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AVRUPA BİRLİĐİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA BİRLİĐİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI

**EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AND ITALY: FROM THE
REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY PERSPECTIVE**

DOKTORA TEZİ

GÖKÇEN YAVAŐ

İstanbul - 2010

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Avrupa Birliği'nin kurucu üyelerinden biri olan İtalya'nın, Avrupa-Akdeniz güvenliğinin inşasında oynadığı "kolaylaştırıcı" rolünü Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi (BGKT) ile açıklamaktır. Tezde, ilk olarak, 1991'da Barry Buzan tarafından oluşturulan, daha sonra 2003'te Barry Buzan ve Ole Waever tarafından geliştirilen BGKT tanıtılmaktadır. Bu teoride, bölgesel güvenlik kompleksleri oluşturma sürecinde rol oynayan devletler arasındaki ve bu komplekslerin kendileri arasındaki ilişki düzeyleri incelenmektedir. Bu teoriyle öncelikle, Avrupa Birliği/Avrupa Güvenlik Kompleksi'nin yapısı ve bu kompleksin tek merkezileşmiş kurumu olan AB'nin Akdeniz'in güvenlik yapılanmalarında oynadığı rol ortaya konulmaktadır. Metin içinde, Avrupa merkezci yaklaşımla AB'nin Avrupa-Akdeniz güvenliğini kapsayan; göç, askeri tehditler, İslami köktencilik, terörizm, siyasi, ekonomik istikrarsızlıklar ve enerji ihtiyacı gibi alanlardaki söylemlerine ve uygulamalarına yer verilmektedir.

Tezin asıl konusunu oluşturan, İtalya'nın Avrupa-Akdeniz güvenlik inşasındaki yeri ise bir sonraki aşamada ele alınmaktadır. Ayrıca, bölge içi ve bölgeler arası ilişkiler düzeyini inceleyen teoriye yeni bir analiz düzeyi (devlet-bölge ilişkileri) eklenerek, bölge devletlerinin bu süreçteki yerine vurgu yapılmaktadır. Tezin başlıca konuları; İtalya'nın AB/Avrupa Güvenlik Kompleksi'nin bir temsilcisi olarak bölgedeki güvenlik oluşturma sürecindeki "güvenlik sağlayıcı" rolü ve AB ile paralel olarak yürüttüğü güvenlik söylemleri ve uygulamalarıdır. Sonuç olarak ise, İtalya'nın, Akdeniz'de sözkonusu olan güvenlik tehditlerinin ifade edilmesi ve önlenmesinde, gerek ulusal düzeyde, gerekse AB araçlarını kullanarak hangi ölçülerde güvenlik sağladığı sorusu yanıtlanmıştır.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of Italy, one of the founding Member States of the European Union, as a facilitator in the construction of Euro-Mediterranean security from the perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). In the thesis, firstly, the patterns of the relationships between the states and regions are portrayed through the RSCT which was sketched by Barry Buzan in 1991, and developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in 2003. The theory, first, scrutinizes the formation of the European Union/European Security Complex and the role of this complex in the configuration of the Euro-Mediterranean security under the leadership of the EU. In line with a Euro-centric approach, the EU's security discourses and practices in the regional security issues ranging from migration, military threats, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, political and economic instabilities and energy needs are laid out.

As the main subject of this thesis, Italy's place in the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean security as a part of the complex is examined in the following stage. Here, regional units' (states') role in the construction process is emphasized by adding a new level of analysis (state-to-region relations) to the existing patterns of intra-regional and interregional relations in RSCT. In this context, being one of the representative states of the EU/European security complex in the frontline, how Italy acts as a security provider in constructing the Euro-Mediterranean security through discourses and practices is analyzed in a detailed way.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APP	Appendix
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CEMISS	Il Centro di Militare di Studi Strategici
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CD	Christian Democrats
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DC	Democrazia Cristiana
EAD	Euro-Arab Dialogue
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Organization
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy

ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESS	European Security Strategy
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUJUST-LEX	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EU-LEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission for Kosovo
EUROFOR	European Operational Rapid Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/ Basque Homeland and Freedom
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut/ The Islamic Salvation Front
FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale/National Liberation Front
FRONTEX	Frontières Extérieures
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armé/Islamic Armed Group
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy

IFOR	Implementation Force
IMTF	Interim Maritime Task Force
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MEDA	Mediterranean Economic Development Area
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MIO	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MTF	Maritime Task Force
NAFTA	North America Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	Northern Dimension Initiative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OAE	Operation Active Endeavor
OPEC	The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCI	Partita Comunista Italiana
PRI	Partita Repubblicana Italiana
PSI	Partita Socialista Italiana
SIS	Schengen Information System
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States

UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

Security is essentially a relational phenomenon to the extent that units in a given security structure are closely connected to each other. Besides international system, “structure” can also entail a region what we call “Regional Security Complex”. A Regional Security Complex is made up of a cluster of states which are geographically located in the same region and whose security cannot be considered independently from each other. States in a regional security complex are born, interact and can even abolish their boundaries by forming entities such as the European Union (EU). Since its inception, the EU has started to reconstruct its security on the basis of identity and almost created an “imagined community” among its Member States. The security perceptions and practices of its Member States have been constructed through a number of shared internal beliefs, norms and values of the EU. Therefore, the membership to the EU represents the personality of each Member State which is resulted from their interactions and transfer of national identities and characteristics to the EU level.

The birth of the EU/European Security Complex dates back to the early years of the Cold War era when the world was divided into two nuclear blocs: the United States Capitalist bloc and the Soviet Union led Communist bloc. During the Cold War, these two superpowers together with the major great powers, namely, China, Japan and the EU, shaped the international system. With the end of the bipolarity, European continent was almost split into several complexes. Since the early years of the post-Cold War era, European complex has been left by three interconnected security complexes: the post-Soviet space, the Balkans and the Europe/EU.

The EU/European security complex is made up of the Western, Central and Eastern Europe. This area possesses a major great power, the EU, plus three more great powers, namely, Germany, France and Britain. These three great powers exert their influences on security and defense matters of the EU. There are other states also known as “middle powers” or “regional powers” such as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and

Sweden which are partly effective in regional policies. In addition, even if the US is not a member of the European security complex, it is largely involved in the affairs of this complex.

The structure of the EU/European security complex has modified in time: One may talk of the existence of “insecurity” in Europe in the 1940s, and 1950s; “security” in the 1960s; “desecuritization” of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s; and “resecuritization of Europe” after the 1980s. EU/Europe as a security community evolved from conflict formation in the 1950s through a security regime in the 1970s to a security community in the 1990s and onwards. As a security community, the EU/European security complex does not perceive any threat from individual states; the EU/Europe is now resecuritized by the external threats mainly coming from its Southern periphery, the Mediterranean region.

In particular, since the end of the Cold War, beyond the global security concerns, the security issues in the Mediterranean have been increasingly addressed in the EU/European security complex region. From a Eurocentric perception, these concerns are linked to the challenges to European security originating from the Middle East and North Africa region. The Mediterranean region is now much more exposed to transnational or trans-regional risks flowing from the South towards the North. The main issues that fall in the realm of the security risks or threats include international terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, money laundering and migration. They are portrayed as the risks to the integrity and order of Europe and the “European identity”.

Under the circumstances of instability and socio-economic breakdown, the EU has developed a new framework of “Euro-Mediterranean security” built upon its security discourses and practices towards the region. More concretely a work program based on regular political dialogue, economic and financial cooperation was launched under the “partnership” and “cooperative security measures”. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean Declaration sets a multilateral framework including economic and security aspects linking to a social, human and cultural dimension.

Not only is the Mediterranean security understanding defined and practiced at the European level, but also the Member States individually, especially the Mediterranean ones, have participated in the construction of a variety of regional security mechanisms. France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and to some extent Turkey as a candidate country all reflect their national performance on the construction process as a distinct dimension. They not only play an entrepreneurship role in taking policy initiatives such as the Global Policy, the Barcelona Process, and the Union for the Mediterranean but also themselves maintain the construction through the articulations of perceptions, interactions and practices.

Within the EU/European security complex, Italy characterizes an important European state that is mainly called as “middle power” and has extensively contributed to the construction of “Euro-Mediterranean security” among the others. The security history of Italy that is full of fragmentation and unifications is rooted in European security along with the Mediterranean region. This was so even during the ancient Roman times, Italian City Republics and after its unification and throughout the eras of Fascism and the Republic of Italy. It has traditionally been an aligning state to the great powers of the concerned eras, namely France, Germany and Britain. What is more, due to its weak political system and insufficient capacity vis-a-vis others, Italy tied its security to other regional and international structures: be they states, organizations or ad hoc formations operating in Europe. For example, after the World War II, in a changing European security, Italy’s fate was interlocked between Europe, Mediterranean and a range of constraints of the international system. However, its security is constructed much more on the continental pillar (that is Europe) due to its high dependency on Europe in terms of economy and power. At the same time, its strong ties to the Atlantic Alliance without a doubt, represented one of the essentials of Italian security structure in the Cold War international system. Given geographical and historical facts, Italy has now found itself as the “pawn of the Euro-Mediterranean Balance” in the post-Cold War period.

In this thesis, as a Member State of the EU, Italy's securitization of the Mediterranean within the framework of EU/European security complex will be studied. In other words, the role of Italy as a facilitator in the construction of the EU's Mediterranean security is basically laid down. The conclusion is derived from the question of whether Italy and the EU have convergent or divergent security perceptions and practices in the Mediterranean.

Argument of the Thesis

In this thesis, I will try to analyze whether Italy constructs the Euro-Mediterranean security acting as a facilitator between the two shores of the Mediterranean within the context the EU/European security complex. As one of the coastal states of the Mediterranean, Italy provides security through acts (in terms of discourses and practices) at national level but rather referring to the European security. This leads Italy to be labelled as a facilitator in the securitization processes, declaring some "existential threats" and then acting against them through national and European mechanisms. This argument is born out of a number of supporting arguments that can be expressed as follows:

The first argument is related to the theoretical background. In the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), state level has been undervalued so far since the RSCT mostly aims to portray the regional security dynamics (of a cluster of states) and their interactions with the global system. However, the theory gives a substantial weight to each regional security complexes where intra-regional, state-to-state and intra-state dynamics can categorically be studied. This thesis also argues that one may take a deep look at a state/states and its/their security identity in order to explore the security constructions in a given issue, sub-region and time. For example, Buzan and Waever (2003) centered their focus only on three major states in explaining the EU/European security complex. However, I will also propose that the thesis offers an outline for state-to-region analysis that can be made along the lines of RSCT.

The second argument is based on a deductive way of thinking: The EU/European security complex is introduced as a product of securitizations of major political, military, economical, societal and environmental issues. During the 1940s and 1950s, the major threats were the Communist threat and interstate conflicts. These circumstances continued, somehow, in a quite looser manner during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s and onwards, the EU/Europe has evolved into a security community which perceives such threats from its bordering regions, mainly the Mediterranean, as terrorism, migration, organized crime, Islamic fundamentalism and energy needs. Not surprisingly, the Mediterranean Member States of the EU face the threats first on the frontier. Italy may make a difference from the other Member States since it has maintained good relations with the regional states from which it has perceived threats. For that reason, in this thesis Italy's regional role is also interpreted as a "security provider" which means that it naturally articulates security issues, threats and discourses and takes necessary measures against them.

Theoretical Approach of the Thesis

The RSCT which constitutes the theoretical backbone of the thesis is built upon on a synthesis of neorealism and constructivism. The theory was first sketched by Barry Buzan in 1991, and almost a decade later, developed by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in 2003.

Buzan and Waever (2003, p.4) explain their objective in developing this theory that

[t]he RSCT enables one to understand this new structure and to evaluate the relative balance of power of, and mutual relationship within between regionalizing and globalizing trends. RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level of interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their location.

Here, one may think that the RSCT is a theory just made up to understand mainly the international system, balance of power structure and the distinction between regional level and international level. However, this theory allows us to go beyond that and analyze the security dynamics at regional levels including intrastate, interstate, interregional and global security relations. One of the main arguments of this theory is that: “most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters, security complexes” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.4). Although these security complexes are influenced by the global powers their security dynamics remain to a considerable degree autonomous from the relational patterns shaped by the global powers.

Within this framework, in this thesis, the security construction of a Member State of the EU in the context of the EU’s developing Euro-Mediterranean Policy is analyzed with regard to neo-realistic logic of actors’ policy practices in a structure (subsystem). Besides, the thesis tries to ground the theoretical justifications extensively on ontology of socially constructed realities, structures (sub/ regional structures and their constructed policies) and state policies. Nevertheless, the thesis mostly keeps away from intricate theoretical considerations; instead, it conceptualizes the making of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Security and the place of a state which belongs to this policy area at a given time in the post-Cold War era.

The theoretical chapter definitely attempts at portraying the extent of the concept of security related to regions. Regions are analyzed in two perspectives: The first one is the neorealist perspective, and the other one is the constructivist perspective that also embodies several elements of the English School and the Copenhagen School.

From the neorealist perspective, regional security complex is made up of territorially connected- individual states in a security environment ranging from anarchic to mature anarchic security system. In a polar structure, states possess capabilities to play certain roles in regional and international politics regarding a range of security issues. In this polarity spectrum there are several states qualified in terms of “power” (ranging from great power to regional powers).

On the other hand, the RSCT borrows from the constructivist approach, in particular, the securitization theory of Copenhagen School Buzan and Waever had previously worked on. They use securitization as “political processes by which security is constituted” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.4). Therefore, the most important difference between neorealism and the RSCT is that first the former takes “structure” as “global system” whereas the latter labels it primarily to regional level. The second distinction is that in the RSCT, the form of distribution of power as “the patterns of enmity and amity” is composed of independent variables and in that sense polarity may be an effective but not a constant determinant of security relations. The thesis also utilizes from another theoretical ground built upon the English School Theory and its three traditions of “Realism,” “Rationalism,” and “Revolutionism” (along the lines of the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian worlds). To put in another way, the English School implies mainly “international anarchy,” “diplomacy” and “the concept of a society of states”. In the RSCT, Buzan and Waever (2003) postulate a new categorization structuring the types of regional complex: In parallel with those of English School, the RSCT lists the patterns of security relations as respectively as conflict formation (Hobbesian), security regime (Grotian) and security community (Kantian). Accordingly from a conflict formation environment, state may form a “structure” in terms of “regional society of states” where certain "common rules and institutions" develop.

Apart from the similarities, the RSCT breaks from constructivism by ignoring the sociological perspective of the constructivist theory. It does not provide us an understanding on how societies are transformed, and on the processes, and concrete conceptualization of the role of agents (different types of agents and institutions historically emerge and evolve in societies). In other words, the processes through which identity is being erected as a result of interaction among different groups and people (agents) are undervalued in this theory. However, this theory helps us to understand the security dynamics taken as a picture at a given time and geography.

In this thesis, first, this theory is used to understand how the EU/European security complex is formed in particular after the World War II. However the focus will be on the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the thesis first tries to draw an outlook on to what extent the EU provides a regional security complex, which security dynamics are effective in the EU/European Security complex, on the polarity structure in terms of enmity-amity spectrum, and the shift from conflict formation to security community.

Second, the relations in the EU/European security complex security relations with other regions, specifically the Mediterranean regions are theorized. Here lies the central point of the thesis that we will not focus on “region-building” or “identity-building” but “security-building”. For example, we are not concerned with how “Europe” or the “Euro-Mediterranean region” is constructed, but with how they are constructed on security discourses and practices. It means that the region building is highly dependent on what and whom they securitize. Therefore in this thesis, we study security discourses and practices more than regionalist discourses or practices. On the other hand, these two processes may go hand in hand in scope and time. In addition, it is worth noting that the Euro-Mediterranean security is not in reality a conception that is blended by European and Mediterranean security understandings and practices; instead, it is built up by the through securitization processes and the security practitioners of the EU/European security complex.

Third, the theory helps us to understand how Italy integrates its security into the EU/European security complex over time, as well as how Italy constructs its security towards the Euro-Mediterranean security within the EU/European complex. In line with the theory, Italian security interdependence in Europe and the Mediterranean will give us substantial information on the general security dynamics of the regions at the same time. For example, the practitioners as securitizing actors (Italian political elites) represent the speakers of Europe or the European Union at the same time. Like other great powers such as France, the UK and Germany, and middle or great powers as Spain, Italy provides a good example in the Mediterranean issues. The most striking argument in favor of selecting Italy as our case study is that this country is located in the Mediterranean region and is the most “regional” state whose security has extremely been interlocked into European security.

As a result, the RSCT gives us a theoretical background where we can find intra-state, interstate, interregional and global level security patterns at the same time. In our case, EU/European security complex serves as the regional level, Euro-Mediterranean security as the interregional level and Italy as the state level.

Case Selection: Italy

This section explains what and why Italy represents in our analysis and what can be learned from the Italian case. The assessment will be made in line with the qualitative research design.

Italy makes a pertinent case study that has been selected for a number reasons:

First, in the EU literature, there are a few studies on Italy’s foreign and security policy. In analyzing the European security structure, the three great powers of the EU, namely France, the UK and Germany are extensively referred to. However, such a categorization in the security analysis may lead us to pure realist conclusions. Similarly,

Buzan and Waever (2003, p.75) take French, British and German discourses which they assume as the main determinants of the EU/European security complex. Such a reductionist perspective may go beyond within the scope of the RSCT. Italy is selected in particular for understanding securitization of Mediterranean which Italy together with other Mediterranean states constitutes direct interlocutors of the regional security. Depending on the “territoriality” argument, as a “frontier” or at the very doorstep of the EU, Italy provides a convincing example for a “deep look” at the Euro-Mediterranean security.

Second, Italy has become an indispensable Member State of the EU in the post-World War years. It is a good choice in explaining how a country ties its security identity construction to that of Europe, being desecuritized by the other Western countries immediately following the World War II. From a former enemy, Italy was rapidly transformed into a fully contributing member of the Atlantic and anti-Communist ideology of the Western sphere. Being a capitalist state, Italy was legitimately allowed to be included in various international alliances such as NATO, the UN, Marshall Plan and the European Community. Therefore, political and ideological threats originating from Italy account for how Italy has become a member of the European Security Complex area on one side. On the other side, for Italy the inclusion to the European family was more than a geographical idea. Apart from the political reasoning, an ideational thinking also gives the readers a clue for the predilection of this thesis for Italy. Several Italian intellectuals and politicians such as Antonio Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colomi contributed to the philosophy of European integration in particular with their initiative, the European Federalist Movement in 1943, with which they played an active role in shaping the European public debates. The movement has broken out as an opposition to the fascist ideology and the reoccurrence of the successive World wars. It had then led to the Congress of Europe in the Hague in 1948.

Second, “Mediterraneanism” has always been an important element of Italian politics articulated several times domestically. As a fact, the Italian foreign and security policy has always been included in an Atlantic-European pluralistic security community. In addition, Europeanism was the symbol of commitment to the construction of the EU, while

its membership in the NATO implies its loyalty to the Capitalist world. Though, neither Atlanticism nor Europeanism was perceived as the only option for Italy's foreign and security policy in its history. "Mediterraneanism" was at same time on the top of Italy's agenda in foreign and security policy. Now, in different contexts, the "Mediterraneanism" has been revived in Italy's political history, in particular in the post-Cold War era but in the name of "Euro-Mediterraneanism". In the 1970s, the concept was put into practice in an autonomous foreign policy especially towards the Middle East. Even though the concept gives a hint of Italy's colonialist past and its close ties with Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria at bilateral level, the elements of "Europeanism" have always remained constant. Compared to the other Mediterranean members of the EU -France and Spain- Italy represents a bit different model. In this respect, Italian connection to the Mediterranean security construction is given as a sample as a Mediterranean constituent. On the other hand, France is seen as an initiator of the EU's Mediterranean Policy (especially with such projects as the Global Mediterranean Policy or Union for the Mediterranean). Likewise, France's role is interpreted as not entirely linked to the European security or continental matters, but much more defined in ideationalistic terms in winning international recognition of its "big power" status and for some material benefits and French conception of European integration. Its ambitions at global level remain in excess of the theoretical framework -the regional aspect- of the thesis. Nevertheless the thesis maintains a reservation in presenting France as a crucial constituent actor in the Mediterranean security in the framework of this thesis. This is because of the one-side dimension of French approach to European Union. However Mediterranean policy, at regional level, testifies the thesis' focus on the construction of the Mediterranean security. As another major Mediterranean Member State, Spain is also known as an initiator with the Barcelona Process, however, its problematic relations with some of the Mediterranean countries like Morocco and looser ties with Tunisia display that the relationships are all aimed at bringing Spain and them closer at bilateral level rather than a direct articulation of a European security linked to the Mediterranean security. Unlike Spain's connection with Latin America, its Mediterranean approach almost stands at the same level as the other two Mediterranean partners. In the

thesis, like France, Spain is also treated as a supplementary case in order to put a more intensive analysis for the Mediterranean region.

Third, Italy is presented as a gateway where it faces the challenges or becomes a “colapasta” (colander) through which the threats are eliminated in the outer door of the European continent. During the Cold War, Italian security was guaranteed by, unobtrusively, the Atlantic Alliance and the EU. Italian foreign and security policy was rather interpreted as a function or extension of the domestic politics (Brighi, 2009). Italian security is no longer restricted to a simple and passive membership but revised as a member changing its role from “security consumer” to “security producer” in the new era. In particular, the end of bipolarity in international system and its impact on regional subsystems changed the nature of threats that the European countries must confront. Since Italy is left on the frontline against the emergencies coming from the neighboring states, it has had to reconsider its foreign and security policy priorities. Thus, issues ranging from economic migrants, political refugees coming from the Balkans, Islamic terrorists all afflict the Italian peninsula first, and then, if possible, access to throughout Europe. Italian role has in this respect become significant in preventing these conflicts and providing a secure environment before the threats are dispensing throughout the European continent. Italy’s role in leading the ALBA peacekeeping forces in Albania in 1997 and the Multinational Force in Lebanon in 2006, and the Active Endeavor that was launched in 2001 and its measures taken against migratory flows and energy agreements in the Mediterranean are all indications of Italian role and importance in the construction of the Mediterranean security.

Methodology

European Union studies when tied to the pluralistic realm of the EU polity in terms of unit of analysis and level of analysis almost set a challenge to the methodological aspects of the IR studies. In respect to the subject of this thesis, the EU studies are assumed as a branch of the IR field thus being associated with much more constructive, interpretive and

subjective ways rather than observable ways in terms of ontological and epistemological explanations. In the thesis, matters related to the EU are generally tested through qualitative methods rather than quantitative ones since the field of inquiry almost consists of unobservable variables in its terms, concepts, variables and assumptions. The aim of this study is to understand how the European security towards the Mediterranean is constructed at regional level in the name of “an overall Mediterranean security”, and the how the Member States are involved in securitization within the Union and towards the external issues. In the study, within the construction processes, mainly perceptions, discourses and practices of even the individuals -as security articulators- are taken into consideration. The actors who articulate what the security is, in a sense conduct a “speech act” in defining the security referent objects. So, it would be appropriate to follow a constructivist way to “interpret” how the Mediterranean security is made up.

Ontologically, the point of departure is anti-essentialist. So, the phenomena of security and regional security are constructed in the form of multiple and mental constructions, socially and experientially based, dependent on the individual persons’, groups’ discourses and speech acts. For example, during the Union for the Mediterranean Summit of 2008, the linguistics of the texts builds more inclusive character for the both sides and limits the definition of the Mediterranean security. So, knowledge and truth are established by the individuals not discovered by mind; reality is not there, but is created. There are both pluralistic and plastic characters of reality: “pluralistic in the sense that reality is articulated in a variety of symbol and language systems; plastic in the sense that reality is stretched and shaped for purposeful acts of international human agents.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.108) We will focus much more on the first assumption. However, on the other hand, we will keep in mind the ontological explanations of security processes. Human knowledge is historically and culturally specific and contingent; it may differ under other historical and cultural conditions. While European states perceived each other as “enemies” until very recently, they have formed a society in which common rules and norms exist. Similarly, the image of South is now being transformed from a threat producer to a security partner at political and cultural levels. Therefore, the constructions are

changeable over time as they are associated realities. So there is no unique real world that preexists and is independent of human mental activity and human symbolic language.

On its constructivist side, in its epistemological orientation, the thesis remains “transactional and subjectivist.” This thesis is based on an interpretative constructivism that explores the role of language in mediating and constructing social reality. Having a post-positivist epistemology, the aim will be to establish the Member States’ understandings over the Mediterranean and the EU’s Mediterranean Policy, and more precisely to display the content of the Mediterranean policy of the EU and Italian understanding and practices towards the Mediterranean Policy.

In this thesis the researcher and the object of the research are seen to be linked to the findings that are literally created and interpreted by the readers. In other words, the author of the thesis intends to understand this world of meaning and how it is embodied in the discourses and actions of actors representing states and centered regional security complexes.

Doing so, the method necessitates a construction of reading of the meanings. Accordingly, the central research problem is to explore the relevance of the state and investigate whether the Member States of the EU as a component of the EU/European security complex participate in the construction of the Mediterranean security.

In sum, the ontological and epistemological accounts all give a way to the readers to draw the methodology of the thesis:

In this study, the methodology is a qualitative research supported with a case study of Italy. The aim behind that study is to understand the social world through a variety of methods such as achieve research, literature review and interviews.

The qualitative inquiry of the subject includes: discourses of the important European leaders and the Italian leaders; and description of security practices and historical analysis.

The main sources referred in writing the thesis are journals such as Istituto Affari Internazionale, Spectator, Il Quaderno, Reports of “Centro Militare di Studi Strategici”, statistics of ISTAT, news from Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, L’Unita, as well as a book by the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi.

Interviews with the following names have also been used in the formulation of the text:

- Lucio Martino, CEMISS
- Laura Allegrini, Senator (L’Alleanza Nazionale)
- Valerio Zanone, Senator
- Reports submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Books about Italian domestic politics and foreign and security politics and Italy’s history

Organization of the Thesis

This thesis has three extensive chapters each of which has theoretical and conceptual assumptions that are designated as follows:

Chapter I introduces the theoretical background of the thesis, and is entitled “the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) which was formulated by Barry Buzan in 1991, and developed by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in 2003. This theory analyzes how security is constructed through processes among the interacting units in a given region and time. More generally, it helps us to understand the regional patterns of security in Europe/EU. The place of regional approach in International Relations; as a theory the RSCT that uses a blend of a number of security theories from rationalist, constructivist, the

English School and the Copenhagen School approaches are examined in detail. This chapter also gives a substantial weight to the constructivist approaches including the concept of “securitization”. The fundamentals (determinants of security relations) of the regional security complexes are taken as individual states, state interactions; regional and interregional dynamics and global power influences are explained. In the last part of this chapter, a “state debate” which discusses the “state placement” within the RSCT and its additional theoretical links takes place.

Chapter II is dedicated to the conceptualization of EU/European Security Complex and of its construct “Euro-Mediterranean security”. Here, we assume two security constructions in the region: The first one is the construction of EU/European security, the other one is of the Euro-Mediterranean security. Therefore, this chapter covers the definition of the EU/European security complex region and its pillars within the framework of the RSCT. Here, the aim is not to explain how the European security is being constructed, but to portray the structures of the EU/European security complex. Secondly, the concept “Euro-Mediterranean security” is also depicted in terms of security concerns (threats including migration, military issues, political and economic issues); security implementations (including the Barcelona Process, the Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean); and security measures taken by the actors concerned.

Chapter III includes a case study of Italy. Italy’s security construction (in terms of discourses and practices) towards the Euro-Mediterranean security EU/European regional Security Complex will be analyzed. Before elaborating on securitization processes, Italian identity formation comprising “Mediterraneanism” and “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism” is examined to comprehend how Italian security identity is formed and reproduced over the years. Italy’s power and role conception (as “sea power” and a “middle power”, and its relations with other great powers in Europe that is commonly called “directoire”) also takes place. As the major part of the third chapter, Italy’s security concerns (articulated through discourses) and practices in the field of migration, terrorism, military activities, political and economic instabilities and energy issues are analyzed in detail.

CHAPTER I

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY (RSCT)

This chapter is dedicated to give a full understanding of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) that was first sketched by Barry Buzan in 1991, and almost after a decade, developed by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in 2003. The theory helps us to analyze the regional patterns of security through a number of empirical evidences, in particular, from the EU/European security complex. In this regard, first, the place of regional approach within the field of IR theory will be touched upon in comparison with two other approaches, namely neorealism and globalism. Secondly, the RSCT mainly drawing on a number of theoretical bases such as rationalism, constructivism, the English School and the Copenhagen School approaches will be examined in detail. Among these approaches, the Copenhagen School (from the constructivist side) will be given a special emphasis since Buzan and Waever claim that the RSCT is to a great extent based upon it and its concept “securitization”. Thirdly, the fundamentals (determinants of security relations) of the regional security complexes including individual states, state interactions, regional and interregional dynamics and global power influences will take place. The fourth section contains a “state debate” which discusses the “state placement” within the RSCT and its additional theoretical links. This section has a unique significance since the thesis portrays a vertical level of security understanding, or more concretely, an analysis for “state within the RSCT”. This basically offers a model of “state security vis-à-vis regional security, or vice versa” rather than a horizontal level of security understanding as state - to-state interrelations within the RSCs.

1.1. Regional-Level Approach within the IR Theory

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the bipolar world system substantially affected all the patterns of international security; new security milieu remained vague and contested, generating more independent security structure/substructures rather than those of the previous era (See also for example, Buzan, 1991a). “Region” constitutes one of those structures of the post-Cold War security arrangements. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.3) argue that “with the decolonization attempts the regional level of security has become both autonomous and prominent in international politics that the end of the Cold War accelerated this process.” In their contention, a regional approach, without a doubt, derives from the fact that “with the removal of superpower rivalry from the regions, local powers or units found maneuver areas to move and shape the regional and world politics” (Buzan, 1991a). Similarly, within the framework of English School theory,¹ Buzan highlights the regional level of security claiming that geography and regionalism are now back in the study of international and world society (Adler, 2005, p.175). Before proceeding with the RSCT as the theoretical background of this thesis, it would be worth pondering, to an extent, on the main approaches related to the structure of international security studies in the field of IR.

¹ The English School was first undertaken by the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, in response to systematic study of the discipline inside the USA. The “English School” of International Relations Theory is fundamentally a middle ground theory offering “an account of IR which combines neorealism, neoliberalism and more radical alternatives (such as critical theory and post-structuralism) as a synthesis of different theories and concepts.” The theory mainly provides a combination of “theory, history, morality and power, agency and structure” (Dunne, 2007). In this study, the English School is mainly referred to the explanations for “structure”, “anarchy”, “power” “cooperation” and “norms” at the regional level. In the following section, the English School Theory will be examined in detail.

1.1.1. Theories on the “Structures” of Security

Special emphasis is paid to the concept of “structure” in the theoretical perspectives examined in this thesis, since the main theme is the “regional security” that refers to one of the “parts” of the system.² In this regard, Buzan and Waever (2003, p.6) to an extent employ the Waltzian concept of “structure” so as to explore the “principles of arrangement of the parts” in the system that also imply “distribution of power” and “enmity/amity spectrum”³ among the units (See also for example, Wendt, 1999, p.249). They particularly emphasize that their objective is not to look into neorealism in detail; but to set up a “structure” based framework to analyze international security, and to privilege the “regionalist perspective” among the related theories (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.6). To make a clear distinction on “structure”, Buzan and Waever overview three major approaches: neorealism, globalist perspective and regionalist approach (2003, pp.6-14).

1.1.1.1. Neorealist Approach

The neorealist approach that emerged in the late 1970s provides an overall international perspective to analyze the patterns of security. Underlying a whole/part dualism, neorealists assume that the whole (the international system) is best understood by its units (states). They also privilege the international system arguing that there is a set of factors related to the system and not to units. Neorealists thus ignore other levels of security such as regional or transnational level (Linklater, 2000, p.859).

“Structure” has a far more dominant role in neorealism whereby Waltz characterizes the concept as “ordering principle”; “functional differentiation and non-differentiation” of the units; and “the distribution of capabilities across the units” (Powell, 1994; see also for example Waltz, 1979). Neorealism takes the international system as a whole and examines, among other things, analyses of the levels of polarity. The structure

² The other components are international system, state or individual.

³ The enmity/amity spectrum will be examined in the following sections.

(international system) constrains unit behavior and consequently generates a power polarity (in terms of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity) (Mouritzen, 1997, p.69). Thus, the distribution of military power and the balance of power logic in an anarchical environment dominate the theory (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.7).⁴

For Waltz (1979, p.88) structure is ordered as either anarchic or hierarchic as principle in international system. Waltz (1959, p.233) argues that under the anarchical structure of the international environment there is nothing to prevent war. In “international anarchy” that entails “the permissive cause of wars”, states function in line with “political division of political labor between states within a power polarity context” (Donnelly, 2000, p.96; Suganami, 1996, p.12; Waltz, 1959, pp.232-233). The power polarity spectrum is a sort of placement where states’ material and social capabilities for acting at the global or regional levels are measured and ranked. This polarity spectrum of the Cold War (that is bipolarity where one can mostly talk of a politico-military structure) was far clearer than post-Cold War polarity: The gap between the superpowers and the rest, and their rivalry were visible. But today, in the absence of an exact superpower definition, it seems hard to define the power and polarity structure as the act of measurement is not easy in particular for a great power. This is due to the fact that there are a variety of great power states which possess the capabilities to play a major role in international politics regarding a range of security issues (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.31-33). This is similar for other powers called “middle powers” and “small powers” acting at regional levels. Donnelly (2000, p.96) also argues that in such an anarchic environment, Waltz introduces the concept of “functional differentiation” by which the latter contends that all states which are equal as units may be required to accomplish all important functions for themselves. He claims that as long as anarchy exists, states remain similar. For Waltz, states are identical not in function but in capabilities (Hout and Lieshout, 1999, p.46). However, considering that the states’ capabilities contour their functions, there may be a range of differentiation in states’

⁴ It means that the theory has a military focus as well as a security dilemma approach: In an anarchical environment, states are fearful from each other and seek to gain military superiority over others. The arms race is everlasting; one’s military superiority will then be balanced or exceeded by others’ military building-ups.

behaviors, roles and even identities. Donnelly also highlights great powers or middle powers that have distinct rights and responsibilities (2000, p.98). It means that functional differentiation is a consequence of power. He also gives the example of the EU, as a structure which supplies a “functional differentiation through obligations and subordinations” (Ibid., p.98). Collard-Wexler (2006, p.411) argues that with the development of diverse hierarchical institutions, an unprecedented level of functional differentiation occurred among the actors in the EU (Donnelly, 2000, pp.97-98). He also gives the examples of the ECJ and the European Central Bank, contends that they perform unique functions and hold an authority that does not exist at the national level (2006, p.411). As such, the institutions of the EU are unlike other international organizations which have already served by the institutions of various national bodies. Another example may be NATO where there is an obvious distinction of labor between states when it comes to the use of force issue (Hout and Lieshout, 1999, p.46). In this study, we should bear in mind that certain attributions of units or states can be indicated in our description of “structure” at European or/and EU level in the following sections.

1.1.1.2. Globalist Approach

The globalist view grants a variety of reverse assumptions in comparison with neorealism’s statist and military based power-political approach of international system structure. There are three basic distinct characteristics from those of neorealism: First, globalization is composed of substantial elements from “cultural, transnational and international political economy approaches” as well as military approaches (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.7). Secondly, the guiding concept should here be “de-territorialization” which also collaborates with other geographical concepts such as “glocalization”, the “global-local nexus”, “supraterritoriality” and “translocalities” (Brenner, 1999, pp.39-44). Buzan and Waever argue that “globalization redefines a territorial sovereignty as the ordering principle for human activity, differing from a state-centric way such as

transcended networks of interaction that involve many different kinds and levels ...” (2003, p.7). Thirdly, this type of interactions generated from technological developments and communication of all types of goods and information are also seen in security areas.

For the first two characteristics, it would be appropriate to outlook briefly how Brenner (1999, p.44) explains globalization.

a double-edged, dialectical process through which: 1) the movement of commodities, capital, money, people, images, and information through geographical space is continually expanded and accelerated; and 2) relatively fixed and immobile socio-territorial infrastructures are produced, reconfigured, redifferentiated, and transformed to enable such expanded, accelerated movement (Ibid.).

Thus globalization is taken as “an ongoing, conflictual and dialectical process rather than a static situation or a terminal condition” that marks “deterritoriality” (Ibid.). On the other hand, Scholte (2000, p.8) claims that “territoriality and deterritoriality coexist side by side and both have an important role in bringing globalization into steering its development” (See also for example, Buzan, 2005, p.132).

Relevant to the above mentioned features of globalization, for the third, there have been less writings on the relationship between globalization and security. Yet, it is significant to explain this category in security terms since it is precisely within the scope of the thesis. In general, as a fact, globalization in security terms conventionally reflects the negative indicators of center-periphery structure. In particular, the emphasis is on the asymmetrical, exploitative and coercive characteristics of relations between center and periphery, colonialism, pre-colonialism and imperialism dependencies. The center prevails over the periphery. Liberal interpretations of the center also strengthened such a negative side of globalization like poverty and inequalities. It means that the more negative sides of globalization the world is exposed to the more liberalization the world must achieve to overcome these negative effects (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.9).

However, globalization can also be linked to transnational issues and responses in security terms just like as those of economic issues. Globalization complicates the security

environment and territorial arrangements given that it reduces the state-centric responses to the global security problems. For example, many issues including financial crises, migration, terrorism, proliferation of WMD correspond to a consistent network of transnational challenges to states and societies in regions like the Caspian, Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa and Europe and handled by actors pursuing more cooperative way in international system (Bourantonis, Ifantis and Tsakonas, 2008, p.2). As another example, the international responses to the terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 triggered the states to take collective action against terrorism under NATO authority (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.8). In this respect, one can also link globalization to the English School, particularly to its solidarist aspect.⁵ This is due to the fact that the English School can deal with the issues such as a shift from balance of power and war to market and multilateralism as the central institutions of international society (Buzan, 2004, p.3). To this end, an understanding of “international society” is endowed with a framework for intervention in human rights issues at global level just as in the Balkan wars of 1990s wherein “international society” took coercive actions in response to the humanitarian crises. Such type of response may also refer to “macrosecuritization” which would minimize the traditional securitizations of national governments just for national issues (Buzan and Waever, 2009, p.254).

Yet another observation on the globalization of the world economic and political system may be on the emergence of “reterritorialization” or “glocalization”, the “global-local nexus”, “supraterritoriality” in the name of “regionalism”. Like the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOUR SADC and similar organizations were created under the label of “regionalism” thus remaining flexible to global changes (Telo, 2007, p.4). Like economic regionalism⁶ and the mutual interdependence between globalization and regionalism, security regionalism fills this gap through several formal and informal arrangements mainly

⁵ The English School is based on the solidarist-pluralist debate which will be touched upon in the following sections. The solidarist view is based on rationalism that privileges a universal humanity and the rights of individuals.

⁶ In economic terms regionalism often refers to “protectionism” and “trade diversion” against the negative effect of globalization.

established by major powers especially in crisis times. Vayrynen (2003) gives the example of the Contact Group that was formed by the great powers in Europe, the US and Russia during the ex-Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s. Besides, except “crisis” or “emergency” times, the regional arrangements become significant for the long term management of conflicts. Panebianco and Attina (2005) argue that globalization is instrumental to describe the region-building process in the Mediterranean, and they align globalization with regional dynamics, in particular, for the Mediterranean region. For them, globalization consists of economic, cultural, material and environmental issues that transcend the national borders and inevitably prompts the regional responses. As a consequence, region-wide institutions are formed to adopt common strategies of solving the conflicts that are mainly known as “structural” as well as “behavioral”.⁷

Buzan and Waever (2003) assert that globalization only to a lesser extent refers to the regionalist approach as well as neorealist understandings of the post-Cold War security order. However, this thesis has far more globalist approach in particular, with its regionalist views than what Buzan and Waever refer to globalization.

1.1.1.3. Regionalist Approach

In their work entitled “Regional Orders”, Lake and Morgan (1997, p.6) argue that

[t]he regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.

Buzan and Waever (2003, p.10) agree with Lake and Morgan in their contention that the “regions are known more salient features of international politics.” However, Buzan and Waever assert that they address a more open security understanding than those

⁷ This is also what Galtung (1996) characterized the concept as “structural violence” and “behavioral violence”. In the former, damage is given to individuals by “operation of impersonal structural forces” not by solely other individuals. The latter implies the direct and physical violence including wars, conflicts, or terrorist activities.

of Lake and Morgan (1997, pp.10-11). They claim that there are two important assumptions for the regional level: The first one is the decline of superpower rivalry and the diminishing capacity of the superpowers which could consequently penetrate into the regions. The second assumption is that the great powers of the Cold War era have now become “lite powers” and less effective in military operations in other areas. Where Buzan and Waever’s regional security understanding differs from that of Lake and Morgan is that the former theorists try to define the regional security dominantly through the regional dynamics whereas the latter scholars underline that the regions are not autonomous even today but important, and the US as not a territorial part of the region has still an important place in regional security order (Lake and Morgan, 1997; Buzan and Waever, 2003). In contrast, Buzan and Waever (2003, p.11) go further by emphasizing that even during the Cold War the regional level of security was also important except when the global powers are enormously the determinants of the regional policies.

The regionalist approach presents the basic framework of our analysis comprising both globalist and neorealist elements. Buzan and Waever (2003) centered their focus on “territoriality” and see the RSCT as complementary to the neorealist approach providing it with the regional dimension in order to analyze “structure” and “power” differentiation. Accordingly, regionalist perspective admits that there is structure that is made up states as units. These states have their own power capabilities.⁸ On the other hand, Buzan and Waever argue that the globalist approach is the least relevant reference in their theoretical spectrum (2003, p.11). In this study, except its “deterritorialization” debate, globalist perspective can also contribute to our regionalist approach in the way that globalization further triggers “emergence of regionalism” or “creation of regional and subregional groupings”. To be more concrete, in Europe, in line with the growing tendencies for “regionalism”, subregional organizations like the Council of Baltic States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean have remarkably been mushroomed much more than ever. In a multipolar

⁸ However, their regional approach is much more related to the constructivist approach.

world, without hegemony, the “new regionalism” is now, as a more spontaneous process, shaped from below; more comprehensive, multidimensional; emerging within a system whereby non-state actors are also active (Preusse, 2004, p.5). Nevertheless, “territoriality” cannot be superseded by non-territorial aspects; nations, states, regions still continue to operate strongly in security realm. “Territorialization of security” can be one of the principles of the regional security complexes where the “most threats more easily travel than over long ones” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.12).

However, deterritorialization of security may only be possible first with the rise of the levels of absolute power that make regional actors less important, and second in case that there appears a shift from more territorialized (military) to less territorialized (economic) threats. But, such a conclusion makes our level of analysis or regional security complexes as the principal component of international security less relevant to this thesis. Yet, we must bear in mind that the features of regional level integrate three aspects (global, interregional and local levels of security) in one way or another (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.8-12).

1.1.2. Distinguishing the Regional Level from the Other Levels

The regionalist approach to security must be studied by making a clear distinction between the regional level and the other levels. The level of analysis issue of international politics was initially studied by Waltz (1959) and Singer (1961) in detail (cited in Geller and Singer, 1998, p.20). In regard with the main debate on providing international security in the field of IR⁹, Waltz analyzes the causes of war at three levels: He explains the major causes of war in the first image of analysis as level of man, individual; the second image in the state or domestic level; and the third image, international or systemic level (Waltz, 1959, p.12). Ray (2001, p.355) also identifies the levels as “characteristics or attributes of individuals, states and international system”. With his work “Theory of International

⁹ This also implies the debate between idealism and realism in the early 20th century.

Politics” of 1979, Waltz defines himself as a third-image theorist and privileges the third level cause which is international environment or structure (Suganami, 1996, p.15). In Waltz’s work, first two images are taken as one category, a unit-level “reductionist” theory, the third image, a system level, is the most privileged and forms the “structural” theory of international politics. Besides Waltz and Singer, there are several scholars who put the “level of analysis” at the very center of security studies: Thompson (1973, pp.90-91) assumes the security area as a “network of system levels including global, regional, national and local.” For Goldstein (2003, p.15), levels are composed of global, interstate, domestic and individual. Buzan defines the levels as international system, regions, (international subsystems), state, subunits (lobbies, bureaucrats) and individuals (Buzan et al., pp.6-7). Buzan et al. (1998, p.5) also take “levels” as “locations where sources of explanations and outputs are located.” For them, levels are “ontological referents” of the happenings and “patterns of interactions” in the world social life. Therefore, it would not be erroneous to note that the major argument of the IR discipline was born out of an ontological question: what is reality composed of? In this study, the concept of “security” is taken as a level of analysis. Together with international system and state, regional level is also studied as a level of analysis in order to comprehend the “dynamics of interactions that operate in the realm of security.” More concretely, state interactions at regional level and state relations with regional settings will constitute the “level of security” that implies all activities including threats and the measures taken against them.

According to the aspects of the “security complex approach”, security is constructed and changeable over time through a number of processes of different conditions, explanations and perceptions as well as different levels and different sectors. Secondly, security is analyzed neither at global level what neorealists privilege nor only as state behavior and systemic approach, but also at regional levels which have their own security dynamics that became apparent with the demise of the two superpowers (Buzan, 1991b). The approach refers to the Copenhagen School¹⁰ that also assumes the levels as

¹⁰ The Copenhagen School that is pioneered by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde provides a variety of levels of analysis (individual, national, regional, global) in the realm of international security; and in military, political,

“security objects” including state, individual, region, world and society. Third, both the existence of observable (military, environmental or as such) and unobservable (social, economical and political) threats can categorically explain the causes of security (Buzan et. al., 1998). It means that while this study puts a limited materialistic dimension of security to some extent, it links the material conditions to idealistic world that broadens the concept into a new understanding of security. The subsystems such as regions which claim that the geographical proximity brings a variety of threats to almost every sectors from migration to human and drug trafficking, from terrorism to proliferation of weapons and environmental issues.

In security analysis, both globalists and neorealists put the global/international structure at the very center of the level debate. Neorealists ignore all levels except the system and regard territoriality where states are the main actors. In the Cold War years, neorealism extensively underlined a “system and unit” conception that is largely explicated by the bipolar dominant system. In this manner, neorealism and globalist approach seem to rather prevail over regionalist perspectives where bipolarity takes the advantage of system and security dynamics and the superpowers penetrate into all regions. But, it can be noted that in the new era multipolarity or unipolarity have some difficulties and constraints to do so. In the absence of a bipolar clash in particular on European territory, security is defined as a loose form (in terms of non-intervention of super power into the continent) which makes the regional units relatively independent from the Cold War rivalry and politics. Buzan and Waever (2003) also argue that there may be conflict between neorealism and regionalist perspectives mostly when the security agenda in traditionalist and military terms move into the other sectors that are not materialistic. Consequently, we may need a region/unit analysis for new security issues not only in military realm but also in other economic, social, environmental and political realm.

economic, societal, environmental issue areas; using the constructivist type classification including both materialistic and idealistic (socially constructed) understanding. The theory offers securitization and desecuritization terms in explaining the processes in security matters. The approach will be studied in the following parts of this section.

For the globalist approach, as we have discussed in the previous section, globalization largely complicates the security agenda; but the question should be to what extent deterritorialization occurs in world politics and security. However, our point of departure is geography and territoriality. Therefore the problem is triggered by the fact that the security agenda is deterritorialized in particular in economic and environmental issues. Yet, as put in the previous section, globalization is also embodied within “regionalism” and “protectionalism” on economic issues and with normative incentives in other security issues such as environment (Buzan and Waver 2003).

As for the distinction between regional and global level what we have explained in the previous section, regional level can be located between global and local level.¹¹ Regions and units are in interaction given that geographically clustered sets of such units form regions and these regions are fixed in a larger system which has a unique structure. Regions rarely have actor capability; rather they provide an analytical ground. However, as in the case of the EU, there may be some distinctions since the differentiation between the units and region becomes unclear (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.8-10). EU is an exceptional regional formation that is strictly and uniquely being integrated in security terms which we will examine in the following chapter. In conclusion, under this title we have tried to discuss how three levels as reference approaches to “structure” become relevant to regionalist perspective. Basically, we aimed at clarifying how the regional level turns into the prominent feature of international security in particular in the post-Cold War era.

¹¹ This then makes the RSCT an analyzing power.

1.2. Regional Security and the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

With the end of the Cold War, the regional level of security has become more autonomous and significant in international politics. The end of the bipolarity removed the superpower rivalry at regional levels if not entirely. The diminishing effects of the bipolarity were clearly illustrated in the Gulf War and the Balkans, where a number of inter-state conflicts broke out in the early 1990s. Although, the superpower intervention still continues in particular with the September 11 attacks in Asia and the Middle East, the international security relations at regional level are less rigid from those of the Cold War era (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.3). Therefore, the increase in the security issues at regional levels points out the new structure and patterns of regional security and the relationships therein. In this thesis, we will use the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as the theoretical framework in order to explain such new regional patterns.

This section basically describes the “level of analysis” that places between individual states and the international political system, and takes regional subsystems as the objects of security analysis. Thus, the RSCT that portrays a specific kind of region joint by common security problems will help us to understand how regional security level is outlined by internal and external regional dynamics (Lake and Morgan, 1997, p.5). Though it is not the whole of the subject of this thesis, departing from the RSCT, one may eventually illustrate a conceptual framework for the new emerging structure of international security. This is due to the fact that the RSCT, on the whole, enables us to comprehend the new regional and international structure, the relative balance of power, and the interrelationships within the structure between regionalization and globalization tendencies (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.4). In addition, Buzan and Waever emphasize that geographical proximity (to the highest degree, along with regional lines) is quite a significant variable in explaining the security relations all around the world (Ibid., p.45).

The RSCT offers to develop a theoretical and instrumental model based on a mixture of the constructivist and materialist approaches. On the one hand, the RSCT is precisely grounded on the conceptualization of “territoriality” and “distribution of power” pertaining to the neorealist account of international security. It essentially borrows the notion of “structure” of regional level instead of global level. On the constructivist side, the RSCT makes use of its views on securitization process comprising “discourses and political constellations” of particular actor/s. This approach is significant since discourses make up “security”. It is assumed that with rhetorical and semiotic feature, any argument can affect sufficiently the audience (taken as the whole people of a territory, also holding an explicit identity) and becomes a nation or region wide security matter (Buzan et. al., 1998, p.25). The securitization process in political and military matters is maintained by the political leaders, for instance, for the sake of a collective identity at a regional level such as the EU, or individual states like France, Germany or Italy wherein the region is affected by a number of inner and outer factors (Dunne, 2007, p.132; Buzan, et al., 1998, p.40). This makes the regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations, interactions between them more than distribution of power within the region. Therefore, the RSCT presents us a comprehensive framework to analyze numerous types of “constructed” security regions in world politics. In this section, the RSCT is explained by dividing its components: the definition of the RSCT and its ontological explanations.

1.2.1. Definition

In general terms, McKenzie (cited in Riemer, 1943, p.276) contends that a region is a geographic unit which is bounded by economic and social activities of its inhabitants and sometimes develops into one focal economic and administrative center. When it is associated with the field of IR, one should consider the region to be one of the components of the international system with particular properties of its own. Lasswell (cited in Haas, 1970, pp.98-99) calls regions as “subsystems” and explains it as “groups of states that

interact with each other on strategic and political matters.”¹² Morgan (1997, p.24) defines regions as entities that can be established on the basis of conditions and aspects that are constant or variable. For him, geography, cultural and ethnic groups are primarily emphasized whereas level of economic development, nature of political system and degree of interdependence are valued secondarily in mapping the regional boundaries. Thompson (1973, p.101) lists the features of regions as follows:

- 1- The actors’ pattern of relations or interactions exhibits a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in the subsystem affects other points.
- 2-The actors are generally geographically proximate.
- 3-Internal and external observers and actors recognize the subsystems as a distinctive area or “theater of operation.”
- 4-There are at least two actors.

Hettne and Söderbaum (2008, pp.16-17) make a three stage categorization called “regions in the making”: The first stage is made up of “protoregions” which develop mainly along the lines of physical and ecological constraints. The Indian subcontinent or the Subsaharan Africa provides the best examples for these regions. Second stage displays the emergence of the regions that derived from either intergovernmental cooperation/supranational integration at regional level or informal market and regionalization attempts made by society in cultural, economical, political security fields. The third stage emerges when a region becomes an “acting subject” with a particular identity, institutionalized actor capability, legitimacy and decision making system (Harders and Legrenzi, 2008, pp.16-17). Luke Van Langenhove’s (cited in Harders and Legrenzi, 2008, pp.16-18) contention is similar in that a region has multiple meanings comprising geographical area and economical interaction to institutional or governmental jurisdiction. He argues that “regionhood” entails a certain degree of autonomy possessing a distinct identity and exercising its power purposively in international arena; and requires the capacity for regional units to act rationally.

¹² He gives the examples that there is no such a strong interaction between Europe and Asia even during the Cold War.

For Buzan (1991b, p.188), the term “region” implies a prominent “subsystem of economic, political and security relations that exist among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other”. Like Buzan and Waever (2003), Rothschild (1995) relates regional dynamics to the phenomenon “security”. For him, region as security is a “relational phenomenon” that connotes interdependence among the units and levels in military to political, economic and social issues in international security system. Interdependence among the units becomes visible when the units are geographically closer to each other. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.22) define region as an interplaying level between states and international system. However, the regional dynamics can also create their autonomous security systems even if they are connected more or less to the international system. Thus, the formation of RSCs stems from the interplay between the international system and its balance of power consequences and the pressures of the geographical proximity (Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer and Waever, 1990, p.13). Besides the interplaying feature of the regional level, Buzan and Waever discover that geographical proximity is a significant variable in explaining the security relations all around the world. For them, threats or risks travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. Therefore, security interdependence displays a cluster of security regions (2003, p.45). Such an adjacency leads more security interactions among neighbors than among states located in further areas. South Africa provides a good example where the conflicts and the interrelations among states constitute a different subsystem that has been slightly influenced by the affairs in the Gulf region or the Middle East. In Europe, in particular with the demise of the Iron Curtain, Central and Eastern European states and the West European states had been involved in closer contact with each other in political, military and societal security issues. On the other hand, instead of bringing in the concept of “geography” into the regional analysis, Lake and Morgan (1997, pp.46-47) define the RSC in terms of “security externalities” as

a complex as the states affected by at least one transborder but local security externality. If the local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states, it produces a regional security system or complex.

It means that geography as a space where states of a regional security complex are located is used as a physical area from which security externalities spread out. They use the term “region” “rather loosely” specifically in terms of geographical necessity for the membership. They argue that although geographical proximity is a prominent factor that may combine members of a regional security complex together, it is not an essential condition to be a member of a security complex; an outsider that is not geographically bounded to that region can also be a member of a complex. They further argue that there may even be one or more great powers which are not physically placed in regional security complexes but able to penetrate the region from a distance (Ibid., p.12). However, Buzan and Waever (2003, p.80) argue that such an explanation would not only leave the levels meaningless but also undervalue the concept of regions. They postulate that external powers are evaluated “in terms of penetration or overlay”, not as members of the RSC since the regions are identified exclusively. With the inclusion of the external great powers as members of an RSC, it would be difficult to differentiate between global and regional level security dynamics and specify their interplay. For them, Lake and Morgan (cited in Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.81-82) thus made an important mistake by duplicating the analytical frameworks drawn for the Cold War whereby international system is explained by the super power dynamics instead of regional ones. They insist that the operationalization of the RSCT is possible in differentiating not only the global level from the regional, but also each RSC from all the other levels. In addition, they claim that their “security externalities” is almost equal to the geographical criteria which can also separate the regional level from other levels (Ibid., p.81).

In regional level, the main aim is to merge the major actors into a constellation of security relations and explore how a state can deal with such an interacting and clustered security concerns. Buzan (1991a, p.160) defined the RSC as: “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely with their national securities cannot be considered apart from another.” RSC is also explained as a “social reality which is more than the sum of its parts...” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.50). For instance, the security of France cannot be considered from the security of Germany. Because, security

dynamics are “inherently relational and no nation’s security is self-contained.” It can be argued that the RSCs are composed of the “fears and aspirations” of the separate units (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.43-50). It would not be erroneous to define the RSCs as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization and their security problems are interconnected and cannot rationally be thought and resolved separately from one another. It means that an extensive part of securitizations and desecuritizations in international system are seen in regional clusters. These clusters are “durable and distinct” from global levels in terms of securitizations and desecuritizations and should be understood in themselves and how two levels interact with each other (Buzan, et. al., 1998, p.201).

In consequence, the RSC defines the region and the relationships within a geographically defined regional area. In this approach, one must give weight to geographical proximity of members, interdependence, autonomy and exclusivity from the global system. Besides, as written in the following sections, these features of regions associated with the RSCs would be valued with the study of the prototypes of relationships (conflict or cooperation) and the variables of the RSCs in order to understand the definition better.

1.2.2. Theoretical References

In the previous sections, the theoretical references of the regional approach were given to the structure-based framework. In this section, along with the “territoriality” question, an outlook at the directly “security” related aspects and what the RSCT is made up as a synthesis of theories will be studied.

In general, most notable references for security ontology basically revolve around the physical/material and/or the idealistic realms, or to put differently, around the rationalist (neorealism and neoliberalism) and reflectivist (critical theories) approaches (Wendt, 1992;

Keohane, 1997).¹³ Dunne, Kurki and Smith (2007, p.5) argue that it is apparent that constructivism and English School are dissimilar to the reflectivist approach as they overlap between the rationalist/reflectivity divide. However, epistemologically they classify rationalist and reflectivist theory as respectively “positivist” and “those opposing positivism”. Buzan et. al., (1998) make a categorization including “constructivist” and “objectivist” sights. They also indicate that they privilege the latter theoretical structure in terms of their “securitization” analysis which is based upon their “Copenhagen School” theory (Ibid., p.203). In this section, the theoretical aspects of the RSCT will be studied on a number of approaches ranging from neorealism to constructivism that analytically stand between rationalist and reflectivist aspects. The two sections will include the English School Theory since the RSCT will be largely grounded on the English School Theory. Its concepts of “international society”, “structure” “anarchy” and “societies of states” are applied to a regional context (Ayoob, 1995).

1.2.2.1. The Rationalist Framework

As mentioned in the previous sections, the RSCT is rooted in neorealist/structural approaches as well as the constructivist theory. This section gives a better understanding of the extent to which the RSCT borrows from the neorealist logic of structure, anarchy and military security sector, and interdependence; and liberal-based thinking in international system.

The RSCT is based on two analytical frameworks of neorealism that are essentially state-centric, and an anarchically structured international system with the distribution of power and the geographical complexity.

¹³ Constructivists use the physical/material and/or the idealistic approaches to distinct the neorealist and constructivist theories. The rationalist and reflectivist approaches were first used by Keohane in 1988 International Studies Association (ISA).

First, the RSCT embraces a state-centric approach that is fixed in regional level framework and attaches the theory to the neorealist or objectivist approach. Grieco (1997, p.164) reminds us Gilpin's opinions about the essence of social reality: "The state is the principal actor and the nature of state and the pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment." Similarly Singer (1971, pp.77-78) describes the states and the international system through an analogy: in social sciences, "observer may first choose how to observe and to focus upon the parts or upon the whole... the trees or the forest." The former represents a systemic model (the whole) and the latter leads to state level foreign policy decision making processes (the parts). For Waltz, IR has been locked into the aspects of systemic level operating regardless of the internal settings of the states involved. Because one cannot understand the whole world politics only by analyzing the domestic politics of states (Waltz, 1979, p.65). Therefore, although among the major strands of neorealist thinking, "state" or "national security" is the most obvious security object, it would be significant to observe the patterns of international politics as not only the states and its behaviors but also the international system. This is because states act can change and be constrained by international politics.¹⁴ The RSCT accommodates the state-centric components within its subsystemic analysis in which subsystems are definitely produced out of regions, and states as units fear from and ally with each other.

Second, the formation of RSCs stems from the "interplay between anarchic structure and its balance of power consequences and on the other pressures of local geographical proximity" (Buzan and Waeber, 2003, p.46). For the realist discourse in Waltz's work "Man, the State and War", wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. In keeping with the third image, threats are physically born out of a "natural existence of anarchy" that is the causes of the outbreak of great wars. In the same manner, for Buzan et. al. (1998, pp.21-37) a security issue during the Cold War was presented as if there are existential threats to a referent object that is traditional state, including

¹⁴ It means that dissimilar units behave in the same way in international environment.

government, territory and society posed by other states. Under a threat perception, anarchy corresponds to the international structure within which states try to acquire supremacy over the others and secure themselves.¹⁵ Therefore, states tend to balance each other due to the existence of an anarchy that could break into war in the future (Waltz, 1959).¹⁶ That is individualistic sort of understanding that those states come together to behave rationally towards each other to keep or maximize their interests. Then again, threats can also be blocked by a variety of appropriate means such as development of new weapons system, adopting a tough military doctrine, engagement in defense organizations and payoffs to participants (Buzan et. al., 1998, pp.21-37). Waltz notes that in an anarchical system, security is the ultimate goal which leads states to share the “minimalist objectives of preserving territorial and political integrity”. Once survival is guaranteed states can safely pursue other goals such as maximizing their military power and as such. Its regional adaptation referred to the Copenhagen School, might be as in Waltz’s contention that physical adjacency creates more interaction among neighbors than among states and regions located in remote areas (Grieco, 1997, p.166). Under anarchy, wars, security dilemma and alliances based on balance of power occur. States which are located in closer areas fear from each other and deploy with military armament, mainly due to the geographical effects and concerns over their territorial integrity. For example, such an arms racing is best explained by the “security dilemma” model where states try to seize relative gains vis-à-vis other neighboring states so that they cannot be exploited by others (Mansbach and Rafferty, 2007, p.23). Such a condition mainly implies the enmity side of the enmity-amity spectrum of the RSCT. In other words, the relationships between the states are built upon conflict regardless their types or degrees of interaction.

¹⁵ The 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, the international arena is like domestic conditions where the people transfer their unlimited sovereign rights to the authority. Hobbes’ articulation of “the war of all against all” also means the state of war that is anarchy in domestic politics is also well illustrated in the relations among states because there is no supranational authority

¹⁶ Waltz calls such a possibility of a war as “shadow for the future”.

The RSCT partly has neorealist (materialist) strands of territoriality and distribution of power. Territoriality implies a state-centrism in neorealism, and distribution of power is mainly incorporated to an anarchic environment. The RSCT is seen as complementary to neorealism's structure argument, but on the regional level. The main difference between neorealism and RSCT is that polarity and any interaction type (enmity to amity) are independent variables and not predetermined or given. Polarity may influence but not establish the nature of security relations. They are created and transformed over time and through social interactions. These interactions may result in cooperation and coordination which form the security community type (a deep amity) just like in the liberal theories (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.4-81).

As for the connection between rationalism and liberalism, it would be appropriate to take liberalism as a model for "international order" which is reconceptualized by Moravcsik. In contrast to realism's state-centric (regardless of domestic levels) and power politics approach, in liberalism the fundamental actors as individuals and private groups which are interacting and acting in pursuit of their interests. He emphasizes the general rules for developing domestic explanations for international behavior. Accordingly, first political institutions represent a subset of the societal interests which then are reflected on the international arena. It means that international outcomes are the products of interactions between societies with different preferences. The interests, if converging, will lead to more cooperative societies (Hill, 2006, p.224; Moravcsik, 1997; Brown, 2004, p.108). Thus, the cooperative relations can lead to progress among the states. The progressive interaction becomes visible in the different categorization of liberalism: sociological liberalism, institutional liberalism and interdependence liberalism (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003, p.108). In these three branches of liberalism,¹⁷ the main indicator is the deniability of the existence of pure-state-state relations in international system. The relations might be extended to the state-society relations and transnational relations as well as state-state relations. In this thesis, the focus is much more on transnational relations in explaining "for

¹⁷ Many scholars add Republican Liberalism to this category; however, in this thesis it remains less relevant.

what and whose interests the states take action in international arena.” The answer for that would be groups, people, organizations, regional entities and identities and as such. Relative to that sociological liberalism brings the idea that people are more cooperative and supportive of peace. Deutsch’s innovation “security community” also mentions that

a group of people which become integrated where interaction is defined as the attainment of a sense of community accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time (Deutsch, 2006, p.41).

For Jackson and Sorensen (2003, p.108), Deutsch’s “security community” constitutes the best example for sociological liberalist thinking. Transnationalism and interdependence are also taken together in line with the liberal thinking. A high degree of transnationalism necessitates a high degree of interdependence (Ibid.). Keohane and Nye (1977) in their work entitled “Power and Interdependence” put a special emphasis on interdependence in world politics. They argue that (complex) interdependence in the postwar era resulted from “increased transnational activities” where military conflicts and use of force were the top issues among the national leaders (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp.12-13). Yet, over time, military force has become less important where low politics such as economics and social issues have become prominent among the states. Keohane (cited in Suhr, 1997, p.104) underlines that cooperation under anarchy is possible if mutual interests are present and a long term relationship among a group of actors form institutions that are also bond by rules, norms and values. He also gives the examples of international regime, conventions, formal intergovernmental or cross-national non-governmental organizations” as complex interdependence. In sum, it would not be erroneous to say that liberal thinking seems to be placed between realist and constructivist notions. Keohane explains that institutionalism is crucial since by institutionalism the meaning of sovereignty has undergone a transformation from the seventh century to the present where states’ relations are based on high interdependence (Ibid.).

Consequently, the relevance of realist and liberal theories in the regional security complex theory is that the Regional Security Complex Theory is a synthesis of rationalist/realist and revolutionist theories since it has both rational views based on state-state relations, structural elements and revolutionist thinking including transnational and institutional views.

1.2.2.2. The Constructivist Framework

The second theory that inspires the RSCT is the “constructivist” approach. In Wendtian logic, this could be an “idealistic” approach in terms of “what security is”. His approach has always remained the same, by privileging the idealistic side of social world over the materialistic one. However, the essence of this thesis is not purely based on Wendtian type of accounts for “materialistic” or “military” security. By remaining loyal to the synthesis of RSCT, this section will describe the degree which the RSCT borrows from the constructivist approach largely associated with the English School and, in particular, the Copenhagen School.

Wendt (1998) aims to offer an idealistic account for international politics and security from the view of constructivist ontology that is the construction of the realities of the social world. For idealistic world, ideas, perceptions, behaviors, identities and beliefs all make up social structure within which the phenomenon “security” operates. Relevant to that, in Wendt’s words, realistic thinking corresponds to a “competitive security system” in which states identify negatively with each other’s security so that one’s gain is seen as other’s lost. It is no less than a negative identification and perception under anarchy which states take both defensive and/or offensive positions towards each other. Security depends on how the states present the security matter (Ibid.).¹⁸ Beside Wendt, Ruggie, Kratochwill,

¹⁸ Wendt gives the Cold War examples as a misperception of the US and the USSR (an antagonistic perception between the Capitalist bloc and the Socialist bloc) against each other when compared to their military capacity. The Cold War perceptions are also evident in the example of military buildups of Britain that seems less threatening to the US than those of the North Korea.

Ashley and Walker (cited in Deudney, 1997, p.92) also criticize Waltz for not explaining the origins of the system. As they put, Waltz asserts that the system is primarily given, instead of taking it as a constructed structure by the agents. However in this study, while utilizing Wendt's constructivist ontology, that can be interpreted as "security is what states make of it"¹⁹, we will not tend to make a distinction between "idealistic" terms and "materialist" terms of security while explaining the "anarchical structure" of regional system. In this thesis, constructivist orientation will explain how security is made up, in particular, in Europe through securitization and desecuritization processes and speech acts that the Copenhagen School accounts for.

Security is analyzed not only at global level what neorealists privilege, but also at regional levels which have their own security dynamics that became apparent with the demise of the two superpowers. Yet, instead of neorealists' systemic approach, the constructivists offer an agent-structure model. Accordingly, the agents (are taken as states) and structure (the regional entities) also mutually shape each other. This is also clearly illustrated in the EU integration process that is explained by the fact that the EU: As a social structure, it impacts on its member states (agents) and their behavior while member states, in return, define their identities and preferences as a result of their interactions within a social environment, the EU (Risse, 2004, pp.162-164). As a consequence, a collective identity (that is harmonization of member states' identities, preferences and interests) occurs. For example, the structure, the EU, has become a community of collective identity which can also influence the member states' attitudes and behavior. Such an explanation is also seen Buzan's revisiting of his theory of English School (Buzan, 2004, p.121). On the other hand, constructivists' notion of agents (be they governments, media, political parties, civil society, companies) are undervalued in the RSCT. However, Adler (2005, pp.177-178) criticizes Buzan in his study of the RSCT since he partly ignored structure's "inseparable twin, agency" and the concrete conceptualization of the role of agents (different types of agents and institutions historically emerge and evolve in societies). In

¹⁹ This interpretation is extracted from and referred to Wendt's one of the popular works entitled "Anarchy What States make of it".

addition, drawing a great portion of attention to the theoretical ground of this thesis, it would be crucial to note that Buzan is also criticized by Pace (2003) for not being constructivist enough, and to a certain extent for remaining state-centric and materialistic in defining in particular in society and its effects on identity construction. Privileging Wendt's thinking, Pace argues that Buzan should have focused on the processes through which the identity is being constructed as a result of interaction among different groups and people (agents) (2003).

As a fact, Buzan stands somewhere between neorealists and constructivists in explaining "regional security complexes". His lacking of emphasis on the "process evaluation" in terms of interaction does not make Buzan a pure realist; instead, his explanation would be a complementary aspect of security which is based on two main parameters of definition. Buzan with his colleague uses the ideas of territoriality and distribution of power in a limited way in neorealist terms. It remains contradictory since neorealism is grounded on a global level. Nevertheless, one may find a number of constructivist strands without difficulty: First, the RSCT is grounded on not given structure and polarity schemes; instead it can be based on a spectrum which can be changed over time through a number of state interactions. Second, even though the RSCT does not explain the "interaction process", constructivism here analyzes "securitization process" through which they focus on political processes where an issue is securitized (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.4). Such an analysis leads us to the Copenhagen School motivated by some constructivist elements such as securitization/desecuritization processes and speech act practices (Buzan et. al., 1998, p.204).

1.2.2.4. The English School

One of the assumptions of this thesis is that the RSCT is largely inspired from the English School Theory. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.54) prefer to make an analogy between Wendtian analysis and the English School's three traditions of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant.²⁰ It means that the English School borrows from both constructivist and materialistic notions that would also be seen in the RSCT.

Buzan depicts the boundaries of English School Theory that

[E]nglish School's triad of concepts exactly captures the simultaneous existence of state and non-state system operating alongside and through each other, without finding this conceptually problematic. It keeps the old and while bringing in the new and is thus well suited to looking at the transition from Westphalian to post-Westphalian international politics, whether this be at the level of globalization, or in regional developments.

Such a definition sketches out a rationalistic and materialistic thinking can be found in both international system and international society categorization. The philosophical strands were depicted in Wight's "three traditions" which he gives details in his work entitled "International Theory: The Three Traditions" that was published in 1991. They are "Realism," "Rationalism," and "Revolutionism" (along the lines of the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian worlds). These imply mainly "international anarchy," "diplomacy and commerce," and "the concept of a society of states, or family of nations." There he puts the three "conditions" as the "state of affairs which produces international theory," stating that the "three component social elements" were "international anarchy," "habitual intercourse," and "moral solidarity" (Wight, 2005, p.143) He also combines history and philosophy in explaining the international theory. Hall (2006, p.141) indicated that Wight explained "realism" by drawing upon the speeches of Mussolini and Carr's "Twenty Years' Crisis", Hobbes' "Leviathan"; "rationalism" by referring to Grotius, Burke, Mill, and Cobden, as well as Tocqueville, Lincoln, and Wilson; and "revolutionism" by focusing on sixteenth and seventeenth century Calvinists and Jesuits

²⁰ Buzan and Waever (2003, p.54) state that "the conflict formation is rather wider than Wendst's Hobbessian model whereas the security regime is narrower than his Lockean model."

to eighteenth century Jacobins, Kant, Lenin, and the twentieth-century totalitarians (Ibid., pp.135-148).

Here, it should be noted that in this section one may refer to the “structure” in terms of “regional society of states” that was almost carved out of the English School thinking of “international society of states”. It mostly posits that as in the case of international society states are the main units. In this sense, the RSCT as a model of English School can be linked to “anarchy” through Hedley Bull’s thinking which he wrote in his chief work of 1977 “The Anarchical Society”. Though, he accepts the existence of anarchy, balance of power and state centrality and that the system forms a society where certain "common rules and institutions" develop (Bull, 1977, p.25). The difference between Waltz and Bull is that the former theorist dictates an anarchical system of states while in Bull view, “there exists high international agential power to promote primary international order, thereby intentionally reproducing the international order of states (Hobson, 2000, p.88). Bull and Watson (1984) also emphasize that “a group of states form not a system but a society that is established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for their relations” (See also for example Buzan, 1993). For them system and society are different. System is basically prior idea; an international system can exist without a society but the reverse cannot. In international system states interact and but in international society states go further by developing norms, values and institutions.

In this framework, the rationalist theories that are rooted mainly in Grotius’ thinking constitute a great portion of the English School theory and the RSCT. Institutionalization of shared interest and identity among states and creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institution depict the rationalist elements of the English School. This is also much parallel to the regime theory and liberal tradition.²¹ Here, although the “revolutionist” or Buzan’s interpretation “world society” category seems problematic and much placed in communism, Waever sees it as liberalism. Because, it has some parallel links to transnationalism and normative political theory. For Wight,

²¹ Though, international society approach holds constructivist epistemology and historical methods.

rationalism falls into somewhere between realism and revolutionism. Accordingly, even though the existence of society of states refers to the anarchical structure of international system, the theory mostly highlights “the progress in agreeing on the basic principles of coexistence and on some rudimentary forms of cooperation.” (Linklater, 1996, p.111) Likewise, Wight’s revolutionism” including the concept of a society of states, or family of nations” is seen by recent “English school” theorists, as characteristics of “rationalism” than “revolutionism.” Bull, for instance, used the terms “international society” and “society of states” interchangeably, respectively as “anarchy” and “those that demonstrated a desire for universal empire or cosmopolitan society” (Hall, 2006, p.143).

As for the constructivist side of the English School, in his recent work entitled “From International to World Society?” Buzan (2004) redefines the English School (while remaining loyal to its basic assumptions) and builds his theory upon a social definition of structure aiming at explaining “how and why norms tame power and why international society may evolve from international society toward world society.” For Adler (2005, p.173), the most salient feature of Buzan’s work on the world society that would also correspond to “collective identity” or “common identity” is that he could also transcend “a normative conception of world society” as representing a “Kantian cosmopolitan community” (See also for example Linklater and Suganami, 2006). Thus such an analysis would give Buzan an opportunity to use constructivist motives instead of liberal thinking. In the RSCT, in explaining the transformation process from a conflict formation to a “regional society of states” under the label of collective identity, Buzan frequently refers to some Wendtian notions. These are “all types of social structures can be internalized via coercion, calculation, and belief, thus relegating the distinction between society and community to the depth of internalization of social relationships” (Adler, 2005, p.173).

Adler (2005, p.173) argues that

[t]he classic English School's normative classification of international system is made up of international society, and world societies (corresponding to the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian worlds). These are respectively replaced by an improved structural trilogy of inter-state, inter-human, and transnational societies, which Buzan distinguished according to the type of actors composing them.

Adler focuses on the applicability of the English School to the regional level and emphasizes that

[i]nternational society and world society can also be found at the regional level (e.g., 'the West' and the EU, respectively), their realization becomes more likely. This move helped Buzan locate the study of Europe's social construction in the English School and ask important questions about social space; about the overlap, congruity, or incongruity between global societies and regional societies, and also, therefore, about the social construction of cultural homogeneity via coercion, self-interest, and identity (Ibid., p.175).

Other than above mentioned redefinition of English School at macro level and the RSCT at micro level, the constructivist approach gives an explanation of security along the RSCT: Security is constructed and may be changed over time through a number of processes and perceptions at different sectors.²² Buzan (1995, p.385) contends that

[t]here are major changes in the structures that define the historical landscape. At these turning-points there is still a lot of continuity, but there are also changes significant enough to create expectations that the players and the rules of the game in the new era will be noticeably different from those which came before.

Buzan (2004, p.330) also argues for the concept "international society" that "a group of states form the international society and are established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements." Therefore a group of states come to form a society and develop common norms, rules and institutions pursuing common interests. Carving out of the international system level based international society; the

²² It was at the 50th ISA Roundtable Panel entitled "Waltz's World" that was organized on 17 February 2009, Little claimed that there were many extraordinary changes in international politics starting from the ancient eras of Greek city states coming till the eras of Cold War and post-Cold War states. The nature of units, ideas, norms are changing and units take different forms at different times. He also criticized Waltz for not considering history and taking units as constant.

existence of societies at regional level such as the EU is regarded by Buzan. Thus, the sub-global developments in interstate and interhuman society are not excluded within the terms of English School theory. Buzan explains the existence of these sub-global systems that

[m]oving from Vincent eggbox metaphor of international society (in which states were the eggs, and international society the box) one might see this unevenness as a pan of fried eggs. Although nearly all the states in the system belong to a thin, pluralist interstate society (the layer of egg-white), there are sub-global and/or regional clusters sitting on that common substrate that are much more thickly developed than the global common, and up to a point developed separately and in different ways from each other (the yolks). The EU, East Asia and North America for example all stand out as sub-global interstate societies that are more thickly developed within themselves.

Buzan contends that the thickly developed sub-global societies are also differentiated from each other in their modes, values, norms and rules binding them. The EU is the most institutionalized one holding a common economic and social market. It is a good example for a post-Westphalian society and convergence of interstate society (Ibid., p.207). The EU can also provide a variety of empirical cases and evidences for the theory where it plays a constructive role. In other words, the EU is a developed inter-state society flourished at sub-global level.

In a nutshell, the English School, being relatively the most questionable approach, makes a huge contribution to the RSCT maybe because of its mastermind Buzan's previous works on the English School. As the RSCT in essence offers an analysis for the "changeable/changing feature of security regions as complexes", it had to be grounded on a synthesized approach comprising the realist, rationalist and revolutionalist traditions. This could be clearly seen in the changing types of enmity/amity spectrum of relations from conflict formation to security community.

1.2.2.4. The Copenhagen School and Securitization

The Copenhagen School attempted to develop a framework for the study of security from the constructivist perspective. It was built up by various academics at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark, including Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Their approach found its best expression in a book entitled “Security: A New Framework Analysis” co-written by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde in 1998. The core theme of this approach is concerned with “how security works in world politics” (McDonald, 2008, p.68).

In his book “On Security”, Lipschutz (1995, p.1) asks two important questions: “What/who is being secured against possible threats?”; “what constitutes the condition of security?” and “by whom and how do the ideas develop security?” Responses to the first and second questions contain “referent object/s” (individual, groups, societies, state, region, and world) in a variety of security sectors including military, political, social, economic and environmental issues. Third question refers to the processes through which the security issues and discourses are constructed and how actors declare the security issues and implement their special measures. These all lead to “practice of securitization” which the Copenhagen School is mostly built upon. In their work, Buzan et. al. (1998) claim that securitization studies aim at understanding “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why with what results, and under what conditions (when securitization is successful).” On the other hand, Waever notably argues that security is a kind of “discursive act” as a “speech act” by which a security issue is labeled as “important” and “urgent” that “legitimizes the use of special measures outside of the usual political process to deal with it” (Smith, 2000, p.85). In this section, the Copenhagen School and its core elements will be studied. It is also noteworthy that the founders of the Copenhagen School view that their approach (that is securitization) is “radically constructivist” that does not question what threat really is; instead, the constructivist approach takes security issue as if they are made by acts of securitization, and defines security as “a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them...” (Buzan et. al., 1998,

p.204). The RSCT uses the Copenhagen School in explaining its constructivist strands comprising the securitization, discourses, and security measures.

Security towards a referent object is constructed through a number of policy practices and security discourses by any actor. Lipschutz (1995, p.8) argues that “threat” is not an objective phenomenon but a product of historical structures and processes. For him, there are struggles not only over security among nations but also among notions. So, how is an issue presented as a security matter and threatening? In the previous part, it was emphasized that social interactions, mutually perceptions and preferences between the units constitute the security understandings. In this section the one way to “the construction of the security preferences and interests” interpreted as “securitization” will be examined.

1.2.2.4.1. Definition

Securitization refers to “discourses and political constellations” with rhetorical and semiotic feature any argument can affect sufficiently the audience. Thus the audience can be convinced that the existential threats are what the rulers or securitizing actors say; and they can tolerate the limitations of daily life and violations of the rules. Securitization is defined as an extreme degree of “politicization” that is made up by a scale starting from “non-politicized” to “politicized”. “Politicization” means that states can either deal with the issue politicized (state makes it as a part of public policy and resource allocations, decisions) or take the issue as an ordinary, non-politicized, not a public debate. Similarly, securitization means that a state or an actor presents an issue as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and mobilization of tools (Buzan et., al. 1998, pp.23-24). The existential threats led the decision makers legitimize to take the necessary measures and use the tools. There is no standard security issue since it is also a phenomenon among statesmen, leaders, strategists or even academics as articulators of the situation. Securitization and politicization are not always performed by states, but also other entities like institutions in order to raise an issue to the level of the highest consideration or even

urgency. Here, the central point is not what people consciously consider an issue as security, but how they use it in some ways make an issue as a prior one. An international issue is more important than the others and presented as an existential threat and urgent.

Securitizations may likely be at both middle and large scales. In their recent work entitled “Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitization theory”, Buzan and Waever (2009) made a distinction between the middle and system levels whereby they offer a new concept “macrosecuritization”. Buzan and Waever argue that after the events of September 11 Bush and Blair used a discourse under the label of a so-called “Global War on Terror”. They also give the examples from the modern discourse about climate change and ancient times including the Crusades (mobilizing in the name of a ‘universal’ religion), and the 18th and 19th century securitization of monarchies against the threat of republicanism (Ibid., p.254).

Huysmans (2006) underlines “the institutionalization of security threats” like in the immigration case in Europe. This also is in agreement with what Schmitt characterizes, enmity and exclusion. For him, due to threatening “others” to political life or security, there may be some exceptions that provide a “suspension of the normal rules of politics” (cited in Williams, 2003, pp.514-516). Loader (2005) makes a point for “securitization of Europe” in the sense that “meaning and meaning-formation are of course internally differentiated, institutionally and discursively overlapping, and unevenly articulated at sub-national, national and transnational levels.” He also claims that “Europe’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations are now being constructed by processes of securitization.”

1.2.2.4.2. Securitizing Actors

Securitizing actors who securitize issues declare something, that is, referent object as existentially threatened. At state level, the government securitizes the state or state sovereignty (Buzan et., al., 1998, p.36). Therefore, certain discursive rules are imposed on the securitizing actor because it refers to identity of all members of those national groups. When it comes to the nations (group, party, movement, and people of Europe) the problem of legitimacy becomes visible in who represent nations (Buzan et. al, 1998, p.41). The securitizing actors and the referent objects are different from each other and but for states, they can mostly speak for themselves because they are the authorized representations. In order to analyze other security levels, it would be appropriate to examine how the security actors declare an issue as a security matter, and to look at the pattern of security connectedness. For instance, in “regional security complexes”, one should respond to the question on whether an issue is successfully expressed in terms of security by any actors; how any security action can be imposed on the security of others and when this repeats significantly. This is apparent in the EU in terms of “who represents the voice of the EU”²³. Both the people of European Union and the outsiders see the High Representative Javier Solana as a speaker of the Europeans? (Alarcon, 2004, p.154) Or, does the Head of the Member State who is currently holding the Presidency constitute the Representative of the Union in foreign and security matters?” The responses can vary on the policy basis. However, it can seem that the EU is a highly institutionalized entity which has already created a framework for articulation of the security issues. There may be overlapping referent objects such as nation, state, people and government. This is also evidenced by an extensive analysis of the European security issues. For example, some of the political elites (Buzan et. al. give the French case) articulate that their national identity is also constructed in European identity. One of the reasons of this self-identification is that the European states do not want to return Europe’s past that is full of wars, fragmentation and struggle of

²³ This saying belongs to the former Secretary of State of the US Henry Kissinger in the form of “If I call Europe, what number should I dial?”. The critiques are directed towards the the political power of the EU and the representation of the people of the European Union.

power. France as a referent object is threatened by the outsiders. At the same time, France as identified itself as Europe is threatened by the US, Japan or the immigrants from the colonial states. On the contrary, Europe can constitute a threat against France as state. For example, some skeptics of the EU can refer to the long-lasting German issue or a deep integration as one of the major threats to the French national sovereignty (Buzan et.al., 1998, pp.171-172). This was overtly experienced during the de Gaulle era. Nevertheless, today it would not be erroneous to note that the relations among the European states are successfully desecuritized. Instead, new security issues are raised on the European agenda, and predominantly non-military in nature and including ethnic conflict, migration, political and economic instabilities, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, failed states and environmental degradation (European Security Strategy, 2003).

1.2.2.4.3. Securitization as “Speech Act”

The concept of international security is highly dependent on “what we are interested in” mostly where the distinguishing feature of securitization is generated from a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action). An issue is securitized when the audience accepts it (Buzan et. al., 1998, pp. 26-34). Buzan et. al. (1998, p.26) argue that “in security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means.” Here it is not the case of assessing some objective threats that must really be defended and secured, but it is concerned with the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.

The process of securitization is in language theory described as “speech act”. “Speech act” in security was first detailed by John Austin and John Searle. It is “saying something externally given and a speech act refers to itself, to the act of uttering security.” One may perceive a threat by saying “I threaten” or “I am threatened” (Huysmans, 2006,

p.24). For Waever (1995) it is not referring to something that is more real; but the utterance itself that is the act. McDonald (2008, p.68) argues that language itself constitute security in particular forms of language – be they spoken or written in a particular context. If one says something that is therefore a promise. Objective measures for security do not solely form securitization but provide the facilitating conditions of the security speech act. Facilitating conditions are the conditions under which the speech act works well or on the contrary is misused. Conditions for a successful speech act are categorized as follows: 1) the internal, linguistic, grammatical to follow the rules of the act 2) the external, contextual and social. A successful speech act is a “combination of language and society of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech.

The internal aspect of a speech act requires the security form, mostly the grammar of security and constructs a map that includes

existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out-the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector and so on. (Waever, 1995)

As for the external conditions of a speech act, it includes first the securitizing actor who holds the authority not necessarily officially. Secondly, threat should be referred to certain objects that are threatening like tanks, pollution and terrorism in variety of sectors.

Speaking for each sector, in labeling an existential threat the most important thing is the emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that description by a significant audience (Buzan, et al., 1998, p.27). In some cases, since securitization has already become institutionalized and there isn't need to talk of such an emergency time. For example, by saying defense one describes an area of urgency that has already priority and security issue. Here, the aim is to mark the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the natural quality of security after defining it as the survival of collective units and principles.

Security is a general term that can vary across the sectors. Security means survival of in the face of existential threats differing from sector to sector. Then what do “sectors” mean? They are defined as “views of the international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units.” (Buzan et. al., 1998, p.27) If security implies interactions and relations among states and societies, it is appropriate to differentiate the sectors or types of interaction as military, political, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan, at. al., 1998). The existence of threat and the nature of survival still remain but differ across different sectors and types of unit.

The term “security” is also losing its objectivity (that means there is a real threat and there is a perceived threat). However, the central point is that the securitization of an issue should not be taken as an issue is a real threat or not. An objective measurement on security is necessarily expected by the students of Security Studies. If any one finds an objective security measurement, then it would not be useful because each country defines its own security threats in different words (Wolfers cited in Buzan et. al., 1998, p.30). For example, the former Yugoslavian state (Serbia) defines the Kosovo issue as secession from the Serbian territory while Kosovo Albanians perceive the threat against their existence and survival in certain areas such as politics, education, health and taxation. Franke (cited in MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p.242) also warns against “oversecuritization” like securitizing everything from nuclear weapons including even unproven allegations that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons in Iraq, and Taliban’s Afghanistan to soft security issues like migration mainly from East to European territory. Such a securitization type may lose its reliability and acceptance possibility in the eyes of the (national and international) audience, and even resulted in clashes between individuals, states and societies on or world-wide level.

1.2.2.4.4. Security Measures

Security includes not only threats or problems or definition of an existential threat, but also measures to tackle with them. The realist thinking declares its measures as “use of force” to block any threatening development. The term “security” has been used in terms of “use of force” as measurement when a state acts at the expense of international peace and security. The Security Council, under Chapter VII, Article 42 the Member States to use military force to solve the problem. It should be noted that states have a “tendency to associate issues with the concept of security so that they can bring force, by introducing and legitimizing a whole new set of issues (the environment) that can be securitized...” (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p.242)

On the spectrum the places of issues vary: In changing circumstances, any issue can be a part of that spectrum. The spectrum can also be updated in respect of issues and states and the international relations. If a threat is persistent or recurrent then the measure comes after very urgently and became institutionalized. Not every issue is publicized and presented as urgent and dramatic because it has been long before established as a security issue and pushed to a legitimized act in state’s policy. In developed states armed forces and intelligence services are established following an elaboration of authorization procedures (Buzan et. al., 1998). In general, states hand over their rights to use the instruments to eliminate the threat towards them. For example, after the terrorist attacks in the US, Turkey, Spain and Britain, the leaders always address the prevention of any terrorist attacks under the framework of NATO. Even NATO launched its first operations outside Europe and has undergone a transformation of its forces and capabilities (NATO Update, 12 September 2001).

There is not only one type of universal threat and measure. It may be “civilian” instruments which are used commonly by the EU as an example. The EU also claims that by addressing the root causes of conflicts and instabilities “wide ranging collective response is the best way to deal with complex, inter-connected threats” (Biscop and

Driessens, 2006, p.277). Claiming that EU as a “civilian power” (by Duchene in 1972) or “normative power” (by Manners 2002), its civilian instruments are listed as “diplomacy, aid, trade and enlargement.” (Toje, 2008, p.39) The securitization is usually towards the protection of five European core values such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p.42). The tools that are used by the EU will be examined in the following sections.

1.2.2.4.5. Security Referents

Security referent objects are seen to be “existentially threatened” and have a legitimate claim to survival. They are, in general, declared in hidden way as a state, individual, society, region, world or a nation to call for collectivity and handle the threats by securitizing actors – mostly the statesmen (Buzan et. al., 1998, p.36).

The realist approach advocates the core values of a state, highlighting only military threats coming from the outsiders and their distribution of capabilities and power. The material superiority poses threat to other states which are also perceived as observable and sometimes measurable to the realist scholars. Along the lines of this approach, the most obvious object of security is “state” or “national security” that is the common level of security and security threats in terms of politico-military understanding. Thus, for materialists/objectivists the most threatened referent object remains “state sovereignty” that is likely under military pressure. From the outside, threats are physically born out of a “natural existence of anarchy” that is the causes of wars. Anarchy corresponds to the international structure within which states try to acquire supremacy over the others and secure themselves (Buzan et. al., 1998, pp.21-37).²⁴

²⁴According to the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, the international arena is like domestic conditions where the people transfer their unlimited sovereign rights to the authority. Hobbes’ articulation of “the war of all against all” also means the state of war that is anarchy in domestic politics is also well illustrated in the relations among states because there is no supranational authority.

In response to that purely militaristic approach, the concept of security is contended by the change in the post-Cold War era that put the definition of security under debate and under-theorized categories of the study. Basically, as a sub-field of international relations, security is assumed as “politics of pursuit freedom from fear”. In that context, beside the essentials of the concept “security”, the scope of research somehow shifted from strategic studies to security studies which entail a wide range of security explanations. Strategic studies often deal with military threats as given and take it as an unconditional material product in military sector (Buzan, 2000). In face of a post-Cold War born intra-state or civil war, the term “security” becomes quite problematic when defining who threatens what. Naturally, the referent object of security itself is ill-defined in its levels and sectors: Does security matter other referents than “state” or “nations”? Here, the concept of security is getting broader in the sense that it is now dealing with new referent objects, thus state-centric epistemologies and methodologies almost remain more sub-sub-field. On the contrary, for some who study critical approaches are concerned with normative points of security. They ask what should be constructed as threats; what should not be; whose interests are served as a result of processes of securitization and desecuritization. While some would like to remain in state-centric approach many others adopt new concerns of other human collectivities (nations, tribes, regions, groups) and individuals for human well beings. Such an attempt, without a doubt, dragged most scholars into the narrow constraints of “national security”. Security implications at individual, regional, societal and global levels came along with the recently arising problems on environment, North-South division, objectives of sustainable development, violations of political and human rights. So called Brandt report of 1980 and the Palme Report 1982 both called for a reconceptualization of security referring to the interdependence among states in the international system. The “Brandt Report” was issued to “reduce the growing economic disparity between the rich North and developing South” (McSweeney, 1999, p.51). The Palme Report developed the concept of “common security”. The aim of the idea is to “move from insecurities of the Cold War to a position where both sides would recognize their common need to control the spread of nuclear weapons and deal with economic and

environmental issues. Such structural or indirect violence stems from the social structure itself between humans between sets of humans (societies), and between sets of societies (alliances and regions) (Galtung, 2003, p.2).²⁵ Thus, problems like poverty, unemployment, inflation, the threat of world recession, and environment issues make people insecure economically as well as in military terms (Buzan, 1991, p.45).

For a state and nation, respectively survival and identity are important. There may be some issues that have been viewed as threats to societal security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121). Migration is one of them: As illustration for this, Turkish migration into the EU or Russian migration to Estonia poses threats in terms of identity that could be changed by a shift in the composition of the population in migrated regions. Likewise, one can also construct anything as a referent object. Sometimes individuals and small groups claim broader security legitimacy. At the system level, nuclear threats of the Cold War represent referent objects that create some problems directly against humankind and currently in the post-Cold War era ignored at a system level. Humanity faces crimes as threats: Massacres and terrorism are also serious threats against humanity. Hence, some limited collectivities seem more agreeable for securitization as long-lasting referent objects. These are states, nations, even civilizations and geographical regions which are also self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities. Such interaction also reinforces “we” / “other” perception in terms of security referent and articulating actors. Although security privileges state with emphasis on military and political security neither is the state the only referent object nor is the concept absolutely equal to state or other collectivities (Ibid., 1998, p.39).

Now, the referent objects have become not only a state or a system but also any dynamics of regional level security (Buzan and Waever, 2003). In his book, Buzan (1991) explains “region” as a “distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other”. Buzan and Waever’s model of “interdependent” and “interrelated” states of

²⁵Galtung emphasizes that so far the violences were examined from the perspective of receiver.

region; and Waever's "speech act" approach are closely linked to the process of "securitization" in construction of security.

1.2.3. Levels of Analysis

The RSCT also constitutes a framework enabling us empirical studies of regional security that may be examined through four interrelated levels of analysis. In general, the RSCT is expected to analyze security interrelations among units within a region like Europe, the Middle East, the South Eastern Asia, the North America, the South America and etc. However, within a region there may often be levels or vertical or horizontal interrelations such as state-to-state relations and within states. Our contention of the RSCT is that the four levels include domestic aspects of states, state- to- state relations, interregional relations and global powers and state relations (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.51).

1.2.3.1. Domestic Aspects of States

This level includes domestically generated vulnerabilities and weaknesses. The state may pose threats structurally to other state or groups of states even if the state has no direct hostile intention against them. Under those conditions, any domestic problem may be handled by other states externally not to be affected by the severe consequences of such neighboring state/s. This is clearly evidenced by the European affairs where any decline in domestic conditions of European states might cause deep turmoil as in the cases of Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the Eastern European states during the post-Cold War era.

In the aftermath of the World War II, some West European countries (France, Italy and Greece) domestically encountered the Communist agitation which would have been a serious threat against the Western democracy and liberalism. The communist movements then (in the post-war period) became almost an ideological problem that trapped the countries in a predicament and were in fact externally forced, namely, by the Soviet Union. Besides, its domestic facet was also noteworthy: In Italy under the leadership of Communist party “an armed force to support a seizure of power” was established with the support of the Soviets (Ledeen, 1987, pp.30-31).²⁶ This was an open conviction of the US on the liberal world, which was so much alarmed together with its European allies. Americans promptly began to put an indirect pressure on its Western partners between 1945 and 1949 that culminated in the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. American intention was then largely predicated with the American intervention to the Italian election of 1948 (Hogan, 1989).

Likewise, during the 1970s, the illustrations of domestically problematic countries including Spanish, Portuguese and Greek cases well fit this category. More concretely, for example, after the death of Franco in 1975, Spain was a poor country lacking a strong democratic tradition. As a response, the Western Europe (through the Council of Europe, the European Community and NATO) extended its political and economic influence to Spain assuming that “the further influence on those politically and economically weak states the safer they will be” (Thody, 1997, pp.21-22). The security of Spain was relatively equal the security of Europe. For that reason, “to be a European” meant for the Europeans

²⁶ Even though such happenings in Italy seemed an external intervention by the two superpowers the Communist threat was domestically provoked and at a large scale became developed against the political ideology of the Western world. More particularly, for example in Italy as a very domestic issue, the Communism was also nourished from the very worsening economic conditions of the working-class and the role of the State on the implementation of those weak economic policies in and during the aftermath of the World War I. For example, the economically poor and weary metal-workers in the industrialized Northern Italian cities like Turin or Milan, in a more organized way were already actively standing against the liberal ruling class and their policies. These movements were also headed by the intellectual and political leaderships of Antonio Gramsci as the founder of Italian Communist party and the political leaders of the party Palmira Togliatti or Luigi Longo. In Italy, with a great portion of public support the Communist ideology that had become a domestic political fact and pursuing a strong party politics had reached its peak after the World War II and continued till the end of the Cold War. Such ideological polarization in Italy was more often perceived as a threat against the West oriented policies during the Cold War.

primarily to secure Spain as well as Europe, by making Spain abide by the obligations of the Western democracies in civil rights and democracy as well as economic issues during the transition to democracy (Royo and Manuel, 2003, p.120).

Differing relatively from those of the Cold War era, in the post-Cold War, most of the security threats include nationalism, ethnic and religious conflicts, political and economic instabilities and social problems. For Duffield (2001), in the beginning of the post-Cold War era, there were totally 12 internal conflicts which were mainly ethnic conflicts that occurred in the East Europe stretching throughout Russian territory. Some of them were on the soil of former Yugoslavian republics which were mainly perceived as a “civil” war, an “internal” problem stemming from domestic reasons (Ibid.). At the beginning, the external powers remained reluctant in intervening to the conflicts; but, in the end, the West European countries feared that the conflict would drag them into the conflict and turn the relations into a power politics among the core EU states. Similarly, the threat of refugees or immigrants all influence, in particular, relevant neighboring countries in the region. In the early 1997 in Albania an economic and political crisis broke out and led a civil unrest and the collapse of the central government. As a regional and neighboring country Italy took the initiative for conducting Operation Alba, a multinational international force (Carpenter, 2000, p.127). Political and economic instabilities in Russia and the Mediterranean are the best examples of domestic conflicts. The problems in the Mediterranean will be studied in Chapter II.

There are several cases for domestically born instabilities, problems and threats which also make a great impact on other peripheral regions. In this thesis, since the main concentration is put on the Euro-Mediterranean region, it would be sufficient to keep the cases in Europe. From the early years until the end of the Cold War, the European continent was fragmented between not only the East and West but also between the suspicious and problematic states. These included newly born Republics out of other nondemocratic regimes like Fascism, namely, Italy, France, Greece or Portugal and searching for their fate in the new ideological alternatives. More concretely, as Linz and Stepan (1996, p.113)

claim that the EEC's democratic character helped those countries' transition and consolidation and saved them from possible future insecure domestic conditions. The European Community was seen as a symbol of democracy and development fighting with dictatorship. This is mainly due to the fact that the Western Europe saw the political and ideological cleavage in both in the Western Europe (specifically the Southern Europe and the Eastern Europe) as the major security threat. In the post-Cold War, those threats were seen in Europe's peripheral regions like the Eastern Europe that was contained and democratized through a number of stabilization and democratization programs that eventually led the membership (See also for example K. E. Smith, 2004). The instabilities and risks have already been over now while the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean have still been suffering from the undemocratic rulers and their practices.

1.2.3.2. State-to-State Relations

State-to-State relations generate one of the essences of the regional security complex approach. Such type of relations in the European security complex area was relatively popular when modern international system – the Westphalian system - as a composite of sovereign states with exclusive authority in its own geographical boundaries began (Krasner, 1995, p.115) “Sovereignty” had become almost a national matter among the states. The so-called equally sovereign states may have disagreements, conflicts or wars that pose large threats to international or/and regional peace. Many researchers study which, how and why states go to war against each other. Some like Cashman (2000, p.142) argue that great powers were involved in this type of activity more than small nations. Speaking specifically for Europe where several cruelest wars were between major rivals and great powers Germany and France, which had been in militarized conflicts 17 times between 1816 and 1986 in 96 years (Geller and Singer, 1998). The contemporary European political history was on the other hand revolved around the German-French relations or the German problem (where France was invaded three times by Germany in 1871, 1914-18 and

1939-45). From then on, France came to terms that Germany as an economically and militarily strong state that would be a potential threat unless a France-German alliance was built up and German problem would be resolved through an economic integration. The integration was realized first in coal and steel sector in 1951, and then in industrial goods in 1957 (Dedman, 1996, p.2). The containment of Germany and the signing of the European integration agreements were meaningful since these events significantly mark the starting of the European security complex spectrum ranging from “conflict formation” where states still feared each other to today’s security community type of Europe.

As for why states wage war on each other, the reasons may differ depending on one’s theoretical stance. Since the theoretical considerations are not the main subject of this part, we may only refer to the main distinction to a certain degree. For example, some realists such as Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1948) argue that interstate wars occur because the system is anarchic and the states are trying to maintain their security, maximize their interests and power vis-a-vis each other (Geller and Singer, 1998, p.6) On the other hand, a few researchers have marked the importance of the role of decision makers in foreign affairs. Singer (1981, p.3) argues that the outbreak of wars become inevitable since foreign policy elites make false predictions about the consequences of actions. He also contends that the conditions that are necessary for waging war are: “the fact that humans can behave aggressively and that many of them do seek power or territory under the proper stimuli; the availability of transport and weapons technology; centralized decision authority; some sort of credible justification, and so forth.” Cashman (2000, p.142) argues that there are variety of reasons for interstate conflicts including territorial demands, power, size, technology and development.

Many conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries; border problems like Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan; the conflicts in Africa (between Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda and their tribal problems) are best illustrated as territorial problems. Other than those conflicts, Duffield (2001) also claims that in particular in the early years of the post-Cold War era, there existed 15 interstate conflicts in Europe. While in the West

Europe there is no interstate conflict, in the Southeastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union territory, there occurred interstate conflicts many of which were ethnic and armed conflicts. Currently, violent conflicts are relatively small, yet serious structural (mainly political and societal) conflicts still threaten the whole continent. In the West Europe, states form a “zone of peace” that was transformed from “conflict formation” and armed hostilities on a significant scale are unimaginable. However, one can still talk of a fear for security since the spill-over effects of the conflicts generating from the Western Balkans still continue. In the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands refugees including mostly Bosnian, Kosovar and Albanian people fled towards respectively to Germany and Austria; Macedonia; and Italy, to their neighboring countries (Ibid., pp.235-246). Another negative effect for Europe is addressed by Mearsheimer in his fragmentation scenario that also implies the “emergence of a conflicting Europe (mostly the great powers) due to European states’ taking a side between the conflicting parties”. For example, during the Bosnian War in the 1990s, Germany and the USA took forceful action against Serbian side while France, Britain and Russian were opposing such an intervention. The “fear of fragmentation” might drag Europe into instability and conflict as it did in the past (Mearsheimer, 1990).

To provide security, European Union, as an institutionalized form of a regional security complex, has adopted a number of conflict management and prevention mechanisms differing according to the types of conflict. Among those activities, even for the interstate conflicts around it, Europe uses an institutional form of conflict management tools like NATO (See also for example Borawski and Durell-Young, 2001; Howorth and Keeler, 2003) and/or EU membership or EU’s particular policies towards the Western Balkans (including economic and financial aids). In Turkish-Greek conflict case that is also known as a sovereignty issue, the EU demanded Turkey (as a candidate state) to settle the border disputes with Greece peacefully and continue its efforts to improve bilateral relations (Turkey 2009 Progress Report). Such a “conditionality” factor for Turkey is crucial to further prevent Europe from the unstable and insecure circumstances that would generate from Turkey-Greece disagreement (Rumelili, 2008, p.111).

In a nutshell, without a doubt, interstate disagreements and conflicts still exist and are among the main security issues that can affect international peace and stability. While worldwide interstate conflicts were shadowed by the superpower effect in systemic level, in the post-Cold War era the regional ones can be handled by regional units such as states, institutions and organizations. In Europe, as the historically prominent core of international security system, there had been many brutal wars that broke out between the sovereign states of Europe and stretched throughout the 20th century. This was best illustrated by the historical conflict between France and Germany that is currently over and transformed into cooperation under European integration. However, there still exist a number of interstate conflicts mainly due to the border disputes between states attributed as “zone of turmoil” and currently contained by the “zone of peace” namely the EU (for this discussion see also for example Singer and Wildavsky, 1993).

1.2.3.3. Interregional Relations

“Interregional” corresponds to the region’s interaction with its neighboring regions. In general, the definition of a regional security complex that is explained by external interaction remains relatively limited since the internal interaction within a region constitutes the major indicator (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.51). In particular in European studies this level becomes significant due to the European security complex is called as “security community” that is also taken as a unit or sometimes actor. The EU is a clear exemplar of security community type of complex. Taken as a unit, Hettne contends that the EU has four types of foreign and security relations:

1. Enlargement towards prospective members
2. Stabilization towards neighbors
3. Bilateralism towards great and strong powers
4. Interregionalism towards other regions and regional organizations (Hettne, 2008, p.9).

Due to a number of external threats, that are composed of mostly soft threats the EU has built a range of interregional relations; local conflicts; immigration; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; organized crime; and failed states (European Security Strategy, 2003). EU maintains its relations with the Eastern and Central European countries which then became the EU members; the Western Balkans and Turkey which are now seen the potential members of the EU; and finally its neighboring areas which are constituted as a “region” by the EU and named “Neighbors”. The EU has endorsed its policies towards the Mediterranean and the Eastern countries by building the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aiming at stabilizing the EU’s neighborhood (Hettne, 2008, p.9). Buzan and Waever (2003, p.374) contend that “interregionalism” becomes significant during the post-Cold War era. Since the EU – Europe started to interact with the post-Soviet region and the Middle East. Russia, Ukraine, Moldova figure the most important boundary cases for the EU-Europe. In addition, the EU shares political and organizational processes with those countries under a range of organizations through the OSCE and partly the Council of Europe. The EU has built a deep relationship with the Middle East which has a distinct dimension based on their colonial past. The Barcelona process is a clear example of a region building project based on cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors, where peace and stability remain as priority. Hettne (2008, p.22) also reminds us that the “Mediterranean region does not exist in a formal sense, but is rather a pure social construction shaped by the EU’s own security concerns.”

This argument is also grounded on the actorness debate that is usually referring to “external behavior”. The concept of actorness was developed by Bretherton and Vogler. The EU, in character shifted from “regionness” to “actorness” has the capacity to “formulate purposes; make decisions; engage in some form of purposive action” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p.17). Its unique nature gives the Union to adopt a sort of interregionalism in the form of an effective actorness in its neighborhood (Hettne, 2008, p.22).²⁷ For example the EU has developed a number of policies such as “conflict

²⁷ On the other hand, actorship in the North America cannot be mentioned; NAFTA for instance can be active with its presence but remains weak in terms of regionness and actorness.

prevention” and “crisis management” towards the third parties which are all the indicators of the EU’s incentives for taking responsibility in interregional areas. This is due to the fact that the European security complex is closely affected by its neighboring regions in terms of instability and insecurity.

In sum, as the most significant level of analysis of the thesis, the interregional level will be much more focused on Chapter II where the fact that European security has become meaningful with other regions’ (the neighboring regions’) security concerns such as the Mediterranean and the Eastern part of the European continent.

1.2.3.4. Global Powers and State Relations

This category includes the “role of global powers in the region” and the “interplay between the global and regional security structures” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.51). In the previous sections, it was clearly indicated that the essence of the RSCT is derived from the idea that with the ending of the Cold War the regional level become autonomous and prominent. The theory helps us “to systematically link the internal conditions, interrelations among units and interplaying regional dynamics with the global actor” (Ibid., pp.2-3). Lake and Morgan (1997, p.125) also contend that the US and the SU played an active role in most regions during the Cold War; the regions can also shape the behavior of great powers in regional politics and determined the security complexes. Kremenjuk (1991, p.144) argues that historically the “resolution of regional conflicts is a matter of practical implementation in the US-Soviet relations.” Nijman (1992, pp.681-684) observed that throughout the Cold War, superpowers were, at one time or another, involved in regional conflicts around the globe from Horn of Africa to Cuba, from Czechoslovakia to Vietnam. This is also referred to “geographic dimension” of superpower relations much labeled as “global reach”, “control of worldwide networks”, “global projection of power”, “control of territory” and “size of influences”. Regional conflicts are “concrete and self-contained situations” that are linked to the “basic contradictions existing in the world arena”

(Kremenyuk, 1991, p.151). Macfarlane (1990, p.3) claims that “military positions throughout much of the Third World have been considered by each to be useful in the attempt to threaten and contain each other.” For example in 1977-1978 the USSR and the US “attempted to negotiate on the issue of the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean on the Middle East—concerning which with they even signed a joint statement on Conventional arms trade” (Kremenyuk, 1991, p.151).

When it comes to the post-Cold War era, Morgan and Lake (1997, p.125) contend that the great power influence were limited and the regional security complexes became the determinants of great power behaviors. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.52) assert that “regional patterns of conflict shape the lines of intervention by global level of powers.” On the other hand, Lake and Morgan (1997, p.139) admit such a fact but add that security concerns of the leaders of the great powers and their domestic support about the regional security complex are also important. Incentives for intervention by the great powers are affected by their economic interests, ideological and ethnic ties and human rights concerns in a region. This is clearly evidenced by the US interference to the West European affairs. For example, even in the post-Cold War era the super powers of the Cold War, namely, the US and Russia intervened to a number of conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Central Asia. It was the US which was leading NATO and decided to launch a military campaign against the Serbian sides during the Bosnian war and almost ended the long lasting bloody war. Before its intervention, the great powers of the EU who were clashing among themselves (France and Britain on the one side, Germany on the other) could not propose and implement a comprehensive strategy towards the area that made the conflict last four years. On the other hand, the US as the champion of the Cold War again came to the terms that without it international security could not be provided overall and endorsed an idea of European security that is still vitally important for the US. However, the Bosnian war in the regional analysis of the European security complex is much imperative since an explicit line is drawn with the end of this conflict (in 1996) when a burden sharing is proposed in the Berlin NATO Summit decision to develop the idea of Combined Joint

Forces²⁸ so that the European members of NATO can carry out an operation without the presence of the US (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003, p.102). The autonomous structure of the EU in military terms came with a number of decisions that took in St. Malo between France and Germany and successive summits. It was most evidenced with the hand over of the peacekeeping forces led by NATO, IFOR, by the EU forces in the Western Balkans in the mid-2000s (Angel, 2010). However, we always keep the “European security” closely linked the transatlantic security, and never overlook the considerable American influence on the continent.

From then on, the transatlantic agenda was mostly slipped into the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. Blackwill and Stürmer (1997, p.1) argue that “Transatlantic policies should more and more take into account the growing web of interrelationships throughout the region.” In theory, in particular with the Iraqi War in 2003, the US - European harmony seemed more difficult to be achieved in the region today. “NATO member states were deeply split over the war on, occupation of, Iraq in 2003 and any NATO involvement in it.” Belgium, France and Germany on the one side, US, Britain, Italy and Spain on the other have been involved in a disagreement first on the protection of their ally Turkey against a possible counterattack on its territory and second on launching a military operation against Iraq (Schimmelfennig and Scholz, 2008, p.184). This was also apparent in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the US prefers to take more sympathetic actions towards Israel while the Europeans stand more anxious and firmly against Israelis. Yet, this does not practically lead to antagonistic relations between the US and Europe/the EU. Satloff (1997, pp.10-29) argues the US has three interests in the Middle East area: “preserving the security of Israel, maintaining the unfinished flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices and ensuring regional stability”. He also claims that the EU has also complementary, but sometimes divergent interests from those of the US: “regional stability, energy and migration”. In the light of these objectives, the EU has employed different (but

²⁸ At the Brussels Summit of 1994, NATO endorsed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept. It was composed of easily deployable multinational military formations. In 1996 NATO decided to create a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO which would support autonomous military operations within NATO.

not contradictory) instruments in the region. The EU has preventive policies like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (focusing mostly on the North Africa), sending peacekeeping forces, being involved in political and economic coordination and diplomacy (in particular with Iranian case). In the Israeli case, the EU has engaged in diplomacy that intensified with a declaration in Venice Summit of heads of state and government and the ministers of foreign affairs of the EEC. Accordingly, the EU recognized the right of self-determination of Palestinians and of the PLO, which would participate in the Middle East Peace Process (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, 1981, p.134). The US had stood much firm on this issue. However, it would be wrong to conclude that there is a strict distinction between the US and EU views on the Middle Eastern cases. The split is most commonly seen in the “use of force” matters as in the case of Iraqi war of 2003.

Nearly for 20 years, the global power effect on regions has not been as same as that was during the Cold War era. No one can deny that there is still US influence on European continent; yet it was at the lesser scale in the form of “the alliance” though mainly backed by NATO. However, Schimmelfennig and Scholz (2008, p.186) argue that even in the “new NATO” there are key differences from the “old NATO”. In the former, with the institutional transformation within NATO, it became flexible organization (as in the CJTF Concept) in which it would be applied in case basis and the arrangement would be determined according to the circumstances, and member states’ plans and contributions. The technical division in terms of “burden sharing” is acceptable by the two sides while in the Middle East the EU/many European countries prefer to be silent. However, another model for “burden sharing” between these two allies can also be seen in the Mediterranean region: While the US take the leadership in military campaigns, the EU handles the other sectors such as political, economical and societal security issues.

1.2.4. Main Variables of Regional Security Complex

Buzan and Waever (2003, pp.31-32) argue that “the theory offers the possibility of systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, relations between regions and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers.” In addition, while analyzing those patterns, some changes and continuities within these structures may be highlighted. Because they have geographical lines (it has both internal and external boundaries and marks the differentiation among the regions); relational dynamics forming a historical scale ranging from enmity to amity or as such; and the structural properties that imply the anarchy, power and polarity. Among all, first “boundary” will be much more focused on since the thesis mainly examines the interregional settings and states’ places within the RSCs. Second, social construction covering the relationship types (patterns of enmity and amity among the units) also constitutes a prominent section since it clearly points out the internal feature of the structure. As for the power, polarity and anarchical structure, it has relatively less relevance in our study since the idea of using polarity is linked to military-political structure at the system level most commonly during the Cold War. Although it is still possible to define post-Cold War polarity as in the case that the US is still perceived as a superpower or there appear as regional powers, polarity had failed to achieve any definitional consensus. Therefore, in this section the variables are examined and ordered by relevance and importance.

1.2.4.1. Boundary

In the RSCT, boundary amounts to the differentiation of one RSC from its neighbors. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.4) assert one of the salient characters of the RSCT as “geography” that is drawn by (as it should be) definite boundaries on map. In a fact, there are a number of boundary related studies, be they internal identity, cultural boundaries, political sovereignty, interstate boundary disputes and separatist movements. In RSCs “boundary” amounts to the questions on state positions within the regions and the regional frontiers.²⁹ Geographic significance is here noticeably linked to “territoriality” and “frontier”.

Lake and Morgan (1997, p.48) claim that a regional system is “a set of states affected by at least one transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area.” They offer the concepts of “neighborhood” and “spill over” effects to define “externalities” as “costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them” A regional security system is thereby produced if a “local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states” (Ibid., p.49). They introduce “externality” as an alternative to “geography” that also postulate the existence of a definite boundary. However, this idea was not supported by Lake and Morgan since they argue that “externalities are not necessarily limited in their effects to states within a particular geographic neighborhood.” For them a global actor like the US can also be affected by the externalities in any RSC. Vayrynen (2003, pp.26-27) goes much further and puts “region formation” on a more tangible theoretical ground where he privileges “geography” one way or another. First, he differentiates between physical (geographical and strategic) regions and functional (economic, environmental and cultural) regions. More concretely, “physical regions refer to territorial, military and economic spaces controlled primarily by states but functional regions are defined by non-territorial factors such as culture and the market that are purview of non-state actors.” The geographical focus is also elaborated by Anderson

²⁹ State debate will take place in the following sections.

(1998, p.8) in terms of “boundary” or “frontier” as follows: “the frontier is the basic political institution; no rule-bound economical, social and political life in advanced societies could be organized without them.” Frontier is central for states since it is equal to the idea of sovereignty, on the other hand, for regions there may be frontier arrangements that are technically determined, disregarding the Westphalian type of sovereignty. For example, in Europe a new frontier policy was launched with the signing of EEC in 1991 when frontier controls were dismantled among European states with the launching “four freedoms contained in the Treaty of Rome”. Vayrynen (2003, p.27) also argues that “state” is a clear example of territorial region whereas functional regions are constituted by non-state units such as a cultural or ethnic group or a broader community at regional level such as European level and more specifically, the European Union. The EU example taken together with Europe in Buzan’s RSCT, constitutes a “territorial identity” other than solely a functional region. More clearly, the EU/Europe is a security complex where the boundaries and “territorial identity” are redefined in particular with the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, “territory” became a prominent indicator for security concerns and priorities in the region where security was also defined externally. Speaking for “Western Europe” in the Cold War era, the EU was formed by its members first so as to prevent the continent from the effects of another world war, and then evolved into a security community that is based on a large integration project. With the end of the Cold War, the EU was more often qualified as “Europe” due to the rising tendencies for the extension of the EU territories throughout the Eastern Europe with an objective of the unification of two Europes. With the fall of the Berlin Wall (a prominent symbol of the Cold War) and the European enlargement, a new territorial organization was introduced by the EU in the post-Cold War security environment. In security terms, the boundaries are depicted regardless of the units having historical and organic ties with those bordering to them. In the process of European integration the Union’s internal (ethnic and territorial) boundaries may change whereas the external boundaries of the Union may become “more impermeable”. This is because “meanings and functions of these boundaries appropriately

point up that the European political space is now being managed in terms of enlargement of the EU” (Virkkunen, 2001, p.141).

With the prospects for unification of Europe, the post-Cold War patterns of politics drifted Europe a core-periphery reality in perceiving the security issues. The boundaries are now drawn in line with Europe’s insecurity areas and the frontlines where the external threats are generating from. It would be noteworthy to classify the periphery which constitutes a number distinct regional security sub-complexes while retaining Europe at the core: 1) The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) region including the Western Balkans 2) Greece and Turkey 3) The Mediterranean that is composed of Mashreq and Maghreb (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

The CEECs and the Western Balkans attract the most attention of the EU. The CEECs is more often seen as are “gained part of Europe” –or half of Europe when the former “Eastern” countries intended to “return to Europe” of “democratic and prosperous states” (Zielonka, 2007, p.24). The conditions were clear that their inclusion or more progressively their “integration” make the whole Europe desecuritized by removing it out of being a central security issue.³⁰ For those ex-Communist countries “the West is their anchor of stability-and the sources of security guarantees” (Waever, 2005, p.168). In the end, they provided themselves with the most security guarantee that they gained the membership status in the EU even if there have still been many societal security problems such as –minority and properties problems- within the region. When the enlargement took place, the insecurity region moved towards borderlines of Ukraine, Moldova and even Georgia. The major security concerns slipped towards the whole Europe and the EU integration: With joining to the EU and being a part of the EU integration, the Eastern

³⁰ In 1990, the Commission led by European Commission President Jacques Delors adopted an approach that “an integrated Europe would be at the center” making first connections with the CEECs through the Europe Agreements, that are special association agreements. Shortly after having offered economic aids, the EU put the main conditions by the Copenhagen Summit of 1993 so that the CEECs could be integrated easily: To improve democracy, human rights, a liberal market economy and the rule of law. With the NATO membership expectations the Eastern countries tried to securitize themselves desecuritize themselves internally as well as externally.

European countries also have the same dilemma that are fear of integration and fear of fragmentation. While the former implies insecurity and an external threat to the national sovereignty, the latter has become the more important since after the Balkan wars the area has more often been seen as an area of potential ethnic conflicts and nationalism and related security risks. Therefore, the integration seems more desirable thing from the western and eastern European sides given their entrance to the EU and promising practices towards stable democracies and market economies (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.367).

Apart from the Eastern Europe, other parts stated above are categorized as “the outer circles of EU-Europe.” However, the Western Balkans can also be included within the “eastern circles of the EU” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp.364-368). Even though the actors in the former Yugoslavia are connected to each other closely, the surrounding of the Balkans that is mainly composed of the EU/European security complex. The internal dynamics of the region are now controlled by the external actors, namely the member states of the EU. Even if the Balkans is not overlaid by the Western powers entirely, in the medium term, the region remains as a subcomplex of Europe, and in the long term, it might be integrated to the core Europe regardless of its “sub-complex” position (Buzan and Waever, 2003).³¹

In the light of these facts, therefore, the EU gives a special importance to the Western Balkans in its policies. In the Summits of the European Council at Feira in 2000 (European Council, 2000) and the European Council at Thessalonki in 2003 (European Council, 2003), the EU stated its prospects of EU membership for the Western Balkans countries thus working for “strengthening the political, economic cooperation, enhanced support for institution building and promotion of economic growth” in the region. It was

³¹ This is due to the “asymmetry of power between the actors in and around the Balkans”; it means that the external powers force the Balkans into the European complex. The Balkans is considered to be a subcomplex within the European RSC which is sometimes defined as an “overlay” and a region that is “repressed by the outsiders”.

also repeatedly stated that the boundary of the EU will not be drawn until the Western Europe is included in the Union.³²

Despite the Eastern member states' entrance and the commitments given to the Western Balkans, it would be noteworthy to say that Central Europe is still presented as an area of "ethnic conflicts, nationalism and political instabilities" and a number conflict scenarios are produced in particular for the Western Balkans.

Tocci and Emerson (2004, p.8) also remind us that the most important challenge posed by Turkey's inclusion to the Union: Thus, it would be impossible for the Union to control its external borders and to act beyond them. This is because EU's borders will reach Syria, Iraq and Iran and the South Caucasus where the member states have to engage in the EU's south-eastern periphery that is also far from the European continent. In addition, boundary becomes important when Turkish question is associated with its long term border and other problems with one of the EU member states, Greece (Turkey, the Report on the Progress 2008).³³

The EU's other boundary has become so prominent in particular with the end of the Cold War: the Mediterranean that is formed by the Maghreb and the Mashreq regions. King (cited in Anderson, 1998, p.8) argues that the "problematic southern façade of the EU, the Mediterranean is the center of the earth and has often been a unifying sea but now seems to represent a great frontier between the developed north and overpopulated poor south". The EU has actually had historical ties with the region. The Middle East issues and the inter-Arab connections (between Maghreb and Mahreq) and the direct risks /threats

³² Before the European Council and the E.U.-Western Balkans Summit of Thessaloniki that was held on 19-20 June and 21 June 2003, the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten had stated that: "Thessaloniki will send two important messages to the Western Balkans: The prospect of membership of the EU is real, and we will not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined.

³³ This is due to the fact that the EU has still seen its external threats coming from across its borders. Therefore, the Aegean dispute, the conditions of Turkish minorities in Greece and Greek minorities in Turkey, and most importantly the Cyprus issue are the sources of insecurity constituted in their relationship with EU/European. For that reason, since 1998 Turkey has been reported that it had to solve its border disputes with Greece peacefully in the progress reports that are published annually (See also for example, Turkey, the Report on the Progress 2008).

coming from the Maghreb all raised a new dynamism in Europe in particular since the 1990s. Threats of immigration, political/economic instabilities, Islamic fundamentalism linked to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction all on the Europe's doorstep. One of the obstacles in maintaining the relations with the region is that the EU does not and will not use a promise of eventual membership to influence the politics in particular in Maghreb. With the increasing tensions in the Middle East and the September 11 attacks on the US, the Mediterranean that is the sum of two subcomplexes of the North America and the Middle East has become a long term security concern (Anderson, 1998).

“Boundary” that derives from the geographical dimension of the RSCT, is essential in drawing the lines of the RSCs. One must say that the borderlines are not precise overall; they are blurred at the same time. This is valid in particular frontier states. For example, Strassoldo (1998, p.75) gives the example of the borderlands of Italian north-east that has a complex situating in the point of contact between Latin, Slavs and Germanics in a historical context. Today this is the same: Italy is surrounded by a number of civilizations of the Mediterranean, Europe and the East. However, we can make a much clearer categorization that the country is defined within the European Security Complex in relation to its history, culture, political and economic system. Even if the boundaries are difficult to define, they are important to draw a “conceptual framework that classifies security regions into a set of types, and so provides a basis for comparative studies” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.4).

1.2.4.2. Anarchic Structure, Power and Polarity

This section takes “anarchy”, “power” and “polarity” together since the variables are closely related to the RSCT assumptions inspired from neorealists’ “structure”, “the capabilities of the units” and the “interaction among the units” analysis. Anarchy is defined in the RSC as two or more autonomous units that compose the RSCs. Polarity means “distribution of power among the units”. Even though the RSCT refers to constructivism, it holds a structural feature that it takes from Waltz’s logic of anarchy, power and polarity, at regional level.

Singer’s level of analysis explanations are also seen in Waltz’s system level analysis in terms of structure. This is prominent in identifying the boundary between unit and system. Units are states whereas system is structure in neorealist accounts (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993). Units are located and interacting under anarchy. Anarchy is assumed to be the most important political condition of international structure. It is one of the ordering principles of international systems.³⁴ Waltz’ logic of anarchy is central to neorealism which Buzan and Weaver refer to in their work.

Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) explains the logic of anarchy in neorealism as

the agents of those units pursue actions that will ensure not only that the political units can survive and reproduce themselves in the anarchic system but also that the anarchic structure of the international system is simultaneously albeit unintentionally reproduced.

The notion that “anarchic system emerges since individual units begin to coact” is also seen at regional level (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993). Buzan and Waever (2003, p.28) also contends that:

[n]eorealism is in some respects strong on territoriality and the potential harmony and synergy between it. And the regionalist perspective is high, especially when states are the main actors.

³⁴ The other is hierarchy.

“Within the structure of anarchy the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and enmity-amity relations” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.49). Enmity-amity relations will be studied in the following section.

Power is essential in analyzing the state identity and placement within a structure on a regional scale. It also brings about the concept of a regional balance of power where states take part in the same network of relations. The “distribution of power among units” or “polarity” implies that units are not equal in terms of power. This category refers to the number of poles within a system that can be bipolar, tripolar and multipolar in keeping with “state power” analysis (Mouritzen, 1997, p.69).³⁵ Accordingly, it would be appropriate to analyze the polarity and power relations. Bipolarity was well defined by the neorealists in the Cold War era. However, today, it becomes unclear to identify the “powers” and their interactions at the system level. This is due to the emergence of a large range of significant powers that do not fall under any category. On the one hand, the US is on the one side of the spectrum as superpower while regional powers like India, Brazil, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey are on the other side. In between there are second rank powers that cannot be very close to the US but transcended regional and middle power status. These are China, Japan, Russia and the EU (1+4), and Germany plus France and Britain. These are when united can balance against the US. Buzan and Waever do not make a clear distinction between “great power” and “middle power” that does not function in international system where only a few powers can be effective on the global level and many play important role in their neighborhood. Buzan (2004, p.71) uses great power and regional power concept rather than middle power. The term “middle power” was rather used in the Cold War system mostly referring to the “Western countries such as Canada, Sweden and Australia which played international roles beyond their home regions”. As a framework to understand the regional and globalizing trends, Buzan and Waever (2003, pp.33-37) make a categorization for the powers.

³⁵ Polarity question is given a distinctive space in Buzan and Waever’s work of ‘Power and Regions’. They contend that after the bipolar Cold War years, there now seems to be less clear international system.

1. Superpowers: The criteria for the superpower status is that they require broad-spectrum capabilities exercised on the global scale. They possess first class military political capabilities. They are effective in the processes of securitization and desecuritization and determine and pursue “universal values” that are also accepted by others.

2. Great powers: They can act at the global level with a material capability. But their capability and behavior are relatively weak vis-à-vis superpowers. Their major feature is that (different from the regional powers) they can respond to the others on the basis of global level calculations about the distribution of powers. They do not need to possess capabilities in all the sectors. They have appropriate levels of capability. During the Cold War, the great power status was held by China, Germany, and Japan with Britain and France. After the Cold War, Britain-France-Germany-EU, Japan, Russia and China have become great powers. The EU as a non-state actor is also defined as a great power. This is due to its efficient material capabilities, despite its political weaknesses.

3. Regional Powers: Regional powers define the polarity of any given RSC: unipolar as the Southern Africa, bipolar as in South Africa and multipolar as in the Middle East, South America and Southeast Asia. They are excluded from the higher level calculations of system polarity whether or not they think of themselves as deserving a higher ranking. They do not register much in a broad spectrum way at the global level.

Within the framework of the power placement and polarity, Buzan and Waever (2003) ask how great powers and superpowers interact within regions. They offer two types of RSCs: “standard” and “centered”. The former is largely Westphalian and anarchic in nature “with one or more powers”. Polarity is defined by regional powers like Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, India and Pakistan). The standard RSCs do not contain global level power and the main security indicators are the relationship among the regional powers. The latter has three forms: The first and second assumptions are that a RSC is unipolar, but the power is either a great power (Russia in the CIS) or a superpower (USA in the North America) rather than only a regional power. The global level power would dominate the region and other regional powers cannot balance it. The third is that the RSC is integrated by the institutions such as the EU. The EU is the example of an entity that is between being a great power possessing an actor quality capability at the global level and being a region as a greatly developed security community (Ibid., pp.53-57). The EU as a Kantian form of structure best provides a highly institutionalized and developed security community.

In the light of this framework presented for polarity and power analysis, this thesis is subjected to two important reservations: The first one is about the level of analysis; the other one is related to the power ranking spectrum.

First, it would not be erroneous to argue that an analysis for power and polarity of the regions is closely connected to the system analysis. In this section there may be some complications in understanding the levels of analysis for this thesis. The RSCT basically aims at evaluating the structure of the world and the relations within it, and between regions and global levels. It says that as a consequence of the relations and interactions mainly related to each regional security dynamics where super powers and great powers (1+4) may affect and be affected present us a world structure (composed of regions) (Buzan and Waever, 2003). However, this thesis covers a state-to-region analysis and has an indirect relation with an global level polarity analysis. Instead, a very bottom-up analysis can be made responding to a couple of questions as follows: How a state is located in the placement and its power capability, role and identity in providing security in its regional security complex.

As for the power placements, Buzan and Waever's great power definition and justification for the absence of the middle power remain relatively weak. They recognize almost a spectrum ranging from superpowers through great powers and regional powers to small powers. They have introduced regional power instead of the "Cold War's traditional middle power" status. However, it would be oversimplification to omit such a status which may have still been present since the Cold War. For example, Buzan and Waever (Ibid., p.34) identify Britain, France and Germany totality of which qualifies a kind of great power which can act at the global level. They are regional powers at the same time. A middle power can be neither a great power nor a small power, but just a relative and relational term. For Holbraad (1984), middle power status can vary from region to region. He determines the power status in according to the hierarchical rankings of GNP and population. Because of their "mediator role" between and/or for the superpowers middle power status is attributed to the Cold War era powers such as Britain and France which are

called “upper middle powers” (as the member states of the UN Security Council) by Holbraad. Lyon and Tomlin (1979, pp.12-13)³⁶ argue that “middle powers locate themselves in the middle “of the ideological spectrum between extreme positions”. They have special roles “as peacekeeping, mediating and communicating”. The geographical location and the diplomatic and operational capability should be considered when identifying the middle power status. Therefore, the identification may change between regions just like Europe where a number of determinants can be found: For example, France, Britain and Germany as “directoire” or “big three” are called “major powers”, “regional powers” or “great powers”. It means that others should remain either regional or small powers. However, some powers as indicated above and like Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Austria and etc have been called as middle power (See also for example Holbraad, 1984 and Santoro, 1991).

In this thesis, the two reservations will form the framework of the analysis. The first one is that the thesis covers mainly the state -to -region analysis and thus the outline of polarity and power analysis goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Second, in our case Italy will be labeled under middle power since we cannot reach a breaking point where Italy’s status is unclear yet.

³⁶ In their work, they evaluated Canada’s status as an international actor.

1.2.4.3. Enmity/Amity Spectrum

Third essential of the regional level of analysis is that the type of interactions in terms of patterns of enmity/amity ranging from conflict formation through security regime to security community.

It would be meaningful to start from the conflict formation type that is based on a Hobbesian world of enmity and conflict. It portrays an anarchic environment. The state-to-state or intra-state relations level denotes a situation of “conflict formation” where there are various territorial disputes, status rivalries and fears and threats among the descendant of the old regimes as states and their peoples. The Middle East, Horn, Central Africa and South Asia are the examples of conflict formation. Sometimes domestic and interstate conflicts can be blurred. For example Palestinian-Israel issue can be defined as both type of conflict (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.195). One may also refer to Migdal (1988) who accounts for the conflicts in the Third World states. He categorizes states as “weak states” and “strong states” in line with the determinants of state capabilities that denote mostly the state control over the society (the components of society), regulate social relationships, extract resources, use of resources in a determined way. For him, many African states are weak states since the state cannot penetrate into the segments of society; the society is strong in those states. Similarly, another reference may be put to what Singer and Wildavsky (1993, pp.3-12) argue: They examine the real world dividing it into two zones: One part is zones of peace, wealth and democracy. The other part is zones of turmoil, war and development. The zone of turmoil is where most people now live in and there are huge devastating conditions such as poverty, war, tyranny, and anarchy that harm human lives. As an example, it would be appropriate to point out the fact that the notion for unity of Europe is based on the existence of conflict formation or fragmentation in the European continent.

Buzan and Waever (2003, p.175) argue that

a security regime does not imply that relations among its members are harmonious and without conflict. Rather, conflict exists but the actors agree to cooperate to deal with it. There has to be some agreement on the status quo among the great powers, a desire to avoid war and an expectation that states will act with restraint when disputes arise.

From the definition it can be inferred that “security regime” falls into the middle of the Wendt’s category that is Lockean (rivalry within some rules). The CIS, South America and the East Asia are Lockean in this sense. The South America is possibly becoming a security community (Ibid., pp.473-475).

As our subject, the EU is also perceived on the Kantian side (including friendly relations and strong restraints on war) that implies exactly the “security community” side on the enmity/amity spectrum (Ibid., p.471). In the first phase of the process –of the construction of a security community- the governments do not actually seek to create a security community. In the beginning a mutual threat triggers the state to seek an arrangement to end their disputes. Deutsch (cited in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.50) explains that “war or common threat is a sufficient or necessary condition for generating an interest in a security community.” So there is no intention of sharing a common identity or knowledge of other. However, they recognize or discover that they may have common interests that require collective action and mutually benefit from a coordinated security arrangements. A common threat may be either a war raged by two disputing states in a region or an ideological threat such as communism against the West Europe. Consequently the states not only develop a common security understanding and a collective defense towards a common threat but also deepen their institutional and transnational linkages that bind these states together. They can promote ideas about a “cooperative security” in terms of the interdependence of states in a number of areas (economic, political, environmental, military and health). There are also a number of material and normative factors that include: changes in military power, new thinking about organizing political life, increase in international/regional catastrophic events and as such. The most obvious feature of the international or/and regional organizations is that they can facilitate the interstate and

transnational interactions. In Deutschian definition of security community the fact is that the actors cannot imagine a war among each other (Ibid., p.12). This implies a form of desecuritization of security community that had marked European integration in the 1950s and 1960s (Waeber, 1998). The most threat for Europe was Europe itself, its past. In brief, the EU moved towards the amity and the end of amity/enmity spectrum. It also created its own institutions and a high level security community (Buzan and Waeber, 2003, p.375).

The constructivist conceptualization goes further in presenting a security community that has “shared identities, values and meanings” (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.12). It is a “socially constructed” or “imagined” community which is geographically differing from its traditional geographical structures. In an “imagined community” the members of the community do not have to know most of their fellow members; they just live the image of their communion (Anderson, 1991, p.6). Haynes (cited in Dale, 1999, p.6) offers that the term “imagined communities” can be used equally to the formation of a European identity in particular when connected to the practice or any ideology such as migration policy towards the third party. With the end of the Cold War, “the European ministers have argued that the main threat does not come from the Communist bloc (as it was demolished) but from its new fault line, that is mostly called Mediterranean.”

Within such identity construction processes and along the dividing lines, the Union is also perceived “zone of peace” from the “two worlds” perspective (Buzan and Waeber, 2003, p.18). The world which the EU belongs to is defined by “a post-modern security community of powerful advanced industrial democracies and international relations.” In “zone of peace” states do not expect to fight against each other, since this zone is the center of wealth, military strength and organization. On the other side, the zone of conflict that is mostly attributed to the unstable periphery of the EU (the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasia) is composed of a mixture of modern and premodern states. In this zone, war is possible among states and their population is easily able to be mobilized for war. The central point is with the end of the Cold War, how these two worlds -zone of conflict and zone of peace- relate to each other (Croft and Terriff, 2000, pp.9-10). One of the purposes

of this thesis is to explore how the “zone of peace” (the EU) will try to penetrate the “zone of conflict” (the Mediterranean). For Singer and Wildavsky (cited in Nagel, 2002, p.161) the zone in turbulence will overcome the difficult processes of economic and political development which will then cause wealth, democracy and peace in those zones. In fact, the EU has already infiltrated into its neighboring periphery as zone of conflicts such as the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean region, the Middle East and the Caucasus through a number of policies and instruments. In the following section, the neighboring regions will be examined briefly.

1.3. “State” within the Regional Security Complex Theory

As in the previous sections, the significance of “state” is repeatedly pointed out. In a structural analysis although state is the smallest level among the other two (region and international system), an extra attention should be drawn into the point of departure in the RSCT that is “state”. They can also be “state interdependence”, “state survival”, “relationships and interactions between states”. Such a necessity derives from the basic assumption of the RSCT that is one state’s security cannot be considered separately from other states’ security in the same region. In general, we cannot deny that in the RSCT, the level of analysis has a “horizontal” dimension (relations between the states, polarity, and power status in relation to each other or system) whereas the state and its position vis- a vis the region remained limited. As the only exception, mainly superpower influence and penetration into the regions are studied. In this section, an assessment will be made on the place of state within a security complex.

1.3.1. Background

As a referent object of security, state in contemporary security studies oftentimes becomes problematic. This is due to not only changing world but also changes in the state itself. These political and economic changes that affect their safety, sovereignty and welfare undermine the traditional roles of states (Lipschutz, 1995, pp.14-15). Theoretically, today, “state” as a political unit and in international relations is much subjected to conventional and critical approaches. Most of debates are directed at the state centrism (neorealism) or an agenda that goes very beyond the state (postmodernism, constructivism, feminism and Marxism). Likewise, in the RSCT, state corresponds to an important component of the theory. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.27) focus on the intensity in security independence between states in a regional complex since they see regions as geographically clustered sets of states. They refer to the post-war relations between France and Germany to display that their security is meaningful at regional security level and linked to other European states and not independent. Therefore, the region is also a level where states or other units link closely that their security considerations cannot be calculated independently from each other. Thus, the origins of the RSCs refer to “fear and aspirations” of the separate units vis-à-vis each other. To take an example as indicated in Chapter II in Europe in the post War Europe states feared from and distrust each other, namely, France and Germany; Benelux countries and great powers like Germany; Italy against Yugoslavia and other European states.

The RSC is defined as “state-centric” with a military-political focus and reformulated the conception for different actors and several sectors of security. “State” is taken as a unit together with other levels (international system and subsystem as regions, subunits as groups etc. and individuals) and left an open framework for deciding whether states are the most important referent objects, if so, in which security issues (Buzan et. al., 1998). Buzan and Waever (2003, p.45) assert that state can be still dominant in one way or another. In RSCT it is not so. However, they put the relationship between state-centric and objectivist formulation of RSCT and the constructivist multi-sectoral and multi-actor

securitization perspective together. In addition and more importantly, there are some traces of applicability of “state-to-region” level in the RSCT.

The first trace that marks the importance of the “state” is hidden in what Buzan and Waever (Ibid., p.21) tried to explain: The states are the major historically evolving units with their peculiar types of internal structures that affect and affected by each other. In essence, in this theory, an analysis on “state” remains relatively limited since the main level of analysis is “regional”. On the other hand, “national” and ‘state’ seem to be useful in explaining the significance of “region” as it constitutes an overlay between global and national levels. For that reason, states constitute the most important part of the security patterns of regions given an assumption that the world evolved from a system of Westphalian type states setting apart from each other predominantly by their extent of power, their geographical location and their cultural background. State level includes variables that play a major role in shaping security dynamics in any particular region. For example, some states are great powers; some have colonial past (they are colonials or occupiers); some states have deep roots while others are newly established states. The spectrum of power is ranging small through middle, great to super powers. All states alike and affect and are affected in different ways. One’s security dynamics may influence the other regional states. Buzan and Waever (Ibid.) argue that

part of our purpose of their work is to set out historical overviews of how RSCs have evolved, and there can be no doubt that the ways in which security dynamics have unfolded in different regions are affected by the type(s) of state to be found in particular regions.

They assert that they also want to leave a room for “political choice and particular circumstances.” This analysis tries to explain how one can explain why states being similar in many aspects behave in different ways; how to deal with interplay between types of states and types of security dynamics; how states’ historical, cultural, socio-economic, political and military background is evaluated vis-à-vis the region. This will be a kind of comparative work within a state’s security history as well as between those of others. A

region may contain a mixture of different and similar types of states which are deeply interlocked to each other (Ibid., pp.20-24).

The second trace is seen in the analysis of an “insulator” state has considerable influences at regional security level. An analysis of those states since they are defined as states that do not belong to any of the regional security complexes and are located in the very overlapping points of the regions. Although, it can be found out that, in their work, an individual state’s considerations can hardly be analyzed, Buzan and Waever (2003) intensively studied on what they call “insulator” such as Turkey, Burma, Afghanistan or those holding overlapping memberships (Ibid., p.484). For example, as an “insulator” state, Turkey’s security aspects and its connectedness to the European security complex have a considerably important place in “Powers and Regions” (Ibid., pp.391-94).

The conceptualization of “insulator” leads us to a number of assumptions: We can also employ the theory in analyzing the security dynamics of a whole region or we can apply to the theory to comprehend the regional security by making analyses at the level of individual states. The answer implies a horizontal level of analysis whereby security interactions or relationships between the regional states and, if possible, global power/s. For example, France’s Gaullist policies towards the EU may be analyzed within the RSCT. Similarly it seems that the importance of state is not diminishing, in particular, in certain boundary areas where the state is included in state/region relations. Therefore, thirdly, it can be inferred that in the RSCs the frontier areas have become prominent in identifying the entrance points and the boundaries of those security complexes and the border responsibilities. Frontier is the basic indicator of identity and used as a discourse in general or particular frontiers (Anderson, 1998, p.5). This is evident in RSCs, in particular in European security complex where all states form a European identity that is also drawn by the external frontiers. More concretely, King (cited in Anderson, 1998, p.8) emphasizes the Southern façade of the EU, the Mediterranean, “as the center of the earth” but at the same time, divided between two sides, developed and rich “north” and underdeveloped and poor “south”. The relevance of state and regional security complex derives from what is

responded to Müller-Graff's question as "whose responsibilities are frontiers?" The question may be reformulated as "who are responsible for regulating and managing (putting restrictions or rules) boundaries?" In general, frontiers symbolize instruments of policies that aim at promoting interests of populations or communities. In the RSCs, the responsibilities imply both the Member States of the EU and the EU as a community. States are responsible for conduct as the Union's agents at an international frontier as well as its external borders. The border management is legally subjected to national law, Community law and international law. In the EU literature, the Community law is much more referred as "the rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States" (Müller-Graff, 1998, pp.11-20). In security terms, borders have become more political, military, social and economic matters. For that reason, to provide security, states become the main constituents of border management of the RSCs.

Fourthly, least but not least, speaking generally, in a range of studies, RSCT has been applied to analyze individual states' security policies within the region. For example, it would be easier to study US policies in Europe by looking at the regional security dynamics which shaped the US's policies. On the other hand, a continental state's security perceptions and policies may be well understood by the regional dynamics or vice versa. For example, the blurred line between national security and European security has become a long debate over decades, even centuries. Buzan and Waever (2003, pp.361-62) also significantly detail the issue in explaining the European security and European, but at the same time national and statesmen's securitization moves. European leaders had to overlap their security identity with that of Europe since they no longer take any risk that would lead Europe into disintegration and a bloody war. For that reason, in many cases many European states base their national security arguments on the "same grand trajectory that points away from Europe's past" (Ibid.). In conflict times, they even go further by taking initiatives like leading peacekeeping operations in the Western Balkans, namely Italy in Albania, France, Britain, Germany in Bosnia and Kosovo. From the RSCT it can be inferred that one may make vertical level of analysis like Germany's security policy within the EU or France's Mediterranean Policy initiatives within the EU.

In this section, the central point is that how we can theoretically stick “state” to the level of analysis.³⁷ Are states, interacting in a structure, in pursuit of their interests as actors or motivated by a variety of interests rooted in identities? How can we relate state’s position to the RSCs? The next section tries to find the answer.

1.3.2. In-between Interest and Identity

In terms of state-centrism within a structure or system, they are interpreted either “actors” or “agencies”. From the essentialist perspective, such as realist and structural realists, to non-essentialist views such as post-modernists states are attributed to these two functional terms – actors and agencies- which are also linked respectively to “interests” and “identities”. In this study, state neither pursues a neorealist understanding of interest nor is solely dominated by identity matters: instead, this thesis offers a state that can be transformed from a conflicting type to a cooperative nature. It means that state is historically develops, interacts and its identity is changed in pursuit of its interests. This thesis offers a state conceptualization that is based on the English School Theory. It would be appropriate to remind the explanations for actorhood of neorealism; and then to give a particular weight to state as an agency like but more of what the English School offers as a relational and historical entity.

The actorhood is fundamental for neorealists and realists. In Waltz’s structure (as product of their parts) units are states (1959; 1979, p.3). Called as “actors” they constitute the major powers. For neorealists an actor behaves rationally in an anarchical structure. One of the most important indicators of an actor is “sovereignty”³⁸ that is defined as “the ultimate expression of being in the dominant state-centric mode of thinking” (Youngs, 1999, p.24). Since the Westphalia, states have been the “chief holder of sovereignty” sovereignty; however it has started to be diminished by a couple of revolutions such as the

³⁷ See the level of analysis section.

³⁸ The concept is the ultimate authority to act or rule.

emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community and the rise of humanitarian intervention in contemporary ages (Philpott, 2001, p.18). Such a brief note for “sovereignty” helps us to understand state relations and priorities that are to maximize their power to protect their sovereignty and survival.

Youngs (1999, p.30) contends that an actor-agency and structure debate remained relatively limited in the field of IR. Waltz (cited in Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, p.152) assumes that “structures can be formed only as the result of actions of rational agents who are not intending by their actions to reproduce the structure of the international system.” Dessler (cited in Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, p.152) provides a more effective theory of social action referring to Giddens and Bhaskar. The model asserts that “the interactions between states unintentionally preserve the anarchic arena and makes room for intentional interactions that perform the same functions.” Actions confirm each other’s sovereignty and therefore “actively reproduce the deep structure of the system.” Treaties, all types of cooperation reproduce the anarchic system of independent states (Ibid.).

For Buzan (cited in C. Wight, 2006, p.109) agent-structure is a “complex debate not a level of analysis. His understanding for state, instead of agency or actor, is something “relational and progressive.” Buzan (1995, p.87) claims that states as “territorially organized, autonomous political entities” that have in relationship with other political entities “face security problems arising from the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities among them.” For him relations tied to each other geographically and technologically. Relations “depend on whether states are bound together by significant activity, and whether their domestic constructions and activities are perceived by others as more threatening or supportive.” As indicated in the previous sections, states may face internal and external security problematique. He contends that states act in parallel with two patterns of its external environment. One is the interaction capability the other is international society. With the technological and organizational factors that imply “the quality and the type of goods and information that can be moved between states.” Such developments and organizational networks pose both threats and opportunities to states. Military and

economic assistance, global sources of finance, information and markets make impossible for states to act independently from each other. On the other side, international society is the “states accord each other mutual recognition as legal equals.” A group of states establish very “dense networks of common rules and institutions for conduct of their relations” (Bull cited in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.11). Youngs (1999, p.24) analyzes Buzan’s views emphasizing that state does not deal with maximization of its capabilities but to “move from a weak to strong position on the domestic axis and for its regional reference group to move from immature to a mature position on international environment.” Buzan is mostly criticized that he cannot explain how they are transformed and the processes and that he is avoiding from a sociological perspective and the agent-structure debate (Adler, 2005).

In this thesis, the focus will be much more on the state conception that is in interaction and developed into a cooperative structure in a society at regional and international levels. The most obvious example is the European Union. Such a development of international society like the EU gives opportunities society of states to tackle with the problems arising from interaction capacity. The term of “system of strong states” that defines the “leading edge of power and development in the international system” is used by Buzan. They project themselves beyond their boundaries in economic, cultural, political and military ways. The EU represents as a security community or a pluralistic society the system of strong states (Buzan, 1995, p.98). Here comes a question: “how far will interdependence go in shifting the security referent object away from states towards such a collective entity?” For Buzan (Ibid.) the EU is the best example of “both regional approach and dissolving of individual national securities into a larger political entity.” The EU functions as a security entity in migration, trade, economic and border control issues. Military structures are also currently developing through cooperation and coordination.

In response to “anarchical structure”, Buzan (Ibid., pp.206-207) provides a “mature anarchy” where strong states are embedded in a well-developed international society. He also constitutes a model as a fusion between liberal and realist visions of the international system: “It keeps states as the basic unit, but contains the security dilemma within a liberal inspired non-violent conflict culture.” This model does not allow dissolving the state system. The mature anarchy is composed of relatively closed states. The EU is a good model for mature anarchy in the sense that such a developed regional society still needs a political structure for and desire for political autonomy based on cultural/or ideological grounds to continue to legitimize states. The synthesis of liberal and constructivist approaches gives a better explanation for the EU structuring and its relations with its member states, the agencies.

To label a state as an actor, in Waltzian understanding derives us to think over actor- interest relations. But, in Wendtian logic, a question can be asked as: “is state really actor or a theoretically construct?” The answer is certainly that it is a theoretical construct. The structures of the world politics are determined through their social interaction “governed by rules, norms, ideas and patterns of behavior.” These “intersubjective” practices “play a major role in shaping the identities and the interests of actors.” For the constructivists, the agents are bounded by structures but at the same time they are capable enough to alter the structural environment in which they operate. Actors are replaced by agencies (White, 2004, p.22).

Wendt (1999) claims that “states are kinds of entities to which we can attribute identities and interests.” For him, states are not inherently self-interested. Instead, they are constituted by interests and constituted by identities. It means that interest is that of identity. For Wendt identity

has a subjective and unit level quality rooted in actor’s self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way. Identity has an intersubjective or systemic quality.

Wendt also discuss four type of identity: 1) personal or corporate 2) type 3) role 4) collective. In the first category, identities are constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities. The term type means a regime types forms of states like capitalist states, fascist states, and so on. The forms of states are established by “internal principles of political legitimacy” For example democratic states type make states believe that democratic states do not go to war against each other. States may be influenced by each other. Third identity is role identities. This is much applied to states by the foreign policy analysts. These identities composed of “foreign policy makers’ beliefs and domestic politics” rather than their relations to others. In other terms, the role taking agency in a structure can be interpreted in terms of Waltz’s conception of “functional differentiation” that leads us to distribution of power (Ibid.). For Buzan, Jones and Little (1993, p.46), yet, roles are “not a concern of deep structure, but a unit-level phenomena.” Finally, collective identity is a kind of relationship between “Self” and “Other” identification. For the constructivist approach, identities and interests are a subject matter of interaction and dependent variable in process. Structural change is inevitable over time and actors define themselves in terms of identity and interests. Such identification is a sense of being a part of “we” as a collective identity where actors have an interest of preserving their culture or political/economic/ideological identity (Wendt, 1999, pp.224-229). Within the framework of identity link between agency and structure, one may say that the Member States of the EU as agencies are embedded within the EU as their structure defined as a collective identity or system of strong states. The historical evolution of and changes in the structure also affect and are affected by their agencies. The EU has a variety of foreign and security policies ranging from the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Black Sea, transatlantic relations to functional issues such as conflict prevention and crisis management. These policies are mainly drawn by the Member States’ initiatives mainly during their presidency terms and welcome by other member states of the EU. For example civilian crisis management tasks were launched by the Finnish-Swedish cooperation (Tuomioja, 2001). Spain working together with other Mediterranean member states of the EU, promoted a range of initiatives such as 5+5 and the Conference on Security and

Cooperation (not realized) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership under the auspices of the Spanish Presidency (Lecha, 2008).

On the other hand, it would be worth noting that identity shape national interests. Opposing to Waltz, Wendt (1999, pp.231-242) asserts that in pursuit of interests – both “subjective”³⁹ and “objective”⁴⁰- states are not self-interested by “nature”. For him, self-interests can be well associated with others’ interests through social interaction. Through interaction, identities are formed or shaped in a society of states, or to form a collective identity.

Under above mentioned definitions, in this thesis, “state” that is fixed in the RSCs, is presented a unit that is much closer to agency in pursuit of its interests shaped by identities.” On the other side, state-centricism is not denied in the sense that it has its own sovereignty and autonomy in “practicing” or “regulating” the policies. However, the state is not a priori but a historical entity. The relations among the states or the state-to-region will be assessed in regard with time and space.

1.3.3. Building a Framework for State-Level Analysis

In this thesis, state and region are taken as a level of analysis. In order to draw a framework for an analysis of state-to-region relation, we should make a number of assumptions along the lines of the RSCT:

1. Besides a regional security issue, a cluster of states’ security relations and global power policies in a particular region, a state’s role and influence in the region can be analyzed. State’s security matters vis-à-vis the region can only be analyzed in line with other regional states’ security dimensions that affect and also affected by the region.

³⁹ They are “preferences over outcomes” what rationalists say.

⁴⁰ They are related to national security which George and Keohane listed as “physical survival, autonomy, economic-well-being”. Wendt added a forth as “collective self-esteem” (See also for example Wendt, 1999, pp.234-242).

2. State is not taken as a unit operating under anarchical structure; instead state is taken which is in a deep interaction with not only the regional states but also other regions and regional units under “mature anarchy”. Anarchy is rather moderated by Buzan and labeled as “mature anarchy” that

would be a highly ordered and stable system in which states would enjoy a great deal of security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity, and from the strength of the institutionalized norms regulating relations among them (Buzan 1991b, p.77).

Such type of relation of a state/s can also be possible in a security community such as the EU.

3. A state can also be involved and in close relation with other security complex/s in particular in case it is located on the borderline of the security region it belongs. The ties can be established upon historical, cultural, security matters and sociological issues. The reasons and consequences of such relationships should also be given a special emphasis. In particular, the frontier states of any given security complex should be much overvalued more than before.

4. In the RSCT, evaluations upon polarity and power spectrum might remain less relevant to the subject matter of this thesis. Since, there has not been an exact definition on the powers, except Britain, Germany and France, there is no need to spend much time on identifying a power status. Attributions may vary from region to region, time to time.

5. One may take the opportunity to make a comparative analysis of its security understandings and practices which can be transformed over time. An analysis on a state can also give us historical information on its policies and security relations with other states more specifically at regional level.

CHAPTER II

EU/EUROPEAN SECURITY COMPLEX AND THE MAKING OF “EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY”

In this Chapter, the European Security Complex’ security concerns and practices in the Mediterranean are examined. In this thesis, the term “Euro-Mediterranean Security” is used in order to refer to the security construction (in terms of securitization and the measures) of the area comprising the EU/Europe and the other regions bordering the Mediterranean by the European Union and its Member States. Here, the aim is not to define a region-building process, but to study “security-building” and find the traces of how the EU’s security construction within a particular security complex is formulated in particular, against the threats coming from Europe’s Southern façade. Therefore, our aim is to point out how the European Union is handling the issues in line with the spirit of a “partnership” between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

With regard to this approach, we postulate two security constructions: The first one is the construction of European security, the other one is of the Euro-Mediterranean security. In this chapter, first, the description of the European security complex region and its pillars will take place with reference to the RSCT. This part sheds light on how European security was constituted in what overlapping processes. It is worth noting that the aim is not to explain how the European security is being constructed; instead, to depict the structures of the European security complex, thus taking this part as “predetermined” and “given”. Second, a definition for Europe’s Southern Circle is made in order to portray it as a threatening area against the security community-type European security complex. Third, the Euro-Mediterranean security is defined in terms of security concerns (threats including migration, military issues, political and economic issues) and security implementations (including the Barcelona Process, the Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the

Mediterranean). The last part is made up of security perceptions including a number of discourses of securitization and security practices and measures taken at the EU level.

2.1. EU/European Security Complex and Its Pillars

Morgan (1997, pp.27-31) asserts that “regional security complexes are the major arenas of conflict and security affairs.” In this regard, European continent sets a good example for such a complex which had experienced a number of crucial structural changes in its past: There have been processes of mergers and fragmentation and several complexes being alarmed by the possibility of a conventional and nuclear war; regional and ethnic problems; terrorism and some other political, social and economic threats (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.343).

In this thesis, the conceptualization of European security complex is made mainly with reference to “EU/European Security Complex”. Before proceeding with the pillars of the EU/European security complex, it would be appropriate to identify the “Europes” which refers to two main complexes and the major powers of the European complex.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States as the two superpowers shaped the international system together with the major great powers, namely, China, Japan and the EU. With the end of the bipolarity, the world was left with one superpower, the USA, and four great powers, EU (together with France, Germany and Britain), China, Japan and Russia. In the meantime, Europe was divided into several complexes. In particular, in the first years of the post-Cold War era, European complex was composed of post-Soviet space, the Balkans and EU/Europe.⁴¹ Pertaining to the subject of this thesis, our focus will only be on the EU/European complex, which is made up of the

⁴¹This area has one great power namely Russia, which has its own complex including the CIS area. Due to the proximity between Europe’s two great powers, the EU and Russia, there is a possibility that there may be a unification of the two complexes which can also be form a loose supercomplex. Western Balkans is also known as a subcomplex that may incorporate into the Europe-EU complex. Within this framework, EU-Europe complex is also called “European security complex”.

West and Central and East Europe. This area possesses a great power that is the EU and three more great powers, namely, Germany, France and Britain. The great powers of the EU can also be the regional great powers: Germany is an “economic world power”; France and Britain are the permanent members of the UN Security Council and still nuclear powers (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.344). Three great powers are also known as “big three” or “directoire” of the European Union which have strong influences on the security and defense matters of the EU.

There are other states also known as “middle powers” or “regional powers” such as Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. These are partly effective in regional policies. In addition, even if the US is not a member of the European security complex, it is largely involved in a “more consistent and systematic way than in most regions” of the contemporary world system (Ibid.).

EU/European complex corresponding to the Western Europe in the Cold War era, and West, Central and East Europe in the post-Cold War era will be studied in line with a number of categorization: First category falls into the “NATO-ization” of European security that refers to US, and as institutionalization, NATO influence in Europe starting from the early 1950s. Second, the transformation at the EU level and the interactions among the Member States of the EU are examined under the label of “Europeanization” in European Security. As the third pillar, the “diffusion” of European security throughout the periphery areas takes place. Each category in terms of “process” implies an evolution effect on the security structures (institutions), functions and geography. The construction of the European security starts with the entrance of an external security provider, NATO, stretches through the deepening and enlarging the EU level security, and ends with the diffusion of European security throughout the periphery.

2.1.1. “NATO-ization” of European Security

Many academics divide the European history into several segments. However, the most striking period starts from the post-World War II and continues to today. Therefore, we can postulate two fundamental transformations in the military security realm over the last century: The first one is the “move from Hobbesian balance of power politics in European state security system to the US-led transatlantic cooperation in the 20th century onwards” (Jones, 2007, p.2). The second one refers to the rise of the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy alongside NATO. This is what we call “NATO-ization of Europe”. This category also implies the US influence on European security and the formation of the transatlantic system based on mutual dependence (Lake and Morgan, 1997). Since its inception, the NATO impact on European security has never been removed from the continent; rather, the Atlantic ties have remained significant in general and transformed under the changing security environment. In other words, this ongoing period well defines the enmity-amity spectrum where the conflict formation structure (during the 1950s) has transformed through security regime (1970s-1980s) towards the security community (1990s onwards) through NATO and the EU.

In the first period, the most remarkable factor is that the US returned its internationalist vision while rejecting its early 20th century isolationism towards the European affairs (Powaski, 1991). Pierce (2003, p.168) explains such a vision as follows: “the US would commit itself to the recovery of Western Europe which was connecting it to the recovery of its own security.” Thus, the transatlantic link was based on a number of institutional networks in not only military spheres but also economic and political realms. The Marshall Plan that was proposed in 1947 provided a considerable amount of funds for economic reconstruction in Western and Southern Europe (Hogan, 1989).⁴² Under the leadership of the US, NATO was established to constitute an essential transatlantic relationship between the US and Europe and to keep the Western Europe united on security

⁴² The American government insisted on the primacy of economics over politics in order to overcome the post-war Europe.

issues. In 1949, the US was affiliated to the European security system by the signing of the Washington Treaty, that is, the North Atlantic Treaty (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949).⁴³ The US also aimed at reuniting Europe economically by backing the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957. Therefore, interests, needs, and ambitions of the countries were to be “harmonized” in the Community which could unify the alliance. That is presented as the “EU’s nonmilitary aspects of NATO” (Tyler, 1963, p.65).

The very deepness of the transatlantic relations stems from the fact that the relations were settled during an insecurity and warfare period of the Cold War. In those years, the main threat in international system is the East-West conflict; threat for one side was the other side. Beside its objectives, the transatlantic ties were founded on mutual relations between the US and Europe in a bargaining relationship. The US created NATO for the purpose of “dual containment”: first, to balance the Soviet threat in a divided Europe; and second, to incorporate Germany into a capitalist European institution. The securitization of both states- the SU and Germany- contributed to provide security for the whole capitalist bloc and France which was feeling threatened by its long-term enemy Germany. As a fact, from the European side, beyond the Soviet threat, the main stimulating factor to be included in NATO for European states is the recurring enmity within Europe (Ikenberry, 2000, p.206). Like France, other small sized- albeit neutral- countries like Netherlands was disposed to join the alliance with the aim of being included in a “regional defense cooperation by which Germany may be defeated through containment” (Heller and Gillingham, 1992, pp.25-29). On the other hand, the main purpose of the Alliance is to guarantee the security of Europe and the Mediterranean against the rising Communist

⁴³ The Atlantic Alliance has also its roots in Brussels Treaty that was signed between UK, France and Benelux states. That treaty formed the Western European Union (WEU). Together with the members of the WEU, US, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Iceland and Denmark joined the Alliance. By Washington Treaty, the members agree that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that...” It means that in face of an armed attack, the parties would take any action in exercise of “collective self-defense” recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Henceforth, any of the member states would act for all, and all the member states would act for one.

parties in European domestic politics.⁴⁴ From the American point of view, the Italian inclusion was significant because Italy could infect the Mediterranean, the West Europe and the Middle East if it had been fallen in the hands of the Communists.⁴⁵ As for Italy, NATO was assumed as one of the multilateral responses to its unresolved border conflict Tito's Yugoslav state on Trieste (Sluga, 2001).⁴⁶ This seemingly corresponds to a convention among the Western, liberal and democratic states to secure mutually their military, political and economical interests.

Thus, the founding of NATO reflected hopes as well as fears, and trust as well as mistrust among the Member States and towards the third party. During the Cold War, NATO had been forced to adapt to some challenges in Europe such as France's departure from the Integrated Command Structure (See also for example Sperling, 1999)⁴⁷; the rising Communist influence in the Southern Europe including Italy, Britain, France; and the West German policies under the name of "Ostpolitik" towards the East European countries; the establishment of détente relations with the SU and the arms control between the US and the SU; adoption of Helsinki Process (and the launch of Helsinki Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) as a security regime (Hofmann, 2007, pp.1-4).⁴⁸ It is utterly just because of the "external threat", Europe through NATO and the EU in some way went to become a "security community". Such a "European-type of security community" thus features an "identity" of economically and politically developed and

⁴⁴ The Communist parties gained considerable support and political strength in some of the West European and Mediterranean countries including Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran.

⁴⁵ The US also launched its anti-Communist propaganda through supporting the economic development of these countries under the name of 'the Marshall aid.'

⁴⁶ The problem of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia started with the end of the First World War. The land which was given to Italy was subjected to the conflicts due to the ethnic differences in the region. After the Second World War, Trieste became a sovereignty area issue. On 31 May 1954 the US, UK and Yugoslavia signed an agreement solving the problem of Trieste. The Trieste zone divided between Yugoslavia and Italy. With the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the parties on 5 October 1954, the Trieste problem was totally "taken off" the agenda.

⁴⁷ France has been out of NATO's integrated military structure since 1966. From the early 1990s French policy towards NATO almost changed. The "sea change" came after Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in 2007: it was willing to reintegrate to the integrated structure.

⁴⁸ Ostpolitik was initiated by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s. It includes a number of bilateral non-aggression treaties with the SU and other East European states. Ostpolitik is also known as the beginning of détente and played a prominent role in launching the Helsinki Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

democratic West and non imaginability of war within the community. For the European states, NATO contributed to the development of a full security community from a non war community, making it more than a military alliance.

The second period refers to a new and vaguer era: After a time of certainty and stability for the Alliance members in the Cold War, NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War's unstable security climate has hardly been accomplished and settled on ad hoc responses (NATO Handbook, 1998).⁴⁹ In the following years, NATO has been transformed at three levels: institutional, geographical and functional. The first and the second level transformation came with the end of the Cold War. Under the changing circumstances, Europe was not lucky enough to cope with the Balkans unlike the Gulf War that led the West to the Allied coalition fighting against the Iraqi invasion in 1990. That was the time when NATO faced broader questions about its role and usefulness towards the 21st century. The alliance on European security matters was then essentially rebuilt in the NATO Berlin Summit in June 1996 where a European Security and Defense Identity pillar was articulated (Press Release, 8 March 1996).⁵⁰ In this framework, the transatlantic ties have evolved into a new partnership form which is based on flexible and autonomous tasks between them. For the first time, in its out of area operation, the Alliance adopted a new military strategy concept known as "Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). That means that NATO would respond to the changing military security environment of Europe with flexible means.⁵¹

⁴⁹With the end of the Cold War in 1990 the superpower order disappeared and the new era added new security discourses to the European agenda through mostly securitizations. These are ethnic/nationalist/religious conflicts, immigration, organized crime, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

⁵⁰It was first stimulated by the Yugoslav conflict. The "Berlin Plus" procedures referred to the mechanisms that the EU would borrow from NATO case by case in regional crisis management operations. Upon the Kosovo crisis broke out, in the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998, the EU called for the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.

⁵¹The decision-making and planning capabilities on a particular military action would be based on the EU-NATO cooperation at institutional level. However, upon the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, the European members of NATO decided to develop the military capacity of the EU due to the dissatisfaction for NATO's military campaign in Kosovo in 1999. The Europeans led by Britain and France called for the "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces" in St. Malo Summit. The transatlantic relations would thus be formulated under a more flexible structure at operational level. This

Beside the transformation of the Alliance as institutional level, one can mention the “opening up of the Alliance” to the new geographies. The latter entails the “enlargement of NATO that could contribute to enhance stability and security for all countries” (NATO Handbook, 1998). Therefore, NATO invited new members in Madrid Summit of 1997: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace (PfP) were established in; cooperation with Russia and Ukraine were launched; in 1996; and the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue has started.

The Mediterranean dimension as the subject of this thesis is one of the security components of the European security architectures. In 1994, NATO launched a dialogue with six countries in the Mediterranean region including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The foreign ministers in 1994 declared that “they are ready to establish contacts on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contribution to the strengthening of regional stability.” The Dialogue is based on bilateral relations and has multilateral meetings on a case by case basis for joint activities and support for other activities by Barcelona Process, the Middle East Process (NATO Handbook, 1998). Mediterranean Cooperation Group was established in 1997 where partner countries would exchange a range of issues related to the security situation in the Mediterranean (Larrabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, 1998, p.50).⁵²

The third period that remarks a new era raised the relationships to a new level of cooperation that also resembles the 1990s. The 2001 is the landmark for the members of the Alliance to reconsider the functions within NATO. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and their consequences have almost become the policy focus of transatlantic relations

signifies a new era that in the absence of the Soviet threat the EU became much concerned about the US dominance in regional issues and the insufficiency of European power. The most visible incentive is the fact that with the removal of the bipolar effect on Europe, no one can guarantee the US participation in future crises in Europe. Such an idea led the Europeans to take substantial steps in times of the regional crises where NATO and the US does are not engaged in.

⁵² On the other hand, for example France feared that the US might interfere in its traditionally strong bilateral relations with North African countries. France also believed that the EU is in better position in the Mediterranean. However, we should bear in mind that NATO had much more military aspects rather than civilian one and thus complementary to those of the EU.

on how much Atlanticist the European member states of NATO are. This was evident during the initial effect of the terrorist attacks in the US in European stance in uniting with the US in a common response against terrorism, in particular to the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. On 21 September 2001, the European Council, and the EU Heads of State or Government of the European Union, issued an action plan to fight against terrorism.⁵³ Nevertheless, the American military campaign in Iraq of 2003⁵⁴ turned the Europe-US relations upside down. It brought anxieties and serious divisions within the EU and between Europe and the US. However, split within the transatlantic entity did not continue any longer: although the EU at institutional level remained reluctant and incapable of taking a forceful action, it complied with the rule of “division of labor” between the European and American partners. With the US’ being hard power, the EU has undertaken some soft missions since October 2003 ranging from “reconstruction of the country, with measures aimed at providing core public services, and expanding to include the provision of employment, poverty reduction and the strengthening of Iraq's institutions and administration” (European Commission, 2004). Given that the European partners also feel the terror in their homelands with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings in terms of “fight with terrorism”, the transatlantic ties have become stronger in civilian police and intelligence areas (Archick, 2006). This is so even in counter-terrorism activities in the Mediterranean; the Alliance launched the Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) which is detecting and reporting suspicious activities in the Mediterranean (Finmann, 2009).

⁵³ Additionally, On 3 October 2001, the European Commission declared that “the Member States should freeze all funds belonging to 27 organizations and individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities.” On 12 December 2001, the Commission built “a group of Scientific Experts in the battle against biological and chemical terrorism.”

⁵⁴ The Iraqi crisis provoked the transatlantic crisis and led several European members of NATO and EU ranging from UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to act together with the US’s military response to Iraq and sign a “community of values” between Europe and the US.

Thus, in a sense, having been described as “community of values”, the members of NATO now came much closer to their commitment to democracy and their liberal values. From this point of view, Al Quida, state failure, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Islamic terrorism are all defined as threats to both physical security and fundamental values of the West.

As a consequence, in terms of strategy and implementation, the EU as a solution sees the international cooperation, multilateralism and partnership as necessity. This would be best achieved with its Atlantic partner, the US. In its Security Strategy Paper (European Council, 2003) it is emphasized that:

[a]cting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

As a consequence, even if NATO was established as a “common defense” organization against the Soviet threat, it has evolved into a multidimensional and flexible security community area. In particular with the outbreak of the Balkan wars on the European territory, and in an era of uncertainties and challenges, the European partners see “the transatlantic relationship as irreplaceable” and think that “the 60 year period in transatlantic ties will pave the way to a much stricter cooperation established than ever before” (Ibid.).

2.2.2. “Europeanization” of European Security

In the previous section, the second important development is articulated as the emergence of a peculiar European foreign, security and defense policy. It can also be called as the “Europeanization in European security policy” that emerged with the beginning of the 21st century. The concept is generally placed within the institutionalization at the European security policy level and also well corresponds to what the English School calls as “regional society of states”. Here, European states go beyond the system and form a society that is established by “dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for their relations” (Bull and Watson, 1984, p.1). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003, p.14) define the term as the “development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and practices governing politics at European, national and subnational levels.” One can mention different types of Europeanization when analyzing the European security policy. In this study, only two of them are focused on: First, the concept may be taken as first institution-building at the European level; and second, relative to the former, as the “top-down and bottom-up approach.” The latter approach attributes “Europeanization” to a two-way process: Member states themselves take part in shaping the policies that they are affected by at the same time (Börzel, 2002, p.195). Member States’ foreign policies conducted at domestic level and the origins of these policies at European level that they have to adopt are not separated from each other. In general terms, the focus is on the “cross level political interactions, interpreted within the framework of historical institutionalism” (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, p.14).

It should be noted that the European foreign and security policy includes the sum of the individual foreign the foreign economic policy or external relations of the European Community that falls in the realm of Community competences including trade, aid, development and humanitarian aid; and the foreign policy of the Union-since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU’s “Common Foreign and Security Policy” that is also known as an intergovernmental level in decision-making. In the last decade, the defense policy and the justice and home affairs issues such as terrorism can also be analyzed under the

analyses of the European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP) (Jorgensen, 2004, p.11).⁵⁵ EFSP is made up of some type of institutionalization processes of the Union on the relevant matters. An ongoing institutionalization process makes a great impact on the foreign policies of the Member States of the EU or the actors. The Member States thus define their interests and foreign and security policy goals at institutional levels. In institutional way of thinking, the EFSP is made through the institutional settings and procedures that also stipulate the cooperation within the EU and the European integration process (Hyde-Price, 2004, pp.99-104).

Even though the institutionalization process of the EU's security and defense policy has started since the end of the Cold War, the attempts for establishing a "security policy" were made in the early 1950s when an idea for the establishment of a "European Defense Community" came out among the Europeans. After the collapse of the EDC project due to the reluctance of the member states in 1954, the Member States of the EU went ahead with a system of foreign policy coordination known as European Political Cooperation" in 1970 (Urwin, 2007, pp.20-25). However, the initiatives almost remained futile until the mid-1990s. The Yugoslavian war followed by the Kosovo crisis and the Macedonian tensions actually was a turning point in the evolution of European security policy, in the name of the CFSP and the European Security and Defense Policy (Lindley-French, 2007, p.273). CFSP that was established in 1991 with the Maastricht Treaty aimed at depicting the policy areas, the decision-making procedures and the legal instruments of its own. Therefore in a face of a crisis, the EU can adopt a "common position" and the "joint action" such as imposing restrictive measures against the warring factions (Treaty on European Union, 1992, Art. J.2-J.3). The CFSP covers a wide range of policy areas from civilian aspects such as humanitarian issues to hard security issues including peacekeeping

⁵⁵White conceptualizes the foreign policy together with security and defense policy as "the European Foreign Policy activities that include the European Community, European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy and national foreign policies or mixture of them" (See also for example White, 2001). In this thesis, the EU's security policy is considered together with the EU's foreign policy that is labeled under the "European Foreign and Security Policy" referring to what White calls and which all the relevant regional and functional issues are included in. Security policy sometimes is prior to the foreign policy or politics of the EU, while foreign policy sometimes triggers more intensive coordinated foreign and security policy.

operations in the Balkans, Asia, the Middle East and Africa (See also for example Council of the European Union). As for the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, as a pillar of NATO (articulated as European Security and Defense Identity), it had enormous impact on the operational capacity of the EU's military vision. The "Berlin Plus" procedures referred to the mechanisms that the EU would borrow from NATO case by case in regional crisis management operations (NATO Handbook, 2002).⁵⁶ By the European Council of Cologne Summit and then Helsinki Summit in 1999 the Member States of the EU accepted that in EU-led operations and new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council (European Council, 1999; Howorth, 2007).⁵⁷

Beside the military terms of security arrangement at the EU level, the ESDP comprises a number of cross-pillar policy issues including "migration"; "human rights and democratization"; "energy policy"; Euro-Mediterranean Partnership"; "European Neighborhood Policy"; environment and the Middle East policy. Most of these policy issues are included in the EU's conflict prevention objectives and measures which try to struggle with the "root causes" of violent conflict such as "poverty, economic stagnation, uneven distribution of resources, weak social structures, undemocratic governance, oppression of the rights of minorities, destabilizing effects of refugee flows, ethnic antagonisms, religious and cultural intolerance, the proliferation of WMP." The European Security Strategy Paper that was published in 2003 also calls for the mixture of both civilian and military instruments to resolve the conflicts (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007, p.31).

⁵⁶ Upon the Kosovo crisis broke out, in the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998, the EU called for the "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces." By the European Council of Cologne Summit and then Helsinki Summit in 1999 the Member States of the EU accepted that in EU-led operations, "Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks" and new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council.

⁵⁷ Amongst them there are the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) (See also for example Howorth, 2007).

The conceptual analysis of Europeanization is also applied to the national foreign and security policies of members of the EU. EU membership made an influence on the national foreign policies through adaptation to practices, norms and behavior. Although applying Europeanization to foreign and security policies seems problematic in nature for a number of reasons⁵⁸, an assessment of the foreign policies of the member states of the EU will constitute a blueprint for understanding the EU level foreign and security policy. Miskimmon (2002, p.6) regards the coordination in the national foreign policies as: “intergovernmentally formed by the member states where the inputs from Member States are prominent for the development of foreign and security policy cooperation.” The foreign policies of the member states have been gradually transformed by the participation over time in European foreign policy-making processes. The membership of the EU also gives meaning to the development of the EU’s foreign and security policy to the extent that the member states pursue their ambitious, goals, interests, identities and reflect their perceptions and their interactions in the EU. Similarly, the European level is also made up by the Member States’ foreign and security policy preferences what the Member states introduce to the EU. Spain’s Latin America approach and its problems with Morocco over the islets, Greece’s Cyprus issue, France’s Mediterranean approach and Germany’s Central and East Europe approach are the examples of the policies taken at the European level (White, 2001, p.118). The EU plays like an actor in many issues raging from UN Human rights Charter to the NATO expansion and refugees, wars in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The EU is in a sense becoming an actor at institutional level and through its member states with their participation and implementations. According to Wong (2005, pp.140-141), the dimensions of Europeanization of foreign policy are realized at three levels regardless of its order. The interaction and the construction processes may be mutual: First, a policy that is on the European political agenda is formed as a result of a range of related issues repeat successively and pose threats to the member states seriously. Then states adhere themselves to their common objectives at the EU level which then turns their

⁵⁸ ...being more different than the Community policies, foreign, security and defense policy touching the concept of “national sovereignty” remains one of the guarded areas of the government policy within the States.

long-term considerations into a Common Policy. Its outputs come prior to the national interests. Finally, in a sense, the Member states use the European umbrella while implementing or participating in the policy. The last dimension is about the identity and shared interests between the member state and the EU as a result of the interaction that also affect the policy-making processes in return.⁵⁹ Therefore, in particular, the regional issues are primarily and mostly owned to one or a number of member states of the EU then to be carried to the EU level and spilled over the others. The relevant member states thus play an important role in constructing the policy areas or issues at the European level (Hyde-Price, 2004, pp.99-113).

In sum, one of the parameters of European Security is that the fact that the regional security is structured on its own dynamics: Due to post-Cold World War security milieu and the changing nature of the European state, there required an emergence of a regional security governance system. The system consists of an increasing institutionalized level of security within the EU and the Member States' inclusion into such a formation.

2.2.3. “Diffusion” of European Security

Under the changing security environment, the European Union (EU) has been compelled to define the major security challenges and policies towards its neighborhood. It means that the Union has now gone on its way without its previously constructed security understanding in the “sphere of intra-EU relations”; instead, it extended its attention to the structural security measures as well as operational ones on the Union’s “exteriority”. Kirschner and Sperling (2007, p.8) argue that this is due to the fact that some “identifiable mechanisms diffuse threats throughout the system irrespective of territorial boundaries.” They went further by classifying the reasons as

⁵⁹ In this thesis, the last stage of the policy-shaping/orienting/limiting and implementation will be examined.

the growing dynamic density of European political sphere; flawed or underdeveloped civil societies or democratic political institutions in regions adjacent to the EU, particularly in south-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin; and simple geographical propinquity (Ibid.).

In other words, the focus of securitization is now shifting from the EU's "interior" to the "exterior" (Joenniemi, 2007, p.128). In the European Security Strategic Paper, the new threats are described being both "dynamic" and "distant". Similarly, Diez (2004) claims that over past decade the EU has tended to a more cultural, historical and geography-based othering (See also for example Joenniemi, 2007, p.127). Since the 1990s the EU has used much more geographically defined political entities that are more exclusive against its "other", its neighboring regions (Diez, 2004, p.320). The EU has now in more defensive position against the threats generating from its periphery regions. This is well defined in the ESS which also concludes that "the first line of defense will often be abroad" (European Council, 2003). Putting Europe at the core, it can be contended that the EU furthermore provides security to its bordering regions with the purpose of guaranteeing a stable and peaceful security environment. This is, in this thesis, what we may call "security diffusion" largely signifying the spreading of European originated security perceptions and measurements across its border.

In the Strategy Paper, the European Council (2003) accepts that the regions surrounding the European continent pose crucial problems and underlines that

[e]ven in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

In a sense, the post-Cold War patterns of politics drifted Europe a core-periphery reality in regarding the security issues. Referring to the “zone of peace and zone of turmoil” perspective, Europe’s “post-modern security community” that is based on liberal and democratic principles (Treaty on European Union, Art.6) would transform its unstable periphery of the EU (the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus)⁶⁰. Through a number of policies and instruments, the EU has now penetrated into its neighboring periphery which is extensively identified as “zone of conflicts”. Joenniemi (2007, p.141) contends that as the Strategy Paper (European Council, 2003) argues that the approach of common security is downplayed, whereas liberal security is provided with a more prominent stance. Liberal security becomes a concept that is a remedy to encounter the threats in the neighborhood. The Strategy Paper (cited in Joenniemi, 2007, p.141) reveals that the EU will promote “a ring of well governed countries.” For Malmwig (2004) the liberal discourse⁶¹ that emphasizes and aims “pluralistic liberal security community” has been increasingly disregarded since liberal democratic Western countries, namely the EU, have shifted their discourses towards the “cooperative security discourse.” Their new cooperative discourse requires a partnership with the authoritarian regimes in handling the main conflict areas of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, WMD, organized crime, illegal immigration and so forth. Browning and Joenniemi (2008, p.539) explain the reason for the prevailing cooperative discourses of the EU referring to Malmwig’s (2007) claims: the EU has preferred “security and regime stability over promoting democratization and human rights” in particular since 9/11. With regard to such type of cooperation in order to cope with terrorism, new responsibilities are underlined in the Strategy Paper (European Council, 2003): “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” Such an understanding is a part of efforts that aim at underlining the Union’s actorness on the international scene. More significantly starting from the dramatic breakup of the Yugoslavian state and the fear for “spill-over” scenarios

⁶⁰ The region comprises a “mixture of modern and premodern states”.

⁶¹ Liberal security discourse includes “democratic states that are responding to the forms of violence, terrorism and external aggressive while the states respect rule of law, human rights and democratic values (See also for example Teson, 2005, p.57).

to the terrorist bombings in Europe, the EU's "actorness" debate was bolstered to build up new mechanisms and then act in its neighboring areas.

According to Missiroli (2004, p.12) over the past decade the EU has adopted at least two distinct approaches towards its neighborhood: Stabilization and integration. Stabilization points out fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships that is "regionality". Integration project on the other hand is aiming at "bringing neighboring countries into the EU through a bilateral process based on strict "conditionality". These notions of the EU also contain a "peace mission" to bring stability throughout Europe and with its identity to spread "European values" to its bordering regions. The main incentive is that the EU sees its outside "as a source of instability and insecurity." To triumph over the external threats and to accomplish the EU ideals, the EU developed broader policies to "extend EU systems of governance to those beyond its borders in order to bring stability and security." Such an ideal would only be achieved through a number of policies ranging from the Association Agreements to the Balkans Stability Pact, to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, to the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI). The "regionality" perspective has also been fostered by the "conditionality mechanism"⁶² which the states⁶³ having potentials for the EU membership in the near future would comply with. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 and the upcoming enlargement for the Western Balkans and Turkey, the EU has formulated a European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for the remaining countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as an alternative to accession (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008, p.188).

⁶² Together with the EU NATO also uses the same conditionality principle but rather being less strict than that of the EU. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008, p.188) underline that most countries for EU and NATO membership, prefer economic concerns to security concerns. For that reason, EU political conditionality on democratization becomes more acceptable in the European Neighborhood.

⁶³ After the collapse of Soviet communism, enlargement process was launched by the EU throughout the Eastern Europe and expected to contribute to the economic recovery, political stability and democratization in the transition countries.

As the subject of this thesis, the Mediterranean, or the Southern Circle, is formed by the Maghreb and the Mashreq regions. After an intense attention to the Eastern question, the EU at the same time and then turned its face to the South. The EU has actually had historical ties with the region. The Middle Eastern issues and the inter-Arab connections (between Maghreb and Mashreq) and the direct risks /threats coming from the Maghreb all raised a new dynamism in Europe in particular since the 1990s. Threats of immigration, political/economic instabilities, Islamic fundamentalism linked to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction all on the Europe's doorstep. One of the obstacles in maintaining the relations with the region is that the EU does not and will not use a promise of eventual membership to influence the politics in particular in Maghreb. With the increased tensions in the Middle East and the September 11 attacks on the US, the Mediterranean that is the sum of two subcomplexes of the North America and the Middle East has become a long term security concern.

As a consequence, it would not be erroneous to conclude that the EU as a pluralistic security community or a sub-global society defines and constructs its "zone of turmoil" mainly towards its South. The construction of a regional society does not require only a set of highly bonded states at an institutional level but also a boundary between insiders and outsiders. Thus, insiders' (states') behaviors are framed by the membership of such an integrated society imbued with common threats as well as common norms, identities and values (Bellamy, 2005).

2.2. Building the “Euro-Mediterranean Security”

In response to the post-Cold War challenges, the European Union has begun to develop an important role in the field of security in the Mediterranean region as well as in its Eastern periphery. For that reason, the EU has given a substantial weight to the Mediterranean as a “priority area of strategic importance” since the mid 1990s. For Del Sarto (2006, p.11), the EU has identified the security threats from its southern periphery as “lack of economic development, rising Islamic fundamentalism and illegal immigration in the EU.” Biscop (2003) also relates the objectives of the European foreign, security and defense policy to the increase in the Union’s “actorness” capacity in preventing the conflicts and guaranteeing the Euro-Mediterranean security. Xenakis and Chrysoschoou (2001, p.119) go further by claiming that the EU has decisively engaged in the policies of order/region building and intensified the possibilities for reaching the substantive agreement on many sensitive issues in the Mediterranean region. However, in this thesis we avoid to use “region-building” since the emphasis must be on the “security discourses and practices” rather than “regionalist discourses and practices” (See also for example Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.48). Therefore, in this chapter, the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean security understandings and practices will be studied with regard to a number of assumptions: The first assumption is related to the securitization of the Mediterranean that is labeled as the “Euro-Mediterranean” (from the European side) and the security practices in the region. For Biscop (2003) Mediterranean is a geographically defined area where the EU and twelve Mediterranean partners share important political economic and other interests. Biscop also uses the term “Mare Nostrum” as not of the EU, but of all twenty seven partner member countries of the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Jünemann (2004) underlines the one sided security definition, discourses, practices and even the region in the Mediterranean. He argues that as the final objective the EU aims at eliminating the “destabilizing tendencies in the southern Mediterranean region, which were perceived as a threat to Europe’s own welfare and security interests.” For the EU this would be possible

⁶⁴ See also for example App. I.

with a close cooperation with the partner countries in the areas of politics, economy and culture and new partnership project towards democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The second one is that one of the main reference points is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or the “Barcelona Process.” As known since the mid-1990s, the EU has taken concrete steps towards the region through a number of dialogue, cooperation and partnership. Such a “spirit of partnership” as a security practice is stimulated by the securitization attempts of the region and the issues at the EU-level and Member State-level. For that reason, a strong emphasis on the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” helps us to understand not only a defined and limited framework but also a reference point to analyze the whole “spirit of partnership” in the fields of legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration and; and the way in which the EU responded to the fundamental changes in both regional and international system.

As evidenced in this thesis, although there is less emphasis on the “security” concept in the Barcelona declaration and more weight on the liberal values that would be spread in the long run, the issues are revolved around the framework “security”. The Union predominantly suffers from the security threats generating from the Mediterranean. On the contrary, the EU has now remained ineffective in pushing for democratization and human rights issues in the Mediterranean states and shifted its focus on security related issues such as preventing illegal migration, terrorism, WMD and peacekeeping operations. The major mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management is the creation of a sense of “cooperative security”⁶⁵ more than a liberal security community (Jünemann, 2003). This is due to the fact that the EU has used a cooperative discourse towards the Mediterranean (regardless of whether it is labeled under the “Euro-Mediterranean security” or “security between the EU and the Mediterranean” or not) becomes much visible. The EU has now preferred to use a more precise discourse addressing the “common security challenges” rather than a “common identity based discourses” (Malmvig, 2004, p.11). Third, as

⁶⁵ This is also based on an OSCE like entity. During the Cold War, the regime or region building processes were witnessed with the launch of the Helsinki Process in 1975 between the East and the West. So, the OSCE model would be a model for the EMP in terms of improving the “transparency, and the predictability of factors that characterize the security considerations in the region.”

mentioned above we will focus on “security construction” more than a “region-building process”. However, it would be appropriate to postulate a regional order or whether it is the EMP or others is also seen as a “mental construct” which is based on a “constructed reality”. Such a contention totally corresponds to Foucault’s notion on “discourses and the construction of the social reality.” He underlines “something” which is also managed by individuals, groups, society, states or regions to be relevant and meaningful in social world then turn out a “reality”. Pace (2003, p.169) links the “policy-making processes of several constructions of realities” and the case of “region-building” processes. While adapting Foucault’s arguments on “reality” to the Euro-Mediterranean area, she uses his ideas on “power”: “Power produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (McHoul and Grace, 1995, p.64). She puts “international organization” instead of “power” or “authority” which tries to define and organize its power over some geographical spaces. The region-building is also seen as a “process of political control” which is a “part of engineering” at political, social, economical and military levels (Pace, 2003, p.169). The EU’s region-building construction process starts with the definition of the EU’s “Mediterranean area” that is inherently fluid in nature. Such a division in the definition of the region leads the states or international/regional entities to numerous ways to construct such an area (in content, scope, extent). In case of the EU, Pace contends that the discursive practices about security, stability and prosperity makes the area “real” whereby the Union is organizing, classifying and governing the region (Ibid., p.80).

In this section, the ways that the EU handles the Mediterranean security issues: First, how the security threats are articulated (the act of securitization) and second, how the EU cope with the threats (the security measures) will be examined. We must underline that within the text the Euro-Mediterranean security is, maybe in a hidden way, much more referred to “whose security and interest are considered” in this direction how the relations are built in the framework of a common security area.

2.2.1. European Security Concerns in the Mediterranean

There are several interpretations on the Mediterranean drawn in line with “mental maps, ideologies, belief systems, perceptions and behaviors” that also shape political interactions in the region (Pace, 2003, p.180).⁶⁶ Historically, in terms of the division between “Orient” and “West”, “Mediterraneanism” has remained a “divided construct” (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001, p.117). Due to such a division, a sense of a “unity” failed to be achieved. Besides the clashing definitions of the Mediterranean, there are also a variety of security issues that create a certain division between the two shores of the region. In face of the post-Cold War era born challenges, the European Union had to generate a dynamic partnership concept between Europe and the Mediterranean. Keeping their Euro-centric approach as prior, the EU has begun to urge a “unity” in a defined geographical region under the name of “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” and a number of practices through which the Union would struggle with the main security issues.

2.2.1.1. Definition of the “Mediterranean”

Chambers (2008, p.12) argues that the “Mediterranean” as an object of study is a product of a historical, geographical, cultural and political categorizations. Though, there is still no consensus on the definition of the “Mediterranean” among those disciplines. The definition encompasses both division and unity.

⁶⁶ For example, some of the Arab countries such as Libya perceive the formations towards the Mediterranean as a mechanism for imposing the Western hegemony which can also divide the African unity in the region.

2.2.1.1.1. Division

The observations on the region always resulted in different descriptions but still try to keep the region unified in definition: In geographical terms, the Mediterranean encompasses the North Africa (the Maghreb), the south-western part of Asia (the Mashreq), and the southern Europe. The region is extending throughout the Black sea linking to the Turkish Straits; and the Red Sea by the Suez Canal; and the Gibraltar passage accessing to the Atlantic Ocean. Such a definition at the same time leads to several historical explanations highlighting not only trade and cultural exchanges but also conflicts and conquests throughout the centuries. Many scholars mostly inspired by the French historian Braudel (2002) may talk of a common Mediterranean identity grounded on great civilizations dating back to the Palaeolithic ages beyond its geographical categorization. Braudel's definition is indeed far from today's Mediterranean concept: One can hardly find a division in the Mediterranean history; instead, the region is conceptually described as a "dynamic region where a persistent human activity –mainly the social and economic activities- develops early civilizations comprising of Islam or Ottoman, European and Asian domains" (Braudel, 1996; Braudel, 1993). In addition, in his book of "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II" of 1972, he argues that

two major truths remained unchallenged. The first is the unity and the coherence of the Mediterranean. I retain the conviction that the Turkish Mediterranean lived and breathed with the same rhythms as the Christian, that the whole sea shared the common destiny, a heavy one indeed, with identical problems and general trends if not identical consequences (Braudel, 1996, p.14).

Although Braudel (1993) emphasizes the unity of the Mediterranean region historically and today, there appeared much division in the region rather than tendencies towards the creation of one identity between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

The perception of the "Mediterranean identity" seems quite problematic when it is complicated by the factors of historic, cultural and religious differences and political, social and economic injustice between the South and the North. The fragmentation of the region

in the eyes of Europe dates back to the early stages of colonialism. The Egyptian, Greek, Persian and Phoenician and later the Roman civilizations used the region to extend their powers on different civilizations. The breakup within the Roman Empire and the rise of the Islamic and Arabic rule in the Middle East, North Africa and Spain, the warring factions such as crusaders and the rise of regional powers like Venice and Genoa have all contributed to the fragmentation of the region. That reality left the Mediterranean a potentially conflicting area of the divisions among its peoples in their history and future (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001).⁶⁷

The North interpreted as modern and secularized dominates the religiously conservative South. The region has always been perceived as a source of conflict and divided into several categories by scholars: the North (developed, democratic and West) and the South (colonized, poor, uncivilized Arab and Islamic countries), Islam and Christian and East and West. This division is not only classified geographically or economically but also identified intellectually. It is also evident from Huntington's article "Clash of Civilizations?" that was published in 1993 and described the relations as the "fault lines between the Western and the Islamic civilizations." He sees "cultural differences as the fundamental source of the conflict" (1993). In fact, for Said (2003) it was no more than a creation of an opposite of West as Islam, with the purpose of identifying their major threat. He criticizes the Western historical, cultural and political perceptions of the East what he calls "Orientalism". The origins of this perception towards the East can be found in the British and French domination of the Eastern Mediterranean during the eighteenth century (Said, 2003, p.17). The West thus drew a cultural and political vision of their own reality that promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them") (Ahluwalia and Ashcroft, 2008, p.57).

⁶⁷ Conflicts in the region are accounted for as follows: First, the conflicts inherited from colonialism (territorial), second those causing from the divided societies (like Lebanon, Palestinian, Israel) and those related to the minority problems (Basques, Corsicans, the Kurds), and the border conflicts (Turkish-Greek conflicts and the Cyprus question as a sovereignty issue) (See also for example Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001).

2.2.1.1.2. Unity

Since the early 1990s, Western states have attributed a growing importance to the Middle East and the North Africa which has also become such an interest area of West that they called it “the Mediterranean”. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars in the Balkans and their effects at global and regional levels and recently the US-led Iraqi war reshaped the Western security paradigms; these problems were also accompanied by the structural problems at global levels including the gap between North and South in terms of technology, economics and political domestic developments. Increase in economic interdependence that also affects adversely human movements or causes migration has also become the major security concern of the Western sphere (Buzan, 1991). In face of escalating threats and risks nearby as well as the global security risks and international interdependence, a tendency towards regionalization of security among states arose to set a regional order for managing the conflicts (Adler and Crawford, 2002, pp.6-9).

In order to eliminate these security concerns the European states found a new way by conceptualizing the “Mediterranean security” in a unified form. It presented a broad normative framework for the whole “pan-Mediterranean region including the region from Atlantic (Morocco) to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East (Tanner, 2004, p.137). For that reason, the Europeans give their attention to the Middle Eastern and North African region (MENA) in order to provide the “Mediterranean security” or constructing a secure region for all. Remaining as a Eurocentric concept, the “Mediterranean security” refers to “challenges to European security coming from the MENA region.” The logic of the Mediterranean approach of the European Union is also aiming at reviving the ideas that the region has its own characteristics, identity based on common values and norms between the two shores of the region. Adler and Crawford (2002) go further by arguing that although an

EU-like security community is not the aim the projects are intended to transform the Mediterranean region into such a community like entity.⁶⁸

The process in the Mediterranean under the auspices of the EU had started at discursive levels in terms of security discourses, discourses of social stability, strategic as plus economic discourses, and intensified at the institutional level through a variety of concrete practices. The initiatives since the years that yielded respectively the Global Mediterranean Policy, Barcelona Process, the Neighborhood Policy and recently the notion of a Union all contributed to institutionalization -in terms of cooperation- of the construction of the Mediterranean region.

Coming back to the geographical thinking, defining the limits of Europe, Asia and Africa is still challenging. Characterizing the Mediterranean region becomes a kind of horizontal dividing line between the European north and an arch of crisis located in the South. A theoretical framework of north-south conflict assumes not only the realities of north-south realities; but also as Xenakis and Chrysochoou (2001, p.27) argue that the “European efforts to develop a set of harmonious and balanced, albeit not-symmetrical, relations across the Mediterranean.”

In progressing a regional aspect towards the Mediterranean, it would be better to consider the Mediterranean according to its sub-regional settings separately. The Mediterranean includes at least two international regions: The first one is the north-western sector, the other one is the south-eastern sector. Southern Europe includes Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta; and Southern Mediterranean covers the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority); and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) (Xenakis, 1999, p.256). In this thesis, some regions bordering the Mediterranean can also be included in the definition of the “Mediterranean” such as Albania which can have some conflicting effects on the other European countries in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, there are other variations in these

⁶⁸ This is because the policy-makers involve in this process duplicate the mechanisms that were previously used to create the EU and the OSCE.

geographical groupings presenting some problems in analyzing the regional identities. Mediterranean sub-regional constellations definitely need a reconceptualization of wider regional dynamics.

In this thesis, the geographical weight will be issue-related. For example, migration threat mostly comes from the Maghreb regions whereas the military threat is perceived from Mashreq and the Balkans area as well. The general focus nevertheless will be on the Maghreb region which has a distinct place for Europe. It is the European Union, in a way, which detaches the Maghreb region from the Middle East. Doing so, Europe sets a more autonomous relationship with the Maghreb region which Europe sees it as a periphery. Developments with Maghreb are put on the very top list of its security concerns in some EU states such as migration, energy dependency and the conflicts nearby. Yet, Europe maintains its “inter-regional” relations in the transatlantic framework. While migration issue is much more securitized by the Member States of the EU, military threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or terrorism are handled by the US (Buzan and Waever, 2000).

In conclusion, despite the fact that there are some divisions in the definition of the Mediterranean or the difficulties in conceptualizing a “unified Mediterranean”, the EU’s security concerns push the North to create a common ground for a partnership between the two shores.

2.2.2. Security Issues in the Mediterranean

Since 1989, Europe has been “transformed” and “redefined”: it has no longer remained under threat of mutual nuclear destruction and any possibility of escalating East-West confrontation in the continent. In the new era, mutual threat perceptions (that is mostly state-to-state) are over and new security issues have occurred. This time, the security concerns did not come from individual states but from an “external threat” which left Europe (as a security community) “re-securitized” (Waever, 1998, p.69). Europe has entered a new era of “regional threats and risks” which may also be labeled as the “areas of securitization”. Before assessing the “challenges and risks” emanating from the European Union’s southern circle, it would also be worth referring to what Aliboni (2002, pp.15-17) classifies in outlining these security concerns: These are North-South dimension and South-South dimension (See also for example European Movement, 2004; European Commission Neighborhood Policy, n.d.).⁶⁹ The first securitization is related to North-South dimension. Challenges in this sphere are generated from seven factors: 1) spill-over effects that may involve Western and NATO allies or their interests and security, a case explicitly contemplated by NATO’s new Strategic concept and the EU’s Security Strategy Concepts 2) the use against and impact on the European asymmetric strategies, as in the case with state-supported terrorism and other kinds of attacks such as sabotage, supply or transit disruptions 3) the political and military impacts of the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions 4) so-called rogue states now the term remains vague after the September 11 attacks 5) the transnational risks and the entanglement of external and domestic factors such as organized crime including trafficking of drugs, arms, human beings and organs, migrants, smuggling, money laundering 6) immigration is also important in terms of crime and illegality in the European cities. 7) Energy needs that have to be met from the Northern shore of the Mediterranean. The second dimension is assumed as the South-South relations:

⁶⁹ North-South dimension is used for the relations and interaction between the Northern countries of the Mediterranean and the South-South dimension whereas the “South-South” implies the relations between the Partner countries of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean. The latter is rarely used by the political leaders officially, however, the Ministries of the Member States of the European Union, a variety of academics and civil societies such as European Movement International do not hesitate to use the classification.

the Southern instability stemming from domestic and inter-state instability, economic, political and social underdevelopment (Aliboni, 2002, pp.15-17).

In this thesis, main security issues are categorized as migration and related issues; terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism; Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Threats; political and economic stabilities.

2.2.2.1. Migration and Related Threats

“Migration” as a “movement” or “phenomenon”, and “migrants” as “huge masses” or “foreigners” are perceived as a threat to “national identity” of receiving countries. The main reason stems from the fact that the huge masses wish to maintain both their cultural, linguistic and religious traditions in those countries, and the socio-economic conditions. Buzan (1991, p.447 and cited in Tsardanidis and Guerra, 2000, p.329) also argues that migration threatens “communal identity and culture” by changing the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic properties of the population. Therefore, the issues of immigration and identity rose as a security problem at European level in the late 20th century. The issues were articulated both the national leaders and the EU level top officials through a number of speeches and declarations.

In the early 1970s, migration was seen as instrumental for the economic development in the North Europe. However, between the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, migration commonly classified as “asylum”, “irregular” or “illegal” migration⁷⁰ started to be displayed as a threat against the security of European citizens (new post-cold war activism) (See also for example, Commission of the European Communities, 2006). In

⁷⁰ In Commission of the European Communities, on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country, illegal migration is explained as such: “... is used to describe a variety of phenomena. This includes third-country nationals who enter the territory of a Member State illegally by land, sea and air, including airport transit zones. This is often done by using false or forged documents, or with the help of organized criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers. In addition, there is a considerable number of persons who enter legally with a valid visa or under a visa-free regime, but “overstay” or change the purpose of stay without the approval of the authorities; lastly there are unsuccessful asylum seekers who do not leave.”

particular during the 1990s, the rise in the asylum demands and uncontrolled immigration flow brought the immigration issue to the very top of the European agenda. While the population of asylum seekers is increasing in the EFTA countries, in the Southern Members of the EU illegal immigration has become a “dominant pattern of immigration” (Santel, 1995, p.76).

Migratory flows were perceived as if the receiving countries are sieged by their poorer and less stable neighbors. Therefore, Europe started to extend their focus on the threats of massive “south-north” migration into Western Europe from the Third World, particularly from the Maghreb. As a fact, the immigration issue concerns the North Europeans as well as the South Europeans. The most significant non-EU presence in terms of citizens is in Germany followed by France, the UK and Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. In the South Europe, the migratory pressures are usually generated from the Mediterranean. In last ten years, immigration in the Southern Europe has increased than in northern Europe, probably because of the economic factors (Bazzoni and Chartouni - Dubarry, 2001, p.60). The geographical structure of the Mediterranean basin exposes Italy, France, Spain and Greece as target and transit countries as parts of Southern Europe. In particular, during the 1990s, the North Africans came to be overpopulated both in the Iberian and in the Italian peninsulas. Italy is the best example that has been “flooded by an uncontrollable waves of immigrants” especially from its former colonies such as Somalia, Eritrea and Libya. They went through from the Western Sahara to Europe. This was seen as a “new wave” of emigration from the Maghreb, differing from the migration flows that affected Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Santel, 1995, pp.75-76).⁷¹ Compared to the migratory movements in 1980 when the migrants were limited to a number of skilled-workers to Europe and North America, since 1990s there has been a remarkable increase in unskilled-workers from the Maghreb countries to Europe. The widely accepted argument on the reasons for their immigration is that they left their countries mainly because of over-population in their

⁷¹ In these countries governments and employers demanded “temporary workers” as they needed additional skilled and unskilled workers. This type of recruitment ended in 1973. Since then European governments avoided more migration flows.

home countries, economic underdevelopment and political insecurity. For Feruccio Pastore (2004) it was a new “emigration stream” also in its social composition: “younger, more urban, more educated, and with a growing share of female first migrants in it.”

The irregular migration is put on the European agenda by the South European states; however it became an important problematic issue at the EU level considering that it is not just a Mediterranean problem, but a European one. This is due to its spill-over effect throughout the continent given that the South European states are also the transit states where the migrants pass through in order to arrive in other European countries. For that reason, at both the EU and national levels, migration as issue was handled many times since it is seen as a threat against strategic security also articulated as “regime, security and inner stability, to structural security and the security of resources or to concepts of identity” (Martin, Escribano and Lorca, 2002). The situation was also voiced at a CSCE seminar in 1994 on migrant workers. In the seminar, it was stated that

migratory movements are increasingly viewed from the angle of security and stability between the states. Internal and external security and stability are undermined by large and unordered migratory movements and the settlement of migrant worker.

As put above, migration as a threat to security strategy occurs when migration flow threatens the external security and integrity of state. It means that the refugee communities start to seek use forces or put pressures on the hosting state in order to recover from the territories which they have been exiled. Some of them also threat against the hosting states while participating violent actions within those countries such as Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) militants in France (Collyer, 2006, p.266).

As for the threats to structural security of host country, immigrants are perceived as economic burden for social state and welfare state. For example in Italy and Spain unemployment was addressed as the “main disadvantages” caused by immigrants (Tsardanidis and Guerra, 1999, p.330). This type of threat is more often used by the nationalist and extreme-right wing political parties. They claim that the immigrants are taking their jobs from the host states’ citizens (Roberts, 1992). Such declarations made by

the rightist parties caused decline in living standards and competition in labor market. In addition, the use of “illegal immigrants” by the clandestine groups poses a threat to public order. In Southern Italy, the “organized criminality” of groups such as Mafia use them for their illegal activities (Tsardanidis and Guerra, 1999, p.331).

Second, migration arises some suspicion in identity based issues like distinction of “self” and “other”. Pace (2004) argues that the discourses related to the Mediterranean issues such as migration are highly based on “identity”. For both the EU and the Member States, the lowest common denominator is that the EU is a security community and their security discourses are based on an “imagined identity.” The pressure is coming through nationalistic discourses which then result in racist and xenophobic movements among within the host country. In Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal the xenophobic tendencies became a phenomenon in the post-1990s (Cohen, 2006, p.89). In Italy, for example, as a result of a survey in 2003 45% of Italians feel negative feelings against the immigrants even if Italy was a emigrant country in the 1960s and 1970s (Parrenas, 2008, p.102). The irregular migration from the Southern Mediterranean also received a great media attention in recent years. Many politicians, scholars and media display the immigration issue as “massive” and “increasing” attacks to the European continent from the South. Millions of sub-Saharan Africans are portrayed as if they are waiting in North Africa to cross the Mediterranean. In the European-African Migration conference of 2006, the French President Jacques Chirac warned: "if we do not develop... Africa... if we do not make available the necessary resources to bring about this development, these people will flood the world" (BBC, 2006). Giving the speech in the multilateral conference, Chirac used a more soft discourse on the migration issue linking it to the development issue in line with the South-South dimension. However, the nationals in their homelands, uses a more strict language. For example, the “electorization” of the issue also puts a negative effect via the mass media in Europe; Umberto Bossi, the leader of an Italian party, the Northern League, goes further: “People who come to Italy must come to work. We will make illegal immigration a serious crime... Stop treating illegal immigrants like normal people” (Migration News, 2001; La Repubblica, 3 July 2001). Bossi as a nationalist leader, as a fact

securitization of the “Christian identity” of Italy and Europe which could be deteriorated by the Muslim originated immigrants (Lega Nord, n.d).

The link between security and migration is clear in a number of European documents regarding the Mediterranean region. In May 1991, the European Parliament issued a resolution on Europe’s role in the Mediterranean security. By the resolution, at the EU level, the issue was portrayed as a population explosion, and increasing migration among the causes of insecurity. In October 1991, the European Commission in its communication to the Council and Parliament linked the issue to: demographic pressure, control and restriction of migration flows and the integration of resident immigrant-origin populations (Flynn, 1993, p.47). This communication recommended the reinforcement of the association and cooperation agreements with the countries of emigration. The EU not only has taken security measures across its borders but also has tried to strengthen its inner structure against the “migratory pressures.” In 1993, when the Commission issued a list of more than a hundred countries for the visa restriction, the Union had taken one more step towards the integration of the EU. In this respect, on 1995, the Commission agreed on the proposals for directives on the “elimination of controls on persons at the internal frontiers of the EU” (Groenendijk, 2004).

More concretely, the Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union (EU) which came into force on 1 May 1999 established for the first time the Community competence for immigration and asylum. In other words, Member States of the EU adopted a common migration policy within the Treaty. Migration policy is included in the Treaty along with the relevant issues. The Treaty states that the EU

must be maintained and developed as an area of freedom, security and justice; (an area) in which the free movement of persons is assured; in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime (the Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union, 1997).

Therefore a framework as a policy was drawn for the common securitization of the migration issue and the measures taken for it. Now a more standardized security discourses and the practices were to be the blueprint of the future actions just like in the European Council adopted in October 1999 in Tampere. A work program set the objectives to be implemented in the area of freedom, security and justice in the period 2005-2010 and was then followed by a set of communications, action plans and reports. In the Tampere, Member States articulated their common stance on the migration issue for a more effective “partnership.” They agreed on the principle that an EU asylum and immigration policy must necessarily depend on intensive dialogue between reception countries, transit countries, countries of origin and migrants themselves (European Council, 1999). These include activities in source and transit countries, police cooperation, to share knowledge of operations which are implemented at the point of entry including border controls and visa policies, legislation against traffickers, migrants and illegals (Van Krieken, 2001, p.15). With the removal of the internal borders by Schengen and the standardization of security measures, the security of each Members State has become more interdependent on each other’s security (European Commission Communication, 2004).

In addition, the events of September 11, 2001 and the fear of terrorist attacks increased the concerns in security issues and adaptation new identity and migration-control regulations in Europe. The bombings of Madrid and London reminded Europe the real threats, and constructing new “perceived threats” linking terrorism to migration issue. Migration has now become more securitized at not only the EU level but also national level. In the Document of the Council of the European Union of 2004, the EU linked migration and security and called for the Member Sates of the EU to take necessary action in internal and external security. It was stated that

[t]he security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organized crime, as well as the prevention thereof. Notably in the field of security, the coordination and coherence between the internal and the external dimension has been growing in importance and needs to continue to be vigorously pursued (Ibid.).

The Council also notes that the EU and the neighboring countries must continue their cooperation and dialogue in line with the Cotonou Agreement, Stabilization and Association Agreements, Neighborhood Action Plans and Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements within the framework of Barcelona Process (European Commission, 2005).

The Commission also calls for the Member States to outline firm guidelines on in particular labor migration, in other words, for legal immigration channels for labor migrants (Fratini, 2006, p.14). Although mostly the Member States are responsible for deciding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the migrants, the Commission wants them to reach a consensus on the objectives of migration and asylum policy in Europe. Lazcko (2002, pp.604-605) argues that referring to his study on Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom “there has not yet been no common European approach to labor migration policy either within or between these countries.” Collinson (1999, p.306), on the other hand, emphasizes the Southern Europe’s preventive policies towards the “unwanted” and “undocumented” worker immigration should be increased because it poses a threat as economic instabilities against not only hem but also the other parts of Europe.

In sum, the first steps in the construction of migration issue in the European politics and its common migration policy have started in the 1980s. Since migration is an old phenomenon with the increase in its qualitative and quantitative characteristics, the European Union and the Member States individually have taken consideration the issue especially since the September 11, 2001. Since then the migration issue was not only handled as an economic and development issue but also linked to the relevant security

issues ranging from terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction which will be studied in the next part of this thesis.

2.2.2.2. Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism

“Terrorism” has become a central issue since it threatens the global international security in particular, after the attacks of September 11, 2001 against the US. In a sense securitization of military issues prevails over political, cultural, social and economical issues. This led the Mediterranean region become a scene for strategic alliances as well as partnership. Europe’s tendencies towards hard security issues are considered from the “cooperative security regimes” more than a “security community” perspective that would be maintained with the Southern partner countries. The anti-terrorist coalition well coincides with the EU-initiated Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and US-sponsored Greater Middle East Project (Aliboni, 2002, pp.103-105).

Terrorism has become one of the main security discourses in Europe since the continent has also suffered from the “spread of terrorism” and other military threats. The terrorist attacks that had been referred to Al Quida by the US have also experienced in Europe such as Madrid bombings of 2004, London bombings of 2005 and the Marrakech Hotel bombing of August 1994 in Morocco and the terrorist attacks in France that both linked to the civil war in Algeria. Aliboni (2002, p.104) argues that “post-11 September evidence suggests that Europe is becoming a target as well as a logistical platform for actions directed to not only North Africa and the Middle East but also the United States and Europe itself.” In this respect, increase in migration from the North Africa and the Middle East that are very adjacent to European continent underline the requirement for new policies (p.104). For example, irregular migration becomes a security problem when associated to international crime, terrorism in particular since the attacks of Madrid of 2004 and London of 2005 (European Council, 2004). This kind of terrorism is differing from

domestic terrorism in that it involves ideological confrontation and separate issues against the presence of the US troops in Saudi Arabia, or American support to Israel in its conflicting issues with the Arab countries.

Whatever Europeans might think of the reality of terrorism and identify the causes in numerous ways, the EU's broad understanding on the soft security nature of the region has almost been complicated with its new "hard security" discourses and measures after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2003.⁷² In the European Security Strategy Paper (European Council, 2003) it is clearly articulated that

[E]urope is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable (New York Times, 30 July, 2005).⁷³

The effects of the terrorist attacks that started with the September 11 were twofold in the perceptions and the practices of the Europeans: First, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Europeans participated in an open-ended "war against terrorism" which remarkably strengthened the NATO solidarity in terms of one-for all and all for one. The Allies were acting together in chasing those who were claimed to be responsible for the attack, the Talibans and the members of Al-Quida. With the removal of Talibans, Europe was following its Atlantic ally in implementing a coherent plan to establish a democratic and a stable government in Afghanistan (de Hoop Scheffer, 2008).⁷⁴

Second but more important developments in the aftermaths of the terrorist attacks have begun to be experienced towards the migrant communities in Europe. The governments and media started to make effort to prevent migration from the Muslim

⁷² It was on 12 September 2001 upon the attacks in New York, the NATO members for the first time agreed on the Article 5 to be operationalized in case of a terrorist attack.

⁷³ The fact that all the September 11, and July 7 bombers were from immigrant-descended communities including Moroccan, Algerian, Lebanese and Pakistani originated people coupled with the allegations on terrorist plans were their most significant proofs. The allegations were on that the September 11 attacks were planned in Hamburg-based networks while London attacks of 7 July in Rome-based networks.

⁷⁴ However, the Europeans were to be divided when it came to the Middle East in "war against terrorism in Iraq" in the context of George Bush's "axis of evil".

communities and especially illegal immigrants in Europe. In the aftermath of the attacks, the European attitudes had begun to be worsened by some European leaders' "clash of civilizations" logic in their discourses.

This is well illustrated by the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's contention of the terrorist attacks as "declaration of war against the civilized world". The US President George Bush also referred to the attacks as being against "civilized countries". Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also used rhetoric "by proclaiming the 'superiority of our (Western) civilization' over Islamic countries" (Herbst, 2003, pp.34-35). In addition, Italian minister of defense under Berlusconi government Antonio Martino's words are worth noting: "... illegal migration is infiltrated by Al-Quida" (Cuttitta, 2009). Similarly, after the Madrid bombings, many officials described Spain as the "main base of Al Quida in Europe" and "a target of violence" as a result of Islamic activities and largely maintained by the Muslim immigrants (Alonso, 2008, p.109). Europe felt much more obliged ever to talk and act tough on the anti-immigrant policies that remained populist on the way of elections in Denmark, Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Norway (Betts, 2002, p.78).

As a consequence, Europeans conceive that terrorism is one of the major threats against Europe. Such an approach resulted in the declaration of "European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy Paper" (European Council, 2005) which, in an exclusionary way, emphasized that terrorism has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU in particular, its southern periphery.

Given that the current international terrorist threat affects and has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU, co-operation with and the provision of assistance to priority third countries - including in North Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia - will be vital.

As for the Islamic fundamentalism that is linked to terrorism and migration also generates a security concern for Europe (Milton-Edwards, 2005, p.92). For Europeans it is not portrayed as if it is "posing a threat to the Arab countries" but also creating a "fifth

column” for radical Muslims in Europe that is also “sleeper cells, secret sympathizers, and potential insurgents” (Betz, 1994, p.138; Boukhars, 2009, p.307; Werbner, 2004, p.463). “Islamism” combined with “militarism” is commonly interpreted as violence towards the Western civilization and rule as it was in terrorist attacks but also towards any unit (mainly state) who opposes Islamist regime. From the civil conflict of the 1990s in Algeria, the Islamist movement led by the FIS and several armed Islamist groups (especially the GIA, the Armed Islamic Group) “terrorized the population and killed tens of thousands of people in an attempt to seize control of the state” (Turshen, 2004, p.120). Since 1992 in Algeria (in the first five years) Islamic fundamentalism has caused deaths over 100.000 Algerians (Lutz and Lutz, 2004, p.80). The roots of the Islamic instabilities had started with the Gulf War when Algeria and Tunisia did not want to give support for the US led-coalition against Saddam Hussein. This was perceived as an antagonistic stance towards the West from the North Africa. Thus, in West, anti- Islamic sentiments that were also translated into anti-Arab sentiments were born with the Gulf War (Bresheeth and Yuval-Davis, 1991, p.114; Siddiqui, 1997, pp.100-101; Collinson 1996, p.42). Such attitudes led the Western states to establish an equation of “Arab=Islam=Islamic Fundamentalism” (Collinson 1996, p.42; Bicchi, 2001).⁷⁵ Turshen (2004, p.121) contends that Islamist movements primarily derived from national opposition movements as in Algeria; and then interact with transnational movements as in the case of September 11 to “realize their global project of Muslim civilization.”

The tough stance towards the increase of Islamic fundamentalism was also mirrored in the Strategic Concept of NATO in 1991 then confirmed by the Strategic Concept of 1999 that includes religious and ethnic factors as threats in the context of a broad concept of security. In its Mediterranean Dialogue launched in 1994 the Member States, agreed to cooperate on a number of issues such as “border security, particularly in

⁷⁵ For Europe, the civil war in Algeria who waged the war as Islamic fundamentalists was set towards the opposition and the Westerners who support the democratic ones. That is why France declared Islamic fundamentalism as a domestic threat and arrested some Islamic militant suspects. It was well evidenced in 1994 when the terrorists group GIA hijacked an Air France airbus and threatened to explode it over Paris. Algerian extremists also conducted a terrorist campaign in Paris in 1995.

connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons, and the fight against illegal trafficking” (NATO, 1994).

Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism together, or put it concretely, when Islamic fundamentalism turns into terrorism, now dominate the political and public debates that are linked to security, international relations and international politics issues in Europe.

2.2.2.3. Military Issues and Related Threats

European security in military terms cannot be considered without its Atlantic dimension. Europe has been defended by NATO for almost 60 years against the major threat, Communism, for 40 years, and the risks coming from the European continent as well as its periphery almost for 17 years. Moving towards the Gulf Region in the South, the risks and instabilities -not expressed as “threat” yet- successively took place in NATO’s Strategic Concepts.

The long lasting isolation of Libya; US preoccupation with Israeli security; with the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe and the breakout of the Gulf War; and with the September 11 attack in particular, the terrorist and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the civil wars in the Mediterranean; and the North African States’ misperception of the ESDP developments towards the Mediterranean have become all potentials for the conflict to spill over all over the world and in particular the Euro-Atlantic area. There are a number of indirect threats or risks against Europe. Though, Europeans see the threats at minimal levels. There were three kinds of indirect threats or risks: One is the involvement of conflict related to the ethnic minorities or territorial disputes in political arenas that are close to the Euro-Atlantic alliance structures. The other risk is that a sudden increase in the migrants and refugees in terms of “uncontrolled human movements”. This type of threats was coming from Northern Iraq to Turkey as a result of the Gulf War, from Albania to Italy as a result of the collapse

of the Albanian state. In the Algeria case, some movements of people towards the Southern Europe have been expected. Third is about the consequences of the September 11 attacks. The threat comes from the South (namely from the Middle East) in the form of Weapons of Mass Destruction and any direct military attacks. It means that the risks or threats from the MENA region have not disappeared. The future risks from the MENA region to Europe are distinguished in the manner whether they are “spill-over” or “involvement”. The answer would be the first in the sense that the spill-over risks come day-to-day such as migrants flowing day by day, not a direct involvement in a conflict (Aliboni, 2002).

Here, military threats are examined in two categories: First, the regional military conflicts in the Mediterranean; second, the terrorism and the WMD issue.

In the first category, the regional where the weak states that can also be labeled as historically a part of Ottoman Empire and partly ex-colonies of the Western world like Albania or the Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon. The Mediterranean received its military threats intensively from these countries which were then exposed to military intervention of the third party. In both countries, the political system demonstrates that they are “weak states” in the sense that there exist “underdeveloped state-society relationships, weak institutional capacity and structures and fragmented society.” Albania like other Western Balkan countries has a weak tradition of the rule of law, the low level of respect for law, a weak state or a state that does not function.” The military conflict that broke out with the economic crisis in 1997 was not surprising for the country which had been experiencing democracy for the first time in its history (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007, p.29). Like Albania, Lebanon is another Mediterranean (a Middle Eastern at the same time) state in terms of its weak statehood and fragmented society (Winslow, 1996, p.6). In Lebanon the problem was about not only the access to and use of resources and but also its survival as a weak state (See also for example Migdal, 1988). The lowest level of social control was in the 1970s during the civil war and when it is highly involved in the Middle Eastern problems. These two countries are the outstanding samples of the conflicting regions which also threaten the whole region with a domino effect. For the former, the whole Balkans and

Italy would be affected, in the Lebanon case, the military conflict has long been a contentious issue in the Middle East and mostly in the Arab-Israel issue. These two cases necessitated an understanding and measurements for crisis humanitarian intervention and peace operations at military level.

The second threat has become visible in particular after the events of September 11: The Euro-Atlantic region has been exposed to new risks that can damage even with low intensity violence such as sabotage, disruptions in supply, or any kind of terrorism. It can be a direct attack such as terrorist attacks in the European land.

The potential spill-over effect of military conflicts from the Middle East has increased with the proliferation of long-range delivery systems and weapons of mass destructions, in particular for the Southern region. Libya has been a military threat as since it has produced weapons of mass destruction (one of the “state sponsor terrorism”) since 1979 (Land, 2002). For Lesser (1995)⁷⁶, the proliferation risk is also prominent for Europe, which had been wary about Libya’s weaponry activities. Israel, Syria and Libya are the main states who are deployed with the weapons of mass destructions. Iraq, Egypt and Algeria have also such intentions. The consequences, without any doubt, can be considerable in that the risks of WMD are damaging the security environment in the Mediterranean even for the distant places.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction issue is also documented in the “Basic Principles of an EU Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destructions” that was approved by the EU Council in 2003. The EU also adopted action plans for its implementation. The document also stresses the importance of the Mediterranean. It was stated that

[p]roliferation of WMD is a global threat, which needs a global approach. However, as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area (European Council, 2003).

⁷⁶ The president of Mediterranean Advisors, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center,

In accordance with the Action Plan, beside a WMD threat assessment for the Mediterranean area, specific non proliferation issues in the EU dialogue with Mediterranean countries in line with the main non-proliferation and arms control treaties, a WMD free area in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is targeted by the EU and its Member States.

2.2.2.4. Political/Economic Instabilities and Energy

In the Mediterranean, the main challenges that are seen as economical and political first stem from the lack of “political legitimacy and economic development” in the Southern Mediterranean that is broadly composed of “weak states” (Lipset, 1960, p.75; Migdal, 1988). Second, energy need of the EU is also interpreted as one of the rising economical issue between the two shores of the Mediterranean region.

2.2.4.1. Political Instabilities

In order to understand the political instabilities, it would be appropriate to refer to Buzan and Waever’s (2003, pp.190-193) security complex notions: From this approach, it can be contended that this area (mostly known as the Middle East) which is made up two subcomplexes is conflict formation in nature. First subcomplex is Maghreb and the other is placed in Levant between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In the first complex, we can categorize its nature in terms of two aspects: First their domestic weaknesses, second the relationships, namely among Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. For the former, Aliboni (cited in Tsardanidis and Guerra, 2000, p.322) argues that in the Southern Mediterranean area, “almost all of the states’ integrity and internal cohesion seem highly jeopardized.” They are also described as “weak states” because of the “peculiar legacy of both colonization and decolonization.” These states possess weak legitimacy for their political regimes and built by the elites in the 1950s under the Arab nationalism. The end of the

Cold War also exposed such weaknesses in the Middle East and the North Africa as well as the Soviet Union and the Western Balkans (Aliboni, 2002, p.16). The most important feature of these states is the fact that the political decision-making structures are highly dominated by the monopoly parties, and lacking adequate participation of the people, fair elections; the rule of law and respect for human rights; and increasing concerns in particular in Europe for its long-term stability. For example, Buzan (1988 cited in Liverani, 2008, p.3) described Algeria as a place where “significant sections of the population challenge the institutions that uphold the state...” It is a weak state where violence is used by the state elites to “penetrate society, shape social relationships and use resources” (Liverani, 2008, p.3; see also for example Migdal, 1988).

On the other hand, Islam is actually not seen as a direct threat against Europe but an obstacle to modernity which the South Mediterranean has not adopted for many centuries. However, for the Europeans, Islam can also be adapted to democracy only if democracy is not defined by the Western standards. Despite all, Islam is linked to “threat phenomenon” when it turns into a radical form that is also known as “Islamism”; Islamic fundamentalism is interpreted as a “reaction to the years of intolerable political and socioeconomic conditions” (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001). The economic, social and political tensions almost prevent the emergence of democratic structures.

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in some Southern Mediterranean countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and the Palestinian territories also affect the stability and security of the Southern European countries; emigration to Europe; Islam-oriented foreign policy structures of the Southern Mediterranean States; and blockage to the access to energy resources (Tsardinidis and Guerra, 2000, p.323).

These developments made Islam a more global issue beyond its impact on the regional level. Politically and socially, Islam has been on the very top agenda and a subject of “macrosecuritization”. Gompert (1998, p.23) argues that even if Islamic fundamentalism is overcome by American-European cooperation, and this cooperation can never be inspired

by a persistent fear from Islam. Moreover, in their speech, the Western leaders focus on the strict solidarity that can be strengthened by their cooperation. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is now primarily linked to the terrorist attacks which General Secretary of NATO Lord Robertson (NATO, 2002) argued that

[t]he terrorists also hoped to strike a blow for Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, they provoked what will be their inevitable defeat. Where once they flourished in shadow, now the whole world is aware of the deadly threat they pose, and is co-operating in stamping it out.

In a sense, Islam that emerged as a new global threat to the Western world and was replaced by Communism has now been “contained” by a number of joint measures taken by the Westerners (Ray, 2004, p.70).

Second, externally these states are almost in enmity form. The main characteristic of this region is that they have interstate problems: Morocco annexed the Western Sahara that started in 1975 which also created a clash between Algeria and Libya. Morocco backed Libya’s opponents in Chad. Libya had also territorial dispute with Chad where Libya intervened for the internal problems. The Maghreb states had also strong ties to the Arab-Israel dispute. Libya opposed Israel and backed radical regimes in Gulf. Algeria had a mediating role among the Arab countries. Morocco had sent troops for several Arab countries in the Gulf (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.193).

Second subcomplex is the Levant region bordering the Mediterranean coastlines where Israel and Arab countries are located. This subcomplex involves Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan and non state actors such as PLO and Hezbollah. The main problem is the long-lasting struggle between Israel and Palestinians the effects of which also spread throughout the neighboring countries thus resulting in hostilities. Israel has a never-ending conflict with Palestine, Syria and Lebanon; Lebanon and Syria have some problems due to the Syrian influence on and control of Lebanese politics and security. Moreover, all the Arab countries have participated in this issue mainly backing the Palestinian side (Ibid., pp.190-191). This complex is also closely aligned with Algeria, Libya, Morocco and

Tunisia in particular in the Palestinian issue since there are a huge number of Palestinian refugees residing those countries.

In conclusion, the political instabilities in particular with the rise of Islam in the Southern Mediterranean pushed the European to introduce political reforms and pluralism in these Southern Mediterranean countries (Aliboni, 2002, p.18). The Europeans see the solution in this region as to strengthen “the civil society and cultural understanding and securing the enduring mistrust of such societies” (Tsardanidis and Guerra, 2000, p.324). However, the most problem has already interlinked to the “repressiveness of the political systems in the South” (Brynjar, 1999, p.40). For that reason, Europe it seems far more difficult to take concrete steps to cooperate with the autocratic and repressive regimes of the Mediterranean on security matters. Europeans may rethink of maintaining their “cooperative security regimes” to eradicate the Islamic terror at the expense of diffusing their liberal values and norms throughout the region.

2.2.4.2. Economic Instabilities

As for economic instabilities, the worsening economic and demographic problems in the South Mediterranean also deeply influence the North Mediterranean countries and Europe. There is huge gap between the North and South. The problems include “inflation, inadequate export-earning, increasing foreign debts, high unemployment, decreasing food self-sufficiency and a general deterioration of the environment due to the urbanization, marine pollution and desertification” (Tsardanidis and Guerra, 2000, p.327). Furthermore, the existence of a wide economic gap between rich industrialized North and poor South portrayed the disparity within the region.

According to Human Development Index (HDI) (2009) which makes calculations each year gives an understanding of a broader definition of well-being for these countries: The HDI provides three basic indicator: “income, life expectancy and literacy”.

Accordingly, in the Mediterranean, France (8th), Spain (15th) and Italy (18th) have the highest rankings belonging to the “very high human development” category. Morocco with 130 is the lowest one amongst all. Algeria is the 104th and Lebanon is the 83rd and Tunisia is the 98th being in the “medium human development” category. Libya is ranked as the 55th (placing in “high human development” category) since Libya’s economy is based on oil revenues.

Similarly, life expectancy is high in France and Italy with 93, Spain with 92 while in the North African countries are low. Morocco has 76, Algeria 78 and Tunisia 81.

The literary rate is highest in Italy with 98.9%, France with 99%, Spain with 97.9% whereas in Algeria the percentage is 69.9%, in Morocco it is 52.3% and in Tunisia it is 74.3%.⁷⁷

For the North Mediterranean one of the most indicators for economic relations is the increase in trade: The EU has been holding fifteen percent of the world trade while the other countries of the Mediterranean account only three percent (Biscop, 2003, p.12). The latter is the third largest market of the EU; the Union is the buyer of the products from the region. The South became economically dependent on the EU and its technology, market and investors. These all create tensions between the North and the South. Foreign investors have not considered the South Mediterranean an attractive region due to the authoritarian governments in the region, and the unstable environment for the investment opportunities. Apart from that the demographic factor is also important since the economy cannot be adequate and cope with the rapid growth of the population in the South Mediterranean. For Rundel, Rizzardini, Montenegro and Jaksic (1998, p.419), by the year 2025 the population will rise to 350 million from 190 million in 1990 in the Southern shore.

⁷⁷ See also for example App II.

Besides the political instabilities in the region, economical issues constitute a challenge for Europe since these have an extra domino effect on several problems such as increase in the migration flows, rise in Islamic fundamentalism that can also result in terrorism and hatred against the West and the decline in regional liberal trade regime.

2.2.4.3. Energy

One of the main components for the Mediterranean trade is energy, supply of oil and gas from some of the Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Syria. These Southern countries export energy commodities while the North is importing energy sources and raw materials from those countries. Beside energy trade between the two shores, oil supplies originating from the Persian Gulf, Russia, and in the future from Central Asia pass through the Mediterranean. This makes the Mediterranean is a vital transit and choke point for oil supplies and trade at global level and well as regional level.⁷⁸ In this manner, it can be understandable for the Mediterranean countries to maintain the relationship between energy supplies and Mediterranean security. Energy security should be provided first to meet the oil and gas supply and second the guarantee the energy routes through the Mediterranean (Luciani, 2002).

EU consumes approximately 18% of global oil and 19% of gas consumption. In 2005, the EU's import approximately represents 50% of its energy needs which is expected to rise to 70% by 2030. EU imports its 50% of the energy (oil and natural gas) from Russia. Such a dependency on Russian energy supplies led Europe to search for new alternatives in Middle East and North Africa since Russia could use the "energy weapon" to influence European political, economic and security policies (Morelli, 2006).

⁷⁸ See also for example App III.

Europe imports approximately 30% of its oil and 10% of its piped gas from the Middle East/North Africa region. Europe's main suppliers of oil are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. One third of gas imports to the EU as a whole came from Maghreb (Calleya, 2003). Gas is delivered through an extensive network of pipelines such as the Trans-Med, Maghreb-Europe, Medgas, Galsi and Greenstream pipelines connecting the Maghreb to Europe (Ariweriokuma, 2008, pp.13-14).⁷⁹ Therefore stability in the Mediterranean, the Middle East Peace Process is significant for European interests in the region. The transportation road of energy pipelines or by sea should be guaranteed. Therefore, this is the field where the energy sector is one of the important areas for cooperation across the Mediterranean (Calleya, 2003, p.20).

Biscop (cited in Lesser, 1999, p.218) argues that gas is more regional unlike oil (that is global) and the EU therefore has a major interest in maintaining stability in the Mediterranean so as to provide gas delivery without being jeopardized by internal or inter-state conflict. Totally 96% of all oil and gas exports are brought to Europe. However in the Mediterranean there will be a main challenge how to provide energy for almost one billion people in the region. By 2050 Euro-Med reserves of fossil energy will be depleted. Europe will not get oil from Egypt and Syria and Libya. The oil and gas may remain to be used for petrochemical industries and for domestic consumption (Rhein, 1997, p.103). This is important also for regional trade. The Mediterranean is also a market for the Member States of the EU. European states export equipment, manufactured goods, agricultural products and chemical products. In order to meet the needs in Arab countries and Europe the Mediterranean security should be provided on both shores (Biscop, 2003, p. 18).

⁷⁹ Transmed connects Algeria and Tunisia to Italy; Maghreb-Europe connects Algeria via Morocco to Spain and Portugal; Galsi (composed of German Wintershall and Italian ENEL) connects Algeria to Italy; Medgas connects Algeria to Spain; Trans-sharan has also a link to Europe; Greenstream links Western Libyan natural gas to Italy.

Consequently, it would not be wrong to say that European relations with the states of the Persian Gulf and North Africa have intensified over the years. EU has maintained its relations with the North Africa in formal ways since in 1995 since the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership. The EU has established a formal dialogue with the states of the Persian Gulf through the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Dialogue and OPEC. The increase in Europe's energy diversification strategy and the competition among the global powers for energy regarding the Middle East and North Africa is important. Such a dependency pushes Europe to develop new and constructive relationships with the region (European Commission, n.d.).

2.3. European Security Practices in the Mediterranean

The European Union has maintained and improved its relations with the Southern states since the 1960s, the post-colonial period. However, the Union decided to put the relations in a comprehensive and systemic framework that is also attributed to “region-building” process. Although the aim of this thesis is not to investigate the EU's “region-building” attempts, the practices are given in order to make clear the EU's broad notions providing the Euro-Mediterranean security. For that reason, this section gives an outline for the EU practices in particular at multilateral level. It would be noteworthy to state that the EU has a multilevel governance and cross-pillar system that is also sustained through a number of policy activities from the each pillar.

2.3.1. The Birth of a “Mediterranean Policy” in Europe (1961-1995)

EU’s Mediterranean policy before the Barcelona Process that started in 1995 or in particular during the Cold War, had evolved within a number of policy initiatives: “the rapprochement” (1961-1972), the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1989); the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (1989-1995).

As Weidenfeld (cited in Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001) calls the “rapprochement” of the EEC towards the Mediterranean approach begins with the post-colonial period during the 1960s and continues up to the Global Mediterranean Policy signed in 1972. This is the period that the EEC was becoming aware of the Mediterranean basin. In reality, the establishment of the EEC was not welcome by the Southern part of the Mediterranean that was deeply relied on the European trade market. They had to compete with Italy and France in the sale of the same products such as olive oil, vegetables and fruits. What resulted from those attempts such as lobbying were some trade preferential agreements with the European countries. These agreements gradually then pushed the South Mediterranean countries to be in closer relationship with the Europe. On the other hand, Association Agreements were signed with Greece and Turkey respectively in 1962 and 1963 with a view to giving the full membership to these countries (Tocci, 2004, p.55). The logic of such an attempt in those years was to stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean against possible Communist influences. South Mediterranean countries were not offered a full membership like Greece and Turkey, rather the regional countries all agreed on trade issues, free access for industrial goods and providing specific concessions for particular agricultural products. Though, the Community’s Mediterranean policy remained incoherent in that they could not adopt a regional approach. The idea of the agreements is interpreted as development aid more than trade (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001a, p.60).

During the 1970s within the framework of European Political Cooperation the EEC adopted a rigid definition of Mediterranean that was labeled as “Global Mediterranean Approach”. For the first time, the EEC addressed all countries as belonging to a “single region”, the Mediterranean. It was first articulated by the European Parliament in the form of Rossi Report in February 1971. It was argued that an approach of ad hoc agreements did not create among Mediterranean peoples the sense of belonging to one and the same region of the world having its own personality and its identity. Thus, a “regional promotion policy” was to be developed. The debate was on the concept among the institutions of the EEC. With the intervention of a member state, namely, France was crucial in codifying a single Mediterranean region (Grilli, 1994, p.185). During the meetings, France was insisting on adopting a free trade with Spain, Israel, Portugal and also the Maghreb countries and Egypt, Lebanon and all other Mediterranean countries, focusing on the trade between the EEC and all the Mediterranean countries. Thus, with the support of Netherlands, France could envision a matured approach towards the region that is a global approach. The idea was then supported by the Commission and of the European Parliament. In 1972, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was announced towards the Mediterranean, the aim of which is to free access to European markets for Mediterranean manufactured exports. In the long term, GMP on the Mediterranean non-members was no more than a frame since the relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean were getting loosened, following the EC Southern enlargement. While the inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the Community stabilized them and prompted the development of their political and economic politics, such development questioned the EC’s GMP (King and Dorrati, 1999, p.152).

By the late 1980s, although the Community wanted to establish a collective entity in political and economic areas in the Mediterranean, its attempts were left limited. It is because while the members of the Community were reluctant to open their agricultural markets to the Southerners whom they see as their rivals in the sector. However, France, Italy and Spain all demanded financial and political support towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region). Some attempts were made as in the Spanish-Italian proposal

for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean like CSCE project (Kasfkamp, 2005, p.152). But, this was failed due to the French opposition.

In 1990 the Commission issued a document to the European Parliament and the European Council under the name of “Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy”. The Community now directed its Mediterranean policy towards sustainable economic agreements focusing on a horizontal relationship in energy, transport and telecommunications. The Gulf region was also included to such initiative and the “global” approach was abandoned and a “policy of geographic proximity” for the South was adopted by the Commission. The logic of the RMP was a reflective of socio-economic threats rather than military ones. Thus the project offered an increased financial aid including the introduction of finance for cross border projects funded from the European Investment Bank (Bicchi, n.d.). The next attempt came with the Euro-Maghreb Document that was agreed in 1992 Lisbon Summit. With the document of the Summit, the Community for the first time linked the economic and financial issues to the human rights and political liberalization (European Council, 1992). Under the CFSP provisions the Maghreb was declared as a geographical area of “common interest”. Through this agreement, the parties would develop regional cooperation and the creation of a free trade area; and the Community would participate in the Middle East Peace Process (Nonneman, 2003; Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001, pp.66-67). In spite of the fact that the ex-Yugoslavian war drove the European attention from the EU’s “renewed” Mediterranean policy, with the new trends in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process regained the EU’s interests in favor of the Middle Eastern region. In June 1993 Copenhagen European Council Summit the Commission generated an idea of “involving Israel with the Mashreq countries in a process of regional cooperation with the creation of a free trade area” In 1994 in Corfu European Council Summit, new momentum had started towards a new “partnership” with the Mediterranean region and the member states of the EU asked for the Commission to prepare a proposal for a “Euro-Mediterranean policy”. The aim was to promote human rights and freedom of expression, and to support economic and political reforms (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001, pp.66-67).

2.3.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-Present)

Towards 1995, in the Barcelona Summit, the European leaders had already decided to progress its future relations by proposing the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area and social, economic, political and cultural dialogue between the 15 member states of the EU and 12 non-member Mediterranean countries (Gillespie, 1997, p.1).

Such a partnership was outlined and adopted by the participating parties in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995. It marked the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also named “the Barcelona Process”) as a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean. The project is a multilateral framework of political, economic, and social relations with a 700 million population in twenty-seven countries or territories around the Mediterranean. In addition to the fifteen EU states, the EMP included Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Libya has observer status since 1999.⁸⁰ The founding Euro-Mediterranean conference brought Israeli and Syrian representatives to the same table that was perhaps the hardest thing during the previous initiatives on the Mediterranean. EU Enlargement has turned Cyprus and Malta which until May 2004 were partner countries, into full members of the Union. It has also added eight more countries to the EMP; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Slovakia and Slovenia. (European Region-Building and the EMP) The latest EU enlargement, on 1st May 2004, has brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the European Union, while adding a total of 10 to the number of Member States (Calleja, 2004).

⁸⁰ Libya was excluded from the Conference because of the UN sanctions over the Lockerbie affair.

The formal objective of the EMP is to create a “zone of peace, stability and shared prosperity.” As for the informal purposes, Tanner (2004, p.137) claims that they are “to defuse migratory pressures from the South by creating stability and supporting economic development.” In the Declaration it is states that

[t]his Conference laid the foundations of a process designed to build a multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. At the meeting, a Declaration and a work program were unanimously adopted by the 27 participating countries. This Euro-Mediterranean Declaration establishes a multilateral framework bringing together economic and security aspects and also comprises a social, human and cultural dimension (Barcelona Declaration, 1995).

This partnership would provide a new dimension to the relations that would be based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity” going beyond traditional bilateral relations, that is a multilateral framework.

One of the innovations of the EMP is first that it changed the definition of security and brought a new comprehensive security understanding including political, economic and societal as well as military security sectors. Panebianco (2003, p.3) contends that

the redefinition of a security streamline that emerged in the post-Cold War world due to the rising of challenges and threats stemming not just from hard security but prominently from political and economic challenge and soft security is reflected in the EMP where security is defined comprehensively. A broad definition of security aims at promoting initiatives to prevent illegal military, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, or economic and social insecurity.

Second, the Mediterranean has become a subject area for region-building. The EU for the first time would maintain its relations with its Southern neighbors in an institutional structure. Derisbourg (1997, p.9) lists the reasons for establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as follows:

1. After the collapse of the USSR, the European Union was attracted to the East, with the possibility of accession for central European countries and the Baltic states. The European Commission and member states wanted to rectify the balance in favor of our Mediterranean neighbors in the South who cannot accede to the EU.

2. The process of regionalization within the broader process of globalization of the world economy is a clear trend: NAFTA in North America, with the possibility of extension to South America: MERCOSUR embracing four Latin American countries: ASEAN and possibly APEC in Asia. The new rules for the EU to review its network of bilateral agreements with its Mediterranean neighbors.

3. The need to stabilize the socio-economic situation of our southern neighbors is associated with two objectives: peace and stability, on the one hand, and a desire to put a brake on immigration to Europe, on the other.

Here, the EU's "civilian power" projection is also understandable as Balfour (2004, p.5) asserts that the EU came to terms to develop relations between the two shores based on "dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion." This is also well coincided with the fact that the EU was much willing to "promote dialogue through the Barcelona process and has also been seeking a more prominent role in the settlement of conflict between Israel and Palestine." In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean was no longer an area of a "proxy confrontation". Furthermore, the Mediterranean has become an area of "peace and stability" in particular with the formal signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993 between Israel and Palestine under the sponsorship of US-EU partnership. Therefore the area needed a deeper cooperation and dialogue. Walker (2001, p.77) contends that the US used diplomacy the EU "agreed to lead the fund-raising and development aid strategy that would underpin the peace." This initiative also well fits the EU's signing of the Maastricht Treaty on the EU that provided the EU with a comprehensive foreign and security policy, CFSP.

Derisbourg (1997, p.10) also asserts that the Partnership brought innovations in three ways: 1) a new spirit in the relations between North-South "working together in various groups that meet frequently and seeking to secure full cooperation between all of the 27 governments involved in the Partnership." 2) "a wider range of issues are included in the Partnership, of a political, economic and financial, social, human and cultural nature" 3) two level relations will be maintained.

“The Work Program” agreed in Barcelona includes the new, comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership focuses on three key aspects. It emphasizes that

political and security aspect aims to establish a common area of peace and stability; the and financial aspect hopes to allow the creation of an area of shared prosperity; the social, cultural and human aspect aims to develop human resources and promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Derisbourg 1997, pp.9-10).

This approach was complemented by the “EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean” approved in June 2000, which essentially confirms the objectives of Barcelona process” (Balfour, 2004, p.9).

2.3.2.1. The Political and Security Partnership

This part is significant which include both political and security issues. The security concerns generated from the fact that Middle East and North Africa harbor many problems related to migration, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and energy issues. Such North-South issues are coupled with South-South security concerns such as internal tensions within the region (Joffe, 1997, p.17). The development of this part is linked to the developing European foreign and security policy (Biscop, 2003, p.35). The partnership was more concretely stems from the Italian-Spanish proposal for a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean” (CSCM) that was inspired from the “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” (CSCE). The CSCM was a wider security proposal. They include the “five plus five” proposal (covering France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta plus Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) (Joffe, 1997, p.18).

In addition, the Declaration establishes a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability. Politically, the parties would: “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (including freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of thought, conscience and religion)”. The parties would begin a dialogue process on exchanges of information related to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia. The parties would respect their sovereign equality and the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination and respect for territorial integrity. The declaration called for the parties to promote confidence building measure, the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and fight with terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking (Gomez, 1998, p.147).

Senior officials meet regularly to discuss means and measures for implementation and decided to take confidence building measures such as “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons through adherence to and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation regimes and the various arms control and disarmament agreements” (Derisbourg, 1997, p.10).

However, the “hard” security issues remained limited while states insisted on the exchange of information on a number of conflict prevention issues.

2.3.2.2. Economic and Financial Partnership

This part implies the importance of socio-economic issues in each country. Besides association of agreements a free market to opening economies and necessary legislation must be established. This can lead to an economic development, private investment and job creation and more transparency and accountability.

The economic and financial basket is the most detailed one of the Barcelona Declaration. The partnership requires

acceleration of the pace of sustainable and balanced socio-economic development; and an improvement of the living conditions of the populations; an increase in the employment level; and the encouragement of regional cooperation and integration (Gillespie, 1997, p.181).

In order to achieve these objectives, the EU and its partners agreed to establish an economic and financial partnership based on

- the progressive establishment of a free trade area;
- the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas;
- a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners.

In the European Council in Cannes in 1995 the EU leaders decided to make financial contributions in support of economic modernization efforts in the Southern region (European Council, 1995). The funds from allocated from the European Investment Bank and MEDA programs would be used for certain areas from environment to regional development and private sector (Derisbourg, 1997, p.10).

2.3.2.3. Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs

The participants agreed on a number of activities that would strengthen the dialogue on the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean, exchanges at human, scientific and technological level. This part puts the objectives that include

exchanges among civil societies. In the context of decentralized cooperation, the emphasis is placed on education, training and young people, culture and the media, migrant population groups and health. Greater cooperation in the field of home affairs and justice is also envisaged, with action in particular against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime (European Council, 1995).

The dialogue should bring peoples from different cultures closer and stress the importance of mass media, development of human resources, education and training of young people, cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respect of cultural identity of each partner, importance of health sector, and of social development, respect of fundamental social rights, promotion of civil society, training programs for job creation and various measures against terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and corruption.

For example, since the Barcelona process, several initiatives have been taken: Euromed heritage, funded by the MEDA program, is the main financial instruments for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership; Euromed Audio-visual; the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, based in Alexandria (Egypt), is an institution financed by all 35 members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. These are the networks that would promote dialogue between cultures (European Commission, 2007). There are other cooperation programs such as Med-Campus, Med Media, Med-Urbs, Med Migration, Med Invest and so forth (European Council, 1998).

This part is the most furthest from other issues in terms of security. The partners have made progress in these confidence building measures in particular the development of civil societies in these areas grows and other cultural programs.

2.3.3. EU's Neighborhood Policy (2004- Present)

With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the EU started to search for new ways to strengthen the cooperation with its new and direct neighbors in the East and the South.⁸¹ The EU thus established the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 with an objective to “support economic transformation, democratic reforms, good governance and the rule of law in its adjacent countries” (Lang, 2007, p.15) The ENP was first framed in a Commission Communication on a “Wider Europe” in March 2003 and followed by a “Strategy Paper on the European Neighborhood Policy” in May 2004. This Communication outlines the framework for the Union’s relations with those neighboring countries without promising for the membership of the EU. For the Communication the EU aims to “develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (European Commission, 2003). In the Strategy Paper, the Commission decided to work on the ENP with a number Actions Plans with its neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region. The parts of these Action Plans include “enhanced political co-operation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy that would be worked jointly by the Commission and the High Representative.” The Commission set the priorities that would be incorporated in the agreed Action Plans in a number of policy areas as follows:

political, dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts (European Commission, 2003).

The relationships with those countries would be on the basis of building a mutual commitment to common values including the rule of law, the promotion of good neighborly relations, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, good governance, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. They would also work on certain significant aspects of the EU’s external action such as the fight against terrorism and

⁸¹The ENP encompasses Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. One of the four main areas of cooperation within the policy is the development of people-to-people contacts

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in respect with the international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.

Accordingly, the EU would take action with the partner countries after a review content of the Action Plans and decide on this basis of this revision for the next step in the development of bilateral relations, including the possibility of new contractual links. The Action Plans will determine the programming of assistance to each country and support from the European Neighborhood Instrument (European Commission, The Neighborhood Policy, 2004).

The main objectives of the Policy are as follows:

- to strengthen economic integration with the EU, notably with respect to capital movements liberalization may increase macroeconomic and financial volatility in specific contexts.
- to work in cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, such as preventing pressure from third countries and trafficking in human beings and terrorism, border management to facilitate legitimate movements. These are support for the creation and training of corps of professional non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure.
- to work in tackling with regional conflicts
- to work for partner countries' sectoral reforms in areas in particular in the areas of energy security, climate change, environment, transport, research, information society, education and training, employment and social development, health, maritime policy, agriculture, fisheries and regional policy, civil society.

One of the aspects of this policy is that the Mediterranean countries of the ENP are the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. They have also the Association Agreements with the EU. One may wonder whether there is an overlap between these two policies. As a fact, they do not. The EMP or the Barcelona process is multilateral and regional while the ENP is bilateral. The Association Agreements in the end results in a Free Trade Area in the Mediterranean. The ENP Action Plans evaluate each country and may be designed to strengthen their relations, if they desire. The ENP is modeled on the basis on the structures of the EMP like Committees and Councils.

In terms of cooperation areas, in the European Communication of 2004, it was also stated that the ENP would also encourage obtaining the full benefits of the EMP

to promote infrastructure interconnections and networks, in particular energy, and to develop new forms of cooperation with their neighbors. The ENP will contribute to develop further regional integration, building on the achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, notably in the area of trade. It will reinforce efforts to meet the objectives of the European security strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

In consequence, the ENP is established for the objective of providing a wider understanding of security in its neighboring regions without a promise for the membership. It means that the countries which are not eligible have the opportunity to establish their relations on the basis their mutual interests bilaterally. On the other hand, the EMP for the Mediterranean countries is another opportunity not just for a technical framework to improve their relations but also to maintain the spirit of the Mediterranean partnership (European Commission, The Neighborhood Policy, 2004).

2.3.4. “Union for Mediterranean” (2008-Present)

The idea for the “Union for the Mediterranean” first brought up by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy during his presidential campaign in July of 2007. The project was officially released during the French Presidency in the European Council of 13/14 March 2008 (European Commission, 2008). After a 5-month preparation period, the Commission made an analysis of the Barcelona process, its achievements and implementations on its role in providing security, peace and dialogue in the region among the partners, and its shortcomings and difficulties of last ten years. As a result, a Joint Declaration for a Union for the Mediterranean was agreed on among the EU and some of its closest partners in Paris Summit held on 13 July 2008 (European Council, 2008). Regardless of the implementations for the time being, the declaration had voiced for new progresses in the Mediterranean area. Like the previous attempts on the Mediterranean, the Union was addressing a variety of regional issues ranging from security, environment,

economic relations through trade and investment, energy supplies, transport, migration, cultural and historical relations to hard security issues including terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It embraces all of the Euro-Mediterranean Partners and the European Commission and welcomes the new participants such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro. During the meeting, the participant countries agreed on a number of objectives of “achieving peace, stability, and security as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process...” The aim is articulated as “deepening the multilateral partnership and increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion” (European Council, 2008).

The spirit of “partnership” is now manifested in another document, “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”. The linguistics of the text builds more inclusive character for the both sides. The Europeans go beyond the “Other” conception of the South in European strategic approach: “The parties would develop good neighborhood relations considering the confidence and security building measures with a view to building an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”. For example, the first part of the declaration remains much more discursive highlighting the geo-historical and cultural ties within the Mediterranean region and addressing the security based issues (hard security as well as soft security matters). Remaining loyal to the Barcelona Process, the participating states once more underscored the importance of acting together in favor of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, arms control and disarmament agreements and non-proliferation conventions and fighting with terrorism. From the political side, the document underlines that the partners should respect human rights such as economic, social, cultural civil and political rights, the role of women in society, minority rights, fighting against racism, xenophobia and democratic principles and solution of the conflicts in the Middle East. In the annex section of the Declaration, the parties take up some main areas for focus acting together: improving energy supply, promoting conservation of water resources; depollution of the Mediterranean including coastal and protected marine areas particularly in water and waste sector; strengthening the maritime trade traffic and land highways; civil

security cooperation in possible devastations caused by natural and man-made disasters; alternative energies (development and creation of a Mediterranean Solar Plan); setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education, Science and Research Area and an Erasmus type student exchange programs for students; providing with resources as technical assistance and financial instruments in the framework of the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.

Speaking in the security terms, the EU tried to shift the image of South from a threat producer to a security partner at political and cultural level. Thus, they agree on improving “mutual understanding between the cultures” by rejecting to link the terrorist attacks to a culture and religion and terrorism. The EU chose to provide regional security through partnership and mutual confidence.⁸²

It would be not erroneous to note that an establishment of the Union equals the development of institutionalization of the EU’s Mediterranean policy. In the declaration, the political leaders agreed on to hold biannual summits that would be resulted in declarations and a list of regional projects to be set up. This initiative also mobilizes many institutional mechanisms like Senior official and ad hoc meetings, summits, ministerial meetings which would be serially-held. A Parliamentary Assembly would be the legitimate body for the expression of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. The parties also agreed on the formation of a co-presidency and a Joint Secretariat that would be open to all members of the Union for the Mediterranean. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU (considering the external representation of the EU) the other from the Mediterranean partner countries (will be elected by consensus for two year period).

⁸² A security community does not require Mediterranean partner countries to become full member states of the EU, but it will promote peaceful change in the entire region. The concept of building future peace in the Mediterranean thus runs through building present community.

This project is not as strong as the previous policies in terms of their implementations. It can only be a forum for annual or bi-annual exchange between countries in the Mediterranean. It is not a new institution replacing the Barcelona. It is based on specific programs, such as “a water agency responsible for combating pollution of the Mediterranean, or a development agency for small and medium enterprises.” This project can be interpreted that it strengthens the partnerships in the region a cooperation areas reminding the “hard security” discourses at least in the text (European Council, 2008).

2.4. EU’s Security Instruments in the Mediterranean

The instruments are the most outstanding issue in particular when it comes to the EU’s “capability” in certain fields of foreign and security policy. Its capacity is being developed by a number of attempts. The development of instruments of the EU proceeded from the foundation of the EEC building upon practices, case-by-case and provisions of the EU treaties.

Smith (2003) classifies the instruments according to their pillars in which they are used: European Communities; Common Foreign and Security Policy; Justice and Home Affairs. It would be appropriate to add the European Security and Defense Policy instruments to this category even if the EU’s military capacity is highly dependent on the NATO assets.

Baldwin (1985, pp.8-9) specifies four types of instruments used in national foreign policy that the EU also applies to some extent though: propaganda, diplomatic, economic and military. The EU is criticized due to its lacking military capability compared to those of national states, however, the EU also constitutes a sui generis structure and can utilize them which the nation states apply to. Smith (2003) also focuses on the ways in which the EU utilizes its instruments towards the third party.

The competences between the Member States and the EU are also important. Some of the instruments are formally the EC instruments; however, the Member States can also use their own instruments too and coordinate their instruments with others. Instruments are developed at the EPC, CFSP and JHA levels. So, the Member States also have the rights to use or reject them on case by case levels. On the other hand, the Member States use their own domestic measurements which remain in coincide with those of the EU.

The classification will be as economic instruments, political instruments and military instruments in the Mediterranean.

Before analyzing the instruments, it would be emphasize that the instruments which the EU has used are a mixture of cross-pillar instruments in the region. The instruments are not limited to the EMP instruments, they are considered in a more comprehensive framework.

First, it would be worth touching upon the working levels of the EMP. Since the partner governments maintain the EMP through making political statements and launching ad hoc programs rather than through legal instruments, no formal organization was built and the management of the EMP is possible at two levels⁸³: First, the EMP is made up of organs of official representatives (the periodical meetings of foreign ministers, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, and the European Commission) and second, working groups and ad hoc meetings of government officials and experts; parliamentarians, local authorities and the social partners. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the Barcelona Process includes officials from both the EU Troika and from its southern Mediterranean partners. The Committee meet regularly (periodic meetings) and report to the Foreign Ministers. The Committee reviews the reports on the Barcelona Process and assesses the work program and monitors its implementation and prepares the annual meeting of foreign ministers.

⁸³ Instead, there are a number of ad hoc meetings of representatives of the partners.

It means that the EU is mobilizing its instruments from all pillars and their agencies.

2.4.1. Economic Instruments

This category is the most powerful foreign and security policy instruments that fall under the realm of European Community. In general, Smith (2003, p.53) categorizes the economic instruments as the “capacity to enter into international agreements” and the “provision of financial assistance to third countries”. White (2001) argues that there are three kinds of economic instruments as “framework (cooperation, association and partnership agreements); regulatory (trade agreements signed to stop unfair trading with third parties like anti-dumping regulations) and coercive instruments (bans on imports)”. Here, the categorization on the Mediterranean region will take place as agreements with third countries that are frameworks and restrictive instruments.

The first type instruments include cooperation, association and partnership agreements that are also frameworks through which the Community can also supply economic concessions, aids and privileged relationships with third countries. As for the agreements there are three types of agreements to third countries: Trade and association agreements fall into the realm of the EU agreements with the Mediterranean. Known as Bilateral EU-Mediterranean Agreements, the Association Agreements refer the agreements which every Mediterranean country except Syria- Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia- in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (European Commission, 2008). In 2008 Syria and the European Union initiated a cooperation agreement that was frozen after the assassination in February 2005 of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri. The EU stated that it goes such a cooperation attempt due to “recent positive developments in Syrian regional policy” (Bilaterals, 2008).

Associated countries may benefit from duty free access to the EU market for “manufactured goods and preferential treatment for exports of agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries products.” Tariffs will gradually be removed for EU exports to the Mediterranean region. The Union has already completed such process with Tunisia. The Union has a 67 Euro billion export while 60 Euro billion imports with the Southern Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2008).

In the EU Commission’s official web page and one of its public information documents, the agreements are labeled as a part of EU Conflict prevention means including “development cooperation and external assistance and trade policy instruments” (European Commission, n.d.) The civilian character of the EU displays the civilian sort of instruments such as liberalizing trade in goods and services between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and attracting new investment to the region. The aim is to “bring the Mediterranean partners' regulatory procedures closer to EU rules, to facilitate access to the EU market and remove non-tariff barriers to trade” (European Commission, 2008). Another aim of the trade agreements that they provide the Union is to draw the frontiers of the Mediterranean region, or to provide regional economic integration between the different Mediterranean countries. Thus, the most important objective is the “creation of a Mediterranean free trade area by 2010, with substantially liberalized trade both between the EU and the Mediterranean region, and between the Southern Mediterranean countries themselves” (European Commission, 2008).

In this framework, the EU provides considerable funding to the Mediterranean region. Since the first MEDA aid program that was launched in 1995 – to support financial and technical assistance in implementing the Association Agreements and social and economic reforms – the EU allocated some €20bn of EU funding to bilateral and regional projects. The Union allocated 3.4 Euro billion between 1995 and 1999, and 5.3 Euro billion between 2000 and 2006 for the MEDA projects. The MEDA together with TACIS, was replaced by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 1 January 2007 (European Commission, 2004). The European Investment Bank is (EIB) is also an

“important source of funding for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” EU allocations to the EIB were 4.8 billion Euro for 1995-1999, and 6.4 billion Euro for 2000-2007, plus 1million Euro for transnational projects. Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership also became operational in 2002 and grant loads (European Commission, 2008).

The second instrument is the restrictive measurements that are namely economic and financial sanctions. Such sanctions include “export and/or import bans, flight bans, prohibitions on investment, payments and capital movements, or the withdrawal of tariff preferences” (European Commission, 2009). The EU implements restrictive measures in general in accordance with international law mostly for the purpose of making the partners be respectful to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU and the UN had imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Libya on 21 April 1986 following a bombing of a nightclub in Berlin, and lifted the embargo in 2004 (SIPRI, 2005, p.630). The EU had also imposed economic sanctions on Syria due to its military presence in Lebanon during the 1980s and 1990s and even the early 2000s. Then it was lifted in 2008 (European Commission External Relations, 2010).

2.4.2. Political Instruments

Primarily through the European Political Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Union can exercise a wide variety of diplomatic instruments.

The first one is demarches which are defined by Smith (1998, p.70) as “generally confidential messages to other governments, delivered by the ambassadors of the troika or only the presidency.” The requests are mostly on the human rights like in the Tunisian case resented in one of the EU-Tunisian Association Council meeting conclusion: The issue was that the wives of exiled politicians are prevented from leaving the country with their children to reunite their families and some of them are imprisoned because of their attempts

to leave the country without passport. Many of these cases have been resolved in recent years through a number of international pressure including demarches made by the Member States of the EU and the presidency (European Commission, 2001).⁸⁴

Second type of instrument is declaration. Declarations or statements are used to express the EU's common position (condemnation, concern or support) on a particular issue mainly on human rights, democratization and peace. Sometimes the EU's position is presented by troika, presidency or the CFSP High Representative in the country concerned. The declarations can either constitute action by using "effective tools and substantial diplomatic events" or pose no implementation (Nuttall, 1992, p.13; White, 2001, p.80). The very first example or the "centerpiece" of the EU diplomacy of this is the 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East. By this declaration the EU set a ground for managing the Israeli-Arab conflict: It balanced Israeli rights to be secured with recognizing that the Palestinians' legitimate rights (Hill, 1992 cited in White, 2001, p.81). The Declaration was followed up by a number of diplomatic attacks that contributed to the Middle East negotiations thereafter. On the Mediterranean issue, the Barcelona Declaration constitutes the most crucial one. Following the European Councils in Lisbon (1992), Corfu (1994) and Essen (1994) and the Commission proposals, "EU decided to establish a new framework for its relations with the countries of the Mediterranean basis with a view to forming a partnership." At the Barcelona Conference, a Declaration and a work program were adopted by the 27 participating countries aiming at establishing "a multilateral framework bringing together economic and security aspects and also comprising a social, human and cultural dimension" (Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 27-28 November 1995). The statements on the relations with the Mediterranean were also embodied within a common strategy towards the Mediterranean in June 2000 to be extended the strategy period to 2006 (European Council Common Strategy, 19 June 2000). Such an initiative was to open a door to the Union for launching a region-building process in the Mediterranean. "Five years on from the adoption of the European Security Strategy

⁸⁴ See also for example Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, EU-Tunisia Association Council Meeting, 29 March 2001. <http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/308/news/focus/10486> (29 July 2009).

(ESS), the EU carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history, reads the report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World” (European Security Strategy. 12 December 2003; Report on European Security Strategy, 11 December, 2008). With reference to the ENP, the report says: “It has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration (Report on European Security Strategy, 11 December, 2008). The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration (Joint Declaration on Union for the Mediterranean, 13 July 2008). Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

Third and most effective instruments are dialogues or “more structured political consultations” with third parties (Hill, 1998, p.33 cited in White, 2001, p.81). Such an instrument with other parties provided some opportunities for the Union to act collectively and shape the relations in international relations. Through regular contacts the Union can establish more or less institutionalized relationships with the third parties. After the 1967 Six-Days war, France became a supporter of the Arab coalitions who were defeated by Israel and at the European level, French diplomacy supported Arab interests, launching a distinct European policy in shaping a concept of a Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) with Libya. Dialogues also play a “conveyer role” in informing the Union on the third parties position and perceptions on particular issues and getting support from them (White, 2001, p.81).. They also constitute a mechanism for expressing their collective identity towards the third party. This instrument is very flexible one without any obligation, it lets bilateral and multilateral contacts could be established and used as “carrot” given the third parties (Smith, 2003, p.62).

Sanctions or restrictive measures that have been frequently imposed by the EU in recent years form the other type of instruments. They can be adopted “either on an autonomous EU basis or implementing binding Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations” (Sanctions, 15 July 2009). It is stated that

[s]anctions are an instrument in diplomatic or economic field. If a state violates human rights and law, and does not respect rule of law or democracy the EU can impose restrictive measures against third countries or non-state entities and individuals such as terrorist groups. They can be “arms embargoes, trade restrictions (import and export bans), financial restrictions, restrictions on admission (visa or travel bans), or other measures, as appropriate.”

The restrictive measures as arms embargo were imposed by the EU towards Libya in 1986 by the Member States and confirmed by common position in 1999, then decided to be lifted in 2004 (European Council Common Position, 14 October 2004). Another illustration of sanctions is that the EU issued a common position towards the Lebanon crisis in 2006 and imposed political and military sanctions. It also warns the Member States to prohibit all the military activities in both their territories and Lebanon including direct or indirect supply or transfer of military equipments, weapons, arms and paramilitary tools (European Council Common Position, 15 September 2006).

The EU has also played a role in resolving conflicts through using instruments albeit remaining low level such as sending envoys to participate in peacemaking process or advancing peace proposals. EU participation in the Middle East⁸⁵ “Peace” Process “including the political, financial and human resources support provided by the Community in 2005 and 2006 to the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, James Wolfensohn.” The Union has also sponsored some confidence-building measures including electoral observation activities funded by the European Commission: “free and fair elections are an essential step to guarantee the success of the Road Map” (European Commission Communication, 5 October 2005).

⁸⁵ European Union is one of the actors of the Quartet that is formed by the US, Russia, the EU and the United Nations.

2.4.3. Military Instruments

Military instruments are the most controversial part since when compared to other two fields of activities, this part remains relatively weak. This is due to the fact that first when the Mediterranean Policy, more concretely the EMP has started the EU has not yet developed its security and defense policies in the name of the European Security and Defense Policy. It had yet established the Treaty of the EU in 1992. Second, the EU did not perceive any direct military threat from the Mediterranean since it was struggling with the wars in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the EU maintained its security relations through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the OSCE. Such a flexible relationship continued more concretely until the September 11 attacks. The most obvious factor for the development a security understanding in the region, or "securitization of the Mediterranean" is the transformation of the internal and external security dimensions of the EU's security policies. In other words, what led the EU to adopt relatively tough measures in the Mediterranean is clearly articulated by Bilgin (2009, p.4).

The turning point in terms of EU practices vis-à-vis the external world in general and the Mediterranean in particular is the merging of internal and external dimensions of security.

In this section, it would be appropriate to examine first, the EU's –albeit inadequate- security and defense instruments towards the region; second, the post-September 11 measures taken by the EU and their Member States in the region.

As mentioned previously, the EU has maintained its security relations through NATO's Mediterranean dialogue instruments and the Western European Union (WEU) which depicts the EU's developing "common foreign and security policy" (Joffe, 1997, p.18). The WEU was the first multilateral institution that would set up a Mediterranean dialogue in 1992 then followed by the OSCE, NATO and the EU's Barcelona Process. In Petersberg meeting in 1992 the WEU Council decided to develop its ties with the North African and the Middle Eastern countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania and Israel. The main purpose was to exchange the views, more concretely to launch the interaction with these countries on security matters. As a result of these views,

the member states of the EU decided to create EUROFOR and EURMARFOR. The latter as a navy force would be composed of Spanish, French, Portugal and Italian units and include humanitarian functions on the emergency and evacuation of European citizens in crisis times. However, the Arab countries opposed such a formation since they wonder whom the operations would be launched (Larrabee, 1998, pp.37-38). These attempts were then followed by a number of initiatives such as Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group were which then failed in the mid-1990s (See also for example, Larrabee, Green, Lesser and Zanini, 1998).

In general, in the Barcelona Declaration, in the Political and Security Partnership basket, the main security areas were stated in general. However, it can be contended that the Barcelona would bring the “spirit of Partnership” with regard to the partners’ own peculiar characteristics. In other words, the Confidence Building and Security Measurements based on a notion of “cooperative security” would be introduced and include a number of measures. Such an understanding would this time aim at diffuse the same regime for the whole of the Mediterranean. This idea was reinforced by the Valencia Action Plan which was issued in the very aftermath of the September 11 and stressed the importance of the effective dialogue in political and security matters including the ESDP, in particular in the fight against international terrorism. In Valencia the Ministers agreed that

[t]he challenges of the EU enlargement, the events of September 11 and the serious developments in the Middle East and other structural changes in the international scene make the Barcelona Process more necessary than ever. The moment is now right to demand a renewed mutual commitment which will contribute to regional stability and peace and give a greater depth to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Presidency Conclusions, 23 April 2002).

Speaking more concretely, “the confidence-building” in the Euro-Mediterranean relations are defined by Brauch (2000, p.249) as "partnership-building measures" and "exchange-furthering measures". Biscop (2003, p.62) listed these measures as follows: “training seminars for diplomats; the Euromesco network of foreign policy institutes; a

register of bilateral agreements among the member countries; exchange information on partner countries adherence to international conventions on human rights and arms control and disarmament; cooperation between civil protection services on natural disasters; regular dialogue in the Euro-Med Committee and the meetings of senior officials.”

Marcquina (1999, p.9) explains the instruments as follows: Political initiatives; Exchange of information; Documentation; Experiences and codes of conduct on issues such as tolerance, coexistence, the fight against racism; xenophobia and discrimination; Co-ordination and mutual assistance on matters such as prevention, management and response to natural and man-made disasters or air-sea search and rescue operations.”

Besides the instruments within the framework of Barcelona, the EU and its Member States use the other instruments in other policy issues and pillars such as the foreign, security and defense pillar and the justice and home affairs pillar. It would be appropriate to remind that the Mediterranean security requires not only a number of soft measures but also some forceful actions that would also bring a cross-pillar security practices. This is due to the fact that the EU has mixed its external and internal security areas in particular after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Since the EU has lacking adequate military assets, the member states of the EU and of NATO implement the navy tasks such as the Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.

This may also be included within the European security implementations since it inspects any terrorist actions against the European continent. Second and more importantly, apart from Commission Communications and Action Plans, “common strategy”, “common position” and “joint actions” are the most significant instruments which the EU and the Member States can make use of all pillar instruments. In 2000, the EU issued a “Common Strategy for the Mediterranean” by which the EU explains its objectives and areas of actions and instruments (European Council Common Strategy, 19 June 2000). As for the common position, the EU may adopt a common position towards an issue. For example the Member States of the EU in line with the Council Common Position of 15 July 2008,

agreed on a list including persons, groups and entities many of them North African and Middle Eastern originated and European residents who were involved in terrorist acts and take restrictive measures against them. Last but not least, the Member States can take “joint actions” in any issue and area. For example, in the Middle East, the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police (EUPOL COPPS) aims at increasing “the safety and security of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law” (Council Joint Action, 14 November 2005).

Council Regulation is another instrument that is implemented by the Member States as in the case of FRONTEX that is the EU’s first pillar Institution and coordinates cooperation between the Member States in the field of management of internal borders. It also provides technical assistance to the joint operations across their external borders. The EU states that the most responsible state for the operation is the concerned country as in the case of Hera I and II operations of Spain in the Canary Islands and Nautilus operation handled by Italy. These countries should conclude the bilateral agreements with the origin countries of migrants (Carrera, 2007, p.121).

As a conclusion, since the political and security basket is limited in its instruments, the partners within the EMP cannot be portrayed as the only security framework in the Mediterranean. Instead, together with the EMP structure, there is a variety of instruments to provide the Euro-Mediterranean security: Declarations, Communications, Dialogue, Confidence-Building and Security Measures, Common Strategy, Common Position, Council Regulation and Joint Action.

CHAPTER III

ITALY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX: IDENTITY, CONCERNS AND POLITICS

In this chapter, Italy's security concerns and practices will be examined in relation to those of the EU/Europe within the framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory. Before outlining the content of this chapter, it would be appropriate to remind the theoretical links in our case study.

The main assumptions are divided into two: The first one is that the EU/Europe as a prominent regional security complex has become a security community which perceives threats from its "exterior" regions. Buzan and Waever (2003, p.72) articulate that the RSCs were usually generated by bottom-up (inside out) processes in which fears and concerns are generated within the region. However, the construction of the RSCs has become relevant to the new patterns of security that can be derived from external pressures. In our case, this is postulated as the "Euro-Mediterranean security" or more concretely, the threats generated from the Mediterranean and spreading throughout Europe. The second one is related to "state placement" within the complexes and between two regions. As pointed out in the first chapter, the most salient feature of this theory is that the regional states are interdependent on each other much closely that their securities cannot be considered separately. Here it can be possible to make deep analyses regarding interstate relations within a given region. With this thesis, it can be concluded that one may study a state's security structure, discourses and practices within a region in order to understand the regional security patterns.

For the second assumption, it would be appropriate to emphasize what Pace (2004) argues on “region” and “state”: A region such as the EU/Europe (whether it is described as security complex or not) constructs its security on identity basis which extensively reflects an “imagined community” among its member states. A member state of security community (taken as identity) is constituted through a number of shared internal beliefs, norms and values of the Union. Therefore, the European Membership represents assumptions, forms and personality of each member state at the same time. As a consequence, it can be talked of several overlapping identities in the EU. Pace (Ibid., p.297) explains this as follows: “Whoever belongs to such a structure or society also participates in the construction of identity.” Our level of analysis is similar; however, we replace “identity” with “security”. We simply offer a model of analysis in which discourses and practices are grounded on “regional security”, “security interdependencies” or “the security of a cluster of states in a region.” In other words, states’ lowest common denominator becomes security interdependencies towards each other and the society (in neorealist terms it is structure). Therefore, it would be significant to focus on perceptions and practices of regional states of society, the Member States of the EU, which also provide security within the society they belong to.

Here, the debate on who represents the region and takes part in the construction of regional security leads us to the very problematic part of this thesis. In the RSCT, Buzan and Waever (2003) posit a “securitization” concept but do not make deep explanations for the units which participate in securitization process. However, they argue that the RSCs are formed by the regional “actors” which define the problems in the region and interact to produce a regional unity to handle them. Buzan and Waever (Ibid., p.72) also indicate that there may be an autonomy left for the acts of securitization by actors in the region. For example, some cases are not subjected to securitization for particular actors and do not make some others worry while others may be more concerned in. As Buzan and Waever (Ibid., p.74) argue that one may focus on a single national country securitizations by looking at the national identity. However, the outcome of this thesis will show us that the state’s overlapping identity with the EU led us to analyze the external (top-down) threats

against the EU through a number of discourses and practices made by the national actors. It would be worth noting that the major powers are primarily emphasized in the “Powers and Regions” since they determine the major developments in the region. But this is much more common in conflict formation security environments where states struggle over the region among themselves. In this study in order to understand the Euro-Mediterranean security, the RSCT helps us to explore in depth the strength of some specific securitizations of the member states in the Euro-Mediterranean area. However, in the EU case, since we can speak of the existence of security community, and the absence of an internal struggle, the Union’s security view seems more coherent in functional (migration, terrorism, conflicts and so forth) and geographical issues (Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Russia). It means that the emerging security discourses are meaningful at not only national levels concerned in the area but also the EU level and among the major powers.⁸⁶

In this manner, Italy is selected to understand how the region and the issues are securitized and security measures are taken with respect to its national identity and European identity.

In this chapter, first Italian identity formation comprising “Mediterraneanism”, “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism” takes place since it would be helpful to understand how Italian security identity is formed and reproduced over the years. Second, Italy’s power/role conception (as “sea power” and a “middle power”, and its relations with other great powers in Europe that is commonly called “directoire”) will be studied. In the very prominent part of the third chapter, the assessment of Italy’s security concerns and practices in the field of migration, military activities and political and economic instabilities and energy issues will be analyzed. The security concerns including discourses and practices of Italy will be examined responding to a number of questions: “which referent objects Italy indicates”, “who securitizes” and “what measures it takes”. In the first part, Italy and European Union will be the referent objects. Second, the securitization will be based on Italian political

⁸⁶ Buzan and Waever (2003) take Britain, France and Germany as the major powers which have security discourses related to their national identities and Europe.

elites. Third, the measures will be taken by the Italian authorities mainly within the framework of European Union instructions

3.1. Italy's Security Identity Formation: Three "Isms"

As indicated above, the English School focuses on historical developments of given societies and argues that the international society (and also regional society) is developed over time as a result of the interaction of its constitutive units (Hobson, 2002, p.40). These constitutive units and the society are also in interaction and yielded an institutional security identity. This section includes Italy's security identity formation with respect to its history and geographical location that has reproduced over decades since the end of the World War II. It would be interesting to discover the deep strands of its identity mainly rooted in ancient Italy, the Roman Empire and the Italian Republics of the middle ages. However, within the limited space and in order to keep the study consistent with the theory and conceptualization of the European security complex, this section only covers 60-year period from the end of the World War II until today. Each category will be divided into two: The first one is the Cold-War Era and the other one is the Post-Cold War era. In regionalist thinking, it can be contended that Italy has also been evolving from its authoritarian and antagonistic state nature towards a part of regional society of European states. Italy's security identity is analyzed from the three identity construction processes: Mediterraneanism, Atlanticism and Europeanism. This section does not aim at exploring how Italy is securitized; rather the conditions and the relations will be focused on.

3.1.1. A Brief Outlook on Italian Identity Constituents

In literature, Italian foreign and security policy has apparently been characterized by some constants connected to both its particular geographical location and its history (Foradori and Rosa, 2008, p.173).⁸⁷ Within such a framework, Italy's fate was interlocked between Europe, Mediterranean and a range of constraints of the international system. Santoro (Santoro cited in Coralluzzo, 2008) indicates that historically Italy's continental role had always prevailed over its naval role due to its dependency to Europe in economy and power. Its strong ties to the Atlantic Alliance without a doubt, on the other hand, built the essential constituents of Italian security perceptions and practices in the Cold War international system. Given geographical and historical facts, it would not be erroneous to contend that having shuttled between the Mediterranean and Europe (together with its NATO commitments), Italy found itself in the "pawn of the Euro-Mediterranean Balance" in the post-Cold War period.

Geography is not the most but one of the important factors that defines the capacity of a nation. Italy's foreign and security policy had always been closely linked to geography.⁸⁸ D.M. Smith (1997, pp.3-4) argues that it mostly tended to be Mediterranean since it was robustly separated from the rest of Europe by the Alps and Apennines. Similarly, Italy's geographical position is seen as "a sort of centaur, with its head well stuck into Europe and hooves reaching down into the Mediterranean" (Castronovo cited in Coralluzzo, 2008). Italian geopolitical identity is described as, first, "maritime", "naval", "Mediterranean", and second, "continental", European (Santoro, 1991, p.51). The latter defines that Italy is more an island than a peninsula, which has theoretically control the half of the Mediterranean basin, thus being attributed as a regional leader in its geographic area. On the other hand, Italy occupies an outstanding geopolitical role, and is perceived only as a peninsula that is also attached to another peninsula (central Europe and Germany), and in turn linked to Asia (Santoro cited in Coralluzzo, 2008, p.51).

⁸⁷ See also App. 3.1.

⁸⁸ This is the same regardless of whether Italy was in united or fragmented form

Historically, it can be contended that the aftermath of the World War II primarily made the major profound impact on and shaped Italy's security climate. After its two year suffering from an obvious "inferiority complex" between 1945 and 1947, Italy decided to reassert its status as a normal member of the international community by first demanding a role as co-belligerent against Nazi-Germany; second, trying to avoid the punitive aspects of the peace treaty; and finally pushing for membership in all the international organizations that the Western world set up (Nutti, 2003, p.92).

The defeat of Fascist Italy in World War II portrayed that Italian foreign and security policy had been radically changed and abandoned the way that it had pursued from 1860. Previously, in conflicting Europe based on a balance of power system, Italy expected to emerge as a Mediterranean power against the great powers of Europe.⁸⁹ For that reason, it contrasted the Western powers such as Britain and France, and was excluded from the Allies in World War I and II. In those decades, other European great powers had rivaled among themselves and had ambitions over the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East (Rimanelli, 1997, p.672). Rimanelli (Ibid.) contends Italy's position vis-à-vis external powers that

[n]otwithstanding sharp politico-ideological differences, both Liberal Italy (1860-1922) and Fascist Italy (1922-1945) were conditioned by the same geostrategic constraints and frustrated ambitions which they sought to overcome through alliances, opportunistic alignment switches, military build-ups and single handed imperialist expansions .

As a fact, both Liberal Italy of the 1800s and Fascist Italy were expansionist but practiced different strategies: the former to a degree kept a balance between its foreign and security policy vision and the limits were derived from domestic shortcomings and international constraints. On the other hand, Mussolini's Italy, was so aggressive that it created deep tensions among its neighboring Europe and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, with the World War II, Italy and Mussolini were forced to end such "illusions and dreams

⁸⁹ It was so in the early years of the 20th century.

of regional supremacy”.⁹⁰ Its defeat compelled Italy to return to its traditional dependency on the alliance strategy with both the most powerful powers, namely, Germany, France and Britain. Having lost its ambitions on gaining a regional supremacy during the WWII, fortunately, Italy placed itself on the winning side and restored to a degree of international respectability under the fear of nuclear confrontation during the Cold War.⁹¹

Romano (1993, p.139) argues that from the end of the Second World War until Italy’s joining to the North Atlantic Pact in 1949, Italy had remained successfully neutral. Italian domestic politics and its reflections on the external affairs were divided into three parts categorically based on ideology, nationalist approaches or neutrality. The rightist Catholics advocated remaining neutral by choosing the “third way” between communist Soviets and capitalist America. The liberals believed that it could be easier for Italy to enhance its role in Europe if it proclaimed neutrality. The debates on the international profile of Italy continued between 1947 and 1949. The armistice that was signed on 3 September 1943 between Italy and the Allied Powers puts the importance in any understanding of post-war Italian politics and the early years of desecuritization of the country. From then on, the country would remain peaceful and could no longer assert use of force as “a key element” of its foreign and security policy (Nutti, 2003, p.91).

In fact, in the first years of the Cold War, Italy knew that it had to privilege one side of the political and ideological polarization between the US and the SU. In such a context, Italy started to be involved in “interlocking alignments” with the West (through the United States, NATO and the European Union) which provided long-term international security guarantee for Italy: First, that alignment ensured it a long-term land, sea, air and

⁹⁰ Italy was not able to secure itself, thanks to German help between 1940 and 1942 it could hardly keep its existence during the war.

⁹¹ On the other side, domestically Italy was in chaos that Mussolini was finally removed from the power by the Fascist Grand Council and Pietro Badoglio’s military coup on 25 July 1943. New general and leader Bodaglio and the King Vittorio-Emanuele III both decided to join the Allies and initiate a “secret negotiated “reversal of alliances”. Such an aspiration was also admitted by the Allies in the end. This was possible with the British acceptance of Italy to the Allies since it had a strong politico-military influence on decision making and joint operations in the Mediterranean. Thus the Allies would secure Italy’s transition from Fascism to a pro-British monarchy and guarantee its loss over its ex-colonies, Albania and the north eastern borders.

nuclear security from any foreign threat through NATO; second, it guaranteed “economic development, trade and emigration relief through the European Union’s cross-national integration and large scale domestic industrialization within the global US-led Western capitalist system”; third, such an alignment gave it a chance to return to “a non-controversial measure of international and Mediterranean prestige” as a new democratic, industrial Western member of NATO and the European Union (Rimanelli, 1997, p.672).

The desecuritization process is on the other hand as Rich (1953, p.475) argues continued at domestic level. Christian Democrats (CD) did not choose to work with the Communists and Socialists since Alcide de Gasperi, the leader of the CD and the prime minister, insisted that Italy had to be integrated into the Atlantic Community through a number of Western economic, political and military organizations. On the other hand, the Left thought that his opinion would divide the world into “two armed camps and threatens international peace.” For the leftists such an attempt would also usurp Italy's inadequate economic resources and rearmament, and hamper her attempts to modernize and industrialize and causes the decline of employment among the working classes. Rich (1953, p.75) also contended that the left side has taken a neutral stand in the cold war between America and Russia for national rather than ideological reasons.

In a comprehensive framework, it can be contended that the processes comprising the birth of Italian Republic on June 1946, nation-building and the post-war Italian security identity construction go hand in hand at the same time. For Prati (2006, p.16) Italian security policy was twofold: It has external and internal parameters. In the former, Italy had to formulate its security policy within the Atlantic Alliance and the process of European integration. It means that Italian national interest and identity are externally crystallized, evolved and found in post-war Italy, and internally constituted from the confluence of supranational and national foreign and security policy. For the former, Italy has four type interests which are shaped by its identity between 1947 and 1951. These are economic interests, security interests, the protection of the Italian state and its citizens from external and internal security threats, the world order interests and ideological interests. In this

thesis, security and world order interests constitute the most significant category (Ibid.). As for the domestic interests, (here described as economic) it is assumed that in order to understand Italian foreign and security policy with its constraints and limitations one must revise its domestic policy in particular the political cleavages and the public opinion.

Prati (2006, pp.68-69) also refers to Romano's classification of Italian foreign and security policy in the era of Alcide de Gasperi and Carlo Sforza⁹² that is based on "national gigantismo (a megalomaniac formulation of foreign policy objective)" and an "Atlantic and Europeanist nanismo (a dwarfed vision of Italy's scope of action)". It means that Italy's security has been to a great extent depended on other international and regional actors' security realms and embedded in European security structure. As (Western) European security complex is penetrated by the US as the superpower, its security identity is mostly linked to the Transatlantic security in the Cold –War era. Posner (1977, p.811) describes this situation as

a political actor characterized by a lack of international autonomy and a high degree of internal fragmentation. Italy's material weakness and historic disappointments as an actor in world politics have led its leaders to make foreign policy coterminous with "fedelta atlantica" (Atlantic fidelity) and a commitment to the European Community.

Towards the end of the Cold War, and with the emergence of more autonomous European security complex, Italy has also been affected by the new type of security concerns in Europe and become the part of development of a European type security community. Therefore, to label Italy only an "Atlanticist" or "a part of NATO" would narrow the scope this thesis.

Therefore, Italian security identity or Italy's foreign policy positions towards in particular European and American policies started to be shaped in two ways: First, Italian foreign and security policy is still based on a transatlantic agreement that was established in the post-World War II. Second, it is also drawn by an extension of domestic politics. Here, domestic politics is prominent as one of the evidences to display how much Italy is tied to

⁹² Carlo Sforza is a leading Italian Europeanist and Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1951.

the regional security realm and its foreign and security policy is an extension of its domestic policy. Brighi (1996) explains the importance of and similarity of the Italian governments in foreign and security policy as: “The style, discourse and choices of the centre-right and centre-left governments have differed only at the level of concepts and paradigms.” It means that Italy has never transformed its security understandings and practices that were rooted in the Atlantic and European fidelity.

In this study, we will consider that Italy’s security identity has historically been constituted since the ancient times in the form of political approaches and choices based on “Mediterraneanism”, “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism”. It is worth noting that these three political orientations do not differ from each other and extensively form the grounds of Italian foreign and security policy. It should also be indicated that, as a general framework, in three “isms”, it can be seen that the early Cold War years denotes the process of desecuritization of “Italy” that means that Italy was no more perceived as a security threat within Europe and against the liberal and democratic West. On the other hand, in particular the end of the Cold War dragged Italy again into a securitization process since the country was left against the new threats coming from the Balkans and the Middle East.

3.1.2. “Mediterraneanism” and Italy

Mediterranean is historically an area of tension and rivalry among the great powers of Europe since the ancient times. Having never been constituted as a security complex, a variety of subregions and elements are to an extent tied to each other in the region as if it is interpreted as a security complex several times. The most important common feature of the Mediterranean is the attempts of the domination over the region mainly under the naval leadership. Except for Ancient Rome, Italy has had a passive role in regional politics considering “its 1300 years of fragmentation (568-1860 AD) and its economic dependence on the imports of foreign materials via sea trade.” Italy historically reached peaks in its prosperity during the Roman State and the Renaissance. On the other hand, the importance

of the Mediterranean started to decline with the conquest of the Ottoman Empire (1450-1700s) and when the Great Discoveries (1445-1554) shifted the center of world in terms of political and commercial activities to the Northern Europe (including Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, France and Britain) (Rimanelli, 1997, p.969). It was so even during Italy's unification in 1860 when the Mediterranean was British-French and Ottoman. From then on, Italy came to the Mediterranean Sea since the existing structural constraints almost compelled Italy to

maximize limited economic-military resources by focusing its foreign policy through building friendship and alliance with Europe's hegemonic land-Power and securing Italian diplomatic-military alignment with the prevailing leading bloc in Continental Europe while protecting on its porous Alpine border from neighboring enemies (Ibid., 1997, pp.969-970).

Italy had two strategies in the Mediterranean: First strategy that denotes the European imperialism of the 19th century in the Mediterranean was Italy's colonial expansion that traces back to the first years of its national independence and political unity. Italy (under the name of Kingdom of Italy that had lived between 1860 and 1941) had governed three African territories as colonies, which are Eritrea, Italian Somaliland (the southern part of Somalia) and Libya (Duignan and Gann, 1972, p.412).⁹³ This was an old strategy that continued to 1941 when Italy had surrendered its colonies to the UN administration. However, such a background is helpful to understand like other colonial nations (in particular Britain and other Mediterranean colonial such as Spain and France) Italy's close relations with the Mediterranean (mostly Maghribi states) (Seddon, 2000, p.225).

⁹³ Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Libya were ruled by Italy respectively between 1890 and 1941; 1880s and 1941; and 1912 and 1942. In addition, in 1935 Italy under the Fascist rule conquered Ethiopia but such an invasion continued only one year.

Second strategy is the most dominant one. On Italy's position Harper (2000, p.96) contends that

[i]n order to possess the power Italy sometimes preferred to be connected to a flexible non-alignment that would shift Italy's weight in favor of the biggest powers like France and Britain; or sometimes alliances with Germany and Austria-Hungary against French activities in the Mediterranean; and to the policies including Mediterranean-African ambitions (in Mussolini Era). Among the ambitions, Italy's preference was best illustrated by its participation in the prevailing system of European state cooperation.

It means that Italy has a balancing or a bridge role between the great powers, alliances over the domination of the region and between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

As a framework, Italy's Mediterranean approach can be examined in two parts: First part encompasses desecuritization of Italy and the Mediterranean region in the Cold War era, the second part goes with the parallel securitization process of the Mediterranean region with the end of the Cold War and Italy's role conception towards the region in this period.

3.1.2.1. "Mediterraneanism" during the Cold War Era

Politically, in the aftermath of the World War II, Italy had not showed an aspiration to deal with the Mediterranean issues deeply. Despite the three pillar security vision of Italy, Mediterraneanism in the early years of the Cold War was relatively less voiced due to two reasons: First, the term Mediterraneanism was hardly uttered among Italian democratic political elites since the term was a "symbol of the aggressive nationalism of the Fascist regime" (Aliboni, n.d, p.1). The term was frequently used by the Fascist political elites and academics in order to outline the Mediterranean description of Italian race and spiritualism over the other races (Gilette, 2002). The second reason stems from the delicate bilateral relations with Britain in particular on the colonial issues on the one side, with France on the other. For Britain, the primary condition for the peace proposal

would only be the surrender of Italian sovereignty in the colonies and their future would be handed over to the UN authorities. It meant that with the Peace Treaty of 1947 and the cutting off Italy's colonial states from itself compelled Italy to adopt both Europeanist and Atlanticist notions (Kelly, 2000, p.44).

Mediterraneanism reemerged as an important aspect of the Italian foreign and security policy in the 1950s under the notions of "particularism" that denotes a more autonomous policy (when compared to the following approaches) under the label of "neo-Atlanticism" and "neo-nationalism". It was commonly argued that with the end of the Second World War and the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1947, Italian foreign and security policy was rather studied within the framework of Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Yet, Mediterraneanism has become a popular notion, in particular during the fifties and eighties when Italy went to opt for "Mediterraneanism" framing it as "national unity".⁹⁴ Harper (2000, p.104) also refers to the "particularist" expression in Catholicism in the 1950s and Craxian Socialism in the 1980s. Even in the post-colonial period, some members of the Christian Democrats and Communist Party argued that the Mediterranean was vital for the national interest (Carbone, 2008, p.157).⁹⁵ In both periods, it had been presented as an alternative to dependency on the external powers and alliances and a policy that is more balanced between among other strategies.

The post-war Mediterraneanism was first initiated by the former Christian Democratic partisan and the leader of the Italian oil company ENI, Enrico Mattei. His policy was aiming at giving support to Arab and Iranian economic and political aspirations and reducing American and Western control in the international oil market. For Mattei, the Mediterranean had become a rivalry area where France was a natural challenger of Italy. Italy would pursue an oil-based Mediterranean policy that was so much consistent with the so called "neo-Atlanticist" approach. The new approach was also developed by the leftwing

⁹⁴ Mediterraneanism has also been much debated since the notion also existed during the fascist era.

⁹⁵ For example, in the early years of the Cold War period, Italy supported decolonization and pro-Arab policy that was sometimes contrasted with the policy pursued by France and the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean. However, these views were public debate. "Italy's support for the construction of the EU, however, was a constant in Italy's foreign policy agenda" (See also for example Carbone, 2008).

leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, namely Gronchi and Fanfani (Aliboni, n.d.). For them, “Atlanticism” would be strengthened through the economic and social – not only purely military- purposes foreseen by Article 2⁹⁶ of the NATO and provide a greater autonomy from the US (Harper, 2000, p.105). They saw Italy as a kind of bridge between the emerging Islamic nations and the secularized capitalist West. For that reason, Italy had started to maintain a more autonomous or semi-independent foreign policy⁹⁷ (Ibid., p.104). That was first evidenced by Italy’s position in the decolonialization processes in the North Africa against Britain and France. Italy had friendly relations with the Arab countries; however it could not be a mediator in the crisis between France and Tunisia on the one hand, and Britain and Egypt on the other hand (Ferraris, 1996, pp.65-68).⁹⁸ Likewise, with the Suez crisis⁹⁹ in 1956 between the US and the Anglo-Franco alliance, Italian leaders thought that Italy got an advantage and privileged place for the US vis-a-vis the other great powers in Europe (Mammarella and Cacace, 2006, p.208).¹⁰⁰ In one of the most prominent scenes of “power politics” in Suez, Italy followed the Atlantic line and gained an international reputation in the eyes of the USA.¹⁰¹ In fact, Italy’s position in the crisis was a

⁹⁶ The Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in 4 April 1949 affirms that : “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949” (See also for example NATO).

⁹⁷ Italy supported Moroccan independence and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in the 1950s.

⁹⁸ With the end of Second World War, France considered the dissolution of Italy as a Mediterranean power a necessary passage to the Western Mediterranean security. However, for France, to achieve the strict application of the clauses of the Peace Treaty related to naval issues and to assure the superiority of France in the Mediterranean were important. The reasons for building good relations with Italy are: fear for an Italo-German collaboration, a likelihood for confrontation with the Italian expectations in Libya and Italy’s special position in North Africa. However, the Mediterranean security was guaranteed with the inclusion of Italy in NATO (See also for example, Ferraris, 1996, pp.66-67).

⁹⁹ Suez Crisis broke out in 1956 upon the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Britain, France and Israel launched a military campaign against Egypt, in particular Sinai area. Over a pressure from the US, the SU, and the international community, the conflict ended and a UN emergency force (peacekeeping operation) (UNEF) force was deployed in the region (See also for example Varble, 2003).

¹⁰⁰ Harper (2000, p.104) notes that their aim was not to challenge the US hegemony in the Mediterranean, but to reinforce it vis-à-vis France and Britain.

¹⁰¹ The Italian attitude was not only aiming at acting with the USA but also targeting to maintaining good relations with the Arab world. In his visit to Egypt in January 1959, Fanfani reacted to the intervention and

reflection of its exclusion from the great powers' conferences on the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern question and the great powers' reluctance to collaborate with Italy in the region pushed Italy to progress its relations with the North Africa. Such developments well coincided with Mattei's neoatlanticist views and practices mainly in energy sector (Ferraris, 1996, p.121).

Italy had friendly relations towards the Mediterranean countries in general; however as an exception it opposed the attempts for extension of the preferential trade regime to North African countries made by France and the European Commission. The main reason was that Italy wanted to preserve its agricultural sector which the EU countries had a dependency on. Italy was against to sign the trade agreements with Morocco and Tunisia which had the same products with Italy (for example, wine, olive oil, vegetables). During the 1970s, Italy supported the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) together with France in order to cooperate not only at bilateral but also at multilateral levels in the fields of industry, environment, science and investment (Carbone, 2008, pp.157-158).¹⁰²

On the other hand, the Socialist governments in the eighties adopted a significant "militant" and "assertive" attitude towards the Mediterranean dimension in Italy's foreign policy. The Italian government started to contribute to the peace operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon in 1979 under the UN authority. Italy also gave weight to its defense spending towards the Alliance's Mediterranean Southern Flank. Coming to the 1990s, Italy had found out that it had to pursue a more balanced approach in the Mediterranean inspired by national interests and multilateralism (Mammarella and Cacace, 2006).

went further by stating that "Cairo is an ideal bridge for reopening the dialogue among the Western states and the Arab World."

¹⁰²However, the Commission signed the agreement but excluded the above mentioned products.

As a consequence, “Mediterraneanism” was adopted in the fifties in the form of “neo-Atlanticism”¹⁰³ (a sort of “pacifist Atlanticism”¹⁰⁴ and “nationalist Mediterraneanism”¹⁰⁵) and in the seventies and eighties in the form of anti-Atlanticism or “neutralism”. Mainly among the Communists and Catholics politics, the Mediterranean had become an Italian political rhetoric more than a real and credible foreign and security policy dimension (Mammarella and Cacace, 2006, p.206; Aliboni, n.d., p.2).

3.1.2.2. “Mediterraneanism” during the post-Cold War Era

The Mediterranean region has permeated discussion of security at discursive level during the Cold War years even if many political leaders persistently referred to the term. The region has become a center of attention for Europeans since the early 1990s when Europe and the Mediterranean countries of the EU have perceived risks and threats including regional and ethnic conflicts, human movements, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and political and economic instabilities from the Southern sphere. To confront with the new threats, Italian governments principally tended to pursue a number of policies through different multilateral organizations of which the country is a member, primarily the United Nations (UN), NATO and the European Union (EU).

¹⁰³ The interpretation of “neo-Atlanticism” of Mediterranean politics assumes a peculiarity for strategic and commercial interests of a country which would go to freedom from the economic conditions backed by external powers (See also for example Ferraris, 1996, p.120).

¹⁰⁴ Even though Italy is a loyal member of NATO, its contribution to the alliance was low. During the Cold War, Italy tended to prefer neutralism in a hidden way. Italy was certainly much concerned with its national independence and territorial integrity but unlike Germany, US and Britain, not for fear of the Soviet Union. For that reason, the weight given by Italy to military alliance seems more moderate. This is defined as “pacifist Atlanticism” by Pierre Hassner (See also for example, Putnam, 1978, p.340; Hassner, 1975).

¹⁰⁵ Mammarella and Cacace (2006, p.206) use the term as a sort of “neo-atlanticism” and “pacifist atlanticism” Mediterraneanism refers to “particularism” or a “neutralism” it is used for the nationalist attitudes towards the foreign powers.

Beyond the issues or occasions that indirectly strike Italian interests in the region, the geopolitical position of the country must be greatly marked when investigating the post-Cold War security concerns for example migration issue. Aliboni (2002, n.d.) depicts Italy's position as a "gateway" to Europe. For that reason, it needs adequate resources in order to negotiate with Morocco, Tunisia and, above all, Libya.

However, it must be noted that Italy had never initiated a pan-Mediterranean dialogue or strategy but on a more minor scale and mainly for commercial reasons (Coralluzzo, 2008, p.116). It means that Italy felt itself even its "neo-Atlanticist" era more flexible or independent role in the Mediterranean area. It has always pursued its policies in line with the policies of the United States and its European allies, even regarding in the geopolitical context of the Mediterranean. Italy's interlocking position into the Atlantic allies and the European complex was described with reference to its "traditional and natural sphere of interest". In fact, it was more than a notion of "pure Mediterraneanism", but rather a Mediterraneanism that is based on a some type of Atlanticism which would increase Italy's role in the region (Brogi, 1996, p.62).

Italy's geopolitical concerns well coincide with those of the US and Europe which Italy has a relatively advantage position vis-à-vis its allies. This advantage stems from the fact that with the new era it has become a frontline country which left Italy directly involved in "Euro-Atlantic community" in particular in Mediterranean issues. This is due to the fact that it faces threats directly and is necessarily involved in every kind of cooperation attempts. Coralluzzo (2008, p.116), similarly, reminds us that Mediterranean "vocation" was never "a barrier to Atlanticism or Europeanism, but rather as a geopolitical blessing to be used to improve the country's position within the Euro-Atlantic community." As a fact, Italy uses its advantage in the Mediterranean to the Western interests as well as national ones. Doing so, Italy was aiming to affect Washington and obtain a privileged position within the region in Romans' "mare nostrum", thus being equal with the major European powers.

Therefore, Italy started to sponsor the Mediterranean initiatives through EU and NATO. In 1991 Italy's first initiative was together with Spain under the transatlantic framework (that is composed of European and American views) promoted an idea of Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM). The CSCM would be based on a three-basket model just like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) integrating economic, political and military aspects into a global cooperative strategy.¹⁰⁶ Aliboni (2002, n.d.) claims that in order to be successful, Italy and other European states needed to reinforce the EU's foreign and security policy (CFSP) which was then agreed in Maastricht 1991. In fact, Italy's policy visions in the Mediterranean region were framed in line with an approach that gives priority to the European security and its position therein and thus Italy was so much criticizing the French initiative due to the lack of EC involvement in its projects. For example, in December 1991, France took an initiative to privilege a sub-regional approach including only the western Mediterranean under the name of "Regional West Mediterranean Cooperation Council". This process would include ten countries: the five Members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and five countries in Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta) (Carbone, 2008, p.160).

As Aliboni (2002, n.d.) asserts, Italy pursued a policy towards the Mediterranean that revolves around the EU's Mediterranean policy, namely, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue. For the former, as a fact, since the negotiations of the EMP continued during the processes of political crises (tangentopoli) and government change, the framework of the partnership was mainly shaped by France and Spain. The first center-left government (1996–2001) put Europe at the very center of its foreign and security policy in its Mediterranean policies. Italy's Mediterranean policy does not only depend on the balance between the two sides (center-left and center-right) but also the complementary actions between the EU and the US in the

¹⁰⁶ This proposal was rejected by major powers such as Germany, United Kingdom, and France). It was believed that this initiative created some opposition from the Mediterranean like the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, the Gulf War. For that reason, Italy decided to withdraw this proposal.

solution of the Middle Eastern conflict. The center-left favored the Palestinian cause just as Europeans did while the center-right opts to act with the US taking relatively pro-Israeli stances (Del Sarto and Tocci, 2008).

Although Italy was much criticized due to its limited role in the Mediterranean, its policy actually well coincides with that of the EU's Mediterranean policy. The EMP was commonly brought up with its failure to achieve its stated goals. The cooperation and partnership initiatives then supplemented by two important projects named "the European Neighborhood Policy" (ENP) in 2004. The President of the European Commission Romano Prodi also supported the idea which would strengthen the bilateral links between the EU and its neighbors in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Like other Mediterranean member states of the EU which are also the partners of the ENP, Italy at first disliked the new initiative since it could have deteriorated the important characteristics of the EMP in that the Eastern European neighbors would be given much prominence and priority.¹⁰⁷

Although Italian stance towards the formation in Mediterranean remains constant over decades, from 2001 till 2006 Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the right coalition in the government, saw the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern issues through the lens of Atlanticism. Italy's support for the US following the terrorist attacks and military intervention in Afghanistan in 1002 and Iraq in 2003 were the best illustrations. In fact this does not mean that Italy's foreign and security policy is overall transformed. For Del Sarto and Tocci (2008), Italy's foreign and security policy towards the region is in precise conformity with the Euro-Atlanticist approach. Such a view was also evidenced by Berlusconi firmly manifested that European integration is in Italy's national interest. It means that all spheres of Italian foreign and security policy is placed within a wider Euro-Atlanticist outlook without any exception even the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Italy's geographical proximity to these two regions makes it to be more active in fields of trade and investment, migration, terrorism, conflict, organized crime and energy. Its Euro-

¹⁰⁷ Italy and other southern Member States of the EU including France and Spain also push for the inclusion of the Mediterranean partners into the ENP (See also for example Emerson, Aydın, Tocci, Vahl and Youngs, 2005, p.205).

Atlancist frame and “Mediterraneanness” would strengthen the country’s status vis-a-vis the EU and the United States (Ibid., pp.135-136).

Within the Euro-Atlanticist axis, Italian foreign and security policy since the beginning of the Cold War given its priorities have developed along the Euro-Atlantic axis, so do its policies towards the Mediterranean region. Italy’s position vis a vis those of the EU and the US can be seen when it uses its advantage within European decision-making and policy structures to strengthen Italy’s power in EU/Europe. This is also important for EU/Europe to provide security from Italy. Italy can clearly play the role of regional facilitator for “desecuritization” of the Mediterranean.

Italy’s role in the Mediterranean has remained relatively passive vis-a vis France and some times Spain. Yet, more than acting independently, Italy preferred to take a Euro-Atlanticist stance in the Mediterranean unlike France. For example, France uses the “Mediterranean myth” as Daguzan (2009) argues that from the sixteenth century, the Mediterranean has always been subjected to French “compensation policy” as responses to failures and difficulties in France’s European policy. He contends that when European strategies are ineffective, France offers the Mediterranean as an alternative. It can be contended that in almost every initiative France reinvented its “new French Mediterranean policy” as in the cases of “Regional West Mediterranean Cooperation Council” and the Union of the Mediterranean” which can be interpreted as alternative to the EU’s Mediterranean policies towards the region” (Ibid.). Similarly, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy for the presidency of France, the Mediterranean issue (its role in international politics and the EU’s external relations) was heated again in the form of establishing a “Mediterranean Union” or “the Union for the Mediterranean” during 2007 and 2008. Such an initiative was highly debated issue among the member states of the EU and the reactions were diverse in the sense that nobody could put a concrete setting for the Union. It would create a Mediterranean Investment Bank, based on the European Investment Bank (EIB). The proposal was mostly opposed by the non-Mediterranean EU Member States, which felt that they were excluded from the area. Since Italy is one of the member states of the EU

which struggles with the consequences of instabilities in North Africa, such an idea comes attractive to Italy because it offered further efforts for the economic and social problems of the Mediterranean region. This was well evidenced by Foreign Minister D'Alema's words: "We are not against it in principle. However, we must seriously discuss what this proposal means and entails. The right approach to the problem is to reinforce the EU's Mediterranean policy because the center of Europe must move towards the South" (Carbone, 2008, p.164). D'Alema supports every step taken to solve the problems in the South. On the other hand, Italy wanted to maintain its traditional support for the EU, which also included the reinforcement of the EMP: integration with the southern Mediterranean countries. That Italy's attitude towards a new formation should be an extension of the Barcelona Process. Italy has similar understandings in many aspects towards the Mediterranean region. Their initiative of five plus five, and attempts for creation of an amphibian brigade to EURFOR and EUROMARFOR are the main examples. Above all, Spain like Italy sees Europe as an ideal goal in particular in the post-Franco period; joining Europe was the historical solution for Spain. For that reason, Spain, even more actively, initiates a series of dialogues between European security units and the Southern Mediterranean countries like the Barcelona Process and the Alliance of Civilizations that started in 2005 (Barbe, 1998, pp.147-160).

In conclusion, it can be said that being an important part of the Mediterranean region, Italy has never invented an autonomous Mediterranean policy or taken a neutral position in the region. Rather, its "Mediterraneanism" remained at rhetorical level more than being a policy. In the post-Cold War era, Italy has necessarily become a security provider in the region since it has directly faced the threats generating from the Mediterranean. Italy has formed its Mediterranean perceptions and implementations in line with the Euro-Atlantic perspectives. However, it would not be erroneous to argue that as EU/Europe has become autonomous after the Cold War, Italy has started to participate in the construction of Euro-Mediterranean security directly.

3.1.3. “Atlanticism” and Italy

There are a number of reasons for the extraordinary importance that the US has assumed in Italy's international relations since the Second World War. Some of them are closely connected to the Cold War international system in which Italy found itself after the catastrophic experience of World War II. The other reasons stem from the increasing role the US, which plays in Italian foreign policy an important role even after the end of the blocs and of bipolar confrontation. In fact, Italy has pursued mutually reinforcing objectives: The first one is to strengthen European voice in Washington; the other one is vice versa. Italy's security structure is based on the Euro-Atlanticist outlook (Del Sarto and Tocci, 2008, p.135).

Within this balance, Italy has always felt itself safest in international arena due to its close relationship with Washington even after the Cold War.

3.1.3.1 “Atlanticism” during the Cold War Era

Given the World War tragedy in which Italy was left as an “inferior” object in Europe in the late 1940s, it had only two choices to continue its existence; one is through use of force, the other is playing the game of power politics and taking sides in the 20th century international environment. As a defeated country and given its domestic considerations, Italy chose to construct a closer relationship with the US in particular under the Italian governing party the Christian Democrats (CD/DC). As mentioned above, in the early years of the Cold War, American aid to the DC during the election campaign in 1948 was prominent in the construction of Italian foreign policy orientation in the shadow of the nuclear horror. For Ginsborg (2003, p.153) Italy had become “an integral part of the American influence” since 1947. However, Italy during the Cold War years and afterwards, even in the disputes between Paris and Washington, remained neutral and did not quarrel with either of them. It had pursued neither a French strategy nor a purely Atlanticist

position (Nutti, 2003, p.94). Since 1949, with the joining to NATO, Italy's role had been determined as somewhat a passive and detached role inside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance (Posner, 1977, p.812).

Italy just because of its political priorities that are demographic and economic needs, desired to remain far from “foreign tensions and high military expenditures” (Hughes, 1979, p.250). Instead, it chose to restore its reputation in international arena and provide its presence under the protection of transatlantic umbrella and for a long time under the leadership of American oriented Christian Democratic Party. Italy could not steer the policy that France did since the former was lacking nuclear weapons and military capacities. The period after the WW II can be viewed as a desecuritization process. From the American point of view, Italy perceived that the US interference was a kind of “protection” in those years¹⁰⁸. The price of protection was articulated as first “the exclusion of the Communists from the power; second, granting the US access to its territory for the deployment of nuclear weapons.” This would limit its sovereignty (Harper, 2000, p.99).

The Italian relations with the US were somewhat balanced by the PSI and PCI (Communist Party in Italy- Partito Comunista Italiano and the Socialist Party- Partita Socialista Italiana) which considerably made a profound impact on the Italian domestic policy. During the 1960s, Italy's low-profile foreign and security policy was coupled with the inclusion of center-left parties in Italian governments during the 1963-76. These parties were strengthened by the public opinion to a great extent irritating Italy's Fascist history (Howorth and Menon, 1997, pp.68-69). From then on till the end of the Cold War, a new dimension, “apertura a sinistra” (opening to the Left – or a DC alliance with the PSI), was added as a domestic part of Italian foreign and security policy (Time, 12 January 1962). With the coming of the leftist parties, a new and balanced policy under the name of “neo-Atlanticism” would be pursued to privilege Italy's traditional national interests standing between the blocs and intensive cooperation with the newly independent states in the

¹⁰⁸ During the Cold War, the presence of a high vote proportion of the Communist Party in Italy- Partito Comunista Italiano and the Socialist Party- Partita Socialista Italiana shifted the policies to a much balanced level.

Mediterranean” (Gearson and Schake, 2002, p.152). Such a neo-Atlanticist view was aiming at accrediting an interpretation in terms of not only military facet but also politico-social aspect of the Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, Italy was searching for its “speciale interesse” (special interests) and “speciale competenza” (special competences) to make its Mediterranean scenario valid to expand its “presenza” in that area and assert its role as a bridge between Europe, Africa and the Middle East (Coralluzzo, 2000, p.48) However, such a new understanding was not viewed as an antagonistic move by the US as in the 1970s, the PSI and the PCI endorsed NATO. This is clearly illustrated by an interview of Berlinguer, the leader of the PCI in the “Corriere della Sera” where he accepted the Italian presence in NATO (Mammarella and Cacace, 2006, p.232). For him, “socialism was safer under the umbrella of NATO than outside it” (Gearson and Schake, 2002, p.152). So, it would not be wrong to say that Italy was paying the price of “protection” through remaining loyal to NATO despite the growing popularity of the leftist parties in Italy.

In addition, US’ reaction against such developments in Italian domestic policy was far stricter rather than expected. For the US, by supporting anti-communist sides in Italy political stability and parliamentary government had to be supported; however the US preferred to this could be done by intervening in Italy’s domestic affairs albeit in a hidden way. In order to repress the communists, the US had granted more than a hundred million dollars to Italy through an undercover military organization codenamed “Gladio” since 1948-1949. This organization through NATO and the US backed Italian anticommunists with military arms and money (D.M. Smith, 1997, pp.448-460). One of the most important aspects of “Gladio” is that it is not only a Cold War organization built for external threats, but also as an instrument used for the internal enemies (leftists) (Gingsborg, 2001, p172).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ “Gladio” was unknown to the Italian public even some prime ministers, and bureaucrats until 1990. It continued even after the end of the communism. It served as an information gathering organization and then dissolved by Andreotti in the end of 1990 (Gingsborg, 2001, p172; D.M. Smith, 1997, pp.448-460).

Italy's other price for its membership in NATO pushed it to take two strategic decisions in 1958 and 1979-83. In 1958, the US President Eisenhower decided to deploy "Jupiter" an intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBM) on Italian territory. Thus, Italy would be the first NATO country to accept the nuclear weapons. Italian acceptance of the deployment was meaningful since Italy was lacking nuclear weapons and this would gain Italy an international prestige and counterbalance the European nuclear powers. Furthermore, despite strong public opposition, the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani welcomed this "opportunity" since with the opening to the Socialist could have damaged Italy's Atlantic orientation. It was not surprising that the leader of PSI, Bettino Craxi also approved of NATO deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II Missiles in his government term in 1979 and in 1983. Despite his Socialist notions, he decided to deploy missiles since such a decision would further contribute to the improvement of Italy's prestige in Europe and "turned Italy into a real pivot of the Atlantic design" (Nuti, 2003, pp.96-97).¹¹⁰ For Joseph and Rosenblum (1984, p.390), one of the major reasons of the deployment is that Italy was willing to establishing de facto protectorate over the Middle East and the North Africa. However, such a view was never evidenced by Italian policies in the region.

In sum, Italy's Cold War era Atlanticism was based on rather decisive, balanced and smooth relations than it was expected. This was the period which Italy as a state was desecuritized and it also firmly fixed its security considerations through the Atlantic Alliance in particular in the horror of the Communist threat both inside and outside.

¹¹⁰ In fact, in Italy the PSI and PCI saw each other as rivals and trying to prevail over themselves. In order to take part in the government it gave support to a great extent to the US missile deployment on Italian territory. The PSI also knew that the PCI was endorsing the NATO reality.

3.1.3.2 “Atlanticism” during the post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of the US and NATO in Italian security policy has remained central despite radical transformations both at international level and domestic level. At international level, bipolarity eventually collapsed, and the security axis shifted from East-West to North-South and a number of local and regional conflicts unavoidably broke out (Bonvicini, 1996, p.90). On the other hand, the years between 1989 and 1991 were rather critical for Italian foreign and security policy, more generally for Italian politics. This is due to the fact that Italian politics, - including both domestic and external policies- has been stuck into the “unfinished transition” process of the Cold War system which brought about numerous uncertainties in the regional and international security environment (Brighi, 2009, p.4). However, the importance of the US remained “unchallenged” when in the post-Cold War era the relations with the US has never been put under question than it was in the last years of the Cold War. Because, there was no Communist threat to be challenged, neither the PCI nor the PSI could survive in the new era under the new political conditions. It was since the Achille Lauro affair,¹¹¹ the U.S. and Italy have been involved in friendly relations (Johnson, 2008).

In the post-Cold War era, the main debate has actually been whether Italy’s policies are characterized by “continuity” or “change”; on its loyalty to NATO; and how Italy constitutes the transatlantic security and in which areas of operations. In order to respond to all these questions we should look at a variety of dimensions of its foreign and security policy. Generally speaking, there is continuity in Italy’s policies being implemented in a more active, even pro-active way (Sedgwick, 2005, p.118). Waltson (2007, p.91) argues that in the new era Italy has shifted from being a “consumer of security” to being a “producer of security” due to its external needs and internal reforms. However, Italy as in the Cold War era, has always relied on Euro-Atlantic ties to balance it

¹¹¹ In 1985, a crisis broke out between the U.S. and Italy since four Palestinian Arabs (members of Palestine Liberation Frontline) hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro who then landed Italian territory Sicily. The U.S. expected Italy to hand over the terrorists for trial in the U.S. Italy did not respond positively to the US authorities since it did not send the suspects to countries where they may face the death penalty. Such an action worsened the relations between the US and Italy, yet, did not last so long.

economic and military weaknesses vis-a vis the other regional powers (Forsyth, 1998, p.1). After the 1990s, Italy's main sponsors are the US and the EU as they were in the Cold War. In a sense, Italy accepted to give up a portion of its sovereignty and used "special relationship" to guarantee its "presence" and to pursue its interests with the regional countries in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Domestically in Italy, with the disappearance of three largest political parties, in the 1990's a new era started in Italian politics. Under "Second Republic", Italy has now been less affected by the US than it was during the Cold War; however, there was no shift in its loyalty to its long lasting ally as in the other security issues. As a member of NATO and the Group of Seven, Italy has still been committed to democratic principles and ideals, Italy obviously shares similar interests with the United States in international arena (Palazzo, 2001, pp. 4-5). Ginsborg (2003, p.158) views Italy's position in NATO, as the "Bulgaria of NATO" to demonstrate Italy's passive role in NATO. Italy was passive but seemed much dedicated enough to the transatlantic policies since it tended to militarily guarantee its security vis a vis other European powers. Italy's solidarity was best displayed by the deployment of the ballistic missiles during the Craxi era in the 1970s, and in the post-Cold War era by the Foreign Minister and the former member of the Communist Party, Massimo D'Alema's decision for launching the military campaign in the former Yugoslavia against Serbia. Italy kept its relations as close as before and this was well portrayed by its support given to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 in Iraq, in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, Iraqi war of 2003 and peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (Nutti, 2003, p.98). This also means that Italy is now much more willing to take on new international responsibilities to play significant role in the region (Bonvicini, 1996, p.90).

For Hill and Andreatta (cited in Sedgwick, 2004, pp.108-109) this is due to the fact that Italy did not want to remain as a “free rider”¹¹² in the security regime of Europe; instead, it started to be an active promoter which the US and the EU are the “bystanders.” Together with Spain and Portugal, Italy frequently expressed their interests to take initiatives for a closer regional dialogue in the Mediterranean area. It is because Italy beside the Cold War’s collective security movements has privileged its own security concerns as well as regional security. Croci (2003, p.266) also argues that Italy had to face the instability in the Balkans nearby and instability in the Middle East which can affect its energy security policy. Under these circumstances, Italy’s first response to the NATO enlargement was that it should consider the southern flank during the enlargement process of the EU and NATO to the East. This was important as Italy was afraid that the South would be ignored and its security and security role would be deteriorated. For that reason, Italy also insisted on the development of a “Mediterranean dialogue” within the framework of NATO in 1994 for the Mediterranean region where Italian medium-term objectives are consistent with American goals and interests (Menotti, 1997, pp.6–7). Together with Spain and Portugal, Italy was the main sponsor of this initiative which was aiming at building more confidence between the NATO members and the Arab countries.¹¹³ Italian Defense Minister General Domenico Corcione also agreed with the creation of a Partnership for Peace (PfP) type dialogue between the two sides (Winrow, 2000, pp.183-184; see also for example Zema, 2002)¹¹⁴.

However, it should be emphasized that Italy envisioned a Euro-Atlantic organization that grants a regional autonomy at institutional, functional and operational levels. This would be just like as the developments in the Balkans. For example, for Italy NATO should also construct a Mediterranean policy and place itself as “geo-strategically” balanced between the Mediterranean and the Central and Eastern Europe. NATO’s Southern Command that has a great importance between the Mediterranean basin and the

¹¹² In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “free-ride” means a “benefit obtained ay another’s expense or without usual cost or effort; soft or easy treatment.”

¹¹³ France seemed less willing for this initiative.

¹¹⁴ This would include military exercises and joint operations.

Balkans region should be strengthened. The tasks in the Mediterranean should be implemented through European presence, namely, the ESDP, WEU ESDI as the European pillar. There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War pushed Italy to pay its attention largely on the regional issues. For that reason it sees European political leadership related to the Mediterranean security indispensable (Menotti, 1997). In a sense, the Mediterranean policy is impossible without an eclectic package which a number of actors ranging from states, international and regional governmental and non-governmental organizations and transnational organizations are involved. He describes the actors as “a number of interlocking security institutions, variable geometries and institutional pluralism” (Ibid.).

Italy also desires to maintain independent policies from those of the US in some issues including the relations with Libya. Romano (cited in Menotti, 1997) argues that the even if the US and Italy shares the same goals they differ at tactical and even strategic levels in the new era. For example, Italy was delegated a degree of autonomy and local leadership on specific issues or crises. This would be welcomed by the US since it would think that Italy is contributing to the stability of the region. The main example of this notion is seen in the economic crisis the Albanian of 1997.

Additionally, it would be noteworthy that Italy has a vision of virtuous combination between Atlanticism and Europeanism (Rapporto 2010). Italy even under its Atlanticist Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi pursued a balanced policy approach towards Europe and the United States.¹¹⁵ During Berlusconi period, this approach shifted the pendulum towards the Atlanticist end of the spectrum compared to Europeanist Romano Prodi. Croci (cited in Del Sarto and Tocci, 2008, p.137) believes that such a shift was just in style not a radical way. This means that Italy’s foreign and security policy has been in continuity even shuttling between the centre-right and centre-left, under a Euro-Atlanticist outlook. For example, even if Berlusconi declared that Italy will act with the US in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, he also wanted to keep

¹¹⁵ Likewise, for Del Sarto and Tocci (2008, p.137) Euroscepticism when compared to Atlanticism was far more symbolic and reinforced by his personality and mediatic style.

Italy's European vocation (Romano, 2006; Del Sarto and Tocci, 2008, p.137). Italy was so much willing and active in the Convention on the Future of Europe under the Italian presidency and signed the Constitutional Treaty in Rome. The continuity of Italy's Euro-Atlanticist attitude is evident during the leftist government in 2006. For example, Italy made contributions to the US-led operations in the Balkans and the Middle East during the era of Prodi and Massimo D'Alema, the foreign minister of Italy. D'Alema asserted that the US would be a reliable partner of Italy. In relation to ISAF-NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2006 Prodi faced a critical crisis that came from the leftist coalition in the government. The leftist leaders also reacted to what Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmedinejad declared "wiping Israel out of map" Italy's and give support to Israel and its existence in the region (Ibid.).

In consequence, it can be said that Italy is one of the most loyal allies of the US and NATO. This was far clearer during the Cold War years that the US penetration into the European security complex region is also built on the Italian guarantee for providing security at both external and domestic levels. Italy was also tied to US domestically through number of official and unofficial economic and military aids. This was so even during the era of leftist governments which continued to see NATO as a security organization. However, all the things Italy committed were strictly tied to global security affairs. In the post-Cold War era, theoretically and functionally, Italy has become more autonomous in the region but under the NATO auspices. Its autonomy is backed by the transformation in NATO and the developing European foreign and security policy. Italy has become a prominent part of the Mediterranean security which faces the threats and crisis primarily. For that reason, the developments and the agenda in the region can also be analyzed given the South Mediterranean allies of NATO.

3.1.4. “Europeanism” and Italy

One may ask whether Italy has truly a unique place in European security, or vice versa, if so to what extent. This would be restated as: “Europe for Italy?” or “Italy for Europe?” The answer is categorically both since the weight of both sides towards each other are also interlocking (Brighi, 2009). Italy’s position and its attitudes towards Europe have never changed since the EU’s inception. Its hidden position in Europe vis-a-vis France, Germany and Britain does not make Italy an ineffective and independent state in the region. It has been a state which provides its security from and to European security (in terms of “security taker” and “security producer”). Italy’s position in European security complex does not provide us a problematic picture; instead, it obviously matches with the evolution of European security complex. During the first years of the Cold War, Italy was among the conflicting states in Europe and between the US and the SU on the one hand, and among the liberalists, Catholics and communist on the other hand. It had sought a security guarantee under the nuclear environment and until 1990s it had been a part of regional structure (be they conflict formation and security regime) that was a scene of a number of national states of conflicts and distrust. Coming to the post-Cold War era with the removal of the US influence, Europe was left with a number of regional conflicts. In the meantime, Italy like other states of European complex had become more concerned with the regional and more real “European” issues. Therefore, it would not be erroneous to say that Italy’s European vocation well reflects its European personality and its policies in particular in the post-Cold War.

3.1.4.1. “Europeanism” during the Cold War Era

Without a doubt, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Italy and Europe began to desecuritize each other through a number of conflict resolution mechanisms. It should be marked that Italy was one of the six original member states of the European Communities and played a significant role in the process of European integration. This was an opportunity for Italy to guarantee its economic and military security under the European integration and NATO respectively. This section gives us a very full understanding on how Italy is embedded within EU/European complex and use European discourses and instruments.

In the very aftermath of the WWII, like other states, Italy as a state policy saw European integration as an instrument for its external action not an entity that it would ground its security identity on. Europe would also be a location where Italy can reassure its power status among the power polarity and the “big states” of Europe (Brighi, 2009).

As a fact given that is European continent had had a long history of fragmentation and conflict, the states had persistently tried to transform the fragmentation into a more balanced system of states through wars and agreements. Sometimes this was formed as an attempt for unity at least theoretically. It was that in the very beginning of the contemporary European security environment, Italy has also contributed with a variety of key figures that helped to shape the new European security environment, more specifically, European integration process following the WW II. They all asked “per quali ragioni fare l’Europa? Come fare l’Europa?” (For what reason Europe is created? How to create Europe?) (Durand, 2007, p.2). In Italy, the movement of European federalists has a constant and determined role mainly in sparking the European integration (Vercelli, 2000, p.151). Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli¹¹⁶ without a doubt, one of the leading figures of the era, wrote his Ventotene Manifesto in 1941 with Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni with which “he called for the creation of the United States of Europe the only alternative, in

¹¹⁶ He then became a Commissioner and a EU parliamentarian.

his view, to a continuous risk of war and destruction.” Therefore, the seeds of the federal thinking were mainly planted in those years when Spinelli an Orthodox Marxist proposed “the European Federation” seen “a stage for a global unity” (Friedrichs, 2004, p.62). For example, Carlo Sforza as the Foreign Minister of De Gasperi era similarly saw the future of Europe in collaboration among European nations in a Federalist Europe (Mammarella and Cacace, 2006, p.174). But in general, as an alternative to federation system, in practical life, like other European politicians, Italian political elites tended to support much looser integration than a federation.

Before proceeding with “Europeanism” in Italy it would be worth emphasizing that desecuritization of Italian domestic politics of the “First Republic” in terms of elimination of anti-Fascist constituents in Italy had successfully been accomplished in the aftermath of the WWII (Morgan, 2007, p. 216).¹¹⁷ In Italy there was no real mass political and social confrontation after the Fascist era; rather Italy’s major parties (DC, PSI, PCI and PRI) formed a coalition to continue their old anti-fascist wartime alliance and conduct national reforms and economic reconstruction (Laqueur, 1997, p.81). During the transition from post-war Allied control to full independence between the 1945 and 1948, Italy’s political establishment was preserved by the external forces (mainly the US during the 1948 elections against a communist threat). During those years, Italy promoted a policy that brought “non-committal neutralist equidistance between the Soviet East blocs and Western blocs and good relations with the both sides” (Rimanelli, 1997). However, with the American support and given Italy’s weaknesses and politico-economic crisis, the newly elected Prime Minister De Gasperi thought that they depend on “constant infusions of foreign economic aid” and was ready to reintegrate itself to the international community (Laqueur, 1997, p.81; Rimanelli, 1997, pp.696-698). While De Gasperi gave a strong support for the US, he was also standing calm towards Europe since he would never tolerate a Europe that could challenge the US protectorate. It is worth displaying that the states in Europe feared each other and their rearmament intentions just like Italy which did

¹¹⁷ Italy’s “liberation” was domestically completed with the killings of Fascists by the armed resistance that occurred in every country under German occupation.

not want to be overshadowed by France and Germany. But, on the other hand, Italy had to give a meaning to its European orientation. For Italy, “Europeanism” means a way to communalize Italy’s difficulties, to get raw materials, aids and subsidies for its undeveloped regions, to provide low-cost exports. For that reason, de Gasperi put forward a prominent purpose that is to balance the left-wing of his party which supported “European unity” against the Cold War rivalry. In particular the Left in Italy strongly believed that the “Europeanism” that would bring “prosperity and efficiency” would replace the national identity (Harper, 2000, p.102). Italian governments asserted a special enthusiasm for European integration “in the name of Europe” not “in the name of Italy” (McCarthy, 2000, p.364). For Italy, there was nothing to do but to surrender its security arrangements and the EC leadership to the big countries of Europe, France and Germany. On the other hand, France sometimes used Italy to struggle with and balance Germany, however, both saw Italy not as a security threat at all and did not ignore it in deciding the future of Europe (Harper, 2000, p.102).

During the Cold War, “Europeanism” was most materialized in Italian domestic political, social and economic environment. Politically “Europeanism” would provide the survival of the parties. Besides the support of the Christian Democrats, the Communist Party (PCI), in particular during the 1970s, in the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer adopted a new position towards Europe. In a sense, after its opposition, the Left would use “issue europea” as an instrument for its “legitimization”. The PCI changed its position and opted for its participation in the European Community and accepted NATO instead of the Soviet Communism.¹¹⁸ Other parties such as the Republicans, liberals, and social democrats all traditionally stayed connected to those who were favoring the European integration (Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli, 2005, pp. 74-75).

¹¹⁸ The period implies when the PCI started to reconcile with NATO, during the American involvement in Vietnam, and the right-wing dictatorships in Greece and Portugal arouse (See also for example, Putnam, 1978).

During the 1980s both Italian political elite and public opinion supported the pro-integrationist policy paradigm. Having become a pro-Europeanist party the Communist Party continued to support European integration and the country's active participation in it. From then on, Italy's political system including political elites and parties with a pro-European outlook, characterizes Italy's EU policy "that is, a policy shared by both the government and the opposition." Italy is one of the pro-European countries among 27 member states. However, Italian national political elites have been lacking of developing an effective strategy towards the EU this in return resulted in inadequacies of political institutions that would maintain the membership in the EU (Quaglia, 2007, 136).

As for Italy's security construction within European security, it can be claimed that Italy has been one of the most "Europeanist" members of the EU/European security complex in all aspects. Besides its Euro-Atlantic views, Italy has also built its security through the European integration mechanisms. On the other hand, Menotti (1997) makes a distinction between Italy's geostrategic and geoeconomic concerns that would respectively be provided through NATO and the EU that match each other and pursue coordinated policies within this balance (Menotti, 1997). However, this would be a very rigid classification in evaluating Italy's position in Europe by limiting it with economic aspects. In this section, rather than claiming that Italy has economically been bounded to the European complex, Italy's security structure will be examined in economic, political and institutional aspects backed by a number of examples. In addition, it would be noteworthy emphasizing that in this period, Italy had acted in pursuit of providing its economic, social and political security vis á vis other Member States of the Union and the Union itself. They were interpreted as attempts for creating a safer security arena among the European states.

Economically, it would not be erroneous to underline that Italy sought to benefit from the Common Market insufficiently. The EEC was a good frame for Italian industry that would shift Italian trade-balance positively. In this era, like other states (for example France) Italy had pursued policies in order to make its agriculture competitive in Europe. But its disadvantage in lacking adequate organizational structures of agricultural product

market sometimes pushed Italy to be a loser of the market. For example, upon France's insistence on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)¹¹⁹, Italy together with Germany and Netherlands defended the Community proposals that had to be agreed with. As a strong supporter of supranationalism and with weak agricultural financing mechanism Italy had always clashed with France (Gilbert, 2003, p.109). Italy's attitude towards the Union's monetary policies was not as warm as it was in the political and security issues. Its high inflation and low income rates pushed Italy not to comply with the European monetary policies. With the oil crisis of 1973¹²⁰, together with, Britain, Ireland and France, Italy left the system to loosen its monetary and exchange rate control and out of the intra-EC exchange rate fluctuations (that was envisioned by the "Snake in the Tunnel")¹²¹ (Zamagni, 1998, p.339; Kaltenthaler, 1998, p.45). In addition, its relatively weak industrial position of Italy also promoted a European regional policy (for the South Italian provisions) that would also make use of European Social Fund and Investment Banks to deal with the underemployment and migration problem (Bonvicini, 1987, p. 185).

Despite Italy's weak performance in economic issues within the Union, it showed a great enthusiasm in some of the political, institutional and social issues. Italy has always been a state which tried to balance France and Germany, in particular, France. This could be evidenced by two affairs: The first one is the rejection of De Gaulle's Fouchette Plan.¹²² The second one is the joining of Britain to the Union. Italy's reaction was in two cases "integrationist". In the former, Italy expressed its negative attitudes towards this project

¹¹⁹ During the 1960s, France under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle rejected the idea that the CAP would be funded through its resources. Instead, for de Gaulle it had to be financed by the Community Member States until 1970.

¹²⁰ Italy was hit by the oil crisis of 1975 which dropped its income rates by 3.6 percent.

¹²¹ European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1978 and Italy became a member in 1979. It was a system supporting "fixed and adjustable" exchange rates between the EC countries.

¹²² Fouchet Plan was first introduced in 1961 by France in Europe. It was formed by a study committee chaired by French Ambassador in Copenhagen Christian Fouchet in 1961 to discuss the principles and the structure of a new entity that would be a Union of states. This new structure would be based on "unanimity, constructive abstention and legal personality." The main objective of this Union would be to create a common security and defense policy to defend the European values at intergovernmental level. Second plan was proposed in 1962; however it was rejected by the other members of the Community considering that it would damage the supranational feature of the EU and Europe's Atlantic link (See also for example Hill and Smith, 2002, p.47).

because it discussed the foundations of the EU. This would not correspond to Italian politics and could provoke a break in the application of the Rome Treaty system in respect with the economic integration (Ferraris, 1996, p.152). The second case is about the membership of the UK that was rejected by France twice (1961 and 1967). Here, it would be appropriate to remind that Italy took a decision that would not be against the Union's proposal before the Union's definition of the problem related to the UK. Unlike France, Italy indicated that its entry is important for an integrated and reconstructed Europe (Ferraris, 1996, pp.157-158).

Italy had also displayed its intentions on the European integration in political and economical levels. For example in 1964 it developed a proposal for a political cooperation that would relaunch European integration. In that project, states would exchange information in every sector of foreign and security (Ferraris, 1996, p.161). In short, "Europeanism" for Italy would mean "modernization" within European integration (Perron and Ambrosius, 2004, p.185). Therefore, Italy's vision on the European integration and contribution to its deeper institutionalization would not be hard to predict. The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the Solemn Declaration was prominent here. The Plan proposed "transformation of political cooperation into a real common foreign policy and the extension of the sector's authority to security and cultural affairs and add political and economic aspects to security" (Bonvicini, 1987, p.185).¹²³ However, within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that was established in 1970, Italy put a weight on the Middle East issue with the Venice Declaration of 1980 in its presidency term. Such an attempt is also interpreted as Italy's foreign and security policy has been institutionalized within the framework of the EU while it angered its US ally (Andreatta and Hill, 1997, p.76).

¹²³ The French and British other governments stayed reluctant.

During the Cold War era, Italy tended to act in favor of the European integration in order to survive in a safer European security regime. Its position related to the deepening and enlargement issues in the Union vis á vis other states, in particular, France was positive and promising. However, Italy was relatively weak since it had no adequate economic, political and military capacity. However, with the end of the Cold War era, Italy has grabbed another chance to overcome the inadequacies and revise its traditional role as a “security consuming” country and put extra efforts to become a “security producing” country as well. For this reason, since the early 1990s, Italian governments have pursued a number of foreign and security policies primarily regionally through the EU and NATO, and globally through the UN (Croci, 2002, p.91).

3.1.4.2. “Europeanism” in the Post-Cold War Era

This section touches upon a number of central points pertaining to Italian “Europeanism”: First, the radical changes in international era have invoked the internal changes and they influence one another. In respect to the new era, it can be contended that Italian foreign and security policy represents continuity albeit the handovers of power between centre-left and centre-right governments since 1994. Lastly, Italy has acted as a security unit and played important roles in international stage. Such developments push Italy to be interlocked to the newly emerging European security complex

As mentioned in the previous section, European integration whether in terms of security or not has become an important fact of life. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Italy felt itself in the “forefront of the resolution of all the crises in Europe and in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf and in Asia” (Walston, 2007, p. 92). It was just as in the post-war era during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Italy had become vulnerable to the deep transformation in the international environment given its geopolitical status and the end of that confrontation between East and West. These facts actually increased Italy’s strategic value, while it was paradoxically confronted with the domestic upheaval (both socio-

economic and political). It had entered yet another era called “Second Republic” which denotes a large-size alteration in Italian party system. After political system collapsed in Italy and the “Tangentopoli”¹²⁴ case, the old party system including Christian Democrats and the Communists was replaced by a system revolving around center-right and center-left parties respectively led by Silvio Berlusconi¹²⁵ and Romano Prodi (and for a short time, Massimo D’Alema)¹²⁶ (McCarthy 2000, p. 368). The debate started with Berlusconi’s win of 1994 elections and continued throughout his victories of 2001 and 2008 whether he would stand against the European integration vis á vis the traditional US politics in Europe.¹²⁷ Del Sarto and Tocci (2009) argued the extent to which the two governments have different prioritizations along the Euro-Atlantic axis. Berlusconi in his terms went on with his European vocation despite the examples of Italy’s withdrawal from the Airbus association for the production of the military plane A400M; and the resignation of Italy’s

¹²⁴ The “Tangentopoli” (bribesville) scandals broke out in the early 1990s. It implies the “revealing of widespread political corruption”. This scandal culminated in the disappearance of Italy’s two main parties, namely Christian Democrats and Italian Socialist Party which previously received illegal donations from several businessmen. In return, the businessmen were favored to a degree tax breaks. The investigations of the scandal, labelled as “Mani Pulite” (Clean Hands) during 1992-1994 led to the bankruptcy and decline of the political system in Italy (See also for example Hanafin, 2007)

¹²⁵ Silvio Berlusconi is a businessman from Milan owning Fininvest corporation with its three TV networks, Europe’s one of the greatest soccer teams, AC Milan and a number of companies. He is so much renowned with his unusual temper in his relations with other European political leaders. His Nazi camp gaffe directed towards a German Socialist MEP caused almost a chaos taken to the European Union’s daily political agenda. However, such personal touches nether did make Italy excluded from the European circle nor led Italy be less European.

¹²⁶ Romano Prodi is an economics professor and former industrialist, a Catholic but advocates the state and Church affairs must be separated. Massimo D’Alema is a former Communist but accepted the globalized economy as an opportunity stressing on balancing monetary union programs to reduce unemployment.

¹²⁷ Beside Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, there are other rightist parties named the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale) and the Northern League (Lega Nord) which had been the main parties of the center-right coalition since 1994. Under economic and political uncertainties in particular during the 1980s, some extreme parties arose such as the Northern League established by Umberto Bossi in 1984 and National Alliance formed by Gianfranco Fini in 1995. The former party claimed that it tried to create a federalist and regional formation towards the over-centralized Italian state, constituting a “Republic of the North” named Padania. The Northern League was also supposed to replace the Christian Democrats. However, this party went much further and being nationalistic enough in standing doubtful even antagonistic against European integration until very recently. Although Berlusconi and Bossi have common references to Europe’s “Christian roots” and they have considerable differences over a range of issues such as ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, the accession of Turkey as a member in the EU. Berlusconi had a positive stance while Bossi seems more antagonistic. The later party that is also known as “racist”, “nationalist” They advocated “development of the EU beyond the purely economic and monetary dimension” as well as the “strengthening of the European pillar vis-à-vis the US” (See also for example Quaglia, 2003).

pro-European Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero. Italy tended to be quite determined to maintain its good relations with Europe. Even during the Iraqi crisis, Italy gave support to the US but it did not commit fighting troops (unlike Britain) and worked to restore its relations with France, Belgium and Germany. This was also seen in Berlusconi's parlance advocating a balanced politics between Europeanist and Atlanticist: "We are proud to be part of Europe. We are proud of the special relationship that we have with the United States." He has also supported European-wide solutions for the problems of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants (Croci, 2002, 95). He also makes religious and cultural references for a united Europe in his words: "Europe must revive on the basis of common Christian roots" (Guardian, 27 September, 2001). For Croci (2002, p.95) although the Right mainly led by the Berlusconi government¹²⁸ has had more problems in its relationships with the EU this does not mean that the Berlusconi government opposes to Europe or change Italy's role in Europe in any radical way. What is more, the first concrete steps of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union as sketched out in the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in early 1992 were taken in this period that started from 1994 and called as Italy's "Second Republic" (Ibid.).

Such a pro-European attitude was strongly reinforced by the two term Leftist (under the Ulivo coalition, 1996 and 2006) government and the Presidency of the European Commission (1999–2004) led by former Prime Minister Romano Prodi. His first term of 1996 fully coincided with Italy's transition period when Prodi desired to push Italy to enter the single currency (the European Monetary Union) (Missiroli, 2007, p.152; Fabbrini and Della Sala Cattaneo, 2003, p.41). In particular in his book entitled "Europe, as I See It" he emphasized the importance of the monetary Union "as a part of European integration which Italy cannot be independent from such stability and prosperity and all global instruments for the stability of the international system." He also explain the "priority of Italian policy towards the European integration" as "the monetary unification as a commitment." Prodi also linked Italy's economic growth as a product of European

¹²⁸ Some of them are ministers (as Eurosceptics) such as Defense Minister Martino and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti.

integration.”¹²⁹ His focus on “interdependency” exactly entails Italian foreign and security policy orientation as “transatlantic “and “European”. In the area of political and military security, Prodi sees the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an extension of Italian foreign and security policy since “national dimension is no longer sufficient” (Prodi, 2000, pp.55-57). However, during he Left government, Italian traditional ties with the US are to a great extent referred. The Left government era put an emphasis on its determination for “re-establishing Italy’s pro-European reputation and credentials” but without damaging its relationships with Washington (Missiroli, 2007, p.162).

Although Italy has some difficulties in economic terms, its contribution to European integration in terms of political and military security cannot be underestimated. In this period, Italy’s European vocation in political and military terms and how it disciplines itself in economic terms in European security complex will be examined. Italy has started to strengthen its capability to act and build its security articulations in every aspect on a security community, the EU.

It would be worth starting from the economic integration of Italy to the Union. In fact when the treaty was signed, Italy could not meet the three out of the four “convergence criteria” that member states had to accomplish in order to enter the final stage of European Monetary Union that was signed by the Maastricht Treaty. Due to the economic difficulties that Italy experienced during the 1970s it had undergone important institutional changes in macroeconomic policy-making (Sarcinelli, 1995). This institutional adaptation is also evaluated by Featherstone and Radaelli using the concept of “Europeanization” which was

¹²⁹ During the era of Prodi and his colleagues in particular after his presidency in the Commission and the April 2006 elections, Prodi’s discourse tended much pro-European as he argues: “... national and European interests are one single thing. It’s our conviction that Italy counts also in relations with the big allies only if it counts in Europe” (Foradori and Rosa, 2008, p.175). In his work, it was well portrayed that Italy and Europe have many things in common. Prodi puts a distinct emphasis on the European history mainly based on Italy. For him, Italy was born out of Europe (in particular after the Second War World), and Europe has still been formed out of its “past” which Italian political and cultural has a great impetus for the European integration. This is because Europe’s soul was originated on “the founding fathers and the present generation; the Italian contribution to European integration; the Christian tradition and the European ideal; and the current challenges to civilization.” Particular attention should be paid to the reference points to the relationship between the spirit of Europe and Christianity in terms of values in terms of the principals of equality and solidarity being composed of economic, political and social identities of Europe (Prodi, 2000, pp.40-46).

realized from the top-down, the EU-level. It means that Italy “strengthened its capability to reform and provides a framework for discipline and order from the EU.” They see the EMU as an “external tool for discipline”. The Italian political elite also created Europeanist discourse to find a legitimate ground to protect Europe. Italy’s efforts of the economic and political elites in implementing economic policies for stability in the late 1990s had been internalized by Italy and facilitated the economic adjustments to the convergence criteria (Quaglia, 2004, p.1105).

Politically and militarily, Italy is also well known with its strong commitments for the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) but unlike France, does never see the development as contradictory and alternative to NATO (Croci, 2002, p.91). In this context, Italy found itself in the middle of power politics among European “big states”, France, Germany and Britain and two other external powers, the US and Russia. Its early exclusion from Franco-German Brigade” and the Eurocorps initiatives, and from the Contact Group that was established during the Balkan wars of 1990s pushed Italy to rethink its political and military policies in the European complex. Its first step was worth noting: The Anglo-Italo proposal of late 1991 aimed at creating a link between WEU and NATO. Therefore, the WEU would be a concrete defense pillar of the EU (Andreatta and Hill, 1997, p.76). Italy also took a number of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War environment within ESDP. Italy with its 20,000 (about 20 percent of the total) men and contributions as weaponry and equipment Italy has participated in the civilian Headline Goal launched by the Union in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 (Missiroli, 2007).

Italy played the major role in leading two important operations as the Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 and the United Nations Implementation Force in Lebanon Force (UNIFIL II). The first operation contains European “coalition of the willing” whereby Italy has a leading role with a delegated task from Europe and the US (Missiroli, 2007, pp.164-165; Silvestri, 1997). This would be also considered as a precedent for the subsequent ESDP missions. Similarly, Italy had led a new operation when the conflict was

intensified between Israel and Hezbollah militias in Southern Lebanon (Missiroli, 2007, p.164-165).

In addition, at political level, in the Future of “Europe Process”, Italy was holding the Presidency of the European Council in 2003. Italy was the host of the International Conference (IGC) on the work for the new European Treaty and the European Convention. The process coincided with the era of Prodi who played an important “external” role in the Convention debate as the European Commission President (Scott and Caffarelli, 2004, pp.41-43). Italy was the first major founding Members States of the EU that ratified the Constitutional Treaty.¹³⁰ Italy was also ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 31 July 2008 (International Herald Tribune, 31 July 2008).

In conclusion, this section implies how Italy is embedded in developing European security structures that was totally evaluated as a “security community”. Italy like other Member States of the EU has faced a number of regional problems and thus was delegated to handle them individually but in the framework of European Union. The construction of security is an ongoing and mutual process whereby both the state and the society operate, through securitizations of the same issues and practices.

¹³⁰According to articles 72 and 80 in the Italian Constitution, a majority of the members of the each of the Chambers of Parliament (Chamber of Representatives and the Senate) is required to be ratified. The Chamber of Representatives approved the Constitution on 25 January 2005 by 436 votes “in favour” versus 28 votes “against” and 5 abstentions. The opposing votes came from the Northern League and Communist group, the most of the members of the Italian Communist Party (PdCI). On 6 April 2005 in the Senate voted in favor of the European Treaty 217 in favor versus 16 “against” (See also for example Deloy, n.d.). The Lisbon Treaty was ratified by 286 votes “in favor” in Senato and by 551 votes (the number of total votes) in Camera.

3.2. Italy's Power/Role Conceptualization.

Buzan and Waever (2003, p.22) claimed that the RSCs have evolved with regard to security structures that are also based on polarity spectrum at regional level. Even if the region is centered, Buzan and Waever argue that there may be regional powers that became prominent in the absence of bipolar system. Here, the idea of polarity is used to define a state in a regional system through observation of practical mode of operation of states in terms of behavioral patterns. In this part, Italy's security identity is examined through definition of its power in relation to "role conception". "Role" is here used as "characteristic patterns of behaviors given a certain position or situation. Santoro (1991, pp.72-73) also distinguishes the position in terms of "rango" (rank, status) and "ruolo" (role). The former is a variable that is resulted from the functions performed and specific weight in terms of military, political and economic power which a national actor exercises and then benefits from. The latter is obtained from formal recognition which international society attributes to national actors, their effective functions developed from its weight in terms of attributions and capacity. In this study we will use "role conception" to understand the state's security identity (through national security discourses and practices) vis á vis European security identity. Security identity is used here as the EU as a security community has created a common identity that also influences national security identity. The English school assumes that the regional system as a society of independent political communities as in the case of the EU, we will evaluate Italy's position vis á vis the states (be they great powers or regional powers) and the society that was formed by states. In addition, the role of Italy, in fact, from its unification thus far, has more often been interpreted in terms of and therefore measured by its internal political system, parties, personal policies more than its power among industrialized European nations or its world-ranking (weight) which does not contain effective policies. Therefore, the central point is always "whether the foreign and security policy is moved within the constraints of the international political system or be guided by domestic concerns" (Santoro, 1991, p.73). It means that sometimes a country's foreign and security policy indicator might be the political elites. So, it can be linked to the internal considerations of Italian policy which would be touched upon here.

However, in this study, we would combine both internal and external considerations and two factors which are “weight” and “role, in order to explore Italy’s power status and how it exercises its capacities (Verbeek 2009, pp.6-8).

Before focusing on Italy’s power and role a number of assumptions must be put: First, there may be confusion on Italy’s status whether it is analyzed at regional or international level. The analysis will be at regional level; however the definition on power also overlaps states’ power status at international level as in the cases of Britain, France and Germany. These three states are attributed to great powers and regional powers. They are great power because they have appropriate levels of capability to act at international level and can act as interplay between global and regional levels. They are regional powers because they are the most active and leading states in the region. When acting with/within the EU, they form one of the poles of the polarity spectrum. For Italy such an explanation complicates the analysis since Italy’s power is not mentioned together with the EU. In this study, Italy’s continuing “middle power” status will be examined. Second, since the concept of “power” builds its references on the neorealist pillar of the RSCT, we will use “role conception” or “behavioral patterns” as well.

3.2.1. Italy as a “Middle-Power”

Although Buzan states that “middle power” is identified in a Cold War polarity spectrum, we use this type of “power” for Italy as it was in the Cold War era. The most reason is that the “middle power” status cannot find an appropriate definition in empirical terms. Buzan (2004, p.71) assumes that “regional powers” have much more importance than middle powers with the emergence of more autonomic regions in the new era. Therefore, Buzan transfers the roles attributed from “middle power” to “great power” which play an international role (as well as regional roles) beyond their home regions and “regional power” which has appropriate capacity to influence the regional politics. However, such a definition is much more related to the international system. At regional

level, if France, Germany and the UK are holding the status of “great power” and “regional power”.¹³¹ Italy’s place remains unknown in this theory. Italy has commonly been attributed to “middle power”, “medium-sized” power or a country with “low profile” in international and regional arena (Verbeek, 2009, p.6).¹³² It was rather characterized as a “middle power” only after Italy had become one of the loyal allies of the US within NATO and of the founding states of the EU; and then changed its profile from defeated country to the aligning country to the great powers from the early Cold War years. However, it is still lacking a clear identification of its power status. In this section we will use the same status definition for Italy since general characterizations for “middle power” still well corresponds to those of Italy.

In coincidence with Santoro’s views (1991, p.21) on making of foreign and security policy, the “power” status is produced by constant (invariable) character and dynamic (variable).¹³³ It means that one should bear in mind that a state has some natural characteristics such as geography, traditional history, long period of economic and technological structure, and in particular political culture and others in this section, in order to analyze Italy’s middle power. Second, for the invariable character one may refer to what Neack (1995, p.225) defines the characteristics of middle power in terms of its “peacekeeper roles and backing of multilateral international organizations.” Pearson (1966, p.204) also assumes middle powers as “mediators”. Therefore it is appropriate to define “middle power” as “mediator (as facilitator), peacekeeper and a loyal member of international organizations” even during the post-Cold War era.

The first factor is Italy’s geopolitical location. Until 1860 Italy was not broadly termed as a nation but a state or a geographical entity. Smith (1997, pp.3-4) It was mainly due to its geography, Smith (Ibid.) highlights that the country was exposed to the foreign

¹³¹ The power status of three states was assessed in the first chapter.

¹³² Although Italy between 1911 and 1943 was in pursuit of possessing a great power status it could not be identified as such among other states in Europe.

¹³³ We have to note that “different countries may enjoy different statuses (both self-perceived and ascribed) in different issue areas. The Netherlands, for instance, being one UNDP’s largest donors makes it at the very least a middle power in the issue area of multilateral developing assistance.”

intervention and exploitation and left the country fragmented for centuries.¹³⁴ Therefore, Italy is defined as a “natural link and therefore an important point of contact (and conflict) between Europe and the Balkans” (Santoro, 1991, p.570 in Perlmutter, 1998, p.204).

Second, historically, the foreign and security policy issues are subjected to military power, and in this respect, the post-Cold War Italian foreign and security policy traced back to its defeat in the Second World War. Such a defeat dragged Italy into political, military diplomatic consequences that have undergone transformation and have characterized between the axis of Mediterraneanism, Atlanticism, Europeanism and sometimes taken as “renationalization” within the conflict formation of European continent. Before putting Italy’s roles, it would be appropriate to emphasize Italy’s position during the early years of the Cold War in order to comprehend the power and polarity structuring of the era. As Waltz (cited in Roussenu, 2006, p.18) analyzes “actions of states” in international environment within the Cold War’s systemic constraints on the state behavior, states may try different alternatives including balancing against threats, bandwagoning and pursuing neutrality.¹³⁵ Italy’s traditional bandwagoning strategy was derived from the fact that it feels itself as a weak country; “a clear inferiority complex” formed the standard operational assumption of Italian foreign policy makers. Italy did not hesitate to align with powers (relatively the great powers), rather than balancing the emerging hegemon with the powers (Brighi, 2006, p.288).¹³⁶

As for the “role”, Italy’s political acts can surely be explained with “middle power” characteristics vis á vis Europe that are also described by Labanca (2001, p. 69) as: “Italy is in the embarrassing condition not only of being thought of as the least of the great European powers or the first of the small powers.” However, this makes Italy to be reliable mediator or facilitator in regional arena. It has some advantages in maintaining good

¹³⁴ The country was much often divided between the outsiders in history.

¹³⁵ For Ikenberry (2001, p.10), “the postwar order mainly centered on the capacities of states to develop institutional mechanisms to restrain power and establish binding commitments - capacities that stem from the political character of states ...”

¹³⁶ This largely corresponds to Waltz’s thinking that this strategy is pursued “when states feel themselves weak” (See also for example Roussenu, 2006, p.18).

relations with the great majority of the Mediterranean countries (due to its short term colonial past and are now its need for supply of oil and gas). This also stems from the fact that it has a strong loyalty to traditional European vocation, not having purely national interests and ambitions in the regions (Labanca, 2001, p.75).

Italy principally has a foreign and security policy notion of multilateralism. As Roussenu (2006, p.20) stated, Italy's participation in international institutions has endorsed the development of numerous links with the Western world that would never isolate the country politically from the community of democratic countries. When we think that Italian new liberal regime adopted by the Christian Democrats, it would be clearly explained that Italy's aim to align with the similar states as a result of interaction with the American and European leaders (Carli, 1993 cited in Fois and Pagani, 2008, p.77).

As a result, Italy had chosen external balancing instead of rearming that constitutes an internal policy like France. When compared to Germany in terms of vulnerability of its geopolitical position, Italy had always been stayed in free-riding position in terms of military preparedness. It also knew the fact that bipolar systems and regimes are characterized by the "centralized nature of security arrangements and by static alignments and integrative institutions" (Andreatta, 2001, p.49). It maintained its relations through such settings in the Cold War years.

However, in the post-Cold War with the changing security environment and in the absence of a bipolar conflict separates the link between global and local equilibrium, multipolar systems tend to produce fragmented security arrangements, organized around various regional subsystems. Since threats and responses to them are no longer global in their implications, outside powers can afford to ignore distant conflicts that do not threaten their interests directly. These general transformations of the international system have had a specific effect on Italy. In particular, the fragmentation of global security arrangements has left Italy more vulnerable than it was during the Cold War, due to its geostrategic proximity

to the Middle East and the Balkans, two of the most unstable regions in the world (Ibid., pp.51-53).

In analyzing the power status, one may refer to a number of characteristics that are clearly unveiled: First, Italy has more often been identified that it “had relatively high aspirations with less capabilities.” But it does not mean that Italy has no potentials in foreign and security foreign policy. It wanted to be among the great powers of Europe, namely France, Germany and Britain and not to be excluded from the main decision-making processes. This issue will be studied in the following section related to the “directoire”. However, such exclusion led Italy to develop its status at least at the middle power status. Second, in particular, at regional level, it pursued a more alternating policy in particular with the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and a common European defense. For example, Italy sometimes has had some concerns about “spending much lower proportion of their GDP in European defense than Western states.” Due to the lack of military capacity and the political criticism from the Communist side its pacifism cannot be explained by its “tactical choice” but “an assertion of identity” that is closely linked to domestic policy concerns (Andreatta and Hill, 1997, p.75). Italian willingness and capability to deal with European matters might be analyzed with its internal characteristics: With the end of the Cold War, Italy had been suffering from the crisis that was a transitional system of the parties and the crisis triggered by the anti-corruption campaign for that reason in the previous years of the Yugoslavian war it could not give adequate importance to the conflict.

Secondly, Italy’s status in terms of foreign and defense policy evolved through the identity symbolizing the political elites from the center-left and center-right groups; in this framework, though, in terms of the country’s international position, the Atlantic and European dimensions have always been -along with the Mediterranean- the main spheres of its foreign and security policy (Missiroli, 2007, p.151).

Third, the conflicts in the Balkans where Italian bases were used by NATO, Italy's exclusion from the Contact Group diplomacy in the former Yugoslavia all prompted Italy to play a more active and assertive role in those regions. Besides these regional and ethnic conflicts, illegal immigration and organized crime and terrorism which "put stability and security at risk" in the Mediterranean changed Italy's situation in international and regional environment. In that respect, Italy's role has been transformed from a "security consumer" to a "security provider" and as Santoro argues that "Italy is finally claiming its middle power." For Perlmutter (1998, p.204) this was well evidenced by the Albanian issue in 1997 where Italy played its mediator, peacekeeper and facilitator role at the same time. This case is important since the lack of international and regional engagement (Andreatta, 2001, p.54).¹³⁷ A medium-sized power in history for the first time led a military operation. Perlmutter (1998) analyzes this intervention "in terms of a politics of proximity" based on the historical and political relations between the countries involved. Italy, in loose regional system, had the opportunity to act as "logical interlocutor between Europe and the Middle East and between Europe and East Africa."

In addition, Italy's mediating role in a policy both pro-Arab and pro-Israeli or Atlanticist policies are also the indicator of its being "middle power" status. For example, Italy has never given up its balancing policies even during the US-Libya tensions, the US bombing campaign of Libya. Italy did no longer allow any isolation within the region and kept its traditional multilateral diplomacy to act more actively in order handle the regional instability. Italy has also involved in every activities of those organizations, in order to advance Italian interests and to strengthen its institutional position.

¹³⁷ The European Union and NATO were similarly reluctant to discuss the possibility of a multilateral intervention in Albania.

3.2.2. Italy as a “Sea Power”

Traditionally, the concept “Sea Power” that was first formulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 19th century implied “a navy superior to those of its enemies” and “the strategic bases, and capabilities, strategies equipped for supplying fleet for battle offering refuge defeat” (Stevens, 2009, p.380). However, “sea power” does not mean military power at sea and there is no ship-to-ship battle, no all-out of war, no desire of control in the seas. Moreover, in contemporary world, it describes an actor’s ability to defend its interests in every sector of security -military, political and economical-environmental and societal- such as regional conflicts, terrorism and natural disasters (US Maritime Strategy, 2007). In particular after the September 11 attacks, military operations in the Mediterranean Sea have become prominent. Nations are acting not individually but collectively conducting operations through integrated maritime operations like formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In his work entitled “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,” published in 1890, Mahan emphasized the six conditions required for a nation to have sea power: 1. Geographical position 2. Seaboard 3. Extent of territory 4. Population 5. National character (having tendency to commerce) 6. Character of government. These can be debatable for every nation mostly that has coastlines in Europe. For example as Mahan indicates in the 19th century, Italy has an advantage of geographical position; however it failed to control the Mediterranean since most of the island are in possession of other great powers such as Britain. However, with regard to the changing security environment over decades, “possession” has become less vital element of the sea operations. Rather, Italy as a member of the EU has pursued more cooperative operations meeting the above mentioned conditions.

In this regard, with an aim to contemplate Italy’s one of the characteristics in the region Italy’s views, strategies and abilities will be examined.

In particular after the WWII, Italian power status remained in “low profile”, generally speaking in foreign, security and defense matters. However, given its

geographical, historical and political characteristics, Italy has had a certain degree of military operational instruments. Certainly it would be meaningless to claim that Italy is a military power in the region, in particular, in the political context of new Italy that recovered from the war and therefore of reconstitution of the Armed Forces that became a delicate and complex issue (Santoro, 1991, p.279). Although the war did not destroy the Italian Navy, Italy was devastated by the consequences of the war. Having a vision of “acting nationally, focusing regionally, envisioning globally” Italy has still been restructuring itself in terms of as a naval actor or even power in security terms ranging from trade to military, from societal to political issues (La Visione Strategica, 2008).

Salerno (2000, pp.196-197) argues that Italy makes a difference in the Mediterranean with its naval strategy in comparison with France whereby he argues that: “French naval strategy and foreign policy perceives the Mediterranean as a theater to pursue a global and independent power whereas Italian strategy aims at ensuring Italy’s status as an influential interdependent power.” One may find the clues of Italian “balancing and interdependent-based strategy” in the century from 1848 to 1945 when the impact of foreign and naval strategy played a major role in shaping Italy’s emerging international image as a “power status” in the region.

In addition, “connection to the Continent to the Mediterranean basin kept it politically fragmented and exposed to ant exploitation from the other European powers.” From its unification up to date Italy’s domestic political and economic problems were never overcome and all reduced Italian capability. Rimanelli (1997, p.966) argues that

[t]hese liabilities also curtailed Italy’s diplomacy and especially its military power, which never became strong enough to sustain a comprehensive, autonomous strategic posture for regional influence and aggressive aggrandizement through force, or even at times the necessary muscle to sustain the country’s foreign policy.

Historically, Italy with its late industrial development and weaknesses and inefficiencies in its governments reflecting on its foreign and security policy and naval strategy, all depended on “careful diplomatic alliances and alignment as well as balancing

powers to maximize its weak military and economic resources.” Ever since its unification, Italy has always feared that its exposure to the sea can attract more threats to the continent.” Such a fear was “an enemy- Great Power - invasion” before the Cold War whereas it was a total of instabilities, risks and threats including migration, organized crime and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Rimanelli, 1997, pp.966-971).

With the beginning of the Cold War years, it would be fair to say that Italy as defeated country was not seeking a “great power” status anymore in the region whereas France was rather in pursuit of a global power and a more independent military policy under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. He went further by identifying the French Navy as the core and withdrew it from the Alliance’s military integrated system (Salerno, 2000, p.203). Italy’s balancing policy still continued in this era in the name of “neo-atlanticismo” that would be to improve the relations with the Arab world and be consistent assets for the US (Ibid., pp.205-206).

With the changing security conditions in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the 1970s and 1980s - the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Algerian-Moroccan conflict, Lebanese Civil War - Italy has begun to define its priorities, prospects and the orientations of the Navy (Ibid., p.206). For Italians, there had to be three types of Navy mission: 1) defense of the North and East (Mission 1) 2) defense of the South/Mediterranean (Mission 2) 3) emergency security operations (Mission 5). The defense of the North-East was carried out by NATO’s advanced forces. The Mediterranean was secured by the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy and the Italian Navy. Third is about “emergency security operations” to deter, to assist in the crisis situation or low intensity conflicts. It is kind of Rapid Deployment Forces that are composed of French, Spanish, US and Italian forces. In the Gulf War the forces had become operational (Santoro, 1991, pp.293-296). As a consequence of the regional conflicts in the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia, the changing view of the Atlantic Alliance of the Mediterranean prompted Europe’s role in maintaining regional security. Here, the focus shifted from “global security” to “regional security”; in the former the US was safeguarding the region whereas in the post-Cold War, the safeguarding task

was granted mostly to the Mediterranean countries. In keeping with this fact, in 1995 the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) was established by Italy, France and Spain (Lertora, 2008).

Italy has actually been involved at the front in every European initiative aimed at building bridges between Europe and non European Mediterranean (La Visione Strategica, 2008). In its report for “Strategic Vision” of defense of marine, the strategic formula was stated as: “acting nationally, focusing regionally, envisioning globally” stemming from the consideration that, in the evolutionary modern scenes, the engagement is much more focused on regional level, with a common sensibility and shared objective that constitutes the crucial element in order to project ‘the national action’ in ‘total perspective’.” In the report, Italy’s contribution to the “Euro-Mediterranean” is emphasized in detail. With respect to Mahan’s conditions, Italy perceives itself as a

middle regional marine power with 8.000 km of coast with total aspirations for a contribution of the cluster marine of the 2,7% to the national GNP, the 14 world-wide mercantile fleet, a crucial dependency on the transport via sea and one important role carried out within the international community .

It means that Italy is focusing on national interests in the Mediterranean area in cooperation with the countries through international and regional organizations in the region (La Visione Strategica, 2008, p.5). Italy’s focus on first national action and second regional vision can be clearly observed.

Italy like other states chooses to take action in respect with the security understandings of the EU in the Mediterranean region ranging from a variety of issues including military, societal, economic and political issues. In this framework, Italy has also a critical role in the Mediterranean basin representing only 1% of the marine surface of earth and the dynamics of the economy and the world-wide trade and economic security. With 25 coastal countries in three various continents and more than 80 ports, the Mediterranean region is characterized for the passage, as a means of ships and oil pipelines, of an amount of oil and gas (which meets 65% of the annual requirements of the

European Union and 20% of the oil trade on a worldwide basis). In the Mediterranean region, the marine emergency also is closely tied to the ability to Countries and institutions to coordinate their own strategies in order to enforce the law of sea in the coastal zones. In that sense, the Navy and the Coastguard in Italy and other states collaborate in such sense with the EU, the Atlantic Alliance and all the marine forces cooperating also through the means of common policies for emergency with the contribution of the FRONTEX and the under NATO in the marine surveillance and the fight with the international terrorism and illegal immigration (La Visione Strategica, 2008, p.7).

3.2.3. Italy's Power vis á vis the "Directoire"

As put in the previous section, Italy, as a middle power, has a tendency to support multilateral settings in security issues, in particular in the European Foreign, Security and Defense Policy. Italy is unlike France which proposes a European armed force, or Britain, which favors NATO, Italy prefers a more multilateral setting where NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations would be more flexible for example "ad hoc" coalitions. Therefore, Italy may act more flexible within these institutions (Andreatta, 2001).

For example, while Italy has favored deepening of the EU, as institutionalization, it supported the EU enlargement throughout the Mediterranean countries for Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey. The country has firmly pursued its traditional policies for further integration especially in the foreign policy and security fields (Andreatta, 2001, p.56).

However, Italy had been excluded from some multilateral settings such as the Contact Group of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the US (Bonvicini, 1996). In particular, since then, Italy had have some concerns about being excluded from EuroCorps Initiative, the Franco-German Brigade, the Franco-British, German "directoire" or "big three" (Ibid., p.75). Smith (2006, pp.45-46) argues this situation as a "tension between collective action and exclusion European action" between the EU3 and other medium-sized

and small Member States of the EU. Besides Italy, Poland and Spain have suspicions for such a formation. This is due to the fact that these three big states have desired to have a status given their global deployment and engagement and their institutional assets and military capacities (Ibid.).

In return, as put in the previous section, Italy had chosen to align itself to the EU, on one side and to the US on the other. However, in face of European vocation of “directoire” in its relations with the European powers, Italy pursued to balance the European great powers through its “balancing power” the US and NATO. The Italian political elites like other states firmly rejected such formation. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who was giving a talk in the Italian parliament, stated that “they are against the idea of a "directoire" running the EU.” He further asserted that “there cannot be a directoire, there cannot be a divisive nucleus which would run the risk of posing a threat to European integration" (Ford, 2004). Italy has been and remains a supporter of ESDP; however, it has been slightly less enthusiastic than the three largest EU members, in part because it fears that those members would constitute a directory, leaving Italy with less influence than it would prefer. Italy’s solution has been scrupulously to maintain a balanced policy between NATO and the EU’s ESDP, while arguing that ESDP is the best path for strengthening NATO (Andreatta, 2001, p.71). However, Waltson (2009, pp.131-132) argues that Italy’s fear stems from the fact that “it would be the first of the small countries instead of the last of the big ones in Europe.” It was clear in Achille Albonetti’s¹³⁸ words in his article published in *Journal of Foreign Affairs, Affari Esteri*, “we must be very careful in order not to be cut off from the beginning of a European directoire. Italy would be a part of that so called vanguard¹³⁹ countries.” Italian leadership in the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon of 2006 is one of the initiatives for a request to be included in “directoire” (Ibid.).

¹³⁸ The former senior European civil servant and Director of the National Committee for Nuclear Energy

¹³⁹ The word “vanguard” is used first by Romano Prodi to attribute Italy an important role.

As a fact, Italy is firmly committed to European continent. For Italy, Germany is the most prominent country, specifically in economic matters and totally integrated into Europe. It has also maintained good relations with Spain and the UK. However, Italy's relations with France since the signing of French-German Friendship Treaty in 1963 and the acceptance of the proposal for Eurocorps,¹⁴⁰ Italy has been much alarmed by the developments between two. On the other hand, more importantly, Italy's concerns about the so-called "directoire" would also split the ESDP from NATO which Italy has strong ties with together with the US (Houben, 2005, p.208). To balance the European great powers Italy has proposed a number of guidelines for the ESDP. In October 1991, it has also joined Britain to propose an establishment and development of multinational troops¹⁴¹ to in the framework of the WEU and NATO. However, such an idea could not realize due to the Franco-German rejection on such a "stronger link" between the WEU and NATO (Bono, 2003, p.45). Despite the failure, this approach created a link between the WEU and NATO (Andreatta, 2001, p.75). Italy has always been somewhere between the UK one the one side and Germany and France on the other.

Against such a minilateralism within the EU, Italy has pursued its balancing role between NATO and the EU; in other words, played a mediating role between Washington and European capitals (Sedgwick, 2005, p.100). It was clearly evident during the Iraqi crisis in 2003 when Berlusconi aimed at "reconstructing the unity of Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance"; however could not succeed in preventing the split within these two entities (Croci, 2004, p.107). Instead of making the powerful states to push agreement with each others, Italy has held a considerable position to mediate politically in Albania or Lebanon and Libya. Similarly, even if Italy is not part of the "directoire", which is negotiating with Iran related to nuclear issues, Italy stayed "very firm on Iran of the US,

¹⁴⁰ The Eurocorps was formally proposed in 1992 in order to make the WEU the EU's defense arm that would serve as a new European army. It had three main tasks "to join and assist NATO missions; to implement missions under WEU command; and to provide humanitarian assistance." For further details see Solsten, 1996. Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, France and Germany are the "framework nations." Turkey, Austria, Greece, Poland, Romania, USA and Italy would contribute to the operations too. Eurocorps cannot be interpreted as a threat for NATO since Germany, in particular, remained very loyal to NATO.

¹⁴¹ These troops would be deployed only in "out-of-areas" and remain autonomous from the EU. Denmark, Portugal and Spain gave support to this idea while France and Germany did not accept such a formation.

France, Germany and the UK.” Italy offered being a “facilitator” in reconstructing dialogue between the US and Iran (Dinmore, 2008). In spite of the weaknesses in Iran issue, it would be appropriate to underline that Italy’s international profile has been raised considerably since the UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon (Walston, 2007, p.91).

Given Italy’s middle-power status, Italy’s “ranking” or “role” is located not among the so-called “directoire”, namely France, Germany and the UK. As a fact, its ranking displays that Italy has had a medium sized material capability and had preferred to be impartial in many conflicts just as in the Lebanon case. This makes it possible that it is not risky in management of the conflict for Italy which has a particular ability to avoid from direct involvement in conflicts, having a considerable autonomy from the major powers (Cox and Sinclair, 1996, p.242).

3.3. Italy in the Euro-Mediterranean Security

This section examines the second pillar of the third Chapter that is Italy’s securitizations and security practices related to the Euro-Mediterranean security. The previous sections of this Chapter have given a full understanding of Italy’s security identity which formed over decades in a regional security complex. Those sections remain descriptive since they are assumed as more “structural” and “given” vis á vis this section. Italy’s securitization of the Mediterranean within the EU/Europe security complex entirely represents and is based on the “constructivist” elements of the Regional Security Approach Theory. For that reason, the issues in the Mediterranean will be examined in two parts: The first one is Italy’s security concerns implying security discourses. The other one is Italy’s security practices in the region. Both security discourses and security practices will be analyzed at three levels: national, European and Regional Security Complex. In the first level, given Italy as referent object, Italy’s national perceptions including discourses will be examined. In the second level, Italy’s European vocation in the security issues will take place. This is important in displaying how Italy performs as a part of European security

identity. An assessment of the connectedness and interdependencies of state and society, Italy and EU/Europe is made in the third level. Before a brief background section will take place in order to understand the issue briefly.

3.3.1. Major Security Issues in the “Euro-Mediterranean”: Background

3.3.1.1. Migration and Related Issues

It was mentioned that the Mediterranean Sea has become a human movement unit in particular between the two shores. King (2001, p.1) also contends that the Mediterranean as a migration area which leads to new cultural intersection in developed countries of southern Europe, namely Italy, France, Spain, Portugal. Italy has definitely been shifted from emigrant to immigrant country in particular since the late 1980s.

Italy was fundamentally an emigrant country between 1945 and the late 1960s. They could easily obtain equal employment rights to those of indigenous workers in the immigrant countries such as France, Germany and the Benelux countries. In Europe, Italian migrant unskilled workers considerably contributed to the economic and industrial development of the European economy (Daly, 2001, p.187).

It was during the Cold War; Italy was always mainly a transit country for refugees and like Austria and Yugoslavia considered to be a country of first safe heaven for refugees from the Eastern bloc (Ibid.).¹⁴² For example, due to the close territorial link between Italy and Tunisia, Tunisian migrants used Italy as a bridge to move to France, Germany and other European countries (Ibid., p.189).

¹⁴² A number of countries like the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand then embraced these refugees

However the intensity and quantity of migration dramatically changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the 1980s and especially after the Cold War era, Italy almost transformed from a country of emigrants to a receiver of immigrants in particular from the Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Phillipines. Today, immigration has become a main challenge to Italy given the fact that its southern border is exposed to undocumented immigrants. Thus the conflict-torn regions including regional conflicts and political, economic and social impoverishment pushed people to seek work and good living standard and asylum in Italy and other countries. They are also called “boat people” which initially came as asylum seekers from Albania and the Mediterranean, and repatriated even if their application for asylum did not accepted (Caritas, 1996, p.122).¹⁴³

Within the Mediterranean context, Italy can be seen as a “soft underbelly” of Fortress Europe, being a popular entry, transit route and point and destination for North African migrants waiting for the entrance to the European Union (Daly, 2001, p.189). Many migrants from the North Africa crossed the Mediterranean Sea, reach and use the southern France, Spain and Italy, as transit routes to their final destinations in the major industrial cities of northern Europe. Italy is largely known as a country where immigration control mechanisms were not yet developed and the borders were more open (King, 2001, pp. 4-5).

¹⁴³ Only 25per cent of Albanian application have been accepted

3.3.1.2. Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism

When compared to other security issues in Europe, in particular since the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean region has remained relatively silent whereas there were troubles in the Balkans. However, in particular with the events of September 11 in 2001 Europe has also become alerted against terrorist attacks which were also seen in London, Madrid and Istanbul in the European “homeland”. Since then Europe has much focused on the threat of terrorism and the measures for it. In the European context, as a former sufferer from terrorism Italy has also put all its energy on this issue and taken a wide variety of measures.

Terrorism has become a “nationwide problem” and a “permanent phenomenon” in Italy since the late 1950s. Terror in Italy was composed of threats from both left and right and also ethnic nationalist terrorists (Engene, 2004, p.134). The Right was made up of old fashioned gangs of fascists and professional terrorists who were bombing buildings, streets and railroads. On the other hand, the Left was shaped in September 1969 and included a number of dissidents of Catholics and Communists of the left. Their aim was to support the struggle for workers’ rights. Its most organized clandestine group was named “Red Brigades” that was established in 1970s and attacked against the infrastructure of the capitalist enemy such as the factories. The Red Brigades had also links to the Mafia which is a criminal underground organization and terrorist elements outside Italy (Spotts and Wieser, 1986, p.182).

Italy’s struggle with world wide terrorism has launched with the events of September 11 against the USA. The difference between the Al Qaeda and the Red Brigade is that the former is religious, suicidal and targets mass killings with weapons of mass destructions. However, Gardner (2005, p.307) argues that two have common elements: “totalitarian philosophy, a utopian goal, and determination to destroy the Western liberal values.” It was known that in Europe there had been many terrorist cells or networks that were settled as family organizations and carried out, planned or attempted terrorist attacks.

In Italy, Tunisians and Algerians organized for the terrorist organization (Martin, 2006, pp.276-277).

3.3.1.3. Military Issues and Related Threats

In Italian foreign and security policy, both perceptions and practices do not imply “discontinuity” regarding the national interest with a geopolitical approach. In fact, for many decades, particularly during the Cold War era, it was hard to define “Italian national interest”. Italian security policy is sometimes articulated as “it does not exist” (Houben, 2002, p.206). Its security policy was actually constraint by first its front-line posture (which was struggling against a common enemy); second its internal division that is invoked by the Christian Democrats (supporting the West) and Socialists (supporting the East); or its loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance.

Creмасco (1988, p.195) on the other hand, speaking specifically for the Cold War years, contends that “Italy, because of its geographic location, military commitments in NATO, and political and economic relations with the African nations, is ‘by necessity’ a Mediterranean country.” Creмасco (Ibid.,p.195) defines its role in terms of its commitments which include

advanced defense of the northeastern border in coordination with NATO’s central European forces, protection of mercantile traffic, control of maritime areas of interest, support of allied naval forces and participation in NATO’s aeronaval operations in the Mediterranean, integration of the Italian national air defense system with that of the Alliance for the defense of the Southern Flank, and participation in NATO’s nuclear and conventional counterair and interdiction campaigns.

In the changing security environment Italy perceived “an important change in its international position: it is a country that is less essential in terms of its traditional alliance duties, but at the same time even more ‘front-line in its position than before’ ” (Bonvicini, 1996, p.96). Such an argument is valid in the first years of the Cold War since Italy is now exposed to new challenges. Houben (2005, p.212) also argues that the new security

circumstances forced medium-sized powers to carry a further burden in international/regional security and stability. Italy has also become more engaged in these conditions. Such engagement is here interpreted as being active, even pro-active in international or/and regional crisis management activities. From then on, Italy has changed from being a “secondary role in the Cold War, as a Southern Flank of NATO, and delivery logistic support” to being a leading actor in several peacekeeping operations.

In this section, Italy’s military commitments in the Mediterranean region are framed with regional and ethnic conflicts around the region which includes countries that border the Mediterranean Sea. Such a definition also covers the Balkan region, specifically Albania even if the theme of this thesis is not directly relevant. The Albanian case is essential for emphasizing the Italian role and commitment to the European continent. For that reason, we will focus on two specific cases: the Operation of ALBA of 1997 and the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon of 2006.

In Albania, “the transition to a market economy had resulted in a rapid process of social stratification which winners and losers emerging from the transition” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2004, p.123). When the crisis broke out in 1997, no one thought that they would need a military multinational force in the region. It was in January of 1997 that the investment funds collapsed and many individuals lost their savings which they invested before. The events intensified when \$1.2 billion of Albanians' savings were soaked up by the pyramid scheme and those people who were the victims of the pyramid system protested the Government in Tirana and Valore, the southern region of Albania. During the riots, the demonstrators looted the government and military depots and stole over 500,000 rifles and other arms. The half of the country almost fell under the control of the rebellion groups (Global Security, 27 April 2005). The Albanian government also initiated a military operation against the protestors in particular in the Southern region (Caiti, 1997, p.24). The social unrest and had also caused many Albanians to leave the country and became refugees in its neighboring countries, mainly Italy. According to the statistics, the Italian government inspected about 17,000 Albanians who arrived in Italy

during the months after the crisis. In addition to that, “several thousand Albanians ‘disappeared’ soon after their arrival, many of whom reportedly left for other Western European countries or continued working in Italy’s underground economy” (Barjaba and Perrone, 1996 cited in Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2003, p.1001). In the end, Italian government on 19 March declared a state of emergency and in a sense handled the issue (Caiti, 1997, p.24).

As for the Lebanese case, the new hostilities broke out between Israel and Hezbollah militia in July 2006 when two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah which offered “freedom of prisoners” from the both side. The Israeli government did not accept such a condition and launched its bombing campaign on 12 July 2006 (Sultan, 2008, pp.13-14). As a result 162 Israelis and 1191 Lebanese were killed and approximately 900.000 Lebanese civilians were displaced from their homes. In accordance with its Resolution 1701 that called for the parties to end the hostilities, a multinational force, co-named UNIFIL II would be deployed there (SIPRI, 2007 Yearbook, p.114).

3.3.1.4. Political, Economic Instabilities and Energy

In recent years, the Mediterranean in particular the Maghreb region has become crucial for Italian foreign and security policy. Since 25 years Italy pursued a more dynamic policy towards and “an emerging profile” in the region (Aliboni cited in Coralluzzo, 2008, p.5). Italy has pursued its relations with the Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Israel at multilateral level; however, with Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco both multilateral and bilateral levels. Due to its geographical position at the intersection of three region (Arab, African and European), the Maghreb has always been important for Italy among the others in terms of political, economic and energy. Italy is more exposed to the risks and instabilities than other countries in the Central and North Europe stemming from increase in migration, instabilities related to energy sources and military threats (mainly terrorism). For that reason, it would be appropriate to look the bilateral relations

with in particular Magreb countries. As for the Middle Eastern region, it will take limited place compared to Magreb countries.

3.3.2. Italy's Major Security Concerns in the "Euro-Mediterranean"

As put in the theoretical Chapter, securitization has major elements. It needs a referent object which is mainly a mixture of Italian and European security, securitizing actor/s who speak/s for the referent object or securitize the issue successfully. The links between the two should be clearly understood in order to frame "the cluster of interconnected security concerns" in the region. The main issues are migration, terrorism, military threats, political/economical issues and energy. In this section, mainly the securitizing actors are the political leaders who speak for the state security. This is prominent in this thesis since when the issue is security based, the credibility and the acceptability by the audience are much more likelihood. This also well coincides with the RSCT as it basically takes state as unit in a structure and examines the major practitioners of foreign and security policy.

3.3.2.1. Migration and Related Issues

3.3.2.1.1. National Level

Basically, Italy has two major problems: illegal and legal migration (Swich and Aggiunto, 2005, p.2). Italy have probably the largest proportion of illegal immigrants in Western Europe (Ghosh cited in Laczko 2002, p. 604) This is due to the fact that Italy has some difficulties more than other immigration country in controlling its borders (De Bartolo, 2007). More importantly, the size of informal economy in Italy in the sectors of

small businesses, private care, domestic services also increases in demand for migration as these sectors encourage unregistered manpower.¹⁴⁴

Such a demand for migrants intensified in Italy after the 1980s due to the Italian strong economic development what Daly (2001, p.189) calls “economic miracle”. For example, the Italian Minister for the Interior, Enzo Bianco, said in July 2000 that Italy “urgently needs a labor force and new vital energy because it is growing old very quickly. If Italy wants to develop and grow, it must turn to immigrants who can act as lifeblood” (Ghosh cited in Laczko 2002, p.604). It means that the need for unskilled migration is prominent since Italy should be included in prosperous states of the European Union. However it also produces a contradictory position in Europe in particular in labor migration.

Yet, there is no consensus on how to struggle with labor migration. The demand for migrants by the northern business and labor shortage pushed the Italian Parliament to grant legal status to more unauthorized foreigners. However, as the Head of the Eurispes “think tank” in Rome asserted that Italy should accept immigrants on the front-door and not legalize them in the country. In this framework, Italy should set up legal channels for receiving workers in more cooperation with the third country (Ibid.).

Apap (2002, p.143) argues that in the country it would be possible to talk of two sides: On the one hand, one group of people have “solidarity” feelings towards the immigrants, on the other hand, some people developed a form of ethnocentrism that results in xenophobic or racist behaviors. The exclusionary discourses and practices that are nourished from xenophobic and racist thinking are extremely intensified when they are linked to all kinds of negative expressions - crime, conflict, disorder, incivilities- in the eyes of the public opinion and formal control institutions (Melossi, 2003, p.379). This can be seen in both political elites and the public opinion overtly and covertly.

¹⁴⁴ In August 2000, the largest Italian farmers' federation, “Coldiretti”, called for 65 000 migrants to be allowed to work in Italy this year (Anon, 2000). Foreign seasonal workers were needed, said its president Paolo Bedoni, to harvest cereals, grapes and vegetables-low-paid work that Italians, despite an unemployment rate of 11%, are reluctant to do.

Migration policy has become one of the major political debates among the Italian elites. In particular migration is articulated as a (societal) threat against national identity and the integrity seen as a static factor by extreme right-wing parties which consequently have xenophobic movements (Bonifazi, 2000, p.237). Politicians express themselves and use the migration issue in the parliamentary debates during the discussions over laws to be passed and in the election campaigns. It was Silvio Berlusconi, Italian Prime Minister who put irregular immigration as central issue in his re-election campaign, and also for a vote of confidence for his government (EU Observer, 14 July 2009). His exclusionary words “Milan looks like Africa. In several cities, when I walk down the streets I see the large numbers of non-Italians, I feel I am in an African city, not an Italian city or a European city” also portray how the political leaders made the situation as a very domestic political issue (La Repubblica, 4 June 2009). Doing so, he put the Italian and European identity in the same basket with an exclusionary approach towards the Africans and Africa.

Xenophobic discourses are overtly used by the extreme right parties such as the Northern League and National Alliance. For example, the Northern League is popular with its anti-immigrant policies. With the sentiments of “insecurity and marginality”, it would not be surprising that the Party had doubled its members in the Parliament.¹⁴⁵ Roberto Maroni who was a member of the anti-immigration and the North League and has also served as interior minister criminalized the immigrants and called for "necessary and urgent" reforms to overcome the illegal immigration (Dailymail, 22 May 2008). Similarly, Laura Allegrini, Senator of Italian Republic from Nazionale Alleanza told during an interview that “the migrants mainly coming from the North Africa, pose threats against Italian cultural identity and religion.” “Italy is Christian, Vatican is in Italy, that well portrays the close ties between Italy and the Catholic faith” she added. She also focused on a national debate and firmly opposed to “the removal of crucifixes from school walls” (Interview with Laura Allegrini, 24 January 2008). In this issue, Rocco Buttiglione, a former Minister of Culture also argued that “It must be rejected with firmness. Italy has its

¹⁴⁵ In 1992 they held 80 seats and in 1994 the number was 180 seats (Apap, 2002, p.144).

culture, its traditions and its history. Those who come among us must understand and accept this culture and this history” (Reilhac and Pullella, 3 November 2009). These two examples show us how the political elite use the “frontier”, “culture” “religion” concepts to referring to “non-European immigrant” and “illegal”. They also point out the exclusionary expressions for these immigrants and their illegality through criminalization and presentation of them with their negative effects (Montali, Colombo, Camussi, Maglietta and Riva, 2007, p.6). All portray us the exclusionary style of their xenophobic and racist discourses which oversecure the immigration.

On the other hand, the left-wing discourse presents the migratory phenomena in terms of “solution” rather than “problem”. Instead of exclusionary rhetoric, the socialist such as *Democratizia Socialista* uses inclusionary discourses and “discuss”, the “possible choices” (Riva, Colombo and Montali 2008, p.1004). For example, Valerio Zanone, the former Defense Minister and deputy in the Italian Senate serving for *Partito Democratico* desecuritized the immigration issue thinking that the immigrants in Italy should not be seen as a security threat, instead they should be seen as part of Italian people. He emphasizes that they are necessary for service sector, like house keeper or patient sitter (Interview with Valerio Zanone, 12 February 2008). Likewise, Livia Turco who is one of the founders of *Turco-Napolitano Law* (2005, p.42)¹⁴⁶ has an inclusionary rhetoric using the slogan of “Security and Solidarity”.

“Security and Solidarity” de facto, seeks to unite and put the two worlds which are not communicative in contact: and who observe that security was indifferent to solidarity, and who want constitute solidarity considering the value of security as the business of the right.

However, as seen above, it should be appropriate to emphasize that the Leftist parties also link the migration issue to security. Here, Turco emphasizes that Italy would overcome this issue through a number of measures including regularization of labor migration and thus border and migration controls. Pero (2007) goes further by claiming that

¹⁴⁶ The *Turco-Napolitano Law* attempted to regulate the Italian immigration law. This will be examined in the following sections.

the left-wing in Italy also has exclusionary practices in not to integrate “extracomunitari” (non-EU immigrants) to the local society they are living with. In particular, the immigrants are living in worse conditions and their “needs, aspirations and dissatisfactions are never discussed by the Italian institutions.” (Bichri cited in Pero, 2007, p.169) Bichri also criticizes the Left which “pretended to deal with the question of immigration, but in practice relegated it to the status of assistance and “emergency” (Ibid., p.170).

In general, the immigration flows are not welcomed by the public opinion in particular during recession period since welfare states migrants a potential fiscal burden.¹⁴⁷ This would not be erroneous to mark that one of the main reasons for the reaction to immigration is that Italy is one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe. For that reason, Italians are afraid that migrants can “steal” their jobs regardless of their being legal or illegal (Pastore, 19 February, 2004). It can be stated that regardless of their political preferences a majority of Italians see migration as a major security threat to their national identity and social welfare. Some see immigration through ideological perspectives (xenophobic), the stance of a silent majority of Italians is described through an analogy as “schizophrenia” (Pastore, 19 February 2004).

The Italian perception of immigration as a security threat against Italian identity is well conceived when we demonstrate the statistical data: Today, for ISTAT data, the total number of the foreigner residents reached to 4 million (3.891295) which compose 6.5 % of Italy’s total population (ISTAT, 2009). The foreign residents in 1981 were 210.937. Between 1984 and 1989, 800 thousand people crossed the Italian frontier. Half of the population was holding a residence permit. This means that they are “illegal migrants”. “Between 1996 and 2006 there was a 316% increase of the foreign population in Italy, obviously with notable peaks in correspondence with the regularizations.” From 2008 to 2009 the number of the foreign residents increased by 458.644. For Italians, the catastrophic results will come out when the birth rate slow down dramatically. According

¹⁴⁷ Since the living standards of Italians and the economy have improved, the need for labor force has increased.

to ISTAT data, it was projected that in 2050 the number of Italian population 45 million. The demographic profile of the immigrants will increase since there were more and more young immigrants and families (Melossi, 2003, p.379).

The discourses usually come together with extensive practices towards the illegal immigration even at the expense of human rights. For example, it was such a surprising development that soldiers were deployed throughout Italy in August 2008, to embassies, subway and railway stations to fight violent crime against illegal immigrants. 3000 troops comprising regular police officers and the military police were deployed for the purpose of “providing security.” For Defense Minister, Ignazio La Russa it is a “security matter”. Such an attempt that is called “Operation Safe Streets” also aimed at inspecting any potential terrorist targets in particular around the Gothic cathedral of Milan and in Naples near the American Consulate (New York Times, 5 August 2008). Likewise, Italian police has pursued a number of operations called as “security maxi-operations” aiming at inspecting several places such as internet points, call centers or money transferring places of suspected fundamental Islamic and terrorist arrangements (Ministero dell’Interno, 11 August 2006).

3.3.1.1.2. EU/European Level

The hostile attitudes against the new comers (be they migrants or refugees) actually started to intensify from the very beginning of the new era when in the summer of 1991 a migration pressure was coming from Albania. The “boat people” were described as “threat”, “an invading and attacking army” “a problem to alleviate” and a “pressure to stop” and Italy became a “fortress to defend.” Immigrants were perceived as “illegals” “irregulars”, “unlawful persons” “people without documents” (Bonifazi, 2000, p.242). Here, the most striking Italian word as a “special statue” that appeared in public discourse would without doubt be “extracomunitari”. Being used as “non-EU-nationals” or “third country nationals” its first articulation was in a parliamentary debate in 1986 when the first

law on immigration came to agenda. It was certainly born out of the concerns “that were establishing some criteria for regulating the presence of those who were not citizens of a country of the then European Community.” It was about “non belonging” or “exclusion from rights”. The word is commonly used by the media to indicate the countries not belonging the European Community and as an “adjective classifying third country workers and the so-called Martelli law (39/90).” It would not be erroneous to define the word as a “construct of a common sense” within the Union but not excluding the people from rights which are also included in the club of Europe (these are North American, Swiss, Japanese citizens and e.t.c.) (Maneri, 2009, p.38).

For example in general in right-wing discourse (mainly *Allenza Nazionale* and *Lega Nord*) where the Bossi-Fini law is supported, in particular illegal immigration that is viewed as a “threat to social security” or “societal security that I mainly related to identity” is controlled, prevented or campaigned against non EU immigrants. The aim is here to “secure the borders of the national territory against non EU immigration” (Riva, Colombo and Montali, 2004, p.1004). The notion of “securing Europe means securing Italy or vice versa” is also best articulated by Allegrini as: “migration comes first in both Europe and Italy. Italy is important with its location and must be perceived as ‘colapasta’¹⁴⁸ which eliminate potential migrants, refugees or asylum seekers at the frontdoor before their entry.”

As for the public opinion, one may conclude that based on Eurobarometer survey on Italy in 2008, Italians think that to confront immigration should be both national and European level. The immigration issue should be “the first policy to be developed at EU level in order to strengthen the EU itself.” The 68% of Italians support European-level management of immigration (Eurobarometer, Autumn 2008).

¹⁴⁸ It means “colander” in English.

As a consequence, this section that also well coincided with those of the rest of the Member States of the EU, at the EU level notify Italy's exclusionary rather than inclusionary logic towards the immigrants.

3.3.1.2. Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism

3.3.1.2.1. National Level

Italy had enormously been alarmed by the terrorist attacks in the US. Italy's first reaction was that it condemned the terrorist outrage and expressed Italy's solidarity with the USA. Berlusconi personally went further by making a personal gaffe which lost Italy's credibility in international arena for a long time: Berlusconi in a meeting where he met with Putin and Schröder claimed a "superiority" or "supremacy" of Western civilization over Islamic civilization. This certainly provoked an international reaction. The Arab League condemned Italy as fascists and the USA insisted that this war is not a religious war or a "clash of civilizations" (Daniels, 2003, p.114). From then on, Berlusconi regretted and started to repair its image and offered an Italian leading military operation in the Mediterranean and named "Enduring Freedom" (Houben, 2005, p.224). In Italy, the right wing and the opposing parties of the Left (under the Olive Tree) officially supported the international war on terror and participate in the military operation. As the former foreign ministry and the leftist leader Massimo D'Alema described the attacks as "against the whole humanity, not just against the USA."¹⁴⁹ He also added international response must be in terms of military operation (L'Unita, 16 September 2001).

¹⁴⁹ Green Communists and Communist Refoundation also condemned the terrorist attacks but stood against military solution. Similarly, Catholic pacifists also opposed Italian decision to send troops in Afghanistan.

In fact, it can clearly be understood that Italy perceives “terrorism” as a mixture of “Islamic terrorism” or “international terrorism”. In particular after the events of September 11, 2001 Italy has clearly supported the US’ political and military activities through the “Global War on Terrorism” and European activities for providing the EU’s “homeland security” (Martino, 2007, p.18). For Albini (2001, p.273), it is a well-known fact that, at least until when he wrote his article in 2001 that “there is no question that Italy is in far less danger of terrorist attack than the United States.” This is because Italy faces less confrontation from both within and outside its boundaries. Italy has been known as a country that engaged in foreign policy practices acting more friendly more than antagonistic. Even after during the Iraqi war, Italy’s peacekeeping operations did not include combat troops but rather are deployed in the post-conflict era to “create the conditions to develop the country’s (just as in Iraq under the Operation named “Antica Babilonia”) political, social and economic infrastructure. It means that Italy has been the main sponsors of the multilateral solutions even post-September era (La Repubblica, 26 December 2006; La Repubblica, 27 December 2006).¹⁵⁰ However, Italy’s support to fight with “Global terrorism” cannot be undervalued.

However, in Italian territory, fear of terrorism has always been felt even if there has not been a direct attack against the country. More empirically, according to the results of a survey on the Italian foreign policy elite’s perception of security threats that was conducted by Foradori and Rosa (2007) terrorism seems in the first place in the rankings. The main threats defined by the Italian elite in the period 2006-2010, (whether in terms of frequency or ranking), “are terrorist attacks, migratory pressures, the criminalization of the economy, macroeconomic instability and the risk of environmental pollution.” On the other hand, conventional or nuclear military threats seemed less worrying threats for the Italian elite. For the Italians, since terrorism is differentiated and categorized in accordance with

¹⁵⁰ This argument is also grounded on Italy’s previous stances towards the peacekeeping operations as in Albania, Lebanon or even Kosovo where Albini claimed that “Italy has offered help to other countries rather than meddling in those places.” This may be the same even in Berlusconi era. This was well evident with the Res. 1483 of the UN Security Council which called for international community to contribute the stability and security in Iraq. For “Antica Babilonia” see also: http://www.esercito.difesa.it/root/attivita/mix_babilonia.asp Italy also reacted to the death penalty given for Saddam Hussein and started a campaign against death penalty.

its subject, the conductors (be they national extreme Leftist or extreme Fascist terrorist groups, or Islamic terrorists) in the survey one may discern from the phrases of “terrorist attacks against state and society” and “terrorists attacks against infrastructures” that the terrorism can be respectively both national and international. Similarly, Italy’s perception in providing “homeland security” is well evidenced when it replaces its national security with European security or vice versa. In interviews with Laura Allegrini, a deputy from the Alleanza Nazionale, Lucio Martino, a Senior Analyst in CEMISS in Rome, Valerio Zanone, the former Defense Minister, “Islamic terrorism” was perceived as the main security threat in Italy and Europe (Interviews respectively 24 January 2008; 19 February 2008; 12 February 2008). It means that Italy and Europe have the same security concerns which should be resolved in a more coordinated way. As Foradori and Rosa (2007) put on policy instruments for combating these threats are chosen as non-military solutions. The threats increased dramatically after the 11 September the risk of terrorist threats although Italy is not directly affected. Those instruments are cooperation between the police force and intelligence services, police operations, diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, and military operations. One of the most outstanding aspects of the survey is that the Italians connect migratory flows with terrorist penetration. Replies show that first diplomatic instruments then economic and financial assistances ere preferred to combat with this issue through “policing”. The first two instruments include interventions in countries of origin that impede the migratory movements. Interventions should first include activities of monitoring and repression in Italy against the movements across the borders (Ibid.).

3.3.1.2.2. EU/European Level

It was shortly after the terrorist attacks in the US, on behalf of the European Union, the Italian President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi asserted that “we, the Europeans, are with the Americans” (L’Unita, 21 September 2001). In a sense, the war atmosphere has arrived in Europe and alarmed all the capital cities of Europe. Other figures like Giuseppe Narducci a Public Prosecutor of Naples also warned against another attack in Europe and argues that “there are such groups and networks logistics of which are efficient enough to do the same in Europe.” Lamberto Dini, the former Foreign Minister, also argued that “nothing will be the same as before, even for Italians and the Europeans. The globalization of terrorist actions could be in Italy or Europe (Ibid.).

It was not so long that Europe and Italy felt the Islamic terror at Europe’s doorstep with the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in November 2003. Italian Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu argued that in those days “Italy is also in danger” (L’Unita, 25 November 2003). For him, considering the tough networking system in Europe, Europe and Italy should be alarmed and secured against a sudden attack. However, Europe only after the terrorist attacks against a railway in Madrid launched on 11 March 2004 founded out that terror is in Europe. Europe’s fear increased all the more after confirming that the attack was not launched by ETA but by Al Qaeda. One of the journalists of L’Unita, Marcello Ciorelli expressed the situation as “the pain in Madrid has arrived in Europe. In Italy even if there is no a single particular threat, it is clear that this type of terrorism may progressively spread everywhere” (L’Unita, 13 March 2004). After the Spanish case, Italy’s fear seems reasonable when looking at the Italy’s immigrant population most of which (about 700.000 as legal residents) is composed of Muslim population (ISTAT, 2008). For Italians and other countries, it was not surprising that the leader of the Madrid train bombings, Rabei Osman Ahmed, was captured in Milan, Italy in a cell where he was planning similar attacks elsewhere in Europe (Guardian, 9 June 2004).

Specifically with the terrorist bombings in London on 7 July 2005, it was revealed that Al Qaeda's European links were strong and its actions would continue in European big cities. Now, Europe felt the terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe. It was echoed in Italy as "Europe is attacked" and "Italy is alerted in its all cities" (L'Unita, 8 July 2005). For Italy it was not an exaggeration to be in alarm since the brother of one of the terrorists conducting the Kamikaze attacks in London was arrested in Brescia, the Northern Italy (La Repubblica, 1 August 2005). Prodi called for Europe to "react politically in unity" and said that "we are all the victims of this attack." He was emphasizing that "the terror is definitely in Europe." The Italian Left (L'Unione and the Democrats of the Left) went further by announcing that "siamo tutti Londonesi per la vita per la democratizia" (We are all Londoners for life and democracy). Likewise, Berlusconi gave a very assertive reaction: "the Jihadist terror came back to the heart of Europe." Moreover, his firm stance towards the attacks resulted in keeping his firm decision for staying in Iraq in the next couple of years (L'Unita, 8 July 2005).

It was since 2001, Italy has investigated terrorist activities in a number of cells all over the country including financing terrorism and planning and organizing such activities (USA Today, 12 November 2009). This also pushed Italy like other countries in Europe to link terrorist activities to immigration phenomenon that can be seen in European and national legislations (Legge 155/2005). Italian Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni points out the relations between terrorism and immigration as follows: "This fact displays and testifies that the maximum level of our security implementations in comparison is contrasting the illegal immigration and international and Islamic terrorism" (Ministero dell'Interno 31 December 2009). This was once well evidenced by the fact that the terror gangs which have co-organized in Algeria, Austria, France, Spain, Switzerland and the UK were arrested in Italy when the suspects were charged with "criminal association, receiving stolen goods and falsifying documents" (BBC, 13 November 2009).

As a consequence, it would not be wrong to say that terrorism is an old issue in Italy, though being changed in nature, from national to international terrorism. Italians like other European countries feel that the terrorism is the main threat against Italy and Europe that has also close links to other international and regional threats like migratory flows. The security measures have also changed and increasingly become more Europeanized in order to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration.

3.3.1.3. Military Issues and Related Threats

3.3.1.3.1. National Level

In particular in terms of military engagement in Italian foreign and security policy, Martino (2007, p.7) claims that it is possible to draw a map of “nodes” to explain Italian military concentration points. He also focused on the geographical terms and lists the main nodes in priority order: First, the Mediterranean basin; second the Western Balkans; third the parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly the Italian Armed Forces decided to intervene in four situations: The first one is intervention or engagement in response to natural and artificial disasters such as earthquakes or floods. This category also includes “protection of frontiers and the fight against organized crime” that insure public orders and national territory. Second, “the Italian Armed Forces may take action to protect ‘the sphere of Italian influence’ in its former colonies” (Martino, 2007, p.7).¹⁵¹ Such an attitude is a strategy that would also help Italy to restore its prestige in those countries (Seton-Watson, 1980, pp.170-178). In the post-Cold War era, Italy’s willingness has come back to intervene to its ex-

¹⁵¹ Intervention in these regions which are previously in Italian colonial sphere can be interpreted as Italian imperial ambitions and in irredentist form; rather that a kind of a strategy. Christopher Seton-Watson (1980) argues that “Italy’s imperialism, just because she was last to enter the race, was largely imitative, and the largest element in Italian imperialism was the pursuit of prestige and glory.” In those years while the colonies were “a necessity of modern life”, the post-World War II, “integration in Western Europe had been perceived by De Gasperi and Sforza as early as 1945 as the solution to the dilemma of Italy’s post-imperial role.”

colonial regions not individually but multilateral levels. The military operations under the label of peacekeeping operations acting together with the international community (under the auspices of NATO, UN and the EU) were conducted “in Albania, and the Horn of Africa as well as the particularly attentive foreign policy reserved for Libya.” Third category includes the “intervention for the protection of the status quo of internal politics.” This type differs from the others in that it does not include a pure “national interest oriented actions” and Italian participation remains limited. These interventions sometimes may create divisions within the Italian political parties and be subjected to the opposition by majority. The operations may be “multilateral or super-national ad hoc coalitions” led by NATO, the UN, EU etc. and are not implemented in a particular geographical area of interests. The examples are the Congo, the Middle East, Lebanon, India-Pakistan etc. The fourth type implies the intervention called upon any destabilization periods of political life. Italian Armed Forces gave support to the government in case of deciding in “international strategic context of a particular Atlantic or Europeanist inspiration.” The examples are in the Fifties “the removal of the Jupiter missiles” or in the Seventies the installation of Cruise missiles. In this section, the second and third categories will be subjected to Italian military security perceptions and practices in the Euro-Mediterranean area (Martino, 2007).

Italy’s participation in the two military operations can be analyzed with Italy’s former participations in previous operations (Cremasco, 1988, p. 221). Italy had politically and militarily committed to any Atlantic or multinational operation in a variety of places in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force for Lebanon/ UNIFIL) in 1982-1984. In the early post-Cold War era Italy played a passive role during the war in the former Yugoslavia. It was exercised in the Adriatic Sea and commanded by Admiral Mario Angeli, Italian Navy (NATO, 2 October 1996). This operation also displays that Italy’s Mediterranean role implies that Italy is necessarily a European country in geostrategic, political and economic terms. The policies in the Mediterranean have been constructed upon NATO and the European Union. However, sometimes it can be argued that Italy’s Mediterranean vocation can sometimes prevail over European concerns. This thinking led many to ambiguities and misinterpretations in particular during the Cold War years. During the mid-1960s, the

Italian political elite, in particular, the Socialist group developed policies that have important Mediterranean strands. Italy could not remain indifferent especially in many of the crisis areas outside the NATO's area of responsibilities and acted in favor of the Western security and stability.

In Albania, Italy's reaction was very firm since the conflict seemed as a refugee crisis. These refugees crossed the Adriatic Sea for a number of economic reasons. However, they have been perceived as criminals by the Italian authorities and people. For that reason, after a while, Italy pushed the Albanians back to their home country. As the crisis continued Italy decided to intervene in Albania to restore order and stability and guarantee that humanitarian aid would reach the country and to prepare election (Perlmutter, 1998, p.203).

When Europe remained incapable of taking "collective responsibility", Italy voluntarily took the initiative the UN authorized Italy with a mandate to lead an international force of 6,000 soldiers. The operation was also launched in Albania under the name of Operation of Alba (April-August 1997). The main contribution came from the Mediterranean Member States of the EU that also formed an ad hoc coalition. In a sense, the EU's and NATO's weaknesses for providing security led Italy as a medium-sized country to take the initiative.

In Italy both Italian Center-Left Government led by Romano Prodi and the Right supported the mission. In face of humanitarian emergencies and migration flows Italy decided to take action to stabilize Albanian political and economic system (Landi, 2003, pp.58-60).

Italy's role and participation in the military operations are in not only European territory but also Mediterranean and Africa due to its geopolitical location. The strategic role of Italy is increasing for the instabilities of the actors and different distribution of power in the Balkans, Mediterranean and Africa. Landi contends that "Italy has now a strategic role as a logistical base and first the aeronaval forces of geography, and second the

territorial forces” (Ibid., p.57). Such an analysis, in particular, Italy’s location and potential are utilized in all over the world from Afghanistan to the Middle East, but more specifically all around the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, the Lebanese case almost once more shifted Italy’s posture from presence to actor, and strengthens the Italian participation in the region. Italian participation in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force for Lebanon/ UNIFIL) during 1982-1984 was interpreted as an “invaluable experience” in the Middle East. Since during the Cold War, the region is mainly termed with the Middle East, Italy had to shape its attitude towards the region in line with the Arab-Israel relations. Backing the multilateral organizations such as the UN and the European Community, Italy had also grabbed an opportunity to “participate in attempts to stabilize the Middle East and need to structure a consistent Middle Eastern policy that included support for the PLO, to protect the Palestinian population and to restore the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.” This operation has also been an exemplar of the fact that Italy’s navy and armed forces were ready for autonomous intervention in the Mediterranean (Cremasco, 1988, pp.223-224). This would be a precedent for the Italians in a variety of military operations, in particular after 12 years, in the same place, Lebanon.

3.3.1.3.2. EU/European Level

For the first case, Carbone (2008, p.161) argues the Italian participation as: “Italy contributed to ensure security and stability in its own and Europe’s neighborhood. In both cases, the indirect aim was to favor the penetration of Italian business firms and prevent a massive flow of immigrants.” However, this was a necessity and innovation since for the first time a medium-sized power was leading a mission albeit its direct interest and history of military occupation. These innovations can be termed as “a politics of proximity which focuses on the historical and political relations between the countries involved.” Due to its geographical posture, Italy constitutes a “natural link” and “an important point of contact (and conflict) between Europe and the Balkans” (Santoro 1991 cited in Perlmutter, 1998,

p.204). In this sense, Italian leadership of a Multinational Force backed by the UN. "military-humanitarian mission" "represented a break from past practices, since the superpowers like the US had led all previous missions" (Perlmutter, 2008, p.203).

In fact, there are two important threat perceptions in the Lebanon case against the Western security where soft security and hard security understandings overlapped and resulted in a peacekeeping operation in the region. The former is what the European Union was concerned about: "the disproportionate use of force by Israel in Lebanon in response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel". For the EU, the violence was completely contrary to international law (Washington Post, 13 July 2006). The war also would create a refugee problem. The Commission attempted to "relieve those suffering the consequences of the hostilities as the main donor in the region" (Barroso, 24 August 2006). On the other hand, hard security perceptions were mainly articulated by the United States blamed Syria and Iran for the tensions for harboring the leaders of Hezbollah (New York Times, 14 July 2006). The US mainly focused on the "question of freedom for the region" rather than on "Israel's controversial bombardment of Lebanon" (Washington Post, 25 July 2006). To clearly put, in terms of hard security, the former Foreign Secretary of the UK, Margaret Beckett argued in a meeting arranged by Solana that there are many ways to be involved in the conflict such as Iran's links with Hezbollah (Beckett and Solana, 13 July 2006). It means that one of the members of the axis of evil put by the US, Iran has strong engagements in the region which would lead to intense terrorist activities. Therefore, disarming of Hezbollah should be necessary (Washington Post, 26 July 2006). The European views that are composed of "humanitarian concerns" and the Atlantic approach that is directly related to the "global fight with terrorism" extend beyond in the solution of the crisis, sending peacekeeping forces to the region.

Italy, here becomes the focus since it took the command of the forces. The choice for Italy is essential because of a number of reasons. France and the US were also seen as the enemies in Lebanon where previously 241 Americans and 58 French peacekeepers were killed in a bombing campaign. D'Alema argues that "our country doesn't have a colonial past in that region. Our presence in Lebanon will not be viewed as interference, as a pretense to taking command." While he says "we don't have enemies in the region", one of the members of the Hezbollah in an interview claimed that "in Lebanon, in general, people love Italy, do not have a negative tendency towards Italy and consider it as a friend" (Salpietro, 7 December 2005). As a threat perception, it is not so surprising what Italy contends about the mission; D'Alema saw the peacekeeping efforts not just a truce between the warring parties but as "part of a comprehensive plan to stabilize the region" (New York Times, 27 August 2006). On the other hand, Italy as a medium-sized power of Europe knew that it had to be backed by the EU and other multilateral organizations. This was well evidenced by the Prime Minister Prodi's emphasis: "this mission is an international mission, we are not alone." Prodi also emphasized that Italy has a huge responsibility of international society and the European Union in this operation (Gente d'Italia, 24 August 2006). In fact, D'Alema also thinks that this mission includes a kind of political and humanitarian engagement requiring the "deployment of an international force in the southern Lebanon for its reconstruction" (La Repubblica, 23 August 2006).

In conclusion, it can be said that Italy's threat perceptions in the Mediterranean well fits those of both the EU and the USA. The two cases chosen in this section are linked to each other in the sense that Italy has a prominent role in both as a medium-sized and logistically appropriate country.

3.3.1.4. Political, Economic Instabilities and Energy

3.3.1.4.1. National Level

In Maghreb, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were the main concern areas for Italy. Italy in general has good relations with the “moderate” political leaders in those countries and thus avoiding to refer the democracy and human rights issues in these countries.

Libya drew more attention of Italy and the international community rather than other regional countries particular during the 1990s. Italy has perceived Libya as its former colony which has a number one of internal instabilities. For Italy like other Western capitalist countries, the major problems in Libya were as follows: During the Cold War era, Libya’s worsening relations with the USA which had bombed Tripoli and Benghazi and its perception and suspicious thinkings on Italy’s support to the US in the military issues, Libyan support for international terrorism [the Lockerbie incident in 1988, Niger (1989), involving Pan Am (US) and Uta (France) aircraft]; immigration issue; and Italy’s (and European) oil interests are on the other hand makes a different in its maintenance of good relations with Libya (Ronzitti, 2009; Coralluzzo, 2008, p.121).

In terms of military security, in general, Qaddafi is perceived the number one enemy by the Western public. In particular, Libya has been on the agenda since the Lockerbie incident which followed by the UN multilateral sanctions and unilateral American sanctions, and its isolation from the international society (Coralluzzo, 2008, p.121). Even during the sanctions, Italy pursued its relations with Libya rich hydrocarbon sources (Otman and Karlberg, 2007, p.41). However, Italy due to its historical ties with the country had to be involved in friendly relations. Italy had the same threat perceptions with those of EU. Immigrants and energy needs have become the major issues. In fact, Libya itself did not pose a threat in immigration issue, since it is not an emigrant country for a long time. The immigrants from Chad, Sudan, Niger and Nigeria are passing through Libya to arrive in Italy and other cities in Europe. Approximately 87 percent of 10 percent of

foreigners in Libya are the immigrants or undocumented. Libyan authorities now regard the immigration flow as a threat. The number of illegal migrants increased in Italy from North Africa from 19.900 in 2007 to 36.000 in 2008. This is nearly 90 percentage increase. Similarly Italy being the fourth highest asylum host country after the US, Canada and France, has been indirectly exposed to the illegal immigration influx in Libya (Frelick, 2009, p.19).

Italy's oil interests are on the other hand makes a difference in its maintenance of good relations with Libya. Italy is the largest importer of the Libyan oil and gas. Out of 27 member states of the EU (which holds the vast almost 70% of its oil production), Italy (523,000 bbl/d), Germany (210,000 bbl/d), Spain (104,000 bbl/d) and France (137,000 bbl/d) import the vast majority of Libyan oil (ENI, 27 May 2008). It sells refined petroleum products (approximately 44% of total) and machinery of various types (approximately 13%) and imports exclusively hydrocarbon fuels and petroleum products (98%) to Libya. Italy's state held gas and oil company ENI had also started operations in Libya in 1959 and continued up to today (ENI, 27 May 2008). With respect to the huge sources of Libyan oil and gas, Italy also brought about an idea that Libya can be a good energy supplier like Algeria, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (Youngs, 2009, p.63). In fact, this was not the most important step of Italy to push the EU for improving its relations with Libya. Individually, in 2004 Berlusconi's visit to Libya to launch a pipeline called Greenstream. In addition, it was on August 30 2008 that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Libyan Colonel Muammar Qaddafi signed the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya. The Treaty would put an end to the disagreements between the two countries and Libya's claims on Italian colonialism. Berlusconi expressed his regret for the colonial period: "In the name of the Italian people, as head of the government, I feel it my duty to apologize and express my sorrow for what happened many years ago and left a scar on many of your families" (Ronzitti, 2009, p.2). Doing so, Berlusconi would sacrifice its colonial prestige in order to provide societal and energy security in the region. In return, Libya would recover its image in the eyes of the Western countries.

As for Algeria, Italy's low profile towards the country is prominent since Italy stayed calm during the Algerian crisis of 1990s and not to annoy the Libyan authorities because Italy depends on for a large part of its natural gas supply. However, the relations had started to be worsened in 1994 when seven Italian sailors were murdered by the Algerian terrorist factions (La Repubblica, 11 November 1994). Similarly, 1997 was one of the worst years in terms of relations between Europe and Algeria since terrorism was on the very high agenda in Europe. In fact European attitude was shaped by France which was very often France which was supported by Spain, Italy and Portugal. Italy also proposed at a conference of Troika (Italy, Spain and France) a joint initiative to end the bloodshed in Algeria. However, that was much criticized by Algeria. As a fact, instead, the Mediterranean countries' tendencies stayed multilateral like supporting increase in economic assistance to the Mediterranean countries in particular under the MEDA.

Algeria has been the first supplier of gas to Italy whereas 30 percent of the European country's gas needs were supplied from Algeria. Around 65% of Italy's gas comes from Algeria. Italy's main concerns thus stem from the energy needs.

Italy's perception towards the country seems moderate. Regarding its political and economic ties, Italy maintained good relations with Algeria. For example, the Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbor Treaty, that is the first bilateral summit was held in Alghero in April 2007 between the Prime Minister Romano Prodi and President of the Algerian Republic Bouteflika. In this Summit, parties mention the partnership in energy, fight against terrorism and illegal immigration and the defense sector (Burrini, 14 November 2007).

Like other countries, Italy's relations with Tunisia and Morocco have been maintained in a good relationship. Its ties stem from the fact that Italy has a considerable Moroccan and Tunisian population (ISTAT, 2008). As a fact, threat perceptions are not articulated at bilateral level by the Italian government. However, when it comes to the

partnership issues, the parties begin to talk about immigration, combatting international terrorism and illegal immigration.

Because of the geographical proximity, Italy and Tunisia traditionally are in good relationship. Italy was the second country which established diplomatic relations with Tunisia after its independence in 1956. Italian authorities state that their “friendship and collaboration” various security issues such as cooperation on a common project for development in particular are energy, agriculture, banking and immigration (Report on Tunisia, 2007, p.54). The most outstanding issue among all seems the illegal immigration issue. In one of the interviews of Berlusconi, he asserted that Italian leaders even go further in collaborating with the Tunisian authorities in returning Tunisian terrorism suspects despite the rulings from the European Court of Human Rights (2008 Country Reports on Human Rights).¹⁵² It means that the South European Member States of the EU may take action at the expense of human rights in order to stop immigration problem and cooperate the other Mediterranean countries.

In sum, at national level, it can be concluded that Italy has maintained its relations with the regional countries at bilateral level and without interpreting much “negative” and “antagonistic” words. Rather even in human rights issues Italy could build good relations with the Maghrebi countries.

¹⁵²Terrorism suspects can face a particular risk of torture with unfair trial proceedings in Tunisia.

3.3.1.4.2. EU/European Level

As stated in the previous chapter, the Mediterranean region constitutes an “area of security” for the EU. The peace and stability is the highest priority in the region. For the EU, the most important priority in political area is to support the reforms in human rights, freedom of expression and democracy issue. Economically, the EU aimed to contribute to promote economic reforms. Within the context of this understanding, Italy also tried to articulate its threat perceptions. However, it is quite difficult to analyze the perceptions over political and economic reforms in those countries. This is due to the fact that EU and the Member States of the EU cannot target the Maghrebi authorities directly; instead they use more regional based discourses not on political instabilities, but more direct threats such as migration, energy and economic relations. As for the political, cultural and economic issues, the EU and the Member States pursue a more multilateral based policies via civil societies and a number of projects.

At bilateral and state level, Italy can underline the main security issues that are directly affect Italian and European territory. For example in one of the interviews in Tunisia he mentioned the number of organizations which deal with illegal immigration that is 300. Berlusconi also stated that the problem is not only Italy’s but also Europe’s major societal security issue (Corriere della Sera, 5 September 2009).

Apart from these, at the regional level, political, cultural and economic dialogue is built through civil societies. For example, under the name Fondazione Mediterraneo which is also the Head of the Italian Network of the Anna Lindth Euro-Med Foundation and the Founding Member of the Non-governmental Euro-Med Platform the projects are prepared to strengthen the Southern Mediterranean civil societies to make adequate contribution to the democracy promotion and institutional capacity in the Southern countries of the Mediterranean region (Fondazione Mediterraneo, n.d.)

3.3.3. Italy's Major Security Practices in the "Euro-Mediterranean"

It was until 1990s, "concrete policy responses" did not take place and both Italian and European politics did not respond to both endogenous and exogenous migration factors." It was since the 1990s, Italian governments – be they center-right or center-left-passed some legislative measures which remained insufficient in funding and inadequate in administrative level (Pastore, 2004).

In this section one may talk of two types of policies: one is implemented as domestic politics and the other is developed within the European context. For the former, the legislation will be touched upon concerning the illegal immigration policy, relatively with reference to European context. The latter is about "Europeanization of the migration policy of the member states" even though there has been an immigration policy of the Union less communitarized.

3.3.3.1 Migration and Related Issues

3.3.3.1.1. National Level

Italian case like other Mediterranean member states of the EU demonstrates that they face some difficulties in developing their immigration policies. The legislation is formed with "emergency-oriented approach" and "the lack of clear, precise political decisions to guide administrative and government measures". Bonifazi (2003, p.245) claims that the "Italian model" which is generated from various sources of pressure, internal and external, rather than an independent political decision-making process. Pastore (2008, p. 106) argues that Italy's migration policy is somehow "a blend of external Schengen-generated constraints and internal political choices which made Italy a particular restrictive country.

Italy perceives itself to be a new immigration country whose legal, constitutional and administrative structures for the management of immigration are still insufficient (Pastore 2008, p.106). However, Italy has adapted a series of regulation of immigration systems since the early 1990s. The immigration laws included regularization of the status of the immigrants residing in Italy illegally, rather than “regulating new legal entries.” (De Bartolo, 2007, p.9) In Italy with respect to legislation the governments and parliament represent the bodies responsible for framing and implementing a migration policy and laws on Italian citizenship (Apap 2002). Between 1986 and 2002 the Italian governments passed four regularization acts: The first one is the 1986 Law (Law no.943). It frames the system on the “employment and treatment of immigrant workers from outside of the EU (and the prevention of undocumented migration).” With this Law, procedures for time limits for regularizations of the status of the immigrants who were in irregular or illegal positions. This was possible for only employees. The second one is the Martelli Law (n. 39 of 1990) which regularized 218 thousands of undocumented migrants (de Bartolo, 2007, p.11) The law took special measures on “political asylum, employees, independent workers, self-employed workers and students, their entry and ‘permesso di soggiorno’ for non-EU national and stateless citizens in the country” were taken. The Law includes new systems for “entry, residence and expulsion and approved funds to the Italian regions for the creation of primary reception centers for immigrants” (Apap, 2002, p.147). The third one is Turco-Napolitano Law that was adopted in March 1998 (Law 40/1998). Law of 39/1990 and Law of 40/1998 were passed under international political constraints in line with the Schengen intergovernmental environment (Pastore, 2008, p.107).¹⁵³ Italy was also under pressure from Schengen partners to improve the conditions which led expulsion of clandestine immigrants and to integrate the immigrants inside the country (They would also access to the public health services and social housing). This law evaluates “the reasons to entry and establishes the criteria for residence, guarantees for respect for human rights and regulates living and working conditions while allows expulsion of those who are a threat for public order” (Apap, 2002, p.150). The fourth law is Bossi-Fini law 189/2002 that can

¹⁵³ Italy had signed the acts of accession to the Schengen Agreements in November 1990.

be considered “the most important legislative measure”. The law gets its name from two anti-immigrant leaders, Umberto Bossi (the leader of Alleanza Nazionale) and Gianfranco Fini (leader of Lega Nord) who did not implement a weak immigrant policy. During Berlusconi term, the law was passed in 2002 that had several amendments to the 1998 law. It permits “employment only if the applicant secures employment, a place of residence, and guaranteed return passage to his/her home country and paid by his /her employer.” The new law also tightened border controls, human trafficking and family reunions. The people who are illegal immigrants can be subjected to jail sentence. The state also calls for military to prevent boats from attempting to smuggle immigrants into the country. Italy would give priority in granting of foreign aid to the countries which are willing to help stop illegal immigration (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006, p.180). For example, on 30 August 2008, Italy and Libya signed an agreement that Italy will pay \$5 billion over the next 20 years, to compensate Libya for the losses during its colonial period of 1911-1943. Italy’s main objective was to stop illegal immigration from Libya. Berlusconi describes the purpose of the treaty as “less illegal immigrants and more oil” (Gazzini, 16 March 2009).

With the law of 2002, “totally 647 thousand immigrants were regularized (a number just less than the previous residence permits which are 680 thousand since 1990)” (De Bartolo, 2007).

In conclusion, between 2000 and 2006 Berlusconi government having a strong anti-immigrant stance contributed to the restrictive implementation of Schengen/EU Agreement (Pastore, 2008, p.107).

3.3.3.1.2. EU/European Level

The making of Italian immigration policy would be too imperfect without referring to European influence on Italian practices. Since the early 1990s, European integration has been a prominent factor in determining the national response to immigration (Pastore, 2004). In fact, policies within the integration process of the EU are taken as if “decisional and operational power is relocated in a dualistic process between the European institutions and the member countries.” This section underlines the practices of “inter-connections of local, national and supranational actors” (Klepp, 2008, p. 5).

It was until 1997-1998, Europe remained constrained since most legal regulations were shaped within the Schengen acquis. Since the 2000s, the framework of the EU for the migration policy has been considered in line with the notions of first European Council in Tampere (Finland) of 1999 where the constituents of a common immigration policy were set up; second, the adoption of The Hague program, which period 2005-2010. Basically, EU has adopted a number of views including: integration of third country nationals (as labor migration); conditions of stay and admissions of immigrants; fight against illegal immigration; balance between humanitarian and economic admission; family unification; and relations with third parties. The EU’s main objective is to balance the security concerns and management of illegal migration and integration of legal migrants. However, the most important point is that the EU cannot directly impose legislation into its Member States. Through European Commission Communication and directives, the Union delegated the management of immigration to the Member States (European Commission, July 2008).

As a member of Schengen, and having found itself in the context of a gradual “communitarization” of asylum and immigration policy as decided in Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, Italy soon sought a more significant and autonomous role for itself in the migration strategy of the EU. Within the European context, Italy’s position has oftentimes been controversial since first it has had some problems in controlling its sea borders adequately and remaining permissive for the immigrants who cross the internal EU borders together

with Switzerland. The second problem is that Italy tries to take restrictive, even forceful measurements against the illegal immigrants rather than controlling them on the border. The migration problem has been much debated in particular with the massive flows of Albanian, Kosovar, Kurdish and North African refugees in the 1990s.

However, it was in Tampere Summit in October 1999, where together with Germany and Austria, Italy demanded the creation for a common European asylum and immigration system, with common standards including asylum and immigrant visa applications. Italy claimed “shared burden financially to strengthen its border” (Hein, 2000, p.154).

Shortly after the “communitarization” of asylum and immigration policy (in 2001), Italy during its EU Presidency term (second half of 2003) projected a migration policy, based on three points:

1. integrated management of European land, sea and air borders through burden sharing, fight against illegal migration as well as against criminal organizations ruthlessly exploiting this phenomenon;
2. regulation of legal migration flows through adequate agreements between the involved countries;
3. aid to development of the origin and transit countries.

For Italy the burden of illegal migration should be equally shared among all EU countries. Relevant to that, Italy had also attempted to initiate a European Border Control Agency (that is now FRONTEX) (Swich and Aggiunto, 2005, p.3). After the decision was taken in November 2003, the Warsaw-based Agency became operative in 1st May 2005.¹⁵⁴

This Agency would have the following tasks:

1. to simplify and enhance the implementation of existing and future community

¹⁵⁴ Decision of the JHA Council of last 14th April

measures;

2. to ensure standard coordination and application of control measures
3. to deter single countries from undertaking specific actions when activities at community level have already been started;
4. to guarantee the fair burden sharing of responsibilities – including financing costs among member States.

Within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, during Italian Presidency, in the ministerial conference in Naples in December 2003, migration issue had become a main concern among the ministers who then agreed that migration can be seen as a positive factor for socio-economic growth in the region. In this meeting, ministers confirmed that there should be “a balance between security concerns and the management of migration flows, on the one hand, and the need to facilitate legal movements and social integration of legal migrants, on the other.” Italy was also among the “5+5” dialogue which is an important new migration forum between the Maghreb grouping (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and the European grouping (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) (International Organization for Migration, 2006, p.80).

Italy, thus gives a great importance to the Mediterranean affairs including partnership, cooperation and dialogue such as the Rabat and Paris Euro-African¹⁵⁵ dialogue meeting on migration and development such as EU- Africa dialogue meetings held in Tripoli and Lisbon are among them. Such a dialogue is aimed at strengthening the fight against illegal migration, while guaranteeing aid to development and bilateral cooperation through a series of agreements and assistance programs. In the Rabat Summit, the Action Plan emphasizes the “interrelationship between many migratory routes, encourage the

¹⁵⁵ “At regional level in the context of the Rabat process, at continental level through the dialogue started in 2007 following the Lisbon Summit between the European Union and the African Union, and also at bilateral level, through relations between the European Union Member States and the African countries.” In the Rabat Summit, it was stated that “... intensifying bilateral dialogue on migratory questions between the different countries of origin and transit with the European Union and its Member States, including in the framework of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement.” Article 13 provides “The issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EC Partnership

relevant countries and organizations in Africa and Europe to adhere to the concepts of the Rabat Conference” (Rabat Declaration, 11 July 2006).

Within the these framework, Klepp (2008, p.5) contends that Italy has also pursued two main objectives: “1) intensifying co-operation with transit countries and countries of origin of migrants and 2) strengthening joint border control missions and the European border agency FRONTEX.”

Italian relations with Libya have a distinct prominence here. It would be noteworthy that Italy contributed to the lifting of the embargo on Libya (adopted by the EU in 1986).¹⁵⁶ Therefore, Italy conducted diplomacy to bring Libya closer to the EU. In fact, Italy wanted to guard its coastline more effectively and detect the hundreds of illegal migrants who cross Europe (Segell, 2005, p.143). Between 1992 and 1994 the EU almost ignored economic sanctions and arms embargo on Libya. It sent a technical mission there in November and December 2004, to “examine arrangements for combating illegal immigration” (European Parliament, 13 December 2004). In 2003, Italy and Libya signed a bilateral agreement for preventing illegal immigration. It came after Italy’s Anti-Landings Decree (2003) was passed in response to 33 percent increase in landings by sea. It allowed the Italian police specific rights to detect boats before accessing Italian waters, and “provides for unlimited presence of the Italian navy Italy has also supported a program of repatriation flights from Libya to the countries of origin and a detention camp for illegal immigrants” (Green, 2006, pp.155-161). The Friendship Pact aimed at increasing cooperation in fighting terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The two countries agreed to reinforce the border control system in Libyan land borders (Human Rights Watch, 21 September 2009). Italy also lobbied the European Council warning that if the EU would not lift the sanctions in September 2004 Italy would be

¹⁵⁶ The EU and the US imposed sanctions on Libya in 1986 in retaliation since Libya supported terrorist groups. UN sanctions were imposed in 1992 to force Libya to hand over two Libyans indicted for 1988 bombing of a US airline. EU was eager to “develop its economic relations with Libya, Italy’s biggest oil supporter.” But on the other hand, the EU wanted Libya to respect human rights. The EU lifted the amrs embargo against Libya in October 2004.

involved in military cooperation with Libya to control irregular immigration by sea (Green, 2006, p.157).

In 2004, Italy “promoted a series of joint programs and operations, such as joint patrolling activities in Central and Eastern Mediterranean Sea (“Progetto Nettuno”, “Operazione Triton” and “Operazione Tetis”). The aim of these operations conducted by police of frontiers and foreigners, or by “la Direzione Centrale dell’Immigrazione dell’Polizia delle Frontiere” is to monitor an extensive sea area, traditionally intersected by illegal migration routes connecting North Africa to Sicilian coasts, through the joint and coordinated use of vessels and aircrafts from Italy and EU countries. These countries are France, United Kingdom, Malta, Greece and Cyprus. Italy is also in cooperation with Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel, Algeria, Syria and Nigeria (Kelpp, 2008, p. 5; Ministero dell’Interno, 2004).¹⁵⁷

Another example for the operation in the Mediterranean Sea is “Operation Nautilus”¹⁵⁸ an EU Frontex operation which also portrayed Italian authorities’ intention for pushing back the migrants in the central Mediterranean Sea, Lampedusa to Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p.30).¹⁵⁹ Operation Nautilus was conducted jointly by Italy and Malta to achieve similar results. Its aim was to halt irregular migration, particularly stemming from Libya. This operation can also be correlated within the EU framework. While Nautilus is launched to prevent the irregular immigration towards Malta and Italy, Operation Hera was led by Spain “to stop irregular migration from Senegal, Mauritania and

¹⁵⁷ In Italy possible the routes are: immigrants from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are Sicilia; immigrants from Sri Lanka is Sicilia and Calabria via Channel Suez; immigrants from Turkey is Calabria and Sicilia; immigrants from Albania is Puglia; immigrants from Greece is Adriatic routes.

¹⁵⁸ The Operation also launched for the immigrants around Malta as well as Lampedusa.

¹⁵⁹ “The main objective of the Joint Operation NAUTILUS 2008 is to reinforce border control activities in Central Mediterranean and control illegal migration flows coming from North Africa countries heading to Malta and in Italy.” For further detail see: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art40.html The routes of the immigrants are the west African shores to the Canary Islands and from Libya to Italy, were established in the past years, constituting today the most important routes across the Mediterranean Sea.

the Cape Verde Islands to the Canary Islands.”¹⁶⁰ In 2006 and parallel to Operation Hera, Frontex began to investigate to detect whether there are more migration routes and if so to plan the expulsions. The “sbarchi” (landing of migrants) question is also closely followed by the European Union, since the Italy is seen as a “softbelly” in Europe, and as a country of Mediterranean.

Italy as well as its comparable views on migration with those of the EU sometimes clashed with the European Union in cases where its migration policies remain national. The first case is related to the fact that Italy approved legislation which criminalizes irregular immigration, in particular against Roma community. For example, Berlusconi government was forced to withdraw anti-Roma measures, after the EU commission threatened that it could take legislative measures against Rome (EU Observer, 14 May 2009).

3.3.3.2. Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism

3.3.3.2.1. National Level

It should be noted that, the measures in fighting with terrorism have been a controversial issue that the legislation also clashes in rebalancing security and freedom.

In the Western Europe, the legal governance of terrorism has effectively grounded on a new counter-terrorist legislation. While these forms of legislation have been formally imposed to restrict the freedom of terrorists, widespread concerns have been raised both about possible infringements of civil liberties and about the impact of new laws on the surveillance and policing of ethnic minority groups. Therefore anti-terrorism legislation has been put into force accelerated since 9/11, such as Italy and Germany, similar concerns are being expressed about the rebalancing of security and liberty the criminal justice system

¹⁶⁰ It was under the Seahorse agreement, “Spain would have the right to implement “joint patrols in the respective territorial waters.”It was reported by AFP that “on 1 June 2009 not a single migrant boat had landed on the Canary Islands for two months.”

(Mythen and Walklate, 2008, p.231). It should be noted that while this legislation has restricted the freedom of terrorists new concerns on infringement of human rights in particular of ethnic minority groups.

Baldaccini (2007) argues that Italian case is important in providing security against terror acts since it has already had provisions related to organized crime which were then extended to terrorism. Italian case is significant in making terrorism as the main threat and put it on the security agenda due to the traditional criminalization of migrants as “dangerous”; and to the “weaknesses of Italian borders to terrorist infiltration.” Italy also took security measures against the terrorist threat in particular with the events of September 11, 2001 in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 that intended to combat terrorism of any kind, anywhere in the world) and with several instruments adopted by the EU” (Fini, 2006, p.2). Through Law No. 438/2001, preventive and repressive measures were taken against individuals suspected for committing terrorist acts of terrorism (since 2001) (Boretti, 2007, p.299). All the measures on terrorism and application of the general provisions on the status of foreigners were changed radically in particular between 1998 and 2002. After September 11, Italy has a more firm approach to the entry of foreign nationals into Italy and focused on irregular migration. According to Law No 431/2001 people would be punished dealing with “criminal offenses, acts of promotion, organization, sponsorship and support of groups existing on the national territory whose objectives are to carry out terrorist activities abroad.” With the introduction of article 270 bis of the Penal Code, new arrangements were set against terrorist acts against a foreign state and international institution and organization. In a sense with the Law, the difference between domestic and international terrorism has become blurred and subjected to common evaluations of the precautions needed since the crimes seriously include the use of weapons and organized crime.

As for the implementations, under the EU regulations, as of 31 December 2001, the total value of financial assets is frozen. Under Law 7/2003 New York Convention of 9 December 2002, Italy regarded the repression of sponsorship of terrorism that in relation to the international treaties against international terrorism. In fact Italy has taken a number of several measures in accordance with the reports of violent radicalization against West in Islamic community and arrested a number of individuals based on the anti-terror legislation approved in 2001. In addition, Italian legislation on immigration and the legal status of foreigners was redrawn in line with the Consolidated Immigrants' and Foreigners' Status Act approved by legislative Decree 286 of 25 July 1998 that was modified by Law 189/2002. It is related to the immigrants indirectly and their entry and residence of their foreign nationals in Italy. Terrorism is one of the impediments to entry into the territory of Italy and filing applications of refugee status. Within such context, several suspected individuals who are in the lists of individuals put by the EU as members or sponsors of terrorist groupings (reported by Italy or other country in the SIS (Schengen Information System)). Italy is also a part of the Schengen Convention ratified pursuant to Law 358/1993 that makes cross-checks in the SIS for entry and visa applications. Apart from entry control, deportation from Italy becomes an important issue, albeit deportation of legally residents of Italy or suspicious threats to public order and national residents such as "Imam of Carmagnola" for "disturbing public order and for being a threat to national security." Many investigations and arrests were conducted in Italy. For example Ansar Al Islam closely connected Al Qaeda to Italy and Germany and is responsible for training individuals ideologically (Boretta, 2007, pp.300-323).

3.3.3.2.2. EU/European Level

It was frequently stated that the EU has perceived the terrorism issue a border security and “homeland security” issue. The former Minister of Interior Claudio Scajola argued that “Europe is strong in combating terrorism. In Europe, terrorism will not range. We are all the members of the Union which desires a major collaboration” (Cittadinitalia, n.d.) For that reason, its precautions are mostly included in its “Justice and Home Affairs policies”. Even if the efforts are made at the EU levels such as “information exchange and cross-border cooperation between national authorities charged with internal security have increased, with Europol, Eurojust, the Situation Centre, (outside the EU framework) the Counter-Terrorist Group, and Frontex” the EU also sees the Member States as “primarily responsible for the fight against terrorism.” In its document for “Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism” issued on 12 December 2005 the EU calls for Member States to give an extra importance to their national arrangements to prevent and combat terrorism in Europe. The EU’s major recommendations are the need of interagency cooperation, information exchange and national coordinating structures. In the previous sections, the reflection of the EU regulations on the Italian national level has been examined. In general, it was stated that the EU has fought terrorism at both political and technical levels so far. In technical terms, for example, in accordance with the action plan to fight against terrorism on 3 October 2001, the “European Commission proposed that the Member States should freeze all funds belonging to 27 organizations and individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities.” In 2002 the activities were intensified by the EU, in particular when the Council of Ministers defined as follows:

A common concept of terrorism should be put and all of the Member States of the EU must comply with this concept in their legal status and set the minimum level of penal sanctions (Freedom, Security and Justice, n.d).

Accordingly, as stated in the previous section, Italy has undergone a transformation in its own legislative system. For example it abided by the EU's blacklists that created for "freezing the assets of individual terrorist groups." This is because Italy has been counted as one of the member states together with France, Spain and the Netherlands that holding the highest number of arrests of Islamist terrorist suspects. The arrests are in origins mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In the 2008 TE-SAT report of Europol, it was emphasized that "France, Italy, Spain and Portugal consider that the increasing activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) aiming at international targets have an impact on the threat level in their member state." Italy, due to their geographical proximity to the Maghreb, has the risks of terrorists attempting to come to the territory of the EU via Italy (TE-SAT, 2008).

Besides political and technical levels, terrorism has become a matter of operational response that is mostly given within the context of the NATO and the EU. However there are some differences between the US' "Global Terrorism" and the EU's "Homeland Security", Europeans act with the Americans in naval and air patrols in the Mediterranean. Americans saw terrorists using sea routes for their terrorist actions of terror or transit between terrorist havens, Europeans saw terrorists making their way on the homelands of Europe. The patrols in the Mediterranean sea "served to control the illegal immigration and smuggling into Europe." Within these activities, European countries cooperate with Morocco, Algeria and Libya "to work in patrols, sharing information, handling migrants passing through those countries from sub-Saharan Africa." Spain, France and Italy launched bilateral programs with Morocco, Algeria and Libya that are warmly welcome by the EU. This is due to every year thousands of migrants coming from the North Africa are prevented from passing across the Mediterranean and posing a serious threat to Europe. This is interpreted as "radicalization of a large North African population" being "potential terrorists" which mainly nested in the Mediterranean members in Europe (Whiteneck, 2007, p.18).

Apart from that, for Italy, in the context of transatlantic relations (within NATO) in the Euro-Mediterranean region is the launch of the NATO's Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), which has been led by Italy since 2001. For the purpose of securing the Mediterranean, as indicated in the previous chapter, NATO's Allied Maritime Component Commander is based in Naples, Italy where approximately 1200 persons work under the order of Admiral Roberto Cesaretti. As well as inspecting the terrorist suspects and suppression of illegal immigrants, in terms of energy security, NATO ships are implementing route surveys in "chokepoints" as several passages and harbors in the Mediterranean. Throughout the Mediterranean "theater" between the strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the monitoring task lasts twenty-four hours a day in constant collaboration with intelligence staff (La Repubblica, 29 April 2008). This operation includes NATO members, mainly from the Mediterranean such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey which support the operation with naval assets (NATO, 29 March 2010).

In sum, it can be inferred from the terrorism issue that Italy's role as a part of European security community should be underlined. Maybe it is because of the fact that terrorism is subjected to many kinds of cooperation, many states can have the opportunity to put their all efforts to secure not only its national territory but also the regions where it is located. Italy is one of the countries which has a long story with terrorism and has worked in deep cooperation with the European countries in the Mediterranean region.

3.3.3.3. Military Issues and Related Threats

3.3.3.3.1. National Level

The use of Italian Armed Forces and Italian presence or more concretely role in conflicting regions, in Martino's analysis, fall into the second and third categories: be they its engagement in ex-colonial regions as peacekeeping operations under the auspices of NATO, UN and the EU like in Albania, or its intervention in regions that are in need of political, military and humanitarian aids such as in the Middle East. The first operation has a distinct priority in that Italy was tasked with the command the multinational forces in Albania, for European and Italian security. The operation in Lebanon on the other hand is also important for Italy, not only for Europe, but for the whole Mediterranean security and indirectly contributed to the fight with terrorism.

In the first case, Albania was not among the priorities of NATO which showed a great interest in Bosnia: therefore, a unique formula that could function was an intervention by individual nations namely Italy under a "willing of coalition" (Apicella, 20 April 2003; Favretto and Kokkinides, 1997). It was indicated above that when the crisis broke out "Italy and other neighboring countries braced for a stream of refugees" (Perlmutter, 1998, p.207). In particular, Italy had a peace operations experience (named *Operazione Pellicano*) in the Adriatic Sea due to the intense illegal immigration flowing from Albania after the death of the Enver Hoxha between September 1991 and December 1993. The Italian Government had decided to bring the first humanitarian aids in Albania in order to discourage immigration and to repatriate how many illegal immigrants had been caught up the Italian coasts. As for the crisis of 1997, Italy pursued two ways during the crisis: first, the Italian navy started to function with its patrols and the "Foreign Ministry was calling on the European Community to develop a plan for concerted action." However, the European only sent a European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) commission. On the other side, the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee announced that there had to be sent humanitarian aid convoys to Albania to be protected by a military force and "called on the

Council to take the necessary steps to support democracy in Albania” (Perlmutter, 1998, p.207). Second, Italian political leaders tried to make diplomatic talks with the Prime Minister Sali Berisha and the opposition leaders in particular on the evacuation of the Italian citizens (Caiti, 1997, p.22).

The multinational operation named the Operation of ALBA was launched by a coalition of states led by Italy and under the authorization from the UN Security Council (Res. 1101/1997) “to help create a secure environment for the action of the international organizations to provide support in the areas of international assistance” (Perlmutter, 1998, p.207). The Italian-led operation would: be commanded by General Luciano Forlani; composed of total 10 nations (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Turkey) nearly 7.200 troops; and last from 15 April 1997 to 10 August 1997 (Perlmutter, 1998, p.207).

The main tasks of the Multinational Force Mission would be

to guarantee principally the main entry points from Albania; to allow the free circulation main ways of communication of interest for the performance of the assigned tasks to the Mission; to assure that the operations backed by sufficient stocks were carried out without incidents and to supply with assistance in collaboration with OSCE and NGOs; to provide security during the elections to the OSCE observation team (Margeletti, 1997, p.31).

Accordingly, the structure of the Italian military presence was branched into several segments: 28 Gruppo Italian Navy that was operating from 15 April 1997; the Italian Delegation Experts; Italian Armed Forces; State Police to reconstruct the Albanian Police and the Finance Guard. Other 9 nations made relatively less contributions than Italy. Italian participation was quite comprehensive. For example, Italy sent 3500 troops and France comes the second with its 934 troops whereas Austria sent only 10 personnel and Belgium only 14 medical personnel. However, it should be emphasized that this operation can be defined as a “humanitarian assistance” in nature more than military operation (Puđu, 1998, pp.22-31).

Margeletti (1997, p.35) argues that “ALBA is certainly a good bench to test the structure of Command and Control even if the greater distance between Milan and Grosseto rather than between Vlore and Lecce cannot be forgotten.” The military system was thus experimented in a shorter distance between homeland and neighboring Albania. Italy is now “sure to have characterized a precise responsibility in commanding an out of area activity that would bring extra benefits for the future. Ever since its participation in the peacekeeping operations Italy had never implemented its task with such a great consideration and responsibility for an achievement (Margeletti, 1997, p.36). Similarly, from the outside view, as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Danish Foreign Minister Helveg Petersen argues, the role would be undertaken by “interested countries that would play in the Albanian operation led by Italy, indicates that this was a model for future European security initiatives” (Favretto and Kokkinides, 1997).

As the second case which symbolizes the prominence of Italian participation, UNIFIL II, practically, characterizes a bit dissimilar operation in terms of responsibility and weighting to the ALBA. Under the name of UNIFIL I, the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon had traced back to the 1970s when the Middle East conflict had been intensified on the Israel-Lebanon border in particular when the Palestinian armed forces had been transferred from Jordan to Lebanon and committed a commando attack in Israel. UNIFIL I, a relatively small peacekeeping operation deployed in 1978 would monitor the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.¹⁶¹ The conflict in the 2000s changed the conditions where the UNIFIL functioned (United Nations, n.d.). When the new conflict broke out in 2006 with the Israeli military campaign in the southern Lebanon, new but robust peacekeeping forces were required. Ronzitti and Di Camillo (2008, p.60) argue that “SC Resolution 1701 for establishing a new peacekeeping, UNIFIL II that was adopted unanimously, was preceded by an intensive diplomatic effort.” The Italian Government in pursuit of its interests and identity in the Mediterranean voluntarily organized a conference

¹⁶¹ It was created in accordance with the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

in Rome on 26 July 2006 where “the representatives of 15 States, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Fouad Siniora, and the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice” attended.¹⁶²

Upon the request of the Lebanon government the operations had been launched and then its mandate was extended up to the deployment of UNIFIL II. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council with its resolution 1701 called for “a full cessation of hostilities and the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations” (United Nations, n.d.).

UNIFIL would

[m]onitor the cessation of hostilities; Accompany the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in their deployment in Southern Lebanon; Help ensure humanitarian aid; Assist the government in keeping Southern Lebanon free from militias and foreign forces and to disarm armed groups; Assist the Lebanese government in securing its borders to prevent the entry of weapons and related materials (Marta, 4 September 2009).

The prominence of UNIFIL II is that it has an expanded mandate which increased the number of troops from 2,000 to 15,000 (from 29 nations).¹⁶³ The UN Security Council for the first time decided to send a Maritime Task Force as peacekeeping operation (United Nations, n.d.). However, it was also fully contributed by the EU and its Member States.

On the other hand, the EU promised to provide up to 7,000 peacekeepers to the UNIFIL in Lebanon – out of the 15,000 called for by UNSCR 1701 (Pirozzi, 2006, p.2).

¹⁶² Israel did not participate. The Conference, which was co-chaired by Italy and the United States, was also attended by the UN Secretary General (SG), Kofi Annan, representatives of the European Union and the President of the World Bank. A seven point plan, disclosed by the Lebanese Prime Minister at the Conference in Rome, was later adopted by the Lebanese Council of Ministers.

¹⁶³ Italy has the largest number of troops for the redeployment of UNIFIL II: at the end of 2006, the Italian troops are composed of 2,415 men among 26 contributing countries (France was the second with 1,617, and Spain was the third with 1,277).

3.3.3.3.2. EU/European Level

Italy's role in the operation, in theory, that is embodied within a European notion more than an Atlantic spirit. In principle, the EU preferred to contribute to the operation through its Member States, and the use of maritime. For example, the Operation Mimosa was launched by the Italian Navy "in support of the evacuation and the humanitarian activities in Lebanon in default of an EU dedicated framework". This operation then was supported by the US, Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom. Italy also initiated to build up an Interim Maritime Task Force (IMTF) to be replaced by the UNIFIL II Maritime Task Force (MTF) led by Germany (See also for example Caffio, 2006, pp.13-18).¹⁶⁴ The naval blockade was lifted by Israel as soon as Italy negotiated an agreement with Lebanon to deploy along with other willing countries - France, Greece and UK.

The lead of the IMTF was then taken within the framework of the EU. "The Minister of Defense Arturo Parisi declared that from February/March 2008 EUROMARFOR could be employed in the UNIFIL II framework under Italy's leadership. This means that the movement in the Mediterranean Sea in terms of naval forces led EUROMARFOR, for the first time to "activate to participate in a real world operation under UN mandate." EUROMARFOR was also favored by the Member States (France, Spain and Portugal) (Difesa, 2008). The EUROMARFOR mission under UNIFIL is tasked with

assisting the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and entry points and to fulfill their security responsibilities within Lebanese TTW, by conducting Surveillance and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) in order to prevent the flow of illegal arms and related materials into Lebanon. The mission includes an effective support to the Lebanese Armed Forces with the training provided to the LAF-Navy personnel, aimed to increase their Operational Capabilities (Lertora, 2008).

¹⁶⁴ Italy negotiated an agreement with Lebanon that was effective and Israel lifted the blockade for the air and naval blockade.

Italy is the 6th of 15 largest UN contributing members in 2006 when the UNIFIL II was launched (Global Policy, 2006). This did not change in 2008 (Global Policy, 2008). The EU has also the 2nd place among EU countries in the lists.

In general, in this section, it would not be the aim to display the quantitative dimension of the military engagements; rather, to mark the Italian efforts in the Mediterranean in particular within the Euro-Mediterranean security framework. Speaking for the both operations, there may be some common points:

First, in two cases, there was no direct military threat against European and global security; for that reason, these operations were carried out mainly humanitarian activities as well as monitoring and inspecting for the protection of the internal order. Under the leadership Italy, there are a number of humanitarian operations co-named Operation Pellican in Albania and Operation Mimosa in Lebanon. During the conflicts, NATO did not play a role, and the great powers showed no interest for participation since a large amount of their troops (mainly the land) have been operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the EU with its contributing nearly 8,000 peacekeepers (UN “blue helmets”) took its actions through its Member States. In that sense, Lebanon has been “a positive example of European commitment and provides an enormous opportunity to increase the Union’s standing in the Middle East, if adequate diplomatic follow-up is assured.” Italy has successfully accomplished the missions in the Mediterranean in terms of diplomacy and humanitarian assistance and become one of the powers –albeit medium-sized- that played a leading role in the absence of the great powers (Biscop and Missiroli, 2008, p.16).

3.3.3.4. Political/Economic Instabilities and Energy Needs

3.3.3.4.1. National Level

Italy's threat perception is less articulated than its security practices as Italy has maintained its bilateral relations at "friendship" or "partnership" levels since the mid-1990s. It can be said that Italy's relations with Libya in the 1980s and the early 1990s were shadowed by the international system of the Cold War. There were a number of problematic issues such as the expulsion of 20000 Italians from Libya and the issue of their goods, Italy's guarantee agreement on Malta's neutrality with Libya, Italy has restarted its diplomatic dialogue with Libya in 1996 when a Joint Stock Company would be established 1996 onwards, on the initiative of the first Prodi Government (Aliboni, 2001). Italy's good relations with Libya led to an Italo-Libyan declaration in 1998 which aimed at resolving the old issues including its colonial responsibilities and some contemporary issues such as migration, terrorism and energy between the two countries (Othman and Karlberg, 2007, p.41). Such an attempt can be interpreted as Italy's intention to "reintegrate the country into the international community" (Coralluzzo, 2008, p.121). In fact, the Declaration was not the most important step of Italy to push the EU for improving its relations with Libya. Individually, in 2004 Berlusconi's visit to Libya to launch a pipeline called Greenstream. Italy's economic ties are becoming much deeper which would also improve the economic relations within the region.

In Algeria, the most striking point is that during the civil war in Algeria, a NGO, the Community of St Egidio attempted to mediate and succeed in bringing the Algerian parties sign the so-called "Platform of Rome" in January 1995. However, the Algerian authorities who believed that the Islamists were responsible for the civil war, have started the civil war rejected the Platform. Italians were afraid that it did not want to worsen the relations with a country on which it depends in the energy sector. Finally the Platform of Rome was accepted by the President of Algeria, Bouteflika with some modifications (Coralluzzo, 2008, p.121).

Apart from that, the first bilateral summit in Alghero in 2006 resulted in a Joint Declaration which offered a deeper collaboration between the two sides in fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and energy (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, n.d). Italy mainly provides Algerian gas through a number of pipelines such as Transmed and Galsi.

Italy has also good relations with Morocco and Tunisia and numerous visits were made between two important Maghrebi countries at bilateral levels.

3.3.3.4.2. EU/European Level

Within Europe, the relations with the North Africa have begun to develop at bilateral levels, mainly in economic sectors. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, France agreed with Libya in the field of armament and energy; Spain on the hydrocarbons sector; Germany on chemicals and petrochemicals sectors (Zoubir, 2009, p.404).

European Union has projections mainly within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In political, economic and social baskets, the EU aimed at providing financial support and other activities initiated by the Member States of the EU to the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

Beside multilateral, at bilateral levels, Italy, Spain and Germany constitute the most trading partners with 80 per cent of Libyan exports and generating 75 per cent of Libyan imports (Joffe, 2001, pp.75–92). The most striking thing is that the trade between the parties continued even when the US sanctions were imposed.

Libya is one of the important countries in the region for European continent. It was the 1990s that marked a positive U-turn for Libyan-Italian relations, so did for Libyan-European relations. It was in the leadership of Italy the EU which had previously a common strategy for Libya in terms of embargo, started to use carrot through offering partnership while the US prefers carrot for the country. Italy's long diplomatic efforts

towards Libya yielded in the 1990s and partly ended its isolation from the international and regional system. Italy acted as a mediator between Libya and the West.

3.3.4. An Assessment of Italy within the Regional Security Complex

Italy is geographically a frontline country between Europe and Mediterranean. Its security identity is born out of and embedded within these two regions. Italy within the Regional Security Complex is also known as middle power or within this category or as a “medium-sized regional power” which has the mediating, facilitating and peacekeeping roles. In providing national and regional security, Italy uses Europe or the European Union as referent objects beside its national identity. In this section, Italy and Euro-Mediterranean Security will be assessed within the securitization context of Regional Security Complex, in particular in migration, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, military operations, and political/economic instabilities and energy needs.

First of all, in terms of interdependency, there is no doubt that Italy has always handled the migration issue in relation to Europe. As a fact, in the early years of the integration, in the 1960s and 1970s it was an emigrant country which provided unskilled labor force to the developed countries of the Union, in particular Switzerland and Germany. Therefore it did not pose any threat to European integration. Instead, some countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands launched several programs (including education courses) with an aim to integrate those immigrants to the other parts of Europe resulted in a more coherent Europe. However, over time the developed countries understood that these work labors bring social cost more than economic advantages. The 1980s and 1990s were the years which Italy has been transformed from an “emigrant” country to “immigrant” one just like the other European states. Migration as an “existential threat” against the European continent has become on the very top of national and European agenda in particular after the Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 and the internal borders were abolished in line with a single external border. The securitization of European borders at the same time

entails the construction of a European identity where national identities will be broadly incorporated. Political leaders of Italy thus acting a representative of European security identity through their discourses have become the defenders of identity and welfare of the European system. Migration issue is mainly securitized with reference to directly national identity and indirectly European identity against the “externals”. Italy similarly does not hesitate to use nationalistic, albeit including cultural, religious and ethnic elements that rooted in both Christian heritage and European identity against people from uncivilized Arab and Muslim world. Such a reality displays us the compatibility in securitization of migration issues between Italy and the EU.

Secondly, terrorism when related to organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration has become the main security issue in the EU level and national level policy making agenda. This package of problems that is mainly rooted in “migration” and Islamic fundamentalism cause ethno-national fear of foreigners and strong policing measures for “internal security”. Terrorism is a security phenomenon itself; however when combined with other issues it extends the scope of securitization. Security discourses mainly on the attacks of September 11 resulted in acts of arrests and exclusion of the Muslim Arabs. At first, it can be inferred that the European countries articulated their sympathy towards their fellow Americans in their discourse; however, when the terror spread throughout European soil, the issue has been much related to migration issue in the national and European security discourses. It was quite interesting in Italy that a considerable portion of population feels terrorism on their own soil. Similarly, Italian political leaders also use their discourses largely with reference to European security. Italians like other Europeans and unlike Americans link terrorism to socio-economic causes and development issues in particular in the other parts of the Mediterranean. On the other hand Americans see terrorism as a global issue as well as military and national security issue. Italy also conducts in European way in combating terrorism. Italians also have the responsibility of pursuing coordinated policies with regard to the other Member States of the EU.

Thirdly, at regional level, the most striking issue has always been the military conflicts in and around the European territory. The previous examples of Bosnia and Kosovo had also proved that Europe would be inevitably fragmented as a result of the clash of views among the great powers of the EU. However, in Albanian and Lebanese cases a similar threat perception is articulated by the Member States of the EU that is the humanitarian emergencies that would result in “migration”, and “weak state” in those regions. However, they showed much reluctance in acting as a leader in these conflicts. In regional thinking, as it is not blended with the global concerns medium sized countries can also take the leadership as in these cases. The conflicts are perceived as a threat against European stability and order since there may be a huge refugee flow from those regions. So, the most concerned state is the most affected one that is geographically close to the conflicting regions.

Speaking specifically for Albania, Italy’s close geographical, political and economical contact with the country pushed it to take the responsibility first. This is because the threat initially came to Italian territory, the refugees who would then pose threats to national, even the Union’s integrity and welfare structure. The securitization of military issues is also linked to the societal security issues. In Lebanon, Italy acted as a substitute for great powers such as France or the global power, the US. Since they have historical problems with the ethnic groups in the region, Italy as a medium-sized country would represent the “security provider” role in Lebanon. The region posed two major threats against the European continent. The first one is articulated by the European leaders, that is the humanitarian catastrophe in the region and enormous refugee flows to Europe. However, the threats perceived by the US were also considered by the Europeans and Italy in initiating the mission. Disarmament of Hezbollah and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important for global fight with terrorism. The Middle Eastern link to the global and regional security made the regional states mobilized with their full assets in the region and act in the name of the regional security.

Such local conflicts, if not directly state-to state conflicts, have the domino effect that may destruct the regional stability and peace. For the Member States of the EU and Europe, the main threat is seen first the likelihood of emerging a opposing sides and power politics, second the threat of refugees which may leave the Member States as a relevant country which is not involved in conflict. The second threat is more possible in the Italian case.

Forthly, the most difficult part of the regional analysis in this thesis is the political and economic section since the issues are mainly included in South-South dimension. It means that the European countries should deal with primarily the consequences of the political and economic instabilities which constitute then South-North threats. The main consequence of this type of stability is the migration flow from the South.

To put in another way, the political and economical instabilities constitute “intra-state and intra-region (Maghreb) levels since these weak states are incapable of reaching all over the countries in political, economical and social issues. The consequences of such weaknesses of the Southern states pushed the North to take adequate measures towards the region. In terms of perceptions, political and economic security is articulated at regional level. For Europe and more specifically the representation of the EU, liberal political and economic order must be secured, at least for in Europe. However, Italian and other European leaders choose to cooperate with the authoritarian leaders in the South. This is mainly due to the fact the Member States’ economic and societal needs such as ending migration flows and energy needs such as oil and gas. Europe’s energy interests and societal priorities portray their security concerns among all the projections in the region.

In conclusion, the huge migration influxes, local conflicts, terrorist acts and political and economic instabilities are all posing a direct threat first to the frontier countries which are the South Europeans such as Italy. Our case have also showed us that Italy and Europe in terms of security perceptions and practices are compatible with each other. Italy as a nation does not merely use “nationalistic” discourse; but also concerns “a

total European security”. Such an argument also brings us to a very conclusion that states have become more interdependent to their regional security settings and concerns.

CONCLUSION

National foreign and security policies play a substantial role in construction of regional security. Such an assumption is derived from the fact that a nation's security cannot be self-contained and considered independently from other regional states. To put it more concretely, European continent which in earlier times generated a global world system has always been shaped by the great power relations among the legacies of the Reich Germany, Napoleonic France and the British Empire. On the other hand Italy, not at times of ancient Rome or City Republics, but after its unification in 1860 started to build its security on such a network of the consistent alliances in Europe. The great powers of Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War put a considerable weight on Italy's security that was to play a key role in the Cold war due to its geographical position in the Mediterranean. Yet, its relatively weak position vis á vis the other powers has always been a contentious issue. With the end of the Cold War, this debate has dramatically changed since Italy has exposed to a number of security threats at one of the doorsteps of Europe, the Mediterranean. This is due to the geographical shift in world politics from the West-East to North-South axis. Such a radical change has compelled the European Union and its Member States to a number of securitizations of both Europe and the Mediterranean. In this context, Italy as a frontier (in between) state has considerably gained a new position to partake in the construction of "Euro-Mediterranean" security through its security discourses and practices.

Basically, the European Union is called by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever as a society of the centered regional security complex, the EU/European Security Complex. This security complex was built upon a number of securitization periods that passed throughout the nuclear confrontation experiences. These periods are significant for portraying how a society of regional states in Europe that is the European Union developed and the states are increasingly integrated into the EU/European security complex.

The EU/European security complex and a security community had been historically centered on the “Western Europe”. Therefore, European Security Complex was an area of confrontation between the two superpowers in the Cold War era in an anarchical environment. The region (the West Europe) was extensively penetrated by the US which also led NATO-ization of European security and two great powers, France and Britain. NATO-ization is one of the pillars of European Security which previously desecuritized Germany and Italy, and went through the securitization of a number of issues (perceived threats) that were: “internal political threat, the Communists; the interstate disputes and distrusts between the European states such as Germany, France and other medium sized and small states; the economy; and Soviet threat as a global threat and the dark shadow of the bipolar confrontation. The threats were not exactly perceived at the interregional level. The era between the 1950s and 1970s is described as “conflict formation”. The second period which we have pointed out as the “emergence of the security region” in Europe has started in the 1970s with the Ostpolitik, détente and the Helsinki Process. This period can also be interpreted as “desecuritization of Europe” and continued throughout the end of the 1990s. In a sense, the security structure evolved through a “mature anarchy” where states can cooperate in stable system. In this period, mutual military fears and the security dilemma had almost diminished in comparison with the securitization of previous era.

The end of the Cold War has brought up new security challenges and (re)securitizations in the EU/European Security Complex. The characteristics of the new era can be listed as follows: Only one superpower, namely the US, has managed to survive in different aspects; and there appeared three great powers which can have a huge capability when acting together with the EU (France and Britain, Germany). Second, with regard to the main assumption of the RSCT, the removal of the superpower influence left the regions more autonomous more than ever as a cluster of interdependent states. In this period, the European Security Complex has divided into two: the first one is the EU/Europe comprising the West, East and Central Europe; the other one is Russia-centered complex. Third, Europe has also undergone a deep transformation and adapted to the new changing security challenges through a “Europeanization” period. It definitely corresponds to the

institutionalization and a new emerging governance system at the European security policy level. European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP) that is composed of some type of institutionalization processes of the Union also makes a great impact on the foreign policies of the Member States of the EU or the actors. Member States also affect the EU-level decision making. In this context, a new level, that is interregional, has become almost the main focus of security understandings and practices, in particular in Europe. In this period, new political security concerns appear but are mostly conceived for “Europe” not “individual states.” Resecuritization has become possible towards the European security community which perceives threats from its periphery. One of the regions of its periphery is the Mediterranean. The other region was the East and Central Europe that was integrated within the Union. In these regions, the EU diffuses security with the purpose of guaranteeing a stable and peaceful security environment. This also implies a construction that also leads the Union to provide security after its security discourses and practices. This is, in this thesis, what we called “security diffusion”. As the subject of this thesis, the Mediterranean security that can also be seen under the label of “Euro-Mediterranean security” constitutes the main security priorities of the EU/European complex.

Historically, the European countries have contradictory observations that always resulted in different descriptions on the “Mediterranean” but still try to keep the region unified in definition: First there is no consensus of an existence of one single definition on the Mediterranean which will create a unity in discursive level. Instead, a description of “Mediterranean identity” seems quite challenging when it is complicated by the factors of historic, cultural and religious differences and political, social and economic injustice between the South and the North. This region has always been perceived as a source of conflict against the North (developed, democratic and West) from the South (colonized, poor, uncivilized Arab and Islamic countries), Islam - Christian and East - West. Since the early 1990s, Western states have attributed a growing importance to the Middle East and the North Africa under the label of the “Mediterranean. The Mediterranean includes at least two interrelated regions: The first one is the north-western sector, the other one is the south-eastern sector. For the former, geography encompasses three sub-regional groups:

southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta); the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority); and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). Albania is also included in this category. While EU leaders use “discriminatory” language in identifying their threats, they use specific discourses “unifying” the two shores to develop a set of cooperative and harmonious but asymmetrical relations the Mediterranean.

The term “Euro-Mediterranean” is to a great extent referred to the EU’s Mediterranean dimension as an institutional form of the Barcelona Process that started in 1995. The “Euro-Mediterranean” region geographically covers Europe and the countries bordering the Mediterranean. In this thesis, the “Euro-Mediterranean” was used first for depicting the security issues peculiar to the mutually affected Europe and the Mediterranean regions. The “Euro-Mediterranean” is closely related to the two shores of the region regardless of “threatened” and “threatening” elements, peoples, groups, states, issues. Second, in order to outline a comprehensive framework for the conditions which the multilevel security units securitize the issues and take the security measures. The difference between the emphases on the “Euro-Mediterranean security” and the “Euro-Mediterranean partnership” gives us the distinction between the “securitization” and “taking security measures”. In the former, the only focus is on the fact that there is a security threat from the region and mobilization of the people and community, more concretely the Europeans. The second term denotes to the EU’s security management or “region-building” mechanisms: The states of the two shores would maintain their relationship through the “partnership” which is also depicted under the “cooperative security” understandings and practices. In this section, it should not be concluded that “cooperative security” is only provided through the EMP’s “confidence building and security measures” but also through all the levels of security instruments at both the multilateral and bilateral levels.

As a fact, the main securitization issues are listed as “migration, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, regional and ethnic conflicts, WMD, political and economical instabilities and energy needs.” These are mostly securitized by the EU and the leaders of the Member States. Some scholars may classify these issues as North-South (referring to the relations between the Europeans and their Southern Partners) and South-South (referring to the relations among the EU’s Southern partners) dimension. It means that there are some issues that the North is mainly affected by such as “hard” security issues, energy and migration. On the other hand, political and economical instabilities are the main problems that must be resolved among the Southern partners. In the post-September 11 period, it can be argue that the EU has given substantial weight to the first category since the European leaders see the solution of the problems in more strengthened “partnership” mechanisms. For that reason, they go to keep their partnerships even with the authoritarian regimes in the South and do not intervene into the political issues that are related to regime structures.

Migration (regardless of being illegal or legal) is seen as a threat as if the receiving countries are invaded by poorer and less stable Muslim countries from the South. It has also been as an EU level problem given that it is not just a Mediterranean problem. The spill over effect of migration throughout the continent affected profoundly the other European countries. The Southern European states are also the transit states where the migrants cross in order to arrive in other European countries. For that reason, it is seen as an existential threat against the inner stability, structural security and European identity.

Second, terrorism has become one of the main security threats in Europe in particular after the terrorist attacks in the US in 11 September 2001. Securitization of Europe has also been possible with the Al Quida-linked bombings in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005. Such attacks resulted in a number of developments: Europeans have begun to adopt a kind of “clash of civilizations” logic in their discourses. Not at the EU level but at national level including governments and media have started to make effort to

prevent migration towards the Muslim communities and especially illegal immigrants in Europe.

Third security perception is related to the military threats related to the ethnic minorities; a sudden increase in the migrants and refugees in terms of “uncontrolled human movements” mainly coming from the Northern Iraq to Turkey and from Albania to Italy; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and any direct military attacks.

The fourth threat is perceived from the perspectives of South-to-South dimension. Thus, main challenges that are seen as economical and political first stem from the lack of “political legitimacy and economic development” in the Southern Mediterranean which are also as “weak states”. Second, energy is also a rising economical issue between the two shores of the Mediterranean region. The EU has a major interest in preserving stability in the Mediterranean not to impede gas and oil delivery which could be endangered by internal or inter-state conflict.

The process in the Mediterranean under which has started at discursive levels (in terms of security discourses, discourses of social and political and economic discourses), intensified at the institutional level through a variety of concrete practices. These practices that are Global Mediterranean Policy, Barcelona Process, the Neighborhood Policy and recently the notion of a Union all contributed to the institutionalization -in terms of “cooperative security” and “partnership”- of the construction of the Mediterranean region.

Although the EU has a constant framework for a “Euro-Mediterranean” security under the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, the construction of security in the region is not limited to the instruments of this partnership. This is due to, in this thesis we use “Euro-Mediterranean security” in terms of all the discourses and activities in the region at cross policy implementations levels. Any action taken in the Mediterranean in support of European security can be included within Euro-Mediterranean security framework. This is mainly apparent in the instruments of the EU used in the Mediterranean region as well as used in other regions.

Instruments used in the EU are listed as: economic, political and military. In economic instruments, trade and association agreements, MEDA then replaced by the ENPI aid programs; economic and diplomatic sanctions such as export and/or import bans, bans on investment, payments and capital movements, flight bans or the withdrawal of tariff preferences. Politically, the EU uses demarches, declaration, sanctions or restrictive measures. Military instruments are: Declarations, Communications, Dialogue, Confidence-Building and Security Measures, Common Strategy, Common Position, Council Regulation and Joint Action.

Related to the “securitizations” and the “security measures” in the Mediterranean, it can be contended that the former has not contain as “cooperative” elements as the latter includes. In other words, the EU and the Member States use a more “contradictory” or “discriminatory” terms in their discourses while they offer more “cooperative” security practices towards the South. No one can talk about an objective of creating a security community within the region given that there is a huge gap between the North and South in terms of security perceptions, articulations and practices.

Within this context, Italy’s position in the construction process is Italy’s foreign and security policy is the most striking one among others. Italy as a nation due to its geographical location and its history was completely interlocked between Europe, Mediterranean and a range of constraints of the international system. In this context, it would not be erroneous to indicate that Italian political approaches and choices are based on “Mediterraneanism”, “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism”. Italy’s foreign and security policy that has highly been attached to the regional security complex is also an extension of its domestic policy. Italian governments regardless of whether they are center-right or center-left have also similarity in their discourse and differences in the concepts and paradigms they used.

During the Cold War, “Mediterraneanism” emerged as an important aspect of the Italian foreign and security policy in the 1950s and used as “particularism”. The view was adopted in the fifties in the form of “neo-Atlanticism”, “pacifist Atlanticism” and “nationalist Mediterraneanism” and in the seventies and eighties in the form of anti-Atlanticism or “neutralism”. Mainly the Communists and Catholics politics used the idea that had become an Italian political rhetoric more than a practical foreign and security policy dimension. While during this era Mediterraneanism meant freedom from the economic conditions backed by external powers in the post-Cold War this idea did not worked in terms of “particularism”. In the new era, Mediterranean has never been a barrier to Atlanticism or Europeanism, but rather as a relatively advantage position within the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, Italy’s policy towards the Mediterranean definitely revolves around the EU’s Mediterranean policy, namely, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue.

As a defeated country and given its domestic considerations in the early years of the Cold War, Italy had become a subject an integral part of the super power rivalry and the US influence in Europe. For the US, the Italian inclusion was vital since Italy could affect the Mediterranean, the West Europe and the Middle East if the Communists will dominate the Italian political regime. On the other hand, Italy was highly dependent on the US support since it would restore its reputation in international arena and provide its presence. The US even intervened into domestic politics in order to suppress anti-communist sides in Italy. In addition, Italian acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons (Jupiter, Cruise and Pershing II) was meaningful since this would gain Italy an international prestige and counterbalance the European nuclear powers. In the post-Cold era, although Italy’s importance of the US and NATO in Italian security policy has remained central despite radical transformations both at international level and domestic level. In the security environment, Italy started to act as an active promoter in construction of European security. In particular, together with Spain and Portugal, Italy has been willing to take initiatives for a closer regional dialogue in the Mediterranean area within NATO and EU. The tasks in the Mediterranean should be implemented through European presence, in NATO partnership,

namely, the ESDP, WEU ESDI as the European pillar. It can be said that in the post-Cold War era, Italy has become more autonomous in the region but within NATO and the developing European foreign and security policy.

The most striking part of Italian identity formation is rooted in the notion of “Europeanism”. Italy’s position in European security complex provides us an apparent picture where Italy’s security settings well match with the evolution of European security complex. During the first years of the Cold War, Italy had sought to guarantee its security under the nuclear environment and until 1990s it had been a part of regional structure that was a scene of a number of national states of conflicts and distrust. In fact, Italy was not a country that incited a big threat against Europe where states fear each other due to their rearmament intentions. Mainly, Italy built its security dynamics on Europe where it can communalize the difficulties and achieve its economic development. Italy’s Europeanism is described as it always acted in favor of the European integration in order to survive in a safer European security regime. It gave a support to all aspects of European integration such as political cooperation in common foreign and security and cultural affairs and political and economic aspects to security. Italy’s views on the institutionalization are evidenced by its rejection of De Gaulle’s Fouchette Plan and support the Genscher-Colombo Plan and the Solemn Declaration and Venice Declaration in 1980. Such supranational attempts led Italy as other Members States of the EU the institutionalization of the EU that would turn into a security community.

As the main focus of this thesis, the post-Cold War era that has gained its autonomous status pushed the Member States to reconsider their security preferences, but in regional level. Therefore, Italy has pursued its integration in economical, political and security aspects. Italy had some difficulties with the economical “convergence criteria” of the Maastricht Treaty. Even though it struggled economically, it managed to enter the final stage of European Monetary Union. On the other hand, politically, Italy has faced a rivalry among European “big states”, France, Germany and Britain and two other external powers, the US and Russia in the region. Italy has experienced two-sided politics in the region:

First, it was earlier excluded from Franco-German Brigade, the Eurocorps initiatives, and from the Contact Group that was established during the Balkan wars of 1990s. However, Italy has been much more compelled to take more concrete steps: The Anglo-Italo proposal of late 1991 aiming to create a link between WEU and NATO., its peacekeeping operations in particular in the leadership of Operation of Alba and UNIFIL II, and its work on the Future of Europe Process that was to initiate the new European Treaty and the European Convention were the main indicators of Italian participation.

Thus, “Europeanism” is without a doubt, Italy’s first priority when regional challenges have become obvious, in particular in the Southern periphery of Europe. Italy is inevitably included such challenges which were mentioned above and has taken part in a number of security construction processes. These processes are made up securitization of the Mediterranean region that also articulate “Euro-Mediterranean”. Italy as a middle power being mediator, facilitator, peacekeeper and the main sponsor of multilateralism has been placed within the region, this time not in a hidden, but more active way. Italy has also played a role as a sea power which is responsible to defend not only national but also regional security, in every sector - military, political and economical-environmental and societal- such as regional conflicts, terrorism and natural disasters. However, it must be noted that in security realism Italy’s position is also undervalued vis á vis “big three” or “directoire”. Although Italy’s foreign and security policy is low profile among its peers, it has a considerable influence in particular in balancing the policies between Franco-German and British views.

Within this context, Italy’s securitization of the issues in the Mediterranean has two categories: The first one is security discourses and perceptions. The second one is the practices.

As an old emigrant country in the 1980s, it is surprising that since the 1990s migration (legal and illegal) has become the main societal security issue in Italy. Italy has probably the largest proportion of illegal immigrants in Western Europe. Illegal migration is mostly encouraged by small businesses, private care, domestic services as unregistered manpower. In national level, migration generates antagonistic atmosphere when it is felt as a (societal) threat against national identity and the integrity in terms of welfare, economic and social life in particular by the rightist parties. Such reactions push public into several xenophobic movements that are also linked to all kinds of negative expressions (crime, conflict, disorder). The exclusionary discourses and practice made by Italian politician leaders who underlines the security of the borders of national territory against non-EU nationals. Doing so they attribute a special statue called “extracommunitari”. Italian identity and European identity have the same threats against “third nationals” mostly coming from the North Africa and the Middle East. They also use a symbolic language as “Catholic faith”, “Italy as a colapasta”, “fortress Europe” to mark the commonality of Italian and European identities.

The implementations in Italy are grounded on a number of sources of internal and external pressure rather than a synthesis of independently established political decision-making process. In other words, Italy has been in a path comprising external Schengen-based constraints and internal political choices. Italy was shifted from being Europe’s “soft-belly” to a particular restrictive country. In this context, Italy nationally passed several laws in order to overcome illegal migration such as 1986 Law, Martelli Law in 1990, Turco-Napolitano Law in 1998 and Bossi-Fini Law in 2002. Accordingly such measures have taken for political asylum, employees, independent workers, workers and students, their entry and “permesso di soggiorno” for non-EU nationals in the country. These are regularization of illegal immigrants and family reunions, border controls, prevention of human trafficking, jail sentences for illegal migration business. As a result, Italy as a part of European region has built its migration discourses and practices as a result of inter-connections of local, national and supranational actors. Italy in an interdependent European security complex has constituted a part of a whole. Its articulations on the negative effects

of migration also much refer to the destruction of European integration and the measures are mainly taken within the context of the European Union policies.

Although, terrorism based on leftist, rightist and ethnic nationalist activities has been a “nationwide problem” in Italy since the 1950s it has been much concerned with the world-wide terrorism after the terrorist attacks in the September 11 2001 against the US. In the aftermath of the events, the toughest reaction came from Italian leader Berlusconi who claimed “superiority” and “supremacy” of Western civilization over Islamic civilization. Italy perceives “terrorism” together with “Islamic terrorism” or “international terrorism”. Europe and Italy felt the Islamic terror in the territory of Europe with the terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Madrid and London. Although there was no direct attack against Italy, it has felt the “fear of terrorism” in their homeland. The political elites listed terrorist attacks as the top of the security threats against Europe and Italy. Practically, there are a number of measures taken for war against terrorism. For example within the framework of EU regulations, as of 31 December 2001, the financial assets have been frozen towards numerous organizations. The entry into the territory of Italy and the applications of refugee status are now checked. Several suspected individuals who are members or sponsors of terrorist activities all around Italy have been arrested.

Italy’s terrorism experiences display quite an interesting picture in Italy since it has no direct attack on its territory. Italian leaders’ articulation of terrorism that is in European vocation largely refers to European integration more than Italian security and European identity that is perceived more civilized and “superior” in securitization processes of European region. Their statement that Europe is attacked also interprets Italy as a responsible Member State for protecting European security.

The securitization of military issues in the Mediterranean clearly indicates that Italy has conventionally been interlocked to the regional settings such as NATO, the UN and EU due to the Italy’s Mediterranean character. In the post-Cold War, militarily, Italy’s commitments to NATO have become more autonomous and specified. This is because

Italy is now exposed to new danger in the new security conditions led such a medium-sized/middle power to share a burden in international and regional security and stability. Italy's engagement is active, even pro-active in crisis management activities. There are two cases for peacekeeping activities: The first one is Operation of Alba and the second one is UNIFIL II in Lebanon. In comparison with Italy's European, global and Mediterranean attachments, it can be said that it newly articulated Mediterranean role cannot detract from the fact that in geostrategic, political and economic terms, Italy is necessarily a "European country." However, in the post-Cold War era, Italy's Mediterranean vocation is also linked to a blend of NATO and EU priorities and implementations.

Italy has a constant role in ensuring security and stability in its own and Europe's neighborhood which it aims at preventing European views that are composed of "humanitarian concerns" and the Atlantic approach that is directly related to the "global fight with terrorism." Italy's most concrete argument is that it does not have enemies in the region unlike France or the US and can be the facilitator for the solution of the crisis by leading the peacekeeping forces in the region and to prevent a massive flow of immigrants.

On the other hand, Italy has strong political and economical ties with the region. Italy like the whole EU has a priority energy issue as the first issue. In this respect, Italy has improved its relations with its ex-colonies such as Libya. For example, Italy's oil interests are effective in its maintenance of good relations with Libya. Likewise, Italy's low profile towards Algeria in the crisis times of 1990s not to worsen the relations with the authorities of a country that Italy and Europe depended in energy field. Italy unlike France in its Algerian case went further by apologizing for the happenings in Libya during its colony times. Its interference in those states' domestic politics remained relatively weak in when compared to other security issues such as migration, terrorism and etc. Since political and economical instabilities are South-South dimension, it is the most difficult part of securitization process, in particular in taking measures.

In conclusion, Italy represents one of the most “regional” states in EU/European Security Complex. This is due to the fact that as a defeated country it had built its security on European security dynamics that is mixed with transatlantic security considerations. In the post-Cold War period, it has started to reconsider its security priorities in the Mediterranean mainly within the context of EU/European context.

APPENDICES

Appendix I. The Mediterranean




Source: Worldatlas.com

Appendix II. The Political Map of Italy



Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html>

Appendix III. Gas Pipelines In The Mediterranean



Source: Hayes, M.H.(2004). *Algerian Gas to Europe: The Transmed Pipeline and Early Spanish Gas Import Projects*. Working Paper 27.

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