

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANA BİLİM DALI**

**THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY UNDERSTANDING
ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Rana İZCİ

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Nilhay USTA'nın "THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY UNDERSTANDING ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCES FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE" konulu tez çalışması 02 Nisan 2010 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

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ABSTRACT

It is widely acknowledged that the European Union is an important actor in political and economic arena in the world. However, European Union did not reach its present position immediately. This was a long process and this thesis mainly claims that among the pioneers of this integration and world actorness, Christian Democrats have been the most significant actors among others; because they have been at leader position in every initiative that consisted of the building- stones of the European Union. Therefore, in this study principles and main features of Christian Democrats as well as their influence on European Integration and present status in different EU member states are examined. In addition to these questions, this study also tries to present a brief analysis of European Christian Democrats' position about Turkey's membership process.

ÖZET

Avrupa Birliđi'nin günümüz dünyasında politik ve ekonomik arenadaki önemli aktörlerden biri olduđu bilinen bir gerçektir. Ancak bu yapının řu anki pozisyonuna bir anda gelmediđi de bir diđer gerçektir. Bu tez uzun bir süreç sonucunda kurulan bu yapılanmanın oluşmasında öncülük edenler arasında belki de en önemlileri olarak Hristiyan Demokratların gösterebileceđini çünkü onların Birliđin yapı taşı oluşturacak her türlü girişimde lider pozisyonunda olduklarını ileri sürmektedir. Bu çerçevede tezde Hristiyan Demokratların özelliklerini, ilklerini olduđu kadar Avrupa entegrasyonu üzerindeki etkilerini ve AB üyesi ülkelerdeki řu anki durumlarını incelemey çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliđi'ne giriş sürecinde keskin çıkışlarda bulunan Avrupalı Hristiyan Demokratların davranışları ve Türk tarafının buna cevabı analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

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İstanbul,2010

Nilhay USTA PAMUK

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INTRODUCTION

Today the European Union (EU) is regarded as an important actor in the international scene. Yet it did take a long time for the EU to reach this position after crucial deepening and widening processes. In this long process, some political groups such as Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, Greens, Conservatives, acted as driving force. Among these groups Christian Democrats have a special role. Furthermore many argues that Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on 01 December 2009, brought great advantages for the Christian democrats since this Treaty gives greater responsibilities to the institutions of the EU of whose present presidents are Christians Democrats.

It can be claimed that Christian Democrats among others, are the pioneers of many important projects and attempts in the EU and driving force behind the EU integration. To illustrate, they supported sincerely all deepening movements in the EU such as the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and lastly they give an inspiration and support to the Lisbon Treaty. And also they encouraged successive enlargements in the EU. This study, therefore, argues that Christian Democrats have been the most effective political group in the EU and with the aim of assessing the role that Christian Democracy has played in the European political arena. Within this framework, this study tries to answer the following research questions:

- What are the bases of Christian Democracy idea?
- Why this concept is still significant in today's 'modern' Europe?
- What is the effectiveness of this concept on European people and politicians?
- How did its principles have influence on the historical evolution of the European Union (EU)?
- How do Christian Democracts effect the decisions of the EU today?

- What are the reasons of their severe manner of conduct against Turkey's EU membership?

This study is therefore divided into four main chapters and in every part intends to mirror the implication of Christian Democracy concepts and Christian Democrats in the EU's political past and present. Without perceiving basic features of Christian Democrats, it can not be understood the effectiveness of them in today's EU political life. Thus, at first, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of Christian Democracy concept and Christian Democrats, and then, to present the effective position of Christian Democrats in the EU political arena in present time.

The first chapter, therefore, examines the main features of Christian democracy and its origins. There are various historical developments which affected and shaped the concept and principles of Christian Democracy. Among all, a closer look to the impacts of the some political ideas which emerged with the effects of the French Revolution such as traditionalism and romanticism on the concept and principles of Christian Democracy is necessary to understand the main features of the Christian Democracy. Papal documents on the other hand are crucial to shed light on the emergence and development of Christian Democracy.

After examining the main features and development of Christian democracy- the second chapter consists of two parts- at the first part of the second chapter the main question to be answered is 'What is the present situation of Christian Democratic parties in today's European political life?' Thus, a classification is going to be made according to Christian Democratic parties' position, power and effectiveness in the European Union member states. A three-fold typology is going to be applied with regard to the Christian Democrat Parties in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and Poland. And then, the second part of the chapter focuses on the questions 'What is the major Christian Democratic organizations of Christian Democrats in the EU member states?' and 'What are the features of their organizations?' and 'How Christian Democratic organizations have affected the evolution of the EU so far?'. Thus, in this chapter in addition to Christian Democratic parties, the important international Christian Democratic organizations from the past to the present are also analysed. This analysis is

important because they supported a Union in Europe and paved the way for the establishment of the European People's Party.

At the third chapter, the European People's Party and its organizational characteristics are examined. This chapter also tries to point out the effective position and important visions of the Party in the European Union for over 50 years and its approach to the enlargement.

After the explaining the basic characteristics of European Christian Democrats, at the fourth chapter, the historical development of Turkey-EU relations is examined briefly and the views of European Christian Democrats about Turkey's membership process of the EU and Turkey's respond to these views, are tried to be analysed. Otherwise, this study lacks a very significant component with regard to the EU enlargement process and discussions on the future of the EU. Therefore, this chapter also questions whether there is any common idea about Turkey's membership process of the EU among European Christian Democrats and if there are differences, what they are.

To conclude, the significance of European Christian democrats on the European integration is undeniable, however, they lost the elections in some European Union member countries and their effectiveness has been reduced decreased recently. Nevertheless it appears that still they can play an important role for the future of the EU, if they revise their political goals and approaches about candidate countries especially Turkey.

To analyze these research questions, newspapers are thoroughly examined as well as academic books and journals. The formal websites of Christian Democrats are also used to get basic and first hand information about their views and activities on the EU integration.

I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES & HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY CONCEPT

This chapter starts defining the concept of Christian Democracy. Examination of origins of the Christian Democracy concept is essential for better understanding of the roles that were played and are being played by Christian democrats throughout the European Integration and their current situation in both in Member States and in the EU parliament. To understand the major features of Christian Democracy concept it is also crucial to examine the current developments within the EU. Therefore, in this chapter the basic principles and historical evolution of of Christian Democracy approach will be examined.

1.1. Christian Democracy Understanding & Its Basic Principles

Today, Christian Democrats are strong supporters of any initiative that favorable for the future of European integration. Thus, it can be said that they are entirely integrationist. This is one of the main characteristics of Christian Democrats. Before going to details of other characteristics of the Christian Democrats, first it should be explained that what Christian Democracy is and when it emerged.

The concept of Christian Democracy has had a great importance especially after the Second World War, but the roots of this concept go back to thoughts at the time of the French Revolution. And also, it is a general idea that actual historical developments in the name of Christian Democracy occurred in the nineteenth century. About this subject, but there is a general but not a definite opinion that the word 'Christian Democracy' emerged in the early the 1800's in western Europe especially Belgium¹.

However, in the first time in 1830 in France, Christian Democratic ideas came to focus by the French priest Abbe de Lamennais in the journal 'L'Avenir' and in this journal Lamennais and his friends mentioned about the importance of contemporary liberties and they tried to create an agreement between democracy and the rules of the

¹ New Advent. *Encyclopedia-Christian Democracy-The name*. Retrieved 09 Sep 2009 from: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04708a.htm>

Christianity². Then, these ideas spread through other Catholic countries of Europe. Particularly, with the Revolution of 1848, a social Christianity appeared and a suitable climate emerged to strengthening of Christian Democratic idea³.

The definition of 'Christian Democracy' is not simple. It has not a certain definition. It may be said that Christian Democracy is a completely different and "open-ended phenomenon"⁴. Many commentators claim that Christian Democracy is not a "well-defined ideology as socialism or liberalism, but it has some characteristics of both of them"⁵. Christian Democracy can also be defined as "a middle-way between these two political movements"⁶. But it should be clarified that Christian Democracy is "not only a political idea but also a social point of view that based on religious values"⁷. To sum up, it can be thought that the concept of Christian is a combination of different ideologies such as socialism and liberalism.

In Christian Democracy, economic and social problems are tried to be solved by using both the principles of democracy and the rules of the Christianity. As a result Christian Democracy may be defined as an accord of Catholic Church with the requirements of modern world⁸.

Consequently, it is asserted that Christian Democracy occurred as a confrontation of Catholic Church with a group of lay or democratic Christians, and also it claimed that the major actors that were effective on the emergence of Christian

² Roberto Papini (1997) *The Christian Democrat International*, Translated to English by Robert Royal, Lanham, Boulder, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, p.1.

³ Ibid, pp.1-2.

⁴ Kees Van Kersbergen (1995) *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and The Welfare State*, London: Routledge, pp.230-231.

⁵ Kees Van Kersbergen (1994) "The Distinctiveness of Christian", in David Hanley (ed) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, p.34.

⁶ Kees Van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, pp.230-231.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Michael P. Fogarty (1957) *Christian Democracy In Western Europe 1820-1953*, Notre Dame-Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, p.6.

Democracy idea, came from dissimilar groups of society; so Christian Democracy was defined as “a third way between conflicting benefits”⁹.

When Christian Democracy understanding after the 1950’s is observed, it can be said that there are essentially two major thoughts related with this concept¹⁰. The first argues that Christian Democracy can be defined as “a left-wing branch of conservatism”, with several distinctiveness¹¹. According to this view, there are similarities between Christian Democrats and conservatives in terms of:

respect for tradition, awareness of human imperfection, an emphasis on the natural social relationships in society and on the social need for religion, a clear preference for a form of affirmation of authority, the acceptance of a natural inequality among people and the defence of private ownership¹².

Also, Christian Democrats act as conservatives in the aspect of “respect of pessimism as to human nature, attachment to the right of property, to non-extremist groups”¹³. But the other view of classic Christian Democracy, insists that it has a distinct ideological descent and comprises five distinctive core elements which are commitment to an organic view of society, belief in family, social capitalism, a kind of supranational identity and religiosity¹⁴.

Firstly, Christian Democracy tried to provide reconciliation between different parts/groups of society, so ‘community’ perception is so significant in Christian Democracy understanding¹⁵. And also, this community idea has a strong attachment with social personalism and solidarism¹⁶. Social personalism perceives “the individual as socially embedded and only able to reach fulfillment within the natural structures of society: family, community and the place of work”¹⁷. And, solidarism stresses “the

⁹ Paul Misner (2003) "Christian Democratic Social Policy Precedents For Third Way Thinking" in Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (eds) *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, Notre Dame-Indiana: University of Notre Dame Pres, pp.68-69

¹⁰ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak (December 2006), *Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland (and Why does it matter?)*, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No: 91, p.7.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Kees Van Kersbergen, "The Distinctiveness of Christian ", p.32.

¹⁴ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak, *Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland*, p.7.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid, p.8.

¹⁷ Ibid.

integration and reconciliation of different social groups”¹⁸. Namely, according to Christian Democratic view “society is composed of socially embedded persons rather than atomized individuals, and individual rights and choices only gain meaning when the context of the wider community”¹⁹.

Despite its similar sides with socialism and conservatism, Christian Democracy is different from them. For example, there is a respect to collectivity understanding but individual is also crucial for Christian Democratic view²⁰. And then, in Christian Democracy, all groups in society is essential and Christian Democracy does not support the dominance of a group in society, therefore, Christian Democracy is not similar with conservatism in terms of conservatism’s elitist view²¹. Shortly, Christian Democracy could be described as “political movement that seeks to establish cross-class compromise via a policy mix which capitalism a human face and social policy a capitalist creation and foundation”²².

Secondly, for Christian Democrats, the family is the main element of the society²³. And according to them, family is essential and “...seen as an an ideal tool for social regulation”²⁴. In addition to their family- centered view, they do not support unusual life styles such as homosexual relations; they say that these damage the family concept and the society²⁵.

Thirdly, in economic area, Christian Democrats advocate a social-capitalist view²⁶. In this view, private property, market-based economy, interventionist state are three major qualities²⁷. Therefore, in terms of their social-capitalist view , Germany is showed as the most suitable example, because in The German social market economy “both individuals, social groups such as business and the unions, and the state have

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid

²² Kees Van Kersbergen, " The Distinctiveness of Christian ", p.39.

²³ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak ,*Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland* ,p.24.

²⁴ David Hanley (1994) " Introduction: Christian Democracy As A Political Phenomenon ", in David Hanley (ed) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, p.6.

²⁵ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak ,*Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland*,p.8.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

rights and are constrained by mutual long-term obligations”²⁸. Also, for Christian Democrats, attaining social welfare and lessening of poorness are important targets in economy and to reach these aims, they support cooperation between different parts of economy such as state, labours, and trade unions²⁹.

Fourthly, for Christian Democrats, supranationality is so significant concept that should also be adopted in foreign policy³⁰. They give more importance to supranationalism than nationalism, because the universal values of Christianity have great effects on Christian Democrats³¹. So, they have sincerely supported the European integration process in a supranationalist understanding, and they also want spread this understanding worldwide³².

Fifthly, religiosity is a very important characteristic for Christian Democratic parties³³. The aim of Christian Democrats in political life is to show the significance of the values of Christianity, therefore; they have closeness with the Catholic Church and Catholic organizations or groups³⁴.

To sum up, since the 1950’s in Christian Democracy view society, family, social capitalism, supranationality, religiosity have been essential terms that supported by Christian Democrats strongly. According to them, these five concepts have a close relation with each other, as a chain ring³⁵.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid, pp.8-9.

³⁰ Ibid, p.9.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, p.46.

1.2. Historical Roots of Christian Democracy Concept

In order to examine the historical roots of Christian Democracy concept, it is necessary to look at the impact of the French Revolution on existing political ideas. And then the status and position of the Church and Papal documents that are at the centre stage of all discussions about the roots of Christian Democracy will be investigated. After a brief examination of the impact of the French Revolution and some political ideas on the concept of the Christian Democracy, the Papal Documents will be analyzed in detail to define the evolution of the Christian Democracy concept in this chapter.

1.2.1. Significant Ideas Emerged After the French Revolution

Christian Democracy's first historical source is the 'French Revolution'. This revolution is so important in terms of its effects on the emergence of Christian Democracy understanding. Because of the results of the Revolution, the power or status of the Church decreased on society, namely this Revolution affected the Church badly³⁶. After that, an opposite view, known as 'traditionalism', emerged against the traumatic effects of the Revolution on the Church's power³⁷. 'Divine Truth' perception was the centre of this view, and according to it, "there was only one truth, this truth was eternal"³⁸. In this traditionalist approach, the Church helps the people for eliminating the bad effects of the Revolution and the Pope represents the power of the Church³⁹.

In addition to the French Revolution and traditionalism, another root of Christian Democracy is 'romanticism'. The romantic view was against the industrialization and it criticised the modernity from a warm perspective⁴⁰. According to this view, there was instability in society and to end the awful effects of the modernity on the public, the solution was the rebuilding of the society⁴¹.

The other root is 'religious conservatism'. According to this view, the modernity and industrialization led to a falling in the moral and religious sense of the

³⁶ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, p.208.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid, p.209.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.211.

⁴¹ Ibid.

people⁴². Thus, this falling caused a social problem⁴³. So, the Church proposed the applying to the values of the Christianity to overcome the bad effects of modernity and industrialization on society⁴⁴. Shortly, in this view, “the solution should consist in the renewal and deepening of religious spirit because the suffering of the masses was caused by the absence of the right religious spirit and conviction”⁴⁵.

In addition to traditionalism, romanticism, religious conservatism, another root is ‘social Catholicism’. Social Catholicism asserted that the Industrial Revolution affected workers awfully, so workers’ religious and moral values became degenerated and they went away from the Church⁴⁶. Therefore, the Church should have been applied a social policy for regaining workers⁴⁷. And this view, as religious conservatism, the Church supported the term of charity for providing a social order⁴⁸.

1.2.2. Papal Documents

In addition to, traditionalism, romanticism, religious conservatism, social Catholicism, when it is searched the historical background of the Christian Democracy concept, it is seen that early Christian Democratic ideas reflected some elements of Catholic social thoughts that came from ‘the social encyclical (papal letter to bishops) of the Catholic Popes’. Encyclicals are defined as:

official papal letters to the church body, formally addressed to a bishop or a group of bishops in an area the Pope wishes to reach, because they are public. Encyclicals, in effect, addressed to the whole world and they do not merely present the opinion of a pope but carry the entire tradition of Church since the time of Christ⁴⁹.

And also the claims in these social encyclicals, such as subsidiarity, cooperation, are important principles of today's EU. Therefore, in this part of the study, it is emphasized some significant Papal encyclicals, especially three well-known about Christian Democracy; *Rerum Novarum*, *Graves de Communi* and *Quadragesimo Anno*.

⁴² Ibid,p.213.

⁴³ Ibid,pp.213-214.

⁴⁴ Ibid,p.214.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid,p.217.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Edward A. Lynch (1993) *Latin America's Christian Democratic Parties: A Political Economy*, Westport: Praeger, p.4.

Until the 1880's, the Church did not accept the presence of a social problem⁵⁰. But, when an economic crisis, which led to a collapsing on the life conditions of worker, emerged on the 1880's, workers inclined towards radical Marxist movements⁵¹. At that time, the Church recognized the presence of the social problem and its danger for the society and for the Church⁵².

The Papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII (published in 1891) was so significant document from the aspect of historical development of Christian Democracy thought⁵³. This was the first social encyclical that addresses the miserable life conditions of workers class in society, with this encyclical; the Pope recognised the bad life conditions and extreme poverty of workers⁵⁴. In these bad life conditions, a decreasing of workers' religious values emerged and the social order corrupted⁵⁵. Therefore, this encyclical showed a favorable approach to Catholic organizations, such as trade unions, youth associations to regain the confidence of Catholic people in society against the rising of socialism at that time⁵⁶. Thus, with this approach of the Church, Catholic organizations that had a great effect on the development of Christian Democracy idea, emerged. The predecessors of Leo XIII merely rejected all phenomena of modernism, but Leo XIII believed that industrial society and Catholicism could be reconciled⁵⁷. In *Rerum Novarum*, the emphasis on charity should be considered:

True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own needs and those of his household; nor even to give away which is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life... But, when what necessity demands has been supplied and one's standing fairly taken thought for, it becomes a duty, not of justice (save in the extreme cases), but of Christian charity, a duty not enforced by human law⁵⁸.

Rerum Novarum is “the first papal document attempting to introduce other means than the duties of charity as relief for social misery”⁵⁹. However, in this

⁵⁰ Kees van Kersbergen , *Social Capitalism*,p.219.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid,p.220.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.219.

⁵⁸ In E.Gilson (1954) *The Church Speaks to the Modern World.The Social Techings of LeoXIII*, New york:Image Books,pp.217-218, in Kees van Kersbergen , *Social Capitalism*,p.220.

⁵⁹ Ibid.p.221.

encyclical, socialism was seen as a major danger⁶⁰. According to the encyclical, “increasing wages and savings could improve the material position of workers and lead to a more equal distribution of resources. As a result, workers would empathise with their employers and turn away from the errors of socialism”⁶¹.

The main topic in *Rerum Novarum* was the condition of the working class⁶². The encyclical discusses that the miserable life conditions of workers led by the lessening of their attachment to religious values⁶³. So, in the encyclical the Pope supported private property concept to solve the social problem as “only a part of Catholic co conception of justice”⁶⁴.

And also in the encyclical, there was a crucial stress on the importance of harmony between different classes of the society to reach a well-functioning social order⁶⁵. Furthermore, in this encyclical the Pope asserted that “state intervention is limited and the state should only come in when the general interest or any particular class suffers”, and so it can be said that in *Rerum Novarum*, “there was an embryonic form of subsidiarity”⁶⁶.

Beside all of these opinions in *Rerum Novarum*, during the pilgrimage of important workmen, the Pope Leo XIII in 1898 for the first time used the term ‘Christian Democracy’ in his expressions orally:

If democracy will be informed by the teachings of reason enlightened by faith and if it will accept with religions resignation and as a necessary fact the difference in classes and conditions, while guarding itself against fallacious and subversive theories, if it will lose sight, in the midst of a search for the solution for the manifold social problems which rise every day, of the superhuman charity which Jesus Christ declared to be characteristically his own; if, in other words, democracy will be Christian, it will grant your fatherland a future of peace, prosperity and happiness. If, to the contrary, it abandons itself to revolution and socialism, if blinded by fantastic illusions it delivers

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid,p.222.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid,p.223.

⁶⁶ Ibid,p.226.

itself to vindictive claims on the laws on which the whole civil order is based, the immediate effect for the working class itself will be servitude, misery and ruin⁶⁷.

After this oral using, Christian Democracy concept for the first time found in a papal encyclical, *Grave de Communi* of Pope Leo XIII (1901):

Moreover it would be a crime to distort this name of Christian Democracy to politics, for although democracy, both in its philological and philosophical significations, implies popular government, yet in its present application it is so to be employed that, removing from it all political significance it is to mean nothing else than a benevolent Christian movement in behalf of the people⁶⁸.

The encyclical *Graves de Communi* is known as “popular Catholic action”⁶⁹ since in this encyclical, there was an intensive stress on Catholic movements among people, and these movements seen as a tool for solving social question⁷⁰. Shortly, Popular Catholic action, therefore, means that “the scope mapped out for the activity of the organization is the well-being of the people; and that the movement proceeds along Catholic lines, under the guidance of Catholic leaders”⁷¹.

And in *Grave de Communi*, Leo XIII defined Christian Democracy in terms of ideas and aims. It was:

concerned primarily, though not exclusively, with the problems of the working class. Aimed at so improving the conditions of life as to allow people to feel themselves to be men, not mere animals; christian men and not pagans. A means, in these ways, of enabling people to strive with more facility and earnestness to attain that one thing needful, that final good for which we came into the world⁷².

In this encyclical, Leo XIII gave a great significance to the term of charity on society, but he did not consider the term of democracy in political meaning⁷³. So, it can be claimed that this encyclical formally limits the activities of Christian Democracy to

⁶⁷ In *Allocutio ad Galliae opifices* of October 8, 1898 in *Acta Leonis XIII*, vol VII, pp.196-198, in Hans Maier (1969) *Revolution And Church: The Early History Of Christian Democracy 1789-1901*, Translated to English by Emily M. Schosberger, Notre Dame-London: University of Notre Dame Press, pp.277-278.

⁶⁸ In *Acta Sanctae Sedis*, vol.XXXIII (1900/01),pp.385-386, in Hans Maier, *Revolution And Church*,p.279.

⁶⁹ Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy In Western Europe*, p.3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² In *Grave De Communi*, in Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy In Western Europe*, p.3

⁷³ Hans Maier, *Revolution And Church*, p.24.

the social field⁷⁴. Moreover, according to this encyclical, Christian Democracy rests on principles which “are and remain completely outside party rivalries and political changes”⁷⁵.

To sum up, with this encyclical the effect of the Church on the public increased because it showed a way as Christian Democracy for overcoming social problems⁷⁶. In spite of it was made a stress to the requirements of modern age in this encyclical, this stress did not damage the power of the Church, but it provided re-building of its power⁷⁷.

Beside *Rerum Novarum* and *Grave de Communi* of Leo XIII.’s, another significant encyclical in the aspect of Christian Democracy is *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) of Pope Pius XI. In this encyclical Pope Pius XI blamed “capitalism for an excessive concentration of wealth in few hands and also he asserted that workers, far from obtaining the exalted place in human society to which their numbers and efforts entitled them, had become neglected and despised by modern society”⁷⁸.

Furthermore, in *Quadragesimo Anno*, Pope Pius XI claimed that the unity can not be provided with a conflict between classes of society⁷⁹. According to Pope Pius XI, individualism and collectivism, both of them were essential for the emergence of a social and personal feature of a human⁸⁰. In addition to this, in *Quadragesimo Anno*, Pope Pius XI criticized capitalism and also socialism, he supported corporatist projects⁸¹. And also he considered that re-establishment of the order in society will be based on subsidiary understanding and in this understanding corporatist structure is so significant⁸².

In *Quadragesimo Anno* Pope Pius XI stressed subsidiarity in its embryonic form:

⁷⁴ Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy In Western Europe*, p.10.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.280.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Edward A. Lynch, *Latin America's Christian Democratic Parties*, pp.12-17.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 12

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Paul Misner, “Christian Democratic Social Policy:Precedents For Third Way Thinking”, pp.79-80.

⁸² Ibid.

It is indeed true, as history clearly shows, that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large organizations. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too it is an injustice and at the same time a great evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies⁸³.

Christian Democrats think that “a state which is strong within its proper limits. It must restrict its responsibilities to what it can effectively carry out”⁸⁴. This principle of Christian Democracy can be seen in *Quadragesimo Anno*:

The state should leave to smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance. It will thus carry out with greater freedom, power, and success the tasks which belong to it because it alone can effectively accomplish them⁸⁵.

As a result, all of these explanations in the papal encyclicals provided a ground for the spread of Christian democracy idea and its values such as subsidiarity, support for corporatist projects, solidarity, co-operation, decentralization and so on. Also it can be asserted that these characteristics have constituted the prominent principles of the European Union today.

⁸³ In D.J. O’Brain and T.A. Shannon (ed) (1992), *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, Maryknoll: Orbis, p.60, in Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, p.226.

⁸⁴ Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy In Western Europe*, p.90.

⁸⁵ In *Quadragesimo Anno*, CTS (ed), p.37, in Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy In Western Europe*, p.90.

II. MODERN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN EUROPE

In the first decades after the World War II, the Christian Democratic Parties gained a majority of the votes and became pivot of the political system in Western Europe. And today they are still certainly as key players in Europe. In spite of the other political groups' (such as the Greens, The Socialists, The Conservatives) relatively narrow scope policies in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats can be perceived more active than the others in terms of many policy areas.

For instance, The Greens, mostly, are known with their vigorous approach about environment and woman rights, the Socialists are mostly associated with their position about worker rights and working conditions, the Conservatives are well-known with their support to free-trade policy view and thoughts about financial problems. However, the Christian Democrats are known with their pioneer position about various decisions that resulted in the present structure of the EU. The best example for this is the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). They provided a great inspiration for the Founding Treaty of Rome with their view of 'the united Europe'.

2.1. An Assessment of Christian Democratic Parties in Europe: A Three-fold Classification

At the first part of this chapter, the established and powerful positions of today's Christian democratic parties in Europe are examined in detail to answer the question 'Christian democratic parties are how much effective in Europe or are they effective?' Therefore, this study uses a three-fold classification (the first, the middle and the third level) between to understand in which member states Christian Democrats are more effective and even in power. This three-fold classification mainly depends on the two criteria; their shares in the national elections and their effectiveness and role within the government regardless of their voting percentage in the elections. These two criteria are not always complementary sometimes as in the case of Germany, Austria. Therefore, in this classification, the effectiveness is the most crucial one, and then the

vote percentage is the secondary. (Please see the well-known Christian Democratic Party names and their predecessors' names on the Table 2.1).

Table 2.1.
Christian Democratic Parties in Continental Western Europe and Ireland

| COUNTRY | PARTY | PRE-WAR PREDECESSOR (S) | FOUNDED |
|--------------------|--|---|---------|
| Austria | Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) | Christlich-Soziale Partei (CSP) | 1945 |
| Belgium | Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP)/Parti Social Chretien (PSC) | Katholieke Vlaamsche Volkspartij (KVV)/ Parti Catholique Social (PCS) | 1945 |
| France | Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) | Parti Democrate Populaire (PDP) | 1944 |
| Germany | Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU)/ Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) | Zentrum | 1945 |
| Italy | Democrazia Cristiana (DC) | Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) | 1943 |
| Netherlands | Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) | Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP) | 1945 |
| Switzerland | Schweizerische Konservative Volkspartie (SKV) | | 1912 |
| | Konservativ-Christlich Soziale Partei (KCSP) | | 1957 |
| | Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartie (CDVP) | | 1971 |
| Ireland | Fine Gael (FG) ^a | | 1933 |

Note: ^a The inclusion of the Fine Gael rather than the Fianna Fail here is controversial. Hanley (1994:91) argues that the former 'has a many (or as few) Christian democratic features as the latter'. However, it was the Fine Gael that joined the group of Christian democrats in the European Parliament in the 1970's. Perhaps a more convincing argument in favour of including the Fine Gael among the family of Christian democratic parties concerns the fact that this party was most committed to Catholic social policy (Cohan 1983).

Source: Kees van Kersbergen (1995) *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and The Welfare State*, London: Routledge, p.50.

2.1.1. The First Level

According to the aforementioned three-fold classification, this level is at the top in terms of the degree of effectiveness of Christian Democratic parties. Despite of the fact that in the last parliamentary elections in Germany and Austria, Christian Democratic parties declined their vote portion-but they are still part of the government in their countries-; in this level these countries are chosen as examples, because in these countries there is an established Christian Democratic party culture. Therefore, it is thought that these are suitable samples for showing Christian Democracy understanding's dominance in political and social life.

2.1.1.1. Germany

In Germany, the Center Party (German Zentrumspartei or Zentrum) founded in 1870 as the background of today's Christian Democratic Union⁸⁶. The Center Party was a clearly confessional party, and it had a cross-class social composition, consisting of a variety of anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist forces such as priests, aristocrats, farmers and workers⁸⁷. More than 80 % of voting Catholics supported the Center Party and between 1871 and 1912, the Center Party controlled a politically pivotal bloc of votes in the Parliament (Reichstag) of an average of 24 %⁸⁸. From the beginning, one of the party's strongest points was “its rather elaborate social and economic programme which aimed at the accomodation of the interests of various social groups”⁸⁹.

While discussing the historical development of Christian Democracy in Germany, it is also necessary to refer the well-known *Kulturkampf* (culture struggle). The *Kulturkampf* was significant because with this *Kulturkampf* German people met the reform under the leadership of Otto von Bismark against religious exploitation. Nevertheless despite of this reformist effort, it can be seen easily that Christian Democracy has not lost its effects on society.

The *Kulturkampf* in Germany was gradually relaxed in the early 1880s and eventually abolished in 1887, Catholic Union and political strength was preserved and the Center Party became pivot of German political system between 1890 and 1914⁹⁰. In fact, all governments during this era depended on the support of the Catholic Party. The Center Party was the leading political force of the Weimar Republic, too. In divided Parliament, it commanded between 1919 and 1932 an average of 14 % of the seats⁹¹. The party held government positions in every coalition until 1932 and provided 9 of 22 chancellors⁹². The reinforced labour faction of the party initially accorded a more left-wing orientation and facilitated the cooperation with the social democrats⁹³. Typically,

⁸⁶ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, p.38.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.,p.39.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

the Center Party defended anti-capitalist policies and promoted social policy, but never agreed with the social democrats on the right to private property⁹⁴.

In spite of the strength of the Catholic labour movement and the success of the left faction of the Center Party a gradual return to more conservative policies was noticeable in the late 1920s. The conservative Catholics leadership controlled the party in the early 1930s and supported the appointment of Hitler⁹⁵.

After the Second World War, West Germany's politics was shaped under the leadership of Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was formed in 1949 as a right-center party⁹⁶. The CDU, together with its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), is the successor of the old Catholic Center Party⁹⁷.

For the first time in the history of German political parties, “one party-the CDU/CSU- succeeded in uniting of strongly committed Catholics and Protestants together with voters of less intense religious feelings in 1949”⁹⁸. At the same time, it united rural and urban voters, farmers and businessmen, artisans and white-collar workers, professionals and housewives, employers and labour union members⁹⁹.

The CDU and the CSU are in agreement on their political aims. Their basic policy principles have remained essentially unchanged since they took over the Government in 1949¹⁰⁰. While acknowledging the diversity and national identity of the peoples of Europe, it has promoted all efforts towards the creation of a united Europe, politically, economically, and culturally¹⁰¹. And when it was set up in 1949 in foreign policy it stood for the reunification of Germany in peace. In addition to these, fundamental requirements of the CDU's programme have included “the protection of

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid,p.40.

⁹⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and D. Brent Smith (1987) "Political Culture, Parties and Elections", in Roy C. Macridis (ed) *Modern Political Systems: Europe*, 6th ed., New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, Inc., p. 224.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ John J. Wuest and Manfred C. Vernon (1966) *New Source Book in Major European Governments*, Ohio: World Publishing Company, p. 354.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

the sanctity of marriage, family and the protection of the individual against excessive demands of the state'¹⁰².

There have been some basic principles of the CDU such as :

the maintenance of a socially responsible free enterprise economy; the strengthening of small and medium-size private enterprise and of agriculture; to secure savings and widely dispersed property; a sound education for everyone from primary to university, the expansion of educational and scientific institutions; equal opportunities for all, according to ability and inclination¹⁰³.

The CDU wants to shape public life in the service of the German people, from a sense of Christian responsibility and according to the moral code, in a democratic manner and on a basis of personal freedom, and also the CDU wants to assure churches freedom in their religious activities¹⁰⁴. However, it is conscious of the secular character of the modern state, and of the impossibility of creating a Christian State¹⁰⁵.

At the beginning, it was getting more of the votes of the wealthy and the well off, but was doing well in every income group, it has consistently had a strong appeal for voters over sixty years of ages¹⁰⁶. By 1983 the CDU counted 732.000 members and the CSU counted 180.000 members; however, in 1964-1965 the CDU had membership of approximately 225.000, the CSU had about 70.000 members¹⁰⁷. By looking at these numerical values it can be seen that there has been a strong tendency in German society through the CDU/CSU.

The source of the CDU's electoral support is reflected in the composition of its leading bodies, such as the formal decision-making body of the CDU, its national executive (Bundesvorstand), mirrors the diversity of the party's supporters and its strong local roots, particularly in Southern and Western Germany¹⁰⁸. Formal power in this executive is divided between leaders of regional organizations and the party's chief representatives in the federal government and in Bundestag, between Protestants and

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, pp. 353-354.

¹⁰⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and D. Brent Smith, "Political Culture, Parties and Elections", p. 225.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Catholics and between trade union leaders and representatives of business and industry¹⁰⁹. The multiplicity of interests and the broadness of the party's electoral support have given the party and its leaders a measure of independence against any single pressure group¹¹⁰.

In addition to these, the wideness of this support is also related to the successful performance of the leaders of the party who become unifying symbols for the party and its electorate. Konrad Adenauer was the leader of the CDU from 1949 to 1966¹¹¹. His power over the CDU was well-known. After Adenauer, Erhard (1963-1966), Kiesinger (1967-1971), Barzel (1971-1973), Kohl (1973-1998) became the leader of the CDU¹¹².

Although in opposition from 1969 to 1982, the CDU attempted to revise its image as a party of moderate reforms¹¹³. At the same time it sought to turn advantage on the fears of socialism among its sizable conservative constituency¹¹⁴.

In the early the 1980s the strains of a weak economy increased public support for the party and its conservative economic program, and in 1982 the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats formed a new conservative government through the first successful constructive no-confidence vote¹¹⁵. The CDU restored the vitality of the economy through “a combination of budgetary restraint and economic incentives for business” while ties with Eastern Europe were continued, the nation's military defence was strengthened¹¹⁶. Public support for these policies returned the governing coalition to power following the 1983 and 1987 elections¹¹⁷.

The collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989 provided a historic opportunity for the CDU and Helmut Kohl, while others looked at the events with uncertainty, Kohl quickly embraced the idea of closer ties between East and West

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Rüssel J. Dalton (2000) "Politics in Germany", in Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, Rüssel J. Dalton (ed) *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 7th ed, Logmann, p. 301.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p.301.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.302.

Germany¹¹⁸. Thus, when the March 1990 German Democratic Republic election became a referendum in support of German unification. The Christian Democrats were assured of victory because of the party's early commitment to German Union¹¹⁹. It is known that Kohl served as a chairman until the defeat of the CDU in 1998 election¹²⁰. It was defeated because many Germans looked for a change; the CDU/CSU fared poorly in the election, especially in the Eastern provinces that were frustrated by their persisting second-class status¹²¹. The CDU's poor showing in the election was a rebuke to Kohl, he resigned the party leadership and Schauble took control¹²². Schauble has the task of rebuilding the party and reshaping its program as an opposition party, since 2000 Angela Merkel has been the leader of the CDU, and it is known that the CDU has raised its vote proportion for last two years again¹²³.

The latter parliamentary election was held in September 2005 in Germany. The SPD lost its absolute majority in these elections, but the opposition CDU/CSU, four seats ahead in the Bundestag, had no absolute majority either¹²⁴.

¹¹⁸ Ibid,p.302.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Table 2.2.
Germany Bundestag Election (2002 and 2005)


| Political Parties | (%)Percentages of Votes in 2005 Election | (%)Percentages of Votes in 2002 Election |
|---|--|--|
| CDU | *27,8 | **29,5 |
| CSU | 7,4 | 9,0 |
| SPD | 34,2 | 38,5 |
| FDP | 9,8 | 7,4 |
| The Left | 8,7 | 4,0 |
| The Greens | 8,1 | 8,6 |
| Others | 4,0 | 3,0 |
| * In 2005 CDU and CSU together won 35,2 % of total votes. | | |
| * In 2002 CDU and CSU together won 38,5 % of total votes. | | |

Source: EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. *In The Member States*. Retrieved 05 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/germany.asp>

On October 10, 2005, after three weeks of negotiations, the CDU leader Angela Merkel was set to become Chancellor of a federal grand coalition made up of the CDU/CSU and the SPD, with seats in the 16-member cabinet divided between the two main power blocs, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. And the leader of the CDU has become the first woman prime minister of Germany¹²⁵. It can be seen also the number of seats of the CDU on the graphic 2.1.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Bundestag Composition



Graphic 2.1. Bundestag Composition After 2005 Elections

Source: EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. In The Member States. Retrieved 05 Dec 2009 from:

<http://www.epp-ed.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/germany.asp>

The last parliamentary election was held in September 2009 in Germany. Preliminary results showed that Social Democratic Party (SPD) got 23.0% of total valid second votes (in 2005, this portion was 34,2%), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) won 27,3% of the total (in 2005 27,8%), its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) won 6,5% (in 2005 it was 7,4%), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) got 14,6% of the total (in 2005, it was 9,8%)¹²⁶.

When a comparison is made between 2009 and 2005 German Bundestag Elections result, it can be seen that the CDU and the CSU lost their votes in 2009, but the loss of the SPD is bigger than the CDU and the CSU's. Therefore, it can be said that The CDU and CSU won the election with the lost votes of the SPD and the FDP's coalition support, and the three parties (The CDU-CSU-FDP) announced their intention to form a new centre-right government with Angela Merkel as Chancellor (Bundeskanzlerin). Their main opponent, Social Democratic Party (SPD), conceded defeat. Angela Merkel won the second time. The Table 2.3. (below) shows the election

¹²⁶ Germany Bundestag, *Elections 2009*. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from:
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/results/index.html

results according to the link between votes and seats and the graphic 2.2. gives a comprehensive picture how the seats are distributed in the Bundestag.

Table 2.3.
Germany Bundestag Election (2009)

| Party | First Votes | % | Direct Seats | Second Votes | % | List Seats | Total Seats |
|---|-------------|------|--------------|--------------|------|------------|-------------|
| Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union | 17,047,674 | 39.4 | 218 | 14,658,515 | 33.8 | 21 | 239 |
| Christian Democratic Union (CDU) | 13,856,674 | 32.0 | 173 | 11,828,277 | 27.3 | 21 | 194 |
| Christian Social Union (CSU) | 3,191,000 | 7.4 | 45 | 2,830,238 | 6.5 | 0 | 45 |
| Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) | 12,079,758 | 27.9 | 64 | 9,990,488 | 23.0 | 82 | 146 |
| Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.) | 4,076,496 | 9.4 | 0 | 6,316,080 | 14.6 | 93 | 93 |
| The Left. (DIE LINKE) | 4,791,124 | 11.1 | 16 | 5,155,933 | 11.9 | 60 | 76 |
| Alliance 90/The Greens (GRÜNE) | 3,977,125 | 9.2 | 1 | 4,643,272 | 10.7 | 67 | 68 |
| Pirate Party of Germany (PIRATEN) | 46,770 | 0.1 | 0 | 847,870 | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
| National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) | 768,442 | 1.8 | 0 | 635,525 | 1.5 | 0 | 0 |
| The Republicans (REP) | 30,061 | 0.1 | 0 | 193,396 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 |
| Others | 430,550 | 1.0 | 0 | 930,111 | 2.1 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Election Resources on the Internet. *Germany*. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from: <http://electionresources.org/de/bundestag.php?election=2009>



Graphic 2.2. Distribution of Seats in The 17th German Bundestag

Source: Germany Bundestag. Elections 2009. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from: http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/results/index.html

In conclusion, the picture since 1949 it can be seen that the CDU has addressed the main desires of not only Catholic-conservative electors, but also various parts of German society. Thus, it acts as a complete catch-all party.

2.1.1.2. Austria

In Austria, the former version of the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) was Christlich-Soziale Partei (CSP) founded by Karl Luegger in 1899 and rapidly became major political force, and initially, it was supported by the lower classes and the lower levels of the clergy¹²⁷. The Catholic Party was successful in gaining political control over Vienna in 1897 and gradually also over some non-urbanised areas¹²⁸. By 1907, when the estates system was abolished and the first general elections under universal manhood suffrage was held, the party won considerable support and entered the national government as a leading political force¹²⁹. Austrian political Catholicism steadily worked on the establishment of the unity of all Catholics. Gradually losing contact with the lower class, partly as a result of successful socialist mobilisation, it lost support and the battle over Catholic unity. In spite of the troubled relationship with Catholic labour movement, the CSP won an average of 44% of seats in the Parliament (Nationalrat) between 1919 and 1930¹³⁰. “The CSP never fully accepted democratic principles, was strongly influenced by a Romantic thought and aimed at the establishment of a corporatist social and political order”¹³¹.

After the CSP, in Austria, the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) founded in April 1945 after the World War II¹³². In the first times, it asserted that to be a totally new party, rather than the successor of the Christian Socials¹³³. However, this new party actually had some continuity with the Christian Socials, such as it chose its leaders from the predecessor party and accepted large parts of the ideological heritage of the Christian socials¹³⁴. Despite these continuities, the ÖVP also has some distinct characteristics; the founders of the Austrian People's Party deliberately distanced the party from the Catholic Church, unlike its predecessor¹³⁵. It emerged as “a conservative, democratic party based on Christian values that sought to

¹²⁷ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, pp.33.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.34.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.34.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. In *The Member States*. Retrieved 09 Dec 2009 from: http://www.eppgroup.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/AustriaHistory_OVP.asp

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

include diverse interests’’¹³⁶. Between 1945-1955 the party advocated low taxes, reduced government expenditures, had a balanced budget and wage increases and it favoured a limited government role in the economy¹³⁷. After much debate, the party adopted the Klagenfurt Manifesto in 1965 which referred to ‘‘the ÖVP as an open people's party of the new centre, it stressed the importance of expanding economic welfare and educational opportunities for all social groups’’¹³⁸.

The ÖVP defined itself as ‘‘a non-socialist catch-all party’’, as a non-socialist party, the ÖVP was remarkably successful between 1945-1966¹³⁹. During this time, it was the strongest party in the Parliament, but in that period, it was in coalition with Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), but between 1966-1970 it formed its first single-party government, but after which, it was in opposition for 16 years¹⁴⁰. After 1986 elections, although its votes reduced, it was in a coalition government with the SPÖ as a junior partner until 1995¹⁴¹. But their coalition collapsed because of differences in budget policies, and after this collapsing, the ÖVP again entered into a coalition headed by the SPÖ¹⁴². But after general elections of 1999, the ÖVP entered in a controversial coalition with the Freedom Movement¹⁴³.

Consequently, it can be said that at the beginning of the 1990's the ÖVP lacked a clear mission and a coherent profile. During 1990's the catch-all character of the party profile was defined as the major reason for a series of electoral defeats from the end of the 1980's¹⁴⁴. Therefore, in 1995, the newly elected party chairman Wolfgang Schüssel adopted a principle change in order to preserve his road, and the ÖVP presented itself as the only part of the political center¹⁴⁵. It can be seen that the ÖVP's vote potential between 1945-1990 as follows:

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Wolfgang C. Müller and Barbara Steininger (1994) "Christian Democracy in Austria: The Austrian People's Party", in David Hanley (ed) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, p.87.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.88.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Table 2.4.
Austrian Elections (1945-1990)

| | Percentages of Votes | | | | Seats In Parliament ¹ | | | |
|------|----------------------|------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----|------------------|---------------------|
| | ÖVP | SPÖ | FPÖ ² | Others ³ | ÖVP | SPÖ | FPÖ ² | Others ⁴ |
| 1945 | 49,79 | 44,6 | - | 5,6 | 85 | 76 | - | 4 |
| 1949 | 44,03 | 38,7 | 11,66 | 5,6 | 77 | 67 | 16 | 5 |
| 1953 | 41,25 | 42,1 | 10,94 | 5,7 | 74 | 73 | 14 | 4 |
| 1956 | 45,95 | 43 | 6,52 | 4,5 | 82 | 74 | 6 | 3 |
| 1959 | 44,19 | 44,8 | 7,7 | 3,3 | 79 | 78 | 8 | - |
| 1962 | 45,43 | 44 | 7,04 | 3,5 | 81 | 76 | 8 | - |
| 1966 | 48,34 | 42,6 | 5,35 | 3,7 | 85 | 74 | 6 | - |
| 1970 | 44,69 | 48,4 | 5,52 | 1,4 | 78 | 81 | 6 | - |
| 1971 | 43,11 | 50 | 5,45 | 1,4 | 80 | 93 | 10 | - |
| 1975 | 42,94 | 50,4 | 5,4 | 1,2 | 80 | 93 | 10 | - |
| 1979 | 41,9 | 51 | 6,06 | 1 | 77 | 95 | 11 | - |
| 1983 | 43,22 | 47,7 | 4,98 | 4,2 | 81 | 90 | 12 | - |
| 1986 | 41,29 | 43,1 | 9,73 | 5,9 | 77 | 80 | 18 | 8 |
| 1990 | 32,06 | 42,8 | 16,63 | 8,5 | 60 | 80 | 33 | 8 |

Notes:

1 1945-1970:165 seats; 1971-1990:183 seats

2 Before 1956 VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen)

3 1945-1962 mainly Communist party (KPÖ);1966 mainly DFP, a splinter group from the SPÖ;
1970-1979 mainly Communist Party; 1983-1990 mainly green parties.

4 1945-1956 mainly Communist Party; 1986 and 1990: Green Alternative

Source: Wolfgang C. Miller and Barbara Steininger (1994) "Christian Democracy in Austria: The Austrian People's Party", in David Hanley (ed) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, p.93.

With its new approach, in 2002 election, the ÖVP won voted from the supporters of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and also it increased its share of vote from 27% to 42.3% and became the strongest party in Austria for the first time since 1966¹⁴⁶. According to the results of election between 1986-2002, the vote percentages of the political parties in Austria as follows:

¹⁴⁶ Franz Fallend (2004) "The Rejuvenation of an 'Old Party'? Christian Democracy in Austria", in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (ed) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, p. 104.

Table 2.5.
Election Results for Lower Chamber of Parliament, 1986-2002

*Election results for the lower chamber of parliament, 1986–2002
(in per cent of the votes)**


| | ÖVP | SPÖ | FPÖ | Grüne Alternative | Liberales Forum |
|------|------|------|------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1986 | 41.3 | 43.1 | 9.7 | 4.8 | |
| 1990 | 32.1 | 42.8 | 16.6 | 4.8 | |
| 1994 | 27.7 | 34.9 | 22.5 | 7.3 | 6.0 |
| 1995 | 28.3 | 38.1 | 21.9 | 4.8 | 5.5 |
| 1999 | 26.9 | 33.2 | 26.9 | 7.4 | |
| 2002 | 42.3 | 36.5 | 10.0 | 9.5 | |

*Only parties that won seats in the parliament are included.

Source: Franz Fallend (2004) ‘‘ The Rejuvenation of an 'Old Party'? Christian Democracy in Austria’’, in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (ed) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Pres, p.80.

Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) has been the Federal Chancellor. The government was formed by a coalition between the ÖVP and the BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich - Alliance for Austria's Future) until the result of 2006 election. 2006 election for the national election in Austria was held on 1 October 2006. According to the results of the election, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) won 1.523,43 votes (34,22% of the total) and 66 seats with 13 seats lost according to 2002 election, on the other hand the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) 1.589,126 votes (35,71% of the total) and 68 seats with 1 seat lost¹⁴⁷. Total seats numbers of the ÖVP after the election, can be seen also on the graphics 2.3. and 2.4. as follows:

¹⁴⁷ Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Parline Database*. Retrieved 09 Dec 09 from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_06.htm




Graphic 2.3. Parliament Composition "Nationalrat" According to the Election of 2006

Source: EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. In The Member States.

Retrieved 09 Dec 2009 from:

http://www.eppgroup.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/austria_power.asp



Graphic 2.4. Parliament Composition in "Bundesrat" According to the Election of 2006

Source: EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. In The Member States.

Retrieved 09 Dec 2009 from:

http://www.eppgroup.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/austria_power.asp

The last federal election was held in September 2008 in Austria. This early election emerged with the withdrawal of the ÖVP from the coalition with the SPÖ because of the dissatisfaction with the coalition. Final results of the election showed that

Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) got 29,3 % of total valid votes with 57 seats Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) won 26,0 % of the total with 51 seats, it can be seen that in 2008 as in 2006, the decline the ÖVP's votes continue¹⁴⁸. However, another important result that, this election caused the big gains for the far-right and their anti- EU approach (see Table 2.6).

Table 2.6.
Austrian Parliament Election (2008)

| Party | Votes | % | Seats |
|---|-----------|------|-------|
| Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) | 1,430,206 | 29.3 | 57 |
| Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) | 1,269,656 | 26.0 | 51 |
| Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) | 857,029 | 17.5 | 34 |
| Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) | 522,933 | 10.7 | 21 |
| The Greens - The Green Alternative (GRÜNE) | 509,936 | 10.4 | 20 |
| Liberal Forum (LIF) | 102,249 | 2.1 | 0 |
| Citizens' Forum Austria - List Fritz Dinkhauser (FRITZ) | 86,194 | 1.8 | 0 |
| Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) | 37,362 | 0.8 | 0 |
| Others | 71,744 | 1.5 | 0 |

Source: Election Resources on the Internet..*Federal Elections in Austria*. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from: <http://electionresources.org/at/nationalrat.php?election=2008>

At the end of the 2008 Parliament election, a new coalition set up and has continued since 2 December 2008 between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, chancellor from the SPÖ, vice- chancellor from the ÖVP¹⁴⁹.

To conclude, it can be seen easily that there is a noticeable decline of the ÖVP's votes in the last two national elections (as it can be seen on Table 2.7.) because of Austrian electors' becoming near to far-right parties (such as the Austrian Freedom Party) and their expressions that against the EU policies. However, The ÖVP is still a part of the present government in Austria.

¹⁴⁸ Election Resources on the Internet..*Federal Elections in Austria*. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from: <http://electionresources.org/at/nationalrat.php?election=2008>

¹⁴⁹ Federal Chancellery: Austria.Government. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.bka.gv.at/site/3539/default.aspx>

| Table 2.7. Composition of the National Council From the 19th Legislative Period (based on election results in each case) | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| Legislative period | Election date | SPÖ | ÖVP | FPÖ | BZÖ | GRÜNE | LiF | KPÖ |
| 19th | 09.10.1994 | 65 | 52 | 42 | - | 13 | 11 | - |
| 20th | 17.12.1995 13.10.1996 | 71 | 52 | 41 | - | 9 | 10 | - |
| 21st | 03.10.1999 | 65 | 52 | 52 | - | 14 | - | - |
| 22nd | 24.11.2002 | 69 | 79 | 18 | - | 17 | - | - |
| 23rd | 01.10.2006 | 68 | 66 | 21 | 7 | 21 | - | - |
| 24th | 28.09.2008 | 57 | 51 | 34 | 21 | 20 | - | - |
| SPÖ – Austrian Social Democratic Party (till 14.06.91 Austrian Socialist Party) | | | | | | | | |
| ÖVP – Austrian People's Party | | | | | | | | |
| FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party | | | | | | | | |
| BZÖ – Alliance for the Future of Austria | | | | | | | | |
| Greens – The Green Club | | | | | | | | |
| LiF – Liberal Forum | | | | | | | | |
| KPÖ – Austrian Communist Party | | | | | | | | |
| 19th legislative period: 7 November 1994 till 14 January 1996 | | | | | | | | |
| 20th legislative period: 15 January 1996 till 28 October 1999 | | | | | | | | |
| 21st legislative period: 29 October 1999 till 19 December 2002 | | | | | | | | |
| 22nd legislative period: 20 December 2002 till 29 October 2006 | | | | | | | | |
| 23rd legislative period: 30 October 2006 till 27 October 2008 | | | | | | | | |
| 24th legislative period: 28 October 2008 till | | | | | | | | |

Source: The Austrian Parliament .National Council. Retrieved 10 Dec 2009 from:
http://www.parlament.gv.at/EN/AP/NR/ZS/ZSXIXGP/NRZS_XIXGP-E_Portal.shtml

2.1.2. The Middle Level

At the second level of the aforementioned classification, the Christian democratic parties in Belgium and the Netherlands will be analysed. In these countries, it is still possible to state the the dominance or effectiveness of the Christian Democratic parties in society. However this influence is limited when compared to the Christain Democratic Parties in Germany and Austria.

2.1.2.1. Belgium

Belgian Christian Democracy was born of anti-Catholic policies of Belgian liberals in the 19th century in Belgium¹⁵⁰. Belgian Catholic Party developed from the below and “its original platform called for independence for labour and labour representation in governments”¹⁵¹.

In Belgium, Catholic politics was not properly organised on a regular basis until the 1860s and the first party was founded in 1884¹⁵². At first, the Walloon Parti Catholique (PC) and the Flemish Katholieke Partij (KP) were class-based parties, mainly supported by Catholic segments of the bourgeoisie¹⁵³. Gradually, the parties attracted the Catholics working class and the Catholic framers, and it introduced a stronger concern for the social effects of industrial capitalism, resulting in a political programme in the late 1890s¹⁵⁴.

After that, the political process of the unification of all Catholics led to the establishment of well-defined factions within the party in 1914 and eventually a major reconstruction of the party 1921¹⁵⁵. This newly founded Union Catholique became “an indirect party, direct membership was excluded”¹⁵⁶. It was a federation of distinct

¹⁵⁰ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, p.34.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.35.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Catholic, social and political groups of the middle classes; actually, it did not have a clear political programme but consistently united forces during electoral campaigns¹⁵⁷.

Between 1884 and 1919, the Catholic Party managed to control an absolute majority in the Chambre des Représentants while on average it held almost 40% of seats in interwar period¹⁵⁸. In the beginning, there were well-defined factions within the party, but these factions gradually lost their political weight during an area of increasing nationalism, as a result of which a linguistically fractioned party¹⁵⁹. Then, the Bloc Catholique Belge, was founded in 1936, consisting of the Katholieke Vlaamsche Volkspartij in Flanders and the Parti Catholique Social in Wallonia¹⁶⁰. At first, it gradually developed a social concern for those who suffered the consequences Belgian industrialism, mainly as “a result of the influences of its labour wing and Vatican social teaching”¹⁶¹. Much of the party's support came from Belgian Large Families League, the party especially supported the goals of the Leagues and stressed the importance of family¹⁶².

However, the party's anti-socialism prevented it from “cooperating with the socialist on a more permanent basis, and instead joined the conservative liberals in subsequent governments in the inter-war period”¹⁶³. After the the World War II, the Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian People's Party, CVP) replaced the Catholic Party, the CVP was founded in 1945 as a single party, but split into two wings in 1968 as the CVP (supported by the Flanders) and the PSC (Parti Social Chretien-supported by the Wallonia)¹⁶⁴. This split mirrored a distinction between the Flemish and the French speaking Christian democrats¹⁶⁵.

Except for the period 1954-1958, PSC/CVP participated continuously in the central government in coalitions with the Socialists and Liberals until 1999. For the first

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Edward A. Lynch, *Latin America's Christian Democratic Parties*, p.40.

¹⁶³ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*, p.35.

¹⁶⁴ Wouter Beke (2004) "Living Apart Together Christian Democracy in Belgium", in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (ed) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, p. 133.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

time 1958, and in 1999 federal elections Belgian Christian Democrats went into opposition¹⁶⁶.

Until that election, in Belgium the Christian democrats were leader in politics, they provided the prime ministers be effective in political agenda. In 2001 the name of CVP changed as CD&V(Christen-Democratische Vernieuwing-Christian Democratic Renewal)¹⁶⁷. On June 9, 2001, the congress of the PSC approved the Charter of democratic Humanism.

On May 18, 2002, at the end of a long process of discussion in all the districts, the congress of the PSC adopted the new statutes and the new denomination of the party: Center Humanistic Démocrate (cdH)¹⁶⁸.

Despite of these attempts in Belgian Christian Democracts, they could not succeed.And, since then the Vlaamse Liberalenen Democraten (Flemish Liberals&Democracts -VLD) took over political leadership under the presidency of Guy Verhaftstand and in 2003 the Socialistische Partij Anders (Socialist Party. Different – Spirit -SPA-SPIRIT) also overtook the Christian Democrats, and the Christian Democrats had only the third place due to the increasing popularity of socialists and liberals¹⁶⁹.

Actually in 2003 elections the Christian democrats were still particularly strong in the more rural regions but weak in the more urban regions¹⁷⁰. The results can be seen as follows on the graphic 2.5.:


¹⁶⁶ Alan J.Day (2000) *Directory of European Union Political Parties*, London: John Harper Publishing, p.10.

¹⁶⁷ Wouter Beke (2004) " Living Apart Together Christian Democracy in Belgium",p.142

¹⁶⁸ Centre démocrate humaniste.LeParti.L'*historique*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from:
<http://www.lecdh.be/le-parti/lhistorique>

¹⁶⁹ Ibid,pp. 135-137

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.



Total: 150 members

| List | Members 2003 |
|-------------|--------------|
| VLD | 25 |
| PS | 25 |
| MR | 24 |
| sp.a-spirit | 23 |
| CD&V | 21 |
| VLAAMS BLOK | 18 |
| CDH | 8 |
| ECOLO | 4 |
| N-VA | 1 |
| FN | 1 |

Graphic 2.5. Chamber Seat Distribution According to 2003 Election Results

Source: Belgium Federal Portal. Elections 2003. *List results -Chamber of Representatives* –

Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://polling2007.belgium.be/en/cha/seat/seats2003.htm>

Federal election results in the Chamber of Deputies between 1991-2003, as follows

Table 2.8.
Federal Election Results in The Chamber of Deputies 1991-2003

| Political Group | % Seats 1991 | 1995 * | 1999 | 2003 |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Christian Democrats | 26,9 % 57 | 27,3 % 41 | 21,4 % 32 | 19,3 % 29 |
| CVP/CD&V | 18,4% 39 | 19,3% 29 | 14,7% 22 | 14,0% 21 |
| PSC/CDH | 8,5 % 18 | 8,0% 12 | 6,7 % 10 | 5,3 % 8 |
| Socialists | 29,7 % 63 | 27,3 % 41 | 22,0 % 33 | 32,0 % 48 |
| PS | 16,5 % 35 | 14,0 % 21 | 12,7 % 9 | 16,7 % 25 |
| SP/SPA-SPIRIT | 13,2 % 28 | 13,3 % 20 | 9,3 % 14 | 15,3 % 23 |
| Liberals | 21,7 % 46 | 26,0 % 39 | 27,3 % 41 | 32,7 % 49 |
| PVV/VLD | 12,3 % 26 | 14,0 % 21 | 15,3 % 23 | 16,7 % 25 |
| PRL/MR | 9,4 % 20 | 12,0 % 18 | 12,0 % 18 | 16,0 % 24 |
| Greens | 8,0 % 17 | 7,3 % 11 | 13,3 % 20 | 2,7 % 4 |
| AGALEV | 3,3 % 7 | 3,3 % 5 | 6,0 % 9 | 0,0 0 |
| ECOLO | 4,7 % 10 | 4,6 % 10 | 7,3 % 11 | 2,7 % 4 |
| Vlaams Blok | 5,7 % 12 | 7,3 % 11 | 10,0 % 15 | 12,0 % 18 |
| VU/NVA | 4,7 % 10 | 3,3 % 5 | 5,3 % 8 | 0,7 % 1 |
| Others | 3,3% 7 ** | 0,9% 2FN | 0,5% 1FN | 0,5% 1FN |

* As a result of constitutional reform of 1993, the number of seats in the Federal Chamber of Representatives has been diminished since 1995 from 212 to 150.

** The Walloon FDF obtains three seats, a Flemish libertarian protest party also three seats and the Front National one seat.

Source: Wouter Beke (2004) “Living Apart Together Christian Democracy in Belgium”, in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (eds) *Christian Democratic Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, p.136.

The Christian Democratic Party which since the Second World War has presented itself as People's Party seeks to promote namely an appeal to all social classes and it supported a mutual cooperation between employers and employees in socio-economic matters as an alternative to socialists and liberals¹⁷¹. The CVP/PSC stood for “a third way that presents the path of a market economy, providing profitability for businesses in exchange for social redistribution”¹⁷².

From 1999 onwards, the government which not included Christian Democrats, so it was extremely difficult for Christian democrats to attach the government's policies; however, Christian Democrats still tried to distinguish themselves from liberals and socialists in the way they attributed more importance to the role of civil society,

¹⁷¹ Ibid,p.148.

¹⁷² Ibid,p.148.

particularly in the areas of education and social service¹⁷³. Whereas the government considered them to be “an integral part of the state, Christian Democrats emphasize the autonomy of the schools, hospitals, especially Catholic ones”¹⁷⁴.

Until the 2007 elections, the government was formed by the VLD (Flemish Liberals&Democracts), MR (Reform Movement), PS (Socialist Party) and SP.A-SPIRIT (Socialist Party. Different – Spirit), but with the last Belgian elections (on June 10 2007) the alliance of Christian Democratic and Flemish party (CD&V) and the New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) received an increased share of the vote from the previous election (2003) by using good governance theme against their rivals¹⁷⁵. The electoral alliance between the Flemish CD&V and N-VA parties became the biggest single parliamentary grouping (25 seats for CD&V and 5 for N-VA). Finally, in March 2008 - nine months after the election - the Flemish and French Christian Democrats and Liberals, along with the French Socialists reached an agreement to form a coalition government headed by CD&V leader Yves Leterme. Yves Leterme was replaced by Herman Van Rompuy (CD&V) on 30 December 2008¹⁷⁶. The number of seats after 2007 elections can be seen as follows:

¹⁷³ Ibid.,p.149.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 148-149.

¹⁷⁵ Election Resources on the Internet.*Federal Elections in Belgium*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from:
<http://electionresources.org/be/>

¹⁷⁶ EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. *In The Member States*. Retrieved 25 Aug 2006 from:
http://www.epp-ed.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/Belgium_power.asp

Table 2.9.
The Composition of the Chamber of Deputies After 2007 Elections

| Results For Chamber of Deputies After 2007 Election | | | |
|--|-------------|--------------------|-------|
| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
| Christian Democratic and Flemish (CDV) / New Flemish Alliance (NVA) | 1,234,950 | 18.51% | 30 |
| Flemish Interest (VB) | 799,844 | 11.99% | 17 |
| Socialist Party Difference (SP.A) / Spirit | 684,39 | 10.26% | 14 |
| Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) / Vivant (V) | 789,445 | 11.83% | 18 |
| Socialist Party (PS) | 724,787 | 10.86% | 20 |
| Reformist Movement (MR) | 835,073 | 12.52% | 23 |
| Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) | 404,077 | 6.06% | 10 |

Source: International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Belgium: Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1104>

Therefore, it can be said that despite of their lost in the last years, 2007 election results showed that Belgian Christian Democrats has had still significant in their country's political agenda with their vision. In addition to their effectiveness in the country, when it is looked the effectiveness of Belgian Christian Democrats in the development of Christian democracy in Europe, it is seen that they have been very much involved in efforts to establish international cooperation between Christian Democratic parties. In 1947, Nouvelles Equipes International (NEI) has founded in Chaud Fontaine in Belgium and also a Christian Democrat Jules Soyeur became its first Secretary General¹⁷⁷. And from 1950-until 1965 two other founding members of CVP, Auguste Edward de Schrijver and Theolefevre were the presidents of the NEI, and then, Leo Tindemans served from 1965 to 1974 as the first secretary general of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) from 1976 until 1985 as the first president of the European People's Party (EPP)¹⁷⁸. Thus, it can be clearly seen that, Belgian Christian Democrats have a special significance in their country as well as in the EU's history.

¹⁷⁷ Paul Lucardie and Hans-Martien ten Napel (1994) " Between confessionalism and Liberal Conservatism: The Christian Democratic Parties of Belgium and the Netherlands", in David Hanley (ed) *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, p. 52.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid,p.53.

2.1.2.2. The Netherlands

When it is considered the historical past of Dutch political parties, it is seen that religious segmentation characterized this nation. Religious strives and disputes are evident features in the history of this nation, for instance religious cleavage controlled Dutch politics during the second half of the 19th century, and it was the most important cause for the rise of pillarised structure of the political system in this country¹⁷⁹. Kees van Kersbergen underlines the dominance of that religious cleavage in the political system as such “the political impact of the fundamental religious cleavage on Dutch society, both expressed as liberal-confessional conflict and as a Calvinist- Catholic anti-thesis”¹⁸⁰.

This cleavage primarily determined the dominance of Christian and Catholic parties during the most of the 20th century, in effect; religious conflicts and pillarisation explain why an inter-denominational Christian democratic party did not arise until 1980¹⁸¹. The politically dominant liberals intended “to create a universal, state-controlled and religiously neutral educational system and passed a law for that purpose in 1878”¹⁸². This law obviously threatened to fall the confessional schools and led to the foundation by the Calvinist minister Abraham Kuyper of the first Dutch mass party, the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP) in 1879¹⁸³.

The party was anti-revolutionary; it rejected the tenets of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, but recognized the change¹⁸⁴. Kuyper believed to be the vital and essentially free areas of social life such as the family, the church, the school. And the ARP struggled for the survival of the Calvinist minority and for the limitation of the state intervention¹⁸⁵. It was a genuine party with “a cross-class appeal”, but it disproportionally supported by the orthodox lower or middle classes¹⁸⁶.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism*.p.43.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid,p.44.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

The party not only organized in the Calvinist electorate but also those whose were denied the right to vote¹⁸⁷.

The ARP was successfully electorally and on average controlled about 20 percent of seats in the Tweede Kamer between 1888-1913 and in the inter-war years its electoral appeal declined gradually to approximately 14 percent of seats¹⁸⁸. During 1888-1891 it formed the first confessional coalitions with the Catholics played a dominant role in the government and during the 1918-1940, it controlled economic, social policy and provided the prime minister five times¹⁸⁹.

In addition to the ARP, the other significant political party was, the Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP), founded¹⁹⁰. Actually, the Catholic social and political emancipation was slow. The priest Herman Schaepman had already written a Catholic political programme in 1897, it took a genuine Catholic party in 1926, the Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP)¹⁹¹. Similar to other Catholic parties, the RKSP was an outright confessional party and comprised a mixed of the political and social organizations of the Catholic sub-culture. The RKSP won about 30 percent of seats between 1929 and 1940; this proportion reflects the numerical strength of the Catholic minority in the Netherlands¹⁹². The social and political system of pillarisation together with the proportional system was particularly beneficial to the mobilisation of Catholic power in the inter-war years. The RKSP, “as the political representative of a comprehensive network of Catholic social and cultural organisations”, became the single largest party in the Parliament¹⁹³.

But it is crucial that because of the traditional pillarisation of the Dutch society, there were separate organizations for Calvinists and Catholics in every area in the Netherlands. And a unitary Christian Democratic party was only formed in 1980¹⁹⁴. In that year, three confessional parties, the Calvinist-Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid,p.45.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Paul Lucardie and Hans-Martien ten Napel (1994) “Between confessionalism and Liberal Conservatism: The Christian Democratic Parties of Belgium and the Netherlands”,p. 53.

Dutch Reformed Christian Historic Union (CHU), Catholic People's Party -Katholiekee Volkspartij (KVP), which had formed a federation in 1975, merged into Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)¹⁹⁵. The new CDA formation represented an attempt by these confessional parties to reserve the steady decline in their votes since 1945¹⁹⁶.

In 1977, the federated Christian Democrats received a slightly higher vote than the three separate parties had received at the previous election, and then, in 1981 and 1982 parliamentary elections the CDA again suffered some losses¹⁹⁷. In this period, the party was divided not only into confessional groups but also into left and right wings, yet by, 1986, the CDA had overcome these difficulties and it increased its share of the popular vote by more than 5 % ¹⁹⁸.

In 1989, the CDA was the most powerful party in the Netherlands. In the parliamentary elections of that year, it had won 154 seats of 150¹⁹⁹. Moreover, the Christian Democrats occupied a pivotal position in the party system, as the two other major parties had excluded each other as possible coalition partners since 1952²⁰⁰. But at the end of the 1990's, this ring of the CDA went into a decline. They lost their seats in the parliament and their pivotal position in the system. Because of frequent leadership changes of unpopular leaders of the party, weak positions on important issues, the decline of influence of churches and Catholic organizations led to a dramatic decreasing to the member of CDA seats²⁰¹. Yet in 2002, the party revived and it won 43 seats (about 28 % of popular votes) became the largest party in the national parliament and its new leader Jan Peter Balkenende became the prime minister²⁰².

At the sudden election in January 2003, the CDA even better than 2002 election, had 44 seats and approximately 29% of votes²⁰³. Finally, it might be said that the effects of Balkenende as a charismatic party leader was so high in this increasing of

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Paul Lucardie (2004) "Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained ? Christian Democracy in the Netherlands", in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (ed) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 159.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid,p.166.

votes of the party. He refers ‘‘communitarism to restore balance between individual liberties and responsibilities and common values rather than cultural diversity’’²⁰⁴. It can be seen that this position was successful in 2003 election on the table 2.10. and a comparison of 1981-2003 election results on 2.11. On the table 2.10, it can be seen that the CDA was successful and the leader, but it did not gain a great majority of votes, the CDA gained 44 seats, the Labor Party gained 42 seats after 2003 election of the Tweede Kamer.

Table 2.10.
The "Tweede Kamer" Composition: House of Representatives) As In 2003

| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
|--|-------------|--------------------|-------|
| Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) | 2,763,480 | 28.62% | 44 |
| Labor Party (PvdA) | 2,631,363 | 27.26% | 42 |
| People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) | 1,728,707 | 17.91% | 28 |
| Socialist Party (SP) | 609,723 | 6.32% | 9 |
| Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) | 549,975 | 5.70% | 8 |
| Green Left (GL) | 495,802 | 5.14% | 8 |
| Democrats 66 (D66) | 393,333 | 4.07% | 6 |
| Christian Union Party (CU) | 204,694 | 2.12% | 3 |
| Political Reformed Party (SGP) | 150,305 | 1.56% | 2 |
| Others | 127,093 | 1.32% | 0 |

Source: International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Netherlands: Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from:<http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=312>

²⁰⁴ Ibid,p.171.

Table 2.11.
General Elections Results

General election results, 1981-2003

| | 1981 | 1982 | 1986 | 1989 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| CDA | | | | | | | | |
| % | 30.8 | 29.4 | 34.6 | 35.3 | 22.2 | 18.4 | 27.9 | 28.6 |
| seats | 48 | 45 | 54 | 54 | 34 | 29 | 43 | 44 |
| Left parties* | | | | | | | | |
| % | 34.5 | 36.9 | 36.6 | 36 | 28.8 | 39.8 | 28 | 38.7 |
| seats | 53 | 56 | 55 | 55 | 44 | 61 | 42 | 59 |
| Liberal parties** | | | | | | | | |
| % | 28.4 | 27.4 | 23.5 | 22.5 | 35.5 | 33.7 | 20.5 | 22 |
| seats | 43 | 42 | 36 | 34 | 55 | 52 | 31 | 34 |
| Protestant parties | | | | | | | | |
| % | 4 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 4.3 | 3.7 |
| seats | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 5 |
| Other parties*** | | | | | | | | |
| % | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 3 | 19.3 | 7 |
| seats | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 28 | 8 |

Total number of seats: 150

*PvdA, SP, GL or its predecessors

**D66 and VVD

***Seats of extreme right parties in 1982, 1989 and 1994 and of LN and LPF in 2002 and 2003

Source: Paul Lucardie (2004) "Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained ? Christian Democracy in the Netherlands", in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (eds) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, p. 161.

On the table 2.11, it can be seen that the vote percentage of the CDA increased generally between 1981-2003. However, only in 1982, 1994 and especially in 1998 the vote percentage of the CDA decreased.

Lastly, after the 2003 election, the general elections were held in the Netherlands in November 2006. With this election the Christian Democrats remained the largest single party (with slight losses), while the Socialist Party increased to a strong third place, almost tripling its electoral following - largely at the expense of Labour, which suffered a major setback. VVD lost ground as well and slipped to fourth place, while D66 had its worst election result ever and losing its remaining seats in the House of Representatives (The numerical data about 2006 election result can be seen on the table 2.12.).

However, both the rightist Party for Freedom (PVV), the VVD were breakaway, and the Party for the Animals (PvdD), which advocates animal rights, secured parliamentary representation²⁰⁵. No combination of two parties secured an absolute majority in the new House of Representatives, and Balkenende remained at “the helm of a minority CDA-VVD caretaker government” until February 2007, when he formed a new, centrist coalition government composed of the Christian Democrats, Labour and the small Christian Union (CU)²⁰⁶.

Table 2.12.
Summary of the 22 November 2006 Dutch House of Representatives Election Results

| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
|---|-------------|--------------------|-------|
| Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) | 2,608,573 | 26.51% | 41 |
| Labor Party (PvdA) | 2,085,077 | 21.19% | 33 |
| Socialist Party (SP) | 1,630,803 | 16.58% | 25 |
| People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) | 1,443,312 | 14.67% | 22 |
| Party for Freedom (PvdV) | 579,49 | 5.89% | 9 |
| Green Left (GL) | 453,054 | 4.60% | 7 |
| Christian Union (CU) | 390,969 | 3.97% | 6 |
| Democrats 66 (D66) | 193,232 | 1.96% | 3 |
| Party for the Animals (PvdD) | 179,988 | 1.83% | 2 |
| Reformed Political Party (SGP) | 153,266 | 1.56% | 2 |
| Other Parties | 120,919 | 1.23% | 0 |

Source: International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Netherland: Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1118>

²⁰⁵ Election Resources on the Internet. *Elections to the Dutch Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives): The political Parties*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://electionresources.org/nl/>

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

2.1.3. The Third Level

At the third level of the classification, an example from the Scandinavian member state, Sweden, is given first, then Polish example is analysed for showing the inefficient position of Christian Democracy idea in the central and eastern European member states of the EU.

2.1.3.1. Sweden

In Sweden, Christian Democratic Community Party (Kristdemokratiska Samhallspartiet-KdS) founded in 1964 as a third alternative in Sweden against socialist or non-socialist ones²⁰⁷. The emergence of this party is closely associated with especially debates on religion and morality in that time²⁰⁸. It supported “a new way of life in social problems”²⁰⁹. In its first election in 1964 it won about 78,000 votes and by 1985, it did not pass the 4% barrier to representation in Swedish Parliament (Riksdag)²¹⁰. But in 1985 election, it entered into an electoral pact with the Center Party and it had one of Center Party's 44 seats²¹¹. Thus, it entered in the Riksdag. The party took its new name Christian Democratic Assembly (Kristen Demokratisk Samling) and totally revised its programme in 1987²¹².

In 1988, it failed to provide representation after the general elections. But in 1991 it won 26 seats and it became a member of a center- right coalition government²¹³. It can be seen the vote portion of KdS in those years from table 2.13 and 2.14, as follows:

²⁰⁷ Alan J.Day, *Directory of European Union*, p. 195.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

Table 2.13.
The Christian Parties of Scandinavia in Parliamentary Elections, 1933-1991

| NORWAY | | FINLAND | | SWEDEN | | DENMARK | | Notes: The Parties are: Norway: Kristelig Folkeparti Finland: Suomen Kristillinen Liitto (SKL) Sweden: Kristen Demokratisk Samling, since 1991 Kristdemokratiska Samhallspartiet (KDS) Denmark: Kristeligt Folkeparti *KDS share of ballots cast for the electoral alliance with the Center Party. |
|--------|------|---------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|---|
| Year | % | Year | % | Year | % | Year | % | |
| 1933 | 0,7 | 1958 | 0,2 | 1964 | 1,8 | 1971 | 2 | |
| 1936 | 1,3 | 1962 | 0,8 | 1968 | 1,5 | 1973 | 4 | |
| 1945 | 7,9 | 1966 | 0,4 | 1970 | 1,8 | 1975 | 5,3 | |
| 1949 | 8,4 | 1970 | 1,1 | 1973 | 1,8 | 1977 | 3,4 | |
| 1953 | 10,5 | 1972 | 2,5 | 1976 | 1,4 | 1979 | 2,6 | |
| 1957 | 10,2 | 1975 | 3,3 | 1979 | 1,4 | 1981 | 2,3 | |
| 1961 | 9,6 | 1979 | 4,8 | 1982 | 1,9 | 1984 | 2,7 | |
| | | | | | 2,5 | | | |
| 1965 | 8,1 | 1983 | 3,0 | 1985 | * | 1987 | 2,4 | |
| 1969 | 9,4 | 1987 | 2,6 | 1988 | 2,9 | 1990 | 2,7 | |
| 1973 | 12,3 | 1991 | 3,1 | 1991 | 7,1 | | | |
| 1977 | 12,4 | | | | | | | |
| 1981 | 8,9 | | | | | | | |
| 1985 | 8,3 | | | | | | | |
| 1989 | 8,5 | | | | | | | |

Source: Lauri Karvonen (1994) "Christian Parties in Scandinavia: Victory over the Windmills" in David Hanley (ed) Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, London: Pinter Publishers, p. 123.

Table 2.14.
National Election Results in Norway, Sweden Denmark And Finland Between 1989-2003

| National election results in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland since 1989 | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| NORWAY | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 | 2001 |
| Socialist Left | 10.1 | 7.9 | 6 | 12.5 |
| Labour | 34.3 | 36.9 | 35 | 24.3 |
| Centre | 6.5 | 16.8 | 7.9 | 5.6 |
| Christians | 8.5 | 7.9 | 13.7 | 12.4 |
| Liberal | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 3.9 |
| Conservatives | 22.2 | 17 | 14.3 | 21.2 |
| Progress | 13 | 6.3 | 15.3 | 14.7 |
| SWEDEN | 1991 | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 |
| Left Party | 4.5 | 6.2 | 11.9 | 8.3 |
| Greens | 3.4 | 5 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| Soc Dems | 37.7 | 45.3 | 36.6 | 39.8 |
| Centre | 8.5 | 7.7 | 5.1 | 6.1 |
| Christians | 7.1 | 4.1 | 11.8 | 9.1 |
| Liberals | 9.1 | 7.2 | 4.7 | 13.3 |
| Conservatives | 21.9 | 22.4 | 22.7 | 15.2 |
| DENMARK | 1990 | 1994 | 1998 | 2001 |
| Unity List | 1.7 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 |
| Soc Peoples | 8.3 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 6.4 |
| Soc Dems | 37.4 | 34.6 | 35.9 | 29.1 |
| Soc Libs | 3.5 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 5.2 |
| Christians | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Liberals | 15.8 | 23.3 | 24 | 31.3 |
| Conservatives | 16 | 15 | 8.9 | 9.1 |
| D Peoples | 6.4 | 6.4 | 7.4 | 12 |

| FINLAND | 1991 | 1995 | 1999 | 2003* |
|----------------|------|------|------|-------|
| Left Alliance | 10.1 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 9.9 |
| Greens | 6.8 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 8 |
| Soc Dems | 22.1 | 28.3 | 22.9 | 24.5 |
| Centre | 24.8 | 19.8 | 22.4 | 24.7 |
| Christians | 3.1 | 3 | 4.2 | 5.3 |
| Sw Peoples | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.1 | 4.6 |
| Nat Coaln | 19.3 | 17.9 | 21 | 18.6 |
| True Finns | 4.8 | 1.3 | 1 | 1.6 |

Source: John T.S. Madeley (2004) "Life at the Northern Magrin Christian Democracy in Scandinavia" in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (eds) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press pp.230-231.

In 1993, a new comprehensive revision of the party's programme was implemented and the party established a programme of principles²¹⁴. In 1994, it won 15 seats and it went into opposition. In 1995, the party supported the accession of Sweden to the EU²¹⁵. In 1996, the name was changed to the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna), and the party's profile has been focused on the significance of ethics/morals in a good society, the fundamental significance of family and schooling, health care issues and international solidarity²¹⁶.

In 1998 elections, the party won 42 seats with its campaigning on family values, but it remained in opposition²¹⁷. The results of the election as follows on the table 2.15:

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

Table 2.15.
Parliament (Riksdag) Composition After 1998 General Elections

| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
|--|-------------|--------------------|-------|
| Social Democratic Party (S) | 1,914,426 | 36.39% | 131 |
| Moderate (Conservative) Party (M) | 1,204,926 | 22.90% | 82 |
| Left Party (V) | 631,011 | 11.99% | 43 |
| Christian Democrats (KD) | 619,046 | 11.77% | 42 |
| Centre Party (C) | 269,762 | 5.13% | 18 |
| Liberal People's Party (FP) | 248,076 | 4.72% | 17 |
| Green Party (MP) | 236,699 | 4.50% | 16 |
| Other | 137,176 | 2.61% | 0 |

Source: International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Sweden:Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=893>

After 2002 election, the party had 33 seats in Riksdag, but it was still in opposition²¹⁸. The results of the election as follows on the table 2.16:

Table 2.16.
Parliament (Riksdag) Composition After 2002 General Elections

| Riksdag election result 2002 | | | |
|--|----------|-------------------|--------------|
| Name of party | % | Difference | Seats |
| The Moderate Party (M) | 15,20% | -7,70% | 55(5)* |
| The Centre Party (C) | 6,10% | 1,10% | 22(6)* |
| The Liberal Party (FP) | 13,30% | 8,70% | 48(4)* |
| Christian Democrats (KD) | 9,10% | -2,60% | 33(4)* |
| Social Democrats (S) | 39,80% | 3,50% | 144(2)* |
| Left Party (V) | 8,30% | -3,60% | 30(17)* |
| The Green Party (MP) | 4,60% | 0,10% | 17(11)* |
| The Norrbotten County Party (NBP) | 0,20% | | -- |
| Other parties (ÖVR) | 2,80% | 0,30% | |
| * of which adjustment seats | | | |
| The result is given with one decimal, which creates a discrepancy of 0,6%. | | | |

Source: Sweden Election Authority (Valmyndigheten). *Previous Elections:2002 Riksdag Election*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: http://www.val.se/in_english/previous_elections/2002/index.html

²¹⁸ Sweden Election Authority (Valmyndigheten). *Previous Elections:2002 Riksdag Election*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: http://www.val.se/in_english/previous_elections/2002/index.html

However, with 2006 election, the party has been a part of the present coalition in spite of decreasing of its seats, because of the success of the center right coalition against the Socialists²¹⁹. The results of the election as follows on the table 2.17:

Table 2.17. Parliament (Riksdag) Composition After 2006 General Elections

| Riksdag election result 2006 | | | |
|--|----------|-------------------|--------------|
| Name of party | % | Difference | Seats |
| The Moderate Party (M) | 26,23 | 10,97 | 97 |
| The Centre Party (C) | 7,88 | 1,69 | 29 |
| The Liberal Party (FP) | 7,54 | -5,85 | 28 |
| Christian Democrats (KD) | 6,59 | -2,56 | 24 |
| Social Democrats (S) | 34,99 | -4,86 | 130 |
| Left Party (V) | 5,85 | -2,54 | 22 |
| The Green Party (MP) | 5,24 | 0,59 | 19 |
| Other parties (ÖVR) | 5,67 | 2,55 | 0 |
| The result is given with two decimals, which creates a discrepancy of 0,01%. | | | |

Source: Sweden Election Authority (Valmyndigheten). Previous Elections: 2006 Riksdag Election. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: http://www.val.se/in_english/previous_elections/2006/index.html

In addition to the KdS, the other member party of the EPP from Sweden the Moderate Alliance Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet-MSP) was founded in 1904, actually its name was starting with Conservative but it changed to Moderate Alliance Party in 1969²²⁰. The party combines “a conservative heritage with liberal ideas to support a moderate, anti-socialist policy in favor of a free-market economy and individual freedom”²²¹. The party participated in coalitions and formed minority governments several times until 1932 but after which the social democratic Labour Party (SAP) was in power for 44 years²²². The Moderate Alliance Party advanced again 15.6% of votes in the 1976 elections and it entered the first non-socialist coalition²²³. And also it can be said that the party has been known as “Sweden's leading non-socialistic party”²²⁴. In 1981 the party withdrew from the coalition because of disagreements on fiscal policy, and with the election of 1991 the party went into power

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Alan J. Day, *Directory of European Union*, p. 198.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

in a coalition with the Centre, Christian Democratic community and Liberal People's Parties; the chairman of the party, Mr. Carl Bildt, became the prime minister between 1991-1994²²⁵. The 1994 elections resulted with a minority SAP government, and after two months the elections, the party welcomed the referendum result in favour of the EU membership, and then in 1998 general elections, the party won 82 votes but remained in the opposition²²⁶.

After the elections of 2003, the Moderate Alliance Party has been continued in opposition, while a coalition government set up between the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish People's Party²²⁷. However, for 2006 general election, the Moderates, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Center Party agreed to run on a common platform, and formed the Alliance for Sweden to challenge the political dominance of the Social Democrats²²⁸. With the last general election held in September 2006, the four center-right parties went on to win a narrow parliamentary majority in the election, while the Social Democratic Party decreased even worse than in 1998, although it remained the largest single party in the Riksdag²²⁹. The Moderates increased their seats with soar their best results since 1928, but the Liberals were unable to hold on to their 2002 gains and lost considerable ground²³⁰. After the election, a four-party government based on the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats was formed and then Moderate Party leader Carl Bildt has been Prime Minister.

2.1.3.2. Poland

After an example of social democratic Scandinavian country Sweden, Polish example presents an interesting case to demonstrate the weak position of Christian democracy in the new member states of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe that have a communist background.

²²⁵ Ibid.p.199.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Election Resources on the Internet. *Elections to the Swedish: The Political Parties*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://electionresources.org/se/>

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

Despite the fact that Poland is a nation of practicing Roman Catholics who make up around 95% of a population of almost 39 million, shortly “almost all Poles are Roman Catholics and that religion has played an important part in post-communist Polish politics, no self-declared Christian Democratic party has been successful in post-1989 Poland”²³¹. None of the currently successful Polish centre-right parties profile themselves as Christian Democratic, “nor can they be labeled as such objectively, while superficially Poland looks like fertile ground for Christian Democracy”, the factors that were crucial to the formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in post-war Western Europe were largely absent during the emergence of democratic, multi-party politics in post-communist Poland²³².

The Catholic Church has played an extremely important role in Polish history, but Christian Democracy does not have deep historical roots in that country. Political entrepreneurs hoping to form “a successful Christian Democratic party in post-1989 Poland did not really have any successful historical antecedents, or even much of a political tradition at all, upon which they could draw”²³³. These have been the major reasons of the non-occurrence or failure of a viable Christian Democratic party in post-communist Poland²³⁴. First of all, it can be argued that after 1989 “the Christian Democratic movement was divided, organisationally weak, and its programmes were incoherent”²³⁵. Moreover, the problem is also related with the identification of Polish parties themselves. It is claimed that there is no Christian Democratic Party since “none of the main Polish right wing or centre-right parties currently operating in Poland has sought to profile itself selfconsciously as Christian Democratic”²³⁶.

Today in Poland it may be observed that Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland - PO) as a so-called Christian party, at least a member of the European People's Party, was established by the joint declaration entitled ‘The Commitment’, signed by Maciej Plazynski, Andrzej

²³¹ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak (December 2006), *Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland (and Why does it matter?)*, p.3.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid,p.9.

²³⁴ Ibid,p.46.

²³⁵ Ibid,p.19.

²³⁶ Ibid,p.46.

Olechowski and Donald Tusk on 19th January 2001 and on 5th March 2002, it was formally registered as a political party²³⁷. The main characteristics of its program depends on the ‘‘human initiative, private entrepreneurship, free market, traditional family values and the protection of human life’’²³⁸.

At the general election in September 2001, the PO won 65 seats in the lower House of the Polish Parliament (the Sejm) and became the largest opposition against the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), had 216 seats²³⁹.

After the 2001 election, the party attempted to ‘‘re-position itself as more socially conservative and with a stronger national-patriotic discourse’’, which has also involved developing a more religiously informed dimension to its ideological profile.²⁴⁰ This was exemplified by Civic Platform's December 2001 ‘Ideological Declaration’:

a key statement of self-definition, which cited the Ten Commandments as the basis of Western civilisation and outlined the party's role as being to prudently support the family and traditional moral norms, which have served development and permanence, defend human life, ban euthanasia and limit genetic research²⁴¹.

This shifted the party closer towards a more identifiably Christian Democratic ideological and programmatic profile²⁴². Moreover, although Civic Platform developed a more national-patriotic element to its discourse, and made some high profile criticisms of the EU constitutional treaty, these were not fundamental and the party remained broadly supportive of the European integration project²⁴³. From the outset, it was a candidate member of the European People's Party and the party's MEPs became full members of its EP group after the June 2004 elections²⁴⁴.

However, Civic Platform’s economic programme emphasised ‘‘the importance of competitiveness, sound public finances and low taxation rather than a social market

²³⁷ EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. *In The Member States*, Retrieved 26 December 2009 from: http://www.eppgroup.eu/inthememberstates/memberstates/en/PolandHistory_civicplatform.asp

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Poland:Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=564>

²⁴⁰ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak (December 2006), *Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland (and Why does it matter?)*, p.21.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

approach based on welfarism, state intervention and corporatism’’²⁴⁵. The party’s major policies included:

commitments to introduce a flat tax; reduce costs and regulations on employers and create more flexible labour markets; reform public finances to reduce the state budget deficit; a more restrictive and targeted welfare policy; introduce education vouchers and university tuition fees; and partial privatisation of the health service²⁴⁶.

After, these new policies, in 2005 general election, Civic Platform got 133 seats of total 460 seats, and the largest party populist-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) held 155 seats, and then, a right-wing coalition government of PiS, rural-based Self Defense SRP and the staunchly conservative League of Polish Families (LPR) was set up²⁴⁷. The results of the election can be seen on Table 2.18. as follows:

Table 2.18.
Parliament Composition (September 2005 Elections - Total 460 Seats)

| Results of 2005 Parliamentary Election | | | |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
| Law and Justice (LJ)/ Politiol juswisc (PiS) | 3,185,714 | 26.99% | 155 |
| Civic Platform | 2,849,259 | 24.14% | 133 |
| Self-Defense Party/ Samoobrona (SO) | 1,347,355 | 11.41% | 56 |
| Democratic Left Alliance | 1,335,257 | 11.31% | 55 |
| League of Polish Families | 940,762 | 7.97% | 34 |
| Polish Peasant Party | 821,656 | 6.96% | 25 |
| Other Parties | 1,324,673 | 11.22% | 2 |

Source:International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Poland:Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=75>

However, in the last election in Poland in 2007, Civic Platform won a victory, although the party fell short of an absolute parliamentary majority. Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk formed a coalition government with the Polish Peasant Party

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid,p.22.

²⁴⁷ Global Economy Matters (19 October 2007). Manuel Alvarez Rivera.*Poland’s Early Parliament Elections*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2007/10/polands-early-parliamentary-election-of_09.html

(PSL)²⁴⁸. Meanwhile, Left and Democracy (LiD) failed to match the combined showing of its constituent parties two years ago, while both Self-Defense (SRP) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) were wiped out, losing all their Sejm seats²⁴⁹. A compared table of results can be seen in the table below:

Table 2.19.
Parliament Composition (October 2007 elections - total 460 seats)

| Results of 2007 Parliamentary Election | | | |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Party | Valid Votes | % [of Valid Votes] | Seats |
| Civic Platform | 6,701,010 | 41.51% | 209 |
| Law and Justice | 5,183,477 | 32.11% | 166 |
| Democratic Left Alliance | 2,122,981 | 13.15% | 53 |
| Polish Peasant Party | 1,437,638 | 8.91% | 31 |

Source:International Foundation For Electoral Systems. *Election Profile of Poland:Results*. Retrieved 26 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1360>

Despite of the successes of Civic platform in the last years, it should be stressed that, Civic Platform is more accurately categorised as a right- wing liberal or liberal conservative, rather than a Christian Democratic party²⁵⁰. To sum up, the failure of a successful Christian Democratic to emerge in post- communist Poland reinforces the lesson that “such parties in Western Europe are already learning individually that, their continuation depends upon their adaptation; and that, collectively, they need be broad-minded when considering new recruits to their cause”²⁵¹. Thus, Civic Platform can be reached a settled position in Poland’s political arena as examples of Christian Democracy in the Western Europe in future, even if Civic Platform is not a pure sample of Christian Democratic parties.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak (December 2006), Why there is no Christian Democracy in Poland (and Why does it matter?).p.47.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

2.2. International Christian Democratic Organizations

In this part of the chapter, successful and unsuccessful attempts for building international Christian democratic organizations will be examined (since the 1920's until the building of the European People's Party). This part mainly questions the importance of former Christian Democratic organisations for today's European People's Party and how they prepared a background to present ideas that used in the European People's Party.

2.2.1. The Foundation of The Nouvelles Equipes International (NEI)

During the Second World War, the Christian Democrats of many countries in Central and Western Europe were forced to go into exile, primarily to Switzerland, England, North and South America²⁵². In these countries, they developed stronger ties with each other and also with other political exiles, and then this situation led to a preparatory stage in the development of the Christian Democrats' international cooperation²⁵³.

The first attempt to create an international organization based on Christian Democratic values came from Luigi Sturzo in the middle of the 1920's with the aim of take attention of the importance of a France-German rapprochement and international union of Christian popular parties as a way of ending the isolation of the postwar period²⁵⁴. The atmosphere was wanted to create, has the characteristics: “one of an international fraternity based on spiritual common wealth a place far removed from international tensions, seek conciliations and common good of European Community”²⁵⁵.

The creating of an organization depended on some values such as the primacy of morality in political life and in economic and social relations, the grounding of morality in Christian tradition, respect for human rights, the importance of civil and political freedoms with an equitable balance between individuals and society,

²⁵² Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, p.25.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

cooperation among nations based on moral principles, condemnation of war as a solution to international disputes²⁵⁶. And by the end of the World War II, the Christian Democrats had become intensely aware of international problems, and so they began a series of international contacts. In 1945, French Christian Democrat, Robert Bichet went to Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg in order to establish relations with the Christian Democratic parties in these countries²⁵⁷. In 1946, on another trip to Belgium, Austria and Italy, Bichet met with Paul Van Zeeland, Alcide De Gasperi, Luigi Sturzo for the purpose of setting up an international Christian Democratic organization. But these contacts were mostly personal and did not lead to any permanent link²⁵⁸.

Then, the founding congress of the Nouvelles Equipes International (NEI) was held at the Spa Chaudfontaine near Liege in mid-1947 under the chairmanship of Belgium²⁵⁹. The theme of the congress was the social situation of workers in Europe, but the most interesting debate revolved around establishment of an international Christian Democratic organization²⁶⁰. And the name Nouvelles Equipes Internationales was chosen for the organization, emphasizing the more neutral name rather than Christian Democracy, appears only in the subtitle. Namely, NEI was established in 1947 at the Spa Chaudfontaine (Liege, Belgium)²⁶¹.

The headquarters of the new organization was set up at Brussels but in 1950 it was transferred to Paris and in 1960 with the dissolution of the MRP, the headquarters moved to Rome²⁶². From the beginning, the goals of the NEI were France-German reconciliation, reconstruction of all countries destroyed, European Union, economic and social development, the maintenance of democratic institutions and peace²⁶³. The NEI concentrated on European problems. The scope of the NEI is to establish regular contacts among the groups and the well-known political parties of the various countries which are influenced by the principles of Christian Democracy in order to study on

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p.30.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.49

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid,p.50.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid,p.51.

²⁶³ Ibid,p.54.

international problems and seek international harmony within the context of democracy and peace²⁶⁴.

The main organ of NEI was the steering committee which normally met every three months, consisted of representatives of the national equips; the activity areas of it: the organization of congress²⁶⁵. The Congresses were organized around these themes: the difficult social situation of workers and the relations between labour and capital, transcending the capitalist economic system by distributing power among various social groups, to form a working group to prepare proposals for reorganization of Europe²⁶⁶. And supporting international cooperation thoughts accepted as means to resolve the problems of Germany and Europe²⁶⁷. These were congresses of reconciliation and themes such as the economic and social policy of Christian Democracy in tomorrow's Europe political and economic integration of Europe. In these congresses on European integration, the urgent necessity of creating a European common market and the signing of a treaty to set up Euratom as well as the need for German reunification was stressed and the necessity of freedom for the people of Eastern Europe as “the basis for real detente, the urgency of ratifying the treaties constituting the common market and Euratom” were put forward²⁶⁸.

2.2.2 The Geneva Conversations

Between 1947 and 1956, some of the most important Christian Democrat leaders in Europe met discreetly and informally at Geneva three or four per year and their meetings were not made public, but these meetings had a historical importance because they sought French-German rapprochement, European cooperation and even cooperation among Christian Democrats²⁶⁹.

The principal topics included the definition of Christian Democrat doctrine, the European military situation, European security, the rearmament of Germany, the political organization of Europe, the creation of a European Parliamentary Council, the

²⁶⁴ Ibid,p.55-56.

²⁶⁵ Ibid,p.56.

²⁶⁶ Ibid,p.60.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, pp.61-67.

²⁶⁹ Ibid,p.69.

constitution of European army, an Atlantic army and their interconnections, the Schuman Plan²⁷⁰. Lastly, with these meetings the participants recognised that the construction of a united Europe was necessary²⁷¹. These meetings brought a rapid integration view, and they had an influence on the decisions of European governments, also accelerated their steps towards European integration. These led to the strengthening of cooperation with the NEI and thus it prepared the way for the creation of the EUCD²⁷².

2.2.3. European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD)

In the early years of 1960s, Christian Democrats needed to change the name of the Nouvelles Equipes International (NEI). And in 1965, at the Congress of Taormina in Italy, the European Christian Democrats decided to change the name of NEI and its charter²⁷³. But this decision was also the death of NEI and the birth of EUCD. Officially in 1971 the European Union of Christian Democrats founded and took place of NEI with the amendments of the charter of 1965²⁷⁴. The EUCD was the direct successor of the NEI. In article 1 of EUD:

The EUCD described itself as a European wing of the Christian Democratic World Union (CDWU) and it aims the creation of a federal Europe by setting a common political program between Christian Democratic parties in Europe²⁷⁵.

However, in the 1970's, European integration was the main aim of the Christian Democratic parties but lacking of European unity and nationalist presses led to the deterioration of the general climate of inter-party cooperation²⁷⁶. And these difficulties pushed the European Christian Democratic parties to strengthen their activities at the level of the European Community and prepared the way for the creation of the European People's Party in 1976, and the relationship between the EUCD and the

²⁷⁰ Ibid,pp.71-72

²⁷¹ Ibid,pp.73-75.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid,p.85.

²⁷⁴ Ibid,p.86.

²⁷⁵ Ibid,p.87.

²⁷⁶ Ibid,pp.90-100.

EPP was governed by an agreement of 4 May 1977²⁷⁷. Finally, in February 1999 the EUCD integrated into the EPP²⁷⁸.

²⁷⁷ Ibid,p.89.

²⁷⁸ Ibid,p.100.

III. THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (EPP)

This chapter tries to indicate influence of the European People's Party (EPP) in the European Union by explaining its organizational structure, vision and approach especially on the topic of enlargement of the Union. The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the position of the European People's Party in today's European Union political agenda by trying to answer the questions is the supremacy of the EPP as a political group in the Union only numerically or is it the greatest one with its sincere encouragement on development of the European integration.

3.1. The Establishment of The EPP

On 23 June 1953 the Christian-Democratic Group in the Joint Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community was officially constituted, that group, with its 38 members, all of them delegates from national parliaments of the six founding member states (Belgium, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands), was the forerunner of the EPP in the European Parliament (the EP)²⁷⁹. Towards the establishment of the EPP, some important steps emerged in the mid of the 1970's. In 1972, the Political Committee of the Christian Democratic Parties of the European Economic Community was established with the aim of improving the coordination of European policy and cooperation²⁸⁰. In 1975, a European Party working group of the Christian Democrats was also established with the task of drawing a draft charter and program for a party of the Christian Democrats in the EEC and Wilfred Marten and Hans-August Liicher were appointed as rapporteurs for this task²⁸¹.

The foundation of the European People's Party occurred in Brussels on 29 April 1976 by the political committee of the Christian Democratic parties of the EEC within the EUCD²⁸².

But officially, the party was established as the European People's Party-Federation of Christian Democratic Parties of European Community' in Luxembourg on

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p.147.

²⁸⁰ Ibid,p.148.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid, p.100.

8 July 1976 when the constituted assembly took place. Leo Tindemans was elected as the president of the EPP²⁸³. The founding members of the EPP were the CVP and PSC from Belgium, the CSU and CDU from Federal Republic Germany, the DC from Italy, the CDS from France, the CSU from Luxembourg and the Fine Gael from Ireland and the three Dutch Party KPV, CHU and ARP²⁸⁴.

After the establishment of the EPP, in the European Parliament the members of the Christian Democratic Group renamed the Christian Democratic Group as Group of the European People's Party in March 1978 and later in July 1979, just after the first direct elections of the European Parliament; the group changed its name to the European People's Party Group (Christian-Democratic Group)²⁸⁵. And lastly, in July 1999 the group changed its name to the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED). Thus, it now unites the centre and the centre-right in Europe²⁸⁶. And since 1999, the EPP-ED Group was the leading force and also the strongest group in the EP both politically and numerically.

3.2. The Organisation

The EPP has several organs to realise its common policies toward a European federation and also to coordinate, organise its members' activities on European basis²⁸⁷. The organs are the Congress, the Political Bureau, the EPP Council, the Presidency, Working Groups and EPP Summits²⁸⁸. In addition to these formal organs, Associations are also supplementers in the EPP organisational structure²⁸⁹. Between these organs, especially it should be mentioned about the Congress because in the EPP Congress all major policies and programmes of the party are set up, and it is the main democratic

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Steven Van Hecke (2004) "A Decade of Seized Opportunities Christian Democracy in the European Union", in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (ed) *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe Since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, p.271.

²⁸⁵ Roberto Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, p. 100.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ European People's Party. *The Party-Party Overview*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp.eu/subpagina.php?hoofdmenuID=1&submenuID=1>

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

forum of the EPP and also it elects the Presidency²⁹⁰. Significant decisions that adopted in the EPP Congresses, some of them:

The idea of equality of Christian Democracy with assuring peace and freedom; achieving a United Europe; the need for an economic system that would assure both liberty and justice through a social market economy; peace would be guaranteed through the reestablishment of military balance; Europe should better assume its responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance; the ideas of unity in diversity and we are all part of one world Basic Document: A Union of Values; the thoughts of a constitution for a strong Europe and to create a Europe close to its citizens²⁹¹.

When it is looked at the decisions of the EPP Congress, it is can seen that the decisions are so similar with the main principles of the European Union, adopted in political and social and economic area. Therefore, it can be said that these Congress have had effects not only on the EPP's organization but also on the EU's decisions.

3.3. Member Parties

Today in the European Parliament (EP), the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (the EPP-ED Group) is the largest political group; 265 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) sit in the EPP-ED Group, this number represents 36 % of the total 736 members in the EP²⁹². The Group unites Christian Democrats, Conservative and other centre and centre- right political parties from 26 member states (only except of the United Kingdom between 27 members of the EU)²⁹³. The composition of the EP can be seen as on the table 3.1.(below):

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Roberto Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, pp. 112-113.

²⁹² EPP Group in the European Parliament. *About Us*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/home/en/aboutus.asp>

²⁹³ Ibid.

Table 3.1.
Composition of European Parliament In the 7th Term










































| Seventh term : 2009 - 2014 - Incoming Parliament | |
|--|--------------|
| Political group | Seats |
| EPP | 265 |
| S&D | 184 |
| ALDE | 84 |
| GREENS/EFA | 55 |
| ECR | 54 |
| GUE/ NGL | 35 |
| EFD | 32 |
| NA | 27 |
| Total | 736 |
| Legend | |
| EPP-ED : Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats | |
| PES : Group of the Party of European Socialists | |
| ALDE : Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | |
| GREENS/EFA : Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance | |
| ECR : European Conservatives and Reformists Group | |
| GUE/NGL : Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left | |
| EFD : Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group | |
| NI : Non-attached | |

Source: The European Parliament. *EP Elections-Composition of Parliament.*

Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&id=214>

Table 3.2.
MEPs By Member State And Political Group // 7th Parliamentary Term

| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | NI | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|--------------|
|  | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 1 | | | 2 | 22 |
|  | 6 | 4 | 5 | | | | | 2 | 17 |
|  | 2 | 7 | | | 9 | 4 | | | 22 |
|  | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | | 13 |
|  | 42 | 23 | 12 | 14 | | 8 | | | 99 |
|  | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | | | | | 6 |
|  | 4 | 3 | 4 | | | 1 | | | 12 |
|  | 8 | 8 | | 1 | | 3 | 2 | | 22 |
|  | 23 | 21 | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | 50 |
|  | 29 | 14 | 6 | 14 | | 5 | 1 | 3 | 72 |
|  | 35 | 21 | 7 | | | | 9 | | 72 |
|  | 2 | 2 | | | | 2 | | | 6 |
|  | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 8 |
|  | 4 | 3 | 2 | | 1 | | 2 | | 12 |
|  | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 6 |
|  | 14 | 4 | | | 1 | | | 3 | 22 |
|  | 2 | 3 | | | | | | | 5 |
|  | 5 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 25 |
|  | 6 | 4 | | 2 | | | | 5 | 17 |
|  | 28 | 7 | | | 15 | | | | 50 |
|  | 10 | 7 | | | | 5 | | | 22 |
|  | 14 | 11 | 5 | | | | | 3 | 33 |
|  | 3 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 7 |
|  | 6 | 5 | 1 | | | | 1 | | 13 |
|  | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | | | 1 | | 13 |
|  | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | | 1 | | | 18 |
|  | | 13 | 11 | 5 | 25 | 1 | 13 | 4 | 72 |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | NI | Total |
| Total | 265 | 184 | 84 | 55 | 54 | 35 | 32 | 27 | 736 |

Source: The European Parliament. *Your MEPs-Directory*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/expert/groupAndCountry.do?language=EN>

Many of the parties represented in the EPP-ED, belong to the European People's Party, the first-ever transnational party to be formed at European level, the other parties, in the EPP-ED Group, come from the European Democrats and they sit as allied members of the Group²⁹⁴. The distribution of Christian Democratic Parties in the EP

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

according to the nations can be seen on the table 3.2. And also the list of the members, observers, associated countries of the EPP can be seen at the Annex 1.


3.4. The Elections

Since the establishment of the Communities, the EPP have taken a long road. While going on this road, electoral performances of the party in the successive European Parliament elections also have a significant role for the development of the party.

In this part of the work it will be shown some significant elections in the Christian Democratic Group history: 1953, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections for showing the important status of Christian Democrats in the EU, because from 1953 until 1975, the Christian Democrats had been by far the largest group in the European Parliament but the arrival of British Labour parliamentarians finally gave the advantage to the Socialists. After 1979, the Socialists took the first place with every European election. However, in the European Parliament the Group of the European People's Party (EPP) was the largest group since 1999.

Firstly, at the 23 June 1953 with the creation of Christian-Democratic Group in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, the group had 38 members out of a total of 78, namely the Group had 48.7% of the total. Thus, the Christian-Democratic Group was the largest group in the Assembly²⁹⁵. The results can be seen on the Graphic 3.1 as follows:


²⁹⁵ EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p.31 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>



Graphic 3.1. The Results of The 1953 Common Assembly Election

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p.31 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 01 May 2005 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

In 1979, at the first elections of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, The EPP obtained 32.8 million of a total of 111 million votes and at a result, The EPP Group had 107 members out of a total 410, namely 26.1% of the total. The EPP became the second largest group in the European Parliament after the Socialists²⁹⁶. The details on the graphic 3.2.:




Graphic 3.2. The Results of The 1979 Election of The European Parliament

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 101 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

²⁹⁶ Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 101 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

At the 1984 European elections, the EPP Group won 110 seats of the 434 seats, namely 25.35% of the total. The EPP again became the second largest group in the European Parliament after the Socialists²⁹⁷. A detailed table of the results can be seen on the graphic 3.3.




Graphic 3.3. The Results of The 1984 Election of The European Parliament

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p.118 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

At the 1989 European elections, the EPP Group won 121 of the 518 seats, namely 23.36% of the total and the EPP again became the second largest group in the European Parliament after the Socialists²⁹⁸. The results can be seen on Graphic 4.4. as follows:

²⁹⁷ EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p.118 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

²⁹⁸ EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 132 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>




Graphic 3.4. The Results of The 1989 Election of The European Parliament

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 132 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: [http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003 .asp](http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp)

At the 1994 European elections, the EPP Group won 157 of the 567 seats, namely 27.69% of the total and the EPP again became the second largest group in the European Parliament after the Socialists²⁹⁹. The Graphic 3.5. shows the result below:

²⁹⁹ EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 148 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>




Graphic 3.5. The Results of The 1994 Election of The European Parliament

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 148 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

At its constituent meeting, the Group changed its name to the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED). With the alliance of the Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats, at the 1999 European elections, the EPP-ED Group won 233 of 626 seats, namely 37.22% of the total and the EPP-ED Group became the largest group in the European Parliament³⁰⁰. The below graphic 3.6 shows the details:

³⁰⁰ EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 164 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>




Graphic 3.6. The Results of The 1999 Election of The European Parliament

Source: EPP Group in the European Parliament (June, 2003), *50 Years of History of the EPP-ED Group in the Service of A United Europe*, p. 164 (www. Document) UDL. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/en/zpublica2003.asp>

European elections in 2004, the EPP-ED Group won 279 of 732 seats, namely 38.1% of the total and with this result, the EPP-ED Group continued as the largest group in the European Parliament³⁰¹. The results can be seen on the graphic 3.7. (below):

³⁰¹ European Parliament. *Elections 2004*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/graphical.html>




Graphic 3.7. The Results of The 2004 Election of The European Parliament

Source: The European Parliament. *Elections 2004*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/graphical.html>

The last election of the European Parliament were held in June 2009, a total of 736 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were elected and the EPP Group won 265 of the 736 seats, namely 36,00 % of the total³⁰². According to these results, the EPP-ED Group has been the largest group in the European Parliament since 1999³⁰³. The graphic 3.8. (below) shows the number of seats, and the graphic 3.9. shows the percentages of votes.


³⁰² The European Parliament. *Parliament-Archive-EP Elections*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en.html

³⁰³ The European Parliament. *Parliament-Archive-EP Elections*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en_txt.html



Graphic 3.8. The Results of The 2009 Election of The European Parliament

Source: The European Parliament. *Parliament-Archive-EP Elections*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en.html



Graphic 3.9. Composition of The European Parliament After The 2009 Election According to Percentages

Source: The European Parliament. *Parliament-Archive-EP Elections*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en.html

3.5. The Overview of The EPP About The Future of The European Union

In this part of the study, it is tried to mention about the vision of the EPP about the EU' future and it is considered the expressions of the EPP's politicians about this subject. To illustrate, at the 14th the EPP Congress in Berlin in January 2001, the EPP declared its future expectations in 'A Union of Values' Document. In this document, it might be seen many certain and clear statements that related with the Party's vision about the future of the EU. At the preface of this document, the EPP declared that:

The 21st century poses new challenges to our values. Globalization, the new economy, the information society, new technologies demand new answers. The EPP will respond on the basis of our traditional values. These have to be reaffirmed, rethought and modernized in order to make them applicable in the 21st century. Pragmatism, efficiency or some undefined third way do not address people's real concerns. The European model is based on values, cultures and history. That is where the answers to the new questions come from. That is the starting point for us as Christian Democrats, moderate and centrist members of the EPP. And that is the European People's Party's new vision of A Union of Values. The 21st century offers Europe the chance to build a European Union worthy of the name-a Europe that is whole, free and prosperous. The human person must and will be at the very centre of our politics. Coming from many different cultures and traditions, secular and confessional, the EPP's member parties have remained united by certain core values: freedom and responsibility, dignity of human person, solidarity, subsidiarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy³⁰⁴.

The first section of the document is about the people in the EU and at the first section of the document (in the 107th article) it is stressed that "a civilised Europe means a Europe based on the rule of law"³⁰⁵. And also, the second section is related with the economic perspective of the EU. The 229th article of the second section stresses the link between economic and social values as such:

Europe will have no meaning unless it is both an economic and social Europe. The social market economy links the market mechanisms of supply and demand with the obligation to respect the dignity of every human being. The values of the European social model, based on performance and social justice, competition and solidarity,

³⁰⁴ EPP Group in the European Parliament (January,2001), *Final Text agreed at the XIVEPP Congress* (www.Document) UDL.Retrieved 27Dec 2009 from:

http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/peve00/eve015_res01_en.asp

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

personal responsibility and social security, remain relevant in conditions of globalized markets and rapid industrial change³⁰⁶.

At the third part of the document, the EPP's views about the technological developments of this century are stated. According to the EPP, the EU must promote technological innovations that emerged at the 21th century³⁰⁷. However, for the EPP, it should be careful about the effects of these technological developments about the future of the humanity, for example, "in the field of bio-ethics, the EPP recognises the exciting progress of science and technology, which contributes considerably to health and welfare"³⁰⁸.

At the fourth part of the document, the identity of the EU is the main topic. The thought of the EPP about the identity of the EU is based on a new model of federalism³⁰⁹. In this model, the using of the community method, the governance, democracy, capacity to act, equality, justice, welfare, solidarity in a competition between member states, rule of law, subsidiarity are shown as some basic features of federalism in the EU³¹⁰.

In the fifth part of the document, the EPP mentions about the EU's relations with the World and it claims that, at present despite the fact that European Union is an economic power in global arena, it is not powerful in other areas of such as foreign policy and security. This leads to a dilemma about the EU's effectiveness in different arenas³¹¹. In addition to these, at the fifth part of the document the EPP argues that the European Union must have an active Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy. According to the EPP, this is essential, if the EU aims to gain a prestige as a political power in global political atmosphere³¹². For the EPP the EU has to enhance its power in several aspects; "Europe must match its economic power with the political diplomatic and military resources required to represent its interests and exercises its responsibilities. The EPP supports every effort to achieve this goal"³¹³. In the the fifth part of the document, it is

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

asserted that peace, democracy, justice and market economy, respect to the human right have to be major principles of the foreign policy of the EU, and the EU should encourage the settlement of these principles in the other parts of the World³¹⁴.

At the last part of the document, the EPP stress the new values of the EU. In this part, it is considered the principles are “freedom and responsibility of persons, fundamental equality, solidarity, justice, subsidiarity and sustainability”³¹⁵. And the EPP underlines the significance of these values in the European Project as:

New questions will always arise in the European project, along with unexpected developments, new opportunities, and new horizons. Given the dynamism of the present times, concrete political choices may change. The EPP's firm values are more than ever essential, a clear beacon and frame of reference: to distinguish between what to conserve, what to improve, what to avoid, and what to combat. We ultimately derive our strength and motivation from our values (freedom and responsibility, dignity of the human person, solidarity, justice and the rule of law), which are a whole vision of life, and cannot be separated from each other³¹⁶.

To sum up, the EPP desires a decentralisation in the EU, so transparency and subsidiarity are crucial for them. Also, the EPP aims to reach an active political union with a dynamic common foreign and security policy in the global world³¹⁷. In conclusion, in 2004 the EPP-ED Group (former name of the EPP Group) Vice Chairman of József Szájer explained their priorities for five years (between 2004- 2009) as:

Our priorities are based on our commitment to making Europe a better place to live and work. We want to increase Europe's competitiveness to generate jobs and prosperity. We want to improve the security of Europe's citizens. We want to make Europe a stronger force in building a safer and more prosperous world³¹⁸.

As a conclude, it can be said that the EPP's vision about the EU's future based on some major concept such as subsidiarity, sustainability, rule of law, democracy, market based economy and for the EPP, all of them are necessary and in other words, are indispensable.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ European People's Party (11.10.2005), Marten's First Reflection on The Post-Referanda Europe. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp.eu/newsdetail.php?newsID=84&hoofdmenuID=5&submenuID=49&subsubmenuID=115>

³¹⁸ EPP Group in the European Parliament (09.12.2004), *A stronger, safer and more competitive Europe - EPP- ED Group political priorities for the Barroso Commission*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showPR.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=3131&PRContentID=5951&PRContentLg=en>

3.6. The Enlargement Policy of The EPP

In addition to the overview of the EPP about the future of the EU, before looking at the approach of European Christian democrats about Turkey's membership, the attitude of the EPP to the enlargement policy needs to be examined. In 2006 The EPP-ED rapporteur Alexander Stubb in a speech in the European Parliament states clearly the problematic nature of the enlargement as such:

When the enlargement policy of the EU is considered, one of the most important term is the absorption capacity or with another name is integration capacity of new members, how integration capacity is defined. This is a problematic subject that if integration capacity is not a condition for enlargement, it is a criterion for the current Member States or not. There is always a debate before each and every enlargement about how much the European Union should deepen. And so enlargement has been potentially a sensitive subject, before 1973 the Union became a customs union, before 1986 the Single European Act was put forward, before the Finnish-Austrian-Swedish accession Union had the Maastricht Treaty, before the big bang in 2004 Union had Amsterdam and Nice. The difficulty is that you cannot give integration capacity a strict definition because it is linked to two elements. The first is the time of accession. The second is the number of new states coming in. In other words, enlargement in 1973 was radically different to enlargement in 2004. Still on the definition, integration capacity is about three things: institutions, budget and policies³¹⁹.

But generally, enlargement is seen as one of the European Union's most successful foreign policy strategies, since it has brought stability to Europe and contributed to the spread of democracy and the rule of law in Europe. The prospect of EU membership is an important tool that enables countries to push through internal reforms. The question should be asked that whether it is wanted to maintain the balance between deepening and widening by the member states of the EU³²⁰.

In addition to these general concerns about the EU members about enlargement, The EPP-ED group determined their approach about this subject explicitly in Solemn Declaration on 9 May 2000, the EPP-ED Group stated:

The enlargement which is now under way is consistent with the grand design of the founding fathers of the European Union. It will ultimately serve to reunify the continent; the accession of the applicant countries will bring about the culmination of the vision propounded by Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and all the

³¹⁹ EPP Group in the European Parliament (13.12.2006), *Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2006-2007 - The institutional aspects of the European Union's capacity to integrate the new Member States*

Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/pspeech06/spe1213stubb_en.asp

³²⁰ Ibid.

statesmen who have elevated European integration to the rank of a project for a civilization³²¹.

Also, in January 2001 in Berlin, the 14th Congress of the European People's Party adopted a resolution about the historical, moral and political necessity of enlargement. It states that enlargement of the EU is a good step to unify the people; in other words it is the best way to achieve people's Europe, as:

The future enlargement of the European Union is an historic milestone on the route to an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe. An enlarged Europe is a wonderful opportunity to guarantee peace in our area of the world³²².

Accession by candidate countries is both their political and economic interests, also in the interests of the European Union and its Member States. The EPP-ED Group says that enlargement should not injure the European Institutions, especially decision-making process, or create a danger for the strengthening of European integration, and in this respect, the Group's aim harmonizing of the goals of widening and deepening³²³. The EPP-ED Group says this harmonization could be provided with the following of "the European Union's fundamental objectives: establishment and respect of liberty, security, stability and economic development balanced by social justice and solidarity"³²⁴.

The Group acknowledges that "an enlarged European Union is already a reality" and "the enlargement is one of the most important opportunities for the European Union in the beginning of this 21 st century"³²⁵. Finally, the sentences of Chairman of the EPP-ED Group (between 1999-2007) Hans-Gert Poettering clearly indicates the view of the EPP group about enlargement:

The enlargement of the European Union is not just a material question, essentially it is a question of values, and moral issues, we should ask ourselves jointly, the present and the future Members of the European Union, what can we do jointly for Europe, so this is a strong Europe, and a democratic Europe. A Europe that has clout on the world stage. Enlargement is a massive challenge in terms of internal security, we have to say to guard our external borders, but this person pointed out that the drug Mafia who are

³²¹ The EPP Group in the European Parliament. *Policies*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: http://www.eppgroup.eu/policies/afet/archive/pol_01_en.asp

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ibid

already within the European Union will be extending to the accession countries. So we need to have Europol and police co-operation stepped up³²⁶.

To sum up, from all of these explanations of the European Christian Democrats, it can be understood that enlargement is beneficial both for the candidate countries and also the EU. In the aspect of the candidates, they aim to reach a full membership position in an intensive endeavour, and try to implement basic values of the Union such as respect of human rights, democracy, rule of law, a working market economy in their internal politics. In addition to these, enlargement is a gainful instrument for the EU, because the values of the Union could spread to the outer of the Union with the enlargement. When the borders of the Union enlarge, the effectiveness of the EU in the world politics rises.

³²⁶ EPP Group in the European Parliament (10.03,2004), *Enlargement - the people of Central Europe, Cyprus and Malta are welcome*. Hans-Gert Poettering, *Chairman of the EPP-ED Group*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showPR.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=2589&PRContentID=4968&PRContentLg=en>

IV. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

In the last chapter of the study, Turkey-EU relations will be analysed with a view to understand the approach of European Christian Democrats about Turkey's membership to the European Union and Turkey's respond to their position. To start with, a historical evaluation of Turkey-EU relations will be examined briefly. Then the focus will be on the future of Turkey-EU relations through the lenses of Christian democrats and Turkish reaction on those views.

4.1. A Brief History of Turkey-EU Relations

Turkey, as a secular, pluralist and also Muslim country, is regarded a peculiar country in the contemporary international scene. Since the beginning of the Republic, modernisation has been perceived with westernisation together. So, Turkey has tried to set up close relations with European countries³²⁷.

And firstly, a short time after the creation of the European Economic Community, Turkey made the first application to the Community to join in July 1959, and with this step, the Ankara Agreement (as an association agreement) was signed on 12 September 1963, establishing a partnership regime between the parties³²⁸. The final aim of this agreement was written in the article of twenty-eight, as the full-membership of Turkey³²⁹. With this agreement, a three-step integration process of Turkey was foreseen. These steps are, the preparation phase, the transition phase and the final phase³³⁰. The aim of the first phase to reduce economic differences between the parties, this phase started on 1 December, 1964, when the Agreement entry into force³³¹.

In the preparation phase, Turkey did not have any obligation, but with the implementation of the Additioanl Protocol in January 1973, the preparation phase

³²⁷ Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Secretariat General For EU Affairs, *Turkey-EU Relations*, Retrieved 25/01/2010 from: <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

³²⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy*, Retrieved 25/01/2010 from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

³²⁹ The Economic Development Foundation (İKV), *Turkey-EU*, Retrieved 24/01/2010 from: http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=tarihce&baslik=History

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

ended, and the conditions of the transition phase were designated³³². And the setting up a Custom Union was especially aimed in the transition phase³³³.

In 1987, without waiting the completion of the transition period, Turkey applied for full membership, but the Commission said that Turkey is eligible but the conditions of the Community not suitable for a new enlargement, because of the Community's deepening aim³³⁴. But, in 1995 the Custom Union between parties completed, and thus transition phase also ended, and consequently Turkey entered into the final phase to reach full membership status³³⁵.

In 1997 in the Luxembourg Summit, the candidate status of Turkey not affirmed officially but a strategy was proposed³³⁶. After this decision, the Turkish government declared that the relations with the Union would be suspended because of the Union's double standards³³⁷. However, a new period started between parties, after 40 years since the first application of Turkey, in 1999 with the Helsinki Summit in which the candidate status of Turkey declared³³⁸. After the declaration of candidate status, Turkey adopted eight reform packages until 2004 to provide criteria of the Union³³⁹.

Following these reform packages, a concrete improvement was provided and in 2004 the Commission proposed the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 with the condition of continuing of the reform process³⁴⁰. All of these historical milestones between Turkey-EU relations can be seen chronologically at the Annex 2.

To sum up, even if the accession negotiations with Turkey started, many chapters were blocked especially by the Greek Cypriots, and almost eighteen

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Secretariat General For EU Affairs, *Turkey-EU Relations*, Retrieved 25/01/2010 from: <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

³³⁴ The Economic Development Foundation (İKV), *Turkey-EU*, Retrieved 24/01/2010 from: http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=tarihce&baslik=History

³³⁵ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy*, Retrieved 25/01/2010 from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

³³⁶ The Economic Development Foundation (İKV), *Turkey-EU*, Retrieved 24/01/2010 from: http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=tarihce&baslik=History

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Policy*, Retrieved 25/01/2010 from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ The Economic Development Foundation (İKV), *Turkey-EU*, Retrieved 24/01/2010 from: http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=tarihce&baslik=History

chapters were plugged or stopped because of political reasons³⁴¹. However, there is a favorable development for Turkey. Despite the insentive efforts of the Greek Cypriots, in the last Summit of the EU in December 2009; the decision was taken to continue negotiations with Turkey³⁴².

4.2. Christian Democrats, Turkey and the Future of the EU

Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. In spite of this development, it appears that still many European Christian Democrats are opposed to the full membership of Turkey to the EU and, rather they propose a privileged partnership for Turkey. Generally speaking Christian Democrats are well known about their negative approach towards Turkey's full membership. The question of privileged partnership is not only crucial issue among both politicians and academics to analyse but also is a popular topic in media and even an instrument through which the future of EU-Turkey relations are being discussed. Thus in this part of the study, the comments of some politicians, academics and journalists about the topic are also presented for a comprehensive discussion to see how state and the civil society respond to the Turkey's full membership from the points of views of the European Christian Democrat side and Turkish side. Since these political positions and proposals affect the the idea of EU membership in Turkish side and might frame the how Europeans see Turkish membership as well as reflect the existing view in European societies about Turkey, heated debates in the public opinion are unavoidable. These political views, on the other hand, also reflect the discussions on the future of Europe among the citizens of Europe as well as what politicians and academics would imagine for Europe's future. Therefore it will be interesting to start with pointing out the difference views towards Turkey's full membership.

For example, Selçuk Güldeşli from Today's Zaman argues that there is no homogeneous approach towards the full membership of Turkey among Christian Democrats contrary to the generally accepted approach of Christian Democrats about the position of Turkey in the EU.

³⁴¹ Şebnem Karauçak (2010), "Ayıp Oluyor Artık", *Kriter*, No:43, (January 2010), p.3.

³⁴² Ibid.

...it is not possible to evaluate all the European Christian Democrats as being essentially the same. The approach of Christian Democrats in southern Europe to the issue of Turkey is quite different from those in the northern part. And there are serious differences among the northerners as well³⁴³.

He stresses that Belgian Christian Democrats is different from the German ones, they give a support for Turkey's future membership, and also in the Netherlands, a half of the Christian Democrats are the supporter of the Turkey's membership³⁴⁴. However, he also mentions about that the French Christian Democrats have a noticeable negative approach about the Turkey's membership. In addition to the French, the German Christian Democrats are also in a negative view about against Turkey's future membership. In other words upon his research, it can be argued that "although the French opposition is boiling deeply, the German Christian Democrats are screaming"

³⁴⁵

Futhermore, in his article he portrays the attitude of Christian Democrats who are in power towards Turkey as:

By that attitude, they reject what Walter Hallstein, who was the first president of EU Commission (then called the European Economic Community) and also what both the Germans and Christian Democrats like themselves said in 1963, 'Turkey is a part of Europe,' when the Ankara Agreement was signed. Accepting that Germany and France formed the EU firstly as a locomotive data, a policy should be determined according to this. The French rightists are in power. When we consider the fact that (Chancellor Gerhard) Schroeder is losing strength fast in Germany and resigned from the party leadership last week, we can say that a Christian Democrat government is looming on the horizon. In any case, Ankara has to closely follow both the German and French Christian Democrats, who have formed a tough opposition against Turkey³⁴⁶.

As the leader of Christian Democratic Union of Germany, Angela Merkel's explanations about Turkey is also worthy of attention and create great impact in the public opinion as the chancellor of one of the biggest and powerful country of the EU. There is a well-known assertion that used by her frequently, if the EU gives a full

³⁴³ Selçuk Gültaşlı (2004), "Gul's Dance with Christian Democrats", *Today's Zaman* (13.04.2004), Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from:

<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz->

[web/yazarDetay.do?jsessionid=42E4D4F6491A5CA4FFD2C5F7562FD285?haberno=5389](http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-)

³⁴⁴ Ibid

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

membership status to Turkey, the EU can not overcome the difficulties and we force the capacity of the Union completely.

Thus, the question raised in Turkish media as Mehmet Aktan clearly states with reference Merkel's basic question 'Can the EU integrate a country as Turkey?' is about the EU's borders and absorption capacity³⁴⁷. Moreover, Ertuğrul Özkök also points out the same problems. He argued that Merkel said that Turkey was a so big country and had problems about her population and the EU was also a complex body and in the EU problems could not be overcome as the number of member countries increases and population rises, and we did not want to promise for next 10-15 years. As he underlined according to Merkel, giving a promise to Turkey for full membership is dishonesty and the position of the CDU about Turkey would not change³⁴⁸.

In addition to Aktan and Özkök, Ahmet Külahçı from *Hürriyet* also questions Merkel's expressions about Turkey's membership. He underlined the fact that according to Merkel, the negative outcome of referendums related to the EU constitutions in France and Holland mainly based on the concerns about Turkey's membership. He also claimed that Merkel's view that EU could not continue the negotiations with Turkey for long years because we know that in these countries the votes about Turkey's membership would be always 'no', clearly demonstrated her position. Consequently, according to Merkel, as he argues privileged partnership proposal is beneficial for the two parts instead of 'neck or nothing' approach³⁴⁹.

Beside his writings, Külahçı says that Merkel regards this privileged partnership status is a structure above the Customs Union, but below the full membership and there are some institutional bodies to support this structure. These are³⁵⁰:

³⁴⁷ Mehmet Aktan, (2005) "Merkel: AB'nin Kapasitesi Yetmez", *Milliyet* (29 August 2005), p.15.

He further underlines the basic idea behind Merkel's words quoting that that Merkel said that we want to be a friend of Turkey by setting up realistic and actual relations; we reached the end of our frontiers with the full membership of the new 10 countries in the EU.

³⁴⁸ Ertuğrul Özkök, (2005) "Erdoğan Etkileyici Ama Yine de Karşıyım", *Hürriyet* (22 April 2005), p.5.

³⁴⁹ Ahmet Külahçı, (2005) "İmtiyazlı Ortaklık Herkese Yarar", *Hürriyet* (17 October 2004), p.24.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

EU-Turkey Common Commission: This Commission is responsible for the negotiations for privileged partnership. It is composed of representatives of the EU Commission and the EU member states and Turkish embassies.

EU-Turkey Council: It consists of the ministers of foreign affairs of the EU member states and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and this council meets at least two times in a year.

EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee: This Committee consists of the deputies from Turkish National Assembly and members from the EU Parliament. The Committee makes a contribution with its own dialogues and recommendations to take decisions.

In addition to these, K ulahçı refers to Merkel's view about other subjects as such; in the case of free movement of persons, even if Turkish citizens stay in the EU member countries for less than 3 months, they have to get visa. There is a visa obligation. Thus a facility can be provided for persons reside near the frontier areas³⁵¹. Furthermore, K ulahçı adds that, the deputy of CSU Karl Theodor Freiherr Zu Gutenberg, took apart effectively to prepare this privileged partnership proposal that was about a structuring as European Economic Area³⁵². What is more, Merkel particularly stressed the Cyprus question and the issue of opening of the harbors and airports to the Greek Cypriots in her visit to Turkey in the first week of October 2006. She also repeated her privileged partnership opinion about Turkey but still she underlined that the significance of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* during her visit. However, when she went back to Germany, she declared in her web site that the negotiations with Turkey should be continued as an open-ended process and the frontiers of the EU should be drawn accordingly.

Another politician, who opposed to the full membership of Turkey to the EU, from France, is Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of the UMP, also supported the views of

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

Merkel about Turkey. He also proposes a privileged partnership position for Turkey certainly as Merkel.

In addition to Merkel and Sarkozy's speeches and attitudes, there are some significant explanations of the EPP-ED Group (between 199-2007) leader Hans-Gert Poettering about Turkey's membership. On 17.12.2004, Hans-Gert Poettering, for instance, explains his views on accession negotiations with Turkey as:

The decision of the Summit of EU state and government leaders on the Brussels Summit to begin EU accession talks with Turkey was no surprise. It was also an indication of the kind of difficulties, such as formulations for Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey would create during the accession negotiations. If Turkey is unable to fulfil the obligations which membership entailed and the appropriate response is necessary to the complex character of the upcoming negotiations with Turkey, this response may be a safety clause. This is a safety clause for negotiations which may well turn out to be very difficult. The European Union must not take the risk of being confronted with an all or nothing situation during negotiations³⁵³.

He, thus referred to that the safety clause idea as a suitable reply to the complicated form of the negotiations with Turkey, and argued that these talks should be "an open-ended process", namely the outcome of the process was not certain³⁵⁴. Hans-Gert Pottering also said that:

The accession of 10 new EU states could only be described in a formal sense as successfully completed, any then any further EU enlargement should start with a critical overview. About Turkey, the decision to open accession talks with Turkey was, one of the most important decisions the Union has ever taken. Turkey's stated expectation that negotiations might be completed in as short a time as five years was disturbing. In any case, the results of the negotiations must entirely conform with the EU's value system. According to the European Council Conclusions, the goal of the talks was full membership. However, the thought should also be devoted to what the alternative was, should this goal prove unattainable. So it was to be welcomed that the European Council had explicitly stated that the negotiations were an open-ended process, and that where an applicant state could not fulfill all the obligations of EU membership, then it must be ensured that the applicant was completely anchored in the European structures through building the strongest possible links between it and the EU³⁵⁵.

³⁵³ EPP Group in the European Parliament (17.12.2004), *Hans-Gert Poettering on the Brussels Summit - Turkey decision no surprise - EPP will be able to push through Council Conclusion safety clause*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showPR.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=3181&PRContentID=6020&PRContentLg=en>

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ EPP Group in the European Parliament (21.12.2004), *Taking a critical view on future EU enlargement - Hans-Gert Poettering on the Brussels Summit*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from:

In addition to these, the EPP's view about Turkey's full membership is also based on the "fulfillment of the so called fourth Copenhagen criterion", in other words, the EPP give so much importance to "the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration"³⁵⁶.

In terms of the explanations in the European Commission progress reports, the EPP has some questions that are related with Turkey's full membership process, such as Turkey's neighbourhood relations, fulfillment and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, the financial aspects of accession of Turkey to the EU and the Union's absorbing capacity. The EPP comments on absorbing capacity of the EU and Turkey can be summarized as:

It is presumed that Turkey will normalize its relations with Cyprus. Other open questions and conflicts in Turkey's neighbourhood relations, particularly if they could have negative repercussions on negotiations, should be resolved as quickly as possible in the spirit of good neighbourliness and in accordance with the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes. An effective instrument has to ensure that negotiations can be put on hold, suspended or broken off if serious problems arise regarding the Union's fundamental values or if important targets along the way are not met. It is essential that Member States remain masters of the whole process. -And the progress in negotiations should depend on progress in complete fulfillment and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria. In this context, special attention should be paid to the respect of human rights, the guarantee of religious freedom, the rights of women, children, people with disabilities and minorities, the stability of democratic institutions as well as the independence and the effectiveness of the judiciary and the system of legal protection. To this end a correspondingly strong monitoring system should be maintained during the whole process. -The financial aspects of accession of a candidate state must be allowed for in the applicable Financial Framework. Hence, accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose accession could have substantial financial consequences requiring financial reform can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014. Even beyond that, special regulations would be necessary in certain areas in case of a positive conclusion of negotiations, most notably concerning the freedom of movement of persons (migration, labour market), finances, agriculture or the acquisition of real estate in the form of very long transition periods, permanent safeguard clauses or even derogations. - Maintaining the Union's capacity to act as well as acting in accordance with its capacity to absorb new members is as important as the fulfillment of the accession criteria by

<http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showPR.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=3183&PRContentID=6021&PRContentLg=en>

³⁵⁶ European People's Party (16.12.2004), *Starting Accession Negotiations with Turkey*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from:

<http://www.epp.eu/ssspagina.php?hoofdmenuID=5&submenuID=51&subsubmenuID=65&sssmenuID=53>

Turkey. The accession negotiations are an open-ended process; the outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand³⁵⁷.

Lastly, from the side of Christian Democrats, explanations of the EPP President Wilfried Martens about Turkey need to be underlined. He referred to the future of EU-Turkey relations the meeting on 16 December 2004 of the EPP heads of government and party leaders as such:

There was no way back. After decades of cooperation, we owed it to Turkey to start accession negotiations, the agreement for the start of negotiations with Turkey is a positive signal in a difficult moment for the European Union. Europe moves forward when EU Member States work together for the strengthening of the European integration project. But the accession negotiations are an open-ended process; the outcome cannot be guaranteed³⁵⁸.

A closer look at the responds in Turkey to those questions, indicate the dynamics of internal politics. In Turkey, there is a well-known and certain approach of the Justice and Development Party (the AKP in Turkish) about the opposition of European Christian Democrats against Turkey's membership to the EU. Whenever a subject is raised with regard to Turkey-EU relations at a TV channel or in an article of a newspaper, the authorities of the AKP proclaims that our aim is full membership, there is not any other choice and we have relations with the states not with the parties, so whether the oppositions emerged by well-known European Christian parties against Turkey or not, we will continue our relations with the EU for reaching full membership status.

Despite these clashes on Turkey's full membership, the AKP also gives attention to have close and good relations with European Christian Democrats. So, she made an official application to the European People Party for membership in 2004. Actually, it is known that at first, in the EU Parliament the AKP took place in liberal group, but then the AKP made her first unofficial application to EPP in March 2003. In that time AKP notified her desire about the membership of the EPP to the president of the EPP Wilfried Martens, because the EPP is the most effective group in

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ European People's Party (04/10/2005), *Martens: Europe Moves Forward With Turkey & Croatia*. Retrieved 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp.eu/newsdetail.php?newsID=77&hoofdmenuID=5&submenuID=49&subsubmenuID=115>

the EPP. In September 2004, the AKP made her official membership application to the EPP³⁵⁹. Then, in January 2005, she participated in the EPP as the observer country³⁶⁰.

Even if the AKP gained an observer status in the EPP since 2005 with this status, it is realized that there is a great problem that results from being an observer status in a group. To illustrate, the AKP and other observers in the EPP possess the right to speak, but they can not vote, it is awarded by the authorities of the AKP, so they have insisted on becoming an associated member because associated members have voting right.

Besides, with their well-known statements on the media the authorities of the AKP asserts that observer status creates an uncertainty about her future in the group. But, the AKP has not reached an associated member status in the EPP yet, because there are some certain and well-recognized rules in the group. For example, if a political party participates in the group firstly, it starts with the observer status and then, it is given the associated member status, lastly, she can be full member³⁶¹. Therefore, the AKP can be a full member of the EPP when Turkey becomes a member state of the EU. Briefly, it can be understood that AKP wants to be in close relations with European Christian Democrats as well as to reach the full membership target.

A different approach about the relation between the AKP and European Christian Democrats came from William Hale from University of London. In his article, he stressed on the similarities and difference between Christian Democracy in Europe and the AKP as follows:

Some of its supporters may seek to legitimize the AKP by claiming that it is the Muslim equivalent of a Christian democract party, but the outline history of Christian Democracy suggests that it should not be taken as a model for Turkey. In France, the MRP had a relatively short life as an effective political movement, mainly due to the unique role of Charles de Gaulle in French post-war politics. In Italy, DC flourished for almost five decades, but then perished in the systemic collapse of the early 1990s. In Germany, the CDU-CSU continues to exist as a powerful center-right party, but the Christian part of its intellectual inheritance is nowadays diluted, or distorted into

³⁵⁹ The European People's Party (28.01.2005), *EPP Accepts AKP & Our Ukraine As Observers*. Retrieved 24 Jan 2010 from: <http://www.epp.eu/newsdetail.php?newsID=23&hoofdmenuID=4&submenuID=49>

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ The European People's Party, *EPP in Europe-Member Parties*. Retrieved 24 Jan 2010 from: <http://www.epp.eu/memberparties.php?hoofdmenuID=3>

conventional conservatism. The AKP will clearly need to avoid these pitfalls. In particular, if it achieves long-term dominance in Turkish politics, as DC did in post-war Italy, it ruins the risk of internal factional divisions and the corruptive influences of unchallenged long-run power. At the same time, even if the leaders of the AKP reject the Muslim democrat label, there are intriguing similarities between this party and the Christian democrat parties of Western Europe in terms of policies, especially on moral, cultural and educational issues, international attitudes, and support structures. The main differences appear to derive from those inherent in the Christian and Muslim religions, and in the historical circumstances of their birth and development. The most striking contrast is that while the Christian democrat movement in Western Europe generally developed in a conservative, pro-status quo direction, the AKP, while culturally conservative, also projects itself as an anti-establishment force in Turkish politics, opposing the state-centered authoritarian secularists who have, it is argued, become Turkey's new conservatives. Tayyip Erdoğan is taken as a fitting symbol of this resurgence as a man of people who moved up from a humble position in society, and successfully challenged the old state establishment. Clearly, this radical élan (dash) had helped to sweep Erdoğan's party in to power. What remained to be seen was, whether unlike its Christian democrat predecessors, it could survive the transition, and remain an invigorating as well as dominant force in Turkish politics in the years ahead³⁶².

Despite of the efforts of the AKP to set up a close relation with European Christian Democrats, there is well-known reality that Turkey's full-membership has been opposed by European Christian Democrats obviously which insist on the privileged partnership proposal. However privileged partnership is not a desired end for many people in Turkey. Academic and politicians explicitly express their concerns about this attempt to redefine EU-Turkey relations. For instance, Can Baydarol from Istanbul Bilgi University makes significant explanations about privileged partnership, he claims that privileged partnership might lead to sovereignty questions on part of Turkey and he explains that privileged partnership can not be accepted definitely, because in privileged partnership, Turkey does not know her place where in the decision-making process of the EU and this is unacceptable thing for Turkey³⁶³.

Can Baydarol also considers that, until today it has always been stressed that cost of Turkey to the EU in economic aspects, but there is a more important thing that the EU does not think about her own losses if the EU does not accept Turkey as a full-membership³⁶⁴. Today Turkey is seen as a source of stability in her region and for her neighbours, and Turkey is only one country that can export stability to her periphery;

³⁶² William Hale, (2005), "Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts", *Turkish Studies*, 2005, Vol:6 No:2, pp.306-307.

³⁶³ Türkiye Gazetesi (2005) "İmtiyazlı Ortaklık Mandacılık Getirir", (02.10.2005), Retrieved 23/02/2010 from: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com/haberdetay.aspx?haberid=262978>

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

therefore, an emergence of a probable unstability in Turkey due to the problems about full-membership will be the problem of the world³⁶⁵. And also, according to Baydarol, the rejection of Turkey as a full-member by the EU will lead to a problem of confidence and sincerity about the acts and commitments of EU. The EU will lose her prestige in the international arena; lastly, if the EU wants to have a voice in world politics, since its global actornes is closely related with the Turkey's full-membership³⁶⁶.

Moreover, another explanation about privileged partnership comes from Dr. Bahadır Kaleağası, the Turkish Industrialist's and Businessmen's Association (in Turkish TUSIAD) International coordinator. He argues that European Christian Democrats maintain privileged partnership idea and the digestion capacity of the EU especially in case of Turkey's membership. Nevertheless if Turkey has ever fullfiled the Copenhagen Criteria, and overcome the all the deficiencies in its political system and reached an economic power and even then the EU does not accept Turkey as a member, this situation would be a tragedy both the EU, Turkey and also the world. He futher presumes that if such a situation emerges, the EU will get away from to be a magnet³⁶⁷.

Dr. Kaleağası also stresses that, when Stefan Fule, as the last Commissioner of the EU for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, spoke in the opening plenary session, he preserved an institutional line in his explanations and stressed that privileged partnership idea was a groundless alternative and it was not in the EU agenda³⁶⁸. As Dr. Kaleağası stated, he affirmed the full-membership target without any hesitancy³⁶⁹. Therefore, Kaleağası emphasizes that this attitude of Fule is likely to create a positive approach about Turkey, therefore a good-starting occured³⁷⁰.

Prof.Dr.Çağrı Erhan from Ankara University, also stresses that in the European Parliament a Christian Democrat Parliamenter from the Netherland, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, prepared a report about Turkey, and this report was accepted on 10 February

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ ABHaber.com *Türk Gençlerinin Avrupa Parlemontusu Çıkarması*, (2006), Retrieved 24/02/2010 from: <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=11280>

³⁶⁸ ABAnaliz(2010) "Kaleağası:Fule tam üyelik hedefini alkışlattı, iyi başladı,"(14.01.2010), Retrieved 24/02/2010 from: <http://www.ataum.tk/haberdetay.asp?ID=50>

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

2010. In Turkey, politicians showed a reaction to the report because of its chapters about Cyprus, and in Turkish public opinion, an impression emerged that this report is related with only Cyprus³⁷¹. Prof.Dr.Erhan also asserts that, actually this report is similar with the former ones, that is the European Parliament has always a double standard in the case of Turkey in 2004 report as today, however the real differences are about the attitude of Turkish politicians. Briefly he clarifies his view that when sympathy lessens about the EU membership among Turkish people, politicians in Turkey abstain from using close or sincere sentences about the EU, in other words, an attitude change has arisen among politicians in Turkey, not in the European Parliamenters³⁷².

To show the problematic sides in privileged partnership proposal of European Christian Democrats for Turkey and Turkey's concerns and expectations about this subject, a few more references can be made about the vagueness of the concept. For instance, Cengiz Aktar from Bahçeşehir University expresses that 'Privileged Partnership' word was articulated in France in autumn 2004, but, the documents of the UMP and UDF do not have a coherent explanation about privileged partnership³⁷³. He also pointed out that for filling up the contents of privileges on 5 October 2004 Robert Schuman foundation President Jean-Dominique Giuliani and on 24 November 2004 Joint Parliament Commission member Jacques Toubon wrote articles in *Le Figaro*³⁷⁴. However, Aktar asserts that these articles are too superficial and include some strange proposals as giving the control of the Bosphorus to a Joint Commission of Turkey and the EU and thus the entrance of prohibited goods from the Bosphorus can be prevented³⁷⁵. Aktar also stated that that in spring 2005, Political Renewing Foundation President Frank Debie made some conversations in Turkey about privileged partnership and he said that privileged partnership status could be understood as to be exempt from political criteria³⁷⁶.

³⁷¹ Çağrı Erhan, (2010), "Bugünkü Avrupa Parlamentosu 2004'tekinden farklı mı?", *ABAnaliz* (17/02/2010), Retrieved 24/02/2010 from: <http://www.ataum.tk/haberdetay.asp?ID=98>

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Cengiz Aktar (2005), "Fransa İmtiyazlı Ortaklıkta Ne Anlıyor?", *Vatan* (20 September 2005), p.16.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

According to Aktar, the supporters of privileged partnership, mentions different subjects³⁷⁷. However, Aktar stresses that there are some contradictions between them particularly about the extent of customs union and the immediate implementation of privileged partnership, from the aspects of timing; for example from one side, the extent of customs union will be widened, it requires many negotiations that will continue many years, and from another side, this partnership will start immediately tomorrow³⁷⁸. He also states that about common defence policies, the question of why a privileged partnership can not exist is explained very well by French senators Robert Del Picchia and Hubert Haenel who prepared a perfect report about privileged partnership in February 2004³⁷⁹. Aktar stated that in this report, these senators said that judicial and internal affairs fields were sensitive and serious transfer of sovereignty would be necessary, and consequently if the partners were not equal position in the partnership, this transfer could not happen³⁸⁰. Aktar also states that from common defence and security side, Turkey is already a NATO member and so asks why Turkey should be willing to accept a privileged partnership, in place of full membership³⁸¹. Moreover, Aktar stresses that Turkey already has a customs union with the EU; but this customs union does not include agricultural goods and services³⁸². If a privilege is given in these fields, full integration of Turkish economy to the single market can be provided³⁸³. However, this kind of customs union has some deficiencies since Turkey can not participate in decision-making mechanism in the EU³⁸⁴.

Furthermore, Aktar says that privileged partnership includes participation in some common policies, but they are only some marginal politics such as research politics of the EU budget, education politics³⁸⁵. For example, some questions have not been answered, such as how the limitations of common agricultural politics are accepted without participation into decision-making process and how can be the participation of a country which is not a member state of the EU, to the politics that requires a solidarity

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

between the member states. Consequently, the content of privileged partnership proposal is problematic and unacceptable³⁸⁶.

A satisfactory explanation about the possibility of privileged partnership idea came from the chief negotiator of Turkey, Egemen Bağış, after his visit in Paris in September 2009. He explained that after his contacts with the French politicians, they understood the sensitivity of Turkey about full-membership, and as a result they would discontinue their privileged partnership idea³⁸⁷.

And also, another content clarification for Turkey came from European Commissioner for the Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy of the EU, Stefan Füle. He stressed that an idea of privileged partnership about Turkey was not on the table, the negotiations would continue with Turkey for full-membership³⁸⁸. And he asserted that the rule for the membership of the EU is obvious, and the same conditions will be implemented for all candidates, this is also subject to the rhythm of the candidate countries³⁸⁹.

These two comments are important to answer officially one of the most popular and thorny questions in Turkey–EU relations which have so far mostly raised and discussed either behind closed doors or openly in public through party leaders, journalists and academics. To sum up, it can be said that the government in Turkey has a certain target about the EU that is becoming a member state. However, from other side, European Christian Democrats do not look at this target of Turkey positively. They present alternative approaches for Turkey as privileged partnership. Both sides have their own opinion and explanations about the subject. It can be said that ‘wait and see’ approach at this point takes the center stage, at best forcing both sides to reach in a common opinion as time passes and accession negotiations goes forward.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ İsmail Küçükkaya, (2009) “İmtiyazlı Ortaklık Söylemi Bitecek Mi?”, *Akşam* (24/09/2009), Retrieved 22/02/2010 from: http://www.aksam.com.tr/2009/09/24/yazar/14394/ismail_kucukkaya/imtiyazli_ortaklik_soylemi_bitecek_mi_.html

³⁸⁸ *Euroactiv*, (2010) “AB Genişleme Komiseri Füle: Türkiye için imtiyazlı ortaklık masada değil”, (2010), Retrieved 23/02/2010 from: <http://www.euractiv.com.tr/genisleme/article/ab-genisleme-komiseri-fule-turkiye-icin-imtiyazli-ortaklik-masada-degil-008485>

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Long before the establishment of the European Union, European Christian democrats supported an idea of Union in international arena. And finally they reached their target, today the European Union history is also remembered with the name of many significant Christian democrats such as, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Leo Tindemans, and Jacques Delors. Also it is well-known that the values, which Christian democrats have supported them since the first years of the emergence of Christian democracy concept, such as subsidiarity, decentralisation, fraternity, human rights, are several significant principles of today's the European Union.

And at present Christian democrats carry on their vision in the European Union as the most effective group. It can be seen from their number in the European Parliament; they are the biggest group of the Parliament and seen from their supports on any action that related with the development of the integration, such as their encouraging approach for the acceptance of a European Constitution.

European Christian Democrats say that they have worked consistently and successfully to provide the development of the European Union on the basis of the primacy of law and respect for fundamental rights, the principle of subsidiarity and an efficient power-sharing of the institutions, and also more efficient servicing for the common interest of all Europeans, and they believe in a view of Europe of values that consist of diversities.

Futhermore, they want a 'Europe' which creates opportunity for not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world by functioning competitive market economy that provides the well-being of everybody. Therefore, for them sustainable development concept as one of the main principle of the Union also, is so crucial. Also they wish to see that the EU has an effective common foreign and security policy and to make the institutional reforms that are necessary to have more efficient policies such as to reach a success in the enlargement policy.

Shortly, they say that they work to have a better Europe for all. Consequently, as this thesis argued, Christian democrats have been strong supporters, may be the strongest one of the European integration from the past to the present, especially since the 1920's.

In addition to their effective position in the European Union institutions, they are also effective in political arena of their countries at the national level. For instance, Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany, Jan Peter Balkenende from Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in the Netherlands, Nicholas Sarkozy from the New Union for Public Movement (UMP) in France, Silvio Berlusconi from The People of Freedom (PDL) in Italy. Consequently, there is an undeniable reality that, Christian Democrats have significant effects on the decisions which taken in today's Europe not only in the European Union but also at the national level.

Beside their historical achievements in the EU history, in the last years, European Christian Democrats have become the major actors in the discussion about Turkey's membership. Even if there are certainly more neutral Christian Democrats, most of them are against Turkey's membership. It can be argued that opposition of Christian Democrats mainly depends on the fear of many Europeans to welcome a big Islamic country into the EU, now that Turkey is knocking on Europe's door. All in all, they don't think that Turkey's membership would contribute to the building of a European identity. Some concerns of opponents to Turkish membership can be listed as: the identity issues, religion, culture, Turkey's affinity with Europe; and the issues of scale, the huge size of Turkey, the population (which is very large), the cost to the budget of joining the EU and the voting weight that Turkey will have in the EU if it joins.

Against these concerns of European side, according to Turkish side Turkey's membership contributes the EU to play an role as a global actor, helps the EU ending the image of the Christian Club, contributes to the European Common Defence and Foreign Policy, provides great advantages to the European market with young Turkish population and opens a 70- million market to Europe, and with her geostrategic position

on the map Turkey gives big opportunities to the EU for making cooperation with Asia and Middle-East.

In addition to these benefits from the aspect of the EU, this membership is also beneficial for Turkey. Turkey sees the EU as a community of the values and wants to become a part of this community and also the EU is a community of states constitute from 450-500 million population, and becomes a member of this community will provide easiness to Turkey when strategic decision should be taken. There is also an economic advantage, if Turkey becomes a part of this community, it will be a member of a functioning market economy and benefit from all advantages of a huge market. The last reason is European identity idea. If a country becomes a member of this community, as a EU member it will get more foreign investments and respect to the country.

To sum up, at worst, even if Turkey fulfills all conditions of the *acquis communautaire*, she can not be a member, since her membership can be rejected in referendums of member countries finally. And if Turkey can not be a member country in the future, this situation will likely to create new approaches in Turkey's foreign policy. For those who support Turkish membership, this situation will also lead to lessening of the EU's power in the world politics. They believe that Turkey's membership is a great opportunity for the EU, with this membership the EU may have an active and important role on world politics events, because of Turkey's strategic position. They further claim that if Turkey can not be a member of the EU, not only Turkey will be unsuccessful at the end of this long process, but also the EU will be in a failure. Accordingly, the EU has to clarify that what is the difference of Turkey from the other member, especially from the latter ones. If the EU reject Turkey's membership after Turkey met all conditions for the membership, the EU will lose its prestige on the world. The EU is known as a union of values and freedoms. If the EU can not digest the differences of Turkey, then the EU's reputation and aim to reach 'unity in diversity' will also be damaged.

Nonetheless, it seems that most Christian Democrats do not agree on the aforementioned benefits of the Turkish membership. Their proposals to redefine the Turkey-EU relations clearly show that their possible future image about EU does not have a place for Turkey. However, it should be remembered that there is no homogeneous Christian Democrat profile towards the full membership of Turkey despite their strong criticisms against Turkey. There are still some Christian Democrats that might support the membership of Turkey or at least change the stern view of the others on Turkey. However, it should also be noted that in the last months, in addition to Christian Democrats, Socialists have started to consider on privileged partnership idea against Turkey's full membership and they are preparing a report about this subject to present the European Parliament. So, it can be said that this report may enforce negative conduct of manner against Turkey's full membership not only European politicians but also in the European Union's official institutions. Finally, from the aspect of the decision making in the European Union, European Christian Democrats may take one of their important exams about Turkey's membership to the Union. Future developments show us that whether and how the strong position of European Christian democrats will affect Turkey's future.

In conclusion, it can be stated that even if Christian democracy concept is transformed according to the conditions of the time from its initial stages to the present, and also Christian democrats have went through some changes themselves, they have always been influential in European political scene and never lost their leader positions in decision-making process and shaping European integration.

**ANNEX 1: The members, observers, associated countries of the EPP part
(Christian Democrats) of the EPP-ED Group**

| Name | Country | Type | Name | Country | Type |
|--|------------------|-------------|---|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA) | NL (Netherlands) | Full Member | Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria | BG (Bulgaria) | Full Member |
| Platforma Obywatelska | PL (Poland) | Full Member | Union of Democratic Forces | BG (Bulgaria) | Full Member |
| PSL | PL (Poland) | Full Member | GERB | BG (Bulgaria) | Full Member |
| Democratic and Social Centre - People's Party | PT (Portugal) | Full Member | Democratic Party | BG (Bulgaria) | Full Member |
| Partido Social Democrata | PT (Portugal) | Full Member | Agrarian People's Union | BG (Bulgaria) | Full Member |
| Democratic-Liberal Party | RO (Romania) | Full Member | Democratic Rally of Cyprus | CY (Cyprus) | Full Member |
| Christian Democratic People's Party | HU (Hungary) | Full Member | Krestanka a demokraticka unie | CZ (Czech.) | Full Member |
| Fidesz - Magyar Polgari Szövetség | HU (Hungary) | Full Member | Christlich-Soziale Union | DE (Germany) | Full Member |
| Fine Gael | IE (Ireland) | Full Member | Christlich Demokratische Union | DE (Germany) | Full Member |
| UDC - Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro | IT (Italy) | Full Member | DET KONSERVATIVE FOLKEPARTI | DK (Denmark) | Full Member |
| POPOLARI UDEUR | IT (Italy) | Full Member | Kristendemokraterne | DK (Denmark) | Full Member |
| centre democrat Humaniste | BE (Belgium) | Full Member | Democratic Party of Albania | AL (Albania) | Observer Member |
| Il Popolo della Libertà | IT (Italy) | Full Member | Party of Democratic Action (SDA) | BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina) | Observer Member |
| Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats | LT (Lithuania) | Full Member | HDZBiH | BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina) | Observer Member |
| Chr schtlech Sozial Vollekspartei | LU (Luxembourg) | Full Member | PDP | BA (Bosnia and Herzegovina) | Observer Member |
| New Era | LV (Latvia) | Full Member | United Civil Party | Belarus | Observer Member |
| Tautas Partija | LV (Latvia) | Full Member | Belarusan Popular Front | Belarus | Observer Member |
| Partit Nazzjonalista | MT (Malta) | Full Member | Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit - Christian Democrats in Finland | FI (Finland) | Observer Member |
| Slovenian Democratic Party | SL (Slovenia) | Full Member | VMRO-DPMNE | FYROM | Observer Member |
| Slovenian People's Party | SL (Slovenia) | Full Member | United National Movement | Georgia | Observer Member |

ANNEX 1: The members, observers, associated countries of the EPP part (Christian Democrats) of the EPP-ED Group

| Name | Country | Type | Name | Country | Type |
|--|---------------|-------------|---|------------------|------------------|
| Nova Slovenija - Krscanska ljudska stranka | SL (Slovenia) | Full Member | Demokratski Centar/Democratic Centre | HR (Croatia) | Observer Member |
| Austrian People's Party | AT (Austria) | Full Member | Südtiroler Volkspartei | IT (Italy) | Observer Member |
| Unio Democràtica de Catalunya | ES (Spain) | Full Member | Christian Democratic People's Party | Moldova | Observer Member |
| NEA DEMOKRATIA (NEA ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ) | GR (Greece) | Full Member | Kristelig Folkeparti | NO (Norway) | Observer Member |
| Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség | RO (Romania) | Full Member | Partito Democratico Cristiano Sammarinese | SM (San Marino) | Observer Member |
| Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat | RO (Romania) | Full Member | Justice & Development Party (AKP) | TR (Turkey) | Observer Member |
| CD&V | BE (Belgium) | Full Member | Batkivshchyna | UA (Ukraine) | Observer Member |
| Kristdemokraterna | SE (Sweden) | Full Member | People's Movement of Ukraine | UA (Ukraine) | Observer Member |
| Moderaterna | SE (Sweden) | Full Member | People's Union | UA (Ukraine) | Observer Member |
| Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party | SK (Slovakia) | Full Member | Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina | Y1 (Serbia) | Observer Member |
| Kansallinen Kokoomus | FI (Finland) | Full Member | G17 PLUS | Y1 (Serbia) | Associate Member |
| Strana Madarskej koalície | SK (Slovakia) | Full Member | Democratic Party of Serbia | Y1 (Serbia) | Associate Member |
| Christian Democratic Movement | SK (Slovakia) | Full Member | Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei | CH (Switzerland) | Associate Member |
| Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union | EE (Estonia) | Full Member | Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica | HR (Croatia) | Associate Member |
| Partido Popular | ES (Spain) | Full Member | Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka | HR (Croatia) | Associate Member |
| Union pour un Mouvement Populaire | FR (France) | Full Member | HOYRE | NO (Norway) | Associate Member |

Source: European People's Party. *Member Parties*. Retrieved: 27 Dec 2009 from: <http://www.epp.eu/memberparties.php>

ANNEX 2: The Milestones of Turkey- EU Relations

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| • Feb. 1952: Turkey becomes a full member of NATO. |
| • Sept. 1959: Ankara applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community. |
| • Sept. 1963: Ankara Agreement (an association agreement) signed to take Turkey into a customs union and finally full EEC membership. First financial protocol also signed. |
| • Nov. 1970: Additional Protocol and second financial protocol signed in Brussels. |
| • Jan. 1973: Additional Protocol enters into force, comprehensively setting out how the customs union would be established. |
| • During the first half of the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the EEC come to a virtual freeze following the military <i>coup d'etat</i> on 12 September 1980. |
| • June 1980: Association Council decides to decrease customs duties on almost all agricultural products to "zero" by 1987. |
| • Sept. 1986: Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process. |
| • 14 April 1987: Turkey applies for full EEC membership. |
| • Dec. 1989: Commission endorses Turkey's eligibility for membership but defers assessment of its application. |
| • March 1995: Turkey-EU Association Council finalises agreement on customs union, which enters into force on 1 January 1996. |
| • Dec. 1997: Luxembourg summit sees EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey. |
| • Dec. 1999: Helsinki summit gives candidate status to Turkey. |
| • March 2001: Council of Ministers adopts EU-Turkey Accession Partnership. |
| • March 2001: Turkish government adopts National Programme of Turkey for adopting EU laws. |
| • Sept. 2001: Turkish parliament adopts over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. |
| • Aug. 2002: Turkish parliament passes sweeping reforms to meet EU's human rights criteria. |
| • 13 Dec. 2002: Copenhagen summit resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. In the meantime, EU leaders agree to extend and deepen co-operation on customs union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance. |
| • May 2003: Council of Ministers decides on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of an Accession Partnership with Turkey. |
| • Jan. 2004: Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed by the EU. |
| • March 2004: European Council recommends ending monitoring of Turkey. |
| • 17 Dec. 2004: European Council decides to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005: with strings attached. |
| • 23 May 2005: Turkey names Economy Minister Ali Babacan as the country's chief accession negotiator. |
| • 1 June 2005: Turkey's revised penal code, first adopted in September 2004, enters into force. |
| • 17 June 2005: Council reiterates EU's determination to proceed with enlargement process. |
| • 29 June 2005: Commission presents 'rigorous' negotiating framework to Ankara. |
| • 29 July 2005: Turkey signs protocol to Ankara agreement, extending EU-15 customs union to the ten new member states including Cyprus. Ankara also issues a declaration on non-recognition of Cyprus. |
| • 21 Sept. 2005: EU approves its counter-declaration to Turkey's 29 July declaration. |
| • 3 Oct. 2005: Accession talks symbolically opened with Turkey. |
| • 23 Jan. 2006: Council decides on principles, priorities and conditions contained in Accession Partnership with Turkey. |
| • 16 March: European Parliament adopts resolution based on report by Elmar Brok on Commission's enlargement strategy paper. |
| • 12 Apr. 2006: Selection panel for the European Capital of Culture 2010 recommends Istanbul. |
| • 12 June 2006: EU starts concrete accession negotiations with Turkey. The negotiating framework specifies 35 chapters. Each chapter needs to be unanimously opened and closed by the Council. Council agrees to open and close chapter on science and research. |
| • 12-27 July 2006: A court ruling on 'Turkishness' in the case of Hrant Dink sends an ambivalent signal to EU and raises concerns over freedom of expression in Turkey. |

ANNEX 2: The Milestones of Turkey- EU Relations

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31 July 2006: Hardline General Yasar Büyükanit appointed chief of Turkish military. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Sept. 2006: European Parliament adopts report concerning Turkey's progress on preparing for membership. The report said Turkey had made insufficient progress in the areas of freedom of expression, minority rights, corruption and violence against women. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 Nov. 2006: Commission publishes critical report on Turkey's accession progress. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 29 Nov. 2006: Commission recommends partial suspension of membership negotiations with Turkey due to lack of progress on Cyprus issue. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 Dec. 2006: EU foreign ministers decide to follow Commission's recommendations and suspend talks with Turkey on eight of the 35 negotiating areas. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26 June 2007: Two further negotiating chapters, on statistics and financial control, are opened. But opening chapter on economic and monetary union is taken off agenda. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22 July 2007: Erdogan's ruling AKP gets re-elected with 47% of vote in early parliamentary elections. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 28 Aug. 2007: Abdullah Gül is elected president of Turkey in third round of voting in the Turkish assembly. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Febr. 2008: Adoption by Council of revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2008: Turkish Constitutional Court narrowly rejects allegations that AKP Party is trying to establish Islamist state. If accepted, the allegations would have led to the banning of the party. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June 2008: Negotiations open on two chapters: intellectual property and company law. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 Oct. 2008: Ergenekon trial - which sees members of the military and security establishment accused of fomenting unrest - begins. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2009: Kurdish initiative launched with a view to extending cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurdish minority, whose condition is seen as a major problem in EU accession talks. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jan. 2009: Egemen Bağış appointed minister for EU accession and chief negotiator. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2009: Local elections weaken standing of the AKP party which lost some 8% of votes compared to parliamentary election in 2007. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 July 2009: Turkey adopts law aimed at meeting EU criteria to limit the power of military courts, despite warnings from the army that this might escalate tensions with government (EurActiv 09/07/09). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 Sept. 2009: Government defends \$2.5 billion dollar measure against Dogan Media Holding. Considering the critical stance of the latter against the government, the EU expressed concern (EurActiv 15/09/09) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Oct. 2009: Turkey and Armenia signed a peace accord in Zurich aimed at opening borders between the neighbouring countries. The rapprochement is seen as a precondition for Turkish accession (EurActiv 12/10/09). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 Oct. 2009: Latest progress report on Turkish accession published. |

Source: Euractiv. *Turkey-EU Relations*. Retrieved: 24/02/2010 from: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678>

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