

**T.C.  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ  
AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER  
ANABİLİM DALI**

**EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: NEOREALIST AND  
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES**

**Doktora Tezi**

**Nergiz ÖZKURAL**

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Doktora öğrencisi Nergiz ÖZKURAL'ın "EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: NEOREALIST AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES" konulu tez çalışması ile ilgili 15 Haziran 2010 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

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## ABSTRACT

In this thesis, the main problematic is to put forward the function of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a foreign policy tool in the framework of European integration in an appropriate way. The research question of the thesis is whether the EU uses ENP as a geostrategic tool to maximize its power in the periphery, or as a modernization and a socialization tool to stabilize and change the region. In this thesis, two systemic theories, namely, constructivism and neorealism, have been applied for the case of ENP and the questions of “what”, “why” and “how” are asked to take a three dimensional picture of the policy.

In the first part, the question of ‘what is neighbourhood policy’ is answered. In the first chapter of this part, genesis of the concept ‘neighbourhood’ is considered. After the conceptualization part, the development, tools and aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy is explained. Moreover, the scope of the policy is analyzed under the titles of thematic and geographic.

In the second part, the ‘why-questions’ are asked and the reasons lying behind the creation of the ENP is questioned in neorealist perspective. The evolution of the ENP is focused in the framework of power struggle between the great powers in the sense of balance of power. In this international environment the EU is considered as a sub-system and the relationship between the sub-system and international system is assessed. In the chapter of field of activity, the cases of ‘widening’ and ‘energy relations’ are examined.

In the third part, how-questions are asked and the process of ENP is examined in constructivist perspective. In this part, the EU is considered as a social structure and it is objected to find out how to categorize the agents of the ENP and how the democracy promotion capacity of the EU, in the region in the case of the ENP could be measured and how the ENP could have an impact on stability and change in the defined area. With the cases of democracy promotion and border relations, the effect of the ENP and the socialization process are tried to be measured.

\*European Union    \*European Neighbourhood Policy    \*Neorealism  
\*Constructivism

## ÖZET

Bu tezin ana sorunsalı Avrupa bütünleşmesi kapsamında, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın bir dış politika aracı olarak işlevinin doğru bir şekilde ortaya koyulmasıdır. Tezin araştırması; “Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nı çevresinde gücünü maksimize etmek için kullandığı jeostratejik bir araç mı yoksa çevresini stabilize etmek ve değiştirmek için kullandığı bir sosyalizasyon aracı mıdır?” sorusu üzerine kurulmuştur. Metodolojik olarak, iki sistemik teori olan neorealizm ve konstrüktivizm Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası örneğine uygulanmış ve tezin bölümlerinde “ne”, “neden” ve “nasıl” soruları sorularak politikanın üç boyutlu bir resmi çekilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Tezin ilk bölümünde, “Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası nedir” sorusuna yanıt aranmıştır. Burada kavramsal olarak “komşuluk” tanımı üzerinde durulmuş daha sonra politikanın gelişimi, amaçları ve araçları ele alınmıştır. Bu bölümün ikinci kısmında ise politikanın alanı coğrafi ve tematik olarak incelenmiştir.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, “Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası neden yaratılmıştır?” sorusuna genel olarak yanıt aranmaktadır. Genişleme ve enerji ilişkileri bu bölümde iki ayrı temel değişken olarak ele alınmıştır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde ise, “Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası süreci nasıl işlemektedir?” sorusuna cevap aranmıştır. AB sosyal yapısının çevresine sosyalizasyon ve modernizasyonu nasıl ihraç ettiği sorunsalı “demokrasi ihracı” ve “sınır etkileşimleri” örnekleri üzerinden analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bölümde ele alınan tüm süreçler iki yönlü bir şekilde analiz edilmiştir.

\*Avrupa Birliği \*Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası \*Neorealizm \*Konstrüktivizm

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AC</b>	Arctic Council
<b>AEBR</b>	Association of European Border Regions
<b>BEAC</b>	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
<b>BSER</b>	Black Sea Euroregion
<b>BP</b>	British Petrol
<b>BTC</b>	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
<b>CENN</b>	Caucasus Environmental NGO Network
<b>CBC</b>	Cross-Border Cooperation
<b>CBSS</b>	Council of the Baltic Sea States
<b>CDC</b>	Community of Democratic Choice
<b>CEE</b>	Central and Eastern European
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>EIDHR</b>	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
<b>EMP</b>	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework
<b>ENP</b>	European Neighbourhood Policy
<b>ENPI</b>	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
<b>EPI</b>	Eastern Partnership Initiative
<b>ERDF</b>	European Regional Development Fund
<b>ESS</b>	European Security Strategy
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUBAM</b>	EU Border Assistance Mission
<b>EU BAM Rafah</b>	EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah
<b>EUPOL COPPS</b>	EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
<b>EUSR</b>	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus
<b>FYRM</b>	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<b>GMF</b>	German Marshall Fund of the United States
<b>GMP</b>	Global Mediterranean Policy
<b>GRECO</b>	Group of States against Corruption
<b>GUAM</b>	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
<b>IBPP</b>	Institution-Building Partnership Programme
<b>IBSU</b>	International Black Sea University

<b>ICC</b>	International Cultural Centre”
<b>IUBSNGO</b>	International Union of Black Sea NGOs
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>INOGATE</b>	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
<b>INTERREG</b>	Interregional Cooperation Programme
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>JEPP</b>	Journal of European Public Policy
<b>MEDA</b>	Mediterranean Economic Development Area
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>ND</b>	Northern Dimension
<b>NCM</b>	Nordic Council of Ministers
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organizations
<b>NIP</b>	National Indicative Programmes
<b>NNI</b>	New Neighbourhood Instrument
<b>ODED-GUAM</b>	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PABSEC</b>	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
<b>PCA</b>	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
<b>PHARE</b>	Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
<b>PKK</b>	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
<b>PVT</b>	Parallel Vote Tabulation
<b>STGM</b>	Civil Society Development Centre
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>SBGS</b>	State Border Guard Service
<b>TACIS</b>	Technical Assistance to the CIS
<b>TRACECA</b>	European-Caucasus-Asia transportation corridor
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UPAC</b>	Project against Corruption in Ukraine
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USGS</b>	The United States Geological Survey

## **INTRODUCTION**

The EU is an evolving and a changing entity. In the course of each enlargement process, the members of the EU change as well, which also triggers off changes in its institutional structure. The main objective of the system is to survive like a living organism does. This implies that the system can evolve and change its appearance, but this new appearance would not change its presence.

The enlargement of the 2004 was a turning point for the EU with respect to its relations with Russia and the new neighbours of the EU. Especially after the EU membership candidacy of Turkey, the EU started to extend beyond the geographical framework of Europe. The new neighbours and neighbour's neighbours gradually became important in terms of economics, politics and culture. In that sense, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been designed as a functional tool to cope with several effects of the EU enlargements by not offering a membership to its ENP partners.

Benita-Ferrero Waldner, the former Commissioner of the ENP has been replaced by Stefan Fule, and the name of the commissioner has changed into 'EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy'. This step, which was taken after the new set up of Lisbon Treaty in February 2010, has proven that expansion and ENP are complementary policies of the EU. In the context of changing cyclical conditions, the EU placed more emphasis on the countries that could become potential EU members, and on their neighbours that could become potential EU neighbours. This significant shift in the policy also alludes to the evolving characteristics of the EU system, which could be interpreted as yet another response to the inputs coming from the international system. Many factors, such as the assertive foreign policy decisions of Russia, the post-communist countries' attitudes towards Russia and the EU, the changing structure of Turkey, the new small independent states which appeared in the Balkans and the Caucasia, the illegal migration flow coming from the Southern African countries, and EU's energy need, have an impact on the evaluation of the ENP.

## **Literature Review**

Due to a literature review of the ENP, it has been observed that there exists no detailed theoretical analysis to provide one with a three dimensional picture of the policy. In this thesis; EU official documents, speeches, books, articles, and results of some surveys and researches have been used as main resources of the thesis.

The basic theoretical problem in the writing process of thesis has been the lack of resources on the implementation of neorealism and constructivism to the EU integration. Especially neorealism, by its nature, is a challenging theory to the very nature of EU integration, which inevitably results in the considerably small number of academic studies on the implementation aforementioned. The only study available to researchers is Simon Collard-Wexler's article entitled "Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union", which provides a specific theoretical perspective. Therefore, it has been the objective of this work to develop an original perspective in order to analyze the ENP in neorealist terms. In this perspective, the EU is regarded as a sub-system, and the implementation problem of the neorealist theory to the EU integration has been approached from this standpoint. On the other hand, the researches on the implementation of the constructivist theory to the EU integration are ambiguous. Constructivism holds some difficulties concerning the implementation of the theory on particular cases. Especially the assessment of socialization proves to be difficult, which leads to the assertion that the instruments of the theory is inadequate in this sense. To cope with the ambiguous structure of the theory, the survey results and statistical indicators have been used to examine socialization processes. In constructivist analysis, the agents and the instruments of ENP have been analysed to suggest clarifications in an original and explicit way.

## **Methodology**

In this thesis, two systemic theories, namely, constructivism and neorealism, have been applied for the case of ENP. The thesis methodology is constituted by the case study. ENP is a newly developed policy which has been active since 2004, and during the research of thesis, the current developments about the policy have created a living and real-time laboratory for the analysis. Some tangible examples were taken into consideration to support the case study. The examples were generally chosen from the

Black Sea region and the Eastern European countries. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, the more active and willing ENP partners are chosen to be able to give remarkable examples. For instance, Syria and Jordan do not have Action Plans and they are passive partners. Secondly, the examples have been chosen with respect to their functions to prove the argument effectively. For instance, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine has been chosen to assess the democracy promotion efforts of the EU and to understand the socialization processes in an ENP partner.

The level of analysis is systemic. The common ground of neorealism and constructivism is their systemic approaches. However, these two theories are contradictory and complementary at the same time.

The unit of analysis is taken as 'the state' in neorealism and constructivism. However, the interpretation of 'the state' is totally different in the approaches that constitute the basis of each theoretical perspective. The vital difference between the two is related to their understanding of the concept of 'state'. In neorealism, the states are the actors which could be great or regional powers, where the concept of the state refers to a formal understanding. In constructivist perspective, however, the concept of 'state' refers to an informal understanding, consists of all the agents, and has a wider meaning. Thus, in constructivist analysis, the term 'agent' is used instead of 'state' to express its wider meaning.

In due course of the implementation of the theories to the EU integration, analysis of the EU as a unique unit brings about many difficulties, as a result of which the EU has been defined as a system/structure. From a neorealist perspective, the EU is considered as a sub-system, whereas from a constructivist perspective, it is referred to as a social structure. Likewise, the system-actor relations in terms of neorealism relate to the agent-structure relations in terms of constructivism. However, the shift between the theories has not necessarily changed the reality of the systemic nature of the EU. In the context of the system/structure of the EU, the member states' concerns and interests are emphasized in the examination of the cases as provided by the ENP.

Basically, from a constructivist perspective, the ENP is analyzed in terms of 'change', on the other hand, from a neorealist perspective it is analyzed in terms of 'distribution of power'.

### **Theoretical structure**

In this thesis, neorealist and constructivist theories have been employed to analyse the ENP. The underlying reason for this is that it is instrumental in the acquisition of looking at the same picture and hence assessing it from different angles. It is possible to regard the constructivist perspective of the ENP as an antithesis of neorealist thesis, however, it should also be noted that both theories are systemic theories, and this common ground is instrumental in reaching a synthesis. It has been argued that these two theories complement one another, and as such, describe a system model in the end of the thesis. By means of a neorealist approach, the reasons which underlying the foundation of the ENP – and hence the inputs of the system – has been figured out. The processes in the system, on the other hand, have been argued from a constructivist perspective by focusing on the particular aspects of the policy.

The fundamental difference between these theories is the agent-centric characteristic of neorealism. In that sense, Rey Koslowski emphasizes on this differentiation by stating that, from a constructivist perspective, “the international system is understood as an interacting collection of human-made institutions including, but not limited to, states.”<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, neorealism focuses on the reasons by posing ‘why-questions’. In that context, neorealist theory will be used to answer why the policy is emerged. On the other hand, constructivist approach that poses ‘how-questions’<sup>2</sup> to analytical contexts, searches for an understanding of how the event has emerged, and focuses on the progress of the process calls for a perspective in the context of which nothing is pre-determined, and all the dynamics are assessed in the social environment.

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<sup>1</sup> Rey Koslowski, “A Constructivist Approach to Understanding the European Union as a Federal Polity”, **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, p. 565.

<sup>2</sup> For the details of the interpretation of ‘how-questions’ and ‘why-questions’ see; Richard Price, “Interpretation and Disciplinary Orthodoxy in International Relations”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol.20, Issue 02, April 1994, pp.201-204. See also Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism” in Andrew Linklater (ed.), **International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science**, U.K: Routledge, 2000, pp. 1800-1803.



## **Research Aim and Major Argument**

The general research aim is to give a theoretical insight to the ENP. It should also be emphasized that a comparative analysis of constructivism and neorealism is not within the scope of this thesis, and they have been employed to reach a synthesis by analyzing the case.

The research question is whether the EU uses ENP as a geo-strategic tool to maximize its power in the periphery, or as a modernization and a socialization tool to stabilize and change the region.

The EU is taken as a system/structure, which supports the argument about the efficiency and role of the EU member states. The case study, on the other hand, provides an assessment regarding whether or not the big countries of EU, which are Germany and France, are the core constituents of EU policies.

## **The Organization of the Thesis**

The organization of the thesis is based on the three dimensions of the case of the ENP. Every part signifies one of the dimensions of the policy. The whole picture of the ENP shows a system model which would be helpful to explain the structure of the thesis. With respect to this model, it is possible to observe the input and output of the political system. The inputs are formed by the demand and support which change the decisions or policies made by the political system. These decisions and policies constitute the outputs and provide feedback.<sup>3</sup> Due to the fact that the ENP can as well be defined as a system, the inputs of the system have been figured out in the first and the second part of the thesis. In the third part of the thesis, the process of the system has been analyzed.

The objective of the first part is finding answers to the question ‘what’, in effect, the European Neighbourhood Policy is. In this part, neither neorealism nor constructivism has been employed as the fundamental theoretical perspective. However, as necessitated by the scope of the policy, both neorealist and constructivist lenses have been put into use. This use has provided insight for the rest of the thesis. Therefore, in

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<sup>3</sup> David Easton, “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems”, **World Politics**, Vol.9, No.3, April 1957, pp. 383-400.

the conclusion part, the manner how the unpremeditated use of these theories has accomplished this has been explained.

In the first chapter of the first part, the conceptualization of the neighbourhood relations, along with the development and the tools of the ENP are explained. In the second chapter of the first part, the scope of the policy is examined under geographical and thematic scopes. In this manner, the dilemma of the concept ‘neighbourhood’ about the physical adjacency and the further thematic connotations have been analysed. The geographical dimensions of the policy have been categorized under four main regional dimensions. These dimensions have been designed to stop the competition between the regional dimensions – as is the case between the Southern and Northern dimension –, and to complement each other in the framework of the ENP. The thematic scope alluding to further meanings and connotations of the neighbourhood concept has been explained under the headings, ‘conflict’ and ‘peace’. These two headings are also the basis of the second and the third parts of the thesis. Frozen and energy conflicts comprise the neorealist aims of the policy, and indicates the interests of the EU. Symmetrical to these headings, on the other hand, democracy promotion and energy dialogues have been analysed as the processes of the policy under the heading ‘peace’. The scope of the policy, by nature, involves both constructivist and neorealist aspects. These particular aspects have determined the organization of the following parts of the dissertation.

The objective of the second part is finding answers to the question ‘why’ the ENP has been founded. This also entails a clarification of the basic assumptions of neorealist theory, along with an explanation of the European integration with reference to neorealism, in the context of which ENP is also located. In the framework of this neorealist approach, the ENP has been analyzed with reference to the cause and effect relations. The interests of the great powers in the anarchical system have also been taken into consideration to interpret the reasons underlying the foundation of the ENP. The great powers of the EU system (Germany and France), attempts to survive in the EU system and their roles in the international system have been analyzed. In this part, the widening-ENP relations function as a case to explain the EU’s interests and objectives of power maximization in the wider Black Sea region. The energy game

between the great powers has been analyzed to see the fundamental strategic motivations of the ENP, too.

The objective of the third part is finding answer to the question 'how' the process of the ENP continues. The basic assumptions of the constructivist theory are clarified, and the European integration with reference to constructivism is explained by positioning the ENP in that framework. From a constructivist perspective, the interaction of the agents with the social structure of the EU has formed the basis of the research. The actors and instruments of the policy have been assessed from a constructivist perspective to observe the functions of the policy. The cases of democracy promotion towards the Black Sea region and the coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and the case of border interaction issues have been analyzed to evaluate the effectiveness of the ENP with neighbourhood countries.

**PART ONE**  
**EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**

In this part, the conceptual analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is made by defining the concepts and the history of the policy. The tools and the scope of the policy are also explained to consider what the ENP is. Thus, one dimension of the ENP will be covered to illuminate the other two dimensions of the policy.

**1. THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION**

In the sense of conceptualization, firstly the conceptualization of ‘neighbourhood policy’ will be discussed to be followed by an analysis of the historical evolution and development of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

**1.1. Conceptualization**

In the context of conceptualization, the historical evolution of good neighbourhood relations will be overviewed to grasp the essence of ‘neighbourhood policy’. Then war-peace dilemma, which is crucial for international relation studies, will be defined to explain the genesis of the term ‘neighbourhood’. Hinging on the definition of conceptualization, which reads as the process of abstraction defining the relationships between the objects, the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ is built against enmity-friendship contradiction regarding the perception of war and peace. ‘Neighbourhood’ has positive connotations in terms of conceptualization, and it is a means of peaceful relations. Therefore, the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ will be used to refer to ‘good neighbourhood.’

Physical adjacency is not necessarily a prerequisite for neighbourhood relations, whereas geographical adjacency can also be the source of violence. In addition, two states can have neighbourhood relations with another state which does not

hold geographical proximity. Thus, it could be argued that neighbourhood is an intellectual process and it is constructed.

‘Neighbourhood’ concept can be evaluated in geographical terms which are, nevertheless, static processes depending on the location of the nation-states. On the other hand, as Hasan Bülent Kahraman points out, “neighbourhood is a kind of relationship that removes threat.”<sup>4</sup> From his point of view, the term ‘neighbourhood’ is based on the activeness of objects. There could be two forms of objects, namely, neutral and active. The ‘neutral’ form of neighbourhood refers to a physical positioning of the objects, where the state of physical position relates to a geographical and legal position of these objects. The ‘active’ form of neighbourhood, on the other hand, argues that there should be an interaction between these objects. This form alludes to the historical and ontological positions of the objects which, in the context of countries, cause neighbours to be respectful to each other and avoid violence. Even though the status of peace seems to be a passive process, it becomes an active one in neighbourhood relations. In the nature of neighbourhood relations, friendship and consent are fundamental beyond the interests of the objects.<sup>5</sup> Neutral or active positions of the states could be assumed to be an opportunity or a threat. Physical adjacency could also trigger enmity and otherness depending on territorial disputes.

In historical context, it could be observed that there is a correlation between geographical positions and wars. One of the main criteria of having neighbourhood relations is related to territorial relations, because one basic aspect of neighbourhood relations is to respect the sovereignty and borders and to share the resources mutually.

In economic and cultural contexts, on the other hand, neighbourhood relations could be observed since the ancient Greek cities. There are several factors and instruments to construct neighbourhood relations. In the economic context, trade was one of the crucial instruments between states. The trade routes were also both the reason of war and peace in that period. The cultural context, nevertheless, indicates marriages which were used as one of the most influential diplomatic instruments to construct

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<sup>4</sup> Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “Turkey-European Union: Are We Just Neighbours?”, *Varlık*, Vol.12, 2005, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

neighbourhood relations by city-states and empires throughout history. However, marriages could also be the cause of war. Yet another tool to divide the lines between the bad or the good neighbourhood is religion. In 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Thirty Years War between Protestants and Catholics is a prominent war in the era of empires which had deeper political implications on drawing the invisible borders in Europe. The Westphalia Treaty led to the foundation of modern nation-states, and these nation-states determined the borders of the states and nations. The perceptions of imperial period and the instruments for the neighbourhood relations were changed. Nation-states had homogenous structures, and religion was no longer the central underlying effect behind wars.<sup>6</sup> However, these relatively homogenous structures and national identities created yet another source of conflict which would influence the understanding of neighbourhood.

World War I was the end of major imperial powers, as a result of which new nation-states emerged. In the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, the basis of the *United Nation (UN) Charter* was founded by the American President Woodrow Wilson<sup>7</sup>, who is one of the leaders of the countries constituting the League of Nations. The basis of Wilsonian vision could be related to his ‘peace without victory’ concept, which refers to his achievement on leaving the U.S. out of the World War I. Wilson tried to pursue peaceful policies from 1921 onwards, and following the Wilsonian idea, Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a ‘good neighbourhood policy’ towards Latin America in the beginning of 1930s.<sup>8</sup> In the *UN Charter*, it is ruled that the neighbourhood countries should accept not to interfere with the internal affairs of one another, and that these countries must hold an understanding position for each other. In the *Charter*, it is also stated that big states should respect the small states, should obey the article imposing

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<sup>6</sup> Charles Tilly, **Zor, Sermaye ve Avrupa Devletlerinin Oluşumu**, Kudret Emiroğlu (translator.), Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2001, p. 112.

<sup>7</sup> President Wilson was a leader of intellectuals who were supporting a peaceful world system. He believes that public opinion represents the ‘intelligence’ and there should be ‘open diplomacy’ concept in a public opinion. Atilla Eralp, **Devlet, Sistem, Kimlik, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996, pp. 64-65.

<sup>8</sup> Howard Cincotta, **An Outline of American History**, U.S: United States Information Agency, May 1994, pp. 245-264.

equal treatment, and should settle every dispute peacefully.<sup>9</sup> In the second article of *UN Charter*, the use of violence is definitely forbidden in international relations. However, it should be added that the *UN Charter* is not a pacific text, for it tries to give a shape to the use of power and normatively puts a limit to it.<sup>10</sup> It states that

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”<sup>11</sup>

Johan Galtung argues that the *UN Charter* is incomplete with respect to positive peace, and the *Charter* dismisses focusing on social and economic equality between countries.<sup>12</sup> In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance drafted a report entitled *Our Global Neighbourhood*. This Commission is endorsed by the UN Secretary General and holds the view that world events were recently affected by technological and environmental dilemmas, and the world needed to recognize the benefits of global governance which is a new system based on peace and a set of core values. In the *Global Neighbourhood Report*, ‘neighbourhood’ is defined by ‘proximity’ which can be either geographical or communal ties. It is also mentioned that people have to cohabit with their neighbours, and fear, avoidance or escape is not an option.<sup>13</sup> The report further offers peaceful and friendly relations between people under the umbrella of global governance.

Constructing peaceful and friendly relations with neighbourhood countries is related to the enmity-friendship relations that could give a direction to war and peace. Carl Schmitt believes that politics is defined by the tension between friendship and enmity, indicating that political structure should be built on the principle of polarization. Schmitt has a narrow distinction between friendship and enmity, as a result of which he

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<sup>9</sup> Barrister Harun ur Rashid, Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, “What does it take to be good neighbour?”, 27.04.2007. See <http://www.sydneybashi-bangla.com/Articles> [20.05.2007]

<sup>10</sup> The Speech of Antonio Cassese in Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, **Barışı Hayal Etmek**, Evrensel Kültürler Akademisi, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004, pp. 124-126.

<sup>11</sup> For the UN Charter, see <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

<sup>12</sup> Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.6, No.3, 1969, pp. 167-191.

<sup>13</sup> “Our Global Neighbourhood”, **Report of the Commission on Global Governance**, Oxford University Press, 1995. See <http://www.libertymatters.org/globalgovernance.htm>.

has given a new direction to the international relations.<sup>14</sup> Schmitt argues that the distinction between enmity or friendship does not say anything about the content of the framework of politics, but offers a conceptual standard. This diversification between enmity and friendship can continue without any criteria about moral, aesthetic or economic evaluations. The enemy should be both ‘the other’ and the foreigner, and this evaluation is the basis of the definition of the enemy. International law considers the state and the sovereignty as the main principle to limit war and enmity. He argues that no state would constantly act as the enemy or the friend for the other state, and that the status of the state could change as well.<sup>15</sup> However, it should be noted that Jürgen Habermas criticizes his opinions severely by stating that the consequences of this could be harmful for the human being.<sup>16</sup> Although Schmitt’s ideas have inspired many international relations scholars, his contribution to the Nazi labelled him as a fascist in the literature.

Zygmunt Bauman has also focused on the ambivalent position of what constitutes a friend or an enemy, and he defines ‘the enemy’ as ‘the stranger’. According to him, friends and enemies are opposite to each other, and enemies are what the friends are not. There is a symmetry between the concepts of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, and they complement each other. If there are no enemies, then there are no friends, either.<sup>17</sup>

Constructivists, on the other hand, evaluate the enmity-friendship relation from a different perspective. Thomas Risse argues that enmity and friendship do not result from the distribution of power as realists assume, but that they are socially constructed. He asserts that peacefulness as well as enmity are learnt through international interactions.<sup>18</sup> Another constructivist, Alexander Wendt, claims that “...enemies are constituted by representations of the ‘other’ as an actor who does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its

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<sup>14</sup> Carl Schmitt, **Siyasal Kavramı** (translator) Ece Göztepe, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2006, pp. 47, 57.

<sup>15</sup> **Ibid**, pp. 31, 47, 55.

<sup>16</sup> Jürgen Habermas, **Bölünmüş Batı**, Dilman Muradoğlu (translator), İstanbul: YKY Publishing, 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, **Modernity and Ambivalence**, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p. 53.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995, p. 503.



violence toward the Self.”<sup>19</sup> Wendt defines enmity-friendship relationship in the framework of his analysis on distinct cultures of anarchy which is Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. He believes that each of these cultures is constituted through the basic relationships of states. In that respect, a state may regard its ‘other’ as an enemy, rival or friend. Thus, in the context of Wendt’s approach, Hobbesian and Kantian cultures could explain the enmity-friendship contradiction. Neighbourhood relations could be based on the Kantian culture which proposes friendship where states expect each other to obey the rules of non-violence and mutual aid. Kantian culture occurs when collective security norms are internalized.<sup>20</sup>

Peace can be defined both in economic and moral terms. Immanuel Kant defines peace in moral terms as an idealist and moralist, believing that enmity is a bigger problem for international politics than friendship. He offers a peace system based on a democratic system, and his arguments on peace are the basis of Wendt’s claims on the culture of anarchy. On the other hand, Hobbesian culture is based on the arguments of the father of realism, i.e., Thomas Hobbes, who believed in ‘perpetual war’. In his book *Leviathan*, he wrote on the violence of human beings and the reality of war, assuming that “...politics emerge from fear and dreaming peace is related to overcome the biggest instincts of ourselves on protecting life, insecurity, arrogance, violence and fear of death.”<sup>21</sup> Wendt believes that, in Hobbesian culture of anarchy, war is a necessary and honorable phenomenon.<sup>22</sup>

In economic terms, “peace is conditional on adequate wealth and it is conditional on the eradication of excessive wealth.”<sup>23</sup> One of the most famous arguments about constituting peace claims that liberal states do not fight one other, and democracy is an essential force for peace.<sup>24</sup> “Even though liberal states have become

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<sup>19</sup> Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 260.

<sup>20</sup> **Ibid**, pp. 258, 298-308.

<sup>21</sup> The Speech of Paul Ricoeur, Per Ahlmark, “Demokrasi ve Barış” in Barret- Ducrocq, **op.cit.**, p.122

<sup>22</sup> Wendt, **op.cit.**, pp. 258-278.

<sup>23</sup> Sean Cubitt, “To Transitory Peace”, **International Journal of Cultural Studies**, Vol.5, No.1, Sage Publications, 2002, p.13.

<sup>24</sup> See for the details of this argument Bruce M. Russett, “Democracy and Peace”, pp. 245-261 in Harvey Starr, Bruce Russett, Richard J. Stoll (eds.), **Choices in World Politics: Sovereignty and Interdependence**, New York: W. H. Freeman & Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, March 1989.

involved in numerous wars with neo-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with each other.”<sup>25</sup> Therefore, poverty could be seen as both the cause and the result of war.

Per Ahlmark points out to the relationship between peace and democracy by claiming that democracies do not fight. He supports his ideas with the analysis of the period of 1816-1991, that is, a period that witnessed no wars between democratic states. He believes that “imagining peace is almost the same thing with imagining the democracy”.<sup>26</sup> Regarding this argument, it may be asserted that liberal countries do not fight each other, however, it may also be asserted that liberal states can fight with non-liberal countries.

Kantian notion of ‘Perpetual Peace’ is one of the main sources of liberal scholars who focus on democratic peace theory. Kant’s idealist arguments are mostly affected by French revolution, which are best reflected in his fostering of the political rights of all individuals.<sup>27</sup> Going back to that period, one may state that in the year of 1795, there was no democracy except the naive experiments of French and American democracies.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the notion of democracy has changed in today’s global system. Taking all these into consideration, it should be noted that the Kantian thought has always had different reflections throughout history, and that it is difficult to support democratic peace theory with the Kantian approach to peace.

In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant mentions that liberal states are not pacific in their relations with non-liberal states. He argues three ‘definitive articles’ of peace which are the guarantees of perpetual peace. In the First Definitive Article, he states that perpetual peace can only take place when the states have civil constitutions in a republican system.<sup>29</sup> Within this article, he refers to citizens’ rights which are protected by a civil

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<sup>25</sup> Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, **Philosophy&Public Affairs**, Vol.12, No.3, p.213

<sup>26</sup> Ahlmark, “Demokrasi ve Barış” in Barret-Ducrocq, **op.cit.**, p.62.

<sup>27</sup> Immanuel Kant, **Political Writings**, (Edited with an introduction and notes by Hans Reiss), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.4.

<sup>28</sup> Ahlmark, **op.cit.**, pp.57-58

<sup>29</sup> Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.80, No.4, December 1986. In, Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond**, Boston: Allyn and Bacon Publishing, 1993, p. 274.

constitution which deems citizens as the subjects in the constitution. It would be easier to declare war to another country in a system where the country is ruled by a single ruler, and the citizens cannot participate in the process of decision-making. In the second article, Kant mentions that “no independent existing state, whether it is large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.”<sup>30</sup> This article emphasizes the equality between states regardless of whether they are big or small. This indicates that Kantian thought is not based on power relations. He explains his ideas on peace within the concept of ‘universal hospitality’, and states that, “stranger has the right not to be treated with hostility when he arrives someone else’s territory”<sup>31</sup> In the sixth article and he continues his ideas on hostility and states that, “no state at war with another shall permit such act of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace.”<sup>32</sup> Kant believes even suspension of hostilities is not a guarantee of peace in neighbourhood relations.<sup>33</sup> Michael C. Williams interprets Kantian thought and states that “insecurity is not the same as injury, and the lack of trust which liberals feel toward non-liberal states is an adequate justification for hostility toward them.”<sup>34</sup>

In the Second Definitive Article of a *Perpetual Peace*, Kant offers a pacific federation (*foedus pacificum*) which is a general agreement between the nations in the framework of a league. This treaty would be different from a peace treaty signed between two states that end one war, but pacific federation will end all wars.<sup>35</sup> “This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states.”<sup>36</sup> “The Third Definitive Article established a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union and the cosmopolitan law shall be limited to

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<sup>30</sup> Kant, *op.cit*, p. 94.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>34</sup> Michael C. Williams, The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social Construction of Security Communities, *European Journal of International Relations*, No.7, 2001, p. 537.

<sup>35</sup> Kant, *op.cit*, pp. 102-104.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

conditions of universal hospitality.”<sup>37</sup> Cosmopolitan law is above international law and it is a universal civil rights which are binding states.<sup>38</sup> The United Nations’ structure inspired from Kant’s idea of pacific federation and cosmopolitan law.

Kant offers a system of federation above all states seeking to reach a perpetual peace. However in this system, “politics is not to interfere with economics and democratic peace theory is naive to assume that a liberal economic market will automatically guarantee prosperity.”<sup>39</sup> Kantian system is moralist and there was not a liberal economic system when Kant created his argumentation. In that sense, it is debatable to correlate democratic peace theory with Kantian thought.

In the post-cold war period, in the context of democratic peace theory ‘peace’ and ‘state-behaviour’ are reinterpreted. In this period, the definition of ‘threat’ is changed. Terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts within states and nuclear arms proliferation and soft security issues became new threats which are vital for states. The instable countries which are also perceived as non-democratic countries are seen as the source of threat. Therefore, the definition of ‘enemy’ is also changed and it is created a new perception of ‘neighbourhood’. Western powers drew a framework for the fundamental condition of being a neighbour as the internalization of liberal and Western values and becoming more democratic. If a country ignores to be in the system of Western norms and values, as the case of Iran, it would be seen as a potential threat. Since the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) share same liberal and democratic values and norms, there are some significant differences between their perspectives towards democratization and the peace. While the EU suggests civilian and diplomatic methods, the US prefers more assertive methods for diffusing democracy to non-democratic countries. It could be said that, the democratic peace theory is used by the US to legitimize the use of force and the Afghanistan and Iraq cases are significant evidences of it. However, it should be also noted that, since the Obama government took the presidency in the US, there is an attempt to recovering the military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan by encouraging more civilian policies.

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> Heinz Wismann, “Kant’a göre Barış Yolu” in Barret-Ducrocq, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>39</sup> David P. Calleo, **Rethinking Europe’s Future**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 358.

Georg Sorensen, who is one of the scholars studying on democratization argues that democracies lead to peaceful relations because democratic government is controlled by the citizens, and the citizens would not prefer to fight or live in a state of war.<sup>40</sup> On the other side, there are many critiques on democratic peace theory. For example, Michael C. Williams, in his article asks for if liberal democracies do not go to war with each other how do they recognize each other as liberal democracies.<sup>41</sup> Democracy is a subjective concept and it is difficult to measure the degree of democracy. Thomas Risse-Kappen interprets democracy in constructivist terms and believes that, democracies create their own friends and enemies.<sup>42</sup> Therefore it is related how you recognize or create your 'other'. Also he states that "democracies are janus-faced and while they do not fight each other, they are frequently involved in militarized disputes and war with authoritarian regimes."<sup>43</sup> On the other side, some scholars like Sarah Mitchell and Brent J. Steele emphasize the role of war in democratization and believe that "war is pushing us ever closer to a federation of free states"<sup>44</sup> and "war between democracies and non-democracies, 'mixed dyads', has been and continues to be a well-established (and legitimate) way to increase the number of democracies in the system."<sup>45</sup> "Proudhon uses the term 'antinomy' to explain that 'peace demonstrates and confirms war', while 'war in turn is a demand of peace'."<sup>46</sup>

Risse-Kappen states "the realist assumption which claims today's friend can always be tomorrow's enemy is no longer valid and that, therefore, each state has to worry that its partner might gain more from co-operation than oneself."<sup>47</sup> Liberal states

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<sup>40</sup> Georg Sorensen, "Kant and Process of Democratization: Consequences for Neorealist Thought", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.29, No.4, November 1992, Sage Publications, pp. 397-414.

<sup>41</sup> Michael C. Williams, "The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social Construction of Security Communities", **European Journal of International Relations**, No.7, 2001, p. 527.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.1, No.4, 1995, p. 492.

<sup>43</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 491.

<sup>44</sup> Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution", **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 46, No.4, 2002, p. 752 in Brent J. Steele, "Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist Critique", **International Studies Review**, No.9, pp.35-36.

<sup>45</sup> Steele, **op. cit.**, p. 35.

<sup>46</sup> P. J. Proudhon, **La Guerre Et La Paix, Recherches Sur Le Principe Et La Constitution Du Droit Des Gens**, Paris: Dentu, 1861 cited by Eric Alliez, Antonio Negri, "Peace and War", **Culture & Society**, Vol.20, No.2, Sage Publications, p. 109.

<sup>47</sup> Risse-Kappen, **op. cit.**, p. 523.

create a collective identity with creating their 'other' and they share common values. Therefore states can gain through co-operation and share democratic values and norms of capitalist market economies. Risse-Kappen put forward that "domestic orders, norms and political cultures shape the identities of actors in the international norm."<sup>48</sup> It should be noted that economic system and geographical variables are parts of the norm sharing. European states share the norms of western countries in social and economic terms and this is also a reflection of a different norm-creating process. Therefore, western perception of 'peace' could be different than eastern countries' perceptions.

Before and after World War I, in Europe, a serious effort initiated on constituting a peace by uniting European states. This idea is affected by federalist movements in Europe and it is created by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923 under the name of Pan-European movement. In 1926, Association for European Cooperation is established in Geneva and worked on diffusing the idea of "United Europe".<sup>49</sup> World War II created notable trauma in the area of war and after the war European nation-states strived again on creating a peace system in Europe. The advocates of the federative idea, like Altiero Spinelli, achieved to found the origins of the EU in 1952. Therefore, European states became good neighbours for each other and they became interdependent under a supranational structure. The member states became more than neighbours for each other and the neighbourhood notion placed out of the formal borders of the EU system and changed after every enlargement process.

Throughout history, there are peace periods such as, pax-Romana, pax-Americana, pax-Sovietica. These periods offer stability which is interpreted as a status of peace. With the beginning of Cold War, in Western World, an artificial peace period took place between two big powers. This period since 1945 is also called as pax-Americana<sup>50</sup> although the U.S. was involved in many regional wars such as Korean War, Vietnam War, Soviet-Afghan War and Iraq War. Since today, the U.S. used the ideology of pax-Americana which is based on democratic peace theory. Some scholars

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 524.

<sup>49</sup> Martin J. Dedman, **Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1955: A History of European Integration**, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 16.

<sup>50</sup> See for the argumentation, Wolfgang Ischinger, "Pax Americana and Pax Europea", Tod Lindberg (ed.), **Beyond Paradise and Power**, Vol.1, Part.3 , November 2004, pp. 81-92.

claim that the EU also offers a peace system in Europe and it is called as ‘pax-Europea’ referring to EU’s imperial similarity.<sup>51</sup> The EU integration could be assessed as a remarkable attempt to constitute a peace between the states. The status of peace between the EU member states did not change since the beginning of the European integration. However it is difficult to compare the EU with an empire and to find similarities with the previous peace periods of empires. National interests of the member states are still crucial in the EU. Also EU enlargement process is not similar to an imperial widening. Enlargement is a mutual process which is based on the consent. The instruments and the mechanisms of EU enlargement are totally different. Moreover, in the context of EU’s relations with neighbourhood countries, the EU system cannot be considered as an empire and the perceptions and interests of EU member states are significant in the sense of EU’s external relations. Although most of the EU member states are agreed on the EU’s Kantian stance, some of them do not have the same perspective. According to Robert Kagan, the ENP seeks to provide stability and peace in its neighbourhood and legitimize EU’s Kantian stance.<sup>52</sup> In other words, the idea of constituting peaceful relations with the neighbourhood countries is related to EU’s civilian policies and Kantian perspective.

## **1.2. The Development of the European Neighbourhood Policy**

The turn of the century brought challenges in various aspects. 9/11 terrorist attack was a turning point for the international relations and reshaped the new security environment. The U.S. started to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the Middle East. In this international environment, the EU had to reconsider its foreign and security policies. Thus, EU re-designed its security strategy and external relations.

Under these circumstances, the decision of enlargement process held in December 2004 led to the publication of a European Commission Communication what

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<sup>51</sup> See for details of “European Empire”, Jan Zielonka, **Europe as Empire**, USA: Oxford University Press, 2007.

<sup>52</sup> See for further details Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, **Policy Review**, No: 113, June/July 2002. See <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html>

was then referred as *Wider Europe*<sup>53</sup> and took the first step to show EU's place in the world. In this document, the main concern was about the stability of its neighbourhood. In that context, *European Security Strategy* (ESS) paper was declared in December 2003 and Javier Solana as an EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) drafted the ESS. While the paper drawing a framework for the EU as an international actor, the paper also sets down the long-term goals for the Union. It addressed key threats such as immigration, border conflicts, energy supply or frozen conflicts. Strategy Paper underscoring such threats called for more active Union. The ESS paper made descriptions of time and space that is experienced by the Union. From the perspective of the paper, "the post-Cold War environment is defined as one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked".<sup>54</sup> As for post-Cold War period paper stressed that the end of the bipolar system did not end the wars, conflicts and challenges. From the point of view of such clarifications, ESS paper defined European interest as "promotion of a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations (...)".<sup>55</sup>

The 2004 enlargement of the EU changed the external borders and countries in its periphery. New *status quo* provided incentives for the Union to modify its neighbourhood policies *vis-à-vis* new external variables. Based on the inevitability of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries, which was essentially forced by the post-Cold War security vacuum and reasons embedded in economical and political spheres, the Union had nothing but to develop tools of the new setting of the external variable. Therefore, soon after the enlargement process completed, the Commission prepared and declared the *European Neighborhood Policy-Strategy Paper*.

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<sup>53</sup> European Commission, "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy: A New Framework For Relations With Our Eastern And Southern Neighbours", **COM(2003)104**, 11.03.2003.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf) [05.10.2007]

<sup>54</sup> European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World", **European Security Strategy**, Brussels, 12.12.2003.

See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> [05.10.2007]

<sup>55</sup> **Ibid.**



This was remarkable in the sense that it underlined that ENP offers neighbouring countries the possibility of sharing “the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement.”<sup>56</sup>

The EU uses several mechanisms to influence peripheral state’s behaviours. Membership conditionality is one of the most influential mechanisms of the EU for norm-making. Besides membership conditionality, there are other mechanisms actively used for the non-member countries with no membership perspective. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is one of these mechanisms used for diffusing EU norms to the neighbourhood states. In this norm diffusion process EU uses Action Plans, ad-hoc visits, letters, country reports, declarations and the other communication tools in addition to financial tools.

Even though the main focus of the new neighbourhood policy was on the Eastern Europe in the beginning of the evolution of the policy, the existing regional partnerships such as Mediterranean partnership and also Caucasus countries are included in the same framework. Southern Dimension is established in 1995 towards the countries of the Mediterranean region and it was differentiated from the Eastern dimension. All these dimensions were taken together under the umbrella of the ENP.

ENP is formally developed on 9 December 2004 and is built on bilateral agreements and cooperations between the EU and the third countries from North Africa; Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt; Middle Eastern countries; Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian, Syria; Caucasian countries; Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Eastern European countries Ukraine and Belarus. Through ENP, old neighbours of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework (EMP)<sup>57</sup> incorporated into the ENP apart from new neighbours. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while having some tangible differences, had a complementary and initiatory role in the establishment of the ENP. The significance of the ENP is that, it is based on bilateral relations with tools and methods in contrast to EMP’s multilateral setting.

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<sup>56</sup> European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper”, 12.05.2004, **COM(2004) 373 final**, p.3.

<sup>57</sup> For further details see, Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique features, First Results and Future Challenges, CEPS Middle East& Euro-Med Project, **Working Paper** No.10, Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2003; Rosa Balfour, Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Dialogue, **Occasional Papers**, Institute for Security Studies, No. 52, May 2004.

There are two crucial points to understand the nature of the ENP. First point is about how to group ENP countries and how to determine the scope of the policy. It can be said that, both geographic and thematic variables constitutes the scope and they are interact with each other. The second point is related to the title of the policy. The term ‘European’ is not implying just the countries dealt with the European identity and ‘Asian’ or ‘African’ countries could be included in the ENP. In that sense it should be emphasized that the ENP covers a broad area in political and cultural context.

EU enlargement created concerns on the new Eastern borders and the perception of these borders as lines of division by the neighbourhood countries. In an effort to counter-balance development of such perceptions, in the official texts of the EU the main objective of the ENP is mentioned as “avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the EU with and its neighbours”.<sup>58</sup> In fact, this was reflection of fear of building a new ‘Iron Curtain’ and the 2004 enlargement process and change of European borders recalled the old times. Therefore, ENP aims to create a “ring of friends”<sup>59</sup> in the periphery of the EU. The constructive parts of this aim are defined as ‘good governance’ and ‘institutional reform’. Progressive economic integration and deepening political co-operation based on common interests and values are also defined as fundamental parts of the program. But it should also be noted that, ENP does not foresee membership to the partners of the ENP.

Arguably, the EU after the eastern enlargement shifted its politics from ‘exclusion’ to ‘inclusion’ and tries to achieve its objectives through ENP instruments.

“On the one hand, the ‘politics of inclusion’ as enshrined in the ‘Wider Europe’ strategy, aims at the closest possible association with neighbouring countries below the threshold of membership; on the other hand, ‘the politics of exclusion’ aims at externalizing risks form the enlarging Union.”<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> **COM(2003)104 final**, p. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Sandra Lavenex, “The Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion in ‘Wider Europe’” in Joan DeBardeleben (ed.), **Soft or Hard Borders?: Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe**, , U.K and USA: Ashgate Publishing, 2005. See further details on the relationship between ‘politics of inclusion’ and ‘politis of exclusion’ in the EU, Michael Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.34, No.1, 1996, pp. 5-28.

In 1990s' EU's neighbourhood policies towards the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries was different than today and promising a membership perspective to them. In contrast to inclusive, in membership wise, underpinnings of early 1990's policies towards East, the ENP is not related to the membership concept of the EU as it mentioned above. This point was made clear by the former Commission President Romano Prodi who clarified the limits of the ENP and said; "EU have to be prepared to offer more than a partnership and less than a membership without excluding the latter categorically".<sup>61</sup> The contemplation of the ENP as clarified in the words of "sharing everything except institutions"<sup>62</sup> included a promise to neighbourhood countries and explains the essence of the EU's neighbourhood policies.

The ENP is discussed as the end of EU geographical extension.<sup>63</sup> From this point of view, the geographical limitation that is set by the ENP carries a threat of loosing of its essence by creating an 'other' outside of the EU borders. Any of the ENP country has a right to have an accession perspective as a separate process than the neighbourhood policy of the EU however it seems difficult for them to have an accession perspective. EU is in an identity-building process and constructing a new identity formation and should define itself with the 'other'. The EU constitutes a European identity which aimed to make EU as a gravity center for the neighbourhood countries.

In the case of Russia, EU constituted a 'special relationship' with Moscow through Strategic Partnership.<sup>64</sup> The Partnership is agreed at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2004, and covers four 'common spaces' in the areas of cross-border and sub-

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<sup>61</sup> W. Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", **Notre Europe Policy Paper**, No.4, July 2003, p. 5.

<sup>62</sup> Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, "A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU", Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project, **SPEECH/02/619**, Brussels, 5-6.12.2002. See <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/619&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [20.09.2007]

<sup>63</sup> Rutger Wissels, "The Development of European Neighbourhood Policy. Reasons for Initiating the ENP", *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, **A Quarterly Publication on German and European Foreign Policy**, Vol.7, Issue 19, 27.07. 2006. See <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsleterr/issue19.pdf> [21.05.2007]

<sup>64</sup> Further details for EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. See [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/russia/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm)

regional co-operation.<sup>65</sup> These four common spaces cover items such as the cooperation on politics, security issues, socio-economic cooperation and environmental issues. EU-Russia Relations and the background of Russia's engagement to ENP is based on the *EU's Common Strategy on Russia* adopted in 1999 mentions that:

“The EU's main objective is to engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values to which both sides are committed in the relevant international organisations, as well as with each other in the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: in particular democracy, human rights, the rule of law and market economy principles.”<sup>66</sup>

ENP is comprehensive and has an inter-pillar structure. In the Presidency Conclusion of Helsinki European Conclusion, the importance of “ensuring inter-pillar coherence”<sup>67</sup> is mentioned in 1999. Also in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy the need for a closer inter-pillar structure is stressed.<sup>68</sup> Therefore the legal basis of the inter-pillar structure of the ENP, which provides a possibility to utilize from three pillars and from the coherence of these pillars, is built up by the EU's prior works.

“Ultimately, the pillars are not in themselves a brilliant work of art. They have to carry a common vault, while maintaining their own identity and separateness, and where one pillar – the Community one – seems more valued and is better protected than the two others. It turns out to be easier to combine the pillars when the common vault can be pragmatically put together, as is the case in external representation.”<sup>69</sup>

While the policy aims to promote the settlement of regional conflicts and promote democracy, it also helps Union objectives in the area of Justice and Home Affairs on fight against organized crime, corruption, border management and

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<sup>65</sup> **COM (2004) 373.**

<sup>66</sup> European Commission, Common Strategy of the European Union of 4.06.1999 on Russia (1999/414/cfsp).

See [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc\\_114137.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114137.pdf) [22.10.2007]

<sup>67</sup> Helsinki European Council, AnnexIV of the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11.12.1999, p.6

<sup>68</sup> Reporter Karl von Wogau, The Implementation of the European Security Strategy in the Context of the European Security and Defence Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, INI/2006/2033, 18 October 2006.

See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2006-0366+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

<sup>69</sup> Lecture by Michel Petite, “Current Legal Issues in the External Relations of the European Union”, Legal Service of the EC European University Institute, Academy of European Law, Florence, July 2006, p. 13.

migration.<sup>70</sup>

ENP is active in different regions from Mediterranean to Middle East and EU has bilateral relations with these countries. ENP complements existing instruments of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which are the legal basis for the work with partner countries. The ENP instruments are designed to build common values such as democracy and good governance in partner countries without offering them a membership.<sup>71</sup>

The ENP is firstly based on the Strategy Paper which outlines the general overview and vision of the policy. In the Paper, the principles and scope of the policy is explained by focusing on geographic coverage and existing instruments. Especially the priorities of Action Plans are defined and also overviewed the situations of the Southern Caucasus, Libya and Belarus which are the in the neighbourhood area of the ENP. In addition the financial support of the ENP is focused in the Strategy Paper. It draws a general framework for the ENP and it is one of the basic documents of the policy.<sup>72</sup>

Country Reports and Action Plans are the essential instruments of the ENP. While Country Reports provide a detailed data and analysis on the partner country, Action Plans point out implementing and monitoring the improvements to increase the level of commitment to common values and capacity to implement priorities which are jointly agreed by partners. In addition, European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) is a financial instrument and a general framework for financial programmes.

Strategy Papers are unique instruments of the ENP. These papers replaced the existing agreements that were activated previously with the ENP partners.<sup>73</sup> Strategy Papers are important as it clarifies the policy tools of the ENP and the policy-making procedures. Neighbourhood Strategy Papers are in line with the Country Reports and

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<sup>70</sup> European Commission, Communication on “European Neighbourhood Policy”, Strategy Paper, **COM (2004) 373 Final**, pp. 6-10.

<sup>71</sup> European Commission’s Memorandum, “Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy”, **COM (2004) 795 Final**, 2.08.2005, p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> European Commission, Strategy Paper, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, **COM(2004) 373 final**, 12.05.2004.

<sup>73</sup> “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper”, as Fn. 16, p. 3.

Action Plans which enters into force for every individual ENP partner. Bilateral Action Plans are the central elements of the ENP and these Plans are used as a reference point for the implementation of the policy. For instance, EU has efforts to find solution to the conflict in the Middle East<sup>74</sup> and there are Action Plans designed for both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to support cooperation and dialogue.<sup>75</sup> Last but not least implementation is monitored through sub-Committees.<sup>76</sup> These sectoral sub-Committees (eight or nine) meet per year and they pursue the implementation steps to be taken in any given year.

The European Commission publishes Country Reports and Communication to the Council which recommends developing the Action Plan. In other words, these reports have the fundamental informations and basis for Action Plans so the EU is able to have joint actions with the neighbourhood countries. Country Report summarizes neighbourhood country's relations with the EU and presents its situation from different perspectives. The main objective of these reports is to evaluate political, economic, social and institutional situation of the countries and to provide a data for Action Plans. Also these reports assess the bilateral relations of partner country with the EU and they are also individual reports for every partner country.

In the introduction part of the Country Report, the relations of the neighbour country and its relations with the EU have been taken into consideration. The other main part of the Country Reports are the second part which analyzes the political situation and the economic and social situation and show the weak and stronger points of the neighbourhood country.

Country Reports were published on 12th May 2004 along with the Strategy Paper, for Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, and Tunisia; and for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt and Lebanon published in March 2005. Commission issued twelve Country Reports until April 2007 and only Belarus,

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<sup>74</sup> European Commission Website, The Policy: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ). See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm) [24.05.2007]

<sup>75</sup> See for details European Commission, "Strengthening The European Neighbourhood Policy", ENP Progress Report Israel, **COM(2006) 726 final**, Brussels, SEC (2006)1507/229, November 2006.

<sup>76</sup> **COM (2004) 373**, pp. 2-7.

Algeria, Syria and Libya remained (See APP 1).

Country Reports take into consideration and analyze the following issues: political dialogue and reform; economic and social reforms and development; trade, regulatory and institutional measures; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation; social policy and people-to-people contacts.<sup>77</sup> Country Reports are fundamental documents for Action Plans and points out crucial issues. For example, in the Country Report of Ukraine, it is stated that Ukraine has a major role in solving Transnistria conflict<sup>78</sup> and the Action Plan of Ukraine focused on this conflict by drawing a pathway to see how to be a mediator in this conflict.

Action Plans are the main instruments of the ENP and negotiate and agreed jointly by the EU and the authorities of the participating countries. These plans “are not an international legal agreement but rather a political commitment that sets out the parameters of the Union’s relations with its neighbours.”<sup>79</sup> Action Plans are like road maps for the partner countries for the three to five years and they are also the basis for the European Neighbourhood Agreement and these Action Plans are based on the relevant Country Reports of the neighbouring state.

“Action Plans will cover two broad areas: first, commitments to specific actions which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy; secondly, commitments to actions which will bring partner countries closer to the EU in a number of priority fields.”<sup>80</sup>

The Action Plans are based on common principles and values but the specific areas and the priorities for every country are differentiated because every neighbour has different conditions. Each country has different circumstances with respect to its geographical location, political and economical situations and the level of relations with the Union. “For instance, Moldova enjoys asymmetric trade preferences because it is not able to sustain a total opening of its market to EU goods and services whereas there

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>78</sup> Transnistria conflict is a frozen conflict located in the eastern Moldovan border to Ukraine. Transnistria is a problem for both Moldova and Ukraine. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Ukraine Country Report, **COM (2004) 373 Final**, 12.5.2004, p. 10.

<sup>79</sup> **COM (2004) 795 Final**, 2.08.2005, pp. 3-4.

<sup>80</sup> **COM (2004) 373 Final**, p. 9.

are plans to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine once it has joined the WTO.’<sup>81</sup>

‘Joint ownership’ and ‘differentiation’ are the key concepts to understand the essence of Action Plans. Joint ownership means that the ENP based on the awareness of shared values and common interests and the Union does not aim to impose priorities to its partners. Therefore, they depend on mutual interests on success and common consent.<sup>82</sup> Differentiation principle means that every country has different priorities so every Action Plan is tailor-made and varies from country to country.

The Action Plans were taken into force in Ukraine and Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia since 2004 and in Egypt, Lebanon, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, Georgia since 2006 and in Algeria since 2007. The EU currently has no contractual relations with Libya, Syria and Belarus.

In the case of Belarus, President Lukashenko failed to implement reforms and reply to the EU’s state building requirements so there is still no progress with Belarus. In the case of Syria, the new president Bashar Al-Assad did not make any concrete progress on human rights and democracy, and created a disappointment for the EU. In the case of Libya, the state still does not have formal relations with the EU but has an observer status in the Barcelona Process.<sup>83</sup>

The Commission prepares the Country Reports before the Action Plans to identify priorities for each country. The Plans point out a comprehensive set of priorities in areas beyond the scope of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and cover a wide area of issues. Priorities for action for every neighbour country are listed in the Action Plans and there are limited numbers of key priorities which support the reforms in the neighbourhood country.<sup>84</sup> These priority areas are almost the same for all ENP partners but the systemizing of them could be differentiated depending on the

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<sup>81</sup> Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull, Harnisch, Sebastian (eds.), “The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union Perspectives from the European Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Moldova”, **Foreign Policy in Dialogue**, Vol.7, Issue 19, 27.07.2006, p. 10.

<sup>82</sup> **COM (2004) 373 Final**, p. 8.

<sup>83</sup> Janet Mather, **Legitimizing the European Union: Aspirations, Inputs and Performance**, U.K, et al.: Palgrave Publication, 2006, p. 151.

<sup>84</sup> **COM (2004) 795 Final**, 9.12.2004, pp. 3-4



importance of these priorities. As an example, in the Action Plan of Azerbaijan; Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is put in the first priority, corruption is analyzed in a different priority area and functioning of customs is analyzed in an independent priority title.<sup>85</sup>

Action Plans covers the area of strengthening of democratic structure and human rights in the framework of political dialogue and reform, encouraging trade, regulatory and institutional measures in the framework of economic and social development and energy, transport, information society, and environment issues in the framework of justice and home affairs. Especially energy dialogue is vital for ENP for promoting increased energy efficiency, energy and the use of renewable energy. Action Plans were built on existing bilateral or regional initiatives such as energy co-operation in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership or EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.<sup>86</sup> In the context of Justice and Home Affairs, “border management is highly important for the ENP and is likely to be a priority in most of the Action Plans of the partners.”<sup>87</sup> Border management covers the area of co-operation on migration, asylum, visa policies, combating terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and arms and money laundering.

In the case of EU’s external action, also conflict resolution efforts are significant.<sup>88</sup> The Commission seeks the contribution of the SG/HR (Secretary-General of the Council of the EU/Representative Common Foreign and Security Policy) for issues related to political dialogue, cooperation and the CFSP. The ENP use of CFSP instruments such as EU Special Representatives in such cases as the Middle East and the Southern Caucasus and also ENP partners may involve in some missions of the European Security and Defense Policy like Morocco’s participation in the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>89</sup> Action Plans state that ENP partners are also expecting to share the responsibility of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. For

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<sup>85</sup> European Commission, EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/azerbaijan\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)

<sup>86</sup> COM (2004) 373 Final, p. 18.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>88</sup> COM (2004) 795 Final, pp. 3-4.

<sup>89</sup> Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 13.

instance, in the Action Plan of Ukraine, the responsibility of Ukraine as a mediator in the Transnistria conflict is emphasized as a priority.

Apart from the issues of JHA, there are also essential issues mentioned in the Action Plans for neighbourhood countries related to the first pillar of the EU such as social dialogue and social policies. In the Action Plans, the importance of social dialogue and their role for the development of market economy is stressed. Promoting fundamental norms of labor, improving working conditions and equal treatment are part of social dimension which should be under consideration by partner countries.<sup>90</sup> One of the other objectives of the Action Plans is opening up of EU programmes and agencies which involve many EU programmes such as education, environment and research.<sup>91</sup> After the adoption of Action Plans, within two years the implementations of these Plans are monitored and reviewed. When the priorities are achieved by the partner countries, European Neighbourhood Agreements replace the bilateral agreements.<sup>92</sup>

The joint bodies which are Association or Cooperation Councils, Committees and sub-committees are used to monitor implementation of Action Plans.<sup>93</sup> “These bodies bring together representatives of member states, partner countries, the European Commission and the Council Secretariat.”<sup>94</sup> Some of these sub-committees could be modelled and strengthened from the existing committees in the EuroMed Association Agreements but some of them are set specifically for the Action Plans. These sub-committees and working themes are formed according to the priorities of the partner countries. Then experts, officials and ambassadors of the EU member states come together in the sub-committees.<sup>95</sup>

Action Plans are monitored by the Progress Reports which are published annually and analyze the developments and progress of the partner country. The Progress Reports of Ukraine and Moldova are published earlier than the other partner

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<sup>90</sup> Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes, Preparatory document for the 2006 Euromed Civil Forum, Revised on 21.10.2006, Marrahech, 2006, pp. 3-4.

<sup>91</sup> **COM (2004) 795 Final**, p. 3.

<sup>92</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 4

<sup>93</sup> **COM(2004) 795 final**, p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> The World Bank, European Neighbourhood Policy. See, <http://go.worldbank.org/HHADNP2PV0>

<sup>95</sup> Working Paper, “The European Neighbourhood Policy, **Civil Forum Euromed**, Marakech 2006, p. 6. See [http://www.euromedplatform.org/spip/IMG/pdf/Package\\_II\\_-\\_Neighbourhood\\_Policy.pdf](http://www.euromedplatform.org/spip/IMG/pdf/Package_II_-_Neighbourhood_Policy.pdf)

countries. These Reports are important for the future implementation process and they show the degree of success of the Action Plans and could be a step for deeper relations and new contractual frameworks.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, the ENP countries should consider on these Reports and draw their pathway in the way of democratization.

There are some criticisms about the implementation of the Action Plans. For instance, in the South Caucasus the implementations and preparations of the Action Plans for the region are interpreted as an elite-driven process by the Caucasus Project Director Sabine Freizer. She states that there is a lack of civil participation (civil society, media, local authorities, citizens and parliament).<sup>97</sup>

The Commission published a Communication in July 2003 which clarifies the need for a New Neighbourhood Instrument (NNI) for achieving the objectives of the ENP. The Commission determined two phases; first one is from 2004 to 2006 and the second phase is after 2006. In the first phase, the main objective is to achieve a better coordination with the existing programs such as INTERREG (Interregional Cooperation Programme), PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies), TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) and MEDA (Mesures D'Accompagnement). In the post-2006 phase the main objective is to provide a cross-border and regional cooperation activity around the external borders.<sup>98</sup> The new instrument aims to get together regions of the member states and partner countries in the both sides of the sharing border so the borders would be seen as “an opportunity rather than a barrier”.<sup>99</sup> The Communication states that NNI; “promotes sustainable economic and social development of the border regions and pursuing regional and transnational co-operation by ensuring the smooth functioning and secure management of the future border”.<sup>100</sup>

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is a new financial

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<sup>96</sup> **COM (2004) 795 Final**, p. 4.

<sup>97</sup> Sabine Freizer, “Responding to South Caucasus Conflicts in the European Neighbourhood”, European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 22.02.2006.

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument”, **COM(2003) 393 Final**, 1.7.2003, p.10.

<sup>99</sup> Balfour Rosa and Rotta Alessandro, “Beyond Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy and Its Tools”, **The International Spectator**, 2005, No.1, p.19.

<sup>100</sup> **COM (2003) 393 Final**, p.3.

instrument which supports the implementation of the Action Plans. The new instrument could also “help to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.”<sup>101</sup> ENPI aims to assist ENP in promoting stability and cooperation with Member States. Also it supports partner countries in their achieving of their objectives.

Since the financial perspective agreed in 2007, ENP’s general financial support is provided by this new financial instrument. ENPI is replaced with all existing financial programs such as MEDA for EU’s Mediterranean neighbours and TACIS programmes for eastern neighbours. The potential sources of ENPI financing are the bilateral, regional, interregional, cross border and thematic programmes.<sup>102</sup> ENPI is expecting to reach over 13 billion Euros over 7 years which is higher than total of MEDA and TACIS programmes. Also this instrument should be ready and flexible for the unexpected changes in the priorities. Partner countries are able to include third participant that they have trans-boundary relationship which are not ENP partners such as Turkey. The ENPI is managed by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament which are joint decision makers within a co-decision procedure.<sup>103</sup>

ENPI’s objectives are stated by Commission as; promoting sustainable development in regions on both sides of common borders, working together through joint actions for common challenges such as environment, energy, and fight against organised crime, ensuring efficient and secure common borders through joint actions; promoting local cross-border people-to-people actions.<sup>104</sup> The scope of the ENPI is so broad and has to be used in all areas in the framework of the ENP. Border management and energy issues are significant areas of this instrument.

ENPI has a “cross-border cooperation component and finances ‘joint programmes’ bringing together regions of Members States and partner countries sharing a common border and this will bring radical simplification in procedures and substantial

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<sup>101</sup> COM (2004) 795 Final, 2 August 2005, p.4.

<sup>102</sup> Mard Jenny, DG External Relations, European Commission, “The ENP and ENPI”, **4th Conference of the Water**, Directors of the Euro-Mediterranean and Southeastern European countries, 10-11.12.2007.

<sup>103</sup> Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes, *op.cit.*, p.7.

<sup>104</sup> COM (2003) 393 Final, p.8.

gains in efficiency.”<sup>105</sup> Partnership, multiannual programming and co-financing are the fundamental principles of cross-border programmes and they are used by the ENPI in the both sides of the border. The Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) is modelled on the principles of structural funds and co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).<sup>106</sup> The ENPI also targets sustainable development and approximation to EU policies, legislation and promoting the participation of ENP partners to the EU’s internal market.<sup>107</sup> “Legislative approximation, regulatory convergence and institution building will be supported through mechanisms such as the exchange of experience, long term twinning arrangements in Community programmes and agencies.”<sup>108</sup>

Every partner country has different circumstances and reacts differently in case of CBC programme. Especially after the eastern enlargement of the EU, trans-national relations became crucial in the case of challenges in eastern borders of the Union. The national involvement and commitment to the programme is essential for a successful implementation. Especially the countries in the eastern border of the EU pioneered the CBC programme. As an example, in Russia and Finland, the involvement in national level and support to CBC programme is taken as a model for the other relations. In Ukraine and Russia some changes on legislation were made on the national level to support border relations with the EU. The regional and local authorities should have an institutional capacity to implement CBC programmes and Action Plans of the partner countries including these institutional reforms. The experiences of Member States within the regional programmes such as INTERREG and PHARE were transferred to ENPI’s cross-border component.<sup>109</sup> It could be said that the unique financial framework becomes more effective in the CBC programmes.

Historical and cultural links are essential in the case of cross-border

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<sup>105</sup> European Commission, “Laying Down General Provisions Establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, **COM(2004) 628 Final**, Brussels, 29.9.2004.

See, [http://www.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/getdoc\\_en.pdf](http://www.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/getdoc_en.pdf) p.2.

<sup>106</sup> European Neighbourhood&Partnership Instrument, Cross-Border Cooperation.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_cross-border\\_cooperation\\_strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross-border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>107</sup> **COM (2004) 795 Final**, pp.3-4.

<sup>108</sup> European Commission, “The Instrument for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013”, **COM (2004) 626 Final**, 29.9.2004, p.8.

<sup>109</sup> European Neighbourhood& Partnership Instrument, Cross-Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper 2007-2013, **Indicative Programme 2007-2010**, p.6.

cooperation with neighbourhood countries. For instance; Ukraine and Poland have a common history and sharing a European culture in the borderland area and this historical background is a fundamental dimension to understanding the essence of today's cross-border relations and cooperation. Poland, Ukraine and Belarus take one of the highest financial support from the ENPI (See APP 4). Cohesion, involvement and cooperation can be strengthened just through these links. Also maritime borders and cooperation can be improved by the same methods.<sup>110</sup>

In December 2006, the Commission made proposals to strengthen the ENP policy further in terms of social and economic integration covering civil society dimension under the title of 'thematic dimension'<sup>111</sup> which includes multilateral or bilateral cooperation on key sectors such as environment, energy, migration and cross-border cooperation.

For the process of implementation Actions Plans are vital and the changing capacity of these countries and their adaptation level to the ENP is considered in that context. Moreover, Actions Plans can be used for the categorization of ENP partners and to make the index of ENP countries. Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva and Nicu Popescu, from the Centre of European Policy Studies think-tank, classify ENP partners as the 'willing' and the 'passive' ones. They also classified other partner states which are currently having no Action Plans as the reluctant and the excluded ones. (See APP 2) They grouped the countries according to the EU policy instruments and packages. Also they identify a 15-point program to give an impetus to the development of ENP to be a strong policy differentiated from enlargement policies.<sup>112</sup> In this table, there is a lack of theoretical perspective and countries are differentiated according to the implementation of Action Plans and their democracy level or stabilization capacity are not emphasized. Besides the explanations about the countries' situations are not very clear. However this categorization has a significant place in the literature of the ENP.

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<sup>110</sup> **Ibid.**, p.9.

<sup>111</sup> See, **COM(2006)726 final**.

<sup>112</sup> See Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, "European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years On: Time Indeed for an 'ENP Plus'", **CEPS Policy Brief**, No.126, March 2007, pp. 1-31.

As a revised and an alternative categorization which is mentioned above, I propose a table as an alternative model of categorization (See APP 3). ENP aims to stabilize the ENP partners by supporting economic and political reforms. I put ‘change’ to the Y axis and ‘stability’ to the X axis. Change axis show ENP partners’ capacities in implementation and adaption the European Neighbourhood Policies. Y axis starts from capacity of minor change and going to capacity of major change. The dates of policy instruments, contract and country’s adoptions of them are the basic data for me to put them into the Y axis. Ukraine, for example, is one of the most open countries to the EU policies and signed and implemented ENP contract before the other neighbour countries but Belarus on the other side is near to the minor capacity of change and it does not activated in ENP. I put the countries on the X axis according to their level of stability comparatively to each other. (See APP 3) The political stability is one the fundamental data for me to put them on the Y axis which starts from instability goes to stability.<sup>113</sup> Economic indicators are not evaluated to put the countries in order.

## 2. SCOPE OF THE POLICY

Scope of the EU’s neighbourhood policy can be categorized into two as geographical and thematic. This categorization also brings up the question of territoriality and the conception of ‘border’. It should be noted that these two categories of the policy could also be overlapped.<sup>114</sup> Geography could also have broader thematic implications and it is “more than a comparison of proximity and distance and is the product of political relationships that come together in particular places and through which national trends emerge and institutions, such as borders, are a part of that

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<sup>113</sup> For the detailed datas of countries’ stability level see: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006”, **World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280**, July 2007. Also see Daniel Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002”, **World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3106**, World Bank, 2003.

See <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/>

<sup>114</sup> See Wendy K. Tam Cho, Erinn P Nicley, “Geographic Proximity Versus Institutions, Evaluating Borders as Real Political Boundaries”, **American Politics Research**, Vol.36, No.6, Sage Publications, 2008, p. 816.

geographic context.”<sup>115</sup> For instance, Ukraine’s adjacency to the EU has a role in Ukrainian pro-European attitudes.

Borders are the lines which separate political, social and economic spaces by creating a sense of exclusion and inclusion. After the latest enlargement process, the EU changed its borders and in the point of EU view, borders should be transparent with the aim of avoiding a new ‘iron curtain’ which has a potential to divide Europe. However, as it is seen in the Kaliningrad example, the implementation of Schengen area and the other border problems showed that the concept of ‘border’ could also have implications about exclusion. It is related to the politics of inclusion and politics of exclusion.<sup>116</sup> The ENP is designed to diminish the negative effects of Schengen borders which could create a sense of exclusion.

The impact of geography on constructing identity of an entity is also related to the definition of ‘territory’ itself. “Territory interacts power, nature, and culture, or force, space and meaning, it is the fulcrum for all forms of human organization, from the purely social to the purely political and territory calibrates space and times.”<sup>117</sup> When a state determines the lines of the territory, it also draws the border and excludes ‘the other’. “Territories and borders are coterminous, for this reason territory is never neutral, and it is deeply connected to the exercise of social and political power.”<sup>118</sup> The EU as an entity has a fortress structure, but like a nation-state it constructs borders and neighbourhoods. The EU exercises political and social power on a territory where reshapes the lines of it after every enlargement process.

Apart from geographical indicators, there are other recent indicators in constituting borderlands such as security perceptions. After 9/11, global threats occurred and there is a need of focusing on de-territorialization and re-bordering. “Indeed, one problem with the ‘re-bordering’ thesis, which emphasizes the renewed

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 820.

<sup>116</sup> For this discussion Michael Smith, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-28.

<sup>117</sup> Mabel Berezin, “Territory, Emotion and Identity”, in Mabel Berezin, Martin Schain (eds.), **Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age**, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 4.

<sup>118</sup> Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era”, **American Historical Review**, Vol. 105, No.3, pp. 807-831 is in *Ibid.*



need for securitized borders in a world of global threats.”<sup>119</sup> It can be said that, security and also economic variables are the other indicators which are not related to the territorial fixity.

In the case of EU’s neighbourhood policy, it can be claimed that geographic and thematic variables interact and reshape each other. Also geographic regions are constructed and became regions in a short or a long-period so it is difficult to say that geographical scope is totally differentiated from thematic scope.

## **2.1. Geographic**

In this part, the geographic neighborhood area of the EU is analyzed under four regional dimensions: the Southern, Northern, Eastern, and Black Sea Dimension. These four regions are actually the dimensions of the Union which are constituted by the EU considering their historical, political and economical relations and potentials. However, these relations and potentials could be interchangeable relating to the autonomous dynamics of the each region. Sometimes historical, but sometimes economical relations (such as energy relations) could be more remarkable for constituting regional or sub-regional cooperations in the neighborhood of the EU. These regional cooperations are named as ‘dimensions’ of the EU, in the official website of the EU Commission’s External Relations department. As a first reason, cooperation would be perceived as an alternative regional cooperation to the European integration. Secondly, the ENP is the general framework of all these cooperations. Thirdly, it can be argued that, the term ‘dimension’ refers to a spatiality which object persists in the space so it can be interpreted as these dimensions are legitimize the ontological reality of the EU.

Hiski Haukkala claims that all these dimensions are “reemerging as distinct policy platforms and one reason for the re-emergence of such ‘dimensionalism’ is the

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<sup>119</sup> Rumford, *op.cit*, p.157.

current internal dissonance within the EU.”<sup>120</sup> The fundamental reason behind these discussions is about the competition for the financial resources in the external relations.<sup>121</sup> At that point, the ENP would be a unique framework for all these diversified regional dimensions. It could be said that, ‘dimensionalism’ could be a challenger for European federal ideas and aims and ENP draws a unique framework for all the regional dimensions.

In this part, the backgrounds and dynamics of every dimension will be taken under consideration to illuminate the scope of the neighbourhood policy of the EU. The dimensions of the ENP are examined as regarding to the south-north division and to the interaction of eastern dimension and black sea connection. The significance of each dimension could be changed cyclical and the term presidency of the EU could be influential on these changes. As an example, while the Finnish presidency was giving importance to the Northern Dimension, Italian presidency took the presidency seat and gave emphasis on the Mediterranean dimension.

### **2.1.1. Southern Dimension**

Through out the history, Mediterranean Sea had been the crucial trade route since ancient era. Mediterranean region had been under the influence of Roman, Egyptian, Anatolian and Mesopotamian civilizations and became a cross-road for all these civilizations in the context of geography, economy and culture. European colonialism had a strong impact on Mediterranean region. Today, the heritages of these empires and the ex-colonial area have a direct or an indirect impact on some of the vital decisions of European foreign policy.

Every region has its own properties and priorities but Mediterranean region had a special status in European history and politics. The most famous historian Braudel,

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<sup>120</sup> Hiski Haukkala, “A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU’s New ‘Neighbourhood Policy’”, **UPI Working Paper**, No. 41, Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 2003 is cited by Pami Aalto, Helge Blakkisrud, Hanna Smith (eds.) and put forward by Michael Emerson, op.cit, p. 3.

<sup>121</sup> E. Barbé, “Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions” in J.Zielenko (ed.), **Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy**, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.126.

took the Mediterranean region as a ‘distinct unit of analysis’ and also claimed that Black Sea region is just a ‘backyard’ of Mediterranean region.<sup>122</sup> Braudel’s analysis on this area constructs a regional perception and it is a root of region building.

Turkey, Cyprus and Malta signed Associate Agreements in the 1960s and the roots of the southern dimension were set with the trade relations. In the beginning of the 1970s, because of the Arab-Israel conflict, the number of terrorism and illegal immigrations in Europe increased and EC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) to stabilize the Mediterranean region. In GMP, it is addressed that, “all riverain countries as belonging to a single region with a new generation of agreements including the same core provisions for all countries in the Mediterranean region”<sup>123</sup>. One of the aims of GMP was to promote peace, besides economic purposes. Thus GMP objected to “attracted Israel closer to Europe through free trade and it offered the Arab Mashrak/Maghreb countries further unilateral free trade and some further but still (modest) financial assistance.”<sup>124</sup>

In the post-Cold War era, the two Gulf Wars took the attention of Europe to the Middle East that is also related to the Mediterranean region. In December 1990, the Council adopted the ‘new Mediterranean Policy’ and “the rational of the policy is no longer rooted in fear for military or economic security threats but the new security considerations are of diffuse, socio-economic nature.”<sup>125</sup> These new security threats were mostly soft security issues such us illegal immigration, drug trafficking and human smuggling.

In 1990 there was an attempt of 5+5 West Mediterranean Forum covering five southern European member states (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal), Malta (was a candidate) and five Arab Maghreb Union countries (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco,

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<sup>122</sup> Fernand Braudel, **The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II**, London: Fontana/Collins, 1976, pp. 109-110 is cited in Tunç Aybak (ed.), **Politics of the Black Sea, Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict**, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>123</sup> Federica Bicchi, “The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices”, **Institute of European Studies**, Paper 040612, June 2004. See at <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040612>

<sup>124</sup> G. Vanhaeverbeke, “A Survey of Europe’s Mediterranean Policy, Where it Comes From-Where It Stands Today-Where It Is Likely To Go”, **Information & Training Seminar For Diplomats**, 15-17.03. 1997.

<sup>125</sup> **Ibid.**

Mauritania). However, this attempt was not effective and deactivated from 1992 until 2001.<sup>126</sup> The first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in November 1995 and the Barcelona Process was initiated. This process constituted the European Mediterranean Policy and it has three different chapters which are foreseeing cooperation on political; economic and financial; social, cultural and human. Bringing peace and creating stabilization in the Mediterranean region are the main targets of this policy.<sup>127</sup> The EMP covers; “ten Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey), and Libya as an observer since 1999.”<sup>128</sup> About the emergence of Euro-Mediterranean Policy, it can be claimed that the economical and political difference between southern and northern Mediterranean creates a necessity for such a policy in this region. The instability in the southern side of the region has an impact on the northern side and it triggers restructuring in the EU.<sup>129</sup>

Trade relations with the Mediterranean countries which are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia have been strengthened under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since 1995. In the context of exports, the trade in goods is 67 billion Euros and in the context of imports the trade in goods is 60 billion Euros. The amount of trade is increasing every year. “Total trade with the EU was 127 billion Euros in 2007 which is some 5% of total EU external trade.”<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy Assessment and Open Issues”, CEPS Working Document, **Centre For European Policy Studies**, No.220, March 2005, p.3. See also S.Calleja and M.Heller, “The Restructuring of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership After EU Enlargement: The Logic of Subregionalism”, **Euromesco Working Group Report**, Lisbon, 2003.

<sup>127</sup> European Commission-External Relations. See [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/) [15.11.2007]

<sup>128</sup> Astrid B. Boening, “History of EuroMed Partnership, Multilateralism South of the Border: The EuroMed Partnership”, **Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series**, Vol.7, No.1, January 2007, pp. 2-3

<sup>129</sup> Michelle Pace, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Mediterranean Strategy? European Union Policy from a Discursive Perspective”, **Geopolitics**, No.9, No.2, Summer 2004, pp. 292-293.

<sup>130</sup> European Commission, “Euro-Mediterranean Trade Relations are Healthy and Growing”. See [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/euromed/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/euromed/index_en.htm) [15.11.2007]

9/11 terrorist attack affected EU's Mediterranean Policy in a negative way. The EU had to avoid of having a distinction between Muslim countries in the southern Mediterranean with the countries in the northern Mediterranean. The Western countries put the 'Islamist terrorism' and 'Islam' into the same case and this situation created instability in the region.<sup>131</sup> Following 9/11 attack, U.S. operated Afghanistan and later invaded Iraq in 2003 which created a dispute in the EU. There were states (like Spain and Italy) supporting the U.S. invasion to Iraq and the other EU member-states (like France and Germany) which were opposed to it. In that vein, Mediterranean and Middle East policies of the EU are needed to be revised by the EU. In 2004, ENP is initiated with an alternative non-regional approach to Mediterranean Policy. The ENP would be complementary to regional policies and would be a general framework for every neighbourhood country.<sup>132</sup> "While the Barcelona Declaration is a regional process, the ENP is bilateral and gives the possibility to work more flexibly to meet the interests of each country."<sup>133</sup> The ENP differentiates every southern Mediterranean state so it can focus more on economical and political progress of every country. Bilateral Action Plans with the southern Mediterranean countries have tailor-made reforms for each state. For the neighbourhood countries the EU offers cooperation which would not lead to the membership.

There was a competition between Southern and Northern Dimensions about the allocation of funds, but after the ENPI framework the level of this competition is decreased. "A 45 million euro MEDA Neighbourhood Program was agreed for 2005-6 and under European Neighbourhood Instrument, by 2013, the proposals have been forwarded to double funding for the Mediterranean"<sup>134</sup>.

On 13 July, French President Nicolas Sarkozy initiated the idea of 'Mediterranean Union' and designed the project for creating a new Community but it

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<sup>131</sup> Raffaella A. Del Sarto, **Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 71-72.

<sup>132</sup> **Ibid**, pp. 72-73.

<sup>133</sup> Elisenda Estruch, "European Instruments and Programmes Towards Southern Mediterranean", **Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale**, April 2007, p. 43.

<sup>134</sup> Richard Youngs, Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform?, Fundacion Para Las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), **Working Paper**, No. 2, January 2005, p. 4.

was accepted as a continuation of Barcelona Process.<sup>135</sup> The project does not seem to be reliable for most of the southern Mediterranean countries and the policy does not demonstrate the unique voice of the EU. The possible contribution of the Mediterranean Union to the ENP seems very little and weak.

### 2.1.2. Northern Dimension

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Baltic States regained their independence. In 1995 Finland and Sweden became EU member states. Finland has the similar role in the Baltic region compared to Poland's role in CEE region. Finland has historical ties with Russia and has also similar neighbourhood relations with referring to its position between east and west. Within accession of Finland and Norway into the EU, for the first time the Union had a long border with Russian territory.

Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen initiated the Northern Dimension (ND) in 1997 which has a background in the beginning of 1990s. He enlarged the scope of the initiative and even though he has a pro-Russian stance he preferred to include the U.S. and Canada into the initiative.<sup>136</sup> By enlarging the scope of the dimension, he believed that ND could give an impetus to the aim of EU's actorness in the system.

With parallel to Finland's EU membership status and by the establishment of ND in a short time period, Russia was convinced to sign Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1997 and a Common Strategy in 1999. Finland's mediating role (in Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin mission to Belgrade during the Kosovo crisis) between EU and Russia is remarkable and gave a positive impact to the relations of Russia and the EU.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> "Akdeniz Birliđi'nde Anlařtılar", **AB Haber ve Politika Portalı**, 05.03.2008.

<sup>136</sup> Nicola Catellani, "The EU's Northern Dimension After the Enlargement", in, Esther Barbé, (eds.), **Beyond Enlargement: the New Members and New Frontiers of the Enlarged European Union**, Barcelona, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, 2003, pp. 4-8.

<sup>137</sup> Nicola Catellani, "Outlining the Northern Dimension: Toward Regional Cooperation in Northern Europe", **Laboratorio CESPI**, 2000, p. 23.

Until 2004 enlargement process, one of the aims of the ND was to accelerate three Baltic States' and Poland's accession into the Union. After the accession of the post-communist Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) into the EU in 2004, the scope and aim of this dimension changed. The Baltic Sea became surrounded by EU member states, and the EU's common border with Russia has expanded. Recently, the ND covers an area "from the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas to the southern shores of the Baltic Sea, including the countries in its vicinity and from North-West Russia in the east to Iceland and Greenland in the west."<sup>138</sup> In the framework of this dimension, also there are other participants such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Arctic Council (AC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM).

Iceland, Norway and Russia now stayed as non-EU members in the Northern Dimension. "The Initiative provides a multilateral cooperation framework complementing the EU's bilateral efforts to integrate Russia, as well as Norway and Iceland, further in a wider European institutional architecture."<sup>139</sup> However, Iceland and Norway have a different status than Russia. They are already in the European Economic area and also included in the Schengen area. Although they are not part of the EU, they are *de facto* members of the single market.<sup>140</sup> On the other side, EU and Russia, both not consider on EU membership perspective and Russia concern on fully integrating to the European institutions.

Another Nordic country, Sweden also is one of the key players in the new Northern dimension and interested in Baltic area. Sweden seeks to strengthen regional cooperation with Russia and also supports Ukrainian integration to the EU.<sup>141</sup> Energy

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<sup>138</sup> Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document, European Commission-External Relations/Northern Dimension, p.1.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/north\\_dim/doc/pol\\_dec\\_1106.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/pol_dec_1106.pdf) [01.12.2008]

<sup>139</sup> Mette Sicard Filtenborg, Stefan Ganzle, Elisabeth Johansson, "An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy: 'Network Governance' and the Case of the Northern Dimension Initiative", **Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association**, Vol.37, No.4, 2002, p. 397.

<sup>140</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and Its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, Integration and Partnership" in Roland Dannreuther, **European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy**, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 20.

<sup>141</sup> Pami Alto, Helge Blakkisrud, Hanna Smith (eds.) put forward by Michael Emerson, "The New Northern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood", **Centre for European Policy Studies**, 2008, p. 2.

interdependency with Russia and the debates on energy relations creates a challenge for integration of Russia into the new ND. “Since the new ND functions as the regional expression of the common spaces with Russia, it is useful to assess the extent to which energy cooperation can be pursued within the ND’s agenda.”<sup>142</sup> The effectiveness of ND could strengthen the energy relations with Russia and increase the effectiveness of the ENP.

In EU perspective, there are still fundamental problems with Russia. For instance, in the Finnish-Russian border there are still hard security issues, especially in Kola Peninsula where is a base for Russian northern fleet and area for arm stock of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Also there are soft-security threats such as HIV and other illness coming from Kaliningrad and Kola peninsula.<sup>143</sup> Kaliningrad oblast<sup>144</sup> is the other problematic issue for the EU-Russia relations. Kaliningrad can be called as a Russian island in the middle of the EU. Lithuania and Poland are most important neighbours and trade partners of Kaliningrad. For the citizens of Kaliningrad, the most important issue is the visa regime and the cross-border relations and for the EU part the soft security problems have a priority. After Poland and Lithuania started to implement the Schengen Treaty which requires visa for non-EU member states, Kaliningrad started to have some visa-problems with these countries.<sup>145</sup> Kaliningrad could be interpreted as the symbol of the difficulties that the Union has in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU-Russia relations. “During the Finnish presidency prioritizing Russian relations, Russia says that the Kaliningrad oblast could become a pilot project for EU integration in the next few years.”<sup>146</sup> So as Anronenko puts

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<sup>142</sup> Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Russia’ Energy Strategy&Prospect for an Energy Partnership” in Pami Alto, Helge Blakkisrud, Hanna Smith (eds.), **op.cit.**, p. 153.

<sup>143</sup> Hiski Haukkala, “The Northern Dimension, A Presence and Four Liabilities” in **op. cit.**, pp. 100-101.

<sup>144</sup> Kaliningrad was a former German city called Königsberg that became a Russian oblast in 1946 after the Second World War. The majority of the population is Russian, and there are few ethnic Germans. For further details on Kaliningrad Enclave see; Evgeny Vinokurov, “Kaliningrad, Enclaves and Economic Integration”, Special Report, **CEPS**, March 2007.

<sup>145</sup> Evgeny Vinokurov, “Kaliningrad Transit and Visa Issues Revisited”, **CEPS Commentary**, Bulletin EU ½, 2006.

<sup>146</sup> Andrew Rettman, “Kaliningrad Enclave to Pilot EU-Russia Integration, Moscow Says”, **EU Observer**, 28.05.2009. See <http://euobserver.com/?aid=21997>



forward, “Kaliningrad should become a region of cooperation between Russia and the EU.”<sup>147</sup>

During the term presidency of Austria, on 1st of July in 2006, Finland initiated the new Northern Dimension. Since the evolution of the idea of this dimension, there is a clash between south and the northern EU member-states. The Southern countries perceive Northern dimension as a competitor for Euro-Med cooperation but Finland put forward that it is not objected to create a division between North and South.<sup>148</sup> Vice-versa, the EU designed Northern and Southern Dimensions to complement each other in the framework of the ENP. It can also be argued for the Eastern Dimension, however both Northern and Eastern dimensions have focused on post-communist area and there is a common sharing. For instance, Poland, as the one of the initiators of Eastern Dimension project, needs to have good co-operation with the Baltic States to solve the debates with Ukraine and Russia which have borders with the new enlarged European Union. Poland needs to promote the ND to be successful in the Eastern dimension project. The ENP is a new framework which shows common interests and common problems which all these different regions have.

### **2.1.3. Eastern Dimension**

Eastern dimension has a different place in the context of ENP and is out of the competition between Northern and Southern Dimensions. While the Northern and Southern dimensions are seem like to be in a competition between each other, the Eastern Dimension has a different meaning for Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU objected to avoid of having new dividing lines with the Eastern Europe. The biggest difference between Southern and Eastern neighbourhood is related to

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<sup>147</sup> Oksana Antonenko, Pinnick, Kathryn (eds.), **Russia and the European Union**, USA and Canada: Routledge, 2005, p. 160.

<sup>148</sup> H. Haukkala, “Comment: National Interests versus Solidarity Towards Common Policies”, in H. Ojanen (ed.), *The Northern Dimension, Fuel for the EU? Program on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP No. 12* Helsinki & Berlin, **Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik**, 2001, p. 110.

Eastern neighbours' feeling of belonging to Europe and their attitudes towards being a part of the EU.<sup>149</sup>

The eight CEE countries- Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia- joined the EU on 1st of May, 2004. They were willing to be a part of the EU and they assessed this process as going “back to Europe”.<sup>150</sup> The Eastern Dimension has its roots since the Cold War period. In the 1970s, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt followed an *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy) that played a vital role in the international politics. The main purpose of the eastern policy of Germany was to include Poland into western institutions. Germany was the border of the EU before the accession of CEE countries and afterwards EU borders moved to Poland's border. So it can be argued that Poland took the mission of *Ostpolitik* towards its East and became one of the key player in CEE region.

The heritage of Polish-Lithuanian common-wealth and Poland's geo-strategic position between Germany and Russia construct Polish image in the eastern European region. Also, “Poland has positioned itself as the biggest Central Eastern country overtly committed to Western values.”<sup>151</sup> During its history, Poland had invaded by eastern and western powers and had to be a bufferzone between the zones of influence of the West and Russia.<sup>152</sup> Since 1998, with the efforts of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek, Poland had been initiated to create an ‘Eastern Dimension’ and emphasized the role of Poland in the eastern borderland.

Poland put forward the proposals in a form of a non-paper<sup>153</sup> that was submitted to the EU and Eastern European countries in January 2003. Poland's role is to act as a lobbyist for the EU widening further east, because after the enlargement Ukraine and Belarus have become the EU's nearest neighbors in the east. Ukraine,

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<sup>149</sup> Iulian Chifu, “The Eastern Dimension of the ENP-Romanian Approach”, **Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova**, Issue.10, 2006, p. 3.

<sup>150</sup> Karen Henderson Passim, **Back to Europe: Central Eastern Europe and the European Union**, U.K: Routledge, 1999.

<sup>151</sup> Lonnie Johnson, **Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends**, New York:Oxford University Press, 1996, p.249.

<sup>152</sup> See Ilya Prizel, “Putin's Russia, the Berlin Republic, and East-Central Europe: a New Symbiosis?”, **Orbis**, Vol. 46, pp. 685-699.

<sup>153</sup> See for further details of Polish non-paper; Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Republic Poland at, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/>

Belarus and Moldova have potential possibilities for closer cooperation with the EU. However, the success of Polish lobbyist role for the further widening to the east, “Poland figures as a border-maker in the sphere of framing the figure of ‘Europe’ and the existence of a continuing divide is preserved, and the East continues to remain understood in negative terms.”<sup>154</sup> After its accession to the EU, Poland legitimized its western identity and the European eastern borders are reconstructed. From the beginning, Poland tried to avoid of being a new Iron Curtain nearby the eastern European states.

In 2008, Poland became the initiator of the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI) with Sweden.<sup>155</sup> On the 26th of May, they gave a well-prepared proposal for EPI at an EU foreign minister’s meeting in Brussels, “in a mini-version of France’s ‘Mediterranean Union’”.<sup>156</sup> One of the main arguments on launching such an initiative was, “balancing EU’s Mediterranean Union, launched in July by the French presidency.”<sup>157</sup> The Eastern Partnership Initiative includes eastern European countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and also Caucasian countries (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). This initiative focus on the countries which are on the routes of the energy line but could give a positive impetus for the ENP with focusing on a single region. For instance, Ukraine needs a special focus with its ambiguous and divided identity structure and almost dysfunctional democracy.

Ukraine is a significant country for the Eastern Dimension because it is one of the biggest and crucial neighbour countries of Poland and they shared the same destiny in the context of being squeezed between the East and the West. The EU sees Poland as a role model for Ukraine in the context of being integrated to the western institutions. Poland was the first state to support Ukrainian sovereignty on 13 October 1990 and it was a reaffirmation of Marshal Pilsudski’s famous statement that “without and

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<sup>154</sup> Christopher S. Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, “The European Union’s Two Dimensions: The Eastern and the Northern”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 4, December 2003, p. 471.

<sup>155</sup> Andrey S. Makarychev, “Where the North Meets the East Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’”, *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Institutional Studies Association*, Vol. 39, No. 3, Sage Publications, 2004, p. 299.

<sup>156</sup> Philippa Runner, “Poland and Sweden to Pitch ‘Eastern Partnership’ idea”, *EUObserver*, 22.05.2008. See, <http://euobserver.com/?aid=26194>.

<sup>157</sup> Alexander Sivetz, “Eastern Partnership: Analysis of the Initiative and Corresponding Russian Behavior”, *European Dialogue*, 2009. See <http://eurodialogue.org/eastern-partnership/18>.

independent Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland”<sup>158</sup> While Russia was an “elder brother”<sup>159</sup>, Poland was “an equal partner for Ukraine and many Ukrainian nationalists saw Poland as an escape hatch from Russian domination.”<sup>160</sup> Since then support for maintaining Ukrainian independence has become one of the top priorities of Poland’s eastern policy. Poland tried to create a balance between supporting the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine while maintaining good relations with Russia and the West.

In 2004, Ukraine had a pro-European stance and Yushchenko government worked for the EU membership. At that time, in Ukrainian perspective, ‘Europe’ was an important symbol which became identical with the ‘European Union’. Ukraine has reacted negatively to the term ‘Neighbourhood Agreement’, implying a status of definitive exclusion from the EU. For this reason, EU aimed to enhance the agreements and developed “ENP plus”<sup>161</sup> agenda.

Moldova and Belarus are the other Eastern European countries which are closer to Russia compared to Ukraine. Belarus is a passive ENP partner and is a close ally of Russia. In the case of Moldova, the border dispute with Ukraine and also problems with Romania are significant. Although there is a serious Russian effect on Moldova, with the consequence of bad economic conditions, Moldova wants to benefit from the advantages of the EU by arguing that they are part of Romania and they should be a member of the EU.

Relations with Russia may pose a challenge to the EU’s Eastern Dimension. It is a fact that the EU can hardly contemplate Russia’s membership in the Union. It is equally hard to treat Russia like Belarus and Ukraine, and Putin’s presidency demonstrates that a dynamically changing Russia may become one of the EU’s key

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<sup>158</sup> A. Karatnycky, “A Polish Voice”, *New Leader*, 15.06.1981. Cited by Wolczuk Roman, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations Between 1991 and 1998: From the Declarative to the Substantive”, **European Security**, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 130.

<sup>159</sup> Sarah M. Terry, “Poland’s foreign policy since 1989: the Challenges of Independence”, **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, Vol. 33, 2000, pp. 7–47.

<sup>160</sup> I. Prizel, **National Identity and Foreign Policy**, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 139.

<sup>161</sup> ENP Plus is declared by Germany during its EU presidency. See for further details; Frans-Walter Steinmeier, “Interaction and Integration- A new phase of Ostpolitik: Globalisation Demands Interaction, Not Isolationism”, **Internationale Politik**, DGAP, Berlin, Spring 2007.

political partners in global politics.<sup>162</sup> In the framework of the Eastern Dimension, there could be four areas in Russia that have potentials which are energy, border security, Kaliningrad, and Chechnya.<sup>163</sup> Kaliningrad issue is also important for the Northern dimension and Chechnya conflict is one of the crucial issues also for the Black Sea dimension. Energy and security problems also affect both the Northern and Black Sea dimensions. At that point, it is obvious that all these dimensions work together and should cooperate under the ENP framework to create a synergy.

Russian showdown on the energy relations with Ukraine triggered the Union to take a step on the eastern relations. This event has a role in evolving of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. For that reason, it includes all transit countries that provide oil and gas transportation to Europe.

The initiative also covers the areas of Transnistria conflict and Karabakh conflict. The tailor-made structure of the EPI which is similar to the structure of the ENP could create confusion for countries in the implementation of policies (especially on energy security) or *vice versa*. The role of the EPI in the context of the ENP is debatable. “European Commissioner said the EPI program envisages renewal of the Neighbourhood Policy.”<sup>164</sup> So it could be argued that EPI program would offer a revised and more strengthened neighbourhood policy and would have a complementary role. But on the other side, it can be said that, “the initiative demonstrates that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ ENP will not find acceptance among the member states.”<sup>165</sup> It means that more regional cooperation such as EPI, could be an alternative to the ENP and the European Commission could have an opportunity to rethink on the ENP. “Instead the

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<sup>162</sup> Jacek-Marek Cichoński and Paweł Kowal, “Poland and the EU’s Eastern Dimension” in Kowal, Paweł (ed.), Bohdan Ambroziewicz (translation), “The EU’s ‘Eastern Dimension’-An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy?”, **Centre for International Relations**, Warsaw, 2002.

See, <http://www.csm.org.pl/en/>

<sup>163</sup> Andrey S. Makarychev, “Europe’s Eastern Dimension Russia’s Reaction to Poland’s Initiative”, **PONARS**, Policy Memo, No. 301, November 2003.

<sup>164</sup> “Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner Discussed “Eastern Partnership” Initiative in Baku”, **Azeri Report**, 21.01.2009.

See, [http://azerireport.com/index2.php?option=com\\_content&task=views&id=913&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=53](http://azerireport.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=views&id=913&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=53)

<sup>165</sup> Daniel Grotzky, “Whose Neighbour?”, **Center for Applied Policy Research**, 28.05.2008.

See, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2008/neighbour.php>

EU rather than ‘a ring of friends’, the ENP is resembling more and more a ‘chain’ of various interlinked regions.”<sup>166</sup>

EPI envisages for political and economic cooperation, enhanced energy relations and easier visa facilities to enter into the EU. Some Russian experts like Polkhov claims that the EPI program “says nothing about the military and political cooperation”.<sup>167</sup> EPI does not have a military perspective but the political cooperation could be effective if it works coherently with the neighbourhood policies of the EU.

“The EPI is a purely European initiative that may be more successful than the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) project in preparation of which the USA took active part.”<sup>168</sup> GUAM is revised following the colored revolutions- in Ukraine and Georgia- and named as Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED-GUAM) at a Kyiv summit on 23 May 2006. ODED-GUAM gives priority to “the energy security across the Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea axis, and a free trade area among the member states, as well as democracy promotion.”<sup>169</sup>

#### 2.1.4. Black Sea Dimension

Throughout the history, Black Sea has witnessed the struggle of big powers for reaching the warm seas and still it is a cross-road for the regional and major powers. One of the fundamental discussions came to the fore on the regional identity of Black Sea region. Gregory defines the concept of ‘region’, “as a more or less bounded area possessing some sort of unity or organizing principle(s) that distinguish it from other regions”.<sup>170</sup> It could be argued that, regions are constructed entities such as states.<sup>171</sup> There are different views on defining the Black Sea region. Valinakis claims that;

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<sup>166</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>167</sup> Svyatoslav Polkhov, “EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ and Russia-Belarus Relations”, **Russia**, 19.12.2008. See [http://rbth.ru/articles/2008/12/19/191208\\_rrelations.html](http://rbth.ru/articles/2008/12/19/191208_rrelations.html).

<sup>168</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>169</sup> Fabrizio Tassinari, “A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative”, **CEPS Policy Brief**, No. 105, June 2006, p. 2.

<sup>170</sup> D. Gregory, “Region and Regional Geography”, in **Dictionary of Human Geography**, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 687. Also see Frans Joachim Schrijver, **Regionalism after Regionalization**, Spain, France and United Kingdom, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 21.

<sup>171</sup> M. Keating, “Is there a regional level of government in Europe?”, in P.Le Gales, C. Lequesne (eds.) **Regions in Europe**, U.K: Routledge, 1998, p. 18.

“It is perceived either as a concrete geopolitical entity, actual or resulting from history and thus with a sense of common identity and togetherness or as a process in hand; as a sub-region, rather than an entity *per se*, or a network of bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral links.”<sup>172</sup>

During the history Black Sea was named in different ways with the dynamic political structure in the region. It was named as the “inhospitable sea or Axenos and later the ancients called it the Euxine or hospitable sea, so these metaphors demonstrate how perceptions of geography are closely tied to political and social conditions.”<sup>173</sup> “It is the political will of the interested countries and constant intellectual engagement with the idea of regional identity that turns a geographical area into a geo (political) region.”<sup>174</sup> In that sense, Black Sea region could be seen as a region which has a regional identity with its geopolitical nature.

Eyüp Özveren analyzes the region of Black Sea as a unit of analysis and tries to understand the region with historical lenses. He criticizes Braudel’s characterization of on the region which is defined as ‘only partly Mediterranean’. Özveren does not interpret the Black Sea as a ‘backyard’ of the Mediterranean world, but treat it as the essential part of the Black Sea basin. He uses Bratianu’s –a historian- geographical characterization of the Black Sea and views him as Braudel of the Black Sea region.<sup>175</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the new post-Soviet Eurasia, different separated regions appeared such as Southeastern Europe, the Caspian and the Caucasus with different political conditions. However, all these regions are named under the ‘Black Sea area’ because of the geo-strategic reasons.<sup>176</sup> So it can be put forward that, in the post-cold war era Black Sea region is reconstructed with the new political dynamics.

This region is the back door of the Middle East. Also it exists between two significant regional powers such as Russia and Turkey. In the EU official documents,

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<sup>172</sup> Yannis Valinakis, “The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe”, Chaillot Paper 36, **Institute for Security Studies of WEU**, July 1999, p. 6.

<sup>173</sup> Aybak (ed.), **op.cit.**, p. 1.

<sup>174</sup> Aydın, **op.cit.**, p. 20

<sup>175</sup> Eyüp Özveren, “The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis” in Aybak (ed.), **op.cit.**, I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2001, pp. 63-77. See also Fernand Braudel, **The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II**, London: Fontana/Collins, 1976, p.110.

<sup>176</sup> Aydın, **op.cit.**, p. 6.

the location of the region is described in a broad scope between Asia and Europe covering Southern Europe and Caucasia.

The willingness of the countries in the region increased since the end of the Cold War, and they showed their desire to cooperate. Black Sea Region is a problematic area where economic and political ambivalences exist. The crisis spots in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, ethnic animosities, economic crises, environmental problems, military armaments qualify the region as an instable part of the world. Besides these, with increasing energy dependency of world economies and increasing energy bills, the existence of significant oil and gas reserves and transit routes in the region underlines the necessity of stability in the region. Such challenges made regional cooperation as an unavoidable requirement.

With Bulgaria's and Romania's accession into the Union, the EU accessed to Black Sea region in January 2007 officially. The Union now has direct borders with the Black Sea and this triggered a process of construction of meanings and eventual EU interests in the region. Therefore, a new region oriented policy known as "Black Sea Synergy"<sup>177</sup> was formulated in April 2007. The Black Sea Synergy is not an independent policy and it has a complementary role to BSEC and the ENP. Also this policy can regulate EU's relations with Turkey in the region before its accession to the Union. Apart from the Synergy and the ENP, Council of Europe initiated a platform called as 'Black Sea Euroregion'. It was established in September 2008 in Bulgaria to encourage the EU projects between the cities and strengthen the intergovernmental and inter-regional relations in the region.<sup>178</sup>

The EPI and Black Sea dimension cover almost the same countries. Belarus is the only country which is in the EPI but not in the Black Sea dimension. In the Black Sea region there are so many cooperations and initiatives so the EU desires to focus on the energy routes of the EU from both the Eastern and Caucasian side. The coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia set the agenda of the EU's external relations and

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<sup>177</sup> For details see, European Commission, "Black Sea Synergy-A New Regional Cooperation Initiative", **COM (2007)**, 169 Final, 11.04.2007.

<sup>178</sup> Murat Daoudov, "Bölgesel İşbirliğinin Yeni Adresi: Karadeniz", **Birlik**, Aralık 2008, No.5, p.35. <http://licencetothink.blogspot.com/list/articles-yaz%C4%B1lar/676443470.pdf> [02.02.2009]



after that the EU put these countries into the same initiative within EPI to use the potential and will of democratization of these countries to stabilize these neighbourhood areas.

## 2.2. Thematic

Thematic scope is an intellectually constructed process which does not depend on the geographical variables. For instance, geographical adjacency is not the fundamental indicator of EU's relations with some of the Caucasian countries because of the vital thematic issues. The Black Sea Synergy or Eastern Partnership Initiative covers Caucasus countries (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) even though they are referring to different sub-regional cooperation. Since it seems like there is a geographical or territorial link within these countries there is a dominance of thematic dynamics –such as energy routes- in relations with these Caucasian countries.

Geographic and thematic variables interact and reshape each other. It is difficult to differentiate geographical and thematic factors. For instance, energy relations could be a factor of both geographical and thematic relations. Also geographic regions are constructed and became a region in a short or a long-period; therefore it is difficult to say that geographical scope is totally differentiated from thematic scope. It could be argued that enlargement process is one of the overlapping areas of geographical and thematic scope. On the one hand, enlargement process causes a changing of borders and it has geographical consequences. On the other hand, it triggers thematic relations with other over border countries. After 2004 and 2007 enlargements, perceptions of the EU have changed and the EU started to focus on security concerns, domestic stability and regional peace. The EU seeks to avoid of provoking the fear of creating new dividing lines between the west and the east. In that sense, as Jan Zielonka mentions that, it is a dilemma for EU to create postmodern entity with blurred borders and divisions or to create sharp divisions between insiders and outsiders.<sup>179</sup> Hence, the

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<sup>179</sup> Jan Zielonka, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape The European Union", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.39, No.3, 2001, pp. 507-36.

EU acts in a broad sense and draws a wide neighbourhood area from Middle East to Eastern Europe and to Northern Africa.

In the framework of the ENP, the EU has bilateral relations with each country considering their own sensitivities, however in some areas where different regions could meet at some common interests there are also multilateral relations. In the Commission's Communication on *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*, it is stated that;

“There are a number of cross-cutting themes where the EU and its ENP partners, both South and East, share common interests and concerns and which could usefully be addressed in a multilateral context. In areas such as energy, transport, the environment, rural development, information society, research cooperation, public health, financial services, border management, migration or maritime affairs, problems are often not merely bilateral in nature and could benefit from common debate, action and cooperation between the EU and all or most ENP partners. These areas are important for durable growth, prosperity, stability and security.”<sup>180</sup>

The efforts of the EU on crucial themes of the ENP- such as energy, migration, environment, transport- created a need for building thematic dimension to ENP which is proposed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner on 4th of December 2006. She stated that, the thematic dimension could hold “ad hoc, regular ministerial or expert meetings with ENP partners or a more institutionalized set up if appropriate”.<sup>181</sup>

In addition, the multilateral relations of the EU could be complementary to the bilateral relations and efforts of the ENP. In the non-paper of the Commission, the thematic dimension of the ENP is defined as “the sum of sectoral issues of interest to more than one ENP partner country and as the sum of opportunities for the EU and ENP partner countries to address such issues together, beyond merely bilateral policy dialogues.”<sup>182</sup>

Actually bilateral-regional and multilateral relations in the framework of the ENP try to be balanced within thematic dimension of the ENP. While in the South there

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<sup>180</sup> COM (2006)726 Final, p. 8.

<sup>181</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy-Speaking Points”, Press Conference, **Speech/06/778**, Brussels, 4.12.2006.

<sup>182</sup> European Commission, Non-Paper, Expanding on the Proposals Contained in the Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Strengthening the ENP”, **COM (2006) 726 Final**, 4.12.2006, p. 6.

are multilateral relations (the EU also adds bilateral relations) to the East there is no multilateral dimension of the ENP.<sup>183</sup> “Multilateral agreements between the EU and ENP partners in small key sectors should be urgently considered- especially; energy (extending the Energy Community Treaty) and transport (horizontal/global aviation agreements).”<sup>184</sup>

Under the title of thematic scope, the question of which variables have an impact on EU’s aims for broadening and strengthening neighbourhood relations apart from geographic variables will be answered. The EU seeks to be active in the areas full of conflicts and instable areas to secure the energy routes and to promote democracy to the instable countries. Under the title of ‘conflict’, the impact of changing security threats on European security perception will be analyzed to understand how these security challenges gave an impetus to the neighbourhood policy of the EU. The conflicts will be taken under consideration as frozen and energy conflicts. Under the title of ‘peace’, democracy promotion and energy dialogue will be analyzed. The two main parts complement each other in the context of cause and effect relationship. It can be argued that, the secure and peaceful areas are convenient for democracy promotion and energy relations.

### **2.2.1. Conflict**

For understanding the interpretation of conflicts in EU perspective it is crucial to mention how the concepts of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ are changed. In this part, the conflicts are analyzed under the headings of ‘frozen’ and ‘energy’ conflicts instead of interstate, local or ethnic conflicts because the EU official usage of the terms of ‘conflict’ is taken as a reference point. Also the relation between the energy routes and frozen conflicts are focused.

The concept of ‘security’ is related to the perception of ‘threat’. During the Cold War, communism was the fundamental threat for the rest of the world; however,

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<sup>183</sup> European Commission, Non-Paper, **COM (2006) 726 Final**, 4.12.2006, p. 8.

<sup>184</sup> **COM (2006)726 final**, p. 9.

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nature and the environment of ‘threat’ have been changed rapidly. International security agenda is restructured in the new unipolar system. Notably, the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the U.S. gave an impetus to the American domination in the international politics indirectly. A new understanding of ‘threat’ is created by the dominant powers.

In the aftermath of these events, in the *European Security Strategy Paper* which is published in 2003, the global security challenges were stressed. The EU also showed its hesitation on terrorism, because the Union already had some concerns on the possible source of threat coming from the Islamic countries in the border of Mediterranean region. The bad image of these Islamic countries affected EU’s relations with its southern neighbours. However, as Loost Lagendijk states, the EU has chosen “to draw the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.”<sup>185</sup> At that point, the ENP which covers Mediterranean region and part of the Middle East could be evaluated as a crucial step in building good relations with the Islamic world.

In the *European Security Strategy Paper*, the concept of ‘security’ and the consequences of conflict are defined as below:

“Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.”<sup>186</sup>

The meaning of ‘security’ has been extended by scholars like Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan and Stephan Walt. These theorists interpreted ‘security’ with a broader view. According to them, security would not be limited with military security as the classical realists argued but also security of economy, environment or energy should be taken under consideration.<sup>187</sup> As Glyn Morgan claims, “the key security challenge to the

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<sup>185</sup> Loost Lagendijk, Jan Marinus Wiersma, “Travels Among Europe’s Muslim Neighbours: The Quest for Democracy”, **Centre for European Policy Studies**, 2008.

<sup>186</sup> European Security Strategy. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> [05.10.2007]

<sup>187</sup> See Ole Waever, “The Constellation of Securites in Europe” in **Globalization, Security and Nation State**, Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (eds.), State University of New York Press, 2005. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A new Framework for Analysis**, Boulder: Lynnee Rienner

EU is not defense anymore, but the need to construct a policy towards its ‘near abroad’ which responds in a sensitive manner to aspirations for inclusion and fears of exclusion.”<sup>188</sup>

Buzan argues, “physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas”<sup>189</sup> *Vice versa*, in the context of the ENP, it is argued that the security interaction could also be effective between the countries which do not have a physical adjacency depending on different variables. Some of the important variables can be considered as economic relations, energy dialogue, conflict prevention and democracy promotion.

#### 2.2.1.1. Frozen Conflicts<sup>190</sup>

The European Security Strategy (ESS) Paper states that after the enlargement process the EU became closer to instable areas and “these neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”<sup>191</sup> Therefore, the EU tries to be active in conflicts -such as the ones in the Middle East and South Africa- which become an area of competition for global powers and become internationalized with the effect of the Cold War.<sup>192</sup> So the EU takes a mission in regional conflicts with parallel to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions in these regions. In the context of the ENP, the local conflicts such as

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Publishers, 1998. Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in Ronnie Lieschutz (eds), **On Security**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86.

<sup>188</sup> Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, **The European Union as a Global Actor**, Routledge, 1999, p. 198.

<sup>189</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.45. See also for this argument Stephan Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>190</sup> The conflicts in the Post-Communist area such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh called as frozen conflict which means that there is no clear movement towards solution. However there are new improvements in these areas in the last years so it is getting difficult to call them ‘frozen’ anymore. But in this thesis, it will be used as ‘frozen conflicts’ to identify these conflicts.

<sup>191</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003.

See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> [05.10.2007]

<sup>192</sup> David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), **Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World**, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997, p.4.

Transnistria and Karabakh conflicts are also taken under consideration under the regional dimensions.

In the ESS Paper, regional conflicts are categorized as one of the other key security threats of Europe. In ESS paper, different types of conflicts were taken under consideration. These can be categorized as global or local conflicts. In addition, most of the local conflicts in the border of the EU are categorized as frozen conflicts. While the conflict in Transnistria could be categorized as a local conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be categorized as a global and a violent conflict. Regions are related to each other and they are interacted. For instance, Caucasus and Black Sea regions are interrelated and they are back doors of the Middle East. In that sense, the EU has to have a wider framework to be effective in conflict-resolution in all these regions.

In 2006, in the paper of the Commission entitled *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*, accepted that the ENP has achieved little progress in its efforts on conflict-resolution in the conflicts and the EU needs to be more active in peace-monitoring and peace-keeping operations.<sup>193</sup> Conflicts threatens EU's security, "whether through the risk of escalation or of an exodus of refugees, or by interrupting energy supplies or cutting trade and transport links, or through the spread of terrorism and organized crime including trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms."<sup>194</sup> Conflicts have economically and politically negative effects on the development of neighbourhood countries. These effects also have a capability to spill over other regions. For instance, "conflict and political division in the Mediterranean (Western Sahara, Palestine) over the past half century has seriously retarded the development of the region."<sup>195</sup>

The EU focuses on the conflicts in the Middle East. Israel-Palestinian conflict is one of the important conflicts in the region and it has an inter-state character. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Middle East witnessed many wars between Arabs and Jews. In 1988 the independent Palestinian government is declared by the

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<sup>193</sup> COM (2006) 726 final, 4. 12. 2006, p. 4.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>195</sup> European Commission, "Wider Europe-Neighbourhoods: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 9.

Palestinian National Council. Although there have been many peace attempts in the region the violent conflict did not end. The U.S. had several attempts in the region with the support of Jewish lobby aiming to control oil sources. Also the U.S wanted to be active in the Middle East region and therefore to legitimize its global actorness. The EU also attempts to be mediatory in the conflict with the help of ENP and also with European Security and Defence Policy activities. Jordan is also a part of EU peace attempts in the region. There are Action Plans for regional co-operation with three countries which are Jordan, Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territory.

In the Strategy Paper, the role of the EU in the region is expressed as below;

“...two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map, with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side in peace within secure and recognized borders and enjoying normal relations with their neighbours.”<sup>196</sup>

In October 2009 in Gaza conflict 1400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli is killed. United Nations Human Rights Council ratified the report accusing both Israel and Hamas to violate international human rights law on 16 October 2009.<sup>197</sup> There is an inequality in the Israel-Palestinian conflict and it is obvious in the numbers of dead people from both sides however the decision of the U.N. was a surprise for Israel.

The EU has peace activities in this conflict beyond ENP actions however the results are also important for the efficiency of the ENP. “There are two European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions which are EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EU BAM Rafah).<sup>198</sup> Also “the EU is a member of the Middle East Quartet (alongside the UN, U.S. and Russia), and has its own Special Representative for the Middle East

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<sup>196</sup> European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, **Strategy Paper 2007-2013& Indicative Programme 2007-2010**, p.3.

<sup>197</sup> “Birleşmiş Milletler Hamas’ı ve İsrail’i Suçlu İlan Etti”, **NetHaber**, 26.10.2009.

See <http://www.nethaber.com/Dunya/119286/BIRLESMIS-MILLETLER-ISRAILI-VE-HAMASI-SUCLU-ILAN>

<sup>198</sup> See EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL-COPPS), EUROPOL-COPPS/02, 9.02.2006. For the details of EUBAM Rafah see, <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/>

Peace Process.”<sup>199</sup> EUPOL COPPS is established in November 2005 “has a long term reform focus and provides enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.”<sup>200</sup> With EU BAM Rafah which was started mission in November 2005, EU accepted to be a third party and to monitor the border crossing in Rafah after Israel and Palestinian Authority agreed on ‘Agreement on Movement and Access’. It could be said that the mission in Rafah was not so effective because at the end of 2008 a violent conflict started in Gaza and continued in 2009.

The conflict in the Middle East cannot be separated from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the conflicts in Eastern Europe and Caucasus. Israel-Palestinian conflict has also an impact on the EU’s relations with Russia and the U.S. Therefore, if the EU wants to be active in conflict-resolutions then it can be said that ENP should be implemented in a broad framework which is able to cover all of these relations.<sup>201</sup>

Western Sahara conflict is another conflict which the ENP considers in the context of Southern neighbourhood area. Western Sahara is a post-colonialist region and known as Spanish Sahara. Since 1975 the region is independent from Spain. In 1976 Western Sahara is divided between Morocco and Mauritania. After this division, the conflict breakout between Morocco and Polisario Front who supports the independence of Western Sahara. However, there are other actors behind the scene. Algeria is one of the most important supporters of Polisario Front who claims that the Sahara is occupied by Morocco which has irredentist arguments. Thus, this situation creates another dispute between Algeria and Morocco. On the other hand, Morocco is a good ally of the U.S and the U.S. gives financial aid to Morocco since 1950s.<sup>202</sup> Morocco has a geopolitical importance and is a backdoor of Africa and Middle East. In 1990 Morocco and Polisario Front agreed on ceasefire. In 2007 the Manhasset

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<sup>199</sup> Stefan Wolff, “Conflict Resolution as a Policy Goal Under ENP in the Southern Neighbourhood”, Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, pp. 5-6.

<sup>200</sup> Council of the European Union. Consilium, EUPOL COPPS. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=974&lang=en>

<sup>201</sup> Geoffrey Edwards, “The Construction of Ambiguity and the Limits of Attraction: Europe and Its Neighbourhood Policy”, **Journal of European Integration**, Vol.30, No.1, 2008, p. 46.

<sup>202</sup> Stephan Zunes, “Morocco and Western Sahara”, **Foreign Policy in Focus**, Washington DC, 1.12.1998. See, [http://www.fpif.org/reports/morocco\\_and\\_western\\_sahara](http://www.fpif.org/reports/morocco_and_western_sahara)



negotiations held in New York by the U.N. and the U.N.-sponsored negotiations renewed until today but the dispute still has not been resolved.

Southern neighbours have connections with many EU member states related to their colonial backgrounds. The conflicts in Western Sahara and the relationship with Spain and also the relationships of France and Algeria<sup>203</sup> are some of the examples for these relationships. The terrorist attacks of radical Islamist groups are active in Algeria and also there are soft security issues such as illegal migration from Southern countries to Europe. In that context, the conflicts and disputes in the southern neighbourhood are considered by the EU.

Southern Caucasus is another area with full of conflicts. In this region there are different types of ethnic, religious and linguistic differentiations which could be a ground for these conflicts. Especially Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have problematic regions. Apart from Middle East, this region is also another area where the global actors have competition and rivalry. Because South Caucasus is a backdoor of Middle East and also it is important for energy sources and energy routes. The Southern Caucasian countries are newly independent states and obviously after the collapse of the Soviet Union, until today, they have been facing serious domestic problems. These domestic problems make these countries instable and triggers ethnic conflicts.

Since 1989, there has been South Ossetia problem in Georgia. In 1922, Southern Ossetia is integrated to Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Southern Ossetia wanted to federate Northern Ossetia and this situation created a violent conflict from 1989 to 1992. “The years 1992 brought a ceasefire, which is monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a Joint Peacekeeping Force composed of Georgians, Ossetians and Russians.”<sup>204</sup> In 1994, a ceasefire halted and Georgia withdrew troops from South Ossetian territories. Since 2008, South Ossetia is an unrecognized state by any country and legally it is belong to Georgian state. Georgia started an operation on 8<sup>th</sup> of August,

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<sup>203</sup> Wolff, *op.cit.*, pp.5-6.

<sup>204</sup> Anna Labedzka, “The Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)” in Steven Blockmans, Adam Lazowski (eds.), **The European Union and its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration**, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, p. 586.

2008 to South Ossetia to stop separatist movements of in the region. The fight between Georgia and Russia started just after this event. With EU's conciliatory attempt, they have agreed to a ceasefire.

The important name of Rose Revolution in Georgia, President Mikheil Saakashvili is labeled as the responsible of Georgia-Russia war by EU representatives.<sup>205</sup> In 2005, he presented a peace plan to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe about a solution to the conflict in Ossetia. In the plan, he stated that Georgia envisions a Constitutional guarantee of Autonomy.<sup>206</sup> He focused on South Ossetia conflict after the success of Georgia in Ajara region in 2004. He was planning to give Autonomy so he planned to protect the unity of Georgia. Russian President Medvedev stated that Georgia had an attempt to commit genocide during the period of Zviad Gamsahurdiya to these ethnic regions and he claims that Saakashvili choose the same method. He also argues that Russia protected these regions from genocide in the past and today.<sup>207</sup> Russia claims that Georgia had a violent operation to South Ossetia and does not recognize minority rights in the region. But on the other side, "Georgia said Russia was seeking to change Europe's borders by force."<sup>208</sup>

Abkhazia conflict is another frozen conflict and with its bloody background. Although Georgia wanted to give autonomy to Abkhazia, government could not reach consensus with the rebels. The Georgia-Russia war in August 2008 also affected Abkhazia after South Ossetia. On 26th of August in 2008, Russia officially recognized Abkhazia and Ossetia as two independent states after the recognition of the independent Kosovo by Western countries.<sup>209</sup> After that, Russia and Georgia still have a dispute on Abkhazia and it is an intersection point for illegal operations. "Russian peacekeepers,

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<sup>205</sup> See "AB Gürcistan Savaşı raporunun sonuna geldi, Rusya mutlu", **Euroactiv**, 02.10.2009.

<sup>206</sup> See the speech of Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia, Communication and Research Directorate, Council of Europe, **D 8 (2005)**, Strasbourg, 26.01.2005.

See <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/PA-Sessions/janv-2005/saakashvili.pdf>

<sup>207</sup> **Zaman Online**, "Rusya, kritik 'bağımsızlık' imzasını attı; Gürcistan 'bu bir ilhaktır' dedi", 26.08.2008.

<sup>208</sup> **BBC News**, "Russia Recognizes Georgian Rebels", 26.08.2008.

<sup>209</sup> Ivan Simic, "Russian Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: New Political Reality", **Pravda**, 29.08.2008.

See [http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/29-08-2008/106242-South\\_Ossetia\\_Abkhazia-0](http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/29-08-2008/106242-South_Ossetia_Abkhazia-0)

Georgian paramilitaries, and Abkhaz forces are involved in the smuggling business, which knows no ethnic limits.”<sup>210</sup>

In the Action Plan of Georgia, ‘peaceful resolution of internal conflicts’ is the priority<sup>211</sup> and Georgia considers that European integration could help conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia expects for a support from the EU. “It would like the Action Plan to include more instruments from the ESDP toolbox to promote regional stability and crises management.”<sup>212</sup> Before the establishment of ENP, since 1997 the EU has been supporting financially the conflicted zones in Georgia. Since 2006, the EU has increased the amount of this support and now the EU’s support is the biggest one in the region. Especially the EU focused on the conflict in South Ossetia because it seems easier to solve it. South Ossetia is close to Tbilisi and the conflict seems more urgent than the conflict in Abkhazia by the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR).<sup>213</sup>

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another conflict in the Southern Caucasus which is crucial for the EU. In the Western part of Azerbaijan, there is an Armenian-populated region which is called mountainous Karabakh. In respect of the U.S. Institute of Peace Roundtable Report, “Stalin, by including the Armenian populated region within the boundaries of Azerbaijan was pursuing a divide and rule policy.”<sup>214</sup> Therefore, it is claimed that the background of this conflict is grounded by the Soviet Union. Armenian people in this region were willing to integrate to Armenia during the Cold War. The tension increased between Azerbaijan and Armenia because of the ethnic discrimination and ethnic cleaning in both sides. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the tension increased. In the end of 1991, the tension between these countries became a war and

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<sup>210</sup> “The South Caucasus. A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment”, Prepared for the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA), 30.08.2002, p. 48.

<sup>211</sup> European Commission, EU/Georgia Action Plan. See [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/enp\\_action\\_plan\\_georgia.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_georgia.pdf)

<sup>212</sup> Speech by Sabine Freizer entitled “Responding to South Caucasus Conflicts in the European Neighbourhood”, European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 22.02.2006.

<sup>213</sup> Nicu Popescu, “The European Union and Conflicts in the South Caucasus”, **Caucas Europeanews**, 08.01.2007.

<sup>214</sup> Patricia Carley, "Nagorno-Karabakh. Searching for a Solution", **United States Institute of Peace Roundtable Report, Peaceworks 25**, 1998, p.1.

20,000 people were killed.<sup>215</sup> In 1994 they agreed to sign a ceasefire and OSCE has been monitoring negotiations for peaceful solution since then. “The effects of the conflict are worrying, as thousands of people have been driven from their homes, both Azerbaijani (over 800.000 people from territories occupied by Armenia) and Armenians (230.000 ethnic Armenians forced out of Azerbaijan).”<sup>216</sup> The conflict between Azeri and Armenian communities is also related to Turkey-Armenia relations. On the one hand, Turkey has to deal with the EU requests about solving the Armenian dispute and on the other hand it has to protect good relations with Azerbaijan.

Apart from the EU, there are other attempts for conflict-resolution in the Caucasus region. Minsk group, co-chaired by United States, Russia, and France, is working related to the ENP Action Plans and support EU’s peaceful resolutions of this conflict.<sup>217</sup> Since today, the efforts of the OSCE Minsk group has not been successful on Karabakh conflict but the peace efforts are still going on in the region. Apart from Minsk group, Turkey and Russia agreed to create a subgroup in April 2002 on the Southern Caucasus for fighting terrorism and also there is a trilateral agreement between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia working on anti-terrorist cooperation and the other soft security threats such as money laundering and human trafficking.<sup>218</sup> In the case of the Southern Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Iran are the regional players besides the EU. In addition, these countries are not included in the ENP, except Russia. Turkey is candidate of the EU, Russia has strategic partnership on common points and Iran does not have a connection with the ENP. “So the EU has remained an outsider to the region’s frozen conflicts, on the basis that other actors are conducting the negotiation processes contrary to that of Turkey and Russia who have acted as both supporters and

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<sup>215</sup> Elkhan Nuriyev, “Geopolitical Breakthrough and Emerging Challenges: The Case of the South Caucasus”, **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. VI, No. 2, June-July 2001, p.11

<sup>216</sup> Labedzka, **op.cit.**, pp. 584-585.

<sup>217</sup> See, “EU Statement of the OSCE Minsk Group”, Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Permanent Council No. 707, **PC.DEL/239/08**, 3.04.2008.

<sup>218</sup> Leonid Polyakov, “New Security Threats in Black Sea Region”, Razımkov Centre. This is a condensed version of a chapter that will appear in **The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building**, edited by Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, which will be published by M.E. Sharpe in cooperation with the EastWest Institute.

financers.”<sup>219</sup> In that sense, the EU should also cooperate with the other regional actors to be more active and effective in frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus region.

Transnistria<sup>220</sup> is another conflict which the ENP considers in the context of Eastern neighbourhood relations. However, this conflict has some differences than the other frozen conflicts. First of all, this conflict is a part of Moldova which has a border with the EU. After the accession of Romania to the EU, the borders have been changed and Moldova became a close neighbour. Transnistria is a secessionist region on the eastern border of Moldova but all maps still show the region as a part of the territory of Moldova. It is also a big problem for Moldova-Ukraine relations and in that context it is also crucial for EU-Ukraine relations. Transnistria region declared its independence in 1990 and after a war in 1992 had its *de facto* independence. Russian troops stayed in Transnistria after this war. “The possible unification of Moldova with Romania, linguistic and ethnic discrimination, as well as the anti-Soviet, anti-Russian and pro-Romanian decisions was the fear of Transnistria.”<sup>221</sup> Therefore, Transnistria wanted to be independent from Moldova. Especially after the accession of Romania to the EU increased the will of Moldova to be a part of Romania and the EU and this situation increases the fear of Transnistria to lose their identity being a part of Romania.

Besides the EU efforts since 1992, there are peace efforts of OSCE in the region. Since 2003, the EU has been implementing visa ban against the *de facto* Transnistria administration and also the EU has a status of observer in the mediation process since 2005. This mediation process is a new format called ‘5+2’, covering talks with Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine plus EU and U.S. In addition, the EU organized an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) on the Moldova-Ukraine

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<sup>219</sup> Licia Simao, MariaRaquel Freire, “The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding New Patterns of Cooperation”, **Caucasian Review of International Affairs**, Vol.2, No.4, Autumn 2008, p. 228.

<sup>220</sup> “Transnistria is the Moldovan name of the secessionist region, the Russian name of the region is Pridnestrovye and the formal name of the self-proclaimed republic name is Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika or PMR.” is cited from Nicu Popescu, “The EU and Transnistria, From Deadlock to Sustainable Settlement”, **IPF Policy Brief (final)**, p. 2.

See <http://www.policy.hu/npopescu/ipf%20info/IPF%201%20transnistria.pdf>

<sup>221</sup> Alla Skvortova, “Moldova” in Steven Blockmans, Adam Lazowski (eds.), **The European Union and its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration**, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, p. 561.

state border with the request by Moldovan and Ukrainian governments since 2005.<sup>222</sup> The cross-border relations are important for the Union in the context of soft security challenges such as smuggling, drugs trafficking and organized crime.

### 2.2.1.2. Energy Conflicts

In this part, it is argued that energy conflicts are related to the frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood area of the EU. Therefore, it is one of the reasons why the EU includes these areas in the thematic scope of the ENP. The energy policy and the EU attempts on the conflicts (conflict-resolution, conflict prevention) are interrelated issues. Regional powers and global powers have roles in the conflicts. For instance, in the Caucasus region while Russia support Abkhazia, the U.S. supports Georgia and the regional power's interests are crossing in the region. In general, conflicts are located on the way of energy routes and they create instability in the region. Especially Caucasus and Middle East are 'hot potatoes' and difficult to handle. In the paper of *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy* it is stated about frozen conflicts that;

“‘Frozen conflicts’ and recent events in the Middle East and Southern Caucasus remind us that the conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established, both between some of our neighbours and with other key countries. These are not only our neighbours’ problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism.”<sup>223</sup>

By referring to the ‘Great Game’ which is named by Rudyard Kipling to explain the competition of big powers in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Russia and Great Britain) to control of the trade routes to India, the recent power competition for controlling over the Eurasian energy resources is named as the ‘New Great Game’.<sup>224</sup> Therefore, geopolitics of pipelines in Caucasus and Asia became a major foreign-policy issue for the U.S. for the last few years. “The U.S support energy routes (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan), so

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<sup>222</sup> European Commission, External Relations, Moldova.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/moldova/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/moldova/intro/index.htm)

<sup>223</sup> COM (2006) 726 final, p. 2.

<sup>224</sup> Sander Hansen, “Pipeline Politics; The Struggle for Control of the Eurasian Energy Resources”, *Clingendael International Energy Programme*, April 2003, p. 65.

the EU's contribution is growing with parallel to the U.S. engagement in the region."<sup>225</sup> Regional players like Iran, Turkey, and Russia are also competing to have a bigger role on pipeline politics in the region.<sup>226</sup> They welcome the stabilization and progress in the conflicted regions.

The EU is the largest importer of energy sources and energy dependency is increasing every year with the accession of new member-states. According to *the Green Paper* of the Commission, the energy dependency of the EU was 50% in 2000 and will be 70% in 2030.<sup>227</sup> Therefore, the EU also focuses on the energy relations and tries to diversify the energy resources and to find alternative energy routes. Luigi Narbone noted that "most of the neighbourhood countries are vital for the energy security of the EU; Algeria, Egypt, Russia are the suppliers and the Ukraine, Belarus, Morocco and Tunisia are as transit countries."<sup>228</sup> The EU mostly imports gas from Russia and especially Ukraine is significant as a transit country. The Transnistria conflict, in the border of Ukraine, creates instability in the Eastern European region. Also Gazprom's cut off decision of the gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus triggered the concerns of EU becoming an overdependent to Russia and the war in Georgia threatened EU's one of the main non-Russian pipeline corridor.<sup>229</sup> "In the case of the Black sea area the EU has a vested interest in ensuring the safety of energy supplies from the Caspian and Central Asia which constitute a useful alternative too much reliance on either Russia or the Middle East."<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Patric M. Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders", in Lake and Morgan (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>226</sup> Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Region" in **The Caspian Region at a Crossroad, Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy and Development**, Hosshang Amirahmandi (ed.), Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 163.

<sup>227</sup> European Commission Green Paper, "Towards a European strategy for the Security of Energy Supply", **COM(2000)769**, 29.11.2000.

<sup>228</sup> Luigi Narbone, "The European Neighbourhood Policy and Energy", Seminar organised by NL, PT and UK Permanent Representations, European Commission External Relations, Brussels, 30.11.2005.

<sup>229</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, **Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics**, USA: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2009, p. 175.

<sup>230</sup> E. Carr, P. Flenley, "Region Building in the Wider Black Sea Area" in Peter M. E.Volten, Blagovest Tashev, "Establishing Security and Stability in the Wider Black Sea Area: International Politics and the New and Emerging Democracies", Vol.26, **NATO Science for Peace and Security**, IOS Press, 2007, p.41.

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are ENP partners and they are vital countries for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline so the conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh are effective in the context of energy security. Therefore EU aims to be more active in these conflicts in the region. Besides the EU, regional players such as Russia and Turkey are active on frozen conflicts and energy routes in the Black Sea region. There are actually same profiles in the every sub-complex security system in the regions in the scope of the ENP. “The Kremlin, using the Nagorno-Karabakh war as leverage, has heavily increased its influence in recent years with the purpose of re-establishing Russian control of the Azerbaijani-Iranian frontier by bringing back its border guards.”<sup>231</sup> On the other side, Armenia is an ally of Russia and it is dependent to Russia in energy terms and is a transit country bordering Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran and Georgia. Although “the EU is Armenia’s biggest import and export partner, it also has the strongest ties with Russia in the field of defense of the South Caucasia.”<sup>232</sup> In that context, Karabakh conflict affects all the countries in the region.

Azerbaijan changed its status towards Turkey after Turkey signed a Protocol with Armenia. Heydar Aliyev, The President of Azerbaijan, stated that Azerbaijan is supplying Turkey’s energy need with lower prices than the average and he gave an instruction to increase the price. The Karabakh conflict is not resolved in peaceful ways and this situation has a negative impact on the energy transportation from Azerbaijan to the EU. The transit right with Turkey is another problem. Aliyev stated that Russia and Iran were other options for Azerbaijan to have energy trade. Within this event, it is obvious that Azerbaijan uses the energy card and it can be also another example to prove the correlation between conflicts and energy relations.<sup>233</sup> “Mammadyarov spoke at some length about the ‘different options’ of supplying gas to EU markets without once mentioning the EU's Nabucco pipeline expected to link Azerbaijan via Turkey to a pipeline hub in Austria by 2015.”<sup>234</sup>

With the southern neighbours, the EU “develops an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market and works with the Maghreb countries to promote

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<sup>231</sup> Nuriyev, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>232</sup> Labedzka, *op.cit.*, p. 579.

<sup>233</sup> **Habertürk**, “Azerbaycan Enerji Kartını kullanmaktadır”, 19.10.2009.

<sup>234</sup> Lobjakas, *loc.cit.*



regional integration of their electricity markets, and with the Mashreq region to enhance security and infrastructures in the gas sector.”<sup>235</sup> “Russia, Algeria and Libya supply half the EU’s oil imports, while Russia and Algeria supply two-thirds of the EU’s gas imports.”<sup>236</sup>

Western Sahara conflict is also related to the energy routes with the geopolitical importance of the region. Morocco is the backdoor of the Middle East and Africa. The conflict between Algeria and Morocco affects the energy relations of the major players.

One of the objectives of the ENP is to promote energy policies of the EU. In the Action Plans of the ENP, there are energy sections and energy is one of the priorities of these plans. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia included in the in the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and in the Trans-Caspian energy corridor projects in accordance with the objectives of the ENP. The EU wants Azerbaijan and Georgia to have an active role in energy supply and transit diversifications in the region. In the context of energy supply, the climate change also has an importance which the EU has to consider.<sup>237</sup>

The security of energy supply is needed to enhance the energy policies and it is related to the conflict-management on the energy routes.

### **2.2.2. Peace**

Processes of stabilization and promotion peace to EU’s neighbourhood, are directly related to the EU’s efforts on promoting democracy to its neighbourhood area. In the instable areas, there is a lack of democracy and there are frozen conflicts. Securing energy routes and energy supply are crucial motives for these efforts. In this part, how the scope of thematic neighbourhood is constructed in the instable regions within the efforts of democracy promotion and energy dialogue will be discussed.

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<sup>235</sup> COM(2007) 774 final, Brussels, 05.12.2007, p. 7.

<sup>236</sup> Report on Green Paper : Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, June 2005. See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy\\_transport/doc/2005\\_green\\_paper\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/doc/2005_green_paper_report_en.pdf)

<sup>237</sup> Official Journal of the European Union, “A more effective EU policy fo the South Caucasus”, **P6\_TA (2008) 0016**, 19.02.2009.

See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:041E:0053:0063:EN:PDF>

### 2.2.2.1. Democracy Promotion

It could be argued that democracy promotion is related to the concern of stabilization. In the ESS Paper, sources of instability were determined as the failed states and they are categorized as one of the security threats for Europe. It states;

“Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.”<sup>238</sup>

In realist terms, the instable states could be the sources of threat and these states should be stabilized. In that sense, the EU uses democracy promotion to stabilize the instable states. Stabilization and promoting democracy complement each other and this refers to a mostly American oriented and liberal argument which states democracies do not fight each other.<sup>239</sup> Therefore the EU creates a ring of stable friends which are also more democratic. The cause and effect relationship clarifies the reasons of the democracy promotion. The realist causes could create constructivist effects in the case of democracy promotion. While the need of stability is the main factor of democracy promotion, promoting EU values by socialization process is regarding to the process and the outputs of the policy.

In respect of the ‘democratic gravity’ model of Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, the big democracies are the centers and they create gravity force for the other states. According to them, the U.S. and the EU are the good examples of this model. There could be historical, cultural or other spheres of gravitational attraction.<sup>240</sup> They also state, “the EU simply exists and is an object of gravitational attraction for its

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<sup>238</sup> European Security Strategy.

See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> [05.10.2007]

<sup>239</sup> See Robert A. Dahl, **Democracy and Its Critics**, New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, July 4, 1991.

<sup>240</sup> Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”, paper presented at the CEPS-Stanford Conference on Democracy and the Rule of Law, 4-5.10.2004, and published as CEPS Working Document No. 214, November 2004, p. 3

neighbours and does not need to try actively to shape its neighbourhood.”<sup>241</sup> In the case of the EU, so-called “Europeanization”<sup>242</sup> process is the general name of promoting democracy and diffusing European values to the periphery of the EU. ‘Europeanization’ can be assessed with social constructivist theory because there is a top-down and bottom-up socialization processes. The force of attraction of the democratic center “depends on the reputational quality and attractiveness of that democracy, its geographic and cultural-historical proximity, and its openness to the periphery.”<sup>243</sup> As regards to democratic peace theory, democracies do not fight each other, though it is a controversial argument, and the EU considering itself as a center of democratic states by a majority. According to McFaul, “while democracy is widely regarded as an ideal system of government, democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal has become increasingly acceptable throughout most of the international community.”<sup>244</sup> Before, in the democratization literature, the democratisation was considered as a regime change however today it is called democratization and the democracy promotion is a process of change which external factors have a role.<sup>245</sup>

It could be argued that there is an interdependence between the democratization and conflict settlement.<sup>246</sup> To understand the relation of democracy promotion with the thematic scope of the ENP, the link between the conflicted areas and EU’s interferences with its neighbourhood policy instruments should be focused. “The case studies illustrate how the objective of democracy promotion can be trumped by several other priorities, such as strategic security, energy supply security, strategic diplomacy, conflicting visions for the future of Europe and world views.”<sup>247</sup>

The EU as foreign policy actor, use democracy promotion among third countries. In the context of external relations, the Union gives financial aids and export

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<sup>241</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>242</sup> See for more details; Johan Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, **Arena Working Papers**, WP 01/2, 2002.

<sup>243</sup> Emerson, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”, p. 3

<sup>244</sup> McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value”, **The Washington Quarterly**, Winter 2004-05, p. 148.

<sup>245</sup> G. Olsen, “Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of Europe: Limits to International Idealism”, **Democratization**, Vol.7, No.2, pp. 142-167

<sup>246</sup> Emerson, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”, p. 3

<sup>247</sup> Mathew Spence, “Policy Coherence and Incoherence: The Domestic Politics of Democracy Promotion”, **Working Paper, CDDRL**, Stanford University., 4-5.10.2004.

European values to the third countries. The EU uses different tools to export democracy. Political conditionality is a tool to promote European values to the candidate countries, but on the other hand the ENP could be evaluated as another tool for the countries that do not have EU-membership perspectives.

Before the establishment of the ENP, since the beginning of 1990's, the EU had several attempts on promoting democracy. After the Single European Act in 1988, in the Rhodes European Council EU's role in protecting international peace, resolving regional conflicts and promoting democracy in less developed countries. The Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon went further and strengthened EU's role as a foreign policy actor in external relations.<sup>248</sup> In respect of, 'the European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in the Third Countries' which was published on 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2002, EU's role in promoting democracy is emphasized.<sup>249</sup> "EU's external assistance programmes total some € 5 billion per annum in addition to European Development Fund resources for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (13.5 billion Euro under the 9th EDF between 2000-2007)."<sup>250</sup>

European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has been established as a legal framework and it supplements the other external assistance programmes in promoting democracy.

In addition, attitudes and the interests of the EU member-state could be different towards democracy promotion to the ENP partners. "Former colonial powers have tended to be hesitant to intervene politically in their former colonies, as perhaps in the case of France and Spain in the Maghreb."<sup>251</sup> "Member states have offered Morocco sizeable assistance bilaterally, including France (€200 million in 2005), Germany (€62 million) and Italy (€40 million), while the country has become the largest recipient of

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<sup>248</sup> Nathalie Tocci, "Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and Its Global Partners", in **Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners**, Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 1.

<sup>249</sup> European Commission, "The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries", **COM(2001) 252 final**, Brussels, 8.05.2001, p. 11.

<sup>250</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>251</sup> Michael Emerson, Senem Aydın, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Marius Vahl, Richard Youngs, "The Reluctant Debutante. The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood", **CEPS Working Document**, No.223, July 2005, p. 6.

Spanish aid.”<sup>252</sup> Therefore, the amounts of financial aid could be change within different hesitations of each member state. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia the numbers of European donors gave a financial support to these countries like Germany, France, the UK, Denmark and Sweden.<sup>253</sup>

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) maintains a legal framework for the bilateral relations with the ENP partners and the Action Plans are the most important political tools for promoting democracy, human rights and provoking reforms in these countries. It should be noted that democracy promotion is a multidimensional process. It has political, economical and cultural dimensions. Moreover, democracy promotion is a two-way process and the political consent is the fundamental basis in that process.

#### **2.2.2.2. Energy Dialogue**

The democracy promotion and energy dialogue are complementary issues because improving economic relations is related to stabilization process and energy is one of the most functional tools for economic cooperation. In that context, it should be noted that the politics which are implemented in the context of external relations are a circle and support each other.

The energy conflicts in the neighbourhood area are taken under consideration by the EU. On 23 September, 1997 the Energy Charter Treaty was established “for international cooperation between European countries and other industrialized countries with the aim of developing the energy potential of central and Eastern European countries and of ensuring security of energy supply for the EU.”<sup>254</sup> In this Treaty, the CEE countries are taken under consideration but after the accession of these post-

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<sup>252</sup> Richard Young, “Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?”, CEPS Working Document, No.292, May 2008, p.3. See also Richard Youngs (ed.), **Survey of European Democracy Promotion Strategies 2000-2006**, FRIDE, Madrid, 2006.

<sup>253</sup> Young, “Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?”, p. 3.

<sup>254</sup> Summaries of EU legislations, “European Energy Charter”.

See [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/energy/external\\_dimension\\_enlargement/127028\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/external_dimension_enlargement/127028_en.htm)

communist CEE countries into the EU, as a matter, of course, the Union changed the area of interest.

In October 2005, in the EU summit at Hampton Court, a step towards European energy policy has been taken. After that, in 2006 the *Commission Green Paper on an Energy Strategy for Europe* focuses on the challenges of energy security in Europe and states that it lies on “balancing sustainable development, competitiveness and security of supply.”<sup>255</sup> “The Commission stated that energy security policy ‘must also be consistent with the EU’s broader foreign policy objectives such as conflict prevention and resolution, non-proliferation and promoting human rights’.”<sup>256</sup>

The national interests of each EU member states and their own internal dynamics could be in challenge with the interests of the EU. The intergovernmental structure of the energy policy is tried to be put in a federal framework and this situation provokes EU member states in a negative way. In the *Green Paper*, it is stated that “choices made by one Member State inevitably have an impact on the energy security of its neighbours and of the Community as a whole and it is a question of subsidiarity.”<sup>257</sup> In the context of energy security each of the member states’ activities are essential.

On 3 September 2007, Ferrero-Waldner put energy in a top priority level and offered the idea of a new *Neighbourhood Energy Agreement* and she also stressed that the aim to support the foreign-policy dimension of the energy policy is one of the essential driving force behind the ENP. The external dimension of the EU’s energy policy is tried to be improved by the Commission. The Commission published Strategic Energy Reviews in 2007 and 2008.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> European Commission, Green Paper, “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, Brussels, **COM 2006, 105 Final**, 8.3.2006, p. 4.

<sup>256</sup> Richard Youngs, **Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge**, USA and Canada: Routledge, 2009, p. 24.

<sup>257</sup> **Europa Press Release**, “Fuelling Our Future: The European Commission Sets Out Its Vision for an Energy Strategy for Europe”, **IP/06/282**, Brussels, 8.03.2006, p. 2.

See <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/282&format=DOC&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

<sup>258</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Opening Speech, European Neighbourhood Policy Conference, **SPEECH/07/500**, Brussels, 3.09.2007.

The EU decided to establish energy dialogues with ENP partners in the context of thematic dimension. Also Memoranda of Understanding on Energy is applied to Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Algeria. In addition, the EU has some energy initiatives; such as Baku initiative, Euro-Mediterranean partnership and Africa-Europe energy partnership which would support the energy dialogues with the neighbourhood countries. Improving energy relations with Egypt and the other Mashrek/Maghreb transit countries and implementing the Energy Community Treaty with Ukraine and Moldova.<sup>259</sup>

The ENP has tailor-made Action Plans and there are energy sections in these plans. In these sections it is stated that:

- “energy dialogue and co-operation
- convergence of energy policies and legal/regulatory frameworks (includes for example internal electricity and gas markets)
- possibilities to participate in EU programs and events
- cooperation on energy networks, energy efficiency and new/renewable energy sources
- nuclear issues (Ukraine; in future Armenia)
- build on existing (regional) initiatives: Tacis programme on Caspian oil and gas pipelines; Euro-Maghreb electricity market; Israel-Palestinian Authority energy co-operation; Mashrek gas cooperation.”<sup>260</sup>

As it is stated in the Action Plan’s energy section, one of the vital issue in the context of energy relations of ENP is nuclear issues (including non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security and combating trafficking of nuclear materials) with ENP partners, e.g. Armenia and Ukraine.<sup>261</sup>

Action Plans are not concluded with Belarus, Syria, Algeria and Libya. These countries are significant countries for the energy relations of the EU and the scope of the ENP wants to enlarge through these countries.

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<sup>259</sup> European Commission, Non-Paper, “ENP-Thematic Dimension”, Expanding on the Proposals Contained in the Communication to the European Parliament and Council on “Strengthening the ENP”, **COM(2006) 726 Final**, 4.12.2006, p. 16.

<sup>260</sup> Luigi Narbone, “The European Neighbourhood Policy and Energy”, **Seminar organised by NL, PT and UK Permanent Representations**, European Commission External Relations, Brussels, 30.11.2005.

<sup>261</sup> European Commission, Non-Paper, “ENP-Thematic Dimension”, **COM(2006) 726 Final**, 4.12.2006, p. 16.

“In 2005, Algeria accounted for 3.6% of the EU-27’s oil imports, while Libya supplied the EU-27 with 8% of its crude oil; and as regards gas needs of the EU-27, Libya accounted for 1.9%, and Algeria for a crucial 20.6% of the Union’s gas imports in that year.”<sup>262</sup>

With Algeria there is energy cooperation under the Association Agreement of Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. The EU becomes more independent to Algerian gas and Algeria is willing to cooperate with the EU.<sup>263</sup> In the case of Libya, there have been informal relations since 2004 but there is still no active relationship. In addition, Belarus is a close ally of Russia is still not a full ENP member. However, the EU wants to improve neighbourhood relations with this essential transit country between Europe and Russia. It could be said that, Belarus is a part of Europe and has an European culture so it makes easier for the EU to establish closer relations with Belarus rather than Libya.

There is a new tendency on reactivating the Silk Road. ‘The Southern Corridor’ project is related to the countries of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, as well as those of Mashreq and the Middle East. In his speech José Manuel Barroso states that, the Southern Corridor is a good source for new energy sources for the EU and it could provide energy security and energy cooperation (also in fighting climate change issues).<sup>264</sup>

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are ENP partners and they are essential countries for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the EU gave importance to include these countries into ENP framework to strengthen energy dialogue in the Caucasus region.

“When Azerbaijan was indeed included in the ENP, former Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner declared that this offer reflected the country’s geo-strategic location and energy resources and for this reason (she claimed) it was included in the

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<sup>262</sup> European Commission, DG for Energy and Transport, “EU Energy and Transport in figures, Statistical Pocketbook 2007/2008”, p.32.

<sup>263</sup> I. Stein, "EU Energy Policy vis-à-vis Algeria: Challenges and Opportunities", **The Bologna Centre Journal of International Affairs**, Vol.13, Spring 2010. See <http://bcjournal.org/2008/eu-energy-policy-vis-a-vis-algeria/> [20.04.2010]

<sup>264</sup> Speech by José Manuel Durao Barroso, “New Silk Road”, The Southern Corridor Summit, **Speech/09/228**, 08.05.2009. See, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/228&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [30.04.2010]



ENP.”<sup>265</sup> As mentioned before, it is an area with full of conflicts and it is crucial to develop energy dialogue to secure the energy routes coming from this area.

Besides the ENP, other EU programmes such as TRACECA<sup>266</sup>( the European-Caucasus-Asia transportation corridor) and INOGATE (the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) “designed to enhance energy relations to support co-operation in the area of oil and gas infrastructure.”<sup>267</sup> TRACECA is a project to revive the ‘Great Silk Road’ and Georgia and Azerbaijan are playing important roles as transit countries. Apart from TRACECA, there are also other sub-regional initiative such as Baku initiative and Black Sea Synergy which are also supporting energy dialogue of the EU. All these regional and sub-regional initiatives and projects work interrelated with them and with the ENP to have harmony in external relations.

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<sup>265</sup> Youngs, **Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge**, p. 104.

<sup>266</sup> The EU, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan are the members of the TRAECA.

<sup>267</sup> Xymena Kurowska, “More Than a Balkan Crisis Manager: The EUJUST Themis in Georgia” in, Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds.), **European Security and Defence Policy: Implementation Perspective**, USA and Canada: Routledge, 2008, p. 98.

## PART TWO

### NEOREALIST APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

International relations theories have been shaped by significant debates since 1920s. One of the most important debates was between idealism and realism since 1950s, the following debate was between scientific behaviourism and traditionalism. In the third debate, positivists and critical theorists became the focus of the IR discipline in the 1980s. The third debate evolved to a fourth debate focused on constructivists vs. rationalists.<sup>268</sup> Recently, the fourth debate still is an attractive discussion among scholars. Especially the approaches of these theories to the European integration are interesting and still evolving. In this sense, in this thesis, neorealism and constructivism are taken as two main theories to explain the European Neighbourhood Policy within different perspectives.

Both neorealism and constructivism are systemic theories<sup>269</sup> and “the questioning of how much structures in the system are material or social is crucial to understand for these theories.”<sup>270</sup> Rationalist theories see material forces and idealists see shared knowledge structure as the basis of world politics. The fundamental structure of common knowledge makes the system conflictual and in this system, power and interest matters.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> See for the discussions in IR theory; Antje Wiener, “Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory: Puzzles and Promises”, **Constitutionalism Webpapers**, No 5, 2006, pp. 2-4. See also Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in A Post-Positivist Era”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.33, Iss.3, 1989, pp. 235-254.

<sup>269</sup> There is a debate whether constructivism is a theory or an approach. Nicholas Onuf argues that it is an approach but Fierke argues that Alexander Wendt builds a theory in his book **Social Theory of International Politics**, 1999. In this thesis, constructivism will be taken as a theory and will be compared with another rationalist theory. However the approaches of these theories will be used to analyze one of EU’s policies and in that sense their approaches to the European integration will be focused.

<sup>270</sup> Thomas J. Biersteker, Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty”, in Thomas J. Biersteker, Cynthia Weber (eds.), **State Sovereignty as Social Construct**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 242-243.

<sup>271</sup> Alexander Wendt, Daniel Friedheim, “Reconstructing the Analysis of Sovereignty” in, **op.cit.**, p. 243.

In this part of the thesis, firstly the basic assumptions of neorealist approach will be explained. Then, the neorealist approach to European integration will be clarified and this approach will be applied to the case of European Neighbourhood Policy with considering actors. The place of EU as a sub-system in the international system will be clarified and also the dynamics of the system of the EU will be taken under consideration to put forward the reasons which are lying behind the evolution of ENP.

The international, regional actors and their instruments will be figured out to illuminate the field of activity of the ENP. In the context of field of activity, widening and energy relations will be taken as significant variables of the policy. In the context of widening, the relationship of widening process and the ENP will be examined to put forward the neorealist aims of the system of EU. In the context of energy relations, Russia as a great power and Ukraine as a crucial transit country will be taken as two significant cases to be able to analyze the energy game in the international system which. In that framework, the impacts of energy relations on the evolution of the ENP will also be figured out.

In this part, the development of realistic thought and the basic principles of realism will be taken under consideration, with especially the ideas of Hans Morgenthau, to explain the roots of neorealist approach. After that, the basic assumptions of neorealism will mainly be based on the Waltzian approach but also other neorealists will be considered. In the last part, it is objected to clarify the neorealist approach to European integration and the ENP with reference to neorealism.

## **1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF NEOREALIST APPROACH**

The basic concern of international relations and idealist-realist debate is to understand the nature of war and peace. Realism has counter arguments and negative claims to idealism, however these two philosophical approaches complement each other with their critical opinions. Robert Gilpin pointed to realism as “a philosophical

disposition”<sup>272</sup>. The roots of the realist approach can be found in ancient times when Thucydides is accepted as the founding father of realist thought. His *Peloponnesian War* was used by realists to understand the nature of war and it also became a source for realists like Hans J. Morgenthau and E.H.Carr.

Classical realists believe that the negative potential of human nature is the main cause of war. States are like mankind and power is the main thing to struggle for, so conflicts and complications are crucial to understanding of world politics. For realists, international politics has the same meaning with power politics.<sup>273</sup> Realist theories share three assumptions concerning the nature of international environment. First, international system is described by anarchy which is an ordering principle and there is not a centralized political authority. Second, states are principal and unitary actors. Third, states are self-interested political entities<sup>274</sup> and “states seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power.”<sup>275</sup> Realists generally identify state capacity with military capability and John Mearsheimer argues that states needs to have offensive military capability, which gives them power to hurt or possibly destroy each other. Also he adds that, the most basic motive driving states is survival and none of the states can ever be sure about the other state will not use its offense military capability.<sup>276</sup> Guzzini generalized the concepts which are the basis of realists’ state-centric assumptions as power, security, anarchy and conflict. Realists believe that states in anarchy behave as unitary actors and aim to preserve their own national interests and security and are, then vulnerable to conflict rather than co-operation.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism”, in Robert O.Keohane, **Neorealism and Its Critics**, (Ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 304.

<sup>273</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism” In Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), **International Relations Theories**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007, p. 72.

<sup>274</sup> Jonathen Monten, “Thucydides and Modern Realism”, **International Studies Quarterly**, No.50, 2006, pp. 7-8.

<sup>275</sup> Keohane, **op.cit.**, pp. 164-165.

<sup>276</sup> J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, **International Security**, Vol.19, No.3, 1994/1995, p. 10.

<sup>277</sup> Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis”, **International Organization**, Vol.47, No.3, Summer 1993, pp. 443-78 is cited in “Was Realism and State Really Sacked by Capitalism? Reconsidering Realism, Interdependence and Globalization”, Emre Bagec, METU Studies in Development, 30.12. 2003, pp. 142-143.

After World War I, the idealistic and unrealistic beliefs were collapsed and war was inevitable. Carr and other realists showed their reactions to World War II, and the unsuccessful initiatives between the two world wars. So the wars effected scholars and embodies the theory of realism. Morgenthau incorporated Weber's epistemology into realism.<sup>278</sup> Morgenthau also inspired from Hobbes description of human nature as the source of evil. He summarizes his realist approach with six principles. First principle says that objective laws guide politics. Secondly, he argues that interests are defined in terms of power and he believes that instead of focusing on motives and ideology, the emphasis should be on action and understanding action in terms of interest in power. In his view, all states try to maximize their power. In the third principle, national interest is defined with national survival and can be defined as power, which is universally true. Fourthly universal moral principles can not determine politics and there is a tension between them. In fifth principle, morality can not connect to the foreign policy which can be dangerous. Finally, sixth principle is about the autonomous nature of political sphere.<sup>279</sup>

In the first years of international relations discipline, Reinhold Neibuhr and Carr also stressed the meaning of power. Especially Morgenthau gives more importance to the concept of power and its usage and limits, in his book *Politics Among Nations*. According to him, power should be differentiated from effect and force. Regarding to realists, the key factor driving state behavior is power and the principal form of power is military power which is equivalent to force which can limit politics as a physical violence. According to Morgenthau, power is influenced by several factors such as population, geography, natural resources and industrial potential. Desire of having dominance and control over other countries effects the need to balance power. The international system is characterized by the balance of power, but it does not secure peace. Power struggles always trigger balance of power because every dominant power ceases one day to be dominant and existing ballast.<sup>280</sup> “Morgenthau understood balance

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<sup>278</sup> H. J. Morgenthau, **Uluslararası Politika**, (Translators) Baskın Oran and Ünsal Oskay, Ankara: Sevinç Yayınları, 1970, p.10.

<sup>279</sup> H.J. Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, Fifth Edition, Revised, New York: Alfred A.Knopt, 1978, pp. 4-15.

<sup>280</sup> F. Oktay Tanrısever, “Güç” in Atila Eralp (ed.), **Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar**, İletişim Yayınları, 2005, p. 57.

of power as a diplomatic practice and balance of power is one of the institutions of international society.”<sup>281</sup>

In the middle of 1970s, the international environment changed and the international order is created by the U.S in the post-war period. So realist paradigm as the dominant theory was criticized and reinterpreted.<sup>282</sup> Kenneth Waltz, as one of the most important scholar, wrote several books to acknowledge criticism of realism. He redefined the realist theory and is the founder of structural realism. It should be noted that, structural realism was named as ‘neorealism’ by the scholars.

Neorealism is inspired from classical realist assumptions. It is crucial to see the main differences and similarities between the two realist approaches. According to Jack Donelli, the main difference between realists and neorealists can be best explained by “their treatments of the national interest.”<sup>283</sup> “While Morgenthau saw national interest as objective and subject to discovery by realist analysis, the neorealist usually sees the national interest as subjective and given rather than a subject of inquiry or analysis.”<sup>284</sup>

The realists do not prefer to draw a clear distinction between the system of states and the nature of the sovereign units. “In Waltz’s thought the relationship between the units and the system remains a deeply contested theme in his thought.”<sup>285</sup> It can be put forward that Waltz was inspired from Rousseau’s theoretical assumptions especially about the ‘source of evil’. While realist’s father, Hobbes, believes that the ‘source of the evil’ is in human being, Rousseau believes it is product of society. Similarly, while realists find the reason of evil and war in nature of human being Waltz sees the international system as a reason of war.<sup>286</sup>

Actually, it could be said that all forms of realism have a number of characteristics that are common. Both realism and neorealism highlight the importance

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<sup>281</sup> Stefano Guzzini, **Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy**, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 46.

<sup>282</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Devlet” in Atila Eralp (ed.), **Devlet ve Ötesi**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005, p. 37.

<sup>283</sup> Jack Donelli, **Realism and International Relations**, Cambridge, and et. Al: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 31.

<sup>284</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>285</sup> Andrew Linklater, “Neorealism in Theory and Practice” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), **International Relations Theory Today**, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p.243

<sup>286</sup> Donelli, **op.cit.**, p. 38.

of the state and they both focus on political groups instead of the individual. For both approaches anarchy is important and the conflict is the natural state of affairs. While realism gives importance to the first image (human nature), for neorealism third image (anarchy) as the ordering principle is inevitable. On the other hand, both theories use balance of power concept and security dilemma.

Rosenau put forward the difference between traditional realists and neorealists as depending on “how much choice states have in balancing”.<sup>287</sup> Balance of power is related to the question of how much power states have. “The military and strategic effects of anarchy can be summed up in one phrase; the balance of power.”<sup>288</sup> For neorealists states may have too much power and survival is necessary for them.

For neorealists and realists, perception of balancing is different. Neorealists assume balances are naturally in the anarchic system. For realists, balances depend on the perceptions of threats. Also neorealists’ and realists’ views differ on the rationality of cooperation and on hegemonic leadership. Neorealists argue that cooperation is not rational, but if there is cooperation then it means that a dominant state sets the rules and imposes other states to implement them.<sup>289</sup> In neorealists’ view, the leadership of a state is a guarantee of cooperation.

To better understand the essence of Waltzian approach, his book *Man, State and War* (1959) should be taken into consideration to understand the third image perspective which is based on anarchic realm of world politics. These three images or categories explain the international politics. First one expounds international politics as driven by humanity. Second one explains it as being driven by the states, while the third image focused on the structure and systemic factors.<sup>290</sup> Waltz does not explain how states will respond to structural pressures and he assumes that structure does not

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<sup>287</sup> James N. Rosenau, Mary Durfee, **Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to An Incoherent World**, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 21

<sup>288</sup> Griffiths, **op.cit.**, p. 83

<sup>289</sup> Rosenau, and Durfee, **op.cit.**, pp. 21-26.

<sup>290</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, **Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis with a New Preface**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

determine state behavior.<sup>291</sup> Waltz tried to make a connection between theory and practice and in a way he theorized realism.

Waltz puts the 'system' in the center of his theory and redefined the concept of international system. "He took structure to represent the system level of analysis and defined structure in highly restrictive terms and by this method he could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes and effects down to the unit level."<sup>292</sup> His purpose was to improve system theory by showing how to differentiate obviously the system from the unit level.<sup>293</sup> "Waltz argued that the international system had dashed liberal and socialist hopes that the rise of legitimate regimes would bring an end to war".<sup>294</sup> He sorted international politics in a number of ways and put the causes of war and peace regarding to the level at which causes are located whether in man, state or state system.<sup>295</sup> According to Waltz, analysis at the national or individual level is reductionist but the theoretical analysis on the international level is systemic.<sup>296</sup>

Waltz defined a system as "composed of a structure and of interacting units"<sup>297</sup> and he adds that the purpose of a system theory "is to explain how structures affect systemic interactions and how interactions influence the structure."<sup>298</sup> Although every country has a different domestic and state structure, all states are affected in anarchic system of the international system in equal terms and therefore it assumes that all units have a different function in the international system. According to Griffiths, Waltz's theory "only explains the expected impact of structure on systemic behaviour, not policy-making processes, although he strictly makes a distinction between levels of analysis."<sup>299</sup> In a neorealist system, the interaction of states has been expounded as "the

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<sup>291</sup> Jonathen Monten, "Thucydides and Modern Realism", **International Studies Quarterly**, No.50, Georgetown University, 2006, pp. 15-16.

<sup>292</sup> Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, Richard Little, **The Logic of Anarchy, Neorealism to Structural Realism**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 24

<sup>293</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 22

<sup>294</sup> Linklater, "Neorealism in Theory and Practice", p. 242.

<sup>295</sup> Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.18.

<sup>296</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>297</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>298</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 79.

<sup>299</sup> Griffiths, **op.cit.**, p. 85.



billiard ball model.”<sup>300</sup> States are like balls crashing into each other. This model also shows that all units react equally to the other units.

For neorealists, bipolar system is more peaceful because there are two powerful states and there would be stability in the international system. Weak states are loyal to the powerful and dominant states. However, multipolar systems are much more complex and changeable and therefore it seems more dangerous and unpredictable than bipolarity. Waltz argues that bipolar system is more stable and it should be continue. During the Cold War, in the bipolar system, both Soviet Union and United States had a strong military capability and nuclear weapons which were accepted as a source of stability. Because of the importance of military power in neorealist theory also technology (especially military technology) plays an important role in this theory. On the other hand Waltz makes a prediction in the post-Cold war period and states that “that unipolarity will fade and be replaced by a more typical multipolarity.”<sup>301</sup>

Waltz defines the international political structure with a three tier definition. First one is ‘ordering principles’, which defines domestic political structures which its parts are related to each other. Fundamentally in neorealist theory the international system is anarchical and Waltz assumes that domestic systems are hierarchical where all different units organized by an authority.<sup>302</sup> “Hierarchy entails relations of super and subordination among a system’s part, and that imply their differentiation”<sup>303</sup> On the other side, Mearsheimer claims that “the opposite of anarchy is hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic politics.”<sup>304</sup> Second one is the ‘character of the units’, which defines differentiation of units and their functions. Although the states are the most important actors in the system they have never been the only actors in the international system. Waltz uses economic analogy to expound which units should be taken as parts in the system. He compares the structure of a market and the competing firms in the market, with the international system and states. In oligopolistic

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<sup>300</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, **International Security**, Vol.19, No.3, 1994/1995, p. 48.

<sup>301</sup> Kenneth, N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, **International Security**, Vol.25, No.1, 2000, p. 27.

<sup>302</sup> Griffiths, **op.cit.**,1992, p. 81

<sup>303</sup> Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, p. 93.

<sup>304</sup> Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism” in **op.cit.**, p. 73.

competition there are few firms dominating the system. However, he believes that this analogy is lacking the explanation of the impact of multinational corporations and non-state actors. Consequently, he assumes that states are the units and their interactions shape the international political structure. Third one is 'the distribution of capabilities' among its component parts. Capabilities of the units in a system are changeable and related to their power capacity. Also systems may change from anarchic to hierarchic and distribution of units' capabilities change.<sup>305</sup> "Within a system whose distribution of capabilities is stable, anarchy is a constant condition that explains continuity, not change."<sup>306</sup> According to Waltz, the second definition of this three-tier system becomes consonant and independent variable at the international level in time.<sup>307</sup>

Waltz emphasizes the concept of survival as a single motive and he claims that states are unitary actors seeking their survival. Interest of survival determines their actions.<sup>308</sup> Mearsheimer assumes the survival of states as a consequence of anarchy because all states are potential threats for each other. States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power in relation to other states.<sup>309</sup> While strong states survive, weak states can not survive in the structure. The structure influences and limits the state behaviour. Structure is not an agent and is based on state capabilities. States as agents constrain and limit each other. Waltz also focused on how the components of the structure shape state behaviour and what their consequences are in international politics.

Structural realism has the same meaning with neorealism. However Mearsheimer entitles it as structural realism while Waltz entitles his approach to realism as neorealism. Their main difference is that; while Mearsheimer is an offensive realist Waltz is a defensive realist. Waltzian neorealism differs from offensive realism with a question of why and how much power states desire. Mearsheimer finds a correlation between state's relative power and state's security. In other words, as the amount of state's relative power increases, the security increases at the same time and in parallel.

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<sup>305</sup> Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, pp. 93-98.

<sup>306</sup> Griffiths, **op.cit.**, p. 82.

<sup>307</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 81.

<sup>308</sup> Jack Doneli, **op.cit.**, pp. 52-53.

<sup>309</sup> John. J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Instability in Europe After in the Cold War", **International Security**, Vol. 15, No.1, Summer 1990, p.13.

Offensive realism suggests maximization of relative power which is different than what Waltz offers.<sup>310</sup> Offensive realism is active and argues that states seek to maximize their security by decreasing other's security level, however defensive realism is more static and does not try to change other's security status.

In realist approach, power is the main validity of international relations because it guarantees the state's survival. Mearsheimer assumes that states seek to maximize power and he also states that "power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls and the balance of power is mainly a function of tangible military assets that states possess."<sup>311</sup> In addition, Mearsheimer claims that, states have a second kind of power which is a latent power referring to the socio-economic indicators such as the population and wealth of the power.<sup>312</sup>

Regarding to defensive neorealism, states only pursue power as a means to achieve security and states balance their pursuit of power and security. Waltz assumes that bandwagon and balancing behavior are contradictory and states in anarchy balance rather than bandwagon, which is sensible behavior where loser states may also win and gain security. States should aim to maximize their power to provide security and they have to join the stronger side to be successful.<sup>313</sup>

"Structural realist theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime type, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers."<sup>314</sup> In other words, it does not matter whether the state is democratic or non-democratic. Therefore, the assessment of states with regarding to their democratic level is invalid in structural realism because states should assess with regarding their power.

Another important difference of neorealist theory from offensive realism is about Waltz distinction between reductionist theories and systemic theories. Waltz

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<sup>310</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, New York and London: W.W.Norton, 2001, pp. 17-25.

<sup>311</sup> Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism" in **op.cit.**, p. 72

<sup>312</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>313</sup> Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, p. 126.

<sup>314</sup> Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism" in **op.cit.**, p.72

claims that reductionist theories just focus on the parts of the system but not on the system itself.<sup>315</sup> Therefore, reductionism is not sufficient to expound state behaviors but systemic theories are able to explain state behavior when states in similar situations are taken.<sup>316</sup> According to Waltz, all the other theories are reductionist and in that vein realism seems to be reductionist.

With the immediate collapse of the Cold War, neorealists gave different reactions to the breakdown of the bipolar system and the balance of power. Waltz does not believe that the end of the bipolar system will transform the international system and Mearsheimer argued that the end of this system is a real concern. In the post-Cold War period, many criticisms to neorealism are appeared. Some scholars like Cox, Ruggie and Ashley argue that neorealism “a-historical, positivistic, deterministic, and highly parsimonious framework.”<sup>317</sup> John Ruggie believes that neorealism failed to estimate the “shift from medieval international society to the modern system of states.”<sup>318</sup> Fundamentally in neorealist approach, anarchy and states do not change but only great powers change as component. Another criticism to neorealism is about it missing the point on the cultural forces including beliefs and traditions. For instance, Linklater believes that neorealism neglects a possible fourth image, which can focus on the construction of community.<sup>319</sup>

In the book of *Neorealism and Its Critics*, there are two important criticisms about Waltz and one of them is related to this issue and says that neorealism is too static. Also because Waltz’s methodology is different than other scholars’ like Cox’s, the structuralist approach seems too narrow.<sup>320</sup> Morgenthau’s view on change was stricter than Waltz’s because his beliefs centralize on the constant nature of the human being. In his book *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz interprets ‘change’ as:

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<sup>315</sup> Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, p. 60.

<sup>316</sup> Linklater, **op.cit.**, p. 242.

<sup>317</sup> John Hobson, **The State and International Relations**, Cambridge University: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 30

<sup>318</sup> Linklater, “Neorealism in Theory and Practice”, p.254. Also see for details, John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Politic: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis” in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, pp. 131-157

<sup>319</sup> Linklater, **op.cit.**, p. 255.

<sup>320</sup> Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, Richard Little, p. 25

“A structural change is a revolution whether or not violently produced, and it is so because it gives rise to new expectation about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts and interaction of units whose placement in the system varies with changes in structure.”<sup>321</sup>

Neorealism in general does not deny ‘change’ but focuses on continuities. “Change within the international system has occurred because there have been alterations in the configuration of military power, but no change of its organizing principle has occurred nor has it ever seemed probable or imminent.”<sup>322</sup>

John Hobson argues that, Gilpin’s *War and Change in World Politics (1981)* is “a variation of Waltz’s systemic approach and while both Waltz and Gilpin take different routes, they end up squarely within the same structuralist problematic and accordingly deny the state any international agential power.”<sup>323</sup> Hobson supports his argument with the common points of Gilpin and Waltz. He puts forward that both scholars are opposite to the ideas of liberals and interdependence theorist’s arguments on the concept of ‘change’ and they both work on the continuity problem. Secondly, he believes that both of them do believe that ‘change’ could be within the surface problems like changes in the distribution of power or units but not the deep structure of the system. Thirdly both scholars are focus on the logic of anarchy. However Gilpin puts two intervening variables to the Waltz’s conceptual schema. In Waltz schema, basic causal variables are based on the logic of anarchy and power differentiation and the outcomes are the adaptive or nonadaptive states. Gilpin adds intervening variables into the schema which are “varying domestic agential power of the state and socio-economic fetters that could be economic sociological and technological.”<sup>324</sup>

Vasquez also criticize and argue, “the theory of the balance of power can give no clear answer to the question of when a war is likely to occur even at the level of generality to which Waltz adheres.”<sup>325</sup> “Waltz makes a major distinction between theory

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<sup>321</sup> Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, p.70.

<sup>322</sup> **Ibid.**, p.100.

<sup>323</sup> Hobson, **op.cit.**, pp. 30-31.

<sup>324</sup> **Ibid.**, pp. 30-32.

<sup>325</sup> John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Vs Progressive Research Programs”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.91, No.4, 1997, p. 907.

and reality arguing that reality must be greatly distorted by theory.”<sup>326</sup> Therefore, it shows the difference of his methodology.

In the post-Cold war period, Waltz had a tendency towards liberalism. According to Waltz, any unbalanced power is threat for other states and an unbalanced U.S. power is a matter of concern. Some writers claim that the current international scene is multipolar. But it is difficult to recognize EU as a power because EU member states are still considerably independent in security affairs and the EU does not meet great-power standards.

## **2. THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WITH REFERENCE TO NEOREALISM**

In this part, first neorealist theory would be adapted to European integration with considering the EU as a sub-system which has great powers and a bipolar system. The behaviours of the great actors for the system of the survival and the other great powers reactions in the international system are taken under consideration.

The neorealist framework of the system of the EU and the international system are figured out. The actors and the instruments of the ENP are focused in neorealist perspective to illuminate the field of activity of the policy.

### **2.1. Neorealist Approach to European Integration**

In this part, in the context of systemic view, EU's place in the international system will be figured out. The EU is considered as a sub-system and the dynamics of a 'system' is adapted to the system of EU. In neorealist terms cooperation or integration is a great concern. According to Simon Collard-Wexler cooperation is difficult because of

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<sup>326</sup> Sean Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism, A Genealogy of Power Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 127.

two reasons: “First, cooperation under anarchy is similar to a prisoner’s dilemma in which the dominant strategy will be to defect, making states worry about cheating; and second, concerns about the distribution of gains will hinder inter-state cooperation.”<sup>327</sup> In neorealism, the fundamental aim is protecting national interests and the survival of the state. Therefore, if there is an imbalance in the cooperation because of conflict of interests, it would trigger a loss of credibility and a conflict between the states. In that sense, the EU with its awkward structure seemed extremely difficult to analyze in neorealist terms. The EU has a unique and an ongoing structure. Therefore, in this thesis, under the light of neorealist approach, the EU will be taken as a sub-system in the international system. So the EU as a system will be evaluated in its own dynamics. When the EU is taken as a system then it is more functional to analyze it in neorealist term without concern. First, the place of the EU in the international system and then the sub-system of the EU will be focused.

After the end of the Second World War, in the bipolar world of Cold War, Europe was ruined and economically distorted. The U.S., as one of the poles of the system, helped Europe recovering by Marshall Plan to create a buffer zone for preventing the Soviet threat. In the post-war conditions, neorealists evaluate European integration process as an inter-state cooperation and believe that this integration process was a response to the dynamics of superpower contest. Also, “the European Coal and Steel Community, was predicated on creating economic interdependence based precisely on strategic goods that neorealists believe would be most likely to cause conflict.”<sup>328</sup> Therefore, in the context of European system, the interdependence on strategic goods creates a cooperation of interests of two crucial European countries France and Germany.

“In historical terms, contemporary European integration represents an intensification of interstate cooperation within the overall context of the Cold War.”<sup>329</sup> In the end of the Cold War, bipolar world ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the EC entered into a new phase in the multipolar world. According to neorealists,

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<sup>327</sup> Collard-Wexler, *op.cit.*, p. 400.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 406.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*

multipolarity always has a risk of triggering conflict rather than co-operation because of competition between the states. Just after the end of the superpower system, Mearsheimer was still defending the benefits of bipolar system for international politics and he was pessimist about European integration and skeptical about EC's potential about providing basis for peace in a multipolar Europe.<sup>330</sup> He believes that America's hegemonic position in NATO and its security umbrella was a guarantee for the cooperation among the European states.

During the Cold War period, with the security guarantee of U.S. and with the impetus of the cooperation France and Germany increased their power. Just after the end of the Cold War, attempts of the EC increased for the political union. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 changed the name of the EC as the EU and the creation of the Euro is initiated. The Monetary Union is established and the economic integration is succeeded.

Although there were many federal attempts inside the EU, the Union still did not go beyond being an economic cooperation. The national interests and hesitations are still on the foreground in the EU. According to Collard-Wexler, the EU meets the criteria which Waltz and many realists state as population and territory, military strength, resource capacity, economic capability. But he thinks that the EU does not meet the criteria of political competence<sup>331</sup> and states that "the EU could be an economic giant but remains as a political dwarf".<sup>332</sup> The rejection of the Constitution is one of the dramatic failures for the federal efforts of the EU. One of the other failures of the EU is the reactions of the EU states towards Iraq war in 2003. At that time, the European states divided into two blocks consisting of supporters of Iraq war who are pro-American states (especially Britain and CEE countries) and the opponents who are close to Franco-German axis (especially Belgium, Luxembourg).

In the context of system-actor, the question of 'actorness' in realism depends on how much military power the country has. However the military capability of a state

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<sup>330</sup> See Mearsheimer, *op.cit.*

<sup>331</sup> For the criteria of being a great power see; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.131.

<sup>332</sup> Collard-Wexler, *op.cit.*, p. 423. See also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.



is important in an anarchic world, in neorealist terms economy is also an indicator of power capabilities of the country. As it is mentioned before, Waltz also uses microeconomic analogy in his neorealist approach. Power is supported by economic and other resources although it is mostly depended on the military capability.

In this thesis, EU is taken as a sub-system and the global actorness of the EU is not an acceptable concept in neorealist analysis. Although the great powers in the system (Germany and France) render the EU system an economic power it is debatable to call the EU as a security actor or an international actor. Many realist scholars like Hedley Bull or Mearsheimer do not believe that the EU could be an actor in international affairs.<sup>333</sup> The actorness capacity of a unit is interpreted in the book of *The European Union as a Global Actor* as:

“The attribution of actorness does more than simply designate the units of a system. It implies an entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment, and indeed from its internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or purpose. Hence a minimal behavioral definition of an actor would be an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions, and thus engaging in some form of purposive action.”<sup>334</sup>

Autonomy concept is stated as one of the fundamental tests for the actorness of a unit by Hopkins and Mansbach. They stated “the ability to behave in ways that have consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted entirely by reference to other actors or authorities”.<sup>335</sup> Caporaso and Jupille believe that the EU should propose four criteria to have an actor capacity. According to them, “the EU needs recognition (outsiders’ acceptance of EU competence); authority (the legal competence to act); autonomy (distinctiveness and independence from other actors); and cohesion (the extent to which it acts in a unitary way externally).”<sup>336</sup> Especially the last criterion about the cohesion is debatable especially in terms of member states’ different reaction

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<sup>333</sup> See Hedley Bull, “Civillian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms in R. Tsoukalis (ed.), **The European Community: Past, Present and Future**, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983, pp. 149-170.

<sup>334</sup> Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, **The European Union as a Global Actor**, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 20.

<sup>335</sup> R.E. Hopkins, R.W. Mansbach, **Structure and Process in International Politics**, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 36.

<sup>336</sup> James A. CaPoraso, Joseph Jupille, “States, Agency and Rules: The EU in Global Environmental Politics”, in Carolyn Rhodes, **The European Union in the World Community**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 231-31.

towards CFSP and external relations. Consequently, in the EU, the nation-states' roles are still important and there is a gap between the strong and weak countries. Great powers are more dominant in foreign affairs decisions and external relations.

The European integration increases the power of great powers in the EU system. Waltz and other neorealists assume that the new era is U.S. unipolarity and other leading power in the system will balance against U.S. is the EU, especially Germany as a dominant power.

Many realist scholars, such as Mearsheimer believe that it is difficult to analyze EU's policies in the framework of neorealist approach. Especially EU's deep inter-state cooperation seems impossible for neorealists. They say, "in view of the attention to relative power that the anarchical system tends to force on states, it is possible but very difficult for them to engage in cooperation."<sup>337</sup> Waltz believes that state's fear of becoming dependent to the other states makes international cooperation difficult because in cooperation there is a possibility of inequality. In his view, in the EU there is an effort to curtail Germany's potential power and there is a balance of power inside the EU between the member states.<sup>338</sup> According to Rosamond, "a large proportion still regards the state as the primary actor in the development of European integration."<sup>339</sup> He claims that, one of the theoretical camps of the EU studies is state-centric approaches which acknowledge nation-states as the center of the EU.<sup>340</sup>

By considering these criticisms, in this part, it is decided to take the EU as a sub-system, so the balance of power of the EU states could be analyzed in the view of systemic analysis. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde take into consideration the international sub-systems as;

“...the meaning groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other. Sub-systems may be territorially

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<sup>337</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>338</sup> Glyn Morgan, **The Idea of a European Superstate**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 91.

<sup>339</sup> Ben Rosamond, **Theories of European Integration**, London: Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 130.

<sup>340</sup> Rosamond, **op.cit**, pp. 131,141.

coherent, in which case they are regional or not, in which case they are not regions but simply sub-systems.”<sup>341</sup>

In this part, it is argued that, the EU sub-system is a bipolar system and France and Germany are the two poles. The Franco-German reconciliation is always accepted as the fundamental motive of the EU. They are the great powers of the EU. Sometimes the balance of power changed and Germany has become more dominant in the system. For instance, during 1980s and 1990s the power of Germany has increased and became a major challenge to the balance of power in the European system.<sup>342</sup> Britain, as a Eurosceptic state, is out of the European system because it does not prefer to be in the Euroland. Britain chose to have an individual and independent stance in Europe because it doesn't prefer to lose its power in the Commonwealth. Also it is a close ally with the U.S. and the Iraq was a significant indicator which shows that interests of Britain are different than the EU interests which means that there are different state behaviours in the EU system. In the system, small and big powers cooperate and this is beneficial for both sides. Collard-Wexler supports the same idea and claims that “weak states cooperate because it gives them a voice within the EU and small states know that the EU will affect their independence, and they are better off getting a voice at the table than being excluded completely.”<sup>343</sup>

In neorealist perspective, anarchy-hierarchy relation in the context of power domination of big states is debatable. EU is a hybrid system that combines elements of anarchy with strong hierarchical institutions and there is a level in between these two levels. “The juridical predominance of the ECJ, the legislative hyperactivity of the European Commission, and the growing use of QMV in EU decision-making all suggest that the EU is becoming a zone of mixed hierarchy.”<sup>344</sup>

Enlargement is one of the fundamental policies of the EU. Rosecrance describes EU enlargement as a bandwagoning that is in contrast to balancing, and this is

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<sup>341</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 11.

<sup>342</sup> Rosamond, **op.cit.**, p. 134.

<sup>343</sup> Collard-Wexler, **op.cit.**, p. 414.

<sup>344</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 410.

also a challenge for neorealist perspective to the EU.<sup>345</sup> In this part of the thesis, it is proposed that states are in anarchy and the widening process of the EU is also related to the balance of power efforts of the Franco-German axis in the international system. The stabilization of the periphery is the main concern. For instance 2004 enlargement is a conclusion of security vacuum which has appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the CEE countries.

## 2.2. ENP in neorealist perspective

In this part, to analyze the ENP in neorealist perspective first the system will be taken under consideration and secondly the roles of the actors will be focused in the international system and in the sub-system of the EU. The systemic perspective is fundamental in neorealist analysis because the system is anarchic. Moreover, “the anarchical states system is ontologically superior to the units and is an autonomous and self-constituting realm, international politics never changes but has always been a realm of necessity and violence.”<sup>346</sup> After understanding actors of the system, the aims of the policy will be examined under the light of actors’ behaviours in the system.

In neorealist approach, the reasons are analyzed to answer, why and in which conditions the events are emerged. Doty explains why rationalist and constructivist approaches pose different questions to the analytical contexts. He states that constructivists pose ‘how-questions’ and rationalist approaches posing ‘why-questions’.<sup>347</sup> Therefore, rationalists assume the existence of the actors and focus on the behaviour of the actors. In that sense, neorealist analysis is not concerned about the process of the policy but it is concerned why it happened.

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<sup>345</sup> Richard Rosecrance, ‘The European Union: A New Type of International Actor?’, 1998 in J. Zielonka (ed.), **Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy**, p.16 cited in Collard-Wexler, p. 404.

<sup>346</sup> Hobson, **op.cit.**, p. 18.

<sup>347</sup> Roxanne Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines’, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.37, No.3, pp. 297-320.

The system is composed of units of interaction in an anarchic environment. As Mearsheimer defines the model as the billiardball model<sup>348</sup>, states are like balls crashing into each other and all units react equally to the other units. Actor's behaviours are shaped by the structure of the system.

According to Kaplan, system is the whole of interdependent variables and the similar behavioral order which diversify the variables from the external world point out the internal dependency.<sup>349</sup> There are systems and sub-systems which have the same properties. However sub-systems also diversify from the international system in some points. To see the general picture, first the international system should be focused and then the EU as a sub-system will be analyzed within that system.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. increased its power and the U.S. dominance in the system was perceived by Waltz and other neorealists as U.S. unipolarity. In the same period, Russia was weak and it took time to recover its economy and to improve relations with the newly independent post-communist countries. The American dominance was appreciable in these days and the unipolar system on the basis of American superpower was acceptable until September 11 terrorist attack in 2001. In the eve of the new century, the factuality of increasing the numbers of great powers in the system is obvious. Joseph Nye, asserts that the U.S. cannot be a lonely superpower in the new century and should give emphasis more on its civilian mission and cooperate with other powers.<sup>350</sup> Neorealists assumed that the EU- especially the German power- could balance U.S. power. The U.S. could decrease the negative impact of the multipolarity with supporting the EU system. But on the other side, the U.S. balanced the power in the system by using some economic measurements such as low currency policy to balance the European major powers.

Throughout 1990s the EU's major powers, Russia and China increased their economic power. Also, in the case of Russia, its dominance on energy politics is

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<sup>348</sup> Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", p. 48.

<sup>349</sup> Morton A. Kaplan, **System and Process in International Politics**, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1957, p.4.

<sup>350</sup> See Joseph S. Nye, **The Paradox of American Superpower: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone**, Oxford and et. al.: Oxford University Press, 2002.

increased. Therefore it could be said that today there are four major powers which are the U.S, Russia, China and the EU major powers (France and German core). “In a multipolar world great powers may either balance allying against the stronger side or the stronger side and bandwagon.”<sup>351</sup> Great powers can change as a component in an anarchic system but the states and the anarchical structure do not change in neorealist terms. In that context, the distribution of power could be occurred either in bipolar or multipolar systems. In multipolar system the numbers of poles are higher but the relationship between the weak and strong states are the same. Weak state is on the periphery of a major power and has closer relations. It could be argued that, the competition between the major powers is related to the capacity of gravity force of the major powers on the minor powers. The role of Germany in euro crises in Greece which is started in February 2010 is a good example showing Germany as one of the pole in the EU system. Germany threatened Greece to turn out it from Euroland and after negotiations between two countries Germany decided to give a conditional support to Greece.<sup>352</sup>

Potential powers could be seen as a threat for the bicentric structure of the EU system. For example, after the accession of Poland to the EU there were many debates on Poland’s place in the system. Poland is a middle-size country and when it is compared it is bigger than many EU member states. The population of the country is also higher than many other member states and Polish weight in the majority voting procedure created a hesitation for France and Germany. Also, the geo-strategic importance of Germany moved to Poland after its integration to the EU. Poland has an envisaged leadership potential and its potential in the region of Central and Eastern Europe is used by the EU system in the framework of EU’s interests. It can be put forward that Poland is used as a buffer zone between instable post-communist countries between the EU and Russia. Russia is a destabilizing factor for the system of EU. Especially the energy card of Russia is a threat for the survival of EU system and the frozen conflicts which are related to the energy security are also other threats for the

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<sup>351</sup> Waltz, *op.cit*, 1979, p. 126.

<sup>352</sup> CNN Türk, “Almanya’dan Yunanistan’a Şartlı Destek”, 27.04.2010. See at <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/ekonomi/dunya/04/27/almanyadan.yunanistana.sartli.destek/573772.0/index.html> [28.04.2010]

system. Therefore the system encouraged Poland to take a mission to improve relations with Ukraine and to solve the soft security problems in the border of the EU with Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad.

Apart from great powers in the international system and in the sub-system of the EU there are also regional powers which can affect systems' functions. For the system of the EU, as Beril Dedeoğlu mentions in her article;

“the challenges like environmental problems, energy issues, illegal immigration and common foreign and security policy issues which EU faces cannot be dealt with only by France and Germany's joint decisions and also the global system's main players, regional powers and the EU's neighbors must do their part.”<sup>353</sup>

For the system of EU, Turkey as a regional power, is one of the crucial neighbouring countries which is located in the periphery of the EU. Turkey is a middle-size country, has a big population and also has a geo-strategic importance as a bridge between east and west, and also is on the way of all vital energy routes. For that reason, Russia also seeks to improve cooperation with Turkey and Turkey has a possibility to be closer with Russia in the framework of its interests. Especially Turkey's potential leadership capacity in the Black Sea region is essential for the relations of Russia and the EU. Especially in the South Caucasia and Black Sea become strategic frontier in terms of energy and security issues and the great and the regional powers are facing these challenges. The system of the EU has to make secure Turkey and to attract it to the the gravity centre of the EU. Therefore Turkey became an official candidate in 1999 and because of that reason Turkey was not taken into the ENP area. Obviously, the ENP as a new policy can not be sufficient for attracting Turkey to the gravity force of the EU.

Actually to understand the gravity force of the EU and to see how it designed relations with the non-EU countries concentric circles could be used as a model. The origin of the idea of concentric circles is established by the former Commission President Jacques Delors. According to him, this model would let “the Community to proceed with economic and political integration in the core, while strengthening its

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<sup>353</sup> Beril Dedeoğlu, “Will the EU do whatever France and Germany ask?”, **Today's Zaman**, 21 October 2009.

relations with its European neighbours without offering them immediate membership of the EU.”<sup>354</sup> If it is adapted to the ENP, it could be said that Franco-German axis is the main core of the Union. The old members are in the inner circle and the new members could be in an outer circle. Candidates of the EU membership are located in the outer circle after the newest member states circle. Neighbourhood countries are in the next outer circle but there is another thin circle for the countries which are potential EU members and locate in between candidacy and neighbourhood countries. The outermost circle consists of the third countries.

From the point of EU view, the neighbourhood countries seem as a source of threat. Terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, illegal operations and organized crime are the threats the EU facing today. The countries in the periphery of the Union are made secure and they are integrated into the system by the EU with a diplomatic tool which is ENP, so the system becomes more functional.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner in her speech called the ENP as the EU’s “key geo-strategic project”.<sup>355</sup> Her description was about the property of this diplomatic tool. To assess the background of this statement, the definition of Jakub J. Grygiel on the term geostrategy may be efficient. According to him, geostrategy is “the geographic direction of a state’s foreign policy and it describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity.”<sup>356</sup> Geostrategy is a foreign policy, only implementing in the specific areas, if the state has limited resources or capability for a foreign policy in all directions.<sup>357</sup> Within the boundaries of geostrategy, the ENP also could be evaluated as a foreign policy for specific areas, because the scope of the ENP is for a specific area and thematic neighbourhood concept of the ENP is also another evidence for the geo-strategic perspective of the ENP. Grygiel takes Ottoman

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<sup>354</sup> Smith, *op.cit.*, 2005, p. 273.

<sup>355</sup> Speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Das ist ein geostrategisches Schlüsselprojekt für Europa”, **Europa als globaler Akteur**, 24.01.2005 in Ruth Seitz, “Exporting Stability or Importing Problems? The EU’s Security Policy Towards Its Near Abroad” in Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), **Europe’s Near Abroad**, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008, p. 103.

<sup>356</sup> Jakub J. Grygiel, **Great Powers and Geopolitical Change**, Jakub J. Grygiel. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 22.

<sup>357</sup> **Ibid.**



Empire as a case in his book to explain the concept of geostrategy. According to him, geo-strategy, “is shaped by the assumption that power deters and weakness is attracts and this explanation asserts that Ottoman geostrategy was directed toward weaker neighboring regions.”<sup>358</sup> Although the geostrategy of the EU cannot be compared with the Ottoman geostrategy, the method seems similar and Waldner’s expression of ENP as a geo-strategic project makes sense in these terms.

In neorealist terms, states are unitary actors seeking their survival. Interest of survival determines their actions in the anarchical environment to protect themselves from other states which are also potential threats. Therefore, weak states should maximize their power by cooperating with strong states. Referring to that argument, the best option for the EU’s neighbours is to cooperate to be able to survive. Every state as an agent constrains and limits each other. For instance, Armenia is an ENP country and seeks to balance its relations with Russia and the EU and also has to consider the roles of regional powers such as Turkey and Iran. Recently Turkey and Armenia agreed on a Protocol which shows how Armenia changes relations regarding to its interests with balancing relations with Russia and the EU. The major powers of EU and Russia are rivals and neighbourhood countries cooperate with major powers towards their own interest.

On the other side, the EU also has to protect interests of the EU member states’ interests to maximize the power of the Union. In neorealist terms, relative gains are the central concern of states. Through the ENP, the EU aims to promote asymmetric gains<sup>359</sup> to the neighbourhood countries. Eneko Landaburu states in his speech that, “by helping our neighbours, we help ourselves”.<sup>360</sup> His statement obviously shows the realist perspective of the EU in neighbourhood relations. The EU as an intergovernmental entity should establish regional security in the neighbourhood areas and stabilize them to maximize its power. In her speech Ferrero-Waldner stated that;

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<sup>358</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>359</sup> Collard-Wexler, **op.cit.**, p. 403.

<sup>360</sup> Speech by Eneko Landaburu, “From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are There Concrete Alternatives To Enlargement?”, **CEPS Conference “Revitalising Europe”**, Brussels, 23.01.2006, p.2.

“European Neighbourhood Policy is about responding to our citizens’ concerns for prosperity, security and stability, not with an abstract concept but with concrete, measurable results. And it is about helping our neighbours towards their own prosperity, security and stability, not by imposing reforms, but by supporting and encouraging reformers.”<sup>361</sup>

Consequently, it can be said that the main objectives of the system is the continuation of *status quo*, to survive and to be aware of threats. In that framework, first of all, the aims of the ENP should be to serve to the main objectives of the system. In that context, strategic objectives of the policy are crucial and support the fundamentals of the policy. In *Presidency Progress Report* about strategic objectives it is stated that;

“There is a clear geopolitical imperative to foster stability, the rule of law and human rights, better governance and economic modernization in our neighbourhood. This is critical to address our strategic objectives, to tackle the challenges we face and to reap the substantial benefits of closer political and economic ties.”<sup>362</sup>

The EU member states objected to be influential in the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and Arab-Israeli conflict to foster the stability in the neighbourhood and to improve regional security. As it is mentioned before, in the context of thematic neighbourhood concept of the EU, the energy security and frozen conflicts are the most essential issues to stabilize the neighbourhood relations.

“It is France that has most often taken the lead in European Initiatives in the Middle East. Since the late 1960s, France’s policy has been characterized by a clear pro-Arab stance and its priority has clearly been the promotion of closer relations with Arab states. French governments have promoted the EU’s international activity as a vehicle for those initiatives France alone cannot accomplish, and which are intended to supplement French efforts at a national level. The European presence is particularly useful in those areas of the world where French influence is weak and American hegemony is strong. France has sought to project a strong European political voice, to complement and amplify its national voice.”<sup>363</sup>

Besides the conflicts in Southern Caucasus and in Middle East, the Transnistria conflict and Western Sahara are also the other frozen conflicts which are serious concerns for the EU system.

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<sup>361</sup> Speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy”, **SPO6-226EN**, Stockholm, 7.3.2006. See, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/149&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [25.01.2010]

<sup>362</sup> General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), **Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy Presidency Progress Report**, 10874/07 DJ/gso 1, 18-19.06.2007, p.1.

<sup>363</sup> Costanza Musu, “The EU and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds), **European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System**, New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2007, p. 118.

In addition to the strategic objectives, the EU uses ENP as a tool for limiting future membership of the EU and to use coping with the several effects of enlargement of the EU. Romani Prodi declared in his speech in 2002: “we have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter.”<sup>364</sup> The EU should sustain the stability in its system and has to protect the balance of power in the system. Especially after 2004 enlargement the CEE countries included into the Union and the borders are changed. The borders of the EU have a high importance in the context of security concerns of the EU. There are serious security challenges such as illegal operations, smuggling, arms, drugs and human trafficking, especially with regard to the frontier countries in the East. In addition to the Eastern frontier neighbours, southern neighbourhood countries have also the same destabilizing potentials for the system with the same security challenges.

Germany with using its influence on Catholic community supports the accession of Croatia to the EU which is a closer country to Germany than the other Balkan countries. This is an evidence to show how Germany protects its place as a great power in the system and seeks to find new allies that sustain Germany’s place. Serbia and Macedonia are also the potential members and so they are in the membership perspective not in the neighbourhood perspective. These little countries which appeared after the Bosnian War, attempted to integrate into the EU. The EU has closer ties with these countries within the aim of filling the security vacuum in the Balkans.

The ENP is also a tool for strengthening links with energy suppliers. The ENP is like a buffer zone between Russia and the EU. The EU imports most of its need of gas from Russia and most of the neighbourhood countries are transit countries in that sense. Ukraine in the eastern European side of the EU and Georgia and Armenia (in the Caucasia) are transit countries. Azerbaijan is an energy supplier and has a different status for the energy relations. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is one of the vital energy projects and starts from Baku in Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijan is part of a project which seeks to build a pipeline to transfer Caspian oil to Europe and also is a part of

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<sup>364</sup> Romani Prodi, “A Wider Europe- A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, Sixth ECSA- World Conference, **Speech/02/619**, 5-6. 12. 2002, p.5.  
See, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/619&format=DOC&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [05.04.2010]

INOGATE energy programme. Azerbaijan is one of the key countries to diversify energy resources and to secure energy routes.

Referring to the argument that energy relations are related to the frozen conflicts which are main sources of threat for the EU system, resolving Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also crucial for securing energy routes. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates instability in the region and it is a big concern for the EU. Through energy Action Plan and with the implementation of the Energy Memoranda of Understanding with Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and strategic energy partnership with Algeria are significant attempts of the EU for improving EU energy relations with the neighbourhood countries.<sup>365</sup> In the context of Maghreb countries it should be noted that EU imports some oil and gas from these countries for its member states and Western Sahara conflict is related with this area and creates conflict in the region and for the reason of securing energy this conflict also is taken under consideration.

Energy relations and energy security are one of the top priority issues for EU's relations with Russia because the EU imports most of the gas and oil from Russia. Russia as one of the great powers in the international system became one of the largest neighbours of the EU after 2004 enlargement and obviously declared its stance on not being a part of the EU. Russia is a significant challenger for the EU system which has potential to destabilize the system. In addition, the post-communist Eastern European countries locating between the EU and Russia are mostly dependent on Russia in terms of energy. The energy dependency also increases the influence of Russian power on these states. As regarding to the survival of the system, the EU is agreed on four 'Common Spaces' with Russia as agreed at St Petersburg Summit of May 2003. With this agreement the EU objected to keep the *status quo* with Russia and to protect the system from destabilized factors.

In the *Progress Report* it is stated, "strengthened cooperation with 'the neighbours of our neighbours', e.g. on energy, transport, the fight against illegal

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<sup>365</sup> General Affairs and External Relations Council, "Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy Presidency Progress Report", **1084/07/DJ/gso 1 Annex DG E VI**, 18-19.06.2007, p. 3. See at [http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/download\\_docs/Juni/0628ENP/ENP\\_en07.pdf](http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/download_docs/Juni/0628ENP/ENP_en07.pdf) [10.04.2010]

immigration”<sup>366</sup>. In other words, the EU system seeks to strengthen the area of influence to the outer circle of the ENP area. This includes Russia, Turkey, Middle Eastern countries, Central Asian countries and other African and Arabic countries which are neighbours of EU’s neighbours. The instability in the outer neighbourhood circle can create a butterfly effect and destabilize the inner circle. In that context, for the survival of the system all destabilizing factors should be stabilized.

### **3. FIELD OF ACTIVITY**

ENP’s field of activity will be analyzed in neorealist perspective with considering actors and interests of the ENP. Why-questions will be asked for this analysis. Therefore, the analysis will be based on cause and effect relations. Widening and energy relations are used as two cases and variables at the same time, to figure out neorealist aims which are lying behind the ENP policy.

The system of the EU seeks to maximize its power in the Black Sea region. The most significant reason is to control the energy routes and to balance the power of Russia in the region. The variables of widening and energy relations are part of this objective.

The Wider Black Sea region, from Caucasia to Southern Balkans is one of the most geo-strategic regions for the EU. The region is also a backdoor of Middle East, Caspian Sea and Central Asia where most of the energy resources are located and it has an access to Mediterranean Sea and Balkans. Therefore, for the great powers of the EU, controlling this region means controlling the most important energy routes. The EU is dependent on Russia in energy terms and Russia maximizes its power. In that context, EU’s main interest is to balance Russian power for the continuation of the EU system.

The ENP is founded on the main interests of the EU, and widening is also used as a tool to succeed these interests in the field of activity. It is argued that, widening and

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<sup>366</sup> **Ibid**, p. 12.

the ENP are interrelated processes and are used for the EU's interests in maximizing power in its neighbourhood.

### 3.1. Widening of the EU

In this part, the neorealist aims and interests of the EU will be examined with different cases from wider Black Sea and Mediterranean. Also the relationship between the widening process and the ENP will be analyzed. In addition, it is objected to figure out if the widening process is complementary to the ENP or the ENP is a complementary part of widening process. The Commissioner of the ENP, Benita-Ferrero Waldner is replaced with Stefan Fule and the name of the commissioner is shifted as 'EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy' in February 2010. Also under the new set up Lisbon Treaty, the high representative for foreign policy is established and Catherine Ashton is appointed as the high representative. Ashton is also Commission Vice President which means that "she has double-hatted role as High Representative and Commission Vice President with regard to the one policy that should be the prime example of combining supranational with intergovernmental instruments."<sup>367</sup>

This change could also be evaluated as a consequence of the dilemma between widening and the ENP. It is argued that both of them serve to the fundamental objectives of the great powers of the EU which are the continuation of *status quo*, the aim of survival and the perception of threat. Also it could be argued that the EU use widening and the ENP in relation with energy politics. The change of the Commissioner could give a hope to ENP partners about EU membership in the future but at the same time it could create a concern for the EU candidates to lose their status. According to Loost Lagendijk, this change could create a concern for Turkey. The EU could make a plan for changing the membership status of Turkey by this shift and also by this

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<sup>367</sup> Valentin Misteli, "A Shaky Start for the ENP", **ISN Security Watch**, 19.12.2009. See <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=110482>

institutional change Turkey will be considered by the same EU experts who will work on ENP partners such as Syria and Armenia.<sup>368</sup>

The EU as a sub-system has some instruments to survive in the international system and to maximize its power. Widening process of the EU has dual consequences. On the one side, it brings negative impacts and threats for the system of the EU and on the other side it takes some positive impacts and increases the powers of the EU great powers. Territorial expansion is a way of increasing power but at the same time widening process changes the borders of the EU. While it creates geopolitical advantages, it also creates new sources of threats. It could be argued that widening in 2004, is the most significant process which shows these dual consequences.

After the dissolution of Soviet Union, a security vacuum has appeared in the post-communist space. Especially the Central and Eastern European countries which are bordering the EU could be the main source of threat. Especially Germany, since Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* stance in 1960s, Germany geo-strategically gives emphasis to the relations with the Eastern neighbourhood countries. In 2004, eight post-communist countries which are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, included into the EU. This was an evidence of EU's geo-strategic concerns and implications on widening decisions. The accession of these countries brought several security concerns on the new borders and also Russia changed its foreign policy in a more assertive way as a reaction to these widening processes. Russia perceives post-communist countries as a backyard of Russia. Especially the integration of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic into the EU changed the geo-strategic line from CEE countries to the Eastern European countries for both Russia and for the EU great powers.

In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and this was also another evidence for the geopolitical implications of the EU. Although Bulgaria and Romania have worse economic indicators with low GDP rates and high level of corruption they were integrated into the EU. In 1999, in Helsinki Summit the EU gave a candidacy

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<sup>368</sup> Loost Lagendijk, "Olli Rehn Gitti, Stefan Füle Geldi", **Radikal**, 02.12.2009.  
See <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazarYazisi&ArticleID=967103>

status to Turkey and just after the widening process in May 2004, in December of the same year, the EU decided to initiate negotiations with Turkey in 2005. This was a carrot not to lose Turkey and to diminish Turkish reactions to these widening processes. However, the negotiations were defined as ‘open-ended’ by which means that the end of the negotiations does not guarantee membership.<sup>369</sup> On the one side, Turkey is a regional actor in the Black Sea region and a crucial transit country between Europe and Asia. On the other side, Turkey is an agricultural country with a high population, high level of unemployment and also with huge cultural diversifications. The half of the EU’s budget is for agricultural expenditures and the EU member states, especially France and Germany do not believe that the EU could overcome Turkey’s agricultural expenditures. In that sense, in the negotiation process, political conditionality is used by the EU system, as an effective leverage for increasing the influence of the EU on Turkey. Thus, Turkey would not destabilize the system of the EU and would not collapse the bipolar system with changing the balance of power.

In the aftermath of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession in 2007, EU frontiers reached for the first time to the Black Sea region and this triggered EU’s interests in the region. This focus is forced by the nature of the region. Throughout the history, ‘reaching to warm seas’ has been a motto for major powers which have coasts nearby the inner seas. Black Sea has a connection with the Mediterranean Sea through Bosphorus and also this connection enriches the meaning of the Bosphorus where it places. Therefore; historically, the competition to dominate Black Sea stood at the center policy pillar of the regional big powers. Through these accounts of past, the region has been dominated for centuries only by big powers.

Since the Black Sea region is a transit way for the energy resources, it is home for instability and conflicts. The EU had to reconsider about its neighbours and the rest of the post-communist space is included into the ENP. ENP is also a diplomatic tool, however it could be said that the effectiveness of the ENP is lesser than the political conditionality tool. In the context of the geo-strategic importance of the Black Sea and

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<sup>369</sup> See Olli Rehn, “Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU”, **Speech/06/747**, Helsinki, 27.11.2006. See also, Honor Mahony, “Merkel Says EU-Turkey Talks Are ‘Open-Ended’”, **EUObserver**, 30.03.2010. See <http://euobserver.com/9/29792> [05.04.2010]



the need of finding alternative energy routes, the EU initiated Black Sea Synergy and focused on the Black Sea dimension under the framework of ENP. One of the objectives of the EU great powers is to make Black Sea into an 'EU lake' and to be the major power in the region. In that sense, the question of 'if the widening a complementary part of the ENP or *vice versa*', is came into fore.

The Black Sea dimension of the EU does not cover only littoral states but also includes Balkan countries. Before the establishment of Black Sea Synergy, the BSEC is and crucial initiative in the region. It is established in 1992 by Turkish initiative with eleven countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Macedonia and Serbia). This re-structuring on a new legal basis generated operational mechanisms for BSEC. These new mechanisms became operational in May 1999. Turkey also aims to be a regional power in the Black Sea and to use its advantages towards the EU and Russia. In 1998, with the consensus reached at Yalta, BSEC re-designed as a full-fledged regional organization.

The cooperation through BSEC served well in several aspects. First one is environmental issues. Black Sea Ecological Program became operational to reach lower levels of pollution in the Black Sea. Second successful aspect is measures taken against organized crime. The Cooperation in Combating Crime Declaration (1998) constituting the basis for cooperation on this question defined investigation, disclosure, prevention of acts of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, trafficking drugs and weapons as priorities. Third aspect is cooperation in building communications substructure.<sup>370</sup> In the functioning of the organization and its norm making processes Turkey plays a leading role and seeks to sustain increased regional cooperation. This initiative of Turkey was based on the fact that Ankara considered itself as a regional leader after the end of the Cold War. Being at the intersection point of regions –Middle East, Southeastern Europe, Black Sea, Caspian Region- Turkey continues to claim special status with historical, economic and political access to the neighbouring regions. Being a member of BSEC, Turkey put itself as the critical and required actor in bringing stability to the region.

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<sup>370</sup> Oleksandr Pavliuk, Ivanna Klympush Tsintsadze (eds.), **The Black Sea Region, Cooperation and Security Building**, EastWest Institute/M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p. 30.

Turkey's prolonging EU membership process turns BSEC platform for Turkey to contribute more into the regional norm creation process.<sup>371</sup>

Initially BSEC was not constructed as an alternative regional project to replace the Euro-Atlantic organizations. It was seen as a complementary organization to support the integration of the region with the rest of the continent and the World. This vision so far limited the horizons of the BSEC countries. However, BSEC is likely to appear as leverage for full integration of region to the world based on the norm construction process of its own.

After the establishment of BSEC, other initiatives and cooperations emerged in the region. Black Sea Regional Energy Centre (BSREC) is established by the EU Commission in February 1995.<sup>372</sup> The center's main aim is to develop cooperation in the energy field between Black Sea region countries and the EU. In addition to this cooperation, in 2001, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia decided to establish a multinational naval force, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) to cooperate for security and stability in the Black Sea which will also support strengthening good neighbourly relations. There is also UNESCO initiative and Black Sea Regional Tolerance Network which was established in 1996 as a non-governmental group.<sup>373</sup> In November 2004, Baku Initiative<sup>374</sup> was established apart from BSERC for strengthening the energy relations of the EU with the energy market in the region. Also energy diversification and supplying energy security are the other aims of these initiatives.

Russia does not approve initiatives which could be alternative to BSEC so the regional initiatives of the EU could not take the support of Russia. On the other side, Turkey also wants to strengthen the BSEC which was a Turkish initiative. So Turkey

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<sup>371</sup> Aybak even brings forward Turkish initiative to establish a Black Sea Cooperation framework in the very beginning of 1990's, as an alternative initiative to stagnating EU prospects of Turkey. Turkey applied for EC membership in 1987 and received a negative response in 1989 with the declared Avis. See for the argumentation of Turkish attitude, Tunc Aybak, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>372</sup> Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in 1995, Macedonia signed in 1999, and Serbia-Montenegro signed in 2001.

<sup>373</sup> Aydın, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>374</sup> The participants of the Baku Initiative are; the European Commission and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, Iran (observer), Russian Federation (observer).

has to balance its relations with the EU and also with Russia and it has to protect its leadership potential in the region. Therefore, Turkey is quite concerned about the EU's initiatives such as Black Sea Synergy and Black Sea Euroregion. Russia does not want to be entirely integrated to the Euro-Atlantic cooperations in the region. For instance, during the Russian intervention to Georgia, NATO troops passed through the Black Sea. Therefore, Russia is concerning to lose its area of influence in the region.<sup>375</sup>

The EU uses the widening process for strengthen the effectiveness of the ENP. EU officially accepted Croatia and Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and considers the rest of the Balkan countries (Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) as potential candidates. In the case of Kosovo, it should be noted that some of the EU member states did not recognize the state (Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Spain, Romania, and Cyprus) and there is still no international agreement for Kosovo.

The EU countries agreed on not to require visa for Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia in December 2009, but on the other side for Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo there is still a visa requirement. For the first look, it could be argued that the EU system differentiated Muslim and Christian Balkan countries because of the fear of Islamist terrorism. Moreover, there are other geo-strategic objectives behind this division between these Balkan countries. It could be argued that the closer countries to the Black Sea region are preferred to give visa-free pass to use these countries more effective in the sense of energy relations. On the 6<sup>th</sup> of January 2009 Russia stopped supplying gas to Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia<sup>376</sup> in the aftermath of the Ukrainian gas dispute. This also shows that Serbia and Croatia are exposed to the Russian assertive pipeline politics in first place and could explain the reason behind the privileges which are given to these countries. On the other side, as it is mentioned above there is still no consensus on Kosovo. It should be also noted that the independence of Kosovo changes the dynamics in international politics. Russia was opposed to the

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<sup>375</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>376</sup> **Euractive**, "Pipeline Politics? Russia and the EU's Battle for Energy", 20.09.2009. (updated 29 January 2010).  
See, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/pipeline-politics-russia-eu-battle-energy/article-177579>  
[11.04.2010]

detachment of Kosovo because Serbia is a good ally of Russia. In addition, Russia interpreted the recognition of Kosovo as a victory of the other great powers in the system. Russia gave a big reaction about Kosovo and recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a confrontation to the EU great powers and the U.S. The EU considers Kosovo in the context of integrating Balkans to the EU. In May 2010, Stefan Füle states in his speech that, "it is in the interest of all of us to make sure Kosovo does not fall behind the rest of the region."<sup>377</sup> In other words, Kosovo will probably be taken into the EU membership status in the near future.

The chess play on ethnic conflicts can be evaluated as rivalry between global actors to be a global power. Georgia as one of the regional powers in the Black Sea region is a pro-western country. During the Rose Revolution Georgia was supported by the western institutions therefore the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was also Russian response to the pro-Western behaviours of the Georgian state. These weak and newly independent states could be evaluated as Russia's periphery where it can maneuver easily. Mr. Medvedev said that, "relations with the West were deteriorating sharply and that a new Cold War could not be excluded, but that Russia did not want one and there are no winners in a Cold War."<sup>378</sup> With this statement the will of Russia to be a global power is obvious. The U.S. warned Russia not to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia during Bush government. After the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, the idea of integrating Kosovo to NATO created a negative reaction in Russia. Similarly, Russian attempt on recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia was not welcomed by the U.S., therefore Russia suspended common operations with NATO.<sup>379</sup>

The initiation of 'Mediterranean Union' on 13 July 2008 by French President Nicolas Sarkozy can be taken as a good example for proving EU's major actor's power maximization in another geo-strategic region. This Mediterranean Union would be an alternative community and also would have its own council. At that point one of the main dilemmas is would be whether this community can independent from the EU or is

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<sup>377</sup> **AFP**, "EU Promises to Help Keep Kosovo from Falling Behind", Kosovo, 7.05.2010.

<sup>378</sup> **BBC News**, "Russia Recognises Georgian Rebels", 26.08.2008.

<sup>379</sup> **BİA Press**, "Rusya, Güney Osetya ve Abhazya'nın Bağımsızlığını Resmen Tanıdı", 26.08.2008.

it just a *décor* for creating an alternative to hamper Turkish EU membership and also for creating an alternative Middle East project? Middle East is also another significant region for the energy relations and there are some similarities between EU's policies towards Black Sea region and Mediterranean region. Both of the regions are significant in terms of energy relations and Turkey is a regional actor in both cases. Sarkozy pointed out that, "Turkey could be a backbone of a Mediterranean Union"<sup>380</sup> and this statement created some questions for Turkey. If this union would be an alternative to the EU membership, Turkey would definitely not accept to be a backbone of such a union which has 43 members. EU leaders modified the idea of Mediterranean Union to avoid of Turkish hesitation and gave a guarantee to Turkey that this union is not related to Turkish membership. Turkey is one of the most important countries in the Mediterranean region with its long coast and geo-strategic position between Europe and Middle East. Therefore, Turkey has a positive stance on cooperation in Mediterranean and accepted to be a part of the Mediterranean Union.<sup>381</sup> By the plan of the Mediterranean Union, the EU would stabilize Turkey in the periphery but not include it into the EU. Thus a bipolar structure of the EU system would not collapse with Turkish accession to the system. Turkey is perceived as a threat for the EU system, because Turkey with its high population and the geographical properties could change the balance of power in the sub-system.

Sarkozy's initiation was a failure because Mediterranean Union is accepted as a continuation of Barcelona but not as an independent Community. It has been perceived as a threat to European integration process and its pre-federal structure. "Chancellor Angela Merkel has also claimed that France's idea of a Mediterranean Union threatens the EU and its institutions."<sup>382</sup> Because Merkel was arguing that the work-sharing between Northern and Southern Europe would hamper the process of European integration.<sup>383</sup> On the other side, French Foreign affairs minister Bernard

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<sup>380</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy, "Turkey could be the backbone of a Mediterranean Union", **Turkish Press Review**, 08.02.2007.

See <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2007/02/07x02x08.htm> [06.03.2010]

<sup>381</sup> **Euractive**, "Akdeniz Birliđi'nde Anlařtılar", 05.03.2008.

<sup>382</sup> Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "The Mediterranean Union: Dividing the Middle East and North Africa", Centre for Research on Globalization, 10.02.2008.

See <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6879> [16.05.2009]

<sup>383</sup> Didier Billion, "Akdeniz Birliđi Projesi, AB'ye yeni sıkıntılar getirecek", **Zaman**, 28.03.2008.

Koucher stated that the Mediterranean project is stuck because of the Israel- Palestinian conflict. The Arab members of the union took a decision to protest the meeting to react Israel's after Israel attack to Gaza.<sup>384</sup> The project of Mediterranean Union has been revised and the project is accepted after all these discussions. The Union will use EU funds with the consensus of all EU member-states. Also in contrary to Sarkozy, all EU member-states could be a part of this project so the project would not be limited with Mediterranean countries in Europe.<sup>385</sup>

This project can be evaluated as a competition of two great powers-France and Germany- in the EU. Both France and Germany try to strength and enlarge their area of influence in their periphery. France enlarges its influence in ex-colonial periphery and Germany seeks to be effective in the Central and Eastern European and Baltic area. "Sarkozy tried to be the Robert Schuman of the Mediterranean Union and to make France key player in the Mediterranean and Middle East region."<sup>386</sup> In the bipolar system of the EU there is a balance of power. A great power does not let the other great power to be stronger.

While the case of wider Black Sea region is related to the rivalry in the international system, the case of Mediterranean Union mostly points out the rivalry both in the sub-system and in the international system.

### 3.2. Energy Relations

The system is composed of a structure and the interactions of the international and regional actors. In multipolar system, great powers are interacting on the basis of power maximization and survival as a consequence of the anarchy in the system. The 'energy' factor is a critical variable to observe the efforts of the states to survive and the power struggle between the great powers. Material conditions show the capacity of powers of the states. Russia is one of the biggest suppliers in the system and use the

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<sup>384</sup> Ali İhsan Aydın, "Sarkozy'nin Akdeniz Birliği Projesi Öldü", **Zaman**, 21.05.2009.

<sup>385</sup> **Zaman**, "Akdeniz Birliği Brüksel'de Rengini Kaybetti", 15.03.2008.

<sup>386</sup> Ali İhsan Aydın, **op.cit.**

energy capacity as a foreign policy tool to keep its *status quo* and stabilize the threats against its system.

According to Hedley Bull, there are many interrelated chessboards in the system. In every international political move, the major players could change.<sup>387</sup> During the Cold War, “the U.S and the Soviet Union were the major players on the nuclear deterrence chessboard, but in the areas of trade and investment Japan replaced the Soviet Union.”<sup>388</sup> In that sense, in the context of energy relations of the EU system besides the great powers, Turkey and Iran are also influential as regional powers.

In neorealist perspective, in the context of understanding the reason behind the genesis of ENP, it could be argued that an energy relation is a vital variable for the evaluation of the policy. Energy resources could be categorized as the primary and the secondary resources. Primary resources are fossil fuels, which are natural gas, oil and coal and these resources are related to the external dependency of the country to the other countries which have these energy resources. Secondary resources are nuclear, hydro, wind, solar and bio-fossil resources and these resources are related to the material capacity of the country which could decrease the level of dependency. Thus, in the context of energy relations with the ENP partners, the natural gas and oil, as the crucial primary resources will be considered as the main parameters to analyze the energy game in the international system and its effect on the EU system. Some of the secondary resources, such as nuclear energy in Ukraine, are considered as the other variables which could have an impact on the energy dependency and relations of the country.

The scope of the policy from Northern Africa to the Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle East covers a broad area where a number of energy routes exist. Russia is an influential power in the Eastern Europe, Black Sea and

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<sup>387</sup> See Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffmann, Andrew Hurrell, **The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

<sup>388</sup> Richard Little, “The Balance of Power and Great Power Management” in Richard Little, John Williams, **The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.102.

Caucasus. In this part, firstly the Russian influence on the post-communist ENP partners and the reactions of the EU system will be analyzed.

Ukraine and Belarus are the most important transit countries for the energy relations of Russia and Europe because “80% of Russian gas which goes to Europe pass through Ukraine and 20% of it pass through Belarus”.<sup>389</sup> Therefore; Ukraine as a backyard of Russia will be taken under consideration and its role in the energy game will be focused to analyze the dynamics of ENP.

In the framework of the ENP, energy issues are related to the frozen conflicts implicitly. If the energy dialogue could be provided in these regions, then it would support conflict resolution efforts and peace building activities. In neorealist analysis, the reasons of the conflicts could be attributed to the energy conflicts between the states, and this is an assumption about the reason of the conflicts and questioning why the EU concerns on the conflicts nearby the energy routes. The roles of the regional and major powers should also be considered in the sense of their role on the conflicts. In the international system, some significant actors show similar state behaviours and they repeat these behaviours. These are related to the interests and the functions of these units. In the context of energy relations, the role of Russia and the functions would be same and therefore it could be argued that its relations with Ukraine would probably in a cyclical trend.

### **3.2.1.Russia**

The EU imports more than half of its energy need and is highly dependent on Russia in terms of energy relations. Therefore, the EU states seek to find alternative energy routs from Caucasia to get rid of its import dependency from Russia. However there is not a unique energy policy of the EU. Thus, it could be argued that energy relations of the EU is a good example to explain the EU as a sub-system that the member states’ behaviours could be differentiated as regarding to the national interests. Moreover the post-communist ENP partner states are locating in the ‘grey area’

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<sup>389</sup> İlyas Kamalov, **Moskova’nın Rövanşı: Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası**, İstanbul: Yeditepe Press, January 2008, p.288



between the system of the EU and Russia. Therefore, their relations with their peripheries could be interpreted over energy relations.

Russian relations with its periphery which is also the area of post-communist ENP countries, is related to the Eurasianist perspective of Russia. Russian new Eurasian perspective is based on the classical Eurasianist views which are initiated in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century arisen from the discussions on Russian identity. This approach is an alternative approach to the Euro-centric views and put Russia between Europe and Asia. New Eurasianism started with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the period of Viktor Chernomyrdin government Eurasianist policies started to be effective with the near abroad policies.<sup>390</sup> According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “accounting for 75 percent of the world's population, 60 percent of its output, and 75 percent of its energy resources, Eurasia's potential power overshadows even America's.”<sup>391</sup> Eurasia covers all the countries with high populations like India, China, Iran and also all the energy resources in the Middle East and Caspian region. The geo-strategic paradigm of Russia set the state behaviours of Russia in the context of its relations with post-communist countries.

In the period of Vladimir Putin, Eurasianist policies became more of an issue. After 9/11 event Russia had a closer and softer relations with NATO and the EU. Terrorism became big threat for the major powers and Russia had to cooperate with the Western countries to be able to cope with this threat. Chechens are also Muslim group in Russia and Chechen conflict is the Achilles heel of Russia. In 1994, Russia invaded Chechnya in the sense of Russian near abroad policy to control the pipeline which is started from Baku and pass through Grozny (Chechnya) and end in Novorossiysk.<sup>392</sup>

Putin's pipeline diplomacy aimed to maximize Russian influence on the near abroad countries. In 2005 winter, Russia increased the price of the gas for the eastern

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<sup>390</sup> Erhan Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış, Söylemler , Arayışlar ve Fırsatlar”, in Erhan Büyükakıncı (ed.), **Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna**, Ankara: Phoenix Press, 2004, pp. 148-149.

<sup>391</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia”, **Foreign Affairs**, September/October 1997.

<sup>392</sup> Ariel Cohen, “The New ‘Great Game’: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, **The Heritage Foundation**, 25.01.1996. See <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1996/01/BG1065nbsp-The-New-Great-Game> [15.04.2010]

European countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and for Georgia. This was an evidence how Russia use its energy card to maximize its power. After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine's pro-European stance triggered Putin to lead assertive policies. The EU proposed Russia to ratify the *European Energy Charter* to ensure the energy supply, however Russia did not accept to ratify it.

After Putin, Medvedev took the power in May 2008 and two months later in August 2008 Georgian-Russian war happened. Medvedev accused US to provoke the war. It could be said that Medvedev have a more liberal stance rather than Putin. One of his significant objective is to create a Russian monopoly on gas sector as an alternative to OPEC.<sup>393</sup> Medvedev run Gazprom and as a conclusion of his successful works in Gazprom, Putin assigned him as the Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister. Besides Gazprom, Rosneft is the other energy giant in Russia which has close ties to the government and with Putin himself.<sup>394</sup>

'Backyard' of Russia is essential for Russian energy diplomacy. The backyard of Russia is the non EU post-communist countries which are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Also these countries are the ENP partner states. It could be argued that, the great power game is played on this area. The EU's 'Eastern Partnership Initiative' in the framework of the ENP is a part of this game.<sup>395</sup> The EU created this new initiative to be able to focus on these countries and increase the influence of the EU with more intensive bilateral and multilateral frameworks. All of these countries have a big role in the energy relations of Russia and the EU. Former European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner states the different levels that EPI operates and also calls the initiative as one of the most ambitious regional project EU ever had:

"On energy alone, it offers: first, tailor-made bilateral support to boost each country's own energy security, in full recognition that the needs of countries dependent on

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<sup>393</sup> **Türkiye Newsweek**, "Medvedev Doktrini", 01.12.2008.

See <http://www.newsweekturkiye.com/haberler/detay/22233/Medvedev-doktrini> [16.04.2010]

<sup>394</sup> Vince L. Morelli, "The European Union's Energy Security Challenges", **CRS Report for Congress**, 11.09.2006, p.11. See <http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33636.pdf> [16.04.2010]

<sup>395</sup> See **Euractive**, "EU launches Eastern plan in Russia's backyard", 08.05.2009.

See <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-launches-eastern-plan-russia-backyard/article-182123> [17.04.2010]

Russian gas like Armenia and Moldova, transit countries like Ukraine and Georgia, and suppliers such as Azerbaijan – will differ. Second, it proposes multilateral cooperation to improve early warning and crisis preparedness. Third, it suggests flagship initiatives to help diversify the EU's sources of energy supply and transit and promote green energy.”<sup>396</sup>

Ukraine and Belarus are the two crucial transit countries and Russia play the energy game with the EU through these countries in the Eastern Europe. As regarding to the East European Gas Analysis’ map, the gas pipelines via Ukraine are as in the listed below (with the destination countries);

- “Orenburg-Western border (Uzhgorod) (Slovakia, Czech, Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy)
- Urengoy-Uzhgorod (Slovakia, Czech, Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy)
- Yamburg-Western border (Uzhgorod) (Slovakia, Czech, Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy)
- Dolina-Uzhgorod (Slovakia, Czech, Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy)
- Komarno-Drozdowichi (Poland)
- Uzhgorod-Beregovo (Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia)
- Hust - Satu-Mare (Romania)
- Ananyev-Tiraspol-Izmail & Shebelinka-Izmail (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia).”<sup>397</sup>

As referring to the map in Appendix 6 the Russian gas pipelines via Belarus are as in the listed below (with the destination countries):

- “Yamal-Europe (Torzhok-Kondratki-Frankfurt/Oder) (Poland, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, UK)
- Kobrin-Brest (Poland).”<sup>398</sup>

And the other Russian pipelines are;

- “St. Petersburg-Finland – (Finland)
- Blue Stream ( Turkey and possible to Greece, Macedonia)”<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Eastern Partnership-an ambitious project for 21st century European foreign policy”, **European Commission**, 20.02.2009.  
See [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/eastern/docs/eastern\\_partnership\\_article\\_bfw\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eastern_partnership_article_bfw_en.pdf) [18.04.2010]

<sup>397</sup> East European Gas Analysis. See <http://www.eegas.com/fsu.htm> [18.04.2010]

<sup>398</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>399</sup> **Ibid.**

Yamal-Europe pipeline is 4000 km long and 33 cubic meter gas transfers from Russia to Europe pass through Belarus and Poland. Since the gas crises with Ukraine, Russia has tensed relations with Poland, therefore Russia decided to built another route from using the North way (through Baltic Sea). On the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 2006, an agreement was signed between Russia and Germany on the North Stream gas pipeline. "Russia does not prefer to use Russia-Ukraine-Poland route".<sup>400</sup> In the context of close historical and geo-strategical ties with Ukraine, Poland is not a best option for Russia. In addition, Poland is an EU member state and has a major role in norm-diffusion to Ukraine. By the Northern route, Russia seeks to bypass Poland and Ukraine and could transfer the gas directly to Germany. Russia has to pay transfer price to transit countries and the alternative ways not to pay these prices.<sup>401</sup> While Russia uses the card of increasing the price of Russian gas towards these transit countries, they are using the card of increasing the price of transferring.

Poland's defense minister Radek Sikorski said that, "Germany should have consulted Poland before the deal, because taking the decision first and consulting us later is not our idea of solidarity."<sup>402</sup> This event showed Germany's great power stance in the system of the EU. As regarding the statistics of Europe's Energy Portal, the gross energy consumption of Germany is 349 million tonnes oil and energy dependency is 61.3% and gross energy consumption of France is 273.1 million tonnes oil and the energy dependency is 51.4%.<sup>403</sup> The small countries and minor power's energy dependency is lower. For instance, the gross energy consumption of Estonia is only 5.4 million tonnes oil and for Hungary it is 27.8 million tonnes oil. This indicators show that the major powers of the EU have higher dependency on energy and this is a proof of the motivation of the struggle of major powers on energy.<sup>404</sup>

In November 2007, Russian company Gazprom and Italian company Eni signed the treaty of Southern Gas Pipeline Project which offers an alternative energy

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<sup>400</sup> Kseniya Fokina, "Truba-Oçen Vajnyj Faktor", 16.01.2005. In Kamalov, **op.cit.**, p. 288.

<sup>401</sup> Kamalov, **loc.cit.**

<sup>402</sup> **BBC News**, "Russo-German Gas Deal Irks Poland", 30.04.2006.

See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4961186.stm> [20.04.2010]

<sup>403</sup> **Europe's Energy Portal**. See <http://www.energy.eu/#routes>

<sup>404</sup> **Ibid.**

route to Nabucco by transferring gas from Russia to Bulgaria, Italy and Austria through Black Sea. This route starts from Bregova in Russia and ends in Varna in Bulgaria. In the context of southern pipelines; an agreement on Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline was signed in March 2007 with Russia, Bulgaria and Greece. Russian and Caspian oil which is coming through Black Sea to Burgas in Bulgaria will transfer to Alexandroupolis in Greece. The Russian gas pipeline North Stream is scheduled for 2011 and South Stream is scheduled for 2015.<sup>405</sup> The Southern Stream is bypassing Turkey because Russia does not want to be dependent to Turkey in transferring Russian gas because of its pro-American and pro-European stance. Although these project in the context of southern route, aimed to bypass Turkey and Ukraine; they had to include these two important countries because they entered the continental shelf of Ukraine or Turkey in the Black Sea.<sup>406</sup>

Turkey is a regional player which has a significant role in the energy relations in the Caspian region. In the Caspian Basin, there are northern, western, eastern and southern routes. In the context of the northern route, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) which is multinational project transports oil from Tengiz to Novorossiysk. In the case of Azerbaijan oil, the Baku-Supsa (from Azerbaijan to Georgia) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) are crucial pipelines. BTC<sup>407</sup> is one of the new pipeline projects bypassing Russia and bringing oil and gas to Europe. BTC is a project which is supported by the EU and the U.S. Nabucco gas pipeline is from Erzurum in Turkey to Southern Europe which Russia is opposed it.<sup>408</sup> This project would be connected with Caucasian-Central Asian and also Middle-Eastern gas lines (from Iran) so Russia will be by-passed decisively. Moreover, Blue Stream pipeline is coming through Black Sea to Turkey and bypassing the third countries. It is an alternative for Turkey, in the case of rejection of Turkish membership to the EU.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> See <http://www.energy.eu/#routes>

<sup>406</sup> Hasan Kanbolat, "Karadeniz'in Jeopolitik Önemi Artıyor", *Stratejik Analiz*, ASAM, May 2008, p. 49. See <http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp684.pdf> [05.04.2010]

<sup>407</sup> BTC pipeline starts from Caspian and Central Asia through Caucasus on to Turkey and the EU.

<sup>408</sup> Mankoff, *op.cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*

In the context of the western routes, the territories of Russia and Iran would be excluded and U.S., Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia prefer this route to be more effective in the region. This pipeline transfers the oil is taken from Supsa port (Georgia) through to Bosphorus to Europe. Although this pipeline is less expensive there are some handicaps in this route such as conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia).<sup>410</sup> “More than 800,000 barrels of high-quality Caspian crude oil flow daily to the Mediterranean beneath the Georgian village, 42 km (26 miles) from breakaway South Ossetia and threat of war hangs over Georgian energy routes.”<sup>411</sup> Because of the South Ossetian conflict, British Petrol (BP) decided to shut down the Baku-Supsa pipeline.<sup>412</sup> In this route, also the tankers passing by the Bosphorus are threatening Istanbul. Therefore, Turkey also support for another pipeline from Baku to the Ceyhan Port in the southern part of Turkey. In the context of southern routes Iran would be a principal actor and the pipeline will come from Iran to the European markets. In the context of eastern routes, there is safe energy transport from Kazakhstan to China.<sup>413</sup> This route is not related to the EU however, by this route, China could increase its power in the Caspian region and it can have an impact on the pipeline politics in international arena.

As it is argued in the first part of the thesis, the energy politics and frozen conflicts are interrelated. The security of energy pipelines are depending on the stability of the region. In that sense, frozen conflicts could create instability in the region and give harm to the pipeline politics. Therefore, major powers could use these conflicts towards each other to control the energy resources. War between Russia and Georgia is also related to the BTC pipeline.

“Many Western analysts have suggested that one reason Russian aviators dropped a bomb only 50 meters from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline during Moscow's

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<sup>410</sup> Hooshang Amirahmadi, “Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Region” in Hosshang Amirahmandi (ed.), **The Caspian Region at a Crossroad: Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy and Development**, New York: Macmillan Press, 2000, pp. 164-167.

<sup>411</sup> Nico Mchedlishvili, Matt Robinson, “Threat of War Hangs Over Georgian Energy Routes”, **Reuters**, 31.07.2009.

<sup>412</sup> **Upstream Today**, “BP Shuts in Georgia Links”, 12.08.2008.

See <http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article160951.ece> [05.04.2010]

<sup>413</sup> Amirahmadi, **op.cit.**, pp.164-167.

invasion of Georgia in August was to highlight how insecure that link between the Caspian and the West which bypasses Russian territory has become.”<sup>414</sup>

Georgia and Azerbaijan have conflicts with Russia over Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia inevitably use military intervention over these conflicts. The Rose Revolution showed the American influence in Georgia and Georgia’s pro-American stance triggered the stance between Russia and Georgia. When Georgia invaded South Ossetia territory, Russia took a side in the war in August 2008. Just after the Georgian-Russia War, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian attempts could be explained with two reasons. Firstly it is a conclusion of the Georgian-Russian war and secondly it was a reaction to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence which was held in February 2008. As a close ally of Serbia, Russia rejected the independence of Kosovo. It should be noted that some EU member states also did not support of the independence of Kosovo such as Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Cyprus.

The EU leaders attempted to have a peacemaker role between Russia and Georgia. Georgia is in the context of ENP and Russia is the main energy supplier. In addition, these tensions with the U.S and Russia over Georgia could lead to a new Cold War which Russians are not afraid of as Medvedev mentioned in his speech.<sup>415</sup> In that context, the EU leaders have to take steps taking account the stability of European security which is a part of NATO. The EU leaders have to balance the power between the powers to keep the EU system stable. In that context, one of the aims of the ENP is to promote conflict-resolution efforts in the region.

Besides the South Ossetia conflict, the other crucial conflict is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which is also related to Azerbaijan and Turkey apart from Georgia and Russia. In the context of Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan, the Chechen problem and BTC project are turning points. Russia accused Azerbaijan to support the Chechen fighters, however Azerbaijan claim that they supported Russian unity. Moreover, Russian government never approved Azerbaijan’s contribution to the BTC project- in a

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<sup>414</sup> Paul Goble, “North-South Energy Routes More Attractive Than East-West Ones, Moscow Analyst Says”, *Georgian Daily*, 24.01.2009.

<sup>415</sup> *Associated Press*, “Medvedev: We’re ‘Not Afraid’ of a New Cold War”, 26.08.2008.

cooperation with Turkey and the U.S.- which bypass Russia from pipeline politics.<sup>416</sup> Russia recognized the independence of Karabakh in August 2008. In the case of Azerbaijan, Turkey also has a significant role. Turkish governments objected to have special ties with Azerbaijan in terms of ethnic roots since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey gave support to Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and closed the borders with Armenia to freedom movement and freedom of goods since 1993. Turkey closed the border. Until the signing of Rapprochement Protocol on 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2009 Turkey had very poor relations with Armenia, however this Protocol changed the *status quo* and Turkish government moved into a normalization process with Armenia. “The EU played no direct role in the rapprochement, which was chaperoned by the United States and Russia.”<sup>417</sup> After this development, the reopening of borders between Turkey and Armenia started to be negotiated. The Azeri companies boycotted Turkey and Turkey delivered a note to Azerbaijan. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 2010, Armenia stopped the ratification process of the Protocol and also the normalization process with Turkey. After Azerbaijan increased the price of gas which exports it to Turkey, Turkish government put a pre-condition of resolving the Karabakh problem for the ratification of the Protocol and lost its credibility on Armenian side.<sup>418</sup> Therefore, Armenia did not accept this pre-condition for the ratification of the Protocol and preferred to frozen the relations.

Turkey as a regional player and a crucial transit country between Europe and Caspian region creates an alternative to Russia in terms of energy routes. Moreover, Russia also distrusts Turkish stance on Chechen problem. On the other side Russia gave support to PKK terrorists for a long time.<sup>419</sup> Turkey is an EU candidate and a potential regional power in the Black Sea region. Both Russia and the EU works on alternative energy transit ways for bypassing Turkey. France and Germany have concerns about Turkey and in the case of changing the status of Turkey’s candidacy to Turkey they

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<sup>416</sup> Kamalov, *op.cit.*, pp. 109-110.

<sup>417</sup> Ahto Lobjakas, “EU Reviews Cooperation With The South Caucasus”, **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Radio Liberty**, 26 October 2009.

<sup>418</sup> Cengiz Çandar, “Türkiye-Ermenistan: ‘Derin Dondurucu’ da”, **Referans**, 23.04.2010. See [http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR\\_KOD=139158&\\_KOD=](http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=139158&_KOD=) [24.04.2010]

<sup>419</sup> Mehmet Ögütçü, “Caspian Energy ‘Poker Game’ and Turkey: Prospects for a New Approach”, **The Journal**, Vol.8, No.4, CEPMLP Website, 12.01.2001.



have to secure the energy ways. While Turkey is being used as an alternative route to Russia by the EU, there are also other routes excluding Turkey.

TRACECA and INOGATE are the two programmes to find alternative ways to reach energy resources and to improve energy security. These programmes are complementary to the ENP and work on the same basis.

Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia Programme was established in 1993 to strengthen cooperation on transportation and economy with the EU Commission and the governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This multilateral programme objected to revive the Silk Road and strengthen transportation between Europe, Caucasus and Asia. Ukraine and Moldova in 1996, Bulgaria and Romania in 1998 and Turkey joined the programme in 2000. The Programme uses EU funds and also the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and BSEC give technical support to the programme.<sup>420</sup> This programme prefers to draw a route to the rich energy resources by excluding Russia and Iran.<sup>421</sup>

Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) is another programme “to support the cooperation on energy (oil, gas, electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency) of the EU and the littoral states of the Black & Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries.”<sup>422</sup> INOGATE is funded under ENPI.

Renewable energy sources are another important area for finding alternative energy resources for the EU. Also, “this is an area where the ENP countries have huge potential, especially in solar and wind power and biofuels.”<sup>423</sup> In that sense, ENP countries and the EU aims to cooperate on the renewable energy resources so both post-communist ENP countries and the EU member states could be more independent from Russia in terms of energy supply.

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<sup>420</sup> TRACECA, see <http://www.traceca-org.org/default.php?l=en> [11.03.2010]

<sup>421</sup> Kerem Aklin, Sabit Ataman, **Küresel Petrol Stratejilerinin Jeopolitik Açından Dünya ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Etkileri**, İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2006, p. 189.

<sup>422</sup> INOGATE Energy Portal. See [http://www.inogate.org/inogate\\_programme/about\\_inogate](http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/about_inogate) [24.04.2010]

<sup>423</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “European Neighbourhood Policy Conference”, **Speech 07/500**, 03.09.2007.

In the article of Bart Van Vooren, the oil import statistics of Eurostat and OECD shows that Russia (nearly 190 thousands of ton), Libya (nearly 54 thousands of ton) and Algeria (nearly 17 thousands of ton) are the oil importers to the EU. According to him, “there is a high negative correlation between the development of ‘normal ENP relations’ (existence of an Action Plan) with a neighbouring country and the EU-27’s level of dependency on that country’s energy imports.”<sup>424</sup> Therefore it could be argued that, Russia as one of the greatest energy exporter to the EU would probably not have normal ENP relations.

In the context of the relations between Russia and the EU, a Summit held in 2000 is a milestone. Every year since 2000, several summits held however there is no significant improvement in the relations between the EU and Russia. With the development of the ENP, also Russia agreed on four ‘common spaces’ on economic, legal, security and research issues. In 2010 a progress report of 2009 is published on the ‘common spaces’. Referring to the report, an essential step has taken with setting up the Early Warning Mechanism. In addition, the thematic group which is in the context of common spaces with Russia, work on the “two EU-funded cooperation projects on renewable energy (€ 2 Million) and on energy savings (€ 3 Million)”.<sup>425</sup>

Eventually, the slow progress of EU-Russia relations is related to state relations in the EU system. Since the accession of post-communist countries into the EU, the diversification of the state behaviours became more observable. New members and old members have different attitudes towards Russia. While especially France and Germany have warmer relations with Russia, new members still perceive Russia as the biggest threat for their countries. Especially Poland and the Baltic countries which are neighbours of Kaliningrad Enclave have a fear of Russian invasion. After Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, post-communist countries started to worry about Russia’s imperialistic behaviors. Therefore, in the EU-Russia summits these challenges

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<sup>424</sup> Bart Van Vooren, “Integrating The Union’s Energy Policy Into Its European Neighbourhood Policy: Added-Value or Emulating Its Deficiencies?”, **EUI Law Working Paper**, No.1, 2009, p. 6.

See [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1308455](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1308455) [20.03.2010]

<sup>425</sup> European Commission, “EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2009”, March 2010.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/russia/docs/commonsplaces\\_prog\\_report\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/docs/commonsplaces_prog_report_2009_en.pdf) [20.03.2010]

between post-communist EU member states and the old EU member states. Poland reacted to the Russian idea of constructing a Northern route for transferring the gas directly to Germany. Exclusion of Poland from the energy relations creates mistrust and a source of threat for Poland.

The Arctic Ocean is another geo-strategic region which has big amount of oil and gas resources lying under the ice. In the 2008 report of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) it is stated that, “90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic, of which approximately 84 percent is expected to occur offshore.”<sup>426</sup> These numbers are equal to the energy reserves of Russia which is the second biggest energy supplier in the world.<sup>427</sup> With the high potential of energy resources it became an attractive region for the global powers. In that context, the Arctic region also has a potential to have power struggles between major actors in the international system as it is in the Caspian or Middle East region. However Canada, Denmark, Norway, the U.S. and Russia met in Greenland and agreed on sharing the natural resources. The EU is also interested with the Arctic region in terms of finding new energy resources as an alternative to Russia.

Russia is the most active power in the region and works on reaching to the energy resources and controls them. Russia has “oil operations in the Timan-Pechora area where the Baltic Pipeline System originates and gas extraction occurs in the Yamal Peninsula area and also the Yamburg field and pipeline that connects it to Norilsk.”<sup>428</sup> Yamal pipeline is transferring gas from Russia to Europe through Belarus and Poland. In that context it is related to the EU interests.

“Russia recently confirmed that it regularly sends a fleet of around eight nuclear-powered ice-breakers to patrol in the Arctic Ocean and it is planning to

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<sup>426</sup> “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle”, **USGS Fact Sheet** 2008-3049, 2008.

<sup>427</sup> Niall Gren, “Pressures Mount Over Arctic Energy Resources”, **ICFI**, 05.08.2008. See <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/aug2008/arct-a05.shtml> [10.04.2010]

<sup>428</sup> Peter F. Johnston, “Arctic Energy Resources and Global Energy Security”, **Journal of Military and Strategic Studies**, Vol.12, Issue.2, Winter 2010, p.11.

construct a new fleet of ice-breakers after 2010.”<sup>429</sup> Ice-breaking attempts of Russia, trigger the consequences of global warming in the region.

As a result of global warming, the ice in the poles is melting everyday and it makes easier for great powers to reach the energy resources. The changing climate and the attempts for reaching energy resources give the balance of nature. The environmentalist NGOs consider on the environmental security in the region. The EU declares that they give emphasize also on environmental policies in parallel with energy policies.

“The seven-page document was written by High Representative Javier Solana and external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who believe, in part, that global warming will strain Europe’s security concerns.”<sup>430</sup> In the report, it is also stated that new trade routes and waterways are appeared after the rapid melting of ice in the Arctic.<sup>431</sup> These trade routes also change the gostrategic dynamics and could trigger the power struggle in the region.

“Moreover, the Russian Navy’s North Sea Fleet is reportedly operating in the Arctic Ocean with its base in the Kara Peninsula.”<sup>432</sup> The increased Russian military activity in the Arctic region could be related “to secure seabed resources and control the Northeast Passage to prevent intervention from other nations.”<sup>433</sup> The other great powers in the system are concerned on Russian activity in the region.

### 3.2.2. Ukraine as a Transit Country

In the context of Russia’s near abroad policy, Ukraine is crucial with its size and geopolitical location. Especially since Ukraine became a border country for the EU

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<sup>429</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>430</sup> **The Other Russia**, “Russia and Europe to Clash Over Arctic Resources- EU Report”, 11.03.2008. See <http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/03/11/russia-and-europe-to-clash-over-arctic-resources-eu-report/> [10.04.2010]

<sup>431</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>432</sup> Kazumine Akimoto, “Power Games in the Arctic Ocean”, **Institute of the North**, 20.10.2009, p.7. See [www.institutenorth.org/servlet/download?id=728](http://www.institutenorth.org/servlet/download?id=728) [11.04.2010]

<sup>433</sup> **Ibid.**

in 2004, Ukraine became a tool for a head-on confrontation with the EU. In 2004-2005 with the wind of Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian government accelerated pro-EU attempts. Russia's 'near abroad' policy and EU's 'European Neighbourhood Policy' covers the same area in of CIS countries where there are crucial oil and gas pipelines and energy resources.

Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia are important transit countries for Russian energy export to Europe. More than 80 % of Russian gas passes through Ukraine and for that reason Ukraine has become a vital transit country for Russia. On the other side, most of the gas transfers to Germany and France and Ukraine also a crucial ENP partner for the EU.

“The coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and problems with seemingly loyal partners such as Belarus made the Kremlin realize that the low gas and oil prices offered to former Soviet countries were no guarantee of Russia's political control over them.”<sup>434</sup> Russian government decided to increase gas prices to increase Russian dominance over these countries.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the post-communist states were paying the same price for the gas and oil. “But they quickly faced an important foreign economic policy choice that would influence Russia's willingness to continue to subsidize their energy consumption: whether to introduce a national currency, the so-called ruble zone.”<sup>435</sup> In these days, Russia put pressure on post-communist state about using the single currency and threatened them with not giving energy subsidies.<sup>436</sup> In that context, in November 1992, Ukraine fully separated from the ruble zone<sup>437</sup> and it was an important step for the autonomy of Ukrainian economy. Also it was a turning point for Ukrainian foreign policy.

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<sup>434</sup> Grzegorz Gromadzki, Wojciech Kononczuk, “Energy Game: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus between the EU and Russia”, **Stefan Batory Foundation**, August 2007, p. 20.

<sup>435</sup> Rawi Abdel, “Interpreting Interdependence: National Security and the Energy Trade of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus” in Robert Legvold, Celeste A. Wallander (eds.), **Swords and Sustenance: The Economic of Security in Belarus and Ukraine**, Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Science, p. 105.

<sup>436</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>437</sup> See Marek Dabrowski, “The Reasons of the Collapse of the Ruble Zone”, November 1995. See [http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja\\_plik/3460035\\_058e.pdf](http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/3460035_058e.pdf) [12.03.2010]

Therefore, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2006 Russia showed its reactions to Ukraine's pro-EU stance, by cutting off all the Russian gas transferring to Ukraine after a confrontation on gas prices. In 2006, Ukraine gas prices increased from 50 to 95\$ but only the price for Belarus did not increase from 47 \$.<sup>438</sup> At that time, the gas prices were raised also for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. It could be argued that, the pro-Russian attitudes of Belarus state is awarded with the price stability of gas.

The gas dispute was over in 2007 but in March 2008 gas supplies reduction initiated by Russia towards Ukraine.

The Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 was a significant indicator for the EU which shows that Russia could be a potential of insecurity and instability for the geo-strategic regions such as Black Sea region and Caucasus. Regarding the European Commission, the Russia-Georgia conflict "confirmed how vulnerable Eastern countries can be and how the EU's security begins outside the borders of the Union".<sup>439</sup> The war proved that the EU should give more emphasize on ENP countries in terms of security.

"Russia-Ukraine tensions flared in recent weeks after Moscow accused Kiev of supplying arms to Georgia, and Kiev tried to limit Russia's use of its Crimea-stationed warships against Georgia."<sup>440</sup> Under the effect of these tensions between Ukraine and Russia, in the beginning of January 2009, Russian gas company Gazprom cut off the gas supply to Ukraine. Although European consumers are not affected from this dispute, it was a real threat for the Union.<sup>441</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> J. Mostova, Gazova firtashka, 'Zerkalo Tyzhnia', 29.04–12.05.2006 In Grzegorz Gromadzki, Wojciech Kononczuk, "Energy Game: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus between the EU and Russia", **Stefan Batory Foundation**, August 2007, p.23. See for the details of 2006 energy crises; Jonathan Stern, "The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crises of January 2006", **Oxford Institute for Energy Studies**, 16.01.2006. See [http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment\\_0106.pdf](http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0106.pdf) [13.04.2010]

<sup>439</sup> European Commission, "Eastern Partnership". See [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/eastern/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm) [13.04.2010]

<sup>440</sup> Philippa Runner, "EU Should Save Ukraine From Russia, NGO says", **EUObserver**, 25.08.08. See <http://euobserver.com/9/26638> [17.03.2010]

<sup>441</sup> **BBC News**, "Russia to Cut off Ukraine Gas Supply", 5.01.2009. [17.03.2010] See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7812368.stm>. Also see Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia Cuts Off Gas Deliveries to Ukraine", **Newyork Times**, 1.01.2009. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/europe/02gazprom.html> [17.03.2010]

The gas dispute in January 2009 was over after the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. According to these negotiations;

“Kiev will pay 20% less for Russian gas than the European market price, or around \$450 per 1,000 cubic meters. Meanwhile, Russia said it will continue to pay \$1.7 per 1,000 cubic meters for each 100 kilometers of gas transited via the Ukrainian pipeline system.”<sup>442</sup>

Russia accepted the discounted gas prices for Ukraine and Ukraine agreed not to increase the transit fees. Russia and Ukraine have signed a 10-year gas deal for the period between 2009 and 2019.<sup>443</sup> “Many observers decided that Russia ‘won’ the conflict, as the new terms appeared to be worse than those agreed a year earlier.”<sup>444</sup> It could be pointed out that Russian interests are more than the low transit fees and related to expand its sphere of influence to Ukraine, weaken the influence of EU’s great powers on Ukraine and maximizing its power in the international system.

Ukraine governments have some attempts to decrease the level of energy independency to Russia. From Caspian oil and gas (from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) could transfer to Ukraine and also to Poland. ‘White Stream’ which is proposed by Yulia Tymoshenko and promoted by a London-based company, is a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, via Georgia and Black Sea to Ukraine and the EU countries. The other project of Ukraine is to construct a pipeline from Iran and to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. Naftogaz Ukrainy proposes to Gaz de France to build this pipeline from Iran to Europe.<sup>445</sup>

Russian influence over Ukraine is not limited to the gas prices. The Russian fleet which is stationed since 1783 in Crimea (Sevastapol port) is another source of threat for Ukraine. In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed a lease agreement for Sevastapol however it does not mean that Russia would leave the port in 2017 when the agreement

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<sup>442</sup> **Euractive**, “Pipeline Politics? Russia and the EU’s battle for energy”, 20.09.2009 (updated 29.01.2010). [11.04.2010]

See <http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/pipeline-politics-russia-eu-battle-energy/article-177579>

<sup>443</sup> **BBC News**, “Russia and Ukraine Sign Gas Deal”, 19.01.2009.

See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7836736.stm>

<sup>444</sup> **Euractive**, “Pipeline Politics? Russia and the EU’s Battle for Energy”, 20.09.2009 (updated 29.01.2010). [11.04.2010]

<sup>445</sup> F. William Engdahl, “Color Revolutions, Geopolitics and the Baku Pipeline”, 27.06. 2005.

See <http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/print/Color%20Revolutions.html> [11.04.2010]

is over.<sup>446</sup> Russia probably would not prefer to leave this strategic point in the Black Sea which is close to Bosphorous and also to the energy routes coming from the Caspian region. “Some 60 percent of the 2 million people who live in Crimea are ethnically Russian, hundreds of thousands of whom secretly hold Russian passports, the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) says.”<sup>447</sup> The dual identity structure is so distinctive in the region of autonomous Crimea and in Donetsk oblast. In these regions, there are Russophone people who are opposite to the EU and NATO integration and mostly pro-Russian.

The other crucial point in the context of Russian dominance over Ukraine is about the Transnistria conflict. In 1992, Russia had a peacekeeper role in the ceasefire between Moldova and Transnistria. In 1994, the prime ministers of Russia and Moldova signed an agreement about withdrawing Russian troops from Transnistria however it did not come into force because Russian government did not approved it. In addition, at the summit of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) in 1999 Russia promised to withdraw its troops from the region but the deadline is extended when the deadline expired.<sup>448</sup> “Moscow argues that its military presence guarantees peace and stability in the region, but what it also guarantees is the stability of the authoritarian regime in Transnistria, and Russia's indirect influence over all of Moldova.”<sup>449</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly published the *Resolution 371 on the Future of NATO-Russia Relations*, in November 2008, and urge Russia “to respect its commitments which were taken at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 and withdraw its illegal military presence from the Transdnestrian region of Moldova in the nearest future”.<sup>450</sup> Ukraine has borders with Moldova and Transnistria conflict is also a Ukrainian concern. Ukraine as a willing ENP partner chose EU-based solutions in the

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<sup>446</sup> Otto Luchterhandt, “Ex-Soviet States Fear Russian Aggression”, **Spiegel Online**, 29.08.2008.

See <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,575238,00.html> [11.04.2010]

<sup>447</sup> Philippa Runner, “EU Should Save Ukraine From Russia, NGO says”, **EUObserver**, 25.08.08.

See <http://euobserver.com/9/26638> [17.03.2010]

<sup>448</sup> Nicu Papescu, “Transnistria: An Old Conflict for The New Europe”, **Russia and Eurasia Review**, Vol. 2, Issue. 6, Jamestown Foundation, 18.03.2003.

See

[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=28403&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=226](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=28403&tx_ttnews[backPid]=226) [13.04.2010]

<sup>449</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>450</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Resolution 371 on the Future of NATO-Russia Relations”.

See <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1652> [13.04.2010]



region and activated in the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine which is over in December 2009. “Russian nationalist views Transnistria as a test case for Russians in the near abroad.”<sup>451</sup> Therefore, it could be argued that, Transnistria conflict is another tool for using Russian influence over Ukraine and Moldova. It is also another arena for a head-on confrontation with the EU.

Energy issue is one of the significant priority areas of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. In the Action Plan, the energy priorities of Ukraine are stated as,

“Adoption of an overall energy policy converging towards EU energy policy objectives, gradual convergence towards the principles of the EU internal electricity and gas markets, progress regarding energy networks, progress in the transit of natural gas and advance in the restructuring of the solid fuels mines, progress on energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources and continue co-operation on nuclear energy and nuclear safety”.<sup>452</sup>

In the Action Plan it is stated that “develops infrastructures for the diversification of oil and gas supplies including the Odessa-Brody-Poland oil pipeline (Ukraine Poland Agreement should be implemented further).”<sup>453</sup>

During the SSCB period, a part of the nuclear armament of the Soviet Union was located in Ukraine. After the collapse of the Union, Ukraine had to give the armaments to Russia as a communist legacy. The Chernobyl disaster was a big concern for the EU member states. In 1992 both Russia and Ukraine signed the START1 Treaty and adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear energy produces with the technology of nuclear armament, therefore when Ukraine gave back the nuclear armament to Russia this was another concern for nuclear energy producing.<sup>454</sup> Ukraine still “has 15 nuclear reactors and receives nuclear fuel and nuclear services from Russia.”<sup>455</sup>

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<sup>451</sup> Steven D. Roper, “From Frozen Conflict to Frozen Agreement: The Unrecognized State of Transnistria” In Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, Henry Felix Srebnik (eds.), **De facto states: The Quest for Sovereignty**, USA and Canada: Routledge Press, 2004.

<sup>452</sup> European Commission, EU/Ukraine Action Plan,  
See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/ukraine\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf) [17.03.2010]

<sup>453</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>454</sup> Erhan Büyükakıncı, “Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Ukrayna-Rusya İlişkileri” in Erhan Büyükakıncı (ed.), **op.cit.**, pp. 410-412.

<sup>455</sup> “Nuclear World Association”, “Nuclear Power in Ukraine”.

For the EU member states, the safety of nuclear power plants in Ukraine is vital and it is focused in the framework of ENP. In the EU-Ukraine Action Plan one of the priorities is about the nuclear energy and nuclear safety.<sup>456</sup> “Production of electricity in Ukraine declined from 296.3 TWh to 181.4 TWh from 1990 to 2004 and at the same time, production of electricity from nuclear power (ENP) in Ukraine has been increasing”<sup>457</sup>

Through ENPI, Germany, France, Poland, Sweden, Britain (Canada and Norway also as non EU states) give financial aid to Ukraine on energy issues.<sup>458</sup> The natural uranium capacity of Ukraine is another point in the context of its relations with the EU. “Ukraine has prospects to provide 100% of its own uranium needs (rather than only 34.5% at present), and to export its surpluses, according to Minister Sergey Yermilov.”<sup>459</sup> Uranium processing could be done with a high technology and Ukraine needs to cooperate with Russia in terms of mining and processing.<sup>460</sup>

Nuclear energy is preferable mostly by great powers in terms of energy independency. Environmentalists claim that nuclear energy gives harm to environment but the major powers in the international system argue that nuclear energy could be more clean and safe. The President of the Commission Barroso states that “nuclear energy an at least temporary solution to stop climate change and to reduce our dependency on oil and gas”.<sup>461</sup>

As it is mentioned in the Memorandum of the EU on cooperation in the field of energy between the EU and Ukraine; besides nuclear safety and the integration of

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See <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf46.html> [17.03.2010]

<sup>456</sup> European Commission, EU/Ukraine Action Plan.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/ukraine\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf) [18.03.2010]

<sup>457</sup> Mariam Ubilava, “Development of Non-Carbon Energy Power Projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia”, **Climate Institute**. See <http://www.climate.org/topics/clean-energy/non-carbon-power-russia.html> [18.03.2010]

<sup>458</sup> “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Ukraine’s National Indicative Programme 2011-2013.” See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011\\_enpi\\_nip\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf) [18.03.2010]

<sup>459</sup> “World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Uranium Project.”

See <http://www.wise-uranium.org/upeur.html> [18.03.2010]

<sup>460</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>461</sup> Renata Goldirova, "Barroso Attempts to Woo Germany on Nuclear Energy", **EUObserver**, 07.07.2008. [18.03.2010]

electricity and gas markets, the transit of hydrocarbons is also important.<sup>462</sup> “The coal sector plays a key role in Ukraine’s security of energy supplies, accounting for some 50% of indigenous energy production.”<sup>463</sup> In terms of hydrocarbons, the clean coal technologies are important for the EU member states in the context of environmental problems.

In January 2007, The EU Commission proposed a proposal on *An Energy Policy for Europe* for better European energy policy. In the Communication of the Commission the objectives which are mentioned are planned to be achieved by 2020. In the paper, the energy relations seek to improve with transit countries and key players in energy relations.<sup>464</sup> Thus it is proposed as a more enhanced Energy Policy which will also support ENP activities.

With the latest presidential elections in Ukraine, Yanukovich became a president and Ukraine began to follow a pro-Russian line. “He refused to membership of NATO and gave a positive signal for the staying of Russian fleet in Sevastopol also after 2017”.<sup>465</sup> Moreover, Ukraine decided to improve energy relations with Russia to end the gas dispute.

Energy resources are the most crucial material conditions for a state. Ukraine has to cooperate with Russia to be able to survive in the system. Moreover, Russian military force and the assertive policies to its near abroad increased Ukrainian hesitations. Especially Georgian war triggered this perception. In that context, in April 2010 Ukraine agreed to allow Russian Navy to stay in Ukraine until 2042 and “in return for the extension, Moscow pledged to cut by 30 percent the price cash-strapped Ukraine pays for Russian natural gas.”<sup>466</sup> “Stefan Füle recommends pragmatism to the EU's

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<sup>462</sup> European Commission, “Memorandum of Understanding On the Co-operation in the Field of Energy between the EU and Ukraine.”

See [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy\\_transport/international/bilateral/ukraine/doc/mou\\_en\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/bilateral/ukraine/doc/mou_en_final_en.pdf) [18.03.2010]

<sup>463</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>464</sup> European Commission, “An Energy Policy for Europe”, **COM(2007) 1 final**, 10.01.2007, pp. 3-24.

<sup>465</sup> “Ukrayna, Rusya’dan Doğalgaz İndirimi Alamadı”, **Ekotrent**, 26.03.2010.

See <http://www.ekotrent.com/haber/20100326/Ukrayna-Rusyadan-dogalgaz-indirimi-alamadi.php> [18.03.2010]

<sup>466</sup> **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Radio Liberty**, “Ukraine, Russia Approve Contentious Black Sea Deal”, 27.04.2010.

neighbors in their relations with Russia, but says the countries must remain free in choosing their own future.”<sup>467</sup> The system of the EU benefits from Ukraine’s pragmatic relations with Russia. The EU great powers seek to hold Ukraine in the middle of Russia and the EU policies, to avoid of Russian assertive policies which could be a threat for the system of the EU and to benefit from Ukrainian energy resources. For the EU member states, Ukraine is so important not to lose and so risky to gain.

The ENP Action Plans did not meet the interests of Ukrainian state. By the northern route project, Russia and Germany bypassed Ukraine in their energy relations. Thus, Ukraine chose to turn its face to the Eurasianist policies to be closer to the energy power in the system to survive.

In May 2010, “Russia's proposed to merge its Gazprom gas company with Ukraine's state gas company, Naftogaz and the merger of the two would likely give Russia some control over Ukraine's gas-related assets.”<sup>468</sup> Although Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich stated that he would not support Russian proposal, for Ukrainian state it is difficult to confront Russian pipeline diplomacy.

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See [http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine\\_MPs\\_Approve\\_Black\\_Sea\\_Deal/2025524.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine_MPs_Approve_Black_Sea_Deal/2025524.html) [28.04.2010]

<sup>467</sup> **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty**, “EU Elargement Chief Tackles Balkans, Moldova, Eastern Neighbours, and ‘Elephant in the Room’”, 09.03.2010. [28.04.2010]

See <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1978674.html>

<sup>468</sup> **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Radio Liberty**, “Ukrainian President Doubts Gazprom-Naftogaz Merger”, 06.05.2010. [06.05.2010]

See [http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukrainian\\_President\\_Doubts\\_GazpromNaftogaz\\_Merger/2034624.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukrainian_President_Doubts_GazpromNaftogaz_Merger/2034624.html) [07.05.2010]

## PART THREE

### CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

In this part, constructivist approach will be used to analyze the case of ENP. Constructivism is a systemic theory like neorealism, but at the same time it is an antithesis of it. In that context, the differentiations of constructivism from neorealism will draw the road map of constructivist analysis.

Constructivist analysis will not depend on the basis of power and interest, as it was done in the neorealist part. In addition, constructivism does not argue that material forces may cause cooperation and form the structure of the system. “States are not socialized by material structures but by the socializing principle of the international normative structure.”<sup>469</sup> Wendt underlines that the constructivism does not claim that; “ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest but it is said that; power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.”<sup>470</sup>

One of the differences between rationalism and constructivism is “the claim that state interests and identities are much more *malleable* in constructivism than is allowed for in rationalist theory.”<sup>471</sup> “One of the other variables which differentiated systemic theories is the relationship between agency-structure, and also the properties of state agents and the way how they are constructed is one of the other basic concerns.”<sup>472</sup> In the context of the differentiation between social and material structures of the system, constructivism is chosen as a theory to analyze the processes of the ENP. Moreover,

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<sup>469</sup> Hobson, *op.cit.*, p.154.

<sup>470</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 246.

<sup>471</sup> Hobson, *op.cit.*, p. 146.

<sup>472</sup> Biersteker&Weber, *op.cit.*, pp. 242-243.

constructivism will be used to focus on the behaviours of the EU as an agent and its interactions with the other agents. In the framework of social structure of the EU, there are many other agents such as European institutions, EU member states, NGOs and their interactions with the other agents such as ENP partner states, multinational corporations, international institutions, NGOs.

In this part; firstly the basic assumptions of constructivist approach will be explained. Then, the constructivist approach to European integration will be clarified and this approach will be applied to the case of European Neighbourhood Policy. The actors and instruments of the ENP will be figured out to illuminate the field of activity of the policy. In the context of field of activity, democracy promotion and border interactions will be taken as significant variables of the policy. Democracy promotion attempts towards Black Sea region and on the coloured revolutions will be taken as cases to be able to examine the process of democracy promotion attempts of the EU. Cross-Border Cooperation and migration problems are taken as notable cases which can help to examine the process of border interactions in the context of ENP.

## 1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

Constructivism is akin to idealism. Plato as one of the most important idealist thinkers accept that the external world of objects is just a reflection of the reality which is created by the ideas. Therefore, Plato argues that only ideas could reach to the reality. Apart from ancient Greek philosophers, Jackson and Sorensen argue that the root of constructivism is based on the eighteenth-century writings of Giambattista Vico who is an Italian philosopher. According to him, “the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by Man”.<sup>473</sup> In other words, Vico put forward that although the physical conditions of world are created by God, social reality, the history and the social norms are constructed by the human being. Also Jackson and Sorensen argue that, also Kant’s ideas on the subjective knowledge of human being which obtain the world

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<sup>473</sup> Vico L. Pompa, **Selected Writings**, Syndicare of the University of Cambridge: Binghamton Press, 1982, p. 26 is cited by Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, **Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 164.

through human consciousness are another source of constructivism.<sup>474</sup> Therefore, human consciousness is the main source to construct the values, norms and identities.

The social world does not deny the reality of physical entities and it is a part of it. For example; “the international system of security and defense consists of territories, populations and other physical assets, it is the ideas and understandings according to which those assets are conceived, organized and used that is most important.”<sup>475</sup> In other words, physical components of the system are nothing without an intellectual process.

Theories of international relations discuss the nature of actors in world politics; environment where actors are operating, and the way actors interact with each other. As for realism, states are primary actors in world politics on which the comprehension effort should be exerted. States are units that are power seeking and, they act and interact within an anarchical environment. “In materialist theory states, or power actors more generally, know exactly what their interests are, and that they know how to realize them, but for constructivists, states do not *a priori* know what their interests are.”<sup>476</sup>

Neorealist theory treats states as individuals which are trying to maximize their power but constructivists give emphasis to the social ontology. “Fundamentally social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from a context of normative meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them.”<sup>477</sup> State is considered as “an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation.”<sup>478</sup> “States can be defined in terms of their claims to sovereignty, while sovereignty can be defined in terms of the interactions and practices of states.”<sup>479</sup> Thus, neorealist perspective to the states is definitely different than constructivism because they consider states as a Westphalian state. But constructivism, in its design, focuses on the limitations of

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<sup>474</sup> Jackson & Sorensen, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

<sup>475</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>476</sup> Hobson, *op.cit.*, p. 146.

<sup>477</sup> K.M. Fierke, “Constructivism”, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), **International Relations Theories**, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 169-170.

<sup>478</sup> Hobson, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid.*

realism and appears as an alternative to mainstream approaches.<sup>480</sup> “Constructivists begin by arguing that rationalist theory has been excessively materialist and agent-centric.”<sup>481</sup> Therefore, they do not accept the classical Westphalian state model.

Hobson compares rationalism and constructivism with regard to the degree of autonomy. “For rationalists, norms are either epiphenomenal or are accorded a ‘relative autonomy’ from power actors and constructivist insist that norms are wholly autonomous and can fundamentally shape the interests and identities of power actors.”<sup>482</sup>

Basically, constructivism challenges the idea that coherent description of the world is impossible. It appears as an alternative way to define and describe nature of the actors, their environment and interactions in the world. While mainstream IR theories and their critics exclude people as a social creature from their analysis, constructivism, in their analytical efforts, emphasizes people and their activities. From a traditional mainstream perspective material structure makes social behaviour involuntary and predictable. “Many constructivists seek to establish is that states are far more constrained than materialist theory recognizes and states are constrained by social normative structures.”<sup>483</sup>

Constructivists, on the other hand, see human behaviour and social structure as inseparable, simultaneously co-constructed. Constructivists believe that, “constitutive norms do not simply regulate behaviour; they also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate.”<sup>484</sup>

“Constructivists are defined by their emphasis on the socially constructed character of actors’ interests and identities and by their concomitant faith in the susceptibility to

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<sup>480</sup> See D. Desler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent Structure Debate”, **International Organization**, Vol. 43, 1989, pp. 441-473, K Onuf , and Frank Klink, Activity, Authority, Rule, **International Studies Quarterly**, 1989, Vol. 33, pp. 149-174, Guzzini, S., A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 6, 2000, p. 147. For counter argument see, Barkin, J., S., Realist Constructivism, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 325-342.

<sup>481</sup> Hobson, **op.cit.**, p. 145.

<sup>482</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 146.

<sup>483</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>484</sup> Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, in P.J.Katzenstein, (ed.), **Culture of National Security**, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 22.



change of even the most seemingly immutable practices and institutions in world politics.”<sup>485</sup>

Constructivists argue that the nature of international relations cannot be reduced to rational action and interaction within material constraints or within institutional constraints at the international and national level.<sup>486</sup> Nevertheless, interaction of states is not among fixed national interests but must be understood as a pattern of action that shapes and is shaped by identities. “The constructivists describe the historical processes of identity formation, while the rationalists would account for the actual behaviour of international actors”<sup>487</sup>

“Social constructivism presents a model of international interaction that explores the normative influence of fundamental institutional structures and connection between normative changes and state identity and interests.”<sup>488</sup> As for constructivists, interests and identities of actors in international relations can be put into shape since interests and identities of actors closely connected to context that they are finding themselves. As for traditional IR theories, states have a fixed nature either power seeking or economic gain maximizing. However, as for constructivists, states have an identity that determines basic state goals. On the basis of these identities, states construct their national interests.

Identity originates from social life. Identity shaping process is characterized as regards the existence of ‘other’. Without ‘the other’ there appears no requirement of a talk of reason to have an identity. Identity, then, originates from societal activities and in the course of effort to self-identification of an individual. In that sense, in a given case of an interaction of identity, society and the individual is required. Societal nature of identity acquiring process builds upon existence of ‘other’ which can be observed in all identity categories and that existence of ‘other’ is constructed upon the differences.

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<sup>485</sup> Andrew Bradley Phillips, “Constructivism” in Martin Griffiths (ed.), **International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century**, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 60.

<sup>486</sup> See for details E. Newman, Human Security and Constructivism, **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 2, 2001 pp. 239-251.

<sup>487</sup> J. Lezaun, Limiting the Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations, **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, Issue. 3, 2002, p. 230.

<sup>488</sup> Shaun Narine, “Economics and Security in the Asia Pacific: A Constructivist Analysis”, **International Studies Association**, 2003. See [www.ciaonet.org/isa/nas01/](http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/nas01/)

In addition to these features, identity is multifaceted, continuous and dynamic. Therefore, identity can be defined in a spectrum from family to humankind.

The process of identity acquiring is a historical phenomenon. The referent of identity may change in that historical process and for the time being the most common referent of identity is national. The historicalness of identity refers to its dynamic nature that it changes in due course, and societal nature refers to its continuity. In development of an identity, objective and subjective elements are crucial. The members of an identity unit share objective elements. These are symbols, myths, language, religion, ethnic origin, geography, life style, history, values and traditions. These are the basis for identity development. The process of internalization of objective elements provides a way to subjective elements. Thus the question is the matter of realization level of these elements. In that realization of elements modern state has played a significant role.

Constructivists accept anarchy as the characteristic condition of the international system which means there is not supreme entity in world politics to enforce orders. Constructivists do not necessarily assume it as a basis of suspicion and competition. As Alexander Wendt puts clearly “anarchy is what states make of it.”<sup>489</sup> Social world is not given but constructed. In other words, war and conflict are not the inevitable results of anarchy but they are just the fiction of the states.

Hobson’s three-fold typology shows the key ways for analyzing the state and IR in constructivist terms. According to him, the three variants are international society-centric, state centric and radical constructivism. In society-centric constructivism, referring to Martha Finnemore, he stated that “states do not always act what they seek and the question is about how states interest are defined and state identities and interests are defined by the normative structure of international society.”<sup>490</sup> Finnemore distinguish international society into two as; ‘the deep structure’ which is a normative structure and ‘the surface structure’ which includes international organizations or non-state actors which are agents diffuse the norms of the deep structure. The other two

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<sup>489</sup> Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 246.

<sup>490</sup> Hobson, **op.cit.**, p. 149. See also Martha Finnemore, **National Interests in International Society**, Cornell University, 1996, p.128.

types of constructivism are far from middle-ground constructivism. Radical constructivists are deconstructing the state and do not accept that state is equal to the sovereignty. Also radical constructivists have many fractions from feminism to postmodernism. As the last variant of constructivism, state-centric constructivists emphasize domestic policies rather than international politics, so they do not concern on the system.<sup>491</sup>

Wendt distinguishes between micro and macro-level structures. Against the neorealist view on anarchy, he claims that anarchy can have three kinds of structure at the macro-level which dominates the system. These structures differentiate according to their roles- enemy, rival and friend- and he calls these structures as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. Especially Kantian structure refers to “a pluralistic security community” which Karl Deutch defines it as a community that all members give an assurance having a friendship.<sup>492</sup> Dale C. Copeland interprets Wendt’s approach and states that, “the state is a real self-organizing entity that, being held in the collective memories of many individuals, is dependent for existence on no particular actor.”<sup>493</sup>

Wendt could be accepted as a middle-ground constructivist. He follows a middle way between mainstream and constructivism. He combines epistemology and post-positivist ontology.<sup>494</sup> According to Jackson and Sorensen conventional constructivists are Alexander Wendt (1999), Peter Katzenstein (1996), Christian Reus-Smit (1997), John Ruggie (1998), Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998), Ted Hopf (2002), and Martha Finnemore (2003) and their main difference from critical constructivists is their less skeptical position towards the possibility of the truth claims.<sup>495</sup> According to Jörg Friedrichs, the middle-ground constructivism (conventional constructivism) is also categorized into two; such as sociological and radical constructivism (called also as Wittgensteinian constructivism). “Wittgensteinian constructivism is agnostic about whether there can be any direct knowledge about

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<sup>491</sup> Hobson, *op.cit.*, pp. 148-165.

<sup>492</sup> Wendt, *op.cit.*, p. 247.

<sup>493</sup> Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism”, in Stefano Guzzini, Anna Leander, **Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics**, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 9.

<sup>494</sup> Friedrichs, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>495</sup> Jackson&Sorensen, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

reality, since the world we live in is constituted by contextual meaning”<sup>496</sup> Conventional constructivism which examines the role of norms and identity, is following mostly middle-ground Wendtian constructivist approach.

After the Third Debate, the biggest discussion became the question of how important does epistemology and ontology are in IR theory. “Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the origin and nature of knowledge and begins with a question about how we come to have knowledge of the world.”<sup>497</sup> After the Third Debate two sides appeared; one side is known as positivists who believe that epistemology is more important in IR discipline and the other side-who are post-positivists believe that ontology is more important to understand the world.<sup>498</sup> The distinction between object and subject is the fundamental division of these two beliefs. “The subjects of constructivism are guided by logic of appropriateness.”<sup>499</sup> This shows the main difference between rationalists and constructivists because logic of appropriateness puts stress on the individual.<sup>500</sup>

“Constructivists embrace an intersubjective ontology, emphasizing norms, social agents, and structures and the mutual constitution of identity, but accept an epistemology indebted to positivism which includes hypothesis testing, causality and explanation.”<sup>501</sup>

Wendt stands on the positivist side and he argues that he is in the middle of the third debate because he does not think that “idealist ontology implies a post-positivist epistemology.”<sup>502</sup> He argues that he wants to find a middle way through the Third Debate and gives an emphasis on the question of, “how we think about the objects of social science”.<sup>503</sup> “By accepting a positivist epistemology, constructivists have gained

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<sup>496</sup> Friedrichs, *op.cit.*, pp. 111-112.

<sup>497</sup> Fierke, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>498</sup> Wendt, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>499</sup> March Olsen and Johan P.Olsen, **Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics**, New York: Free Press, 1989 is cited in Fierke, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

<sup>500</sup> Fierke, *op.cit.* p. 172.

<sup>501</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>502</sup> Wendt, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>503</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 41.

considerable legitimacy, such that the debate with rationalists has come to occupy an important place in the discipline.”<sup>504</sup>

According to Friedrichs, putting social constructivism in a post-positivist camp, he defines middle-ground constructivism as an attempt which is done by social constructivists to make a deal with positivism by combining a social ontology and rationalist epistemology.<sup>505</sup> Wendt claims that, IR scholars need to shift from epistemology to ontology. Realists are too much worried about epistemology because the states and the state systems are not observable but they can “conceptualize in material and social terms.”<sup>506</sup> Friedrichs states that, “if somebody wants to overcome materialist ontology, he will also have to be critical about rationalist epistemology; conversely, if somebody wants to stick to rationalist epistemology he will have to stick to materialist ontology as well.”<sup>507</sup> He assessed that middle ground constructivists assume constructivism as “an ontological challenge to both materialist ontology and rationalist epistemology.”<sup>508</sup>

According to Wendt, apart from ontological challenges between realism and constructivist theories, social kinds are one of the other crucial diversification point for these theories. Realist philosophy is positivists and assumes that object and subject are not related and separated and the reality exists independent from human beings. Constructivists do not agree with this argument and they assume that social kinds do not exist independently of human beings. But it should be noted that, social kinds are constituted by collectives but not by the individuals.<sup>509</sup> Wendt believes that “social kinds are made mostly of ideas.”<sup>510</sup>

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<sup>504</sup> Fierke, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>505</sup> “‘Positivism’ is used as the term for theoretical approaches that combine a rationalist epistemology with a materialist ontology; ‘post-positivism’ is used as the term for approaches that combine a reflective epistemology with a social ontology (sometimes ‘reflectivism’ is using as a synonym for post-positivism)”, Jörg Friedrichs, **European Approaches to International Relations Theory, A House with Many Mansions**, Oxon, USA, Canada: Routledge, 2004, p.156. (From the notes of the part; “Middle Ground or halfway house?”)

<sup>506</sup> Wendt, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>507</sup> Friedrichs, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>509</sup> Wendt, *op.cit.*, pp. 49, 75.

<sup>510</sup> *Ibid.*

Wendt draws the distinction between social and natural kinds with Roy Bhaskar's identification and puts their differences under four items:

"Firstly, social kinds are more space-time specific than natural kinds because reference to certain places and eras is often part of their definition. Secondly, unlike natural kinds the existence of social kind depends on the interlocking beliefs, concepts, or theories held by actors. Thirdly, unlike natural kinds, the existence of social kinds also depends on the human practices that carry them from one location to another. Social kinds are a function of belief and action. Fourthly unlike natural kinds, many social kinds have both an internal and an external structure which means that they cannot be studied solely in the reductionist fashion realists use to explain natural kinds. By external structure relational in the sense of being constituted by social relations."<sup>511</sup>

The questioning of what is the effect of the structure of international politics on the states could be another vital discussion for Wendtian approach. He believes that the international system also could be constructed by states. According to Waltz, structure is a distribution of capabilities. "Actors take each other 'into account' in choosing their actions and this process is based on actors' ideas about the nature and roles of Self and Other, and such social structures are 'distribution of ideas'."<sup>512</sup> Wendt criticizes and suggests for a rethinking of Waltz's definition on 'the structure'. 'Structure' contains both material and ideational elements and on the material side there are 'forces of destruction' and this explained as a 'distribution of capabilities' by Waltz. Wendt believes that 'relations of destruction' gives a meaning to the forces of destruction. He gives an example to explain the importance of state's relations. In his example, he writes that five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones. Therefore, 'the shared ideas' could be whether cooperative or conflictual and the structure which creates these kind of state behaviours are important.<sup>513</sup> "Structures have effects not reducible to agents and the structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas."<sup>514</sup> Ideas constituted interests, interests constitute material conditions and material conditions constitute reality. As for Wendt, the conduct of international politics is made

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<sup>511</sup> **Ibid**, pp. 69-71. See also Roy Bhaskar, **The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences**, Brighton and Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 48-49.

<sup>512</sup> Wendt, **op.cit.**, pp. 248-249.

<sup>513</sup> **Ibid**, p. 255.

<sup>514</sup> **Ibid**, p. 138.

because identities and interests are constructed and reproduced by practice.<sup>515</sup> In the context of Wendtian approach, the notions of self and the environment which shape interactions and are also shaped by interaction. In that sense, international system can be reshaped.

The focus should be put on social character of international life rather than material characteristics. It is important to understand that states may have many different social identities that these can be cooperative and conflictual and that state interests may vary accordingly. Such these traits are determined and influenced by their social context made up of shared rules, meanings and ideas. The correct or incorrect behaviour of states shapes up in the context of such variables. Such a social context is not static but change in due time.

“Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works.”<sup>516</sup> Institutions and states therefore mutually constitute entities. Wendt put forward that, “states are self-organizing facts.”<sup>517</sup> Questioning the function of the states means taken the existence of the system as a given factor. He also adds that, “state identities and interests are apartly exogenous to the system.”<sup>518</sup> The identification of the state is also related to the relations between institutions and norms.

“The distinction between Wendt’s focus on structure as the interaction of units, and a realist focus on structure as the potential for co-action, is neither semantic nor trivial. For Wendt and other constructivists, it is the past that matters-how interactions and gestures in the historical process have socialized actors toward certain conceptions of self and other. Most fundamentally, realism is a forward-looking theory.”<sup>519</sup>

“Institutions embody the constitutive and regulative norms and rules of international interaction as such, they shape, constrain and give meaning to state action

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<sup>515</sup> A. Wendt, **Levels of Analysis vs. Agents and Structures: Part III, Review of International Studies**, Vol.18, 1992, p. 183.

<sup>516</sup> A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, p. 399.

<sup>517</sup> Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, p. 246.

<sup>518</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>519</sup> Copeland, **op.cit.**, p.15.

and in part define what is to be a state.”<sup>520</sup> Alexander Wendt argues that institutions are “a structure of identity and interest”.<sup>521</sup> Norms have constitutive effects and institutions can use norms as a tool to construct identity or promote democracy. But it can not be argued that all constructivists are normative or use norms in the same degree. For example, some constructivists believe that Kratochwil is more normative than Wendt.<sup>522</sup>

## 2. EU INTEGRATION WITH REFERENCE TO CONSTRUCTIVISM

In this part, constructivist approach to European integration will be addressed. The actors and tool of the ENP will be figured out to draw the general framework of constructivist perspective to the policy.

### 2.1. Constructivist approach to European integration

The basic discussion between rationalism and constructivism is also has an impact on EU studies. Constructivist approach to European integration can be evaluated as an empirical test of the theory. The rules and norms of the European governance and the identity construction of the Union provide a wide research area for the scholars. There are different approaches in the field of constructivist approach to European integration.<sup>523</sup> First contributions to constructivist approach to European integration, started from the post-positivist camp in the middle of 1990s. The Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP)- the special issue in 1999- entitled The Social Construction of Europe, which is edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener is one of the most important reference point for understanding the constructivist

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<sup>520</sup> Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan, **International Relations: The Key Concepts**, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 52.

<sup>521</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, p. 399.

<sup>522</sup> See Ray Koslowski, V. Friedrich Kratochwil V., “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System”, **International Organization**, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp. 215-47, p. 222.

<sup>523</sup> See T. Christiansen, K.E. Jorgensen, A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, **Journal of European Public Policy**, December 1999, pp. 528-544.



approach to European integration. These scholars follow Adler, Checkel and Wendt and try to find a middle way between positivism and post-positivism.

“Wendt (1999) and Checkel (2001) insist that constructivism can and should share the rationalist commitment to developing knowledge through clear research programmes, refutable hypotheses, and the specification of causal mechanisms that produce regularities.”<sup>524</sup>

According to the editors of the JEPP special issue, this kind of constructivism “consists in its social ontology which comprises many constitutive elements of human interaction such as rules and norms, language and discourse, identity and ideas.”<sup>525</sup>

One of the basic challenges of constructivism is about the empirical shortcomings of the theory. Therefore, it seems difficult to adapt the theory to European integration. Especially rationalist Moravcsik makes criticisms about this difficulty.<sup>526</sup> Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener give an answer to these critics and assert that constructivism accept rationalist epistemology. They claim that constructivism is a metatheoretical approach and it is empirically suitable as any other approaches which are metatheoretical.<sup>527</sup> Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel asserts that; “EU presents a living laboratory within which to study a variety of economic, social, political, and institutional developments, none of which is unique to it.”<sup>528</sup> The EU is an ongoing process and it is like a laboratory, so the scholars have to observe and use some research methods to test their theories and empirical findings. Especially in the case of European integration there could be vague analysis by constructivists. ‘Change’ is a fundamental variable for constructivist perspective and the reality is problematic.<sup>529</sup> Checkel considers the debate on bridge building between rational choice and constructivism, and how it has been applied to EU studies. He believes that, a little positivism is necessary for EU studies. He states that there are different sources such as memoirs, observations

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<sup>524</sup> Michelle Cini, **European Union Politics**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 130.

<sup>525</sup> Friedrichs, **op.cit.**, p. 112.

<sup>526</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet”, **European Union Politics**, Vol.2, No.2, 2001, p. 227.

<sup>527</sup> Thomas Risse, Antje Wiener, “‘Something Rotten’ and the Social Construction of Social Constructivism: A Comment on Comments”, **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol. 6, No.5, December 1999, p. 778.

<sup>528</sup> Joseph Jupille, James A. CaPoraso, Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union”, **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol.36, No.7, 2003, p. 8.

<sup>529</sup> Cini, **op.cit.**, pp. 130-131.

and interviews which show that there are arguments and deliberations are necessary and important elements of the EU integration.<sup>530</sup> Positivism is vital for improving empirical findings.

Pollack also believes that, EU is a fruitful area to test hypotheses for constructivists, about “socialization, norm-diffusion, and collective preference formation.”<sup>531</sup> “Socialization means the process by which actors internalize the norms which then influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interests and simply and it is about the ‘constitutive’ effects of norms and institutions.”<sup>532</sup> In that context, the way how the EU define itself and how state itself in international politics is vital in the sense of constituting European identity. The identity-building process of an agent involves value sharing and socialization processes. The European integration is an evolving process and has a transformative character.

Checkel believes that understanding of power in European integration is both ‘hard-edged and multi-faceted’. By hard-edged he means that, “the compulsive face of power and by multi-faceted, he refers to conceptions of power that go beyond this standard coercive-compulsive notion to capture its institutional and productive dimensions<sup>533</sup> as well.”<sup>534</sup> The power of the EU is generally remised by constructivists.

The actorness problem of the EU also is not a critical problem as for the constructivists as it is for the realists. For constructivist approach, ideas are more important than power and the actorness is interpreted in the sense of intellectual process. Actors, institutions and identities are all constructed elements and the fundamental question is about how the EU constructs the EU identity and how the agents react to this identity. From a constructivist point of view, actors shape their own

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<sup>530</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, **ARENA Seminar**, Centre for European Studies, 9.05.2006.

<sup>531</sup> Mark A. Pollack, “International Theory and European Integration”, **EUI Working Papers**, RSC No. 2000/55, 2000, p.17.

<sup>532</sup> Risse&Wiener, **op.cit.**, p. 778.

<sup>533</sup> “Institutional power is actor’s control of others in indirect ways, where formal and informal institutions mediate between A and B. Productive power is generated through discourse and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produces and transformed.” quotation from Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, **Power in Global Governance**, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 51-55.

<sup>534</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, **ARENA Seminar**, Centre for European Studies, 9.05.2006, p. 22.

identities and behaviours, and the social context emerged in identities and behaviours in turn shapes the agents' identities and behaviours. Therefore, such a cycle lies at the core of constructivism. The actions and interactions of the agents keep the cycle moving.

Neorealist theory claims that the main objective of the system is to survive, so the policies of the EU should also support this fundamental objective of the EU. However in constructivist perspective, there is not a rule of survival but there are settled or ongoing set of practices which are constituted and regulated by norms.<sup>535</sup> “Norms reconstruct identities, so interests change, leading on to change in state policy, thus interests and identities of states are informed by norms.”<sup>536</sup> Constructivists do not support *status quo* and believe in ‘change’ which is a fundamental variable of the theory. The EU is a process and is changing everyday and it is like a living organism and observable. Every national identity is a construction and EU is a reconstruction over these constructions with its *sui generis* structure. Every EU member state has its own identity building process. The EU created a sphere for pooling a part of the sovereignty of every member state and seeks to construct an EU identity.

The international system is anarchic in neorealist terms but in constructivist terms anarchy is constructed by the states. Wendt gives an example on this construction process. He states that;

“If the states militarize, others will be threatened and arm themselves, creating security dilemmas in terms of which they will define egoistic identities and interests. But if they engage in policies of reassurance, as the Soviets did in the late 1980s, this will have a different effect on the structure of shared knowledge, moving it toward a security community.”<sup>537</sup>

In the international normative structure, states are socialized and they could become cooperative or conflictual. Security concerns or state interests are resourced from ideas and shared knowledge. Constructivists focus on the structure which is constructed by social practice, and the interaction of states. “Structures, in constructivist

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<sup>535</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>536</sup> Hobson, **op.cit.**, p.146.

<sup>537</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, **International Security**, Vol.20, No.1, Summer 1995, p.77.

analyzes, are not defined in material terms, rather they are intersubjective.”<sup>538</sup> “Intersubjective systemic structures consist of the shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions”<sup>539</sup> Moreover, intersubjective structures give meaning to the material structures.<sup>540</sup> Consequently, material structures and facts are constituted by the intellectual processes and choices. Material realities such as military, natural resources and geographical advantages become meaningful with the choices and interpretations of the agents. “There is no choice is significant not as a reflection of an outside reality but as a political contextualization of actions and if we do not have a choice, we cannot be blamed.”<sup>541</sup> The military, for example, could be used for making a war or for peace keeping purposes. Also geographical factors become meaningful with political processes. For example, the construction of Black Sea region and its geopolitical importance are constituted by the interaction of agents and the structure. Wendt argues that, “social structures exist not in actors' heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices.”<sup>542</sup> It could be said that, Wendt emphasizes on the process and the on-going character of the structure. For instance, when the Cold War ended the Post-Cold war period started and they are different social structures. Also 9/11 could be interpreted as another social structure because shared knowledge and the actions of the states are changed after this event. Social structures’ cooperative or conflictual property could determine the interests and identities of states. The structure of the EU is cooperative and the member states’ behaviours shape the social structure. “Many European states within the European Union are former enemies who have learned to cooperate because relationships are a product of a historical process and interactions over time.”<sup>543</sup> The bases of the interests are formed by identities. “While constructivists would not deny the importance of interests, they would tie them more directly to the identity of the

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<sup>538</sup> Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, **The European Union as a Global Actor**, Routledge, 1999, p.28.

<sup>539</sup> Alexander Wendt, A Collective Identity Formation and the International State, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.88, No.2, p. 389.

<sup>540</sup> Thierry Balzacq, “The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Tools, Processes, Putcomes, **CEPS Working Document**, No.303, September 2008, p. 10.

<sup>541</sup> Maja Zehfuss, **Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 256.

<sup>542</sup> Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, p. 73.

<sup>543</sup> Fierke, **op.cit.**, p. 170.

subject and also neither identity nor interests can be detached from a world of social meaning.”<sup>544</sup>

In this thesis, the EU is treated as a social structure consisting of EU values, norms and ideas in the international system. It has a post-territorial structure and the borders are more transparent than a Westphalian understanding of border. In constructivist perspective, the state can not be measured with its sovereignty and in the system of the EU; sovereignty is not the main concern of the member states. The interaction of the EU with its neighbours is different than the interaction of the EU member states with each other. As a matter of fact, the old member states and the new member states have different level of interactions, because the adaptation of the new members to the Union and to the EU identity building process takes time. In that sense, in the European social structure, the identities of the EU member states construct the interests and therefore European institutions and *vice versa*.<sup>545</sup>

Actually, anarchy is not the starting point for the constructivists but it is the consequence of the process. Therefore, constructivists believe that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system. The defining of the threat is also can be explain within the same perspective because threats are constructed and do not inherently exist in the system. During the Cold War, in realist terms, the threat for the EU was Soviet Union and it has changed with the end of the Soviet Union. The concept of ‘other’ would be helpful to understand how the EU defines the ‘threats’. Every agent defines itself with ‘the other’, because it is the different one. Defining ourselves is related to define our identities. While during the Cold War era, ‘the other’ was communism, in the Post-Cold War era the concept of ‘other’ has been reconstructed. After 9/11 attack, by the western countries and Islamic fundamentalism became one of the main ‘other’. The variables are essential to analyze the construction process and 9/11 event is an intervening variable and changed the definition of the threat. Islamic fundamentalism is constructed as a threat and moreover Islam itself became ‘the other’ for the Western institutions. But it should be noted that, in the context of the EU, there

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<sup>544</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 171.

<sup>545</sup> See Jeffrey T. Checkel, Social Construction and Integration, WP 98/14, **Arena Working Papers**, 1998.

are multiple identities and multiple ‘others’ and it is difficult to determine a unique ‘other’. Each EU member state has its own historical, cultural and sociological backgrounds and variables. Even though the EU has a supranational structure, still there is a significant effect of national identities of the member states. In other words, all these identity constructions include their own ‘others’. For instance, France’s ‘other’ could be seen as the USA, but on the other hand Poland’s ‘other’ could be Russia or Germany’s ‘others’ could be its own history.<sup>546</sup> The principle aim of the EU identity construction, is explaining by the motto ‘unity in diversity’ in official texts. The EU identity is designed as a supra-identity covering all the other sub-identities by the EU elites. Although the identities are constructions which designed by the elites, the identity building process should be a two-way process and should supported by from bottom-up interactions. Otherwise the identity building process would be failed. Regarding the Eurobarometer survey whose fieldwork was done in 2007, “%91 of the interviewees felt attachment to their nations and only 49% to the EU.”<sup>547</sup> In that sense, nearly half of the individuals of the EU do not feel attached to the EU identity and this shows that the EU identity building process is not supported by the individuals adequately.

One of the biggest obstacles in constructivist analysis is to measure the interactions and socialization processes. Checkel suggest ‘process-tracing method’ to be able to measure persuasion, socialization and also preference change of social agents. Generally conventional constructivists are “positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates of bridge building among diverse theoretical perspectives; the qualitative, process-tracing case study is their typical methodological starting point.”<sup>548</sup> Process-tracing is the method that, “attempts to identify the intervening causal process- the causal chain and causal mechanism- between an independent variable (and variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”.<sup>549</sup> He uses three techniques for his method: Interviews (with individuals who are the target of socialization); content

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<sup>546</sup> See Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse, “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities”, **Journal of European Public Policy**, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, p. 616.

<sup>547</sup> **Eurobarometer 68**, Public Opinion in the European Union, May 2008, p. 67.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb\\_68\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf) [ 02.02.2009]

<sup>548</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 4.

<sup>549</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 8.

analysis of media and specialist publications and lastly consulting official documentary records.<sup>550</sup> Actually this method can support analyze of the socialization capacity of European institutions. “Process-tracing only works if you hold things constant in a series of steps: A causes B: B then causes C: C then causes D: and so on and such an approach simply cannot capture the recursivity and fluidity of post-positivist epistemologies.”<sup>551</sup> “Checkel assert that “the use of process-tracing along with a consideration of counterfactual explanations, where appropriate, allow him to minimize reliance on ‘as if’ assumptions<sup>552</sup> at the agent level.”<sup>553</sup> Most of the constructivists “engage in Checkel’s ‘as if’ reasoning and focus almost exclusively on explaining the role of ideas in foreign policy-making.”<sup>554</sup>

There are different criticisms about Checkel’s research method and Risse and Wiener maintained that his method is empirically testable.<sup>555</sup> However Moravcsik criticized the process-tracing and persuasion procedures.<sup>556</sup> No method can be perfect and measure any socialization processes which have transformative characters and in that sense Checkel’s approach is a significant contribution to the constructivist approach to European integration.

In general terms, the constructivist approaches make research by asking the question ‘how’. These questions are not searching for the unique cause, but trying to find out all the dynamics in the social environment. Comparing to why-questions (using in methodology of rationalism), how-questions are more critical and widespread because in constructivist perspective nothing is given.<sup>557</sup> “How-questions are examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social and objects, thus constituting

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<sup>550</sup> Checkel& Moravcsik, **op.cit.**, p. 223.

<sup>551</sup> Checkel, **Constructivist Approaches to European Integration**, p.9.

<sup>552</sup>“Actors act as if they are egoistical and self-interested.” See Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack, Ben Rosamond (eds.), **Handbook of European Union Politics**, London: Sage Publications, 2007.

<sup>553</sup> Checkel& Moravcsik, **op.cit.**, p. 223.

<sup>554</sup> Moravcsik, “Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet”, p. 227.

<sup>555</sup> Friedrichs, **op.cit.**, p.157.

<sup>556</sup> Checkel believes that constructivist theories predict persuasion, whereas rationalist theories predict manipulation. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet”, **European Union Politics**, 2001, p. 228.

<sup>557</sup> See Price, **op.cit.**, pp.201-204; Price and Reus-Smit, **op.cit.**, pp. 2000-2004; Ioannis F, Galaraiotis “The Theoretical and Empirical Application of Social Constructivism in EU’s Foreign and Security Policy”, **Cyprus Center of European and International Affairs**, Paper No. 2008-04, January 2008, pp. 23-27.

particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude others.”<sup>558</sup> In the context of neighbourhood policy of the EU, some of the fundamental how-questions are; how can we measure EU’s democracy promotion capacity in the region in the case of the ENP? How is the ENP impact on stability and change in the defined area?

In this thesis, the ENP is taken as a case. Some examples are taken into consideration to have a closer look into the case and to reach the empirical data. The constructivist analysis of the examples is grounded on the two-way interactions and the bottom-up approach to be able to measure the effectiveness of the socializations and interactions of the agents. Thus, firstly the social structure and the agents will be clarified and the statistical tables and researches will be used for analysis. Moreover, some social-psychological mechanisms will be used to measure the socialization processes.

## 2.2. ENP in Constructivist Perspective

Constructivists do not focus only on the system or on the agents but focus on the interactions of them. The level of analysis problem is excluded by constructivists and they believe in mutual and two-way relations and interactions.

“A constructivist approach is not wedded to existing legal structures or political organizations as ‘units of analysis’ *per se*; rather, constructivism focuses on human practice, the contingency of practice and the mutual relationship between agents and structures.”<sup>559</sup>

Actors of the ENP are influenced from varied social structures: both EU-level and international level. The EU is a social structure but there are also other social structures in the international system.

In the context of international political system there are kinds of social structures which are facts evolving with historical events, cultural spheres, institutions

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<sup>558</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, **Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations**, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 4

<sup>559</sup> Koslowski, **op.cit.**, p. 565.



or regional organizations. For instance, the 9/11 event or the end of Cold War created social structures. The EU social structure interacts with these social structures and includes various kinds of agents. Also some constructivists, such as Finnemore and Sikkink, believe that there is an ‘international normative structure’ and argue that shared beliefs and ideas constitutes an international norms in the structure.<sup>560</sup> As an example, violence to women and the right to vote occurred as regional problems and constitute shared beliefs and ideas which construct international norms. Therefore, the agents which activate in the context of ENP would be analyzed in the framework of interactions of both social structures and their interactions with the international normative structure. It could be argued that they complement each other. Also the interactions of agents between each other and their interactions with the social structures are crucial.

In these social structures, there are varied agents which are interacting with the structure and so they are socializing. So how can we categorize the agents of the ENP? Actually, all the factors which constitute the perceptions could be assumed as ‘the agents’. Allen and Smith did not treat the EU as a state-like actor and they used the concept of ‘presence’ instead of actor and stated that, “the presence is not the prerogative solely of ‘actors’ centered on people and institutions, but can be a property of ideas, notions, expectations and imaginations.”<sup>561</sup>

Fundamentally, agents of the ENP could be analyzed within two processes which are top-down and bottom-up processes. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan state five interacting arenas of democratization which are civil society, political society, economic society, the rule of law and state bureaucracy.<sup>562</sup> Marc M. Howard summarizes these arenas and shows the interaction of them in detail. According to him,

- “Political society includes community and local organizations, human rights groups, peace institutions, environmental or ecological movements, education

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<sup>560</sup> See Martha Finnemor; Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, **International Organization**, Vol.52, No.4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887-917.

<sup>561</sup> D. Allen, M. Smith, “Western European’s presence in the contemporary international arena”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol.16, No.1, 1990, pp.19-20.

<sup>562</sup> Juan José, Alfred C. Stepan, **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 7-12

or cultural activities, churches or religious organization, sports and leisure clubs, women's group, Veteran's organizations, youth groups, elderly groups, disabled group, animal rights groups, health organization, self-help group.

- Economic society includes business, financial institutions, entrepreneurs and economic elites.
- In the sphere between economic society and political society there are labour unions, professionals, employer and producers associations, economic interest groups and NGOs.”<sup>563</sup>

This categorization on democratization could be helpful to find out the agents of the ENP. In the context of top-down processes of the ENP state-actors could be taken account such as; EU presidency, EU institutions, EU member states, ENP states, governments and parties. But in the bottom-up processes non-state actors could be taken account such as; civil society institutions and organizations, Multinational Corporations, media, public opinion, small groups, individuals. The impact of George Soros in Rose Revolution or Gazprom's impact on energy dialogue with Ukraine could be given as examples to show how different agents could be effective in ENP actions.

The effectiveness of civil society in a country is related to the democratic level of that country.<sup>564</sup> Micheal Walzer states that democratic state and civil society have a cause and effect relationship. In other words, democratic state can create civil society and democratic society can support a democratic state.<sup>565</sup> Howard compares the types of undemocratic countries as; post-communist, post-authoritarian and old democracies and argues that the communist legacy has the most negative effect on civic society. Even in post-authoritarian countries civil society is more active.<sup>566</sup> “Another group of factors that accounts for the weakness of civil society is history, tradition and culture – if people are simply not accustomed to defending their interests and taking active part in public life, they do not easily change their habits.”<sup>567</sup>

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<sup>563</sup> Marc Morje, **The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe**, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 37.

<sup>564</sup> For the positive correlation between civic society and democracy see Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, **Civic Traditions in Making Democracy Work: Modern Italy**, Princeton University Press, 1994.

<sup>565</sup> Micheal Walzer, “The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction”, **Dissent**, No. 39, Spring, pp. 239-304.

<sup>566</sup> Howard, “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society”, pp. 157-69.

<sup>567</sup> Kristi Raik, “Promoting Democracy Through Civil Society How tot Step Up the EU's Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood”, **CEPS Working Document**, No. 237, February 2006, p. 4.

The state actors could pressure on non-state actors in non-democratic states. In that sense, there is a common belief that, the state actors challenging with non-state actors. Especially in the Eastern European countries, the civil society was in opposition with the communist regime but in democratizing system it is different. The state could also be in interaction with the civil society.<sup>568</sup>

In the case of ENP, the neighbourhood countries are non-democratic countries but in different levels. Thus, the effectiveness of civil society in these countries is debatable. The EU seeks to support the civil society in ENP countries in the context of democracy promotion efforts. But as regarding the study, “the EU has given less support to civil society in its Eastern neighbourhood than some other major donors.”<sup>569</sup>

The other crucial point is about the changing agents in every case of the ENP. The variables of the ENP; democracy promotion process, Cross Border Cooperation, conflict resolution or energy dialogue all have different agents. In the case of the impact of ENP on conflict resolution the agents are different than the democracy promotion efforts of the EU because in the conflict there are two sides and the EU is the third part. Thus, the agents are could be categorized such as; conflicting parties, conflicted parties’ small groups, individuals, NGOs, governments, parties, beuraucrats, EU member state governments, EU member states’ NGOs, EU institutions, ENP external commissioner, non-EU governments and civil society organizations. Moreover, there could be non-EU states and organizations influence over the conflicts. In the case of the energy dialogue the agents and their interactions are different. For example, the oil and gas companies and businessman could be more active in the energy dialogue.

Jan Beyers conception of ‘role playing’ could be useful to explain the agents’ role in the sense of ENP. According to him,

“Thus actors from their social context by playing their roles; that is, they transmit information on how things should be done. Although roles are properties of individual actors, they also provide information about how groups, networks, or larger social

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<sup>568</sup> Marc Morje Howard, **The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe**, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 39. For further argumentation about the relations of state and civil society see also; Antonio Gramsci, “State and Civil Society” in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, **The Anthropology of the State: A Reader**, Blackwell Publishing, 2006. pp. 71-86.

<sup>569</sup> Raik, **op.cit.**, p.1.

aggregates function. In sum, a study of role playing should focus on the individual without looking sight of the broader context in which this individual embedded.”<sup>570</sup>

Role concept is widely used in the literature of behavioural sciences. Role conceptualization is used in the socialization process and personality development and also for the description of the structure, societies and sub-systems.<sup>571</sup>

Every agent defines itself in its social context. The EU member states have role playing in two ways as intergovernmentalist or supranationalist in the level of representatives.<sup>572</sup> The different attitudes of the EU member states change their preferences about the ENP partners. Every EU member state gives financial support to the different ENP countries and priority arenas. Regarding the national indicative program of Ukraine, for every Action Plan arenas different member states are becoming donors. (e.g. for improving the human rights in Ukraine; Denmark, Germany, Estonia, France, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, United Kingdom.) For the cooperation with civil society the same countries except Germany, were the donors. For the conflict prevention efforts Germany, Finland and Sweden are donors. Also there are non-EU donors in every priority areas. One way to exemplify this would be state that; Norway and the U.S. are donors for the conflict prevention but for the cooperation with civil society Canada, Norway and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave financial aid to Ukraine.<sup>573</sup> The other crucial point is the attitude of the civil society and public opinion towards the ENP countries social systems and people. The results of Eurobarometer’s survey on EU citizen’s attitudes towards neighbourhood countries shows that “some %68 of EU citizens consider the EU’s relations with neighbouring countries to be good and %14 perceive them to bad.”<sup>574</sup>

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<sup>570</sup> Jan Beyers, “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe” in Jeffrey T. Checkel, **International Institutions and Socialization in Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 101.

<sup>571</sup> Ward S. Mason, Neal Gross, “Role Conceptualization and Empirical Complexities”, Paper presented at the American Sociological Society, Berkeley, California, August 30- September 1, 1953, p. 1.

<sup>572</sup> See for the details of socialization in the EU; Jan Beyers, “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials”, **International Organization**, Vol.59, No.4, 2005, pp. 899-936.

<sup>573</sup> European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, Ukraine, National Indicative Programme 2011-2013, pp. 35-37. See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011\\_enpi\\_nip\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf)

<sup>574</sup> Eurobarometer, “The European Union and Its Neighbours”, October 2006, 259 Summary, p.4. See [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_259\\_sum\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_259_sum_en.pdf) [05.02.2009]

The attitudes of the neighbourhood countries towards the ENP are changing from country to country. ENP partners also have different role playings regarding to their attitudes. The neighbourhood country could be pro-European, pro-American, pro-Russian attitude or any of the combinations of them. One way to exemplify this would be assert that; Ukraine, has a divided social structure between its eastern and western regions as pro-EU and pro-Russian. Role playing is related to the identity formations and images of the agents. Every agent from individual to the institution and governments, have role playing which reflects these images. The actions of the agents and the discourses are the parts of this role playing.

The social structure and agents of Russia are crucial to understand the attitudes of the EU agents and the ENP agents. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the social structure of Russia was still under the constituting effect of the values of Soviet legacy. The national identity of Russia had to be restructured to change the structure of multi-ethnic national identity which was constructed during the Soviet Union era. Principally Russian elites identify Russia as a Eurasian country and claim that Russia does not aim to be a part of Europe. Russia also attempted to be the part of liberal system however Russia still has a “limited economic reforms, corporate closeness of the state and controlled democracy (or even overt authoritarianism)”.<sup>575</sup> All these factors carried Russia as one of the ‘others’ of the EU system.

The post-communist countries sandwiched between the EU and Russia, aimed to be a part of European values and norms, again and this objective is called with the motto of ‘back to Europe’. In the official papers of the EU, the values of the Union is represented as, “respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.”<sup>576</sup> The CEE countries are locate between Russian and EU social structures and they are also been reconstruct their identities with interacting both of these social structures which consist of shared understanding, expectation and social knowledge. Thomas Carothers uses the term 'political grey zone' for the post-communist

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<sup>575</sup> Oleksandr Pavliuk, “The States ‘In Between’” in Alexandeer J. Motyl, Bair A.Ruble and Lilia Shevtsova (eds.), **Russia’s Engagement with the West**, M.E.Sharpe, p. 186.

<sup>576</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper”, 12.05.2004, **COM(2004)373** final p. 12.

states which are in between being fully liberal or fully authoritarian.<sup>577</sup> Therefore, it could be put forward that Russian and EU social structures are overlapping in the post-communist sphere. The post-communist countries in the ENP area could be assorted as Eastern European (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and Southern Caucasian countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia). In the beginning of 1920s, Southern Caucasian countries were a member of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and than they became the constituent member states of the Soviet Union. All these post-communist countries were under the impact of Russification politics. Through Russification, the language of Russian became a common language for all the communist countries and they were all reconstructed politically and culturally. In that sense, obviously the communist legacy is still significant in these countries. Even though there are prominent western and European effects in post-communist countries, they are in between the eastern and western influences. Also post-communist countries which became EU member states after 2004 are transitional countries and there could be economical, social and political sharings through these countries with the tool of ENP. NGOs, academic and cultural activities and people to people connections are active between these countries and the EU countries. Poland-Ukraine relations, is a good example for these activities. Regarding the historical background between Poland and Ukraine, Poland is an important agent for strengthening relations with respect to European values. However the recent political developments and election results in Ukraine show that the democratization process in Ukraine was interrupted. Yanukovich do not attempt to become closer to the European social structure and would probably turn the face of Ukraine to the East. Therefore it could be said that the democracy promotion efforts of the EU just triggered the east-west split in Ukraine did not find the support in the presidential election.

In 2004, some of the CEEs became the part of EU system. The historically and culturally shared norms and values are the fundamental instruments to spread out European norms and values to the other Eastern European countries which are remained outside the borders of the EU. Rey Koslowski believes that constructivism intends to

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<sup>577</sup> See Thomas Carothers, "The End of Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.13, No.1, January 2002, pp. 5-21.

understand European integration as a social and historical process in a deeper way.<sup>578</sup> In that context, ENP is constructed as a policy to include these countries into the EU values system but not accept them legally into the EU. In other words, the ENP is a policy which limits the possibility of EU membership for the neighbourhood countries. The EU countries want to share the norms and values but they do not want to make these countries as decision-makers in the system. However on the other side, the perspective of the EU system is not to exclude the eastern European countries which remained in between Russia and Europe especially after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and to give an impetus to the construction of the ENP as a functional tool to cope with several effects of the EU enlargements.

In the context of the relationship with the Mediterranean countries the variable of the otherness of Islamic fundamentalism is crucial. It is a dilemma for the values and ideas of the EU which is based on multiculturalism, and it is challenging in the sense of Turkish membership, attitude to Muslim minorities or immigrants in the EU member states and the relations with the Islamic neighborhood countries. At that point, the ENP is also projected as a diplomatic tool to improve and balance the relations with the Islamic countries in the northern Africa and in the Middle East. Although there is a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which has started to be active in the Mediterranean region, the ENP drew a broader framework. In the ENP, there is also Azerbaijan as another Muslim country and there are other potential ENP partners in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan which has a Muslim majority.

The Northern African countries which are taking into consideration with the ENP are mostly out of the European social structure even though they were colonized countries. Their cultural and political formation is constructed by different norms and values. Morocco, for example is applied for EU membership but it is rejected. On the other side, Mediterranean region is historically a crucial region for Europe and especially France gives emphasis on the construction of regional identity buildings in the Mediterranean region. Northern Mediterranean countries such as Italy, France and Spain have political and economic connections with these neighbours and they do not

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<sup>578</sup> Koslowski, *op.cit.*, p. 565.

want to exclude these Mediterranean neighbours from the EU social structure. Moreover, there is an economical and political gap between the northern Mediterranean EU countries and southern Mediterranean countries. In that context, improving economical, political and cultural ties within these countries is essential to fill this gap and have friendly relationship. Otherwise, the probability of facing more security challenges such as immigration and illegal operations would be inevitable. Moreover, events of 9/11 in 2001 and other terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, are constructed a negative image in Europe for the Islamist countries and this also affected the relations with northern African countries in a negative way. In addition to 9/11 attack, US operation to Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered the EU member states to revised its Middle East policy. After these events, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is reconsidered and the ENP is constructed as a broader framework as a supporter for this regional partnership.

The southern dimension of the ENP is designed to attract these countries into the sphere of European influence. Regional security concept in the Mediterranean region would also be constructed through European norms and values. It could be argued that the EU identity consists of different level of identities. Regional identities are also part of the EU identity. By constructing a regional identity, also the negative effect of some security issues in the region such illegal operations and immigration could be decreased and could be controlled. Black Sea region is a good example for a construction of a region. For centuries, the region is dominated by big powers and a regional identity is constructed though these years. The ENP gives emphasis on the Black Sea dimension and supports the EU identity-building efforts in the region. After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU the Union had new borders to the Black Sea. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia are included into the ENP area. Turkey which is one of the important constituent in the region is a candidate of the EU. Thus, all the countries in the Black Sea region are trying to include in the sphere of European norms and values. Similar to the region of Eastern Europe, the Russian and European influence are clashing in this region. In that sense, the EU designed to sign a Treaty with Russia agreeing on four common spaces. Therefore, it would encourage cooperation with Russia on same certain issues even though Russia reject to be a part of



the ENP in the framework of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In constructivist perspective, this Agreement which is based on common values and shared interests seem not to be affective because Russia is ‘the other’ in the EU identity construction and it is difficult for both sides to interact and to share the common values and interests.

Consequently in this part a general framework is drawn, as a ground for the analysis of ENP’s field of activity with various examples from the ENP countries.

### 3. FIELD OF ACTIVITY

The field of activity of the ENP will be taken under consideration in constructivist perspective and will be clarified with various examples from ENP countries. EU’s efforts on promoting democracy and border interactions will be considered as the fundamental instruments or variables of the EU that will be crucial examples for the constructivist analysis ENP. How are the agents of the ENP interacting and how does the EU use instruments in socialization and modernization processes?

The field of activity of ENP would not be analyzed on the interests of the actors that give emphasis on power and national interests. In constructivist perspective, interests are constructed by ideas, and material conditions are interpreted within these ideas and meanings. After that, material conditions constitute reality. Identities and interests are constructed by practice as Wendt mentions<sup>579</sup> and in that sense the practices of the ENP will show the interests and identities of the EU. “Instead of an *a priori* view of actors and interests, constructivism regards them as being the focus of investigation.”<sup>580</sup> The value transfer, in the end of the process of democracy promotion or conflict-resolution efforts, could be accepted as one of the interest which is created through the ENP efforts.

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<sup>579</sup> A. Wendt, Levels of Analysis vs. Agents and Structures: Part III, **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 18, 1992, p. 183.

<sup>580</sup> Kamran Bukhari, “Constructivism & Epistemic Community: Theoretical Tools for Understanding the Crafting of Foreign Policy towards Non-State Actors”, **The McMaster Journal of Communication**, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Article 4, 2004, p. 37.

Nina Tannenwald put the ideas into four major categories: “ideologies or shared belief systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, and policy prescriptions”<sup>581</sup> “Ideologies or shared belief systems are a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs that reflect the social needs and aspirations of a group, class, culture or state.”<sup>582</sup> Moreover, ideas could change or be changeable. For instance, the perception of the neighbour is changed after the 2004 accession and new perceptions are constructed new ideas and beliefs about these countries and their people. Thus, social reality is affected by the changing ideas and interests. So it is shaped in virtue of “the intersubjective beliefs and ideas, conceptions and assumptions that are widely shared among people”.<sup>583</sup>

The ideas and shared meanings of the EU transfer to the ENP countries through socialization and modernization processes. In a General Affairs and External Relations Council’s paper, it is mentioned that the EU has “a great modernizing power”.<sup>584</sup> Moreover for the EU’s neighbours it is stated that, “advance on their paths of modernization and creating a space of stability and shared values beyond our borders is in our mutual interest.”<sup>585</sup> The modernization process is the construction of a modern society and as Schimmelfennig states, one of the mechanisms for democratization.<sup>586</sup> “According to modernization theory, democracy is a function of the level of social and economic development of a country.”<sup>587</sup> The ideas and beliefs in the EU social structure are resourced from European liberal and democratic culture which is based on market economy. The *acquis communautaire* reflects the fundamental values and norms of the EU and it is a social contract for the EU citizens which are belong to different nationalities and also for the potential members. For Kwarciak, “...*acquis communautaire*, is perceived by most of its neighbors as a very attractive object of

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<sup>581</sup> Nina Tannenwald, “Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda”, **Journal of Cold War Studies**, Vol.7, No.2, Spring 2005, p. 15.

<sup>582</sup> Jackson & Sorensen, *op.cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>583</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>584</sup> “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, General Affairs and External Relations Council, **DG E VI, 10874/07**, 18-19.06.2007, 10874/07, pp. 1-2

<sup>585</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>586</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Conditionality, Economic Development, and Linkage”, **Paper for EUSA Biennial Conference**, Montreal, May 2007, p. 9

<sup>587</sup> **Ibid.**

potential identification.”<sup>588</sup> The identity formation of the EU is injected in the *acquis* and it is reflecting some of the properties of the social structure of the EU to the ENP countries. The *acquis* evolves with parallel to the widening and deepening of the Union. (e.g. the number of chapters is increasing after every enlargement.) It should be emphasized that the *acquis* and the agreements with the neighbourhood countries represents just a part of the social structure of the EU but not the whole. Historical, social and cultural variables are also the other components of the social structure.

Jan Beyers argues that “the organization of social interactions which are the institutional conditions and informal/formal rules that structure social life affect behavioural practices, norms and preferences.”<sup>589</sup> If we adapt this argument to interaction of agents of the ENP, it could be said that *acquis communautaire* is the fundamental base for the institutional conditions and the formal rules are consist of the Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with ENP countries, Action Plans, Country Reports, European Neighbourhood Agreements and the financial instruments. Also there are informal mechanisms which are constituted by such as the scholars which are studying on the ENP, the speeches of the Commissioners, EU bulletins, ad-hoc visits, letters, declarations and the other communication tools. The formal rules are not totally based on punish and reward mechanisms as it is implementing for the candidate countries. ‘Consent’ is an essential principle for the ENP socialization process. Both formal and informal mechanisms are a part of the top-down process. The political language and discourse constructs an image and a “speech act”<sup>590</sup> for the EU. The discourse of the EU also draws the transparent borders of its identity.

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<sup>588</sup> Krystyna Kwarciak, “Re-Socializing Neighbors: A Theoretical Perspective on the EU’s Power Attraction and Its Socializing Strategy of Conditionality” in Krystyna Kwarciak; Sergiu Panainte, “Socializing Strategies and Their Application: The Case of Moldova”, **Center for EU Enlargement Studies**, Vol.4, No.6, p. 8.

<sup>589</sup> Jan Beyers, “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe” in Jeffrey T. Checkel, **International Institutions and Socialization in Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 99.

<sup>590</sup> Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert (eds.), **International Relations in a Constructed World**, New York: M.E.Shartpe Armonk, 1998, pp. 66-69.

How could the socialization process and social interaction be constituted within the ENP influence? Alastair I. Johnston evaluates socialization as;

“non-coercive diplomatic influence attempts by most actors most of the time are aimed at 'changing the minds' of others, of persuading, cajoling or shaming them to accept, and hopefully internalize, new facts, figures, arguments, norms and causal understandings about particular issues.”<sup>591</sup>

With parallel to this interpretation, ENP influence could be evaluated ‘as a non-coercive diplomatic influence’ as Johnston mentions. However, it should be noted that, in the context of the ENP, the socialization process is not assessed as an elite-driven process consisting of shaming or punishing the neighbourhood countries. In constructivist perspective, this process could be evaluated from two sides and persuasion is a key concept. According to Johnston, ‘empathy, honesty and trust’ are essential in persuasion process.<sup>592</sup> The success of persuasion process is parallel with internalization of norms and values. The internalization is related to the bottom-up interactions which are vital for the success of the modernization and socialization processes. Otherwise, the ENP partners could not internalize the norms and the values. For the persuasiveness of the interaction between agents of the EU and the ENP partners the bottom-up processes should be effective. According to Onuf, “whether speech act accomplish anything depends on whether others respond to what they hear.”<sup>593</sup> In other words, the perceptions shape reactions and feedbacks of the receiver in a basic communication process which means that the ENP partners and the agents reactions and feedbacks out of the EU social structure is essential. The success of the persuasion process related to the reassessment of these reactions and feedbacks. Thus there should be a two-way interaction process.

Civil society organizations, the public opinion and individuals in the ENP countries are the basic agents of bottom-up processes. John Ruggie emphasizes the role of civil society and calls the agents which are in the process of bottom-up process such

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<sup>591</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.45, No.4, 2001, pp. 491-492.

<sup>592</sup> Johnston, **op.cit.**, p.13. See for the persuasion concept, Michael C. Williams, “The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations”, **Conflict and Cooperation**, Vol.32, 1997, pp. 287-307.

<sup>593</sup> Onuf, **op.cit.**, pp. 66-69.

as individuals and small groups as “micro-practices”.<sup>594</sup> The feedbacks of the neighbourhood countries towards the ENP could be measures with these agents’ reactions. The EU is aware of the importance of civil society dimension for the success of the ENP. In the paper of General Affairs and External Relations Council, it is stated that;

“Therefore, strengthening its civil society dimension is vital for the ENP’s overall success. This will take the form of an intensified dialogue with civil society in partner countries, including on inter-cultural and inter-faith issues, better information on ENP matters by EU and Member States’ institutions, also on the ground, and in particular through enhanced EU support to the civil society dimension.”<sup>595</sup>

According to Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, civil society refers to “the arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.”<sup>596</sup>

The necessity of the role of civil society is a part of role conception of the ENP agents, however in practice the lack of the civil society could be observed. As regarding to the result of an survey on “Civil Society in the Context of Monitoring the Implementation of European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan” leaders of hundred Georgian NGOs answered the questionnaire and it is found out that,

“59% of the respondents are dissatisfied with the level of communication of EU with civil societies of neighbor countries and express the desire that EU communication be revealed in EU policy and regulations, which may imply creation of permanent working group, conducting the discussions and meetings, ensuring constant exchange of information not only with the government, but also with the civil society.”<sup>597</sup>

The weakness of civil society in ENP countries is also acknowledged by the EU and there are attempts on improving it. In the Non-Paper of the EU on

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<sup>594</sup> John Ruggie, **Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization**, New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 27.

<sup>595</sup> “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 8.

<sup>596</sup> Juan José Linz, Alfred C. Stepan, **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe**, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 7.

<sup>597</sup> “Survey of Civil Society in the Context of Monitoring the Implementation of European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan”, **Open Society Georgia Foundation and Eurasia Partnership Foundation**, Tbilisi, 2008. p. 8.

*Strengthening the Civil Society Dimension of the ENP*, some crucial points addressed by the EU which are seeking to strengthen;

“the education cooperation and student and teacher mobility (Tempus, Erasmus Mundus, Scholarships to the College of Europe, Life-long Learning, Jean Monnet Action, Training young professionals), creating a borderless European, cooperation among research institutions and think-tanks, youth exchanges, cross-border cooperation, cooperation between local and regional authorities and culture( dialogue between writers, thinkers, painters, artists as well as cultural organisations).<sup>598</sup>

In the bottom-up process of the modernization of ENP, other social-psychological strategies could be effective such as persuasion and trust. ‘Trustworthiness’ of the persuader, the mutual trust and internalization of the shared beliefs are essential in persuasion process.

For persuasion, the discourse and the content of the speech are also crucial.<sup>599</sup> In the framework of EU social structure; the public opinion of the EU citizens and also the governments and the civil society of the member states are also taken into consideration. The message which the EU social structure gives to the receiver is directly related to the property of the sender in a basic communication model. As regarding to a Eurobarometer’s survey which was carried out in 2006 for citizens of the EU (25 members) strongly support cooperation in specific areas- terrorism (%90), crime (%90), economic development (%88), democracy (%87), education and training (%83)- between the EU and its neighbours”<sup>600</sup> The support of the EU citizens is an element of trustability of the EU social structure from the perspective of the ENP partners. The identities and the roles conceptualizations of all agents are essential for the persuasion. In constructivist perspective, the ‘language’ is one of the most influence instruments. Language of the official papers and the statements are the reflection of the discourse<sup>601</sup> of the EU agents.

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<sup>598</sup> European Commission, Non-Paper, “Strengthening the Civil Society Dimension of the ENP”, **COM (2006) 726 Final**, 4.12.2006, pp. 3-6.

<sup>599</sup> See European Rhetoric Website. See <http://www.european-rhetoric.com/rhetoric-101/modes-persuasion-aristotle/> [16.01.2010]

<sup>600</sup> **Eurobarometer**, “The European Union and Its Neighbourhood”, October 2006, No.259, p. 8. See [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_259\\_sum\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_259_sum_en.pdf) [16.01.2010]

<sup>601</sup> For the details of the concept discourse see; Kenneth J. Gergen, **An Invitation to Social Construction**, Sage Publications, 1999, pp. 62-87.

Especially, Action Plans are the fundamental instruments in creating a dialogue between the ENP Partner states and the EU. ENP states give feedbacks to the Action Plans. The civil society experts analyze the priorities of the Action Plans and prepare some reports. For instance, in Armenia, The Partnership for Open Society<sup>602</sup> is a platform which analyzing the Action Plans and give feedbacks about them. In Georgia, Open Society Institute<sup>603</sup>, which is founded by George Soros is active in Georgia and supports the Georgian civil society. The institute also analyze the Action Plans and the other official documents in the negotiation and gives feedbacks by its reports.

In the EU paper entitled on *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*, the importance of interaction with individuals is assessed and it is stated that;

“...the ENP must have a “human face”, and citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries should have more opportunities to interact, and to learn more about each others’ societies and understand better each others’ cultures. The ENP cannot only be a matter for officials and politicians. On both sides of the borders, people should be able to see directly the impact of a stronger bond between the Union and its neighbours.”<sup>604</sup>

In this paper, it is objected to strengthen “educational and youth exchanges (e.g. Erasmus Mundus); mobility of researchers (e.g. Marie Curie fellowships); civil society exchanges (e.g. contacts among trade unions, regional and local authorities health practitioners, NGOs, and cultural groups).”<sup>605</sup>

The financial supports which are given through ENPI are also essential in the socialization process. The financial guarantee could reinforce reliability. With the National Indicative Programmes (NIP), the budget and the allocation of the financial support are planned. For Ukraine, e.g., the indicative financial support for the period 2007-2010 is € 494 million. Moreover, for the first Priority Area which is a support for Democratic Development and Good Governance is 48.2 mn (30%).<sup>606</sup> For Morocco, as

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<sup>602</sup> “A group of NGOs and individuals have established a partnership of civil society actors - Partnership for Open Society - a coalition of independent and influential NGOs, donors, and international agencies in Armenia and Diaspora.”, See at [http://www.partnership.am/en/About\\_POS](http://www.partnership.am/en/About_POS) [16.01.2010]

<sup>603</sup> Open Society-Georgia Foundation. See, <http://www.osgf.ge>

<sup>604</sup> European Commission, “On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, **COM (2006) 726 Final**, p. 6.

<sup>605</sup> **Ibid.**, p. 7.

<sup>606</sup> European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “Ukraine”, National Indicative Programme 2007-1010. See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_nip\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf) [16.01.2010]

another example, for the same period of NIP there is €654 million. For this country, the first priority is on social problems. The programme gives 45, 26%€ m, mostly for education and health, to Morocco. The difference of treatment to these two countries indicates the ‘tailor-made’ property of the Action Plans and the priorities for the ENP partners which could be diversify for each partner in the context of their different social, economical and cultural dynamics.

### 3.1. Democracy Promotion

Promoting democracy to the ENP countries is one of the major variables which constitutes the fundamentals and processes of the policy. On this matter, Ferrero-Waldner, in one of her speech, states that;

“Perhaps our greatest success in democratization has been the enlargement process. This used the EU’s gravitational pull to foster democracy and the rule of law across central and Eastern Europe, and the process continues today. Although enlargement is unique in offering the incentive of EU membership, we have nevertheless learnt from the experience and have used it to inform the development of our newest democratization tool, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).”<sup>607</sup>

As Ferrero-Waldner emphasized in her speech that the enlargement process is an influential tool for the democracy promotion efforts of the EU with its effective mechanism of political conditionality. Copenhagen criteria (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), which is put forward in the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, includes all the instruments of the modernization and socialization process.<sup>608</sup> The ENP is another modernization tool with using different mechanisms for interacting with the neighbourhood countries.

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<sup>607</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Remarks on Democracy Promotion, “Democracy Promotion: The European Way”, Conference Organised by the European Parliament’s Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”, **SPEECH/06/790**, 7.12.2006.

<sup>608</sup> See Elena Baracani, “The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of Democratization in the Framework of the Neighbourhood Policy?” in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi, **European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues**, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med” Department of Political Studies, 2004, p. 43.  
See <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/baracani.pdf> [18.01.2010]



Democracy promotion is related to the concept of stability in neorealist terms, in constructivist terms it could be put forward that it is related to the stability with referring to peace and harmony. While realist theories consider instability as the source of anarchy, in constructivist perspective, stability can be explained by hierarchy and also complex stable systems should be hierarchical because anarchical systems are seen as immature.<sup>609</sup>

In the official documents of the ENP, democracy is a prerequisite for the stability. Regarding that issue, in the paper of the Commission it is stated that; “democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labor standards are all essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic development.”<sup>610</sup> Liberal constructivists believe that the democratic peace theory which is grounded on the Kantian thought on ‘perpetual peace’, could explain the relationship between stability, democracy and peace. Democratic peace theory argues that democratic states do not fight and there would be peace between democratic countries. As Risse-Kappen mentions democracies create their own friends and enemies.<sup>611</sup> In that context, it is totally related to how the EU identifies its ‘other’ and its identity. The ENP partners are not EU’s ‘other’ and EU puts them into the category of its ‘friends’ by referring them with the phrase of ‘ring of friends’ in the official documents.

Democracy is one of the fundamental values of the EU and it could be implemented with two-way processes. The norm-diffusion is mostly a top-down process but in the democracy promotion there should also be a bottom-up process. On this issue Ferrero-Waldner mentions in her speech,

“Our main tool is our geographic programmes which are tailored to particular countries’ needs. The philosophy behind our assistance is a long-term commitment; tailored to local needs; aware that the crucial element in democratisation is the

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<sup>609</sup> Stefano Guzzini, Anna Leander, **Constructivism and International Relations**, Oxon, USA, Canada: Routledge, 2006, pp. 154-155.

<sup>610</sup> European Commission, “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, **COM (2003) 104 Final**, p. 7.

<sup>611</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument”, **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.1, No.4, 1995, p. 492.

domestic impetus for reform. We know democracy cannot be imposed from outside; our responsibility is to support and encourage the forces of reform.”<sup>612</sup>

The reactions and feedbacks of individuals and other agents are vital. The bottom-up process is related to the mutual trust which can be shared through socialization processes and interaction.<sup>613</sup> According to Schmitter and Karl, NGOs and informal informational networks are essential for the democratization process. These informal and civilian attempts are prerequisite for the effectiveness of the bottom-up process.<sup>614</sup>

In addition, the bottom-up process of democracy promotion is planned to support by the tailor-made structure of the ENP. Each neighbourhood country has its own political, economical and social dynamics and variables, so the Action Plans for each country focus on different issues. But there are fundamental conditions which the EU offers for the ENP countries for having more democratic government and governance. The Action Plan of Ukraine, stressed on some of these fundamental conditions and states,

“...internal reforms based on strengthening democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence, democratic election in accordance with OSCE and Council of Europe norms and standards (political pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non discrimination on grounds of gender, and on political, religious and ethnic grounds).”<sup>615</sup>

The activities of democracy promotion are supported by the new legal instrument for financing which is European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). For the period between 2007 and 2013 the EIDHR allocated a budget of

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<sup>612</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, **SPEECH/06/790**, 7.12.2006.

<sup>613</sup> See Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, (eds.), **Security Communities**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

<sup>614</sup> Philippe Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is...And Is Not” In Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), **The Global Resurgence of Democracy**, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 49-59.

<sup>615</sup> European Commission, EU/Ukraine Action Plan, 2005.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/ukraine\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf) [19.02.2009]

1.104 million Euros.<sup>616</sup> Financial aids should be supported with other social and political activities to make it more effective.

### 3.1.1. Towards the Black Sea Region

Black Sea region is one of the cornerstones to assess the EU's neighbourhood relations. After Romania and Bulgaria became EU members in 2007, the EU had borders in the Black Sea. The Black Sea region started to be interpreted as a European region by the EU institutions and elites. The candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, and FYRM), the ENP Partners (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), EU member states (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria) and Russia as a strategic partner are the parts of the Wider Black Sea Region.

The region covers a wide post-communist space with the willing partners<sup>617</sup> which are Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia could create a synergy for the democracy promotion and strengthens the interaction. Although the membership perspective did not mention formally, the potential of these countries are implied in the EU discourse. The new European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, implies this discourse in his speech on the website on the Commission. Füle states that ENP does not determine the future prospects on ENP partner and they are independent which means that these countries might have a membership perspective in the future.<sup>618</sup> Also the experiences of coloured revolutions in the region are considered by the EU elites, as a motivator for the civil society interactions which could activate the modernization process.

In the context of the Black Sea region, the regional identity question came along. Historically, the empires of the Byzantine, Ottoman and Russian empires

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<sup>616</sup> European Commission, External Cooperation Programmes, European Instrument for Democracy & Human rights (EIDHR). See [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm) [19.02.2009]

<sup>617</sup> Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, "European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time indeed for an 'ENP Plus'", **CEPS Policy Brief**, No.126, March 2007, p. 10.

<sup>618</sup> Loost Legendijk, "Olli Rehn Gitti, Stefan Füle Geldi", **Radikal**, 02.12.2009. See <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazarYazisi&ArticleID=967103>

constructed norms, values, identities and interests in the region. In a similar way, the Soviet Union constructed a communist identity in this space, except Turkey and Greece, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union a post-communist values and shared meanings appeared in this area. The Western institutions and agents became effective in the beginning of the 1990s. Common history, geography and values constructs similar interests and these are essential elements for the democracy promotion efforts. From the reference point of considering every identity is constructed, it can be put forward that the Black Sea identity is a region-building process. In other words, regions could be defined as “emergent, socially constituted phenomena.”<sup>619</sup> In constructivist perspective, for the socialization of a region, “the formation of regional social linkages (language, culture, ethnicity, awareness of a common historical heritage), political linkages (political institutions, ideology, regime types) or economic linkages (preferential trade arrangements)”<sup>620</sup> are fundamental. In this process, geographical and historical legacies could be considered as agents and apart from that, there are other agents such as institutions, regional organizations, states, governments, non-governmental platforms, NGOs and individuals from both Black Sea countries and Western Institutions.

In constructivist perspective, in the regionalization process different agents are active. Björn Hettne differentiates regionalism as ‘old regionalism’ and ‘new regionalism’. The state is in the center of ‘old regionalism’ process but in the ‘new regionalism’ there are many different aspects as social, cultural, economical and political.<sup>621</sup> Thus, the concept of ‘new regionalism’ is parallel with constructivist approach.

The Black Sea region came to have a wider meaning than it has geographically. Besides Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, the southern

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<sup>619</sup> Bob Jessop, “The Political Economy of Scale and the Construction of Cross-Border Micro-Regions” in Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy Shaw (eds.), **Theories of New Regionalism**, U.K and USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 63-80.

See also p. 4 at, <http://socgeo.ruhosting.nl/colloquium/ConstructionOfCrossborderMicroregions.pdf> [19.02.2009]

<sup>620</sup> Rodrigo Tavares, “The State of the Art of Regionalism: The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline”, **UNU-CRIS e-Working Papers**, No.10, 2004, p.4.

See, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN018784.pdf> [19.02.2009]

<sup>621</sup> See for ‘new regionalism’, Björn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, **The New Regionalism Series**, Vol. I-V, Macmillan Press, 1999-2001.

Caucasus countries and also the western Balkans countries have been included into the “wider Black Sea” region.<sup>622</sup> It should be emphasized that these countries are evaluated in different levels by the EU. While the Balkan countries and Turkey have EU membership perspective, the other non-EU countries have only ENP perspective. Moreover Bulgaria and Romania are already EU member states.<sup>623</sup>

Emerson argues that, “a Black Sea initiative could be seen as seeking to bolster the ENP and to compensate is some degree for the disappointment of the Black Sea states aspiring to membership – *compensatory regionalism* for the excluded lying beyond the frontier.”<sup>624</sup> Because according to him, “Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are disappointed at not being granted a ‘membership perspective’ by the EU.”<sup>625</sup>

As regarding to the Freedom House’s democracy scores of the countries in 2008 which is an average of ratings for electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption, Moldova (5.0), Armenia (5.21), Georgia (4.79) and Ukraine (4.25) have the best score when compared to the other post-communist countries.<sup>626</sup> These countries are improving themselves on the way of democratization and in that sense their expectations are higher than the other ENP countries.

Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka, Tina Freyburg, Anne Wetzel and Sandra Lavenex established a project team in the framework of efforts of “National

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<sup>622</sup> Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom”, **Policy Review**, No.125, June/July 2004, pp.17-26.

<sup>623</sup> European Commission, Commission Communication, “Black Sea Synergy- A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, **COM (2007) 160 Final**, 11.04.2007.

<sup>624</sup> Michael Emerson, “The EU’s New Black Sea Policy: What kind of Regionalism is this?”, **CEPS Working Documents**, No. 297, July 2008, p. 4.

See, <http://www.harvard-bssp.org/static/files/381/Michael%20Emerson%20EU%20New%20Black%20Sea%20policy.pdf> [19.02.2009]

<sup>625</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>626</sup> **Freedom House**, Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, New: York: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p. 50.

See [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2008/05\\_tables.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/05_tables.pdf) [10.03.2009]

Center of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21th Century”<sup>627</sup> to discover how democratic change is promoted to EU’s neighbourhood countries by the EU mechanisms. The research group focuses on three mechanisms which could have a positive effect on democracy promotion which are conditionality, transnational exchange and sector-specific cooperation. The research group argues that conditionality and transnational exchanges have a limited effectiveness on democracy promotion. However the third mechanism which is a sector-specific cooperation is more effective in the attempts on democracy promotion to the neighbourhood countries.<sup>628</sup> The conditionality mechanism could be effective for the countries that have an EU membership perspective however this mechanism’s persuasion capacity would be so limited and indirect for the ENP countries. The second mechanism which is a ‘transnational exchange’ includes economic, social and cultural interactions. The research group believes that there is a weak civil society in the neighbourhood countries so it would not be that effective as one of a mechanism in promoting democracy. They mention on this matter as,

“the measurement of *transnational exchanges* presented them with more difficulties because data availability for such interactions as visits, communication or academic exchanges proved extremely limited given the extensive empirical scope of their study except for trade.”<sup>629</sup>

As they mentioned, the constructivist analysis of democracy promotion has some empirical obstacles in measuring the interactions and their socialization effects.

The basic activities of democracy promotion is the monitoring the free and fair elections (OSCE standards) and supporting of civil society, free media, democratic and local governance and supporting anti-corruption measures. To observe and to measure the socialization process in the context of democracy promotion efforts of the EU system through the ENP, all the agents interacting in the region should be focused.

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<sup>627</sup> National Center of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century is an interdisciplinary research program which focuses on the democracy challenges. See for further details, <http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/>

<sup>628</sup> “How the EU Promoted Democracy in Neighbouring Countries”, **NCCR Democracy 21 Newsletter**, No.5, September 2008, pp. 4-5.

<sup>629</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange”, **European Union Politics**, Vol.9, No. 2, Sage Publications, 2008, p.197.

Firstly, in the context of top-down process, all the international organizations established in the region, bilateral-trilateral and multilateral initiatives, institutions and agreements should be mentioned. In the context of top-down instruments in the region, official statements and political dialogue mechanisms could be taken under consideration. In the case of ENP; the Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, European Neighbourhood Agreements, Country Reports, Action Plans, ENPI and also the speeches of the commissioners, EU bulletins, ad-hoc visits, letters, declarations and the other communication tools are some of the official instruments which could be used as the top-down instruments with using such mechanisms like punishment and award systems. In the context of the modernization process of the Black Sea region, the EU social system interacts with the other organizations and initiatives. Therefore, the EU social system uses the core of the socialization dynamics in the region at present and co-constructs a regional identity.

In the region, the Council of Europe initiated a Black Sea Euroregion (BSER) which is a special commitment of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, it is established with the member states of Armenia Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. This platform is for cooperations of national, intergovernmental and multilateral initiatives. The platform probably will be designed as a non-profit organization to be more effective for inter-regional and inter-municipal co-operations in the region.<sup>630</sup> In the website of the BSER some of these organizations mentioned as; Black Sea Trade & Development Bank, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), Black Sea Universities Network, Black Sea Global Ocean Observing System, International Black Sea University (IBSU), ONG Mare Nostrum Onstanta, Danish National Research Foundation's Centre for Black Sea Studies, Centre for Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information, Black Sea Commission, Black Sea Regional Energy Centre, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Center for Black Sea Studies, Black Sea University Network, LITE&CPSC, Societatea de Explorari Oceanografice Si Protectie a Mediului Marin

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<sup>630</sup> Black Sea Euroregion. See <http://www.bser.eu/>

OCANIC-CLUB, ONG Mare Nostrum, Centrul Local al Organizatiei Nationale ‘Cercetasii Romaniei’, Grupul de Cercetare si Educatie Ecologica ‘MONACHUS’ Constanta, Asociatia de Protejare a Omului si a Mediului Pentru o Dezvoltare Durabila in Lume, ECO 2004.<sup>631</sup>

In August 2005, with the ‘Borjomi Declaration’ which is signed by Ukraine and Georgia, the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) was established as a "powerful instrument for removing the remaining divisions in the [Baltic-Black Sea] region, human rights violations, and any type of confrontation, or frozen conflict.”<sup>632</sup> This intergovernmental organization includes nine states (Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, and Macedonia) and delegations from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and observers from the U.S., the EU and the OSCE. It has a western orientation and could support democratization process in these countries. CDC also has a Youth Forum (CDC Youth Forum) to promote partnership, cooperation and democracy.<sup>633</sup> This organization is parallel with the EU’s regional programmes such as The Black Sea Synergy that is initiated as a part of the ENP. Under this programme the Black Sea Regional Centre is also established. Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme 2007-2013 established in 2009 is under the framework of the ENPI. It has 10 participants in the programme which are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, and Greece. This programme also strengthens people-to-people interactions and promotes social and economic developments. For this programme, the ENPI allocated nearly 19 million euros.<sup>634</sup> The allocation of the funds is related to the needs and dynamics of each country.

In the context of the bottom-up process of democracy promotion, it could be said that in the Black Sea region there are many civil platforms and NGOs. It might also be argued that the region-building process and the regional civil society attempts could

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<sup>631</sup> Black Sea Organizations. See <http://www.bser.eu/sectiune.php?s=14>

<sup>632</sup> Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice”, **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty**, 02.12.2005.

<sup>633</sup> Community of Democratic Choice Youth Forum. See <http://www.cdcyouth.org/mycdc.php> [19.03.2009]

<sup>634</sup> Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme 2007-2013. See <http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/index.php?page=HOME> [19.03.2009]



create a synergy and could give an impetus to the democracy promotion efforts in the region. Therefore it could also be put forward that the socialization process in a region could give a positive impact on the ‘transnational exchanges’<sup>635</sup> by strengthening civil society platforms in the region-level. EU’s elites give emphasize the role of civil society in democratization process. Therefore, “in general, about 90 per cent of democracy promotion funds go to non-governmental organizations.”<sup>636</sup>

Romania and Bulgaria are active in the sense of promoting attempts on democracy in the region. In Romania, under President Traian Basescu the regional initiatives and cooperations are accelerated.<sup>637</sup> Therefore, in 2006 the ‘Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership’ was initiated by Romania in 2006. Its main aims are to create trust, dialogue, and cooperation in this region. This forum aims to create a synergy in the region between the institutions, governments, academia (research institutions, academic think tanks) of Western institutions and the civil society of regional countries.<sup>638</sup> With Romania’s initiative there are trilateral meetings (i.e. Romania-Hungary-Austria, Romania-Moldova-Ukraine, Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey, Romania-Poland-Ukraine and Romania-Bulgaria- Greece) for regional cooperations.<sup>639</sup>

‘The Black Sea NGO Network’ established in 1998 is a network for the NGOs in the region. Over 60 non-profit and non-governmental organizations from Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine formed a platform to be effective in environmental issues and to improve democracy in the region by sharing common meanings, values and experiences in the region.<sup>640</sup> ‘The Black Sea NGO Forum’ is a different initiative which is founded by the European Commission, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ‘Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation’ in 2008. ‘The Black Sea NGO Newsletter’ started to be published after the foundation of this forum.<sup>641</sup> In the end of ‘the NGO Black Sea Forum 2008’, nine different concepts on social justice

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<sup>635</sup> Schimmelfennig&Scholtz, p.197.

<sup>636</sup> Richard Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy”, **Centre for European Policy Studies**, Working Document, No. 167, pp. 5-11.

<sup>637</sup> Fabrizio Tassinari, “A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU initiative”, **Centre for European Policy Studies**, No. 105, June 2006, p.2

<sup>638</sup> <http://www.blackseforum.org/index.html>

<sup>639</sup> Aydın, **op.cit.**, p. 69.

<sup>640</sup> Black Sea NGO Forum. See, <http://www.bseanetwork.org/index.html>

<sup>641</sup> See <http://www.blackseango.org>

and human rights; democracy and good governance, and environment were proposed to the donors. ‘Black Sea Youth Forum’ with the contributions of Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Romania; and ‘Enhancing Effective Civil Society Peace Building and Violence Prevention in the Black Sea Region’ with the contributions of Armenia, Romania, Turkey, Moldova, Georgia and USA were proposed under the title of ‘democracy and good governance’.<sup>642</sup> For every proposal, different Black Sea countries are contributed in the context of their own social structures. ‘Civil Society Development Centre’ (STGM) was established in Turkey in 2004 by some of the civil activists.<sup>643</sup> ‘The Black Sea Peacebuilding’ platform has made up of four countries which are Moldova, Russia, Georgia, and Armenia was launched at the ‘Black Sea NGO Forum’ in 2008. The countries which initiated this platform have ethnic conflicts in their countries and they aimed to have an effective civil society initiative for support peacebuilding efforts in these conflicted regions.<sup>644</sup> ‘Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation’ is founded by the ‘German Marshall Fund of the United States’ (GMF) with the aim of promoting regional cooperation and good governance. The cooperation modeled the Balkan Trust for Democracy which was implemented before the GMF. The aim of the cooperation is to support the initiatives of the civil societies in the wider region area for a 10 years period.<sup>645</sup> ‘Caucasus Environmental NGO Network’ (CENN) is a network in the region of Caucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) which seeks to support civil society and good governance in the region. It also has some projects in the framework of the ENP.<sup>646</sup> ‘Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation’ is a think-tank and an advocacy group which was founded in 2002. The main of the centre is to support democratic values and human rights. It is also active on the normalization efforts of Armenia-Turkey relations.<sup>647</sup> ‘International Union of Black

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<sup>642</sup> Black Sea NGO Forum 2008.

See <http://www.blackseango.org/library/Altele/Report%20Black%20Sea%20NGO%20Forum%202008.pdf> [19.03.2009]

<sup>643</sup> Civil Society Development Centre.

See <http://www.blackseango.org/library/NGOs/Civil%20Society%20Development%20Center%20-%20Turkey.pdf> [19.03.2009]

<sup>644</sup> Black Sea Peacebuilding Network. See, <http://www.bspn.gfsis.org/mission>

<sup>645</sup> Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.

See [http://www.gmfus.org/template/page.cfm?page\\_id=324](http://www.gmfus.org/template/page.cfm?page_id=324) [19.03.2009]

<sup>646</sup> Caucasus Environmental NGO Network. See, <http://www.cenn.org/wssl/index.php?id=72> [19.03.2009]

<sup>647</sup> Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation.

Sea NGOs' (IUBSNGO) was founded by 40 NGOs from 10 different countries (Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia, Russia, Romania, Moldova, Greece, Georgia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Albania). Its main sponsors are governments of Sweden and Norway. The main objective of this Union is to support NGOs activities and to promote social policy developments in the region.<sup>648</sup> The effectiveness of these civil society platforms and NGOs could be measured with the help the Freedom House's statistics on the improvements of the civil societies in the Black Sea countries.

In the Appendix 10, the improvements of the civil societies in the ENP partners since 1999 are shown.<sup>649</sup> The ratings are based on 1-7 scale with 1 shows the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. As regarding to the survey of Freedom House, since 2007 there is no movement in the indicators of the civil society improvement. These results can be interpreted as the initiatives of Romania and Bulgaria since they became EU member states did not bear fruit in a very short period in the context of bottom-up socialization. However it does not mean that in a long-period these attempts would not be effective. The improvement of the civil society is directly related to the improvement of the democracy. Also concerning the scores, Azerbaijan did not strengthen the civil society and there is a negative progress since 1999 to 2008. Also Armenia protects its *status quo* and does not have any improvement because of its authoritarian tendencies. Besides, the Eastern European countries and Georgia have a positive progress in the same period. Ukraine has the fastest improvement in civil society comparing to the other Eastern European countries. The progress of Georgia could be related to the impact of Rose Revolution.

As regarding to the Appendix 11 of Freedom's House on the scores of democratic improvement<sup>650</sup>, the democratic score of Ukraine in 1999 is 4.63 and in 2008 it is 4.25, the democratic score of Moldova in 1999 is 4.25 and in 2008 it is 5.00, the democratic score of Georgia in 1999 is 4.17 and in 2008 it is 4.79, the democratic score of Azerbaijan in 1999 is 5.58 and in 2008 it is 6.00, the democratic score of

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See <http://www.acgrc.am/about.htm>

<sup>648</sup> International Union of Black Sea NGOs.

See <http://www.bsngon.com/en/index.php>

<sup>649</sup> **Freedom House, op.cit**, p.44.

<sup>650</sup> **Ibid.** p.50.

Armenia in 1999 is 4.79 and in 2008 it is 5.21. The table shows that in these countries there is a negative tendency and countries are not becoming more democratic. Only Ukraine seems to have a little improvement since 1999. When the ratings for electoral process; civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption are compared corruption draws the attention. All the elements of democracy are interrelated and the high level of corruption is directly related to lack of free media, the good governance, strong civil society and fair elections. In the post-communist countries, former communist *nomenklatura* created a new elite and they constructed a system of which that corruption is a part.

Numbers of steps towards the legislative arena on anti-corruption measures are taken by the EU mechanisms. ENP countries are encouraged by the EU to join the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) which was established by the Council of Europe for monitoring anti-corruption standards and is not limited to Council of Europe countries. Moreover, in the Action Plans and Progress Reports of the ENP countries the recommendations for fighting corruption is significant. However these attempts are not sufficient for fighting corruption. Since corruption is effective on the agents from political, economic and social environment, “the hidden nature of corrupt politics makes it difficult to study.”<sup>651</sup> Thus, apart from legislative reforms people to people connections and educational systems in these countries are crucial. The education programs of Erasmus-Mundus also used to promote EU values to support anti-corruption measures in the long-term. Moreover NGOs’ number of projects against corruption is supported by the EU. As it is mentioned before, EIDHR is another tool for strengthening democracy promotion efforts in the non-EU countries through supporting all agents from individual to the role of civil society and to public and private sector.<sup>652</sup> In the post-communist countries corruption became a sharing a culture and all level of the society and politics it could be observed.

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<sup>651</sup> Rasma Karklins, “Typology of Post-Communist Corruption”, **Problems of Post-Communism**, July/August 2002, p. 24.

<sup>652</sup> European Commission, External Cooperation Programmes, European Instrument for Democracy&human Rights (EIDHR). See [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm) [19.03.2009]

In addition to the corruption problem as an obstacle to democracy promotion efforts in the Black Sea region, ethnic animosities (Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh etc.), which create conflicts in the region, are also a significant obstacle for democratization. Conflict resolution, peace building efforts and democratization are interrelated issues.<sup>653</sup> Most of the NGO platforms and organizations focus on the conflicts to strengthen democracy and human rights in the region.

### 3.1.2. EU Attempts on Coloured Revolutions in the EU's Periphery

Georgia and Ukraine are taken as two examples to analyze EU's democracy promotion efforts in the case of ENP. How did the EU support the Orange and Rose revolutions? Georgia and Ukraine are two ENP partners which are also post-communist countries "having both authoritarian and democratic elements in their political systems that it is related to a very large part of the world that is often called the 'grey zone'".<sup>654</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Ukraine reconstructed their national identities. In the 1990s both of these countries had a chaotic structure and were still under the influence of Russian social structure and made it difficult to construct their national identity. On the other side, the motto of 'Back to Europe' was effective on public opinion. Therefore, social structure of Ukraine and Georgia were stuck between the influence of western institutions and Russia. The high level corruption and oligarchic and clan systems are the common problems of both transition countries. The social explosions in these countries against the rigged elections and undemocratic systems were entitled as 'coloured revolutions'. The fundamental questioning is

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<sup>653</sup> See Antj Herrberg, "Unlocking the Potential-Civil Society as the Missing Link in Black Sea Peace-Building" in Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), **Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea**, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006, pp. 229-249.

<sup>654</sup> Ghia Nodia, The Dynamics and Sustainability of the Rose Revolution in Michael Emerson, "Democratization in the European Neighbourhood", **CEPS Paperback Series**, issue.11, 2005, p. 38.

whether these movements are revolutions or not? Are they regime change, social movement or a coup<sup>655</sup> as it is mentioned for Georgia just after the Rose Revolution?

In these so-called revolutions, western institutions and foundations had a strong impact through supporting the NGOs and students. Following the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000, Georgia had the Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraine had the Orange revolution in 2004. According to Taras Kuzio, in the case of the reasons of Orange revolution the economic issues did not have a role and this situation differentiates the Orange revolution than the Rose revolution.<sup>656</sup> But he found ten common factors leading to the coloured revolutions. These are;

“authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition, ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism that assists in civil society’s mobilization, a preceding political crisis, a pro-democratic capital city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate, a united opposition, mobilized youth, regionalism and foreign intervention.”<sup>657</sup>

Both Rose and Orange revolutions were evaluated by the EU as a big step towards democracy. The mass mobilization of NGOs, big opposition against rigged elections and the support of the media to the activists were crucial improvements for these transition countries. However modernization and democratization are long-term projects and the social structure of a country could not be changed in a day. The potential of civil society and their will for being a part of the EU social structure seems promising for the EU agents.

The Rose and Orange Revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine have some positive impacts on democracy promotion efforts of the EU, especially in the Black Sea region. They have “led to the emergence of a serious ‘democracy club’ within the region, as confirmed by the formation of the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) and of the

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<sup>655</sup> Giorgi Kandelaki, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective”, Special Report, **United States Institute of Peace (USIP)**, p.2. See <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr167.pdf> [24.05.2009]

<sup>656</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution” in Anders Aslund, Michael McFaul, **Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough**, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2006, p. 49.

<sup>657</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave”, George Washington University, p. 12.

new ODED-GUAM (Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development)<sup>658</sup> But the effects of these revolutions did not take long. The negative events which occurred in these countries after coloured revolutions changed the ideas in the EU social structure about these countries potential on modernization. In constructivist perspective, the agents are interacting in conjunction with the changing ideas, meanings and the new constructed interest. The Ukrainian elections in 2010 was one of the prominent event which led to reconstruction of a negative image for Ukraine as if Ukrainians left the democracy way.

### 3.1.2.1. Rose Revolution

Georgia is one of the Southern Caucasian countries which is a partner of the ENP and has attracted the attention of the EU with its pro-Western attitude of its public. Georgia has historical, cultural and social similarities with Ukraine. An authoritarian president, corrupted political system and a Western support (the agents of US and the EU) created a social explosion in the country and it is evaluated as a big step towards democratic system by EU elites.

Under the rule of Shevardnadze, there was a deep economic and political crisis in Georgia. Moreover, the country has been full of conflicts and some of the regions did not recognize central authority's control.

“Abkhazia and South Ossetia had seceded under Russian protection. Adjara was controlled by its local potentate, Aslan Abashidze, who ignored central institutions and laws. To the South, the Armenian region of Javakheti was more closely integrated into neighboring Armenia.”<sup>659</sup>

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<sup>658</sup> GUAM was reconstructed as the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development at a Kyiv summit on 23.05.2006. Tassinari, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>659</sup> Stefan.F. Jones, “The Rose Revolution: A Revolution Without Revolutionaries?”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.19, No.1, 2006, pp. 33–48.

Shevardnadze lost his credibility as a leader after Georgia lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>660</sup> Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement was a strong opposition and he is a charismatic leader who could gain credibility and trust of the public.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 2003, Parliamentary elections were held in Georgia and Shevardnadze's 'For a New Georgia' bloc had the majority with 57 seats while Saakashvili's National Movement got 36 seats.<sup>661</sup> OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission declared in its report that this Parliamentary Elections in Georgia was rigged.<sup>662</sup> The protests were started by the youth organizations against the result of rigged elections.

*Kmara* (Enough) which is a youth organization, was the most significant agent in the evolving of 'the Rose Revolution.' These young people were mobilized and organized in different ways. "The local Georgian branch of the Soros Foundation helped support *Kmara* out of its \$350,000 election support program, and *Kmara* and other opposition groups received significant financial and organizational aid from the National Democratic Institute."<sup>663</sup> George Soros, who is the founder of the Open Society Foundation, had a vital impact on organization of the civil society.<sup>664</sup> Moreover *Kmara* activists were trained by the Otpor activists in Belgrade on techniques of nonviolent resistance.<sup>665</sup> *Kmara* worked on the canceled rigged elections. They printed and distributed the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) results contrasting with the official results.<sup>666</sup> Moreover they "began a poster and graffiti campaign attacking government corruption."<sup>667</sup>

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<sup>660</sup> Lincoln Mitchell, "Georgia's Rose Revolution".

See <http://www.columbia.edu/~lam13/documents/Georgias%20Rose%20Revolution.pdf>

<sup>661</sup> **IFES Election Guide**, see <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=389>

<sup>662</sup> OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, "Post-Election Interim Report", 3-25.11.2003.

See [http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/11/1593\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/11/1593_en.pdf) [25.05.2009]

<sup>663</sup> Mark R. Beissinger, "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?", **Dissent**, Winter 2006.

<sup>664</sup> Mark MacKinnon, "Georgia Revolt Carried Mark of Soros", **Globe and Mail**, 26.11.2003, [http://www.markmackinnon.ca/dispatches\\_georgia3.html](http://www.markmackinnon.ca/dispatches_georgia3.html) [25.05.2009]

<sup>665</sup> Beissinger, **loc.cit.**

<sup>666</sup> Giorgi Kandelaki, "Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective", Special Report, United States Unstitute of Peace (USIP), p.2. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr167.pdf> [25.05.2009]

<sup>667</sup> MacKinnon, "Georgia revolt carried mark of Soros", **The Globe and Mail**, 23.11.2003.



According to Saakashvili, “the NGOs did have some role in organizing student protests, but mostly *Rustavi* had a big role.”<sup>668</sup> *Rustavi* is a big media center which also achieved to mobilize Georgian youth individually. According to Giorgi Kandelaki, “a number of NGOs, such as the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and ISFED or the Liberty Institute, were very important; however, most groups remained fundamentally elitist, never winning the support and participation of the masses.”<sup>669</sup>

On 22<sup>nd</sup> of November with the support of civil society, two opposition leaders - Mikhail Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania- walked into the Parliament building. They had red roses in their hands when they overran the Parliament building and in Georgia the ‘coloured revolution’ took the symbol of a red rose and it is entitled as the Rose Revolution. Shevardnadze is convinced of resigning from power. On the January 4, 2004 presidential election were held in Georgia and with 96% of the votes Saakashvili became president and Shevardnadze’s ‘For a New Georgia’ bloc lost the elections.<sup>670</sup> After the Georgian legislative election in 2003 President Eduard Shevardnadze was replaced with Mikhail Saakashvili.

In the new period of the president Saakashvili, one of the notable changes is about the reconstruction of Georgian national identity. He planned to change the ethnic nationalism with the concept of civic nationalism. “He has emphasized state symbols, the hymn and state seal and the national flag has been changed.”<sup>671</sup> It could be argued that he changed the identity construction which is based on ethnic nationalism with the aim of decreasing the ethnic tensions in the conflicted regions. The civic nationalism would be more effective for building the Georgian national identity. However, the ethnic conflicts in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and also the economic-political turmoil in the country continued.

Under these circumstances, Saakashvili was re-elected in January 2008 with 53.47% votes. This shows that he lost his credibility since Rose Revolution which he

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<sup>668</sup> “Interview with Mikheil Saakashvili”, in Zurab K’arumize, James V. Wertsch, “Enough!: The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003”, Nova Science Publishers, 2005, p. 24.

<sup>669</sup> Giorgi Kandelaki, **loc.cit.**

<sup>670</sup> IFES Election Guide, see <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=185>

<sup>671</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave”, George Washington University, p. 12.

had 96% of votes in Georgia. There are two prominent reasons for that. One of them is about the lack of opposition in the political system. Oksana Antonenko, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies says that;

“Saakashvili wanted to perpetuate the system which he had after the Rose Revolution and no real opposition included in the political process and that kind of dysfunctional political system which was established has really deprived Georgia from effective governance.”<sup>672</sup>

Because of the lack of opposition in the political process led to the reaction of civil society. There were demonstrations against the government in 2007 and in 2009. In 2007, to activists protested government and demanded for a resignation of Saakashvili. These demonstrations were responded by the harsh reaction of Georgian policemen and some of the protestors were sent to jail. In 2009 the demonstrations were more peaceful.<sup>673</sup> Saakashvili gave a more peaceful reaction after he lost half of his votes in 2008.

Second reason of his loss of credibility of Saakashvili is related to the Georgian war. 2009 demonstrations were mostly related to the Georgian War. In August 2008, Georgia attacked South Ossetia and had a five-day war with Russia over South Ossetia. Russia had the victory and recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

“The EU played a key role in negotiating the ceasefire in Georgian War and a new operation under the aegis of the ESDP, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), was deployed in Georgia, with a mandate that is due to expire on 14 September 2010.”<sup>674</sup>

The report of the EU on Georgia War in 2008, which was drafted under the leadership of Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini and published in January 2009, shows that Georgia’s attack was unjustifiable but on the other side Russian invasion had violated international law and went beyond the limits of defense. All sides of the conflict (Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia) violated International Humanitarian Law

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<sup>672</sup> **Voice of America**, “Georgians Disillusioned with ‘Rose Revolution’”, 01.09.2009.

See <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-01-voa48-68756972.html> [20.11.2009]

<sup>673</sup> Valentina Pop, “Anti-Saakashvili Protests Kick Off Peacefully”, **EUObserver**, 09.04.2009.

See <http://euobserver.com/9/27940>

<sup>674</sup> Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Background Notes, “The EU and Georgia”.

See [http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/background\\_notes/FT-ADLE-Caucase-en.pdf](http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/background_notes/FT-ADLE-Caucase-en.pdf) [24.11.2009]

and Human Rights Law. The Report also mentions that the recognition of the regions is illegal.<sup>675</sup>

The improvement on democratization of the country is analyzed between the period from Rose Revolution (2004) to the Georgian War (2008). As regard the democracy scores of the Freedom House (see Appendix 11), Georgia's democratic score in 2004 was 4.83 and decreased to 4.79 in 2008.<sup>676</sup> The democratic score is an average of the democratic indicators, which are electoral process ( 5.25 in 2004 and 4.75 in 2008), civil society ( 3.5 in 2004 and in 2008 ), independent media ( 4.0 in 2004 and 4.25 in 2008), national and local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence (4.5 in 2004 and 4.75 in 2008) and corruption (6 in 2004 and 5.0 in 2008) (See Appendix 12)The indicators show that the civil society potential of Georgia did not change since the Rose Revolution to 2008 and the freedom of media and judicial framework and independence is still debatable. On the other side, electoral process is improved and the level of corruption is decreased during the presidency of Saakashvili. The democratic score shows that the democracy level has progressed since the Rose Revolution but it is a small progress and shows that the impetus of the Rose revolution had a small impact on democracy.

One of the significant criticisms of Saakashvili government is about “changing the constitution from an American-style separation of powers between parliament and the president, to a super-presidential system with a very weak parliament, which is quite typical of semi-authoritarian, post-Soviet countries.”<sup>677</sup>

Georgia is still does not have a democratic country and in respect of the survey of the Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Georgians are not positive about the state

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<sup>675</sup> **EurActiv**, “Russia Triumphant as EU’s Georgia War Report Sees Light”.

See <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/russia-triumphant-eu-georgia-war-report-sees-light/article-185934>

<sup>676</sup> **Freedom House**, “Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia”, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p.50.

See [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2008/05\\_tables.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/05_tables.pdf) [24.11.2009]

<sup>677</sup> Ghia Nodia, “The Dynamics and Sustainability of the Rose Revolution” in Michael Emerson, “Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood”, **CEPS Paperback Series**, Issue.11, 2005, p. 44.

of democracy and freedom in their own country.<sup>678</sup> However on the other side, this survey also shows that Georgians are willing to join to the EU and they trust that the EU has a potential to promote democracy. In respect of the results of the Caucasus Research Resource Center's survey,

“Georgians have a positive perception of the EU, with 16 percent of the respondents rating the EU as ‘very positive’ and another 35 percent as ‘somewhat positive’ and 50% Georgians’ trust in the EU. Moreover, an overwhelming majority (78%) of the interviewees basically agree with the statements that the EU is a democratic institution, that it provides peace and security in Europe (76%) and promotes democracy and economic prosperity for non-member countries (%70).”<sup>679</sup>

The EU became the second big donor after the U.S which gives financial aid to Georgia between 1992 and 2004. After the ‘Rose Revolution’ the EU founded 'EUJUST Themis' operation to promote rule-of law and created the office of European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in South Caucasus, to strengthen its field of activity in Georgia.<sup>680</sup>

In the context of ENP, the Action Plan officially initiated in 2007 was covering the support of the civil sector in Georgia in 2005-2007. Over 70 civil organizations especially with support the Open Society-Georgia Foundation, Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung and Eurasia Foundation prepared some recommendations for the Georgian Government while the government was working on the priorities of the Action Plans. Non-paper on strengthening of the civil society dimension of the ENP recommends for a ‘monitoring and dialogue’, however the government prepares national Action Plans and reports without asking opinions of the civil society organizations.<sup>681</sup> In that sense, the bottom-up processes do not work properly in Georgia. The interaction of civil society and government is not efficient in the country.

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<sup>678</sup> See Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Georgian Public Opinion, Attitudes towards European Integration”, **Caucasus Research Resource Center**, 23.10.2009, pp.2-3. See [http://epfound.org/files/eusurveyreport\\_georgia\\_aug09.pdf](http://epfound.org/files/eusurveyreport_georgia_aug09.pdf)

<sup>679</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>680</sup> Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Background Notes, “The EU and Georgia”. See [http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/background\\_notes/FT-ADLE-Caucase-en.pdf](http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/background_notes/FT-ADLE-Caucase-en.pdf) [20.11.2009]

<sup>681</sup> “Georgia’s Post-Rose Revolution Challenges and Civil Society’s Response”, Post-Seminar Notes, 11.08.2008. See [http://eurasiapartnership.org/files/post-seminar\\_notes\\_1.pdf](http://eurasiapartnership.org/files/post-seminar_notes_1.pdf) [20.11.2009]

### 3.1.2.2. Orange Revolution

In this part, first the general analysis of Ukraine's political and social structure will be done. Then, the political turmoil occurred in 2004 and the internal-external dynamics and circumstances which led to the Orange Revolution will be taken under consideration. The questioning of how the Orange Revolution gave impetus to the democratization and modernization process of Ukraine is also related to the effect of EU support. Therefore the analysis of the impact of the Orange Revolution on the socialization process is also correlated with the EU's agents' role in the democracy promotion to Ukraine and Ukrainian's internalization capacity.

Parallel to Georgia, Ukraine is also a transition country which had economical and political turmoil after it became independent. The *nomenclature* of Soviet Union became oligarchs in the post-communist Ukraine and this oligarchic nature<sup>682</sup> of the country constructed the Ukrainian social structure. The perception of the 'Oligarchs' by public is measured by a survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2001 and according to the survey, the public definition of oligarchs is shown in the Table 1. The majority of the people defined it as 'mainly those who steal from Ukraine with the help of the authorities' (55%). Moreover, as regarding to another survey of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on public identification of oligarchs in January 2001, the most well-known names of the oligarchs are listed as Pavlo Lazarenko (33.9), Yulia Tymoshenko (20.9), Leonid Kuchma (11.8), Grygoriy Surkis (7.7), Leonid Kravchuk (4.5), Viktor Yushchenko (4.0).<sup>683</sup> These surveys showed that, in 2001, most of the party leaders were oligarchs who are not trusted by the public. But it should also be noted that Kuchma has 11.8 % but Yushchenko has 4.0 % which means that after the Kuchmagate crisis the trust of the public towards him is highly decreased.

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<sup>682</sup> See for further details, Taras Kuzio, "Oligarchs, tapes and Oranges: 'Kuchmagate' to the Orange Revolution", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 2007.

<sup>683</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

**Table 1. The interpretation of ‘Oligarchs’ by Ukrainian public**

PUBLIC DEFINITION OF OLIGARCHS, JANUARY 2001 (%)

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Wealthiest people in Ukraine	11.8
Small group who rule Ukraine	16.6
Very wealthy who influence senior levels of government	26.7
Mainly those who steal from Ukraine with the help of the authorities	55
Other answer	0.9
No answer	3.9

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*Note:* The question asked was ‘What do you understand an “oligarch” to be?’

*Source:* Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at <<http://www.kiis.com.ua>>.

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The authoritarian rule of Kuchma which is similar to the rule of Shevardnadze, the rigged elections, corrupted governance and the western support to the civil society created a social explosion in the country. Parallel to Georgia, Ukraine is also in the national identity-building process however it should be noted that the identity of Ukraine over centuries is matter of ambiguity. Taking the fact that over-unified definition of an identity lacks because of long occupations and the pursued construction of national identity by independent Ukraine is in conflict with that of Russia, study of national identity of Ukraine, in a historical dimension, is required for in-depth understanding of constructive interactions that has determining the substructure of Ukrainian relations with its west and east. Historical data shows that in due courses of long suffered occupations, wars of secession, civil war, treaties, migrations and settlements in the respective geography led to diverse societal experiences ending up with different languages, religion, political, economic understandings. The historical variables manifests, as basis of identities, ethnic Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians on one hand, and ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians on the other challenges a compromised and unified identity form. The western part of Ukraine (old Galicia) is dominated with ethnic speaking Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists but on the eastern side of Ukraine there is a Russian speaking majority who do not accept on Ukrainian identity.<sup>684</sup>

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<sup>684</sup> See for further details, Oksana Malanchuk, “Social Identification Versus Regionalism in Contemporary Ukraine”, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.33, Issue 3, September 2005, pp. 345-368; Paul

The Kuchma regime can be categorized as a “competitive authoritarianism”<sup>685</sup>, that is to say a hybrid fusion of the former Soviet system and the emerging reformed economy and polity. Kuchma regime and aftermath events became turning points for Ukraine. The events lying behind the Kuchmagate are essential to understand the social dynamics in the country. The murder of the Ukrainian journalist who is called Georgiy Ruslanovich Gongadze in 2000 was one of the prominent reasons of Kuchmagate. Gongadze was making researches and writing reports on the corruption in the level of Ukrainian government and because of that reason he attracted attention with his researches. Moreover, some tape records were founded in the office of Kuchma. These records were on the illegal act of the government on;

“undeclared sale of weapons abroad, rigging of the October–November 1999 presidential election and the April 2000 referendum, persecution of independent journalists, manipulation of US money-laundering investigations, high-level corruption, abuse of office and misuse of public funds and violence against politicians and journalists.”<sup>686</sup>

These tapes created a big scandal and a deep political crisis in the country. All these circumstances in Ukraine created ‘Kuchmagate’ period with full of protests against the government. Moreover, this period led to the Orange revolution in four years.

In these days there were numerous different opinions about the case. Kuchma and his allies claimed that “the murder of Gongadze was a U.S. plot to take over Kuchma presidency with Yushchenko however the rest of the Ukrainian elites did not agree with these claims”<sup>687</sup>.

The effect of this was reflected on 2004 elections. In these elections two politicians and their supporters were on the agenda of Ukraine. One of them is Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-western politician who strongly supports the EU integration and

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Kubicek, “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour”, **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 52, 2000, pp. 273-294.

<sup>685</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Regime Type and Politics in Ukraine under Kuchma”, **Communist and Post-Communist Studies**, Vol. 38, No.2, 2005, pp. 167-190.

<sup>686</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Oligarchs, tapes and Oranges: ‘Kuchmagate’ to the Orange Revolution”, **Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, 2007, p.42.

<sup>687</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Any Nearer the Truth on Gongadze’s Killing?”, **RFE/RL**, Vol.3, No.8, 28.02.2003, p. 2.

reforms and the other one is, Viktor Yanukovich a pro-Russian politician who is a fond of *status quo*. These two politicians were also the symbol of the divided nature of Ukraine.

In 2004 Ukraine had two-round elections. In the first round of the elections Yushchenko had 41.96% and Yanukovich had 41.37%. In the votes run-off, Viktor Yushchenko who is the leader of Our Ukraine coalition gained 48.51% votes (with the support of Yulia Tymoshenko) and Viktor Yanukovich who is the leader of Party of the Regions had 51.49% vote.<sup>688</sup> In the second round of the elections the results were cancelled because the opposition and civil platforms protested because they believed that the elections were rigged. Poland also did not accept the results of the 2004 election's second tour in Ukraine and supported "a peaceful solution of the crisis on a legal basis" and Polish President Kwasniewski became crucial with European Union high Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Lithuanian president Adamkus.<sup>689</sup>

Just after the second round elections in 22 November of 2004 a hundreds of people protested the election results and calling for a new second-round elections in the Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti).

Until December 26<sup>th</sup> of 2004, when the third round election was held the protest continued. The leader of the opposition Yushchenko won the elections with 54.05%. Yanukovich could have only 45.95% of the votes and lost the presidential elections.<sup>690</sup>

One of the reasons lying behind the civil movement in Ukraine is about the poisoning case of Yushchenko. As regarding to the diagnosis of Austrian clinic's doctors he argued that some of his opponents attempted to assassinate him by dioxin poisoning. "Mr. Yanukovych's supporters ridiculed the opposition, saying the illness

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<sup>688</sup> Election Guide, for the results of 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections.

<sup>689</sup> Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, "Western Influence" in Anders Aslund, Michael McFaul, **Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough**, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p. 132.

<sup>690</sup> **Election Guide**, for the results of 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections, See <http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=267>



was probably caused by bad sushi, too much cognac or a severe case of herpes and a parliamentary investigation found no evidence of poisoning.”<sup>691</sup> However the sudden change in his appearance justified the assassination claims. There is a still debate and mystery about the poisoning case. The Ukrainian Security Service and Prosecutor-General's Office investigated the case but could not find any evidence and in 2009 they falsified it. The opponents of Yushchenko claim that he created this story by himself with the support of the EU and the US. The private Austrian clinic collaborated with the US agents and poisoned his blood to influence the Ukrainian public opinion and to make Yushchenko as a victim.<sup>692</sup>

The revolution took its name from ‘Our Ukraine’ (Nasha Ukrayina) which is the political party of Yuschenko using colour of Orange. One of the big civic platforms supporting the Orange Revolution was *Pora* which means ‘it’s time’. It is a civic youth platform which was affective in Orange Revolution. Yellow *Pora* is also a political party in Ukraine. Many European foundations supported the *Pora* activities. The Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada who immigrated to Canada after the First and the Second World War also supported the Orange Revolution. Hundreds of Ukranian Canadians traveled to Ukraine to watch the third round of election. “Canada's ambassador to Ukraine, Andrew Robinson also gave \$30,000 to *Pora* through a special embassy fund.”<sup>693</sup> According to Kuzio, “young Ukrainians born in the 1980s grew up in the 1990s. They are not afraid of the authorities in the same manner as their elders, who experienced Soviet rule.”<sup>694</sup> They also used the advantages of communication technology which are big TV screens, internet and cell phone.

Is Orange revolution a real ‘revolution’? According to Motyl, revolution can be conceived as “a type of upheaval (sudden, mass), a type of change (rapid, fundamental,

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<sup>691</sup> **Times Online**, “Who Poisoned Yushchenko”, 8.12.2004.

See <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article400357.ece>

<sup>692</sup> **RT**, “Ukrainian President’s Poisoning Was Falsified”, 28.09.2009. See <http://rt.com/Politics/2009-09-28/ukrainian-president-poisoning-falsified.html>. Also see “Spouse of Ukraine’s President Charged Up to United States CIA Agents”, Eurasian Secret Services Daily Report, **AXIS**, 23.09.2009.

<sup>693</sup> Mark MacKinnon, “Agent Orange: Our Secret Role in Ukraine”, **The Globe and Mail**, 14.04.2007. See [http://www.markmackinnon.ca/dispatches\\_ukraine4.html](http://www.markmackinnon.ca/dispatches_ukraine4.html) [20.11.2009]

<sup>694</sup> Kuzio, **op.cit.**, p.56.

comprehensive), or a type of turmoil (sustained, all encompassing)”<sup>695</sup> “Roman Bessmertny, Yushchenko's campaign manager, two years prior to the 2004 elections, put as many as 150,000 people through training courses, seminars, practical tuition conducted by legal and media specialists.”<sup>696</sup> Daniel Wolf interprets the Orange Revolution as a public relations campaign not as a real civil society movement. Liberal Michael McFaul argues that the western support to the coloured revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine are significant however the dynamics of these revolutions are different and are not just related to these aids. According to him, these dynamics are related to some conditions which are; a semi- authoritarian regime, partly civic freedom, unpopular leader, an organized opposition, independent NGOs and media. Moreover the regime should not rely on the military or police forces.<sup>697</sup>

Apart from *Pora*, Ukraine Christian Churches also supported the Orange Revolution with encouraging a nonviolent resistance. “Communities of faith from Kyiv, as well as from many regions of Ukraine, mobilized their membership and sustained the nonviolent character of the protests (the Embassy of God mobilized its 25,000 members)”.<sup>698</sup> The activists of Rose Revolution were trained by the Serbian Otpor activists and it could be said that the activist of Orange revolution also modeled the nonviolent resistance techniques from previous coloured revolutions. The *Pora* leader Oleh Kyriyenko mentioned in his 2004 interview with Radio Netherlands that, the book of Gene Sharp, entitled *From Dictatorship to Democracy* which was also used by Otpor became the bible of *Pora*.<sup>699</sup> Therefore the ideas and shared meanings of the coloured revolutions are constructed on to the same platform.

In the sense of external support for the Orange Revolution a big amount of financial support came from the Western institutions.

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<sup>695</sup> Alexander Motyl, **Revolutions, Nations, Empires. Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities**, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 24.

<sup>696</sup> Daniel Wolf, “ A 21st Century Revolt”, **The Guardian**, 13.05.2005.

See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/13/ukraine.features11> [10.12.2009]

<sup>697</sup> Michael McFaul, “Transitions from Postcommunism”, **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2005, pp. 5-19.

<sup>698</sup> Svetlana Filiatreau, “Christian Faith, Nonviolence and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: A Case Study of the Embassy of God Church”, **Religion in Eastern Europe XXIX**, Vol.3, August 2009, pp. 10-13.

<sup>699</sup> **Ibid.**

“Between 2002-2004, the US State Department spent \$65m for Ukraine and October 2004 report of the Soros Foundation in Ukraine states that it allocated \$1,201,904 to NGOs in Ukraine and on the other side \$200m came from Russia for the government side.”<sup>700</sup>

According to Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, the official and non-governmental U.S. representatives showed their will and gave more support to the Orange Revolution than the EU. The division of old and new members’ perspectives on Ukraine are significant. The new members, especially Poland convinced the old members about taking a common and effective action in Orange Revolution.<sup>701</sup> However as regards the numbers of 2007, “the EU became the largest donor to Ukraine with assisting over €2 billion since 1991 mainly under its Tacis programme and the yearly average was €70.7 million per year in 2004-06 and is €123.5 million per year in 2007-10.”<sup>702</sup>

Poland is a crucial unit that shapes the Ukrainian nation-building and democratization process. During Polish history, as a major power in Europe it had an impact on Ukraine and after 2004 Poland became a part of the EU and became part of the EU’s democracy promoter role on Ukraine. It should be noted that Poland’s own historical, regional and geographic characteristics are important for EU’s policies and for *Europeanization* effect of the EU.

Before Polish accession to the EU, Poland was the first state to support Ukrainian sovereignty in 1990 and in 1992, the Treaty on Good Neighbors, Friendly Relations and Cooperation was signed between Poland and Ukraine. After the accession of Poland into the EU, ‘the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation’ was established in 2005;

“to build the capacity of Ukraine to integrate more closely with the EU and NATO through the application of Polish and European experience and to facilitate extensive

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<sup>700</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, “When, how and where should West Promote Democracy”, **The Guardian News Service**, The Dawn Group of Newspapers. 17.12.2004.

See <http://www.dawn.com/2004/12/17/int7.htm>

<sup>701</sup> Sushko and Prystayko, **op.cit.**, p.134.

<sup>702</sup> **EuropeWorld**, “EU Increases Financial Assistance to Ukraine”, 9.03.2007.

See <http://www.europaworld.org/week298/euincreases9307.html> [0.12.2009]

crossborder dissemination of knowledge and experience in key areas that impact human capital and civil society.”<sup>703</sup>

In addition there are some Polish NGOs which are working on some activities to give an impetus to the Europeanization of Ukraine through reconstructing the common historical heritage and common cultural values and norms between Poland and Ukraine. One of them is ‘International Cultural Centre’ (ICC) which is a Polish origin centre founded in Krakow in 1991 and aims for an inter-cultural communication and a common Europe without any division<sup>704</sup>. The ICC has crucial activities (conferences, workshops, summer schools, exhibitions) to improve Polish-Ukrainian common heritage which depends on the region Galicia including Krakow in Poland and Lviv in Ukraine. Lviv is the most pro-EU region in Ukraine and the effort of ICC on inter-cultural dialogues between Poland and Ukraine is important in the sense of sharing values and norms. Another crucial NGO is a Stefan Batory Foundation which is an independent Polish foundation established in 1988 by George Soros and a group of Polish democratic leaders. Its mission is to support the democratic society in Poland and in the other CEE countries. The Foundation has different types of donors from the EU countries and the US. In the annual report 2008 of the Foundation the abbreviated financial report shows the name of the donors and grants. ( See APP 13) ‘Memoria’ supports to preserve the common cultural heritage with the countries Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Kaliningrad District and Germany. This is actually the area of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Poland is the main motivator in that process. ‘Community Initiatives Partnership’ supports cooperation projects which are implemented by the NGOs from the same countries listed above. ‘East East: Partnership beyond Borders’ supports international projects implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and also Central Asia.<sup>705</sup>

The questioning of how the democratization processes of Ukraine developed after the support of western institutions to Ukraine’s Orange revolution is vital to figure out the measure of ENP effect. Concerning to the democracy scores for Ukraine with

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<sup>703</sup> The Cooperation was active as trilateral cooperations entitled as, “Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative” since 1999. See Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI). See <http://www.pauci.org/en/about/history/>

<sup>704</sup> **International Cultural Centre**. See <http://www.mck.krakow.pl/view.php?id=1>

<sup>705</sup> The Stefan Batory Foundation. See <http://www.batory.org.pl/english/index.htm>

the index of the Freedom House (see APP 14 ), there is an improvement of democracy level from 2004 (4.88) to 2008 (4.25). In the same period from the date of Orange Revolution to 2008, the ratings for electoral process (from 4.25 to 3.00), civil society (from 3.75 to 2.75), governance (from 5.25 to 4.75), and freedom of media (from 5.50 to 3.50) improved. However in the same period, the ratings of judicial framework (4.75) and corruption (5.75) did not improve. In this period there were some EU originated supports on anti-corruption measures. A Project against corruption in Ukraine (UPAC) which was objecting “to support strengthening Ukrainian institutions’ capacities in their anti-corruption efforts (jointly funded by the European Commission and the Council of Europe) worked between June 2006-2009.”<sup>706</sup> However, concerning the scores on corruption there is no serious improvement after these promotes of the EU.

After the Orange Revolution, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine in March 2006. Yanukovich’s Party of Regions won the elections with 175 seats<sup>707</sup> and became Prime Minister. It could be said that the result of the elections is related to the Russian influence on the Ukrainian oligarchs and pro-Russian groups in Ukraine. Especially the gas dispute in January 2006 had an impact on them. In September 2007 another Parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine and Yanukovich’s Party of Regions had the majority of the seats again.

In the presidential elections in Ukraine (the first round held on 17 January and second round held on 17 February 2010) Yanukovych, Party of Region had 36.75%, Tymoshenko Bloc had 26.06% and Yushchenko, Our Ukraine, had 5.69%.<sup>708</sup> Tymoshenko accused Yanukovych about the rigged election results. But European Council and European Parliament observes stated that the elections are fair.<sup>709</sup> The ongoing energy disputes with Russia since 2006 and the role of oligarchs and pro-Russian groups on Ukrainian social structure shaped internal politics and therefore the

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<sup>706</sup> Council of Europe, “Support to Good Governance: Project against Corruption in Ukraine UPAC”. See [http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/upac/upac\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/upac/upac_en.asp)

<sup>707</sup> IFES Election Guide. See <http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=984>

<sup>708</sup> Election Guide, for the results of 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Elections, See <http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=1768>

<sup>709</sup> **Deutsche Welle**, “Ukrayna’da Turuncu Devrimin Sonu”, 08.02.2010. See <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5225510,00.html> [08.10.2010]

results of presidential elections. In addition, the personal conflicts between Tymoshenko and Yanukovich had a negative impact on the results.

The victory of pro-Russian Yanukovich creates a hesitation in the EU social structure about Ukraine's democratization process. However Ukrainian government did not change its preferences on the way of the EU. Ukrainian ambassador to the EU, Andriy Veselovsky whose position was confirmed by President Viktor Yanukovich on the 1st of March 2010 by the new President Yanukovich Express his opinions on the government's attitude on the European integration with the words of; "Europe ends where people -- and not governments -- do not want to be in Europe."<sup>710</sup> His statement is related to the importance of ideas, opinions and attitudes of the civil society in Ukraine. As regarding to his explanations Ukraine does not insist on the EU membership and is content with the Eastern Partnership Initiative in the context of the ENP. Moreover, Veselovsky explained Ukrainian expectations on the main issues in the short and long term. Ukraine expects from the EU to lift the visa requirements before the European soccer championship in 2012, which will be hosted jointly by Ukraine and Poland. Also Ukraine aims to sign a free-trade agreement with the EU, within the conclusion of an Association Agreement.<sup>711</sup>

In April 2010, Ukrainian state decided to allow Russian Navy to stay in Ukraine until 2042. A big protest by the civil society and a chaos is started in Ukraine.<sup>712</sup> In that context, state's realist interests contradict with civil society. The state would not consider the voice of public opinion and it is a typical state behaviour for undemocratic countries.

In the new period of Yanukovich, the conditionality would not be a 'carrot' for Ukraine because they would not be insisted on the EU membership. But lifting visa

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<sup>710</sup> Ahto Lobjakas, "Ukrainian Envoy: EU Will 'Always' Remain Kyiv's Main Priority", **RFE/RL**. See [http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukrainian\\_Envoy\\_EU\\_Will\\_Always\\_Remain\\_Kyivs\\_Main\\_Priority/1982624.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukrainian_Envoy_EU_Will_Always_Remain_Kyivs_Main_Priority/1982624.html)

<sup>711</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>712</sup> **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Radio Liberty**, "Ukraine, Russia Approve Contentious Black Sea Deal", 27.04.2010.

See [http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine\\_MPs\\_Approve\\_Black\\_Sea\\_Deal/2025524.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine_MPs_Approve_Black_Sea_Deal/2025524.html) [27.04.2010]

requirements for Ukraine, signing free-trade agreement and financial aids would be ‘carrots’ for EU attempts of democracy promotion to Ukraine.

In conclusion, EU’s participation and support to the Orange Revolution process could be evaluated as persuasive and trustful in the sense of democracy promotion process. It enhanced the potential of a formation which is already evolved and therefore, it could be said that ‘the trust’ is constructed on Ukrainians consent. The ‘back to Europe’ motto gave a significant motivation to the youth platforms; however this motivation did not last long. The 2010 elections showed that *the status quo* in Ukraine did not end. After the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian public opinion expected for EU membership perspective but they disappointed with the ENP offer. In Ukrainian perspective, the fundamental reason of this disappointment was to be put into the same situation with Middle Eastern and North African countries which do not have a European experience and heritage. Therefore, the most important elements of persuasion mechanisms which are trust and empathy are not used in an efficient way by the EU elites. So it is changed the reactions and perceptions of the Ukrainian agents and in that context the bottom-up process of democracy promotion is weakened.

### 3.2. Border Interactions

The term ‘border’ has a dual conceptualization consist of the physical meaning and the signified meaning. In the context of the physical meaning, borders are the frontiers demarcating between two political authorities, but in sense of signified meaning there are political, social, psychological<sup>713</sup> and cultural meanings which are more than physical limits.

In constructivist perspective it could be said that the borders are what states make of it and they are “constructed institutions.”<sup>714</sup> “Borders provide specific

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<sup>713</sup> See Malcolm Anderson, **Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.4.

<sup>714</sup> Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter, “The Transformation Power of Integration” in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter (eds.) **The European Union and Border Conflicts**, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.21. See also D. Newmann, *On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework*,

mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion into different social realms, with citizenship as ‘membership’ in the political community of a nation state being the most visible one.”<sup>715</sup> Therefore, political borders are the consequence of the construction of an identity with defining ‘the other’.

There are also social and cultural borders which are independent from political or psychological borders. Social structures has own shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge but also there is an interaction between social structures. EU social structure and post-communist social structure intersect and interact at the same time. The border between Poland and Ukraine or Romania and Moldova or the borders with the Kaliningrad enclave could be the best examples for considering these overlapping social structures. Poland and Ukraine or Romania and Moldova share a common historical and cultural heritage and there are minorities in the border regions. These minorities are generally bilingual and they have relatives on the other side of the border.

Social-psychological variables explain the attitudes of the people towards the borders. The feeling of exclusion and inclusion are significant in the sense of the ENP. The EU elites seek to avoid of creating an exclusionary border which would be a ‘paper curtain’<sup>716</sup> which is created by official EU papers and regulations between EU members and neighbourhood countries. At that point Schengen borders should also be taken into consideration. Schengen area draws a mental border inside and outside the EU. The new EU member states could not enter Schengen area. For new member states a time period is needed for coming into effect and for implementing the Schengen agreement. This transition period is also for the cultural internalization and socialization process for the new member states. Schengen visa regime is the most visible side of the EU borders.

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**Journal of Borderland Studies**, Vol.18 No.1, pp.13-25. V. Kossolov, “Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches”, **Geopolitics**, Vol.10, No.4, pp. 606-32.

<sup>715</sup> A. Nassehi, *Geschlossenheit und Offenheit. Studien zur Theorie der Modernen Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter, “The Transformation Power of Integration” in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter (eds.), **op.cit.**, p.21.

<sup>716</sup> See Julie Smith, Charles Jenkins (Eds.), **Through the Paper Curtain: Insiders and Outsiders in the New Europe**, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003.



The European integration is an elite-driven process and borders are changing within every enlargement process. So, the borders and the neighbours also change. The EU social structure has fundamental values and norms such as democracy and liberty. Also ideas and values of the new member states enrich the social structure of the EU.

Border management is a central concern in the context of ENP and in constructivist perspective it is preferred to call it as border interactions. Border interactions which cover cross-border cooperation and migration problems are also two-process and are evaluated in the sense of top-down and bottom-up processes as it was used in analyzing the case of democracy promotion.

### **3.2.1. Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC)**

In the framework of the cross-border cooperation, the EU social structure promotes its values and norms. The CBC is a vital instrument in the sense of deconstructing the meaning of borders of the EU with constructing new ideas and sharing them with neighbourhood countries. The success of the CBC creates 'trust' and increase the persuasion capacity of the ENP partners. Also the CBC programmes focus mostly local and regional interactions and this could also encourage the bottom-up processes of democratization and socialization. The CBC could be interpreted as a two-way process which would be in top-down and bottom-up processes.

In the *Manifesto for Cross-Border Cooperation*, the need of two-way interaction for the success of cross-border interaction is expressed as,

“The cross-border territory appeared as the most federating and most operational concept for bringing Europe closer to the citizen and these territories gradually become spaces of multicultural dialogue between socio-economic actors and local authorities, forging a European citizenship and acting as powerful vectors for integration of internal borders and pacification of external borders of Europe.”<sup>717</sup>

The institutional structures of the CBC programmes and also the other organizations and initiatives will be covered to see the agents of the top-down process

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<sup>717</sup> Manifesto for Cross-Border Cooperation, “Recommendations to the National and European Authorities for Bringing Europe Closer to its Citizens”, **EUROMAT**, April 2008, p.5.

and the bottom-up processes also will be covered to see the interaction in the border regions.

Before the establishment of the ENP, cross-border cooperation was launched under the TACIS programme, which addressed the New Independent States (NIS) and under the MEDA programme which addressed the non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region. “The total funding for TACIS CBC during the period 1996-2003 amounted to €257 million.”<sup>718</sup> After the 2004 enlargement process, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was created. FRONTEX support member states when they need technical and operational assistants for the cooperation in the external border.<sup>719</sup>

In 2007, ENPI covered both MEDA and TACIS programmes. The cross-border cooperation programs address the issues from socio-cultural interactions to environment, transport and tourism.

The Commission adopted the ENPI CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Indicative Programme 2007-2010. These are the fundamental documents for the cross-border cooperation programmes of the EU. The EU based programmes are designed to promote economic, social and cultural development on the both side of the common borders and address some challenges like organized crime, immigration and environmental problems. These programmes promote ‘people-to-people’ actions in the border regions by giving support to civil societies, local administrations and media to provide sharing meanings, cultural heritage, history and values.<sup>720</sup>

In the context of Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, nine land-border and three sea-crossing programmes and three sea-basin programmes were founded for the period 2007-10. Land border programmes are for Finland and Russia border entitled as

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<sup>718</sup> **EU Co-operation News**, Bi-Weekly Newsletter of the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, No.14, 8.10.2008. See <http://www.rcbi.info/>

<sup>719</sup> European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Members States of the European Union (FRONTEX). See [http://europa.eu/agencies/community\\_agencies/frontex/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/frontex/index_en.htm)

<sup>720</sup> European Neighbourhood&Partnership Instrument, “Cross-Border Cooperation”. See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_cross-border\\_cooperation\\_strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross-border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf)

Kolarctic programme and Karelia programme. SE programme is a land programme for Finland-Russia, Estonia-Latvia-Russia, Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus, Lithuania-Poland-Russia, Poland-Belarus-Ukraine, Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine and Romania-Moldova-Ukraine. Sea crossing programmes are for Spain-Morocco, CBC Atlantic Programme and Italy-Tunisia. Sea Basin programmes are for Baltic Sea Region, Black Sea and Mediterranean.<sup>721</sup>

The cross border cooperation is financed by the ENPI but also financed by European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

“On this basis, the total funding available for ENPI-CBC programmes for the period 2007-10 amounts to € 583.28 million, of which € 274.92 million from ENPI, and € 308.36 million from ERDF. For the period 2011-13, it is foreseen that a further € 535.15 million (€ 252.23 million from ENPI and € 282.93 million from ERDF) will be made available, subject to the mid-term review of this strategy and the adoption of the Indicative Programme for the period 2011-13.”<sup>722</sup>

The tailor-made structure of the ENP facilitates the cross-border cooperation by having bilateral relations and especially with micro scale cooperation attempts. Moreover, the establishment of Euroregions in the EU supported the cross-border regional development programmes. The important euroregion in the borders of the EU; are the Carpathian euroregion (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania), Białowieża Forest euroregion (Belarus, Poland), Bug euroregion (Belarus, Poland, Ukraine), Siret-Prutu-Nistru euroregion (Romania, Moldova), Superior Prut and Lower Danube euroregion (Romania, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine), Dunărea de Jos euroregion (Moldova, Romania, Ukraine), Prutul de Sus euroregion (Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).<sup>723</sup> Cross-border associations of local government are crucial in the sense of improving interactions.

Borders between Poland-Ukraine, Romania-Moldova or the borders with the Kaliningrad enclave are the most challenging borders for the EU. Because, as it is

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<sup>721</sup> European Commission, Development Cooperation for ENPI countries.

See <http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/regional-updates/cross-border-cooperation.html>

<sup>722</sup> European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “Cross-border Cooperations”, Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010.

See <http://www.enpi.org.ua/index.php?id=36&L=1>

<sup>723</sup> Council of Europe, “Euroregions existence”.

See [http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Areas\\_of\\_Work/Transfrontier\\_Cooperation/Euroregions/Euroregions\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Areas_of_Work/Transfrontier_Cooperation/Euroregions/Euroregions_en.asp) [04.04.2010]

mentioned above, there are minorities in the both side of the borders and with the Schengen visa regime borders became harder and this makes the cross-border interactions harder in the sense of minorities in the both sides. CBC programmes seek to soften these relations. Even Moldova has ethnic relations with Romanians although they remained out of the EU but these two countries are still in the same social boundaries and this creates a contradiction. Being aware of this contradiction, “Romania has postponed the introduction of a visa regime with Moldova until accession.”<sup>724</sup> Romania did not fulfill the Schengen criteria, but seeks to be a Schengen country in 2011.<sup>725</sup> The level of organized crime and illegal operations are high in Moldova and the EU borders are designed to seek to prevent these illegal activities.

Schengen visa regime is one of the big obstacles in the sense of cross-border cooperations. Since the implementation of the Schengen visa regime, the illegal operations in the border increased. Even the increasing cost of the visa application is a problem for the poor neighbourhood countries. According to Sergei Prozorovng, with referring to his research on the Kaliningrad oblast he claims that, “Schengen destroys efforts made by the euro-regions framework: euro-regions were created to improve the integration of borderlands of Europe by financing cross-border projects, but they are now jeopardized by Schengen imperatives for a strict border regime.”<sup>726</sup> “Trade between Poland and Ukraine, for example, has decreased since the imposition of the Schengen-*acquis* on Poland.”<sup>727</sup>

The Commission has put forward a proposal to establish a local border traffic regime at the external land borders of the member states. This border regime also foresees a specific Local visa (L-type multiple entry) that would be limited to the member states that are in the border area. This visa also provides an entrance facility for

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<sup>724</sup> Eiki Berg, Piret Ehin, “What kind of Border Regime is in the Making?: Towards a Differentiated and Uneven Border Strategy”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol.41, No.53, 2006, p. 63.

<sup>725</sup> Paul Ciocoiu, “Romania Seeks Schengen Membership by 2011”, **Southeast European Times**, Bucharest, 26.06.2009.

<sup>726</sup> Sergei Prozorov, “Border Regions and the Politics of EU-Russian Relations – The Role of the EU in Tempering and Producing Border Conflicts”, **Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies**, No.3, January 2004, EUBorderConference, University of Birmingham, p.13.

<sup>727</sup> Oliver Kramersch, Roos Pijpers, Roald Plug, Henk van Houtum, “Research on the Policy of the European Commission Towards the Re-bordering of the European Union”, **EXLINEA Project Study Report**, Nijmegen, May 2004.

the third countries. In the ‘border area’ which is defined as up to 50 km from the border, the people from third countries could stay with the maximum duration of seven consecutive days.<sup>728</sup> “In the absence of internal check-points, there is nothing to keep these borderlanders within the prescribed zone of ‘flexible interaction’.”<sup>729</sup>

Schengen Information System (SIS) is revised with the new members joined into the Schengen area and SIS II is founded to better control visa system and to improve border management. In addition, the Visa Information System (VIS) is created to exchange the visa data between Member States and fight against illegal operations in the border.<sup>730</sup>

For the success of the cross-border interactions, this top-down process should be compliment with bottom-up process. NGOs, local and regional authorities, organizations, research centers and universities are the most crucial agents in that process.

In the case of representative associations and cooperations, Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and Barents Cooperation could give as an example. AEBR which is founded in 1965 assists EU cross-border cooperation attempts by organizing events, helps to solve cross-border problems and gives information to European political bodies and public about these issues.<sup>731</sup> In addition, Barents Cooperation’s representatives proposed a new initiative, in 2010, on cross-border cooperation to Stefan Füle who is the new EU Commissioner on Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy. The new initiative was formalized in the project entitled ‘European Border Dialogues - Promoting CBC in a wider Europe’. The project is headed by Vazil Hudak who is the Board Leader of the Prague-based Institute of

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<sup>728</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities, “Council Regulation on the Establishment of a Regime of Local Border Traffic at the External Land borders of the Member States”, **COM (2003) 502 Final**, 14.08.2003.

See, [http://www.unece.org/trans/main/tem/temdocs/Proposal\\_4\\_council\\_regulation\\_regime\\_border.pdf](http://www.unece.org/trans/main/tem/temdocs/Proposal_4_council_regulation_regime_border.pdf) [12.03.2010]

<sup>729</sup> Berg and Ehin, **op.cit.**, p. 63.

<sup>730</sup> **Europa Press Release**, “Improving Efficiency and Interoperability of large-scale data bases in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security- A Short Glossary”, **MEMO/05/440**, Brussels, 24.11.2005.

See

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/440&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [05.04.2010]

<sup>731</sup> Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), <http://www.aebr.net/>

Stability and Development, also the International Centre for Democratic Transition, the Carpathian Foundation, the Ukrainian Institute of Cross-border Cooperation, the Jefferson Institute, the Kaliningrad Regional Economic Development Agency, the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence and the Barents Institute will give support to this project.<sup>732</sup>

The EU supports bottom-up process of internalization of norms and values in the ENP countries in the context of cross-border cooperation. ‘Joint Task Force’ and ‘Joint Managing Authority’ (JMA) are the areas that both member states and neighbouring countries agents could work together through bottom-up processes.<sup>733</sup> ‘The Tacis City Twinning Programme’ and the later ‘Institution-Building Partnership Programme’ (IBPP) finance civic society and also local-regional authorities in the Post-communist countries and in the EU member states. The Tempus programme finances the higher educational institutions and their interactions with the civil society in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean region.<sup>734</sup> For the Black Sea region there is a ‘Cross-Border Cooperation Programme for Black Sea’ which “facilitates the further development of contacts between Black Sea towns and communities, universities, cultural operators and civil society organisations, including consumer organisations.”<sup>735</sup>

Frozen conflicts and the conflict-resolution attempts are also a part of border management issues. The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)<sup>736</sup> is crucial for the EU for improving the CBC programmes. Under ENPI, 12 million Euros is allocated for the period of December 2007-November 2008 for funding this mission.<sup>737</sup> The EU’s border-management operations are also in “Rafah with EUBAM, the EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia and the EU Police Mission in the

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<sup>732</sup> **BarentsObserver**, “New Cross-Border Initiative Presented to EU Commission”, 10.03.2010.

See <http://www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4757497&cat=99350> [10.03.2010]

<sup>733</sup> European Commission, Development Cooperation for ENPI Countries, “Cross-Border Cooperation” See <http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/regional-updates/cross-border-cooperation.html> [05.04.2010]

<sup>734</sup> European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, “Cross-border Cooperations”, Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010, p.12.

<sup>735</sup> Romania-Bulgaria Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013- Final Draft, June 2007. See [http://www.eufunds.bg/docs/CBC\\_Romania-Bulgaria\\_2007-2013,1.pdf](http://www.eufunds.bg/docs/CBC_Romania-Bulgaria_2007-2013,1.pdf) [05.04.2010]

<sup>736</sup> EUBAM. See <http://www.eubam.org/>

<sup>737</sup> EUBAM, Annual Report 2008, p. 6.

See, [http://www.eubam.org/files/600-699/642/Mission\\_Report\\_2009\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.eubam.org/files/600-699/642/Mission_Report_2009_ENG.pdf) [05.04.2010]

Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)”.<sup>738</sup> “The South Caucasus Republics have been invited by the EU to enter in an enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.”<sup>739</sup>

The frozen conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood, as they were focused in the section of thematic scope above, relates to different agents and structures. These conflicts distort peace in the region and these conditions have an impact of all the interactions between the agents of EU social structure and the agents of ENP partnerstates. “A constructivist reading would argue that one of the decisive objectives of the ENP is to arrive at a desecuritized relationship between neighbours and the EU”<sup>740</sup> In that sense, the frozen conflicts which are creating security challenges are aspired to be resolved to create a desecuritized relationship with ENP countries. The EU tries to play a role of mediator between the two parties and gives financial assistance. As an example, in the case of frozen conflicts in Georgia, the European Commission allocated 25 million Euros to Abkhazia.<sup>741</sup> Moreover, there could be bilateral donors from the Member States. As an example, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the UK, Germany, Norway and Sweden are the bilateral donors.<sup>742</sup>

In the context of these frozen conflicts, the EU as a third party with its mediatory role is not interventionist but seeks to analyze the historical and social backgrounds of these conflicts and assess the psychological and financial damages in both sides.<sup>743</sup> For instance, in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the EU focused on the conflict as a priority area in the Action Plans of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. For the priority area, “promoting the civil society, people-to-people contacts and increasing the diplomatic efforts and political support to OSCE and the measures to

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<sup>738</sup> European Commission, “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 8.

<sup>739</sup> Burcu Gültekin, “Necessary Cross-Border Cooperation”, **Caucas Europe News**, 08.01.2007.

<sup>740</sup> Balzacq, **op.cit.** p. 19.

<sup>741</sup> “Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role”, **Crisis Group Europe Report**, No.173, 20.03.2006, p. 17.

<sup>742</sup> Tevan Poghosyan, “The Armenian ENP and Conflict Resolution in Nagorno Karabakh”, Crisis Management Initiative, The International Center for Human Development, September 2009, p. 19.

<sup>743</sup> Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, “Çatışma Ortamlarında Üçüncü Tarafların Uzlaştırma Amaçlı Mühaleleri: Paralel Diplomasiye Eleştirel Bir Bakış” in Nimet Beriker (ed.), **Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya, Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar**, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009, p.132.

assist refugees and Internally Displaced Persons”<sup>744</sup> are mentioned for both sides as the pathway for both the EU and the two parties. In the Action Plan of Azerbaijan, it is said that, “Azerbaijan is invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.”<sup>745</sup> The discourse of the EU in the Action Plan could be interpreted as delicate and mediatory in the sense of its peace making mission. Moreover, France as a member of Minsk Group with co-chair of U.S. and Russia observe the official negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and inform the other member-states about the developments. The contribution of France is criticized by Azerbaijan that blames France’s pro-Armenian stance. In the Minsk process, the lack of neutrality of the third participants is criticized by all parties.<sup>746</sup>

In the context of economic and social development; transport, energy and communication are crucial and energy dialogue is a variable for improving Cross-Border Cooperation. Constructivism focuses on social facts and non-material constituents and energy is a material reality. *Per contra*, physical entities are a part of social world. In that sense, the intellectual process which constitutes energy relations between the agents in the context of a structure could be an area of research for constructivists. The process of energy dialogue and the interaction and behaviours of agents- e.g. the EU, ENP states, NGOs, oil and gas companies- should be analyzed to understand the interaction. The peace, prosperity, nuclear safety and environmental issues are all components of energy dialogues with the ENP countries. The construction of cooperative ideas on energy relations would construct the interests and interests would construct the material conditions and the material conditions would construct the reality. Reality is not a given data in constructivist analysis, therefore bilateral dialogues and cooperative relations on energy issues with ENP countries could change the variables of energy relations in the area of ENP. The EU attempts on the process of improving energy relations were mentioned in *the Sectoral Progress Report on Strengthening the ENP*. These attempts are; enhancing the energy dialogue with

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<sup>744</sup> Poghosyan, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>745</sup> European Commission, EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan.

See [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/azerbaijan\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf) [05.04.2010]

<sup>746</sup> Poghosyan, *op.cit.*, pp. 9-15.



Moldova and Morocco; Euro- Mediterranean Energy Forum and Baku energy initiative. Also, a *Memorandum of Understanding on Energy* is also signed with Ukraine, Azerbaijan and would probably be signed with Algeria and Egypt.<sup>747</sup> Apart from these interactions between the EU and the ENP countries, there are other kinds of interactions between the other agents. The multinational gas and oil companies and their interactions with the governments should also be considered. Gazprom is an important agent for Ukraine-Russia and the EU relations. Also in the context of energy relations, the environmental problems are crucial. After the bad experience of Chernobyl in Ukraine, nuclear safety is one of the most vital issues for both energy and environmental issues. In the sense of environmental issues the international and regional initiatives and agreements, the people-to-people contacts, NGOs and civil society are all active agents and should be considered. Therefore for analyzing the ENP, the environmental issues should also be respected as independent variables which affect the construction of energy dialogue.

### 3.2.2. Migration Problem

In the analysis of migration policy, the interaction of the agents in the both EU and ENP countries are taken into consideration. The migration problem could be categorized as internal and external migration. In the case of the ENP, the external migration will be considered to analyze the interaction between the ENP agents and the EU social structure.

The external migration is a janus-faced structure which means that it has both positive and negative sides. On the one side, the EU has an aging population (especially EU15) and needs young working power<sup>748</sup>, but on the other side illegal immigration is a negative factor also leading to illegal operations which damage the social structure of

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<sup>747</sup> **Europe Press Releases**, “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, MEMO/07/336, 30.08.2007

<sup>748</sup> See for further discussions; Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons”, **The Political Quarterly**, Vol.74, No.1, 2003, pp. 25-38. Channe Lindstrøm, “European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration. Addressing the Root Causes of Forced Migration: A Justice and Home Affairs Policy of Freedom, Security and Justice?”, **Social Policy and Administration**, Vol.39, No.6, 2005, pp. 587-605.

the EU. Ferrero-Waldner expresses the vision of the EU with her words as; “We need to be fighting those who organize illegal immigration, not the migrants themselves.”<sup>749</sup> The prejudices towards immigrants increased especially after the 9/11 events with parallel to the negative attitudes towards Islamic countries especially in the Northern Africa. The Northern African countries, which are also ENP countries, have a big migration potential to the EU. These immigrations could be in legal or illegal ways. This situation creates a dilemma in the attitudes of the people of EU member states on the diversification between illegal and legal migration. EU citizens see all legal and illegal immigrants as potential threats for the social structure of the EU. Especially, “the negative attitude towards immigrants from Islamic countries like Morocco occurred in the EU.”<sup>750</sup>

Referring to the Eurobarometer 2007 survey, 38% of the EU27 countries believe that immigration is very important and 39% believe that it is fairly important. There are also differences between old and new member states as regards the attitudes towards cooperation on immigration. While 40% of old member states believes that immigration is very important, 31% of new member states believe that immigration is a very important issue. Polish people also believe that immigration has a fairly important role. People from France and Belgium believe that immigration is not an essential area. Moreover, the 62% of EU citizens believe that close cooperation with neighbourhood countries will reduce illegal immigration. Also in that statistics, people living in the newer Member States are more optimistic about the neighbourhood cooperation could reducing the illegal operation.<sup>751</sup>

The migration issue is related to the social structures and the interaction of individuals with the structure. The terrorist attacks of fundamentalist Muslims created new social structure in the international system and it has an impact on all the agents in the structure of the EU. For instance, “among non-EU immigrants, Moroccans ranked

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<sup>749</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Migration, External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 24.01.2006. See for further discussions about Hansen, *op.cit.* Lindström, *op.cit.*

<sup>750</sup> Luigi Cafara, Kaisa Korhonen, “European Neighbourhood Policy: A Case Study of Morocco”, Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series, 17.04.2008, p. 8.

<sup>751</sup> **Eurobarometer**, “EU’s Relations with its Neighbours”, No.285, Wave 67.3, September 2007, pp. 21-22.

first in flows to Spain and Belgium but were also numerous in France and Italy”.<sup>752</sup> Accordingly, Spanish and Maltese public opinion believe that immigration should play a key role in the context of building specific relations with neighbouring countries.<sup>753</sup> The immigration policies are also taken under consideration in top-down and bottom-up processes. It is a two-way process and the interactions of the agents in the both parties are crucial.

Migration is related to the understanding of the border regarding to the territorial frontiers or social/conceptual boundaries of the EU. Moreover, the migration issue could be categorized as legal or illegal immigration.<sup>754</sup> The big potential of legal immigration could also increase the level of illegal immigration.

There are ‘push and pull factors’ for migration. There could be political, economic, demographic, social or environmental reasons for immigration and ‘the push factors’ are mainly related to the socio-economic conditions in the countries of the migrants. Human rights abuses, ethnic cleaning, overpopulation, poor economic conditions (unemployment, low GDP rates) or natural disasters are the fundamental pushing factors. The economic wealth, the democratic values and better living conditions are the basic ‘pulling factors’ for the migrants.<sup>755</sup> Thus, the relation between development and migration is vital and is considered by the EU.<sup>756</sup>

As regards the ‘pushing factors’ to migration, the socio-economic profiles of the ENP countries should be considered to see how the potential of these countries for migration. The profiles of ENP countries are similar and it could be said that all of them are undeveloped countries with poor economic conditions in different levels.

If we categorise ENP partners according to the geographical regions it should be noted that Northern African countries have the highest numbers of immigration rates.

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<sup>752</sup> Anne Herm, “Recent Migration Trends: Citizens of EU-27 Members States Become Over Mobile While EU Remains”, **Eurostat Statistics in Focus**, No.98, 2008, p. 4

<sup>753</sup> **Eurobarometer**, “EU’s Relations with its Neighbours”, pp. 21-22.

<sup>754</sup> Andrew Geddes, **Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe**, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 3

<sup>755</sup> Jesmond Xuereb, “Migration in the Mediterranean”, Local Youth Parliaments Networking in Europe, 4.12.2008.

<sup>756</sup> Website of Migration and Development.

See <http://www.migrationdevelopment.org/index.php?id=home>

Concerning the World Values Survey, the northern African countries are the most traditional and it shows that religion is an important factor and the society structure is based on traditional values and they generally have a nationalist outlook and they are not industrial countries.<sup>757</sup> These socio-economic structures of the Northern African countries push them to the EU social structure and the EU social structure could be a gravity center for the immigrants from ENP countries. This potential of immigrants also contains the illegal immigrants. This also indicates a contradiction of the essence of ENP. Creating a 'ring of friends' motto is not persuasive for the immigrants who feel themselves excluded from the EU. The effectiveness of the democracy promotion efforts could also be measured with the level of illegal immigration from ENP countries.

The circumstances of Northern African countries are different than Eastern European countries in the context of border relations and immigration issues. Eastern European countries belong to a different social structure than the Northern African countries. With respect to the World Values Survey, although the Eastern European countries are not industrialized countries they are not traditional and their visions are not so much nationalistic as traditional countries.<sup>758</sup> Therefore, social pressure on the individual is lesser than the African countries and this is effective on individual preferences. However the poor social conditions are the significant factor for the immigration from these countries. The Eastern European countries have land borders while Northern African countries have sea borders. This is another crucial variable in analyzing the immigration problems. The Eastern European countries have a land border and these borders could not demarcate with physical border because of the wider social and cultural boundaries related to the common historical legacies and sharings. In that sense, after the 2004 enlargement process and implementation of the Schengen border on the 1st of January, 2008 created a negative impact on the Eastern European frontier countries and increased the attempt on illegal immigration in these countries.

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<sup>757</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 64 based on the World Values Surveys.

See [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

<sup>758</sup> **Ibid.**

The EU mostly focused on Northern African countries in the context of immigration policies in the context of Southern dimension of the ENP. Concerning the Eurostat estimate (see FIGURE 1) on the number of non-EU immigrants in 2006, it is shown that while Morocco is in the first place and Ukrainians is the second place with nearly 100 000 migrants to the EU (Czech Republic, Italy Spain and Portugal).<sup>759</sup> Since the first EU-Africa summit in 2000, the EU gave more emphasis on migration issues related to the Africa. Sub-Saharan migrants pass through Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal to reach Europe.<sup>760</sup> Libya and Morocco are included in the framework of ENP. Libya is still a passive partner but Morocco is highly important in the sense of Mediterranean relations and immigration policies. A migration flow is different “in the EU’s northern states, as well as the EFTA countries, have a particularly high number of asylum-seekers while in the EU’s southern members (Italy-Spain and Portugal) illegal immigration has become the dominant ‘pattern of migration.’”<sup>761</sup> Especially Italy has real concerns on immigration from South African countries and from old colonial countries. From Tunisia and Libya illegal immigrants went to Italy’s island of Lampedusa and Sicily.<sup>762</sup>

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<sup>759</sup> Anne Herm, “Recent Migration Trends: Citizens of EU-27 Members States Become Over Mobile While EU Remains”, Eurostat Statistics in Focus, No.98, 2008, p. 4


<sup>760</sup> Hugo Brady, “EU Migration Policy: An A-Z”, Centre for European Reform Briefing, p. 5.

See [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing\\_813.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_813.pdf)

<sup>761</sup> Robert Miles, Dietrich Thränhardt, “Migration and European Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion”, London: Pinter Publisher, 1995, pp. 75-76. Cladudio Calvaruso, **Illegal Immigration to Italy in OECD: the Future of Migration**, Paris: OECD, 1989.

<sup>762</sup> **BBC News**, “Key Facts: Africa to Europe Migration”, 02.07.2007.

See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm>



Source: Eurostat estimate

**Figure 1 Eurostat numbers of immigration rates from non-EU immigrants, 2006.**

The Eastern European Countries, especially Moldova and Ukraine are significant countries for the immigration policies because both of these countries have a land border with Romania and Poland which are the new member states and post-communist countries. Both Moldova and Ukraine are transit countries for the immigrants from CIS countries because the citizens of CIS do not have a visa problem to enter these countries and could pass the EU countries in legal or illegal ways. In the case of Ukraine, it had 5.3 millions international migrants in 2010 and the country is in the top ten lists.<sup>763</sup> Percentage of immigrants in 2010 to Poland is 2.2 and for Romania 0.6%.<sup>764</sup> To Poland “among illegal migrants the most numerous were citizens of Ukraine (907 persons).”<sup>765</sup> These numbers indicates two issues. First, the low percentage of immigrants to Poland show that Ukraine is a transit country for immigrants and immigrants move to the west of Poland. People from Vietnam, Pakistan-India, Sri-Lanka-Bangladesh, Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Iran, Turkey,

<sup>763</sup> International Organization for Migration, “Regional and Country Figures”.

See <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/regional-and-country-figures> [12.03.2010]

<sup>764</sup> International Organization for Migration, “Fact and Figures”.

<sup>765</sup> Piotr Stocki, Director of the International Co-operation Bureau of the Polish Border Guard Headquarters, “Illegal Migration”. See [www.oefz.at/fr/Bratislava04/Interventions/Stocki.pdf](http://www.oefz.at/fr/Bratislava04/Interventions/Stocki.pdf) [12.03.2010]

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia use Ukraine as a transit country.<sup>766</sup> Secondly, it indicates that most of the immigrants to Poland are illegal immigrants. Poland entered Schengen area therefore the immigration level has decreased automatically but Romania will enter Schengen zone in 2011. According to the State Border Guard Service (SBGS), “the number of illegal migrants precluded on the border of the and neighbourhood countries decreased since 2004 period because of the initiation of the ENP and the initiation of SBGS activities on preventing illegal migrants.”<sup>767</sup>

In the case of Moldova, it should be noted that as regarding the UNDP Human Development Report in 2005, Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and in the 2007/2008 report 694\$ GDP per capita was reported for Moldova.<sup>768</sup> Moreover, “Illegal migration is often associated with human trafficking and in USA State Human Trafficking Report, it is stressed that 1% of all Moldovan migrants are human traffic victims.”<sup>769</sup> Moldova and also Ukraine are also Black Sea countries and are included in the activity areas of platforms and NGOs for democracy promotion and region-building attempts in the region. Romania also as a Black Sea country and a member state of the EU is active on the projects covering these countries in the case of migration issues. A project entitled as ‘Managing Migration in the Black Sea region: Improving the implementation of national policies in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania through regional cooperation among NGOs’ is initiated by the Institute for Public Policy (Romania), the Viitorul Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (Moldova) and the International Centre for Policy Studies (Ukraine) with a support of Open Society Foundation network and the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation for improving migration policy in these countries. This project published a report and referring to the report Moldova is chosen for “a pilot project in the area of rotational migration field and

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<sup>766</sup> White Paper, “Ukraine’s Policy to Control Illegal Migration”, International Centre for Policy Studies, Institute for Public Affairs, June 2006, pp.12-13. See also, UA-Reporter, “Movement Against Illegal Immigration”, 11.07.2008. See <http://ua-reporter.com/eng/33499>

<sup>767</sup> State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, <http://www.pvu.gov.ua>

<sup>768</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2005. UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008. See [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR05\\_complete.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR05_complete.pdf) and <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/> [12.03.2010]

<sup>769</sup> Sever Voinescu, Georgiana Neacșu, Adrian Moraru, Valeriu Mosneaga, Natalia Vladicescu, Natalya Shapovalova and Victor Chumak, “Migration Trends and Policies In the Black Sea Region: Cases of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine”, Institute for Public Policy, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives, “Viitorul”, International Centre for Policy Studies, Chisinau 2008, p. 9

gave 5.5 million EUR the period since 2008 (e.g. in January 2008 Simplified Visa-Regime between Moldova and EU countries implemented)”<sup>770</sup>

In the context of the EU legislation on migration issues, in 2005 the Commission published a Communication on “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”<sup>771</sup> and presented also a Communication on “Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union”<sup>772</sup>. Both of these Communications focus on the dialogue and cooperation in the field of migration. FRONTEX as an EU agency is also active in illegal immigration issues in the context of border relations.

In the framework of the ENP, Action Plans that are tailor-made which means that for every partner the priorities could be changed, are crucial. In the Action Plans of some of the ENP partners like Morocco and Moldova, immigration is one of the priorities. The ENP countries also have their own National Action Programmes and focus on the migration issues.

International Organization for Migration (IOM), is an influential inter-governmental organization which was established in 1951, works in the field of migration with different agents from over 100 countries. The IOM recognizes a correlation between migration and development of the country.<sup>773</sup> There is also a platform as a part of the IOM which is entitled as ‘the Pan-European Dialogue on Migration Management’. It seeks to provide “a multilateral regional dialogue in order to shape coherent and transparent migration-related policy and programming priorities between the EU Member States and their neighbors.”<sup>774</sup> To this platform different

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<sup>770</sup> **Ibid.**, p.11.

<sup>771</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission, “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”, **COM (2005)699 final**, 21.12.2005. See [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005\\_0669en01.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0669en01.pdf) [12.03.2010]

<sup>772</sup> European Commission, Communication From the Commission, “Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union”, **COM (2007) 247 Final/2**, 08.06.2007.

<sup>773</sup> International Organization for Migration. See <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom>

<sup>774</sup> **Ibid.**



agents (NGOs, policy-makers, experts and researchers) from both the EU, neighbour states and also from Russia, the U.S and U.N are participating.<sup>775</sup>

Illegal migrations create negative perception such as hesitation and fear for the people living in the EU member states and this perception creates a negative attitude towards the ENP countries. Therefore, the interactions of the agents in the context of immigration policies could be negative and the security measures and visa procedures could weaken the interactions between the agents of the ENP countries with the agents of the EU. On the other side, in the old EU member states, since 2004 in the local and regional elections there is a tendency towards nationalist parties which support anti-immigration policies.<sup>776</sup> The mutual trust is the basis for the interaction between two parties. Thus as Franco Frattini states in his speech, “the word migration is negatively loaded with loss and sorrow, therefore a new expression is launched: *EU mobility*.”<sup>777</sup> The EU elites aim to reverse the immigrations policy to a benefit rather than a danger for the social structure. The immigration of qualified workers to the EU would support the EU economy.

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<sup>775</sup> The pan-Dialogue on Migration Management.

See <http://www.belgium.iom.int/pan-europeandialogue/documents/Initiative%20on%20Migration%20SHORT%20SPROUT%2021-12-2005.pdf>

<sup>776</sup> Hugo Brady, “EU Migration Policy: An A-Z”, Centre for European Reform Briefing, p. 29.

See [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing\\_813.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_813.pdf)

<sup>777</sup> Franco Frattini, “Enhanced Mobility, Vigorous Integration Strategy and Zero Tolerance on Illegal Employment: A Dynamic Approach to European Immigration Policies”, **Speech/07/526**, Lisbon, 13.09.2007.

## CONCLUSION

The structure of the thesis is tried be constituted in an original way with interpreting three dimensions of ENP in three main parts. In that context, the ENP became concrete with this three dimensional analysis.

In the first part, the question of ‘what is neighbourhood policy’ is answered. In the first chapter of this part, genesis of the concept ‘neighbourhood’ which substantially has a positive meaning is evaluated in the Kantian perspective. The concept of ‘neighbourhood’ is built against enmity-friendship contradiction regarding the perception of war and peace. It is assessed that, ‘neighbourhood’ is an intellectual process and it is related to the status of peace and is also correlated to the Kantian stance of the EU.

After the conceptualization part, the development, tools and aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy are explained. In the first chapter of the first part, the ENP partners are categorized in the axis of change and stability with an alternative diagram. Therefore, the ENP countries are categorized according to their level of change under the effect of the ENP. With this categorization, the activeness and the changing capacity of the ENP partners are figured out. Ukraine, for example, is found as an active partner and has a high capacity of change, but Belarus on the other side is near to the minor capacity of change and it does not activated in ENP.

In the second chapter of this part, in the sense of scope of the policy, it is found that the neighbourhood is a concept which should be assessed beyond physical boundaries. In due to the course of analysis of the neighbourhood relations of physical boundaries and beyond the physical boundaries, some evidences are found on the main argument of the thesis.

As it is mentioned in the introduction part, in the first part there is no explicit theoretical framework and in accordance with the scope of the chapters sometimes constructivist sometimes neorealist perspective is used spontaneously. For instance, the Black Sea region is considered as an intellectually constructed region and the relations of ENP with region-building processes in the region is in constructivist perspective. But

on the other side, the relationship between the energy conflicts and frozen conflicts are explained in neorealist perspective. These evaluations are illuminated the part two and part three.

In the first part, in the part of geographic scope of the ENP it is found out that geographic dimensions could be in competition with each other and could be a basis for alternative regional unions in apart from the EU. This observation shows that ENP is designed as a policy which could create a unique framework to unite all these dimensions and create a synergy.

The thematical scope is divided into two parts as ‘conflict’ and ‘peace’. In the part of ‘conflict’ the factors which creates neorealist aims and in the part of ‘peace’ the factors which could be correlated with the constructivist policies. In the thematic part, it is argued that there is a relationship between frozen conflicts and energy conflicts. By great powers, frozen conflicts could be used as a tool for putting pressure on the small states in the regions where energy routes are passing. In other words frozen conflicts could be used as a tool of pipeline diplomacy of great powers. This argument is supported in the second part of the thesis, with the analysis of energy relations in neorealist perspective. In the sense of ‘peace’ relations, it is argued that democracy promotion and energy dialogue are interrelated. The need of stability and peace in energy relations is crucial. Moreover it is also related to the relation between frozen conflicts and energy relations. The energy dialogue would support the peace-building efforts indirectly and create stability. Moreover, stability would support the democracy promotion efforts in these regions. In the context of democracy promotion the thematic neighbourhood relations is considered on the axis of cause and effect relations. It should be noted that the democracy promotion is taken as a factor in constituting thematic relations, but the process is focused in the third part of the thesis which is written with different dynamics.

As a conclusion of the chapter of scope of the policy, it is put forward that even though geographical and thematic neighbourhood are challenging on some issues they complement each other.

In the second part, the ‘why-questions’ are asked and the reasons lying behind the creation of the ENP is questioned in neorealist perspective. The evolution of the ENP is focused in the framework of power struggle between the great powers in the

sense of balance of power. In this international environment the EU is considered as a sub-system and the relationship between the sub-system and international system is assessed. In the chapter of field of activity, the cases of ‘widening’ and ‘energy relations’ are examined. These cases gave an impetus for answering why the ENP is constituted. The power struggle between the great powers is focused and some concrete examples were given to prove why the EU developed the ENP.

In this chapter, it is put forward that the widening and the ENP processes could be complementary to each other. In the context of power maximization of great powers in the system of the EU, sometimes widening or the ENP could be used to complement each other. In the framework of energy relations, the role of the EU in energy politics and the impact of the energy politics on ENP are examined. In addition, Russia’s influence over the post-communist space is put forward with the case of Ukraine. Ukraine is taken as a case because it is a crucial transit country and it has a geo-strategic importance both in the Black Sea region and in the Eastern European region. Also the dual political structure of Ukraine between the EU and Russia makes its role more important. The case of Ukraine is chosen as an efficient example to show the Russian influence in its near abroad and the power struggle between EU’s great powers and Russia over Ukraine.

In the third part, how-questions are asked and the process of ENP is examined in constructivist perspective. In this part, the EU is considered as a social structure and it is objected to find out how to categorize the agents of the ENP and how the democracy promotion capacity of the EU, in the region in the case of the ENP could be measured and how the ENP could have an impact on stability and change in the defined area. The interaction of the agents of the ENP with the social structure of the EU and the international system and also the instruments of the ENP are focused in the second chapter of the third part. The agents of the ENP are interacting and the EU use instruments in socialization and modernization processes. The socialization process and social interaction could be constituted within the ENP influence. With the cases of democracy promotion and border relations, the effect of the ENP and the socialization process are tried to be measured.

In all cases of the third part, the two-way interactions between the EU social structure and the ENP partners are emphasized. Moreover, in this part the ground of the analysis is based on the effect of bottom-up processes.

In the cases of Orange Revolution in Ukraine and Rose Revolution in Georgia, how these coloured revolutions gave impetus to the democratization and modernization process in these ENP partners is examined. It is argued that the analysis of the impact of the coloured revolutions on the socialization process is also correlated with the EU's agents' role in the democracy promotion to these countries' internalization capacity. EU's support to the Orange Revolution process is evaluated as persuasive and trustful in the sense of democracy promotion process. It enhanced the potential of a formation which is already evolved. After the Orange Revolution, the ENP created a disappointment in Ukraine and the most important elements of persuasion mechanisms which are trust and empathy are not used in an efficient way by the EU elites. So it changed the reactions and perceptions of the Ukrainian agents and in that context the bottom-up process of democracy promotion is weakened. Moreover, 2010 elections in Ukraine showed that *the status quo* in Ukraine still continues.

In the case of border relations, cross-border cooperation and migration is taken as two cases to explain the process in constructivist perspective. The CBC is taken as an instrument in the sense of deconstructing shared meanings with the neighbourhood countries. It is put forward that, the success of the CBC could construct 'trust' and increase the persuasion capacity of the ENP partners. Also the CBC programme focus mostly local and regional interactions and this could also encourage the bottom-up processes of democratization and socialization. The CBC could be interpreted as a two-way process which would be in top-down and bottom-up processes.

In the case of migration problem, migration is related to the understanding of the border regarding to the territorial frontiers or social/conceptual boundaries of the EU. The immigration policies are also taken under consideration in top-down and bottom-up processes. It is argued that illegal migration creates negative perception in the EU member states and this perception creates a negative attitude towards the ENP countries. Therefore, it is found out that the interactions of the agents in the context of immigration policies could be negative and the security measures and visa procedures

could weaken the interactions between the agents of the ENP countries with the agents of the EU.

Consequently, in the third part the social structure of the EU and its interactions in the system analyzed in constructivist perspective to understand the actors of the ENP. In the context of the agent-structure interaction, the variables which constitute the process and the aims of the policy were taken under consideration. In constructivist perspective, the aims of the policy were not based on the reasons and the subjects, but could be based on the interaction of the object and the subject analyzed.

Both constructivism and neorealism are systemic theories and they are assumed the international environment on the basis of international system. In this thesis the EU is taken as a sub-system or a social structure which has an interaction with an international system. This is the common ground of both theories. But the main difference between these theories is related to how they perceive the unit. In neorealist perspective the unit of analysis is the 'state'. In constructivist perspective, the unit of analysis is also 'the state', but as it is mentioned in the introduction part, the state is assumed as an unit with considering all policy-making processes in a country with emphasizing bottom-up processes and emphasizing the role of 'the individual' in society. It could be argued that constructivism is a sociological based theory and the role of social psychological factors, the individual, and the role of the civil society is crucial. But in neorealist perspective, there is a wide-angled view and just emphasize the role of great powers. Therefore, it could be said that parameters are different in both theories. In this thesis, constructivism is used to be able to focus on 'the process' while the neorealism is focused on 'the cause-effect' relations. In that sense, constructivism does not make predictions and future prospects. In constructivism, there is no data given but the process is vital and should be analyzed. However in neorealism, some predictions and future prospects could be done because there are given data and also recurring relations in the system.

The approaches of neorealism and constructivism to the EU are pointed out that the actorness of the EU is so weak to be considered and the EU's member states are still crucial and should be considered.

Consequently, it could be put forward that the EU uses ENP both as a geo-strategic tool to maximize its power in the periphery, and a modernization and a

socialization tool to stabilize and change the region. The ENP has a janus-faced structure. On the one side, the evolution of the ENP could be based on neorealist purposes and on the other side constructivist instruments and mechanisms could be used to increase the effectiveness of the policy. The two sides of the ENP are complementary, and both approaches propose the continuation of the system.

In the case of ENP, some predictions could be done for the future prospects.<sup>778</sup> In the future, ENP could be use to balance the enlargement process and Turkey would be a vital country because of its neighbourhoods in the east. Therefore, ENP could enlarge its scope and would be a more effective policy. Also, some ENP partners (especially Ukraine) could be taken into the candidacy status even though ENP hamper candidacy for its partners.

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<sup>778</sup> In neorealist perspective some predictions could be done for the future prospects but constructivist analysis just analyzes the process, the given data and it does not make predictions for the future.

## APPENDICES

### APP 1: ENP partners

Countries	EU Contracts	Country Report	Action Plan	Adoption by the ENP Partner
Armenia	July 1999 (PCA)	March 2005	Autumn 2006	November 2006
Azerbaijan	July 1999 (PCA)	March 2005	Autumn 2006	November 2006
Belarus	PCA is agreed in March 1995 but it is suspended since today by the EU.			
Egypt	June 2004 (AA)	March 2005	End 2006	March 2007
Georgia	July 1999 (PCA)	March 2005	Autumn 2006	November 2006
Jordan	May 2002 (AA)	May 2004	End 2004	January 2005
Israel	June 2000 (AA)	May 2004	End 2004	April 2005
Kazakhstan	July 1999			
Lebanon	April 2006 (AA)	March 2005	Autumn 2006	January 2007
Libya				
Moldova	July 1998 (PCA)	May 2004	End 2004	February 2005
Russia	December 1997	Strategic Partnership on Four Common Spaces		
Palestinian Authority	July 1997 (Interim AA)	May 2004	End 2004	May 2005
Syria	October 2004 (AA)			
Morocco	March 2000 (AA)	May 2004	End 2004	February 2005
Ukraine	March 1998 (PCA)	May 2004	End 2004	February 2005

**Sources:**

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1467&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

(Brackets): expected date  
 PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
 AA – Association Agreement




**APP 2: Categorization of ENP partner states**

<b>With Action Plans</b>	<b>Without Action Plans</b>
<p><b>Willing partners</b>  <i>East</i>  Moldova – European identity, don't take no for answer, wants more  Georgia – <i>idem</i>  Ukraine – <i>idem</i>  Armenia – want more, but has other security priorities  <i>South</i>  Morocco – wants more  Tunisia – economic anchorage to the EU  Palestine – desperate for aid  Israel – European identity  Jordan – reformist partner</p>	<p><b>Reluctant partners</b>  <i>East</i>  [Russia – from the beginning excluded itself  formally from ENP, but is included in ENPI and four common spaces resemble Action Plans]  <i>South</i>  Algeria – oil rich, averse to conditionality, in ENPI &amp; Barcelona process</p>
<p><b>Passive partners</b>  <i>East</i>  Azerbaijan – oil rich  <i>South</i>  Lebanon – superficial participant, desperate for support  Egypt – regional leader, averse to conditionality</p>	<p><b>Excluded partners</b>  <i>East</i>  Belarus – lack of democracy currently excludes activation of ENP  <i>South</i>  Syria – in ENPI and Barcelona process, but activation of ENP currently excluded  Libya – in ENPI &amp; Barcelona process, but activation of ENP currently excluded  <b>Excluded entities</b>  <i>East</i>  Transnistria – non-recognised entity  Abkhazia – <i>idem</i>  South Ossetia – <i>idem</i>  Nagorno Karabakh – <i>idem</i>  <i>South</i>  Western Sahara – occupied territory</p>

**Source:.** Micheal Emerson; Gergana Noutcheva, “European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years On: Time indeed for an ‘ENP Plus’”, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief, No.126. March 2007, p.10.

**APP 3: Categorization of the ENP partners from the aspect of ENP effect**




#### APP 4: ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation

##### Indicative allocations per programme, 2007-10, in million Euro

	2007-10	2010-13	Total 2007-13
<i>Land-Border Programmes</i>			
Kolaretic/Russia	14.728	13.513	28.241
Karelia/Russia	12.101	11.102	23.203
SE Finland/Russia	18.871	17.314	36.185
Estonia/Latvia/Russia	24.915	22.859	47.775
Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus	21.766	19.970	41.737
Lithuania/ Poland /Russia	68.908	63.222	132.130
Poland/Belarus/Ukraine	97.107	89.094	186.201
Hungary/Slovakia/Ukraine/Romania	35.796	32.842	68.638
Romania/Moldova/Ukraine	66.086	60.632	126.718
<i>Sea-Crossing Programmes</i>			
Spain/Morocco	81.738	74.993	156.732
CBC Atlantic Programme	16.773	15.389	32.162
Italy/Tunisia	13.138	12.054	25.191
<i>Sea-Basin Programmes</i>			
Black Sea	9.025	8.281	17.306
Mediterranean	90.539	83.068	173.607
Baltic Sea Region (ENPI contribution to the integrated Baltic Sea programme)	11.791	10.818	22.608
<b>Total</b>	<b>583.283</b>	<b>535.152</b>	<b>1.118.434</b>


**Source:** European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument, Cross-Border Cooperation, Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010, p.33.

**APP 5: EUBAM's area of operations**




Source: The Official Website of EUBAM, see <http://www.eubam.org/index.php?action=group&group=27&sid=%3C>

**APP 6: Major Gas Pipelines of the Former Soviet Union and Capacity of Export Pipelines**



Source: East European Gas Analysis, <http://www.eegas.com/fsu.htm>

APP 7 : Oil and Gas Pipelines in Europe



Source: BBC News,  
See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/guides/456900/456974/img/1152550748.gif>

## APP 8: Oil Pipelines in Caspian Region

Caspian Region Oil Pipelines (U)



Source: US Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis.  
[http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Azerbaijan/images/Caspian\\_pipe\\_map.pdf](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Azerbaijan/images/Caspian_pipe_map.pdf)

## APP 9: North Stream and South Stream Pipelines

PROJECTED ROUTES OF NORD STREAM, NABUCCO AND SOUTH STREAM PIPELINES



Source: BBC News,

See, [http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45891000/gif/\\_45891665\\_nabucco\\_south\\_stream\\_gas\\_pipelines\\_map466.gif](http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45891000/gif/_45891665_nabucco_south_stream_gas_pipelines_map466.gif)



## APP 10: Civil Society Ratings of non-EU post-Communist Countries

### Ratings History and Regional Breakdown

	1999–2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Non-Baltic Former Soviet States									
Armenia	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Azerbaijan	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.25	5.25
Belarus	6.00	6.50	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.50
Georgia	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Kazakhstan	5.00	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50
Kyrgyzstan	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50
Moldova	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75
Russia	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.25	5.50
Tajikistan	5.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.50
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75
Uzbekistan	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.50	7.00	7.00	7.00
<b>Average</b>	<b>4.81</b>	<b>4.83</b>	<b>4.90</b>	<b>4.85</b>	<b>4.92</b>	<b>4.88</b>	<b>4.98</b>	<b>4.98</b>	<b>5.02</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>4.63</b>	<b>4.50</b>	<b>4.50</b>	<b>4.38</b>	<b>4.50</b>	<b>4.75</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.13</b>	<b>5.38</b>

NOTES: The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The 2008 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2007.

**Source: Freedom House**, “Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia”, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p.44.  
[http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=196](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=196)

## APP 11: Democracy Scores non-EU post-Communist Countries

### Year-To-Year Summaries by Region

	1999–2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Non-Baltic Former Soviet States									
Armenia	4.79	4.83	4.83	4.92	5.00	5.18	5.14	5.21	5.21
Azerbaijan	5.58	5.63	5.54	5.46	5.63	5.86	5.93	6.00	6.00
Belarus	6.25	6.38	6.38	6.46	6.54	6.64	6.71	6.68	6.71
Georgia	4.17	4.33	4.58	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79
Kazakhstan	5.50	5.71	5.96	6.17	6.25	6.29	6.39	6.39	6.39
Kyrgyzstan	5.08	5.29	5.46	5.67	5.67	5.64	5.68	5.68	5.93
Moldova	4.25	4.29	4.50	4.71	4.88	5.07	4.96	4.96	5.00
Russia	4.58	4.88	5.00	4.96	5.25	5.61	5.75	5.86	5.96
Tajikistan	5.75	5.58	5.63	5.63	5.71	5.79	5.93	5.96	6.07
Turkmenistan	6.75	6.83	6.83	6.83	6.88	6.93	6.96	6.96	6.93
Ukraine	4.63	4.71	4.92	4.71	4.88	4.50	4.21	4.25	4.25
Uzbekistan	6.38	6.42	6.46	6.46	6.46	6.43	6.82	6.82	6.86
<b>Average</b>	<b>5.31</b>	<b>5.41</b>	<b>5.51</b>	<b>5.57</b>	<b>5.66</b>	<b>5.74</b>	<b>5.78</b>	<b>5.79</b>	<b>5.84</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>5.29</b>	<b>5.44</b>	<b>5.50</b>	<b>5.54</b>	<b>5.65</b>	<b>5.72</b>	<b>5.84</b>	<b>5.91</b>	<b>5.98</b>

NOTES: The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The 2008 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2007.

The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and Corruption (CO).

**Source:** Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia”, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2008. See [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=196](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=196)

## APP 12: Democracy Score of Georgia (with the variables of democracy)

### Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electoral Process	4.00	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.25	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.75
Civil Society	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Independent Media	3.75	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25
Governance*	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.50	5.75	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.50
Judicial Framework and Independence	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.50	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75
Corruption	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00
Democracy Score	4.17	4.33	4.58	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79

\* With the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

Source: **Freedom House**, "Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia", Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2008.

See [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=196](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=196)

**APP 13: Annual Report 2008 of the Stefan Batory Foundation**

## Abbreviated Financial Report

## Grants and donations (in PLN)

Open Society Institute Foundation, Zug (Switzerland)	8,307,110.00
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Flint, Michigan	2,569,920.00
Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart	623,036.75
Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, Washington	614,640.00
Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation, Berlin	610,959.20
1% Personal Income Tax Donations	521,885.91
Ford Foundation, New York	428,517.00
Agora S.A., Warsaw	311,523.00
Individual Donor from the United States	139,398.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw	131,683.45
Agora Foundation, Warsaw	125,200.00
UE Transition Facility Program 2005	121,349.97
Friends of Batory Foundation, Washington	112,687.95
Individual Donors from Poland	39,662.15
NGO Fund — EEA and Norwegian Financial Mechanism	35,996.67
Nestlé Poland, Warsaw	30,000.00
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels	20,677.72
Open Society Foundation, London	14,936.84
Damage fines adjudged by the courts in favor of the Foundation	4,900.00
Open Society Institute, Brussels	2,040.59
Axel Springer Poland, Warsaw	1,200.00
Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia	1,163.22
Polityka Cooperative, Warsaw	665.20
Caritas of the Hildensheim Diocese, Hildensheim (Germany)	494.00
Commercial Bank BH, Warsaw	169.28
Grants returned	194,424.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,964,241.00</b>

**Source:** The Stefan Batory Foundation. See <http://www.batory.org.pl/english/index.htm>

## APP 14 Democracy Score of Ukraine (with the variables of democracy)

### Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electoral Process	3.50	4.00	4.50	4.00	4.25	3.50	3.25	3.00	3.00
Civil Society	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75
Independent Media	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	4.75	3.75	3.75	3.50
Governance*	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.00	4.50	4.75	4.75
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25
Judicial Framework and Independence	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.75	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75
Corruption	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Democracy Score	4.63	4.71	4.92	4.71	4.88	4.50	4.21	4.25	4.25

*\*With the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.*

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

**Source: Freedom House**, “Nations in Transit 2008: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia”, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p. 50.

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