

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL
CRISES IN THE CONTEXT OF HER RELATIONS WITH THE EU**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Armağan GÖZKAMAN

İstanbul – 2010

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın ana hedefi, Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği'nin küresel platformdaki temel sorunlarla mücadelelerindeki uyumluluğu, özellikle uluslararası krizleri merkez altına alarak, araştırmaktır. Bu amaçla, ilk ana bölümde kavramsal ve tarihsel arka plana yer verilmiştir. İlk olarak uluslararası krizin ve ilgili kavramların tanımı - tarihsel süreç de ortaya konarak – verilmiş, daha sonra da Türkiye'nin ve AB'nin krizlere verdikleri tepkilerde paralellik oluşmasını sağlayan faktörler incelenmiştir. Son bölümde bu iki aktörün kriz yönetimiyle ilgili olarak geçirdikleri tarihsel evrim, NATO'ya da yer vererek incelenmiştir.

İkinci ana bölümün ana araştırma temasını, bu iki aktörün olgusal uyumunu araştırma teşkil etmiştir. Bu çaba, üç bölüm aracılığıyla somutlaşmıştır. Birinci bölümde diplomatik girişimler incelenmiş, ikinci bölümde ise operasyonel alandaki paralellik ve farklılıklara odaklanılmıştır. Çalışmanın son kısmı, Türk dış politikası açısından önem taşıyan Kıbrıs ve Irak vakalarının incelenmesine ayrılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Uluslararası kriz, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, dış politika

ABSTRACT

The main goal of the study has been to seek whether there is a compatibility between Turkey and the European Union (EU) in meeting the key challenges in the global platform, with a special focus on the international crises. With this purpose, the first part has been allotted to the conceptual and historical background. It began with an effort to define the international crisis (and the concepts derived from it) by presenting a historical development. Then, the factors that provide a parallelism for Turkey's and the EU's reactions to crises have been explored. The last chapter was related to the historical evolution of crisis management in these two polities by according a place to NATO.

In the second part, factual compatibility of action between the two actors constituted the main research theme. This effort has been materialized through three chapters. At first, diplomatic initiatives have been exposed. The second area of focus concerned the parallelism and divergences in the operational field. Last, the following two cases have been studied because of the particular importance that they have for Turkish foreign policy: Cyprus and Iraq.

Keywords: International Crisis, Turkey, European Union, Foreign Policy

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| AFOR | Albania Force |
| AFSOUTH | Allied Forces Southern Europe |
| AKP | Justice and Development Party |
| AMIS | African Union Mission in Sudan |
| BG | Battle Group |
| BSEC | Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation |
| CEEC | Central and eastern European country |
| CEI | Central European Initiative |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CSCP | Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform |
| EC | European Community |
| ECAP | European Capability Action Plan |
| ECU | European Currency Unit |
| EDA | European Defence Agency |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| EOKA | National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters |
| EP | European Parliament |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| EU COPPS | EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support |
| EUFOR Althea | EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| EUISS | European Union Institute for Security Studies |
| EUJUST LEX | European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq |
| EULEX | European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo |
| EUMC | European Union Military Committee |
| EUMS | European Union Military Staff |
| EUPM | European Union Police Mission |
| EUPOL COPPS | EU Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support |
| GNAT | Grand National Assembly of Turkey |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| ICISS | International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty |
| IFS | Instrument for Stability |
| IGC | Iraqi Governing Council |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| JFC | Joint Force Command |
| KDP | Kurdistan Democratic Party |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| MEDO | Middle East Defence Organisation |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilisation Force in Haiti |
| MONUC | United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NACC | North Atlantic Cooperation Council |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NSP | National Space Board |

| | |
|----------|---|
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development |
| OMLT | Operational Mentor and Liaison Team |
| ONUCI | United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| OSCE BMO | OSCE Georgia Border Monitoring Mission |
| OSCE KVM | OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission |
| PBC | Peace Building Commission |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| PKK | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| PUK | Patriotic Union of Kurdistan |
| R2P | Responsibility to Protect |
| SAA | Stabilisation and Association Agreement |
| SG/HR | Secretary General / High Representative |
| SECI | Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative |
| SEECF | Southeast European Cooperation Process |
| SFOR | Stabilisation Force |
| SPSEE | Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe |
| TAF | Turkish Armed Forces |
| TEU | Treaty on European Union |
| TFSC | Turkish Federated State of Cyprus |
| TIKA | Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency |
| TIPH | Temporary International Presence in Hebron |
| TMT | Turkish Resistance Organisation |
| TRNC | Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMI | United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq |
| UNAMID | African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon |
| UNIIMOG | United Nations Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group |
| UNIKOM | UN Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force |
| UNMIK | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNMISSET | United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor |
| UNMIT | United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor |
| UNOMIG | United Nations Observation Mission in Georgia |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCOM | United Nations Special Commission |

| | |
|--------|--|
| UNTAET | United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States of America |
| WEAG | Western European Armament Group |
| WEAO | Western European Armament Organisation |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WMD | Weapon of mass destruction |

INTRODUCTION

“Do Turkey and the EU react to the international crises in a similar manner?” is the main question that drives the present study which aims, as its title suggests, to assess the reactions of Turkey to international crises in the context of her relations with the EU. The attempt to accomplish this task requires that these two actors’ logic and actions be exposed. There are certainly some factors which promote the compatibility between them in the field of crisis management as well as some handicaps which limit it. Asserting both the negative and the positive elements that determine its degree seems to be useful for arriving to conclusions.

Inevitably, some peculiarities need to be invoked at the outset. The first point that should be focussed on is the word crisis itself which has implications on the security and defence realm which refer to ‘high politics’. This does not mean that crisis management is conceived in a static domain. Global evolutions necessitate the (re)adaptation of existing concepts, if not the invention of new ones. That of the crisis management is not spared of this dynamism. The whole international community has to revise its foreign and security policies. Those states that can create an added value to the management of crises and those that undergo the direct consequences of them find themselves in a particular position –it goes without saying that both of the criteria may apply to many. For some, the involvement in the crisis management activities becomes therefore more likely than others.

In addition, the management of crises requires a “multi-dimensional” approach. The general trend is hence to integrate military and civilian components. It involves the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the states that after the building up of the stability. As will be shown in this study, this approach is particularly visible in the EU’s actions. Turkey is also going through an evolution process on this matter, which makes us see that the civilian power is replacing the traditionally military conception that marks the decisions of intervening in foreign crises.

Another peculiarity is related to what the present study is based on: The comparison between two different levels of decision-making. On one side, there is a sovereign state; while on the other, a supranational entity –whose decisions on crisis management touch mostly the intergovernmental domain. Although the latter refers to the most developed integration model, it is made of sovereign states; except some areas, supranational decisions are taken in national level. It is therefore difficult to assert a unified, single view from Brussels.

Comparing Turkey and the EU poses another question in what regards the ‘numeric indicators’. The total population of the EU’s 27 member states was around 500 million in 2009 when Turkey’s population topped 71 million. However, according to the *Eurostat Yearbook 2008*, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was 23.500 Euros in the EU territory while it was 4.400 in Turkey. The allocation of funds to the research and development (R&D) were not conducive to optimism either: Despite a high annual growth rate, the sum of Turkey’s R&D expenditures was one third of the EU average in 2006. One can claim, in the light of these statistical data, that the difference of development between Turkey and the EU should be kept in mind while comparing the range of action in the international platform.

Attention being drawn to the points that pose difficulties for the present research, its general outline can be exposed. Two main pillars will be asserted to encompass the subject. First of all, it seems plausible to present the conceptual grounds on which a compatibility between Turkey and the EU flourishes. It is important to note that they are closely linked to the developments that occurred in time. Therefore, in the first part of this study, a historical perspective will accompany the conceptual one.

Based on these grounds, the second part will centre on the factual compatibility between Turkey and the EU in the field of crisis management. The conformity of actions can be observed through ‘diplomatic initiatives’ and ‘military operations’ which will be the first two chapters. A third one, which will present the sophisticated case studies of Cyprus and Iraq, will follow next.

To accomplish this study, primary and secondary sources are used. The former includes texts of law, treaties, interviews conducted by the author and media articles. The latter include books, journal articles, official statements, parliamentary records, government publications, media interviews and dictionaries.

However specific a study on Turkey and the EU may be, there is a need to address the wider relations between the two entities. This is a hot topic and there are lots of writings and discussions on it. Turkey is willing to join the EU and is officially declared candidate ten years ago. Yet, the EU members’ inclination to accept this country’s accession varies from one to another for several reasons.

Hence, in this introductory section, it is useful to present a historical overview of the relations between Turkey and the EU. An observation deserves to be made beforehand:

Turkey's EU bid reflects two idiosyncrasies. First of all, it is the longest period of candidacy. The difficulties were related both to European-level issues and to Turkey's internal problems. Second, it is a very rare example in which complete consensus on accession does not exist: So far, only the UK had problems due to Gaullist France's obstinacy to refuse its demand of accession to the then European Communities.

Turkey's European odyssey started in July 1959 when the government of Turkey sought an association agreement with the EEC shortly after a similar demand made by the Greek government. As a result, Ankara Agreement was signed on 9 September 1963. In 1973, the Agreement was modified by the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. Since then, the relations between the two parties have been shaped by various economic and political factors.

Despite warnings coming from European side, Turkey made an application for full membership to the Community on 14 April 1987.¹ The negative reply was given a year and half later, on the grounds that an enlargement was not on the agenda: the priority must be given to the consolidation of the structure envisaged by the Single European Act and it was unwelcome for the Community to start accession negotiations with any state before 1993, the Commission declared in its avis on Turkey's application. Moreover, Turkish case presented a number of specific problems: the weak economic position, political issues between Turkey and a Community member state (namely Greece, which was strongly opposed to Turkey's accession at this time) and problems concerning human rights, minorities and the quality of Turkish democracy. The Commission considered however that Turkey might qualify for membership and encouraged the strengthening of the links established under the Association Agreement.²

As Baykal and Arat remind, in 1990s, there are several developments which had a serious impact on the relations between Turkey and the EU.³ The beginning of the decade was marked by a profound transformation of the international system: the regime change in central and eastern European states which adopted parliamentary democracy and economic

¹ Following the military coup of 1980, the association agreement was frozen between that year and 1986. Turgut Özal, the then prime minister, made this move as a 'shock therapy' in order to ameliorate relations with the Community.

² The Council of Ministers endorsed the *avis* of the Commission on 3 February 1990.

³ BAYKAL Sanem, ARAT Tuğrul, "AB ile İlişkiler" (Relations with the EU) in ORAN Baskın (Ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası. Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (Turkish Foreign Policy. Facts, Documents, Interpretations from the Independence War on), Vol. II, İletişim, İstanbul, 2005, p: 326.

liberalism. This new era provided the EU with the possibility to incorporate those states which, although historically and culturally part of the Europe, had remained victim of an artificial division of the Old Continent in the period following the end of the 2nd World War.

Such an opportunity necessitated serious burdens indeed. Wide-range financial and technical programmes, framed by *Europe Agreements*, have been built in order to help those states in their transition periods. The systemic transformation coincided with the Community's transformation plans. As a prolongation of earlier pledges, an economic and monetary union was planned to be effective in the first half of 1990s. In addition to this and due to developments in the international context, building a political union was also gaining ground. Hence, the Treaty of Maastricht (effective as of 1993) established the European Union.

The room of manoeuvre provided by the systemic change, accompanied by the above-mentioned progress, allowed the Union to discuss such matters as identity and culture. Hence, defining the frontiers of Europe was a more sensitive question than it has ever been. This was a hot topic for Turkey because, in this new era, her belonging to the European civilisation would be called into question. The problem originated from the fact that general European perception on this delicate issue diverged from that of Turkey.

In addition, the strengthening of the human rights rhetoric had negative consequences for Turkey. In the aftermath of the Cold War, human rights have been a determining factor in European states' relations with third parties.⁴ The very unfortunate event for Turkey was the 1980 military coup which severely deteriorated Turkey's image in European countries and perturbed the flow of relations between Turkey and the Community.

The economic and political instability in Turkey further complicated the relations between Ankara and Brussels. The excessive use of force during the fight with the PKK intensified the allegations concerning human rights abuse in Turkey. In addition, Greco-Cypriot problems had constituted severe barriers for the progress of Turkey's EU bid.

Full membership perspective was another point of discord between the two sides. European states preferred to manage the relations with Turkey in an overall framework of

⁴ In order to prevent misunderstandings, it is useful to remind that human rights have had this feature in earlier periods of European integration as well. For instance, during the CSCE negotiations in 1973-1974, the Community member states have unanimously maintained that the 3rd basket of Final Act be allotted to the affirmation and respect of fundamental rights in Iron Curtain countries. Examples concerning Western countries can also be given: The return to democracy in Greece and Portugal was necessary for these two countries to join the Community.

partnership although Turkey's objective was a full-fledged membership of the EC/EU. This divergence of view is ongoing.

Within this context and in conformity with the dispositions of the Additional Protocol, a customs union between Turkey and the European Union came into force on 31 December 1995. The main problem related to its functioning was the Greek veto of the 375 million ECU grant in 1996 –lifted in 1999 following the general rapprochement between the two countries. Another difficulty that Turkey had to confront the same year was the EP's call on the European Commission to withhold the money destined for Turkey under the Barcelona process unless it was used to promote democracy, human rights and civil society, and the Commission agreed not to disburse the money until it had consulted with the EP.

The Luxembourg Summit of 1997 failed to qualify Turkey as a candidate while recognizing its eligibility for membership –although the European Commission had stated in July of the same year that Turkey qualified for EU membership and declared that it would be assessed on the basis of the same objective criteria as other candidate countries – and did not include Turkey in the group of countries named for inclusion in a second round of formal accession negotiations. Instead, it imposed special additional requirements for her accession. For its part, the European Council was of the view that the strengthening of Turkey's ties with the EU depended partly upon the progress of Turkey's programme of political and economic reform; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, and support for action taken under the auspices of the UN to achieve a solution to the issue of Cyprus.

Highly unsatisfied with the current situation, Turkey presented its own strategy for the development of relations between Turkey and the EU later in 1998. It made the general point that the customs union could not exist in isolation from a guarantee of eventual full membership of the Union. Turkey called on the Association Council to approve a strategy towards this goal.

A new breakthrough in the relations of the EU and Turkey came at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, where EU heads of state and government declared that Turkey was a candidate state destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria applied to the other applicant countries. As a corollary, it would benefit from a pre-accession strategy as all other candidates did. Such a strategy required a partnership for accession which was

formulated by the European Commission in November 2000. In what regards Turkey's future accession to the EU, the partnership document defined:

- political and economic priorities in function of Copenhagen criteria and the obligations of EU member states;
- financial resources destined to support Turkey in the implementation of these priorities.

These developments found their echoes in Turkey through Constitutional revisions and reform packages.⁵ They were related to the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms (as illustrated by the formal abolition of the death penalty) including the freedom of thought, expression and assembly, non-Muslim religious foundations' rights of acquiring (and disposal of) property, television and radio broadcasting and education in vernacular languages and dialects.⁶ Further steps taken in the implementation of relevant reforms included measures of preventing torture and ill-treatment within the framework of the "zero-tolerance policy", efforts of promoting gender equality, the schooling of the police in human rights and the lifting of the state of emergency in the last two cities where it had applied in view of PKK activities. The reform process was accompanied by improvements in the economic realm as well.

At the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, a date for entry was set for ten candidate states and it was decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey without delay in December 2004, on the condition that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria.⁷ Furthermore, during the Summit it was agreed to strengthen the existing accession strategy for Turkey with a view to supporting Turkey in its road to accession, the Commission was invited to intensify the process of screening Turkey's legislation. Parallel to that it was indicated that the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU would be expanded and deepened and the pre-accession funds would be increased significantly. Copenhagen summit

⁵ Between 19th of February 2002 and 14th of July 2004 eight reform packages have been adopted.

⁶ In 2002, Kurdish-language broadcasting by Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the national public broadcaster of Turkey, started.

⁷ Those criteria, which were adopted during the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, describe what the EU membership requires for any candidate country. Hence, the latter should have achieved the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for – and protection of – minorities; have a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; be able to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

was hence certifying Turkey's candidate status amid discussions on downgrading her fifty-year relations with the EU to a privileged partnership.

Another encouraging event from the EU side comes by the Commission's Recommendation based on the 2004 Progress Report. The Commission advises the member states to start accession negotiations with Turkey by recognizing that Turkey has sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and by concluding that the overall effect of Turkey's accession would be positive for the Union. All these assertions do not lead to any doubt against Turkey's candidate status, but it may still be relevant to point out that the Commission's Recommendation reiterated the phrase used in the Helsinki Summit decision: Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU. Parallel affirmations took place later that year, during the Brussels summit. Moreover, a major breakthrough came out when – based on the resolute steps taken by Turkey in pursuing a comprehensive reform process – the EU heads of states and governments decided to open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005.

Nevertheless, the accession talks will be of open-ended nature. Turkey's full-fledged membership will not occur automatically: when the time comes, this will be decided depending on circumstances. As underlined by former British Foreign Office Secretary, there is a long way to go for Turkey and the progression will be '*rigorous and challenging*'.⁸ The EU institutions were justifying this view in 2006: The report voted by the European Parliament (EP) had qualified Turkey's progress towards EU membership as "insufficient"⁹ two months before the Commission's critical report on Turkey.¹⁰

The pessimism reached a higher level when the decision of the Council in December 2006 to suspend 8 of Turkey's 35 negotiating 'chapters' because of its failure to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes has effectively led to a partial suspension of Turkey's membership bid. Although Turkey is keen to see the issue of its membership status resolved without reference to the Cyprus problem, other Member states take entirely the opposite view, arguing that only by addressing Cyprus will it be possible to re-open the

⁸ This was Jack Straw's statement to press right after the agreement on the beginning of negotiations had been reached between Turkey and the Union. For his part, Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister back then, welcomed the agreement and qualified it as a historical turning point. "What is important for us is that the perspective of a full membership is very clear. No privileged partnership alternative is at stake", he said. See "La Turquie a Engagé des Négociations Historiques avec l'UE en vue de son Adhésion", *Le Monde*, 04/10/2005.

⁹ EURLINGS Camiel (Rapporteur), "Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, Committee on Foreign Affairs", *European Parliament*, 2006/2118(INI), 13/09/2006.

¹⁰ Turkey 2006 Progress Report, *Commission Staff Working Document*, Commission of the European Communities, COM 2006/649 Final Brussels, 08/11/2006, p: 75.

suspended chapters. With no immediate EU or UN brokered solution on the horizon, the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus looks set to continue. This, however, did not prevent the opening of nine chapters between 2007 and 2009.¹¹

¹¹ These are the chapters on Enterprise and Industrial Policy; Statistics and Financial Control; Health and Consumer Protection; Trans-European Networks; Company Law and Intellectual Property Law; Economic and Monetary Policy; Information Society and Media; Taxation; Environment. The opening of the chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy was blocked by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

PART I

CONCEPTUAL and HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As the old saying goes, an ounce of cure is worth a pound of prevention: dialogue and constructive action are much cheaper than dealing with the consequences of a disagreement which turns into violence. That is why the prevention of negative developments which may have impact on peace and stability before they emerge is the immediate diplomatic priority in international relations. However, it is not always possible to deal with all problems in time in a way to prevent the outbreak of conflict. Besides, there is always a risk that unexpected conflicts occur, no matter how sophisticated and widely-used the prevention instruments are. This creates the necessity for building rapid reaction and long-term support mechanisms for managing crises.

Certainly, there is not always a complete commonality of the policies adopted or actions taken by Turkey and the EU. This fact is hard to criticise because all states and international actors have differing perceptions on foreign policy issues. Moreover, even the EU member states do not always share the same perceptions on the latter. Yet, there are considerable similarities between Ankara and Brussels that can not be equalled to a bulk of random actions and that lead to consider the existence of firm conceptual and historical grounds.

Therefore, the objective of this part will be to present the conceptual underpinnings of crisis management together with its development in time. The latter will concern not only the incorporation of this concept into the policy of states and international organisations, but also the processes that Turkey and the EU have gone through. In order to serve this purpose, a three-chapter structure will be adopted. The first one will – after providing the semantic clarifications of the related notions – present a historical evolution of the crisis concept. The following two chapters will focus on the two main actors of this research. The one will be allotted to the factors that provide common perceptions for them while the other will treat of their evolution in the field of crisis management.

I.A. Crisis Management: Meaning, Evolution And Politicisation

There has never been a state that ruled alone on a given geography in total isolation from others. Nations had always been obliged to live in interaction with others, in some cases within the same frontiers. Geographic vicinity of states makes them affected by the same conditions. Besides, most of the time, the developments in one of them have impact upon others.

An analysis of the recent history shows that crisis management has been gaining ground incrementally on the formulation of foreign policy actions. This trend is also visible when the level of analysis is shifted from states to the international organisations. Hence, in this section of the study, following the necessary explanations on the signification of crisis management and the definition of the related concepts, the evolution of the attitude towards the crises will be asserted before moving on with the particular cases of Turkey and the EU. Before proceeding with these sub-sections, resorting to some clarifications of the concept of crisis seem necessary.

I.A.1. Semantic clarifications on the notion of crisis management

Before attempting to define the word ‘crisis’, it is useful to remind that the task is not an easy one because of three main reasons. First, the word is overused and may refer to a wide range of situations. There are cases that differ widely on many counts, but they are all defined as crisis. For instance, two different operations launched by NATO, the one which aims to end the atrocities in Kosovo and the other to combat the piracy off the Somali coasts, can be (and in fact are) asserted as crisis management operations. Any unstable and stressful condition may be qualified as a crisis.

A second reason why there is such difficulty regards the variable nature of crises and changes in the international environment following the Cold War. As shown by the examples below, the definitions of crisis made during that period are not adequate to comprehend modern crises. Depending on international context, the concept of crisis needs to be defined in time, and the conceptual limits must be given in a way to give the possibility to tackle with the issue in a right way. Thus, it can be said that the characteristics of the crisis – accompanied by the peculiarity of each crisis – create pessimism on the easiness of defining the concept of crisis management.

What is more, the definition will differ whether a wide or narrow sense will be taken into consideration.¹² In case of ‘global treatment’, preventive action to prevent the situation from becoming a crisis or coping with it by preventive diplomacy – not to mention preventive deployment – will be part of the solution.¹³ Taking into charge the ‘peak’ stage of confrontation will certainly require shorter-term efforts.

Third, the difficulty of definition does not only belong to the theoretical realm: There is also an operational aspect of crisis management. Identifying a situation as a crisis is a political choice that has operational implications.¹⁴ From the moment of definition on, governments find themselves in a situation of responsibility. Since the latter may culminate in ‘hard choices’, it is normal to observe vigilance on the decision-makers’ side in the definition of crisis.

I.A.1.a. International crisis: Meaning and Characteristics

The crises are as old as the nations. In ages, there certainly has been a variation in the kind of crises: terrorism, narcotic materials, weapons of mass destruction which are the items on international agenda nowadays, but have not preoccupied the nations during the Middle Ages. Having pointed on this issue, the fact that the word crisis may be used as a reference to different concepts should be asserted. This is the reason why, in order to avoid semantic confusions, the concept of crisis will be defined in this section.

What should be understood from the word ‘crisis’? Reminding that the answer may change according to the choices of time and circumstances that one will make, making an etymological study on “international crisis” and asserting the motivations of the states to intervene in crisis situations may be a pertinent effort. The use of the word crisis dates back to antique Greece. It first appeared as *krinein*, which means ‘to judge’. This Greek word was later used as a ‘distinction’ and ‘to distinguish’. The Latin word ‘*crisis*’ lost its original meaning of ‘judgment’ and ‘decision’ to become ‘*crisin*’ in the 14th century and ‘*crisis*’ in the 16th. It then acquired its current meaning.

The study of international crises as a research discipline is a new phenomenon. The first syntheses date of mid-1970s. Researches in the United States of America, stimulated by

¹² TERCINET Josiane, “L'UE et la Gestion des Crises” in *La Défense Européenne* (Colloque du vendredi 1er février 2002 sous la responsabilité scientifique de Joelle le Morzellec et de Christian Philip), Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003, p: 121.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ LORD Carnes, “Crisis (Mis-)Management”, *Joint Force Quarterly*, no: 22, Summer 1999, p: 73.

the Cuban missile crises, has paved the way¹⁵. Crisis management, as a new study branch of international relations, was brought into existence from the researches and reflections of that time.

According to Charles Hermann, a crisis is a situation described by three conditions: *It threatens the high-priority objectives of a decision unit; reduces the time of available response before the decision is transformed into action; surprises the decision-unit members by its occurrence.* General Beaufre's definition made in 1974 defines the crisis as a "*state of tension during which there is a maximum risk of escalade towards an armed conflict and in which one side desires to prevent its adversary from acquiring some political or military advantage; the latter represents a stake of the crisis, thus, for the defender, the minimum risk*". For Philippe Moreau Defarges the crisis is "*a moment of tension which brutally puts at stake the fundamental interests of two or several states, with the initiative of one or some of them; it leads then, after a struggle, to the relaxing of the tension and to a form of real or apparent agreement among the partner-adversaries*".¹⁶

Based on the above-mentioned quotations, some features of the notion of 'crisis' may be delineated. Thus, the crisis refers to a break-off within a political system. It forces the decision-makers define a position in favour of either the conservation or the transformation of a given system, within the perspective of returning to the balance. The reason of this necessity is directly linked to the preservation of national (sometimes vital) interests. Applied to an international system, the crisis may be the consequence of both a situation of pressure and an offensive intention of an actor. In any case, as a threat for the national or international security, it necessitates the rapid adoption of appropriate measures and the implementation of appropriate decisions to resolve it.

¹⁵ DUFOR Jean Louis, *Les Crises Internationales: du Pékin (1900) au Kosovo (1999)*, Editions Complexe, Paris, 2001, p:17.

¹⁶ Another effort of definition by the same scholar is as follows: "*the breach of a dynamic balance which results from a power relation and from a confrontation of actions having different natures which are made according to general tendencies of states*". In similar lines, General Poirier defines the crisis simply as an "*abrupt or gradual deterioration of balance factors which provide ordinarily the relations of co-existence between states*". According to Alastair Buchan, the crisis is a "*period of a conflict among two or more states which occurs when one of the parties has challenged one another on a precise or definable point and when a decision should be taken on the response to give to this challenge*". Among many other definitions, let us add the one that is made by Raymond Aron: "*When the war is unthinkable (...) the crisis is this form of modest violence, of unachieved confrontation, intended to weigh heavy on the determination of the other in order to constraint it to give up its legitimate interests, and to obtain from it concessions that are not worth the stake and the risk of total war*". Ibid, pp: 18-19.

With this in mind, it is possible to present the first definition of the international crisis: An event that leads the foreign governments to act in order to deal with a situation that destabilises – or has the potential to destabilise – another state. It is important to note that classical definitions do not always draw a fit-for-all scheme: the international crisis may not be characterised by an opposition of motivations between the actors. In some cases, the intervention is desired by the state that confronts the instability; in others, it is made against its will for helping those who suffer. One should remember that the interests of the intervening states may not be directly affected by the crisis or not affected at all. As examples reveal, the participation to crisis management efforts may be made within a spirit of alliance.

The second attempt to assert what should be understood from the phrase ‘international crisis’ will put forward its humanitarian characteristic, in which the notion of intervention – and, consequently, that of sovereignty – is to be analysed. A humanitarian crisis is an event or series of events which represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area. There are many types of emergency that can be addressed under this title which include, *inter alia*, armed conflicts, epidemics, famine, natural disasters. The ones that will be taken in this study concern long-term man-made disasters related to “civil strife, civil war and international war”. In other words, they are complex emergencies which are related to armed conflict and wars.

Whether they are of political or humanitarian nature, at least five characteristics of crises can be distinguished nowadays. First, they are more numerous, as a consequence of the end of bipolar confrontational international system. In the absence of this limiting context, nationalist tensions and religious rivalries gave birth to the profusion of conflicts as were witnessed in the Balkan territories.

At this point, it may be useful to draw attention to the fact that the discord between the major powers continue to have an impact on the ways crises are managed although the antagonism between the superpowers ceased to shape the geostrategic environment,. In Georgia, Russia is perceived as an invader by the international community and its move to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia is not supported by any other state. In Kosovo, the UNSC failed to react in a proper manner due to the divergence of views among the permanent members. What measures to adopt against Iran with regard to the nuclear crisis is another matter of discord.

Cooperation across the globe is needed more than ever. Legitimacy of action, which may include military action, is essential to ensuring durable solutions to the security needs of our time. The challenges to peace and security today are predominantly global. While they are not necessarily or entirely new, they take place in a new context and have far-reaching effects. They require complex and collective responses, which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed and properly used.

In the last two decades, international crisis management has consolidated its position on international platforms and consequently of national security policy. In the post-Cold-War international context, crises are not anymore the exceptions in the international system. They occur frequently and they have a more important place in the political agendas. Frozen conflicts erupted and external actors had the freedom to intervene. Combined, these two factors increased the scale of the crisis management operations to the extent that states have to take it into consideration seriously in their foreign and security policies. Modern states face the question on whether this change from the ‘politics of exception’ to the ‘regular politics’ may require a change in the political arrangements such as the relation between the executive and legislative organs, or questioning on the necessity of a more stringent policy coordination, better communication and interaction with the public, and on different modes of intergovernmental cooperation.¹⁷

We live in an era that is remarked by the rise of humanitarianism. International humanitarian law gains ground on the launch of the operations, legal and moral considerations occupying the primary place in taking a decision to intervene. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations carried out by the United Nations (UN) peaked since the end of Cold War. The number of uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping increased from 10.000 in 1991 to more than 83.000 in 2007. Expenditures on humanitarian assistance underwent a similar trend as well, a broad variety of actors (governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental) being involved in that field.

Second, modern crises have a propensity to spill over in various degrees into other states. It is not rare to see the blurriness (or inexistence) of frontier between internal and external dimensions. The one case that can be given as an example is related to the cross-

¹⁷ HOUBEN, Marc, *International Crisis Management. The Approach of European states*, Routledge, London, 2005, p: 12

border displacements. Turkey, for instance, had to ask for international help when faced with the Iraqi Kurdish population's massive flow in early 1990s.

The reason why this frontier is not perceptible is that the front lines of the crises roughly follow ethnic dividing lines, which do not coincide with frontiers between nation-states.¹⁸ The violence reaches hence a greater region. Attention should be drawn however to the fact that although they are more destabilising on a regional plan, they are eventually less dangerous for global peace when compared with the previous period remarked by the antagonism between Eastern and Western blocs.

Third, ambivalence marks the nature of modern crises. Very often, the "internal affair" gains an international dimension, especially when the loss of life and suffering are to a great extent. The international community is more and more concerned about internal conflicts despite the article 2(7) of UN Charter. The mass-media backed by a high-level technological infrastructure gives the opportunity to grasp the news coming from every corner of the world in a formerly unimaginable speed. The sensibility of public opinions to the humanitarian dramas increased the tolerance towards the international community's reaction.

Fourth, most of the time, crisis is a multidimensional phenomenon.¹⁹ A solely military point of view will not suffice to cope with crises which will not only have military, but also economic, social and environmental dimensions. Any policy to deal with them must include means to target the different aspects. The necessity to adopt a new crisis management approach paved the way for reflections in various circles. The civil-military cooperation, which was born out of this intellectual endeavour, aims to mobilise public and private expertise with the aim of restoring the society affected by the crisis.²⁰ In governmental level, there is an increasing awareness on this matter which is easily perceptible on both the EU and Turkey.

Fifth, the consequences of crises are felt in time in various degrees and forms. Houben describes this fact by mentioning that the consequences of crises are direct (such as victims of war, economic losses, displaced persons, damaged environment, disrupted society, undermined rule of law) and indirect (unrest caused by flows of refugees, closed borders due

¹⁸ HOUBEN Marc, Op. Cit., p: 19.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ GARDA Christophe, "Le Rôle de la Coopération Civilo-Militaire dans la Reconstruction de la Paix", (Analysis Paper), *Ressources pour la Paix*, 2002 (<http://www.irenees.net/fr/fiches/analyse/fiche-analyse-1.html>).

to economic sanctions, instability of regional cooperative mechanisms) in their consequences.²¹

I.A.1.b. Definition of the relevant concepts

Crises can have serious humanitarian impact, in which case the intervention of foreign powers may be necessary. This reality leads us to ponder on the issue of state sovereignty and that of intervention which may have military implications. Cornerstone of the modern state system, the notion of sovereignty occupied the international agenda for centuries. Mario Bettati refers to Vienna law scholars while describing the concept: “As an absolute category which is inherent to the notion of state, sovereignty is characterized by the generality recognized to the state power, in other words the aptitude of its authority to exert without any limitation in all domains of human activity.”²²

The traditional rules of International Law hold that the principle of sovereignty determines relations between states. According to the contemporary international law, state is the exclusive holder of sovereign authority; and the norm of non-intervention to other states’ internal affairs constitutes the foundation of international order. International relations are thus shaped within a framework that puts the emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention. This modern conception of sovereignty is subject to discussions and has evolved throughout the history. Today, there is a growing adherence to the idea that sovereignty carries with it the responsibility to guarantee the welfare of its own peoples and fulfil its obligations to the wider international community.²³ In cases where a state falls short of meeting these obligations, the international community can assume the responsibility to lessen the severity of consequences, to “help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be”.²⁴

Any decision to intervene in a crisis will inevitably entail an assessment of interests. The concept of national interest is very popular in the political science literature. It is deemed

²¹ Houben Marc, Op. Cit., p:18.

²² He goes on by saying that state possesses an “undetermined competency”, or, as the German scholars affirm, the ‘competency of competency’. Cf. Bettati Mario, *Le Droit d'Ingérence. Mutation de l'Ordre International*, Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1996, p: 42.

²³ *A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004, p: 17.

²⁴ Ibid.

by a particular state to be a vital or desirable goal in its international relations.²⁵ Put another way, it refers to what is the most important to a state, what constitutes the principal stake for her and guides thus her foreign policy action.²⁶

All intervention-related decisions pass from the filter of domestic deliberation. Andreani and Hassner assert that the decision of intervention follows a linear path: it is made up in domestic field first, and then, international factors affect the decision-making process.²⁷ The legitimacy of the recourse to force is rooted, primarily, in the internal order. The decision-making process is completed within the domestic structure through a series of debates on the recourse to force. These debates constitute the stage during which the opportuneness of the action is subject to collective preferences of the society. There, costs, risks and consequences of the action are discussed.

Subjectivity rules in the perception of crises. It is true that the more a crisis is brutal and grave, the more it entails unity of riposte, efficiency of reaction, rapidity of response, credibility and capacity of collective action. However, there are also some factors that do create a difference in the attitude of the third parties in taking the decision to intervene. For instance, the identity of victims and that of the perpetrators matter: religious and cultural affiliations influence the decision to intervene.

It is the politicians' responsibility to state the national interest without ambiguity and articulate it, which is indeed a difficult task.²⁸ Another difficulty is to adapt national interests to the necessities of the global era. It is true that at present, in a scale that have never been witnessed before, threats are interrelated and "a threat to one is a threat to all".²⁹ In modern international relations, the effectiveness of dealing with crises is closely linked to the broad interpretation of the national interest.

²⁵ BERRIDGE G. R., JAMES Alan, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, Palgrave, Hampshire and New York, 2001, p: 164.

²⁶ Hans Morgenthau affirms that in foreign policy there is "only one categorical imperative, one only criterion of reasoning, one only principle of action: national interest". According to Alexander Wendt, "nobody denies that states act on the basis of national interests as they perceive it". Raymond Aron defines the foreign policy as an "art to manage the commerce with other states to the best of the national interest". The concept of 'national interest' is a useful tool for theorists in their attempt to explain state behaviour on the international scene. See SMOUTS Marie-Claude, BATTISTELLA Dario, VENESSON Pascal, *Dictionnaire des Relations Internationales. Approches, Concepts, Doctrines*, Dalloz, Paris, 2006, p: 298.

²⁷ ANDREANI Gilles, HASSNER Pierre, *Justifier la Guerre? De l'Humanitaire au Contre-Terrorisme*, Les Presses de Sciences-Po, Paris, 2005, p:164.

²⁸ HOUBEN Marc, Op. Cit., p: 233.

²⁹ *A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility*, Op. Cit., p: 14.

There is a clear difference between the crisis management rules of the epoch in which each block was responsible of its own discipline and the present time. Nowadays, the crises do not eventually lead to the confrontation between superpowers which possess the nuclear annihilation potential. Although such an apocalyptic scenario is out of expectations, the unpredictability of consequences of modern conflicts still constitutes a serious threat to security. As a consequence, crisis treatment stands for a major undertaking in states' security policies.

The definition of the common interest, as well as designating the authority to define it, reveal nonetheless difficulties. The former UN Secretary General rightfully argues that national interest must be conceived in a broader and more widely way. His point is that the traditional pursuit of national interest is a barrier for the states to find a greater unity in the pursuit of basic UN Charter values as democracy, pluralism, human rights and the rule of law.³⁰

As Art argues, the way a nation defines its interest sets its fundamental course in global affairs on the one hand, and shapes considerably the means it chooses to attain its objectives on the other.³¹ There are indeed various 'scales' of the national interest. Vital interest costs to the nation somewhere between "severe" and "catastrophic" in case it is not protected –whereas, when protected, its benefits are "large".³²

Contemporary political decision-making process has a number of consequences over the crisis management decisions.³³ It is possible to begin with the complication of the process particularly due to political exchanges between states on sensitive issues. Every crisis reflects a set of variables which refer to various levels of priorities for different governments. Because cooperation in the international platform suits the interests of the states in many ways, the search for maximising profits and facilitating the success make the negotiation with other foreign actors inevitable. In the current geostrategic context, the 'national' can not be

³⁰ Ibid, pp: 40–42.

³¹ ART Robert J., "The Strategy of Selective Engagement" in ART Robert J., WALTERS Kenneth N. (Eds.), *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2004, p:302. Former Foreign Minister of Turkey, İsmail Cem, used a similar wording: The process of foreign policy is the one that shelters the parameters which shape the interests and their calculation. See CEM İsmail, *Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya. Birinci Cilt: Strateji – Yunanistan – Kıbrıs* (Turkey Europe Eurasia. First Volume: Strategy – Greece – Cyprus), İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, p: 21.

³² ART Robert J., Op. Cit., p: 302.

³³ Martin Ortega defines four of them, which will be developed in the following paragraphs. See ORTEGA Martin, "Military Intervention and the European Union", *Chaillot Paper*, no: 45, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, March 2001, p: 69.

envisaged isolated from the ‘non-national’. This fact entails close connection between different states in maintaining security and stability. The security environment of the modern era makes it impossible for the national security to be ensured only by national efforts. Dialogue and common action in regional and international levels are necessary.

In addition, foreign policy objectives became more sophisticated, including humanitarian purposes and concerns of maintaining international peace and security. This somewhat reminds of the previously brought-up subject of widening the national interest, but it is meaningful to add that more parameters are taken into consideration while forming policies. These may coincide, for instance, with domestic expectations (as in the case of reacting to the armed fighting in the Middle East by taking into account the sensitivities of the electoral constituency) or foreign support (political and financial expectations may force the government to participate in a mission which would otherwise not occupy its agenda).

International organisations’ role on the decision-making process has increased. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the decision to intervene makes intense negotiations in the UN, regional organisations and ad hoc groupings inevitable. The World Summit Outcome Document’s call for expanding consultation and cooperation between the UN and the regional organisations is significant on this matter. The EU, for its part, has been building a systematic relationship with the UN.³⁴

All those factors necessitate a broader interpretation of national interest. The global trend of convergence between national and global interests is evident since 1990s.³⁵ Borrowing from Houben’s reasoning, one has the right to assert that the discourse on national interest has been complemented by a discourse in which national responsibility plays a key role.³⁶ This trend is particularly bolstered by the adherence to collective security structures. Kofi Annan underlines that the way states define their national interest affect the efficiency of action in humanitarian crises. He emphasises that the national interest equals collective interest in the global era where humanity faces a growing number of challenges.

³⁴ The French EU Presidency made a call on this matter at the UN General Assembly. See *Le Discours de Hubert VEDRINE, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française, Président du Conseil de l’Union Européenne*, 55^{ème} Session de l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, New York, 12/09/2000 (<http://www.un.int/france/eu/speeches/debat/0912F.htm>). Then, the regular contacts and informal meetings between the Secretary General/High Representative and the UN Secretary General were built. In September 2003, the Secretary General and the EU Presidency concluded a joint declaration.

³⁵ See, for instance, ORTEGA Martin, Op. Cit., p: 70.

³⁶ Ibid

“Of course, the traditional pursuit of national interest is a permanent feature of international relations and of the life and work of UNSC. But as the world has changed in profound ways since the end of the cold war, I believe our conceptions of national interest have failed to follow suit. A new, more broadly defined, more widely conceived definition of national interest in the new century would, I am convinced, induce states to find far greater unity in the pursuit of such basic Charter values as democracy, pluralism, HR and the rule of law.”³⁷

I.A.1.c. Types of crisis management

Because crises have different characteristics, the way they are managed differ. A distinction of the means used in the management of international crises may be made according to the nature of these means. From this angle, there are two ways of resolving conflicts. The one concerns the solutions in which the states concerned (sometimes a single state) uses non-military tools to convince the parties to end the crisis. The other is about using military mechanisms to accomplish this objective.

Before going into more detail, it can be highlighted that crisis management is a collective action. The reasons of this choice will be clarified in the next section, but for now, it is appropriate to suggest that the instabilities closely concern several actors in the global stage. As a result, efforts that aim to resolve them involve a great number of actors including security organisations, states, international institutions, NGOs, interest groups and so forth.³⁸

Among the non-military means of managing crises, diplomatic initiatives are the ones that come to mind first. Preventing disputes from arising (or preventing the existing ones from escalating into bigger conflicts which can also have the potential to spread into other regions)³⁹ is a significant dimension on this matter. Such efforts are not under the exclusive competence of states. During the last two decades, international institutions have been focusing on putting an end to the crises in a peaceful way as well. They hence achieved some success in the field of preventive diplomacy. In addition to the change in the global strategic context, the high costs of managing conflicts have been a major factor of revising the traditional perception on crises.

³⁷ Two Concepts of Sovereignty, New York, 20 September 1999, in ANNAN Kofi A., *The Question of Intervention. statements by the Secretary-General*, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, December 1999, p: 37.

³⁸ DEDEOĞLU Beril, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji (International Security and Strategy)*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p: 218.

³⁹ This process is named as ‘preventive diplomacy’ by the former UN Secretary General Boutros-Gali. See “An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping”, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992* (<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>).

Non-forcible humanitarian intervention is another tool of crisis management. It emphasizes the pacific activities of states, international organisations and NGOs in facilitating third party conflict-resolution and reconstruction. Delivering humanitarian aid, which can be defined as material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, is also among these activities. The primary objective of the aid is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. These actions operate normally with the consent of sovereign governments.

According to the UN, peacemaking is “the action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter [of the United Nations]”.⁴⁰ In this sense, peacemaking is the diplomatic effort intended to move a violent conflict into nonviolent dialogue, where differences are settled through representative political institutions. The objective of peacemaking is thus to end the violence between the contending parties. Peacemaking can be done through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. International law provides another channel through international courts. From 1990s on, a large number of conflicts were brought to an end, either through direct UN mediation or by the efforts of others acting with UN support.⁴¹

Peacekeeping is defined as “a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace”.⁴² This is the period that follows the ending of the fight between the combatants. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Although not the exclusive one, the UN is the main organisation of peacekeeping.⁴³

The evolution of the peacekeeping perspective on the latter domain, due to the change in the political landscape, is plain to see. In time, the nature of the operations has shifted from the ‘traditional’ to ‘multidimensional’ because of the complexities that appeared in the peace operations. Contemporary peacekeepers take on a wide variety of tasks ranging

⁴⁰ CHESTERMAN Simon, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p: 170.

⁴¹ The list includes El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Bougainville, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the North-South conflict in Sudan. See *Peacemaking*, The UN Department of Political Affairs (<http://huwu.org/depts/dpa/peace.html>).

⁴² The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have been more than 60 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. See *United Nations Peacekeeping* (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>).

⁴³ The NATO mission in Kosovo and the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula set up after the negotiations between the US, Egypt and Israel can be given as examples of other peacekeeping frameworks.

from the establishment of sustainable institutions of governance and security sector reform to the demobilisation of former combatants.⁴⁴

The last type of missions that can be counted among those that foresee the peaceful resolution of the crises is called “peace-building”. They are based on the idea of restoring peace – in a sustainable way – after the conflicts and involve the relevant processes and activities. They have a particular importance because the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty.⁴⁵

In many cases, the United Nations assists in post-conflict peace-building in the absence of any military deployment. Through a range of efforts, often in partnership with other organizations, the UN provides good offices to keep peace processes on track, monitor elections, assist in the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and aid in the rehabilitation of war-torn economies.

I.A.2. Historical Overview on Military Intervention with Humanitarian Purposes

Long before the modern conception of humanitarian intervention has been shaped, people pondered on the issue of saving human lives from grave atrocities. It is interesting to see that theories that have been developed on the matter have roots in periods which are remarked by violence, and that common features exist between the old and the contemporary thinking.

I.A.2.a. From the early periods to 20th Century

Humanitarian intervention is an old concept. Passages from Buddhist scriptures on just war seem to allow humanitarian intervention because such a war would have a “righteous” cause.⁴⁶ In Muslim faith, both Quran verses and the Prophet’s sayings authorise and impose the use of force on behalf of oppressed people; the same approach is seen in Hebrew Scriptures and Judaic Law as well.⁴⁷

Early Christian theologians’ contribution to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention – as a continuation of ‘just war’ concept, originated with classical Greek and Roman

⁴⁴ *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Op. Cit.

⁴⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, United Nations General Assembly, 63rd Session, A/63/881, New York, 11/06/2009, p: 4.

⁴⁶ On Buddhism, the author primarily focuses on a core of scriptures—generally regarded by all schools as authoritative—that recount the teachings of the Buddha (born in Nepal around 563 BCE). See LEPARD Brian D., *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religion*, University Park, Penn state University Press, Philadelphia, p: 90.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp: 90-92.

philosophers – is important. The just war tradition is a set of guidelines for determining and judging whether and when a state may have recourse to war and how it may fight that war. It is concerned with applying moral limits to states' recourse to war and limiting harms that states can commit against other states, military forces and civilians. It consists of two parts: *jus ad bellum* (justice of war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war). The former refers to the justification of initial resort while the latter to the ethics of conduct, i.e. the means, the weapons and tactics employed.

The works of Saint Augustine (354-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) have been source of inspiration for centuries. In his comments, Saint Augustine put the emphasis on the morality of war. According to him, the reason of going to war should be to ensure peace and justice. He described the just war as the one that avenges wrongs. Aquinas lays his idea of peaceful war on religion: the motives of the war must be the punishment of evil-doers and uplifting the good, not territorial expansion or cruelty. In his *Summa Theologicae*, Aquinas connects the possibility of a just war to the existence of three conditions: sovereign authority, just cause and right intention.

Suarez (1548-1617), was one of the scholars who developed the teachings of Aquinas. In his *Tractatus de Legibus*, he maintained that in order to wage a just war, three conditions were to be observed: a legitimate power must give the decision to go to war; such a decision must lay on a just and right cause; the methods used must be just. The just cause may obviously be related to helping others, because Suarez does not see any obstacle for a war with the aim of aiding a friendly country when the latter requests such an aid.⁴⁸

Gentili (1552-1608) also subscribed to the concept of just war by approaching the common interests of mankind. In his book *Of an Honourable Reason for Waging War*, he pointed to the question of undertaking war for “the common interest and in behalf of others” instead of the private reason of one's own.⁴⁹ There, he maintained that those who act against the laws of nature and mankind deserve the attack of others. Foreigners are part of the “society formed by the whole world”. Cruel and unjust treatment of these people approves the principle of defending them.

⁴⁸ MERON Theodor, “Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol: 85, No: 1, January 1991, p: 113.

⁴⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p: 114.

On the *Law of War and Peace*, Grotius maintained that resort to war was lawful, under natural law of nations, when doing so was based on a just cause, such as a defence against an injury, recovery of what is legally due, and the infliction of punishment on a wrongdoing state for excessive crimes. When oppression is obvious, he says, the rights of human society should not be excluded. Vattel, for his part, pointed to the state's obligation to "preserve" all the individuals within its frontiers, a duty that "flows from the very act of association as a nation".⁵⁰ But:

"If a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid".⁵¹

These reflexions paved the way for the first doctrine of humanitarian assistance in 19th century. Then, Jacquemyns was underlining the legitimacy of the right to intervention in the existence of a violation of the rights of humanity by a government. The right existed when the latter was acting "by excess of cruelty and injustice which profoundly hurt [the] moral standards and civilization".⁵² That the acts were within the limits of the government's sovereignty was not, in the scholar's view, a barrier for others' right of intervention.

In the twentieth century the doctrine has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam War.⁵³ Several works on the field attempted to define the humanitarian intervention concept.⁵⁴ 20th century is also remarked by the existence of an international organisation which justified, for the first time in the history of mankind, the intervention with the aim of ensuring global peace.

⁵⁰ MURPHY Sean D., *Humanitarian Intervention : The United Nations in an Evolving International Order*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, p: 45.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp: 45-46.

⁵² JACQUEMYNS Gustave Rolin, "Note sur la Théorie du Droit d'Intervention", *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*, 1876, p : 673. Quoted in TÜRKMEN Fusun, "Cyprus 1974 Revisited. Was It Humanitarian Intervention?", *Perceptions*, Winter 2005, p: 63.

⁵³ The most important contemporary texts include, among others, Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977) and *War and Justice* (2001), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill's *The Ethics of War* (1979), Richard Norman's *Ethics, Killing, and War* (1995), Brian Orend's *War and International Justice* (2001).

⁵⁴ One of the modern definitions is made by the Danish Institute of International Affairs: Coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its Government, with or without authorization from the UN Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. See CORELL Hans, "To Intervene or Not? The Dilemma that Will Not Go Away" (Keynote Speech), *The Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, Durham, North Carolina, 19/04/2001

(http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_07-09/hum_intervention/hum_03b_correll.html).

I.A.2.b. Limits of the Intervention in the United Nations era

In the aftermath of the World War II, bolstered by the willingness to stop war between nations, a system of collective security was built with the aim of regulating and pacifying international relations. The organisation and the Charter of the United Nations hence established an institutional and normative framework obliging the member states to resolve pacifically their disagreements. The essence of contemporary collective security system consists of giving up the use of military means by states in their reciprocal relations – the use of force being under the exclusive competency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Charter states that the UN is founded “*on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members*” (Article 2.1). Non-intervention is the principle set out in the seventh paragraph of the same article: Nothing contained in the Charter will allow the UN “*to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state*”. Likewise, member states can not recourse to the settlement of such matters under the UN Charter.⁵⁵ Moreover, the fourth paragraph cites the necessity for all member states to refrain in their international relations from all manners inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Among those, the threat or use of force are particularly underlined.

The resolution 2625⁵⁶ adopted by the United Nations’ General Assembly on the inadmissibility of intervention, has the same spirit and shows the concern of security prevailing in the context of the Cold War:

- no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state and that, consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state are condemned;
- no state may use or encourage the use of econ, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind;

⁵⁵ The only exception to these non-intervention rules relates to the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

⁵⁶ *Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among states in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, United Nations General Assembly, 1883rd Plenary Meeting, 24/10/1970.

- the strict observance of these obligations was essential to international peace, since any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter but also leads to threatening situations.

In addition to the UN mechanisms, several treaties embody the prohibition of intervention.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that despite all the emphasis put on the sovereignty of states, some promoters of humanitarian armed interference could maintain that the objective of the United Nations is precisely the rights of the individual.⁵⁸ In fact, the UN Charter's preamble theoretically paves the way for such a stance: "*We, the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined (...) to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person*". One can further maintain that the Charter allows humanitarian intervention on two counts: by referring to fundamental rights, and, by stipulating the possibility of using force under the aegis of the UN. A state can resort to force in a case of self-defence or when the Security Council decides to take measures in order to "maintain or restore international peace and security".⁵⁹

That the practice of UN since the end of the Second World War showed some inclination to narrow the area reserved to domestic jurisdiction is plain to see, especially in what regards the issues like that of apartheid.⁶⁰ The frontier between international concern and national sovereignty is still a matter of discussion for the international community. During the Cold War, a notable platform has been built by the CSCE. It is noteworthy to mention that in its Final act, a strong and detailed statement of the doctrine of non-intervention has been

⁵⁷ One can cite the third article of the International Law Commission's Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of states provides that "every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other state".

⁵⁸ CORTEN Olivier, KLEIN Pierre, *Droit d'Ingérence ou Obligation de Réaction? Les Possibilités d'Action Visant à Assurer le Respect des Droits de la Personne face au Principe de Non-Intervention*, Editions Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1992, p : 165.

⁵⁹ An explicit reference is made to Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. According to the former, the Security Council "may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures". The latter states that when the Security council considers the inadequacy of the measure provided for in Article 41, it "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".

⁶⁰ To see the evolution of the UN's attitude towards the issue of apartheid from 1946 to 1994, see REDDY E.S., "United Nations and Apartheid. A Chronology", *African National Congress* (<http://www.anc.org.za/un/un-chron.html>).

exposed by the principle six. The seventh principle, on the other hand, was allotted to the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁶¹

I.A.2.c. The post-Cold War era: New Horizons for Intervention

It is important to remind that humanitarian intervention with military means was not an acceptable application during the East-West confrontation that marked the aftermath of the Second World War. Very few exceptions could have been witnessed in this period. One of the most prominent examples is the war between Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra in the period 1967-1970. The conflict has caused immense sufferings and led to the creation NGOs such as the *Médecins Sans Frontières*, founded by Bernard Kouchner, for whom non-intervention in some severe public health situations can not be justified by state sovereignty. Things have changed however with the beginning of 1990s. The interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo were all explicitly justified in humanitarian terms by the interveners. Since the Cold War is over, there is an increasing involvement in the efforts to halt existing conflicts and to prevent new ones. Not only national governments but also international organisations and non-state actors play a part in these efforts.

The conception of security has been extended in a way to go beyond the traditional framework of state security. Realist literature is inadequate to explain the emergence of security concepts in the new era which are based on terms like ‘societal’, ‘global’ and ‘democratic’. In this era, humanitarian intervention finds a new theoretical basis: Human security, which is pronounced for the first time in the 1994 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme. The report endorsed a conceptual shift from the “nuclear security” – that is built exclusively upon a military reflexion – to “human security”.⁶² The latter is centred, as its name suggests, on the security of people.

According to the Report, many people had the feeling of security not because of an apocalyptical on a global scale, but more from worries caused by everyday life. As David and Rioux describe successfully, human security is of universal range, founded on interdependence, centred on the prevention and on individuals.⁶³ With these features, it reduces the territorial emphasis and accentuates the attention brought to the populations;

⁶¹ VINCENT R. J., “Grotius, Human Rights and Intervention” in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, Adam Roberts (Eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p: 247.

⁶² DAVID Charles Philippe, RIOUX Jean François, “Le Concept de Sécurité Humaine” in RIOUX Jean François (Ed.), *La Sécurité Humaine*, Harmattan, Paris, 2001, p: 21

⁶³ Ibid.

which consequently makes it replace the (realist) military security approach by that of (liberal) endurable development and of humanitarian intervention.⁶⁴

The new context made it possible for the UNSC to act in favour of maintaining international security. In the contemporary international relations, the signification of local wars diminished strongly in the strategic calculations of big powers.⁶⁵ But what occurred was not a decrease in their number as it was widely expected. Instead, changes in the characteristics of military interventions have been witnessed. The first observation that can be mentioned is the end of unilateral interventions of big powers.

The inter-state war had almost disappeared, but the frequency of civil wars continued to increase.⁶⁶ Intervention in this era was made by coalitions or by particular states under UN mandate. In some cases, regional organizations played an important role, which strengthened the developing multilateralism. Another important characteristic of this era is the justification of the intervention by universal values.⁶⁷ Human rights being the battle cry, the 'new interventionism' thus took a liberal and solidarist character.⁶⁸

Naturally, developments in the global arena have entailed new reflexions on the concepts of International Law as well. Thus, state sovereignty can no longer be construed in the way it was recognized in Westphalia in 1648. The 1990s have been frequently described as a period when humanitarian activism played an unprecedented role in global politics.⁶⁹ As will be shown in the following sections, the attention brought to the subject was not limited to academic circles.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Mac FARLANE Neil, "Entre Politique Internationale et Conflit Local: L'Intervention" in Pierre HASSNER, Roland MARCHAL (Eds.), *Guerres et Sociétés*, Karthala, Brussels, 2003, p: 91.

⁶⁶ He affirms that the number of refugees was around 2,4 millions in 1975 whereas 14,5 in 1995. Quoted in ROBERTS Adam, "Humanitarian Action in War", *Adelphi Paper*, 1996, 305, p: 12.

⁶⁷ Mac FARLANE Neil, Op. Cit., p: 91.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ ROBERTS Adam, "The Role of Humanitarian Issues in International Politics in the 1990s", *International Review of the Red Cross*, no: 833, 1999, pp: 19-43 (<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPSU>); BELLAMY Alex J., WHEELER Nicholas J., "Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics" in *The Globalisation of World Politics*, Op. Cit., p: 528; WEISS Thomas G., "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era", *Security Dialogue*, vol: 35, no: 2, 2004, p: 135.

⁷⁰ Yet, it is not possible to maintain that there is a perfect functioning in the UNSC. Military operations under chapter VII are agreed largely on the existence of shared interests or tradeoffs among the five permanent members of the Security Council. In June 1994, for example, disparate interests resulted in separate council decisions to authorise interventions by the French in Rwanda, the Americans in Haiti, and the Russians in Georgia. Each of the three permanent members traded its vote for the favoured intervention of the other in return for support of its own favoured operation. See Mac FARLANE Neil, WEISS Thomas, "Political Interest and Humanitarian Action", *Security Studies*, vol: 10, no: 1, Autumn 2000, p: 137.

Kofi Annan's views reflect how changing dynamics affect the concept of sovereignty. This change is not without impact on the contemplations concerning the states' responsibility of protecting their citizens:

“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty—and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual as enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her own destiny”.⁷¹

In another occasion, the former UN Secretary General further stated that no juridical principle – including that of sovereignty – could condone crimes against humanity, pointing to the UNSC's moral duty to act on behalf of the international community against the aggressors.⁷²

I.A.2.d. The *Responsibility to Protect* as a Framework for Crisis Management

In 2002, an alternative approach to humanitarian intervention known as “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) was delivered by the International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty (ICISS) Report. The work of the ICISS is the search of the answer to the question posed by Kofi Annan in the Millennium Summit: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”⁷³ The report reads that the right of humanitarian intervention is its principal focus. It deals with “the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state”.⁷⁴ The hope was that the Committee would be able to find ways of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable notions of intervention and state sovereignty.⁷⁵

According to the ICISS, the responsibility to protect members of the community from murder and other grave human rights situations is the most basic and fundamental

⁷¹ “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, New York, 20 September 1999, in ANNAN Kofi, *The Question of Intervention. statements by the Secretary-General*, Op. Cit., p: 37.

⁷² ANNAN Kofi, *‘We the Peoples’. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 2000, p: 48.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p: 48.

⁷⁴ *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty*, Published by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001, p: VII.

⁷⁵ *Ibid* p: 81.

responsibility imposed by the sovereignty. In extreme cases where the state does not live up to this responsibility and fails to provide a minimum content of good international citizenship, coercive intervention by other states may be warranted.

I.A.2.d.(1). The principles of the R2P

The report enumerates the principles for humanitarian military intervention as follows: just cause, right authority, precautionary principles and operational principles. All together, the principles put forth by the ICISS report provide legitimacy for the intervention made by other states.

- **The “Just Cause” as a threshold criteria and the precautionary principles**

According to the ICISS report, the military intervention with human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. A serious and irreparable harm to individuals—either occurring or being imminently likely to occur—must be at stake. Hence, the military intervention is justified when it aims to prevent or put an end to the large scale loss of life (with or without genocidal intent) or large scale ethnic cleansing.

Four other substantial conditions should be met, in the Commission’s view, for the intervention to be legitimate. The first one is described as the *right intention*. To stop or avert human suffering must be the primary objective of the military intervention. The support of the victims – for whose benefit the operation takes place – and that of the countries in the region certify the rightness of the motivations. Multilateralism and collective action are conceived as the best ways to ensure this objective.

For many, collective intervention is the remedy to the problem of legitimacy. In modern era, the increasing interest of the international community in the protection of human rights – which is observed both on global and regional scales – reduces the necessity of individual humanitarian intervention.⁷⁶ The more an intervention is made with the collective will of the international community, the less it will put the harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states into jeopardy.⁷⁷ This is facilitated by the growing readiness and involvement of the international community on both global and regional platforms.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ JENNINGS Robert, WATTS Arthur, *Oppenheim's International Law. Volume 1. Peace. Introduction and Part I*, Longman, Essex, 1992, p: 442.

⁷⁷ That’s the view of Hedley Bull. Quoted in SHUE Henry, “Limiting Sovereignty” in WELSH Jennifer M., (Ed.), *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p: 21.

⁷⁸ JENNINGS Robert, WATTS Arthur, *Op. Cit.*, p: 442.

One can easily observe the general reflex of building an interventionist coalition to deal with regional crises: For most governments, unilateral expedition is not desirable for a number of reasons. Connaughton reminds the two (quantitative and qualitative) dimensions of this practice.⁷⁹ The number of participants is very important for leading nation(s). In Iraq and Afghanistan operations, the US efforts to ‘keep the players in the game’ prove clearly the crucial significance of this criterion. The qualitative dimension cannot be ignored indeed, for the successful achievement of the mission’s objectives depends on the troops.⁸⁰

The following two conditions set out by the International Commission’s report are easier to assess and fulfil compared to the previous one. The military intervention must be the *last resort*, which means that all non-military options must have been exhausted beforehand. In other words, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that lesser measures would not have succeeded. *Proportional means* refer to the scale, duration and intensity of the military operation: They should be the minimum necessary for achieving the objective of protecting victims. In addition, the means must be commensurate with the ends and close to the extent of the original emergency.

The last condition, *reasonable prospects*, signifies that a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the human suffering must bolster the intervention. The outcome of the action must be thought to be better than that of inertia. An objection to this point may concern the difficulty to foresee all the effects that an intervention will produce. Besides, this precautionary factor would only permit militarily strong states to engage in humanitarian intervention against states or actors over whom they maintain an overwhelming power advantage.⁸¹

Perspectives on the aftermath of an intervention have an impact on the decision-making process. In most cases, a veritable success requires post-conflict involvement of the foreign actors. Here again, a reference to Annan is helpful: The commitment to peace must be as strong as the commitment to war in the aftermath of the conflict, which demands high levels of skill, sacrifice and resources for an enduring peace to be built.⁸² In a similar vein, it may be asserted that reconstruction efforts can do more harm than good. Besides, domestic

⁷⁹ CONNAUGHTON Richard, *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping. The Reality*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, p: 53.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ HEINZE Eric A., *Commonsense Morality and the Consequentialist Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention*, *Journal of Military Ethics*, vol: 4, no: 3, November 2005, p: 173.

⁸² *The Question of Intervention. statements by the Secretary-General*, Op. Cit., pp: 40 – 42.

governance mechanisms may evolve more effectively than the ones imposed by occupying forces.⁸³

- **The “Right Authority”**

Another principle for military intervention is described as the right authority by the Commission in whose view the UN is the most appropriate body to authorize military intervention with humanitarian objectives. The Security Council’s authorization provides legitimacy to all military interventions to be carried out. For this reason, the task should be to bolster its functionality rather than seeking alternatives.

It is worth reminding that, in the scholarly literature, there are different views as to owner of the legitimacy to authorize a military intervention to protect humans from grave violations of their rights. Some point to the UN’s authorisation as the only source of legitimacy of such interventions. Others deem it unnecessary.⁸⁴ For some, regional organizations may provide legitimacy as well. There are even scholars who advocate the virtues of unilateral intervention in some cases.

- **Operational principles**

The authors of the ICISS report wanted to install the doctrine of “responsibility to protect” on some operational principles. Hence, objectives must be clearly defined and accompanied by an unambiguous mandate and matching resources; intervening forces must share the same military approach and have a unity of command; the military force must be confined in conformity with the mission and in adherence to international humanitarian law; force protection must not have priority over the principal objective of the mission; maximum coordination with civilian authorities and organizations must be ensured.

Operational principles touch the realm of effectiveness. Pattison’s typology, for instance, helps to expose the connection between them. She conceives three types of effectiveness, two of them being subdivisions of ‘external’ dimension and the other being

⁸³ COYNE Christopher, “Reconstructing Weak and Failed states: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, no: 2, 2006, p: 344.

⁸⁴ Some even doubt on the existence of an appropriate authorizing institution. They believe that the UN’s competence to authorize humanitarian intervention is controversial, because the UN is neither democratic nor impartial, as the (few) permanent members of the Security Council are “each judge and jury in their own case” – a fact that causes “total arbitrariness instead of impartiality”. See BADESCU Cristina G., “Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard Choices in Saving Strangers”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol: 40, no:1, March 2007, p: 53.

‘internal’.⁸⁵ What she calls ‘local external effectiveness’ is related to, as the name suggests, the capacity of improving the situation for the people of the intervened region. The intervening force must succeed to deal with the humanitarian crisis successfully in order to be deemed locally externally effective.

As to the ‘global external effectiveness’, one must take into consideration the harm or amelioration brought to the world at large as a result of humanitarian intervention. Ameliorating the well-being of the people in the troubled region is not the sole purpose of the latter: the final result must be positive for everyone. For instance, if the intervention provokes massive refugee flow to the bordering countries or a larger conflict in the region, then it will lose legitimacy.

The ‘internal effectiveness’ is measured by the extent to which an intervener promotes its own citizens’ well-being. Indeed, expecting a global improvement in those citizens is almost impossible in that soldiers’ enjoyment of basic human rights will diminish (not to mention the high probability of human casualties in many cases) and that there is always a financial facet of the operations. Yet, the operation must be conducted in a way to have, by and large, tolerable losses.

Given the importance of an intervener’s being effective in these three senses, it follows that an intervener’s overall effectiveness is a necessary condition of its legitimacy. If an intervener is ineffective when its local external, global external and internal effectiveness are combined, the intervention does not fulfil the legitimacy criterion. Accordingly, an intervener must be likely to make an overall improvement in the enjoyment of basic human rights to be legitimate.⁸⁶ It is also important to note that the question of legitimacy is to be taken in a broader view in the intervention, without being confined to the question of effectiveness.

⁸⁵ PATTISON James, “Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?”, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, vol: 12, no: 3, June 2008, pp: 399-400.

⁸⁶ A similar point is made by Jane Stromseth: “Humanitarian intervention should have a reasonable prospect of success in stopping the atrocities that triggered intervention in the first place. Otherwise, the interveners will simply be exposing their soldiers and the target population to life-endangering situations without the hope of success that justifies the risks to be borne”. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p: 401.

I.A.2.d.(2). Concretisation and Difficulties of Implementation

Jennings and Watts draw attention to the existence of a consensus on the state's ability to treat its own nationals according to discretion by virtue of its personal and territorial authority.⁸⁷ In cases where sovereign states do not ensure their citizens' security, a dilemma occurs: tyrannical states will, as legitimate members of international society, enjoy the guarantees laid out by non-intervention principle⁸⁸ or will be targets of humanitarian intervention. Both in doctrine and in practice, there is a support for the view that this discretion is however limited: when a state commits cruelties against its nationals by denying their fundamental human rights and shocking the conscience of mankind, the matter ceases to be solely the domestic affair of that state –in which case an intervention in the interest of humanity might be authorised by law.⁸⁹

In 2005, an important development on this account occurred when the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is concretized in the World Summit Outcome:

“Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility (...). The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.⁹⁰

Even though saving human lives is a noble stance, history did not witness as many interventions as it should have been. Even the balance sheet of the post-Cold War era in terms of conflict prevention and crisis management is far from satisfying: human suffering associated to armed conflicts grew considerably.⁹¹ It is difficult to assert a success in extending the stability and prosperity to the entire planet in the aftermath of the Cold War; barely can it be mentioned for the confines of Europe.

The R2P poses difficulties for the international society for a number of reasons. At the top is placed the post-Westphalian structure characterised by the principle of sovereignty,

⁸⁷ Robert Jennings, Arthur Watts, *Op. Cit.*, p: 442.

⁸⁸ HOFFMANN, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention”, *Survival*, 1995, vol: 37, no: 4, p: 32.

⁸⁹ Robert Jennings, Arthur Watts, *Op. Cit.*, p: 442.

⁹⁰ *2005 World Summit Outcome*, United Nations General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, A/60/L.1, 15/09/2005, p: 31.

⁹¹ Van MEURS Wim, BRUMMER Klaus, WEISS Stefani, *Beyond Cold Peace. Observations on the Challenges of Post-Conflict Management*, Betrelsmann Stiftung, Guetersloh, October 2004, p: 2

where non-intervention is the main rule. The idea of intervention has not gained an absolute and unconditional approval of the international community. As Thouvenin makes the point, it is considered an illegal act despite some doctrinal positions which tend to contribute to the evolution of international law.⁹² Then comes the question of motives, which may not always appear ‘humanitarian’ enough. They may also not reflect the veritable intentions of the intervening states even though they are used as a battle-cry. The declaration of Havana is one example that contains this opposition:

“We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law. (...) [W]e stress that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of host countries, and should be initiated in response to a request or with the approval of these states”.⁹³

A historical analysis reveals that interventions in crisis areas followed diverse objectives. Not all states adopt the same perspective on humanitarian interventions and build the same level of preparedness; it would not be pertinent to expect otherwise. The Baltic approach to such missions differs from that of former colonial powers, which may be in total divergence with the US approach. As Thierry Tardy reminds, even within the EU, the discussions concerning the adoption of humanitarian tasks have shown the difficulty of having common views about ensuring peace by expeditions.⁹⁴

An ideal model of international community is the one in which all member states share responsibility for the general protection, whether it concerns natural or man-made disasters, and build up rapid reaction mechanisms for dealing with fast-breaking crises.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, such a model does not exist, and due to a sophisticated web of parameters, it is difficult to respond effectively to most crises. The commitment of the international community to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction varies greatly from region to region, and crisis to crisis. As Walzer argues, the general problem is that intervention, even when it is justified by its inevitability to prevent terrible crimes and

⁹² THOUVENIN Jean-Marc, “Genèse de l’Idée de Responsabilité de Protéger” in *La Responsabilité de Protéger*, Colloque de Nanterre, Société Française pour le Droit International, Pedone, Paris, 2008, p: 25.

⁹³ *Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit*, Havana, 10-14 April 2000.

⁹⁴ TARDY Thierry, “Introduction” in TARDY Thierry (Ed.), *Peace Operations After 11 September 2001*, Frank Cass, Oxon, 2004, p: 1.

⁹⁵ DAMROSCH Lori Fisler, “The Inevitability of Selective Response? Principles to Guide Urgent International Action” in SCHNABEL Albrecht, THAKUR Ramesh (Eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2000, p: 407.

when it poses no threat to regional or global stability, is an imperfect duty - a duty that doesn't belong to any particular agent. Somebody should intervene but no specific state in the society of states is morally bound to do so. The massacres go on, and every country that is able to stop them decides that it has more urgent tasks and discordant priorities, finding the likely costs of intervention too high.

On this account, it is hard to refute Wheeler and Bellamy's argument that the growth in 'cosmopolitan moral awareness' has not yet been translated into the solidarist project of *forcible humanitarian intervention* as the Rwandan genocide brutally demonstrates.⁹⁶ They are also right in referring to the fact that "media-nurtured sense of compassion" determines which human suffering deserves the response of international community.⁹⁷ On the other hand, a danger in the opposite direction is also present: interventions which begin with humanitarian credentials can all too easily degenerate into a range of policies and activities which go beyond, or even conflict with, the label 'humanitarian'.⁹⁸

What is desirable is to ensure the earliest possible intervention, but most of the time this objective remains elusive. states not only lose time with the expectation that things go back to the track with prevention-focussed efforts, but also the question of taking the decision to intervene is generally not a process that states can be very quick at. Worst still, governments usually tend to ignore or remain passive for resolving the crises or acting in order to reduce tensions before they turn to bigger conflicts. The divergence between the willingness among the members of the international community to mobilise and apply the necessary resources results in a handicap for crisis management: The point at which enough political will is mobilised usually comes after the point at which the crisis can be controlled.⁹⁹

There are some factors that hinder countries' desire to be present in every crisis situation. For instance, most nations will not be willing to intervene in conflict zones with humanitarian motives when their national interests are not at stake. When the expected loss of inaction is higher than that of intervention, governments are more eager to act even when domestic opinion may be against the action. Put differently, in cases where the decision-

⁹⁶ BELLAMY Alex J., WHEELER Nicholas J., Op. Cit. pp: 490-491.

⁹⁷ They give the cases of crises in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia, in which governments acted with humanitarian purposes in opposition to those of Angola, Liberia and Afghanistan which caused the death of millions of people in brutal civil wars at the same period. Ibid.

⁹⁸ ROBERTS Adam, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", *International Affairs*, vol: 69, no: 3, July 1993, p: 446.

⁹⁹ HOUBEN Marc, Op. Cit., p: 4.

makers believe that there is not much to lose, the willingness to face domestic pressures will be less intense.

At this point, the concept of ‘political humanitarianism’ coined by Joanna Macrae can be mentioned. The concept refers to the efforts of analysing the selectivity and conditionality criteria in humanitarian efforts.¹⁰⁰ Macrae thus provides a framework where decisions are made according to an evaluation of two factors. The one is related to the need of assistance: some human rights issues deserve to be tackled more than others, especially when the security threats they face (or pose) are taken into consideration.

A further fundamental problem with a strategy of forcible humanitarian intervention concerns the so-called *body bag* factor. The expectations of human loss determine force projections. Big discussions take place in Parliaments when human casualties pass a threshold during military missions. Indeed, there is not a determined threshold but the number of human lives that a society can bear sacrificing for the noble cause of humanity is quite low.

Another factor that sets back the moral duty to advocate the right of humanitarian intervention is that establishing general rules (such as framing the purpose, limiting the scope and determining the precise means of intervention) is very difficult. This difficulty inevitably leads to worries caused by the possibility of abuse by hegemonic powers and aggressors. Since there is not an agreement upon (and a mechanism to define) what exactly a supreme humanitarian emergency is, there is a possibility for weaker states to claim that strong states’ response to crises is selective, motivated by self-interest rather than humanitarian concern. Reinforcing peace, security and stability is the main objective of the humanitarian intervention, but the lack of rules jeopardizes these objectives.

Even when the decision of collective action is taken, divergences in the way to follow may appear. The issue of building an efficient collective reaction is accompanied with the question on which cooperation framework will be picked: acting under the aegis of the UN (the first Iraqi War), within a regional organisation (as illustrated during the campaign against Kosovo), or a coalition of states (the second Iraqi War). The question of how the collective response will be given pops up every time that a crisis occurs. In the end, every situation creates its own scheme.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in PUGH Michael, “Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues”, *Disasters*, 1998, vol: 22, no: 4, p: 340.

I.B. Common Grounds of Crisis Management for Turkey and the European Union

That Turkey and the EU show common reaction to international crises is due to the existence of a complex web of parameters. The aim of assessing the extent of the parallelism between Turkey's and the EU's foreign policy choices necessitates the exposition of this web. They may be classified under two rubrics: the foreign policy parameters and the regional priorities.

I.B.1. Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy

In order to show the common grounds of foreign policy between Turkey and the EU, the factors that determine Turkish foreign policy should be given first. They are composed of conceptual and material factors. Because the commonality of interests and security concerns complement the latter, they also merit attention.

I.B.1.a. Foreign Policy Determinants

An observer builds an analogy between nations and individuals by maintaining that nations are the product of their unique historical experience in the same way that individuals are, in a biological sense, the product of their genetic background.¹⁰¹ Based on this assertion, it is possible to claim that this historical experience makes up a state's collective self-image and designs its strategic personality –in other words, how it situates itself in the global arena, evaluates its interests and options, and, decides on the action to take”.¹⁰²

In order to comprehend fully Turkey's self-conception on the global stage and the subsequent policies adopted by successive governments, one should refer to the founding principles of the Republic which may be summarised on three counts.¹⁰³ One of them is the establishment of a European-style nation state, which would create a more favourable and profitable environment for the new member of the international community. Both in social and political realms, the choice has been made in favour of Western-type modernisation model and institutions.

¹⁰¹ ZIEMKE, Caroline F., “The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counter-Proliferation Perspective” in UTGOFF Victor A. (Ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Order*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2000, p: 89. Quoted in BAHGAT Gawdat, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran”, *International Studies. Perspectives*, no: 7, 2006, p:126.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ These three pillars are based on the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic. See SANDER Oral, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (La Politique Etrangère de la Turquie) (Edited by Melek Fırat) İmge Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1998, pp: 73-74.

It also consisted of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity. The survival of state as a key actor of the international system was for long time the fundamental preoccupation of Turkish governors. The Republic was born following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire through a painful war of independence that was waged against colonial powers. It is definitely interesting to see that Turkey took the former enemies as model for her development project.

However, it is hard to deny that the past had some negative implications on the foreign policy choices. Although good relations have been built with and a friendly and cooperative attitude has been adopted towards the Western world, some bitter memories of the past persisted. The initial traumatism, almost systematically underestimated by western observers, was by no means rubbed out totally from the political conscience of Turks and played an essential role in the determination of the country's foreign policy for longtime.¹⁰⁴ The will to develop good relations in the immediate neighbourhood and to endeavour to contribute in a larger scale to the peace and stability was inevitable for Turkey who suffered the consequences of the war. The concern for a peaceful environment was also a matter of national security.

The second founding principle is the 'energetic' and determined initiative of promoting Turkish society to the level of 'contemporary civilisation'.¹⁰⁵ To integrate Turkey into the western civilisation – in political, economic and cultural terms – was the principal objective. A quick economic development was necessary for enhancing the society's living standards and eventually for attaining the social and political objectives. The cumulative exhaustion of wars brought the necessity for the state to have a determining role on this field.

The Republic of Turkey has been built on European model and is one of the rare countries in Asia and Africa endeavouring to realise its economic development in a parliamentary system. The immense difficulty posed by the task is easily conceivable. Western European states reached the present level of economic development level and political maturity in at least 200 years through a painful process. In the process, Turkey's defects and doldrums are natural if assessed in a broad historical perspective. Her objective is to maintain its existence as a democratic state in European community of nations and to carry

¹⁰⁴ BAYART J.-F., "La Politique Extérieure de la Turquie: Les Espérances Déçues", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Octobre-Décembre 1981, no: 5/6, p: 863.

¹⁰⁵ See SANDER Oral, Op. Cit., pp: 73-74.

on her economic development. For this to become true, Turkey aimed to follow peaceful foreign policy and accorded priority to her relations with the West. The features presented so far facilitate its achievement of this objective.

For Turkish decision-makers, modernisation equalled Westernisation. That was also providing the grounds for Turkish foreign and domestic policies.¹⁰⁶ The Republic's ending of all antagonistic policies towards West accompanied its will to thoroughly integrate Western civilisation. In time, Turkey joined all Western organisations that she could. When these facts are taken into consideration, it seems highly legitimate for the Turkish policy-makers to expect to be identified as European. As a Turkish scholar notes, the objective of Turkish foreign policy was to gain acceptance as European.¹⁰⁷ As an upshot to above-mentioned principles, Turkey had close links and endeavoured to integrate the West.

The fact that the Republic of Turkey conceives itself as belonging to the European civilization also influenced its security ties. Turkish high-level connection to European security system is the end-product of this conception. Turkey shares western values in many ways as a democratic, secular and liberal country. Her resolve in joining the European Union makes of it a valuable partner. The strongest ties Ankara has established in financial, economic and -more importantly- political and defense-related domains are with Western countries. In fact, Turkey's cultural and political connections with the West go back to the first modernisation efforts of the Ottoman state which culminated in collective defence engagements and foreign trade links. Such a deep-rooted orientation is not likely to change in the long run, notwithstanding the difficult periods it faces in its relations with the West.¹⁰⁸

From this point, one can refer to another characteristic of Turkish foreign policy, defined by the "peace at home, peace on earth" principle. Atatürk had affirmed Turkish contemporary society's willingness to live in harmony with international law and institutions by underscoring that war must be "inescapable" and "vital". According to him, unless a nation's life is at stake, war is a crime.¹⁰⁹ Even at war, he left the door open for peace

¹⁰⁶ BOZDAĞLIOĞLU Yücel, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity. A Constructivist Approach*, Routledge, New York and London, 2003, p: 60.

¹⁰⁷ MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ Meltem, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue*, vol: 31, no: 4, 2000, p: 498.

¹⁰⁸ SOYSAL Mümtaz, "The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy" in MARTIN Lenore G., KERIDIS Dimitris (Eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London, 2004, p: 44.

¹⁰⁹ Ministry of National Education, Republic of Turkey (www.mbe.gov.tr).

negotiations in order to create a favourable international atmosphere for the future Turkish state.

Since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkish foreign policy has been based on this principle which has the primary objective of helping “secure and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative regional and international environment that is conducive to human development at home as well as in the neighbouring countries and beyond”.¹¹⁰ That created positive atmosphere for the young Republic –rarely observed in newly independent states. That choice was the end-product of the satisfaction that Turkey’s governors had with the status quo.

Inevitably, the concern of following peaceful foreign policy had implications on the relations with other states. Ever since the international peacekeeping has gained new significance, Turkey has been carrying out an active participation in and support for various missions led and implemented by the UN, NATO and the EU, by using various means which include the participation to peace-keeping operations and the efforts of dispute resolution – including post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.¹¹¹ These prove her commitment to peacekeeping across the globe and her importance for the European security structure.

Hence, reinforcing the stability and peace in the surrounding regions is one of the salient objectives aimed by Turkish foreign policy. In the governmental platforms, emphasis is put on constructive, problem solving approach and the “win-win” concept that had practical implications -for instance, the improvement of relations with Bulgaria, Greece and Syria.¹¹² A broadening of the national interests seems to be ongoing, as indicated by the President of the Republic:

“It is no longer possible to define the world geopolitics of the 21st century with conventional power politics. One also has to take into consideration such elements as political and social values, interaction between societies, identity and cultural harmony. With this understanding, Turkey does not confine itself in a strict sense to the framework of national interest alone, but rather pursues a pro-active foreign policy aimed at contributing to regional and global peace and security”.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm>).

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² ERSAVCI Murat, “Turkey’s Contributions to Stability”, ANU/National Europe Centre, Canberra, 05/06/2007 (www.turkishembassy.org.au/assets/docs/istikrar.doc).

¹¹³ Ibid.

The peaceful character of Turkish foreign policy finds its reflection in a feature that is very important for the field of crisis management: The “complete absence of any irredentist design” in relations with the neighbouring countries. After 1923, Turkey’s foreign policy has been shaped by the status-quo orientation. But this choice has not been a barrier for a settlement of problems in an internationally approved way. Balkan and Sadabat Pacts were built by consensus with the states of the region. Mossul¹¹⁴ was a failure, but the long-running “straits question” was solved in 1936 by the *Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits* and largely served Turkey’s interests. Likewise, the annexation of the Hatay state to the Republic of Turkey took place in conformity with the principles of the international law.¹¹⁵

Among post-imperialism societies, the point in which Turkish nation was most successful is that it made itself believed and adapted to its new role in the world. Turkish statesmen adapted their state to the position of “middle size state” and built up a foreign policy in accordance with this reality. The net and definite collapse of the Ottoman empire facilitated the policy-makers’ decision to undergo such an adaptation. Strict adherence to the principle of “peace in the world” implied a policy of keeping clear of any adventure in foreign affairs. That was in the very philosophy of the new Republic, which was built after an arduous independence war.

Since the establishment of the republic, Turkey’s foreign policy’s main axis was preserved. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has acted in accordance with its traditional foreign policy identity in Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. For not being accused of having imperial objectives, Turkish governments followed very cautious steps in their involvement in the restoration of peace in the Balkan region. These include principally the diligence of not reacting to the tensions on the grounds of ethnical and religious solidarity. In the Gulf wars, even despite the accusations of being ‘more royalist than the king’ and the financial losses she incurred, Turkey preferred to act with her westerner allies.

¹¹⁴ After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, both Turkey and Iraq claimed the former *Vilayat* of Mossul. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, had stipulated that the frontier between Turkey and Iraq would be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and the UK “within 9 months”. After the failure of the negotiations, the League of Nations Council – which was seized of the dispute - awarded the territory to Iraq. See WRIGHT Quincy, “The Mossul Dispute”, *The American Journal of International Law*, vol: 20, no: 3, July 1926, p: 453.

¹¹⁵ Following an agreement signed between France and Turkey, bolstered by the decision taken unanimously by Hatay’s national assembly, Hatay became a city of Turkey.

M. Soysal maintains that the best proof of the non-irredentist philosophy of republican foreign policy resides in its constantly underlined attachment to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne which established the Republic of Turkey. This choice had consequences in what regards Turkey's relations with the outside world: The nation relinquished its rights in all the territories that it used to govern. In other words, it becomes impossible for the policy-makers to revive the "imperial grandeur".¹¹⁶

Such an attitude is possible when a realistic and rational attitude is adopted while dealing with foreign policy issues. Rational realism is among the most significant aspects of Turkey's foreign policy.¹¹⁷ That requires considerable common sense and good will to be a part of the resolution of problems without being trapped in political and material gains. Turkey faces a good deal of problems with grave and dramatic nature in a very difficult corner of the world, and, paradoxically, despite the temptation of lucrative and irredentist involvements.¹¹⁸

The founding principles are not the only source of Turkish foreign policy parameters. Decision makers always feel bound by some factors that determine the general guidelines of the foreign policy and consequently affect the decisions on foreign intervention. Turkish decision makers face the same reality. Geographical proximity of the crisis is one of these factors. Many examples illustrate the fact that states may easily fail to show the political determination to send troops to regions even when grave atrocities are committed.¹¹⁹

In terms of geography, Turkey has a unique position. She is situated at the crossroads of Balkans, South-East Mediterranean and Middle East, Caucasian region and Central Asia. This region concentrates most of geopolitical and geostrategic stakes, fossil fuels of the Caspian or national and frontier conflicts of Caucasia and Iraq (not to mention Afghanistan or Balkan territories). The growing importance of this region can be conceived as an important asset for Turkey's relations with the EU.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ SOYSAL Mümtaz, Op. Cit., pp: 39-40.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p: 46.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ This is the reason why, for instance, European countries remained in active in what regards the genocide in Rwanda.

¹²⁰ Ismail Cem stated that the growing importance of the region played a key role in Turkey's designation as a candidate state in the Helsinki Summit. See BILLION Didier, "Les Atouts de la Politique Extérieure de la Turquie", *Pouvoirs*, no: 115, 2005, p:115.

In the case of Turkey, one of the consequences brought by the geographic location – accompanied with the prevailing global security conditions and the country’s willingness to have a peace-provider status – was the preservation of a realistic deterrence capability. To facilitate the circumvention of insecurity, Turkey had to be militarily strong and join (or establish, if possible) alliances. Geography is therefore far from being a factor that exclusively plays in favour of the stable and peaceful character of Turkey’s foreign policy. Throughout the history, Turkey has confronted the uncertainty of being invaded by at least some of its neighbours.¹²¹ The newly established Republic inherited this perception from the Ottoman Empire. This was strengthened by the circumstances which brought about the emergence of a defence strategy called “two and half wars” from the first half of 1990s: A simultaneous war with Greece and Syria, accompanied with a PKK insurrection.¹²² This defence doctrine, justified partly by the security agreement signed between Greece and Syria in 1995, by Öcalan’s presence in Syria and PKK-Athens relations supposes, since its origins, the maintenance of a strong and dissuasive defence apparatus capable of carrying out a combat in the enemy’s territory. An additional factor that increased the feeling of insecurity in Turkish decision-making circles is the conviction that Turkey was surrounded by an ‘alliance’ composed of Greece, Russia, Armenia, Iran and Syria.¹²³

Historical and cultural connections between countries may also stimulate the will to resolve the conflicts. Again, the Republic of Turkey has a particular position. The Ottoman Empire expanded its frontiers to three continents, which created diverse links with various regions. The consequence is that, because of these links, Turkey had to intervene in several crises that occurred in the regions which belonged to the Empire. One can also add the cultural and religious connections that are not the consequence of occupation. This is clear in the examples of Azerbaijan and, to some extent, Afghanistan.

Another important feature of Turkey’s foreign policy is defined as multi-dimensionality. The meaning of this term is presented in a functional way: reconciling the West with the East and the North with the South; being active in various regions; serving by way of geographic location and close historic and cultural links within a landscape as a

¹²¹ SANDER Oral, Op. Cit., p: 138.

¹²² ELEKDAĞ Şükrü,, “İkibuçuk Savaş Stratejisi” (Two and Half War Strategy), *Yeni Türkiye-Türk Dış Politikası Özel Sayısı*, Mart-. Nisan 1995, p: 519.

¹²³ KİRİŞÇİ Kemal, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times”, *Chaillot Paper*, no: 45, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, September 2006, p: 15.

crucial bridge for dialogue and interaction between cultures at the heart of Eurasia. In line with this definition, emphasis is put on Turkey's taking part in a variety of international organisations and its contribution to dialogue and cooperation among different cultures.

At the beginning of the 21st century, two major developments in the international arena brought to the fore Turkey's bridging capacity and the functions that she can fulfil due to her peculiar characteristics: September 11 attacks (2001) and American intervention to Iraq (spring 2003). They are perceived as the antagonism between the West (particularly the US) and the Muslim world. Because Turkey does not suit this scheme as a secular democracy and a Muslim country, the EU has interest in taking profit of this 'bridge' of civilisation.

One of the brightest – and the most global – examples that Turkey uses her bridging role for strengthening intercultural dialogue¹²⁴ is the "Alliance of Civilisations" initiative, established in 2005, co-sponsored by the Kingdom of Spain, under the auspices of the United Nations. According to the official mission statement, the latter initiative "aims to improve understanding and cooperative relations among societies across cultures and religions and, at the same time, to help counter the forces that stimulate polarisation and extremism".¹²⁵

Turkey attempts to play the role of honest broker or facilitator with a view to helping to solve disputes whenever circumstances arise. She has important assets on this matter, such as being one of the few countries in the world that has succeeded in combining Islam and

¹²⁴ Despite Turkey's potential on this subject, in the domestic platform, there are some incidents that weaken Turkey's international prestige. The European Union's official website on intercultural dialogue points to four major challenge for Turkey: Often problematic relations in Turkey with its ethnic and national minorities (especially Kurds, Armenians, Roma and non-Islamic people), most of which are still not recognized as such under Turkish law; ongoing incidents of violation of human rights such as freedom of press, language and religion contradict Turkish efforts towards positive image-building. Candidature to European Union met with important reservations from several European countries; repeated acts of politically motivated persecution and violence. Critical or liberal intellectuals threatened by nationalist assaults or being criminalized by state organs (e.g. 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian writer Hrant Dink); gap between legal provisions or state efforts to prioritise human rights and social realities, especially in remote provinces. See Turkey (Country Sheets), Intercultural Dialogue, ERICarts Institute, Bonn (<http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/intercultural-dialogue-country-sheets.php?aid=128>).

¹²⁵ According to its mission statement, The Alliance functions, both globally and within the UN system, in the following capacities: a *bridge builder and convener*, connecting people and organizations devoted to promoting trust and understanding between diverse communities, particularly – but not exclusively – between Muslim and Western societies; a *catalyst and facilitator* helping to give impetus to innovative projects aimed at reducing polarization between nations and cultures through joint pursuits and mutually beneficial partnerships; an *advocate* for building respect and understanding among cultures and amplifying voices of moderation and reconciliation which help calm cultural and religious tensions between nations and peoples; a *platform to increase visibility*, enhance the work and highlight the profile of initiatives devoted to building bridges between cultures; and a *resource* providing access to information and materials drawn from successful cooperative initiatives which could, in turn, be used by member states, institutions, organizations, or individuals seeking to initiate similar processes or projects. See *Mission statements*, Alliance of Civilisations (<http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/39/73/lang.english/>).

pluralism within a democratic experience of almost nine decades. That gives an enormous potential for progressing political and cultural dialogue between civilisations whereas extremist movements aim to divide the global society along artificial cultural and religious fault lines. At a juncture in world politics when cross-cultural skills are increasingly becoming a necessity for states in their foreign relations, Turkey has undeniably much to offer.¹²⁶

Another important point to make is that Turkey's integration to the EU will permit to give a strong signal to the Muslim world and prove that Westerners and Muslims can do more than cooperating in some domains. This will invalidate the arguments of religious fundamentalists. Possessing both Asian and European identities, as a NATO ally, EU candidate and an OIC member, Turkey was in a position to fix the broken dialogue and able to neutralise misunderstandings.¹²⁷ In an environment where the US and Muslim world seemed to have come face to face in a context of clash of civilisations, Turkey was the only country to dissipate the atmosphere of confrontation.¹²⁸

Voices from senior European bureaucrats also confirm this view. Former European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, G. Verheugen is reported to have said that September 11 terrorist attacks raised Turkey's strategic importance for Europe while asserting his belief on Turkey's ability, as an EU member, to play an important role in Europe's future political and economic security.¹²⁹ More recently, Turkey's key role in inter-religious and intercultural dialogue was evoked by René van der Linden, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.¹³⁰

The much-evoked "bridge theory" is not spared from criticism however. For instance, M. Soysal defines it as a "role of liaison and mediation between antagonistic spheres of influence in the region, implying thereby the gain of moral and material advantages from the use of the bridge".¹³¹ The lack he reports in Turkish case is the political and ideological

¹²⁶ ERSAVCI Murat, Op. Cit.

¹²⁷ CEM İsmail, *Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya. Birinci Cilt: Strateji – Yunanistan – Kıbrıs*, Op. Cit., p: 56.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ "Verheugen: 'I Believe Turkey Will Fulfill the Criteria by Year's-End, but There Are No Guarantees'", *Turkish Press Review*, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, 25/02/2004 (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2004/02/04x02x25.HTM#%206>).

¹³⁰ "PACE President to Discuss Reforms with Turkish Officials", *Hürriyet*, 14/01/2008 (<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=pac-president-to-discuss-reforms-with-turkish-officials-2008-01-14>).

¹³¹ SOYSAL Mümtaz, Op. Cit., pp: 38-39.

neutrality towards East and West at the same time –which is a necessity for the bridging role to be effective.¹³² Turkey’s institutional links to the West outweigh its connections to the East. This asymmetry weakens its potential to be an efficient bridge.

I. B.1.b. Common Security Concerns and Reciprocal Interests

If the end of the Cold War put an end to the apocalyptic annihilation theories, security threats of global scale still remain valid. What is more, a multitude of actors can make the spread of these threats possible in the new strategic environment. As a consequence, states had to consider establishing necessary measures to offset them –not without excluding the cooperative schemes.

A simultaneous look on the ESS and the official documents elaborated by Turkish state reveals the parallelism of threat perceptions between Turkey and the EU. It is therefore reasonable to focus on some issues which stand out in the field of crisis management: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism.

I.B.1.b.(1). The weapons of mass destruction

The proliferation of the WMDs is one of the major concerns for the global security. The steady technological sophistication of their means of delivery – mainly, that of the missiles –makes it all the more worrisome: Some non-state organisations and states that do not comply with non-proliferation requirements challenge the delicate balance built up by the non-proliferation regime. Although the latter is somewhat preserved by the UN, the international community does not feel safe from the risks.

It is important to note that, as a country in the Middle East region, Turkey is highly exposed to the security threats caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their increasingly sophisticated delivery means. The three neighbours of Turkey – Iran, Iraq and Syria – are formerly or currently suspected of producing and/or stockpiling WMDs. Despite this fact, Turkey’s policy is based on not possessing WMD and supporting the objective of “*general and complete disarmament of WMD under strict and effective international control*”.¹³³ On the contrary, nuclear non-proliferation – along with arms control

¹³² Ibid, p: 38.

¹³³ *General Policy On The Non-Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) And Their Delivery Means*, Turkish General Staff (http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/diger_konular/kitleimhasilahlari.htm).

and disarmament – constitutes one of the central elements of Turkey’s international security policies.

Thus, Ankara welcomed the UNSC Resolution 1540 and the *Proliferation Security Initiative*¹³⁴ while affirming its ardent support to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is also party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997), Biological Weapons Convention (1974), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1999). Moreover, during the last decade, Turkey became member of export control regimes on WMD and their means of delivery as well as related materials and technologies.¹³⁵ Hence, she was:

- one of the founding members of Wassenaar Arrangement, which aims to control materials and technologies used for the production of conventional arms and which was established in 1996;
- member of the *Missile Technology Control Regime*, since 1997;
- accepted to the *Australian Group* (which aims to control the export of materials and technologies which may be used for the production biological and chemical weapons) in 2000;
- member of the *Nuclear Suppliers Group* which aims to regulate the export of materials that are used in the nuclear technology and those which are susceptible of dual use;
- one of the 37 members of the Zangger Committee which offers guidance by contributing to the interpretation of article 3, paragraph 2, of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹³⁶

Turkey’s perception of the threat and her active participation in various arms control and disarmament initiatives – including her adhesion to international agreements – suit the EU’s conception and policies regarding the prevention of WMD proliferation. The European Security Strategy brings out the latter subject as the greatest threat to the security of

¹³⁴ Led by the United States, the Proliferation Security Initiative involves the interdiction of third-country ships on the high seas on the grounds of carrying nuclear materials.

¹³⁵ They are: Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.

¹³⁶ The article stipulates that “each state party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article”. See *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm>).

Europeans. It goes further by highlighting some facts that amplify the danger caused by the WMDs: arms race in the Middle East, scientific and technological progresses and the possibility of acquisition by terrorist groups.

Involving as many states and institutions into the non-proliferation efforts is the cornerstone of the *European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD* which was adopted in the Brussels summit of December 2003, simultaneously with the ESS.¹³⁷ The strategy exposes the priorities on which the EU has been concentrating its efforts. Two intentions stand out. The one is about supporting and reinforcing the existing mechanisms to build and universalise the system of non-proliferation. The other is related to the cooperation with partners and the supply of assistance to third countries.¹³⁸

Political proximity between Turkey and the EU in dealing with the WMD proliferation challenge is concretised by diplomatic actions. As of today, Turkey and the EU spawn similar efforts in bringing Iran in line with the internationally accepted norms of nuclear non-proliferation. Although Iranian case will be dealt with more in detail later on, it seems worthwhile to underline that Turkey's dynamism in the field and the overlap between Ankara's and Brussels' interests are obvious.

I.B.1.b.(2). Terrorism

Neither in Europe nor in Turkey is terrorism a new experience. Several EU member states have been exposed to terrorist attacks in the past which forced them to develop national mechanisms and legislative frameworks to deal with the issue. Due to the international dimension of the phenomenon, they also envisioned cooperation through intra and extra-European schemes.

In the White Paper of Turkish Ministry of Defence, terrorism is defined as a phenomenon that aims to achieve objectives by using destructive methods. It has "the objective of destroying the traditional feeling of trust and protection between the state and the people, by applying a systematic (...) strategy of violence against governments and innocent

¹³⁷ *Note from the Council of the European Union to the European Council*, 15708/03, Brussels, 10/12/2003 (<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf>).

¹³⁸ The Strategy provided a basis for the concept paper on the same subject. See *Cover Note from the Council of the European Union General Secretariat to the Delegations*, 16694/06, Brussels, 12/12/2006 (<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st16/st16694.en06.pdf>).

civilians”.¹³⁹ Terrorists achieve their objectives by “increasing political instability and domestic tension” against which “oppressive methods” remain the only viable option.¹⁴⁰

Turkey is very sensible to the question of terrorism. As stated in the White Paper, she has been subject to practically all types of terrorism since the end of the 1960s including political, religious and ethnic origins.¹⁴¹ She has long fought with the *Kurdistan Workers’ Party* (PKK), listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU and a number of states. Around 40.000 people have died since the PKK launched the armed struggle which caused a massive burden for Turkey’s budget.¹⁴²

The fight with terror has given birth to different formulations within the European integration process. Cooperation on a European scale dates back to 1975 when the TREVI group was set up. In the TEU, the combat against terrorism is established as a priority objective among the matters of common interest. In 1993, as a result of the TEU, TREVI was incorporated into the EU as part of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar, bringing the cooperation against terrorism within the ambit of the community scheme. As a support to this institutional move, the conclusions of Madrid European Council of 1995 qualified terrorism as a growing threat to democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to economic and social development for all EU member states. It also underscored the importance of collective action as did the Action Plan adopted in Vienna (1998) and the conclusions of Tampere Council (1999).

Ten days after the September 11 attacks, during an extraordinary meeting, the European Council adopted a plan of action to combat terrorism.¹⁴³ The *Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism*¹⁴⁴ defines terrorist offences by combining two elements. One is related to objectives followed: seriously intimidating a population; unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political,

¹³⁹ Defence White Paper 2000, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of National Defence, Ankara.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² PKK had a moment of cease after its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and, subsequently, put on trial in Turkey. The terrorist organisation’s position weakened among the Kurds of Turkey since then. Nevertheless, although it had stopped the violent conflict with the Turkish government for some while, it called off the ceasefire in 2004 and resumed terrorist attacks.

¹⁴³ *Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001*, (http://ue.eu.int/Uedocs/Cms_Data/Docs/Pressdata/En/Ec/140.En.Pdf).

¹⁴⁴ “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism”, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 2002/475/JHA, 22/06/2002.

constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization. The other concerns the description of offences that will be deemed to be of terrorist nature.¹⁴⁵ The detailed description of these offences reflects clearly how powerful the impact of September 11 has been.

In addition to the political decisions, the strategic paper of the EU also dealt with the problem of terrorism. The ESS identified terrorism as the first “key threat” against which it urged concerted action at European level, while indicating that its causes may be very complex. What can be inferred from this statement reflects the EU’s perspective on the fight with terrorism: A sophisticated and a long-term project is necessary. It is therefore not surprising to see that both the Council and the Commission adopted various packages of proposals aiming at improving the EU’s capacity to fight with terrorism.

Hence, the identification of the threat has provided the step preceding the announcement of ways to deal with it. The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted in 2004, is in line with the ESS and foresees important mechanisms and procedures including legislative measures, cooperation schemes and information sharing.¹⁴⁶ The same year, the Council adopted specific measures on combating terrorist financing, civil protection policy, prevention of recruitment, critical infrastructure protection and external security policy.

In July 2005, terrorist attacks committed in London accelerated the implementation of anti-terrorist measures that had already been decided upon. Later that year, the EU adopted a counter-terrorism strategy having a four-fold objective: Preventing people turning to terrorism; protecting citizens and infrastructure (and reducing the vulnerability to attacks); pursuing and investigating terrorists across national borders and globally; getting prepared to manage and minimise the consequences of terrorist attacks. In addition, the Council

¹⁴⁵ The document lays out a long list of these offences: (a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in paragraphs (a) to (h).

¹⁴⁶ The Council is invited to adopt necessary measures to maximize the effectiveness of Schengen Information System. See *Declaration on Combating Terrorism*, Brussels, 25/03/2004. (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf).

established a specific program for the period 2007-2013 with the aim of supporting projects in the field of prevention, preparedness and consequence management for terrorist attacks and other security-related threats.

It is plain to see that in the post-September 11 period, the EU's awareness on the terrorism issue has flourished –and, consequently, efforts to tackle the threat gained momentum. In time, Brussels has elaborated guidelines for common action against terrorism. Its global approach to the issue can easily be perceived through the political dialogue that involves states. The cooperation and partner schemes built up with other international actors, including the US and Russia, can be given as an example. Technical assistance provided to some states and the measures adopted with the purpose of preventing the financing of terrorist activities also deserve to be mentioned. The cooperation between the second and third pillars facilitated the Union's above-mentioned efforts.

Cooperation with international organisations is another instance that can be used for highlighting the Union's efforts to deal with the question of terrorism. The UN and NATO particularly stand out. The 27 accord a primordial place to supporting the UN's role and attach importance to the implementation of UN resolutions and conventions. The cooperation against terrorism between the EU and NATO is defined as an area of “key priority” for the two institutions.¹⁴⁷

The parallelism between the EU's and Turkey's policies can be easily seen at two points: Enhancing the cooperation schemes, and, strengthening the existing measures. Turkey has not only responded in a constructive manner to all diplomatic efforts aiming to eradicate terror beyond her borders, but she also contributed to its elimination in the international level. Her belief in the necessity of international cooperation is justified by the bilateral cooperation agreements signed with more than 30 states and the international covenants to which she is party.¹⁴⁸

Ankara expresses on every occasion its readiness to share the know-how she acquired throughout the years in the fight against terrorism and extends great efforts in doing

¹⁴⁷ *NATO-EU : A Strategic Partnership*, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm).

¹⁴⁸ Among them the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (since September 2005), the *Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism* (since January 2006) and the *Council of Europe Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism* (since March 2007) can be cited. Moreover, Ankara hosted the second meeting of the *Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism* (February 2007).

so when required. Her being among the very first countries to join the global war on terrorism is based on a broad vision and bitter experience. So is her attitude to take part in international legal frameworks to counter terrorism. In line with this reality, Turkey has been contributing to the steps taken in view of a codification on terrorism by playing an active role in the elaboration of various international agreements and resolutions on the issue.

I. B.2. The Commonality of Regional Preferences

The convergence of foreign policy between Turkey and the EU is bolstered by the existence of interests in the regions whose priorities emanate from their proximity. Hence, Balkan territories, the Middle East and the Caucasus deserve to be focussed on.

I.B.2.a. Balkan Region

Historically, there has been differing views on the frontiers of the Balkan region. Roughly, Balkan is the name given to the south-east European region on an area of more than half million square kilometres inhabited by 55 million people. Because Balkan territories have been a crossroads of cultures and religions of diverse kinds throughout the centuries, it is home to various ethno-linguistic communities at present.



The collapse of the communism brought the opportunity of freedom to the region while leaving it face to face with the difficulties of passing from totalitarian regimes and state planning to the democracy and market economy. The situation was propitious for pessimism: Yugoslav population was not ready to deal with these transition problems and ethnic questions were only frozen during the socialist period. The ethnic and religious structure

caused the most intractable problems when one community tried to rule others. As a result, decade-long bloody wars ruled in most of the region.

Balkan countries have made significant strides in economic development and stabilization over the past decade. Slovenia acceded to the EU, while Croatia is negotiating for accession and other former Yugoslav Republics will eventually follow the same path. The perspective of NATO and EU memberships leads to consider them as security provider.

Turkey, with her historical and cultural connections accompanied by a strong sense of belonging to the Balkans, follows closely all developments that occur in the region. This attitude is particularly discernible during the intense crisis periods. Turkey believes – and is believed – to have a key role on the peace and stability there. This view is justified by the fact that Ankara found itself at the forefront of international attempts and formulations that aim to bring peace to the region..

Turkey wants to strengthen her relations with the entire Balkan region in every way. This aim obviously shapes Turkish foreign policy. Economic and commercial domains are privileged recently in addition to the political ones. Ankara explains this position by the fact that economic development of Balkan states can directly affect the regional security and stability. In the same vein, the support for the transition to democracy and market economy in the region is one of the salient features of Turkey's foreign policy, which is supported by both governmental and non-governmental efforts. An institutionalisation of the financial and technical aid given by Turkey to the countries of the region is concretised by a recent development: the units of Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania have been established in Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, which originally targeted Central Asian Turkic Republics.¹⁴⁹

Working for the enhancement of regional cooperation in the region is another characteristic. Turkey takes part in international structures that are related to the stabilisation and development of the Balkan region: the *South East European Cooperation Process* (SEECP),¹⁵⁰ the *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe* (SPSEE),¹⁵¹ the *Regional*

¹⁴⁹ ÜLGER İhsan Kaya, "Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye: 1990'lı Yıllar" (Balkan Developments and Turkey: The 1990s) in BAL İdris (Ed.), *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century), Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara, 2006, p: 269.

¹⁵⁰ It constitutes the only indigenous cooperation format that stems exclusively from the countries of South East Europe. Albania, Macedonia, FRY, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Greece, all participate in the SEECP. Since October 2004 Moldova has participated in the SEECP, having being granted observer status.

*Cooperation Council*¹⁵² and the *South East Europe Cooperation Initiative* (SECI).¹⁵³ These endeavours are remarked by determination, including a broad range of military and civilian components. It goes without saying that the positive role played by Turkey will absolutely be reinforced by its accession to the EU.¹⁵⁴

The social sympathy to the Balkan people is also important in Turkey's relations with the region and bolsters all the good relations built in the governmental level. This is obvious in the social mobilization in favour of a decision to intervene in a crisis situation. Another example that can be given on this account is the help of Turkish people to the refugees who sought shelter in Turkey.¹⁵⁵ The fact that there is a Turkish minority in the region further stirs Turkey's interest and it had the pre-eminence as a matter of foreign policy especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. When a crisis occurs, the Turkish-origin communities' situation deteriorates and there is a massive immigration to Turkey from the

¹⁵¹ Established in Cologne in June 1999, The Stability Pact is the "first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community" with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. The SPSEE stemmed originally from a French proposal and its principal objective was to create a belt of stability around Former Republic of Yugoslavia by fostering peace and stability, reinforcing democracy and respect for human rights and promoting economic prosperity. Its members are the countries of the region (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia); the European Union Member states and the European Commission; other countries (Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, USA); international organizations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD); international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, EBRD, EIB, Council of Europe Development Bank); regional initiatives (BSEC, CEI, SECI, SEECP). See *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe* (<http://www.stabilitypact.org>).

¹⁵² In time, qualified progress was achieved in the region and the transformation of the Stability Pact into a more regionally owned and led cooperation scheme became necessary. This led to the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which was "designed around priorities defined by the region itself" and based upon the principles of its predecessor. The RCC is operational since 2008. Ibid.

¹⁵³ SECI comprises a consultation framework for addressing economic and environmental problems with a regional dimension. The role of SECI is to complement and strengthen existing regional initiatives and actions for transferring know-how, realising private investment and harmonising the trade legislation and policies of the countries in the region. The SECI Initiative cooperates closely with the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The following states are SECI members: Greece, Albania, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Bosnia - Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Moldova. The following countries are SECI partners: US, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the Czech Republic.

¹⁵⁴ This is the view of Bulgarian EU Affairs Minister Gergana Grancharova. See "Turkey to Play Key Role in Balkans If Accepted to EU", Today's Zaman, 21/04/2008 (<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=139578>).

¹⁵⁵ Especially during the spring of 1999, large-scale charity activities took place to help Kosovars. See "Kosova'ya Yardım Seli" (Torrential Aid to Kosovo), *Sabah*, 08/04/1999 (<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999/04/08/r04.html>).

region. Turkey endeavours to pursue a strategy remarked by the emphasis put on the protection of these communities' rights.¹⁵⁶

The EU declared without ambiguity that the future of the Balkans is within the EU. This clear stance on having a common future with the states of the region is based on at least three factors. One of them concerns the Europeanness of these states. Economic benefits that the enlargement will bring to the Union comes next. Another point is related to the increase of the regional stability. The EU's fundamental objective for the Balkans region is to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable –expanding to the region the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom established over the last 50 years by gradual European integration. The concretisation of this objective is built on different pillars and solid mechanisms are used for its achievement such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs).¹⁵⁷

Obviously, the countries of the region will continue on the path toward European integration –albeit with a lack of clear plan and timetable for now. The undisputable Europeanness of those states is helpful for their accession to the EU. Conceived as part of Europe, these states will become members of the EU provided that they conform to the EU standards. The EU's attitude towards the Balkan states is not unrequited: The states of the region have a strong feeling of belonging to Europe. That the democratic reforms lose support and legitimacy in time seems a low probability. Likewise, the EU and European capitals will not withdraw their economic and political support to Balkan's prospect EU membership. At the time they will be EU members, they will already be solid states in economic and political terms.

I.B.2.b. The Middle East

The Middle East, in a broad definition, is the region that covers south-western Asia and Egypt. It is a land of arid climate and poor agricultural development where the oil is the main source of revenue. The vast energy resources, which form the backbone of western economies, are the reason of historical involvement of foreign powers in the region. As one of

¹⁵⁶ TÜRKEŞ Mustafa, "Türkiye'nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim" (Continuity and Change in Turkey's Balkan Policy), *Avrupa Dosyası*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2008, p: 256.

¹⁵⁷ In talks with countries who have expressed the wish to join the EU, Association Agreements are concluded with them in exchange for commitments to political, economic, trade, or human rights reform in a country. In exchange, the country may be offered tariff-free access to some or all EU markets (industrial goods, agricultural products, etc), and financial or technical assistance. The SAA is an important tool of the European Neighbourhood Policy which can legitimately be considered a key step on the road to full membership.

the world's largest importers of oil, gas and coal, the EU is among the biggest consumers of Middle East resources. The energy factor plays an important part in Turkey's relations with the countries of the region as well.

Another characteristic of the region is formed by socio-political complexities which involve the decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict spurred by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Basically, it is a struggle over the Palestinian area. The Jewish claim to this land are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants. Palestinian claim is based on continuous residence in the country for centuries.

The establishment of a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East which will allow it turn into a stable and prosperous region is a commonsensical desire shared by Turkey and the European Union. Both sides favour a lasting settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict through mutual negotiations on the basis of a two-state vision that implicates secure and recognized borders –in conformity with the relevant Resolutions of the UN Security Council, the principle of land for peace, the *Road Map* and the Arab Peace Initiative.¹⁵⁸



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-192062619-middle_east_pol_2008.jpg

Turkey's close relations with Israel are another point of convergence. The recognition of the Israeli state having come 11 months after the proclamation of the Hebrew state, diplomatic relations were established in 1950. Military, strategic, and diplomatic

¹⁵⁸ *Middle East Peace Process*, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-the-middle-east.en.mfa).

cooperation between Turkey and Israel were accorded high priority by the governments of both countries, which share concerns with respect to the regional instabilities in the Middle East.¹⁵⁹ In a mutually beneficial context, the relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv went well in general – a fact that caused strain for Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries.

Within this framework, the Middle East peace process that began with the Madrid Conference of 1991 – bringing together Israel and the Palestinian delegation along with Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the USA, the USSR and the EC delegation – has been welcome by Turkey particularly because it would eliminate an important Turkish foreign policy dilemma: keeping good relations with the Muslim world while strengthening the links with Tel Aviv. Subsequent peace projects have also been supported by Turkey, such as the first and the second Oslo arrangements of 1993 and 1995 and the Annapolis Conference of November 2007.¹⁶⁰

As a complement to the political support, Turkey made material contributions to the establishment of the future Palestinian state’s economic and institutional infrastructure as well. She participated to the *International Donors Conference for the Palestinian State* of December 2007 and pledged 150 million US dollars of financial aid in the context of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan.¹⁶¹ Ankara Forum is another significant point that proves Turkey’s commitment to the economic development of the Palestinian population. Founded with Turkey’s initiative in 2005 with the participation of the businessmen from Turkey (Union of Stock Markets and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey-TOBB), Israel (Israel

¹⁵⁹ The signing of *Framework Agreement for Education and Technical Cooperation in Military Field* in February 1996 between Turkey and Israel had severe repercussions in the region. The agreement stipulated common education activities for both countries’ air forces and the possibility for Israeli pilots to use Turkish air space for training to which Middle Eastern capitals reacted severely. They were not comforted by Turkish government’s declaration on the fact that the agreement signified in no way Turkey’s standing with Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite reactions, several bilateral agreements ensued in the following years. The military/strategic solidarity between Ankara and Tel Aviv has been further solidified by joint military exercises such as the *Reliable Mermaid* that was realised in the Mediterranean by the participation of the US. Israeli-Turkish military *rapprochement* was a strong message to Middle Eastern states. On this account, it should be mentioned that the signing of a common defence agreement by Syria and Greece in summer 1995 – which granted Greece the right of using Syrian air space in case of a conflict – had a catalyst effect.

¹⁶⁰ At Annapolis, a compromise between Israel and Palestine was reached on the document entitled *Common Understanding* document, which aspired to start at once the bilateral negotiations with good will to ensure the conclusion of a peace agreement. The latter would achieve the settlement without exception of any unresolved issue including all the fundamental matters in the context of advancing the target of two states living side by side in peace and security. Turkey officially declared her backing of this document. See Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/middle-east-peace-process.en.mfa>).

¹⁶¹ The Conference was organized in Paris by the co-presidencies of the French and Norwegian Foreign Ministers, Representative of the Middle Eastern Quartet Tony Blair and the European Commission. Turkey attended the conference by the delegation headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan. Ibid.

Manufacturers' Union) and Palestine (Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Trade), the Forum has conducted seven meetings since 2005.¹⁶²

Financial aid is the strongest point of the EU's power in the Middle East. In fact, the EU has the desire to play a central role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Yet, its efforts have remained limited. Although the EU's positioning towards the Middle East has been gaining visibility during the last five decades, its weakness in the resolution of the conflict is obvious. Even in the post-September 11 context which gives the EU the possibility to have an active role in the Middle East peacemaking, the EU is still far from becoming a significant peacemaker.¹⁶³

Political weakness of the EU is overshadowed by its economic power: The European Commission is the biggest donor of financial assistance to the Palestinians. The EU's budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority is crucial to its functioning, for it is remedy to the short term liquidity problems following Israel's decision to cut off monthly transfers of customs and tax revenue since the start of the Intifada.¹⁶⁴ The Commission provided €246 million non-targeted budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority for the period 2000-2002.¹⁶⁵ In 2006, the EU provided almost 700 million Euros to the Palestinian territories, and total aid flows reached 1.2 billion US dollars –which sustained the ruined Palestinian economy.¹⁶⁶

Yet, the lack of efficiency in political terms does not mean the inexistence of convergence. The European Union affirmed on several occasions the Palestinian right to self-determination and its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian state. The Middle East occupied the agenda of the European Community through the European Political Cooperation framework, even before the CFSP was established. The EU supports both Israelis and Palestinians to reach a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, which

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ AOUN Elena, "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol: 8, no: 3, 2003, p: 290.

¹⁶⁴ SOETENDORP Ben, "The EU's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building of a Visible International Identity", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2002, Vol. 7, p. 288.

¹⁶⁵ "OLAF Finds 'No Conclusive Evidence' to Link EU Funds and Terrorism: European Commission Welcomes Final Report on Assistance to the Palestinian Authority"

(<http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/85255db800470aa485255d8b004e349a/c6d3a9f772113eb285256fc70065dc63!OpenDocument>).

¹⁶⁶ Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/int_economic_issues/country_page9248_en.htm).

is the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region.

In order to bolster the resolution of the conflict between the two entities, the EU has been working for long time with the Palestinian Authority to build up the institutions of a future democratic, independent and viable Palestinian state living in peace with Israel and its neighbours within secured and recognised borders. A multi-dimensional partnership programme framed by Barcelona Process which was later strengthened and diversified by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) defined the EU's relations with the Middle East and North Africa. Some country-specific action plans of the ENP reveal the range of the efforts which focus on economic, financial and juridical aspects.¹⁶⁷

A grouping known as Middle East Quartet – composed of the USA, the EU, the Russian Federation and the UN – is involved in mediating the conflicting sides. This initiative makes the EU part of the efforts and reveals that Brussels is not totally absent in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Quartet supports the goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement and sticks to the vision of two states as laid down by the UNSC Resolutions. In order to fulfil this elusive objective, the Quartet encourages all parties in the region to seek a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A negotiated permanent settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 is a must for putting an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which seems infeasible without international support.

As a deep-rooted and highly complicated issue, the antagonism in the Middle East is not subject to a substantial progress. The EU policy-makers utter that their Union, as a major financial contributor, should assume a stronger and more visible political role in the region – proportionate to their financial strength. Bringing peace and stability to the region will certainly be an arduous task.

¹⁶⁷ Achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability through prudent monetary and fiscal policies; develop the framework for financial services with the aim of improving access to finance, insurance and other financial services important to enterprises; address administrative, legislative and regulatory obstacles to the creation and development of firms; ensure the security of property rights, contract enforcement and investor protection; improve competition policy, continue trade liberalisation, remove restrictions on capital flows; undertake institutional and judiciary reforms, including capacity enhancement; support research and development, and improve the quality of education; fight against corruption.

I.B.2.c. The Caucasus

Throughout the history, Caucasus has been a very strategic region with particular ethnical and religious features. A field of competition for many states, it has been very popular in modern times with the discovery of its vast oil and natural gas resources. This added a particular dimension to its relations with outside world. Besides, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the rise of ethnic dissonances plunged Caucasus into turmoil. The EU's interest to the region should be considered in light of these two variables.

The search for security and stability in the region has found its reflections on international formulations. NATO, for instance, has explicitly affirmed its interest towards and established connections with the region. The Caucasus states take part in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program which aims at creating trust between the members of the Alliance and other European or former Soviet states. Besides, the three Caucasian states have further developed their relations with the transatlantic organisation through individual partnership action plans.¹⁶⁸



Source: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/europe-caucase-sud/conflits-caucase-sud.shtml>

In what regards Turkey's relations with the states of the region, attention should be brought to two exclusive domains: economy and security. Turkey's economic relations with the states in the region have flourished despite some difficulties met during the economic

¹⁶⁸ Launched at the Prague Summit of 2002, these plans are designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a partner country interacts with the Alliance. Objectives covered fall into the general categories of political and security issues; defence, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and resource issues. See *Individual Partnership Action Plans*, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (<http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html>).

transition period.¹⁶⁹ The military dimension of the relations is of particular importance for Turkey because the instabilities and conflicts in the region have direct repercussions in this country. For this reason and due to the close connections with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Turkey brought its support to these states in the modernisation of their armed forces in order to help them tackle more efficiently with security issues.¹⁷⁰

Azerbaijan has a privileged place in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's relations with this country developed more rapidly and more efficiently compared to the other two states. The relations between Ankara and Baku remained limited during the Soviet era. But right after the collapse of communism, the two countries have developed strong partnership. Turkey has provided a strong support to the Azerbaijani struggle for independence and has backed firmly Baku's efforts to overcome the multi-faceted difficulties faced in 1990s. Ankara was the first capital to recognize Azerbaijan on 9 November 1991. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established as early as 14 January 1992.

The relations between the two countries thrived since then in a variety of fields, including economy, trade, transportation, telecommunication, agriculture, social security, health, sports, culture, science and tourism. Their cultural relations – already strong due to the linguistic and ethnic affinities – are all the more intensified due to educational projects.¹⁷¹ Continuous multi-level contacts strengthen the existing links. The transport of oil and natural gas towards Western markets has brought additional amplification to the relations between the two Turkic states. Since then, economic expectations brought them even closer. The two capitals have also strong military ties, due to bilateral agreements¹⁷² and their connection to NATO.

Turkey and Georgia are close allies as well. They have common interests in many areas, especially that of energy and military training –which create strategic ties between them. Turkey recognized Georgia as an independent state immediately after the dissolution of

¹⁶⁹ These difficulties were intensified by those in the political realm as well. Besides, Turkey's limited capabilities of responding to these states' needs limited the development of the economic relations.

¹⁷⁰ DEMİR Ali Faik, *Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden Güney Kafkasya* (South Caucasus from the Turkish Foreign Policy Perspective), Bağlam, Istanbul, 2003, p: 289.

¹⁷¹ For an analysis of Turkey's educational initiatives targeted towards the Turkic states, see DEMİR Ali Faik, *Op. Cit.*, pp: 202-208.

¹⁷² A detailed list of the documents signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan between February 1992 and November 2007 can be found on the website of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry (http://www.mfa.gov.az/eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=348&Itemid=68). For a research on the military agreements and protocols between Turkey and Azerbaijan, see ÖZTARSU Mehmet Fatih, "Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Askeri İlişkileri" (Military Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey), *Azerbaijan Strategic Research Centre*, Baku, 17/04/2009 (<http://www.azsam.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=428>);

the Soviet Union in 1991 and their relations have rapidly developed in several fields since then. Both countries attribute considerable importance to the development of existing relations including those in the military field.¹⁷³

An outstanding factor in the relations between Turkey and Georgia is related to the transport of energy resources. The *Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline* transports Caspian oil to the southeast Anatolian port of Turkey. It therefore creates a firm solidarity between these three states by creating a huge economic and strategic stake. A parallel construction has been the *South Caucasus Pipeline* which transports the natural gas from the *Shah Deniz* gas field (in the Azerbaijani sector of Caspian Sea) to Turkey. The specific importance of these two pipelines for Turkey comes from the reinforcement of the country's energy-corridor status and the significant contribution to her diversification of energy sources.

Armenia is the country of the region with which Turkey has the most strained relations. The unconditional Turkish recognition of the newly independent Republic came on 19 December 1991. In addition, the first years of the relations between the two states have witnessed some friendly gestures from the Turkish side: the authorisation of humanitarian aid transfer, the sending of a delegation to Erevan with the aim of developing diplomatic and commercial relations, the invitation extended to Armenia for becoming a member of the *Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation* (BSEC) prove Turkey's desire to build friendly relations with Armenia.¹⁷⁴

The smooth atmosphere of early 1990s has not been adequate to prevail over the enmity and distrust caused by a set of historical and political issues, particularly the genocide claims of Armenia.¹⁷⁵ Ankara constantly denies these allegations and maintains that the forced deportations which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Armenians were applied in response to security concerns arising from the Armenian rebellion during which hundreds of thousands of Turks died as well. In 2005, Turkey has officially proposed to the Government of Armenia the establishment of a joint commission of history composed of

¹⁷³ The military relations concern bilateral agreements and the modernisation programme as well.

¹⁷⁴ BAL İdris, "Türkiye Ermenistan İlişkileri ve Ermeni Sorunu" (Relations between Turkey and Armenia and the Armenian Question) in BAL İdris (Ed.), *Op. Cit.*, pp: 440-441.

¹⁷⁵ Tensions stemming from the 1915 forced migration of Armenians by the authorities of the Ottoman Empire are a bitter point of contention. The numbers are given between 200.000 and 600.000 by the Republic of Turkey but reach 1.500.000 in foreign literature. Most historians maintain that it was a deliberate and intentional attempt to exterminate the Ottoman Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. This view is also the position of the Armenian Republic. Several nations (and some states in the US) have passed formal legislative condemnation of the *Medz Yeghern* by qualifying it as a genocide despite Turkey's diplomatic efforts.

historians and other experts from both sides to study together the events of 1915. The proposal maintained that not only the archives of Turkey and Armenia but also those of all relevant third countries should be open for this study and that the findings should be shared with the public. In Turkish authorities' view, if Armenia had accepted this proposal, the joint commission would also serve as a confidence building measure that would lead to the normalisation of relations.¹⁷⁶

For some time, Armenian and Turkish sides seem to be willing to reach a compromise. In 2001, a Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission – which spawned civil society projects involving different groupings of the society – was established. An important move on the governmental level was the signing of a protocol in October 2009 by the two foreign ministers with the aim of normalising relations within a 'reasonable' period of time.

In the Caucasian region, there is one conflict that raises both Turkey's and the EU's concern which originated from the invasion of an Azerbaijani territory by Armenia. Nagorno Karabakh, an Azerbaijani enclave with a large Armenian population, declared independence from Baku in the early 1990s and has been a hotspot since then. It is supported by Armenia, but no country has officially recognized it as an independent state. It became a conflict zone in 1988 when Armenian deputies to the National Council voted in favour of unification with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. 30.000 people were killed and a million displaced. Some six years after violence had erupted, a cease-fire ended the fight; but minor battles still continue. Having not signed a peace treaty, the two sides are technically still at war.

The Karabakh administration affirms that they can be part of Azerbaijan again, but with the condition of being linked to the government of Baku by 'horizontal' links. They also want to maintain the control of Latchin corridor, their shortest connection to Armenia, and have security guarantees from Armenia. Azerbaijan demands an unconditional liberation of all occupied territories and the immediate and safe return of refugees to their homes while refusing to engage in direct talks with Karabakhi Armenians. Her offer consists of a 'high level of autonomy' within Azerbaijan.

Ankara has been Baku's staunchest supporter in the effort to reach a political settlement to the Karabakh conflict, believing that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "stands as the principal obstacle to the political stability, economic development and regional

¹⁷⁶ *Armenian Allegations Concerning the 1915 Events*, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/armenian-allegations-concerning-the-1915-events.en.mfa>).

cooperation in the Southern Caucasus” and that the massive refugee flow and the displacement of people it caused is deplorable.¹⁷⁷ The governmental posture is backed by the unambiguous support of Turkish public opinion as well. Nevertheless, some factors prevented Turkey from pursuing an active policy on the issue despite the above-mentioned official and popular attitudes. Military participation would be arduous and would affect Turkey’s relations principally with Russia, the EC/EU, the US and NATO.¹⁷⁸ Ankara therefore maintained that the international community should actively engage in creating a favourable environment to resolve the problem. Turkish diplomats have therefore made strenuous efforts to keep the conflict on the international agenda¹⁷⁹ while supporting direct and indirect bilateral talks between the two countries.¹⁸⁰

Turkey has long made the normalization of relations with Armenia conditional on a resolution of the Karabakh conflict acceptable to Azerbaijan. In early 2004, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations became strained after Ankara considered opening its border with Armenia, to which Baku showed severe reaction. Likewise, recent diplomatic developments between Ankara and Yerevan and the revival of the border-opening discussions raised fears in Azerbaijan that Ankara might soon drop this precondition in return for Armenian concessions on other issues.¹⁸¹ However, Turkish officials made known that there is not a change in the government’s foreign policy by stressing the importance of a Karabakh settlement for Turkish-Armenian dialogue. For Turkey, Armenian withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territories and the respect for territorial integrity and current borders continue to be the preconditions for Karabakh settlement.

¹⁷⁷ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Azerbaijan”, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-azerbaijan.en.mfa

¹⁷⁸ AYDIN Mustafa, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla İlişkiler” in ORAN Baskın (Ed.), Op. Cit., p: 400.

¹⁷⁹ The OSCE has been the main framework that these efforts have been focussed on as shown by Turkey’s membership of the Minsk Group which Turkey considered a useful mechanism to “reach a peaceful, lasting and just settlement” in the conflict. Former Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü Sina Gürel, stated that these efforts led to the refusal of a *fait accompli* by Armenia on Karabakh and to the redefining of the region as an Armenian territory. See GÜREL Şükrü Sina, “Karabağ Sorunu Üzerine Bir Not” (A Note on the Karabakh Problem), Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Vol: 47, no: 1, p: 184.

¹⁸⁰ Hence, Turkey welcomed a joint statement of Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 2, 2008, targeting a solution on disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh through direct dialogue based on international law which will not exclude possible high-level contacts. The leaders of the two countries, hosted by Russia, agreed upon a joint declaration calling on the two sides to “continue their work (...) to agree on a political settlement to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict”. During the summit of November 2, Russia and Armenia called for a solution based on the principles agreed in Madrid in 2006. This may be considered as a historic development, because never before have Armenian and Azeri sides agreed upon a settlement proposal. That gives the hope that the Karabakh conflict may have entered the final stage of resolution.

¹⁸¹ There have been public protestations in Azerbaijan and in Turkey following the decisions of 2004 and 2009.

Arguably, the positive atmosphere provided by an unprecedented rapprochement with Yerevan helps Turkish government in its mediation role. Conscious of this opportunity, Turkish authorities want to focus their efforts to find a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations moves ahead. As stressed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, these two processes have a mutually reinforcing character - any positive development on one would significantly have a stimulating effect on the other.¹⁸² In this sense, Ankara's message is that current endeavours to better the relations with Yerevan should be considered by Baku as a positive development.

Several official documents asserted the EU's call for strict respect of the ceasefire modalities the additional measures and the commitment of avoiding the resort to force as agreed in the 1995 agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹⁸³ Two additional remarks may point to the harmony between the positions held by Turkey and the EU. The Union's support for the development of confidence-building measures as recommended at the Ministerial Council of the *Minsk Group* meeting in Helsinki is one of them. The other is the EU's encouragement and positive reception of the regular meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan by the EU.

The EU follows closely the political, juridical and economic reforms in the region and attaches great importance to its relations with these states, as proved by the incorporation of them in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework. In fact, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have strong European aspirations and identity, which facilitate the enhancement of their connections to Europe. Their security concerns originating from the conflicts and the necessity to deal with the local and foreign actors had a positive impact on the development of their relations with the EU.

Action plans for the three Caucasus states have also been adopted by the EU in 2006 as the main element of the ENP.¹⁸⁴ Partnership and cooperation agreements are in force since 1999, and the Council of the EU expressed its support for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation, in the region.¹⁸⁵ In addition to the emphasis put on the above-mentioned reforms, one can also read the EU's support for the independence

¹⁸² BABACAN Ali, "Calming the Caucasus", *International Herald Tribune*, 23/09/2008 (<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/23/opinion/edbabacan.php>).

¹⁸³ See, for instance, *Statement by the European at the 761st meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council Regarding Nagorno Karabakh*, PC.DEL/349/09, 14/05/2009; *Statement by the European at the 752nd meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council Regarding Nagorno Karabakh*, PC.DEL/123/09, 05/03/2009.

¹⁸⁴ The South Caucasus, European Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.4.3.pdf).

¹⁸⁵ 2331st Council Meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001.

and territorial integrity of those three states and its respect of democratic principles, human rights and market economy in the agreements.

I.B.2.d. Afghanistan

For centuries, Turkey has had a close and friendly relationship with Afghanistan. This connection preserved the momentum gained after the proclamation of Turkish Republic until the Soviet invasion.¹⁸⁶ During the internal conflict of 1990s, Turkey was again active through humanitarian assistance projects that included medical and educational services and shelter to the Afghan people. Turkey's equidistance to all Afghani groups has been useful for the success of her assistance.

Following the terrorist acts of September 11, Afghanistan has been attacked in the framework of the *Operation Enduring Freedom* conducted under the umbrella of the US' global war on terror with the participation – in various degrees – of around 50 nations.¹⁸⁷ Begun on 7 October 2001, the operation aimed to destruct terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, to capture of *al-Qaeda* leaders and to terminate terrorist activities in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁸

After the ouster of the Taleban regime, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference, as a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of UNSC, in December 2001. Built in conformity with the resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510, the force was established to provide a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction period and to assist the new government, the Afghan Transitional Authority.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ In mid-1920's, Turkish President Atatürk provided an important state-to-state development assistance to Afghanistan by sending an important human resource (including military personnel and various scientists) to this country in order to support its modernization efforts. This assistance has been useful to the country with the reforms introduced by Afghan King Amanullah Khan who had noted the modernization and secularization advanced in Turkey during his visit of 1928.

¹⁸⁷ There are two remarks that should be made about the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). First, it refers to a set of operations conducted in distinct regions: Afghanistan-Iraq (OEF-A), Philippines (OEF-P), Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) and Kyrgyzstan. Second, the one taken in this study (OEF-A) is a joint US, UK and Afghan operation and is separate from the ISAF –which is an operation of NATO nations including the US and UK. The two operations run in parallel.

¹⁸⁸ See the former US President George W. Bush's address to a Joint Session of Congress on September 20, 2001 (the transcript is available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>).

¹⁸⁹ ISAF mission was launched under the British command with approximately 5.000 troops. At the outset, individual nations volunteered to lead the ISAF mission in rotation, for a period of six months. A change occurred in August 2003, when ISAF gained the support and the leadership of NATO. Since then, it is incumbent on the troop-contributing countries to finance the force. NATO has the command, coordination and planning responsibilities, which include "providing a force commander and headquarters on the ground in



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/index_en.htm

As a Muslim nation and highly welcome by Afghani people, Turkey definitely had a privileged status for the mission. She was also among the first countries to express interest in undertaking the multinational force's command. Her decision to contribute troops to the US-led military operation was in line with the responsibility flowing from NATO membership and in conformity with the UN resolutions to combat global terrorism.¹⁹⁰ Approximately 300 military personnel at the outset have been deployed despite all the risks envisaged by Ankara. The number of troops increased in time: It was around 800 in September 2009, a sizeable force in Afghanistan compared with many NATO allies.¹⁹¹

Right after the UK, Turkey took over the command in 2002 and led the international force for eight months and in 2005 for six months. A third term was due to begin in November 2009.¹⁹² Turkey pledged to double its contribution to peacekeeping in Afghanistan

Afghanistan". The force currently numbers 8,000 troops from 47 NATO and non-NATO nations. Individual contributions by each country change on a regular basis due to the rotation of troops. See *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm).

¹⁹⁰ The mandate of Turkish troops included the support for the training and preparation of the *Northern Alliance*, the opposition group that is fighting the Taleban. Helping the development of "a broad-based administration" that will involve all ethnic groups in Afghanistan was also among the missions of Turkish forces. See ZAMAN Amberin, "Ankara's Muslim Soldiers Join Campaign", *Daily Telegraph*, 02/11/2001 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1361316/Ankaras-Muslim-soldiers-join-campaign.html>).

¹⁹¹ Even before the decision to participate to the mission was made, Turkish government had opened its skies and bases to US military aircraft to facilitate military operations.

¹⁹² For the policy-makers, the terrorist threat to ISAF – heightened by several attacks – was a major concern on troop deployment. There were also other difficulties: Turkey had obtained from western nations the guarantee

as she takes over control of the rotating command of NATO operations. The reinforcements, which come against the previous declarations of refusal on sending more troops to the region, will bring the number of Turkish military personnel to 1,600. Turkey also trains Afghan security forces and provides assistance in the fields of health and education.¹⁹³

Another major Turkish contribution to ISAF was the appointment of the former Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to the post of NATO Secretary-General's Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan –for two consecutive terms between November 2003 and August 2006. The task is important because it is about concretising the political-military objectives in the region by “representing the political leadership of the Alliance in Kabul officially and publicly” while liaising with the local government, civil society and foreign actors.¹⁹⁴ After doing an “excellent job” in Afghanistan, Mr. Çetin was presented NATO's meritorious service medal at the Brussels meeting of December 2005.¹⁹⁵

Turkish contribution to the stability in Afghanistan has not been limited to the military field. Implementing reconstruction projects – regarded as another requisite for peace and security in Afghanistan – occupied Turkey's agenda as well. Health, education and agriculture have been the main areas of activity.¹⁹⁶ In addition, a Turkish team composed of civilian and military personnel work in Wardak province which is close to Kabul. Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) became operational in November 2006 in order to deal with the reconstruction and infrastructure responsibilities and the training of local Afghan National and Auxiliary Police Forces, along with humanitarian aid programs.

Since its establishment, the PRT of Wardak served the two policy axis adopted by Turkey in her relations with Afghanistan: it provided a considerable support for the economic

that none of them would withdraw their forces from the region during Turkish lead of the international force. However, Belgium and Portugal did not honour this pledge. Besides, the US Congress voted on the geographical extension of ISAF mission, which was against hitting Turkey's objections since the early stages of the stabilisation process. This is the context in which Turkey's acceptance of ISAF's command must be evaluated

¹⁹³ As of 2009, 2.000 Afghani soldiers have been trained by Turkish military.

¹⁹⁴ *NATO'S Senior Civil Representative in Afghanistan*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50096.htm).

¹⁹⁵ That is the phrase that Jaap de Hoop Scheffer used in an article he wrote for the Turkish daily newspaper *Hürriyet*. See “Hikmet Çetin Afganistan'da Mükemmel İşler Yapıyor” (Hikmet Çetin Is Doing Excellent Works in Afghanistan), *Hürriyet*, 19/02/2004 (<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=203699>).

¹⁹⁶ According to the data provided by Turkish Foreign Ministry, more than 800.000 patients have received so far free medical treatment in Turkish-built, equipped and operated health centers in Afghanistan (with an average of 900 patients daily). Turkey was planning to build four more medical facilities and add 14 schools to the 27 built and equipped in various parts of the country. These schools were already providing proper education to approximately 50.000 Afghan students. See *Turkey's Political Relations with Afghanistan*, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa).

development and the reconstruction of the region while securing the long-term stability, national unity and territorial integrity of the country. The fact that PRT works in a relatively secure region with a low-risk profile makes the mission uncontroversial, and that will most probably allow it to carry on its contribution to the improvements in the above-mentioned domains.

There are solid grounds that reveal the parallelism between Turkish and Western approaches to the Afghan question. The fact that all EU member states except Cyprus and Malta provided troops for the ISAF mission should be underlined first. Besides, the EU is highly involved in the global resolution of the Afghan problem as justified by its participation to the *Afghanistan Compact* – both in Community and member-state levels – which is the outcome of the London Conference on Afghanistan. In 2006, the Conference gathered 66 states including Turkey and 20 members of the EU, along with 15 international organizations. It can be described as a political commitment of both the government of Afghanistan and the international community to create conditions of peace, security, rule of law and economic development.¹⁹⁷

The European Commission's *Country Strategy Paper* shares the Compact's features. Evolved since its inception, the paper aims to create the necessary conditions for sustainable development and poverty reduction while strengthening the capacity of Afghan institutions in a way to provide them with viability in the long term.¹⁹⁸ This is all the more important because challenges remain despite the "impressive progress" made since the fall of the Taliban regime, as mentioned in the 2007-2013 Strategy Paper: the fragility of the security situation is exacerbated by the narcotics trade; the problem of human rights plays against the legitimacy of the new state; the country is politically divided along ethnic lines –a situation that is worsened by centre-periphery issues.¹⁹⁹

The *EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration* of 2005 had pointed to the same concerns and announced the need to formalise the political dialogue between Kabul and Brussels so as to

¹⁹⁷ It can also be seen as the extension of the Bonn Agreement which launched the reconstruction process in 2001 and marked a wide range of significant achievements including the establishment of ISAF and the creation of the new Afghan constitution.

¹⁹⁸ The Commission's first CSP for 2003-2006 was primarily focused on the new Afghan state's urgencies: overall reconstruction (including that of the infrastructure) and the building up of governmental institutions and public services. The second paper drafted for the period 2007-2013 deals with the needs of a country which evolved in political and economic terms.

¹⁹⁹ *Country Strategy Paper. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2007-2013*, European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf).

strengthen the cooperation and examine how much progress was made in meeting the commitments.²⁰⁰ Both sides' desire to cooperate is clearly stated at the introductory section of the document:

“The European Union and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are committed to a secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan as laid out in the Afghan Constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 (...). Both parties wish to see Afghanistan play a full and active role in the international community and are committed to building a prosperous future free from the threats of terrorism, extremism and organised crime”.²⁰¹

Hence, the compatibility of approaches adopted by Turkey and the EU can easily be observed, as it is the case for the other regions that are mentioned in this section of the study. Inevitably, this compatibility will concretise in diplomatic and military terms. Before moving on with this practical dimension, an attempt to expose the development of Turkey and the EU as crisis management actors will be made for the simple reason that this process has determined the extent of their practice.

I.C. Crisis Management of the EU and Turkey in a Historical Perspective

Conception and practices of defence and achieving security have changed over time. In the last fifty years, an incremental shift from territorial defence to collective security, force projections and crisis management is noticeable. Besides, the conventional tasks of armed forces have been challenged since the end of the Cold War. Nowadays, the fact that the risk of a conventional war has considerably declined is a matter of general consensus.²⁰² This led most countries to redefine the role that the armed forces should play: The army will perform in exceptional situations that follow the failure of preventive measures. As such, it will respond to an actual threat. Quite often this threat does not directly jeopardise the territorial

²⁰⁰ The formalisation of the dialogue would involve annual meetings at ministerial level. See *EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration. Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership*, Council of the European Union, Strasbourg, 14519/05 (Presse 299), 16/11/2005, p: 7.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Traditionally, military forces are organised in a way to fight wars with the aim of conquering enemy territories and defending their own, weaken the enemy and rule. Clausewitz, who is famous for his statement “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means”, maintains that the impulse to destroy the enemy is central to the very idea of war. Wars represent a recurrent and seemingly inherent phenomenon of the Westphalian system in that more than 14.000 are registered since 1648 –more than 150 of them are counted after 1945. While war seemed to be out of fashion, the notion of conflict has gained progressively more importance from the 1960s due to globally-observed reasons such as the increase in the number of internal and identity-related conflicts rather than ideological or territorial ones. See Von CLAUSEWITZ Carl, *On War*, N. Trübner, London, 1873 (<http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm>); STRAND Havard, WILHELMSSEN Hans, GLEDDITSCH Hans Peter, *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 20/12/2004, p: 3.

sovereignty of a state and does not create a compelling security imperative for involvement in a crisis situation –hence the term ‘wars of choice’.

During the Cold War period, European armies were structured in a way to deal with the threat emanating from the eastern block. The necessity to meet this challenge forced Western Europeans to build large-scale military apparatus to fight conventional war –where the shadow of the nuclear annihilation was constant. However, experience shows that these structures are ill-suited for putting an end to new conflicts. In the new strategic environment, national armies face the reduction of their staff, the increase of the allocated funds and the necessity to meet the challenges of professionalization. External and state-centric threats to their existence ceased to occupy the priority in the national security agendas of European states; they do not provide the uncontested rationale for their armed forces’ organisation and force structure”.²⁰³ Instead, new strategic thinking prevails: New battles necessitate flexible²⁰⁴ and rapidly deployable units. Soldiers are most likely to be sent abroad for saving the lives of strangers –they need extra skills to deal with the wide range of problems on the field.²⁰⁵

The most salient impact of the change in the military doctrine is concretised by the operations that are launched with humanitarian purposes. A totally different logic rules this kind of operations: Troops will not fight for expanding territories to the detriment of another state, they will return to their barracks after completing the mission –which is to put an end to the existing conflict and to build peace. Causing human casualties is not the inevitable part of the mission; saving lives is the main objective.

Neither the EU, nor Turkey could remain disinterested to this evolution. In the last decade, there have been major changes in the European armies in a wide area –changing from the abandonment of the conscription to the capability structures and ammunition. In Turkey, although the conscription system will remain as the basis of the military structure for a long

²⁰³ EDMUNDS Timothy, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe”, *International Affairs*, vol: 82, no: 6, 2006, p: 1065.

²⁰⁴ Flexibility can be defined as the adaptation to the changing circumstances during an operation. Today, the goal of territorial conquest is forsaken. The armies are in a reactionary mode not only against the attacks to the territory, but also against aggressions in some corner of the world.

²⁰⁵ The following quotation illustrates the new qualities required in the resolution of crises: “The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown that, in addition to the ability to fight, soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of stressful and demanding roles, from diplomat through policeman and arbitrator to first-aid worker, hospital manager and city administrator”. See DONNELLY Chris, “Shaping Soldiers for the 21st Century”, *NATO Review*, vol: 48, no: 2, (Summer/Autumn 2000), p: 29.

period of time, the adaptation to the new military environment is perceptible. In Europe, the following transformations occurred in the armed forces due to the new security paradigm:²⁰⁶

- Their setting changed from being garrisoned either at home or as part of NATO's forward defence force to being virtually permanently deployed under the aegis of NATO, the UN or in the framework of an *ad hoc* coalition;
- Their orientation emphasised crisis situations rather than the 'enemy';
- Their orientation changed from a 'territorial' (based on the conviction that the security of a state lies at home, that the security of a state and its territorial integrity must be defended at its borders) to 'expeditionary'. The crises that European states have faced since 1990 s made it clear that faraway crises could have a profound impact on international political and economic stability and hence, on the domestic scene.

The "guarantor" status of the military forces in what regards the state security has not disappeared.²⁰⁷ But the military has seen its objectives diversified. The developments that occurred in the EU and Turkey concerning the management of crises took place in this context. They will constitute the theme of first two sections. Then will NATO's idiosyncrasy as a platform of crisis management for Turkey and the EU be exposed.

I. C.1. The EU's Development as a Crisis Management Actor

Because of the EU's economic, commercial and financial power, the international community expects it to play a role on issues of global security. The Union is willing to meet this expectation and knows that strengthening its capabilities will provide a better position for finding solutions to international problems and confronting the threats. The stake is considerable, because the threats are numerous, among which one can count failing states, global disease outbreaks, chronic poverty, natural disasters, climate change, terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The role of the EU in the field of crisis management remained embryonic for long time. However, from 1990s on, the EU has incrementally become an important actor of stabilisation in the international platform, using a combination of assets which include not only military, but also economic, commercial and political/diplomatic components.

²⁰⁶ HOUBEN, Op. Cit., p: 14.

²⁰⁷ EDMUNDS Timothy, Op. Cit., p: 1066.

I.C.1.a. The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU is a peace project since its inception. In early 1950s, the Treaty of Paris that established European Coal and Steel Community aimed to put an end to the war in Europe. It was obvious that the European integration was not based solely on economic grounds: political commitment has always been a part of the integration process. Since the inception of the European Community, member states had the will to have a certain voice in world affairs –although the degree of enthusiasm differed and views diverged on the means to acquire. In early 1970s, the European Political Cooperation was launched outside the Community framework.

With the establishment of the “European Union” by the Treaty of Maastricht, twelve member states pledged to have a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Two main reasons led them to substitute the European Political Cooperation by the latter. The first one is related to the wish of incorporating the security and defence issues into the community architecture. Conceived and implemented outside community treaties, the EPC has achieved some success and become an important instrument for European integration over the years. Yet, maintaining the coordination among foreign policy and community acts was increasingly posing problems. CFSP was conceived to establish links between the supranational entity and foreign policy practices of the member states.

The change in European security architecture was the second reason of the passage from EPC to CFSP. Two strategic implications merit to be highlighted. First, the monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat disappeared with the collapse of the communist bloc. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation’s dissolution and the dislocation of the USSR in 1991 put an end to the antagonism between the free world and the iron curtain countries. Second, a security vacuum has appeared. Within this new environment, conflicts of different nature—that the security organisations were not ready to deal with—broke out.

The first effect could have provoked a divergence of view of Europeans. In view of Nicole Gnesotto, the post-Cold-War-era crises were not affecting vital interests of western democracies. Therefore, the *immediate solidarity* and *convergence of views* related to Soviet threat were not *almost automatic* anymore.²⁰⁸ Philip Gordon asserted a parallel view by

²⁰⁸ GNESOTTO Nicole, “Défense Européenne et Partenariat Atlantique” in de la SERRE Françoise & LEQUESNE Christian (Eds.), *Quelle Union pour Quelle Europe. L’Après-Traité d’Amsterdam*, Editions Complexes, Paris, 1998, p : 75.

arguing that the end of the Cold War “eliminated one of the strongest reasons to feel the need of a collective security in Europe”. In the absence of a common enemy and the simplicity of the cold War’s bipolar system, “security interests were potentially more differentiated”.²⁰⁹

On the other hand, the new international context could be conceived as more favourable to the expression of a European dimension of security. In fact, new crises entailed considerable preoccupations for the EU member states. Security and defence matters were subject of profoundly renovated discussions in the new era. It was thus the ‘hour of Europe’ after an epoch of nearly half century—which made all attempts to build an autonomous European security architecture inopportune—was over. The new politico-strategic environment was characterized by the end of a bipolar dissuasive system which made the emancipation of various groups possible.

The consequence was momentous for Europe: the demise of the USSR and the end of Cold War led to instabilities which are extremely difficult to manage. Militant nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), trans-border criminality (including different facets of organised crime and terrorism) gave no choice but to reinforce cooperation among European states. Although territorial integrity was not directly threatened, the national-level conception of security became more precarious with the multiplication of security criteria.

With the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU member states vowed to define and implement the CFSP whose objectives are to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the EU’s and international security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.²¹⁰ These objectives demonstrate the member states’ desire to ensure global security. That is in fact due to the undeniable increase in the interest shown -and pressure exerted by- the general public for a systematic

²⁰⁹ GORDON Philip H., “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, vol: 22, no: 3, 1997, p: 98.

²¹⁰ Under the “General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Title V), The Lisbon Treaty extends these objectives to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; to encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; to develop international measures to preserve and to improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources in order to ensure sustainable development; to assist populations, countries, and regions confronting man-made or natural disasters; and to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

arrangement of the Union's humanitarian action. It is therefore not surprising to see that the EU's constitutional treaties present an amalgamation of territorial defence and human security. The article 28A.7 formulates mutual assistance among EU members: If a Member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member states will have the obligation to bring all the aid and assistance they can. This provision is remarkably similar to what is stipulated in the article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.²¹¹

On the other hand, the so-called Petersberg tasks are introduced in the EU's constitutional framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Originally set out during a meeting of the Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, they cover a wide range of military missions: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Under the Headline Goal 2010, the range of these missions has been enlarged to include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform –as indicated by the European Security Strategy. The Lisbon Treaty, in its article 28 B paragraph 1, brought new amendments to Petersberg missions by adding the provisions of military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, and, post-conflict stabilisation.²¹²

In 1998, the Franco-British declaration of St. Malo increased the chances of the EU to translate its foreign policy objectives into practice by emphasising that the Union must have the capacity of autonomous action. The following year, Helsinki Summit constituted a milestone for the EU in what concerns security and defense field. It gave birth to the ESDP which was a step forward for the EU's world power status, both on grounds of capability enforcement and in terms of the eagerness to become a veritable politico-military actor. Within the framework of the *Helsinki Headline Goal*, the EU agreed to deploy rapidly and then sustain military forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. The objective was to have a force of approximately 60.000 troops, deployable in 60 days and sustainable in the field for at least a year. This would in fact mean the availability of 180.000 military personnel because of the rotating replacements.

²¹¹ The article V states that “if any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”. See *Brussels Treaty* (http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/brusselstreaty.php).

²¹² See “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 306, vol: 50, 17/12/2007, p: 35.

Attention should be drawn on the time periods that the CFSP and the ESDP have been elaborated and approved by the member countries. Indeed, European integration has been gradually spilling over to the security realm, but it is important to note that the adoption of security and defence policies was a response of the EU to the international events -and they were reflecting the common European view that the EU must undertake its responsibilities more efficiently. After all, the Union could not stand idle and watch the atrocities being committed in its immediate neighbourhood. One can therefore argue that, all the amelioration efforts in this highly sensitive issue of foreign and security policy, decisions are taken not only because of internal dynamics, but also due to external factors.

I.C.1.b. The European Security and Defence Policy

Since its inception, a twofold approach is observed in ESDP. One pillar can be conceived as ‘defining the concept’. The other is about monitoring the capabilities and defining the gaps to focus on. Growing military and operational contributions of member states reduce the inadequacies. Although the EU’s military capabilities keep getting stronger, more needs to be done on this field.

I.C.1.b.(1). Concept definition and strategic orientation

The lack of strategic vision and concept definition made the EU subject to criticism for long time. A major development occurred in 2003 as an antidote to this situation when Thessaloniki European Council adopted the paper entitled “*A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*” prepared by the Secretary General / High Representative Javier Solana. The strategy paper devotes its first chapter to global challenges and key threats to European security. It puts forth the three objectives that the EU should have in order to defend its security and promote its values: extending the zone of security around Europe; strengthening the international order by building effective multilateralism; countering the threats by combining military and non-military instruments.

The paper goes on by emphasising the necessity to work with partners, not without mentioning the irreplaceability of transatlantic relationship. Before concluding on his contribution, J. Solana underlines the necessity for the EU to improve the capacity to work with other key actors and to extend the network of partnership. Then, he affirms that EU members should be more active, more coherent and more capable in order to make a contribution to world peace that will match their potential. He goes on by emphasising the

necessity to co-operate with partners and key actors while extending the network of partnership.

A revision of the ESS is in process so as to adapt it to the current security environment. Taking into account new security challenges (such as energy security, climate change and cyber-security) may be considered. Besides, the quality of the current strategy's implementation may be ameliorated. Yet, the adoption of the ESS was an important development because, for the first time, a declaration of the EU's international responsibilities and strategies has taken place.

In line with this development, the member states pledged themselves to become capable of responding to crisis management operations, by 2010, in a rapid and decisive way. Interoperability of the forces, their deployability and sustainability are the focal points of the document called Headline Goal 2010. It incorporates the missions envisioned in the ESS (joint disarmament operations, the support of third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform). Thus, it goes beyond the Petersberg missions. The document also points out the necessity for the EU to be capable of conducting "several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement".²¹³

The question of capabilities was addressed by the WEU even before its transfer to the EU.²¹⁴ Later on, the *European Capability Action Plan* has been a significant step on this account. In November 2001, EU defence ministers agreed to meet the capability gaps.²¹⁵ This

²¹³ "Headline Goal 2010 Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004", *Council of the European Union*, Brussels, (<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>).

²¹⁴ Thus, several deficiencies were identified in the WEU's recommendations for strengthening European capabilities. The document identified two types of capabilities where urgent efforts were needed: collective capabilities (strategic intelligence, strategic planning) and operational capabilities (multinational, joint operation and force headquarters; with particular reference to command, control and communications capabilities and deployability of force headquarters). Availability, deployability, strategic mobility, sustainability, survivability and interoperability and operational effectiveness of the forces need to be addressed urgently as well. See *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations. Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations*, WEU Council of Ministers, Luxembourg, 22-23/11/1999 (<http://www.weu.int/documents/991122en.pdf>).

²¹⁵ ECAP is based on three principles. The first one is related to enhancing effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts. The second is the bottom-up approach to European defence co-operation—which refers mainly to the voluntary basis of the member states' commitments. No state is obliged to make a predetermined contribution. When the nature of the ESDP is taken into consideration, one can assert that this is the best scheme than can apply to the integration in the field of security and defence. Capabilities Commitment Conferences – during which member states announce their specific national commitments – are the instances that concretise the contributions of member states. The last principle is related to the coordination between EU member states and co-operation with NATO. This may be thought in a broad approach, to include both the avoidance of wasteful duplication of capabilities²¹⁵ and the inadequacies in operational level.

decision conforms to the declarations made since the Helsinki summit. The main objective of the plan is to improve the capability of dealing with international crises. The importance of rationalizing the member states' defence efforts and increasing the synergy between their projects for enhancing European military capability is highlighted in the plan.

ECAP was in line with Helsinki objectives and can be considered as a milestone regarding the concretisation of the latter. The main objective of the plan is to improve the capability of reaction to international crises. Hence, it highlighted the importance of rationalizing member states' defence efforts and increasing the synergy between their projects for enhancing European military capability. The document also points out the necessity for the EU to be capable of conducting "several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement", a very important point regarding crisis management. Once again, the reiteration of the tasks announced in the ESS is plain to see.²¹⁶ It may be pertinent to underline that all of these missions reveal an intense desire to tackle crisis situations.

Presented in September 2004, the *Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capability* projects a 'Human Security Doctrine for Europe'. Prepared under the leadership of Mary Kaldor, it focuses on how to implement the ESS by underlining the necessity for Europe to acquire the capabilities in order to make a *more active contribution to global security*. The necessity for the EU to focus on protecting civilians is also emphasised.

The proposed structure has three pillars. The first one concerns a series of principles, i.e. the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. Then comes the 15.000-strong "Human Security Response Force", at least one third of it being composed of civilian personnel. A new legal framework—governing both intervention decisions and operations on the field—completes the scheme.

The report goes further by stating three reasons why human security is a matter of concern for the EU. The first one relates to morality, which is connected to the common humanity: the idea that human lives become 'cheap' in extreme situations is not acceptable – all human lives are of equal worth. The second one is of legal nature. It is not just a matter of right, but also an obligation for the EU to promote human security worldwide –a fact that is enshrined by international covenants and recognized in the Lisbon Treaty. "Enlightened self-

²¹⁶ The tasks are related to joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform.

interest” constitutes the third reason: Europeans can not be secure while others live in severe insecurity.

The work initiated by the Barcelona Report is further developed in the *Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*, in 2007. Its peculiarity is twofold. The one is about the fact that it extends the EU interventions’ conformity with the principles set out in Barcelona. The other concerns the presentation of challenges for the CFSP and its defence component on the one hand, and proposals to advance human security agenda on the other.

I.C.1.b.(2). The development of the EU’s crisis management capabilities

The ESDP process is remarked by the significant development of politico-military structures from the outset. One of them is the *Political and Security Committee* (PSC) agreed by the Helsinki Summit which will deal with all the aspects of the CFSP. Operational since 1 January 2002, the Committee helps define the EU’s political guidelines. Charged with preparing the EU’s response to international crises, the PSC is the mainspring of the ESDP. In times of crisis, it provides ‘political control and strategic direction’ of EU operations. Moreover, it holds a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High Representative.

Under the auspices of the Council, the PSC takes responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities. It works in close connection with the Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Heads of crisis management operations, such as military commanders or EU special representatives, may attend its sessions.

As the highest military body established within the Council, the *European Union Military Committee* (EUMC) is composed of member states’ chiefs of defence who are represented at weekly meetings by their military representatives. The EUMC issues military advice and recommendations to the PSC. Monitoring the progress of military operations and evaluation of strategic options are the Committee’s responsibilities. A working group (EUMCWG) performs the preparation for its work.

The *European Union Military Staff* (EUMS) is the source of military expertise for the ESDP. The EUMS is to carry out early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg missions. This task includes the identification of European forces, be they national or multinational, as well as the implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. On this point, it is worth underscoring that the EUMS assures the link between

the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU. It also “*contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the capability goals*”.²¹⁷

In addition to the above-mentioned bodies of the Council, the contribution of the agencies to the EU’s crisis management efforts is also worth underlining. Based in Torrejon (Spain), the *Satellite Center* is a successor to the WEU Satellite Center with the purpose of strengthening the EU’s early warning and crisis management functions.²¹⁸ The PSC has the political supervision of the center’s activities which are related to information and analysis based on satellite imagery. Having its own legal personality in order to fulfil its mission, the center also conducts research and development projects.

The EU *Institute for Security Studies* (EUISS) is another agency that was initially established within the WEU structure. Established at the same Council Joint Action, it aims to “*help create a common European security culture, to enrich the strategic debate, and systematically to promote the interests of the Union*”.²¹⁹ As an autonomous agency, The EUISS performs three functions: research and debate on the major security and defence issues that are of relevance to the EU; forward-looking analysis for the Union’s Council and High Representative; development of a transatlantic dialogue on all security issues with the countries of Europe, Canada and the United States.

The Council established a *European Security and Defence College* in July 2005 in line with the decision taken in Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003. Operational since 2006, it aims to develop a common security and defence culture among the EU member states. The ESDC is organised as a network of national academies, colleges and institutes in the EU that cope with the latter fields. Within this structure, the EUISS will have an important role to play.

The European Defence Agency was created in 2004 to help EU member states improve their defence capabilities for crisis management operations under the ESDP. Two main pillars will make the Agency achieve its objectives. The first one is based on the encouragement of EU governments to make defence expenditures in order to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The second is related to “*helping them identify common needs*” and to

²¹⁷ “Council Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the Establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union”, *Official Journal of European Communities*, L 27, 30/01/2001.

²¹⁸ “Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the Establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre”, 2001/555/CFSP, *Official Journal of European Communities*, L 200, 25/07/2001.

²¹⁹ “Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the Establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies”, 2001/554/CFSP, *Official Journal of European Communities*, L 200, 25/07/2001.

“promoting collaboration to provide common solutions”.²²⁰ The Agency is ascribed four functions: covering defence capabilities development; armaments co-operation; the European defence, technological and industrial base and defence equipment market; research and technology.

A high readiness of force deployment is also envisaged. The units may be of a stand-alone type or part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases. In what concerns the rapidity of decision-making, the aspiration of the EU is to be able to decide on the launch of an operation “within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council”. Concerning the deployment of units, the goal is to make it possible “no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation”.²²¹

That formed the ground for the EU Defence Ministers to agree on setting up a military rapid reaction force capable of dealing with a range of peace support and humanitarian tasks and able to be deployed at short notice to conflicts around the world. It is complemented in the civilian domain by the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism* (RRM), later on replaced by the Instrument for Stability, with the aim of being able to “respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a technological or natural disaster”.²²²

Hence, the ‘Battle Group’ (BG) concept reflects an approximate 1.500-strong force which will be capable of conducting its duties under all conditions of weather and geography.²²³ As a specific form of rapid response, a BG is meant to be the minimum military which has the necessary coherence, effectiveness, credibility, rapid deployability which will provide the capability for stand-alone operations. It may play part in the initial phase of operations which will later be carried on by larger troops.

²²⁰ *European Defence Agency* (<http://www.eda.europa.eu>).

²²¹ The concept of battlegroups is announced in the Headline Goal 2010 as well and its in-depth study is available in the present volume.

²²² The purpose of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is “to support measures aimed at safeguarding or re-establishing the conditions under which the partner countries of the EC can pursue their long term development goals”. The principal added value of the RRM is defined as the “ability to provide support to the political strategy of the Commission faced with a crisis in a third country”. See *Rapid Reaction Mechanism*, European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm).

²²³ *Military Capability Commitment Conference*, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 22/11/2004 (<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MILITARY%20CAPABILITY%20COMMITMENT%20CONFERENCE%2022.11.04.pdf>).

I.C.1.c. Hindering factors for the ESDP

Crisis management and humanitarian intervention had gradual development and gained increasing importance in the framework of the ESDP. Indeed, the European integration has been making an important progress towards the security and defence field. Yet, there are at least two serious weaknesses that stand against the EU's capacity to deal efficiently with international crises: the lack of political will (which is materialised by difficulties relating to the reconciliation of national and community interests) and the financial problems.

I.C.1.c.(1). The Weakness of a Political Will

The European Union can make a difference only if it speaks with one voice. One of the major problems in the field of ESDP is the reluctance of member states to give up on their political decision-making monopoly within a supranational entity. At present, risk evaluation in foreign policy remains a nation-state priority while specific perceptions dictated by geographic, historic and political considerations play an important role. Policy makers can hardly overcome the priorities of national interest in favour of the Union's interests.

The defining rule of 'political Europe' remains the preservation of the principle of 'national'. As a corollary, the European treaties on which governmental representatives agree reflect a complex architecture. In fact, the majority of governments accept that the CFSP must be provided with necessary means to build a powerful Union. However, member states can build a consensus neither on the institutional structure to adopt nor the operational capabilities to set up –not to mention the speed or the range of the reforms to operate.

The Union does not have a vision of the world that is shared by all its members. This creates problems of coherence and, in some cases, a common strategy becomes difficult to reach within the EU. Foreign and security policies of member states continue to rely mainly upon 'national reflexes'. Political visions and cultures differ from one country to another –a fact that obstructs the definition of a unique and consistent CFSP.

The reason why substantial progress was not made in terms of security and defence policy during treaty revisions is the lack of agreement among member states. Some prefer a pragmatic approach with reluctance to let community method spread to intergovernmental procedures. Others opt for a closer connection between European integration and the political domain. Even the countries that have closer views may not agree on how far to deepen the Union. As a result, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has an ambiguous formulation.

Moreover, the unanimity principle remains the characteristic of the decision-making principle. Some institutional complexities (such as the relations between the Commission and the Council), technical hurdles (for instance, diversity of national defence cultures and the dominance of the Cold War paradigm) and the financial questions stand against the crisis management operations –not to mention the transatlantic questions.

These cleavages create serious difficulties for the EU to assume its responsibilities of providing and reinforcing security outside its frontiers. Because of differing diplomatic traditions, member states adopt different attitudes in a crisis situation. Making an exhaustive list goes beyond the aim of this paper, but underlining some cleavages seems to be a pertinent effort. For instance, although all of the EU member states agree upon the legitimacy of an independent Palestinian state, some of them are more pro-Israeli than others. An autonomous European defence structure is not the best option for all member states, the transatlantic links being more fervently defended by some of them. For the EU capitals, the regions of the world that constitute priority also differ. One can also argue that permanent member status in the UN Security Council puts two member states in a distinct platform in international relations.

All these factors weaken the possibility to build a common stance in resolving crises and hinder the chances of success. From this point of view, the enlargement to new states may not reinforce the EU's political determination in this field: Every new member will bring new sensibilities and reluctances to the discussion table. Turkey is a very specific case on this matter, for the reasons that have been evoked earlier in this study. It is important to remember that Turkey's desire to solve international crises, accompanied by her capabilities, will be highly valuable once she joins the EU.

The difficulties described above lead to inefficiencies of the EU's institutional structure. The reason is due to the peculiarity of the EU where national interests are to be reconciled with supranational (community) ones. As a result, the configuration of the CFSP/ESDP reflects competing institutions. The Council has competence over the entire three-pillar-structure while the Commission's initiative prerogative is limited to the first – community – pillar although it is partly involved in the CFSP process.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) points to the necessity for the Union to ensure the consistency of all external activities with its policies that involve security, economy and development. For such consistency, the TEU stipulates, the Council and the Commission must cooperate while implementing these policies in accordance with their respective powers.

However, the translation of the above-mentioned clause into practice is problematic. The differing preferences of the Council and the Commission in the field of the CFSP (more intergovernmental for the former and more supranational for the latter) had an impact on the ESDP operations.²²⁴ There is also a competition between administrative structures, exacerbated by the development of the ESDP.²²⁵ That institutional rivalries go against the will of the TEU in what concerns the harmonious functioning of the CFSP is a matter of fact.²²⁶

I.C.1.c.(2). Financial questions

Every crisis management operation has a financial dimension. The possession of financial means and appropriate instruments is important for a successful management of crises. The issue is all the more sensitive for the CFSP because its budget is seriously underfunded. In order to be credible and to deal with global issues and threats, the CFSP must be allocated resources commensurate with its objectives and efficiency desire.

According to the article 28 of the TEU, there is a distinction between administrative and operational expenditures of crisis management operations. The treaty stipulates that administrative expenditures of the institutions which are related to the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy are taken charge by the budget of the European Communities. The same financing procedure goes for the operational expenditures with two exceptions: when the operations have military or defence implications and when the Council decides otherwise.

If, in a given case, the expenditure is not undertaken by the budget of the European Communities, it will be “*charged to the Member states in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise*”. The TEU provides for the possibility to opt out from operations having military or defence implications. If member states resort to such a ‘constructive abstention’,²²⁷ they will not be obliged to contribute to the financing of the decision taken by the Council.

Obviously, the TEU sets up a clear demarcation between administrative and operational expenditures. Yet, setting a common budget is of crucial importance for the

²²⁴ GAUTTIER Pascal, “Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the EU”, *European Law Journal*, vol: 10, no: 1, January 2004, pp: 27-28.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, p: 28.

²²⁶ DUMOND Jean-Michel, SETTON Philippe, *La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC)*, Collection Réflexe Europe, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1999, p : 22.

²²⁷ Article 23 TEU.

efficiency and success of rapid deployment of forces. For this reason, the Council has made some efforts on this domain. In June 2002, it made public a report on military operations, which mentions three different schemes for military expenditures. The first one can be summarised as ‘costs lie where they fall’: the operations with military or defence implications will be financed by national budgets. The second shows some intervention by the Community in a case-by-case basis. The last one is related to common costs.

Another initiative of the Council came out in 2004, with the ‘Athena’ mechanism.²²⁸ It administers the early financing of EU Military Rapid Response operations. The payment system functions in two ways. Member states may pay contributions to Athena in anticipation. Or, they may pay their contributions which are related to the common costs of the operation decided by the Council, within five days following the call -unless the Council decides otherwise. A special committee has also been set up for the well functioning of the system. The significance of Athena lies in its capability to translate political solidarity into financial one. But it illustrates how hard it is to surmount the financial problem which slows down the progress in the security/defence sphere.

At present, the financial underpinning of crisis management operations needs to be ameliorated: In 2007, the budget allocated to the CFSP was 150 million Euros when a police mission in Kosovo could cost 100 million Euros yearly.²²⁹ One can legitimately argue that budgetary contributions of the member states do not match the ambitions that are declared. This is the most important predicament for the future sustainability of the ESDP operations.

I.C.1.d. The EU’s decision-making on crisis management

The EU is composed of 27 member states and, despite their convergence of view on many questions, they have differing foreign policy priorities that may sometimes cause fundamental disagreements. As a consequence, military intervention cultures differ in member states; some are more active than others. For instance, France and the UK (due to their colonial past) do not share the same vision of intervention with Germany. Nonetheless, all member states have interest in intervening to crisis situations, which allows some convergence of their foreign and domestic policies and the adoption of European politics.

²²⁸ Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004.

²²⁹ MISSIROLI Antonio, “Une Question d’Argent: Le Financement de la Gestion de Crise au sein de l’UE” in LAVALLEE Chantal (Ed.), *L’Europe de la Défense : Acteurs, Enjeux et Processus*, Les Champs de Mars. Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, No: 19, Janvier 2008, pp : 123-124.

What is observed in the EU's stance is that it is driven by a "more of humanity" rather than a "more of power" which is deemed to strengthen stability more successfully.

The EU does not aim to guarantee its territorial defence and the inviolability of its frontiers through its military capabilities. It is not a defensive alliance although any attack to the security of a member state is considered to have negative repercussions on others and to bring prejudice to existence and integrity of the Union. The collective defence on European continent remains the exclusive duty of NATO. The mutual relationship of the Union and the integration project are so intense, deep and long-term in nature that member states will be affected despite the geographic distance among them.²³⁰ This creates the necessity for all EU members to envisage a global security system that would encompass the totality of their Union and to respond if the security of their partners is in jeopardy. It is therefore possible to maintain that the EU's security is coextensive with the sum of the national security of all its member states.²³¹

Despite the depth of the European integration, the security policy of the EU does not aim to substitute member states' national defence policies. In Helsinki, EU member states emphasised that the capability goals do not correspond to the will of creating a single European army or a standing European military force. That is in line with a statement Javier Solana made in 2000:

"Let us be clear. The European Union is not creating a European army; it is not forcing countries to deploy their armed forces against their will; and it is not undermining the Atlantic Alliance. We are creating a pool of military resources ready and able to undertake EU-led crisis management operations; we are setting up effective decision-making structures to provide the political control and strategic direction of such operations; and we are working in full transparency and cooperation with NATO."²³²

The institutional decision-making mechanisms of the EU are built on these grounds. The Council regularly exchanges information with member States and the European Commission. When an intensification of crisis is at stake, the PSC elaborates a crisis management concept with the support of various intelligence sources. The Situation Centre

²³⁰ MULLER Harald, "Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment", *Cahiers de Chaillot*, no: 58, Paris, March 2003, p. 19.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² He added that "American allies have moreover clearly recognised that enhancing European military capabilities will also have the effect of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance as a whole". See *Address by Dr. Javier Solana, WEU Secretary General to the Second Part of the 46th Session of the WEU Assembly*, Council of the European Union, 05/12/2000 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=338&BID=107&DocID=64226&insite=1).

addresses reports to the SG/HR, PSC and EUMS. Then, PSC convenes a meeting and asks for the support of the diplomatic missions and the EUMS. If an action is envisaged, then an ad-hoc committee prepares a document. With or without adjustments, the PSC transmits it to the Council. After the preparation of strategic options with the involvement of other partners (non-EU NATO members and members of other institutions such as the UN and the OSCE), a joint action may be taken.

The European Commission has three directorate generals that can deal with the management of crises in a broad sense, including the prevention of them and the reconstruction in the post-conflict stage. These are the directorates of external relations, development and commerce. Europeaid (which deals with the external aid programmes that are addressed to the developing world) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which are consequently under the administration of the first two directorates, deserve to be counted as well.

That the Commission administers a significant fund to use for public aid to development should also be highlighted. This amount is big enough to bring an essential support to the promotion of the target countries.²³³ It can be useful in three ways: by attacking the profound causes of conflicts (be them economic, political, social or cultural), by influencing the behaviour of policy-makers through political dialogue and the principle of conditionality, and, by implementing specific programmes that are destined to crisis management and conflict prevention.²³⁴

One last point to emphasise about the Commission's crisis management capability concerns the *Instrument for Stability* (IfS) which replaced the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism*. The IfS is a financial instrument to respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability. The Commission resorts to the IfS only when the other financial instruments can not be used within the necessary timeframe. It can circumvent the bureaucratic procedures which prolong the Commission's action through a simplified decision-making process.

²³³ EVANS Gareth, "Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation: From Crisis to Peaceful Governance" (Keynote Address), *International Crisis Group*, 2006, p: 8 (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4101&l=1>).

²³⁴ SANTOPINTO Federico, "Le Role de la Commission Européenne" in DELCOURT Barbara, MARTINELLI Marta, KLIMIS Emmanuel (Eds.), *L'Union Européenne et la Gestion des Crises*, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2008, pp: 51-61.

The European Parliament shows growing interest to the management of crises as revealed by the establishment of a Subcommittee on Security and Defence under the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs. Yet, because the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy area, its competency on the decision-making process is limited. This holds all the more true for the operations that have a military nature.

The influence of the EP can be perceived in institutional and budgetary spheres. The Parliament is consulted by the Presidency on the principal aspects of – and the fundamental choices related to – the CFSP. It is also regularly informed. Thus, its institutional role is largely related to the supervision. The inter-institutional meetings reinforced this role since the launching of the ESDP. The budgetary authority of the EP concerns only the operations that are funded from the community budget.

I. C.2. Crisis Management in Turkish Foreign Policy

Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey's institutional and political development was framed by functions to which she was assigned by the West: being the outpost of NATO (or, in broader view, of the West) and a bulwark against Soviet threat –and, to some extent, against the risks that could emanate from Arab countries.²³⁵ Driven by the international conjuncture, Turkey had to adhere firmly to this framework which had serious impacts upon both domestic and foreign policies adopted since 1950s.

With the end of the Cold War, Turkey had the opportunity to be a regional power. Her earliest reflex was in the direction of establishing strong ties with former Soviet republics, in conformity with the slogan 'from Adriatic to Chinese Murals'.²³⁶ Moreover, she realized the importance of the Muslim and kin communities in Balkans, Caucasia and Middle East. Hence, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey had to readapt visions and institutions to the new geopolitical environment.

As Cem argues, being functional in this new environment with values and systems that reflect the traditional Western-outpost (and gendarmerie) role was almost impossible for Turkey.²³⁷ Since the priorities that ruled over the foreign policy calculations of Turkey had lost their importance, an adaptation was necessary. Besides, Turkey did not have much choice

²³⁵ CEM İsmail, *Op. Cit.*, p: 48.

²³⁶ Although conducted originally with enthusiasm, Turkey's policies in the region did not bear the results that met the high expectations. However, the whole process has been fruitful for Turkey, on at least two counts: the understanding of its limits and the adaptation to the new geo-strategic environment.

²³⁷ *Ibid*, p: 50.

and the depreciation period took less long than expected. Strategic changes brought to the fore Turkey: Circumstances which would allow her to rightly determine a right path for herself arose in a new period in which she was able to do so.

Within the new context, despite the decrease of the risk for Turkey to face an expeditionary threat, new instabilities and ambiguities were to be confronted. This fact led Turkish foreign policy to develop new approaches. As pointed in the Defence Ministry's White Paper, the TAF began to make more contributions to peace support operations while privileging military education cooperations, partnership for peace programs and multinational peace forces. That meant the chance to participate to crisis management efforts in various regions of the world. This activism reflects Turkey's determination to reduce the tensions and contribute to the resolution of crises via participating in and/or leading international formations. That would mean a contribution to her own security and to international stability while proving her commitment to the western security structures.

I.C.2.a. Decision-making for managing crises

For every state, the process that leads to decide on whether or not to intervene in a crisis situation is elaborated on a pre-established set of criteria. Turkey conceives the management of crises in a framework drawn by the objectives based on the foreign policy principles exposed in the previous chapter. They consist of:

- contributing to peace and security in the region and in a larger geography,
- becoming a country that formulates strategies in a way to have impact well beyond its region,
- standing as an element of power and balance in her region,
- using every opportunity for cooperation and taking initiatives in this vein,
- making a maximum contribution to the reduction of all kinds of international tensions and to the provision of just and lasting peace,
- taking all necessary measures to prevent crises and conflicts,
- playing an active role in collective defence systems and fulfilling the subsequent responsibilities.²³⁸

²³⁸ Defence White Paper 2000, Op. Cit.

Some points need to be addressed in order to complete the picture. In every decision of participation, national interests – which may be of political, economic, social/cultural and historic – are taken into consideration. The questions that define this decision concern expectations on whether the gain of participation will be in the medium and long term along with the added value that will be brought by the intervention.

The region in which the crisis occurs is also an important parameter every time the decision of intervention is assessed. It goes without saying that, the closer the crisis region is, the likelier becomes Turkey's intervention. Certainly, as will be shown later in this study, that does not mean that participation can not be considered for the operations that are launched in faraway regions.

The participation to crisis management operations and missions will take place to the extent that the capabilities allow. That holds true for every single state and organisation: Even the very powerful ones feel constrained by technical and financial factors while taking the decision to intervene in foreign crises. As will be mentioned in the next chapter, the EU needs additional capabilities for conducting operations.

It is worth reminding that, although making the decision on managing a crisis is in the monopoly of states, the choices made by other actors may affect this process. As mentioned earlier, international organisations provide a platform in which states can defend their position while working for pre-defined common interests. Since the early periods of the Republic, Turkish policy makers did recourse to them in order to enhance the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. Historical and geographic advantages placed Turkey in a privileged position within international organisations – a fact that enabled Turkey to follow its own national objectives and to serve simultaneously the cause of peace, security and stability in various parts of the world.²³⁹

The decision-making process concerning the intervention to crisis regions is more or less the same in all states. Basically, there are two stages: Gathering and processing the information and deciding accordingly. In Turkey's case, before taking the decision of intervention, the data collected by foreign representations (mostly embassies), the General Staff and the National Intelligence Organisation are assessed. In some cases, other relevant institutions may also participate in this mechanism. In the case of military operations, the

²³⁹ LOĞOĞLU O. Faruk, "Turkey with a Seat on the UN Security Council: Tough Decisions Ahead", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Summer 2008, p: 25.

Prime Minister – as the head of the government and in close cooperation with the President of the Republic – asks for the parliamentary authorisation of the operation, which is a constitutional requirement. Article 92 of the constitution stipulates that:

“The power to authorise the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly”.²⁴⁰

A Turkish political scientist reminds that in Turkey, like in other states, the involvement of policy-makers to the decision-making process on crisis management may depend on their own will.²⁴¹ If the consequences of this ‘freedom’ may seem positive at first sight, there have been cases in which the assertiveness of key personalities caused problem. For instance, President Turgut Özal played an outstandingly active role in shaping Turkey's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Yet, he failed to attain some important goals he pursued: Although he was certain that Turkey would reap economic benefits by allying herself with the US during the first Iraqi war, the economy experienced a sharp slowdown due to the disruption of Iraq's oil imports and to the decrease of trade in the region.

I.C.2.b. Turkey's military assets

The armed forces of a country are its government-sponsored defence, fighting forces, and organizations. They exist to implement the foreign and domestic policies of their governing body, and to defend that body and the nation it represents from external and internal aggressors. The obvious benefit to a country in maintaining armed forces, is in providing protection from foreign threats, and from internal conflict. In recent decades armed forces personnel have also been used as emergency civil support roles in post-disaster situations.

The general characteristics of national defence policies – which determine the tasks of the armed forces – are exposed by the objectives assigned to the armed forces. The White Paper of Turkish Defence Ministry defines them as follows: to preserve and protect the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. The

²⁴⁰ The same article states that it is incumbent on the President of the Republic to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces when the country is subjected—while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess—to sudden armed aggression which makes it imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces.

²⁴¹ GÖNLÜBOL Mehmet, BİNGÜN F. Hakan, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events), Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, p: 625.

Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) missions and responsibilities are clearly stated in the Turkish constitution and determined by laws as to react against new security challenges and crises in 2000's, to be ready to face the uncertainties, and to ensure the security of Turkey against internal and external risks. Hence, Turkish Armed Forces are supposed to have the deterrence capability against all kind of threats against the nation, including attacks that can not be defined as conventional war.

In some cases, operational planning will necessitate small scale or limited force deployments. This is particularly important in Turkey's case, because of the fight with the PKK terrorism and the subsequent troop deployment to Northern Iraq. Throughout the Cold War period, TAF was essentially equipped and structured to confront a possible attack from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The disappearance of the threat that was the main parameter of war planning imposed a large-scale adaptation of the army.

Both in terms of personnel and equipment, TAF is one of the biggest armies of Europe. The objectives followed for restructuring the defence of the nation concern the formation of a modern and more professional force which will be smaller but having more operational capabilities and more fire power. These would bolster the adaptation of the armed forces to the new environment necessitating rapid technological developments. As of 2009, there are more than half million troops in Turkish army.²⁴² Around 400.000 army of reserve should also be taken into consideration. Despite the tendency of decrease in the number of recruits, Turkey is the second biggest army of NATO. Turkey also has a significant number of paramilitary, commando, and special operation units that are capable of conducting specific operations.

Regarding the extent of the military budget, Turkey provides again significant numbers. In 2008, Turkey's military spending was above 16 billion US dollars, equalling 2,2% of her GDP.²⁴³ For the same year, the approximate expenditures in US dollars of the five biggest military spenders of the EU (and their share in the gross domestic products) were as follows: UK and France, 66 billion (2,5% and 2,3% respectively); Germany, 47 billion

²⁴² Land forces: 402.000 (325.000 conscripts); naval forces: 48.600 (34.500 conscripts); air forces: 60.000. To this should be added the 150.000 paramilitary forces (including 50.000 reservists). See "Chapter Three: Europe", *The Military Balance*, vol: 109, no: 1, February 2009, pp: 154-157.

²⁴³ *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>).

(1,3%), Italy, 39 billion (1,7%), Spain, 19 billion (1,2%).²⁴⁴ In the ranking, Greece follows Spain by allocating almost 13 billion dollars – and 3,6% of her GDP – to the military sector.²⁴⁵

The organisation of the army and the way that the resources are used are as important as the resources themselves. The international environment and dominant security conceptions do not allow Turkey to exclude totally the possibility to find herself in a war with another state. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the definition of objectives and building of operational capabilities need to take into consideration the scenarios of massive involvement. However, crisis management is an important pillar of Turkey's security policy. Turkey, as an element of power and stabilisation in the region, wants to extend stability to a wider geography. In order to realise all those objectives, she is willing to get involved in all possible formations and to make use of every opportunity to get engaged in initiatives to develop cooperation aimed at having close and constructive relations. This supports her desire to play an active role in remedying the crises and providing fair and enduring peace.

The capability to intervene outside national frontiers is a must for the TAF. The corollary is that well equipped small and flexible units with sufficient capability need to be built. The Ministry of Defence is aware of the role that technology plays in the success of operations. It aims to improve the army's capabilities in order to ensure the security of Turkey and to contribute to regional and global peace and stability.²⁴⁶

TAF has undergone a modernisation process by acquiring the capabilities which will allow it to confront an uncertain future which promise potential conflicts.²⁴⁷ This necessity is obviously strengthened by being situated “in an environment full of conflicts” and being “the last link within the NATO defence chain”.²⁴⁸ The army reduced its troop numbers from nearly

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Hence, TAF needs to acquire: deterrence of military power; command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; superior manoeuvre capability and fire power; high tech weapons and systems; ability to conduct operations day and night; air/missile defence and NBC protection capability against the mass destruction weapons; ability to conduct joint and combined operations; interoperability with the armed forces of the allies; ability to conduct not only conventional war, but also various types of operations –such as peace support, counter terrorism, disasters relief, crisis management, small scale strikes, blockade, embargo, humanitarian aid, control of refugee flow and so forth.

²⁴⁷ “Mission”, *Turkish General Staff*, Ankara (http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/gorevi.htm).

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

one million to around 600,000 as of 2009.²⁴⁹ The final goal of Turkey is to produce indigenous military equipment and to become increasingly self-sufficient in terms of military technologies.²⁵⁰ Today, the Turkish Army officially claims it can deploy an Army Corps of 50,000 men to conduct joint operations at short notice, and also conduct air assault operations with a lift capability of up to 6 battalions at a time, day and night. With air refueling capability, the Turkish air force is also able to participate in overseas operations.

The three components of the TAF have their missions detailed separately. Land forces protect against the external military threats which include defending national territory, preserving internal stability (fight against terrorism, maintenance of public order and help in case of disasters) and contributing to the maintenance of international stability by participating to peace support operations, providing military aid to allied states and contributing to disarmament and arm control mechanisms.

In this framework, the Land Forces Command implemented a reorganisation programme called Force 2014 and aims to put in place a smaller land force trained for a large spectrum of missions, characterised by greater mobility and firepower, capable of combat in conflicts of various intensities, and capable of conducting joint operations (multi-service) and combined (multinational).²⁵¹ This restructuring will culminate in reducing the personnel and the size of unit and will the army will possess more highly trained forces characterized by greater mobility and firepower and capable of joint and combined operations.²⁵²

The mission of the Air Forces is the general air defence of Turkey. Its tasks cover the spectrum of interventions, from humanitarian aid to conventional war, including crisis management, operations of imposing peace and peace-keeping and low intensity conflicts.²⁵³ It is also tasked with the support of land forces and performing necessary duties in the NATO context.²⁵⁴ The enlargement of mission spectrum necessitates some efforts of restructuring that aims at increasing existing capabilities to conduct conventional wars and to participate in

²⁴⁹ This number includes the 510.600 active military personnel and the 102.000 paramilitaries. See “Chapter Three: Europe”, Op. Cit., p: 154.

²⁵⁰ HEN-TOV Elliot, “The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization”, *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol: 8, No: 4, December 2004 (<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a5.html>).

²⁵¹ Turkish General Staff (www.tsk.mil.tr).

²⁵² “Turkey”, *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>).

²⁵³ Turkish Air Force, Turkish General Staff, Ankara (www.hvkk.tsk.mil.tr).

²⁵⁴ “Air Force (Turkey), Air Force”, *Jane’s Intelligence and Insight* (<http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/emedsu/turks120.html>).

missions within international frameworks. The *Turkish Armed Forces Air Concept* has been replaced by the *Aerospace and Missile Defence Concept* in March 2002 as part of the projects to establish a *National Space Board* (NSB). The latter agency will constitute the legal framework for the acceleration of Turkey's efforts to acquire expensive anti-ballistic missile systems.²⁵⁵

Possessing a coast of 8.300 kilometres, Turkey's sea forces are important for the country's welfare and security. Principal missions of Turkish naval force are as follows: strategic deterrence by visibility in sea ("to show flags and existence in all seas when national benefits require"); fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling in cooperation with Allied Forces and international organisations; participation to humanitarian aid and search and rescue operations as well as crisis management operations; establishing and maintenance of maritime control and protection of national interests in territorial waters in cooperation with coast guard command.²⁵⁶ The *Long Horizon Project* involves developing system architectural plans and technical specifications that will enable the continuous monitoring of the operation area of the surface and underwater platforms.²⁵⁷ This will be realised through an integrated 'Maritime Surveillance System'.²⁵⁸

I.C.3. NATO: A particular Platform for Turkey and the EU

NATO has never been more active. As it celebrates its 60th anniversary, it is engaged in several domains, including peace-keeping, stabilisation, anti-terror operations, security-force training, providing support to other regional organisations, and so forth. Most probably, the functionality of the Alliance will linger in the future. Its member states are willing to make sure of it.

Both for Turkey and the EU, NATO has a privileged situation in the crisis management. This occurred in time through an evolution that had many facets. It is therefore plausible to begin with a historical overview of the institution before moving on with its relations with the EU and Turkey.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ www.dzkk.tsk.mil.tr

²⁵⁷ It will also provide timely exchange of firing data with command and control centres and determining reconnaissance, surveillance and information systems. See "Long Horizon Project (1st Phase)", *Undersecretariat for Defence Industries*, Republic of Turkey

[http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN/Projeler/arge/argetamamlanmis/Pages/UZUNUFUK\(1inciEtap\).aspx](http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN/Projeler/arge/argetamamlanmis/Pages/UZUNUFUK(1inciEtap).aspx)

²⁵⁸ "Turkey Pushes Ahead on Its Delayed Long Horizon Project", *Jane's Intelligence and Insight*

(<http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-99/TURKEY-PUSHES-AHEAD-ON-ITS-DELAYED-LONG-HORIZON-PROJECT.html>).

I.C.3.a. Genesis and the Development

After the end of the Second World War, except a brief period of coalition between Euro-Atlantic and Soviet forces against the Axis powers, confrontation ruled the relations between the USSR-led Eastern and the US-led Western blocs. Soviet intransigence obliged its opponent to build a collective security organisation whose preamble refers to the article 51 of the UN Charter.²⁵⁹ A new era hence began, putting an end to the superiority of the Old Continent in the world affairs.

Established at the beginning of the Cold War by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington in April 1949,²⁶⁰ NATO brought to Europe the guarantee of the US military assistance which was indispensable in a climate of bipolar confrontation. European decision-makers who were willing to opt for Atlantic Alliance conceived it as the strongest bulwark against Soviet aggression. For its part, the US had the wish to offer protection to Europe so as to prevent Soviet expansion to the detriment of European democracies. Hence, NATO was the principal instrument for maintaining the security in Europe in a decisive manner throughout the Cold War.²⁶¹ It was responsible of the collective defence as defined by the article 5 which gives possibility for the members to consider an attack or an act of aggression against one or more members as an attack against all.

The disappearance of communist bloc led Westerners to call into question the very *raison d'être* of the Atlantic Alliance. The original threat that cemented NATO had ceased to exist. Its members were to choose between two options: abolishing the Washington Treaty or adapting NATO to deal with the post-Cold-War challenges. In the end, the latter option was held; the dissolution of Warsaw Treaty Organisation did not prove to be an existential crisis

²⁵⁹ Article 51 states that nothing in the UN Charter “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”.

²⁶⁰ The Alliance finds its source in the abandonment of American isolationism concretised by Truman Doctrine. Following the Vandenberg resolution of 11 June 1948, the US-hosted treaty was signed by Brussels, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK. Greece and Turkey (1952), Federal Republic of Germany (1955), Spain (1982) joined the Alliance in the Cold War era. Later on, three waves of enlargement were witnessed in 1999 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and 2009 (Albania, Croatia).

²⁶¹ The assistance guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty is not automatic, but the engagement of the Allies is very strong: when an attack is at stake, the reaction may include the use of armed force aiming to re-establish and ensure the security in North Atlantic region. By referring expressly to the article 51 of the UN Charter, the treaty announces that all attack against one of the parties is considered as an attack against all others. Although member states remain free not to participate to the conflict in case of aggression, Soviet presence in eastern and central Europe and the existence of two German states belonging to two rival blocs lead to believe to an automatic military engagement.

for NATO. It rather created the need to redefine the missions of NATO, even its identity. Instead of becoming obsolete, the Alliance underwent a profound transformation remarked by the substitution of a wide range of security missions for the initial objective of collective defence. A strategic re-evaluation of NATO culminated in the appropriation of new missions and in the extension to new geographies. There are many indicators that point to this significant change: official documents adopted by governmental representatives, practices on the field, declarations made by the senior officers and the institutional restructuring of the Alliance.

The eastward enlargement that occurred after the dissolution of Warsaw Treaty Organisation expanded the region of stability. NATO supported its new members' efforts towards democracy. Some mechanisms have been established in order to ease the difficulties that newcomers would face in the transition process –such as the PfP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). This transformation has inevitably been observed at the doctrinal level as well. In 1991, the Summit of Rome defined a *strategic concept* that reflected the transition from a preeminent soviet threat to multiform risks which are difficult to forecast and evaluate.²⁶²

The Strategic Concept further reads some important observations on the new strategic environment. The primary role of the Alliance has not changed, but new necessities should be taken into consideration by the Allied forces which have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war. Their security is affected by successful management of crises. The new environment provides for opportunities of resolving the crises at an early stage. However, this does not mean that success is always guaranteed.

Because the overall size of armed forces undergoes a process of reduction, the enhancement of flexibility gains importance. So does credible ability for all allied military forces. Therefore, member states are obliged to focus on these two parameters and do the necessary arrangements in a way to play an effective role in managing crises as well as countering aggression against any Alliance member.²⁶³

²⁶² *The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of state and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Rome, 08/11/1991 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>).

²⁶³ The document states that this fact will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. Ibid.

In this context, NATO adopted a deepened and enlarged approach towards security by relinquishing the exclusive reference to the military field. Thus, crisis management became a pivotal theme in the adaptation of NATO to the post-Cold War security environment. Practical justification was to come: The two-week air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces launched in 1995 and the subsequent deployment of peacekeeping forces to the country involved NATO for the first time in a non-article 5 crisis management operation. Others followed later on in Kosovo, Macedonia and also outside the European continent –in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

The strong emphasis NATO places on cooperation deserves to be underscored. It goes beyond a relations between member states. The Partnership for Peace Work Plan, which aims to enhance stability and security throughout Europe, is a successful multilateral scheme in the latter field. It is noteworthy that there are also *Individual Partnership Programmes*. A wide range of activities nurtures the policy of contributing to the peace: briefings and consultations, expert visits, crisis management courses, partner participation in the annual NATO-wide crisis management exercise, and the provision of generic crisis management documents to partners.²⁶⁴

Another scheme of cooperation that is worth mentioning is the one that NATO has built up with international organisations. The necessity to cooperate with the latter was drawn up as a corollary of the need to build a broader approach to security. Because creating synergies between different actors working with the same objectives is valuable, NATO welcomes the involvement of other organizations specialised in peace and stability –by highlighting that “the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary”.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ A further aspect of crisis management is the coordination of responses to disasters or emergencies in the Euro-Atlantic area in which the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) has a key position.

²⁶⁵ The Strategic Concept states that the Allies will “support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions” and further reads that “other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play”. Similar statements are observed in the *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* which was adopted at the same date. The declaration stated that “a framework of interlocking institutions” was necessary and that NATO was working in favour of a new European security architecture in which all institutions afferent to European security (NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe) complement each other. This interaction would have, according to the Declaration, the greatest importance in “preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism”.

The strategic concept was renewed in 1999. Built on similar grounds as its predecessor, the “New Strategic Concept” aims to provide “guidance” for the Alliance.²⁶⁶ The vision on the crisis management that can be deduced from the new concept is in complete parallelism with the document adopted in 1991. The necessities put forth justify this fact: resolute engagement for enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area²⁶⁷ and keeping military capabilities in an extent to deal with the crises. There is something relatively new however: responses to crisis situation must be chosen from a range of both civilian and military measures.

It is worth noting the new momentum in the post-September 11 period which strengthened the importance of the transatlantic organisation. The need to reshape the content of collective security arose and the US attitude towards the European Union’s military-integration-related initiatives has drastically changed. Washington is now encouraging – rather than expressing concerns on – the Europeans to act more assertively in dealing with crisis situations. In other words, the US acts more as a driving factor than as a barrier for a future EU military responsibility.²⁶⁸

The upcoming strategic concept, announced during the Strasbourg – Kehl Summit, is the end-product of a new need to revise the existing one. When the clues are assessed, one can more or less foresee that it will focus on out of area missions. This attitude has been gaining ground since the end of the Cold War, but the new concept will most probably materialise through a less Eurocentric nature of the missions. That will be in line with the need of ensuring security by acting where threats emerge.

I.C.3.b. Connection between NATO and the EU

A clear partnership between the EU and NATO should be defined and the EU must specify the degree of autonomy, freedom and burden-sharing it needs in order to assume responsibility for its security and defence. Many governments subscribe to these realities which have been uttered on several occasions both in official and academic circles. That

²⁶⁶ It is composed of four parts: NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks; central features of the new security environment; elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security; guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces. See *The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of state and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999* (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>).

²⁶⁷ At the time the new concept was adopted, the conflict in Kosovo was particularly highlighting the importance of the crisis management.

²⁶⁸ GNESOTTO Nicole, *ESDP: A European View* (Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum), Brussels, 8 July 2001 (<http://www.eusec.org/gnesotto.htm>).

assigns to the EU-NATO arrangements on the participation of non-EU European allies in the ESDP a particular importance.

The EU is an important strategic partner of NATO: most of its members are also member of NATO or provide various kinds of support to NATO operations. There is a growing convergence between the EU and NATO in what regards threat perceptions and ways to deal with threats. Besides, the Alliance is in close connection with the EU in the field of crisis management since the period when the WEU existed as such.²⁶⁹

With the development of the European Security and Defence Identity, the NATO-WEU relations gained a new shape. The NATO's Berlin Ministerial meeting in 1996 constituted an important and historical landmark on this matter, by formulating the possibility for the WEU-led European defence operations to use NATO assets. According to the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, NATO should (on a case by case basis and by consensus) make its assets and capabilities available for the EU-led operations (be them under the WEU flag or under other formulations) when it is not engaged militarily. At this point, it is important to underline that the full participation of all European Allies should be ensured whenever they wish to participate. This has not always been a matter of consensus between Turkey and the EU.²⁷⁰

In time, the European determination to play an active role in military/operational field became more obvious, reflected especially by the willingness to incorporate the WEU in the EU. During Washington Summit of April 1999, NATO members acknowledged "the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action" which would provide for the possibility to take decisions and endorse military operations in the absence of total involvement by the Alliance. The document reminds that, for this to be realised, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency and asserts the necessity to prevent the duplication of the existing mechanisms. The fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response operations was also desirable.

The European Council at its June 1999 the Cologne Summit made clear the EU's determination to modify its security structure by assigning the General Affairs Council with a

²⁶⁹ Created by the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, the WEU was a defence organisation. For long time, it was the only platform where exclusively European matters of security were discussed.

²⁷⁰ See *supra*, II.B.2.

very important task: to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary for the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities defined by the Petersberg tasks. This included the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of the WEU's functions. According to the Union's member states, the organisation of Brussels Treaty had completed its purpose.²⁷¹ A year later, the EU went a step further in Feira by identifying the principles and modalities for arrangements to allow non-EU European NATO members and EU candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management.

In December 2002, the EU and NATO adopted a joint declaration that built a formal basis and framework for cooperation on crisis management. It asserted the possibility for the EU to access to NATO's planning capabilities for military operations. The two institutions also agreed on an extensive scheme of collaboration that would globally enhance common crisis management capacity.²⁷² The *NATO-EU Security Agreement* (also known as Berlin Plus) is particularly important because it guarantees for the EU the possibility to use NATO assets in an international crisis management in which NATO does not want to get involved – the so-called “right of first refusal”. Such a need appears when the operation is of great scale. To date, this right has been translated into practice once by the EU in the operation EUFOR Althea.

NATO-EU relations in the field of crisis management gained further momentum following the Prague summit where the member states emphasised the impacts of September 11 attacks and subsequent events “have underlined further the importance of greater transparency and cooperation between (...) two organisations on questions of common interest relating to security, defence, and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured”.²⁷³

²⁷¹ As expected, the Summit also declared that “the different status of Member states with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected” and that “the Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member states”. See *Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999* (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm).

²⁷² That incorporates mutually reinforcing crisis management activities; equal footing on and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests; mutual respect for national interests of all member states; effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency; coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements; respect for the Charter of the United Nations. See “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP”, *NATO Press Releases*, 16/12/2002 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>).

²⁷³ “Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of state and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002”, *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>).

Despite the gradual reinforcement of the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, some difficulties for the Alliance persist. Europeans and Americans do not agree upon all aspects of the European security. The degree of ‘Europeanness’ of the latter constitutes one of the discords. Although successive US governments encourage the EU members’ efforts on financial burden sharing, they have strong reservations on what Madeleine Albright called the three ‘D’s: duplication (of NATO assets), decoupling (from NATO) and discrimination (of NATO members that are not in the EU). Unlike the defenders of a more ‘Europeanist’ approach, some EU member states are also unwilling to lead the EU in such a way.

Besides, transatlantic partners face ruptures on several international issues. The National Security Strategy promulgated by Bush administration in September 2002 constitutes an important example in this domain. The document relates the US strategy towards the ‘Islamic Arc’, having major implications for transatlantic links. The latter may cause problems due the disparity between the interests and policy perspectives of European and American allies, the role attributed to NATO being at the centre of the discord.²⁷⁴

At present, the EU has “*neither the military capacity nor the political will to create a security or defence profile that is independent from NATO in the short term*”²⁷⁵. For more than half a century, Europeans have been relying on the security guaranteed by the United States. Giving up on this comfort is very unlikely for most European states. This reality is intensified by limitations in financial and military terms. But still, the uncertainty raised about Europe’s future engagement in NATO could be a source of rivalry between the two organisations.²⁷⁶ Both Europeans and Americans have some question marks on each other’s position: How can the US make the EU’s foreign action remain within the framework of a structure over which the Union has a limited control? On the other side, the EU has doubts about the US’ sincerity in the light of NATO’s strategic reorientation towards out-of-area and not-strictly-military missions.

²⁷⁴ CARPENTER Ted Galen, “The Bush Administration's Security Strategy: Implications For Transatlantic Relations”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol: 16, no: 3, Oct 2003, pp: 515-520.

²⁷⁵ DEIGHTON Anne, “European Security and Defence Policy”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol: 40, no: 4.

²⁷⁶ HOUDET Christian, LEBAS Colombar, DREVILLE Gérard, *Une Défense Plus Globale «Par et Pour» Une Europe Plus Prospère*, Collection des Chercheurs Militaires, Les Editions de Riaux – CEREMS, Paris, 2005, p: 81

I.C.3.c. Turkey's NATO membership

As mentioned earlier, Turkey's long-term pro-Western inclination has been crystallised by the reforms made during the early periods of the Republic. Making an official demand for joining European organisations was the natural outcome of this inclination. Turkey's NATO membership should be considered through a similar reasoning.

Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Two observations about the period should be made. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey was in a precarious economic situation – which was indeed having an impact on its military expenditures. Joining the organisation would create a beneficial situation for her. Besides, as a regional power, Turkey was not able to confront Soviet territorial demands without joining a greater alliance.²⁷⁷

Turkey showed a strong willingness to join NATO which she considers “the linchpin of transatlantic ties and Euro-Atlantic Security”.²⁷⁸ But her admission was preceded by extensive study and debate of the strategy of extending the alliance's southern flank to include the eastern Mediterranean. The main preoccupation was about the long land frontier with the Soviet Union that the Alliance would have after Turkey's accession. Yet, Turkey's prospect membership would have also positive consequences: Acquiring the “front deployment” possibility, large military effectives and extra intelligence gathering capacity were the opportunities profiled by the accession of a new member determined to play an active role in the Alliance.

Time proved that the decision to let Turkey in was beneficial for both the Alliance and Turkey. Both sides' interests coincided largely, and Turkey's contribution was highly valuable. Besides, her geopolitical importance was undeniable: Turkey had the control of the only maritime way between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, at the junction of three continents. Her position was all the more strengthened by her situation on the energy corridor.

During the Cold War, Turkey was the most important southern security flank in Europe, as well as a bulwark against the Soviet Union as a reliable ally. She played a key role in the dissuasion of the adversary Warsaw Pact by maintaining a big and efficient military force, although this task caused a significant economic burden and was achieved at a terrific

²⁷⁷ The Soviet Union wanted to revise the Treaty that put the cities of Kars and Ardahan under Turkey's sovereignty.

²⁷⁸ *Turkey's Security Perspectives and Its Relations with NATO*, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa#III>).

cost, “requiring a major sacrifice of diverting much needed resources”.²⁷⁹ She defended, in cooperation with other NATO members, democracy and Western common values while guaranteeing peace and stability. For a fair assessment of this sacrifice, one should take into consideration the risks and challenges posed by being in such a rough environment –which certainly played a role in Turkey’s orientation towards peaceful initiatives.

Turkey remains an enthusiast supporter of the NATO linkage in a new cooperative era characterised by the replacement of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation by a less definable set of missions for the alliance. Ankara affirms its willingness and determination to do the utmost to counter the new threats and welcomed NATO’s successive enlargements which will make it more capable. The new period did not decrease the importance of Turkey’s NATO membership. Consequently, the latter has not been questioned in the domestic platform. It continues to be one of the main pillars of Turkey’s foreign policy and security structuring.

In this context, some contributions made by Turkey merit attention, such as the support towards the PfP. Turkey has actively participated in the deliberations on it, which is an important platform for strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region in general, and fostering good neighbourly relations in particular. With the same spirit, Turkey has initiated the establishment of *Southeast European Multinational Peace Force* and moreover, a *Partnership for Peace Training Center* which is already in operation in Turkey since June 1998. The *Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group* is another promising security project that is worth mentioning.

At present, with growing instability in its immediate neighborhood, including the Caucasus, the uncertainty over Iran's nuclear intentions and the sectarian fighting in Iraq, Turkey remains a crucial member of the twenty-eight-member alliance. What is more, years of combined defence planning, joint exercises, common practices and joint command and control in NATO attune Turkish military with its European counterparts in many respects.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ KULOĞLU Armağan, “21. Yüzyılın Başlangıcında NATO, Avrupa ve Türkiye” (NATO, Europe and Turkey in the Beginning of the 21st Century) in BAL İdris (Ed.), Op. Cit., p: 962.

²⁸⁰ ERGÜVENÇ Şadi, “EU-Turkey Military Convergence” in GASPARINI Giovanni (Ed.), *Turkey and European Security*, IAI-TESEV Report, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2006, p: 82.

In the Alliance, Turkey has been an influential player in all steps to cope with these new risks and will continue to make every possible contribution to preserve the existing momentum.²⁸¹

In terms of armed force personnel within NATO, Turkey has the second rank after the USA. Under the provisions of the alliance, most of the Turkish armed forces are committed to NATO command in the event of hostilities. Turkish land, sea, and air forces are under the Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples –the former Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) based in Naples. Ankara’s enthusiastic participation in major NATO missions makes this military integration all the more significant.

Turkey will continue to be a reliable member of NATO, which undoubtedly is the most successful alliance that has ever been witnessed in the history. Her membership to NATO does give more than a protection from a common threat by granting a voice in major strategic decisions that would be taken in consensus with Western countries. It is worth reminding that most of the time these decisions would be critical to Turkey’s security. In the new era, this situation did not change. On the contrary, it kept the national security agenda more busy than before.

²⁸¹ DEMİREL Süleyman, “Turkey and NATO at the Threshold of a New Century”, *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, March-May 1999, vol: 4, no: 1 (<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume4/March-May1999/demirel.PDF>).

PARTIAL CONCLUSION

There are some points that outstand in this part of the study. The fact that Turkey has a set of principles that are in harmony with those of the EU is one of them. That provides a significant commonality in the relations with the outside world. To this point, the similarity of threat conception with the West should also be added. As a consequence, a similar doctrinaire and practical approach to the security and defence in the international arena has been adopted by the two entities. This fact is visible in Turkey's efforts of mobilising the international community on two main security-threatening matters: terrorism and WMDs.

The harmony is strengthened by material factors. As it is the case for all the states, Turkey's foreign policy choices have been largely affected by geography. This fact inevitably leads Ankara to conduct a multidimensional foreign policy. Besides, neighbouring regions where crises abound had an impact on its security perceptions. Consequently, Turkey had to build – and revise – a national defence policy and a military structure in a way to be able to confront these challenges. The same reflex is observed in the case of the EU as well.

Especially in the post-Cold War period, dealing with international crises became an inescapable security parameter for Turkey and the EU. Historical factors played a role in this: The long-term integration in Euro-Atlantic defence structure had provided a firm ground for dealing with security issues. This is the ground on which the impetus for crisis management was given by the evolutions in the international context where the security perceptions and defence parameters have been reshaped.

The question to know if Turkey's foreign policy principles, security perceptions and regional connections assign her some role in regional and international platforms is important. Can Turkey choose between inertia and playing active role in the developments that occur in its surrounding regions torn by conflicts? Which role will she assume on these regions, and what pattern of behaviour will she expose? The search of answers to these questions – for which the analysis conducted so far provides clues – will define the practice of Turkey's crisis management efforts.

PART II

FACTUAL COMPATIBILITY between TURKEY and the EU

What has been exposed in the previous part raises important questions. Is a compatibility likely to be observed in the crisis management policies adopted by distinct actors, assuming that they are inevitably influenced by the historical evolution of the concept? To what extent do common perceptions lead to common actions? These points are all the more relevant for the present research because of Turkey's previously mentioned connection to Europe. Hence, the question that will guide the following sections can be posed as follows: Are the actions undertaken by Turkey in conformity with those of the EU, as one would expect in the light of conceptual and historical grounds that have been provided hitherto in this study?

Both the EU and Turkey shoulder responsibilities in what regards the global security in general and the management of crises in particular. Before beginning to assess the compatibility of actions they take, it is useful to make two remarks. At first, one should remember that the translation of values and principles into action requires material resources. As reminded in the introductory section of this volume, there is a significant gap between the two actors in material terms. Turkey is one of the 20 biggest economies of the world and she has a high level of defence spending; but still, the resources she is able to allocate for foreign interventions remains limited in comparison with those of the EU.

The second point to highlight is that the efforts to deal with a crisis reflect a choice – like all foreign policy actions. It is therefore pertinent to analyse how Turkey acts in a crisis situation in order to see if her actions are in accordance with those of the EU. This effort will be conducted under three chapters. In the first one, the above-mentioned compatibility will be sought through the diplomatic initiatives taken by Turkey. The second chapter will have the same goal by focusing on the military operations –without excluding the setbacks on the operational field. The two specific cases of crisis management, Cyprus and Iraq, will be addressed next.

II.A. Diplomatic Initiatives

The endeavours of Turkey in diplomatic realm will be taken on regional basis. At first, the diplomatic moves made in the Balkan region will be exposed. The study on South Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform will be the second section and will precede the third one that is allotted to the Middle East. Turkey's reaction to the crisis in Gaza, her mediation efforts between Syria and Iraq, her stance towards Iran on the nuclear dossier will be the cases to study. Then will come the mediation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

II.A.1. Balkan Region

By 1989, at least four signals of a gloomy future for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been received by the international community: The 1986 Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences,²⁸² the coup which brought Milosevic to power within the Serbian party apparatus, Kosovo's loss of its autonomous status, and, the Gazimestan speech delivered by Milosevic to a huge crowd at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. The Serbian leadership, by promoting and exacerbating ethnic hatred and violence, led the country to the deadliest conflicts witnessed in Europe since the end of the Second World War.

After Croatia and Slovenia had declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, severe fighting started on Croatian soil –caused by the strong opposition of Croatian Serbs supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The then-European Community was unable to stop the hostilities. The United Nations became actively involved in the efforts of bringing a halt to the fighting in the region with the UNSC resolution 713 of September 1991 that was adopted unanimously. It called on all states to implement urgently a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia”. Following the Geneva and Sarajevo ceasefire agreements, the key UN move came with the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

²⁸² Elaborated by the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, the seventy-six-page document criticized the 1974 constitution for granting autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces. More importantly, it accused Tito of having deliberately weakened Serbia. Ivo Banac describes the fundamental position of the memorandum by the fact that Tito pursued consistent discrimination against Serbs and their country. As Carole Rogel underlines, even Slobodan Milosevic denounced the Memorandum as the “darkest nationalism”. Richard Frucht states that “Although much of the Memorandum retains a scholarly, or at least analytical tone, the portions concerning Serbia's relations with its autonomous provinces, and the life of Serbs in those provinces, are quite extravagant”. See BANAC Ivo, “The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise”, *Daedalus*, vol: 121, no:2, Spring 1992, p: 150; ROGEL Carole, “Kosovo: Where It All Began”, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 17, no: 1, Fall 2003, p: 172; FRUCHT Richard C., *Eastern Europe. An Introduction to the People, Lands and Culture*, ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara, 2004, p: 556.

The European Community's decision of December 1991 on recognition of individual republics was taken five days after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. In light of the guidelines agreed on this framework,²⁸³ the Community and its member states discussed the dissolution of Yugoslavia and adopted a common position with regard to the recognition of new republics. They decided to recognise the independence of all the Yugoslav republics fulfilling the conditions set out in the *Declaration on Yugoslavia* that they adopted the same day as the declaration on the guidelines.²⁸⁴

As it was the case for all her allies, it was difficult for Turkey to fully understand and adapt to the quick changes in early 1990s and to react to atrocities in the vicinity of Europe. As a first reaction, Turkey rapidly recognized the independence of new republics in Balkan region and established bilateral and multilateral links with them. Turkish foreign policy-makers, who confronted the bitter reality that there was no possibility to intervene unilaterally in order to resolve the deep-rooted conflicts in Balkans, had to encourage multilateral solutions – mainly within the UN, but also in regional organisms.

II.A.1.a. Bosnian crisis

At the early stages of the Yugoslav problem, Turkey has been in favour of the country's territorial integrity. This preference was based on the assumption that every community of the region could be protected against the aggression of others if the Yugoslav unity is preserved. The instability in Balkan territories could cause a significant concern for Turkey for the reasons that are cited in the earlier parts of this study.

But things turned out differently than what the international community had expected earlier: A process of dislocation has begun, during which international support has been

²⁸³ The recognition of these states necessitated: the respect of UN Charter dispositions and the engagements stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter, especially in what regards the state of law, democracy and human rights; the guarantee of rights for ethnic and national groups and minorities, in conformity with the engagements undertaken within the framework of the CSCE; the respect of the inviolability of territorial frontiers which can only be modified by peaceful means and common consensus; the resumption of all engagements concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as regional security and stability; the engagement to resolve all questions related to the succession of states and to the regional disputes by agreement (and particularly by resort to arbitration). See the *EC Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New states Adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting*, Brussels, 16/12/1991. See TRIFUNOVSKA Snezana, *Yugoslavia through Its Documents. From Its Creation to Its Dissolution*, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht, 1998, pp: 431-432.

²⁸⁴ Hence, all Yugoslav Republics were invited to officially state, by 23 December, whether they wish to be recognized as independent states; accept the commitments contained in the above-mentioned guidelines; they accept the provision laid down in the draft Convention –especially those in Chapter II on human rights of national or ethnic groups- under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia; they continue to support the UN-sponsored efforts and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia.

sought by the leaders of the aspirant states. With this purpose, several high-level visits have been made to Turkey.²⁸⁵ Turkish establishment conveyed them their desire to see Yugoslav unity preserved and the problems solved in a non-violent way. Turkey has been careful about not being in a position to incite the dislocation of Yugoslavia. In 1991, Turkey's Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was pointing to his cabinet's future endeavours to build dialogue among the parties of the conflict in accordance with the OSCE principles.²⁸⁶

Turkey found herself within a rather difficult position and awaited international recognition of the new republics before building diplomatic relations with them. That was a clear sign that Turkey was willing to act in a spirit of solidarity with the international community. The EU's move in this direction, made in mid-January 1992, provided considerable comfort for Turkey. On 6 February 1992, Turkey recognised all four republics that declared their independence from Yugoslavia.

On March the 1st, following Bosnian President Izetbegovic's declaration on his country's independence, conflicts erupted in Sarajevo and quickly intensified – the first air bombing of the city by Serbian forces occurred on 6 April – to become an ethnic cleansing. Turkey, from the earlier stages of the crisis, adopted an unambiguous stance maintained by diplomatic and military pillars. Believing that a widespread recognition would be effective in stopping the attacks to the Bosnia Herzegovina's territorial integrity, Ankara seized the OSCE, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the United Nations between 15 April and 5 May to seek protection for the country.²⁸⁷ Her endeavours have been materialised through several diplomatic moves in the international organisations.²⁸⁸

Turkey's diplomatic activism was not limited to initiatives taken within these institutions. In fact, Turkey brought every kind of support she could to enhance the efforts of

²⁸⁵ In July 1991, Kiro Gligorov (President of the Republic of Macedonia) and Alija Izetbegovic (President of Bosnia-Herzegovina) made official visits to Turkish capital with an interval of one week.

²⁸⁶ KUT Şule, "Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990-1993" (The Crisis of Yugoslavia and Turkey's Policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia: 1990-1993) in SÖNMEZOĞLU Faruk (Ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, pp: 164-165.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p: 166; GÖNLÜBOL Mehmet, BİNGÜN F. Hakan, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events), Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, p: 685.

²⁸⁸ In 1992, Turkey could profit from its position of chairing simultaneously the OIC and the Council of Europe in favour of the Bosnian problem. Hence, Turkey could initiate two extraordinary meetings in the OIC –the project elaborated in the second one has been submitted to the UN General Assembly which subsequently requested the UNSC to impose more efficient sanctions. See SOYSAL İsmail, "Günümüzde Balkanlar ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu" (Balkans Today and Turkey's Attitude) in *Balkanlar*, OBIV Yayınları, Eren, İstanbul, 1993, p: 190.

ending the atrocities. Hence, the endeavours to obtain the support of other international actors took an important part in Ankara's agenda. It is also important to note that Lord Owen (EC representative) and Cyrus Wance (UN Special Envoy) made several visits to Turkish capital in order to exchange views before or after negotiating with Bosnian officials.²⁸⁹ The conference which gathered Balkan foreign ministers in Istanbul on 25 November 1992 was another Turkish project in line.



After the continuation of brutal attacks against Bosnian people proved the inadequacy of diplomatic efforts, a military operation appeared as the only viable solution for the Western world. Turkey had envisaged this possibility earlier on: In August 1992, she brought to the fore the “two-phase action plan” which was a mixture of diplomatic and military measures.²⁹⁰ The plan sought to provide and strengthen humanitarian support (such as ensuring the safe access of humanitarian aid to the regions in need and building safe havens for refugees), to carry on diplomatic initiatives and to resort to military measures (which included the air bombing against Serbian positions).²⁹¹ Independently of this plan, Turkish government had declared its readiness to contribute to an international force built under the UN's auspices. Even when Turkish officials were busy establishing diplomatic contacts on

²⁸⁹ Şule Kut argues that the main objective of these visits was to receive Turkey's aid for convincing Bosnian government to accept the conditions of peace. See KUT Şule, *Op. Cit.*, p: 168.

²⁹⁰ GÖNLÜBOL Mehmet, BİNGÜN F. Hakan, *Op. Cit.*, p: 686.

²⁹¹ KUT Şule, *Op. Cit.*, p: 167.

various levels, they did not omit requesting the US and its allies (mainly the UK and France) to opt for a military intervention in order to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia.²⁹²

Before analysing the EU's diplomatic initiatives to end the Yugoslav crisis, one should highlight that the then European Community was not ready to deal with the latter. The effectiveness of the nascent CFSP is generally evaluated as poor. The former Moscow correspondent for Washington Post is more critical: "Not only have the Europeans been unable to stop a civil war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory responses have aggravated it".²⁹³ Yugoslav crisis has come as an early obstacle for the CFSP.

At the beginning of the crisis, the Community favoured the unity of Yugoslav state. Then, like all other international actors, it had to yield to the inevitable and irreversible disintegration of Yugoslavia. Its immediate reaction to the latter was to dispatch the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (which formed the then Troika) on a good offices mission to negotiate a cease-fire two days after the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence in June 1991.²⁹⁴ The mission easily reached its objective, but the success has been short-lived. The EC has therefore quickly found out that the road to peace would be arduous and showed intense diplomatic activity to end the crisis. This fact is proven by the existence of fourteen cease-fires orchestrated by Brussels – but broken by the warring parties – from June to November 1991.²⁹⁵

Still, an effort to evaluate the 'management' of the crisis by the EC reveals the will to ensure peace in former Yugoslav territories. It is possible to discern three main phases in order to expose the Community's diplomatic handling of the Balkan crisis. The first one can be described as the "EC only" period, extending from June 1991 to January 1992. It is pertinent to name the second period (January 1992 – April 1994) "EC/U – UN burden

²⁹² Ibid.; SOYSAL İsmail, Op. Cit., p:190

²⁹³ He reminds that, from the beginning of the crisis, the absence of policy caused trouble within the Community. Germany's enthusiastic support for secessionist republics was accompanied by Greece's vested interest in maintaining Yugoslav unity –remarked by a particular backing of Serbia despite EC positions and UN decisions. Especially the neighbouring countries had to reorient their foreign policies in a more nationalistic way. See DODER Dusko, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds", *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, Summer 1993, p:4.

²⁹⁴ GINSBERG Roy, *The European Union in International Politics. Baptism by Fire*, Lanham (Md.), Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, p:64.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.; MAURY Jean-Pierre, Op. Cit., p:254.

sharing” as one scholar does.²⁹⁶ From 1994 on, the EU lowered its profile and supported other international actors: The Contact Group, NATO and the United States.

The Community has also been active in various forums. Because most of its members were also present in international institutions, the EC could be successful in mobilising them. The Twelve had recourse to the CSCE mechanisms first. As asserted by Gingsberg, the CSCE endorsed the former in its monitoring missions, backed its diplomatic ploys, followed its lead by imposing an arms embargo and supported its decision to ask for the UN’s involvement in the peace efforts.²⁹⁷ The Community’s cooperation with the UN went even further. These two institutions agreed on a division of labour: Monitoring the cease-fire and the conducting negotiations for peaceful settlement of the conflict would be the EC’s part while blue helmets’ main task would be to protect humanitarian organisations.²⁹⁸ The Community’s cooperation with those institutions provided legitimacy to all the participants’ actions.

The UN and the EC convened a conference in London in August 1992, chaired by British Prime Minister John Major – as the President of the Council – and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Four members of the EU (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) have taken part in the Contact Group set up after the conference and brought their contribution to the political settlement endeavours. The conference also gave way to a committee presided by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. The peace proposal of January 1993, which became known as the “Vance-Owen Plan” has been supported by the Twelve. Based on this plan, the EU declared that if Serbians (of Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro) carried on their uncompromising stance, they would remain isolated for years –whereas they will reintegrate international community if they act in conformity with the peace plan. This was in conformity with the EC/U’s “carrot and stick” approach towards the Serbians.

To conclude, one can state that the EC/U’s aim and efforts were quite similar to the attitude adopted by Turkey during Yugoslav conflicts. The main difference was due to the arms embargo imposed by the UNSC resolution 713 to the Serbians. The embargo has been to the exclusive detriment of Bosnians because Serbia inherited large stockpiles of weaponry

²⁹⁶ LUCARELLI Sonia, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p: 12.

²⁹⁷ The Community received support by NATO Council as well –for negotiations to reach a final settlement in November 1991. See GINSBERG Roy, *Op. Cit.*, p: 72.

²⁹⁸ BOUTROS-GHALI Boutros, *Mes Années à la Maison de Verre*, Paris, Fayard, 1999, p: 74. Qutoed in YAKEMTCHOUK Romain, *Op. Cit.*, p: 262.

from the former Yugoslav army's arsenal and the Croatian army was supplied by Zagreb and could smuggle weapons through the Mediterranean coast. Turkey believed that lifting the embargo would reinforce Bosnians' defence against Serbian attacks whereas Europeans believed that it would worsen the security situation and protract the conflicts.

II.A.1.b. Kosovo crisis

Dayton Agreement did not put an end to the conflict in the Balkan territories. The strategy of "passive resistance" pursued by Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the *Democratic League of Kosovo*, had been useful to some extent during the Balkan wars of early 1990s. Yet, continued Serbian repression made some Albanian factions decide on armed resistance. From early 1996 on, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a guerrilla organisation which sought separation of Kosovo from Yugoslav entity, made itself heard through a campaign against Serbian security forces. That is how the crisis began in the south-east province of Serbia and Montenegro.²⁹⁹

For Turkey, there were a number of reasons that necessitated engagement in ending the clashes. The instability in the region, once again, was prompting her to act in due course. The fights involved a community that was bound to Turkey with historical, cultural and religious ties. The growing sympathy for the plight of Kosovars in the international arena was finding its reflection in Turkey. In addition, the stability of Macedonia and Albania – countries with which Turkey had developed close relations – were under threat.³⁰⁰ These fears were justified in 2001, with the insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia: A series of armed conflict caused by the attacks of Albanian National Liberation Army militants to Macedonian security forces cost the lives of around a hundred people.

Compared with the activism of the 1991-1993 period, Turkish diplomacy exposed a low-profile in Kosovo crisis. The main action was the visit made by the foreign minister Ismail Cem to Belgrade in March 1998. Cem was received by Milosevic for a one-hour meeting where he could convey Turkish President Demirel's proposals that aim to prevent further bloodshed in Kosovo.³⁰¹ The three stage-plan included the immediate ending of clashes, the reinstatement of Kosovars' rights granted by the 1974 Constitution and the

²⁹⁹ Kosovo can be seen on the map at the page 50.

³⁰⁰ *Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*, Bülten No:26, 10/07/1998 (www.byegm.gov.tr).

³⁰¹ "FM Cem Conveys Demirel's Message to Milosevic", *Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*, 09/03/1998 (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/chr/ing98/03/98x03x09.HTM>).

restoration of autonomy for the province.³⁰² The main reason why Turkey was less enthusiastic in working on diplomatic solutions was probably due to the lack of belief in their utility. The experience of Bosnia showed the world that force was the only language Milosevic appeared to understand.³⁰³ There was hence a pertinent ground to believe that the use of force was inevitable so that nothing similar to the terrible strife in Bosnia happens again.

During the Kosovo crisis, the EU has shown more diplomatic activism than Turkey. The issue has been on Brussels' agenda beginning from its outbreak and the position of the Fifteen was clear since the early stages of ethnic clashes. Beginning from January 1998, the EU made known that it would stick to its traditional "carrot and stick" policy: closer relations would be established in case of respect towards the conditions imposed for normalising the relations; economic sanctions would follow if these conditions were not met.³⁰⁴

The EU believed that Kosovo crisis constituted a serious threat to regional stability and required a strong and united response. The European Council asked Milosevic to urgently comply with the following points –asserting that the international community would resort to stronger measures otherwise:³⁰⁵

- stop all operations by the security forces affecting the civilian population and to withdraw security units used for civilian repression,
- enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo,
- facilitate the full return to their homes of refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access for humanitarian organisations; and
- to make rapid progress in the political dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership.

For preventing the recourse to military force in order to stop Milosevic, the EU and its member states have acted on various rallies. The Council and the Commission worked

³⁰² EKINCI Didem, "Turkey and Kosovo: A Chronicle of Post-Cold War Bilateral Relations", *Avrasya Dosyasi* (Balkanlar Özel), vol: 14, no: 1, 2008, p: 286.

³⁰³ That's what Madeleine Albright said in a speech. The same view was also expressed by Gijs de Vries, the president of the European Parliament's liberal group. See WATSON Paul, "Milosevic Halts Envoy's Expulsion Order", *Los Angeles Times*, 22/01/1999 (<http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/22/news/mn-535>); Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No. 7207, 24/04/1998, quoted in DELCOURT Barbara, "La Décision de Recourir à la Force contre la Yougoslavie: Quels Niveaux de Pouvoir? Quel Role pour l'Europe?" in CORTEN Olivier, DELCOURT Barbara (Eds.), *Droit, Légitimation et Politique Extérieure: l'Europe et la Guerre du Kosovo*, Editions Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2000, p: 37.

³⁰⁴ CORTEN Olivier, DELCOURT Barbara (Eds.), Op. Cit., p:36.

³⁰⁵ "Declaration on Kosovo", *Cardiff European Council*, 15 and 16 June 1998, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/54315.pdf).

hard for ensuring dialogue between belligerents. The foreign ministers of the EU member states backed the renewed commitment of the Contact Group for a political settlement which included the convening of an international peace conference.³⁰⁶ These efforts have been put seriously despite the awareness on the possibility that they might not bear fruit. One last push has been made in Rambouillet with the conduct of international negotiations in February 1999 which reflected the European desire of “public diplomacy” before military action.³⁰⁷ Milosevic’s rejection of the agreement proposed after these negotiations led to NATO’s Kosovo bombings.

During the air operations initiated by allied forces, the EU carried on its collaboration with the Contact Group and the G-8 and sent special envoys to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to accept the terms of peace. Some authors also point to the crucial role played jointly by the special envoy of the EU (Matti Ahtisaari) and Russian representative (Victor Tchernomyrdine) during the negotiations on the withdrawal of Serbian troops, where the EU “played a crucial role in ending the war in Kosovo”.³⁰⁸

At the initiative of the EU in its June 1999 Cologne meeting, after NATO airstrikes had ended, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was created with the aim of fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in the region. The launching of the Pact would give a firm European anchorage to the region, which suited Turkey’s policies. Ankara is involved in the process from the very beginning and is among the active participants.

II.A.2. The crisis of Georgia

The independence of Georgia was accompanied by complications: Following the Georgian Parliament’s decision to annul the autonomy of South Ossetia, conflict erupted between Georgian government forces and ethnic Georgian militias on one side and the forces of South Ossetia and ethnic Ossetian militias on the other. Although the war ended by a

³⁰⁶ The activation of the Contact Group had taken place in 1999. See SCHNABEL Albrecht, “Political Cooperation in Retrospect: Contact Group, EU, OSCE, NATO, G-8 and UN Working toward a Kosovo Settlement” in SPILLMANN Kurt R., KRAUSE Joachim (Eds.), *Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International Cooperative Security*, Peter Lang, Bern, 2000, p: 26.

³⁰⁷ FITCHETT Joseph, “Use of Force in Kosovo Splits NATO”, *The New York Times*, 08/02/1999 (<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/08/news/08iht-assess.t.0.html?pagewanted=1>).

³⁰⁸ PETERSON John, “US and EU in the Balkans: America Fights the Wars, Europe Does the Dishes?”, EUI Working Paper, No.49, European University Institute, Florence, 2001. Quoted in PETITEVILLE Franck, *Op. Cit.*, p: 69.

ceasefire and several peace efforts have been tried, the conflict remains unresolved, and minor armed incidents persist. They even led to the Russia-Georgia war in 2008.



Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/staging_site/in_depth/georgia_russia_conflict/default.stm

Another unrest was due to the Abkhazian strife that followed the proclamation of independence by the Abkhazian government in July 1992 which did not receive international backing. The War in Abkhazia opposed Abkhazian separatist forces to Georgian government forces. The conflicting sides committed gross human rights abuses, outlaw acts and violations of humanitarian law throughout Abkhazia.³⁰⁹

Tensions between Georgia and Russia increased in 2008, when both states accused each other of military build-up near the separatist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The crisis has been triggered by the push for Georgia to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan and the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Russia had not hidden its aversion towards these decisions and had already made known that she would react to them. On March 6, 2008 Russia announced that it would no longer participate in the economic sanctions imposed by the Commonwealth of Independent states on Abkhazia in 1996. Increasing tensions led to the outbreak of the 2008 South Ossetia war. After the war, a number of incidents have occurred in both conflict zones, and tensions between the belligerents remained high.

The efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the above-mentioned conflicts were hindered by the conflict with Russia in August 2008. The EU has actively contributed to

³⁰⁹ “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict”, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol: 7, no: 7, Helsinki, March 1995 (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf>).

efforts to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its response to these conflicts was built on political and economic pillars. After Georgia had regained its sovereignty, relations between the EU and Georgia started in 1992. The EU announced a European strategy towards the three Trans-caucasian republics in May 1995. The following year, it signed partnership and cooperation agreements with them –in force since July 1999. In early 2000s, the EU adopted two common actions regarding its contribution to the conflict-resolution process in South Ossetia and the OSCE observer mission on the border with Chechnya and Ingushetia.³¹⁰

The importance attached by the EU to the integrity of Georgian borders is mentioned in various official documents.³¹¹ That is the framework in which the 27 member states did not recognise the legislative elections held in Abkhazia and invited the parties involved in the conflict to negotiate in conformity with the UN Resolution 1393. The European Union, along with the United States, has been involved in conflict resolutions through several initiatives especially in OSCE and NATO frameworks.

An emergency EU summit convened for discussing the situation in Georgia on 1 September 2008. EU leaders condemned Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and breakaway Abkhazia while urging other states not to follow suit. They agreed upon a review of relations with Moscow because of this move and they decided to postpone new partnership negotiations until Moscow withdraws its troops to pre-conflict positions. Moreover, a civilian European Union Monitoring Mission was deployed in the country on 1st of October 2008.

Since August 7th 2008, the EU has provided €6 million in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict.³¹² In addition to the Community-level aid, individual EU

³¹⁰ Council Joint Action of 29 October 2001 Regarding a Contribution from the European Union to the Conflict Settlement Process in South Ossetia, 2001/759/CFSP, *Official Journal of European Communities*, L 286, 30/10/2001, pp. 4-5; Council Joint Action of 21 May 2002 Regarding a Contribution of the European Union towards Reinforcing the Capacity of the Georgian Authorities to Support and Protect the OSCE Observer Mission on the Border of Georgia with the Ingush and Chechen Republics of the Russian Federation, *Official Journal of European Communities*, L 134, 22/05/2002, pp: 1–2.

³¹¹ See, for instance, *Declaration and Recommendations Adopted during the third Meeting of the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee Convened in June 2001* (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/pcc/aag/pcc_meeting/recommendations/2001_06_19_georgia_en.pdf).

³¹² The aid is being distributed by non-governmental organisations, specialised UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent. See “Summary on EU-Georgia Relations”, European Commission, External Relations. (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm).

countries have provided more than eight million Euros between them.³¹³ To define an adequate amount of aid, an expert team has been sent to the country by the EU with the aim of evaluating humanitarian needs.

The EU's endeavours on economic aid to the region involved international cooperation as well. The European Commission, together with the World Bank, has invited international donors and financial institutions to a Donors' Conference for Georgia on 22 October in Brussels. The objective was to call for pledges to mobilise external assistance in order to support the country in rebuilding its damaged infrastructure, reintegrating internally displaced people and bolstering Georgia's recovery from ravaging impacts of the August 2008 conflict on its economy.³¹⁴

The 2008 crisis in the South Caucasus stressed once more the need for the EU to have a strong presence in the region in particular and in its eastern neighbourhood in general, which consequently strengthened the idea of establishing an enhanced partnership. In Georgia, the Union was in favour of upholding the principle of Georgia's territorial integrity, and endeavoured to reach a settlement providing for efficient mechanisms for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees and for effective monitoring of the region's security. The Union established a monitoring mission with the objective of being regularly and fully informed about the situation in the region. The EU's awareness on the necessity of monitoring and preparing contingency plans for other potential conflicts merits to be highlighted as well.

Turkey has followed closely the developments in Georgia, South Ossetia, and the subsequent escalation of the conflict between Georgia and Russia into a war. On this matter, she expressed her desire of the peaceful resolution of the crisis within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, because of the danger posed to the peace and stability in that country and in the broader region. Ankara also participates and provides support to the following frameworks:

- Geneva Process and the OSCE mission to Georgia –which was established in December 1992 in response to armed conflicts in the country.³¹⁵

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ “International Donors’ Conference for Georgia: Call for Wide International Support for Stabilisation and Growth in Georgia, *Europa Press Release*, IP/08/155, Brussels, 21/10/2008.

³¹⁵ In this context, Turkey hosted a conference in Istanbul on 7-9 June 1999 and brought the parties together with a view to contributing to the peace process. Ankara proved its desire to stay engaged on the field by

- The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).
- South Ossetia Peace Plan proposed by the Georgian government in 2005.
- Projects initiated by the OSCE, geared towards the improvement of the socio-economic infrastructure of South Ossetia region.

During the gloomy period that ruled the Caucasus region, Turkey proposed to establish Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) with the aim of facilitating peace, security and stability in the South Caucasus. The initiative was also accompanied by the intensification of diplomatic efforts towards this end.³¹⁶

Prime Minister Erdoğan initiated efforts to establish a diplomatic solution after the war that broke out in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia. He called on the leaders of those countries to heed his proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. He also had a meeting with the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku. Having received general support of all his interlocutors, he stated that discussions would also take place with Armenia in order to incorporate Yerevan in the Platform. The inference could easily be drawn that Turkey wants to profit from the new structure in a way to better her relations with Armenia.

The regional platform would aim at preserving peace and common security and enhancing cooperation in the fields of economy and energy. Crisis management mechanisms based on the principles of the OSCE are also envisaged in this project. He maintained that such a platform would play a key role in preventing similar conflicts to reoccur in the future while underlining the importance of “cooperative projects that reflect common sense and mutual interests” for securing regional peace and welfare.³¹⁷

At the outset, both President Mikhail Saakashvili and the Russian executive (President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin) backed the proposal. However, after a short while, Tbilisi and Moscow stepped back. Georgian ambassador to

communicating to the parties its readiness to reconvene such a meeting. Its efforts also include the supply of humanitarian assistance to both Georgians and Abkhazians, victims of the Abkhazian conflict. See Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>).

³¹⁶ Within this framework, contacts between Turkey and Georgia were also intensified. Visits on high levels took place: Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Babacan visited Tbilisi on 13 August 2008. Shortly later, the Georgian Foreign Minister Tkeshelashvili paid a visit to Istanbul and, the next month, Georgian Prime Minister Gurgenedze visited Ankara. During all these meetings, bilateral relations, recent developments in the region and our CSCP initiative were discussed.

³¹⁷ “Erdoğan Backs Georgian Sovereignty, Caucasus Platform”, *Today's Zaman*, 15/08/2008 (<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=150255>).

Turkey, Grigol Mgaloblishvili, affirmed that his country would not participate to the cooperation platform as long as Russia maintained its soldiers on Georgian territories. He also said that only cooperation mechanism excluding Russia would be assessed seriously by his government –leaving the door open for the involvement of all South Caucasian states and Turkey.³¹⁸ On the Russian side, declarations pointed to the objections to enter into alliance with Georgia as long as Saakashvili is in power.³¹⁹

With the initiatives that she has taken recently, Turkey sought to bring stability and prosperity to the Caucasus region. CSCP can play a leading role in facilitating this outcome. A favorable environment for cooperation, harmony, confidence and mutual understanding will be achievable in the region only after the disputes and conflicts in the Caucasus are resolved peacefully and irrevocably. In fact, Turkey had made similar efforts in early 1990s. Back then, Armenia had rejected the offer saying that it was against national interests of Russia and Armenia. Some observers maintain that the project is almost impossible to realise, because it does not address in the right way the dynamics of the crisis.

II.A.3. The Middle East

The crises in which Turkey has been actively involved are related to the situation in Gaza (the Hamas question), the dispute between Syria and Iraq, Iran’s suspected nuclear activities and the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

II.A.3.a. The Hamas question and Gaza crisis

Hamas, meaning ‘zeal’ in Arabic, is an acronym of *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya* (Islamic Resistance Movement). Designated as a terrorist organisation by a number of countries and the EU, it is the largest and most influential Palestinian movement having an extensive provision of social service (including education) and welfare.³²⁰ It also includes an armed wing, the *Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades*, set up in 1992 for providing military means to support the political objectives of Hamas.³²¹ The Charter of the Organisation calls for the destruction of Israel.

³¹⁸ “Kafkasya İttifakında Sıkıntı Baş Gösterdi” (Annoyance Arose in Caucasian Alliance), *Akşam*, 23/08/2008.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ An Israeli scholar, Reuven Paz, affirms that Hamas devotes almost 90% of its estimated \$70-million annual budget to its social services network. See *Hamas*, Council on Foreign Relations, 27/08/2009 (<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/>).

³²¹ The Brigades are classified as a terrorist organisation, even by the UK and Australia that do not recognise Hamas as such.



Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7811189.stm

Hamas won Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections in early 2006 and seized control of the Gaza Strip from the more moderate Fatah movement in mid-2007. Since then, Israel has tightened a blockade to the region. Egypt, its only Arab neighbour, has refused to open her border, fearing increased Hamas influence and the responsibility for 1.5 million economically distressed people. Israel and Egypt had the same rationale in sealing their border crossings with Gaza: Security was no longer provided there. The blockade intensified rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza on Israel which caused the latter’s retaliation with airstrikes and raids.

In June 2008, Israel and Hamas agreed to a six-month ceasefire. The uneasy calm was frequently violated by armed factions in Gaza, which launched rockets at Israel's border settlements. Israel responded by periodically suspending shipments of supplies into Gaza. In November and early December, Hamas stepped up its rocket attacks before unilaterally announcing the formal end of the truce. The Israeli public and government subsequently gave Defence Minister Ehud Barak freedom to respond.

The response has been bloody. The Israeli offensive in Gaza, operation “Cast Lead”, began on 27 December 2008 with the objective of putting an end to Hamas rocket attacks. Air strikes preceded the ground operation of 3 January. Israel also closed all border crossing points to Gaza and bombed tunnels bringing food and other commodities from – Egypt. Cast Lead has claimed the lives of more than 1300 Palestinians and injured 7.000 civilians –

destroying over 4,000 houses and much of Gaza's infrastructure and buildings – while Israeli death toll stood at 13.³²² The heavy casualties sparked widespread protests throughout the world. Many condemned the West for its apparent inability to react. Amid opposition from the US, the UN Security Council failed on 3 January 2009 to adopt a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Gaza's Hamas militants.

Israel stated that it would pursue its deadly offensive on Hamas in Gaza until rocket fire ceases and an effective mechanism is created to end smuggling from Egypt. Hamas insisted on an end to Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip and the opening of crossing points to normal traffic. A joint cease-fire initiative by Egypt and France to halt the increasingly bloody Israeli offensive in Gaza won support from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire that came into effect on 17 January 2009, a decision that was followed by Hamas.

The deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the heavy toll in civilian lives caused by the armed conflict in the Gaza Strip is regrettable. The humanitarian concern drove Turkey to make a diplomatic move for ending Israeli operation. Since the flare-up of the crisis, Turkey has been urging the international community for stronger efforts to reach a cease-fire in Gaza and supports all endeavours to help restore calm in the region, as profiting from her UNSC membership illustrates: Sarkozy and Erdoğan agreed to further joint efforts by UN Security Council. The Anatolia News Agency reported that they also agreed to assign two special envoys who will start working out details of joint efforts.³²³ Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister had a series of bilateral talks with world leaders in New York on the sidelines of the UN Security Council session.³²⁴

Ankara has been involved directly in efforts to bring about a truce through a delegation headed by A. Davutoğlu, then Erdoğan's senior foreign policy adviser. The delegation resorted to a shuttle-diplomacy between Cairo and Damascus which has been instrumental in convincing Hamas representatives to go to Cairo for the talks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embarked on a tour of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia amid the crisis and spoke on the phone with many leaders, while Babacan attended an extraordinary

³²² "Operation Cast Lead", *GlobalSecurity.org* (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/operation-cast-lead.htm>); "Hamas Announces Ceasefire in Gaza, *BBC*, 18/01/2009 (<http://www.bbcnews.com>)

³²³ "Turkey, EU on the Same Wave, Says Javier Solana", *Hürriyet*, 08/01/2009 (<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10735803.asp>).

³²⁴ According to Anatolia News Agency's report, the Minister had also the possibility to have separate talks with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as well as to meet with his French counterpart, Bernard Kouchner, for the second time in the same week.

meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah and held telephone conversations with his counterparts including Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.³²⁵

Turkey was also of the opinion that an international monitoring mission should be set up along the border between Egypt and Gaza, and declared her readiness to participate in such a mission which would ensure secure passage through the border gates. Turkey was the only country whose participation would not be a matter of objection for any of the parties.³²⁶ That was justified by the idea to give Turkey the task of putting together an international force for Gaza.³²⁷ Although the precise details of the proposal and the degree of Turkey's involvement were unclear, it would not be wrong to assume that Turkey was warm to the idea. In fact, she has not hidden her predilection for the deployment of an international force to Gaza, preferably under UN auspices.

That Turkey had credibility in the eyes of Hamas could be considered as an advantage. In fact, Turkey has played an important role in the negotiations because of having gained the confidence of the Islamist movement. Turkish diplomacy's main function in the event can be interpreted as helping Egypt to deal with Hamas, not replacing it –in other words, mediating between Egypt and Hamas. This extraordinary position of Turkey has been very useful because Hamas - due to some disagreements with Egypt on core issues - currently has more confidence in Turkey than it does in Egypt. The strong tension between Egypt and Hamas could even jeopardize Cairo's traditional mediating role in Palestinian affairs. Egypt faces accusations from Hamas that it is actively supporting the Israeli campaign by continuing to keep its border with Gaza sealed when Israeli missile strikes have been killing civilians – and not only Hamas fighters. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's government, which sealed the border more than a year before Hamas took military control of Gaza, has responded by blaming Hamas for what it has brought upon the Gazan population and implying that the movement is an Iranian proxy –and this critic has been to an unprecedented degree.

In sum, Turkey wanted to make use of every asset she had in order to resolve the crisis. Yet, warm relations between Turkey and Hamas could arouse diplomatic tensions in 2006 when a delegation from the Hamas movement – headed by leader Khaled Meshaal –

³²⁵ "Gaza Crisis Spurs Turkish Diplomacy", *The Washington Times*, 05/01/2009

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/05/gaza-crisis-spurs-turkish-diplomacy/>

³²⁶ An anonymous senior official of Turkish government affirmed that "the Turkish delegation is the only one that talks to all the related parties, including Hamas, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Fatah". See "Turkey Ready for Monitoring Mission on Gaza – Government Official", *Hürriyet*, 15/01/2009

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10778912.asp?ser=1>).

³²⁷ "Turkey to Form Force for Gaza as Diplomacy for a Truce Continues", *Hürriyet*, 07/01/2009
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/10725375.asp>).

visited Turkey. After the meeting, a statement exposed that Foreign Minister Gül reminded to the delegation what the international community expects from Hamas on ending the current crisis and that he underlined the importance of adopting a judicious, pragmatic and conciliatory approach.³²⁸ Yet, the visit of Hamas had provoked severe criticism from Israel,³²⁹ concern from the United States and tacit disapproval from the EU.³³⁰ In fact, relations between the two states had been intense when Erdoğan had voiced his support of Hamas and said that Turkey would act as a mediator between the Islamist organization and the United Nations Security Council. He further stressed that Israel was responsible for violating the six-month cease-fire with Hamas by keeping the coastal strip blockaded.

Relations between the two strategic partners became intense again when, in 2008, Erdoğan voiced strong opposition to Israel. He said that it used an excessive force in Gaza and committed a “crime against humanity”.³³¹ The Prime Minister also suggested Israel be expelled from the United Nations. Israel responded sharply. Erdoğan’s government has been criticised for the strong rhetoric in the domestic platform as well and has been accused of damaging national interests.

In the current situation, Turkey seems to have lost its position of an interlocutor between Israelis and Palestinians, not being perceived as an honest broker by Israel for some while. The aim of Turkey can be explained as an effort to develop good relations with the Muslim countries while continuing its commitment to have close ties with the West. But it only made worst Israel's relationship with Turkey which has got a major blow due to Erdoğan's strong criticisms of Operation Cast Lead.

³²⁸ Although it was initially announced that the Prime Minister received the delegation, his office declared later that the meeting took place at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. See “Turkey Allows Hamas Visit”, *Los Angeles Times*, 17/02/2006 (<http://www.latimes.com>).

³²⁹ Israel's government spokesman Raanan Gissin condemned the visit and asked how Turkish authorities would feel if their Israeli counterparts got together with Abdullah Öcalan. The Foreign Ministry statement reads: “We think the comparison in this statement is totally baseless and wrong. We relayed our discomfort and dissatisfaction with this statement to Israel yesterday”. The ministry also suggested that the Israeli remarks were prompted by Israeli “domestic political concerns”. For its part, the US was reportedly not pleased of the Hamas visit, whereas its reaction was not extreme either: “The important thing is what you say to Hamas” was the message of US authorities. That was different from the EU High Representative’s message: Javier Solana said that no Hamas leader or member would be invited by the EU. See “Hamas Visit Triggers New Diplomatic Rift between Israel, Turkey” *Associated Press*, 19/02/2006 (www.ap.org); “US, EU Watch Hamas Visit Closely”, *Turkish Press Review*, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, 17/02/2006 (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2006/02/06x02x17.HTM#%204>).

³³⁰ See “US, EU Watch Hamas Visit Closely”, *Turkish Press Review*, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, 17/02/2006 (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2006/02/06x02x17.HTM#%204>).

³³¹ “Turkey Calls on Hamas to Pick Politics over Arms”, *The Independent*, 27/01/2009 (<http://www.independent.co.uk>).

Turkish government's diplomatic efforts are considered to have targeted mostly its constituency because of the low chances of success they were believed to possess.³³² But they reflect Turkey's official stance on the resolution of the humanitarian crisis. Here, the conformity between Turkey's and the EU's efforts in the region is important to note. Both sides wanted to better the situation through diplomatic efforts. The EU made known that it would dispatch observers to monitor the border between Egypt and Gaza.³³³ Besides, in response to a suggestion by Israeli Prime Minister, Solana maintained that the European Union would consider the possibility of participating in an international force in Gaza if the major players in the region asked for it.³³⁴ Likewise, the EP voiced its desire to get more involved in the region by asking the Council to consider all means to promote a lasting peace in the region, which would not exclude an eventual deployment of an ESDP mission.

In early January, Javier Solana – during his visit to Turkey as a part of his Middle Eastern tour – praised Turkey's efforts to forge a truce in the Gaza Strip and pointed to Turkey's high level of responsibility. He affirmed that Turkey and the EU share the same opinion on the crisis.³³⁵ It is worthwhile to underline that the Council of the EU could not play an important role in the achievement of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in compliance with the UNSC Resolution 1860, which would allow the start of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian people, in coordination with other regional actors.

The reason of Solana's trip to Ankara was twofold: to emphasise the importance of Turkey in finding a solution to the dramatic crisis in Gaza, and, to discuss the manner and the terms in which an immediate ceasefire could be brokered. Qualifying his conversations in Ankara "very constructive", Solana affirmed that the EU and Turkish government were "on the same wavelength", maintaining that both sides were cooperating in a convergent manner to see how they could make these ideas which were on the table become a reality.³³⁶

³³² "Gaza Crisis Spurs Turkish Diplomacy", Op. Cit.

³³³ The border is laced with a network of hundreds of tunnels, bringing not only food and commodities to Gaza, but also weaponry.

³³⁴ "Solana Says EU Would Consider Military Role in Gaza if Asked", *Associated Press*, 13/06/2007.

³³⁵ "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Calls for Ceasefire in Gaza During Visit to the Middle East and Turkey", *Council of the European Union*, S004/09, Brussels, 09/01/2009.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

II.A.3.b. Mediation between Syria and Iraq

On 19 August 2009, a devastating double-truck bombing accompanied by mortar strikes in Baghdad killed more than 100 people and wounded around 600. The explosions touched the buildings of Finance and Foreign Ministries. It was one of the deadliest violence acts that were witnessed since the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces.

The difference between this event and many other violent acts that are committed in Iraq is the occurrence of a crisis between two states. Iraq has aired a taped conversation as an evidence of the link between two members of the Syria-based Iraqi Baathist movement and the bombings, accused Syria of sheltering these two militants and demanded their handover. Syria rejected the accusations and denounced the terrorist acts.³³⁷ As a consequence, the two countries withdrew their ambassadors from each other's capitals while the *Islamic State of Iraq* – known as an Al-Qaeda umbrella group – claimed responsibility for the bombings.³³⁸

The basis of the crisis was laid by the events of 2003. Several high-ranked Baath Party members are believed to have taken refuge in Syria since the dethroning of Saddam Hussein. Iraqi officials believe that these Baathists have a hand in the terrorist activities in their country. On these grounds, the Prime Minister Maliki has ordered the reinforcement of border police to stop militants' crossing into his country and has asked the United Nations to investigate the bombings.³³⁹ It is important to remind that Damascus had seriously suffered from the invasion of Iraq, to which it objected strongly. The number of Iraqi refugees in Syria passed from 700.000 in 2005 to 1,2 million in 2007.³⁴⁰ In addition, the feeling of being

³³⁷ Syrian Foreign Ministry declared that “In response to the recalling by the Iraqi government of the Iraqi ambassador for consultation, Syria has decided to recall its ambassador to Baghdad” rejecting “categorically” any involvement in the bloody attacks. Syrian President Assad qualified Iraqi accusations as “immoral” and “illogical”, claiming that his country is hosting around 1.2 million Iraqis on its soil and that it has been fighting terrorism for decades. See “Syria, Iraq Withdraw Envoys over Baghdad Truck Bombings”, *Al-Manar*, 25/08/2009 (<http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=100639&language=en>); “Iraq-Syria War of Words Escalates”, *BBC*, 31/08/2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8230635.stm).

³³⁸ “Iraq and Syria Recall Ambassadors”, *BBC*, 25/08/2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8220329.stm).

³³⁹ “Iraq and Syria at Talks in Turkey”, *BBC*, 17/09/2009 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8261805.stm>) ; “Iraq Bolsters Syria Border Force”, *BBC*, 04/09/2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8239301.stm).

³⁴⁰ WILSON Scott, “Iraqi Refugees Overwhelm Syria”, *The Washington Post*, 03/02/2005, p: A18; Al-Khalidi Ashraf, Hoffmann Sophia, Tanner Victor, “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Field-Based Snapshot”, *Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement*, Brookings, 11/06/2007 (http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0611humanrights_al-khalidi.aspx).

encircled by the US caused a significant unease for Syrian authorities. Therefore, Damascus defended the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a timetable.³⁴¹

The importance of the crisis is its capacity to be a setback for the highly fragile stability in the region. Suspended since 1982, diplomatic relations between the two countries were re-established in 2006. Despite the embarrassment caused by the escape of Saddam Hussein's former allies to Syria, cooperation between Baghdad and Damascus had experienced noteworthy progress in recent years and economic cooperation had flourished after years of mutual hostility. The bilateral flare-up threw into disarray all the efforts made so far to strengthen ties between the countries.

In late August 2009, Turkey was involved in a diplomatic mission to resolve the crisis between these two neighbouring states. Turkish Foreign Minister paid visits to both of them in a bid to defuse tensions. He met Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari before travelling to Damascus for talks with President Assad and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. During his visit to Iraq, he was entrusted some documents, evidence and information that would prove Syrian Baathists' role behind the attacks. He later conveyed them to Syrian authorities and affirmed that the two states needed to meet in order to resolve the crisis.³⁴² This necessity laid the ground for the next Turkish diplomatic move: A meeting in Ankara for the Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Syria has been organised with the determination to "co-operate in uncovering all facts behind these barbarian attacks against the Iraqi government and people".³⁴³

According to official statements, the objective of the Foreign Minister's visit went beyond putting an end to the crisis. In fact, a durable solution to the lack of confidence between Iraq and Syria is to be found in order to prevent future problems and, consequently, contributing to better the relations between these two states. Because Turkey is their neighbour and has close connections with them, such an initiative suits Turkish interests perfectly.

The pragmatism of seeking national interest while endeavouring to serve a good cause is salient in the Turkish proposal: to build up a joint trilateral mechanism between Iraq,

³⁴¹ In 2006, the Foreign Minister of Syria called for a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces believing that it would "help end Iraq's sectarian bloodbath". See SERRANO Alfonso, "Syria Calls for US Withdrawal from Iraq", *CBS*, 19/11/2006 (<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/19/iraq/main2199619.shtml>).

³⁴² Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs told reporters that the evidence provided to his Turkish counterpart by the Iraqi government was not related with the recent bombings, but was rather about a past dispute.

³⁴³ Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu affirmed ". See "Iraq and Syria at Talks at Turkey", *Op. Cit.*

Syria and Turkey with the aim of fighting against attacks on these territories. In fact, Turkish Foreign Ministry has been planning to build a joint mechanism with Damascus that would resemble the Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils established in 2009. Although the main purpose of the Strategic Council was to boost relations in bilateral terms, all the parties were willing to see these relations spread to the entire region.

A question that comes to mind is whether the engagement of Syria in such a scheme would ameliorate her cooperation with Turkey in the fight with PKK terrorism. During the two decades that preceded PKK leader Öcalan's capture in 1999 Syria has provided valuable safe havens to the terrorist organisation in the region of Beqaa Valley. Under the pressure of Ankara, Syria had to expel Öcalan. Thereafter, Turkish-Syrian relations engaged with a quick process of improvement. Turkey has been expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long run, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK members of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey.

The normalization of Syria's relations with Iraq is important for the EU because it will be a considerable progress for peace and stability in the Middle East. High-level EU officials underline the importance of Syria as a player in the region and point to the developing relations between Damascus and Brussels which lead to think that "EU-Syria relations are moving in the right direction".³⁴⁴ If Syria may preserve this momentum, her relations with the EU will flourish. That is something highly valued by both sides. The development of Syrian-European cooperation had been frozen for years due to political disputes.³⁴⁵ Syria wants to ameliorate her position in the international platform and has been undergoing a reform process. The EU is willing to encourage her on this issue, as evidenced by the Association Agreement that both sides have initialled in December 2008.

The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Ferrero-Waldner, commended the constructive policy Syria pursued in her region,

³⁴⁴ "EU-Syria Association Agreement: Speech by European Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner", 26/10/2008, Strasbourg (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_6400_fr.htm); "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Says During Visit to Middle East that He Sees Chance for Relaunching the Peace Process", *Council of the European Union*, 31/08/2009 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/109944.pdf).

³⁴⁵ Weak relations reached a nadir when the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005. Syria was widely suspected of being involved in the killing despite the government's consistent denial of any involvement whatsoever.

especially the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon and the indirect peace talks with Israel.³⁴⁶ Turkey has been the principal actor in the latter point and provided the mediation between the two states. It seems therefore pertinent to comment on Turkey's efforts by providing the background of the Israeli-Syrian problem.

Israel is officially in war with Syria since its existence. Tensions between the two states aggravated after the Six Days War of 1967 when Israel seized the Golan Heights which have a very strategic position.³⁴⁷ Tel Aviv annexed it in 1981 –a move that has never been recognized by the international community. As of today, the territory is home to around 20,000 Israeli settlers who live alongside an equivalent Syrian Druze population.

The last direct peace talks between Tel Aviv and Damascus had broken down in 2000 over the disagreement on the future of Golan plateau. For Syria, the return of that territory is the main condition for peace with Israel. Israeli authorities, for their part, request that Syria abandon her support for all the militant groups that fight against them –mainly Hamas and Hezbollah. In addition, Syria should distance herself from “problematic ties” with Iran.³⁴⁸

In May 2008, a statement issued simultaneously in Turkish, Israeli and Syrian press announced the launch of Turkish-sponsored indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria: The two sides “declared their intention to hold the negotiations in good faith and openly, and hold a serious and continuous dialogue in order to reach a comprehensive peace deal in accordance with the framework set at the (1991) Madrid Conference”.³⁴⁹ The process had begun in February 2007, when Olmert was in an official visit to Ankara. In a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Israeli prime minister had agreed on Turkish mediation between the two states for a peace agreement. Syrian authorities welcomed the idea as well.

The aim of the negotiations was to bring together Israeli and Syrian officials for direct negotiations once a common ground was reached. With this aim in mind, Turkish diplomacy mediated four rounds as a go-between to allow talks to start. Efforts did not prove

³⁴⁶ “EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Visit Syria, 15-16 February 2009”, *European Union @ United Nations*, 12/02/2009 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8491_en.htm).

³⁴⁷ Golan Heights are looking down on Israeli habitations. In the past, Syria used this area to mount ground invasions into Israel.

³⁴⁸ “Israel-Syria Dialogue ‘to Continue’”, *Al Jazeera*, 23/05/2008 (<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/05/2008614233140264306.html>).

³⁴⁹ “Israel and Syria”, *Voice of America*, 07/05/2009 (<http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/2009-05-08-voa3.cfm?CFID=379606779&CFTOKEN=12690002&jsessionid=8830d53a860547d642c07f5f337c4b4f3175>).

barren: In late summer 2008, the two sides were almost ready for direct negotiations.³⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the process had to be suspended following the resignation of Olmert in September that year. Worst still, as a reaction to the Israeli offensive in Gaza, Syria said it ruled out a resumption of the indirect talks any time soon.

In July 2009, Turkish Prime Minister was asked by Israel to mediate the renewal of indirect peace talks with Syria.³⁵¹ It is possible to assume that Israeli representative(s) who brought up the request wanted to remain anonymous, because neither Turkish nor the Israeli side mentioned its origin. Erdoğan, who was warm to the idea, discussed the request with Assad who repeatedly affirmed that Syria had total confidence in Turkish mediation. In fact, earlier on, Turkish Foreign Ministry had declared that Turkey was preparing again for a series of initiatives that were taken in 2008.³⁵² Both Damascus and Tel Aviv affirmed their willingness to resume negotiations.

The move is significant in two ways. First, it contradicts the statements made by Hebrew government officials on Turkey's unsuitability for a role of 'honest broker'. Although the latest discords seem to have degraded the quality of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the trust of – at least some – Israeli officials towards Turkey seems to persist. Second, the four-round negotiation process should have sparked their hopes for some progress in bettering their relations with Syria. It is hard to expect the parties to make a request on the sponsoring of a new negotiations cycle when they do not believe that it will be useful.

If the negotiation process resumes, it will have to deal with an important problem: Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly refuses to relinquish the Golan Heights –a key Syrian demand.³⁵³ Therefore, reaching a peace deal will be an arduous task. What allows the observers to keep the hope is that both sides will win when that will be the case. Syria will not only regain her territory, but also will put an end to her isolation in the international

³⁵⁰ Erdogan called Syrian President Assad and relayed messages to and from Olmert during the last meeting with Olmert. See RAVID Barak, "Netanyahu: Turkey Can't Be Honest Broker in Syria Talks", *Haaretz*, 18/10/2009 (<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1121723.html>).

³⁵¹ "Israel Asks Turkey to Renew Mediation of Syria Talks", *Haaretz*, 23/07/2009 (<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1102444.html>).

³⁵² "Turkey Ready for Israel-Syria Mediation", *Jerusalem Post*, 11/06/2009 (<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPostArticle/ShowFull&cid=1244371074084>).

³⁵³ See, for instance, "Elections 2009 / Netanyahu: I'll Keep the Golan Israeli, Jerusalem Undivided", *Haaretz*, 08/02/2009 (<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1062472.html>); "Netanyahou Ecarte l'Éventualité d'Un Retrait du Golan", *France 24*, 10/05/2009 (<http://www.france24.com/fr/20090510-netanyahou-eventualite-retrait-golan-israel-syrie-region-strategique->); EINAV Hagai, "Netanyahu: We Are Rooted in Golan", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 02/08/2009 (<http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0.7340.L-3668393.00.html>).

platform.³⁵⁴ The advantage for Israel will be to have a considerable advantage in building diplomatic relations with Syria, which will certainly be followed by a peace deal with Lebanon –a scenario in which Israel would find herself recognised by all her neighbours.

Turkey will have important gains if the indirect talks she mediated succeed. At first, one should mention that the tension in the region will be eased. Like all the states of the region, such a development can only be beneficial to Turkey. The profit is much bigger when the subsidiary consequences in commercial and economic terms of the peace are taken into consideration.

The second advantage relates to the strengthening of Turkey's prestige and the justification of her aptitude as a regional power. Although the mediation process has been hampered, it is worth underscoring that conducting negotiations is a success in itself. There has been a lot of failed attempt in the past. Turkey's main contribution has been to build confidence for two sides who "can not talk directly" and "can not even shake hands in the same room".³⁵⁵ Tel Aviv's and Damascus' willingness to resume negotiations under the mediation of Turkey can be conceived as a success for Turkish diplomacy.

The EU supports the resolution of the Golan dispute which is a part of the overall Middle East problem. In 2004, the EU Presidency stated that the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights would impede the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement in the region and that it would jeopardise the long term security interests of Israel.³⁵⁶ European officials also advised Assad to engage in a dialogue with Israel in order to ensure full withdrawal of Israeli troops from Golan Heights.³⁵⁷ Besides, the EU is reported to press the US to get in a closer dialogue with Syria.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁴ In a speech delivered in 2002, the US Under Secretary of State John Bolton maintained that Cuba, Libya and Syria could be grouped with the other rogue states (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) in actively attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. The US' accusations on Syria also concern providing support to terrorism and allowing armed volunteers to cross its borders in order to fight against the US-led coalition in Iraq. See "US Expands Axis of Evil", *BBC*, 06/05/2002 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1971852.stm>); GARDNER Frank, "Who Is Who in the 'Axis of Evil'", *BBC*, 20/12/2003 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1988810.stm>).

³⁵⁵ This is the statement of Sedat LAÇİNER, president of the Ankara-based think tank International Strategic Organization (USAK), quoted in ÖZERKAN Fulya, "Israeli Stance on Turk Mediation Raises Questions", *Hürriyet*, 13/08/2009.

³⁵⁶ Presidency Statement on Golan Heights, *Delegation of the European Union to Syria*, 04/01/2004 (http://www.delsyr.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew_new/detail.asp?id=41).

³⁵⁷ KLEIN Aaron, "Europe Claims Israel Preparing for War with Syria", *Global Research*, 17/04/2007 (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5406>).

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Turkey's mediation role between Syria and Israel is in line with the EU's attitude on the issue. Javier Solana affirmed before the members of the European Parliament that he was pleased with the role played by Turkey.³⁵⁹ Given the EU's interests in the region, it would be right to assume that the collapse of the indirect contacts held by Syria and Israel through Turkish mediators is considered unfortunate by Brussels. A high-level statement justifies this view: In an interview with The Associated Press, the head of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pottering affirmed the readiness of European officials to be involved as honest brokers in the negotiations between the two countries "whenever it is felt to be appropriate".³⁶⁰

II.A.3.c. Iran's nuclear bid

Since 2002, a convoluted dossier has been preoccupying the international community. In December of that year, satellite photographs disclosed the existence of nuclear sites in Arak and Natanz. A series of negotiations in which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was involved concluded with Iran pledging, in September 2003, to voluntarily halt the enrichment of uranium. The crisis reached its apogee in early August 2004, when Iran resumed uranium conversion at the Esfahan plant after rebuffing an EU offer of political and economic incentives in return for declining its nuclear program.



(Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4617398.stm)

Iran insists on having the right, as a signatory to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, to carry out nuclear activities that stop short of developing nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment for fuelling the reactors on its territory. While defending their

³⁵⁹ "EU HR Solana Addresses EU Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs", *European Union @ United Nations*, 10/09/2008 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_8133_fr.htm).

³⁶⁰ "EU: Syria-Israel Talks Could Boost Europe's Mideast", *Haaretz*, 11/08/2008 (<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010491.html>).

country's nuclear bid, Iranian officials mostly stress the legitimate right to satisfy increasing domestic energy demand and argue that the most suitable way to achieve this objective is to possess nuclear power plants.

Despite Iranian allegations, the peaceful rationale of the nuclear program is doubtful to Western countries. It was certain that at some point in time Iran would be referred to the Security Council because she did not give the international community assurances that a nuclear weapons program is not under cover of civil nuclear power.³⁶¹ Hence, the UNSC Resolution 1696, adopted on 31 July 2006 demanded Iran halt its uranium enrichment programme. Iran's failure to respond satisfactorily led to the UNSC Resolution 1737 later that year and stipulated sanctions – related to the supply of nuclear-related technology or materials and to the blockage of individual and company assets. Those sanctions were subsequently stepped up by Resolution 1747 of 24 March 2007. The next year, Resolutions 1803 and 1835 were also adopted by the UNSC.

There are some firm reasons that justify Western concerns. The most important is based on the lack of confidence in the Islamic Republic. In the past, Tehran concealed nuclear activities. For this reason, American government does not share the European opinion that Iran has an inalienable right to civil nuclear energy – although it bolsters European efforts to convince Iranians to give up their nuclear ambitions.³⁶² Moreover, Iran's missile programme – which is capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction – intensifies the worries on a hidden armament project.³⁶³

In addition to above-mentioned factors, a variety of reasons spur Iran's nuclear ambition. Some are related to domestic policy calculations. Possessing a supreme weapon can enhance the prestige of an unpopular regime. Examples of India and Pakistan show that the impotence in addressing economic weaknesses may to some extent be compensated by a nuclear project.³⁶⁴ The notions of *independence* and *resistance* emphasized in President

³⁶¹ The US Secretary of State made this point in 2005. French Foreign Minister had also stated that the international community would certainly ask for the referral if Iranians resumed uranium conversion activities. See JAHN George, "Diplomats: Russia resisting Iran referral", *The Washington Post*, 20/09/2005; "Les Européens Tentent de Trouver un Accord avec Téhéran", *Le Monde*, 05/08/2005.

³⁶² "Dans sa Politique envers Téhéran, Washington Tient Désormais Compte de l'Europe et de la Guerre en Iraq", *Le Monde*, 08/08/2005; "Les Etats-Unis Encouragent les Efforts Européens", *Le Monde*, 11/08/2005.

³⁶³ Nuclear armament is the best way to offset the deficiencies of conventional weaponry. In the past, a few countries could successfully follow hidden programs to produce nuclear weapons.

³⁶⁴ See TARZI Amin, "The role of WMD in Iranian security calculations: dangers to Europe," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol: 8, no: 3, September 2004, p: 98.

Ahmadinedjad's speeches are endorsed by the middle classes. So are the ideas of having a cheap and inexhaustible energy source. For the majority of Iranian people, nuclear technology corresponds to a *prodigious energy that would improve [their] daily lives and would allow, if need be, the dissuasion of eventual aggressors.*³⁶⁵

Security matters also run in favour of a nuclear option. Being designated a part of the 'Axis of Evil' increases the feeling of insecurity in Iran. So do the accusations of training, sheltering and supporting (international) terrorist organizations. The rough neighbourhood does not help either. A special emphasis should be placed on Iran's enmity towards Israel: Official declarations made by Iranian authorities about the 'Zionist entity' are extremely hostile, as witnessed in President Ahmadinedjad's call for it to be 'wiped out off the map'.³⁶⁶ This finds echo in Israeli side: Tel Aviv expects to be the target of an eventual 'Islamic nuclear bomb'.³⁶⁷ The director of Mossad, Israeli intelligence service, declared before the Israeli parliament that Iran's atomic weapons program stands for the biggest threat faced by Israel since its creation."³⁶⁸

Israel is not the only state that takes Iran's nuclear dossier on its agenda. Being a neighbour of Iran – and having incrementally developing relations with her – puts Turkey in a delicate situation. The volume of trade between the two countries is considerable, especially due to Iranian natural gas exportation to Turkey. Although the Economic Cooperation Organisation's enlargement has brought less profit than expected, Iran and Turkey's active positions in the organisation helped them to benefit from the 7 million square-kilometre market. But the pleasant economic landscape has not always found its reflection in the political realm. In the past, Turkey and Iran addressed reciprocal accusations to each other on sheltering unlawful organisation members on their territories. Iran was embarrassed by Turkey's protection of the Islamic Republic's regime dissidents while Turkey was blaming Iran to train and to provide safe haven, financial support, weaponry, sanctuary and medical help for PKK terrorists. Every time Ankara requested Iran to halt its support to the latter,

³⁶⁵ NASSERI Ladane, "Le Nucléaire, Arme de Ralliement en Iran", *Libération*, 20/09/2005.

³⁶⁶ In 2005, during a military parade, Iran marched six long-range missiles of Shahab-3 on which it was written 'Death to America,' 'We Will Stamp Down America,' 'Israel Must Disappear from the Earth's Surface,' Cf. "L'Iran Exhibe ses Missiles Chahab-3 avec des Slogans Anti-Américains et Anti-Israéliens," *Le Monde*, 22/09/2005.

³⁶⁷ "Israël Estime Etre la Cible du Programme Nucléaire Iranien," *Le Monde*, 11/08/2005.

³⁶⁸ FULLER Thomas, "A Top EU Aide Backs Iran in Feud Over Arms", *The New York Times*, 18/11/2003 (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/18/news/18iht-union_ed3_0.html).

Tehran brought to the table Turkey's support to *Mujahideen-e Khalq* members on its own soil.³⁶⁹

Iran's support of PKK has been another point of discord between the two countries. So is Tehran's support to religious extremists in Turkey. Not only Iranian and Turkish political regimes are fundamentally opposed and both conceive each other as a security threat, but also the objective of being 'exported' is inherent to Iranian regime. In 1990s, the Turkish view of Iranian links in the assassination of several republican intellectuals in Turkey amplified the perception of Iranian threat.³⁷⁰

There is no use to mention that Turkey's close relations with Israel – especially its military cooperation – are unbearable for Iran, as it is the case for most Middle Eastern countries. Iran feels particularly uneasy about Turkish-Israeli joint military exercises since the attack of Tzahal to Iran is of higher probability. However, Tehran's unease is less acute than it used to be thanks to the rapprochement with Turkey burgeoned since the AKP government is in power.

Turkey's efforts to deal with Iran's alleged nuclear programme certainly had a different motion with the improvement of relations between the two states. Like the entire international community, Turkey expresses support for a peaceful nuclear programme in Iran. As a corollary, she believes that Iran should obey to the UN Resolutions. This message has been conveyed very clearly to Iranian authorities on many occasions, as it was the case when Ali Larijani, the general secretary of Iran's High Security Council, met Turkish officials in Ankara on 8 and 9 May 2006 in order to discuss Iran's stance vis-à-vis the EU-3, United Nations, and US stance toward its nuclear-development program. Turkish officials made also clear that if the UN votes for sanctions against Iran because of its failure to cooperate with the

³⁶⁹ In August 1992, Turkish troops crossed Iranian borders 4 kilometres in Iran despite the inexistence of a "hot pursuit" agreement. The then President, Turgut Özal, affirmed that Turkish military would penetrate to Iran without hesitation. As an explanation, Turkish authorities presented proofs of links between the PKK and Iran. Moreover, in September that year, Turkish internal minister blamed—in Tehran—Iranian authorities for providing logistic support and allowing PKK to use their territories. See AKDEVELİOĞLU Atay, KÜRKÇÜOĞLU Ömer, *Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler (Relations with the Middle East)* in ORAN Baskın (Ed.), *Op. Cit.*, p: 582.

³⁷⁰ In January 1993, the state Security Court Prosecutor made an official statement that the murderers of Uğur Mumcu, prominent left-wing figure and columnist in the Kemalist daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, had connections with Iranian authorities. During Mumcu's funeral ceremony, slogans were uttered by participants. Iranian interior minister, who was in Turkey then, had to go back to his home country. See AKDEVELİOĞLU Atay, KÜRKÇÜOĞLU Ömer, *Op. Cit.*, p: 581.

IAEA and its obstinacy not to abandon uranium enrichment as the Organisation requests, Turkey would support the resolution and implement sanctions.³⁷¹

Ankara criticised Iran's diplomacy and let Larijani know the government's objection to the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Such a destabilisation in the region goes against Turkish interests for two main reasons. First and foremost, a conflict between Iran and Israel (and the US) will put Turkey in a very difficult position. The more the crisis remains unresolved, the more tensions in the region increase.³⁷² Besides, if Iran gains nuclear weapon capabilities, Turkey will lag behind as a 'mere' conventional power: A nuclear weapon programme investment is highly improbable in a foreseeable future. That will cause a substantial change in the balance of power, which is alarming for Ankara.

Turkish government declared that it can serve as a mediator between Iran and the the grouping that involves the five permanent members of the UNSC and Germany, known as P5+1. The positive answer to this offer came in July 2008 by both parties. Turkey did not have a formal mediation mission, but her role was qualified by Turkish Foreign Minister as the "one that is in a sense consolidating and facilitating" the negotiations.³⁷³ The principal mission Turkey undertook was to eliminate Iranian and Western misunderstandings and lead to a better understanding of the mutual concerns caused by the "deep confidence gap".

Diplomatic means are favoured by the EU as well, as proven by the efforts it put for the last few years. In summer 2003, France, Germany and United Kingdom, accompanied by the High Representative of the European Union (the so-called European Union Three) have started to work for convincing Iran to give up its sensitive nuclear activities. Tehran refused all the proposals made by the EU-3 considering them a negation of its right to produce atomic energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, years of negotiations have proved fruitless. In October 2006, J. Solana announced the end of European efforts to find a

³⁷¹ As if to emphasize its points, Turkey announced that she would stage air and sea manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean from 24 to 26 May together with the United States, France, and Portugal. The manoeuvres were to be conducted in the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative against Weapons of Mass Destruction. See "Turkey Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise", *U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs* (<http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/May/20060524151257adynned0.1979639.html>).

³⁷² In summer 2008, Israel held a large-scale military exercise mocking an airstrike to Iran. The next month, Iranian armed forces replied by test-firing nine missiles during war-game manoeuvres. See WRIGHT Robin, "Israel Conducted War Games, US Officials Report", *The Washington Post*, 21/06/2008 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/20/AR2008062002724.html>); "Iran Reports Missile Test, Drawing Rebuke", *The New York Times*, 10/07/2008 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/asia/09iht-10iran.14371488.html>).

³⁷³ "Turkey 'Facilitating' Iran Nuclear Negotiations, Says Foreign Minister", *AFP*, 21/07/2008.

diplomatic solution for the crisis by negotiating with Iran. Since then, the EU-3 has been carrying on the negotiations in the UN framework.

The success of the EU-3 has been very limited. Mainly, it served to keep Iran ‘on track’. Notwithstanding her rejection of the propositions coming from the European side, Tehran has not put an end to the negotiations carried on with the IAEA and the EU-3. That provided for a temporary suspension on Iranian nuclear activities by framing a negotiation process. Furthermore, one can assert that the EU-3 rallied international community and ensured more engagement of major international actors such as Russia and the United States³⁷⁴. The European Union’s involvement is even said to have led to the discovery of more sophisticated activities conducted by Iran on nuclear field.

Official declarations show that the EU would stick to its traditional approach of conducting diplomacy while offering negotiations to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. It expects to see Iran “engaging with the international community on all issues of concern, in particular over the issue of [its] nuclear programme”.³⁷⁵ If Iran continues to fail such an engagement, Brussels will probably seek more coercive measures which will require a UNSC resolution –which will need Turkey’s support as a member of the UNSC and a powerful state in the region. As mentioned above, Turkey will act in conformity with a UN decision. That the latter is taken without Turkey’s consent will definitely not change this reality.

II.A.4. Mediation between Afghanistan and Pakistan


Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been strained after the Taleban regime’s removal from power in 2001. Although Pakistan joined the international war with terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, she has been constantly accused of training and sheltering the “enemies of Afghanistan”³⁷⁶. That is the ground on which the Afghani executive’s statement of June 2008 – made in the aftermath of Taleban assault – should be assessed: President Hamid Karzai threatened to send troops over the frontiers into Pakistan in

³⁷⁴ Thérèse Delpech, “L’Iran Nucléaire: La Course contre la Montre”, *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, Automne, p: 580.

³⁷⁵ Declaration on Iran, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 18-19 June 2009 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf).

³⁷⁶ TARZI Amin, “South Asia: Did Ankara Declaration Mark a Genuine Breakthrough?”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 02/05/2007 (<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076240.html>).

pursuit of militants who had been launching attacks inside his country.³⁷⁷ In the past, H. Karzai had objected to the geographical limitation of the fight against the Taliban to the Afghan soil and pleaded that Pakistan do more in this fight; but it was the first time that he made such a threat of incursion into Pakistani territory.



The Pakistani government rebuked Karzai’s statement by pointing to the 90,000 troops deployed at the Afghani border and the loss of life of 1,000 Pakistani forces since 2001 in the fight with Taleban forces. Islamabad accuses Afghanistan of being incapable of dealing with the problem, which, in turn, caused the transformation of the insurgency into a populist movement. The Prime Minister denied any involvement in the attacks highlighting the strong interest his country has in Afghanistan’s stability. The speech delivered by Foreign Minister Qureshi was unambiguously exposing Islamabad’s unease on the possibility of an operation as mentioned by Karzai:

“[It was] regrettable that such a statement was made at a time when the two sides had agreed to close the ranks in the fight against terrorism. (...) In my view, the only way to win the war against terrorism and extremism is by showing full respect to the territorial sovereignty and non interference in each others' internal affairs. Since the two countries are faced with a

³⁷⁷ Karzai affirmed his country’s right to retaliate in “self-defence” against militants that crossed over from Pakistan to attack troops in its territory. See “Karzai Issues Warning to Pakistan”, *BBC*, 15/06/2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7455267.stm).

common enemy it is all the more necessary that Afghanistan refrain from making irresponsible threatening statements”.³⁷⁸

It is true that Pakistan would be negatively affected by any destabilization of Afghanistan. Yet, there are some factors that lead to worry on the level of Pakistan’s contribution to the efforts of stability in her region. For instance, whether she could completely cut ties with Taleban after 2001 is questionable. The question is all the more preoccupying when the government’s inability to control all the elements of its intelligence units.³⁷⁹ Besides, Afghan and US officials express their concern on the peace deal that Pakistani government is seeking with militants. The latter causes concern because of the negative impacts it may have on the stabilisation efforts, such as giving the militants time to regroup and lowering the pressure on them – which would both result in the intensification of their attacks. To these problematic points, one should add the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan which is too long to patrol as admitted by Islamabad.³⁸⁰

Upon the initiative of the then Turkish President Sezer and with the participation of the Prime Minister Erdoğan, bilateral negotiations were hosted in Ankara between Afghanistan and Pakistan (both represented at the presidential level) in late April 2007. In a constructive atmosphere, the talks focused on promoting peace, security, stability, and development. They resulted in a consensus upon the Ankara Declaration which set out methods of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is important to note that it was the first joint statement signed by the two leaders. In the declaration, all parties declared their strong will to maintain dialogue and cooperation in many fields, and raise the welfare of the people they represent. Respect for territorial integrity, support for sustainable development and the fight against terrorism, and the development of further confidence building measures between the two governments were the main topics of the agreement.³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ “Pakistan Protests to Afghan Envoy”, *BBC*, 16/06/2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7456019.stm).

³⁷⁹ Senior US military officials affirmed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had links to Al Qaeda and Taleban. The New York Times even reported that ISI operatives made Taleban’s large-scale campaign in southern Afghanistan possible through their direct support. See “Pakistan’s ISI Still Linked to Militants, US Says”, *Reuters*, 28/03/2009 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52R03R20090328>).

³⁸⁰ The former director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, said that cross-border movement could not be controlled, whatever the number of troops. See DURRANI Asad, “Whither Strategic Depth?” *Nation/Post* (Pakistan), May 27, 2006. Quoted in GRARE Frédéric, “Pakistan Afghanistan Relations in the post- 9/11 Era”, *Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, no: 72, October 2006, p: 5.

³⁸¹ A joint Working Group of high-level engagement is also foreseen for monitoring progress and coordinating the confidence-building measures and mechanisms. See *Annex of the Letter dated 3 May 2007 from the*

The declaration was an important development for the relations between Kabul and Islamabad. As the Deputy Spokesperson of the UN reported, the Ankara Declaration “deserves support”³⁸². Global support is indeed necessary for the materialisation of commitments made through the declaration. In addition, and more importantly, strong commitment of the parties is indispensable. If Afghani and Pakistani governments could honour it, they would make a veritable contribution to the regional stability. Yet, this has not been the case.

In September 2008, three months after the crisis erupted between Islamabad and Kabul, Turkey launched a new initiative to bring together again the two leaders in order to revive the Ankara Declaration process. For this purpose, a diplomatic move was made for building a platform for the two countries to discuss their ongoing problems. Within this framework, the second tripartite summit was held in Istanbul where the participants could reach a consensus on military cooperation and the fight with terrorism and narcotraffic.

The third Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey Trilateral Summit, held in Ankara in April 2009, was attended by the three presidents and Turkish Prime Minister. The idiosyncrasy of the summit was due to the participation of the three countries’ Foreign Ministers, Chiefs of Military and Intelligence services. This signalled a deeper commitment to a broader cooperation at all levels of establishments of the three countries. The themes addressed were similar to the previous meetings. Another importance was due to the institutionalisation of the summit process with annual presidential meetings accompanied by half-yearly meetings of Foreign Ministers, together with the heads of military and intelligence organizations.³⁸³

Securing the bordering region between the two countries is of undeniable importance in the fight with international terrorism. Cross-border raids from Pakistan constitute a major barrier for the success of the fight with Taleban and al Qaeda forces and they will continue to be a point of discord between the two countries unless the will of countering it is not firmly shown by Pakistan. U.S. officials have repeatedly warned that the Afghan conflict could drag

Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, A/61/898 – S/2007/266, 09/05/2007.

³⁸² “Ankara Declaration Deserves Support, Says UN”, *Today’s Zaman*, 05/05/2007 (<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=110386>).

³⁸³ The three Presidents also decided that Turkey would organize a regional summit comprising Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours to find regional solutions to the regional issues and have their ownership. See “Third Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey Trilateral Summit in Ankara Concludes”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pakistan*, PR. No: 138/2009, 01/04/2009.

on for years unless Taleban safe havens in Pakistan are shut down.³⁸⁴ As long as the militant “sanctuaries” operate, counterinsurgency campaigns will remain inefficient.

NATO reported that increased cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad has caused a decrease of cross-border insurgent infiltration.³⁸⁵ The reason can be explained by the fact that cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani governments regarding the border control have improved. From this point of view, Turkey’s additional endeavours to ameliorate current links between them reinforce the chances of success of the international community’s commitment in this fight. It also matches the EU’s aim to “explore and implement all possible areas of cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours to eliminate the threat posed to the region”.³⁸⁶

The EU attaches high importance to the efforts of securing Afghanistan and strongly supports the development of a coordinated approach by the states of the region for this purpose. Therefore, Brussels sees it vital to enhance the cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Joint Statement of the first EU-Pakistan Summit held in Brussels on 17 June 2009 highlights this priority by affirming that Brussels and Islamabad seek “to promote sustained, constructive and positive engagement with regional neighbours of Afghanistan including through enhanced cooperation on combating terrorism”.³⁸⁷

II.B. Operational Field: Parallelism and Divergences

All the organisations that deal with security – be them in regional or global level – could only welcome the non-members’ participation in military operations because such a contribution could only increase the chances of success –which is a particularly important matter to be taken into consideration in the case of Turkey. It seems plausible to argue that in all operations, multinational coalitions (be them under the auspices of an international organisation or not) have been eager to see Turkey involved in the peace and stability building efforts. Indeed, the more countries participate in a mission the more chances of success are and the less are the burdens shouldered by other participants. From this point of

³⁸⁴ “Karzai threatens to send troops into Pakistan”, *The Guardian*, 16/06/2008 (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/16/afghanistan.pakistan>).

³⁸⁵ “Turkey Hopes to Boost Afghan-Pakistan Security Ties”, *Reuters*, 31/03/2009.

³⁸⁶ “European Union -Afghanistan Joint Declaration 2009. Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership”, *EU-Afghanistan Conference*, Berlin, DECL 2009, 12/06/2009.

³⁸⁷ *Joint Statement, EU-Pakistan Summit*, Brussels, 11117/09 (Presse 182), 17/06/2009 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/108562.pdf).

view, it is not hard to understand the general satisfaction in the international platform by Turkey's contribution to international efforts.

Because unilateral intervention occurs very exceptionally, one can assert that there are two preferred ways to intervene in crisis situations: Assuming the responsibilities that emanate from the membership of an international organisation or being part of a multinational coalition. At this point, it is appropriate to note Turkey's compliance with the UN call on all nations to participate in the peace making and peace keeping efforts –increased in parallel with the number of crisis situations. To fulfil this demand, Turkey acted under two main titles: support operations by participation as a brigade, and, international observation missions –which require military personnel's participation.

The latter type of missions usually reflects the participant state's willingness to be present in the international event. They are implemented during the conflicts when there is not a defeated warring party and when both adversaries ask the UN to enforce a ceasefire.³⁸⁸ The responsibility of the military observers is to monitor the ceasefire and the restrictions agreed by both parties in a precise geography for a predetermined time.³⁸⁹ Turkey participated to a total of nine observation missions that concerned mostly the Middle East and Caucasian region.³⁹⁰

The Lebanon conflict of 2006 can be taken as a case in which Turkey assumed responsibility in the UN framework. The conflict lasted for 33 days, opposed Hezbollah paramilitary forces in Lebanon and Israeli Government.³⁹¹ On 11 August, the UNSC approved unanimously the resolution 1701 that called on conflicting parties to halt immediately all hostilities while urging the Government of Lebanon to deploy its forces together with the

³⁸⁸ UYAR Mesut, "A UN Type Conflict Management: Dilemmas of Military Observer Missions in the Example of UNOMIG" in CAFORIO Giuseppe, KÜMMEL Gerhard (Eds.), *Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2005, p: 584.

³⁸⁹ The missions may remain much longer than the specified time period. Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Six of them are over: United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) replaced by United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE KVM), OSCE Georgia Border Monitoring Mission (OSCE BMO), United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The continuing missions are United Nations Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

³⁹¹ The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a UN-sponsored ceasefire of 14 August. After Hezbollah's attack on—and kidnapping of—Israeli soldiers, Israel retaliated with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon that damaged heavily Lebanese civilian infrastructure and brought death to many civilians. An air and naval blockade and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon followed suit.

UNIFIL throughout the South –and the Government of Israel to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon.³⁹²

Turkey made efforts to stop the conflict since the outbreak and contributed to the relief of human suffering.³⁹³ The GNAT adopted a decision for deploying troops to Lebanon within the UNIFIL framework.³⁹⁴ The decision put emphasis on Turkey's being a factor of stability in her region and underlined the impossibility to remain "*complacent and detached*" to events that will "*jeopardise peace and stability*". In this context, Turkey had no choice but to give a qualified support to international initiatives brought out for preserving peace.

Turkish Government authorised the use of some airports, seaports, facilities and bases by allied countries in line with the UN resolution 1701. Turkey's contribution to the UNIFIL concerned the following points: adequate troop allocation for the Sea Mission Force that will patrol in Eastern Mediterranean; provision of sea and air transport support for allied countries; training of the Lebanese army.³⁹⁵ As of 2009, around 500 military personnel are deployed in Lebanon within the UNIFIL framework.

Turkey had some advantages that facilitate its decision to take part in the resolution of conflict. In addition to the capacity to lead a robust multinational force, the 'acceptability' of Turkish forces to opposing parties was an important asset. It is worth reminding that Israel's refusal to accept countries to the peacekeeping force if they do not recognize Israel complicated the UN's efforts to form a 15,000-strong peacekeeping force.³⁹⁶ Therefore, Turkish Government's decision to send troops to Lebanon gains a particular importance in restoring the stability in the region. The United Nations can most welcome troops coming

³⁹² UNIFIL is on the field since March 1978. In October 2009, 26 countries were providing it for military personnel. See *Lebanon – UNIFIL – Facts and Figures* (<http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html>).

³⁹³ Besides the humanitarian aid to Lebanese people, Turkey also provided the evacuation of its citizens and allowed more than ten thousand foreigners to pass from its territories to return to their home countries.

³⁹⁴ Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Lübnan'a Gönderilmesi Hususunda Anayasanın 92. Maddesi Uyarınca Hükümete İzin Verilmesine Dair Karar (Decision on the Authorisation of the Government for the Deployment of Turkish Armed Forces to Lebanon according to the Constitution's 92nd Article), Karar no (Decision no):880, 05/09/2006 (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr>).

³⁹⁵ The GNAT decision no:880 also indicates that some military factors will also be provided, primarily the protection forces that will ensure the security of the humanitarian aid activities that will be conducted by Turkish state. The limit, ambit and quantity of these forces will be determined by the Government.

³⁹⁶ Ehud Olmert was reported to have affirmed that Israel would not accept the presence of peacekeepers in Lebanon from countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations. See "PM rejects UNIFIL troops from countries without relations", *The Jerusalem Post*, 20/08/2006.

(<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525911374&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>)

from a largely Muslim country. As for Hezbollah, the presence of Muslim soldiers on Lebanese soil would be more acceptable than that of troops seconded from Western countries.

The international dimension of the Lebanon conflict, particularly the EU's engagement, is of considerable importance for Turkey.³⁹⁷ In addition to its members' individual contributions, the EU has worked for relieving human suffering in Lebanon. The contribution of the EU can be summarised on three pillars.³⁹⁸ First, in civilian/humanitarian field, ECHO and the Monitoring and Information Centre of the European Commission were quick to provide humanitarian assistance and technical help for healing the wounds of the war. Second, as an accompaniment to the political support, the EU built the backbone of the UNIFIL mission by providing it more than 7.000 troops. This contribution offered the possibility of a "durable ceasefire and long-term solution" to the Middle East crisis, in the words of Kofi Annan.³⁹⁹ Third, concerning reconstruction, the European Commission proposed assistance both during and after the conflict to help the Lebanese Government.

Indeed, after the end of the Cold War, Turkey's willingness to make a positive contribution to the international organisations has been easily perceptible. Fortunately, this was not limited to the operational field. Ankara also wanted to better her status in these organisations as much as she could. The most recent evidence this stance came in 2008, when she won a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2009-2010.⁴⁰⁰ A candidate to the UN Security Council must obtain the approval of 128 countries in the General Assembly. Having competed in the "Western European and Others"

³⁹⁷ In many circles, contributing to the UNIFIL mission - especially, undertaking the serious responsibility of sending troops to the region - was conceived as a difficult task. Although Turkish Government believes that Turkey's interests lie in supporting the mission, as the government spokesman Cemil Çiçek affirmed, there was not a consensus on the national level concerning the deployment of troops to Lebanon. The risks borne by the mission were definitely at the origin of the unwillingness to intervene in Turkish domestic platform, but two more factors that were feeding the opposition should be cited: some believed that the decision to participate in the mission did not serve national interests while others were embarrassed by the idea of engaging in a situation in which they could be fighting against fellow Muslims. Opinion polls showed that a high majority of Turkish people was hostile to the deployment of Turkish troops. SIRMEN Ali, "Lübnan Tezkeresi" (Lebanon Permit), *Cumhuriyet*, 05/09/2006; "Turkey Steps toward Lebanon Force", *International Herald Tribune*, 28/08/2006 (<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/28/news/force.php>); "Turkey approves Lebanon troops", *BBC World Service*, 05/09/2006, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5315712.stm); MALLET Laurent, "La Crise Libanaise Vue de Turquie", *Hérodote*, vol: 1, no: 124, 2007, p:

³⁹⁸ *The European Union's Response to 2006 Crisis in Lebanon*, Delegation of the European Commission to Lebanon, Brussels, 2006, pp: 2-3.

³⁹⁹ "EU to Supply Half Lebanon Force", *BBC*, 25/08/2006 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5287084.stm>).

⁴⁰⁰ Turkey had competed in the "Western European and Others" bloc along with Austria and Iceland; out of 192 voting members of the UN General Assembly, 151 voted for Turkey. Turkey and the second winner in the same bloc, Austria, replaced Belgium and Italy.

bloc along with Austria and Iceland, she obtained the accord from 151 of the 192 members presented in the UN General Assembly -which stands for almost 80% of all votes.

The success followed an extended campaign remarked by a wide spectrum of actions.⁴⁰¹ Under the UN statute, applications are reviewed based on the consideration of the applicant's probable contribution to the preservation of international peace and security and the other goals of the organization. Turkey's past record provided her a firm background for being elected. Turkish officials believe that their case for election was based on the strong credentials in the field of international peace and security and Turkey's high-level active and constructive role within the United Nations which revealed persistence.⁴⁰²

Turkey has the potential to make a positive contribution to the work of the UNSC, given her general desire to strengthen peace and stability on the one hand, and her strong willingness to take an active role in the endeavours of conflict resolution. The non-permanent seat in the UNSC will help Turkey get closer to these objectives and give her the opportunity that these assertions are not shallow promises. Certainly, the election of Turkey to the UNSC represents the confidence entrusted in her and the approval of her foreign policy. Moreover, there is no doubt that the two-year membership of the UNSC will provide Turkey with considerable international prestige. It is also important to see that the UNSC membership will permit Turkey to bring her historical depth, its power and its geopolitical value and the tenets of its foreign policy to bear on the deliberations and decisions of the UNSC during the membership period.⁴⁰³

II.B.1. Frameworks of Cooperation between Turkey and the EU

As an important contributor to peace operations through its military and police forces, Turkey is currently present in many regions of the world. All the military operations in which she is engaged are of multilateral type –without excluding the ESDP framework. In the first sub-section, those that are related to the crisis management framework drawn in the previous chapter will be studied. Because the relations between Turkey and the EU in the field of ESDP are of great importance, the arrangements made between the two parties on the

⁴⁰¹ Turkey conducted several diplomatic initiatives and it has been reported that she allocated 50 million USD for her election bid. It was even reported that Ankara had paid off debts up to \$20 million of countries who had lost their voting rights in the UN Security Council over not being able to pay the monthly fees. The claim has been rebuked later on by the Foreign Ministry. See “Babacan Denies Turkey Paid for UNSC Support”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 12/07/2008 (<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10373639.asp?ser=1>).

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Interviews in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 22/12/2008.

latter field will follow next. That will also give the opportunity to expose their divergences of view on critical questions.

II.B.1.a. Ensuring stability through the operations

Since the deployment of troops to Korea at the early 1950s, Turkish army participates to the missions abroad in cooperation with other nations.⁴⁰⁴ Today, Turkish army is present in various geographies of the world, within various political and institutional frameworks. As shown in the chart below, during the fall 2009, there were around 2.100 military and 300 civilian personnel representing Turkey in foreign missions. The majority of them were serving under the auspices of NATO, justifying the high integration level of the TAF to the Alliance. They were followed by those working in the UN and the EU missions.

| Turkey's participation to foreign missions | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-------------|------------|----------|-------------|
| Opérations | Framework | Troops | Police | Others | Total |
| <u>EUFOR - Althea</u> | EU | 242 | 0 | 0 | 242 |
| <u>EULEX - Kosovo</u> | EU | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| <u>ISAF</u> | NATO | 800 | 0 | 0 | 800 |
| <u>UNIFIL</u> | UN | 499 | 0 | 0 | 499 |
| <u>KFOR</u> | NATO | 544 | 0 | 0 | 544 |
| <u>UNAMID</u> | UN* | 1 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| <u>UNMIK</u> | UN | 0 | 125 | 0 | 125 |
| <u>UNMIL</u> | UN | 0 | 26 | 0 | 26 |
| <u>UNMIS</u> | UN | 3 | 34 | 0 | 37 |
| <u>MINUSTAH</u> | UN | 0 | 57 | 0 | 57 |
| <u>UNMIT</u> | UN | 0 | 13 | 0 | 13 |
| <u>MONUC</u> | UN | 0 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| <u>UNOMIG</u> | UN | 5** | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| <u>EUPM</u> | EU | 0 | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| <u>ONUCI</u> | UN | 0 | 11 | 0 | 11 |
| Total | | 2094 | 284 | 5 | 2383 |
| Total NATO | | 1344 | | | 1344 |
| Total UN | | 508 | 275 | | 783 |
| Total EU | | 242 | 9 | 5 | 256 |

* Together with the African Union

** Military observers

Source: www.operationspaix.net

⁴⁰⁴ During this operation, Turkey seconded 15.000 military troops –in rotation. Many analysts argue that it earned Turkey the membership of NATO.

This is clearly an asset for the EU. At present, Ankara conceives its defence policy within NATO's structure, privileges the UN framework, but she also shows the will to get involved in the EU's policies and initiatives in this field. Her active participation to the military missions with her European partners may be conceived as a means to reinforce her position in Europe. Moreover, Turkey supports international sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by international organisations and acts in conformity with them. Since early 1990s, except the operations launched in the Northern Iraq in fight with PKK terrorism, all interventions took place in multinational forums (mainly in UN or NATO frameworks, or in an international coalition).

Hence, Turkey adhered to international cooperation structures in the Balkan region – some of which were conducted within the ESDP framework. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), established by the UNSC Resolution 743 as a peacekeeping mission with the objective of reaching a peaceful political settlement in the region, was one of them. In March 1994, Ankara's demand on the participation to UNPROFOR – whose aim was to establish and to maintain secure regions for the humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina – was approved by the United Nations. The UNPROFOR was composed of nearly 39.000 personnel. 15 of the 27 current EU member states provided troops or observers to the mission.⁴⁰⁵ Turkey deployed a 1.400-strong force to the region between August 1993 and December 1995. On 20 December 1995 the UNPROFOR was taken over by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) whose task was to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. A year later, IFOR's troops have been reflagged under the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), another NATO-led unit. Its troop levels have gradually been reduced to around 7.000 by the end of 2004 when it was replaced by EUFOR-Althea. The latter comprises a 242-strong Turkish force that is deployed in Zenica region.⁴⁰⁶ Besides, 48 Turkish gendarmeries are seconded to the Integrated Police Unit built in the framework of EUFOR-Althea.

Sharp Guard, a joint operation between NATO and the WEU, was another initiative that aimed stability in the Balkan region to which Turkey adhered. The navy manoeuvres took place between June 1993 and October 1996 with the purpose enforcing economic sanctions

⁴⁰⁵ Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁰⁶ *EUFOR Troop Strength in Theatre*, EUFOR Althea (http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=145&Itemid=62).

and the arms embargo against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which laid on a number of UNSC Resolutions.⁴⁰⁷ Turkish Armed Forces also supported the flight prohibition in Bosnian air space by sending a F-16 squadron.

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) that was effective as of January 2003 also received support from Turkey. To this civilian crisis management mission – the first of that sort launched by the EU– Turkey seconded 12 personnel (six from the General Directorate of Security and six from the Gendarmerie General Command). Four Turkish personnel are active in the EUPM II which started in June 2006.

Turkey was also highly active in the military operations that aimed peace and stability in Kosovo. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was the last recourse left after the Belgrade regime had rejected all the proposals that aimed political settlement.⁴⁰⁸ Turkey participated to NATO airstrikes in a spirit of solidarity despite the lack of UNSC authorisation. Within this framework, Turkey contributed to Kosovo air strikes launched by NATO in March 1999 with 10 F-16 warplanes. Following the demands from the Alliance, she allocated eight more and 3 tanker planes while opening three aerodromes to the use of NATO planes. Moreover, a mechanized infantry battalion and 42.000 troops were engaged in the work of implementing the agreement signed between NATO and Yugoslav Federal Republic to put an end to the crisis. In addition, a frigate and a mine detector vessel have been allocated to the mission.

After the NATO operation had ended, Turkey backed the full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.⁴⁰⁹ The resolution is important on several counts, especially in what regards the dispositions that match Turkey's main policies in the region. First, it states that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles agreed by the international community. It was in line with Turkish government's view that the rights of Albanian minority should be preserved and that fair and equitable representation in the political and administrative structures of Kosovo should be ensured. Second, it underscores the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, calling on the relevant parties to

⁴⁰⁷ The resolutions 713, 757, 787, 820, 943, 1021 and 1022 were those that imposed the sanctions that the Sharp Guard Mission aimed to enforce.

⁴⁰⁸ SOLANA Javier, "A Defining Moment for NATO: The Washington Summit Decisions and the Kosovo Crisis", NATO Review, NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 1999 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-01.htm>).

⁴⁰⁹ For the text of the Resolution, see annex 2, pp: 217-220.

cooperate fully in their deployment.⁴¹⁰ Third, it encourages all Member states and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. In 1999, after the refugee problem that arose from NATO's air strikes, Turkey's aid pledge to Kosovo was about 7.5 million Euros.⁴¹¹

The Resolution 1244 authorized an international civil and military presence in the province by placing it under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to which 125 Turkish police officers were seconded in late 2009. It also authorized a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Thus, NATO forces are deployed in Kosovo under the Kosovo Force (KFOR) since the end of air bombings in June 1999 in order to support international efforts to transform the province in a safe and secure environment. Back then, clashes between military – and paramilitary – forces commanded by Belgrade and the KLA was causing a grave humanitarian crisis. If the present situation can not be compared to the former civil war,, a 16.500-strong multinational force is still carrying out its activities in Kosovo within the KFOR framework. Turkey contributes to this force – in the Multinational South Sector Brigade – with a manoeuvre battalion (including national logistic elements and national support unit), a fortification battalion and a military police team, an investigation team, two teams of communication and tracking, three military personnel to the multinational sanitary battalion, 16 personnel to the force mission headquarter and 11 to the KFOR headquarter.

In spite of the concurrence in the operational field, Turkey could not join some ESDP missions. The European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) is one of them. In February 2005, the EU General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council decided to establish the EUJUST LEX which aimed at addressing the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system and strengthening its management capacity.⁴¹² These objectives were also accompanied by the will to be complementary and to bring added value to existing

⁴¹⁰ The Resolution calls on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. The departure of those forces should be synchronized, according to the UNSC Resolution, with the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo.

⁴¹¹ For the period 1992-1999, the total aid to the region reached 32 million Euros. See “Kızılay’dan Rötarlı Yardım” (Delayed Aid from Red Crescent), *Radikal*, 04/04/1999 (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/1999/04/04/dis/02kiz.html>).

⁴¹² “Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq”, EUJUST LEX, *Official Journal L 062* , 09/03/2005, pp: 37-41 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005E0190:EN:HTML>).

international efforts, in particular to those of the United Nations.⁴¹³ Turkey made an official demand to EU institutions for participating in the mission. This move may be explained by a disposition of the Council Joint Action where the Council affirms the EU's will to use its dialogue with Iraq and the neighbouring countries in order to "encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq". Besides, the EU mission was to be realised in a contiguous region. But the EU's response was negative, on the grounds that the participation of non-EU countries was not foreseen.⁴¹⁴

Another mission that Turkey wanted to contribute in was the *EU Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support* (EUPOL COPPS). Formally established in April 2005, EUPOL COPPS has its headquarters in Ramallah, and its objective is to enhance the Palestinian Authority's police and law enforcement capacity. It includes approximately 33 police and civilian experts mainly seconded from EU Member states. Turkey offered to second a police officer to the mission, but due to technical reasons, it could not be possible.⁴¹⁵

In June 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan mission started after the EU had completed its work on building up a civilian mission which would work on the fields of "security sector/police" and/or "the rule of law". Turkey, after being officially invited to take part on the mission, demanded the cooperation modalities between NATO and the EU be determined. But the fulfilment of this demand has not been possible, and Turkey did not participate in the mission.

A senior official in Turkish Foreign Ministry points out two conflicting approaches.⁴¹⁶ On the one hand, it is possible to maintain that Turkey's participation to EUPOL Afghanistan has a different and peculiar dimension if one takes into consideration both the current situation of NATO-EU relations and Turkey's spoken-out views on the participation to the ESDP. On the other hand, Ankara's participation in this mission goes beyond highlighting the importance it accords to (and the continuation of its constructive approach towards) the ESDP: it is a matter of national interest. For this reason, the option to

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

declare the possibility to second four police officers—before the necessary arrangements are made—is being evaluated.⁴¹⁷

Similar concerns are perceptible in Turkey’s approach towards the European Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). During the December 2007 European Council of Brussels, the EU affirmed its readiness to have a “leading role in strengthening stability” in Kosovo and to assist it in the path towards sustainable stability.⁴¹⁸ Thus, the EU leaders invited the General Affairs and External Relations Council to determine the modalities for such a mission and when to launch it.⁴¹⁹ Turkey was invited to take part in the mission along with potential contributing third states. Its answer was positive, and joined all meetings that convened between the EU and the latter states.

But, as it was the case during the decision of whether of not to participate in EUPOL Afghanistan, the existing NATO-EU relations and Turkey’s long-known views on the ESDP have dominated the evaluation process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs held contacts with all relevant institutions before letting the EU know, on every possible occasion, that Turkey wants to take part in the EULEX Kosovo under the following conditions:⁴²⁰

- rapid communication of all documents and information concerning the mission,
- full compliance with Nice implementation document,
- efficient functioning of Participants’ Committee.⁴²¹

II.B.1.b. Turkey’s institutional and legal connections to the ESDP

Turkey, in a persistent manner, acted in conformity with the EU declarations on CFSP. Its continuous and close alignment with the second pillar is also attested by the European Union.⁴²² Although not a member of the EU yet, she participated fully to ESDP activities with all the responsibilities that follow whenever its participation was possible. Ankara’s contribution to important activities – including force and capacity engagements – and participation in EU-conducted operations proved Turkey’s attachment to the idea of a

⁴¹⁷ A Framework Agreement on these officers’ participation is already approved by Turkey and the EU. Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 14/12/2007

(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf).

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008

⁴²¹ Turkish authorities particularly affirmed their dissatisfaction about the weak efficiency revealed by the previous instances of participators committee. Ibid.

⁴²² *Turkey 2007 Progress Report Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council*, Commission Staff Working Document, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2007) 1436, Brussels, 06/11/2007, p: 75.

more capable and more dynamic EU. As put forth in the EU Commission's progress report, "Turkey contributes substantially to ESDP and seeks increased involvement in ESDP decision-making".⁴²³ Turkey put at the EU's disposal 5.000 troops destined to Petersberg missions at the 1st Capabilities Conference of November 2000.⁴²⁴

In addition to the contribution to various missions, Turkey cooperates in two other fields in what concerns the ESDP. The first one is related to the battle groups. Turkey pledged to commit to these forces at the time the EU member states were indicating their willingness to do so. Negotiations reached a point on Turkey's participation to a BG where Italy will be the framework nation.⁴²⁵ Consensus on an Italian-Romanian-Turkish BG led to the signing of a letter of intent in May 2005, during the informal EU Defense Ministers meeting, by the three countries' delegations.⁴²⁶ The letter reads:

- the completion by 2006 of a *technical agreement* among three states –which will include the technical points concerning the establishment of a BG;
- the commencement of military practices in 2007;
- the reach of full capability for the BG by the end of 2009;
- the declaration of the BG as a commitment to the EU for the second half of 2010.

As of today, there are 19 BGs including the one in which Turkey takes part. In mid-2007, a meeting convened with the participation of Italian, Romanian and Turkish delegations on a draft of technical agreement. Another importance of this meeting for Turkey was the Italian delegation's statement that the member states of the BG may be asked to undertake the command in the second half of 2010.⁴²⁷

The second field of cooperation in the ESDP realm is the incorporation of civilian components into the EU's crisis management operations. In the European Council of June 2004, an action plan for civilian aspects of ESDP was adopted by member states. The aim of the document was to deal with the challenge of "[s]etting strategic targets and defining the

⁴²³ Ibid, p: 76.

⁴²⁴ *Building the Means and Capabilities for Crisis Management Under the CESDP*, Reply to the Annual Report of the Council Submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Rapson, Rapporteur, WEU Assembly, Document A/1715 Addendum, 01/12/2000.

⁴²⁵ This BG will also include Romania. Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

political aims of EU's operational capabilities for civilian crisis management".⁴²⁸ The Action Plan was followed by a *Civilian Capabilities Conference*, which laid emphasis on the development of a Civilian Headline Goal. The EU member states' aim is to establish "needs-driven goals" to "further define and build up the civilian capabilities".⁴²⁹

Turkey shares the EU's approach that integrates military and civilian components. This is perceptible in its foreign missions: all military operations are accompanied by civilian missions. It is also important to remind that Ankara announced its desire to contribute in the civilian dimension of ESDP and forwarded its concrete proposal to EU authorities.

Turkey's interest to the ESDP is indeed welcome by the EU. It is therefore not surprising to see that Turkey's contribution is also based on legal basis. Two points deserves to be reminded on this account. First, there is a general call to non-EU European members of NATO. As mentioned before, the EU agreed on ensuring the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members in EU-led crisis management. Those European members of NATO which did not join the EU would be able to participate, on their will, to an operation launched by the Council when recourse to NATO assets and capabilities is at stake. Concerning the operations in which the EU does not have such recourse, non-EU members' participation will be subject to an invitation. Whenever they take part in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces, they will have the same rights and obligations as the EU member states which participate in the operation.

Turkey's participation to crisis management operations in the ESDP framework goes beyond the above-mentioned scheme. The Presidency, backed up by the Council's authorization dating of February 2004, negotiated an agreement between Turkey and the EU in order to establish a framework for the former's participation in crisis management operations.⁴³⁰ The offer was based on a pertinent idea: establishing, through an agreement, a framework for future participations of third states in EU crisis management operations rather

⁴²⁸ *Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP Adopted by the European Council*, Brussels, 17-18/06/2004 (<http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=13785>).

⁴²⁹ *Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference: Ministerial Declaration*, Brussels, 22/11/2004 (<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/COMMITMENT%20CONFERENCE%20MINISTERIAL%20DECLARATION%2022.11.04.pdf>).

⁴³⁰ *Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union Crisis Management Operations*, Council of the European Union, Document 7332/06 COSDP 168 PESC 233 OC 217, Brussels, 5 April 2006, p:2.

than defining these conditions on a case-by-case basis. It is also worth underlining that this document stresses Turkey's importance as an actor of crisis management.

With the objective of concluding such an agreement, it authorised the Presidency—assisted by the Secretary General / High Representative (SG/HR) of the EU—to start negotiations. That decision was in fact consistent with two legal documents. The one is the Article 24 of the TEU, which stipulates that the Council may authorise the Presidency (...) to open negotiations in order to conclude an agreement with one or more states or international organisations. The other is a draft agreement on the modalities of such negotiations.⁴³¹

Hence, the SG/HR invited Turkey to launch negotiations. The Presidency conducted negotiations with the General Secretariat's assistance after Ankara's acceptance of SG/HR's invitation. As a consequence, an agreement was reached between both sides—in which Turkey vowed to undertake both military and civilian missions in conformity with the joint actions on the future EU crisis management operations, the operational plan and implementing measures.⁴³²

According to the Council's decision, after the Union decides to take action in the field of crisis management, it may invite Turkey to participate. When Turkey receives such an invitation, it may accept it and may offer a contribution, subject to a decision of acceptance by the Union. Once Turkey takes part in the crisis management operation, it shall associate itself with the joint action framing the latter and with any subsequent joint action or decision accepted within the same framework.

In the agreement, there are two important points that should be made. The first one concerns the chain of command: Turkey has the same rights and obligations – as the EU member states that take part in the operation – in terms of day-to-day management of the operation. This equal footing is seen both in civilian and military operations. The second point is about financial aspects: Turkey will assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operations, again, regardless of the civilian or military nature of them. Besides, Turkey will contribute to the financing of the “operational budget” of civilian operations and to the “common costs” of military ones.

⁴³¹ Document 6284/04 COSDP 68 PESC 118.

⁴³² Turkey was also pledging to act in conformity with the subsequent amendments (such as the extension of the mission and the implementing arrangements) of the joint actions. See “Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union Crisis Management Operations”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 189/17, 12/07/2006.

II.B.2. Problems for the operational field

Turkey's cooperation with the EC/EU dates back to the WEU period. The Organisation of Modified Brussels Treaty incorporated four different membership status: The full members were those states which belonged both to NATO and the EU –unless they desired otherwise, as shown in the only example of Denmark. At the Rome Ministerial meeting in 1992, a new status of “Associate Member” was established for the members of NATO which did not join the Community. Hence, Iceland, Norway and Turkey became associate members, as did some Central and Eastern European countries later on. The “observer” states were not members of NATO while being members of the EU -and Denmark. In 1994, 10 Central European states that are candidates for NATO and EU membership became WEU's Associate Partners.

The principal objective of creating new statuses was to put the relationship between the WEU and all of the European member states of NATO (regardless of their position within the WEU) on a new basis in order to promote stability and security in Europe. In this vein, a meeting was convened in Rome on 20 November 1992. There was a complete consensus among those states on ensuring peace and security in Europe. The development of the ESDI was unambiguously bolstered and the role of WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance was totally recognised.⁴³³ Within this framework, the association of the non-EU NATO members back in 1992 (and then according to future enlargements of NATO) could only be beneficial to the strengthening of the Alliance and its European pillar.⁴³⁴

At the request of a majority of the member states (or half of the member states including the Presidency) participation to WEU meetings may be restricted to full members. Otherwise, they may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies. Most importantly, they may express their opinion (but may not block a decision that came out of a consensus among the member states; associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states (and participate in their implementation)⁴³⁵; be associated to the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison

⁴³³ Interviews in the Council Secretariat, 25 February 2009.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise.

arrangement; take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces.⁴³⁶

The above-mentioned points refer to a wide range of association indeed. Yet, Turkey had a far more privileged position in the WEU. She was able to participate, and in practice had co-decision rights, in all standing WEU committees except the Security Committee, and it took part in all joint WEU-NATO and WEU-EU meetings. It appointed officers to WEU's Military Planning Cell. As an associate member, Turkey also held full membership of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). Last but not least, Associate Members had extensive and concrete involvement in the activities of the WEU Assembly, WEU Institute of Security Studies, and WEU Satellite Centre. It should be noted, however, that Turkey never formally expressed satisfaction on being an Associate Member and on various occasions argued that it should have access to the status of full membership. It is therefore easier to understand Turkey's concerns on the loss of the strong status and the blockage that she put on the development of EU-NATO links in early 2000s.

Among the six NATO members that are not members of the EU, Turkey had the strongest opposition to permanent NATO – EU arrangements on the recourse to NATO assets during operations to which NATO does not participate. Two reasons explain the reaction of Turkey and why she was the only one to react so strongly. One is about the other five countries' status: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were certain to join the EU in the first enlargement wave of 2004. Iceland and Norway, on the other hand, have not become members of the EU by their own choice⁴³⁷ and they enjoyed security through their membership to the alliance. They can participate to NATO crisis management operations and they would be able to do it through the EU-NATO agreement.

Turkey's EU membership bid is a very specific and complicated case. Ankara is not expecting to join the EU in a near future. From this perspective, when the case of Turkey is taken into consideration, arguing that it is similar neither to that of these two Nordic countries nor to the three Central European ones is legitimate. Besides, Turkey was particularly concerned by the possibility that European operations, which might take place in Turkey's


⁴³⁶ In addition, they may be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate. They will be asked to make a financial contribution to the Organization's budgets.

⁴³⁷ Norway applied twice for EU membership: In 1971 (together with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) and in 1994 (together with Austria, Finland and Sweden). Both applications failed following national referenda.

own area and impact directly on its interests, would be launched by a group of nations including Greece (and later on Cyprus) on circumstances where Turkey and indeed NATO as a whole held no veto.⁴³⁸

Therefore, with the *phagocytosis* of the WEU by the EU, a question arose: the fate of the associate members. Being an associate member of the WEU granted Turkey the ability to participate in its decision-making process. But how would it be when the latter becomes the sole competence of the European Council? Turkish view is that the *acquis* of the WEU should be preserved and developed to the fullest extent. But, in order to have a security and defence policy that is veritably European, non-EU allies should be able to participate on equal footing both to its formulation and its implementation.⁴³⁹

The EU/WEU/NATO institutional geometry before 2002



This requires an inclusive approach on which new perspectives should be built, so that new dividing lines in European security and defence can be avoided.⁴⁴⁰ According to

⁴³⁸ NATO’s work on potential scenarios pointed to 16 possible “hot spots” for deployment of European rapid response forces, and thirteen of those locations were in regions around Turkey.

⁴³⁹ Ismail Cem (Entretien avec), “L’Avenir des Relations entre la Turquie et l’Union Européenne Six Mois Après le Conseil Européen d’Helsinki”, *Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, no:39, Paris, Automne 2000, p : 20.

⁴⁴⁰ ÖYMEN Onur, “What Sort of NATO Do We Want? What Does NATO Need to Do?”, *Chatham House Conference*, 11/04/2002 (<http://www.onuroymen.com/arsiv/263>).

former ambassador O. Öymen, two mistakes must be avoided.⁴⁴¹ The one concerns the attribution of lesser roles to certain countries on the basis of what he calls an “artificial criteria” of their membership status in a given organisation. Encouraging the division of labour among European organisations in the field of European security is the other tendency to leave aside. The efforts must focus on the search of a real cooperation between all Allied countries, as well as between NATO and the EU. Öymen puts forth a view that is endorsed by Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs by maintaining that institutional priorities and discriminative approaches make it impossible to build a comprehensive and implementable system which will enable all European partners to make the optimum and most effective use of their existing military capabilities against the new threats.⁴⁴²

Official declarations show that the EU member states subscribe to this view. Cologne meeting mentioned “satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU Member states to ensure their fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations” as a necessity for building successful European policy on security and defence. These arrangements were to be erected on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. Ensuring that all participants in an EU-led operation have equal rights with regard to the conduct of the above-mentioned operation was also necessary.

The summit bolstered this position by referring to the decisions taken in Washington according to which it was necessary for NATO and the EU to ensure together the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency. These efforts would be built on the existing mechanisms between NATO and the WEU.⁴⁴³ They also highlighted the utmost importance accorded to the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations which lay on the consultation arrangements within the WEU. There again, one can observe a very similar wording to the one that was used in Cologne.⁴⁴⁴ This statement was of crucial importance for Turkey. Some

⁴⁴¹ The speech of Onur ÖYMEN on Turkey and the European Security (available at <http://www.onuroymen.com/docs/konusma7.doc>, last accessed on 02/01/2008).

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ *Washington Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of state and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999* (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>).

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

authors state that Ankara accepted the final communiqué's passage on the ESDI only after the inclusion of the former.⁴⁴⁵

What Turkey understood from NATO formulations was that the fulfilment of "Berlin plus" agreements was dependent on the EU's treating its non-EU Allied partners in the way that NATO had conceived.⁴⁴⁶ A press release by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentions this fact: "NATO Allies at their Summit meeting (...) have established the basis which takes into account our expectations for full and equal participation of European Allies who are not, like Turkey, members of the EU, in the new structure to be established within the context of the CESDP."⁴⁴⁷

The EU's desire to keep the non-WEU members involved in the ESDP is manifested by the possibility of convening meetings between all EU members and the associate members of the WEU. Additional meetings would take place as the circumstances require. That way, the EU could take the latter's views and positions into consideration before deciding on an operation. Besides, such consultations provide the non-EU European states the possibility to contribute to ESDP and to associate themselves with all ESDP-related declarations, decisions and actions.

But, according to Turkish officials, the schemes built up by the EU are inadequate. The discontent of Ankara is plain to see in Ismail Cem's following statement:

"[I]n Feira, the EU did not take into consideration the important aspects of decisions taken by NATO during Washington Summit of April 1999 and during meetings of [the EU's] Council of Ministers, which are related to the question of effective participation of European allies in question to the crisis management. This may have negative repercussions in future relations between NATO and the EU. If this were the case, it would be out of question for Turkey to accept automatic access of the EU to NATO capabilities. The position of Turkey is in accordance with the decisions of NATO."⁴⁴⁸

After the Helsinki Summit, Turkey found herself in capacity of decision-shaping (including the participation to the operational planning), a position which was limited to a

⁴⁴⁵ DUMOULIN André, MATHIEU Raphael, SARLET Gordon, *La Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD). De l'Opérateur à l'Identitaire*, Editions Bruylant, Brussels, 2003, p: 711.

⁴⁴⁶ "Turkey and the ESDP: A Fact-Sheet", *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (www.sipri.org).

⁴⁴⁷ Press Release Regarding Common European Security And Defence Policy (CESDP) Addressed At The EU's Helsinki Summit, No.239, December 13, 1999 (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-common-european-security-and-defence-policy-cesdp-addressed-at-the-eu-s-helsinki-summit-br-no-239--december-13-1999.en.mfa>).

⁴⁴⁸ He also added that the framework settled by Feira Summit should be ameliorated during French presidency in that non-EU member European allies, including Turkey, can take the place they merit by their important contribution to the security of the continent for more than fifty years. See Ismail Cem (Entretien avec), Op. Cit., p: 21.

‘deep consultation’. The views of non-members would not be binding on the EU decision to mount an operation. In peace time, the European Union will make permanent and continuing consultations with the non-EU European allies which will cover the full range of security, defence and crisis management issues.⁴⁴⁹ The declaration adopted by the Copenhagen Council alleviated Turkey’s concerns about Cyprus’ access capability: The ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements and their implementation will apply only to those EU Member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the PfP –who consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.⁴⁵⁰ After all those difficult periods, Ankara obtained an agreement that matched its objectives, although it was not exactly the one it wanted to have.⁴⁵¹

Turkish authorities underscore the fact that they attach importance to maintaining these arrangements and that they actively supported the development of ESDP from the outset, which emanate from their responsibilities of being both a candidate country for the EU and a NATO ally. Turkish officials even offered a committee to be built between the EU and NATO but it was not accepted.⁴⁵² Turkey also believes to have fulfilled her obligations towards the development of NATO-EU relations in accord with the Agreed Framework. The latter allows the involvement of the EU members which do not take part in the Alliance into the security/defence cooperation structures.

That said, some ‘bitterness’ is also observed on Turkish side. Having asserted their support and contributions to the ESDP process, Turkish authorities also express their discomfort. They point to the general European reluctance in what regards a tighter cooperation with Turkey. There are many facets of this fact, but the most salient dissatisfactions concern the application of the Nice Implementation Document (NID) on the involvement of the non-EU European allies in ESDP.

⁴⁴⁹ “ESDP: Implementation of the Nice provisions on the involvement of the non-EU European Allies Annex (II) to the Presidency Conclusions”, *Bulletin EU*, October 2002 (<http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200210/i1015.htm>).

⁴⁵⁰ This decision did not affect the rights and obligations of EU states in their capacity as EU Members: in the absence of any specific provision in the Treaty or in a Protocol annexed thereto (particular case of Denmark), all EU Member states will participate fully in defining and implementing the Union’s CFSP, which shall cover all matters relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Moreover, it did not block Cyprus and Malta’s representatives’ right to participate and vote in EU institutions and bodies, including the PSC, with regard to decisions which do not concern the implementation of such operations. See Annex 2: Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002, *Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002 Presidency Conclusions*, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 29/01/2003 (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf).

⁴⁵¹ Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 22/12/2008.

⁴⁵² Speech of Onur ÖYMEN in “Redefining NATO’s Security and Transatlantic Diplomacy Role in the 21st Century”, Ari Movement’s 11th International Security Conference, Elite World Hotel, Istanbul, 4-5 June 2009.

Turkish authorities maintain that the application of NID has not been conform neither to the spirit in which it was written nor to the letter of its provisions.⁴⁵³ Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gönül affirmed that the EU is aware of the practical problems caused by this document.⁴⁵⁴ The reasons of Turkish objections can be presented under various rubrics. Some are related to the participation of the non-EU European allies in peace-time ESDP consultations. Here, the main reproach is addressed to the deficiency of “permanent and continuing consultations covering the full range of security, defence and crisis management issues”, as stipulated in paragraph three. Especially the fact that the non-EU European Allies are neither consulted nor invited for exchange of view prior to any of the ESDP/CFSP actions taken in various regions (i.e. the Middle East, Caucasus, Africa and Asia) causes dissatisfaction for Turkey. In a way, the EU does not treat those allies better than third states by simply briefing them on its plans most of the time.

The conditionality of possible contributions to the Headline Goal 2010 reveals the feeling of embarrassment on Turkish side: Ankara declared that contributions will be considered on a ‘case-by-case’ basis and will depend on “the location and other circumstances of each operation or mission”. The neuralgic point is that whether or not to contribute to the ESDP operations will be the consequence of Turkey’s degree of participation in the decision-making processes of the planning and implementation phase of such operations.⁴⁵⁵ Hence, Turkey made publicly known that her will to reinforce the ESDP is not an open-check.

In fact, Turkey’s worries predated the Nice arrangements in that Europeans had given signals that they would build their own structures for military crisis management, and that would mean the exclusion of Turkey which was not yet (and would probably not be in the near future) member of the EU.⁴⁵⁶ As a consequence, it was necessary for Turkey to preserve its strong position in NATO. Using the latter position when and as necessary for strengthening its position in the European security and defence structures was not out of option.

⁴⁵³ Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008.

⁴⁵⁴ GÖNÜL Vecdi, *Official Report of Debates. First Sitting*, 02/06/2003, European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union (http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/cr/2003/cr01.php).

⁴⁵⁵ This position was held by the Minister of National Defence of Turkey at the Troika meeting held in the margins of the EU Defence Ministers meeting in May 2006.

⁴⁵⁶ For a similar view, see DOĞAN Esra, “Turkey in the New European Security and Defence Architecture”, *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, vol: 8, no: 1, March-May 2003 (<http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume8a.php>).

In addition, profiting from the *acquis* of the WEU was on Ankara's agenda as well, although its transfer to the EU and the development of the ESDP meant a more profound process than the mere institutional restructuring. In time, this would be understood better by Turkish authorities. As a matter of fact, the security/defence integration witnessed in the EU during the last decade went beyond the expectations, even for the EU members themselves. It is therefore not surprising to see that Turkey has worries on the new and quick developments in a realm that is of high significance for her.

To these general worries, more specific ones can also be added such as the relations with the EUMS and national headquarters involved in EU-led operations. Turkey's objection is that, arrangements that were made in NATO for non-NATO EU members have not been set as a ground for developing appropriate arrangements for the non-EU European allies in the EU military structures –not to mention that the latter arrangements are inadequate.

Appointing a national representative to the EUMS was the intention expressed by Turkey during discussions on the Nice Implementation Document. Thus, establishing direct and effective cooperation would be possible. In 2003, Vecdi Gönül was drawing attention to the fact that arrangements for the permanent representation of Turkish officers in EU military structures were not yet determined in a satisfactory way⁴⁵⁷ –a problem that still persists. Ankara also affirms that the effectiveness of the cooperation could have been increased by co-locating the above-mentioned representation with the EUMS.

In Turkish view, the involvement of the TAF in EU-led exercises has been limited (and did not conform to the spirit of the Implementation Document) as well. More importantly, the EU did not establish permanent and continuing consultations with Turkey to take into account her concerns and interests.⁴⁵⁸ This deficiency was of particular importance in EUJUST Themis (in Georgia) and EUJUST Lex (in Iraq) missions which took place in the immediate vicinity of Turkey.⁴⁵⁹

A related point is also made on the planning and preparation of EU-led operations. In the past, Turkey was invited to EU inner planning meetings in the context of the first NATO-EU exercise with a mere observer status, although Poland, Hungary and the Czech

⁴⁵⁷ GÖNÜL Vecdi, Op. Cit.

⁴⁵⁸ According to the article 12 of the Nice Implementation Document, consultations must take place “when any of the non-EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national security interests”.

⁴⁵⁹ The Middle East missions EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah can also be cited in the same vein.

Republic (who had the same status as Turkey back then) could express their opinions in these meetings. A more recent incident that embarrassed Ankara was not being informed about the Operation EUFOR RD Congo until the Force Generation Conference. Still, it made an important contribution to it, although it had not been involved in the pre-operational phase.

The cooperation mechanism between Ankara and Brussels is mainly of informative nature. This is the natural outcome of Turkey's not being a member of the Union. On this account, the ineffective utilisation of the *Committee of Contributors* (COC) was another issue raised by Turkish authorities. The Committee is a political platform where third contributing states are informed about the ESDP. Its meetings convene bi-monthly. Turkey can participate and have its say, but does not consider it an appropriate framework for political and strategic discussions concerning the ESDP. The reason is that the Political and Security Committee of the EU does not do more than taking into *account* of the views expressed by the CoC.⁴⁶⁰

Turkey's desire to take part in the EDA structures should also be mentioned. In the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) meeting of 2004, it was decided to transfer WEAG's functions to European Defence Agency. The situation is problematic for Turkey, in that being a full-fledged member of the WEAG did not require EU membership, unlike the case of EDA. Turkey has taken an active part in the armament cooperation in Europe, characterised by positive stance and constructive approach, through its membership of the WEAG and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO). Having some experience on the matter, Turkey was also "ready and willing to be involved in the activities of the new agency" and preferred indeed the WEAG-style structure which is built up in a way to embrace both EU members and non-EU European NATO allies, contributing, consequently, "to the EU headline goal within the framework of the ESDP" and to the "NATO and EU capability development process".⁴⁶¹

At first, Ankara wanted to create an administrative ground for the relations with the EDA and could even obtain some progress: as a non-EU WEAG-member, Turkey has, together with Norway, been invited to establish administrative arrangements with the EDA. Norway signed a document to this end. Nonetheless, Turkey's efforts hit the barbed-wire of Cyprus. At present, the EDA enjoys NATO's technical support within an agreed NATO-EU procedural framework. But, in the Brussels meeting of April 2005, Greek Cypriots blocked

⁴⁶⁰ DOĞAN Esra, Op. Cit.

⁴⁶¹ GÖNÜL Vecdi, Op. Cit.

the *Administrative Arrangements* between Turkey and the EDA and justified their action by “political considerations”. Ankara considers that the Arrangements are “part of the overall equation”, and expects the EU to resolve the current issue.⁴⁶²

Another unwelcome development was the obstruction of the efforts to reach a security agreement between Ankara and Brussels on exchanging classified information due to Greek, Maltese and Cypriot interventions. Ankara’s reaction to this event was to affirm that it would have a negative impact on the general relations with regard to ESDP, and on Turkish participation the 7th Framework Program.⁴⁶³

The Greek Cypriot move is related to Turkey’s objections to Cyprus’ access to classified information. An EU member state can participate in a NATO-EU cooperation if it is a member of NATO or party to NATO PfP. If the second case applies, the state should have concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO. Hence, the non-participation of the Cypriot government in NATO-EU cooperation is the result of the agreed framework between the two organisations, which are under the obligation to act according to the common decisions that constitute the basis of their relations.

These deficiencies lead to some perceptions, by Turkish authorities, on the place accorded to Turkey in European eyes. As mentioned earlier, Turkey believes to have been treated as a “third party” by the EU, although she deserves much better treatment for some undeniable reasons.⁴⁶⁴ Membership negotiations take place between Ankara and Brussels, yet the latter has not taken substantial steps to take into account this change in Turkey’s status from “candidate country” to “negotiating country”. Her significant contributions to ESDP in military and operational terms, alongside her NATO-ally-status, necessitate these steps as well.

Turkey does not want to lose her status shaped by the WEU arrangements and affirms that the EU must honour the agreements that define the ESDP. The European view is that Turkey interprets the official documents similarly to the relatively strong position she obtained in the WEU structure. What Turkey expects is to be allowed to participate in decision-making and decision-shaping processes of the EU. More openness from the EU side,

⁴⁶² The history of the Western European Armaments Group/Organisation, the transfer of its responsibilities to the EDA and the Joint Action of 12/07/2004 constitute the basis of Turkish expectation of seeing the EU solve this problem. Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008.

⁴⁶³ Ankara declared that it would be obliged to revise its financial contributions to the Framework Program. Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 22/12/2008.

⁴⁶⁴ Interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 06/05/2008.

concerning Turkey's national representations in EU institutions and structures, is a much-spelled request from Turkish authorities.

An important point that is made by Ankara relates to the impossibility of developing a strategic culture when Turkey does not take part in more common activities and does not become part of the decision-making process. For instance, Turkey's contributions to the Headline Goal Force Catalogue are still considered as 'supplementary'. Ankara believes that its involvement in the decisional mechanisms will lead to a "qualitative change" in the nature of Turkish participation –which will, in turn, affect not only NATO-EU cooperation, but also the relations between Turkey and the EU.⁴⁶⁵ In other words, the strengthening of relations in the field of the ESDP will lead to an amelioration of Turkey's integration to the EU. In fact, Turkey seems to want more than the EU can give.

The frustrating point for Turkey is to contribute military assets while being kept 'in the dark' during the planning phases of operations because of its non-EU-member-status. A Turkish diplomat bitterly explains his country's stance on the issue: "The EU can't continue to expect to have access to the biggest military in Europe and to treat us as a second class citizen."⁴⁶⁶ Within this context, Turkey's decision to lower its military support for future ESDP missions is not surprising.

Turkey, on several occasions, expressed her uneasiness over her exclusion from decision-making and command mechanisms in the ESDP operations. In 2007, she decided to withdraw its support from the latter.⁴⁶⁷ The decision was made on the grounds that, although Ankara has supported the ESDP since its earliest periods, fulfilled its commitments stemming from it and contributed to the EU's basic objectives, the EU has not developed tangible remedies for the difficulties met by Turkey and for meeting its expectations.⁴⁶⁸ It did not mean however the complete ending of Turkey's participation to the current operations. Ankara confirmed that it had withdrawn military assets, including an infantry brigade and air

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ BILEFSKY Dan, "Turkey Voices Frustration at Being Snubbed by the EU", *International Herald Tribune*, 08/06/2007 (<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/06/08/frontpage/ankara.php>).

⁴⁶⁷ The then Turkish National Defence Minister, Vecdi Gönül, affirmed that the special operations brigade – which would join the European security and defence policy Targeted Military Programme and Projects in 2010 – was withdrawn after it was placed among reserve units. He also stated that the General Staff would carry out a new planning if Turkey's demands remained unsatisfied. See "Turkey Withdraws Military Support for EU Security, Defence Policy", *BBC*, 07/06/07.

⁴⁶⁸ Turkey also expressed its uneasiness over the EU's describing its contributions only as an "appendix" in the documents. Ibid.

and naval supplies, from a list it had allotted to the bloc for peacekeeping missions in various conflict areas such as Bosnia, Congo and Kosovo.

The latest crisis between Turkey and NATO occurred during the negotiations related to EULEX Kosovo.⁴⁶⁹ The latter would work together with the 16.000-strong force KFOR, building hence a mixture of military and civilian components. But Turkey vetoed the EU's mission to Kosovo to use NATO capabilities because of the Cypriot presence in the mission, as a retaliation of enduring Cypriot blocking of her efforts of building close ties with the EU in the field of ESDP.⁴⁷⁰ In 2007, a similar situation had occurred in Afghanistan because there were Greek Cypriot policemen seconded in the EU police mission. Hence, both in Kosovo and in Afghanistan – where recourse to asset-borrowing under Berlin Plus would have been required in practice – it was impossible to achieve Alliance consensus on the actual release of military assets due to Turkish opposition.

The US intervention to the situation solved the problem. A formula of “de-facto arrangement” according to which the EU mission directly contacted the NATO commander in Afghanistan when it needed NATO capabilities, led to the resolution of the issue on the military level.⁴⁷¹ This case proves that, to unblock the EU-NATO relationship, the allies will need to address many of the issues just mentioned. It is generally admitted that Turkey has been asserting objections to the strengthening of NATO links with the EU as a way of revenging on being left in the waiting room while Cyprus joined the Union. Yet, statements of Turkish authorities point to a more complicated situation: Turkey believes that the EU does not understand its concerns, and that, in the resolution of the problems with Cyprus, the EU is more inclined to favour the latter.

For Turkey, the negative effect of the increase in the EU's role in security and defence matters is the possible erosion of the transatlantic link to which Turkey accords high importance. The more Brussels becomes able to conduct operations, the more there is a risk for NATO to see its status weakened. Such a scenario preoccupies Turkish officials. It is therefore not difficult to understand Ankara's efforts of seeking guarantees regarding its

⁴⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, “Kosovo: Council Establishes an EU Rule of Law Mission, Appoints an EU Special Representative”, Brussels., 16/02/2008 (<http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/new/home/eng/st06613.en08.pdf>).

⁴⁷⁰ GÜRCANLI Zeynep, “Turkey to Veto EU's Kosovo Police Mission”, *Hürriyet*, 18/01/2008 (<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/8256139.asp?gid=74&sz=4614>).

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

involvement in the planning of EU crisis management operations. The preoccupation is particularly higher when the operations have direct impact on its own security interests.

II.C. Special Cases of Crisis Management: Cyprus and Iraq

Because of the importance they had for Turkish foreign policy, the cases of Cyprus and Iraq deserve particular attention. Cyprus is one of the most complicated ‘crisis’ situations in the international arena and the longest-lasting one. Likewise, Iraq, before and after the American invasion, has been among the most preoccupying issue for Turkish policy-makers.

II.C.1. The Cypriot Question

Turkish military operations in Cyprus and the ensuing events have had a deep impact on Turkey’s relations with the outside world in general and with the EC/EU in particular. In order to give a complete picture of the case, the process that led to the peace operation of July 1974 will be given first. The following section will address the change in the course of events and its consequences.



Source: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/KIBRIS/CYPRUS-ISSUE.pdf>

II.C.1.a. Historical Background Prior to 1974

Conquered by several nations throughout the history, Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule from 1571 to 1878. Ever since the first Ottoman settlements, Greek and Turkish communities have lived dispersedly in Cyprus but the geographical dispersion has not led to cultural and social amalgamation, both communities having predominantly preferred to live in different sections. Difference of language and religion, as well as the proximity with the

“motherlands” were the main reasons of the persisting separateness. This is clearly reflected in the educational systems: For a long time teachers used schoolbooks that were “imported” from Greece and Turkey.⁴⁷²

In 1878, the United Kingdom began to govern the island until the proclamation of independence that came in 1960. Much inter-communal violence erupted before and after this date, forcing Turkey to take part in the search of solution for the unrest in the region –which inevitably put strain on its relations with Greece.

II.C.1.a.(1). Enosis and the recent history of Cyprus

A study on Cyprus as a Turkish Foreign Policy issue will be incomplete without mentioning Enosis, the movement that appeared in the later quarter of the 19th century. Its objective was to incorporate the regions with Greek ethnic majority to the “motherland” Greece, as in the examples of Crete and Dodecanese. In the case of Cyprus, it gained a special importance for it referred to long-term and painful process.

Enosis constituted the basis of the plebiscite that was held in Cyprus on January 15, 1950. The proposal on whether or not the island should be united with Greece was approved by ninety-six percent of the Greek Cypriot voters, while their Turkish counterparts opposed it. Anti-colonial sentiments were driving the idea of self-determination, as they were leading to the establishment of the terrorist organisation EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) which revealed its existence in 1955 under the leadership of Grivas by a series of attacks.⁴⁷³

EOKA’s ultimate goal was “*the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke*”. Although not stated in its initial declaration of existence which was printed and distributed on the 1st of April 1955, it is generally accepted that EOKA also had a target of achieving enosis. Originally, the Turkish community was conceived as an ally in the fight with an outside ruler and asked them to stay away from opposition to the rebellion and to avoid alliance with the British. Later on, Turkish Cypriot supporters of partition and members of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) were targeted as well.

⁴⁷² SOMMER Jerry, *Security in Cyprus: Threat Perceptions, Possible Compromises and the Role of the EU*, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn, 2005, p: 12.

⁴⁷³ Grivas, a Cyprus-born colonel in the Greek army, was the first leader of EOKA under his code name Digenis. This *nom de guerre* referred to Digenis Akritas, the epic hero of folk ballads who was a member of the elite Akrites (the border guards of the Byzantine Empire).

EOKA attracted the attention of the world through high profile operations that would make the press headlines.⁴⁷⁴ The turmoil it caused led to the Tripartite Conference of August 1955 in London at British invitation of Greek and Turkish governments' representatives in order to discuss on the future of Cyprus –more precisely, on the question of self determination. It is worth reminding that, in the de-colonization period, the British were endeavouring to release from Cypriot entanglement while preserving their strategic presence in the region. Within this context, some support of Ankara and Athens could bolster the construction of a mechanism in which Turkish Cypriot presence on the island would be guaranteed at least as a minority.⁴⁷⁵

Both Greece and Turkey accepted the invitation. The Eden plan maintained the domains of defence, foreign policy and public security under British governorship and asserted a proportional representation for Turkish Cypriots in the legislature and cabinet. The meeting came to an end without a positive income for it had failed to meet either party's demands by not offering self-determination (dissatisfaction for Greek Cypriots) or forbidding it (disappointment for Turkish Cypriots according to whom it meant the end of Turkish Cypriot existence on the island). Turkey's involvement in the Cypriot question is the main significance of the conference.

The next project for the settlement of Cypriot predicament was offered by the Field Marshal J. Harding who assumed his post in October 1955: a majority self-government with guarantees for Turkish-Cypriot minority rights. Although the negotiations between Harding and Makarios raised some hopes at the beginning, they collapsed in March. Makarios, closely identified with insurgency, was exiled to Seychelles a few days later. The absence of the Archbishop gave Grivas the political leadership thrust. More importantly, the violence in the island increased as a result of less moderate forces' gaining ground.

The proposal by Lord Radcliffe, announced in December 1956, was the next on line. Its originality was related to the possibility, in an undefined future, of independence. Ankara accepted it, but Athens and Makarios—who was in exile then—did not. Then came the last British plan on Cyprus: In June 1958, the Prime Minister H. MacMillan called for separate

⁴⁷⁴ In his memoirs Grivas admits to “*arouse international public opinion (...) by deeds of heroism and self sacrifice which will focus attention on Cyprus until our aims are achieved*”. Quoted in HOFFMAN Bruce, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p: 54.

⁴⁷⁵ For a study on the difficulties faced by the UK in that period, see RICHMOND Oliver, “Decolonisation and Post-Independence Causes of Conflict: The Case of Cyprus”, *Civil Wars*, vol: 5, no: 3, Autumn 2002, pp: 172-178.

communal legislative bodies and separate municipalities for the two communities, with a continuing role for Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Macmillan Plan was rejected by Greece because it involved the risk of partition of the island. Yet, the plan paved the way for discussions on Cyprus' future. For the first time, the idea of independence based on a territorial integrity was on the agenda of negotiations. The process was also supported by Makarios, for who better was to negotiate the terms of independence rather than accepting MacMillan's project.

1958 was remarked by lots of clashes between the two communities claiming lives of hundreds and displacing thousands of people. The events also mounted tensions between Ankara and Athens. From then on, in addition to the unrest and assassinations on the island, the eventuality of an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey were looming large.

II.C.1.a.(2). The proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus

It is the climate in which, the following year, Zurich and London agreements were signed. The following instruments were installed by the agreements:

- the *Treaty of Establishment* of 16 August 1960⁴⁷⁶ setting up the Republic of Cyprus whose territory will comprise the island of Cyprus excluding the military bases of Dhekhelia and Akrotiri (which remained the UK sovereign base areas);
- the *Treaty of Alliance* of 16 August 1960⁴⁷⁷, where
 - Cyprus, Greece and Turkey pledged to resist any attack or aggression directed against the independence or territorial integrity of Cyprus,
 - the necessity of establishing tripartite headquarters and stationing military contingents (950 Greek and 650 Turkish) on the island is foreseen;
- the *Treaty of Guarantee* of 16 August 1960,⁴⁷⁸ where Cyprus pledged to maintain the constitutional order built up by the Treaties. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom are the guarantors of this order and Cyprus' independence and integrity.

For the Turks, the independence of the island meant an indirect enosis as well, but they were aware that the partition of the island was technically impossible. Besides, for Ankara, the improvement of Turkish Cypriots' position was a decisive factor to prevent an

⁴⁷⁶ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 382, p. 10 (I No. 5476).

⁴⁷⁷ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 397, p. 289 (Item no. 5712).

⁴⁷⁸ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 382, p. 4 (Item no. 5475).

objection: Turkish minority had gained the status of community. Having an army division on the island may hardly compare to the demand of military base, but it was still acceptable for Turkey. After all, the right of intervention foreseen in the Treaties was providing a solid security umbrella for Turkish Cypriots.

The agreements prohibited both *enosis* and the Turkish desire of *taksim* (division) while compelling all Cypriots to make a fresh start by burying the past and getting rid of their identities, which was a great challenge. More importantly, they were far from matching Greek Cypriots' aspirations. Makarios obtained the necessary domestic support by qualifying the independence as one stage towards Enosis.⁴⁷⁹ For most Greek Cypriots, the new Republic was not more than an "interim solution". The Archbishop would not sign the London Agreement if he had another option, but he had to yield to the political pressure exerted by the UK⁴⁸⁰ aggravated by the lack of Greek counter-support. For Greek Cypriots, such a "dictatorship" delegitimized the arrangements laid out in Zurich and London right from the outset, creating thus an encouragement to call them into question. That the national anthem of Greece was adopted by the Republic of Cyprus is also noteworthy for showing Greek Cypriot unwillingness to share the power with the "18% Turkish Cypriot numerical minority".

Hence, the treaties engendered displeasure and antagonism of the Community leaders. The independence was a *second best* option, a compromise between interest and exigencies that granted the external powers a significant right to interfere in Cyprus' domestic affairs.⁴⁸¹ On top of all, the unfortunate situation was that Zurich and London agreements could build an independent state but not a nation.⁴⁸² For all the time that the two communities lived together, inter-communal links remained inexistent. Fierce communal clashes occurred in parallel to the anti-colonial protestations. From this point of view, there is nothing surprising in the failure of the artificial construction of Cyprus state.

At this point, it is important to emphasise the pertinence of guarantee mechanisms built by constitutive treaties. Firm guarantees were necessary to keep the Republic away from a constant threat of dissociation or union with another state. Nevertheless, the Cypriot case

⁴⁷⁹ DREVET Jean François, *Chypre en Europe*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p: 101.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ De CUETO Carlos, REAU Marion, PERES Hubert, "La Turquie et l'Internationalisation du Conflit Ethnique de Chypre", *Pole Sud*, No : 23, Novembre 2005, p: 99.

⁴⁸² Archbishop Makarios is reported to have stated this fact in The Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail, on 28 March 1963. See *Cyprus (Historical Overview)*, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-historical-overview.en.mfa>).

proved that the association of communities that do not want to share a common future is destined to fail.

II.C.1.a.(3). The failure of the Republic

The two communities could not work together in the framework drawn by the constitution of 1960, which was in fact indicating the failure of the Republic of Cyprus. Only three years after the proclamation of the latter, Makarios advanced a thirteen-point list of changes that he deemed suitable to suppress impediments to the functioning of the government.⁴⁸³ Turkey showed firm opposition, qualifying the proposal as an attempt to annihilate the constitution.

The incidents that started in December 1963⁴⁸⁴ set off a conference in London with the participation of Greece, Turkey and the UK and the two communities of the island. Both Greek and Turkish communities maintained firmly their traditional positions: an independence leading to *enosis* versus *taksim* (or double enosis). The Greek Cypriot intention to abolish all the rights that its Turkish counterpart acquired under the Zurich and London agreements further contributed to the Conference's failure. After that, the situation did not cease to deteriorate: heavy casualties (including assassinations after kidnappings and hostage-takings), uncontrolled activities by irregular forces, separation of the members of the two communities, governmental inefficacy, and risk of military intervention by Turkey or Greece which all pointed to the need of UN forces. Hence, on 4 March 1964, the Security Council

⁴⁸³ 1) The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned. 2) The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 3) The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House. 4) The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 5) The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished. 6) Unified Municipalities to be established. 7) The administration of Justice to be unified. 8) The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished. 9) The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law. 10) The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. 11) The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five. 12) All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. 13) The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

⁴⁸⁴ They went on until the end of 1967 in the form of armed conflicts. For the Turkish Cypriots, this period was probably the most difficult ever witnessed in their history. See ERTEKÜN Necati Münir, *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, pp: 14-15.

passed the Resolution 186, which brought into existence the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

In June 1964, the news concerning the situation of Turkish Cypriots created a strong public support in Turkey for a military intervention on Cyprus. Nevertheless, such a move was precluded by the US president Johnson. The letter he addressed to the Prime Minister İnönü implicated important hurdles for Turkey's intervention.⁴⁸⁵ One of them was about the eventual isolation of Turkey in case of Soviet aggression: Johnson made it clear that in the case of Soviet intervention to Cyprus, NATO allies may not protect Turkey. Another fact was about the necessity for Turkey to obtain the US authorisation for the use of military assistance in cases which were outside the context agreed between Turkey and the US in July 1947. He made it clear that his administration would object to the use of US-supplied military equipment for Turkey's intervention in Cyprus.

In July 1964, Dean Acheson set up a plan that aimed to meet Turkey's security concerns. For Turkey to consent to Cyprus' union with Greece, a portion of the island (preferably in Karpas peninsula which is an extension towards Turkish ports from the main body of the island) would be ceded to Turkey in perpetuity⁴⁸⁶ where it would be able to install a military base with rights to deploy land, sea and air forces. The plan brought forward special arrangements for Turkish Cypriots such as separate geographical units with a distinct regional administration scheme. Despite the amendments made after the Greek Cypriots had declined the first version, both sides rejected the proposal.

The UNSC Resolution 186 assigned to the UN secretary-general the responsibility to appoint a mediator to promote a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. Galo Plaza Lasso issued his formulation in April 1965, recommending that a settlement could best be achieved on the basis of a unitary government – rather than a federal structure or power-sharing mechanisms – ensuring adequate protection and guarantees for Turkish Cypriot individual and minority rights. His report was firmly rejected by the Turkish side and Plaza Lasso resigned in December 1965, the UN role in the peace-making efforts being suspended for some time.

⁴⁸⁵ At that time the US were worried of Cyprus developing into a "Mediterranean Cuba". The communist party of Cyprus (AKEL), whose members were mostly Greek Cypriot, was well represented in the parliament. President Archbishop Makarios' ties to the movement of the non-aligned countries and to the Soviet Union were getting stronger. In the crisis of 1963/64 Makarios even repeatedly called for a Soviet military intervention in the event of a Turkish intervention on the island.

⁴⁸⁶ Changed into a lease of 50 years in the second version of the plan.

After 1965, the inter-communal conflict persisted accompanied by the economic embargo applied on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves by Greek Cypriots. The inter-communal violence in 1967 loomed a Turkish military intervention which would have possible military repercussions with Greece. This risk was defused through the mediation led by US envoy Cyrus Vance. But once again, the temporary solution was far from addressing long-standing issues.

In 1967, a second major attack was launched against the Turkish Cypriot community, with the same objective of realising enosis. The crisis slackened off when Greece withdrew its troops from the island after Turkey had threatened to intervene in order to protect Turkish Cypriots and massed troops near the border with Greece. This led to the beginning of inter-communal negotiations, with no positive outcome. The Makarios government opposed to the establishment of separate municipalities which was against the unitary structure of the state.

From 1968 to 1974, a series of inter-communal talks took place under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. At the beginning of the process, Rauf Denktaş and Glafkos Klerides looked for ways to normalize the existence of the enclaves through separate administrative structures in the constitution. But their efforts did not bear fruit. The negotiations resumed in 1972, but Turkish side had strong opposition on the unitary state formula. The negotiation atmosphere was worsened by the political chaos in the Greek-Cypriot community and in its relations with Greece.

In the period 1963-1974, statistical data on Turkish Cypriot population were terrific. Half of the population remained dependent of the Turkish Red Crescent to survive. A quarter of the Community was in a refugee status. For all those years, thousands dwelled in unliveable refugee camps which were subject to inhuman attacks. The area occupied by the Turks fell from one third to 3% of the island.⁴⁸⁷ In the end, several hundred people – mainly Turkish Cypriots – were killed. Approximately the half of the Turkish Cypriots had to flee their homes by leaving their property behind to find shelter in enclaves for several years. Hundreds of people were murdered –most of which were Turkish Cypriots.

The repression was felt heavily by them practically in every aspect of life.⁴⁸⁸ In 1974, the plan to wipe out all Turks from the island (to end the Turkish problem once and for all) was offered to Makarios by the Greek junta –which, in order to achieve Enosis, secretly

⁴⁸⁷ GIBBONS Harry Scott, *The Genocide Files* (Book Three), C. Bravos, London, 1997, p: 388.

⁴⁸⁸ For a detailed analysis, see *Ibid* (all three volumes).

invaded Cyprus by implementing a big military project in a couple of days. The Greek objective was to exterminate the Turks after overthrowing Archbishop Makarios. From the outset, the genocide programme was linked to the military High Command of Greece and it was put into practice “with the approval of the Cypriot government” which had no Turkish Cypriot member at that time.⁴⁸⁹

II.C.1.a.(4). The coup in Cyprus and Turkey’s military intervention

The remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw continuing hostility and increasing segregation between the two communities, punctuated by intermittent crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for *enosis* by nationalist elements in the Greek-Cypriot community. In 1974, the situation erupted into a major crisis: a coup d’état was orchestrated by the military-junta-governed Athens against Makarios, supported by rebellious elements of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The aim of the coup was to unify the island with Greece.

Archbishop Makarios, before the UNSC on 19th of July 1974, accused unequivocally Greece to attempt to invade the island by using Nikos Sampson and the agents of the Greek regime stationed on the island. The word ‘invasion’ is particularly stressed in his speech. He maintained that, by extending its dictatorship to Cyprus, the Greek junta violated its independence and the democratic rights of its people. It is important to note that both Greek and Turkish people of Cyprus suffer from the consequences of the invasion.⁴⁹⁰

Makarios went further by putting the blame on the Greek government for the failure of peace talks between the two communities. Admitting that the progress on the latter issue has been unsatisfactory, he underlined the impossibility to find a peaceful solution to Cyprus problem after the coup: all parties had agreed that the talks would take place on the basis of independence. The Archbishop accused the regime in Greece of being double-faced on the grounds that it affirmed support for the island’s independence while creating and supporting terrorism.⁴⁹¹

In 1974, the political context of Cyprus was highly convenient for Turkey’s military intervention to the island. The coup had raised the spectre of Greek control of Cyprus and the

⁴⁸⁹ See GIBBONS Harry Scott, Op. Cit., pp: 399-410.

⁴⁹⁰ *Compte Rendu Sténographique Provisoire de la 1780^{ème} Séance* (Tenue au Siège, à New York, le vendredi 19 juillet 1974, à 15 h 30). Quoted in FEYZİOĞLU Turhan, Op. Cit., p: 224-225.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

military junta had established a puppet government in Nicosia. Such a government could hardly benefit from international support. Besides, Turkish community of the island had been suffering from Greek Cypriot offensive for almost two decades, and Turkey had not been able to intervene in 1960s. Ankara requested the dismissal of Sampson, the withdrawal of all Greek officers from Cyprus and the respect of its independence. But these demands have not been met.

Turkey intervened on 20 July 1974, having the right to do so under the Treaty of Guarantee unilaterally, as concerted action had not proved possible. The then Prime Minister Ecevit announced the decision of his government on the radio at 6:30 in the morning, shortly after Turkish Armed Forces had begun to land troops on the island:

“The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and sea. Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. Meanwhile, I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly the United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have the dispute settled through diplomatic methods”.⁴⁹²

Launched with relatively few troops, the Turkish landing had limited success at first, and culminated everywhere on the island in the occupation of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves by the Greek forces. After securing a more or less satisfactory bridgehead Turkish forces agreed to a cease-fire on 23 July 1974. The same day civilian government under Karamanlis took office in Athens, the day the Sampson coup collapsed. Glafcos Clerides became the Acting President in the absence of Makarios.

II.C.1.b. The Second Stage of Turkey’s Intervention and Its Consequences

As a Turkish scholar argues, it is possible to consider Turkey’s intervention of 20 July 1974 which “aimed at safeguarding the rights of a community that were about to be suppressed along with the community itself” as a legal act of self-defence when the specific conditions of urgent necessity that invalidate the principle of non-resort to the use of force are taken into consideration.⁴⁹³ The intervention of 1974 provided for the security of Turkish

⁴⁹² Radio Ankara, July 20, 1974 in Couloumbis, Theodore A., (1983), *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*; p. 93. Quoted in MEYER James H., *Policy Watershed. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974*, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Case Study 3/00 (<http://wws-edu.princeton.edu/research/cases/cyprus.pdf>).

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

Cypriots and the possibility to establish their own administration, but this marked also the beginning of a difficult period for Turkey –a fact that was understood quickly.

The return to power of President Makarios sparked the hopes that Turkish forces would withdraw from the island and a return to a status quo ante would be possible. Nevertheless, Turkey changed her attitude and requested the creation of a new governmental structure for the island: either a loose bi-zonal federation or a six-canton federation. The latter was proposed by Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güreş who demanded a prompt answer although Clerides wanted thirty-six to forty-eight hours to consider the plans. This attitude caused the breakdown of negotiations that involved Turkey, Greece, the two communities of Cyprus and the UK.

Turkish ultimatum was mostly regarded as unreasonable for adequate time to study it was not given to the Greek side. Moreover, it reinforced the belief that Turkey wanted to use its military superiority in order to fulfil its strategic aims by settling a military base in the north of the island. The subsequent Geneva Conference, convened on August 9, may be described as a race against time. The Greek needed to buy some time hoping that the international opinion can shift, and Turks were aware of that.⁴⁹⁴ Thus, Ankara had two problems to deal with quickly: The loss of the international community's support and the necessity of saving Turkish Cypriots whose enclaves were still occupied by Greek forces. Turkey explained its reason of hurry by the fact that Cypriot Turks were still being kept as hostages by Cypriot Greek forces.

The Conference convened with the participation of representatives from both Cypriot communities. During the period separating the two conferences, 33 more Turkish Cypriot villages in the south (outside the area protected by Turkish troops) had to be evacuated. Others were under an “inhuman siege” and subject to massacres and annihilation.⁴⁹⁵ For Ankara, these events were indicating that the peace mission in Cyprus was not accomplished.

On August 14, Turkish Armed Forces launched the second military operation on the island. Turkey did not withdraw her troops after the constitutional order had been re-established. Ever since the intervention, Cyprus is divided by a so called “Green line“, an

⁴⁹⁴ DREVET Jean François, *Op. Cit.*, p: 195.

⁴⁹⁵ See *Human Rights in Cyprus*, published by the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Committee, Nicosia, 1979. Quoted in ERTEKÜN Necati Münir, *Op. Cit.*, p: 35.

internal border with barbed wire and mine fields that was originally drawn in 1963. The two virtually mono-ethnic parts of the island are separated by a UN controlled buffer zone.

The second intervention is considered more a strategic calculation. On the 16th of August, when Ankara accepted a cease-fire following the UNSC resolution, Turkish troops had occupied the northern part of Cyprus until the 35th parallel, reaching the 1964 offer on the partition of the island.⁴⁹⁶ After the ceasefire, some more space is annexed to the future federated state of Cyprus, providing a connection to some enclaves; the final frontier is drawn in September.⁴⁹⁷ Turkey's international reputation suffered as a result of the precipitate move of the Turkish military to extend control to a third of the island.

The consequences of Turkey's intervention are suitable to Turkish Cypriot demands that were rejected by the Greek side throughout the years. Turkish population is grouped in one single part of the island, on a larger land than the population ratio would require. Its safety is ensured: except some minor incidents, Turkish Cypriots do not face the threat of extermination. But this happened in exchange of a price to pay both for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey since the division of the island: international isolation with heavy political and economic consequences.

II.C.1.b.(1) International Reactions to the Operations

The intervention of July 20 was a legitimate and legal action. Based on the Cypriot Constitution and on the Treaty of Guarantee which was part of the Constitution, it was a defensive reflex of preventing the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and protecting Turkish Cypriot community against the atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriots under Athens' tutelage.⁴⁹⁸ Many civilians, mostly Turks, lost their lives during the conflicts.⁴⁹⁹ The Treaty gives "each of the three guaranteeing Powers" the right to take action "with the sole aim of

⁴⁹⁶ DREVET Jean François, Op. Cit., p: 196.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Turkey's July 20, 1974 intervention on Cyprus was legal, say the Athens Court of Appeals (in its decision no. 2658/79 of March 21, 1979) and the Council of Europe. The latter adopted Resolution 573 on 29 July 1974 which states the legitimacy of Turkish intervention by pointing to "the failure of the attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement which led the Turkish Government to exercise its right of intervention in accordance with Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960". See SALIH Halil Ibrahim, *Cyprus: Ethnic Political Counterpoints*, University Press of America, Maryland, 2004, p: 36; *Resolution 573 (1974) on the Situation in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean Area*, European Yearbook 1974, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, p: 432.

⁴⁹⁹ As Sampson confessed himself to the Greek newspaper *Eleftherotipia* in 1981, had Turkey not intervened, not only Enosis would have been proclaimed, but also Turks of Cyprus would be annihilated. TÜRKMEN Fusun, Op. Cit., p: 77.

reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” when common or concerted action of the guarantors is not possible.

Turkey’s official position during the UNSC debates was based on the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee according to which the three guarantors could be able to launch military action alone or jointly. The UNSC resolution 353 had already proven this validity, by referring to the “authority of international agreements”. In other words, the peace operation of 20 July 1974 met the responsibility granted to the guarantor states. Turkey rightfully believed that the operation would meet international support. The Turkish intervention was first welcomed by the world generally because it had put an end to the instability and massacres.

Nevertheless, the aftermath of the second military operation has been troublesome for Turkey. Some 140 to 160.000 Cypriot Greeks fled to the South creating a considerable refugee problem which received international assistance. The following year, approximately 50.000 Cypriot Turks moved to the North and the 10.000 Greek Cypriots were forced to move to the South. Two homogenous ethnic zones were hence created in Cyprus following the events of 1974. The casualties of military operations launched by Turkey reached 2850 while 1600 people (mainly Greek Cypriots) were missing. 3.500 people, mainly Greek Cypriots, are reported dead –including the losses of life that occurred during and after the operation.

Turkey, denounced of having invaded Cyprus, has come under severe criticism. The UNSC Resolution 353, adopted on the day of the first military intervention launched by Turkish Armed Forces, requested an immediate end of it –accompanied with the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel who are not covered by international agreements. The Security Council called on all related parties to enter into negotiations in order to put a rapid end to the situation of conflict. Pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 353, a Conference convened in Geneva on 25 July with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of guarantor powers. At the end of the Conference, it was decided to set up a security zone and the immediate ending of the situation of war was demanded (including the evacuation of all Turkish Cypriot enclaves by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces, and, the exchange or release of military or civilian detainees) along with the beginning of negotiations to restore peace and to re-establish the constitutional government in Cyprus.⁵⁰⁰

⁵⁰⁰ The Ministers also pointed to a “just and lasting settlement acceptable to all parties concerned” and to “the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community”.

The continuation of these contacts was demanded by the UNSC Resolution 361 of 30 August 1974 as well. The latter also deplored the situation in Cyprus, stating that the displacement of a large number of people on the island has brought the need of humanitarian assistance.⁵⁰¹ The Resolution 365, which reiterated the conditions of returning to normalcy on the island, maintained that it was necessary to let the refugees return to their homes. Similar concerns were expressed in other resolutions formulated by both the UNSC and the UNGA.

The immediate reflex of the European Community was to back the UN Resolution 353. It thus urged the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island and called on both sides to ceasefire and to re-establish the constitutional order in Cyprus. In the same vein, on August 14, the Community solemnly addressed to Greece and Turkey to pursue negotiations while reminding the risks of engaging a military action whose consequences would be incalculable.⁵⁰² Because the EC was supporting a negotiated solution, it is easy to maintain that the continuing Turkish presence on northern Cyprus would cause problems for the relations between Ankara and Brussels.

The European Commission of Human Rights was another institution that condemned Turkey because of the acts committed in Cyprus. It found Turkey guilty of repeated violations of the European Convention of Human Rights in 1976⁵⁰³ and 1983⁵⁰⁴ on several counts including displacement of people, deprivation (of liberty, life and possessions) and ill-treatment. Overall, the Commission noted that only Turkish side was responsible of the violations. Turkey had failed to secure the rights and freedoms of the Greek Cypriot community in accordance with the articles of the Convention. In 1983, the Commission was concluding that the Greek Cypriots who were still missing were unlawfully deprived of their liberty in Turkish custody in 1974 and that Turkey had failed to account for the fate of these persons.

⁵⁰¹ The Resolution was reminding that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had already been appointed as a coordinator of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus with the task of coordinating relief assistance to be provided by UN programmes and agencies as well as from other sources. See annex 1, p: 216.

⁵⁰² YAKEMTCHOUK Romain, *La Politique Etrangere de l'Union Européenne*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2005, p: 344.

⁵⁰³ Applications numbers 6780/74 and 6950/75, Cyprus against Turkey, Report of the Commission, European Commission of Human Rights, 10/07/1976.

⁵⁰⁴ Application number 8007/77, Cyprus against Turkey, Report of the Commission, European Commission of Human Rights, 04/10/1983.

II.C.1.b.(2). The Definitive North-South Separation

Despite the above-mentioned reactions, a state-building process in Northern Cyprus has been implemented after the 1974 operations. Turkish Federated state of Cyprus (TFSC), proclaimed in 1975, was the first polity instituted there. Rauf Denktaş, a prominent figure in Turkish resistance, became the leader of Turkish community and remained so until 2004. The constitution had a large approval of the population, but sparked reactions in the international arena.⁵⁰⁵ In fact, contrarily to what its name suggests, it was not a federal state. The naming revealed the willingness to join a federation of Greco-Turkish state of Cyprus.

Yet, such a federation has never been constituted. On 15 November 1983, after eight years of unsuccessful negotiations with the leadership of Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish entity declared its independence on the principle of self-determination and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed. An option of joining the Cypriot federation was still invoked however, by announcing the new Republic's aim to assert its status as co-founder of the future federal Republic of Cyprus.

With the resolution 541 of November 1983, the UNSC deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities on the establishment of the TRNC and considered it legally invalid. Next year, the Resolution 550 stated that the exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the TRNC was a supplementary secessionist act. The move was qualified again as "illegal and invalid" and its immediate withdrawal was necessary. In addition, in the eyes of the UNSC, constitutional referendum and elections in the TRNC were further consolidating the "purported independent state" and the existing division in Cyprus. The whole international community was called upon not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot state and not to facilitate or assist it in any way.

For its part, the Greek-Cypriot administration (essentially the 1960 constitutional structure represented only by Greek Cypriots) assumed the mantle of the Republic of Cyprus, and, as such, has gained international legitimacy and recognition. Bolstered by its status, it succeeded in securing an economic embargo and cultural and political restrictions on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

In time, many initiatives backed by international actors have been taken to resolve the stalemate; but no progress has been made. Only limited improvement in the relations

⁵⁰⁵ The UNSC "regretted" this move. The ECHR declined to recognise the new state. Ibid.

between the two Cypriot communities could be witnessed in the following years, without any agreement about the future of a common state being reached. During the third round of inter-communal talks held in Vienna between 31 July and 2 August 1975, an agreement was reached between the two sides on the voluntary exchange of populations organised and assisted by the UNFICYP.⁵⁰⁶ Based on the long history of violence, Ankara has forbidden the return of Greek Cypriots to the North.

The so-called “Annan Plan” has been the most important one in the island’s history. Wide discussions took place both in northern and in southern Cyprus. It’s the only resolution project for whose approval the two communities went to the referenda. Main features of the plan were:

- one Cypriot state with one international personality and one nationality
- two administratively independent communities (based on Swiss federal model)
- A new constitution adapted to the political and social *acquis* of the EU
- A Collective Presidential Council with six voting members (four Greek and two Turkish Cypriots) with three additional non-voting members (two Greek and one Turkish Cypriots)
- A presidency of 10 months shifting back and forth between the two communities.
- A Senate and a Chamber of Deputies of 48 members of each⁵⁰⁷
- Limitation of Turkish territories to 28,5% of the island
- Partial return of Greek refugees to the north
- Partial return of mainland Turks settled in the island
- Strong decrease in military forces of both sides
- A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges; to be appointed by the Presidential Council.

The Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the UN-sponsored plan in an April 2004 referendum whereas the Greek Cypriot side rejected it. Before the referendum, Washington and Brussels had warned that there would be negative consequences if the plan was not approved. The warnings seem to have aimed only the Turkish side which, despite its approval, still suffers from international isolation. The Greek Cypriots enjoy the EU membership and gained a more advantaged position of bargaining in the future unification negotiations.

⁵⁰⁶ ERTEKÜN Necati Münir, Op. Cit., p: 39.

⁵⁰⁷ The Senate will be made of 24 representatives from each side while the Chamber of Deputies’ members will be based on population. The latter will be made of at least 12 members of the less populous community.

I.C.1.b.(3). Perspectives on the Future of Cyprus

It is worth highlighting that Cypriot question was much more than an ethnic conflict. It had an important place in the policies of two regional powers and it was an inextricable part of their reciprocal problems and balance policies.⁵⁰⁸ Both “motherlands” had conflicting views on the future of the island: Greece desired the de-turkification of the island, preferably through Enosis whereas Turkey opted for building a Turkish constituent state on equal footing with Greek Cypriots. The strategic position of the island, which is qualified as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, is also worth taking into consideration. With two vast British airbases, Cyprus is right next to the Middle East region. This characteristic makes the involvement of great powers’ strategic calculations inevitable. For instance, it is hard to refute that British and the US preoccupation on the return of Akrotiri and Dhekelia bases to Cyprus affected these two governments’ attitude towards Turkish operation.⁵⁰⁹

The three-and-half-decade-long presence of the Turkish military on the island makes the peace operation conducted by Turkey incompatible with the principles asserted by the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect. However, in the current situation characterised by the lack of political solution, the security of Turkish Cypriot community can not be ensured.⁵¹⁰ International guarantees, including that promised by the UK and the actual presence of the UNFICYP failed to protect the Turkish Cypriots. That is the reason why they believe that the only effective guarantee can be provided by Turkey. In case of Turkish troops’ withdrawal, those of the Greek Cypriots will be unopposed.⁵¹¹

The experience of vulnerability to Greek Cypriot attacks and the suffering caused by the events that followed the independence has led to a specific perception of security among Turkish Cypriots. For the majority of them, Turkish military presence on the island is conceived as the guarantee of peace, not an invasion. As for the Greek Cypriot public opinion, the beginning of the whole conflict and the unique reason of the island’s division is the

⁵⁰⁸ USLU Nasuh, “Kıbrıs Sorunu” (The Cyprus Problem) in BAL İdris (Ed.), Op. Cit., p: 347.

⁵⁰⁹ By warding off Turkish military operation in 1964, President Johnson had aimed to prevent a military clash between Greece and Turkey. The US had a vital interest in limiting the influence of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean, an area of great importance because of its vicinity to the Middle East. A military involvement of the USSR could have caused considerable losses and an irreversible strategic deficiency for the Atlantic Alliance.

⁵¹⁰ TÜRKMEN Fusun, “Cyprus 1974 Revisited: Was It Humanitarian Intervention?”, *Perceptions*, Winter 2005, p: 73.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

Turkish invasion in 1974. Therefore, the safety of the island can be ensured only by preventing the risk of Turkish military intervention.

The failure of unification projects may be explained by the lack of willingness to have a common future. Perceptions of history are divided along ethnic lines in Cyprus.⁵¹² The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations have an entirely different collective memory of the past “in content and references”.⁵¹³ The Greek like to remember very little about the casualties preceding the 1974 operation. For the Turks, it is embarrassing to face the casualties that resulted from 1974 operation. The result of the referenda on Annan plan shows that Turkish Cypriots can envisage the abolishment of the green line while their southern neighbours do not.

At this point, the change in Turkish government’s position should be underscored. “No solution is not a solution” is the motto that defines the position of the AKP government on the Cyprus issue. Turkish executive wanted to push the efforts to put an end to the division of the island and show clearly that Turks are not a barrier against the solution. Yet, the strongest announce of the will to solve the problem ever announced since 1974 did not find echo on the Cypriot side.

In July 2005, Turkey extended its Customs Union to the EU’s 10 new member countries, without excluding Cyprus. Nevertheless, this move did not amount to the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Nor did it result in lifting the embargo against Greek Cypriot vessels and planes, although it represents a failure for the implementation of the Customs Union Agreement. As long as a solution agreed by the TRNC is not reached, Turkey’s relations with Cyprus are unlikely to be any better. At present, this remains a problematic issue for the relations between Turkey and the EU.

II.C.2. The Iraqi Case


Since the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraqi question has been at the top of Turkish foreign policy agenda with various dimensions that are of political and economic nature with significant security implications. Turkey closed the pipeline that was Baghdad’s main source of revenue and opened NATO bases on its territory to international coalition. She hence

⁵¹² SOMMER Jerry, Op. Cit., p: 12

⁵¹³ ANASTASIOU Harry, “Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol: 39, no: 5, September 2002, p: 582.

played an important, however ignored, role in the operation to reset the regional order by the international community.

In fact, Turkey has paid a heavy price for war and instability in Iraq even before the above-mentioned war, in terms of large-scale refugee flows, the disruption of trade and oil flows and perhaps most critically the ability of PKK insurgents to use Northern Iraq as a base to attack Turkish armed forces.⁵¹⁴ The war itself and the post-war settlement over Iraq inflicted heavy losses to Turkey in economic terms. Estimates of cumulative economic losses were between 40 and 60 billion dollars, including indirect costs. Many economists blamed the 1991 war for the downturn in the Turkish economy.



Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/international/iraqi_elections_ed_20050128.shtml

The second Iraqi war occurred after the failure of obeying to the UNSCOM directives. As a consequence, the international coalition forces intervened in Iraq. The dethroning of Saddam Hussein and the ending of Baathist regime following the US-led occupation in March 2003 created a new era for the whole region. The synopsis on Turkish foreign policy rightfully points to the vital interest that Turkey has in the ‘prompt return to normalcy’ in Iraq –by reminding that, for more than two decades, Turkey has been directly affected from “the events that have unfolded in and around Iraq”.⁵¹⁵ She therefore had a

⁵¹⁴ EMERSON Michael, TOCCI Nathalie, *Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead. Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy*, Centre for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Papers, no:1, August 2004, p: 23.

⁵¹⁵ Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy, Op. Cit.

national interest in supporting the UN Security Council resolution 1483 which reaffirms the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq and the Iraqi nation's ownership and possession of its resources.

II.C.2.a. Points of Consideration for Turkey's Intervention

Iraqi case is one of the best examples to illustrate that joining national interests with international responsibilities is an arduous task. The main issues arising from Iraqi crisis are related to the points mentioned below.

II.C.2.a.(1). Northern Iraq and the PKK question

The complications caused by the relations between PKK members and the Iraqi Kurds – materialised by cross-border terrorist activities – constitute a very important security problem for Turkey. The PKK is using Iraq's northern region as a staging ground to plan and launch attacks against Turkish targets. Turkey pointed to the “*urgent attention*” and “*effective measures*” necessary for the Iraqi-origin terrorist assaults on her territory.⁵¹⁶ There is a real difficulty for Ankara to deal effectively with this problem: Despite intermittent military operations launched against PKK targets in Northern Iraq, the organisation is still conducting terrorist activities in Turkey.

Following intense PKK attacks on Turkish soil, the Counter-Terrorism High Council convened extraordinary meetings and terror summits. The Council decided that, since PKK attacks emanate from Northern Iraq, Turkey will use its rights if Iraq does not fulfil its responsibilities to halt PKK terror. This meant that military operation is seriously considered.⁵¹⁷

Iraqi stance causes embarrassment for Turkey. Indeed, Iraqi authorities made some official denouncements that suit Turkey. President Jalal Talabani is reported to have appealed the PKK to desist fighting and to transform into a civilian and political organisation or leave Iraqi territory.⁵¹⁸ Nonetheless, despite official denouncements, no direct action against the

⁵¹⁶ Synopsis of Turkey's Foreign Policy, Op. Cit.

⁵¹⁷ High-level statements also underline Turkey's determination. President Gül, for instance, said: “While respecting the territorial integrity of Iraq, Turkey will not shy away from paying whatever price is necessary to protect its rights, its laws, its indivisible unity and its citizens”. See BUTCHER Tim, HOLT Richard, “Turkey Threatens Iraq Invasion to Hit PKK”, *Daily Telegraph*, 24/10/2007.

(<http://www.telegraph.com.uk/news/worldnews/1567005/Turkey-threatens-Iraq-invasion-to-hit-PKK.html>)

⁵¹⁸ BUTCHER Tim, HOLT Richard, Op. Cit.

PKK is taken by Baghdad –which is very inadequate to satisfy Turkey’s needs. In addition, there are serious doubts that the terrorist organisation is fed by Iraq.

Since the early 1990s, when the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties set up their own regional government in northern Iraq, Ankara has been suspecting that their long term aim was to set up an independent Kurdish state. Turkey, Iran and Syria, neighbouring countries with substantial Kurdish minorities, are all concerned that any move towards Kurdish independence in Iraq could stir up unrest within their own Kurdish populations.

II.C.2.a.(2). Problems with the US

The relationship between Turkey and Iraq has seen a mix of tension and cooperation since the U.S. invasion. What can easily be said is that the process has been difficult and both sides have been unable to satisfy the other’s demands. The discrepancy between the priorities followed by Ankara and Washington is the reason why difficulties arose in building a qualified and agreeable cooperation.

Shortly before the war, Turkey disappointed the Bush administration by deciding not to allow coalition forces to use its military bases to mount a northern front of the war in Iraq. The GNAT’s refusal of March 1st was a considerable blow to US–Turkish relations. Washington’s expectations on the approval were high. After all, Turkey was the strategic partner of the US whose backing for its EU membership bid was highly important. Moreover, Turkey’s fragile economy was strengthened by the support of IMF and World Bank in which the US has a strong position –not to mention the loans and aid it directly provided.

Perhaps more importantly, the US had resorted to financial means to convince Turkey on the matter of getting the authorisation of troop stationing on its soil. With this aim, Washington had even offered six billion dollars in grants and an eight-and-half-billion-dollar bridging loan⁵¹⁹ –which was considered to offset fears that war could devastate Turkey's economy. Turkey had appeared to be holding out for a package of financial compensation before accepting US demands. High-level statements had already pointed to the necessity of agreement on political, economic and military dimensions of the deployment before any parliamentary decision of allowing tens of thousands of United States troops.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁹ ÖNİŞ Ziya, YILMAZ Şuhnaz, “The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?”, *The Middle East Journal*, vol: 59, no:2, April 2005 , p: 275.

⁵²⁰ The one made by the Turkish Prime Minister of the era, Abdullah Gül, can be cited among many. See “Turkey Ups Stakes on US Troops, 19/02/2003”, *BBC*, 19/02/2009

But obviously, some facts have been underestimated by US officials. First of all, Turkish government's general approval and support of the military operation did not necessarily find its reflection on the parliamentary level, and this could not have been foreseen beforehand by Washington. The result of the voting showed that even the ruling AKP had 97 members who did not approve the motion.⁵²¹

This failure may be explained by the events of recent history. Turkey's experience of the 1991 Gulf War, and the way this experience has been read in the country, was omnipresent in Turkey's interpretation of the Iraqi crisis, at both the public and the policy level. According to this reading Turkey failed to bargain effectively at that time and thus paid dearly. The commitment 'not to repeat the mistakes of the past' largely framed the bargaining position of the foreign and security policy elite.

The adverse economic impact of a new confrontation with Iraq could have been extremely difficult to tackle for Turkish economy already weakened by the 2001 financial crisis. In fact, there was a strong belief that economic harm was being done even by the prospect of war with Iraq. There were concerns about the expected negative impact of the operation on foreign investment and the general impact of rising oil prices on the economy. This time Ankara wanted to be assured that its prospective economic losses were going to be reasonably compensated by other means such as direct aid, the lifting or relaxation of import quotas, the establishment of an economic security zone.

Throughout the occupation period, Bush administration feared that Turkish attacks on Northern Iraq destabilise the Kurdish-populated region of Iraq which was the one stable part of the country showing signs of development. Iraqi Kurds have been the closest allies of the US in Iraq and the only Iraqi community to veritably support the US occupation. Losing this valuable support, along with the destabilisation of the Kurdish-populated zone of Iraqi federation, would go against Washington's interests.

Turkish authorities answer is that the desire to protect the north would not hinder Turkey's fight against the rebels from the PKK. That is why some cross-border incursions occurred there. In 2006, a statement on a shared vision and structured dialogue to advance the strategic partnership between Turkey and the US stressed Washington's continued commitment to eradicating the PKK.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2773877.stm>).

⁵²¹ Archives of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr>).

Turkey has a general disappointment of not having been rewarded for her support to the fight with terrorism in general and particularly for her contribution to the peace force settled in Afghanistan. The expectation of pay-back is clearly stated by Turkish authorities. Turkey has repeatedly asked U.S. forces and the Iraqi government to go after the PKK and has made multiple threats of military incursion to northern Iraq since the 2003 invasion.⁵²² Voices of concern are heard in various circles in Turkey regarding the quality of Washington's cooperation with Turkey in the fight with the PKK –such as the inadequacy in the field of intelligence sharing. Turkish officials affirmed that their expectations of being supported by international cooperation against terrorism were not met. For the former chief of staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, this failure was more than a mistreatment of Turkey: It was a blow to the common view that firmer cooperation will reinforce the fight against terror.⁵²³

As a response to those critics, the US authorities however claim that they understand Turkey's worries and priorities in this fight maintaining that the current cooperation should continue, without demolishing the current delicate balances established in the region, as the Secretary of state puts it:

“[T]he United States considers the PKK a terrorist organisation, and indeed that we have a common enemy, that we must find ways to take effective action so that Turkey will not suffer from terrorist attacks. (...) This is going to take persistence and it is going to take commitment. This is a very difficult problem. [R]ooting out terrorism is hard. (...) Anything that would destabilise the north of Iraq is not going to be in Turkey's interests, it is not going to be in our interests, and it is not going to be in the Iraqis' interests”.⁵²⁴

Ankara should not have difficulties in understanding that long time and lots of efforts are needed to eradicate PKK in that it has a long history of fight with terrorism. Yet, there are some facts that justify Turkey's embarrassment concerning the developments in Northern Iraq. In 2007, Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani sparked tensions by threatening to stir unrest in Southeast Turkey if Ankara intervenes in the process of determining the status of

⁵²² During a visit to Romania, Tayyip Erdoğan said: "Right now, as a strategic ally, the US is in a position to support us. We have supported them in Afghanistan," he said. See "Turkey : U.S. Won't Stop Iraq Invasion", CBS, 25/10/2007 (<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/25/iraq/main3408593.shtml>).

⁵²³ "Büyükanıt: Terör Mücadelemize Destek Yok", *Sabah*, 03/07/2007 (<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/03/haber,BF0B8E71CD01445284F73E850BD3D5B8.html>).

⁵²⁴ "Rice pledges U.S. support for Turkey against Kurdish rebels", *CBC*, 02/11/2007 (<http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/11/02/us-turkey.html>); "US promises action on PKK", *Daily Times*, 03/11/2007 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C11%5C03%5Cstory_3-11-2007_pg4_2).

Iraq's disputed city of Kirkuk.⁵²⁵ But the problem concerns the difference of perception between Ankara and Northern Iraq.

Notwithstanding the seriousness of the terrorist activities, Turkey's unilateral intervention in the north of Iraq in her fight with the PKK/Kongragel became an even more difficult task after the March 2003 operation. The duration of the cross-border operations is subject to the US authorisation and Ankara is not happy of the level of information provided by Washington. In addition, the EU objects more strongly than before.

Despite its misgivings about US Iraq policy, Turkey continued to cooperate with Washington in sustaining the post-1991 war settlement in Iraq throughout the 1990s. Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey became crucial in the enforcement of the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. But it is legitimate to argue that the status-quo established in Iraq in early 1990s gave birth to a formation which was preoccupying for Turkey. It was unknown what the future of the Kurdish autonomous region would be. The prospect of a second war was making the situation all the more ambiguous.

II.C.2.a.(3). The future of Kirkuk and the situation of Turkmens

The existence of a Turkmen society in Iraq constitutes an important parameter in Turkish foreign policy. It took part in military intervention plans of Ankara in the period preceding the coalition forces' occupation of Iraq. The ethnic links – they used to be named as Iraqi Turks by Turkey – and their precarious position in the post-Baathist era put them in a particular platform for Turkish policy-makers. Besides, their presence in Northern Iraq is perceived as a means to “dilute the case for or territorial integrity of any ethnically based Kurdish autonomous zone”, making the exclusive Kurdish control over the region more problematic.

The final status of Kirkuk, which is a matter of discord among the communities living there, is therefore a serious preoccupation for Ankara. Historical claims on Kirkuk differ. Kurds claim that the city was originally Kurdish while describing it as the “heart of Kurdistan”. Therefore, the annexation of the region into the Kurdish autonomous zone does

⁵²⁵ In an interview with Al-Arabiyah, Barzani said: “Turkey is not allowed to intervene in the Kirkuk issue and if it does, we will interfere in Diyarbakir's issues and other cities in Turkey,”. Diyarbakir is the largest city in Turkey's Kurdish-dominated Southeast. See Mc GREGOR Andrew, “Massoud Barzani Conducting Dangerous Games in Northern Iraq”, *The Jamestown Foundation*, 17/07/2007 (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4312).

not signify to “Kurdicise” it but to return it back to its rightful owners –a quest that is unacceptable for other communities of the region.

The administrative law that was codified after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime stipulated clauses to reverse the previous Arabisation policies.⁵²⁶ Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution points to the necessity to complete the process and announces that a referendum will be carried out after the normalisation of the region. These provisions led to a massive demographic change in Kirkuk. According to a Turkish National Intelligence Organisation report, 227.000 Iraqi Kurds (600.000 with their families) have been moved to Kirkuk and registered as voters since the end of coalition forces’ operation against Iraq in 2003. The report states that the majority of these people have not been expelled from their homes by Saddam Hussein’s regime. It also refers to the UN and Iraqi sources while stating that the sum of all Kurdish, Turkmen, Arabic and Assyrian who were forced to emigrate from Kirkuk was around 12.000.

The Turkmen point to their predominant population in the city which, they argue, should remain part of a unified Iraq. The leader of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Sadettin Ergeç, maintained that due to the complex ethnic and religious nature of Kirkuk, the idea of holding a referendum should be abandoned and the province should be placed under the control of the federal government.⁵²⁷ Qualifying Kirkuk as a “national asset”, he suggested that all the Iraqis should have a say in the future of the province.⁵²⁸

Kirkuk’s Arab population is close to Turkmen position on the issue. Leaders of Arab and Turkmen communities agreed to seek national support on amending Iraq’s 2005 constitution in a way to remove the article 140.⁵²⁹ The disagreement between Arabs and Kurds showed itself also on the revision of election law over parliamentary seats in Kirkuk: the former – together with the Turkmen – wanted the 2004 population records to be used for the elections while the latter opted for the records of 2009 which reflect an improvement of

⁵²⁶ In its article 58, the *Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period* aimed to achieve this objective by restoring the original residents to their homes and property, compensating the individuals who were introduced to specific regions (and resettling them in or near the district from which they came), promoting new employment opportunities, and, granting the possibility of “nationality correction” for those who were previously forced to change their national identity and ethnic affiliation.

⁵²⁷ SENANAYEKE Sumedha, “Turkey Keeps Nervous Eye on Kirkuk”, *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 22/01/2007 (<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347483.html>).

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ “Turkmen Join Arabs to Stop Vote on Iraq Oil Province”, *AFP*, 19/08/2009.

their ethnic profile. Besides, one should not miss the point that the central Iraqi (Arab) government firmly opposes the removal of Kirkuk from its control.

Turkish senior officials made publicly known their embarrassment due to demographic changes in Kirkuk on several occasions. They hold that the efforts to alter the multi-ethnic structure of the province will have an irreversible impact on the referendum that will determine the province's future status. In addition, they made it clear that if conflict erupts, Turkey will intervene in the region.

Originally, the deadline was set for the end of 2007; but the referendum has not yet taken place. Turkish authorities welcomed the postponement of the referendum, which would provoke tensions among the Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and Christian communities –mainly because of its unripe timing. Now they can opt for a solution that satisfies Turkey based on a special status for the city. Turkey encourages all parties to participate in this debate, which is “the healthiest way to find a sustainable solution”.⁵³⁰

Turkish governments supported the Turkmen minority within Iraq and have used their influence to try to block the incorporation of Kirkuk into Kurdish autonomous zone of Northern Iraq. Kurds not only react to Turkey's attitude, but they also see the coalition between Turkey and the Iraqi Turkmen Front⁵³¹ (ITF) a source of problems in their relations with the Turkmen society. They accuse the ITF to be a political instrument in the hands of Turkey.⁵³²

II.C.2.a.(4). Turkish public opinion

Turkey needed to be wary of its own population that is sharply against cooperation with the United States. The latter has been, on several occasions, accused in the past of arming PKK terrorists. Besides, a map of Turkey where its south-eastern region was presented as Kurdistan, published in an American military review, sparked strong reactions in Turkish public opinion.⁵³³ Since the end of the first Iraq war and the establishment of no-fly

⁵³⁰ “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”, Op. Cit.

⁵³¹ Founded in 1995, the ITF is a political movement that seeks to represent the Turkmen population of Iraq. It is made of the coalition of the following parties: Iraqi National Turkmen Party, Turkmeneli Party, Provincial Turkmen Party, Movement of the Independent Turkmen, Iraqi Turkmen Rights Party, Turkmen Islamic Movement of Iraq.

⁵³² HASAN Mazin, “Irak’ın Gizlenen Gerçeği: Türkmenler” in ÖZDAĞ Ümit, LAÇİNER Sedat, ERKMEN Serhat, *Irak Krizi (2002-2003)*, ASAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2003, pp: 56-57.

⁵³³ In his article published in the Armed Forces Journal, Ralph Peters made an analysis on what he thinks a better Middle East would look like if one were able to redraw its borders. The journal also illustrated a map based on this analysis. As one Turkish columnist states, there is the possibility that the articles provide the conceptual

zone which provided a safe haven for Kurdish region to flourish into an autonomous administration, several Turkish politicians, opinion-makers and even at times government officials publicly doubted US commitment to that policy, implicitly suggesting that the aim of US policy was to create an independent Kurdish state.

Turkish public opinion was hence suspicious about the US' intentions in the region and its sympathy over an Iraqi-Kurdish statehood which would reignite Kurdish secessionism within Turkey. The increasing autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq, despite conflicts between the two main groups, namely the Kurdistan Workers Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), resembled a *de facto* state formation process which deeply disturbed Ankara. Several statements made by the US on the unreality of these allegations and its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq have been inadequate to alleviate Turkey's concerns.

In Turkey, the question of participating in the Iraqi war was far from building a national consensus: Public opinion was strongly against the occupation of Iraq and sending military force to assist in it.⁵³⁴ Those who argued for Turkey's involvement based their arguments on strategic necessity. According to this argument Turkey had no choice but to get involved in this war, which would inevitably have significant repercussions for the country. Turkey's early involvement was necessary both to prevent any negative consequences and to ensure it was 'at the table' after the war. It was also argued that Turkey could not afford to alienate its major ally, especially in such a critical period when Turkey needed US economic and political support.

The opponents of Turkey's involvement in a possible war against Iraq, on the other hand, argued that Turkey should not be 'fighting somebody else's war' and should definitely not send forces to Iraq. This opposition generally arose not out of a support for the Iraqi regime, but mainly from concerns about the possible negative effects of such a war on Turkey. Critics pointed to the possible human losses, the negative economic consequences, the increasing risk of Iraqi retaliation (including terrorism) and the negative impact on Turkey-EU relations. Some in the opposition camp even argued that Turkey's territorial integrity depended on Turkey's own political and socioeconomic policies rather than what

ground of further discussions. See KIŞLALI Mehmet Ali, "ABD'nin Kürt Devleti" (The Kurdish state of the USA), *Radikal*, 12/07/2006 (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=192642&tarih=12/07/2006>).

⁵³⁴ In public media, the rate of the opponents was presented around the levels of 90%.

happened in Iraq. According to this view the US government was trying to put pressure on Turkey by exaggerating the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq. The opponents argued that no matter what was promised by foreign actors or putting forth in the national platform, participating in this war would bring disaster.

II.C.2.a.(5). The risk of deterioration of relations with foreign actors

In some crises, it may be difficult to maintain the balance between the preservation of national interests and adhesion to the international solidarity. From this point of view, it is not surprising to see that Turkey's relations with international actors in the lead-up to the Iraqi war have been strained. From the outset, the US applied an immense pressure on Turkey to join the campaign. There were advantages for Turkey to do so: Since preventing the war was not possible, it would be beneficial to take part in the war coalition. On the other hand, such a commitment would bring up many unwanted consequences as well. As a consequence, deciding on whether or not to participate to the war has been a painful process for Turkey.

Moreover, Turkey was also risking alienating itself from France and Germany, the two countries which have influence over whether Ankara's bid to join the European Union will be accepted.⁵³⁵ Paris and Berlin have already clashed diplomatically with Ankara, when they initially would not go along with Turkey's request for early deployment of NATO military forces in the case of a possible conflict with Iraq. In order to appease its own population and European states, former Turkish President Sezer had announced that his country would only allow U.S. troops to be deployed on Turkish territory if the United Nations passed a second resolution specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

Turkey's participation to the war in Iraq would cause displeasure for some groups in Iraq as well. For instance, the IGC's zealous opposition against Turkish soldiers' deployment into the region was accompanied by the Iraqi Kurdish people's protests.⁵³⁶ Arabs were also unwilling to see Turkish troops on their territory because they have been under Ottoman Empire's rule for centuries.

There's also the spin-off effect that is preoccupying for Iraqi people. The intervention of Turkish troops can ignite further foreign intervention. A comment that has been voiced by

⁵³⁵ In both countries, the current heads of the government have declared unequivocally their unwillingness to see Turkey join the EU.

⁵³⁶ "Thousands of Kurds Protest Turkey's Plans for Iraq", *CBC News*, 03/03/2003 (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2003/03/03/kurds_protest030303.html).

some IGC members can be given as an example on this account. Hosyar Zebari, for instance, is reported to say that Ankara's move could prompt neighbouring Iran to send its own troops into the region, adding to the volatility of the situation –which would worsen due to these countries' political agendas and the unwillingness to leave quickly.⁵³⁷

Turkey's choice could also have been deteriorating for its relations with neighbouring countries in the region, namely Iran and Syria. A solid cooperation on the policies to follow among these countries could have been useful. But it has not been possible due to the weakness of political links between Turkey and these countries.

II.C.2.b. Turkey's Stance towards the Second Iraqi War

Turkey has adopted the international trend of conceiving the use of force as the last resort in the resolution of Iraqi problem and has invested great efforts for a peaceful solution. These efforts have been materialised through diplomatic initiatives, such as holding a Summit with five other Middle Eastern countries that called on the Iraqi government to cooperate fully with the UN inspections regime and to allow the search for banned chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs over its territories. Likewise, the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, organised a regional tour with the objective of resolving the Iraqi crisis in a peaceful manner and building up a united Muslim position to Baghdad.⁵³⁸

Yet, at some point, hopes to find a peaceful solution have faded away. The government considered useful to prepare the country against the worst-case scenario in order to protect Turkey's national interests. Its awareness was accompanied by the strong conviction on the appropriateness of supporting the war—in order to be able to play a role in Iraq's reconstruction process. Hence, not only the immediate security but also long-term interests of Turkey were at stake. Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement endorses this stance: "If one is left out of the equation at the start of the operation, it may not be possible to be in a position to control developments at the end of the operation".⁵³⁹

Every additional participation to the coalition force was important for the US government. Although most military supports were largely symbolic, the increase of the

⁵³⁷ O' TOOLE Pam, "Analysis : Turkish Deployment Row", *BBC*, 08/10/2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3176144.stm).

⁵³⁸ Gül visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He also met the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, in Cairo.

⁵³⁹ MARQUARDT Erich, "Turkey Back on Side with the US", *Asia Times*, 04/02/2004 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FB04Ak02.html). This stance is shared by many, especially in the military circles.

participant nations always provide for more legitimacy to military operations. Besides, it would ease the burden on the American military. The question of legitimacy has a particular significance in the Iraqi case, because there is not a broad consensus over the objective of coalition forces. When these factors are taken into consideration, Turkey's participation could only be welcome by Washington.

Furthermore, Turkey had a particular importance for a number of reasons. A bordering country situated in the north of Iraq, it had a great value in operational terms. This is illustrated by a tactic used by the US: Even after Turkey had refused to authorize US military forces to enter to Iraq by its soil, Washington declared that its troops would use Turkish territory for operation, which made Baghdad station forces in the northern front.⁵⁴⁰

Another important factor was Turkey's Muslim identity. Bush administration tried hard to convince a number of Muslim countries to participate in Iraqi operation to prevent the perception of a Christians-versus-Muslims type military operation in people's minds. It would be possible to represent the occupation not as a solely Western effort but as one that is not only multinational but also multiethnic.

II.C.2.b.(1). First try: A failure

In early 2003, it became more and more obvious that the second Iraqi war was inevitable. In order to be in a stronger position to face possible war, Turkish Armed Forces moved troops from the west of the country to the regions bordering Iraq ahead of the outbreak of the war. Turkish officials stated however that the move was not made with the aim to support a US attack: An intervention would take place if developments in Iraq threatened Turkey's interests, especially if Iraqi Kurds declare an independent state. Turkish Chief of General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, stated that an extra deployment could take place only to deal with a threat (like an attack, large refugee exodus or an instability caused by local fighting).⁵⁴¹

Two remarks that he made reveal the delicate policy that the state follows in the Iraq war and merit particular attention. One is about the care given to the collaboration with the US and the efforts to prevent misunderstandings between two sides. The Chief of Staff

⁵⁴⁰ BENNETT Richard M., The Defence of Baghdad - Special Military Report, AFI Research Intelligence Briefing, 03/04/2003. Available on the website of the Centre for Research on Globalisation (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BEN304A.html>).

⁵⁴¹ "Chief of Staff Özkök Says No Immediate Intention to Send Turkish Troops into Northern Iraq", *Turkey News*, March 25-31, 2003 (Compiled by the Washington Office of Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, available at http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=332).

affirmed that Turkey's military action will be coordinated with her strategic partner. The other constitutes a reply to the worries voiced in some circles: Turkish forces would not enter northern Iraq for fighting or land occupation. What was at stake was the mere search of ensuring its security. Özkök lashed out at "friendly and allied countries and institutions" for what he described "suspicious, unjust and sometimes hurtful" criticism of Turkey's planned intervention in the region.⁵⁴²

For its part, Turkish National Assembly was also aware of the necessity to take steps in accordance with Article 92 of the Constitution against hostile developments and to activate military measures necessary to protect Turkey's national interests. In addition, moving more troops into northern Iraq to prevent any flow of refugees was seriously considered. In February 2003, the Parliament had had a *huis clos* meeting in which it evaluated the developments in Iraq and had accorded the government the power to take necessary security measures and make preparations to be able to face the worst-possible consequences of the situation in Iraq. Within this framework, Turkey received some help from the US military/technical personnel. It also initiated negotiations within NATO which resulted in obtaining the latter's support for strengthening Turkey's security.⁵⁴³

This context laid the ground for Turkish government to seek parliamentary authorisation of assistance to a war in Iraq. On 25 February 2003, the government addressed a motion to the GNAT which laid out two main reasons for the deployment of Turkish Armed Forces abroad and hosting foreign powers in Turkey. One of them can be asserted as the reinforcement of international efforts on military dissuasion by allowing foreign troops to be positioned in readiness for combat on Turkish soil. The other is related to the desire of granting the government the ability to pursue an efficient policy, which would be possible through allowing Turkish Armed Forces to be deployed abroad. This move would endow the government with the possibility to be prepared for the worst scenario, to act on time with rapidity and to take necessary precautions.

⁵⁴² "I have difficulty in understanding how those who see dangers from overseas do not find Turkey convincing when it says that the same danger is just across its border", he said. Ibid.

⁵⁴³ The Alliance's Defence Planning Committee agreed to deploy early warning planes, Patriot air-defence missiles and anti-chemical and biological warfare units. This decision caused however a distressing situation in the Alliance whose members have been divided over a Washington request for NATO to send planes and missiles to protect Turkey from a possible strike from Iraq. France, Belgium and Germany were against the idea on the grounds that NATO's activation could have harmed efforts of disarming Iraq peacefully. See OVERHAUS Marco, "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy", German Politics, vol: 13, no: 4, December 2004, p: 558.

In the framework drawn by the above-mentioned factors, the government addressed a note to the National Assembly with the aim of obtaining authorisation for the deployment of:

- Turkish troops on foreign countries and their use in accordance with procedures that will subsequently be defined;
- a maximum of 62.000 foreign troops (and a maximum air-force component of 255 planes and 65 helicopters), for a period of six months, on contiguous zones that will be defined by the government.⁵⁴⁴

But the motion did not obtain the minimum of 276 votes (the absolute majority of the Parliament).⁵⁴⁵ It would not be a mistake to maintain that Turkish authorities were relieved about the impasse on the deployment of troops to the region which was a politically unpopular move. Hundreds of thousands of protesters had rallied against the GNAT motion in major cities. There were also pessimistic expectations regarding the war's implications for Turkey's economy. Had the motion been approved, the government would find itself in a very difficult position.

II.C.2.b.(2). Approval, but to no avail

The decision taken by the National Assembly on the 20th of March 2003 showed a fundamental change in the perspective while the war in Iraq looming large: The Assembly admitted that new conditions necessitated new evaluation of the situation.⁵⁴⁶ As a consequence of the new evaluation, the majority of Turkish parliamentarians authorised the dispatch of Turkish troops to Northern Iraq (without excluding the possibility of the resort to force) on the one hand, and foreign air forces' overflights on the other.

The first observation that is stressed in the decision is the irreversibility of the situation following the latest developments on the military intervention in Iraq –which became indispensable due to the failure of all efforts aiming at peaceful solutions. Since a state of war to be waged on the whole Iraqi territory was at stake, the risks and threats that

⁵⁴⁴ This paragraph also contains arrangements concerning the immediate transfer of the combatant land troops to outside Turkey from their temporary deployment spots; the positioning of air, sea and special forces in a way to provide their participation to a probable operation; the authorisation for foreign air force components to use Turkish air zone; preparations for the arrival of foreign armed forces to Turkey; the determination of the status on which they will depend when they will be in Turkey; the cooperation between foreign troops and Turkish Armed Forces.

⁵⁴⁵ The number of parliamentarians who approved the motion was 264, against 250 who rejected it and 19 abstained.

⁵⁴⁶ The decision was taken on the day the military campaign of the US-led multinational force was launched.

have been mentioned in the governmental letter of March 1st have gained new dimensions and became more grave.

This is perceptible both in respect of terrorist activities and the dislocation of Iraq on ethnic grounds. PKK militants profit from the crisis situation by accelerating their activities and working new arrangements. At the time the National Assembly was deliberating on the issue, Turkish military units were crossing into northern Iraq to take security measures at various points to ensure the safety of units that will follow at various intervals. The reason why troops are sent to the region is the existence of a security vacuum where terrorist activity flourished.

Another grave concern was the possible dislocation of Iraq on ethnic grounds. Activities that could jeopardise the security of ethnic groups were observed in the region. Moreover, a massive population movement towards Turkey was expected. This preoccupation was not new: discussions between Turkish officials and their American counterparts had already taken place on the potential refugee problem that Turkey would face due to a war. But the matter has not been mentioned as a motive of TAF's military action and has not been evoked among the supportive arguments of Parliamentary authorisation request either. However, for Turkey's security, it was important to deal with the problem of displaced persons outside Turkey's borders, in the humanitarian support zones.

Dealing with the above-mentioned threats requires a military presence in Northern Iraq, according to the Parliamentary decision. In addition, with the war looming large, the necessity of taking a decision on the support to foreign countries that will participate in the military operation becomes more evident than before. The decision is also bolstered by the fact that most countries (primarily NATO members) have opened their air zones to the use of the allies.⁵⁴⁷

In early October 2003, to the satisfaction of the US government, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey authorized the deployment of troops to Iraq. The motion gave no details regarding the deployment, stating only that soldiers would remain in Iraq for one year. Moreover, the decision of contributing to the US-led stabilisation efforts did not mean an immediate dispatch of the forces, for negotiations were necessary for the finalisation of the details concerning the deployment. But it was obvious that granting the government the

⁵⁴⁷ The fact that many countries have taken decisions to support a military operation positioned Turkey before the necessity of determining the modalities of support and facilities that will be provided to these countries.

prerogative to send troops would make it easier for Ankara to conduct negotiations with Washington.⁵⁴⁸ Still, the process was expected to be a long one.⁵⁴⁹

Positive reactions to the parliamentary approval were pointing to two gains that Turkey could have.⁵⁵⁰ One of them concerned the prospect of repairing ties with Washington after the bitterness caused by the refusal to authorise the US to mount a front in the north of Iraq. The other was about the opportunity for Turkey to have some say on the future of Iraq and preserve its national interests particularly by fighting the PKK, against which Turkey wanted concrete steps from the US before sending troops to Iraq.

Turkish authorities have declared that they could send up to 12,000 troops to the region although the main opposition party voted massively against the military operation.⁵⁵¹ No wonder Iraqi interim leaders voiced concerns about the prospect of Turkey's troop deployment in the country. They, who could not agree on most issues, were quick to unite vigorously around the question of the Turkish deployment. Their fear that Ankara might use its presence in Iraq to try to interfere in the country's domestic political affairs is considerable. That is a point of discord between the US eager to see Turkey joining the international coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council which does not want to see neighbouring countries' soldiers meddling in their affairs.

Statements coming from Turkish side were indeed different. In the words of Prime Minister Erdoğan, Turkey "could not entirely perform its neighbourly duties without a military contribution". The deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq would not be made in the logic of "occupation force", but "as a friend and brother of the Iraqi people in a bid to ensure that this transition period comes to an end as soon as possible".⁵⁵²

⁵⁴⁸ See Cemil Çiçek's affirmation in PEUCH Jean-Christophe, "Turkey: U.S. Hails Ankara's Decision To Send Troops To Iraq, But Admits Deployment May Take Time", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Prague, 08/10/2003. For the transcript, see *Global Security* (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/10/iraq-031008-rferl-170814.htm>).

⁵⁴⁹ The US state Department spokesperson Boucher was reported to affirm that there was a large amount of work to be done before the deployment can take place. Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Addressing fellow party members ahead of the vote, CHP leader Deniz Baykal cautioned the government against taking part in an operation that he said "has no international legitimacy, and which is wanted neither by the Turkish nor by the Iraqi people". Opinion polls showed that 60% of Turkish people opposed the military intervention to Iraq. Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

The IGC protested against Turkish military presence by a unanimous statement.⁵⁵³ Yet, the IGC members' concerns about Turkish military deployment did not prevent them from understanding that additional military contributions were badly needed. A necessity hence appeared: To work for finding ways to ensure that Turkish military presence in Iraq make an utmost contribution to the stability in the country. For this to become true, it was necessary to negotiate with the US and Turkey in order to agree on the number of troops as well as where (and for how long) they would be deployed. This would reduce the harm that can be done by the deployment of Turkish troops.⁵⁵⁴

To alleviate the IGC's fears, the US government deemed necessary for Turkish peacekeepers to be deployed in central Iraq, rather than the largely Kurdish-populated north. This was the ground on which Washington's plans have been drawn up. But the Kurds point out that, unless these troops are sent by sea, they would have to pass through northern Iraq and might want to set up a supply base in that region. For its part, Turkey was caught between the American encouragement to commit military forces and Iraqi resistance –which would eventually make it change its position. The US authorities endeavoured to find a solution to the disagreement with the belief that Turkey could make a veritable contribution to the stability in the region.

It is worth highlighting that the unwillingness to accept foreign troops was not limited exclusively to those of Turkey. An IGC member pointed to mismatch between the interests of foreign countries' and those of Iraqi people, a view also maintained by a representative of M. Barzani.⁵⁵⁵ Iraqis fear the presence of troops from Turkey, or elsewhere in the region, could provoke more violence in Iraq by reigniting old hatreds and suspicions. The Governing Council does not favour the involvement of any neighbouring countries in the Iraqi situation because of the sensitivities involved.

On 4 November, the Turkish ambassador to the United States affirmed that Turkey would not send troops into Iraq without receiving a formal invitation from the Iraqi Governing Council. Prime Minister Erdoğan made it clear that the determining factor for sending troops would be the demand of the Iraqi people. In case there is not such a demand,

⁵⁵³ Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani threatened to quit the Governing Council if Turkish troops entered Iraq. See "Turkey Cools Towards Iraq Role", *BBC News*, 18/10/2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3204246.stm)

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ DANILOCHKIN Sergei, "Iraq: Governing Council Wary of Turkish Troop Deployment", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 08/10/2003 (<http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1104589.html>).

Turkish troops would not be deployed to Iraq despite the fact that the government acquired parliamentary authorisation for the deployment.

The IGC did not extend an invitation of that sort. Thus, Turkey – notwithstanding its earlier plans to contribute troops to the international force in Iraq – announced on 7 November that it stepped back from doing so. Foreign minister Gül, who reminded that Turkey was not “very eager to send troops to Iraq” from the outset, maintained this decision on the grounds that the contribution would take place only if it was to be helpful.⁵⁵⁶ Since it was not the case, there was no use to deploy troops to Iraq. Besides, the authorisation that the National Assembly granted to the Parliament did not mean an automatic deployment, as Prime Minister Erdoğan reminded.⁵⁵⁷

II.B.2.c. Parallelism between Turkey and the EU on Iraqi Crisis

The EU subscribed to the UN resolution 1483 but could not show unity in its reaction to the US’ action in Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium were the main protesters of the American-led invasion of Iraq. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom declared their transatlantic solidarity in the January 2003 “Letter of the Eight”.⁵⁵⁸ The 10 countries of the Vilnius Group – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – also declared their solidarity with the United States.⁵⁵⁹

Yet, the positions that the EU member states adopted on the solution to the Iraqi problem were similar. The Council expressed its support for the unanimous approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which reaffirms the right of the Iraqi people to determine their political future and to control their financial and natural resources. The presence and role of the UN in Iraq is indispensable in the social, economic and political reconstruction process. The EU supports strongly the UNAMI in Iraq and the continuation of close cooperation between UNAMI and the Iraqi authorities on the implementation of the Resolution 1770 which extends the mandate and broadens the responsibilities of the mission.

⁵⁵⁶ TULLY Andrew F., “Turkey: Withholding of Troops Complicates US Mission in Iraq”, *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 10/11/2003 (<http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1104950.html>).

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁸ The letter was signed by José María Aznar (Spain), José Manuel Durão Barroso (Portugal), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Tony Blair (United Kingdom), Václav Havel (Czech Republic), Peter Medgyessy (Hungary), Leszek Miller (Poland), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark). See AZNAR José María et al., “Europe and America Must Stand United,” *The Times*, 30/01/2003, (<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article858456.ece>).

⁵⁵⁹ DONOVAN Jeffrey, “Eastern Europe: Vilnius Group Supports U.S. on Iraq”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 06/02/2003, (<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1102148.html>).

The official declarations of the EU reveal that the return to normalcy in Iraq and the preservation of its territorial integrity is of crucial importance for Brussels. From the outset, the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq to a transitional government has been desired by the EU, for it would be an important move which would signify the end of the occupation and the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty.

Nevertheless, some basic necessities are required for that to happen. The end of violence is to be cited first. The EU condemned firmly on various occasions all violence and terrorist attacks which prolong the suffering of the Iraqi people and hamper political progress and reconstruction. It firmly believes that a government of national unity is essential to enhance the stability of the country and encourages all political groupings to continue working together towards the formation of such an inclusive government as soon as possible. The encouragement concerns the Government of Iraq as well, whose efforts towards national reconciliation is of crucial importance. In this context the Council reiterates its support for a process of national reconciliation including efforts by the UN in this area and the initiative by the League of Arab states to organise a conference on national accord.

The EU also urges all political and social groups in Iraq to pursue their demands through peaceful means and within Iraq's democratic institutions. Building a political dialogue and deepening relations on various domains are imperative for the future of Iraq. The view of Brussels is that fundamental decisions such as on the constitutional review, the federalism law and the status of Kirkuk, must be taken in a spirit of sincere dialogue and consensus-building if they are to serve as the basis for a peaceful and prosperous future for Iraq.

The support of the international community is of significant importance for stabilising the situation in Iraq. One should remember that the international community as a whole faces serious problems stemming from Iraq. In this context, the role of neighbouring countries will be particularly important, also with a view to regional stability. The importance of continuing the dialogue and co-operation between Iraq and its neighbours, along with a constructive engagement of Iraq's neighbours and partners remains essential to achieve peace and stability in Iraq and in the region as a whole. The international community, and in particular the states in the region, have a responsibility to support and promote the difficult process of national reconciliation and stabilisation in Iraq, and to prevent outside interference that could undermine this process.

A major concretisation of this preference is the Ministerial conference of Iraq's Neighbouring Countries –whose scope goes beyond the regional scale with a broader international participation, including that of the EU. In light of the realities mentioned above, it is not surprising to see that the neighbouring states conference has been “extended” to others as well from its very inception.⁵⁶⁰ The process is welcome by the EU as it goes in line with the “constructive engagement of Iraq’s neighbours and partners in the region”.⁵⁶¹ Turkey’s hosting of the conference in 2007 proves that the government backs the process.

Not only political, but also economic and judicial reconstruction of Iraq is bolstered by the EU. That is perceptible in “A Framework for EU-Iraq Engagement” elaborated by the European Commission in 2004. The document puts forth the EU’s willingness to support simultaneously “the emergence of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq, with a parliament and a government” and the “establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy and society” which is accompanied by Iraq’s economic and political integration into its region and the international system.⁵⁶²

It hence affirmed on several counts its determination to support Iraqi authorities and people in reinforcing the judicial system and encouraging respect for the rule of law.⁵⁶³ The aim here is to build an integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission –to which the EU is capable of making contributions. Despite the divergences on the participation to Iraq’s occupation by US-led coalition forces, the EU member states reached consensus on how to ensure the return to normalcy in Iraq.

For the international community, the reintegration of Iraq into the international system as a sovereign, independent democratic country is a major challenge. Turkey’s interests converge with those of the EU in fostering a peaceful and democratic Iraq.⁵⁶⁴ As one

⁵⁶⁰ The Conference was held in Sharm el-Sheikh on 4 May 2007 and in Istanbul on 2-3 November 2007. The third expanded ministerial conference was hosted by Kuwait on 22 April 2008.

⁵⁶¹ “EU Council Conclusions on Iraq”, *Council of the European Union*, 2831st External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 19/11/2007 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7521_en.htm).

⁵⁶² *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 9 June 2004: The European Union and Iraq, a Framework for Engagement*, COM(2004) 417 Final (<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r16005.htm>).

⁵⁶³ This could inter alia promote closer collaboration between the different actors across the criminal justice system and strengthen the management capacity of senior and high-potential officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full respect for the rule of law and human rights. Such a mission should be secure, independent and distinct but would be complementary and bring added value to ongoing international efforts as well as develop synergies with ongoing Community and Member states' efforts.

⁵⁶⁴ EMERSON Michael, TOCCI Nathalie, Op. Cit., p: 23.

of the countries that are directly affected by the developments in Iraq and willing to play a role in the amelioration of the situation, Turkey aimed to bring together the neighbouring countries around a cooperation scheme. As Gül states:

“Turkey wants to border a prosperous Iraq which is at peace with itself and with its neighbours. Such a neighbour will itself be an advantage and a source of tranquillity for Turkey. At this juncture, I would like to underline that Turkey has the utmost sensitivity on Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity, as well as the prosperity and well-being of all segments of the Iraqi society, with no exceptions. Our leading role in the establishment of the Neighbouring Countries Platform and our cooperation with the Iraqi Government from the very beginning are testimony to this”.⁵⁶⁵

Turkey plays an important role in the region despite all the factors that go against her national interests. Her positive attitude towards Northern Iraq was generally praised by foreign actors. As the former US Secretary of state C. Rice made the point, Turkey has built a bridge with Iraqi Kurds despite the undeniable problems that persist.⁵⁶⁶ The main responsibility that Turkey is expected to fulfil in regard to various communities is the ‘balancing’ of their interests and ‘facilitating’ their integration into the political system. As the European Commission’s consecutive progress reports asserted, Turkey supported efforts towards achieving national reconciliation, security and peace in Iraq.

That was a positive evaluation for Turkey which undertakes important tasks in the country: training Iraqi security forces; organisation of seminars for Iraqi political parties, diplomats, media representatives and health personnel; hosting an enlarged meeting of Iraq’s neighbouring countries to support national reconciliation and stabilisation in the country. On this account, the *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Technical, Training and Scientific Cooperation* signed between Ankara and Baghdad in June 2009 merits to be pointed as well. Based on the idea of enhancing mutual cooperation in the field of security, the MoU will complement the above-mentioned duties shouldered by Turkey.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁵ “Turkey Wants to Border a Prosperous Iraq that Is at Peace with its Neighbours”, *Speech delivered by President Abdullah Gül on the occasion of the Expanded Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting in Istanbul*, 03/11/2007, *Today’s Zaman*, 05/11/2007.

⁵⁶⁶ “Türkiye’nin Irak Politikasına Övgü” (Praise to Turkey’s Iraq Policy), *Hürriyet*, 25/12/2006.

⁵⁶⁷ Gen. Metin Gürak, the head of the General Staff Communication Department, said the pact would contribute to peace in the Middle East. “The memorandum of understanding signed by two neighboring countries with historical, cultural and traditional ties will contribute to peace in the Middle East, which is still facing negative Developments”. See *Newspot*, No: 95, June 2009, p: 22

(<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/db/dosyalar/sureliyayingrupkayitlar16.pdf>).

PARTIAL CONCLUSION

Based on the data provided in this study, a number of observations on the characteristics of Turkey's contributions to peace and stability deserve to be emphasised. One of them is related to the increasing activism in Turkish foreign policy, which is easily perceptible since the end of the Cold War. When the efforts made by Turkey are analysed, one can see that the principles and security perceptions find their reflection in military and diplomatic categories. The former implicates high responsibilities with potential risks. This framework of participation depended on the necessities warranted by circumstances: In Bosnia, it was the UN; whereas in Kosovo, it was NATO. The latter category is related to diplomatic initiatives, which might involve individual efforts (South Caucasus) as well as indirect (in the case of Kosovo) or direct (during the Iraqi crisis) support to international cooperation schemes.

The dynamism inevitably brings up the criterion of geography. As the historical and conceptual evolutions allowed expecting, Turkey is actively involved in the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus. This involvement suits the “principle of peace at home, peace in the world”, makes of Turkey a crucial actor in crisis management, and – because of the high importance accorded to these regions by the EU – provides depth to the relations between Ankara and Brussels.

The cooperative nature of Turkey's actions with the European institutions is another point can be useful in understanding the strategic added-value of Turkey. If the reflex of cooperation is less perceptible in the diplomatic realm, the objectives of Turkish governments have been in line with those pursued by the international community. In what regards foreign military action, although the UN is the principal source of legitimacy, Turkey is also active in regional organisations. This activism is particularly salient in NATO and the ESDP frameworks –because Turkey is a long-time member of the former and she also wants to be active in the ESDP framework despite the lack of a membership status.

Another characteristic that deserves to be mentioned is that Turkey's reaction to international crises is in broad harmony with the ESDP. Both in diplomatic and military fields, peace efforts undertaken by Turkey run parallel to those of the international community, a fact that highlights the compatibility between the foreign and security policies

of Ankara and Brussels. One cannot refrain from emphasising that the complementarity provided by Turkey in her demarches is a significant added-value for the EU.

There are indeed cases that run counter the above-mentioned harmony. For instance, despite the sincere desire of contributing to the peace efforts, some diplomatic moves have been awkward. As evoked earlier in the study, the visit of Hamas to Turkey sparked criticism. Likewise, disapproval has been voiced in various circles when Sudanese Vice president Ali Osman Taha met with the Turkish Prime minister Recep Erdoğan in early February 2009 to discuss the raging crisis in Western Darfur. Taha, who represents the Sudanese regime that stands accused of committing genocide in Darfur, met Erdoğan as part of his lobbying efforts to suspend a resolution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir.⁵⁶⁸

In what regards the two particular cases that have been approached in the latest section, the Iraqi case reveals a qualified overlap between the policies of Turkey and the EU. The way Cypriot crisis is handled by Turkey is unsuccessful. The military coup in Cyprus was a threat that was supposed to be faced with effective counter-measures, making the military action necessary.⁵⁶⁹ Nonetheless, despite the rightfulness of the first operation launched in 1974, Turkey found herself in a very uncomfortable situation in the diplomatic arena for decades because of not having withdrawn the armed forces once the constitutional order has been restored.

⁵⁶⁸ The accusations against Bashir include genocide (Killing members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups; causing them bodily or mental harm; inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about these groups' physical destruction), crimes against humanity (murder; extermination; forcible transfer; rape; torture) and war crimes (attacks on civilians in Darfur; pillaging towns and villages).

⁵⁶⁹ Some argue that the "right to take action" stipulated in the Treaty is not of military nature and claim that this phrase refers to diplomatic efforts such as mediation and economic sanctions. It is difficult to comprehend how and to what extent the non-military actions would be able to reverse the non-compliance with the Treaties marked by high level of violence –which is not very unlikely for an island whose history is full of inter-communal clashes. There is an easy way to explain why the adjective "military" is not used in the text: the action to take will vary according to the necessities of any given situation. But it is difficult to cast off completely the military option.

CONCLUSION

When the increasing role of the international community and the consequences of its efforts in preventing and managing crises are taken into consideration, one can only argue that such challenges must be tackled with as a part of a coherent and exhaustive approach built on the principle of international solidarity. The fact that national and international security are conceived as complementing each other makes this assertion all the more valid. This conception will only gain ground in the future, and definitely hold true for Turkey and the EU. Somehow, this is not a pure choice of governments but rather a factual necessity: moral considerations on the one hand, and national interest on ensuring stability on the other, force them to opt for such an arrangement. Crisis management must be considered in this context.

There are firm grounds to maintain the existence of a strong parallelism between Turkey and the EU in the field of crisis management. Based on the analysis provided by the present study, it can be said that the value of Turkey as a crisis management partner has at least four aspects. First of all, she has a similar conception of security with the West. This resulted in a similar theoretical and practical approach to the security and defence in the international arena. The fact that Turkey worked hard for the mobilisation of the international community on the security-threatening matters together with her European partners is not coincidental: Ankara's active crisis management policy is the natural outcome of a long-term integration in European security/defence structures which shaped its security perceptions and defence parameters.

An important remark to make on this account is the importance of the UN as a source of legitimacy for Turkey and the EU. The latter considers the UN Charter and the international law as the basis for international action, as stipulated in the Treaty on European Union. Although it is not possible to say that none of the member states was involved in military interventions that were not backed by the UN (as revealed by the invasion of Iraq), all military operations launched by the EU have had an UN mandate. These affirmations hold true for Turkey as well: The UNSC resolution is the main driving force for Turkey to take the decision to intervene in crisis situations. But there have been cases in which the legitimacy of the operation prevailed over this resolution. In Kosovo, for instance, it was for sure that the UNSC would not be able to act in order to put an end to the massacres. For this reason, Turkey, alongside many EU member states, participated to NATO airstrikes

Second, Turkey has the willingness to intervene in conflicts in order to ensure peace and stability. The end of the Cold War provided Turkey with the opportunity to get rid of a static and mono-dimensional foreign policy and become more active in the international platform. On this account, attention should be drawn to the fact that Turkey is able to define her national interest in a broad and far-sighted way. Based on the understanding that serving common interests through serving a country's own is a contribution to the stability in a greater scale, Turkey has taken part in cooperation mechanisms – sometimes by initiating them – with several countries.

One can argue, however, that the strength of the willingness will depend on external factors. For instance, long-lasting disagreements may weaken the desire to reinforce – or even to carry on – the cooperation. In the past, difference of perspective and technical problems could cause the detachment of Turkey from the ESDP. It is therefore right to maintain that the membership perspective can only strengthen Turkey's engagement in the EU structures.

Third, Turkey has the potential to participate in crisis management operations. Her power in diplomatic, economic and military terms makes of her an efficient power in a very strategic region of the world and an indispensable partner for the West. The fact that Turkey is capable of providing various means and instruments for managing crises is of crucial importance for the future of the relations between Ankara and Brussels because the EU needs serious assets in restoring stability in crisis regions. It would not be wrong to assume that Turkey's strategic significance amplifies with the additional capacity that she brings to the service of Europe.

At this point, the inclination towards multilateralism as a common attitude between Turkey and the EU towards international crises can be invoked. The EU upholds this concept in its relations with the wider world. In a broad sense, multilateralism refers to working in concert on a given issue. But it also entails the coordination of various policies and actors. When they are isolated, preventive and proactive policies are destined to fail. The EU's interventions combine both military and civilian components. In fact, with a particular mix of means at its disposal, the EU is a unique actor in international relations.

The strong parallelism between Brussels and Ankara in their conception of multilateralism is plain to see. The commitment to work with international organisations is a salient feature of Turkish foreign policy since the proclamation of the Republic. It is legitimate to state Turkey as a norm promoter because it obeys them not only in the

institutional framework, but also in her individual diplomatic efforts. Moreover, one fact merit attention: Turkey is increasingly aligning itself with the EU norms and this process is likely to continue in the future. This long-term internalisation of norms provides Turkey with the possibility to find herself in the same multilateral environment with the EU and reinforces the partnership between them.

The fourth argument is based on a pragmatic approach: Turkey has interest in endeavouring to put an end to local conflicts for the simple reason that many of them are in her vicinity and therefore jeopardise her security. Hence, for Turkey, supporting the management of crises is a matter of preserving her national interest. It is important to see that a mutuality of interests is at stake for both sides. In other words, common engagements provide benefits both for Turkey and the EU.

The same approach may lead to think that participation to crisis management and peacekeeping operations brings about additional significant advantages. Obtaining political, diplomatic, economic and military support of other countries is one of them. In Turkey's case, getting the European (or Western in general) support is all the more important because of the political problems that hinder the EU membership process. These problems create also isolation in the international arena. It is therefore right to argue that Turkey has interest in reminding her strategic significance to her European partners. While considering national interests in getting involved in the resolution of the crisis, Turkish governments usually took into consideration the parameters of international prestige and the necessity of accompanying European partners.

Turkish officials try hard to prove their commitment in the aforementioned subject because of the negative image Turkey has in the international scene. Although getting better, her poor human rights record (intensified by the repression exerted during its fight with the PKK), the existence of 40.000 troops in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognised only by Turkey), the Armenian question are among the most important issues that pose problem for Turkey. Certainly, it would be unfair to state that Turkey wants to palliate its deficiencies by bringing a contribution to the regional stability or world peace. Nevertheless, Turkey's image as a 'responsible' is definitely helpful and gives a breath of fresh air in the international arena.

Turkey made a valuable contribution to the maintenance of security and stability in a vast geography, in the limits of her abilities. Experience shows that Turkish governments

have been successful in using this quality as a foreign policy tool in order to reduce various regional tensions. A firm compatibility in security conceptions in general, and in crisis management in particular, exists between the EU and Turkey. If Western powers want Turkey's backing in the resolution of vital problems in the region, they must understand her perceptions and priorities. It is debatable whether Turkey's strong support is a must for Western powers to realise their projects on the regions surrounding Turkey. But there is one undeniable fact: during the last sixty years, Turkey has been a loyal actor of defence of the freedom and security on the European continent.

This, however, did not prevent the unwillingness of the EU member states to let Turkey accede to their union because they do not consider her a provider of security –maybe less because of its internal weaknesses (which are largely ameliorated compared to early 1990s) but mostly because it borders the unstable and unsecure Middle East Region. In addition, Turkey and the EU do not agree on every single security issue and the applications of Turkey sometimes do not match what the Europeans expect.

Both of these arguments are flawed. Taking Turkey's geographical proximity to the Middle East as an argument of insecurity is possible only by forgetting that since 2004 the Schengen zone became closer to Lebanon and Palestinian territories than Turkey is. At the origin of all the problems encountered because of Turkey's resistance to NATO-EU lies her dim EU membership perspective. But still, granting 'privileged partnership' status to Turkey is *en vogue* although Ankara has made it clear that it would not approve such an option. The main argument against such a scheme is that it does not suit its long-term objective of full membership. Moreover, it is contrary to its right recognised by the Helsinki summit. The fact that the content of such partnership is not clearly defined further decreases the chances of its acceptability for Turkey. In fact, it is not even necessary to know precisely what the project is all about. Turkey refuses to see herself given a mere buffer-zone role between the dangerous regions of the world and the European continent.

This stance of Turkey does not seem likely to change in the future. Although being a member of the EU is a highly important issue for Turkey, there is one fact that remains essential regardless of Turkey's future status: Whether Turkey becomes a member or not, her foreign and security policy choices will have a considerable importance for the EU. That puts her in a special platform in her relations with the EU. The cooperation in the field of security and defence is of crucial importance, not only because of Turkey's particular status, but also

due to the particular geographical, historical and political factors that have been developed in the next sections. These points give significance to Turkey's present and future responses to the international crises.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: UNSC RESOLUTION 361 (1974) on CYPRUS

The Security Council,

Conscious of its special responsibilities under the United Nations Charter, Recalling its resolutions 186(1964) of 4 March 1964, 353(1974) of 20 July, 354(1974) of 23 July, 355(1974) of 1 August, 352(1974) of 14 August, 358(1974) and 359(1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August 1974, Noting that a large number of people on the island have been displaced, and are in need of humanitarian assistance,

Mindful of the fact that it is one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to lend humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one currently prevailing in Cyprus, Noting also that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has already been appointed as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus with the task of coordinating relief assistance to be provided by United Nations programmes and agencies and from other sources,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document (S/11473),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the part he has played in bringing about talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus;

2. Warmly welcomes this development and calls upon those concerned in the talks to pursue them actively with the help of the Secretary-General and in the interests of the Cypriot people as a whole;

3. Calls upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering, to ensure the respect to fundamental human rights for every person and to refrain from all action likely to aggravate the situation;

4. Expresses its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urges the parties concerned, in conjunction with the Secretary-General, to search for peaceful solutions of the problems of refugees, and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible opportunity a full report on the situation of the refugees and other persons referred to in paragraph 4 above and decides to keep that situation under constant review;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of the island in need of such assistance;

7. Calls upon all parties, as a demonstration of good faith to take, both individually and in cooperation with each other, all steps which may promote comprehensive and successful negotiations;

8. Reiterates its call to all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP in carrying out its tasks;

9. Expresses the conviction that the speedy implementation of the provisions of the present resolution will assist the achievement of a satisfactory settlement in Cyprus.

Adopted unanimously at the 1795th meeting.

Annex 2: UNSC RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) on KOSOVO

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

- (a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
- (b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
- (c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
- (d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
- (e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
- (f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
- (g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
- (h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

- (a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
- (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
- (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
- (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
- (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
- (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
- (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
- (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
- (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
- (j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
- (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1: Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
- Marking/clearing minefields;
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.^[1] A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

[1] Other required elements:

A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;

Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);

Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;

The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

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