead to increased coverage, enhanced quality of health care and the development of health infrastructure.</p> <p>-Jordan participated in the Euro-Mediterranean workshop on communicable diseases and health systems, which prepares for a Ministerial conference.</p>	<p>- Among women, unemployment rate is over 22%.</p> <p>-Good progress was achieved towards to increase women's participation in public life.</p> <p>-In November 2007, 13 % of the active population was unemployed (10.1 % for men as against 26 % for women).</p>	<p>-Unemployment and, in particular, youth unemployment, remains a major concern.</p> <p>-Jordan participated actively in the Euro-Med Youth III Programme through the Ministry of Political Development by providing support for the development of informal education, enhanced youth exchanges and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, Jordanian young people, youth workers and organisations can benefit from the opportunities offered by the Youth in Action programme.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-Jordan is notably one of the better-performing countries of the region in terms of life expectancy at birth (72 years old), adult literacy (91%), access to basic services and education (enrolment has reached, respectively, 91%, 80%, and 31% at primary, secondary and tertiary levels).</p> <p>-Adult literacy is 90%, primary enrolment ratio 94%, while secondary enrolment ratio 76%.</p> <p>-Reform of education progressed with the formulation of the Education Reform for Knowledge Economy project (ERfKE) which aims to transform the system at early childhood, basic, and secondary levels to produce graduates with the skills needed for the future knowledge economy.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>-Jordan's education policy agenda aims to tackle the problems in education.</p> <p>-The illiteracy rate for women remains high at 15%</p>

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					<p>(while for men is at 5-6%). Differences in education and literacy levels by geographic location are also reported.</p> <p>-While the overall policy objectives are in line with EU policy conceptions – including the focus on lifelong learning – implementation has been facing a series of obstacles such as for instance difficulties in overcoming traditional gender perceptions and a rapidly growing population.</p>
<p>Lebanon</p>	<p>Problematic Areas: - Five per cent of the Lebanese population falls within the category of extreme poverty while almost a quarter of Lebanese live below the national poverty line.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Recently the concept of a poverty reduction policy targeting the most vulnerable groups in Lebanese society was adopted by the Lebanese Government and formulated in a National Poverty Reduction Plan. The plan envisages the setting up or strengthening of social safety nets and the rationalisation of social expenditure in education, health and social affairs. -In January 2007 Lebanon adopted a social action plan with the aim of improving the efficiency of social spending and reducing poverty.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -In the last decade, life expectancy increased from 68 to 71 years, while the number of children dying before age one fell from 36 to 28 (per 1,000 live births), and infant immunization increased from 61 to 94%.</p> <p>-National Poverty Reduction Plan. The plan envisages the setting up or strengthening of social safety nets and the rationalisation of social expenditure in education, health and social affairs. - Lebanon pursued health sector reform, which aims, inter alia, at increasing accessibility (in particular to the most vulnerable), efficiency and quality of care. Lebanon addresses health reform alia in the context of the social action plan “Towards strengthening social safety nets and access to basic social services” and the document “Recovery, reconstruction and reform”, submitted to the Paris III Conference. The country participated in the Euro- Mediterranean workshop on communicable diseases and health systems, in preparation of a ministerial conference.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Lebanon’s public health situation has gradually recovered from the civil war and faces new challenges such as health risks resulting from urban air pollution and changing lifestyles. The Ministry for Public Health is charged with managing national health care, prevention and laboratory activities.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -A National Commission aimed at increasing women participation in the economy has been set up but has not yet yielded meaningful results.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -There is no holistic approach to women’s participation in social and economic life, which is subsequently very weak. Women are the first victims of poverty and negative developments on the labour market. -Women face discrimination in the workplace. Women find employment possibilities in fields such as medicine, law, arts, academia and government, but to a lesser extent in business. In parts of society, pressure against women pursuing a professional career is strong. --Sexual harassment is punishable by law, but is still reportedly widespread. -A number of laws on family and personal status discriminate against women. “Honour crimes” by relatives against women for alleged immoral acts are frequent and the law allows for reduced punishment of such crimes. -Citizenship is transmitted by paternity, which is a problem for women who are divorced, widowed or abandoned. Without nationality and citizenship, their children are often denied access to education, health and employment rights. -In 1997 Lebanon ratified the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), albeit with some reservations. These are related to personal status, which addresses the issue of equal rights and responsibilities in marriage, of the mother in all matters related to her children including guardianship, custody, trusteeship, adoption and the right to choose the family as well as the right to choose a family name, further to citizenship and naturalisation and to arbitration.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Lebanon also participates in the Euro-Med Youth Programme which enhances cooperation in the field of non-formal education for young people through, in particular, multilateral youth exchanges, trans-national European voluntary service as well as training for youth workers and capacity building for youth NGO’s. Lebanon participated actively in the Euro-Med Youth III programme through the Ministry of Youth and Sport by providing support for the development of informal education, enhanced youth exchanges and intercultural dialogue. A dialogue on sport has yet to emerge. At the same time, Lebanese young people, youth workers and organisations can benefit from the opportunities offered by the Youth in Action programme. -NGO’s are very active in providing education and cultural activities to young people (catch-up classes, literacy, summer camps, artistic groups, libraries, sports, etc.).</p> <p>Problematic Areas: - Current visa requirements and procedures create certain difficulties for youth mobility.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved: -Male illiteracy fell from 12 to 8%, while female illiteracy declined from 27 to 19% by the early 2000s. Literacy indicators among young people are even more promising, also as far as gender equality is concerned. -The Ministry is currently engaged in establishing a reform process which is supposed to emphasize quality assurance and convergence of accreditation systems. These reforms are being prepared in line with the developments of the Bologna process. A vocational educational training strategic framework is being implemented and a Vocational Education Training development plan is under preparation. -The Ministry of Education and Higher Education finalised a national strategy for education with a focus on facilitating access to quality education with particular measures to combat school drop out from students from low income families as well as a policy commitment to provide free secondary education. A review of the primary school curriculum took place in October 2007 while reform of teacher training is ongoing. In the area of higher education, the Ministry promoted reform in the area of accreditation and quality assurance in line with national policy and with the Bologna Process.</p> <p>Problematic Areas: -Education reform is another major challenge, especially in terms of training graduates with those skills currently demanded by the labour market. Lebanon’s public and private education institutions have deteriorated and are struggling to maintain basic standards. No policy framework or national strategy exists for many parts of the educational systems. -Education and training, particularly in the public area, suffered from the civil war including as a result of brain-drain, but is catching up to its previous high level. -The higher education sector suffers from a lack of unified of graduation system, accreditation system and independent evaluation procedures for diplomas. There is a general need to further improve the sector by raising efficiency and quality, by addressing organisational weaknesses, by ensuring sufficient funds including for equipment and buildings and by better matching vocational training with labour market demands. -The overall quality of the learning environment that children (age group 6-15) are exposed to in the 83 UNRWA primary schools does not fully meet UNRWA standards. Owing to difficulties in improving existing facilities and services, the situation has worsened over the last decade, as is evident in the current level of double-shifting in primary schools (shorter and fewer lessons),</p>

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					overcrowding of classes (up to 50-plus students per class), less than satisfactory teacher skills (and motivation), poor and inadequate school infrastructure (premises/classrooms, utilities, playgrounds, furniture, space for cultural activities etc.), violence in schools and too little attention given to children with special needs or learning difficulties. The consequences of this situation are twofold : (i) a substantial percentage of children, estimated as high as 20% of each intake, drop out and do not complete the 9 years of compulsory primary education; (ii) out of those who complete primary school, only 53% succeed in the official Brevet exam, which is well below the Lebanese average (63% in 2004).
Morocco	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morocco is still characterised by a relatively high incidence of poverty (defined as proportion of the population living on less than 1 US\$ per day). Although poverty declined from 21 to 13% during the period 1984-92, it had returned to 19% by 2000. Poverty continues to be primarily a rural phenomenon, with more than 25% of the rural population living below the poverty line, compared to just 12% of the urban population. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The national human development initiative (NHDI) launched by the King in May 2005 is a key instrument for reducing social disparities and combating poverty. The NHDI has a budget of around €1 billion spread over five years and is aimed at reducing socio-economic disparities between the country's poor areas and its more advanced areas. 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While life expectancy has increased to 68 years, many health indicators – such as maternal and infant mortality rates – remain high. Vaccination is widespread throughout the country, but in rural areas access to health services is limited and the quality is poor. Morocco also has very low health insurance coverage, which only reaches 15% of the population. - Despite the progress achieved in the health sector, Morocco's key health indicators still give cause for concern, in particular in terms of the mortality/morbidity of the most vulnerable groups. The infant mortality rate is 40/1000 births and the maternal mortality rate is 227/100 000 births. There is persistent inequality of access to healthcare, both geographical and financial. There are also serious problems as regards the quality of the care offered. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public health reform has been given new impetus by the setting-up of the NHDI, but it remains an urgent priority, in particular to combat poverty. Priorities set by the Government include providing better access to care, especially for the poor sections of the population, enhancing quality, reorganising and decentralising the system and strengthening administrative and financial capacities. - An important series of reforms has been launched by the health ministry: decentralisation/devolution of health services by setting up health regions; the upgrading of hospitals in the framework of hospital reform; the reform of healthcare financing and of basic medical cover (AMO and RAMED). 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Despite efforts to enhance the status and condition of women, gender indicators show important disparities. In rural areas 75% of women are illiterate and only 47% of the girls are enrolled in primary school. The situation is better in urban areas, where female illiteracy is 23% and girls' enrolment rate is 83%. The female participation in the labour force is between 25 and 30%. - Poverty affects rural areas and women above all. The most vulnerable women are young women without schooling. But the incidence of poverty is also high in households headed by women. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The reforms made to the Code of Personal Status (Moudawana) in February 2004, laid down new rules on the status of women and the family. This is a significant step forward. Amongst other things, it is supposed to improve the rights of women in regard to a number of areas such as marriage, divorce, property and inheritance. The reforms are predicated on the establishment of family courts and the creation of a family aid fund and rely much more heavily on the court system than the previous law. 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment stands at 18.4% in the towns (2005) and at 32.7% among young people (2005), whether or not they are graduates, and the rate was rising in 2006. - Illiteracy, non-school attendance and early dropping out among children and young people is a fact of life for much of the Moroccan population. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Euromed Youth programme supports exchange projects involving young people and Moroccan organisations. - The National Education and Training Charter established vocational training as an instrument for satisfying industry's need for skills and for promoting youth employment and improved new prospects for employees. 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Although illiteracy is slowly receding, rates remain persistently high, at around 50%. The World Bank estimates that 2.5 million children do not attend school. In addition, there is a high drop-out rate. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morocco is implementing a National Charter for Education and Training which sets strategic objectives for a ten-year period (2000-2009). A number of reforms have been launched under this Charter but important challenges remain. In 2004 sectoral strategies for the development of the education system, literacy and non-formal education were adopted. The aim of these reforms was to ensure access for all, improve the quality and relevance of teaching, especially in vocational education and training, restructure governance mechanisms and strengthen institutional capacity. Support for education reform is one of the priorities of EC cooperation for the period 2007-2010. - Morocco has drawn up a medium-term literacy and non-formal education strategy. The literacy and non-formal education strategy adopted by the government in 2004 aims to: reduce the illiteracy rate to less than 20% in 2010; almost completely eradicate the problem by 2015; reduce the illiteracy rate of the active population to less than 10% by 2010; provide education for all.
Palestinian Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Poverty levels increased dramatically, with those living on less than US\$ 2 per day tripling to 60% of the population since the beginning of the Intifada. -Using a poverty line of US\$2 per day, the World Bank estimated that 21% of the Palestinian population were poor in 1999; this figure increased to 60% by 2003. Average daily consumption of a poor person has also dropped from US\$1.47 per day in 1998 to US\$1.32 in 2002. 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Health and food consumption indicators have also declined. -Movement restrictions limit access to health services and education. -The current limitation of energy imports in Gaza impacts on the delivery of health care. As a result, hospitals were obliged to reduce their services. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The Palestinian Authority continued to build up its health system including regarding hospitals, primary health care, health information, insurance and human resource development. The 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Women account for only 13% of the formal labour force, mostly concentrated in the services sector such as health and education. Women's participation in economic life remains low, with over 80 % of women in the West Bank and 90 % in Gaza outside the formal labour force. The participation of women in PA political life has increased, in particular as regards female membership to the Palestinian Legislative Council (from 6 % to 12.9 %). On the other hand, female representation at local government level is below 1 %. --The overall situation contributed also to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -In the area of youth, participation in the Youth in Action and Euro-Med Youth III programmes was also actively promoted. 	<p>Problematic Areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Movement restrictions limit access to health services and education. - The ongoing crisis seriously affects education. <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -In 1994, authority in the education sector was transferred from the Israeli civil authorities to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education was officially established in June 1996 in response to the need to create a centralised public body to develop and co-ordinate Palestinian higher education. The Ministry of Higher Education has now been

Annex III: Country based Comparison Table of the SEMCs for the EMP's

Social, Cultural and Human Aspects

		<p>Palestinian Authority established a National Council for Health and adopted a national health strategic plan 2008-2012.</p> <p>-The Palestinian Authority participated in the Euro-Mediterranean workshop on communicable diseases and health systems, which prepares for a Ministerial conference.</p>	<p>increased family and societal violence – with a raise in cases of “honour” crimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those convicted in such cases receive, on average, disproportionate sentences of no more than six months imprisonment.</p> <p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>-Whilst equality of rights has not been given highest priority in the past, there has recently been some change in public attitudes. Discussions on issues such as violence against women, rape (including marital rape and so-called “honour crimes”) and woman’s shelters have been held and in November 2003, a Ministry for Women Affairs was established.</p> <p>-The Ministry of Women’s Affairs is working on the implementation of the national strategy to promote women’s rights and gender equality in all fields of society.</p>		<p>merged with the Ministry of Education.</p> <p>-The Palestinian Authority improved quality and equitable access to education. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education is preparing the second five year plan for education for the period 2007-2011 with the objectives of ensuring education for all, improving quality, and establishing efficient financial and administrative systems. The Ministry developed a comprehensive national strategy on teacher education to strengthen the professional capacity of teachers.</p> <p>-The Ministry of Education and Higher Education has continued to implement the Education Development Plan.</p>
<p>Tunisia</p>	<p>- The second half of the 1990s saw a significant reduction in poverty. “Hardcore poverty” (i.e. persons living below a poverty threshold equivalent to a minimum level of consumer expenditure determined by the World Bank) affected only 4% of the population in 2000, against some 8% in 1990/1995, 22% in 1975 and 40% in 1960. This reduction in poverty was recorded in urban and rural areas alike and throughout Tunisia. Due to progress achieved in the fight against poverty and in the field of human development, Tunisia continues to figure above the average of developing countries. From 1970 to 2001, real capita incomes grew from USD 700 to USD 2,070, while the poverty has declined from 40% to 10% of the population over the same period. However, poverty remains considerably higher in rural areas.</p> <p>- As regards poverty, work has been started to tackle the causes of marginalisation and social division. The official figures show that poverty levels have been reduced to 3.9% and that the middle class now accounts for 80% of the population.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>- Improvements have been noted in health indicators (life expectancy, child mortality, maternal mortality) and universal access to health insurance, or to free or subsidised health care for vulnerable groups. The reform process must continue to increase access to health care, improve quality and efficiency in the sector and ensure that insurance systems are sustainable.</p> <p>- There has been systematic improvement in health indicators, witnessed by the increase in life expectancy to 72.1 years, which is close to the norm in high-income countries, and the reduction in infant mortality, child mortality and maternal mortality. The Government also intends to make health insurance cover universal. The State provides free or subsidised healthcare to the lowest income.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- The health insurance reform should be implemented as a matter of urgency.</p>	<p>Areas Progressed Achieved:</p> <p>- Women represent approximately 30% of the work force. They have acquired a certain presence in the public administration.</p> <p>- The rights of women and their representation in society make Tunisia rank 1st out of all Arab countries.</p> <p>- Under the auspices of the Ministry for Women, the Family and Childhood, the Government has set gender equality as one of Tunisia's development objectives. Under labour law, all statutes adopted since independence make explicit reference to the principle of non-discrimination between the sexes in the workplace and lay down specific rights for women. (In 2002, women made up more than a quarter of the active working population, and more than 5,000 women held leading positions in enterprises).</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- Progress is still possible, especially with regard to the law of inheritance.</p> <p>-They still face societal and economic discrimination in certain categories of private sector employment.</p> <p>-Some discrimination between men and women still exists in law; the practice of Islamic or sharia law as customary law continues to restrict the rights of women, for instance their right to inherit and their family rights. While the Penal Code contains stiff penalties for spousal abuse, domestic violence is reportedly regarded as a problem to be handled within the family.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>- Tunisia participates in Euro-Med programmes such as Euro-Med Youth, which promotes people-to-people contacts and co-operation between actors of civil society, associations and NGOs in the youth field.</p> <p>-The proportion of young people going on to secondary education has increased.</p> <p>- The EuroMed Jeunesse programme provides assistance to exchange projects involving young people and Tunisian organisations.</p> <p>- Employment policy, designed to reduce serious structural unemployment, especially among young graduates. Reducing graduate unemployment (to 14.1% in 2011)</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- Youth illiteracy remains widespread in rural areas. illiteracy is almost non-existent among the youngest generations, although a number of disparities remain between boys and girls.</p> <p>-There is high growth in unemployment among young graduates.</p>	<p>Areas Progress Achieved:</p> <p>- In the area of education, Tunisia has achieved the highest enrolment ratio (98% of all children) for primary school in the region. - the Tunisian Government has put into place a series of reforms designed to improve the efficiency of education at different levels as well as vocational training, with the aim of re-enforcing their alignment with new national development needs.</p> <p>- The undergraduate/postgraduate/doctorate model is being reinforced. Introducing IT throughout the education system is a priority. Technical education and training have been reorganised.</p> <p>-- The MANFORM reform has refocused the vocational training system on economic requirements.</p> <p>- The development of human resources, education and teaching are the underlying priorities of the Eleventh Plan. These sectors account for the bulk of the State budget and there are a growing number of reforms under way in these areas: introduction of the LMD system (Degree, Master’s, Doctorate), mutual recognition of diplomas, development of courses leading to practical qualifications, etc., often supported by Community sectoral programmes. Improving pupils’ and students’ chances of success is the President’s second priority after employment, these two objectives being very closely linked. These sectors are bound to be a strong priority of the forthcoming plan.</p> <p>Problematic Areas:</p> <p>- Literacy rates have improved over the years, illiteracy still affects 19% of the male population and 39% of the female population.</p> <p>-Gateways between higher education and private-sector demand are still at an embryonic stage.</p>

Source: Compiled by the author using Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (a, b, c, d, e, f), Action Plans [European Commission (x, y, z)], European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i), Commission Staff Paper, Commission Staff Working Document (a, b, c, d, e), Commission Staff Working Paper (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). Syria was not included to this table since it newly signed Association Agreement with the EU and it does not have ENP Action Plan and other documents related to the ENP, yet. Turkey also was not included this table due to Turkey’s different level of relation with the EU. The Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1963 and entered in force in December 1964. Turkey and the EU formed a customs union in 1995. Accession negotiations with Turkey continued.

Annex IV: Interviews with HE Micheal Frendo, former Foreign Affairs Minister of Malta, House of Representatives; Roberto Aliboni, founder of the MeSCo (the Mediterranean Study Commission MeSCo- which transformed in Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission-EuroMeSCo) and Vice President of Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Rome; Mario Télo, President of Institute of European Studies (IEE) Brussels; Salam Kawakibi, Human Rights Activist, Arab Center for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Education (ACIHL) Paris.

1)Both the EU and the USA developed some projects like the EMP and the BMENA in order to realize political, economic and social transformation of the countries of North Africa and Middle East region. BMENA in comparison to the EMP is a new project. These two projects more or less similar objectives such as bringing peace, stability, freedoms, prosperity to the region through making them politically democratic and economically liberal. What do you think about this relatively new initiative (BMENA)?

Michael Frendo:

It is important to further the ideals of freedom of the individual and human rights and democratization in the world. Still, I do not think that it is feasible to consider democracy as a product which you can develop in one country and then export it as is to another ...this does not mean however that one should not seek to assist and further the democratization processes in other societies. Without pontificating and with the respect required showing that democracies need to be homegrown. It is a difficult and delicate balance. In the end, if democratic space is not given to liberal, secular political forces, that space will be occupied by extremist religious groupings.

Roberto Aliboni:

I think the BMENA stopped a couple of years ago practically. Democratization as an agenda belongs to both the EMP and the BMENA but the agenda embedded in two quite different political frameworks. Democracy in the BMENA is coupled by the respect for international law and is only political endeavor, whereas BMENA was coupled by military interventions and was a rather unilateral policy by the USA. I must say, though, that the BMENA initiatives were able to involve a great amount of NGOs whereas the EMP initiatives are mostly towards

governments and less able to reach out to civil society than BMENA. Both initiatives proved unsuccessful, though.

Mario Telo:

They are largely competing projects. My advice do not give to much importance to the Bush initiative which will be replaced by other ones with Obama.

Salam Kawakibi:

From a geopolitical point of view and not technical, I think that the measures undertaken by the USA have shown their limits and even failure. Claims to strengthen the rule of law and democratization in the region appeared to be only statements for public consumption. The elites of the region have understood the game and why they did not adhere to the policy of Bush except a tiny minority. The EMP appears to be based on a more solid.

2) Some political changes started to be seen in the Middle East. In 2005, Iraq held its free elections. Iraq's political and economic transformation is continuing. Syrian troops departed Lebanon. Democratic elections were held in Palestinian Authority. Syria and Israel have initiated indirect talks under auspices of Turkey according to the Madrid Conference terms of references for peace. How do you interpret these changes, particularly related to the USA's and the EU's foreign policy approaches to this region?

Michale Frendo:

The will of the Iraqi people to express themselves in a vote in difficult circumstances was truly impressive. They will need more time to develop their own way. In Iraq, US foreign policy objectives were an important factor in this, in my view. However, none could have been achieved without the involvement and commitment of Iraqi politicians and leaders and most of all without the clear enthusiasm and interest of the population. As to the Palestinians, they showed everyone that they can carry out democratic elections to the extent that, in their second elections, (following the presidential one which Abbas won), the party in opposition (Hamas) got more seats than the party then in government organizing the elections-always the ultimate test of fairness! In this case, although EU and US foreign policy approaches may have played some part (certainly far less than Iraq), the Palestinians were also firmly intent to show that they can seriously run a viable state which gives space to all its citizens and these elections strongly increased their credibility to run their own affairs. Many of the motivations

are local and regional particularly in the cases mention relation to Israel, Hamas and Syria. This is not a criticism by any means: the players on the ground are the most important ones and their needs and aspirations, their assessments and internal, regional and international considerations are determining factors guiding their actions.

Roberto Aliboni:

Most of these developments have an only tactical and provisional nature, in my view. The conflict potential remains very high. The US departure from Iraq is a distant event. There are factors perceived as threats almost by every nation, such as instability in Iraq and Iran's aggressive regional policy. The Afghanistan's conflict is still there and is exacerbated by Pakistan's instability and fragmentation. The changes you mention are more often than not stirred by US and/or EU diplomacy. Their tactical character shows the weakness of this diplomacy and requires bolder regional initiatives. The end of Bush's policy might be a good starter.

Mari Téo:

Yes the EU policy matters, whereas the US policy in Iraq provoked unfortunately the opposite consequences. Let's hope that with Obama we will have more harmony and complementarity.

Salam Kawakibi:

The elections in Iraq have increased under occupation. I can not speak of free elections as long as there is occupation. Regarding Syria, it is true that the departure from Lebanon due to foreign pressure. However, this pressure comes not from a desire to promote democracy. It is a policy issues that directly conflicts axes (Saudi Arabia and Egypt, supported by the USA on the one hand, Syria and Iran on the other). Negotiations between Israel and Syria remain unresolved and appear from a dialogue of the deaf. Note that the withdrawal from the Golan, which is inevitable for such as peace, remains a taboo subject for Israeli policies. The election of Hamas in a democratic process has been rejected by the West in Palestine. So it is a rather a failure as success. So, the impact of Western criticism and remains very limited.

3) Can the USA manage various challenges of this region more or less on its own, without political and economic support of the EU? In other words, is it possible to reach common goals while the USA and the EU have significantly different views on the use of force, legitimacy and right way to solve problems in the Middle East? (The USA emphasizes on the

importance of a rapid transformation of the region through using both its military and political power contrasts with EU preferences for more gradual change through using its civilian power).

Michale Frendo:

We shall have to see how US foreign policy develops now that there is a new President- elect. US unilateral action cannot ultimately be successful. Even EU-US collaboration, however much more effective when the EU is an equal partner in the relations, may not be enough. Leadership is important, but this leadership on the international scene must be open to multilateral approaches and, in that context, must acknowledge and strengthen the role of the UN. Soft power, EU-style, is the effective way forward in my opinion. The way that Barack Obama has been projecting his approach to foreign policy in his election campaign seems to me to be 'in sintonia' with this. Of course, one has to appreciate that, as Mario Cumo, so able put it: "you campaign in poetry, you govern in prose".

Roberto Aliboni:

The Bush 's administration acted on principles opposite to those that guide EU international action. Its policy proved quite unsuccessful. Force should not be excluded from any foreign policy. However, it cannot be used as extensively and ineffectively as the Bush administration did. The US and the EU in the last eight years proved to have quite different visions. They refer their foreign policy to different models. This has created strong tensions within the Atlantic alliance as well as divisions. My guess is that a forceful and coherent Atlantic Alliance may compel the US to renounce a number of objectives still strengthen American primacy in the world. In the region there could be no rapid and positive transformation as a result of Bush's policies.

Mario T elo:

Look at the new strategy of non-proliferation by Barack Obama.

Salam Kawakibi:

There was a time when American and European policies seemed different in the region. At the moment, with the Obama administration, it is possible that the American role becomes more understandable realities on the ground. Europeans with the Eastern country (Arab-sceptics) could become in the coming years a reincarnation of Bushism.

4) What are major weaknesses of the EMP? What do you think about possible effects of the ENP in terms of 'proximity policy initiative', on the EMP?

Michale Frendo:

The EMP is a very important and positive process which must continue and which must continue to be reinforced. Its major achilles heel has been, and continues to be, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the fact that this conflict has not been resolved with the Palestinian state living side by side in peace and stability with Israel. That will continue to dog all the discussions and initiatives in the Euro-Med context and continue to poison relations between the EU and the Arabs and the Arabs and the Israelis around the table. The ENP is a bilateral approach EU-neighboring state and as such should be complementary to the E-M Process: still it became a neighboring state relations. One process should not exclude the other.

Roberto Aliboni:

Normative and contractual policies as the EMP takes a long time to generate positive results, if any. The greatest weakness of the EMP is that the EU has a weak Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) only. So, the EMP is soliciting only political reforms without being able to deliver more concrete results in conflict resolution. The ENP is a policy which renounced the political ambitions of reforming domestic regimes in the Arab countries and concentrated on economic development cum very limited domestic reforms and only if desired by involved regimes. Furthermore, it renounced to reach out to regional results and recognizes the deep differences existing among partners. It is presented as a bold solution. In fact, it comes from absence of other options and the failure of the EMP ambitions.

Mario Telo:

1) Shift from multilateralism to bilateralism. 2) not enough concrete projects.

Salam Kawakibi:

The EMP was effective on concrete projects and very low in general. Regional conflicts have affected this process without the real European will to invest fully in their regulation. The ENP seems more efficient and better arrange the bilateral interests.

5)What do you think about the 'reinforced partnership-The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' (UFM)? Does this new initiative give a new impetus to the Barcelona Process? Please explain the reason.

Michael Frendo:

The UFM has given a new focus and a new impetus to the process and has, for the first time, given it an institutional framework even if still seminal: the secretariat and the Summit can develop into important catalysts for change. The EMP has been suffering from not having this constant directional organs: setting up a bureaucracy of this nature can help drive the process forward. We shall have to see.

Roberto Aliboni:

The UFM is an intergovernmental policy juxtaposed to the EMP's EU policy. Personally, I do not think that its intergovernmental character makes it more effective than the EMP. Will the UFM be able to solve conflicts (whereas the EMP proved unable to do so)? The UFM will launch several big regional economic projects. This will not be politically more productive than the regular EMP program, nor these projects will necessarily be more relevant than the EMP in terms of economic development.

Mario Télo:

It could complement the Barcelona Process with 4 or 5 concrete joint projects, according to the functionalist idea of bottom up interest convergence. This initiative is not sufficient to make Barcelona Process successful but it is a good start. The problem is global financial crisis.

Salam Kawakibi:

The UFM is a French initiative. Despite attempts to make it more European, it seems that the trails yet. Since July 13, no seriously activity has been undertaken. The wait is exaggerated to such a project. It may reboot to resolve the status of conflicts. A very complicated right now and especially after the war in Gaza and with Israeli elections which will bring the extreme right in power. In my opinion, this project was launched without properly studying the gaps in Barcelona. So it will be difficult to reinforce Barcelona. The financial side is very important. Europe has not means to finance projects. The French speak of funding from the Gulf, but it seems very much with the crisis and distrust.

6) New projects were launched by the Barcelona Process: UFM. Some of these projects are highly costly. Is it possible for the EU to finance these projects under pressure of global economic crisis?

Michael Frendo:

Financing the Union and its projects remains a challenge to be met. Perhaps, in this instance, using the EU-Arab League process launched in the February 2008 Malta Meeting (this was a Malta initiative within the EU; I co-chaired –as co-host– this meeting with Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia– as in the Presidency of the Arab League– and Dimitrij Rupel of Slovenia– then in the presidency of the EU) and Malta Communique’ mechanisms would be helpful in terms of financing, since the Gulf states are also involved in that process. The Arab League is also now part of the UFM structures.

7) Do you think that new projects launched through the UFM are sufficient to achieve a successful partnership in the Euro-Mediterranean region? Is it possible to achieve political and security cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region? In other words, can Barcelona Process become an OSCE of the Euro-Mediterranean region?

Michael Frendo:

The new projects are ambitious and can make a difference if successful–if seen through to an effective end, not simply become tools to give the impression that things are happening. This is a great challenge. One must not underestimate the difficulties and the Union would do well to remain focused. As Malta had said in the Helsinki Meeting, there can be no security in Europe without security in the Mediterranean. I don't think that the Union should be seen as a Mediterranean version of the OSCE: it is more than that. However, the security aspect is of interest to everyone.

Roberto Aliboni:

The EMP's underlying idea was a kind of Mediterranean CSCE. When the Senior Official began to discuss ways and means to work out this Mediterranean CSCE, very soon they understood that there were asymmetries in security that made the task unachievable: while EU security depended on Arab political reform, such reform was a factor of insecurity for Arab regimes; furthermore, the EMP looked ineffective with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the most important factor of security for the Arabs; ultimately, the Arabs objected

that, contrary to the CSCE situation, in the Mediterranean there is no strategic stability (the stability regulating East-West relations in the Cold War) and there are, in contrast territorial conflicts (Palestine and others) which were just not there in the CSCE. The EMP-UFM can look for establishing broad security conditions but can hardly be a security organization. Security is not the best the EMP-UFM can do.

Mario Telo:

This hope depends on the Israel-Palestinian variable that is largely on the USA.

Salam Kawakibi:

In the current situation and the Arab-Israeli conflict, a common security policy in the Mediterranean is almost impossible. OSCE is not on the agenda yet.

8) Middle East Peace Process is important for the success of the EMP. Do you think that the EU's current approach to this process contributes to the EMP? Senior advisor of Palestinian Authority, Mrs. Lily Habash criticized the EU not condemning Israel by saying that partnership should not be like that. She also criticized the EU's insistence on democratic elections by saying that democratic elections held in Palestinian Authority led to Hamas victory. What do you think about her comments?

Michale Frendo:

The EU has been and remains the strongest financial and technical supporter of the Palestinians. It has kept a balanced approach in this issue but has been vociferous, much earlier than others, in supporting the setting up of a Palestinian state. These are undeniable facts. In this regard, and in this context, Mrs. Habash was not altogether fair with the EU in her comments. As to the democratic elections, these showed the tension between democratic legitimacy and the election of a Party/Organization that is considered to be a terrorist organization by the EU and others. This is where the problem arose. The EU could not engage with an organization/ party it has formally categorized as a terrorist organization. The Hamas vote threw the whole process into disarray and we remain in this unfortunate situation, perhaps now even more complicated now with the Hamas takeover of a part of Palestinian territory, Gaza.

Roberto Aliboni:

The EU is principled international actor: it likes democracy and, as a consequence, elections. No doubt, American (more than EU) insistence on holding elections was tactically a mistaken move, as it was almost certain that Fateh was going to lose; once held, their result had to be accepted. In contrast, as you know the USA tried to organize a coup d'état and the EU kept practically silent. The EU lost its face and credibility. The Saudi attempt at constituting a Palestinian government of national unity was a good idea, but it was not supported by the USA. In all this, the EU was a loser, politically. Mrs. Habash is right when saying that there is a double standard on the Western side.

Mario Telo:

EU should be more assertive and autonomous as the Israel-Palestinian issue is concerned. MEPP is much dependent on the USA, both as political initiative and strategic profile. Our idea of democracy is more complex and rich than "elections now".

Salam Kawakibi:

Europe supports Israel and does not dare to denounce acts of violence against Palestinian civilians. The role of Europe on issues of human rights and democracy does not seem credible on their face soft position against Israeli violations of the rights of the Palestinian people.