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AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

THE ESDP AS THE LAST STAGE OF THE EU's SECURITY INTEGRATION

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

NEŞE ÇALIŞKAN

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Neşe ÇALIŞKAN'ın "THE ESDP AS THE LAST STAGE OF THE EU'S SECURITY INTEGRATION" konulu tez çalışması 6 Kasım 2009 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/ ~~oyçokluğu ile~~ başarılı bulunmuştur.

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ÖZ

Bu tez, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nın (AGSP), Avrupa güvenlik bütünleşmesine Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası aktörlüğü ve güvenilirliğini arttırmak suretiyle yaptığı katkıları analiz etmektedir. Tezin ana argümanı, AGSP'nin Avrupa bütünleşmesinin son safhası olarak değerlendirilebileceği, ancak, AB'nin ve üye ülkelerin (özellikle üç büyük Avrupa gücü olan Birleşik Krallık, Fransa ve Almanya'nın) bunu başarmak için yapmaları gereken daha çok şey olduğudur. AGSP'nin gelecekteki rolünü değerlendirmek için, üye devletlerin Avrupa güvenliğindeki rolüyle birlikte değişen güvenlik algılamaları ve Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma bütünleşmesinin tarihi gelişimi birinci bölümde incelenmektedir. Soğuk Savaş dinamikleri ve AB'nin ortaklaşa hareket etmekteki yetersizliği daha bağımsız bir Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma oluşumuna yönelik engeller olarak tanımlanmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, güvenliğin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönüşümünü ve güvenlik ve savunma alanında üye devletler arasında AB düzeyindeki işbirliğini irdelemektedir. Ayrıca, Sovyet tehdidinin elimine edilmesinin, Avrupa'nın yeni güvenlik ajanı olarak, AB'ye dünya siyasetindeki rolünü arttırmaya yönelik bir fırsat sağladığını göstermekle beraber, yetersiz askeri imkanların, NATO çatısı altında Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliğinin geliştirilmesiyle birlikte, Birliğin NATO ve ABD varlıklarına olan bağımlılığını arttırdığını savunmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde, üye ülkelerin Avrupa savunma bütünleşmesine katkıları irdelenirken, 1998 tarihli St. Malo Zirvesi ve sonrasında AB'nin daha bütünleşmiş bir AGSP yaratmaya yönelik ümit verici çabalarına rağmen, başlıca üye devletlerin kesişen ve çatışan çıkarlarının AGSP'nin Birlik içindeki yetersiz rolünü ve gelişimini büyük oranda belirlediği tartışılmaktadır. Sınırlı askeri imkanlara ve ülke çıkarları bağlamında üye devletlerin çekincelerine bağlı olarak AGSP'nin görece zayıf performansının hala devam ettiğine işaret edildikten sonra, oldukça büyük ekonomik güce sahip bir Avrupa'nın dünya siyasetinde ağırlığını arttırmak için daha etkin bir güvenlik ve savunma politikasına ihtiyaç duyduğunun altı çizilmektedir.

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the contribution that the ESDP brings to European security integration through increasing the EU's international actorness and credibility. Its major argument is that the ESDP can be regarded as the last phase of European security integration, nevertheless, the EU and its member states (especially the three major European powers; the UK, France and Germany) need to do more for achieving this. Changing security perceptions and historical evolution of European security and defence integration, as well as the Member States' role in European security, are explored in the first chapter, to assess the potential role of the ESDP. Cold War dynamics and the EU's inability to act unanimously are defined as barriers to the development of a more autonomous European security and defence formation. The second chapter scrutinizes the post-Cold War transformation of security and the cooperation between the Member States in the fields of security and defence at the EU level. It further reveals that although the elimination of Soviet threat gave opportunity to the EU to increase its role in world politics as a new security agent in Europe, lack of military capabilities increased the Union's dependency on NATO and the US assets along with the development of the ESDI within NATO framework. In the third chapter, in analysing the role of major Member States' contribution to European defence integration, it is argued that despite the EU's encouraging efforts to create a more concrete ESDP after the St. Malo Summit of 1998, the intersection and competition of major Member States' interests largely define the insufficient role and development of the ESDP. After indicating that the relatively weak performance of the ESDP still continues due to limited military capabilities and the Member States' reservations regarding their national interests, it is underlined that a Europe with significant economic power also needs an effective security and defence policy to increase its weight in world politics.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEECs	**Central and Eastern European Countries**
CESDP	**Common European Security and Defence Policy**
CFSP	**Common Foreign and Security Policy**
CHOD	**Chief of Defence**
CJTF	**Combined Joint Task Force**
COMECON	**Council for Mutual Economic Assistance**
EC	**European Community**
ECSC	**European Coal and Steel Community**
EDC	**European Defence Community**
EEC	**European Economic Community**
EMU	**Economic and Monetary Union**
EPC	**European Political Community**
ESDI	**European Security and Defence Identity**
ESDP	**European Security and Defence Policy**
ESS	**European Security Strategy**
EUFOR	**EU Force**
EUMC	**EU Military Committee**
EUMS	**EU Military Staff**
EU	**European Union**
FYROM	**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**
GDP	**Gross Domestic Product**
IFOR	**Implementation Force**
INF	**Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces**
JHA	**Justice and Home Affairs**
NAC	**North Atlantic Council**
NATO	**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**
MBT	**Modified Brussels Treaty**
QMV	**Qualified Majority Voting**
PPEWU	**Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit**
PSC	**Political and Security Committee**

RRF	**Rapid Reaction Force**
SEA	**Single European Act**
SFOR	**Stabilization Force**
TEU	**Treaty on European Union**
UK	**United Kingdom**
UN	**United Nations**
US	**United States**
USSR	**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**
WEU	**Western European Union**
WMD	**Weapons of Mass Destruction**
WUDO	**Western Union Defence Organization**

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)[1] has been one of the most dynamic dimensions in the practice and development of the European Union (EU). The EU started to take its security and defense dimension more seriously during the last ten years when compared to its past. The ESDP is seen as a new machinery of the EU that would upgrade the Union's international presence.

Actually, defence was an integral part of the early efforts in the European integration process and it dates back to the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and of Brussels (1948). European history had been full of wars and attempts to prevent these wars. The idea of a unified Europe was also the product of this war-prone situation. Especially, experiences of European nations in the two World Wars increased the state of insecurity. Therefore the main motive behind the creation of the EU at the first phase could be attributed to the security concerns and the aim to create a mechanism that would prevent wars especially among European nations. Thus, the vision of a unified Europe is directly linked to the cause of common defense and security. However this idea could not be achieved for the entire Cold War.

During the Cold War, Europe has taken huge steps in the economic integration through the European Economic Community (EEC). But, integration in security and defense policy was limited due to the fears of member states related to the revival of German aggression and Europeans' dependency on the NATO/US to ensure their security. Furthermore, the reluctance of the Member States in its creation can be attributed to the relation of defense with the state sovereignty and national defense. On the other hand, member states' different attitudes, towards creating a common security and defense dimension, have been an important reason.

[1]In June 1999 EU Council meeting in Cologne had introduced the term "Common European Security and Defense Policy" (CESDP) in EU documents. Later, the term "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP) was used. For avoiding confusion, this text uses the term "ESDP".

Major Arguments

The dissolution of the Cold War dynamics gave the EU a chance to become the security agent of Europe. The framing of "a common defence policy", with "common defence" as a conditional long-term perspective, was introduced in the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) but they failed to create a visible effect until the launch of the ESDP in Cologne in June 1999 right after the Franco-British St. Malo Summit held in 1998. Since then, the ESDP gained momentum and it is expected to be the future driving force of the integration process.[2]

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution and the general framework of the ESDP with a view to clarifying why the Europeans excluded the defence from their agenda for a long time and then what forced them to launch the ESDP. Additionally, Europe's long-standing desire of pushing the pace of integration and of presenting the EU as an efficient, credible and respectable world power, the contributions as well as effects of some member states (mostly Britain's and France's) along with the external dynamics, such as the lessons drawn from the Iraq War and impact of NATO and of the US for Europe's efforts to build autonomous security and defence structures are addressed.

In order to understand the origins and the development of the ESDP project, *security* and *defence* perceptions in Europe need to be analyzed. In the 1970s and the 80s, within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), these two formerly interchangeable concepts became part of different responses at the EC level. Security was treated as a part of low politics and defined as "reducing or eliminating threats, risks and uncertainties in a number of activities - political, economic, environmental as well as threats of a military nature" - whereas the concept of defence which refers to the "use or threatened use of organized military force" remained intact.[3] In other words, while economic and political instruments within the EU also ensure security, defence can only be provided through military power.

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[2]For this argument see Fraser Cameron, **Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement**, New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.149-162.
[3]Brian White, **Understanding European Foreign Policy**, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.143.

In the 1980s, Hedley Bull has criticized the EU for being ineffective and insufficient in military power and also suggested that developing military capabilities is the only way to transform the Union to a truly world power.[4] As an example of unique integration process, "the economic giant EU"s area of influence in world politics is much lesser than the influence exerted by the US. In that sense, Hedley Bull's argument could be true at some point, as the latest efforts of the EU in strengthening ESDP also justifies that argument. Absence of a truly common security and defence policy could be the missing part of European integration. By integrating security and defence to the Union, the EU would be less dependent and more self-sufficient that meet Bull's criteria for being an influential international actor.

The EU's inability to have a defense dimension has also increased the EU's dependency on NATO and US resources, and this posed one of the biggest obstacles against development of common European security and defence policy. Therefore, security integration and cooperation in Western Europe took on a transatlantic character. Western Europe was dominated by the US in terms of security. Hence, what it is called European integration turned to be integration in low politics. That dependency has also created separation between member states of the Union. While some of the countries led by France sought for a more autonomous European defence policy to balance the power of the US, others led by Britain – the closest European ally of the US – blockade the early formations of common security and defence components within the EU. For that reason, ESDP has been developed more faster than ever before with the proposal of Franco-British initiative of St. Malo.

This paper analyses the contribution that the ESDP brings to European security integration through increasing the EU's international actorness and credibility. Its major argument is that the ESDP can be regarded as the last phase of European security integration, nevertheless, the EU and its member states (especially the three major European powers; the UK, France and Germany) need to do more for achieving this. European security and defence integration is explained reflecting on the context of the external factors rather than integration theories. In order to understand where security

[4]Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.21, No.2, 1982, pp. 149-164.

and defence stands in the European integration, developments in security and defence policy, which had started right after the World War II, are closely monitored. The first chapter is devoted to the evaluation of the European Union's security aspirations during the Cold War. Influence of French policy in shaping European defence community, and position of the EU in a bipolar world is explored. The second chapter takes a look at how European security has evolved from the American-led institutions of the Cold War era to a new post-Cold War dynamic which gave opportunity for increasing defence autonomy of the EU. The process started with the so-called birth certificate of the ESDP, St. Malo and external events that forced the EU to shift toward more autonomous policies within the EU are also examined. The third chapter, on the security and defense preferences of the three most powerful EU members, shows how national security and defense preferences of the individual EU member states shape the ongoing disagreement within the EU over what the ESDP is and should be.

I. SECURITY PERCEPTIONS IN EUROPE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE INTEGRATION DURING THE COLD WAR

This chapter evaluates the history of European security and defense integration between 1945-1990. In 1990, the Cold War ended and Europe's attitude towards security and defense issues has changed drastically. It is questioned how the idea of security and defense integration has existed and what attempts has been made in realizing integration in the fields of security and defense. European security and defense integration can be understood better by looking at the European security perceptions. Changes in these perceptions are clear indications of that why the EU has failed to establish common security and defense policy during the Cold War. Two international relations theory; realism and liberalism are mentioned shortly in this chapter, and the ultimate aim is to better explain the causes of the security perceptions during the 1940s. Special emphasis is given to the role of the United States and NATO during the Cold War in shaping European security and defense framework. This chapter pictures the motives behind establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy.

1.1 AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan argue that integration project is built on a "meta securitization" which means a "fear of Europe's future becoming like Europe's past, if fragmentation and power balancing are allowed to return".[5] Although the EC has been established due to security concerns and the process of European integration is based on cooperation, where national and European actors make sacrifices for increasing their common interests; security and defense have been kept away from integration process for a long time. Security and defense issues were the untouchable fields because they were closely related to state sovereignty. The member states would not think it in their

[5]Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 102.

interest to share their decision making power in those areas.[6] Actually during 1960s they argued that integration was acceptable as long as it strengthens the state.[7]

According to Neil Nugent, the EU has been formed and is still being formed by the "context of the forces", therefore these forces determines the progress of the integration.[8] Economic forces put states together and others especially those firmly related to state sovereignty slow down, even sometimes cut down the integration process.[9] Not only Nugent but also other scholars keep also security and defense issues apart from integration process. Alfred van Staden pointed out that in the near future, nobody expects the EC members to accept "the authority of a supranational body in questions of life and death."[10] Stanley Hoffman also explains that integration occurs if there is "a permanent excess of gains over losses", and he stated that this is not applicable for political integration or high politics because *spillover* exists in the fields of low politics.[11] Moreover, the dynamism of integration is constructed by low politics since "economically significant" fields largely depend on cooperation and thus defense cannot be regarded as such fields.[12]

Meanwhile, not all the scholars see the security issues as a handicap for integration process. Haas defined integration as a process where values change and interests are redefined regionally and where values of national groups are replaced by "a new and geographically larger set of beliefs".[13] Therefore, Hanna Ojanen thinks that

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[6]Hanna Ojanen, "Theories at a Loss? EU-NATO Fusion and the 'Low Politicisation' of Security and Defence in European Integration", **UPI Paper 35/2002**, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2002, pp.1-19.
[7]Hanna Ojanen, **The Plurality of Truth: A Critique of Research on the State and European Integration,** Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 141-146.
[8]Neill Nugent, **The Governments and Politics of the European Union**, Third Edition, Macmillan Press London: Macmillan Press, 1994, p.1.
[9]***Ibid.***
[10]Alfred van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy", in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), **The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe**, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1994, p. 153.
[11]S. Hoffmann 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe'. *Dædalus*, Vol. 95, No. 2, 1966, pp. 862–915 cited in Hanna Ojanen, "The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.44, No.1, 2006, pp. 59. Finn Laursen, "Theories of European Integration", Background paper for lecture on "European Integration: What and Why?" at The Graduate Institute of European Studies, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, March 2002, pp.1-19, http://eui.lib.tku.edu.tw/eudoc/eulecture/Theories%20of%20European%20Integration.pdf.
[12]Ben Rosamond, **Theories of European Integration**, Houndmills, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2002, p. 62. See also Hanna Ojanen, "The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy", pp. 56-76.
[13]Ernst B. Haas, **The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957,** Stanford, Califronia: Stanford University Press, 1958, pp. 4-5.

integration can occur in the field of security; values can change even in these questions and communitarian principles can replace national ones.[14] The key word in their argument is *change*. Although the EU member states were reluctant to share their sovereignty in security and defense, a huge step was taken: the ESDP. The main motive behind this was *change* in security and defense perceptions.

With the eighteenth century, security started to be intensively defined as the same as security of states against threats from other states.[15] During the Cold War, definition of security was not so much different; as it had mostly been based on the preservation of territorial integrity and political sovereignty and having enough military power to protect these.[16] Therefore military power and alliances were the most important ingredients of state security. Actually during the 1940s, "a permanent dialogue" between two conflicting traditions dominated security: liberal/utopian and realist schools of thought.[17] According to the state-centric realist view, international system is anarchical. States are only looking for survival and they need to maximize their security.[18] Cooperation only exists if it is in the state's interest and it can be short term. There is a security dilemma from which the state cannot escape and they try all ways to feel secure: either war or cooperation.[19] So, the future is expected to be the same as the past, where "violent conflict" prevails.[20]

The second tradition is more optimistic about international security. It does not share the idea that war is inevitable. This liberal (also called utopian) school thinks peaceful change is possible. Cooperation can be reached and a more moderate international politics can be established.[21] World War II broke the liberal optimism and realist thoughts have gained their impetus. Once again the realists were able to find evidence that the states were still in control of the limits of cooperation in security

[14]Hanna Ojanen, "The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.1, 2006, pp. 56-76.
[15]Andrew Hurrell, "Security and Inequality", in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds.), **Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics,** Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 248-271.
[16]Margriet Drent, David Greenwood, Peter Volten (eds.), "Towards Shared Security: 7-Nation Perspectives", **Harmoniepaper,** 14, 2001, p.7, http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/harmoniepaper-14.pdf.
[17]John Baylis, "European Security in the Post-Cold War Era: The Continuing Struggle Between Realism and Utopianism", **European Security,** Vol.7, No.3, 1998, p. 13.
[18]Jack Donnelly, **Realism and International Relations**, Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press, 2000, pp. 6-43.
[19]*Ibid.*
[20]Baylis, p.13.
[21] Scott Burchill (et. al.), **Theories of International Relations**, Second Edition, Palgrave, 2001.

matters. Until the 1980s, security perception in Europe was not much different from that perception.[22] In the bipolar world politics of the Cold War, Europe had a definite enemy and it tried to avoid this enemy through alliances. Soviet threat was the main threat and the Atlantic alliance was the best way to respond to that threat.

Since the mid-1980s, perception of security has changed. Security was no longer accepted as being free from the threat of war or feeling safe against potential enemies. It became obvious that security was not only about states or preserving status quo.[23] In other words, military threats against the state existence and creating effective military defense are not the only priorities. Although they are still the vital concerns, the concept of security has changed. There exists the need to create broader and realistic concept, which meets the needs of the day.[24] Threat is no longer definite, and is not only objected directly to the state but also objected to the individuals and to the world.[25] Non-military security issues like migration, global climate change, human rights issues are the new risks and challenges.[26] These issues have also dominated European security agenda and cooperation through international institutions became more desirable when prominence compare to the military power. Such, cooperative tendency in defining security gave chance to Europe to "domesticate" security among its members.[27]

In the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became obvious that a new era has opened in the European security agenda. With the collapse of bipolarity the EU has got a chance to become new security agent of Europe. Relations between internal and external security issues have been blurred and security has become indivisible in that sense. In other words, definition of security has expanded beyond its Cold War definition because nuclear deterrence has lost its priority and other threats have come to the surface. But the major change in the concept of security has been the

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[22]Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Contending philosophies about security in Europe" in Colin McInnes (ed.), **Security and Strategy in the new Europe**, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 1-35.
[23]Jan Zielonka, "Europe's Security: A Great Confusion", **International Affairs** , Vol. 67, No. 1,1991, pp. 127-137, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621223.
[24]Mladen Bajagic and Zelimir Kesetovic. "Rethinking Security" in Gorazd Mesko, Milan Pagon and Bojan Dobovsek (eds.) Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Slovenia: University of Maribor, December 2004, pp.1-12. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/Mesko/208034.pdf.
[25]Booth and Wheeler, *opt.cit.*
[26]*Ibid.*
[27]Helene Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy", in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), **A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP**, London/New York: Routledge. 1998, p.97.

change from "inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict".[28] In the period from 1989 to 1994, 94-armed conflicts in 64 different locations were estimated and just four of these could be counted as "classical inter-state conflicts".[29] Furthermore, instead of using military power, these new challenges need to be responded by conflict prevention and peacekeeping methods to provide flexibility and permanent solutions.

Anne Deighton states that security in Europe is not just about "the avoidance of war and violence by the application of military instruments but it also embraces a societal and even individual dimension."[30] In other words, it become obvious that security does not only have military, but also political, economic and societal dimensions. Most importantly, like economic matters, security issues have started to be treated as the part of low politics.[31] So, it becomes possible to carry the security field to the territory of common policies.

Hanna Ojanen has also pointed out that these dimensions make security "low politicised". According to her: "It is now the realm of security and defense that has the most integrative potential … it is not integration that changes, as the process expands to new fields; it is rather security and defense that change as they are socialized and accommodated into the European process".[32] On the other hand, Howorth states that European integration can be boosted by the politics of security and crisis management since these fields need a rapid and efficient decision-making process.[33]

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[28]Simon Duke, **The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP**, Basingstoke England/New York: Macmillan ; St. Martin's Press, 2000.
[29]Hurrell, p. 259.
[30]Anne Deighton, "The European Security and Defence Policy", pp.719-741, **JCMS,** Vol. 40, No.4, Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002, p. 727.
[31]Richard Sinnott, "European Public Opinion and Security Policy", **Chaillot Paper,** No.28, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, July 1997, pp.1-37.
[32]Ojanen, "Theories at a Loss? EU–NATO Fusion and the 'Low Politicisation' of Security and Defence in European Integration", p.64.
[33]Jolyon Howorth, "European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?", **Journal of Common Market Studies,** Vol. 39, No. 4, 2001, pp. 765-789.

1.2. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE FORMATION DURING THE COLD WAR

"…the idea of European unity was restricted to the matters relating to the foreign conquest."[34]

During its war prone history, making Europe more secure and peaceful place was a common dream of many politicians and philosophers.[35] World War II was a nightmare for Europe. The end of World War II and the very beginning of the Cold War Era pushed Europe to make defensive arrangements. With the new bipolar world order, balance of power, – what Europe wanted to leave behind – entered to the agenda again. The first steps taken by Europe were to sign the Treaty of Dunkirk and the Treaty of Brussels. The Treaty of Dunkirk was signed between France and Britain in March 1947. A year later, came the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defense (amended by the Protocol signed at Paris on 23 October 1954), which was a broadened form of Dunkirk and served as a basis of Western European Union. It created a regional defense organization, the Western Union and was signed by Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.[36] Commitment to mutual defense was emphasized in the Treaty. In September 1948, military co-operation was initiated in the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organization through the Western Union Defence Organization.

Actually these treaties listed their objective as economic and cultural co-operation but indeed they were mutual security pacts with promises of "reciprocal assistance", especially against possible future German aggression.[37] Especially France was so skeptical about rebirth of German threat and wanted to keep Germany weak even in the future. The coup in Czechoslovakia and the Korean War has changed the status quo and forced the US, which had followed isolationist policies for years, to be a part of European security. The Establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[34]John McCormick, **Understanding the EU: A Concise Introduction**, Second Edition, Houndmills: Macmillan, 2002, p.33.
[35]The King of George Bohemia, Duc de Sully, William Penn, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant and Victor Hugo can be listed as some of those politicians and philosophers.
[36]Duke, pp. 12-41. The Western Union also had a defence component called the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO).
[37]Derek W. Urwin "The European Community: From 1945 to 1985", pp.12-25, Michelle Cini (ed.), **European Union Politics,** Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 14.

(NATO) in 1949 made the commitment of the US to the European security and defense issues ever lasting. Collective defense was laid down in Article 5 by stating that an armed attack to the one of the members of NATO would be considered an attack against all of them and that these attacks would be responded collectively.[38] According to Brian White, NATO is the extension of the Brussels Treaty into a "transatlantic defense agreement". [39]

NATO became the core element of Western European security and shaped it right after the World War II. Thus, European security integration took on a transatlantic character. According to Howorth, "the illusion of national defense and the chimera of European security integration are both largely explained by the existence and reality of NATO", because both national and continental dimensions of security have been ultimately attached to the Atlantic Alliance. [40]

1.2.1 European Defence Community

Fear of a possible future Soviet invasion of West Germany raised US willingness about German rearmament. Europeans were confronted with the effects of their dependency on the US, which wanted them to accept the rearmament of the country they feared the most, just few years after the World War II nightmare.[41] Europe was looking for a way to integrate West Germany in its security sphere. Nevertheless, the rearmament of West Germany was not an option for France. France was also looking for ways to reduce, at least to balance NATO and US involvement in Europe's security. Hence, France needed a new initiative. The outcome was European Defense

[38] "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

[39] Brian White, **Understanding European Foreign Policy**, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, p.4.

[40] Jolyon Howorth, "National defence and European security integration: An illusion inside a chimera?" in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (eds.), **The European Union and National Defence Policy**, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 12.

[41] Stanley Hoffmann, "Towards a common European Foreign and Security Policy?", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.38, No.2, 2000, pp.189-198.

Community (1952)[42], modeled upon the newly created European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and inspired by the Pleven Plan.[43] The logic of the creation of a European Defense Community was the establishment of 'a fully integrated' Western European Army, which would include military units from all the member states. West Germany would be also included. By making German unit a part of a European Army, France would be able to prevent an "independent West German command." [44] In other words, the main goal of the establishment of the EDC was to integrate and firmly control the German forces.[45] The proposal of EDC was a huge step because it was perceived as an "integrationist" move towards a common security and defense policy in Europe. It was defined as a supranational European organization in the European Defense Treaty.[46] The EDC was supranational in character, as it would include common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget. Nevertheless, Britain declined to participate. Actually Britain's stance was not a surprise. Britain was not willing to be part of any kind of a supranational entity at the expense of its sovereignty and freedom. European Defense Treaty was signed in 1952 but surprisingly in 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty. Thus, security and defense fell apart from the European integration process for almost forty years. NATO had taken the lead in Europe's security and defense issues during the Cold War. According to Howorth it was "de facto NATO hegemony".[47] Supporters of European federalism defined this failure as the greatest "lost opportunity" in the history of European integration.[48] In other words, integration was limited to the context of economic issues. On the other hand the achievement of economic integration could be seen as a positive side effect of EDC failure. Whereas NATO and the US had taken the burden of security and defense issues, Europe could be able to focus on economic priorities. Schnabel states, "First, the EU was able to develop because it profited from the nuclear shield and

[42]In 1952, France led a group of six European countries, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany, to launch a European Defence Community (EDC).
[43]Pleven Plan of October 1950 named after French Defense Minister Rene Pleven. Pleven Plan proposed the creation of supranational European Army.
[44]Urwin, **The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,** p.18.
[45]Vitaly Zhurkin, "European Security and Defense Policy: Past Present and Probable Future", **Peace and Security**, Vol.34, March 2003, pp.1-11.
[46]Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J. K. Shepard, **Toward a European Army: Military Power in the Making,** London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, September 2003, p.22.
[47]Howorth, "National defence and European security integration: An illusion inside a chimera?", p.13.
[48]Derek W. Urwin, **The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945**, London: Longman, 1991, p.63.

other protection offered by the United States, both against the threat posed by the Soviet Union and from fears that old European rivalries would be renewed."[49]

1.2.2 Establishment of Western European Union

The question of West German re-armament was still on the agenda and needed to be responded urgently. Germany was one of the most important symbols of the Cold War, so, both the US and European powers wanted to keep West Germany in their security sphere.

At the time, Britain was on the stage as well. Britain proposed to invite Germany and Italy to join the Treaty of Brussels (1948) by expanding it. The Protocols to the Brussels Treaty Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty[50] were signed during the Paris conference in October 1954.[51] A new international organization, Western European Union (WEU) was established. Due to the MBT, national military forces of each member state would serve in NATO, under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Unlike the EDC, WEU had no supranational character. WEU completed its mission by allowing German rearmament and integrating Germany into the Western security sphere. It had no integrated army and it was mostly considered as a part of NATO rather than an independent entity. NATO led the security and defense issues. The WEU was not reactivated until 1984.

In 1955, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, stated: "there was not such a thing as European defence and that the European idea was necessarily a limited concept".[52] American hegemony of NATO was obvious and pushed Europe to

[49]Rockwell A. Schnabel, "US View on the EU common Foreign and Security Policy", **The Brown Journal of World Affairs**, Vol. IX, No.2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp.95-101, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Schnabel.pdf.
[50]Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT).
[51]Three main objectives clearly stated in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty: "To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression; to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe".
[52]Quoted from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-7, Vol. IV, "Telegram from the US Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Deparmant of State", Washington DC: USGPO, 1986), *cited in* Duke, p.42.

do something about European security and defence. So security and defense was not completely abandoned from the integration process.

Several attempts were made during 1960s and 70s. In order to understand the attempts towards common security and defence cooperation, firstly one needs to understand the bias of De Gaulle who intensely tried to shape European security in 1960s. De Gaulle opposed the development of supranational institutions for the newly founded. Communities, and stressed national decisions, especially in the vital areas of foreign and security policy. De Gaulle, who held French Presidency in 1958, was in need to strengthen France's hand against Britain and the US. He tried to eliminate Britain by vetoing its accession to the EEC. Spaak has also stated that the reason behind French rejection of British accession was that the French perceived this accession as threat towards France's leading role in the Community.[53] On the other hand, with the support of Germany, De Gaulle called for regular meetings of Heads of State that would coordinate foreign policies among the Six.[54] There would be a Secreteriat in Paris. The Benelux countries, especially Netherlands, rejected such kind of an organization. They thought, without British participation, a political community dominated by France and Germany could weaken the EC.[55]

In 1961, Fouchet Commission, which was named after the French ambassador Christian Fouchet, was established in order to respond to the concerns of the member states about creating a political community. Fouchet Commission prepared several proposals to establish a loose form of political union of the EC member states, based on intergovernmental cooperation; especially on the areas related to foreign policy, defence and culture. There would be Council of the Heads of State or Government or of Foreign Ministers, which would aim to harmonize, coordinate and unite economic, political, cultural and defence issues of the Member States.[56] By creating a security dimension and excluding Britain, De Gaulle aimed to revive the French leadership in Europe and

[53]Desmond Dinan, **Europe Recast: A History of European Union**, Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan 2004, p. 99.
[54]The Six refers to the six Community Countries (The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg).
[55]Clive Archer, **The European Union: Structure and Process**, Third Edition, Continuum, 2000, pp.162-186.
[56]William Wallace, "National Inputs into European Political Cooperation", in David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel, and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), **European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe,** London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982, pp.46-59.

to weaken NATO's impact on European security issues.[57] The Fouchet Plan seemed like De Gaulle's intergovernmental alternative to the EC.[58] Hence, the Benelux countries that were afraid of bigger states' hegemony of the Community rejected the so-called Fouchet Plans. Thus, not only hopes to create security and defense dimension failed but also NATO continued to keep its vital position in European security.[59] The dreams for the European political cooperation have lost their weight for a couple of years.[60]

In the late 1960s, the De Gaullist era ended and enlargement was on the agenda. The EC took huge steps on the economic front but it also needed to strengthen its hand in political front in order to increase its influence in world politics.[61] According to Simon Duke, the EC lacked an "external political persona".[62] Europe had to speak with a more unified voice and only then it could have a greater role to play at the world stage.[63]

1.2.3 European Political Cooperation

The Hague Summit in December 1969 revived the idea of political cooperation where the leaders tasked the foreign ministers to find the best way to enhance *political unification*.[64] The aim was to reach a "united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution….".[65] As a response to the Hague Summit, the Davignon (Luxembourg) Report of 1970 was prepared. It led to the establishment of European Political Cooperation (1972), which allowed the EC Member States to make information exchange, consultation, and

[57]Gülnur Aybet, **The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91**, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p.81-82.
[58]Sonia Mazey, "The Development of a European Idea: From Sectoral Integration to Political Union" in Jeremy John Richardson (ed.), **European Union: Power and Policy-Making,** New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 24-40.
[59]Michael E. Smith, **Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation,** Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 2004.
[60]Anand Menon, Anthony Forster, and William Wallace, "A Common European Defense", ***Survival*** 34:3, 1992 pp. 98-118.
[61]Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, London, New York: Routledge, 2000, pp.71-75.
[62]Duke, p.56.
[63]Richard McAllister, **From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey,** New York: Routledge, 1997.
[64]The Hague Summit Declaration, 2 December 1969, para.15 in Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, p.71.
[65]Christopher Piening, **Global Europe, The European Union in World Affairs**, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p.33. See also, Elfriede Regelsberger, "EPC in the 1980´s: Reaching another plateu?" in Alfred Pjipers, Elfriede Regelsberger, and Wolfganf Wessels (eds.) **European Political Cooperation in the 1980s**, London: Brill, 1998, p.6.

coordination of their positions on foreign policy issues and act together on foreign affairs when it is possible.[66] The EPC had an intergovernmental basis, which means that all activities of the EPC took place outside the EC Treaties until the Single European Act (1986).[67] Although it has carried political cooperation to a new phase, the EPC was still informal and a loose form of cooperation, separate from the activities and the control of the Community.[68] Also, defence was excluded from the EPC process due to the concerns of Benelux countries, which were afraid of loosing support of NATO.

Further attempts to increase the role of EPC were made with the Copenhagen Report of 1973 and the London Report of 1981. The Copenhagen Report of 23 July 1973 did not change but expand the content of the Luxembourg Report. Political commitment of the foreign ministers to consult each other on foreign policy issues was emphasized again. Due to the foreign ministers' positions, the processes of EPC were attributed to "the habits and customs of EPC diplomats themselves."[69] Actually, this made member states feel safe since it is always stated that what foreign ministers try to establish and improve is only cooperation, not a community.[70] Although the EPC related to the EC, it was not part of the Communities' institutions. In other words, although some efforts, issues related to foreign policy, security and defence were still the core interests of the states and treated as a taboo at the Community level.

In order to understand the motives behind the reports and attempts to enhance the role of the EPC, it must be kept in mind that during 1970s and 80s, political cooperation in Europe was mostly shaped by external events, "either in the form of crises or other sorts of demand emanating from the international environment".[71] In a sense the EPC could be seen as the by-product of the external developments. During the 1970s, Europe was experiencing very hard times due to external pressures such as the oil embargo, the war in the Middle East and problems with the US about the Year of

[66]Maria Raquel Freire, "The European Union Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures and Capabilities" in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds.), **European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective,** New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 9-25.
[67]Helene Sjursen, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Limits of intergovernmentalism and the search for a global role" in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen (eds*.),* **Making Policy in Europe**, Second Edition, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001, p.189. See also, Archer, p. 164.
[68]Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, p.74 and White, p.7.
[69]Michael E. Smith, **Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation**, p.92-93.
[70]Duke, *opt. cit*. pp.58-67.
[71]White, p.73.

Europe in 1973. Initially, it was thought that the Year of Europe would strengthen the confidence in the Atlantic Alliance. However, Europe perceived this attempt as a move to restrict the role of Europe in a regional manner.[72] Therefore, it pushed Europe, especially France to make more emphasis on the EPC. Several attempts were made. One of them was the Tindemans Report of 1975. It is important because it stressed the importance of common security for the complete European Union. But the EC Member States did not accept it.

Although, the EPC was established for increasing the importance of the EC on the world stage and to speak with a common voice, it remained far from this aim in the 1980s. It still had a one-sided role, which was the economic one. Hill described this situation by defining the EC as "an economic giant" but "a political dwarf."[73] One of the most important reasons behind this argument was the member states' stance towards issues related to national security. These fields were still accepted as the very core elements of independence and sovereignty.

Nevertheless, security perceptions in the world have started to change in 1980s. Separation between the issues related to the economy, politics and security has blurred.[74] In other words interdependence between security, politics and economy became apparent. Then it was realized that separation of the security aspirations from foreign policy is unrealistic.[75] Europe responded to this awareness in the London Report of 1981, which called for discussions of political aspects of security (for example: armaments, terrorism, arms control).[76] Indeed, the London Report was a reflection of Europe's demand for a more effective EPC, because Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and deterioration in the East-West relations showed Europe's vulnerability against external events and also its dependency on the USA especially in defense. Thus, the London

[72]Simon J. Nutall, **European Foreign Policy,** Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.14-65.
[73]Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.31, No.3, 1993, pp.305-328.
[74]Michael Smith, "The EU as An International Actor" in Jeremy John Richardson (ed.), **European Union: Power and Policy-Making**, New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 247-261.
[75]White, p.145.
[76]In the London Report Part I it stated : " … possible to discuss in political cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security."

Report focused on the expansion of the EPC by increasing political commitment of the EU member states to the EPC.[77]

The Genscher-Colombo Plan (initiative of two foreign ministers: the German Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo) is also important to be mentioned because it proposed to discuss issues related to the defence within the EPC, but outside the framework of the NATO and aimed to establish a parallel council of defence ministers.[78] The plan touched sensitive areas and due to this, it was rejected by the EC member states.

The provisions of the London Report were further discussed in the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart (1983), which added economic aspects of security beside political ones to the EPC framework. This was accepted as a move to edging the Community towards defence matters. [79] However, some of the member states were still reluctant towards the involvement of security issues at the Community level.[80]

EPC has taken a formal (legal) basis with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987; however, it was still treated as a separate entity to the EC.[81] Title III of the SEA was related to the activities of the EPC and provided treaty provisions for the EPC. Not only importance of coordination on the "political" and "economic" aspects of security has been emphasized in the treaty[82] but it was also stressed that cooperation on issues related to European security could boost the enhancement of "a European identity in external policy matters"[83]. Although SEA called for closer cooperation on security issues, it defined the limits by adding such statement "within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance". [84] Actually that provision has summarized the remit of the EPC: although enhancement of the EPC with the SEA has

[77]The London Report Part I: "in a period of increased world tension..... the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the members of the European Community is greater than ever".
[78]The Genscher-Colombo Plan *cited in* Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, pp.120-125.
[79]*Ibid.,* p.125.
[80]Michael Smith, "The EU as An International Actor", pp. 247-261.
[81]In the SEA, it is stated that while the EC was established through its own treaties, the EPC was based on "…reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) and the practices gradually established among the member states" Single European Act, Title I, Article 1.
[82]Single European Act, Title III, Article 30.
[83]Single European Act, Title III, Article 30, Para. 6 (a).
[84]Single European Act, Title III, Article 30, Para. 6 (c).

paved the way for the establishment of the CFSP, defence issues were always kept apart. In other words, while the SEA gave reference to the economic and political aspects of the security, it left the military aspects to the NATO and national governments.[85] In that sense the EC and EPC acted as a civilian power. [86] In its relations with third countries and in its responses to the international problems, the EC through its EPC has always preferred negotiation and persuasion. Its economic strength was the primary power of the EC in the negotiation table. Moreover, defining as a civilian power has also attributed to the EC's inability to create concrete foreign and security policy. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the EC did not show any enthuasism to get hard security issues on its own agenda. It was mostly because of the Soviet threat. Against any possible massive attack, Western European states relied on NATO and the US in defence and did not want to risk this system.Meanwhile, Hedley Bull argued that "a strategic environment provided by the military power of the superpowers" mostly determines the limits of a civilian actor's power. In the light of this determination, return of the EC to "power politics" could be attributed to the military power of the superpowers.[87]

1.2.4 Revival of the WEU

In the 1980s, deteriorating relations with the US (due mainly to US policies over arms control and missile deployments) pushed Europe to take more concrete steps in security and defence cooperation. Dynamics of the Cold War left the EC out of the discussions and agreements (such as INF) between the US and the USSR. Increased dependency to the US on defence matters has also encouraged some EC members to search for new initiatives that would eliminate the imbalances. On the other hand, failure of the EPC process, especially its insufficient efforts in response to international crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) showed that the EPC was stuck

[85]Antonio Missiroli and Gerrard Quille, "European Security in Flux", Fraser Cameron (ed.), **The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement**, New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 114-135.
[86]François Duchene suggested in the early 1970s that Europe represented a 'civilian power', which was 'long on economic power and relatively short on armed force'. François Duchene, "Europe's Role in World Peace", in R. Mayne (ed.), **Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead ,** London: Fontana, pp. 32-47 *cited in* Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.2, pp.235-58.
[87]Bull, pp. 149-164.

in declaratory diplomacy. Most of the EPC work was about preparing declarations.[88] Hence, the EC "remained essentially a commentator rather than an actor." [89] In other words, the EPC became unsuccessful to carry out its mission, which was to increase the influence of the EC in the world politics.

The EC member states recognized the need for an alternative and the idea of reviving the WEU became the most attractive one. Despite the sensitivities of Denmark, Greece and Ireland about discussing defence issues, the other members of the EC[90] agreed on French proposal for reviving the Western European Union. France got a chance to not only to revive the WEU but also its long-standing dream about creating a separate European defence identity from NATO in order to decelerate American hegemony in Europe. France proposed to activate the organization as a forum in which they would be able to discuss and debate security and defence issues without the US involvement. Some analysts regarded this as the move of the EC to abandon its civilian role.[91]

Hence it is agreed to revive Western European Union in 1984 at a meeting of the Ministerial Council.[92] In Rome Declaration of 1984, besides political, geographical and psychological dimensions, the need for strengthening the military dimension of the Community was also emphasized. In the declaration, Ministers referred to a strong western security structure and to a more integrated Europe. They also stated that if WEU was able to operate successfully then not only the security of Western Europe would be enhanced but also there would be great contributions to the "improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance".[93] Provisions of the Rome Declaration together with the revival of the WEU have been perceived as an aim to establishing "common European defence identity" that would empower the European

[88]Simon J. Nutall, **European Political Co-operation**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.13.
[89]Christoper Patten, "The European Union and the World" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), **Europe in the New Century, Visions of an Emerging Superpower,** Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p.79.
[90]France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg.
[91]Panos Tsakaloyannis, "The EC: From Civilian Power to Military Integration" in Juliet Lodge (ed**.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future**, London: Pinter, 1989, pp. 245-246.
[92]A preliminary joint meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers within the WEU framework in Rome on 26 and 27 October 1984.
[93]Reactivation of WEU: from the Rome Declaration to the Hague Platform (1984-1989), Rome Declaration, http://www.weu.int/History.htm.

pillar of NATO. [94] Moreover, Article VIII of the Modified Brussels Treaty paved way for the consideration of the implications for Europe of crises outside the Europe. As a result of increased attention of Europe to the matters outside its boundaries, the WEU started to gain a more active military stance. The Iraq-Iran War (1987-1989) gave chance to EC to show how the WEU would handle a crisis in the other regions.

The WEU was able to respond effectively to the threats caused by mine-laying in the Persian Gulf, which affected free movement in international waters, by coordinating its forces successfully in the Operation Cleansweep.[95] Actually, with that operation, the very first collective European military action has been accomplished.

WEU members were eager to balance the role of US through sharing the burden.[96] They made clear their desire at the Summit in 1987, which took place in The Hague. Platform on European Security Interests was established for addressing member states' stance about Western security and defence. In the Platform, the importance of NATO in assurance of Western Europe's security was stressed by giving special emphasis to the strengthening of its European pillar. [97] In the Platform, it was also stated "the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did not include security and defence".[98] In short, the WEU has been shaped to reinforce the security and defence formation of the Community for a more integrated Europe by increasing its role in the NATO as a European pillar of it and taking steps towards a more coherent European defence identity.[99] The WEU was expanded on 27 March 1990

[94]NATO Handbook, "Chapter 15:The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU", http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm.
[95]Operation Cleansweep was a minesweeping operation in the Persian Gulf. "In 1987 and 1988, following the laying of mines in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, WEU Member States reacted together to this threat to freedom of navigation. Minesweepers despatched by WEU countries helped secure free movement in international waters. Operation Cleansweep helped to complete "the clearance of a 300-mile sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz, and was the first instance of a concerted action in WEU." Joint WEU Actions in the Gulf (1988-1990), Operational Role, http://www.weu.int/History.htm
[96]"burdensharing" refers to sharing of the defense burden of the West on equal basis.
[97]Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, The Hague, 27 October 1987, I.4, Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents,** p.190.
[98]Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, The Hague, 27 October 1987, para. 2, Christopher Hill and Karen Smith, **European Foreign Policy: Key Documents,** p.189.
[99]Howorth, "National Defence and European Security Integration: An Illusion Inside a Chimera?", p.14.

with the participation of Spain and Portugal after the ratification of the 1988 Treaty of Accession.[100]

Meanwhile, during the 1980s, the contributions of the WEU to European security and defence remained limited. European states were feeling much more secure under the NATO framework. Jopp stated that during the Cold War the willingness of EC members to expand integration beyond the economic and diplomatic fields was rather limited due to the positions of NATO and the US as guarantors of Western Europe's Security.[101]

[100]By 1954, members of WEU were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Spain and Portugal joined in 1990.
[101]Mathias Jopp, "The Defense Dimension of the European Union: The Role and Performance of the WEU", in Regelsberger et.al, 1997, pp.153-172.

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE INTEGRATION DURING THE POST-COLD WAR: DEFENCE ON THE AGENDA

"…. defence is the key to the development of the Community's place in the World." [102]

In 1990s, with the end of Cold War, defense issues were not a "bogeyman" anymore. Europe was experiencing a new era in the absence of a definite threat. Facing with new challenges forced the EU to expand its security agenda beyond the economic and political aspects of security. Defence, not as a new but as a latecomer, was welcomed in the Community again. Besides, European defense was accepted as an integral part of the process of European integration. Indeed, it was seen as a natural process following economic integration and political integration.

After the failure of the EDC process, defence issues were abandoned from the European integration agenda and almost forty years it became a taboo subject. During the Cold War, Europe had taken huge steps in economic integration with the European Economic Community (EEC). But, integration in security and defense policy was limited due to the different preferences of member states regarding defence issues and the Europeans' dependency on the NATO/US to ensure their security. In other words, defence was left to the responsibility of NATO.

The end of the Cold War paved the way for the development of a European security and defense identity. Helene Sjursen stated that although the idea of a European security and defense identity was not invented at the end of the Cold War, it was given a new life with the breakdown of bipolarity in Europe.[103] The US' commitment to European defense and the future role of NATO in the absence of the communist threat, gave a chance to the EU to become the main security and defense agent of the Europe. Widening security agenda reduced the value of military power, possibility of a direct military threat has declined; and therefore importance of relations between defense and

[102]Hedley Bull as quoted in Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.31, No.3, 1993, p.318.
[103]Helene Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy", p.95.

national sovereignty has lessened, so the opportunity to forge a defense role for the EU existed.[104] On the other hand, according to Carolyn Rhodes, "the Cold War provided some of the glue that hold the EU states together", hence, the removal of the glue would make the interplay of national security interests more "mercurial and potentially more dangerous".[105]

Although the end of the Cold War removed the bipolarity and reduced dependency of Europe on the US, new problems have emerged. Europe had to respond to the problems related to the newly independent CEECs. In fact, it had to fulfill the power vacuum in the region as the US lost its strategic interest in Europe region, which became apparent with its manner in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.[106] These developments paved way to the inclusion of defense along with security to the integration agenda of the Europe.

In the period beginning with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, EU made attempts to form a common security and defense identity. However, only the developments that started with the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 could give impetus to the creation of an autonomous 'European Security and Defense Policy'. Nevertheless, it was the Maastricht Treaty, which opened the way for the development of a European security and defence identity. Howorth defined the situation as: " genie was out of the bottle and the common defense project had begun to take on a life of its own."[107] Defense was reintroduced into the European integration process.

Indeed, the Europe had a unique integration experience that is also the case in terms of security and defense issues. The process towards the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) started with the failed European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community during the 1950's, and the Fouchet Plans of the 1960's. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) on November

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[104]White, p.147.
[105]David Allen and Michael Smith, "The European Union's Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator, or Manager", in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), **The European Union in the World Community,** Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.52.
[106]John McCormick, "The EU and the World", in John McCormick (ed.), **Understanding the European Union** , Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp.202-229.
[107]Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: the Ultimate Challenge", **Chaillot Paper,** No.43, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, November 2000, pp. 9-31.

1970 has reached some success in coordinating the foreign policies in areas other than economic affairs.[108] Even though the structure of the EPC was established outside the framework of the European Communities (EC), it has developed with the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the European Union - TEU) in 1991, and EPC was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which led to the creation of a more autonomous defense component, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

In this chapter, the effects of the elimination of the Soviet threat from the European security structure are evaluated. International events and also the role of NATO in shaping European Security and Defense Identity are explored. The reasons that pushed the EU to create an autonomous ESDP within the EU framework are evaluated by giving special emphasis to the experiences in Kosovo and Bosnia. Changes in the British stance, which accelerated the processes toward the creation of the ESDP are also be examined.

2.1 THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: THE CREATION OF THE CFSP AND BEYOND

The dissolution of the communist bloc left the EU in an unstable security environment, which created new external demands. The threat was not definite any more; new conflicts, including ethnic and national conflicts in Eastern Europe emerged. As mentioned before, one sided security perception has left and security agenda has broadened to the issues such as ethnic conflicts, border disputes, migration, terrorism, human rights, and environmental problems. The newly independent ex-Soviet states that were experiencing economic and political instability, have also called for the Western European States' contribution to ensure stability in the region.[109] German reunification was reached despite the reservations of Britain and France. Furthermore, since the Soviet threat was eliminated the US was not willing to share the security burden of Europe anymore. The Bush administration called for a whole and free Europe, which

[108]Michael E. Smith, **Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.1.

[109]"The EU established closer relations with CEECs.The recognition by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) of the EC in 1988 was the first step. Future enlargement of the EU was seen necessary for the democratic consolidations and economic prosperity of CEECs. The EU started with association treaties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Europe Agreements, which led to the negotiations of accession and to the incorporation of 10 new members on May 1, 2004.

had to construct new institutions beside old security foundations such as NATO.[110] According to the US, it was making huge contributions to European security through the NATO in financial terms and while the Americans suffer from Europe's defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP)[111], Europeans were comfortable with being protected without a cost.[112] Thus, the US looked for a balance in defense spending within NATO, which referred to a greater burden sharing on the part of Europe. With the end of the Cold War, the US decided to reduce its commitment to European security. Especially during the crisis in the Balkans, the US was very determined in its position that the Balkans did not belong to their sphere of interests. This motivation furthered the attempts towards creation of a more autonomous European security and defense framework.

The real awakening of the EU in understanding how much it needed the creation of a political union particularly in foreign affairs and defense issues took place during the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War[113] and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. It was the recognition that the EPC was unable to deal with the crises. During the Gulf War, inability of the EU to introduce common position and the lack of a military force has appeared. This crisis showed that despite the dissolution of the Cold War, the US and NATO are still the core elements of European defence, and the internal EU disagreement and insecurity about the general purpose of European integration.[114] Once more, the EU was faced with its inability to respond a crisis unanimously, which occurred in the EU's neighbourhood. The war in former Yugoslavia revealed the insufficient political and military capacities of the EU to respond to such a

[110]Duke, *opt. cit.* pp.92-93.
[111]John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO", **International Organization**, The MIT Press , Vol. 44, No. 3, Summer, 1990, pp.379-402.
[112]NATO has two characteristics: "First, a nation's consumption of defense does not effect the amount still available for other nations to consume...Second, once these goods are provided, they are available to everyone...This characteristic provides the incentive for a nation to 'free-ride' when it knows that other nations will provide sufficient alliance defense for its needs." Keither Hartley and Todd Sander, "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 36, No.6, November 1999, p.668.
[113]The crisis in the Gulf and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait prompted the US (along with an international coalition) to a war in 1991. Britain and France joined the coalition, Belgium, Spain and Portugal were involved only in mine sweeping and enforcing the blockade. Germany was constrained by the constitutional limits on the deployment of German troops 'outside of area'. http://www.weu.int/History.htm.
[114]Sjursen, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Limits of Intergovernmentalism and the Search for a Global Role", p.188.

problem. The inability of the EU to show political will derived also from the fact that the institutional machinery of the EU was too weak to introduce a common decision.

On the other hand, these crises helped to the EU to notice that it was in need of recasting their security institutions and developing its own military capabilities to react to the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Karen Smith defined post-Cold War motives for enhancing a European Security and Defence Policy as[115]:

- German unification that boosted the "deepening" of European integration;

- US refusal to share Europe's military burden by withdrawing many of its troops from Western Europe;

- Military force did not seem to be so irrelevant;

- Need for military capability in order to attend peacekeeping missions in the regions that are in crises.

Meanwhile, the lack of military instruments to support the policy aims of the Union exerted pressure for the development of EU defence dimension.[116] Europeans were also recognized that they would have more common foreign interests with the development of the Single European Market and the possibility of a European Monetary Union, but they lacked institutional resources to protect those interests. There was a need to "eventual incorporation of a defence and security identity to complete its external dimensions".[117] Therefore issues of security and defence were brought to the negotiation table of the Maastricht Treaty.

Treaty on the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty) agreed in Maastricht in December 1991 (signed in February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993) aimed to respond to new challenges and to meet the global changes. The Treaty

[115]Karen E. Smith, "The End of Civilian Power EU: Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?", **The International Spectator**, Vol. XXXV, No.2, April-June 2000, pp.14-15.
[116]Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, **The European Union as Global Actor**, Second Edition, London, New York: Routledge , 2006.
[117]Deighton, p.170.

introduced a Union based on three *pillars*: the Community pillar (first pillar), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar (second pillar), and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (third pillar).[118] Indeed, the CFSP, which was about to cover all the areas of foreign and security policy, was a transformed form of the EPC process. Besides, the CFSP was intended to turn out the different positions to common positions. Member states that reached common positions unanimously had an obligation to, "support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity."[119] With the new procedures in the CFSP, there was a possibility for joint actions[120] that could be initiated and/or implemented by a qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council on the basis of principles and guidelines agreed upon in unanimity in the Council.[121] In that sense QMV was a major advancement of the CFSP compared with the EPC. Some examples of Joint Actions under the CFSP[122] are:

- Support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993)

- Dispatch of a team of observers for the parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation (1993)

- Support for the transition toward democracy and multiracial South Africa (1993)

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[118]Pillar one contained the three Communities, with all the major internal areas of policy and the majority of external areas falling within Community competence. The CFSP (pillar two) and pillar three, which deals with cooperation in the areas related to justice and home affairs, are decided by intergovernmental agreement.

[119]Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1-4, http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr2f.htm#16.

[120]The dominant actors of the CFSP are the European Council (of the heads of government and state) and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (of foreign ministers) that work out joint actions, common positions, and strategies. The Commission shares the right of initiative with the member states, the Parliament plays an active role (e.g., in suggesting new issues to be put on the agenda) and the CFSP relies for its operating and administrative expenses on the Community budget. Although the Maastricht Treaty allows the European Parliament only a very limited role in the CSFP process – to be consultative and to approve the CFSP budget - the Parliament exploits its opportunities and succeeds thereby in asserting its own role. According to the TEU, it is regularly informed on the principles and the opinions by the presidency and the Commission. Susanne Peters and Kirsten Westphal, "The CFSP/ESDP: from the Tail Light to the Future Motor of European Integration?", Module for a Study Guide on European Integration, Deakin University, Australia, October 2004. See also: Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty), Maastricht, 7 February 1992; Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

[121]McCormick, p.207.

[122]Piening, p. 41. See also: Giovanna Bono, "European Security and Defense Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues", Research and Training Network: Building the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and Democracy, February 2002, http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/esdp02.pdf.

- Support for Middle East Peace Process (1994)

- Preparation for the 1995 conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (1994)

- Observation of the elections to the Palestinian Council (1995)

- Nomination of an EU Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region (Rwanda and Burundi) (1995)

Unlike the EPC process, the Maastricht Treaty did not marginalize defence but it stipulated the possibility of "common defence" for the future: The Member states agreed to the development of "a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".[123] Although the Maastricht Treaty can be regarded as crucial step towards the establishment of a common defence policy, the wording of the related provision was rather "vague and non-committal" and it indicated the continuing debate between the member states about the degree of integrating defence to the EU framework.[124]

During the preparations for the Maastricht Treaty, the United States signaled its objection to an autonomous European security structure mostly due to the Franco-German proposal of 1991, advocating the merger of the WEU into the EC framework, and creating a separate European security and defence identity outside of NATO. In the Bartholomew-Dobbins memorandum, which was a non-official letter from the US State Department to all the governments of the EU Member States, the US revealed that any kind of provisions, which would allow the development of a European competitor to NATO, would not be tolerated.[125] Hence, while the Atlanticists[126] do not want to lose

[123]Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.4 1.
[124]Adrian Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's resistable Transformation", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol.9, No.1, Spring 2004, p. 51.
[125]Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, "The Creation of the Common and Security Policy", Regelsberger et. al., 1997, pp.41-63. The Bartholomew-Dobbins telegram affirmed that 1991 was "not a time for Europeans to be sending a message, however unintended, to the US public suggesting they want to reduce or marginalize the US role in Europe". "… we want to stress the dangers that positions which seem to emphasise European over transatlantic solidarity or institutional changes which diminish the centrality of the Alliance could pose for American opinion on, and support for, the transatlantic partnership", quoted in Wilhelm Van Eekelen, **Debating European Security 1948-1998,** The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998, p. 340.

the support of the US, Europeanists have showed more sensitivity in the wording of defence section of the Treaty. According to Anne Deighton, with the settlement of the American sensitivities, "the European strategy adopted was to empower the EU by empowering the WEU".[127] So, while dreams about common defense policy are postponed to an unknown time, the WEU has strengthened its position as the defense component of the Union. WEU was in charge of elaborating and implementing decisions and actions that had defense implications.[128]

Despite several attempts through the CFSP for integrating security and defense into the Union, member states were not ready to make the EU a separate defense actor at the expense of NATO. The CFSP preserved the civilian and intergovernmental characteristics of earlier developments, and did not underestimate the primacy of NATO.[129] The weakness of the EU to respond to recent crises and its inefficient military instruments increased the demand to keep NATO in the European defence structure. So, in the Treaty, it was stated that European security and defence cooperation would not underestimate the role of the NATO and also the WEU's activities would be compatible with those of NATO. [130] In other words, while on the one hand WEU was supposed to play the role of the defense arm of the Union, at the same time it was supposed to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.[131]

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[126]The term 'Atlanticist' refers to those who support, " the US-led American-European coalition that would continue to dominate the world scene," while 'Europeanist' describes those who wish to develop a more balanced world in which a unified Europe and an integrated European Union can play a more independent role in international affairs. www.sourcewatch.org.

[127]Deighton, p.724.

[128]Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.4-2.

[129]Michael E. Smith, "Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy", **Journal of Common Market Studies,** No. 39, 2001, pp.79-104.

[130]"The Petersberg Declaration, along with the 'Document on Associate Membership' adopted at the Rome Ministerial in November of 1992, further extended associate membership in the WEU to NATO members, which were not part of the European Union, including Turkey, Iceland, and Norway. These associate members could fully participate in both the meetings and the missions of WEU, although they do not have full voting rights in the organization. At the same time in 1992, another class of WEU membership was also developed, observer status, for EU member states that, due to their neutral status, do not participate in NATO. Two years later, with the Kirchberg Declaration' issued during the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg in May 1994, a final WEU-affiliation status, associate partners, was created for countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia, that were members of neither NATO nor the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland also joined the WEU as associate members in 1999, short after becoming members of NATO in the same year." Alistair H. Taylor, The European Union and the ESDP and the Question of Turkey", Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts, Sabancı University, 2005, pp.15-16.

[131]The first WEU Declaration on "The role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance" stated "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as

The WEU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence met at Petersberg outside Bonn in June 1992. They decided to establish a planning cell and make military units available for the WEU in order to strengthen the operational role of it. Petersberg Declaration paved the way to conduct new out of the area roles for the WEU by adding new tasks separately from its contribution to collective defence in accordance with the Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.[132] The new tasks, which are called as *Petersberg tasks*, are crisis management missions, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making. In that context, the Petersberg Declaration reflects WEU member states' determination to increase the authority of the WEU by both using military forces beyond the purpose of collective defense and to take decisions on their own for getting involved in crises and deploying soldiers.

2.2 SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE: THE ESDI

During the Cold War defining the role of NATO was much more easier since each institution had a clear and definable task; each was a "single issue" institution.[133] NATO was providing collective defence and nuclear deterrence against a specific threat. In that sense NATO was the core element of European security and defence. The end of the Cold War diminished the importance of both collective defense and NATO's nuclear deterrent, so NATO was supposed to lose its charm for Europe. Surprisingly, NATO took on new tasks, which were mostly non-Article V missions that are separate from the traditional collective defence function of the Alliance, including crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and peace-enforcement. It also attempted to transform its passive role in European integration process to an active one. NATO has activated its role in deepening European integration with its attempt to develop European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO.[134] According to Sjursen, during this period "NATO seemed to emerge at the apex of security

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the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role." For the exact wording see "Declaration of the WEU member states on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", annexed to the Treaty on European Union.

[132]Petersberg Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, www.weu.int.

[133]Michael Rhle, "Taking Another Look at NATO's Role in European Security", **NATO Review**, No.4, Winter 1998, pp.20-23.

[134]*Ibid.*

arrangements in Europe, with the EU playing a minor role and the concept of ESDI developing inside the framework of NATO".[135] Although, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO was regarded as an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures, the institutional primacy of NATO and ESDI overshadowed the Europeans' attempts towards the creation of a more autonomous common defence policy during the 1990s. On the other hand, Howorth thinks: "NATO's green light to ESDI unleashed a political process which eventually led to the St-Malo summit and on to Cologne, Helsinki and the CESDP."[136]

NATO declared its desire for the development of the ESDI in the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance launched at the Rome Summit of 1991. It stated that the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, would not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.[137] It also called for three areas of future activity; a broader approach to security, restructuring of its military capabilities for crisis management tasks and allowing European allies to take more responsibility for their own security.[138] However, a more concrete step towards the achievement of the ESDI was taken at the NATO Summit in Brussels in 1994 where ESDI launched unofficially. The ESDI would be a new mechanism to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and led Europeans to take more responsibility for their own defense and security affairs without ignoring NATO's presence. In order to support the development of the European Security and Defence Identity and to avoid duplication of military capabilities and competition between NATO and WEU, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept was agreed at the Summit.[139] In that sense CJTF, which would meet both Alliance and WEU force

[135]Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defense Policy", p.101.
[136]Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: the Ultimate Challenge", p.23.
[137]The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Part 1, Article 2,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm
[138]White, p.148.
[139]"Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance." Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Declaration of the

requirements for out of area operations by using NATO assets, would be a bridge between NATO and the ESDI/WEU.[140]

The ultimate goal of the CJTF concept[141] is to provide improved operational flexibility and a coherent and flexible response in non-Article V operations such as crisis management and peacekeeping operations. The CJTF have also made NATO resources and capabilities available to the WEU. Accordingly, WEU would have access to its core requirements, which are infrastructure, satellite intelligence, logistics, and communications through borrowing from NATO. Besides military elements, CJTF also had political elements. Actually, the CJTF concept was adopted as a result of the US proposal, which seek to find a solution to the burden sharing issue.[142] On the other hand, for the US, the CJTF was not only a technical military arrangement that provided greater share of the burden but it was also a pragmatic means that would ensure the primacy of NATO as the core security institution in Europe while Europeans assumed greater responsibility for their own security. [143] On one hand, the CJTF would make Europeans able to decreasing their defence spending and reducing the need for autonomous capabilities. On the other hand, it increased their dependency on NATO and US assets. In that sense, CJTF can be seen as a move to block European autonomy because NATO would help to facilitate the creation of the ESDI but not as a completely independent initiative, instead the ESDI would be constructed within NATO by taking advantage of military capabilities "separable but not separate" from the alliance.[144]

Decisions taken at the NATO Berlin Meeting of June 1996 made clear that the ESDI concept would be developed within the NATO framework. NATO declared itself

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Heads of State and Government, para. 9, **NATO Handbook**, Chapter 12: "The Military Command Structure- CJTF Concept," from website, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1204.htm.

[140]Sean Kay, **NATO and The Future of European Security**, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998, pp. 123-147.

[141]**A force** is any grouping of military capabilities, manpower and equipment in organised units. **A task force** is a grouping organised for the purposes of carrying out a specific mission or task, which is then disbanded when the task has been accomplished. **A joint task** force is one involving two or more military services (army, navy, airforce, etc.) **A combined joint task** force involves the forces of two or more nations. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/16cjtf.pdf.

[142]Sermes MAT, "AGSK'nın Geleceği", **Ulusal Strateji**, Yıl:5, Sayı:33, Mart 2003, pp.93-94.

[143]Kay, *opt. cit.*

[144]For the citation "separable but not separate capabilities" look at Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, para. 6, from website, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm.

as an integral part of the European security structure.[145] Berlin decisions aimed to complete the objectives taken at the Brussels Summit through taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, that would strengthen European identity by supporting it with appropriate military planning, and permitting "the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU". [146] Accession to NATO's capabilities increased the possibility to enhance WEU as a military effective organization that would able to achieve its Petersberg Tasks such as peacekeeping, humanitarian missions and peace enforcement.[147] In that sense the development of the CJTF has become the central element of the incorporation of the ESDI within NATO. Therefore, the CJTF concept would especially support WEU-led operations. It would allow for a "a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions.... the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR."[148] Both the Brussels and Berlin arrangements clarified that the ESDI within NATO was based on the idea of "separable but not separate capabilities" from the Alliance.[149] In other words, these forces would be separable from NATO when some allies preferred not to get involved and thus could be made available to WEU, but they would not be separate from NATO, meaning that they would remain within the auspices of the Alliance. So, WEU would able to reach NATO's assets and capabilities to conduct military operations even if the US forces were not involved.[150] Moreover, any WEU-led operations that utilize the Alliance's resources needed to receive the prior approval of the North Atlantic Council.[151] Once again, the primacy of NATO in the European security arrangements remained intact but by increasing the WEU's capability in EU-led operations, NATO would support the gradual development of the EU as a strategic

[145]NATO Ministerial Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, para. 3, from website, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm.
[146]*Ibid.*, para. 7.
[147]Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor, Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2002.
[148]NATO Ministerial Communique M-NAC-1 (96)63, para. 6.
[149]Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: Separable but not Separate", **NATO Review**, Vol.48, No.1, Summer 2000, p.12.
[150]Luis Maria de Puig, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO", **NATO Review**, Vol.46, No.2, Summer 1998, p.6.
[151]Paul Cornish, "European Security: The End of Architecture And The New NATO," **International Affairs**, Vol.72 No. 4, October 1996, pp.761-762. See also, Sean Kay, p.137.

actor.[152] According to White, these arrangements did not make any contribution to the creation of an autonomous European defence identity, but they had the effect of "further binding WEU and ESDI into the NATO framework and underlined the dependence of WEU upon NATO for military capabilities".[153]

2.3 THE AMSTERDAM TREATY

Even tough the taboo over defence issues was eliminated with the Maastricht Treaty, different expectations about what would be an independent European defence structure, the future of NATO and the WEU, and the relationship between the EU, WEU and NATO undermined the efforts of a common European defence[154]. Therefore, the CFSP under Maastricht Treaty, like its predecessor, the EPC, was basically devoted to long-term conflict resolution with diplomatic and economic tools and not a quick crisis management mechanism using military means; as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia showed[155]. Those crises influenced the reform of the CFSP under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which emphasised the development of operational capabilities, coherent foreign policy representation, and competences on planning and analysis.

The Amsterdam Treaty did not make radical changes but it introduced some modifications to the Maastricht Treaty. The initiative in the CFSP was still shared between member states and the Commission. Art. 23 envisaged three voting procedures for the Council: unanimity, qualified majority voting, and a majority of member states.[156] Besides unanimity and qualified majority voting Amsterdam introduced the possibility of decision making by majority vote, through the creation of a new voting status, "constructive abstention", which would allow member states to abstain from engaging in a common endeavor while not preventing the rest from doing so, in other words, one-third of the members may abstain from the decision without blocking it.[157]

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[152]Rhle, *opt. cit.*
[153]White, p. 148.
[154]Van Eckelen, p. 59.
[155]Emma J. Stewart, **The European Union and Conflict Prevention - Policy Evolution and Outcome**, Berlin: LIT, 2006, p.49.
[156]Fraser Cameron**, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Past, Present and Future**, Sheffield: Academic Press, 1999, p.65.
[157]Freire, p.11.

Moreover, "common strategies" were added to the existing mechanisms of common positions and joint actions. Proposed action relating to common strategies agreed by the European Council might be taken by qualified majority vote in areas where member states have considerable common interests. This vote may be blocked by any member state by referring to "important and stated reasons of national policy". Any decision with military implications should be taken unanimously. From Article 12 to Article 15 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the policy instruments are listed and specified as: principles and guidelines; common strategies; joint actions; common positions; and systematic cooperation.[158] The Amsterdam Treaty has also introduced enhanced cooperation that allowed groups to advance in a specific area without the consensus of all EU members. One of the important improvements that came with the Amsterdam Treaty was the establishment of the position of a High Representative for the CFSP, which gave the EU a single voice in external representation. The Commission, France and Britain considered this reform as potentially the most important change in the CSFP that took place as a result of the Amsterdam Treaty.[159] To support the new function, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which was crucial for the future development of ESDP, was formed. It is tasked with monitoring analysing and assessing international developments.

On the security and defence front, the Amsterdam Treaty provided military capability to the CFSP, through the incorporation of the WEU Petersberg Tasks within the scope of the CFSP.[160] Indeed member states showed their willingness about a potential merger of WEU into the EU with the provision: "The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide."[161] Although French and German politicians were keen supporters of the WEU merger within the EU, the fear of the Transatlanticist member states about loosing the support of NATO has blocked this attempt. Finally, the Treaty did not merge the WEU and the

[158]Cameron, **The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Past, Present and Future,** pp.64-65.
[159]Sjursen, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Limits of Intergovernmentalism and the Search for a Global Role", p.194.
[160]Treaty of Amsterdam, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.7.1. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf.
[161]Treaty of Amsterdam, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.7.1.

European Union. Such a merger could have led to the transformation of the EU into an organization of territorial defense in the form of a military alliance.[162] Moreover, NATO's unchallenged presence in defence was emphasized: "The policy of the Union…. shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States..…. which see their common defence realized in the NATO".[163] Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty has also emphasized NATO's dominance in the defence realm and with the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks to the CFSP arranged a "security rather than defence role for the EU".[164] In short, despite the efforts to strengthen the WEU via the establishment of the ESDI and CJTF concepts, NATO's predominance in the European defence limited the role of the WEU. For many critics, with respect to defense integration, the "Treaty of Amsterdam only appeared to add to the ambiguity about the Union's future role in this field."[165]

2.4 AN ANALYSIS OF THE EU's DEFENCE POSTURE IN THE PERIOD 1991-1997

The end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the political and strategic environment in Europe. Break-up of bipolarity was an important landmark for European security, as it created an opportunity for the development of a renewed role in security for the EU through restructuring the European security framework and the Union got the chance to increase its sphere of influence in international politics. The end of the Cold War increased the expectations towards the creation of a more autonomous European security and defense framework. Moreover the thought that NATO would lose its importance in European defence because of the elimination of a definite threat diminished the need for a collective security. NATO was established to provide collective security for its members in the face of Soviet expansion, many in Europe, and especially in France, thought that NATO would either

[162]Heinz Gartner, "European Security: The end of Territorial Defence", **The Brown Journal of World Affairs**, Winter/Spring 2003, Volume IX, Issue 2, pp.135-147, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Gartner.pdf.
[163]Treaty of Amsterdam, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.7.1.
[164]White, p.149.
[165]Adrian Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's resistable Transformation", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol.9, No.1, Spring 2004, p. 60.

fade away or strictly limit itself to its Article V collective defense function.[166] Indeed, contrary to general expectations, NATO not only preserved its position but it was also able to increase its prominence. Moreover, crises in the Gulf and the former Yugoslavia revealed shortfalls of the Europe's defence institutions. The EU lacked deployable, professional armed forces, had no common strategic culture and was incapable of projecting significant forces abroad. Budgetary costs to overcome these inefficiencies were not preferable for the member states; instead they chose to rely on NATO and US assets at the expense of autonomous European security and defence. They remained heavily reliant on American military capabilities, especially in sea and air lift, communications, satellite intelligence, and power projection. Leaving defence issues to NATO and the US and escaping from the cost was more convenient for Member States. According to White, increased level of NATO's involvement in European security via Atlanticizing ESDI and the WEU, led the EU to concentrate more on other issues such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and enlargement, "which were either seen as more pressing or upon which agreement could more easily be attained".[167] In other words, NATO allowed Europe to make progress in deepening its integration without dividing its energy between political ambitions and limited military means. As a result of dependency on NATO, and especially American military capabilities, the growth of European security and defense integration was restrained within the NATO-related framework of WEU. That kind of dependency was one of the most important barriers to the development of more autonomous European security and defence in the aftermath of the Cold War. The EU had the opportunity to develop its own defence policy, but missed it by the mid-90s partly due to NATO's incredible transformation in a way that was unforeseen five years earlier.[168]

The EU's inability to have an effective defense component also undermined the Member States' long-lasting desire for upgrading the Union's international role. While the single market program and achievement of the EMU increased the EU's influence in the international arena, the gap between its external economic influence and political

[166]David Yosh, **NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security**, Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 1998, p.208-209.
[167]White, 148.
[168] Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy: The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy," p.95.

impact widened. In the 1990s, EU was still nothing more than a civilian power because it was not able to narrow the capabilities- expectations gap, the difference between what the EU delivers and what is expected of it.[169] Maastricht and Amsterdam were the reflection of the Member States' willingness to move the Union beyond being a civilian power and to add a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union.[170] The expectation was that the three-pillar structure of the EU, through the development of a common foreign and security policy would eventually include a common defence policy. However, for the 1991-1997 period the expectations for foreign policy and military power did not match the Union's capabilities. Hill described it as a "capabilities–expectation gap" based on unreal expectations and Sjursen called it an "eternal fantasy".[171] Peterson and Bomberg also stated: "EU continued to lack one of essential prerequisites of great power status: a military capability that could be deployed in the pursuit of political goals".[172]

Consequently, at the end of 1997, the EU was more a civilian power rather than a military actor. It exercised its power at international stage through issues related to the Pillar I and left the leading role to NATO in security and defence issues. No

[169]When in 1992, Christopher Hill has introduced the idea of capability-expectations gap what he was talking about was the EU's insufficient capability to respond expectations. What he meant by "expectations" were ambitions or demands regarding the EU's international behavior, which come from both inside and outside the Union. What he meant by "capabilities", on the other hand, were related with the conventional instruments of foreign policy such as diplomacy, the use of force etc. Gap existed because of extended expectations on the EU as an international actor and its limited ability to respond to those expectations. It was the end of the Cold War and a chance for the EU, in a place that military forces has lost their attraction, to use its status as a civilian power to take the lead in the international arena. The US wanted to share its burden in world politics and supported the EU to become an international actor that responds to the conflicts, which occurred in Europe and in the world. With the establishment of the CFSP, EU seemed ready to take this responsibility but it could not. First, it failed in Bosnia, and then came Albania. These showed that the EU was not capable of to carrying out the early expectations about it. The gap increased because of the EU's inability to take decisions and hold to them. Ginsberg states four criteria for evaluating the EU's actor capacity. The EU needs recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. Although the EU has recognition it could not be able to reduce the member states' influence and could not be able to transfer autonomy in foreign and security relations from the national level to the EU level. Despite these failures of the EU, Hill stated that the gap between the capabilities and expectations narrowed not because of the increasing capabilities of the EU to respond expectations but because of the lowering level of expectations. For more information see: Roy H. Ginsberg, "Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability –Expectation Gap", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 37, No.3, 1999 pp.429-454; Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 31, No.3, 1993, pp305-328; Martin Holland, "Bridging the Capability-Expectations Gap: A Case study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 33, No.5, 1995, pp.555-571.

[170]Richard G.Whitman, **From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union**, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy : The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy".

[171]Christopher Hill, pp. 305-328.

[172]John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, **Decision-making in the European Union**, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p.240.

progress towards integration in the realms of security and defence was achieved. The Maastricht Amsterdam Treaties were seen just as declarations with excellent wording. Therefore, the common foreign and security policy existed merely on paper. [173]

2.5 TOWARDS THE ESDP: EUROPE IN TRANSITION

The logic of European integration is based on cooperation, where an increased interdependence between national and European actors takes place for "an upgrading of common interests."[174] However, the EU member states had failed to upgrade their common interests in the area of foreign and security policy for a long time. According to de Leon, this failure could be attributed to the framing of external relations that shaped the EU as a civilian power and to the position of NATO as a substitute for an autonomous European security and defence policy.[175] On the other hand, de Leon states: "shocking external events introduce an element of urgency in the strategic calculations of actors participating in the intergovernmental process".[176] It was the Kosovo war that increased the interdependence between member states over collective security.

In the mid-1990s, the Balkans was a zone of conflict, especially the Bosnian war needed to urgent response from the EU. Insufficient military capabilities and different interests of member states limited the EU's role. The US' unwillingness and late intervention to the situation forced the EU to revise its policies. But the real catalyst was the Kosovo War, which was a lesson for the EU member states to get more decisive about the development of an autonomous European security and defence policy. In December 1998, the crisis in the Balkans was at its peak because of the ethnic cleansing of Albanian Muslims by the Serbs in Kosovo. The EU again failed to respond to the conflict. The US had to take the lead.

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[173] Ojanen, "Theories at a Loss? EU–NATO Fusion and the 'Low Politicisation' of Security and Defence in European Integration", p.60.
[174] Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration:The European and Universal Process", **International Organization**, Vol.15, No.3, (Summer 1961), pp.366-392 cited in Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, "New Logics of Integration in European Security and Defence Policy: Changing Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms in the Intergovernmental Decision-Making Process", Paper presented at EUSA Biennale Conference, Montreal, 17-19 May, 2007, p.2, http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/leon-c-06g.pdf.
[175] Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, p.2.
[176] *Ibid.*

The air-campaign of NATO, which raged over Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 in order to enforce Milosevic's approval of a peace settlement, increased the tension between the EU and the US. On the one hand, Europeans disagreed with the US military strategy targeting civilian buildings and areas in order to weaken Milosevic and supported a more truly European way of making peace on the continent.[177] Europe blamed the US for taking many critical decisions that led to the "marginalization and even humiliation" of the European allies.[178] On the other hand, the US blamed the Europeans for not making any contribution other than complicating. Europeans lacked sufficient airlift capability to move troops; they had inadequate intelligence and humanitarian supplies; their satellite capabilities were weak compared to those of the United States; and they had no joint command and control system.[179] To compensate for the Europeans' lack of aircraft and missiles, the US had to take huge amount of the burden and the US had conducted nearly 80 percent of the bombing, 90 percent of the air-to-air refueling, and had approximately 95 percent of the intelligence requirements.[180] Accordingly, the Europeans realized the need to establish a more effective and functional European security structure, which would enable them to intervene in crises without the US interference. According to Ulrich Beck, Kosovo could be "military euro", leading to the creation of a European security and defence identity within the EU in the same way as what the euro represents for the economic and monetary integration. [181]

2.6 THE ST. MALO DECLARATION AND THE COLOGNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Besides the Kosovo War, a shift in British foreign policy has also accelerated the development of the ESDP. Britain abandoned its traditional resistance against an autonomous European defense structure. British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to support a more European role in defense and expressed his ideas for the first time at an

[177]Bono, pp. 29-30.
[178]Philip H. Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defence Work", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.79, No. 4 , July-August 2000, p.14.
[179]Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, "A European Defence Strategy", Bertelsman Foundation, Guetersloh, May 2004, pp.5-95, http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf.
[180]David S. Yost, 'The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union', **Survival**, Vol.42, No. 4 Winter 2000-01, pp. 103-107.
[181]Ulrich Beck as quoted in Roger Cohen, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Europeans; In Uniting Over Kosovo, A New Sense of Identity", **New York Times**, April 28, 1999, p.2.

informal EU summit in Pörtschach, Austria, in October 1998.[182] However, Blair's support was conditional. Accordingly, developing an EU defence policy would be acceptable if it were "militarily credible, politically intergovernmental and NATO compatible". [183] In other words, Britain emphasized the primacy of NATO in any future common European defence formation. At a press conference Blair made Britain's stance clear: "..... we need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need to make sure that that institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to it."[184] Actually, Blair's expression was mostly reflecting the fears of the member states about American isolationism, which also increased their enthusiasm for a more effective defence role. Thus, an autonomous defence capability would not only increase the EU-led operations in the cases that the US and NATO refused to attend but it would also assure the US commitment to Europe's future security problems because the ESDP could reduce the American burden. Blair also talked about strengthening European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, merging WEU and the EU and finding way in which WEU, NATO and the EU could work in line with one another.[185] That British initiative did not immediately get wide spread support because member states were not ready to the merger of the WEU within the EU without serious elaboration. Nevertheless, it opened the way for the British-French Summit took place in Saint Malo, in December 1998, where Britain and France reached a milestone agreement outlining a common defence policy for Europe.

At the joint Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac signalled a new direction in European defence. Both Blair and Chirac advocated an autonomous political and military capability for the EU, by stating that the "Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to

[182]Richard G.Whitman, "Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the Future of the Western European Union", **Occasional Paper** no:7, January 1999, p.7, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ007.pdf.
[183]Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, 'Towards a European Defence Policy', **The International Spectator**, Vol.36, No. 3, July-September 2001, p.47.
[184]Document 1636, Assembly of Western European Union. WEU and European Defence: beyond Amsterdam, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Puig, 15 March 1999, pp. 5-6 cited in Aikaterini Hatjiadoniu, "The Daedalus European Security: The Interactions of NATO, EU and WEU", Geneva Centre for Security Policy, p.44, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hatjiadoniu.pdf.
[185]*Ibid.*

international crises".[186] The aim was to ensure that the EU "can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged".[187] Europe needed to develop military instruments and capabilities to operate vis a vis the US, on the international arena as a credible political and economic actor. Furthermore, it is stated that the EU would contribute to the "vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members".[188] In that sense, Britain and France agreed on the need for a truly established European military force to deal with Petersberg tasks without excluding NATO. Additionally, change in the traditional British security policy towards the EU together with French support to the British initiative paved the way for future practical steps to be taken within the EU. According to Simon Serfaty, "St. Malo was important because it signaled a change in traditional stances on the part of both Great Britain and France. Because Britain was now a leader in the effort, it also assuaged US concerns."[189] Anne Deighton also stressed: "it is unlikely that, without the support of Britain and France, institutional maneuverings alone would have driven major change forward towards the creation of the ESDP".[190] However, their rationales at St Malo were different. The British supported an ESDP that would complement NATO, not rival it. On the other hand, the French were seeking a European defense identity to balance American supremacy. Despite these diverse intentions, St. Malo was a huge step towards the development of European security and defence policy. Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati would even claim: "The historians writing on the birth of a truly united Europe in 2020 will define the St. Malo Declaration as the final stage of European integration".[191]

The Saint Malo declaration was welcomed by the US since it would provide the EU the basis for sharing more burdens as well as reducing the weight on the shoulders of Americans. However, the US had some reservations on the extent of

[186]Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, para. 2, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795.
[187]Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, para. 3.
[188]Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, para. 2.
[189] Serfaty as quoted in James Kitfield, "Will Europe ruin NATO?", **Air Force Magazine**,Vol.83, No.10, October 2000.
[190]Deighton, p.726.
[191]Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati, "St. Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defence", **The Washington Quarterly,** Vol. 22, No. 4, Autumn 1999, p.76, http://www.twq.com/autumn99/224Mathiopoulos.pdf.

autonomy of European security and defence policy. Famous *three Ds* policy was a reflection of that concern. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed up the "three Ds" policy as no *duplication*, no *decoupling*, and no *discrimination* by stating that "any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts and avoid discriminating against non-EU members".[192] Europeans should not duplicate forces in similar to their national or NATO forces in any new European structures. The reason behind that argument was to prevent a decline in NATO's role. The new European initiative should not also decouple both the US and NATO from European defence efforts (i.e. should not weaken US and NATO's role). Lastly, it is stated that there should be no discrimination against non-EU European Allies.

Besides US' reservations, the NATO Summit in Washington of April 1999, also highlighted the importance of the Alliance's presence in European security and defence affairs by making reference to the concrete steps that had been taken over the past five years to develop the ESDI within the NATO framework. Although, NATO agreed to recognize the EU's decisions to develop its own security and defense policies, it reminded that ESDI would continue to develop within NATO.[193] NATO encouraged the EU for a stronger European pillar of the Alliance while at the same time identifying areas that needed improvement. With the support of NATO, the EU expected to strengthen its capacity for action. Additionally, NATO also announced its readiness to "define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance." [194]

In the meantime, Europeans furthered their attempts for developing a more autonomous European defence policy. The European Council held in Cologne, in June 1999, put the decisions taken at St. Malo on formal institutional basis. The Europeans declared their intention to "give the European Union the necessary means and

[192]Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December 1998 cited in Robert E. Hunter, **European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?** Washington: Rand National Defence Research Institute, 2002, pp. 33-34.
[193]Washington Summit Communiqué, para. 5. Washington, DC, 24 April 1999.
[194]Washington Summit Communiqué, para. 10.

capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence".[195] It is stated that the CFSP should be backed by credible operational capabilities so the EU could be able to play its "full" role on the international stage.[196]

Another decision taken at the Cologne European Council was the call for the establishment of Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a European Military Committee (EUMC), to be backed by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Furthermore, the possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU was mentioned:

"We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard, our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose".[197]

In order to implement Petersberg Tasks, they agreed on either using NATO assets as mentioned in NATO's Berlin Summit decisions of 1996 or implementing EU-led operations without using NATO assets and capabilities.[198] In short, both St. Malo and Cologne meant that, with the British decision to support European security integration, the EU opened a new phase in its security and defence policy.

2.7 MORE VIGOR FOR THE ESDP: THE HELSINKI, NICE AND FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISIONS

In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the EU leaders decided to to develop autonomous operational capabilities for the EU-led missions in situations

[195]European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence annexed to the Presidency Conclusions , Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, para. 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm.
[196]Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European Policy on security and defence annexed to the Presidency Conclusions , Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, para. 2.
[197]European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence annexed to the Presidency Conclusions , Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, para. 5.
[198]Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European Policy on security and defence, para.4.

of international crisis. The EU ministers set up the so-called "Headline Goal", which proposed the creation of a EU crisis management force, known as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) which would undertake Petersberg Tasks. In the context of the Helsinki Headline Goal, EU leaders agreed: "Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks."[199] This capability would allow the EU to conduct EU-led operations with or without access to NATO assets. Furthermore, the RRF would need the EU to expand its political and military institutions to conduct EU-led operations.[200] The EU leaders also noted: "this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."[201] The role of NATO was not undermined and the continuity of full consultation and cooperation between EU and NATO was emphasized in Helsinki Presidency Conclusions. To sum up, Helsinki was a very promising and important phase in the ESDP process. In the words of Howorth: "at Helsinki twin pillars of the CESDP were formed: the inauguration of a new, permanent set of institutions and the forging of a substantial Headline Goal of military forces".[202]

In Helsinki, the EU leaders also decided to build up civilian crisis management mechanisms, such as "civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, and electoral and human rights monitoring, etc."[203] At the European Council meeting in Feira in June 2000, civilian aspects of crisis management were intensified by the provision ensuring the deployment of 5000 police officers for international missions, to be set up by 2003.[204] On the other hand, with

[199]Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, II-28, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm.
[200]Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex 1 to Annex IV, See also, Peter Van Ham, **Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US and Russia,** Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, April 2000, p.10.
[201]Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, II-27.
[202]Howorth, "European Integration And Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?", p.4.
[203]Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union, Annex 2 to Annex IV, Helsinki Council, "Presidency Conclusions", *European Council*, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999.
[204]European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, C-11, from website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm.

regard to military capabilities, principles, on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed, were identified.[205]

The European Council Meeting held in Nice in December 2000, made significant progress towards making the ESDP operational. The Nice European Council set the modifications required new permanent military and political structures in order to help coordinating the ESDP. Hence new EU bodies were established: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The PSC is one of the important decision-making mechanism, which is tasked to implement the decisions of the European Council, for both the CFSP and the ESDP policies. Moreover, the PSC is responsible for political control and strategic direction of the EU operations.[206] The EUMC is composed of military representatives of the member states' Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), and is designed to offer advice and recommendations to the PSC and direction to the EUMS. The EUMS, which implements the EUMC's directives, is responsible for early warning; strategic planning and situation assessment.[207]

Finally, the ESDP was proclaimed operational at Laeken European Council on 14-15 December 2001.[208] The EU Member States stated that the EU was capable of conducting certain crisis-management operations. Nevertheless, this remained on paper and the ESDP could only become fully operational in 2003, when the arrangements regarding NATO-EU cooperation for making NATO assets available to the EU were set. These arrangements were called the Berlin Plus arrangements. In March 2003 the EU took over the mandate from NATO in the FYROM for the so-called operation Concordia. Operation Concordia was a small-scale military intervention where the EU

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[205]*Ibid.* See also: Mark Oakes, "European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report", House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/84, London, 2000, pp. 11-12.
[206]Acts adopted under the EU Treaty, Council Joint Action, 2008/38/CFSP OF 20 December 2007, amending Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP on the European Union police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo), Article 7.2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:009:0018:0020:EN:PDF.
[207]Acts adopted under Title V of the Treaty on European Union, Council Decision, 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005, amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, Annex-European Union Military Staff (EUMS) terms of Reference and Organization , 2.Mission, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_132/l_13220050526en00170024.pdf.
[208]Neil Winn, "CFSP, ESDP and the Future of European Security: Whither NATO?", The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2003, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.2/EU/Winn.pdf.

used NATO resources and capabilities.[209] In June 2003, the EU also launched another mission called operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to stabilize the conflict between the rebels and the governments in the country.[210] Although it was small in size, operation Artemis was important because it was the first autonomous EU military operation deployed outside Europe.[211] In December 2004, the EU grounded 7,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina to replace existing NATO forces.[212] The Operation Althea was more sizable operation compared to the other two. Although these operations were appreciated as an improvement in the EU's operational capabilities that led to the implementation of a truly European security and defence policy, EU forces mostly intervened to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts "within weak states, which do not pose a serious security threat to member states".[213]

Consequently, EU attempts to develop a more autonomous ESDP by establishing new political and military bodies that has given a new impetus to the 50 years process. The EU seems more willing to move beyond just being just a civilian power. Hence, it can be said that the ESDP is not only a military policy but it is also treated as a ticket for being a world power with one voice in a true sense. However, the EU's efforts to close the capabilities-expectations gap seem limited on paper. Tones of words but no real action have made the EU more about declarations and institutions rather than capabilities.

2.8 THE WAKE UP CALL: THE IRAQ WAR AND THE ESDP

The Iraq War overshadowed the progress, achieved in the ESDP process since St. Malo. Most importantly, once more, the EU member states failed to speak with single and unified voice. In that sense, the Iraq crisis did not only pose a threat to the transatlantic ties but it also created divisions between member states. Unlike their

[209]Anand Menon, "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq", **International Affairs 80**, 4, 2004, p.640.
[210]Kees Homan, "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo", in European Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, May 2007, pp.151-155.
[211]Catriona Mace, "Operation Artemis: Mission improbable?", **European Security Review**, No.18, July 2003, pp.5-7.
[212]Tomas Karasek, "EU Military Intervention in the Middle East? The Limits of 'Low Security Policy'" **Defence and Strategy,** 2/2007, http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2007/clanky/eu-military-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-limits-of-low-security-policy.html.
[213]Christoper O. Meyer, **The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defense in the European Union,** New York : Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006, p.173.

partnership in St. Malo, Britain and France were at the opposite sides. Meanwhile Stanley Hoffmann concluded that in "his determination to give wholehearted support to the United States over Iraq … Blair scuppered his own St-Malo initiative".[214] France, along with Germany, acted against the United States in the UN-Security Council. France and Germany declared that war in Iraq should be avoided at all costs.[215] On the other hand, Britain, especially Tony Blair, was the closest ally of the US and supported the US for military operation. Division between member states was not limited to Britain and France. Also other member states took their positions according to their national interests. The US supporters in Iraq, led by Britain, were Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands. The opposition came from France, Germany, Belgium Luxembourg, Greece and Austria. Ireland, Sweden and Finland were somewhere in between. The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, criticized France and Germany's position about their opposition to the war in Iraq by stating, "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe."[216] He defined the countries that supported the US War in Iraq, as "new Europe."[217] German foreign minister Joschka Fischer's words showed how severe the division was: "We all know that this is about the question of Iraq, but it's also about the question of Europe".[218]

The contradiction between the old and new Europe became greater at a summit meeting in Brussels in April 2003, where France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg declared their plan to set up the EU military headquarters in Tervuren in Brussels, separate from NATO.[219] These four countries also announced that the member states, which want to participate, could together enhance military capabilities, take common positions on defence issues, and create a joint armaments agency as well as an embryonic form of an integrated European general staff capable of planning and

[214]Stanley Hoffmann, 'The crisis in transatlantic relations', in Gustav Lindstrom, ed., **Shift or rift: assessing US–EU relations after Iraq** (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 19, *cited in* Anand Menon, p.640.
[215]Frank Umbach, "The future of the ESDP", Center for International Relations, Reports&Analysis, 13/03, http://www.csm.org.pl/images/rte/File/Raporty%20i%20publikacje/Raporty%20i%20analizy/2003/rap_i_an_1303.pdf.
[216]CNN.com, "Old Europe hits back at Rumsfeld", January 24, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/24/france.germany.rumsfeld/index.html.
[217]*Ibid.*
[218]**The Guardian** "EU gives Iraq final chance to avoid war but splits remain", 18 February 2003
[219]Antonio Missiroli, "Between EU and US: The Enlarged Union, Security and the Use of Force", in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds.), **The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement**, Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005, p.329.

running EU military operations.[220] The US, joined by Britain, Italy, Spain and Portugal, showed great opposition because that new initiative could weaken the link between ESDP and NATO by threatening Berlin-Plus arrangements.[221] Besides underestimating the role of NATO, they also claimed that this was an effort to exclude Britain from one of the most crucial field where it would be major driving forces in European integration.[222] Hence, *the gang of four* stepped back since they saw defence as "the next big area for European integration and they were not prepared to let Anglo-Saxon hostility deflect their purpose".[223] A compromise was reached between France, Germany and Britain. They agreed on to develop the EU's own civil-military planning cell, to be used for EU missions independent of NATO and also "establishing a British-proposed EU planning cell at NATO headquarters to help coordinate 'Berlin Plus' missions, or those EU missions conducted using NATO assets".[224]

The crisis demonstrated how fragile the ESDP process was and how that process was shaped by member states' individual preferences. The division between member states also undermined the credibility of the EU as a world power. The Union had a unique chance to show that Europe could speak with one voice in international crises. "The failure was as fantastic as the opportunity, and it seems that everyone is to blame."[225] Anatol Lieven also declared that it "may be time to admit that there will never in fact be a common European foreign and security policy".[226]

As a result, the EU needed to do something to show the ESDP was still on track. As part of this process, EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, was tasked for developing an EU security strategy which would define common security interests of the Union. Some of the member states had rejected the idea of laying out a common European strategy almost for years, concerning that it could restrain their national policies; but observers suggest that the internal EU division over Iraq gave impetus to this project as a way to help avoid similar disputes in the future. In

[220]Freire, p.14.
[221]*Ibid.*
[222]Charles Grant, "EU Defence Takes a Step Forward", Briefing Note, December 2003, Centre for European Reform, from website, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_eu_defence03.pdf.
[223]*Ibid.*
[224]Kristin Archick, "Europe 2006 and Beyond", CRS Report for Congress, 6 April, 2006.
[225]Menon, 640.
[226]Anatol Lieven, "EU Must Face Up to a Fractured Future", **Financial Times**, 13 March 2003.

December 2003, the EU approved the European Security Strategy (ESS) "A Secure Europe in a Better World." The ESS defined the key threats to EU security as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Additionally, the ESS underlined the future potential for the EU and its ESDP to play a larger role in world affairs: "The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."[227] However, the document also emphasized that the response to these new challenges should be comprehensive and not merely reliant on the use of the Union's developing military means. It stated: "none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means... The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations."[228] Thus, while the EU is interested in taking on a more active and involved role in international affairs, including the use of more traditional "hard" security means, it will not attempt to focus on their use as a first resort and instead the EU will try to strike a balance between "hard" and "soft" measures to create more comprehensive solutions to the challenges faced by European security today. The ESS provided great contribution to the elaboration of the ESDP and the EU get a chance to have a more operational security framework. It also revitalized the ESDP process again.

The development of the ESDP and the adoption of the ESS opened a new phase in European defence integration "focusing especially on strengthening EU`s real capabilities to act as a global security player."[229] The reason that pushed the EU to follow more aggressive lines in its ESDP was based on the EU's limited military capabilities that paralyzed its role in out of area missions.[230] As a result, the EU member states decided to increase the Union's crisis management capabilities to transform the EU into a more active player. This led to the creation of a new Headline Goal for the ESDP, which set a timetable for reaching priorities in that field by 2010. In June 2004, the EU defence ministers adopted a new action plan known as the Headline Goal 2010,

[227]Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf
[228]*Ibid.*
[229]Boris Ecker, "European Security Integration and its Security Dimension: ESDP, NATO and Slovakia's Position", Euro Atlantic Center Publishings, http://www.eac.sk/docs/esdp,nato_slovakia.pdf
[230]*Ibid.*

which aimed to address deficiencies in key areas. Part of the new Headline Goals was devoted to "the new battle groups concept that envisions setting up 6-10 groups of highly trained combat formations deployable within a period of 5 to 30 days, sustainable for at least 30 days and available by 2007 at the latest".[231]

Although the EU was criticized for its insufficient defence capabilities and vague wording regarding defence, the developments starting from St. Malo show that the Member States are more aware of the need for developing the ESDP to complete European integration.

[231]Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, parag. 4, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf

III. THE ROLE OF MAJOR EU MEMBER STATES IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION

Although, discussions about the creation of a common security and defence policy dates back to the establishment of the EC/EU, the progress in that area has always been limited. The negative effects of NATO and the US presence in European security and defence are mentioned in the previous chapters, but it is not only their involvement that limited the development of a more integrated European security and defence policy. Britain and France's inability to agree on the fundamentals is blamed as the biggest obstacle to both a CFSP and ESDP.[232] Willingness of key Member States has determined how far the Union could take in this regard. Sharing responsibility in economic matters is more preferable because they are mostly functioning on a cooperative basis. In contrast, when it comes to sharing sovereignty on security and defence policy, member states find it rather difficult. Reduction in the sovereignty of the European nation-state is one of the most important reasons behind the reluctance of some European States concerning defence and security matters.[233] Additionally, all Member States have different national interests, orientations and traditions in that field. They also have diverse opinions about European political integration and about degree of their relationship with their transatlantic alliances. Member states have been unable to decide whether defence integration based on autonomous capabilities or US hegemony in this realm was in their interest. Although they found their interests in transatlantic security partnership during the Cold War, the end of the Cold War opened the door for defence integration. However, until the end of the 1990s, there had been little progress, which showed that member states should be more eager to forge common positions on matters of security and defence in order to increase European voice at the world stage. It is obvious that the Europeans need to become more self-sufficient militarily but they are divided over the autonomy of a new European security and defence policy. Some supported rebalancing the transatlantic relationship to reflect Western Europe's economic power, whereas the others are worried about the removal of NATO/US commitment. In this context, two positions emerged: Atlanticists vs. Europeanists.

[232]Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: the Ultimate Challenge", pp.47-48.
[233]Kjell A. Eliassen, **Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union**,London: SAGE PUBL., 1998, p.217.

Atlanticists, which include Britain, Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands are reluctant to the establishment of a security and defence policy that could underestimate the role of NATO and encourage the US to call its forces back. On the other hand, Atlanticists were also aware of the importance of constructing an ESDP for ensuring the continuity of the Atlantic Alliance, which would bring about a more balanced burden sharing in European defence. Developments through 1990s also strengthened their desire to keep the US committed to the European defence. Atlanticists are driven more by the view that Europe needs to share the military burden more equitably with Washington.[234]

On the other hand, Europeanists support a European initiative independent from the US. France was the leading actor of the Europeanists. France's long-lasting debate was based on the US hegemony of NATO, which limited the role of Europe. Many French officials describe the US as a "hyperpower" and argue that Europe should "constitute a factor of equilibrium" in the world.[235]

The intersection and competition of big countries' interests largely define the future role and the institutional development of the ESDP. For instance, with the change in British policy about the creation of an autonomous European defence capability, European defence integration had developed in a few years than it had in forty years. With the security guarantee of the United States, EU member states have sought to make integration acceptable through policies of "self-binding" and "benign power employment."[236] By limiting their own power through multilateralism, bargaining, and consensus politics, the major European powers have also made it possible for the smaller states to be absorbed into the European order without fear of domination and subordination.[237] This was also crucial for European defence integration. In order to understand the EU member states' impact on defence integration and their influence on the ESDP process, three big member states' preferences are examined in this chapter.

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[234]Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Transatlantic relations caught up by reality", **Journal of Transatlantic Studies**, 1754-1018, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 111-136.
[235]Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis. "European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union", **CRS Report to Congress,** April 25, 2000, For a detailed analysis see also: Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force", **International Journal**, Spring 2000, pp.247-266.
[236]Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," **International Security**, Vol. 23, No. 2, Autumn 1998, p. 45.
[237]Kupchan, pp. 45-55.

3.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has always shown resistance to the creation of an autonomous European defence system. The UK, as a close ally of the US, clarified its stance by showing that it would not support any organization that would exclude NATO/US involvement. The UK's primary concern was to preserve US commitment to European security and defense through NATO. Any steps towards the development an ESDP that could reduce American commitment was not acceptable for the British. As a result, vetoing the development of any European security framework designed to challenge or replace NATO's role in Europe was a British motto, especially, during the Cold War.[238] For the Atlanticists, NATO, "the most successful alliance in history", was not only the "cornerstone of European defence", but was also the main vehicle for strengthening political and military ties with the US.[239] After the Cold War, Britain mainly concerned about how to keep NATO on stage. Despite Europe's failure in Yugoslovia crises, during the negotiations[240] for the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, Britain rejected the proposals for "the infant CFSP to take a serious defence remit via the EU itself".[241] Instead, it supported the development of the ESDI within the NATO framework, which would keep US involvement constantly.

The unpleasant European experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo forced Britian to pursue more integrated European security and defence cooperation. When Tony Blair and his Labour party came to power, British voice in security and defence matters became more louder. In the summer of 1998, Blair stated: "In the field of defence as elsewhere, there's no contradiction between being a good European and being a good Atlanticist".[242] Actually, only a year before from that policy change, Tony Blair's speech in June 1997 to the House of Commons on his return from the Amsterdam

[238]However, there were some exceptions in implementation: during the Suez crisis of 1956, the UK acted in defiance of US policy, and between 1971 and 1973, President Pompidou and Prime Minister Edward Heath talked about how to combine French and British military and nuclear capabilities in order to maximize European autonomy from the US. Jolyon Howorth, 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics', **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol.5, No. 3 (Summer 2000), p.378.
[239]Colin Mcinnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review", **International Affairs,** Vol.74, No.4 (October 1998), p. 827.
[240]The Intergovernmental Conferences leading up to those Treaties.
[241]Howorth, "Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics", p.380.
[242]Quoted in John Roper, "Two Cheers for Mr. Blair? The European Political Realities of European Defence Cooperation", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.38, Annual Review, September 2000, p.9.

negotiations showed how Britain was still a consistent supporter of NATO involvement that will also ensure the US presence. Blair stated: "getting Europe's voice heard more clearly in the world will not be achieved … by developing an unrealistic common defence policy. Instead, we argued… that NATO is the foundation of our and other allies' common defence".[243] The main motive behind the British shift was actually the US reluctance to getting involved in the crises in the Balkan region, especially the conflict in Kosovo showed Europe's dependence on the US militarily. The British realized that the US did not have the same willingness to share the burden of European security as it shared in the Cold War.[244] In order to preserve the US role in Europe, the EU needed to strengthen its capacity in the defence field. In other words, by starting to support the ESDP, The UK did not aim to establish an autonomous framework but it aimed to maintain the US commitment. In Howorth's words, the main motivation for the UK was to "maintain and perpetuate the Atlantic Alliance, while keeping the US in business".[245] The solution to this problem would be the creation of a European instrument: ESDP.[246]

Another motivation of the UK was its desire to exert British leadership within the EU, and, the ESDP was the main tool that would provide that key strategic role. In the autumn of 1999, Blair outlined his vision stating, "Britain has a new role…not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future".[247] The UK is now supporting the ESDP as a means of increasing its power within the EU, balancing the French influence in the European security and defense matters, and "enhancing its status in Washington by developing greater and more useful military capabilities that could be used within NATO".[248] In short, The UK supports the ESDP as means of increasing Europe's contribution to the Alliance and the UK's power in the EU. In any case, change

[243]Blair's speech, source (n/a); quoted in John Roper, p. 9.
[244]Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", **Survival,** Vol.42, No.2 Summer 2000, p.34.
[245]*Ibid.*, pp.34-36.
[246]*Ibid.*, pp.34-36.
[247]Blair's speech, source (n/a) quoted in James K. Wither, " British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and Iraq War", **Parameters**, Vol.33, 2003.
[248]Barry Posen, "The Unipolar Moment and the ESDP," Working Draft, p.18, www.yale.edu/irspeakers/ Posen%20-%20EuropeTheoryessay.doc.

in the British stance towards the development of an autonomous European defence capability accelerated the launch of the ESDP project.

3.2 FRANCE

Since the very beginning of the EC/EU process, France has been the driving force that pushes the Community to create a separate European security and defence dimension. After the World War II, French desires were shaped according to the goals of De Gaulle. He determined French foreign policy goals as the elimination of future German threat and maintaining its position as the predominant European power by reducing the role of the US and NATO in European security and defence matters. France had a realist tendency, which was based on balance of power. It was supported the development of an independent and autonomous defence capability.[249] France sought for a distinguished role compared to the other European countries, and wanted to exert itself as an equal vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. [250] This became the rhetoric of France's European policy for the past fifty years, and, after the Cold War France's rivals turned out to be the US, Russia or China.[251] During the Cold War the aim of France was to reduce the influence of the US, as a result always worked for more unified and autonomous security structures within Europe. First of all, France started to reduce its dependency to the US by launching a nuclear force and leaving the military wing of NATO, which is perceived as in the US's orbit, in 1966.

Making Europe a global actor with a more unified voice excited France more than any other European states. According to France, a more united, cooperated and strong Europe would uphold French influence and French autonomy in Europe. [252] In short, during the Cold War, France sought to promote the idea of "L'Europe puissance",

[249]Axel Sauder, "France's Security Policy since the End of the Cold War", in Carl C. Hodge (ed.) **Redefining European Security**, London: Garland Publishing, 1999, p. 119.
[250]Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, "The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years After", New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 106-125.
[251]Thierry Chopin and Quentin Perret, "France and the EU: a common global outlook?" This policy paper was first published as a "Question d'Europe" by the Fondation Robert Schuman ["Le retour de la France en Europe... pour quelle vision de l'Europe dans le monde?", Question d'Europe, no:62, 21/05/2007.], from the website: http://www.europeum.org/doc/pdf/885.pdf.
[252]Helene Sjursen, "Forms of Security Policy in Europe", **ARENA Working Papers**: WP 01/4, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_4.htm.

with France being the key actor in reshaping Europe's strategic ambitions.[253] In this sense, France policy was constructed on protecting French values and promoting the EU as the only international organization that could balance US hegemony.[254] However, France failed to convince other European partners, especially those that were afraid of US isolationism, to form an independent European security and defence posture.

While the end of Cold War has also moderated the sharp tone of the De Gaullist tradition, French policy shifted to multilateral security arrangements. Security agenda has broadened and new threats came to the agenda but Europe failed to the respond those threats with its own capabilities. Especially crises in former Yugoslavia increased the European dependency on collective security, which at that time was mainly provided by NATO. Although France kept its traditional vision through stressing autonomy and national decision-making process in the early 1990s, it realized that *defence* was being replaced by *security* as the guarantor of stability and that "the pursuit of security is best facilitated collectively".[255] As President Chirac expressed it: "In an open world, no one can live in isolation, no one can act alone in the name of all, and no one can accept the anarchy of a society without rules. .... Multilateralism is the key."[256]

France took one step ahead towards its new collective approach in 1995 by rejoining NATO's Military Committee. In reality, France's new approach to NATO from 1995 was essentially defensive and reactive as response to its decreasing unilateral influence. As Kupchan writes: "For France, the EU is more about amassing and projecting power, aggregating the Union's military and economic resources so that it can assert itself as a global player."[257] For France, European presence provided a balance against American hegemony and helped to hide France's own deficiencies in defence capabilities.[258] In 1996 President Chirac represented a new military programme law, the

[253]Margaret Blunden, "France", in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), **The Foreign Policies of EU Member States**, Manchester,: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 19.
[254]Ibid, p. 22.
[255]Jolyon Howorth, "France", in J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds.) **The European Union and National Defence Policy**, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 43.
[256]Jacques Chirac, " Multilateralism... is a guarantee of legitimacy and democracy" , **The Gully Online Magazine**, 25 September 2003, http://www.thegully.com/essays/US/politics/030925_chirac_UN_speech_tx.html.
[257]Kupchan, p.70.
[258]Blunden, p. 41.

Loi de Programmation Militaire where he aimed to close the capability gap with increased defense spending. Awareness of France that it could do little by her own in this new world order finally brought it to the St. Malo Summit for working together with Britain to upgrade the European security and defence component. In fact, both France and Britain recognized that they could no longer make a difference in the international system on their own. The attempts to revamp the commitment to the creation of a European defence posture at St Malo were based on overlapping Anglo-French interests and a need to respond to new security challenges collectively, such as the problems in the former Yugoslavia.

Starting from the mid 1990s, France has realized the importance of multilateralism and the need for the US presence in European security until Europe is able to close the expectations-capabilities gap in foreign and security policy. However France is still searching for more independent and strong European security and defence policy. With new EU members, which have a more Transatlantic tendency, it seems harder for France to reach a consensus on such a sensitive field. According to the new members, any serious disagreement between the EU and NATO is "virtually inconceivable".[259] Actually, Central and Eastern European countries rely on the US more than their Western European neighbours since only the US intervention could end the war in Bosnia and Kosovo, therefore, "the notion of a European directory does not sit well with them".[260] So, at least for a while France will have to abandon its discourse "L'Europe puissance" and to concentrate more on cooperation.

3.3 GERMANY

Germany has made significant contribution to both European integration and the development of European security and defence. Germany was not only a founder of the ECSC but also the root cause of the ECSC's establishment. Western Europe was looking for a safe way to integrate Germany in Europe again. The link between Western

[259] Thierry Chopin and Quentin Perret, "France and the EU: a common global outlook?" This policy paper was first published as a "Question d'Europe" by the Fondation Robert Schuman ["Le retour de la France en Europe... pour quelle vision de l'Europe dans le monde?", Question d'Europe, n°62, 21/05/2007.], http://www.europeum.org/doc/pdf/885.pdf, p.5.
[260] *Ibid.*

Europe and Germany was reestablished through economic interdependency, especially in heavy industries that provide raw materials to military production, through the ECSC. In fact, the Basic Law of 1949 expressed that Germany had to be involved in the development of European integration actively, in order to advance European stability.[261]

On the other hand, German rearmament problem opened the door for European security and defence integration via the establishment of EDC. The legacy of Hitler and the two World Wars made Europeans insecure about Germany. Therefore, Germany was in need to prove herself that it was not a threat anymore. After the World War II, Germany has sought for reestablishing itself and inserting itself into the international system. Germany wanted to leave its war-prone past behind and build healthier relations with the other states. Additionally, with the German Basic Law of 1949, Germany banned military aggression, states: "Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional."[262]

Another precaution against Germany's militaristic past was the generalized conscription. The army was to remain under civilian control and the conscripts "…took no oath of obedience in the traditional sense and retained rights of individual conscience not tolerated in the American, British, or French armed forces."[263] In that sense, Germany has constructed a new security policy that supported multilateralism rather than using military force.[264]

The bedrock of German foreign and security policy has been built on multilateral cooperation. Germany was eager to participate in international organizations more than any other states in order to gain international credibility, to consolidate its democracy and to maintain peaceful relationships with its neighbours.[265] As a result of the Cold War dynamics, NATO had a huge importance in German security policy. After the World War II, Germany was divided into two separate states,

[261]Ouoted in Kirchner and Sperling, p.106.
[262]Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 26 (1), http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#23.
[263]Helene Sjursen, "Forms of Security Policy in Europe".
[264]Giegerich von Bastian, "Mugged by Reality: German Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines", Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, 12.10.2003, www.diasonline.org.
[265]Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, **Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping The Regional Milieu**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p.7.

each integrated into opposed blocs: the Communist controlled East, the German Democratic Republic, and the NATO-allied West, the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO membership became the most eligible choice for the divided and militarily banned West Germany; it became dependent on transatlantic partnership on security and defence issues. NATO shelter has also provided the basis for the post-war recovery of Germany.[266] Being part of Western institutional frameworks allowed Germany to operate internationally and removed the other countries' fears about possible German aggression.

On the other hand, EC had been instrumental in the reintegration of the country and helped Germany to regain its economic and political power.[267] Moreover, Germany was one of the strong supporters of more autonomous security co-operation inside the EC/EU. In that sense, Germany has always been in somewhere between France and the United Kingdom in this regard. While expressing the importance of NATO and the role of US in European security, Germany has always worked to increase Europe's role in security matters. In his speech German ambassador Dr. Klaus Scharioth told: "German security should be deeply anchored in the transatlantic partnership, and in the EU. Our security is inseparably linked to the political development of Europe, the Atlantic alliance, and of the world."[268]

Following reunification and the end of the cold war, the EU and NATO were still the two most important international institutions for Germany. However, their functions changed. “Exporting stability replaced physical survival and maintenance of economic well-being".[269] Germany continued to pursue multilateral policies but in a more assertive way. Instead of being follower, Germany seeks to play leading role by getting involved in EU security structures actively.[270] Germany has realized that

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[266]Douglas Webber, **New Europe, New German, Old Foreign. Policy?: German Foreign Policy since Reunification**, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p.84.
[267]Kirchner and Sperling.
[268]German “White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” with German ambassador Dr. Klaus Scharioth along with Germany’s defense attaché Brigadier General Dr. Henning Hars. *Transformation of German Security Policy* on December 1, 2006, http://www.acus.org/event_blog/transformation-german-security-policy.
[269]Gunther Hellmann, Germany’s Balancing Act in Foreign Policy, **Transatlantic Internationle Politik,** Volume 3, Winter 2002, p.18.
[270]Webber, p.85.

involvement in security matters is a necessary precondition of a greater geopolitical power.[271]

Germany wants to take new responsibilities in international politics and these new responsibilities need to involve a militarily dimension. This has definitely opened a new era for German foreign policy. In a speech to the parliament after the terror attacks of 9/11 the chancellor Schröder clarified their changing foreign policy orientation and stated: "German post-war policy is now gone forever." Germany should "comprehensively meet its new responsibilities," which would require "removing the taboo surrounding military matters."[272] In short, Berlin has started to seek to fulfill the requirements of a great power, putting the militarization on the agenda. In contrast to the past experiences, this time Germany aims to use its military capabilities in pursuit of international objectives such as taking an active role in longer-term military missions outside the boundaries of Germany. Thus, the German armed forces have become a "non-partisan" symbol for setting new priorities and bringing stability and peace to far-away places within multinational coalitions, rather than securing national territory within the Atlantic alliance.[273] In that sense, German has increased its participation in out-of-area missions and deployed its troops in operations ranging from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to ISAF in Afghanistan.[274] Additionally, Germany is one of the most important countries that make greater contribution to European security and defence. It is not only the second most populous state and the strongest economic power in Europe but it also fields a professional army of 247,712 soldiers called the Bundeswehr.[275] Thus, Germany is one of the most important countries that serve for creating more effective defence capabilities in the EU.

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[271] von Bastian, p.2.
[272] Quoted in Hellmann, p.18.
[273] *Ibid.*
[274] As of October 2006, the German military had almost 9,000 troops stationed in foreign countries as part of various international peacekeeping forces, including 1,180 troops stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 2,844 Bundeswehr soldiers in Kosovo; 750 soldiers stationed as a part of EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and 2,800 German troops in the NATO-led ISAF force in Afghanistan. As of February 2007, Germany had about 3,000 ISAF troops in Afghanistan, the third largest contingent after the United States (14,000) and the United Kingdom (5,200). http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/germany.htm.
[275] The Bundeswehr, comprises the unified armed forces of Germany and their civil administration and procurement authorities. The States of Germany are not allowed to maintain armed forces of their own, since the Constitution determines that matters of defense fall into the sole responsibility of the Federal government (Basic Law Art 87a (1) . "The armed forces comprise 247,712 troops, including 35,490 conscripts, 24,351 conscripts who voluntarily extended

3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is obvious that adaptation and implementation of a truly European security and defence policy partly depends on the ability of the three major EU member states France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to reach common policies on ESDP. Since they have different national interests, they still have diverse opinions about "NATO primacy, national force structures, use of force, and relations with the United States".[276] Therefore if they failed to pool their interests on those issues, the presence of the ESDP can be threatened seriously.[277]

As mentioned before, debates on the nature of European security and defence policy is explained by the diverse positions of the Atlanticist and Europeanist EU member states. This distinction is about the degree of NATO involvement in European security. Whereas some choose to act with NATO, others prefer the EU to act autonomously by carrying out missions without NATO involvement or the use of its assets. Actually NATO presented a third option by trying to develop the ESDI as an attempt to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Nevertheless, this attempt waned upon the creation of the ESDP.

Although the US led invasion of Iraq pushed Europe to consider and define a security strategy, different responses of the EU member states showed that national interests still prevail and the EU still has difficulties to speak with one voice especially in times of serious crises. Once again, the EU's diverse nature came on surface about security issues such as "the role of soft and hard power, out of area operations versus EU domestic employment, and defining the EU security relationship with the US and NATO".[278] The division became more visible when some European countries (such as Poland and Spain) led by Britain declared their support for the US to use military force to settle an international crisis regarding the threat of Iraq, while the countries led by France, Germany and Belgium expressed their desire to solve problems related to the

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their service, and 187,871 professional soldiers either on fixed-term contracts or unlimited contracts. (May 2008)" http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/germany.htm.

[276]Larsen Christopher, " ESDP: Security of Consequences", **US Army War College Strategy Research Project**, 2006, p.9. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA449163

[277]*Ibid.*

[278]Vanda Knowles and Silke Thomson-Potteboh, "The UK, Germany and ESDP: Developments at the Convention and the IGC", German Politics, Vol.13, No.4, December 2004, p.582.

EU's security issues through more peaceful instruments as negotiations, instead of using military force. So, they did not give any support to the US operation in Iraq. The brief analysis of the three major EU Member States' positions regarding NATO and the ESDP made above clearly shows their differences.

With regard to France, the country's relations with NATO has mostly been characterized by the debate between the US and France about the limits of US involvement in European security. According to French politicians, NATO is dominated by the US and mainly served US interests. As a result, France has always sought for reducing US dominance in European security and aimed to balance the power of the US through establishing a more liberated European defence and security structure.[279] Meanwhile, the Cold War dynamics curtailed the negative attitude of France toward the US as a result of the security concerns regarding the Soviet threat. But France's limited efforts changed direction. With the end of the Cold War and the creation of ESDP, De Gaullist policies came to surface once again and found a voice in Chirac's speech to the Assembly of Atlantic Societies in October 19, 1999: "In every meeting with our European partners I observe a new state of mind, summarized in one wish: that Europe may be able to enlarge its voice in the administration of world affairs and above all in our continent's affairs."[280] In that sense, France is a country that supports to conduct collective security in Europe through the EU and ESDP by constraining the role of NATO in European security.[281] Moreover, the French support the idea to develop security relations with third countries at the EU level, which is mostly preferred for security relations with the US, instead of constituting bilateral relations with individual EU member states. "French leaders believe that Europe will only get a global voice when it can stand on its own militarily".[282] In 2002, French Minister of Defense, Madam Michele Alliot-Marie told that Europe had no foreign policy weight without the corresponding military potential.[283] Compared to Germany and the United Kingdom,

[279]Ronald D. Asmus,"Rethinking the EU: Why Washington needs to Support European Integration," **Survival**, Vol. 47 No. 3 (Autumn 2005), p. 95.
[280]Barry R. Posen, "The Unipolar Moment and ESDP", p.15.
[281]Gregory Kraak, "NATO: Still Relevant After All These Years", **U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project**, 2005, p.4.
[282]Posen, p.16.
[283]*Ibid.*

France is the biggest supporter of a global power EU that can compete with the US both regionally and globally.[284]

Unlike France, the United Kingdom has always tried to establish close relations with the US and reacted negatively against any formation that excludes the presence of the US in European security and defence issues. Although the changing status quo has altered its national security concerns and reshaped the organizations that guarantee its strategic partnerships, the UK is still the biggest European supporter of the US, especially under the framework of NATO. Despite the UK's alternating stance towards creation of the ESDP, it continued to support the primacy of NATO over the ESDP aiming to preserve the US involvement in European security. According to the British view, once Europe becomes able to increase its military capabilities in NATO, the US will have more interest in Europe. This view also improves the UK's relations with the US, as well as their strategic security.[285] Britain chose to support the ESDP to strengthen the European defense arm of NATO. Tony Blair stated that the U.S. involvement in global security issues was something the Europeans had no right to take for granted and should match with their own efforts.[286] In the late 1990s, the UK realized that the field of security and defence was an area that the UK had enough military capabilities to play a leading role in the EU. In their view, a more assertive role in European defence would also reclaim the UK's irreconcilable image in the Union. In short, whereas the UK is showing more political will to involve in European security and defence policy, it continues to emphasize the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, it seems that the UK's security policy will be shaped by "a strong NATO alliance that works in cooperation with ESDP, and by continued strong ties with the US" for a long time, which sometimes put the UK "at the risk of its own isolation from the continent".[287]

As Europe's largest economic power, Germany is an important political and security actor in the EU, but its "diplomacy is constrained by its historical past and its

[284]Anand Menon, "Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance," in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds.), **Defending Europe The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.207.
[285]Posen, p.19.
[286]Posen, p.17.
[287]Kraak, p.8.

military power is constrained by treaty."[288] Thus, when it comes to European security and defense, Germany has traditionally constituted a balance between Britain and France, by supporting a more Europeanized NATO and autonomous European military capabilities that do no compatible with NATO assets. In other words, while Germany, together with Britain, has supported NATO as the key player in European security, it has also allied with France on the development of an autonomous ESDP. Germany believes that the ESDP is needed for promoting "a common European foreign policy".[289] In 2004 Schröder stated: "A strong NATO needs a strong European base. As such, we want to actively use and strengthen the strategic partnership that exists between NATO and the European Union."[290] Furthermore, Germany has also supported a close relationship between the EU and the US regarding the security objectives of NATO. Actually Germany's stance has started to change especially after the War in Kosovo. German leaders realized the importance of taking a stronger role in security policy, which led them to reevaluate their security goals and degree of German involvement in security matters. Most importantly it was clear, in order to take the advantage of its economic importance, Germany needs to take more active role in security issues. Chancellor Schröder's strong opposition to the Iraq War and the German bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council could be seen as the examples of new German policy in security and defence matters.[291] At the 2005 Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also gave the signals of this new direction of Germany by stating that NATO "is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies."[292] Schroeder also stressed his concern about "the dialogue between the EU and the US which in its current form does justice neither to the Union's growing importance nor the new demands for transatlantic cooperation."[293]

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[288]Posen, p.20.
[289]Larsen Christopher, p.12.
[290]Gerhard Schroder's speech at Opening of Federal College for Security Studies, 22 March 2003. German Embassy website, http://www.germanembassy. org.uk/speech_by_chancellor_schroder_.html.
[291]Von Bastian, p.2.
[292]Gerhard Schroeder's Speech on the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, World Security Network, 12 February 2005. http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=10944.
[293]*Ibid.*

Consequently, the UK, France and Germany, countries with diverging interests in NATO and in their relations with the US, need to find a compromise in the field of security and defence by shifting their positions. Once, these countries are able to transform their national interests within EU framework and agree on required institutional changes in security and defence, the ESDP will become a more effective and a stronger ESDP. This would surely strengthen the hand of the EU in international affairs.

CONCLUSION

Since the 1950s the EU has identified itself as a global economic power by establishing strong trade relations with other countries. Through 1990s, with the creation of single market and a single currency, the EU has generated a unique example of economic integration in the world. As a matter of fact, by 2007, the European Union provides more than half of the funds for international development aid and more than 50 percent of total world humanitarian aid.[294] Unfortunately, in contrast to its distinguished economic weight, the EU failed to play a larger role in security and defence fields. A journalist summarized the international order as "the US fights, the UN feeds, the EU funds".[295]

The Cold War dynamics limited the efforts of the EC to develop a healthy security and defence identity. In the 1950s, Europe's vulnerability to Soviet threat and dependency on NATO and the US resources caused the setback of any European defence project. Furthermore, during the Cold War, any form of security and defence policy became subject to Franco-German domination, which alienated other member states, each with different national interests, from the process.

The end of the Cold War changed the international order. The collapse of bipolarity eliminated the threat of massive attack. The conflict in former Yugoslavia altered Europe's defence priorities and pushed the EU to take more responsibility for its own security by increasing its military capabilities. Although the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties slightly introduced the defence capabilities of the Union for common action, they did not suggest a visible shift from the EU's civilian power role. Both the institutional superiority of NATO under US leadership and distinct interests of the member states have prevented the definition of a common European security identity deeply embedded in EU and undermined any possibility of acting in a united front.[296] Nevertheless, the change in British security preferences led to the creation of

[294]European Comission, Humanitarian Aid, Funding, Budget. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding/budget_en.htm.
[295]Neil Winn, "CFSP, ESDP, and Future of European Security: Whither NATO?", **The Brown Journal of World Affairs**, Volume IX, Issue 2, Winter /Spring 2003, p.151.
[296]Sally McNamara, "The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security", **Backgrounder**, (Heritage Foundation), No. 2250, March 17, 2009.

the ESDP. Thereby, the process, which started with the St.Malo meeting, increased the institutional and military capabilities of the Union, along with the future provisions such as headline goals. These are the signs of the Union's determination to keep the ESDP on track. Neil Winn can be right to claim "success in ESDP will bring great benefits for Brussels' vision of EU integration, whereas failure will set the project back years, if not decades".[297]

This study argues that the ESDP can be regarded as the last phase of European security integration. In this context, this paper has also shown that the ESDP is not purely about transforming the EU into a military actor. The ESDP is also about providing the necessary instruments for turning the Union to a more effective global actor. As the second chapter pointed out, the Europeans have sought to develop an autonomous security and defense policy that would allow them to balance their role vis-à-vis the US in NATO and also strengthen their hand in shaping world politics. Indeed, the ability to project power, both regionally and globally, requires several preconditions such as leadership, credibility, military capability, popular support, and dependable allies. If Europe wants to be considered as a global and credible player, the member states of the EU will have to act together rather than separately and respond effectively to such crises, which have the potential to create worldwide political turbulence. The EU's limited role in security and defence front is not only because of the primacy of NATO but also owes much to the ongoing preponderant role of nation-state. Experiences in the Kosovo War led member states to launch the ESDP, and urged them to follow more common policies. On the other hand, the war in Iraq showed the continuing polarization between member states. While Britain and some other countries chose to act together with the US in Iraq, France and Germany showed their reaction by proposing to launch more European military capabilities independent from NATO. More importantly, all these events suggested that the EU is not capable of speaking with one voice.

The EU's role in security and defence policy has been regarded more as a global talker than a global player. Europe is still far from being an equal partner to the

[297]Winn, p.158.

United States. Although recent developments in ESDP are hopeful, member states are still reluctant to pool their sovereignty concerning defence issues, sacrificing their national interests. First of all, the EU has to learn to speak with more unified voice. Then, it has to make structural changes in the CFSP's decision- making mechanism, which still has an intensively intergovernmental character and which creates problems to take quick and effective decisions on vital security and defence issues. Military capabilities and spending have to be increased to reduce dependency on NATO and US assets. Lastly, member states need to realize that a Europe with substantial economic capabilities will be incomplete, if member states fail to upload their national interests in security and defence to the EU level.

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