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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

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İLİŞKİLER ANA BİLİM DALI**

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
MEDITERRANEAN POLICY**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

Zeynep KALELİ

İstanbul – 2010

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ABSTRACT

The main argument of this thesis is that there is a policy shift in the EU's Mediterranean policies from a global, inclusive and comprehensive region building attempt as in the case of EMP towards a more differentiated relation with the Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries, as in the case of ENP, and finally to a lighter version of cooperation based on concrete projects in the Mediterranean region, as in the case of UfM. To defend this argument, the thesis looks into the EU's three significant EU policies for tackling the issues of the Mediterranean: namely, the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-Barcelona Process (1995)", "Wider Europe-European Neighbourhood Policy (2004)" and "Union for the Mediterranean (2008)". It has a comparative approach through which all the three policies are analysed in depth.

ÖZET

Bu tez, Avrupa Birliđi'nin Akdeniz'e yönelik olarak geliřtirdiđi politikalarının "bölgeselleřme" hedefinden uzaklařarak daha hafif bir iřbirliđi modeline dođru bir deđiřim geirdiđi argümanını savunmaktadır. 1995 Euro-Med Ortaklıđı ile öngörülen global, kapsamlı iřbirliđine dayanan bölgesel politika, yerini 2004 yılındaki Avrupa Komřuluk Politikasıyla farklılařmış iliřkilere bırakmış ve son olarak, Akdeniz için Birlik giriřimi ile somut projelerden oluřan, daha hafif bir iřbirliđini temel alan bir politika benimsenmiřtir. Bu argümanı savunmak amacıyla tezde, Avrupa Birliđi'nin belli bařlı Akdeniz politikaları olan "Euro-Med Ortaklıđı (1995)", "Avrupa Komřuluk Politikası (2004)", ve "Akdeniz İçin Birlik (2008)" politikaları karşılařtırılmalı olarak incelenmiřtir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EMPA	Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
ARLEM	Euro- Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CM	Council of the Mediterranean
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCM	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process
EMPF	Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EUROMESCO	Euro Mediterranean Study Commission
FEMISE	Forum Euromediterraneen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques
FOROMED	Mediterranean Forum
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
MEDA	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Financial Instrument
NIF	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
RMP	Renovated Mediterranean Policy
SMPCs	Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries
UE	European Union
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean

INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean is a complex reality, an interface between three continents which presents challenges to the world¹. An inland sea, around which some of the most ancient civilizations emerged and shaped the history of the world, today, faces sharp political, economic and cultural fractures. The North-South divide² is probably best reflected in the Mediterranean.³

Mediterranean is a crucial area for the European Union (EU) as it presents global challenges such as terrorism, immigration flows, drug trafficking, energy security, militarization and regional conflicts which have spill-over effects for Europe.⁴ All these factors lead the EU to exercise its normative power⁵ vis a vis Mediterranean through the creation of a global policy approach.

In the early years of the EEC, the six European countries maintained highly differentiated bilateral relations with most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. However, in the early 1970s and 1980s, the EC gradually came to adopt a more rigorous

¹Michelle Pace, "Rethinking the Mediterranean: Reality and Re-Presentation in the Creation of a 'Region'", May 2008, RAMSES Working Paper No:3, University of Oxford, European Studies Centre, p.3, <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/ramsesc/pace.pdf>, (March 19, 2009).

²James Bernard Quilligan "The Brandt Report", Brandt 21 Forum, Philadelphia, 2002, www.brandt21forum.info, (February 19, 2009).

³For more on the North-South Divide and the Mediterranean's significance in this regard, see: Münevver Cebeci, "European Union's Mediterranean Policy: A Means of Abating the North-South Divide" paper presented at the ISA Convention, San Diego, California, USA, March 22, 2006, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/1/6/pages98167/p98167-1.php. (September 14, 2009).

⁴For more on the geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean, see: Münevver Cebeci, "European Union's Mediterranean Policy" and Münevver Cebeci, "The Security Actorness of the EU in the Mediterranean: From Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the European Neighbourhood Policy", paper presented at the ISA Convention, San Francisco, USA, March 26-29, 2008. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/0/2/p251022_index.html, (September 19, 2009).

⁵Michelle Pace,, "The Construction of EU Normative Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Volume: 45, September 2007, pp.1041-1064, www.fscpo.unict.it/europa/michellepace2007.pdf, (February 14, 2009).

definition of the region. In the first 1990s, the EU policies towards the Mediterranean experienced a more proactive and multilateral turn. The launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was the first major concretion of these efforts towards constructing a Euro-Mediterranean region, through the promotion of economic, political, social and cultural interaction. The EMP was conceived with a strong normative component in that it envisaged a future highly integrated area on the basis of shared norms and values. The holistic character of the EMP and EU representatives' widespread discourses about the indivisibility of the security and wellbeing in the Euro-Mediterranean area was considered as have perspective of region-building.⁶

Following the Eastern enlargement, the new impetus given to Euro-Mediterranean relations with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 also triggered discussions focused on the modus operandi of the Union when promoting norms and rules in its southern vicinity using concepts such as normative power Europe, external governance⁷, or Europeanization⁸. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) embraced bilateral differentiation as one of its guiding principles, and sub-regional initiatives such as the 5+5 dialogue have gained momentum in certain issue areas.

More recently, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has been an explicit exercise of normative differentiation, in the sense that cooperation is devised in functional and flexible terms, dissociated from the wider political or pro-reform aims of

⁶ Federica, Bicchi "The European Origins of Euro Mediterranean Practices", Paper No.04612, December 12, 2004, University of Berkley, Institute of European Studies, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8c44c395>, (February 14, 2009).

⁷ Sandra Lavenex, "EU External Governance in Wider Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, August 2004, pp. 680-700.

⁸ Gonzalo Escribano, "Europeanization without Europe? The Mediterranean and the Neighborhood Policy for the Mediterranean", *RSCAS Paper*, No.2006/19, June 2006, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/6071/1/RSCAS2006_19.pdf, (January 13, 2010).

the EMP and the ENP. However, there is the risk of inconsistency between the UfM's pragmatic approach and other more reform oriented EU initiatives⁹.

In this thesis, it is argued that there has been a policy shift in the EU practices towards Mediterranean. A drift from “promotion of region building” – as in the case of EMP – which has been the only forum so far which all the Mediterranean partners engage in constructive dialogue and represents a strong commitment to regional stability and democracy through regional cooperation and integration¹⁰ based on negative conditionality¹¹; to, “differentiation” – as in the case of ENP- which foresees bilateral relations as a central element based on positive conditionality; and finally to “union of projects” –as in the case of UfM,¹² which pursues multilateral partnership by focusing on regional and trans-national projects for regional integration and cohesion, with no mention to conditionality. **There has been a shift from the idea of “region-building” to a lighter cooperation framework.**

In view of above, the aim is to analyse the evolution of EU Mediterranean policies from the perspectives of region building, policy convergence, and differentiation dynamics by the following research questions:

-What exactly are the practices that the EU has been developing in Euro-Mediterranean relations?

⁹ Roberto Aliboni, “EMP Approaches to Human Rights and Democracy”, Haizam Amirah Fernández, and Richard Youngs (eds), *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade*, Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, FRIDE, 2005, pp. 47-58.

¹⁰ European Commission, “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council”, *Partenerat EuroMed. Com. 2008 319, p.2*, <http://www.cremo.edu.gr/Union%20for%20the%20Mediterranean%20Barcelona%20Process.pdf> (May 20, 2008).

¹¹ Aliboni, “EMP Approaches to Human Rights and Democracy”, p.53.

¹² Gonzalo Escribano, Alejandro Lorca, “The Mediterranean Union: A Union in Search of a Project”, *Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper*, Vol.13/2008, ,Madrid, 2008, p. 3, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/061d2e004f018a2997b5f73170baead1/WP13-2008_Escribano-Lorca_Mediterranean_Union.pdf?MOD=AJPERESandCACHEID=061d2e004f018a2997b5f73170baead1 (October 22, 2009).

-How do the EU policies affect the leverage of the Union vis a vis Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries (SMPCs) in terms of policy convergence?

-In what extent do ENP and UfM differ from the region building policy of the EU which initiated with EMP?

-What are the causes of the policy shift from region building EMP to bilateral differentiation ENP and finally to a project based cooperation as in the case of UfM?

-Is differentiation dynamics a positive or negative development in terms of promoting policy convergence in the SMPCs?

The thesis uses a comparative approach, analysing the three main EU policy instruments namely, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as the comparative study cases. The thesis explores the international situation, the general political, economical and social conditions in the region and the internal dynamics of the EU, during the creation of the before mentioned policies; assesses the pros and cons of each initiative and makes final remarks on the success of each policy. As the UfM is an initiative still under construction, it is not possible to draw factual conclusions; therefore the final remarks on the UfM have more hypothetical character.

The first chapter gives a conceptual framework in relation with the three main investigation areas namely Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (ENP), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The chapter's aim is to study the theoretical concepts such as "region-building", "bilateral differentiation" "joint (co)- ownership" and "union of projects", associated with the above mentioned European Union (EU) policies.

The second chapter analyses the European foreign policy making toward Mediterranean from a historical perspective covering 1956-1995 period. Section one gives a general idea of how the EU formulates its foreign policy. Section two, outlines the formative phase of EU's relations with the Mediterranean countries before the first global initiatives were launched. Section three assesses the first comprehensive policy framework in the Mediterranean, namely the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) where the concept of "Mediterranean Region" came to be enshrined in EU external relations¹³. The fourth section evaluates the impact of the accessions of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the EU in relation with the Mediterranean policies. And the final section explains the developments in early 1990s till the launch of EMP. Each section gives a brief outline of the actual international environment and the influence of the member countries on the EU policies.

Third chapter analyzes the three EU policies towards the Mediterranean starting from 1995 until present, namely, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)-Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean initiatives. It puts forward the origins, the scope and the instruments used in each of the initiatives in order to make evaluations on their achievements and weaker aspects in the assessment section. While assessing each policy, the basic policy inclinations of each initiative get clearer which later lead to a general comparison of the three initiatives in terms of evolution in the European Union's Mediterranean policy. And finally, the conclusion discusses the facts drawn from previous chapters and gives some recommendations for a global, inclusive and comprehensive Euro- Mediterranean policy.

¹³ For the period before the Southern enlargement (1956-1980), the Mediterranean non Member countries were Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan (for its links to the Israeli conflict), Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and Greece. Libya never manifested an interest in the EC/EU.

1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter seeks to give a conceptual framework in relation with the three main investigation areas namely Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (ENP), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The chapter's aim is to study the theoretical concepts such as "region-building", "bilateral differentiation" "joint (co)- ownership" and "union of projects", associated with the above mentioned European Union (EU) policies.

The chapter starts with a general search on the concept of "region" in international relations, more specifically Mediterranean studies. The first section puts forward different approaches on "region building" within the framework of EMP-Barcelona Process. Second section explores different views on "bilateral differentiation" concept which is associated with the ENP, the third section studies the "joint/co-ownership" concept which has been a basic discussion in almost all Euro-Med policies and finally, the "union of projects" concept, associated with the UfM is dealt with.

The geographical term "region" usually refers to a homogenous area of the earth's surface, with characteristics that make it distinct from the areas that surround it. More over, a geographical area is generally specified as a "region" when there is a certain pattern of regular relations and interactions among the countries in that area¹⁴. Joseph Nye defines an international region as follows: "a limited number of States linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence".¹⁵

¹⁴Michelle Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity, Meddling with the Mediterranean*, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, p. 28.

¹⁵Joseph Nye, *International Regionalism*, Boston: Brown and Company Readings, 1968, p.xii.

In order to define international regions, several scholars like Cantori and Spiegel refer to criteria such as geographical proximity, common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and social bonds and a sense of identity¹⁶. Russett's criteria are social and cultural homogeneity, political attitudes or external behaviour, common political institutions, economic interdependence, geographical proximity.¹⁷ Thompson's necessary conditions are: geographical proximity, regular and intense relations among regional units, common perceptions of the regional sub-system. Nye distinguishes micro-economic organization involving formal economic integration from macro-regional organization, concerned with controlling conflicts¹⁸. Deutsch defines a region as a set of countries distinctly interdependent over a broad range of different dimensions¹⁹.

1.1 Region Building

In order to explain region-building process, International Relations literature makes reference to power balances in the international system²⁰,. Realists and neo-realists, like Waltz as an example, explain regionalism as a return to a multipolar balance of power system, Keohane and Nye as economic interdependence, Huntington as cultural affinity, Deutsch refer to the intensity of transactions and flows of communication, Buzan talks about the intensity of security, political and military interactions, membership of regional institutions²¹. Ernst B. Haas, stresses the need to

¹⁶ Louis J Cantori, and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions; A Comparative Approach*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp.6-7.

¹⁷ Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, "Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)", UC Berkeley: Institute of European Studies, 2004, p.6, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xx6n5p4> (October 12, 2009).

¹⁸ Manuela Moschella, "European Union's Regional Approach Towards its Neighbours: The ENP vis a vis the EMP", University of Catania, Jean Monnet Center, (year n/a), p.6 <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf> (October 12, 2009).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Louise L'estrange Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, *Regionalism in the World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, New York: Oxford Press, 2003.

²¹ Adler and Crawford, "Normative Power", pp.14.

distinguish the notions of regional cooperation, regional system, regional organization, regional integration and regionalism²².

Regional integration processes, have also been interpreted through the lens of various theoretical perspectives, with results that have contributed to strengthen the subject's definitional ambiguities. According to Fawcett and Hurrel's studies²³, in the actual international system region-building presents some specific characteristics: first, the economic dimension's prevalence. Adler argues that practically, region-building is a multi-dimensional process, and economic regionalization can be considered as a first step in order to achieve wider political and security objectives²⁴.

At this point, we should explore the characteristics of the Mediterranean as a "region". Pace gives two different definitions of Mediterranean, commonly found in the literature: The Mediterranean as a "region" with sub-regions, or Mediterranean as an interface between coherence regions²⁵. In the case of the former, the Mediterranean is said to embody many geographical "sub-regions"²⁶. These can broadly be said to be Southern Europe, which includes southern European Union (EU) member states and Turkey; North Africa which consists of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; and the Levant which comprises Egypt, Israel the Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria²⁷.

Many scholars of international relations participate in the debate as to whether a purely Mediterranean region already exists or is in the process of being created.

²² Haas, Ernst B. "The Study of Regional Integration", *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 24, No.4. pp. 646, 1970.(December 12, 2009).

²³ Louise L'estrange Fawcett and Andrew Hurrel, *Regionalism in the World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, p.27.

²⁴ Moschella, "European Union's Regional Approach towards Its Neighbours", pp.6-7.

²⁵ Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity*, p.5.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

According to Attina²⁸, political economists do not hesitate to use the toolbox of the study of international economic regionalism to analyse the process for building the Mediterranean integration. Political scientists, instead, are less confident on making use of the study of international political regionalism as a toolbox for the analysis and explanation of the EMP. The reason for this moderation is that theories and studies of international political regionalism emphasize significant commonality of political and economic structures as the condition for constructing cooperative relations as important as the one proposed in the Barcelona Declaration²⁹. In political science theories, social homogeneity and consistent commonality of political institutions and practices are essential to create regional institutions for dealing with the problems of political and economic interdependence, not to say for adopting norms of joint conflict management and resolution³⁰. To the political scientist, no commonality means not cooperation and integration but instability and conflict. Actually, many political analysts little commonality and homogeneity in the group of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. In this perspective, according to Attina, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a region-level process of building mechanisms and institutions to settle the local aspects of global trends and problems³¹.

Attina, when discussing the socialization-inclusion views of regionalism, regards the region building in the Mediterranean as a gap-reducing process between the societies of the two shores of the Mediterranean, an inclusion process of Mediterranean partners in the neo-liberal global system, and a mutual socialization process of all partner countries³². However, he argues that the disbelief in the Mediterranean area as a

²⁸ Fulvio Attina, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003, pp. 181-200, (18 December 2009).

²⁹ *Barcelona Declaration*, 28.111995,

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/index_en.htm, (September 12th, 2009).

³⁰ Attina, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views".

³¹ *Ibid*, p.181.

³² *Ibid*.

political region made the debate on the nature of the EMP and the future of the relations between the European and North African societies and states a rather scant exercise.³³

Stephen Cellaya denies that the Mediterranean can be regarded as a “region”, stressing that the Post-Cold War Mediterranean realities portray a picture of fragmentation³⁴. Nicolaidis deems the initial question, “Should the Mediterranean be considered as a demarcation line, an interface between two cultural spheres, Europe and the Muslim world, in other words the managed periphery of a wider Europe?”, as crucial. Or should it be revisited as Mare Nostrum sending out its ripples to an every expanding circle of thirty six countries³⁵?

In spite of all the scepticism towards Mediterranean as a “region” there are various studies which tend to consider Mediterranean as a geopolitical, holistic “region” due to the interdependent nature of the political, economical and social issues affecting the area as a whole. There is wide consensus on this explanation of the EMP as a case of new regionalism in terms of coordinated intergovernmental reaction to the problems of the current globalization process³⁶.

Adler and Crawford also argue that, the Mediterranean integration may be considered as a laboratory for an important experiment that is taking place today in international relations³⁷. This entails the invention of a region that does not yet exist and the social engineering of a regional identity that rests neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society, voluntary networks and civic beliefs. For at least some of the designers of the EMP must have subscribed to the haunting idea that the best way to achieve

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Stefania Panebianco, *A Euro Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

³⁵ Kalypso Nicolaidis and Dimitri Nikolaidis, “The EuroMed beyond Civilizational Paradigms”, University of Berkeley, Institute of European Studies, 2004, p.27.

<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/83m7b47x>, (January 2, 2010).

³⁶ Attina, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views”, pp.3-4.

³⁷ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p.23.

security, political stability and economic welfare in the Mediterranean is neither an elaborate system of alliances, collective security systems, or mere functional economic integration schemes. Rather, they probably thought that the best way to achieve security in the Mediterranean is to invent a region that pools its resources and slowly develops a shared regional identity³⁸.

It is also important to analyze how the EU, as an institution perceives the Mediterranean. In the European Union language, promotion of regional cooperation and partnership has been widely used as a practice to cope with the Union security concerns: security issues linked to migration, drug trafficking or organised crime, energy security matters, and also the spill-over effects from regional conflicts³⁹.

The Barcelona Declaration explicitly used the language of regional community building to explain its goals⁴⁰. The Declaration pointed out that the best way to achieve security, political stability and economic welfare in the Mediterranean could be achieved by inventing a region that would share its resources and would offer a social identity as a partner of the EU. The basic premise of Barcelona Declaration was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed enough elements of a region such as geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests to make regional building a possibility⁴¹.

From the realist perspective, the EU regional policy towards Mediterranean is a part of the EU’s strategy to expand its own political influence in the region to meet three balance of power goals: i) countering the United States in the region, especially in

³⁸ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p.23.

³⁹ Moschella, “European Union’s Regional Approach towards Its Neighbours”, p.7.

⁴⁰ *Barcelona Declaration*,

⁴¹ Moschella, “European Union’s Regional Approach towards Its Neighbours”, p.15.

the Middle East, ii) controlling the region through the creation of asymmetrical dependency relationships, and iii) containing political Islam⁴².

Functionalists draw a parallelism between the history of the EEC emerging out of the European Coal and Steel Community. Richard Gillespie argues that in the Mediterranean, the strict concentration on economic and trade cooperation and other functional forms of region building was unsuccessful as the risks associated with political and cultural differences were ignored⁴³.

For constructivists such as Pace, Diez, Crawford or Adler, the EU's power rests on the ability to attract states to become members or partners of a political community, the access to which depends on the adoption of a set of norms, practices, and institutions⁴⁴. Europe practices normative power and this notion of power is codified in the Barcelona Process⁴⁵. In the eyes of constructivists, this normative power is what drove Europe's success in bringing stability, security and well being to the region. In sum, for constructivists, the process of region-building in the Mediterranean is consistent with Europe's practice of normative power and cooperative security⁴⁶. As such, the Barcelona Declaration suggests a move toward a more holistic understanding or conceptualization of the causal linkages between economic and political development and security and stability⁴⁷.

⁴² Adler and Crawford, "Normative Power", p.12.

⁴³ Richard Gillespie, "A Political Agenda for Region-building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa", University of Berkeley, Institute of European Studies, May 30, 2004, p.19. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3gr3m8sh>, (September 19, 2009).

⁴⁴ Marcus Han, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Since 1995*, Hamburg, Diplomica Verlag Gmb, 2009.

⁴⁵ Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33. No:3, 2005, pp.613-636.

⁴⁶ Crawford, "Why the Euro-Med Partnership? Explaining the EU's Strategies in the Mediterranean Region, University of California, Berkley, (date n/a), p. 14. <http://ies.berkeley.edu/contact/crawfordarticles/EU-MED%20Transregionalism%20Aggarwal%202003112.pdf>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Constructivists also tend to describe the Mediterranean through social action;⁴⁸. The Mediterranean is a fluid concept and is socially constructed through discursive construction. Michelle Pace argues that there is a need to rethinking of Mediterranean regionalism as an open and relational context. He conceptualizes the region as a socially constructed entity⁴⁹.

According to Pace, there is an uncertainty in the way which the EU refers to the Mediterranean because in its various initiatives EU has vacillated in its conceptualization of Mediterranean “otherness”⁵⁰. The EMP suffered from a clear definition of the type of Mediterranean the EU is trying to deal with; the construction of the Mediterranean so far in the EU’s policies towards the area reads in terms of security discourses, discourses of social stability, strategic discourses and economic discourse⁵¹. However, the discourses were far from being pure, in process of articulation and confrontation which ambiguities the Mediterranean as a “region”⁵².

Adler sustains that: “behind the EMP and related efforts lies the idea that the most promising –perhaps only- way to achieve long-term security, economic welfare, political stability, and peace in the Mediterranean area is neither an elaborate system of alliances or collective security system, nor a functional scheme of economic integration, but the socio-cultural process of constructing a region” whose success depends on “political and social engineering of a Mediterranean “we-feeling” or collective social identity”⁵³.

⁴⁸Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity*, p.12

⁴⁹Ibid, p.13

⁵⁰ Michelle Pace, “The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 10, Issue 2, November 2002, p.190.

⁵¹ Ibid, p.190.

⁵² Ibid, p.191.

⁵³ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, pp. 24-25.

If one is to analyze the Mediterranean from the perspective of the traditional international relations factors such as geographical proximity, common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and social bonds, it would definitely fall short from being a “region” already built. The basic idea what lied behind the EMP region-building process was to create the necessary bonds, networks and relations between the Mediterranean Partners to finally create the identity of belonging a common Mediterranean region with the objective of peace, prosperity and stability. In many ways the Barcelona Declaration is a farsighted initiative. In the past 15 years, lessons were drawn from the failures from the EMP, and the new initiatives like the ENP and the UfM were introduced to correct the deficiencies of EMP.

1.2 Bilateral Differentiation

The new impulse given to Euro-Mediterranean relations with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) also opened a great deal of discussion focused on the *modus operandi* of the Union. The differentiation dynamics have increased, not only sectorial and geographical, but also in normative terms. The “bilateral differentiation” principle which the ENP is based on foresees to develop relations with partner states with a view to recognising their specific needs inclinations and aspirations and tailoring cooperation to such specifics.

The ENP consists of a macro-regional framework which allows greater flexibility and differentiation for those countries most interested in participating. Its main innovation is the introduction of Action Plans⁵⁴. The Action Plans are the principle policy instrument used to deal with differentiation. The Action Plans do not introduce new legal tools to guide the relations between the EU and partner countries, but they are road maps designed to

⁵⁴ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, on the Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the ENP”, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, (December 14, 2009).

identify the priorities for action and the objectives of reform. The EU Commission documents explain the logic of Action Plans as follows⁵⁵

The Action Plans will draw on a common set of principles but will be differentiated, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests. The level of ambition of the EU's relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.”⁵⁶

The scope of the Action Plans which were designed according to the special needs of each partner country is listed as follows in the Commission document:

The point of departure for the Action Plans is a common set of issues, which correspond with the ENP's objective. However the drawing up of an Action Plan and the priorities agreed with each partner will depend on its particular circumstances. These differ with respect to geographic location, the political and economic situation, relations with the European Union and with neighbouring countries, reform programmes, where applicable, needs and capacities, as well as perceived interests in the context of the ENP. Thus the Action Plans with each partner will be differentiated⁵⁷.

The European Commission stresses that while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework provides the regional context for enhancing regional co-operation, the bilateral framework of the ENP is better suited to promoting internal reforms⁵⁸. Even though the Commission's strategy paper for ENP makes references to regional and sub regional

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ European Commission, “Commission Strategy Paper:ENP”, 12 May 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, (November 9 2009).

⁵⁸ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission, A Stronger European Neighborhood Policy (2007)”, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf, (December 12, 2009).

cooperation of the EMP, and highlights the complementary aspect of the ENP for EMP, the bilateral track prevails.

The ENP's differentiation approach is perceived by the Commission as a means for an enhanced and more focused policy approach of the EU towards its immediate neighbourhood, bringing together the most important instruments at the disposal of the Union and its Member States⁵⁹. Differentiation should at the same time be based on a clear commitment to "shared values"⁶⁰ and be compatible with a coherent regional approach, especially where further regional cooperation can bring clear benefits:

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In the academic literature, the change from a multilateral EMP to a bilateral ENP was largely discussed, by some as a welcomed turn towards a better accommodation of the partners' preferences while for others, bilateralism was considered as an instrument designed to increase EU's leverage *vis-à-vis* individual partner countries or as a departure from the promotion of multilateralism that the EU is preaching for⁶².

⁵⁹ Moschella, "From ENP to EMP", p.24.

⁶⁰ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" 11th March 2003, 104, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, (October 10, 2009).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz, "Preliminary Guidance for a Special Issue on 'Issue-level Dynamics in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Differentiation, Convergence and Region-building'", (Unpublished working paper), March 2009.

According to Rafaella del Sarto and Schumacher, ENP abandons the prevalence of the principle of regionalism that was inherent in the Barcelona Process, and replaces it with differentiated bilateralism⁶³. They argue that, the EMP already incorporated a bilateral dimension, but it was based on rather similar association agreements with the individual Mediterranean partner countries. Displaying a region-building approach to Euro-Mediterranean security, the EMP, inspired by the positive developments in the Middle East peace process of the early 1990s, maintained a strong regional focus, which the Commission considered “one of the most innovative aspects”⁶⁴. Conversely, the “Wider Europe” scheme is an explicitly differentiated and bilateral approach. Indeed, operating on an individual basis, the Neighbourhood Policy offers to upgrade relations to those neighbours that are politically and economically most advanced and/or show commitment to undertake serious political and economic reforms. ENP no longer relies on the EMP's idea of an encompassing Euro-Mediterranean region⁶⁵.

According to Roderick Pace, differentiated and tailor-made, negotiated Action Plans which are coherent with national development plans are important to ensure that partners cultivate a stronger sense of ownership of these plans. It avoids the pitfalls of “one size fits all” and could generate better outcomes⁶⁶. However, he argues that the ENP's emphasis on bilateralism, self-differentiated flexibility and performance of the individual partner countries is criticised for obscuring the multilateral aims or regionalism of the Barcelona Process which the EU considers as the cornerstone of its relations with the Mediterranean countries⁶⁷. But flexibility and the fact that the Action Plans are tailor-made to the partners' needs has the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of

⁶³ Rafaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No.2005/10, pp.17-38.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.18.

⁶⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe”.

⁶⁶ Roderick Pace, “EU Enlargement and Security in the Mediterranean Region”, in Brown David, Alistair Shepherd (eds), *The Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement: Wider Europe, Weaker Europe?* Manchester University Press, December 2006, pp. 174-190.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.176.

“one size fits all”, deals better with heterogeneity and the different levels of economic development, responds to the diversity of cultures and economic structures and could in theory provide incentives for individual partners to determine the momentum of their reforms⁶⁸.

Aliboni⁶⁹ argues that the differentiation which characterises the notion of ENP may affect its strategic perspective in a negative way. The differentiation pursued by the ENP entails risks of fragmentation and, for this reason, may be strategically detrimental. He further argues:

If in the next five years (2008-2013) we will have a situation in which a couple of “willing” countries are offset by a majority of “hesitating” or de facto “marginalized” countries, would this differentiation be regarded as success or a failure? Differentiation being an expected outcome, this would be considered less as a failure than a missed opportunity.” However, it is clear that this would not be a success. What would it mean from a strategic point of view for the EU security?⁷⁰

He questions the success of “differentiation” by explaining the risk of fragmentation, a fragmentation which can cause more dividing lines in the South-South partnership. He argues:

The risk differentiation may bring about is fragmentation. A fragmented “ring of friends” would hardly allow for regional governance (i.e. control/inclusion or possession/milieu) and would fail to bring in the security the EU is seeking.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Roberto Aliboni, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional and Transatlantic Challenges” *Opinions Working Paper*, Johns Hopkins University, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 2003, p. 8.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Because of differentiation, the EU, sooner or later, will confront a state of affairs rather than a well-organised regional framework. In sum, a pronounced differentiation would be a strategic failure, although such failure could be attenuated in the near future by parallel diplomatic success in the EMP/UfM Framework.⁷¹

There are some scholars though who do not especially interpret the differentiation as a basic principle of the ENP. For instance Moschella considers the ENP just as an evolving region-building⁷². She sees it as an initiative aiming at establishing a form of regionalization characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity among the regional units and progressivism in enhancing regional cooperation⁷³. However she argues, there is lack of an institutional dimension, burden-sharing and joint responsibility in addressing regional conflicts among all partners and there is an asymmetrical political and economic interdependence among regional constituent parts, which is aggravated by a limited sub-regional cooperation among neighbours and by the lack of regional institutions in charge of safeguarding mutual interests⁷⁴.

Bilateral differentiation is an instrument which enhances the bilateral relations of the EU vis a vis partner countries. However, if one analyzes it from the region building perspective, one can observe an obvious shift from the multilateral logic of the EMP. There is no doubt some reform minded SMPCs like Morocco, Israel or Tunisia took advantage of this privileged relation and achieved certain degree of convergence to the EU. However, there is a question mark on the “non-willing” countries. Is EU neglecting the “non-willing states”? Will those states be marginalized in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations? The EU should not ignore the fact that the challenges that the EU faces today mostly originate from marginalized and isolated states. The

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Moschella, “EU’s Regional Approach towards its Neighbours”, p.16.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

differentiation principle presents marginalization and fragmentation risks for the SMPCs and does not address their necessities in a comprehensive way.

3. Joint/ Co-Ownership

Ownership is a term that has long been used in the context of North South relations. Laura Feliu and Rafael Grass state that the term “ownership”, along with its various connotations and denotations, has become a common one since 1996, when the OECD’s Development Aid Committee (DAC) adopted the text entitled Shaping the 21st Century Development Partnership Strategy, which, among other aspects, stressed the importance of “developing country ownership”⁷⁵. According to these scholars, ownership, partnership and conditionality are partly overlapping concepts used in the Euro-Med literature even though ownership has recently moved to the fore⁷⁶.

The concept of ownership does not appear in the main documents of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership⁷⁷. The Barcelona Declaration of November 1995, the successive conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences up to Valencia (2002), and the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region of June 2000 make no use of the concept. However, Barcelona Declaration manifests the EU’s determination to develop a “partnership”⁷⁸. The Declaration gives the idea of co-ownership with the following wording: “[The EU is] resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants.”

⁷⁵ Laura Feliu and Rafael Grasa, “Common Ground and Common Language”, Paper presented at the EuroMeSCO Seminar, Barcelona, 14- 15 June 2002.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Feliu and Grasa, “Common Ground and Common Language”.

⁷⁸ “Where are we 10 years after the Barcelona Declaration-MEMO/05/442”, *EU Press Release on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, Brussels, 24 November 2005
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/442&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, (November 3, 2009).

The term “ownership” appears in a European Commission staff working document of January 2001 on external aid, in which, in reference to the Barcelona Process and after having stated that the Partnership must focus on ambitious but viable objectives, it calls for study of “how to increase the sense of “ownership” of the Partnership among our Mediterranean partners”⁷⁹. The Presidency Conclusions of the 5th Conference of Ministers of External Affairs, held in Valencia on 22–23 April 2002, contains a similar reference. The third paragraph states: “[...] A tangible reinforcement of the sense of ownership of the Process by all partners was underlined and concrete initiatives to this end were agreed.”⁸⁰

The Plan of Action approved at Valencia goes no farther than mentioning in its Introduction, the agreement between the parties to strengthen the sense of ownership among the parties⁸¹. Additionally, these same Presidency Conclusions mention co-ownership visibility, which would appear to refer to the need for all the countries involved (both the EU and its member states and the EMP countries) to take the process over as their own rather than to any assumption of responsibilities⁸². However, the official introduction of “co-ownership” as a concept, is by the launch of ENP. The Commission Strategy paper describes “co-ownership” concept as follows:

The ENP is an offer made by the EU to its partners to which they have responded with considerable interest and engagement. Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues. There can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of

⁷⁹ Feliu and Grasa, “Common Ground and Common Language”.

⁸⁰ Presidency Conclusions, 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Foreign Ministers, April 22-23, 2002, http://www.algerianembassy.it/site-home/investissement_file/fichiers_pdf/Barcelona%20-%20final.pdf, (October 4, 2009).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Feliu and Grasa “Common Ground and Common Language”.

priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country. The endorsement of these plans by the highest instance of the agreements in place will give added weight to the agreed priorities for action. The ambition and the pace of development of the EU's relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities.⁸³

Aliboni argues that the ENP facilitates Southern management thanks to co-ownership. While values are nominally shared, the Action Plans and their implementation are subjected to any exception the Southern regimes may advance in the name of ownership⁸⁴. On the other hand, according to Roderick Pace, "Co-ownership" is another halloed goal of the ENP but reality uncompromisingly slices through the rhetoric and the EU remains the only agenda setter and paymaster of the process⁸⁵.

Over the years, the main criticism brought to both EMP and ENP has been the lack of joint ownership for the SMPs. Recently the EU, by launching the UfM initiative seeks for a regional integration process based on the premise to develop a sense of co-ownership to the initiative among the regional constituent parts. Practically the EU tried to make partners feel as equals, it tried to avoid Mediterranean partners' perception of a unilateral European initiative.

⁸³ European Commission, "Commission Strategy Paper on ENP" http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, (November 8, 2009).

⁸⁴ Roderick Pace, "The ENP, Southern Perspectives", in Atilla Eralp, Michelle Comelli, Çiğdem Üstün, (eds), *The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean, Drawing Lessons from Enlargement*, Ankara Middle East Technical University Press, July 2009, pp. 31-53, http://www.ces.metu.edu.tr/docs/european_neighbourhood_policy.pdf (December 18, 2009).

⁸⁵ Roberto Aliboni, "The ENP in the Mediterranean, Evaluating the Political and Strategic Dimensions" ", in Atilla Eralp, Michelle Comelli, Çiğdem Üstün, (eds), *The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean, Drawing Lessons from Enlargement*, Ankara Middle East Technical University Press, July 2009, pp.13-31.

The sensitivity of the SMPCs on co-ownership created the necessity to highlight this concept in the Union for the Mediterranean documents. The Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean describes the co-ownership as follows:

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens.⁸⁶

Hence, the main innovations towards the implementation of a co-ownership in the UfM are the launching of the UfM Secretariat and the introduction of the Co-presidency figure. The Marseille Declaration contains an institutional design based upon four figures: the Co-presidency, the high officials, the Joint Permanent Committee and the UfM's Secretary General. The Co-presidency establishes a six-month EU Co-presidency, rotating according to the presidency of the EU Council, and a 2-year, non renewable, Southern Co-presidency decided by consensus among SMPCs. The Co-presidency is a long lasting demand by SMPCs, which blamed the EMP for being managed without their input.

The launching of an enhanced dialogue through the "joint-ownership" principle is considered as a positive novelty in the Euro-Med relations. Firstly; Joint ownership will contribute to the "we" feeling and will help reducing the philological gap between

⁸⁶ *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, July 13, 2008*, [http://www.emuni.si/Files/Dokumenti%20PDF/Joint declaration of the Paris summit for the Mediterranean-EN.pdf](http://www.emuni.si/Files/Dokumenti%20PDF/Joint%20declaration%20of%20the%20Paris%20summit%20for%20the%20Mediterranean-EN.pdf), (July 18, 2009).

the EU members and the SMPCs. Secondly; it will upgrade the SMPCs participation in the process. Thirdly; it will increase SMPCs' responsibility and accountability. As a matter of fact, we witness that the Egyptian co-presidency is using its diplomatic channels to speed up the UfM progress thanks to the "joint-ownership" spirit. However, in the last one and a half years, ownership in the shape of Co-presidency itself turned out to be a great dispute. The French-Egyptian co-presidency has failed to advance the UfM agenda, and even the functioning of the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona remains blocked, mainly due to the reluctance by the Arab countries to appear as compromising with Israel and due to the conflicts between Turkey and Southern Greek-Cypriot Administration. Hence, it is up to SMPCs to take advantage of the benefits of the "joint-ownership".

1.4. Union of Projects

With the introduction of the UfM, the recent Euro-Med documents started to describe the Euro-Med Partnership as follows:

While maintaining the *acquis* of its predecessor, the Barcelona Process, the Union for the Mediterranean offers more balanced governance, increased visibility to its citizens and a commitment to tangible, regional and transnational projects.⁸⁷

Some of the most important innovations of the UfM include the a rotating co-presidency with one EU president and one president representing the Mediterranean partners, and a Secretariat based in Barcelona that is responsible for identifying and promoting projects of regional, sub-regional and transnational value across different sectors.

⁸⁷ *EURO-MED Partnership*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (December 29, 2009).

As can be seen in the related UfM documents, one of the main objectives of the UfM is to become a union of projects. In order to achieve this objective, the Union for the Mediterranean identified six priority projects which are at the heart of the of Partnership's efforts, including projects for⁸⁸:

- the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea;
- the establishment of maritime and land highways;
- civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters;
- a Mediterranean solar energy plan;
- the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia;
- and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative which focuses on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

These are obviously the selected areas where the Euro-Med partnership can be more concrete and visible. The mentor of the UfM, President of France Nicolas Sarkozy, who defined the UfM as "Union made of projects" explains the idea of UfM as follows as follows:

For France, the Mediterranean Union's remit is not to take the place of all the already existing initiatives and projects, but to give them fresh impetus, a new lease of life. It is to gear them all to a single goal, to pool all the ideas, all the energies, and all the resources.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Union for the Mediterranean*, www.europe.eu, (July 17, 2009).

⁸⁹ *State visit to Morocco, speech by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, Tangiers, 23rd October 2007*,

Ahmed Driss argues that, a Union for the Mediterranean rooted in the idea of a union of projects, focused on the domains where advances have already been achieved, seems to respond to some southern Mediterranean expectations⁹⁰. According to Driss, the UfM structured around the ideal of integration, stalled at the reticence shown by certain European states and their desire for re-equilibrium – a response that resulted in a reframing of the project, explicitly adopting a cooperation logic that from then on prevailed over the prior rationale of integration⁹¹. He further argues that the adoption of this project, as a continuity of the Barcelona Process, somewhat confirms this movement away from the logic of cooperation. It appears that the Southern Mediterranean countries are interested in the prospect of working on concrete projects, according to President Sarkozy's formula of concrete projects in domains where agreement is rapidly established, such as sustainable development or energy integration and the list of potential projects is far from few, with priority being given to strategic issues linked to water management and environmental protection, as well as to the exchange of knowledge within the region and the fight against pollution in the Mediterranean Sea⁹².

Bichara Kader argues that, more than a project of a Union, the UfM is inspired by the principles of construction of Europe, it is based on the method of the founding Mothers of Europe: Concrete actions and constructed solidarity⁹³. Barbe and Herranz argue that, in the UfM the identification of shared mutual interests is considered as the primary aim, more than creation of shared identities⁹⁴. From this point of view, all

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.../state-visit-of-president-nicolas-sarkozy-to-morocco-22-24.10.07_10202.html, (October 22, 2009).

⁹⁰ Ahmed Driss, "Southern Perspectives About the Union for the Mediterranean" The Institute of Public Affairs, 2008, p.5 <http://www.isp.org.pl/files/9714201840010494001244192358.pdf>, (November 18, 2009).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Bichara Khader, *Europa por El Mediterraneo, de Barcelona a Barcelona (1995-2009)*, Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, 2009, p. 32.

⁹⁴ Barbe and Herranz "Preliminary guidance for a Special Issue on "Issue-level Dynamics in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Differentiation, Convergence and rRegion-building". p.8.

forms of differentiation are welcome provided that they contribute to the solution of practical problems⁹⁵. This view seems to be prevailing in the UfM, with a more sectorial and economic-driven approach instead of the global and normative logics of the EMP and ENP. Such an approach resonates with the classical functionalist theory of regional cooperation, that only step by step sectorial cooperation in areas of material well being can work in those cases where there are fundamental political disagreements. Geographical differentiation, whether bilateral or sub-regional, is also considered as the only way to make progress in tackling common problems, thereby circumventing the “Achilles heels of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus far: the assumption of the common Mediterranean space and of regime commitment to domestic reform⁹⁶”.

The pragmatic and functionalist approach of “Union of Projects” is a welcome novelty as well. It is relatively easier to identify the concrete areas of cooperation instead of inventing them as it was the case in EMP. In this aspect, the UfM is more realist than the EMP. However, when one analyzes the UfM projects, one can observe that there is a shift to a lighter cooperation scheme than the previous EU initiatives. It is hard to find a “Union” logic because lacks the idea of a region building. Hence, the “Union of Projects” can be considered as a formation of the missing aspects of the EMP, but not as a replacement of it.

Conclusion

The concepts presented above, are the defining factors of the three EU policies namely the EMP, the ENP and the UfM, which are subject to investigation in this thesis. The assessment of these concepts contributes to develop a structured thinking at the time of evaluating each EU policy. In some cases, more than one concept reflects philosophy of the EU policies. Each concept serves to identify the common denominators and the differencing aspects of the relevant EU policy from the others and

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

enable to identify the policy shifts. The idea of “region-building” which lied behind the EMP, was inspired by the principles of the EU to lead to a sort of Euro-Mediterranean community based on values such as democracy, human rights, gender equality. This was, needless to say, an ambitious goal. The European thinking was inclusive and generous towards the SMPCs. On the other hand, the principle of “bilateral differentiation” which marks the ENP, is a result of EU’s internal dynamics and based on the interests of the EU. This policy was not designed to address the socio-economic problems of the SMPCs in the first place. “Differentiation approach” engages only the countries who commit themselves to reforms and who are willing to adopt the European values. Therefore, the ENP is a departure form the rationale of “region-building”. Finally, the “union of projects” concept which the UfM is based on, from the very start, created a notion of a pragmatic cooperation, without mentioning the guiding principles of the EMP. This concept is a result of the general backward shift in Europe towards realism and re-nationalization. Currently, the “union of projects”, the UfM, aims a pragmatic intergovernmental cooperation. This concept does not embrace the multilateral and community tradition of the EMP, to the contrary blurs all the references to “region-building”, which has been carried out in the EMP activities so far.

2. THE EVOLUTION TOWARD REGIONALISM: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The Euro-Mediterranean relations go back to couple of thousands of years. In many discourses, the Mediterranean is described as the “cradle of civilizations”. “Mare Nostrum”, as the Romans say, has always been a scene of a struggle of domination between those civilizations. The Greeks, Persians, Romans, Carthaginians, Egyptians, the Crusaders, the Muslims, the Spaniards and the Ottomans, as rival powers marked the history of this inland sea.

Until the Second World War, almost the whole area of Mediterranean, from Maghreb to Middle East was under colonial rule, the European powers had absolute control of the region. The Second World War had disastrous effects on the colonial powers; The EEC, which later became the EU, was founded on the ashes of the Second World War, in the context of the Cold War. Since then, the Euro-Med relations have strongly been marked by the EEC/EU policies.

This chapter analyses the European foreign policy making toward Mediterranean from a historical perspective covering the period after the foundation of the EEC until 1995, the launch of EMP. Section one gives a general idea of how the EU formulates its foreign policy. Section two, outlines the formative phase of EU’s relations with the Mediterranean countries before the first global initiatives were launched. Section three assesses the first comprehensive policy framework in the Mediterranean, namely the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) where the concept of “Mediterranean Region” came to be enshrined in EU external relations⁹⁷. The fourth section evaluates the impact

⁹⁷ For the period before the Southern enlargement (1956-1980), the Mediterranean non member countries were Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan (for its links to the Arab- Israeli conflict), Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and Greece. Libya never manifested an interest in the EC/EU. The Balkans, on the contrary, has generally been considered as belonging to the Eastern bloc. After the

of the accessions of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the EU in relation with the Mediterranean policies. And the final section explains the developments in early 1990s till the launch of EMP. Each section gives a brief outline of the actual international environment and the influence of the member countries on the EU policies.

2.1. European Policy Making

Although the EU was formed as a supranational international organization, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, even after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty stay far from having a supranational character. Scholars like Keohane and Hoffman concede that in economic foreign policy some power have been transferred to central supranational authority from distinct states but see no such prospect in the politico-security sphere⁹⁸. By the Lisbon Treaty, the profile of the Union abroad is strengthened by the appointment of High Representative of CFSP, but Council is still the principle decision making power in CFSP matters, a situation which leaves the member governments in control of CFSP.

This chapter is based on Federicca Bicchi's hypothesis on European Policy Making which argues that in the EC/EU a collective policy toward the Mediterranean has developed as member states and EC/EU institutions have crafted new understandings of Euro-Mediterranean relations and forged new initiatives based on them⁹⁹. An interest change (and the possibility of convergence towards a new common European definition of interest) occurs when national policy makers perceive new political and security challenges and thus experience cognitive uncertainty. Their first

Southern enlargement (1981-86), Greece, Spain and Portugal became members, thus since then the expression Mediterranean non members does not include them any longer. Moreover, since the Oslo Agreements the EC/EU has allowed an increasing presence to the Palestinian Authority.

⁹⁸ Ricardo Gomez, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Strategic Action in the EU Policy*, 2003, Burlington, Ashgate Publications, p.10 (October 12, 2009).

⁹⁹ Federica Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp: 9-43.

reaction will be to reconstruct preferences at the national level¹⁰⁰. However, if a majority of member states faces a similar situation of cognitive uncertainty in a certain field, then it is likely that they would be available to discuss the new phenomena at the EC/EU level. It is crucial to the definition of new EFP, a specific actor that takes pains to put the new issues on the EC/EU agenda, namely the “policy entrepreneur”. Entrepreneurs are willing “to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in hope of a future return” in terms of policy change¹⁰¹. The other member states would not spend resources to spark a debate in the European arena, but they are ready to participate to it because it resonates with their own domestic concerns¹⁰².

From 1956 till 1995, EC/EU relations with its southern Mediterranean neighbours have produced two periods of attention to the region. In the first 15 years of its existence, the EC did not consider the Mediterranean to be a homogenous region and negotiated instead, trade agreements with most of the riparian countries on a bilateral basis. In 1972, a conceptual policy change occurred, leading to the first EC initiative which defined the Mediterranean as a “region”. During this period, France was the “policy entrepreneur”. Starting from 1975 one witnesses a long period of negligible interest and the Mediterranean fell very low in the EC agenda during the 1980s. At the end of the Cold War the interest for the Mediterranean resumed and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was launched. This policy was adopted until the presentation of the EMP in 1995. During this period, Spain was the “policy entrepreneur”.

2.2 Evolution of the European Mediterranean Policies: The End of the II. World War and the EEC

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

Since the end of World War II, the hegemony of Europe in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had been disappearing. The withdrawal of the Western European colonial powers was a continuous process starting from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan or Palestine, by England. French and Italian influence disappeared from North Africa. Egypt became politically independent starting from 1956. The Suez Crisis had a deep impact on the balance of power in the Maghreb and the Middle East. It diminished British and French influence on Arab states and hence damaged European powers' traditional authority over the region. Egypt's role in the Arab world was greatly improved, helping to promote pan-Arab independence movements. The crisis also accelerated the process of decolonization in Maghreb, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years. France pulled out from Morocco and Tunisia and, finally, from Algeria. England began the withdrawal from Iran in the Gulf region and Cyprus. Spanish and Portuguese departure from African colonies came later on. In the late sixties, the decolonization of the Mediterranean region was over. However, what was left behind was a politically and economically torn region. European countries maintained strong bonds with the Mediterranean countries; these were not only historic and cultural but also economic. The Mediterranean countries were important suppliers to the EU market of natural resources such as gas and petroleum and were an important market for EU exports. Europe also had an interest in the political stability of the region. Its proximity meant that what happened in the region had important repercussions on the other shore of the sea.

The geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean was much greater than the capacity of local actors to keep the political and economic turmoil in their region under their own control. There had been such a power vacuum that, the affected states were not able to fill, political, or military, or economically. On the contrary, the fragmentation of the region fostered local rivalries, conflicts and wars, which, the Arab-

Israeli conflict has superseded regional frameworks and has become a political focus point since the Yom Kippur War.¹⁰³

The power vacuum and general political instability in the region well induced soon the two superpowers USA and the Soviet Union to a higher ¹⁰⁴ political and military commitment in that part of the world. US-Soviet confrontation in the Mediterranean has led to an armament race, as well as to the creation of zones of influence. As Abraham S. Becker highlights, during that period “in no other area beyond European territory proper has the strategic military balance between the United States and the USSR been a factor in international affairs as it has been in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is not only the back door to Western Europe: as Moscow so frequently reminded us, the Mediterranean leads to the USSR's back door, the Black Sea”¹⁰⁵.

During the cold war years there has been a paradoxical situation that can be characterized by three circumstances: i) the solution of regional problems or conflicts in the Mediterranean and the Near East was no longer possible without the participation of both super powers; ii) the declared intention of both superpowers to stabilize their presence and to prevent conflicts was not feasible, as demonstrated, for example, the Cyprus and the Lebanon crisis and Arab-Israeli conflict, and iii) the hegemonic efforts of the major powers weakened the capacity of the regional actors to control their own political problems and, equally important, their economic problems. With that, the

¹⁰³ Stefan A. Musto, “La Política Mediterránea de la CEE, Piedra de Toque de la Capacidad de Acción Europea”, *Revista de Instituciones*, Vol.11, No.1 (9-32), 1984, p.10, http://www.cepc.es/rap/Publicaciones/Revistas/5/RIE_011_001_009.pdf, (December 17 2009)

¹⁰⁴ Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean*, pp. 9-43.

¹⁰⁵ Abraham S. Becker, “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean”, *Report*, Rand Corporation, November 1977.

Mediterranean area has become one of the most important strategic East-West confrontation stages in the world¹⁰⁶.

The EEC, conscious of its military weakness took advantage of the United States military presence in the region and used its soft power to increase its economic engagement in the region. While USA has always been a supporter of Israel in the Middle East conflict, the EC was reluctant on direct political intervention in the region (for example, the Declaration of Venice)¹⁰⁷. While, the intention of the United States was the to limit the Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean area -which did not contradict at all with the European security interests-, the primary interest of Western Europe was to prevent any arms race and, therefore, to avoid also the deployment of force in any superpower, including the United States, in the Mediterranean. Throughout the Cold War years, Europe tried to maintain the security and stability in the southern flank of NATO, in order to secure the supply of oil and raw materials to West Europe, as well as the keep open markets for exports of the Community. The Mediterranean countries, perhaps with the exception of Israel, were among the developing countries whose prospects of industrialization and development largely dependent on trade and cooperation with the European Community.

The Treaty of Rome (1957) contained no foreign policy provisions or offered little incentives for the definition and the pursuit of common external interests and objectives¹⁰⁸. In the first years of the EC, the relations with the Mediterranean were at bilateral level only. In 1960, the 15% of EEC exports were to Mediterranean non member states, including Spain and Portugal. In return, 60 % of all Mediterranean

¹⁰⁶ Musto, “La Política Mediterránea de la CEE, Piedra de Toque de la Capacidad de Acción Europea”, p.11.

¹⁰⁷ *The Venice Declaration: June 13, 1980. (1999). Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture*, VI (2), http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/venice_eng.htm, (December 12, 2009).

¹⁰⁸ *Treaty Establishing the EEC*, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm, (December 12, 2009).

exports were targeting the EEC South-North trade was dominated mainly by the agricultural and energy sectors¹⁰⁹.

During early 1960's the EC lacked a comprehensive policy strategy for the Mediterranean, therefore the relations evolved in a doctrinal vacuum. During this period, we observe a differentiated relation with several Mediterranean countries. The EC, signed several association agreements with some Mediterranean non-member countries such as Turkey, Greece, Israel and Lebanon, made special preferential commercial arrangements with France's former colonies in North Africa and a series of commercial accords with the rest of the Mediterranean non member countries. The result according to Gomez was a "pyramid" of agreements based on differentiated commercial and political privileges¹¹⁰. Generally speaking, the EC's Mediterranean policy followed a traditional pattern of combining trade concessions with financial cooperation and conventional aid arrangements¹¹¹. Gomez argues that the rationale of this policy was not only rooted in economic but also in political considerations typical for the prevailing cold war preoccupations: every available policy instrument was also conceived as a way to neutralise Soviet influence in the area. He further argues that the real reason behind associating Greece and Turkey to the EC in 1962-64 with a carrot of eventual membership was designed also as a mean to stabilise political regimes against possible Soviet infiltrations or take-overs¹¹².

The gradual and relative downgrading of cold war tensions in the second half of the 1960s favoured the economic aspirations that nurtured the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean. As the effects of détente was more apparent, the Europeans begun to be more assertive about their economic position in the Mediterranean. Between 1969 and 1972 a second group of agreements were signed with several

¹⁰⁹ Gomez, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, p.29.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.29.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

Mediterranean countries (Table 2.1).¹¹³. The intention of the agreements was to protect European interests vis à-vis rest of the world including the USA¹¹⁴. Although France was leading the signing of the agreements, there was still no conception of a single Mediterranean region and there were no activism from the member states in favour of a common regional approach to the Mediterranean.

TABLE 2.1 Historical evolution of the EU Mediterranean Agreements. Special Association Agreements under art. 238 (limited duration except Greece and Turkey).

Greece	1961
Turkey	1963 (additional protocol 1980)
Tunisia	1969
Morocco	1969
Malta	1970
Cyprus	1972

Source: Clara Mira Salama, “The Euro - Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Aspects”, *European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers*, 2002, p.31.
www.edpsg.org/Documents/Dp23.doc

2.3 Global Mediterranean Policy

In the 1970s, even though cold war tensions were relatively low thanks to détente, terrorism and troublesome economic relations were the two new challenges that attracted the attention of member states, of public opinion and of the Commission. Arab/Palestinian terrorism in Europe spilled over from the Arab-Israeli conflict which caused security concerns. There was a need to address for a solution for the “Mediterranean”. The second issue was of economic nature, which after a decade of turbulence culminated with the oil shock in 1973. The Arab states in the Mediterranean showed themselves as increasingly self-confident in economic relations with the European countries- They were undergoing a process of nationalization as a symbol of

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Alfred Tovias, *Tariff Preferences in the Mediterranean Diplomacy*, London, Mac Millan, 1977, pp.34-35.

full independence from colonial legacy. The Arab-Israeli conflict affected the oil trade and oil has become a political weapon and a security issue.

There is a discussion in the literature on the effects of the Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent Arab oil embargo on the Euro-Mediterranean policies. Scholars like Ricardo Gomez¹¹⁵, Loukas Tsoukalis¹¹⁶, and A. Zevi¹¹⁷ argue that the energy crisis and the strengthening of OPEC countries brought a shift in the balance of power towards the south. This has been symbolised by the setting up of the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Euro-Arab dialogue (more detailed information is given in this chapter), despite the apparent hesitation of EEC countries and the North-South dialogue which involved the Western industrialized countries, the oil producers and the developing countries. However, Federica Bicchì argues that oil, did not really play a role in the European interest in the Mediterranean that peaked with the adoption of the Global Mediterranean Policy, as at the time it only represented a part of troublesome economic relations, and the GMP was agreed before that.¹¹⁸

The main policy entrepreneur¹¹⁹ on Mediterranean policy during this period was France, which dominated the Community trade in the region. De Gaulle's government sought to protect French economic interests when the EC began to take control of the commercial policy. Moreover, rapid economic growth in the 1960's meant a growing demand for North African labour in France. Pompidou continued on the line adopted by his predecessor De Gaulle. Taking in to consideration these factors, together with its colonial power history in the region, it was clear that, initially at least; Community policy would be led by France.

¹¹⁵ Gomez, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, p.34.

¹¹⁶ Loukas Tsoukalis, "The EEC and the Mediterranean, Is Global Policy is a Misnomer?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul., 1977), p. 422.

¹¹⁷ A. Zevi "The Reefs of the Mediterranean Dialogue", *International Affairs*, No. 9, Vol.22, 1976, p. 8.

¹¹⁸ Bicchì, *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean*, p 65.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

With the EEC's first enlargement which include Denmark, Ireland and UK, there was a need review the existing agreements in order to include the new members. France was supporting the idea of signing agreements with countries such as Spain or Israil. Some member countries and the Commission proposed to extend the agreements to some more Arab Mediterranean countries. As a result of France's efforts, the first mention of a global Mediterranean policy came by the European Parliament, in the context of report prepared by the French Member of Parliament Andre Rossi¹²⁰. There was a discussion in the EC, of whether a holistic or a differentiated approach toward the Mediterranean would be the best way. In the Paris Summit of October 1972, member states and the applicant countries stated that the EC attached great importance to the Mediterranean and they expressed their intention to establish new global agreements with the Mediterranean countries. Thus, the geographical creation of the Mediterranean as a region was codified by the Global Mediterranean Policy announced at the Summit¹²¹. The member states singled out the construction of a region with which to establish privileged trade relations.

GMP consisted of new generation of agreements with the Mediterranean countries with the exception of Turkey and Greece which already had their association agreements with the EEC. Libya was the only country which did not participate in the GMP. According to GMP agreements, the EC and the SMPCs would establish free trade areas for industrial goods and would get preferential treatment in agricultural goods. The objective was to lower the tariffs on importation of industrial goods gradually and to reach a free trade area by 1977. The Mediterranean counties would get free access to European markets with some exceptions, such as textile sector.

TABLE 2.2. Trade Agreements under art. 113 and 114 (limited duration)

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 97.

¹²¹ An initial joint statement published after the Paris European Summit (19 to 21 October 1972), the Heads of State or Government of the future Nine outlines the objectives and the policies to be pursued with a view to achieving a European Union. <http://www.ena.lu/statement-paris-summit-19-21-october-972-020002284.html>, (December 30, 2009).

Preferential Non-preferential

Spain	1970
Israel (I)	1964
Israel (II)	1970
Lebanon (I)	1965
Lebanon (II)	1972
Yugoslavia (I)	1970
Egypt (I)	1972
Yugoslavia (II)	1973
Portugal	1972

Source: Clara Mira Salama, “The Euro - Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Aspects”, p. 31.

TABLE 2.3.Cooperation Agreements under art. 238 (Unlimited duration)

Israel (III)	1975
Algeria	1976
Morocco	1976
Tunisia	1976
Egypt (II)	1977
Lebanon (III)	1977
Jordan	1977
Syria	1977
Yugoslavia (III)	1980

Source: Clara Mira Salama, “The Euro - Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Aspects”, p. 31.

The agreements within the scope of GMP were also supported by financial provisions such as technological transfers, workers training and cooperation in the form of soft trade provisions were accompanied by financial protocols such as soft loans or grants¹²². The GMP also created several common institutions in the form of councils and committees with every participating Mediterranean country as an embryonic attempt at a political dialogue¹²³. The core idea of the GMP was to create scale economies in the Mediterranean based on exports which would help their economic development thus decreasing the threats such as immigration, terrorism, perceived from those countries.

¹²² Bicchi, “Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Historical Perspective”, in *The FEPS Report on The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security*, Rome, FEPS, 2009, p.16.

¹²³ Ibid.

According to Bicchi, the first time in which the EC/EU has aimed at region building in the Mediterranean is conceptual, namely by “classifying neighbouring countries together under regional strategies was by the launching of Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which for the first time addressed all riparian countries as belonging to a single region, the Mediterranean¹²⁴. On the basis of the GMP, the EC negotiated a new generation of agreements including the same core provisions, from then onwards, in Eurospeak the Mediterranean was no longer a generic geographical expression¹²⁵. It indicated instead a specific group of countries, deemed to be roughly homogeneous among themselves and with which the EC had legally binding agreements. From the perspective of the EC/EU, a new region was born¹²⁶.

Roy Ginsberg describes the GMP as, the “first successful attempt by the EC at a self styled foreign policy”¹²⁷. The EC concluded the agreements between 1973 and 1977 with each Mediterranean country. However while the GMP brought a sense of structure to the Community’s relations with the Mediterranean partners, it failed to change either the bilateral basis of the policy or the asymmetry of economic relations. The GMP did not achieve the goals that it was designed for . Mediterranean exports did not increase significantly. The economic recession and the high inflation rates of 1970s was a set back for the functioning of the financial clauses of the GMP. The Arab countries’ import substitution policies did not match with the GMP’s, economies of scale and export substitution policies.

Still, the Euro-Med relations gained from the GMP initiative. First of all, instead of individual agreements with each Mediterranean country, a holistic approach was

¹²⁴ Bicchi, “The European Origins of Euro-Med Practices” p.12.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Roy H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics, Baptism by Fire*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.

created towards the Mediterranean as a region. Secondly, a platform of dialogue was created between the EC countries and the SMPCs. Thirdly, the European market was opened to industrial goods from the Mediterranean countries. Last but not the least, as Bicchi points out, it could also be argued that in the middle term, the GMP, with its emphasis on equal concessions to all participants, contributed to the shift in the mindset of Europeans toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, which became evident in the Venice Declaration in 1980¹²⁸. The declaration called for the acknowledgment of Palestinians' right to self-government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization's right to be connected to peace initiative¹²⁹.

Another European initiative towards the Mediterranean region taken during 1970s which is worth mentioning here is the Euro-Arab dialogue. The Euro-Arab Dialogue as a forum shared by the European Community and the League of Arab States was a result of a French initiative and was launched at the European Council in Copenhagen in December 1973, shortly after the "October War" and the oil embargo. As the Europeans saw it, it was supposed to be a forum to discuss economic affairs, whereas the Arab side saw it rather as one to discuss political affairs¹³⁰. There was a need for innovation as the EC and the League had at that time very little experience with structured dialogues with other institutions. Thus the main bodies of the Dialogue were created: the "Ministerial Troika", "General Committee" and working committees¹³¹.

The Troika which has entered into normal Community practices with non-member states was initiated to assist the country in the Presidency of the Council for matters of Political Cooperation and to ensure continuity. For the Dialogue, the Troika

¹²⁸ Bicchi, "Euro-Editerranean Relations in Historical Perspective", p. 14.

¹²⁹ *Venice Declaration*.

¹³⁰ *Euro-Arab Dialogue*, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, <http://www.medea.be/?doc=55&lang=en>, (12 April, 2010).

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

consists of representatives from both sides from the current, previous and next presidencies¹³².

The activity of the Dialogue was suspended in 1979 upon request of the League of Arab States, who were furious against the developments like the Camp David Agreements. With the Venice Declaration of June 1980, the EC decided it was time to work on the political aspects of the Dialogue and organized a preparatory meeting for the General Committee in Athens in December 1983. Egypt's absence due to its suspension from all activity of the League of Arab States was enough to prevent full resumption of activity¹³³. Following Egypt's return, there was a further attempt to re-launch the Dialogue in December 1989, once again following an initiative of France - who held the EC Presidency at the time - with a Euro-Arab Ministerial Conference being convened in Paris. The Conference was followed in June 1990 by a meeting of the General Commission of the Dialogue.¹³⁴

The Euro-Arab dialogue started with different expectations from both parts. The EC, wanted to secure its energy supply in exchange for economic cooperation with the Arab countries, while the Arab states wanted to use their oil power to split Europe and the USA in the Middle East issue by getting the support of EEC. These divergent strategies and finally the split between the Arab world after the Gulf Crisis brought the initiative to a halt in 1990s.

2.4 The Accession of New Members to the EC and the Mediterranean:

In the 1980s, the positive internal developments in the EC could not be reflected to Mediterranean partners. The instruments elaborated for the GMP was not effective

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

enough to produce satisfactory results. The accession of Greece (1981), Spain(1986) and Portugal (1986) to the EC created the new set of legal, political and economic borders of the Community. Although the EC played a stabilizing role during the transition periods of the three countries, the entry of the three Northern Mediterranean countries crystallized a North-South split. The Northern Mediterranean countries became Southern European and their economies, societies and politics intermingled with other member states. The EC spent its time and resources first for the negotiations, then for the absorption of the new-comers. The major impact of the accession of the Southern European countries was on agriculture. The three countries became part of the Common Agricultural Policy thus provoking a diversion of trade from the other Mediterranean countries. The accession of the three Mediterranean countries in to the club created a rift between the “ins” and “outs”¹³⁵. The Southern Mediterranean countries, in a way, paid the price of the EC Southern enlargement.

The cold war which entered a new hot stage during this period disabled the EC to develop a new perspective towards the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a new stage in the cold war and provoked tensions in the Mediterranean as well. At the same time oil began to lose its importance as availability increased and the prices fell. The 1980s were a lost decade all developing countries in the Mediterranean. Apart from the economic problems there was widespread social unrest and the emergence of Islamist parties as the main opposition to the regimes in power. The Iranian revolution set an example for the Islamist movements. We witness the emergence of Islamist terrorism during the final years of 1980s. The EC failed to anticipate the underdevelopment, social unrest, the loss of regimes legitimacy and the ascendance of Islamisation. As a result of this situation and the low profile of the Mediterranean in international security balances, EC member states did not have any motivation to re-examine their policy goals regarding the Mediterranean in this period.

¹³⁵ Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Making towards the Mediterranean*, p.12.

2.5 Renovated Mediterranean Policy

The end of Cold war opened a new discussion to reconsider Europe's role in the world. The negative developments in the Mediterranean in the 1980's, which Europeans had failed to face at the time, had turned in to real threat for the EC in the 1990s. Low rates of economic development, mixed with the radicalization of political opposition in the form of Islamic fundamentalism were real risks for the EC members as well as the marginalization of Europe mainly in the Arab-Israeli peace process. All of these factors made realize the European decision makers to come in to terms with the existing challenges and to adopt a policy stance towards the Mediterranean.

From 1989-1991, the Mediterranean became a common foreign policy priority for the Mediterranean EC members namely, Spain, Italy and France. Those three countries set the agenda of the EU on the Mediterranean issues. The Commission as well, realized that the Euro-Mediterranean relations were in need of improvement. And again during this period, Spain was the "policy entrepreneur" which sought to have its new status as a democratic middle power to be acknowledged by the other European countries. Spain contributed the EC to face the Mediterranean challenges and lobbied in favour of European regional initiative for the region.

In 1989, the Commission, in particular Spanish Commissioner Abel Matutes, prepared a document on the Euro-Mediterranean relations which paved the way to Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP)¹³⁶, a 27 pages of promises to improve the terms of the bilateral agreements, additional funding and new financial instruments. The document addressed the achievements and failures of the GMP. In concrete, the RMP was a policy for allocating funds to the Mediterranean countries. The institutional setting remained the same light framework inherited from the GMP. A small part of the

¹³⁶ European Commission, "Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy: Proposals for the Period 1992-1996. Communication from the Commission to the Council." SEC (90) 812 final, 1 June 1990, http://aei.pitt.edu/4402/01/001874_1.pdf, (December 30, 2009).

funds was allocated for multilateral schemes of cooperation. And for the first time civil society could benefit from the funding from the EC. According to Bicchi, in several aspects the RMP made little change to the traditional pattern of Euro-Mediterranean relations¹³⁷. But in some other aspects, raised issues that were later to characterise the EMP, the ENP and even the UfM¹³⁸. it increased the funds, promoted multilateral networks, decentralized cooperation and a public/ private partnership. It was thus a step toward the promotion of regionalism.

Several other European initiatives, almost all of them arising from political and security concerns, were launched during this period. In 1990, France initiated regular meetings with Western European and Western Mediterranean states (5+5) with a political agenda. 5+5 Dialogue, was composed of five Southern European countries – France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain – and the five Arab Maghreb Union countries – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The objective of this sub-regional initiative was to create a security forum in the Mediterranean based on a flexible structure of dialogue, consultation and cooperation¹³⁹.

Ministerial meetings were to be held once a year and working groups were set up to tackle issues of concern, such as desertification, migration flows and the preservation of cultural heritage. After the first two meetings there was a halt in the process due to the lack of interest by both parties. The project was re-launched in 2001 by Portugal, and the 8th meeting of foreign ministers is to be celebrated in Tunis on the 16th of April 2010. However, it is not possible to highlight any significant or effective cooperation mechanism in this sub-regional initiative.

¹³⁷ Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean*, p.32.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ *Dialogue 5+5*, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/europe_828/union-europeenne-monde_13399/relations-externes_853/parteneriat-euro-mediterraneen_2208/dialogue-5-5_5031/presentation_13559.html, (January 22, 2010).

The CSCM is another cooperation initiative launched in this period. During the Ministerial Summit Meeting of the Euro-Arab Dialogue held in Paris in 1989, the Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, stated that the time had come to extend the spirit of Helsinki to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thereby foster democracy and economic development in that region¹⁴⁰. In 1990, with the Spanish and Italian initiative, the idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was launched by a joint statement on the CSCM which was made at the "4 + 5" ministerial meeting (the "latin" four: Spain, Portugal, France, Italy + the MAU: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya)¹⁴¹. It was an instrument for creating and managing common interests in the fields of security, cooperation and mutual understanding with a common approach based on human rights adapted gradually and comprehensively to the specific region¹⁴². The CSCM would provide an umbrella under which the specific mechanisms for the solution of conflicts could develop. As an additional structure, it might contribute to the post-crisis settlements in the Gulf and to the solution of the Palestinian problem¹⁴³. The goal was to promote co-development and solidarity to foster regional integration. It included security, cooperation and human dimensions baskets¹⁴⁴.

However the CSCM did not manage to convince key participants like US, Germany, UK, and the Netherlands which condemned the initiative to failure¹⁴⁵. The CSCM never officially materialized and remained a politically and technically unsustainable framework. Spain learnt lessons from this failure and these lessons set an example for the EMP diplomatic moves.

¹⁴⁰ *Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, <http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2andlang=enanddoc=50>, (23 April, 2010).

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Richard Gillispie, "Spain and the Mediterranean: Southern Sensitivity, European Aspirations", *Mediterranean Politics 1*, Autumn 1996, p.128.

The Council of the Mediterranean (CM) was initiated by Malta at a symposium held in Tunisia in November 1992¹⁴⁶. Guido de Marco, then Malta's Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed a forum that could follow the Council of Europe model. The participants in such a forum would include the European Union, the Arab –Maghreb Union and the Arab League.¹⁴⁷ The criteria for membership were to be: adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, respect for the dignity of the human person and the rule of law, and respect for the establishment and development of representative institutions¹⁴⁸.

The body of the CM was composed of a Committee of Ministers and a General Assembly with consultative powers, where the idea was for Member States to form a Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. The work of this Parliamentary Assembly would be supported by a secretariat which would coordinate the Council's activities in the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural sectors. So far, there has been no major activity of the Council.¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰

The Mediterranean Forum (FOROMED), was launched in 1994 by Egypt and France. The Forum was created as an instrument for co-operation and the members are, Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey¹⁵¹. FOROMED is formulated to work as a more flexible organization because the absence of countries such as Israel, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria would leave the Middle East problem out of the scope of the initiative. The FOROMED works in three levels: Experts, High Level Officers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The ministerial meetings are informal, flexible and characterized by the absence of a determined working agenda.¹⁵² The decisions are taken by consensus, and are presented

¹⁴⁶ Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building?", Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, p.4. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2nq1n3cg>

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ The related EU documents on the CM which have been analyzed for this thesis were mostly about energy and environmental issues.

¹⁵¹ FOROMED, *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Espana*, <http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Paises/Mediterraneo/Paginas/forosmediterraneo2010.aspx#1>

¹⁵² Ibid.

as “Presidential Conclusions”, which are not legally binding. The presidency is for one year and rotates between the EU members and the SMPCs. The working groups, created on issues of common interest such as terrorism, immigration etc. prepare the content of the Ministerial meetings¹⁵³. The last Ministerial Meeting took place in Algeria. Even though the next meeting was supposed to be held in 2009, due to the busy agenda of Euro-Med which is concentrated on the launching of Union of Mediterranean, the date of the next FOROMED had not been fixed yet, by the time this thesis was finished.

The main weakness of this sub-regional grouping is that it lacks the institutional framework to ensure continuity in proceedings – there is no secretariat, and the Forum is thus dependent on the rotating presidency to ensure implementation of any decisions¹⁵⁴. The Forum also lacks a financial mechanism that would ensure implementation of any projects that are agreed upon. Although the Middle East conflict was to be kept out of the agenda of the FOROMED, it keeps being the major contentious issue in almost all FOROMED meetings and is the biggest obstacle for any progress in this sub-regional grouping.

Conclusion

Even though the Mediterranean carried significant importance in terms of trade and security for the EC, there was not a conceptual thinking of the region until 1970s. The relations were marked by the tensions of Cold War or by the colonial legacies. The influence of the two great powers of the Cold War on Mediterranean made it difficult for Europe to penetrate into the region. In the late 1970s the individual economic interests of France paved the way for a more global understanding of Mediterranean which led to the GMP initiative. With the GMP, the Mediterranean entered in the EC thinking as an independent region. However, the EC-Mediterranean relations were far

¹⁵³ *Akdeniz Forumu*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/akdeniz-forumu-foromed-.tr.mfa>, . (April 13, 2009)

¹⁵⁴ Calleya, “The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism”, pp.6-7.

from being multilateral. The Association Agreements were long term commitments of EC to SMPCs with the objective of counterbalancing the influence of the great powers. After the end of the Cold War however, there were several attempts which sought multilateral participation such as (5+5) and CSCM.

The above-mentioned initiatives show us that, in terms of regional cooperation, the Mediterranean had been one of the world's least integrated regions until the 1990s. The numerous attempts of the EU to create a trans-Mediterranean cooperation framework did not function properly. However, former unsuccessful initiatives like the RMP or the CSCM prepared the ground for the EU to develop a more global approach which would include multi-dimensional policies and would be implemented in a multilateral environment such as the EMP or the UfM. Throughout the evolution of the EU, the natural path of the Euro-Med relations evolved from bilateral relations towards regionalism.

3. POLICY EVOLUTION IN EU'S RELATIONS WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the three EU policies towards the Mediterranean starting from 1995 until present, namely, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)-Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) initiatives. It gives brief information on the origins, the scope and the instruments used in each of the initiatives in order to make evaluations on their achievements and weaker aspects in the assessment section. While assessing each policy, the basic policy inclinations of each policy will be clearer which later leads to a general comparison of the three policies in terms of evolution in the European Union Mediterranean policy.

3.1. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership- Barcelona Process (EMP)

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-Barcelona Process is a long term project of the EU which seeks to build a prosperous and peaceful Mediterranean region. Although it was launched as a farsighted, ambitious policy of region-building, the evolution of the EMP has not been as many has expected or hoped when the partnership was first presented back in 1995

3.1.1 Origins

The EMP was launched in 1995 within a context of optimism, both in the Middle East and the EU. To understand this “new orientation”¹⁵⁵ in the EU, we should have a look at the global, regional and local geopolitical context, marked with many international events such as the fall of Berlin Wall which was followed by the EU enlargement, the Gulf War and the rising of political Islam that took place during 1990s.

¹⁵⁵ Khader, *Europa Por el Mediterráneo, De Barcelona a Barcelona*, p.23.

The end of Cold War also eliminated the obstacles for regional cooperations like the CSCM ¹⁵⁶ and Western Mediterranean (5+5) Initiative which were mentioned at the previous chapter, and finally NATO's Mediterranean policy in 1994, which promised to work with non-members to strengthen regional stability. Hence, there was a general interest to work with the Mediterranean countries with the aim of boosting regional economic development through cooperation, increasing regional trust and transparency.

The EU had to reassess its Mediterranean policy since the previous policies which were explained in Chapter II, stayed far from filling the gap between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean neighbours. The European leaders feared immigration and security threats arising from North Africa and the Middle East. The EU foreign ministers also recognized a need to respond to new security issues emanating from the region, such as drug trafficking, human rights violations, and environmental degradation. Furthermore, many EU officials regarded the building of a region and the creation of interregional relationships as a strategy to compete with other trade blocs, without having to invite non- European Mediterranean countries to join the EU. ¹⁵⁷

In the light of the above mentioned events, Europe was forced to re-formulate its policies in eastern and southern flanks. However, in the early 1990s, the EU was more concentrated on the Eastern borders –unification of Germany, Enlargement- more than the Southern borders and the Euro-Med relations were condemned to be marginalized. Following the completion of internal restructuring like consolidation of emerging democracies in the Eastern Europe or preparation of accession processes of Austria, Finland and Sweden, EU reoriented its attention to Mediterranean.

¹⁵⁶ M. Fatih Tayfur, "Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean", *Perceptions*, Vol.5, September-November 2000, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume5/September-november2000/VolumeVN3FatihTayfur.pdf> (January 15, 2010).

¹⁵⁷ G. Joffé, "Relations Between the Middle East and the West – The View from the South", in: B. A. Roberson (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe – the Power Deficit*, London, New York, 1998, pp. 45-72.

In 1992, the European Council Summit recognized for the first time that “The southern and eastern shores of Mediterranean and the Middle East are both areas of interest to the Union, in terms of security and social stability.¹⁵⁸” Spain proposed the creation of a Euro-Maghreb free-trade area in March 1992; the Commission agreed and this was confirmed by the European Council at Lisbon in June of the same year. Negotiations were started, but the problems in EU-Libya relations and the crisis in Algeria prevented this regional initiative from being successful¹⁵⁹. After this failure and some changes in the political situation, the EC considered the extension of the initiative to the whole Mediterranean region. Accordingly, the Corfu European Council charged the Commission to review current policy towards this area. The Commission drew up a proposal for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Association, accepted by the Essen European Council of December 1994¹⁶⁰.

Spain, which can be described as the policy entrepreneur of EMP, encouraged by success in these efforts and progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, together with France and, to a lesser extent Italy, were mandated to prepare a meeting of all EU members and the Mediterranean countries at the highest level¹⁶¹. During the negotiations divergent views emerged within the EU; the Southern countries favoured an approach based upon more aid and fewer trade concessions than the Northern Member States¹⁶². The opinions of the non-EU Mediterranean countries were sought

¹⁵⁸ “Presidency Conclusions”, Goteborg European Council, 15-16 June, 1992, p.16, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/goteborg_concl_en.pdf (January 12, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Clara Mira Salama, “The Euro - Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Aspects”, *European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers*, 2002, www.edpsg.org/Documents/Dp23.doc, (December 16, 2009), p.3.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Clara Mira Salama, “Madrid and Valencia: Latin America and the Mediterranean in the Spanish Presidency. The Latin American and Mediterranean Agendas Compared”, *Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 11/2002*, 8/11/2002 p.1, page on internet text, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT11-2002, (December 16, 2009).

¹⁶² Ibid.

through visits of the Troika and the Commission¹⁶³. It was in this context that the Barcelona Conference took place on the 27th and 28th November 1995 and the Barcelona Declaration was adopted, inaugurating the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona process. European Union became formally involved in the project of creating regional stability in the Mediterranean¹⁶⁴.

3.1.2 Scope

As explained in the first chapter, the Barcelona Declaration explicitly used the language of regional community building to express its goals, and it treated security as an organic and intrinsic aspect of regional development¹⁶⁵. The stated purpose of this process was to extend southward the European area of stability.¹⁶⁶ It relied on the notion of “partnership” to signal the intent to create more interdependence between the EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries, and it saw that partnership leading to a distinct Mediterranean region.¹⁶⁷

Backed by the largest EU financial commitment ever made outside the Union, the Declaration launched a set of economic, political, cultural, and social initiatives, intended to reinforce one another in an open-ended process of regional integration with the assistance of the EU.¹⁶⁸ The basic premise of Barcelona was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed enough of the precursor elements of a region (geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests) to make regional building a possibility¹⁶⁹. At the most basic level, the goal of regional peaceful change is served by the practice of pluralistic integration or “region

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Clara Mira Salama, “The Euro - Mediterranean Partnership: Political and Economic Aspects”, p.8.

¹⁶⁵ Claire Spencer, “Building Confidence in the Mediterranean”, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2/2: 1997, pp.23-48.

¹⁶⁶ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p.27.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.p.28.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

building.”¹⁷⁰ So the idea is to achieve the “democratic syllogism” of Lorca and Escribano “first promoting economic development then democracy will arise from spontaneous generation”¹⁷¹.

According to Adler, the EMP has borrowed from the European integration the practice of creating common economic spaces, which start from free trade areas¹⁷². These free trade areas generate spill over effects that lead to more integration in related economic endeavours, such as in transportation, energy, and communication¹⁷³. Thus, for example, the EMP’s Basket II, which purports to lead to the creation of an “area of shared prosperity,” owes much to neo-functionalist intellectual conceptions, which guided European integration processes.¹⁷⁴ And from the CSCE process, the EMP has adopted a series of practices that played a positive and active role in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end¹⁷⁵.

3.1.3. Instruments

The Barcelona Declaration has three chapters which are called baskets: i) Political and Security; ii) Economic and Financial; and iii) Social, Cultural and Human Affairs. The economic basket includes the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Union and SMPC countries by 2010. The EU would provide economic aid to help the SMPCs private sector and to promote structural reform and privatization. The basic aim of this economic pillar was to help the SMPCs to converge their economies in the belief that such transformation would also help resolve political crises, undermine authoritarian regimes, and provide a basis for social stability in the region. From 1995 till 2013, the EU has allocated almost 16 billion Euros to EMP through different

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Alejandro Lorca and Gonzalo Escribano, “Regionalism’s Political Implications in the Euro Mediterranean Region”, paper presented at the *Global Development Network Conference*, Bonn, December August 8, 1999.

¹⁷² Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p. 33.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

channels. However, the target which was to complete a free trade area by 2010 is unfortunately not met.

Crawford and Adler argue that the political element of the Barcelona declaration is inspired from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act; in its adoption of a set of principles that set the normative guidelines around which the prospective region is supposed to be constituted¹⁷⁶. These principles include respect for international law and human rights, non-intervention, respect of the territorial integrity of states, cooperative measures for countering terrorism, and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means¹⁷⁷. The EMP also adopted “soft” security practices, such as regular political and security dialogues, security expert meetings, and seminar diplomacy, and Partnership Building Measures with the aim of creating trust and collective security understandings between EU members and partner states¹⁷⁸.

The third pillar is contained in the cultural basket, intended to break the barriers between cultures around the Mediterranean, and promote a dialogue between civilizations¹⁷⁹. The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, the EuroMEsco and FEMISE networks, la Maison de la Mediterranee de Marseille and Cooperation in Civil Protection and Disaster Management are important steps in this regard. The EU, has also made significant attempts to strengthen the civil society in the SMPCs and realized training programmes in the areas such as justice, human rights and social integration of immigrants.

¹⁷⁶ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power” p. 25.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p.26.

On the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (1995), the Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State Summit meeting in Barcelona (2005) set out the objectives for the next five years for the Partnership, including the following: strengthen democracy, promote gender equality, enhance respect for human rights and freedom of expression, and guarantee the independence of the judiciary; enhance the security of all citizens, particularly through counter-terrorism policies; intensify cooperation on all aspects of illegal and legal immigration; develop the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development and endorse a timetable to de-pollute the Mediterranean Sea by 2020; meet the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the areas of education, act jointly against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, rejecting extremist views; strengthen dialogue between governmental and non-governmental players; promote South-South regional integration¹⁸⁰.

The EMP's institutional structure can be divided into dimensions as multilateral and bilateral. The bilateral dimension consists of the Association Agreements with the SMPCs. It is the most operational and legally binding commitment of the partnership. These replace the first generation of agreements, such as the cooperation agreements of the 1970s. These Association Agreements contain a tariff reduction schedule in line with this objective. So far, it is still an ongoing process between the EU and the SMPCs. The EMP Association Agreements follow the EU practice of introducing special human rights clauses which empower members to complain about human rights abuses. The MEDA Regulation was the principal instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership¹⁸¹. It was launched in 1996 (MEDA I) and amended in 2000 (MEDA II) which later was replaced by European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in relation with ENP. According to the MEDA Regulation, respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms was an essential element of the partnership, the violation of which justifies the adoption of appropriate measures. These measures could be adopted by the Council

¹⁸⁰ *ENPI Regional Strategy Paper, 2007-2013*, www.ec.europa.eu.

¹⁸¹ Adler and Crawford, "Normative Power", p.29.

acting by a qualified majority on a Commission proposal. In this way the EU sought for a “negative conditionality”¹⁸² towards SMPCs.

The multilateral dimension targets the Mediterranean area as a whole and covers such areas as the energy, water management, industrial cooperation, environment, transport, and the information society. The multilateral dimension consists of Euro-Med Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Sectorial Ministers Conferences and Sectorial Working Groups. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), established in Naples on 3 December 2003, by decision of the Ministerial Conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is the most recent institution of the Barcelona Process.¹⁸³ Within the EMP, there are sub-regional groups such as Mashreq, Maghreb and Agadir. However, South-South cooperation stalled as well due to the Western Sahara and Middle East conflicts.

3.1.4 Assessment

For the majority of the prominent scholars which inspired this study, such as Emerson, Gillispie, Crawford, Adler, Lorca and Escribano, the EMP is the most comprehensive effort of region building. The shared final goal was to achieve a region of shared peace, stability and prosperity, develop human potential, facilitate understanding among cultures and exchanges between societies. According to Adler, the EMP is the invention of a region that does not yet exist and to the social engineering of a regional identity that rests neither on blood, nor on religion, but on civil society voluntary networks and civic beliefs¹⁸⁴. It is about building future with present community links¹⁸⁵. The multilateral institutions are a clear symbol of construction of a

¹⁸² Karen Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective”, *EUI SPS Working Papers*, SPS No. 97/7 European University Institute.

¹⁸³ See: *EP Delegation to the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly*,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/assembly/default_en.html,

(January 12, 2010).

¹⁸⁴ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p.23.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

region similar to the EU in the Mediterranean area. The EMPA is an attempt to legitimize the multilateral aspect of EMP.

When the EMP was launched in 1995, peace talking characterized the Middle East, multilateralism, was the symbol of that era, “clash of civilizations”¹⁸⁶ was not a relevant concept, the EU had only 15 members and we could not speak about a “war on terrorism”. According to Michael Emerson, on the positive side the EMP is the only political institution in the region, where competence, legitimacy and resources are present.¹⁸⁷ It is the only regional platform where the Israelis and the Arabs exchange views. The other attempts to bring together the countries from both shores of the Mediterranean had lower profiles and did not seek a holistic, multilateral and inclusive approach. However, within the ten years it was launched the international and the regional panorama changed completely. In early years of 2000s, the Middle East peace process collapsed paving the way to armed conflicts in the region. The tragic events of 11 September and the Neo-con policy of US changed the perception of East-West relations and destabilized the region more. The focus of world’s attention turned to Islamisation and terrorism. The Europe developed an idea of “other” towards the SMPCs. The existence of an open armed conflict in the region strained the possibility of a region building. The EU could not live up with the challenges of this new international reality and stayed marginal in most of the regional conflicts, most importantly the Israel –Palestine problem.

Apart from all what was going on internationally, there were impossibilities stemming from EUs internal structure as well. First, we have seen a move to the right and rising nationalism in the Europe with negative implications on the EU’s relations with Mediterranean. As Adler and Crawford argue, Europe’s anti liberal stance,

¹⁸⁶ Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, (October 12, 2009).

¹⁸⁷ Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy”, *CEPS Working Document*, No. 220, March 2005. (October 13, 2009).

nationalism, xenophobia, commitment of territoriality, sovereignty and self reliance spell a rejection of multilateralism, openness and a regional identity which lies at the heart of Euro-Mediterranean process¹⁸⁸. The 2005 enlargement to the Eastern countries shifted the balance toward eastward and Mediterranean lost its importance relatively.

The strengthening of authoritarian regimes and in the Middle East and North Africa was another threat to rationality of the EMP. Many of those states torn with sectarian and tribal conflicts lack state identity which made it impossible for them to embrace a regional identity. It is surprising to see that within the EMP, “negative conditionality” was almost never used against those regimes either. There was no coherent mechanism or procedures to benchmark or monitor the human rights performance of the SMPCs. As a result, the “democratic syllogism” which the EMP aspired in its early years did not have success in the SMPCs.

The economic inequality between the EU and the SMPCs has created an asymmetric interdependence which has also impeded the “partnership” or “we” feeling, an important component of region-building. Trade dependence of the SMPCs awaked a suspicion towards the EU members as neo-colonial powers. Another factor which influenced the dissattachment of the SMPCs, was the decision making process which mainly took place in Brussels in the EU Council or Commission.

We can assess that the basic aim of the EMP initiative was to form a region. However, the initial idea which lies in the heart of EMP of constructing a region similar to that of the EU did not work successfully due to several factors. First of all, neither the EU nor the SMPCs digested the idea of “we” even though nurtured by different factors. The partnership lacked the relevant institutions to create a partnership feeling. There

¹⁸⁸ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p. 34.

was an asymmetry in the decision making process giving the authority to the EU institutions in Brussels. “One size fits all” approach did not give positive results with all SMPCs. The EU, did not open its borders to SMPCs in economic terms. This did not induce a growth in the SMPCs economies and did not achieve to produce a “democratic syllogism”. Also, SMPCs had a different perception of the EMP, mainly as an economic integration which they could benefit from financially and economically.

Despite all its deficiencies, the EMP is the most farsighted initiative so far, regarding the EU’s Mediterranean policies. It showed EU’s willingness to engage in the Mediterranean. So far it has been the only international platform where the Arabs and the Israelis share the same table. Following initiatives were built upon the institutional structure of the EMP but lacked the guiding principles of the EMP. The EMP’s strong region-building component which is to construct an area of peace and stability through multilateral means, and its tradition of community building, should be conserved in the future EU initiatives in order to prevent more dividing lines in the Mediterranean region.

3.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched to give a driving force to EMP. It was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, and instead, blurring the borders. The ENP remains distinct from the enlargement process and gives the willing partners “everything but institutions”¹⁸⁹

3.2.1 Origins

¹⁸⁹ Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability” , Speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, December 5-6, 2002, <http://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3386/>, (January 17, 2010).

The rationale behind the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was clearly the Eastern enlargement. The ENP was a result of the EU's changed composition and geostrategic outlook in view of the last round of enlargement. With the end of Cold War, the EU was no longer influenced by Cold war threats, instead was disordered by its immediate neighbours in the east and the south. To discard this threat, the EU provided membership to some of the Eastern European countries. However it couldn't provide the same membership perspective to the rest of the Eastern European and Southern countries. When the EU felt that it could not accept more Eastern European members, the ENP was launched.

The first move for a European policy of this kind came from the British government in 2002¹⁹⁰. The main concern expressed was the fact that enlargement to the east would put the EU in direct contact with ex-Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, whose precarious economic situation and political turmoil would pose serious risks to the EU, especially in the matter of immigration and illegal cross border traffic¹⁹¹. The suggestion was to therefore to pay incentives to those countries in exchange for advances in terms of political and economic reforms, granting the countries a special neighbourhood status based on commitment to democratic principles and the free market¹⁹². The idea was nurtured by the Commission and the Parliament, the scope was enlarged to Southern Mediterranean Countries and finally resulted in the “Wider Europe” Communication released by the Commission in March 2003. In June 2004, few months after the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the initiative was further extended to South Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and it was renamed as the “European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)”¹⁹³.

¹⁹⁰ Letter of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to the Spanish Presidency of the EU, January 28, 2002. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/ListArchive?month=8andyear=2002>, (January 12, 2010)

¹⁹¹ Andrea Amato, “The Rise and the Fall of ENP”, *Panorama*, (1-2), Vol:153, IEMED, 2008, p. 2.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *European Commission*, “Communication from the Commission to Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” 11th March 2003, 104 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, (January 18, 2009).

The ENP has been conducted in the Directorate General for Enlargement in the Commission. With the appointment of Catherine Ashton, the ENP will fall on the responsibility of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice President. Therefore, the policy entrepreneur of the ENP can be considered as the Commission.

3.2.2 Scope

The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, the relations are developed through a Strategic Partnership. The new European policy is to deal with 16 countries, ten of them located in the Mediterranean. The thesis concentrates on the ENP's relations with SMPCs Mediterranean dimension.

According to the Commission, the declared aim of the ENP is “to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security, and well-being”¹⁹⁴. The Commission stressed in its Wider Europe document that, ENP is “designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours”, while offering them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation¹⁹⁵. However, as del Sarto and Schumacher argue, the range and scope of the envisaged cooperation, which is to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration, as the Commission puts it, represents a novelty,

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

together with the geopolitical vision of a creating a ring of friends ranging from the Ukraine to Morocco¹⁹⁶.

With regard to Mediterranean, the Commission on various occasions reiterated that the ENP was compatible with the EMP. The Commission stated the “ENP would not override the existing framework of EU relations with the SMPCs. Instead, “wider Europe” would supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements”¹⁹⁷. On another occasion, the Commission declared that regarding the Mediterranean, the ENP “will be implemented through the Barcelona Process and the Association Agreements with each partner country”¹⁹⁸ However, there are obvious policy changes with regards to EMP, which will be discussed in details in the relevant section.

The ENP is interest oriented. As del Sarto and Schumacher argue, the framework of the ENP the EU is much more straightforward regarding the question of what its genuine interests are¹⁹⁹. Close cooperation with the neighbours in order to enable the EU to provide security and welfare to its citizens as well as the effective control of borders, explicitly mentioned as a “common interest”²⁰⁰. ENP policy is, first of all, the result of a process in which the EU was primarily concerned with itself - and not with the realities in its southern periphery; the main aim of the ENP is not to contribute to the socio-economic development of EU’s periphery, on the contrary by blurring the EU’s external borders seeks to move farther the dividing lines²⁰¹. ENP is a response to this new situation²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Rafaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?”, pp. 17-38.

¹⁹⁷ European Commission, “Communication from The Commission to Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe”

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Rafaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” p.23.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

3.2.3. Instruments

The central element of the European Neighbourhood Policy is the bilateral ENP Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. These documents are negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, based on the country's needs and capacities, as well as their and the EU's interests. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) and a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health ...). The incentives on offer, in return for progress on relevant reforms, are greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access. Implementation of the ENP Action Plans (agreed in 2005 with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine, in 2006 with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and in 2007 with Egypt and Lebanon) is underway. Implementation is jointly promoted and monitored through sub-Committees. ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and the partner in question (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Association Agreements in the framework of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership). The ENP is not yet "activated" for Belarus, Libya or Syria since no such Agreements are yet in force. The financial instrument of the ENP is called European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments. The instrument comprises two types of programmes: country and multi-country programmes, which receives about 88% of total funding, and cross-border cooperation programmes²⁰³.

Implementation of the reforms is supported through various forms of EC-funded financial and technical assistance, including instruments which have proven successful

²⁰³ Communication from the Commission ENP, Strategy Paper, May 12, 2005
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, (December 10, 2009).

in supporting reforms in Central, Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe but also new instruments, such as the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and Governance Facility. In December 2006, April 2008 and April 2009, the Commission presented reports on the progress made in implementing the ENP, an overall assessment, country reports for countries having agreed bilateral ENP Action Plans and sectorial progress reports.

The ENP emphasises the principle of “bilateral differentiation” – on which detailed information was given in the previous chapter – according to which the level of cooperation and association with the Union is a function of bilateral relationships between the Union and each neighbour. The EU Commission recognizes that its neighbourhood is made up of distinct countries, some have longer relations with the EU, some have lesser incomes, some are more reform oriented or some have different priorities vis a vis Europe. The principle of differentiation claims that each partner decides the degree of association with the Union based on its institutional and political capabilities. This principle is implemented by means of Action Plans.

The introduction of the principle of “joint ownership”, another concept which was dealt with in the previous chapter, is certainly a positive development. In the framework of the EMP, Mediterranean partners had repeatedly complained about the lack of sufficient consultation and involvement in the formulation of the country-specific priorities of MEDA funding. The ENP apparently aims at correcting this flaw. Thus, it stipulates the intensive involvement of the partner states in the path to take and in the country-specific definition of priorities, termed Action Plan by the Commission²⁰⁴.

²⁰⁴ Del Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?”, p.23.

Finally, one observes a shift to “positive conditionality” in ENP. However, the positive conditionally never includes full membership it means granting neighbouring countries rewards in exchange for political and economic reforms. The “positive conditionality” foreseen by the Neighbourhood Policy allows greater access to markets where “good results” in terms of respecting human rights and democratic principles are achieved by member countries. Currently, one can observe advanced relations in the case of Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.

3.2.4. Assessment

The ENP is separate from EU enlargement and officially it does not prejudice any future accession for any of its European participants. ENP’s “everything but institutions” approach offers the reform minded countries “a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)”²⁰⁵. Contrary to Eastern partners which seek perspective to full membership, the SMPCs, especially countries like Israel, Morocco, Tunisia considered the “bilateral differentiation” principle as a major step in their relations.

ENP follows the enlargement logic in the sense that it seems to rely on the same instruments, incentives, and normative rules as towards potential EU members. However, since the ENP policy rules out membership option, the cost-benefit ratio is not the same as in the case of prospective EU membership and this logic is to what extent serves the interest of the SMPCs, remains as an other question²⁰⁶.

The ENP abandons the prevalence of regionalism and replaces it with an explicit bilateral and differentiated approach. This issue has positive and negative criticisms in

²⁰⁵ Communication from the Commission ENP, Strategy Paper, May 12, 2005.

²⁰⁶ Del Sarto and Schumacher “From EMP to ENP”, p.37

the literature as explained in the previous chapter. Although the differentiated approach can accelerate the convergence processes of the reform minded countries, there is always the risk of marginalization of the less reform minded countries. Considering the self interest oriented approach of the ENP, it is likely that the less reform minded countries could easily be neglected by ENP. Aliboli refers to this threat as “fragmentation”²⁰⁷. He argues that a fragmented “ring of friends” would hardly allow for regional governance and would fail to bring in the security the EU is seeking. Because of differentiation, the EU, sooner or later, will confront a state of affairs rather than a well-organised regional framework; in sum, a pronounced differentiation would be a strategic failure²⁰⁸. On the other hand, Roderick Pace stresses that, flexibility and the fact that the Action Plans are tailor-made to the partners’ needs has the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of “one size fits all”, deals better with heterogeneity and the different levels of economic development, responds to the diversity of cultures and economic structures and could in theory provide incentives for individual partners to determine the momentum of their reforms²⁰⁹.

The EU acknowledges by the ENP its ambitions to act as a “normative power”²¹⁰ by exporting its values as “shared values”²¹¹. The Commission does not leave any doubts that the “commitment to shared values” - such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity - refers to the values of the EU and its Member States. We can tell that, the perceptions of these values by the SMPCs have been insufficient when we analyze the political situation in the region. However, it is also noteworthy to say that the EU is not persistent in exporting its “normative power” on countries like Libya or Algeria which to whom is energetically dependent.

²⁰⁷ Roberto Aliboli , Fouad M. Ammor, “Under the Shadow of Barcelona: From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean”, *EuroMesco Paper*, Vol:77, 2009, p-20..

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Roderick Pace, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The Southern Dimension”, p.32.

²¹⁰ Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, p.42.

²¹¹ Communication from the Commission ENP, Strategy Paper, May 12, 2005.

A 2007 Commission Communication identified regional conflict resolutions as one of the areas where more progress needs to be achieved in the ENP²¹². The ENP plays little or no direct part in any of the Mediterranean's "frozen conflicts". The Middle East problem is tackled by the Quartet which also includes the EU, but the most trusted interlocutor is the USA, and what little initiative occurs now takes place under the aegis of the fading US-led Annapolis process; the Western Sahara issue is left entirely in the hands of the UN; the Cyprus Question involves the UN as well as ongoing contacts and negotiations between the governments of Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The UK is also involved²¹³. The problem of the Western Sahara uncovers one of the major flaws of the ENP: of the two main protagonists involved in the conflict, Algeria has no ENP Action Plan but the EU wishes to negotiate with it a "Strategic Energy Partnership", while Morocco is negotiating for an advanced status ENP agreement demonstrating amongst other things that despite its reticence on the issue and the lack of progress made, the deepening of its relations with the EU is in the realm of possibilities.²¹⁴

The ENP is a strategic instrument to maintain the EU's security by asserting its values and interests to partner states. It is an initiative which can be identified easily with EU's self-centrism and self interests²¹⁵. It is a part of different policy frameworks towards the same region but directed to two different groups of countries as Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean²¹⁶. It is a clear shift from EMP's regional approach to a bilateral and differentiated approach. It abandons the "negative conditionality" but can not use an effective "positive conditionality" because it lacks necessary instruments such as full membership perspective.

²¹² Del Sarto and Schumacher "From EMP to ENP", p.22.

²¹³ Pace, "The ENP: The Southern Perspectives", p.12.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Del Sarto and Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP", p.25.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

The ENP also lacks the multilateral institutions that the EMP has. The initiative does clearly not carry a “we” logic but fosters “we” and “other” perception. The bilateral differentiation is a very good example of this approach. The “co-ownership principle”, in the ENP functions bilaterally not multilaterally. However, it is important to note that, bilateral differentiation, if can be used in parallel with multilateral instruments is a better way for the convergence of the SMPCs to the EU. The ENP successfully targeted some of the problems of the EMP and freed itself from the regional constraints. However with the ENP, the EU has abandoned the region building strategy for the Mediterranean which can be regarded as a negative development.

3.3 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

Until France and President Sarkozy took the initiative to promote the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) initiative in 2008, the interest was waning in the EMP. In many ways the UfM highlights the importance attached in the Mediterranean region. The EU is seeking to engage SMPCs more actively in the Euro-Mediterranean relations and to create a new synergy in the region. Does the UfM have the capacity to fulfil the political and socio-economical aspirations of both sides?

3.3.1 Origins

The “policy entrepreneur” of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is without doubt France. French President Nicolas Sarkozy first proposed the idea of a “Mediterranean Union” on 7 February, 2007 in Toulon, while he was campaigning for the presidential election of that year, and the idea attracted very much attention on the Euro-Mediterranean political scene from its presentation until its final format approved at the 13 July, 2008 Paris Summit²¹⁷, which left some issues open to discussion that were finally agreed upon in Marseille, 3-4 November 2008²¹⁸. At first the idea was seen

²¹⁷ Council of Ministers, Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008.

²¹⁸ Council of Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministerial Conference on the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, Final Declaration, 4 November 2008.

as just another terrain for the French election campaign, designed for internal politics and separate from the on-going inter-governmental mechanisms of the countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The proposal had French populist spirit; it was a combination of French commitment to the Mediterranean region with an apparent alternative to Turkey joining the EU.

The initial project of the French was proposed from a purely multilateral, though flexible, point of view, with the aim of revitalizing cooperation in the Mediterranean and achieving the goals of peace, development and human understanding, goals which have not yet been attained within the framework of the Barcelona Process²¹⁹. Sarkozy based his thesis on the fact that the Barcelona Process has failed to achieve its goals, in part because the EU's enlargement to the East has surpassed other priorities, but also because of the predominance of free trade on the rest of the "baskets" of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. But as the proposal was a campaign product, it lacked goals, structure, composition which was later on filled by the French diplomats and the Commission.

The Avicenna Report of April 2007 which diagnosed turbulent events in the Mediterranean countries inspired the then president Sarkozy. The report concluded the following facts²²⁰:

- The problems of the Middle East are interdependent.
- The Palestine issue is the epicentre of the regional resentment.
- There is no military solution to regional problems.
- The image of the Western countries has downgraded.
- The regimes of the region are not motivated to move for reforms and democracy

²¹⁹ Deniz Devrim and Evelina Schulz "Enlargement Fatigue in the European Union: From Enlargement to Many Unions", *Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper*, No.13/2009, March 13,2009.

²²⁰ Khader, *Europa por el Mediterraneo*, p.89.

- In many of the cases the Islamists are the only organized authority therefore the only alternative.

-There is also a demand for democracy in elite populations of the region.

From 2007 until the spring of 2008 there was climate of reflection and debate, and the French proposal had a mixed reception. A less benign interpretation was that the “Mediterranean Union” was simply an instrument for France to project its power, and that its ambiguity was a deliberate strategy to avoid the proposal being rejected altogether at the outset, trusting that the French president’s political vigour will manage to smooth over resistance to it. Finally, it was also ventured that the Union might simply be Sarkozy’s Turkish gambit, prematurely aborted due to the predictable and vehement refusal of Turkey to consider any alternative to EU membership²²¹. Turkey, however, after being reassured that the UfM was not an alternative to its full membership accepted to participate in the initiative where as Libya refused to participate alleging that Libya did not belong to Brussels²²².

Among EU’s Member States and non-EU member partners, the attitude has been to wait and see, without offending the French president, and trying to have an influence on the proposal so as to project each country’s own preferences into it²²³. In Spain's view, Sarkozy's initial conception obviously eroded the prominence it enjoyed during the Barcelona Process. As we shall see, Germany was among those which reacted most negatively to Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposal²²⁴. The opposition of the German government and of the chancellor was so stiff that they forced the Elysee to modify the initial proposal substantially. That took place in the first half of March 2008 and it was

²²¹ Michael Emerson, “Making Sense of Sarkozy’s UfM”, *CEPS Policy Brief*, March 7, 2008, Vol.155, www://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334057, (November 12, 2009).

²²² Sarkozy-Gaddafi meeting, December 10, 2007.

²²³ Eduard Soler i Lecha, “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Genesis, Evolution and Implications for Spain's Mediterranean Policy”, *Documento de Trabajo*, CIDOB: Vol.28, 2008, p. 12, www.cidob.org/es/content/download/365/1928/file/esoler_cv_eng.pdf, (December 12, 2009).

²²⁴ Ibid.

embodied in the presentation of a joint Franco-German proposal which the European Council of 13 March ended up approving.²²⁵

The UfM was formally established at the Paris Summit with the assistance of almost every Euro-Mediterranean Chief of State and/or Government, as well as several international organizations representatives, including the Arab League. The Paris Summit (July 13, 2008) and the Marseille Ministerial Conference (November 3-4, 2008) established a new institutional structure for the EMP, which since Marseille will be named Union for the Mediterranean²²⁶. The title “Barcelona Process” was dropped out from the name, following the diplomatic bargaining where Spain, the mentor of “Barcelona Process” took the UfM Secretariat, in return of accepting “Barcelona Process” from the name of the new initiative to be dropped.

3.3.2 Scope

The Paris Declaration puts forward the following as the main aim of the Union for the Mediterranean:

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens. They share the conviction that this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Roberto Aliboni, “Under the Shadow of Barcelona: From EMP to UfM”.

promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.²²⁷

Although the aim of the initiative overlaps with those of EMP and ENP in some aspects, the UfM has more modest and more pragmatic objectives than the previous initiatives. The idea is to find common solutions to immediate challenges which the Mediterranean region is facing. The UfM is more convinced that there is no immediate solutions to the basic problems of the region, and when they are addressed a more functionalist and pragmatic approach should be adopted. In order to secure the active participation of SMPCs the multilateralism and co-ownership aspects prevail.

The UfM gives a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways²²⁸:

- by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
- by providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and
- by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.

The UfM first of all, seeks to amend some of the elements of previous initiatives that were most heavily criticized by SMPCs, Brussels and the rest of the EU Member States: It endorses the principle of “equality” to avoid colonialist-sounding connotations, circumvents the issue of immigration, foresees participation by the European Commission, and presents the “Mediterranean Union” as a common project that did not seek to replace the Barcelona Process or the Neighbourhood Policy.

²²⁷ *UfM Paris Declaration.*

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

Secondly, it adds some general features that do provide greater specifics, although conceptual and not at the operational level: It proposes a pragmatic Union based upon variable geometry, and gave priority to sectors such as culture, education, justice and health. It also coins the formula “a Union of projects”²²⁹ in line with the recommendations of the Avicenna Report and other similar proposals.

Last but not least, the UfM attaches great importance to the active participation of civil society, local and regional authorities and the private sector in the implementation of the initiative. In this vein, on January 21, 2010, the first meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) took place in Barcelona.

3.3.3 Instruments

One of the most significant changes relates to the new institutional setting of the UfM. The new institutional structure brings a Secretary General, two co-presidents one from EU members, the other from non-EU partners (The actual co-presidents are France and Egypt), and 6 Secretary Generals responsible for six project areas. The Secretariat will be based in Barcelona. Recently, on 12th of January 2010, at the Meeting of High Level Officials, the Secretary General of the UfM has been chosen as Ahmed Mashedah from Jordan. Although there is a serious discussion on the structure of the Secretariat due to the political problems between Turkey and the Southern Greek Administration, the Secretariat would probably become operational as of April 2010. Apart from the executive secretariat there will be a Joint Permanent Committee based in Brussels which will assist and prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-up; it may also act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro- Mediterranean

²²⁹ Khader, *Europa por el Mediterraneo, de Barcelona a Barcelona*, p.89.

partners. The Senior Officials will continue to convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial Meetings and sectorial meeting. The Foreign Ministers Meeting which was supposed to meet on the 25th November 2009, in Istanbul has to be cancelled due to the political stalemate between the Arab countries and Israel²³⁰

The cooperation projects will focus on six areas: solar energy, civil protection, higher education and the Euro-Mediterranean university, de-pollution of the Mediterranean, business development initiatives and maritime and land highways. Unlike the traditional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the UfM invites its members to opt for flexible multilateralism (not all the countries need to be involved in every single project) and they are supposed to find new sources of finance, be they public or private.

These changes in the functioning of the UfM reflect new priorities. While energy became more important, other dimensions of the Barcelona Process, such as the promotion of democracy, the safeguard of human rights or the enhancement of the role of civil society have remained in the background. In other words, the traditional emphasis on economic cooperation still prevails over any other aspect of the action plans.

As stated in the relevant EU documents, the aim of the initiative is to increase political dialogue and to achieve a more egalitarian relationship between the EU countries and the Mediterranean partners, which is referred as “joint-co-ownership”. In order to meet this goal, regular Euro-Mediterranean summits and more frequent ministerial meetings will be held.

3.3.4. Assessment

The UfM emerged as a national policy projection which was Europeanized later on. The policy is a clear shift to political realism. The UfM stems from the serious difficulties encountered by the EU approach, based on contractual relations, engagements, norms and regional integration, if not its failure, with the task to replace that approach by going back to an inter-state multilateral approach, based on realism and traditional diplomacy. The value added of the UfM is its economic capacity, as long as it works properly. The concept of multilateralism in the UfM should be interpreted minimally, and in a pragmatic approach more than political. This is a shift from classical normative discourse of the EU. Scholars like Esther Barbe argue that, the shift from grand political ambitions of the EMP to sectorial and pragmatic approach of the UfM can be regarded as a return to the functionalist theory, a classic thinking of regional cooperation.²³¹

Following a thorough study of the UfM documents one can argue that the UfM abandons the reference to democracy and human rights enshrined in the previous initiatives. Besides, we can not talk about conditionality at all. The co-ownership is a positive novelty however it is not still certain that it will work successfully. So far, the decisions have been taken under the leadership of France, imposed on the co-president Egypt. Some of the decision concerning the formation of the Secretariat have also been previously coordinated by EU member states and imposed on the non-member partners. Also, there are different groupings within the non-member states. Such as the Arab group and the rest which can impede the decision making process. The membership of Israel halted the process for more than a year and lately, in November 2009 a Ministerial Meeting in Istanbul had to be cancelled because of the pressure from the

²³¹ Barbe and Herranz “Preliminary Guidance for a Special Issue on “Issue-level Dynamics in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Differentiation, Convergence and Region-Building”, p.13.

Arab states not to invite the Israeli Foreign Minister²³². The membership of Israel in the Euro-Med structures is sometimes questioned in the academic and diplomatic circles. The existence of open conflicts is the cause of the major problems in decision making process²³³. At the time of writing of this thesis, It was still agreed on, whether the second UfM Summit of Heads Of States and Governments would take place like planned on the 7th of June 2010 in Barcelona or not²³⁴.

The UfM, alone, can not be considered as a comprehensive and holistic foreign policy instrument for EU towards the Mediterranean. With its actual structure, it can neither replace the EMP or the ENP nor serve as a stabilizing policy instrument in the Mediterranean. The UfM should be enhanced with the existing Euro-Med policies and most important of all, it should embrace the multilateral initiatives and political “acquis” of the EMP.

3.4 Comparative Analysis

For more than a decade, the EMP has been the main venue for the Euro-Med relations. First of all, the stemming point of the EMP was that the EU members believed that the best way to achieve security, political stability and economic welfare in the Mediterranean could be achieved by inventing a region that would share its resources and would offer a social identity as a partner of the EU²³⁵. The basic premise of Barcelona Declaration was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed enough elements of a region such as geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests to make regional building a possibility²³⁶. The stemming point of the ENP is totally different. The concept of “wider

²³² Murial Aseburg and Paul Salem, “No Euro-Mediterranean Community Without Peace”, *10 Papers for Barcelona 2010*, IEMED, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/10Papers-01.pdf> (December 12, 2009) p.17.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ *EU PTresidency Calendar*, www.eu2010.es, (January 28, 2010).

²³⁵ Attina, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed”.

²³⁶ Bewerly and Crawford, “Normative Power”.

Europe” and the ENP are a clear result - and a reflection - of the EU's internal dynamics. In this vein, the objective of establishing a “ring of friends” might be read as an attempt to buffer, and with it to blur, the EU's external borders, contrasting the inclusive approach of the EMP as del Sarto and Schumacher argue²³⁷. The stemming point of the UfM, on the other hand is a national political campaign placing France’s foreign policy priorities in the common EU agenda. The EMP and UfM are aimed at solely to SMPSc, whereas the ENP was not designed to address the socio-economic problems of the SMPCs in the first place.

Secondly, the EMP is based on multilateral regionalism. During the last 15 years it has developed an institutional framework which involves, Summits, Ministerial Meetings, Parliamentary Meetings, sectorial Meetings, as well as academic, educational and cultural institutions such as EUROMESCO, FEMISE, Anna Lindh Foundation etc. However, it lacks the institutions which give a “joint-ownership” character to the initiative. The UfM took lessons from the EMP’s errors and is created with a multilateral structure. The figure of the Jordanian Secretary General, six Secretary Generals, the Co-Presidencies and all the structure of the Secretariat constitute “joint-ownership” feeling in the non-EU partners. Joint-ownership principle gives responsibility as well as willingness to non- EU member countries in order to further develop the initiative. However in the current situation where there are open armed conflicts between the non- EU member partners, the common decision making process is almost non-existent and functions under heavy pressure from the EU partners. Regarding the ENP, the initiative has no multilateral dimension. The ENP documents put forward that the EU-Mediterranean relations would be dealt within the EMP multilateral institutional framework, but the focus of the ENP is on bilateral dimension.

Thirdly, the transition from EMP to ENP reflects a shift regarding the “conditionality”. The EMP introduces “negative conditionality” as a principle in its

²³⁷ Del Sarto and Shumacher, “From EMP to ENP”, p. 19.

practices. The EMP reflects EU's normative power by "negative conditionality" enshrined in the Association Agreements and Financial Instruments such as MEDA. The ENP on the other hand, is explicitly based on "positive conditionality", still assertive on its normative power. Only those states, that share the EU's political and economical values and or/ commit themselves to engage in to reforms will have gain everything to gain from the ENP. The Action Plans have benchmarks and are conditional. It is important however that, in the EMP practice, the negative conditionality has never been used. In the ENP practice, we can observe some countries which have more advanced relations with UE such as Morocco, Israel or Tunisia. However, especially in the case of Morocco we can't observe a rapid progress in the democracy or respect for human rights or any kind of dialogue in the West Saharan conflict. The UfM on the other hand, has no interest in setting "conditionality" as a principle in its mechanisms, due to its pragmatic approach. In the UfM logic, willing states can go further in any of the project areas as far as they want. As have been witnessed many times before, when there is an economic interest, the EU is more reluctant to put forward political conditionality.

Fourthly, the ENP is more straightforward when defining the European "interests" and "shared values" in comparison with the EMP. While the EMP is very careful when using the term "interest" or refers to "shared values" in the framework of region building, the ENP is formulated on European interests imposed on the partner countries as shared interests. Commitment to shared values - such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity are the values of Europe are put forward as benchmarks of Action Plans. In the case of UfM, although Art. 6 of the UfM makes a reference to human rights and democracy, there is no explicit attribute to shared values. The UfM instead highlights more realistic concepts such as peace, regional stability and security through regional cooperation.

One can conclude by arguing that the ENP contradicts the regional identity of the EMP, and makes it a complementary aspect of the country to country dialogue, whereas the UfM is a light version of the EMP but lacks the inherit political region building logic in the EMP. The UfM neither has the institutional capacity to region building nor has the political will.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that there has been a policy shift in the EU practices towards Mediterranean from the concept of a “region-building” to a lighter cooperation framework. It has shown that the global and regional challenges together with the EU’s internal dynamics are the main factors which determine the architecture of the EU policies towards the Mediterranean. It has also argued that the attitudes of the policy entrepreneurs have also been influential, at the time of shaping the EU policies.

The historical trajectory shows that the European states, weakened by the Second World War, preferred to address their relations with the Mediterranean neighbours mainly through EC policies, in addition to their national policies which in some cases still maintain a degree of relevance. Since 1960s until 1990s, the Euro-Med relations evolved from un-coordinated bilateral trade agreements towards a holistic, global Mediterranean policy. The bilateral association agreements of 1960s paved the way to GMP in 1970s, a systematic and generalised vision for all SMPCs which maintained as the main EU policy towards the region, until the 1990s. Starting with early 1990s, in the new world order after the Cold War, the necessity to face the challenges originating from Mediterranean neighbours forced the EU to reassess its Mediterranean policy.

During 1960s and 1970s France was the policy entrepreneur for the Euro-Med policies, whereas in the 1990s, Spain was the leading actor in shaping the Mediterranean cooperation. Even though the European initiatives or sub-regional cooperation such as CSMC, RMP, 5+5 Dialogue or CM did not achieve satisfactorily the goals designed for a trans-Mediterranean cooperation framework, these initiatives prepared the ground for a more global policy which would be put in to effect in a multilateral platform, namely the EMP.

The EMP was designed at a time of optimism where a relative peace was dominating the international environment. Regionalism was hot topic on the international politics agenda and there were necessary dialogue mechanisms ready to launch the EMP. The logic behind the EMP, was to achieve a region of shared peace, stability and prosperity, develop human potential, and facilitate understanding among cultures and exchanges between societies. It was an indication of the EU's willingness to become more involved in the region. The EMP was a major change in the EU-Med relations which brought novelties to the Euro-Med cooperation. The EMP created a new partnership among the Northern and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. It introduced a multilateral channel of political dialogue. Whereas previous EC policies were confined to purely economic matters; the political, security, social and cultural baskets of the EMP enabled an enhanced dialogue between the EMP partners. During the last 15 years, the EU constructed the necessary multilateral institutions to support this "region building" approach. The strong "region-building" component of the EMP had positive and negative consequences. The EMP's global approach has developed a dialogue especially in the Israel-Arab relations. However, the pace of the regional integration did not live up with the expectations and slowed down the integration of the willing partners. Needless to say, the break-down of the Middle-East peace process had also a negative effect on the EMP. The asymmetrical relation between the Northern and the Southern partners distanced the SMPCS from the EMP. The economic basket did not give immediate results to the economic problems of the Southern partners. Although Europe was the main economic partner of the SMPCS, free trade area stayed far from being a reality in the Mediterranean region. The lack of economic growth prevented the "democratic syllogism". The "negative conditionality" principle was never used, therefore the democratization and human rights issues in many of the SMPCS could not be addressed properly.

The ENP targeted some of the short-comings of the EMP. It freed the bilateral cooperation from the multilateral framework which was under the shadow of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, this initiative was launched initially to deal with the EU's

concerns regarding its Eastern borders. The changing composition, shifting borders and the altered geopolitical outlook of the EU and the priority for the stabilization of the Eastern neighbours, played important factors when designing this policy. In the 2000s, the EU did not claim, any more, to have a region-building strategy for the Mediterranean region²³⁸. The ENP instruments were not especially designed for the SMPCs whose problems differed dramatically than the Eastern neighbours and needed special attention. During the transition from EMP to ENP, we witnessed a policy shift from “region-building” to a “differentiated bilateralism”. In fact, several SMPCs like Morocco, Israel and Tunisia could overcome the restrictions of the EMP and achieved more advanced relations with the EU. But on the other hand, questions like democratization, human rights or gender equality were hardly addressed in the ENP Action Plans. ENP also lacked the “we” idea, instead promoted the “otherness” of the SMPCs. The ENP, like the EMP, established an asymmetric relation between the EU and the SMPCs. And finally, the ENP constituted an innovative cooperation framework but definitely drifted from the “region-building” idea of the EMP.

The UfM was born as a national foreign policy instrument of France in 2007, which later was Europeanized. It was launched at a time when the Euro-Mediterranean relations were in need of revitalization. As terrorism and migration have become top priorities in the EU agenda, the European countries started to increasingly value cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. In fact, Nicolas Sarkozy’s initial proposal which focused to create a “Mediterranean Union” had more components of “region-building”. However, the initial proposal was rejected and the 27 EU countries were included in the final formulation of the UfM. The actual outcome lacks many of the multilateral aspects of the EMP, let alone any major novelties to Euro-Med relations. Its pragmatic and functionalist approach and “co-ownership” characters are positive assets but at the time being, cooperation between the Northern and Southern partners is far from being on equal terms. The European Commission, the French co-presidency

²³⁸ Federica Bicchì, “Significance and the Prospects of the Union for the Mediterranean”. *The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security*, Brussels, Foundation for Progressive Studies, 2009, p.18.

and the rotating EU-presidency are the decision takers in most of the cases. The project does not foresee any political engagement. In fact, any implication with the on-going international or internal conflicts in the Mediterranean region is not welcomed and seen as an obstacle for the successful functioning of the project. But, unfortunately, the Middle-East conflict has already become the main impediment for the UfM. Regarding the democratization and human rights, the UfM does not present any conditionality principle. The imbalance between the economic and political issues reflects that the UfM will not precisely be the organization to adopt the democratization element of the EMP. The UfM also introduced the “variable geometry” approach for cooperation which would promote the sub-regional activity while minimizing the Euro-Med partnership activities. The increased degree of differentiation between the SMPCs, has the potential risk of harming the South-South relations in the long run. Another obstacle for the UfM is the financial issues. The Europeanization of the project did not solve the financial questions. At the moment, the establishment of the UfM Secretariat is under risk because of the reluctance of the member states and the European Commission to allocate more funds. In the actual economic crisis environment, it is optimistic to tell that the UfM would be financially well equipped to address its projects properly. It is important to take in to account that the project is still under construction and faces some difficulties due to the political conflicts between the partner states. So far, there has not been any concrete policy action which could be analysed in depth. If, as stipulated at the EU’s web site, the UfM is the re-launch of the EMP, it is far from bringing the desired vitality to Euro-Med relations, because of the deficiencies in its scope, final goals and its institutional set up.

This thesis has acknowledged the positive and new aspects introduced by the ENP and the UfM. For example, the ENP’s ‘bilateral differentiation’ principle, as long as the fragmentation can be addressed correctly, is more likely to be a suitable mechanism than the EMP’s “one size fit all” approach. Likewise, the “joint-ownership” principle, which was introduced institutionally by the UfM can address the “otherness” problem which the EMP could not deal with its existing mechanisms. Also, the

pragmatic and functionalist approach of the UfM can contribute the Mediterranean economic energy cooperation. The multilateral institutions of the EMP, especially the EMPA should maintain as it is an effective way to increase the legitimacy of the policies.

This thesis has defended that the actual shift from a “region-building” process of EMP to a “union of projects” of UfM should not constitute EU’s only foreign policy instrument in the Mediterranean for the future, because it stays far from addressing the real challenges that the region is facing today. For a global, inclusive and comprehensive Mediterranean regional reality the following recommendations are made:

First of all there should be a clear mindset on the part of the EU, with regard to restructuring of the actual policy mechanisms in order to avoid duplications. The UfM, should define its scope and its relationship with the actual EMP structure. The ratification of Lisbon Treaty is supposed to clear most of the actual complications in this respect. It is expected that a clear vision with regard to the interrelation between the three abovementioned policies will be given the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security/Vice President of the Commission as, the EU external relations falls under the scope of her office.

Secondly, the actual deadlock in the UfM should be overcome as quickly as possible in order to define the opportunities and the limitations which this policy can offer. The Second UfM Summit which will be held in Barcelona on June 6th 2010, will be a litmus test in this respect. It is important to note that even if the bureaucratic complications of the UfM might be addressed in the short run, the Israeli-Palestine conflict will remain to be the main obstacle in front of any kind of progress in the Euro-Med relations, unless a comprehensive peace settlement is achieved. Western Sahara

conflict, Moroccan claims on the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or the Cyprus problem are other potential risks which can hamper the UfM cooperation. The absence of Libya is another issue to be addressed if a holistic cooperation is what is desired to be achieved. Even if the UfM behaves as if those conflicts did not exist, it will be obliged to survive under the shadow of existing conflicts.

Thirdly, any initiative in the Mediterranean region should offer a political dialogue on equal basis to all partners based on a “common specific political strategy” which addresses peace, security issues as well as economic, social, cultural areas. Civil society and environmental issues are *sine qua non*, in a comprehensive Euro-Med regional cooperation. The poverty, social equality and democratization should be the priority policy areas but always with special attention to the socio-economic situation in the SMPCs.

Fourthly, conditionality principle which was adopted both the EMP and the ENP is necessary and can be used both “positively” and “negatively” depending on the policy instruments. However, there must be political will from all partners to impose conditionality on the partners. The UE should be creative to develop ‘positive conditionality’ instruments that can appeal the SMPCs for engaging themselves in reform processes. Apart from financial incentives, measures like lifting of visas, easing of movement of workers etc. can be good examples of “positive” conditionality’.

Fiftly, the multilateral dialogue channel which was one of the EMP’s main novelties should be adopted by the UfM, and should be strengthened. Although, the term “variable geometry” is one of the mottos of the UfM, this type of “differentiation” should go hand in hand with multilateralism and regionalism in order not to marginalize non-willing Southern partners in the long run. The Barcelona Process’ goal was the

creation of an inclusive “Mediterranean” region with the support of all EU members. The UfM, should not be exclusive neither in the Mediterranean region nor in the EU.

Finally, for a successful integration in the Mediterranean, the EU should address the issues of Islam and the immigration better. The incidents like caricature crisis, Islamo-phobia, the rising of radical right movements in Europe or tight immigration laws feed fundamentalist identities in the Southern Mediterranean and cause further dividing lines. While dealing with these issues Europeans should try to connect with their origins when the Mediterranean was not a closed sea, instead was a melting pot of civilizations and religions.

The idea of a constructed region of peace and stability is a necessity for the Mediterranean region. The normative power of the EU, if exported correctly to the Mediterranean region is the only solution to overcome the challenges we face today such as North-South confrontation. It is also true that the realities of the Mediterranean demand a degree of pragmatism. Therefore, the European policy towards the Mediterranean region should follow a pragmatic approach without losing the ideals embraced by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

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