

**T.C
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA TOPLULUĐU ENSTİTÜSÜ
AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK IDENTITY

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

BATU KINAYYİĐİT

İstanbul, 2010

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ONAY SAYFASI

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EC- European Community

ECJ- European Court of Justice

ECSC- European Coal and Steel Community

EP- European Parliament

EU- European Union

GDP- Gross Domestic Product

GNP- Gross National Product

IMF- International Monetary Fund

MEP- Member of European Parliament

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PASOK- Panhellenic Socialist Movement

PPP- Purchasing Power Parity

TC- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti

USD- United States Dollar

USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU- West European Union

INTRODUCTION

Identity issue is one of the pervasive debates that has been continuing within the European societies both in regional and national level while equally being discussed in continental and in particular the EU level as well. Through identity, Europeans not only try to define what they understand of Europe but perhaps more essentially to settle themselves within what they understand. Defining what Europe is and the European identity will probably define the EU as a political entity as well. Secondly how they relate Europe to their own identities gives another meaning to their perception of Europe. For instance, how the general public in Britain defines Europe is not sufficient enough to clarify where and if the same public locates Europe in its identity.

The same applies to Greece and the Greek identity. This thesis aims to elaborate on Greek identity's rather troubled relation with the idea of Europe and how EU membership has influenced this relation. Its main argument is that EU membership and certain other developments originating from European issues which Greece has encountered have had an considerable impact on Greek national identity and that Greece has to adjust itself to this new situation. This impact and the adjustment in response can be seen as the Europeanization of Greek identity.

Except this introduction this is composed of has three chapters. Chapter I discusses the concepts around which the main line of argument is built. In the beginning, the arguments regarding what is to be understood of Europe are discussed. The definitions given usually have the power to indicate the approaches to European identity. Therefore it is of necessity to comprehend the various meanings Europe can manifest. Besides Europe this section also puts the emphasis on the term 'Europeanization'. Since this term covers a wide spectrum, there is a need to narrow it down and especially define the process of Europeanization with reference to 'the europeanisation of identity'.

It also seems befitting to address nationalism in this section as nationalism and national identity are indispensable concepts when dealing with this subject. Although there

are radically different interpretations of it, the emergence of nationalism in the 19th century has provided an abundance of information on identity and its construction. Greece was one of the first countries where nationalism generated a sense of nationality that led to an upheaval, creating the Modern Greek state. The newly born state owed not only its expansion to the same ideology disguised as the Meghali idea (μεγάλη ιδέα) during the 19th century, but the ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’ in 1922 which affected Greek society for decades.

Having concentrated on the theory of nationalism, the discussion refocuses on the concept of Europeanization in a broad sense. Then another section is devoted to the explanation of Europeanization with regard to the Europeanization of identity. The changes that occur with Europeanization are so profound that they affect and change even the national identity of a member state. Thus this concept as a whole and specifically with regard to identity should be assessed.

Chapter II is wholly devoted to the Greek identity. Since its rare if not unique nature and special relation with the European civilization stands in the core of its identity, this is necessary. Mentioning Greece and Europe cannot be completed without a reference to Ancient Greece. Though it is not highly relevant to our question, nonetheless it is important to grasp a basic understanding of this period and its connection to modern times and modern Greeks as many Europeans feel affiliated to this period. In fact, in the traditional European view, the Ancient Greece is regarded as the cradle of the European civilization. Thus, Ancient Greece has always been an issue in the modern Greek identity since the emergence of nationalist sentiments and movements within the Greek elite in the 18th century. Therefore a section is designated to the identity of Ancient Greece.

However the legacy of Ancient Greece is hardly the main element in modern Greek identity. On the contrary, the legacy of the Byzantine Empire has been much more influential in the shaping of it. Therefore that period deserves a scrutiny, not only in the chronological sense, but also regarding its affect on today’s Greece. Byzantine symbolizes the Orthodox face of Greece, which has been probably the single most essential element in how the Greeks have come to identify themselves for centuries. Section 2.2 concentrates on this period.

Section 2.3 elaborates on a certain phase of Greek history during which Greek nationalism emerged and founded an independent state in 1821, ending over three centuries of Ottoman rule. However this was not the consequence of a single movement; instead various theories existed which emphasized ethnicity, Orthodoxy or even a democratic structure within the Ottoman Empire.

The foundation of an independent state might even be interpreted as the beginning of identity question in Greece as it was no longer an issue related to the ideal of a Greek state, but the pivot of an existing state structure, which could not be possible beforehand under the Ottoman Empire. This period until 1981, the year of full membership to the EC is discussed in 2.4. This is also a crucial period as the foundation of the Greek nation-state brought up questions as how to define the state and its citizenship.

A whole new Chapter is needed to discuss the period from 1981 onwards. In Chapter III, the effects of the EU membership is thoroughly discussed. The main argument is especially elaborated on in this chapter. The question `why and how Greece needs to reform itself and its approach to its national identity` is addressed. On the other hand, the conclusion is a brief evaluation on the possible outcomes of this phenomenon in Greece. In other words, while former sections try to depict the current situation the concluding remarks try to evaluate how or if Greece will react to it.

It is generally conceded that the European Union has been a success story so far, especially in the realm of economic integration. Though it has gone through periods of set backs, nonetheless, over half a century after the Schumann Plan the neo-functionalist spill over effect seems to have occurred since the integration process that started with the ECSC has led to a single market and currency. The political phase of integration also proceeds, as it now covers, albeit with difficulties, areas such as justice and home affairs or common foreign and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty is the latest leap in European integration . Moreover, the Union has managed to be a center of almost indispensable and immense attraction for the whole continent. Today the borders of its members stretch out not only to the former USSR borders, but as well beyond them covering almost the whole continent and still expanding furthermore.

However as economic and technical integration is achieved, new spheres of challenges have begun to make to the top of the agenda. The powers that have been and are being transferred to Brussels have led to national dissatisfactions and harsh criticism. As it will be discussed later, it should be considered normal; an unprecedented supranational organization such as the EU attracts the antagonism of nationalist views as the very elementary founding principles of the EU contradict with nationalism intensely. Another criticism driven not only by the nationalist but also by democratic principles as well to the EU is the question of ‘democratic deficit’. The possibility of a fully competent European Parliament remains, however the issue of accountability and democracy, just as nationalism, brings us to the same phenomenon: The existence or lack of a ‘European Demos’.

It can be argued that unless the peoples of Europe associate and identify themselves more profoundly with the EU or with ‘Europe’, it will be much harder, if possible, to reach the ultimate goal of a federal Europe or a European super-state, leaving aside the question whether this is desirable. Yet the debate goes on over whether this is at all possible or if it is; how? The European Commission’s method is in general based on the previous experience of nation-states during the 19th century: that is to invent and stress European symbols and to emphasize the shared legacy among the peoples of Europe. The Commission has initiated this policy only in the 1980s and it is early to do draw any conclusions regarding the impact on European societies. Currently it is a fact that those who identify themselves with ‘Europe’ strongly constitute roughly about a mere 10% while weaker identification adds around another 30%. (Erdenir, 2005:131) Thus those who do not identify themselves with Europe in any degree hold the majority in member states. It is also discussed whether such an identification is possible in the future or not.

Another prerequisite needed for the creation of a ‘Euro-demos’ is a definition of Europe widely consented to, which constitutes another hard task. However there is disagreement not only on how to define it but also on its existence. These debates have had a new dimension in an era when heavy immigration to Europe has metamorphosed European societies quite significantly. The views on how to define Europe and therefore, the very identity of the Union could be summed up along two main suggestions. The first

argument is to define Europe in historic and cultural terms, claiming that a common heritage has yielded the European identity that exists and this identity is present across the continent. Although the elements of such a common heritage vary among its supporters, almost all refer to the legacy of Ancient Greece-Rome, the Enlightenment and Judeo-Christianity. On the other hand, there are those who are skeptical of such a legacy. In addition, those who are, also tend to believe that building a European identity on those columns would not only be imaginary but also exclusive as such a perception could not embrace the new multicultural societies of Europe. It is also debatable whether such an identity can be inclusive of all the nations that were historically omitted from the course of West European history: Namely the Eastern European and Balkan nations which had been ruled by autocratic empires and later on fell behind the iron curtain. In the final analysis the counter argument accentuates the need for a political identity that is based on political values, consensus and citizenship and claims that such an identity would be realistic and could not be prone to any exclusion of any nation or social group that lives in Europe. (Erdenir, 2005:148-149)

Regardless of the existence and possibility of a European identity or how to build one, it might well be considered ironic to elaborate on the Europeanisation of Greek identity as Greece with its history stretching back to the Antiquity has generally been regarded as one of the great columns on which the European civilization rests along with Judeo-Christianity, the Enlightenment and other great phenomena of the European history. The word Europe itself echoes in Greek mythology. Thus Greece appears to be one of the countries where terms such as European identity or Europeanisation should be challenged the least. However, for reasons to be discussed, Greece is one of the countries, which has been the most distant and sometimes even hostile to the term `Europe`. This rather unique case then arguably carries the potential to be useful and stimulating for a number of issues regarding the identity question within the EU, which needs a clearer explanation.

The question to be asked should be `in what ways can the Greek case be of essence, regarding these issues`? A number of ways might be brought up. First of all, as mentioned in the first paragraph Greece and Europe have had a complex and adverse interaction not only in the modern times, but also probably since times dating back to Romans. This is

thoroughly examined within this thesis. The reflection of such a history on modern Greece, its perception of Europe and the European identity is significant. In other words where Greece, a country widely regarded as the cradle of European identity, can be located within a common European identity today should be discussed.

Secondly, Greece historically has been distant to Europe if not hostile. As it will be explained later in more detail, the Rome-Constantinople division dating back to 4th century, the Great Schism in the 11th century and the invasion of Constantinople by Latin Crusader armies in the 13th century all fueled the division and even abhorrence within the collective memory of the Greek people as a feature lasting until modern times. The effect of being an EU member and the policies to foster a common European identity on such a historically distant member state can be an indicator for the wider effects across the member states. Probable positive outcomes in a country where strong anti-Europe attitude has persisted for centuries might imply a bigger success of the EU's policies within other EU countries, which do not share the duality Greek society has in its perception of Europe.

In sum, the common elements they share regarding their relations with Europe such as the dual character of their identities or their historical antagonism towards Europe while actually admiring it as a model for modernity, indicate that relevance exists in the Greek case to the debate on Turkey's European identity. How the Greek identity was affected by its European journey could be of essence in understanding Turkey's capacity to be a part of 'the peoples of Europe'.

In addition, Greece faces other challenges to its identity lately. Since 1981, the year Greece joined the EC as a full member, the Greek economy has made significant progress thus bringing the standards of living in Greece to comparable levels with the West European societies. One of the main social consequences of this prosperity was the influx of large sums of foreign workers into the quite homogenous Greek society. Certain difficulties concerning Greek identity, which had been aroused by this fact complicates and in a way europeanizes the identity issue in Greece, since it has created a Greek society of a multicultural nature similar to the Western societies. Apparently, the heavy immigration, which has carried various cultures, languages and religions to the European societies

including Greece, make up an important component of the Europeanization of identity issue today.

In sum the nature of Greek identity in its historical context and in the face of current circumstances, constitutes one of the most interesting cases today to be studied. It is also an important case considering its potential to contribute to the identity debate in Europe.

ON IDENTITY AND EUROPEANIZATION

Dealing with the Europeanization of Greek identity requires addressing various complex concepts such as the European identity or the concept of Europeanization. Europeanization as a powerful phenomenon requires theoretical explanation both in general terms and in terms of the Europeanization of identity. In addition, the meanings of Europe or European identity are vast subjects which also require a theoretical framework within this text. Moreover, Modern Greek identity is a national identity. In this respect, the concept of national identity should be included in the theoretical framework. In sum, this chapter aims to lay the theoretical foundations of the major concepts regarding the subject.

1.1- On the Concept of Europe

Europe historically has been a hard term to define. To begin with, unlike other continents it is not easy to determine even the geographical boundaries of Europe, as Europe does not have a clearly defined eastern border. Traditionally, the Ural and Caucasian Mountains are considered to constitute the eastern and the southeastern end of the continent. However, the real challenge Europe poses is in terms of delineation of the limits of Europe, deciding common grounds for inclusion and exclusion. Whether countries such as Russia or Turkey are within Europe or not has come to be a matter of discussion. Moreover, the common historic or cultural heritage of the inhabitants is also much debated. A frequent definition of Europe since the 19th century has been that it rises on three columns, Ancient Greece, Rome and Judeo-Christianity. However, this definition is not sufficiently precise and explanatory since fitting both Finland and Portugal or Ireland and Greece into this definition has had its critics as well. The counter arguments underline the fact that Europe is linguistically (with 21 official EU languages) culturally and historically too diverse to share a common history and culture:

“They lack a common history, they speak many languages, they have different social values, their views of their place in the world often differ, they have gone to war with each other with tragic regularity, they have often redefined their allegiance and their identity...In addition, Europe has never been united and its history has been one of fragmentation, conflict and changing administrative boundaries.” (McCormick, 1999:32-33)

On the other hand, with the overall achievement of European integration that has taken place since the end of the Second World War, the question of Europe is closely related with the integration process. “There is little question that Europe is closer than it has ever been to being considered a region with common interests and a common identity.”(McCormick, 1999:43) Not only the integration process itself is profoundly impressive compared to the situation of the continent in 1945, but also the fact that this process is widespread over the continent, covering 27 European states currently and with others to come is phenomenal. However a common European identity under the EU umbrella is quite controversial in many aspects and still it is hard to claim a general public awareness or acceptance of such a phenomenon.

Some critics claim that European identity is an artificial construction, which cannot replace or even complement the national identifications. Some define ‘Europe’ as a cultural area or even a civilization that has been defined by certain historic processes and significantly different than ‘the others’ such as Asia or Africa. On the other hand, such definitions have been contested. It is also claimed that the idea of Europe as a common cultural area or civilization is not valid in many respects and in addition, it is exclusive and disrespectful to many cultures that inhabit Europe today. However, these various interpretations will be addressed in detail later on. This section will focus on the historic definitions of ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ and not the contemporary debates since the beginning of European integration in the 20th century. As Lukacs puts it, “the history of European unity did not begin in 1945”(Lukacs, 1965:103) This history is relevant though, in the sense that it contributes to the comprehension of different views on what Europe is today and what it can be in the future. Thus it needs to be elaborated on -the historical meaning of Europe- before moving to discuss European identity or Europeanization of identity.

It is appropriate to begin with the emergence of the name Europe and its early meanings. As known, the name Europe has its origins in Greek Mythology. According to the myth ‘Europa’ was the daughter of a Phoenician king, with whom Zeus fell in love. Europa was abducted to Crete on Zeus’ back in the form of a bull. However, this myth is also interpreted as an effort to attribute the name Europe to Ancient Greece while it

actually has Asian roots. (Erdenir, 2005:53) A linguistic argument is that Europe meant 'dark' in Phoenician language since Phoenician sailors had noticed that as they went north the weather had changed significantly and become gloomier compared to their native sunny Mediterranean.

Regardless of the actual origin of the word, the ancient Greeks were among the first to distinguish Europe as a geographic entity. They distinguished between Asia, Africa and Europe geographically. In the classical maps the River Don and the Sea of Azov marked the boundary between Europe and Asia. (McCormick, 1999:33) However although scholars like Aristotle made a distinction between Europeans and Asiatic peoples, they did not include Greece among Europeans. On the contrary, Europe symbolized a rather vague area to the North where the Barbarians lived.

Most parts of Europe were brought under a common government at the height of the Roman Empire. However, it is not quite possible to say that the term 'Europe' gained any considerable weight under the Romans. The Roman Empire not only ruled significant parts of Europe but it also conquered the entire Mediterranean basin in Asia and Africa. Secondly the Roman political system did not regard its dominions as Romans but as their subjects. Therefore it did not try to forge a common European or any other sort of identity within the empire due to this political nature. "The inhabitants of Europe were known (and still are in some places) as Franks or Romans by the inhabitants of the Middle East and North Africa." (McCormick, 1999:33)

The fulfillment of the meaning Europe began to take place in the Middle Ages following the demise of the Roman Empire. The emergence of Europe as a political and cultural sphere was the result of "Europeanization of Christianity." (Erdenir, 2005:54) Following the spread of Christianity within the Roman Empire and the reappearance of Rome as a spiritual center, a new Christian identity was forged deeply in the face of various threats these Christian communities of Europe faced. The most significant among these were Muslim Arabs who had been advancing in Iberia, crossing the strait of Gibraltar in 711. The armies under Charles Martel who stopped the Islamic armies that had reached southern France in the Battle of Poitiers in 732 were described as 'European forces' by their contemporary chroniclers. (McCormick, 1999:34) Besides threats from the East,

pagan and Barbarian tribes from the North also contributed to the emergence of an identity in Europe that was built against non-Christian adversaries. As Erdenir points out the rivalry between the Eastern and Western Churches (which will be addressed later on) that eventually led to the Great Schism in 1054 also contributed to the development of a specific Christian identity in Europe (Erdenir, 2005:54-55). By that date the hostilities between the Eastern and Western Churches that dated back to the division of the Roman Empire had reached a peak and both parties had denounced each other. The ‘Great Schism’ completed the exclusion of the Orthodox world from Europe, rendering the political and cultural boundaries of Europe in line with the sphere of the Western Church. (Erdenir, 2005:54-55)

With the eventual Christianization of the Barbaric tribes of Northern Europe by 9th century the weight of Christianity in Europe had shifted to North-West. The peak point of this phenomenon was the reign of Charlemagne in early 9th century as the Holy Roman Emperor and ‘pater Europae’-father of Europe. It was pointed out in the early stages of European integration that the boundaries of Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire and the 6 founding states of the EC more or less overlapped. (McCormick, 1999:34)

A third significant event that forged a Christian Europe is the Crusades: Until 11th century Europe was lagging behind China and the Eastern World in general. The East was more prosperous and scientifically advanced. This was mainly due to the fact that the Roman Empire and thus central authority in Europe had collapsed under the influx of Barbarian tribes. Moreover, Christianity had rejected the legacy of Antiquity in favor of its own worldly view. (McCormick, 1999:34) Feudality became the social and economic norm and the European trade and security issues were precarious considerably in the absence of central powers. However, after 10th century a revival began to take place. A stronger Europe in search of prosperity fueled Crusaders with the aim of gaining control over the trade routes, which included many troops across kingdoms of Europe and carved a stronger consciousness of the self and the others.

However, until the end of the Middle Ages the term Europe remained of secondary importance as Christianity in the Middle Ages was the greatest common denominator, culturally and politically. However various phenomena that marked the end of the Middle

Ages changed this situation and the term Europe “emerged...the way in which we are accustomed to think and speak about it.” (Lukacs, 1965:109) The Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment as well as geographic discoveries and colonization of overseas territories must be referred in this context.

The Reformation shattered the overwhelming domination of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. The sectarian division led to wars of religion and ended a possible and sufficient categorization of Europe as a Christian Kingdom. The rediscovery of the legacies of Ancient Greece and Rome and the emergence of modern states and secular ideas rendered a new definition of Europe necessary. As mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, geographic discoveries and colonies urged Europeans to identify themselves in opposition to the native peoples of their colonies as the East had lost its might and potential to be a menace. Beginning from 18th century onwards Europe began to use the concept of ‘European Civilization’ and view itself as representing the values of Enlightenment, progress and order. Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 was the last treaty among European states that referred to ‘Respublica Christiana’. Treaty of Paris in 1856, on the contrary, referred to the contracting parties as ‘civilized nations’ (Erdenir, 2005: 59-62)

The demise of feudalism in Europe and an increase in centralization of political power from 16th century onwards led to the creation of states in the Modern sense. With the emergence of these states such as Britain and France, the meaning of Europe began to include a political dimension. The role of Christianity was replaced by what “came to be called the European balance of power, the European state system, the equilibrium of Europe or as in the 19th century post-Napoleonic wars the Concert of Europe” (Lukacs, 1965:112) The understanding of Europe as a political entity gained roots with the Enlightenment. The Enlighteners distinguished European governance as unique and superior in comparison to the despotic governments of the East. As Lukacs suggests this uniqueness attributed to politics of Europe was inseparable, according to enlighteners, from the perception of a culturally unique Europe. Voltaire describes this phenomenon as the Great Republic of Europe (*Grande Republique d’Europe*). Edmund Burke stated in 1796 that, “no European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe” (Lukacs, 1965:114-117)

The states formed in the post-Medieval age in Europe were Monarchic. In fact the Royal families in Europe through inter-marriages had developed a real European nature. On the other hand 19th century Europe saw the rise of nationalism and nation states built on the principles of the Enlightenment and unleashed by the French Revolution. Despite the fact that Enlightenment philosophers had written positively about a unified Europe, the relations between nation-states, nationalism and the term Europe was not an easy one. In the course of 19th century the meaning of Europe remained more as a political equilibrium in the face of competing European nations. Within same century, probably the most famous formulation of Europe was argued by historian Edward Freeman as Ancient Greece, Rome and Judeo-Christianity. (Erdenir,2005:64) By then Europe was perceived as a historical reality, which had prevailed since Ancient Greece. On the other hand, the unifications of Italy and Germany started a new era in which adversities between Europeans got denser. The scale of destruction Europe faced in the two World Wars only within the first half of the 20th century however urged Europeans to consider the uniting of Europe much more seriously than ever before.

Although European Integration as understood today began only after World War Two, Robert Schumann was not the first person to elaborate on such a phenomenon. Various people including great historic figures have come up with different proposals since the Middle Ages. It is possible to observe that what inspired many people at different times was foreign threats Europe faced, such as the advancement of the Ottoman Empire or the internal volatility and conflicts. For example French lawyer and diplomat Pierre Dubois had suggested a confederal Christian Republic in 1306 in the face of wide spread instability that affected Europe at that time. (McCormick, 1999:35) Similarly the religious conflicts and wars during the era of Reformation urged Duc de Sully (1560-1641) to propose a Grand Design to establish a balance of power in Europe and create a European Senate. William Penn (1644-1718) on the other hand proposed a European Parliament that would settle conflicts and where votes would be weighed according to the economic weight of the member states. Penn had suggested this in the midst of an English-French war. Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Comte de Saint-Simon, Schiller (who wrote 'Ode to Joy' of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), Daniel Defoe, Immanuel Kant, Rousseau, Victor Hugo and Jeremy Bentham are among those who advocated for a united Europe.

The calls for cooperation in Europe between the World Wars were intense and especially dramatic due to the repercussions of failure that followed. A couple of names are worth mentioning in this rather short (1919-1939) period. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and his idea of Pan-Europa, which promoted a political union in the continent was influential among European elites. French Prime Ministers Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand were among those who joined the Pan-Europa association. In an era when peace in Europe was thought to be possible by containing Germany, Briand distributed a memorandum in 1930 in the League of Nations and called for a European Confederation. He, in fact, referred to terms such as 'common market' and 'European Union' (McCormick, 1999:37-38)

In sum, it is reasonable to argue that Europe was always defined through the other. In the Middle Ages 'the others' were those who threatened Europe or Europe saw as rivals. The Orthodox Christians had become the others and thus non-European after the Great Schism in the 11th century. Muslims, to be more precise, Arabs in Iberia and Ottoman Turks in the Balkans also defined Europe by constituting the others over long centuries. However, as they ceased to pose a threat to Europe (Arabs after 15th century and Ottomans 18th century) the native peoples of the European colonies also began to constitute the other. Erdenir argues that the diversity in Europe led to the formulation of European identity through the alienation of 'the others' internally or externally. (Erdenir, 2005:56) The debates about Europe and its identity and even its non- existence are high in the agenda of European Integration. The next section shall discuss the contemporary approaches to the European identity and the europeanization of identity.

1.2-Nation and National Identity in Europe

Understanding nationalism is of profound necessity when we refer to issues of identity in the modern age. Although there have been debates on the future of nationalism and the nation state, there are not any strong arguments to prove that the demise of these concepts are imminent or to happen even in foreseeable future. Therefore the debates concerning

identity, whether it may be European or Greek, have to address nationalism intensely. As Ozkirimli puts it “ no single political doctrine has played a more prominent role in shaping the face of the modern world than nationalism.” (Ozkirimli, 2000:1) This section aims to explain the concise history of the terms nation, national identity and nationalism in Europe and the major approaches to the origins and nature of nationalism.

Definitions might prove to be useful to begin with. In order to state it very simply and in its historic context, a nation can be described as a group of people who commit themselves politically to a state of their own. (Brunner, 1996:24) Secondly the concept of national identity requires some emphasis: It probably would not be wrong to categorize ‘nation’ and therefore ‘national identity’ as rather ambiguous concepts. To mention the concept of national identity we must first refer to the common denominator that creates such an identity, which is in fact the cause of ambiguity. Opinions may vary on the traits of the people who possess the same national identity share in relation to their national identity. According to Anthony Smith, individuals of the same national identity share a historically common country of their own. In addition, they share common myths, historic memories, language, legal rights and duties as well as an economy that enables free movement within the borders. (Smith, 1993:60) Whatever such lists may contain, it is also of essence that individuals are conscious about what they have in common. According to Gellner, two individuals share a common national identity through a common culture and the awareness that they do share a common culture. (Gellner, 1983:6) When national identities are mentioned the verb share is inadequate since identities are also defined via their juxtaposition to outsiders. In other words national identities also share their common differences in comparison to others. (Erdenir, 2005:43) However, as an identity is also defined with reference to what it actually isn’t, the nature of such alienation is crucial. If the unity of an identity is achieved through the alienation of ‘the other’ it is much easier to mention intolerance and exclusion within that society. On the other hand an identity which is focused on itself can be much more flexible and in harmony with ‘the others.’ (Erdenir, 2005:44)

The foundations of nationalism as a modern phenomenon date back to 18th century Enlightenment thought and the French Revolution in 1789. “The French Revolution challenged the traditional foundations of authority that underpinned the European ‘Old

Order' and ensured that states would increasingly need to invest themselves with the aura of popular consent." (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:13) The ideas of self-determination, popular government and Rousseau's 'general will' spread to the rest of the continent with Napoleonic wars. However, the birth and spread of nationalism was by no means a coincidence. On the contrary, the conditions and requirements of 19th century Europe paved the way for and in fact required nationalism. The key word in this regard is the Industrial Revolution.

The development of commerce and industry, the widening of markets, greater social mobility, urbanization, the speeding up of communications especially the railway revolution, all of these processes made it easier for people to imagine their membership of a national community. (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:12)

According to Gellner whose ideas will be addressed along with the Modernist interpretations of nationalism, the relation between Industrial Revolution and nationalism was not merely accidental but deliberate and the new industrial economy required the enhancement of nationalism through the continent. (Gellner, 1983:19-38) Yet the impact of nationalism lied in its ability to bind popular sovereignty, political legitimacy and the nationhood. The nation transformed the subjects of the King into citizens; the people for the first time began to share the sovereignty, which used to be divine and hereditary under the 'Ancient Regime'; they were for the first time politically significant. Jenkins and Sofos use the term 'key catalyst' to describe this phenomenon:

The subsequent impact of these ideas...paved the way for the development of the nation-state idea across the continent in the 19th century. This association of nationhood with the goals of democratic citizenship and social emancipation within a territorially bounded political community has been a powerful motor in the advent of political modernity virtually everywhere (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:12)

The fulfillment of political sovereignty and legitimacy through nationhood leads one to the relations between the nation and the state. It is observed historically that states have created nations and the reverse is also a valid argument. France, along with Britain, is probably the most prominent example of the former.

France was already, under the Ancient Regime, a prototype nation-state with well-established frontiers, a centralized administration, a standing army and a long history as a collective entity. Its revolution was ‘national’ in the sense that it conferred political identity on the ‘nation’ through the concept of citizenship. France was a state before it became a nation in the modern sense, it did not need to be ‘invented’ along those dangerous faultlines of language, religion and... ethnicity. (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:14)

In many other cases the ‘nation’ did not have a unitary nation-state. Germans and Italians and numerous other nationalities especially in Eastern Europe fell into this category. Germans and Italians lived under multiple states, kingdoms or principalities. The ‘ethnies’ in Eastern Europe were under the rule of Empires. Therefore “a sense of nationality had to be created as a precondition of state formation, hence the appeal to criteria of language, religion, a common history and culture and ethnicity, as a means of mapping the future frontiers of self-government.” (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:14) Greece in this sense was the first success story by achieving independence from the Ottoman Empire as early as 1830. The difference between nation forming states and state forming nations leads the argument to types of communities that occur under those two circumstances. Ferdinand Tönnies’ typologies of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* must be addressed here:

Gemeinschaft relates to a certain sense of belonging based on shared loyalties, norms and values, kinship or ethnic ties (community); it is conditioned by the feeling that this is a natural and organic association that is based on an a priori social unity, on the idea of ‘one people’ and hence a clearly cognizable *demos*. *Gesellschaft* on the other hand, relates to the idea that people remain independent from each other as individuals, but may decide in a ‘social contract’ or a ‘convention’, to group together for the conduct of profit making transactions (society); it remains an artificial construct which will only continue to exist as long as its citizens will find the contractual arrangements of common value. (Van Ham, 2000:3)

The French Revolution carried the idea of a nation that could be described as a *Gesellschaft* type of society where the people under a civil-egalitarian constitution constituted Rousseau’s ‘general will’. Although significantly different, the idea of nation in the Anglo-Saxon world is in this category “where the idea of a territorial body politic covering ethnic differences and certainly allowing for regional, personal subdivisions became generally accepted in Great Britain in the 17th century.” (Brunner, 1996:17) On the other hand Germany has been the origin of *Gemeinschaft* where a ‘Kulturnation’ with common culture, language and ethnicity were seen as the necessary elements that could attest to a nation. Many nation-states in Eastern Europe that initially appeared as

secessionist movements in the Empires, namely Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian, were based on and founded by this type of nationalism.

Explaining the dynamics behind nationalism and the nation state, however does not answer the ‘how?’ question. A study of nationalism must address the methods used in order to foster a sense of nationality among the masses especially in the 19th century. The states have had various tools or means to insert a sense of identity to their citizens. Hobsbawm calls the effects of these means ‘the invention of tradition’, which are “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”. (Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983:1) Among these were the imposition of the national language through unitary mass education and other means. National Armies were also centers for such impositions. Secondly, invented traditions include symbolisms and rituals via flags, anthems national holidays and various ceremonies. All these embrace individuals right at their childhood to impose a certain sense of belonging. However, a second element is quite necessary for these methods of propaganda to be effective. “A strategic cadre of intellectuals and administrators: A new elite composed of the professional, and above all educated, middle classes who were to become the pioneers of ‘national consciousness.” (Shore, 2000:32) Anderson uses the Latin American example where a continent with common language and culture were divided among nation states along colonial administrative divisions. Anderson concludes that these divisions gradually became the fatherland of those elites who saw their interest and belonging embedded in them. (Shore, 2000:32) “One has to look at the way administrative organizations create meaning for those who belong to them and how these political actors diffuse that consciousness through the agent of culture” (Shore, 2000:32)

Theories regarding the roots of nations are also relevant today as they significantly shape the overall perceptions of nationalism. “Perhaps the most significant axis of debate in the literature on nationalism has been that concerning the modernity or otherwise of the nation.” (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:27) The variety of theories and opinions on nationalism can be divided along this matter of debate. Modernists argue that nationalism is a modern concept, which has appeared and even been ‘invented’ as a phenomenon in the 19th century. On the other hand primordialists believe that nations are natural forms of human

social life and their roots and existence go way before French and Industrial Revolutions. These theories require further elaboration.

It could be better to start with Modernism since it has “emerged as a reaction to primordialism of the older generations who tacitly accepted the basic assumptions of the nationalist ideology” (Ozkirimli, 2002:85) In other words, “modernists are not attached to a search for the primeval or even medieval roots of nations and nationalism. These are associated with modernity, however defined.” Durkheim, Weber and Marx have been particularly influent on modernist writers. (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:34)

Ernest Gellner is among the most influential modernists. He argued that nations were merely a product of the nationalist ideology itself. Gellner also used a functionalist approach to explain the birth of nationalism: He explained that an industrial society would have its own pre-requisites and the social order of an agrarian society could not be compatible with the needs of an industrializing society. Gellner also emphasized that an industrial society is possible with a “cultural homogeneity, based on what he names as ‘high culture’.” (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:34) The economy of this new type of society would require greater social mobility “at a level which can only be achieved if those individuals have been socialized into a high culture.” (Gellner, 1983:140) Gellner sees the state education system as the main tool of forging such a culture and through that a nation. “A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it and needs to be sustained by that polity.” (Gellner, 1983:18) In such a new society, the homogeneity of culture is more welcomed than variety. Gellner in fact does not necessarily interpret this phenomenon negatively, but actually views it as a necessity of modernity.

Benedict Anderson is probably another scholar who deserves to be located among the leading modernists. Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ has been one of the well- known descriptions of nations. Anderson argues that nations are “ imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1991:6) According to Anderson the roots of nationalism date back to long before 19th century or French revolution. The Reformation overlapping with the boom in printing in the 16th century terminated the domination of Latin in Europe,

which had persisted through religion. Moreover, following the Reformation the religious ‘imagined communities’ or the unity of all Europeans under a single Church which had prevailed through the Middle Ages, ceased to exist. Secularization brought on by the Enlightenment, the weakening of the empires and the French Revolution all led to the emergence of nationalism in the 19th century. At the same time “the development of commerce and industry, the widening of markets, greater social mobility, urbanization, the speeding up of communications especially the railway revolution all of these processes made it easier for people to ‘imagine’ their membership of a national community.” (Jenkins, Sofos, 1996:12)

Primordialism on the other hand, represents an end in the spectrum concerning the modernity of nations. Primordialism is an “umbrella term used to describe scholars who hold that nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell and nations have existed since time immemorial” (Ozkirimli, 2000:64) Primordialists summon biology, psychology or culture in order to prove that nations were a repercussion of human natural and social traits. (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:27)

Perennialism is another non-modernist theory to mention; however perennialists do not argue in favor of nations as a natural phenomenon of human social life. As Anthony Smith describes:

They are arguing that nations and nationalism are perennial, and that they are natural. Of course, acceptance of the latter proposition entails acceptance of the former; but not vice versa. One can claim that nations and nationalism have always existed in the historical record, without having to agree that they are in some sense, natural. (Smith, 1986:12)

A third critical approach to modernists has come from Anthony Smith who has named his approach as ethno-symbolism or historical ethnosymbolism. Smith disagrees with primordialist and perennialist assumptions. On the other hand Smith does not disagree with the modernist assumption that nations are built or invented by the elites in the modern age. However he also argues that modernism fails to acknowledge that nations have deeper roots in the history.

The rise of nations is predicated on the prior existence of ethnic groups and nations are formed around ethnic cores, developed from premodern ‘ethnie’ whose

members possess a collective proper name, share a myth of common ancestry, possess one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, share historical memories, associate themselves with a specific 'homeland' and have a sense of solidarity for significant sections of the population... (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:28)

Without such a heritage it would be impossible or extremely hard to convince the people that together they constitute a nation of their own.

The inventions must resonate with large numbers of the designated co-nationals otherwise the project will fail. For ethno-symbolists what gives nationalism its power are myths memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been and can be rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias. (Spencer, Hollman, 2002:28)

It is possible to observe that non-modernist theories of nationalism have a common stance in rejecting that nationalism cannot be adequately explained as a repercussion of 19th century history. Even ethno-symbolism as a theory, which acknowledges the nation building processes of 19th century claims that these would have been futile without the existence of a people united by a sense of common history, culture and homeland. Modernist writers on the other hand unite in their negligence and denial of any social or cultural roots nations may have beyond French Revolution. Ethno symbolism after all, can be regarded as a theory that is somehow closer to both arguments.

In the final analysis, the wide appeal of nationalism that crosscut ideologies and countries has made the treatment of nationalism as a unitary ideology impossible. Nationalism has been subject to so many different interpretations and utilizations in a wide political spectrum that spanned from communists to Nazis and from liberals to conservatives. There is no single interpretation and understanding of the idea of nation. It is apparent however, that theories and perceptions of nationalism are highly relevant to European integration and identity. It is a valid statement to suggest that the EU has challenged the nation states of Europe in various ways. Nevertheless the future of a common European identity can be parallel to the past of nationalism. In fact contemporary debated in Europe regarding identity attest to nationalism frequently. While modernism suggests that a European identity can be forged similarly, as were the nations in the 19th century, some writers such as Anthony Smith is skeptical of such possibility, as he believes the necessary historic and cultural patrimony is simply not there. Secondly the forging of a

possible European identity is also subject to discussion on whether it is to be on the basis of a *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*. Thirdly the identity policies of the EU resemble to those used in the 19th century by nationalists. Therefore the issues of nationalism are definitely not out of date within European politics. These issues need a closer focus in the following sections.

1.3-Europeanization

Europeanization has been one of the most popular and discussed phenomena of European studies over the last decade. While only 3 articles had it as a subject term between 1981 and 1988, there were 22 articles just in 2001. (Featherstone, Radaelli, 2003:5) It is, however, not easy, if necessary, to define Europeanization just in a single way as it is not a uniform concept. The cumulative effect of EU membership can be intense enough to affect the national identity of a member state. In this sense Europeanization requires special focus. Europeanization can have various meanings with regard to which area or subject it is applied to.

It is not a simple synonym for European integration or even convergence, though it does overlap with aspects of both. As a term for the social sciences, it can range over history, culture, politics society and economics [...] It has referred to the export of European authority and social norms: imperial control, institutional organization and practices, social and cultural beliefs, values and behavior. Europeanization is used this way by historians to describe the export of cultural norms and patterns [...] A second category of application sees Europeanization as increasing transnationalism: that is, the diffusion of cultural norms, ideas and patterns of behavior on a cross-national basis within Europe. (Featherstone Radaelli, 2003:3-7)

This second category arguably resonates with the Europeanization of national identities in nation states and the possible emergence or enhancement of a common European identity. However both categories of have not been the primary focus of the literature on Europeanization.

Europeanization today is most often associated with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership. This perspective can be seen as refracting the integration process underway at the EU level or [...]

used to denote how public administrative institutions at the center have adapted to the obligations of EU membership. (Featherstone Radaelli, 2003:7)

In fact, it would be logical to argue that the increasing popularity and significance of Europeanization has been parallel to the intensity of integration process of the EU and structural changes it has exerted on the member states. The spectrum of these changes has become wider as the EU affected more elements within the member states. Nevertheless it would be useful to use some definitions from different sources. According to Ladrech “Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.” (Ladrech, 1994:69) Ioakimidis adds that it entails a steady redefinition of functions, relationships, boundaries, values and cultural traits, regulatory patterns that shape the internal dynamics of the political system.” (Ioakimidis, 2001:72) Another source define Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.” (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:3)

As aforementioned, today the primary focus of Europeanization is the adaptation of domestic structures and governance to the effects of EU membership. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso present the general dynamics of how this phenomenon takes place. First “relevant Europeanization processes- formal and informal rules, regulations, procedures [...] legal practices, European Court of Justice rulings, EU directives and policy mandates, state-society relations and even informal understandings and meanings of EU norms- at European level” must be identified. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:6) These are the processes, by which Europeanization occurs, as they have to be in compliance with EU norms, rules and procedures.

What determines Europeanization is the “goodness of fit” between European norms, rules and procedures on the one hand and the national ones on the other. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:6) How well they fit together determines the ‘adaptational pressure’ which, in a way, measures the degree of change necessary for the institutions and policies of the member states to comply with EU rules and policies. (Caporaso Cowles Risse,

2001:7) In other words a misfit means that the member state has to adapt to the EU to a greater extent and therefore the adaptational pressure is high. On the other hand, member states may already have a high ‘goodness of fit’ with the EU requirements and that would apply less adaptational pressure. Adaptational pressure can come in numerous ways. Firstly, there can be a ‘policy misfit’ between the EU and national rules and regulations in a specific policy area such as transport or agriculture. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:7) Secondly, adaptational pressure can be more direct, targeting domestic institutions and administrative traditions. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:7)

When there is an extensive misfit the reactions from the member states can be inconsistent. It is possible that a member state adjusts its policies or institutions in accordance with the EU demands, regardless of high adaptational pressures. However, member state reactions are not always straightforward as such. Member states or their institutions can resist the EU in the face radical change. Naturally a member state can attempt to change or reverse the EU demands, which create the high adaptational pressure. Furthermore, the reaction can even lead to an opt-out. Britain’s opt-out regarding the Euro zone is an example of such a case. In case of an institutional resistance from the member states “some sort of stalemate between EU institutions and domestic institutions resulting in severe implementation deficits or gaps between prescribed institutions and behavior” can occur. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:8)

Thirdly, the role of mediating factors needs focus in the process of Europeanization. These can be classified as domestic factors, which shape the course of Europeanization in member states. Caporaso, Cowles and Risse name and describe three such factors: Multiple veto points, mediating formal institutions, and political and organizational cultures. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:9-10)

Multiple veto points render the fostering of domestic change harder, as more actors are involved within the decision making process. In such cases consensus is harder to obtain. It is also more difficult to respond to adaptational pressures emanating from the EU. On the other hand the existence of mediating formal institutions can reverse the effect. A commission can make a difference in one member state regarding a specific policy. Similarly British common law tradition tends to refer cases to the European Court

of Justice. Thirdly, the political and administrative culture of a member state affects how change is managed within that organization. The role of consensus, for example, in a political culture can affect Europeanization. The legal culture in a country similarly affects the willingness to cooperate with the ECJ by referring cases to it.

Europeanization also affects actors as well as institutions. Caporaso, Cowles and Risse identify two main reflections of such an effect: Differential empowerment of actors and their learning. (Caporaso Cowles Risse, 2001:11-12) The former concept attests to the changes in the balance of power among the domestic actors that emanate from the European level. Europeanization can positively affect the role of certain domestic actors “By transferring policies from the domestic to the European arena, executives acquire some home-turf advantages. Although autonomy is diminished with regard to their foreign counterparts, it widens the autonomy of executives in relation to other domestic actors.” (Caporaso, Cowles, Risse, 2001:11) Secondly, Europeanization can be a learning process for the domestic actors through which they change their preferences.

Ioakimidis categorizes Europeanization into two basic types: Responsive Europeanization and intended Europeanization. (Ioakimidis, 2001:74) In the former, Europeanization occurs naturally as a response to the adaptational pressures. However, in countries where Europeanization is intended, the adaptational pressures also represent the need of modernization and change. In other words, in such cases Europeanization is perceived as synonymous with modernization and change. Especially the relatively backward southern members have experienced intended Europeanization. For Greece, Spain, Portugal or Ireland, Europeanization was a tool to catch up with the developed western members. On the other hand, members such as the Netherlands or Germany beyond ‘responding’ to Europeanization, did not face a need to use it as a gateway to modernization.

Europeanization, however, should not be confused with convergence. It is a valid statement that Europeanization leads to convergence, but Europeanization is the process itself rather than the consequences. (Vink, 2002:5) In fact, convergence does not have to be the result of Europeanization. It can happen voluntarily if needed. Secondly,

Europeanization should not be understood as merely a top-bottom process. It is also possible that national actors elevate certain issues to the European level.

Approaching Europeanization exclusively from a 'top-down rather than bottom-up perspective' may in the end fail to recognize the more complex two-way causality of European integration. After all, even when EU policies can admittedly strongly affect domestic policies, these policies do not come out of the blue, but are the result –among others– of political action by domestic actors who shift domestic issues to the European level (Vink, 2002:7)

This phenomenon requires further elaboration on the nature of European integration. European integration in basic terms works through 'positive and negative integration'. (Vink, 2002:8) Negative integration has a deregulatory or market-making nature. It works against national barriers to achieve free movements and a common market. On the contrary, positive integration is regulatory or re-regulatory and thus reestablishes regulations at the European level instead of the national level. In this sense it is 'market-shaping'. A third type named as 'framing' is also put forward. Framing "tries to set norms in areas where the underlying conflicts of interest between the member states only allows the EU to adopt policies which are vague and more or less symbolic" (Vink, 2002:9)

Framing, according to Vink, could attest to a second dimension in the typology besides positive and negative integration; integration can be classified as weak or strong. (Vink, 2002:9-10) The determinant in this case is whether a certain policy is binding or non-binding. Railways or higher education policies could be named under this category. This two dimension policy leads to four types of integration such as strong-positive or weak-negative. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that policies cannot be categorized to the full extent as the lines which distinguish types of weak and strong integration are not clear-cut. In addition, almost all policies contain positive or negative integration elements. (Vink, 2002:10) Nevertheless, these categories can render the understanding of integration dynamics easier.

A relevant issue of Europeanization regarding European identity is how change in institutions can alter identities of actors. The 'thick' or 'cultural' approach (sociological institutionalism) to this question states that institutions matter as they "affect the very

identities, self-images and preferences of actors.” (Vink, 2002:11) On the other hand ‘thin’ or ‘calculus’ approach (rational institutionalism) suggests that actors use their rationale and their identities or self -images are not altered by institutions.

In the final analysis Europeanization is an indispensable element in the studies of European integration. It is also crucial in the sense that it is necessary for studying the possible effects of change that the obligations of EU membership generate for domestic institutions and actors. These changes carry the potential to even influence national identities since Europeanization also covers identity issues such as citizenship or immigration. In sum, it is not possible to separate Europeanization from questions of identity in contemporary Europe.

1.4- Europeanization of Identity

As discussed previously, Europeanization is a multi-dimensional concept, as is the European integration process. Lately, it can be argued that the Europeanization of identities has become a significant debate within the Europeanization literature since the issue of identity is a critical matter for the future of Europe. It can be argued that without the forging of a European identity that is widely accepted by the peoples of Europe, the integration process cannot go beyond a certain point. However, this debate has its dimensions as well. First of all, the interpretations of a common European identity vary. Some argue in favor of a cultural identity which should depend on a shared culture among the peoples. According to this argument, Europeans only need to be enlightened about their common heritage. On the other hand, this approach is also found invalid based on the reasoning that European common culture is a myth. In addition, it is argued that such an approach could enhance intolerance and exclusionism in a Europe that is even more multicultural nowadays. The alternative put forward instead is political identity.

Secondly, the possibility of a common identity is contested. Ethno-symbolists such as Anthony Smith argues that it will be very challenging to evoke a sense of common identity among the peoples of Europe due to the lack of common symbols, myths and history. (Smith, 1993:133-134) It seems that the EU agrees, since the cultural policies of the EU show a resemblance to those of 19th century nation states with the creation of Euro-symbols. Before elaborating on these debates, it is first necessary to first emphasize what is to be understood from Europeanization of identity.

In simple terms Europeanization of identity means “the development at the individual level in Europe of people seeing themselves as Europeans.” (Buzan Kelstrup Lemaitre Waever, 1993:64) For Chris Shore, it is to “imagine the new Europe as a political entity and community and to conceive of oneself as part of that community” (Shore, 2000:26-27) Van Ham describes it as “an effort to invent an all-embracing imagined community on a continental scale” (Van Ham, 2000:12) It might be wondered why it is crucial for the peoples of the EU to see it as a political entity they attach to and beyond that to perceive other member states as nations they share a common political or cultural identity. This has not been an issue for Council of Europe or NATO.

Naturally it is the unique supranational nature of the EU that in a way requires the popular support and even identification. The transfer of significant degree of sovereignty to Brussels and the emergence of the EU as a political entity arguably creates a ‘democratic deficit’. As the integration enhances this deficit or gap also widens.

Almost by definition the building of a political community means the creation of a sense of community or solidarity among the people of a given region. It is this sense of community or solidarity, which gives legitimacy to the Community’s institutions. A viable political community needs the allegiance of its mass public as well as that of elites. In the case of the European community, a lack of public commitment to Europe tends to be seen as a major threat to the existence of the Community. (Cowles Smith, 2000:293)

Chris Shore points out that this lack of commitment is due to the fact “European public or demos barely exists as a recognizable category and hardly at all as a subjective or self-recognizing body.” (Shore, 2000:20) In other words, the EU needs its demos to gain legitimacy and become more democratic. Otherwise, arguably it cannot fully emerge as a

true political entity. “Western democracy, based on the Roussonian principle of the ‘general will’ and the sovereign people, requires both empowered representative institutions and a body politic to represent.” (Shore, 2000:20)

Eurobarometer polls have some indications regarding how the peoples of Europe are attached to the idea of Europe. Over the 1992-2004 between 38% and 45% of Europeans said that they only affiliated themselves with their national identity. (Erdenir, 2005:131) Those who only affiliated themselves with Europe changed between 3% and 7%. (Erdenir, 2005:131) An additional 40% to 48% percent said that their national identity was dominant over Europe. (Erdenir, 2005:131) In other words about 80-85% of the Europeans either do not feel any attachment to the EU or their sense of EU identity has secondary status after their national identity. (Erdenir, 2005:131)

In fact, the low level of identification of the European public with the EU is not necessarily a new phenomenon. When Jean Monnet remarked, “if we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture” (Van Ham, 2000:19), he was probably concerned about the same issue. The initial expectation regarding the attachment between the EC institutions and the European public was that as those institutions acquired new competencies from national levels, the public would increasingly identify with them and their expectations and loyalties would gradually and eventually shift to the European level. Yet, as mentioned above, the identification levels with Europe is rather limited. In the face of these facts, the views about the future of European Integration are various. The identity issue is indeed serious for the EU considering the aforementioned concerns about the lack of a common European identity.

Those who argue in favor of the construction of a European identity emphasize that nations should not be considered as the natural order of societies. (Van Ham, 2000:7) In fact, they are phenomena that are only a few centuries old. On the other hand, empires were the dominant political model in the history of Europe throughout its history. Thus, in this respect they argue that identities and individual freedoms could only flourish under nations states. (Van Ham, 2000:7) In addition, advocates of European identity point out that the same reasoning put forward previously in favor of nationalism now applies to European identity. As previously mentioned, nationalism or the nation-state has been of

essence for the formation and sustainability of modern-industrial societies. Now arguably the era of globalization challenges this theory.

Nation states have now lost much of their core purpose in a postmodern era, which requires new forms of political organization that go above and beyond the contemporary system. Rather than confined national identities, the era of globalization would call for continent-size markets regulated by one clear set of economic and political rules and values. This is the postmodern cosmopolitan culture...It is a pastiche of cultures, rather than based on one, specific culture. It is eclectic in nature... has no concern for ethnic or national origins and is blissfully ignorant of history. (Van Ham, 2000:7)

On the other hand European identity has its skeptics as well. In this case skeptics seem to be distant to modernist interpretations of nationalism. Anthony Smith is among the prominent figures of this argument. As discussed previously, Smith represents the ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism. "That is, those groups are likely to form nations which have had, at the core, a substantial ethnic community with its own memories, symbols, myths and traditions and whose populations share common sentiments and aspirations." (Smith, 1993:130) Smith argues that elements such as the Roman law, Greek philosophy and science, Hebraic ethics and Christian theology as well as Renaissance and enlightenment have shaped most of the continent in varying degrees and forged a European family of cultures. (Smith, 1993:133) Nevertheless, despite their common heritage these cultures are too diverse to constitute a base, which ethno-symbolists regard as the key factor in the formation of nations.

Even with the headstart provided by Europe's cultural histories, there seems to be as yet a very deep and clear gulf between the aspirations for political unity of Europe and the development of a genuine European cultural identity, which can compete in popular consciousness and loyalties with deeply rooted national affiliations. (Smith 1993:133)

Smith therefore reaches the conclusion that the divisions of language, myths of ethnic descent and historical memories divide the nations of Europe to the extent that any attempt to create a European identity prevailing above national identities is unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. Instead he argues:

Different levels of identification, 'concentric circles of allegiance' to use James Coleman's useful concept, will exist within the other. For the moment however,

the ethnic and national levels of identification will take priority and remain much more vivid and accessible to the mass of the population than more abstract, shadowy and higher-level regional identities like that of Europe. (Smith, 1993:134)

Nevertheless Smith does not argue that European identity is impossible to appear. Yet, he believes that the happening of “Euro-genesis” will take considerable passage of time that could be measured by generations. (Smith, 1993:134) Then, the next question about the Europeanization of identity should target what type of identity is to be understood by this phenomenon. A common cultural identity is not the only option Europe faces about its identity in the near future. In fact, one can argue that it should not be, since this policy could turn into a tool of discrimination and exclusion in today’s multicultural European societies.

Cultural identity is widely formulated as the natural identity element of Europe. (Erdenir, 2005:83) It is based on the assumption that European nations share a common history and culture. As aforementioned, the pillars of this common denominator are mainly seen as the Ancient Greek, Roman and Judeo-Christian legacies as well as the Renaissance and Enlightenment. According to this argument their heritage renders Europeans a family with a common identity although a majority of them are not aware of it. This is also the stance of the EU Commission which argues that “Europeans are not sufficiently aware of their common values and shared European heritage.” (Shore, 2000:25) As mentioned before even Anthony Smith who strongly argues in favor nations’ durability agrees that in the long term this can be a valid argument. (Smith, 1993:134)

On the other hand, building Europe on cultural unity and uniqueness has many critics. Van Ham argues that:

Such a reading of history obviously excludes other cultural centers of gravity from the equation and ignores the valuable inputs of other cultures on what we now know as European civilization. We should also question the political consequences of a replication of the process of identity-construction and organic community building within an EU framework. There is certainly a risk that such a European Gemeinschaft will merely legitimize exclusion based on clear-cut division between us and them (Van Ham, 2000:14)

The cultural identity of Europe carries the potential to be exclusive regarding communities that have roots stretching out of Europe to the Middle East, Asia and Africa. These minorities constitute a significant percentage of the population and in the face of globalization and immigration there is no reason to expect that the current situation is to change in the foreseeable future. Therefore, a cultural Europe would arguably alienate these communities, if not even some European nations. Black and Shore go as far as describing it as “a highly selective definition of Europe that is potentially racist” (Goddard Llobera Shore, 1994:294) Besides, Europe’s past is not only about progress, peace and harmony. Religious and ethnic wars, intolerance and repression have also left their mark in the history. Van Ham argues that perhaps the aim should not be “to stress collective memory, but rather collective amnesia in an effort to collectively forget the centuries of strife and conflict among European peoples and states” (Van Ham, 2000:13)

For its critics, besides the potential tensions it can create, a common cultural identity is not regarded as necessary. Waever and Kelstrup argue that the integration process does not necessarily need a cultural homogeneity but a common political identity. (Buzan Kelstrup Lemaitre Waever, 1993:76-78) In their model, national affiliations would remain as cultural identities. In other words, Europe would constitute the *Gesellschaft*, while nationalities remain as *Gemeinschafts*. “In this perspective our political-cultural future could possibly consist of a dualism, with Europe as the civic state-nation and our old nation-states as organic people-nations. Identity and politics would be delinked and political identity partly refocused.” (Buzan Kelstrup Lemaitre Waever, 1993:76-78)

Habermas believes that a European nation is illusionary and cannot be built by the techniques of 19th century nation states. There is not a necessary link between European history or European culture and European politics. European integration actually needs “sufficient political energy”. (Buzan Kelstrup Lemaitre Waever, 1993:67) “Our task is less to reassure ourselves of our common origins in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of 21st century.” (Buzan Kelstrup Lemaitre Waever, 1993:67)

The question of European identity has not remained merely on theoretical grounds. Arguably, various policy involvements have carried it to the practical level. These

practices need focus to comprehend the issue of nationalism in Europe today. Matters of culture and identity first became a part of the European integration agenda in 1970s. 1973 'Declaration on the European identity' is the first major step in this regard. It underlined that "the nine member states shared the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual" (Shore, 2000:44) A year later a conduct of study into granting special rights to member state nationals was agreed on. Tindeman's report came out the following year (1975), in which forging 'People's Europe' was suggested. However, more practical work began into the 1980s following the 1983 'Solemn declaration on European Union' "which invited member states to promote European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas" (Shore, 2000:45) Secondly low turn-outs in 1984 EP elections (63.8%) urged the European leaders and the Commission to take action in the realm of culture. (Shore, 2000:46) The two reports of the ad hoc committee chaired by MEP Adonnino came out in 1985. (Shore, 2000:46) The reports suggested numerous measures including European sports teams, academy of science, lottery, educational and youth programs as well as television channels. (Shore, 2000:46) Secondly, the report underlined the importance of symbols in creating a sense of belonging. (Shore, 2000:46)

The invention of symbols arguably constitutes the most significant elements of EU's identity politics. European flag with a circle of twelve yellow stars against an azure background is probably the most known and ubiquitous of European symbols today. It was taken from the logo of the Council of Europe and hoisted for the first time in 1986 outside the Commission headquarters.

Twelve was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year or the signs of the Zodiac. Lastly, the circular layout denoted union. (Shore, 2000:46)

Twelve stars are also the symbol of Virgin Mary's halo and therefore as the Commission describes it, they symbolize "par excellence of European identity and unification." (Shore, 2000:47) Secondly, Ode to Joy from Beethoven's 9th Symphony was declared as the European Anthem. Other European symbols included a uniform standard

for passports and the designation of a day as 'Europe day' on May 9 which was the anniversary of the Schuman Plan.

In addition to these basics the Commission launched cultural initiatives to foster public awareness of the EC. These included EC youth orchestra, sporting events, European prizes such as the European Literature Prize or the European Woman of the Year Award and lectureships in integration studies. Postal services were invited to commemorate European events. Preservation and restoration of Europe's cultural heritage such as the Parthenon was sponsored. Projects such as 'European City of Culture' and European years for chosen themes were initiated. Education was also set as a crucial target for the enhancement of European identity. Textbooks and educational videos that represented EC's perception of European history, culture and identity were funded. Exchange programs with names such as ERASMUS SOCRATES or LEONARDO were launched.

It was the Maastricht Treaty that empowered the EU with the necessary jurisdiction that was related to identity issues. In 1980s, the initiatives had to be conducted indirectly and to a limited extent. Maastricht brought areas such as education, youth and culture within EU's competences, enabling the Commission to work more efficiently in this regard. Title IX, article 128 sets out the community objectives in cultural fields: "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." (Shore, 2000:53)

Concluding Remarks

It is obvious that the EU's stance on European identity is to invest in a common cultural identity manifested in the statement 'unity in diversity'. "This meant that "Europe's mosaic of cultures were but smaller units in a greater European design. 'European culture' was therefore an over-arching, encapsulating and transcendent composite of national cultures; a whole greater than the sum of its discordant parts." (Shore, 2000:54) According to the EU, the tackling issue about the European identity is the unawareness of the European nations about their common culture and heritage (Shore,

2000:25) Ironically, the methods the EU uses are to a great extent same as those used by nation-states in 19th century. The invention of symbolisms, days and the usage of mass education all resemble the policies of the 19th century. It can be argued that the EU attempts to forge a common cultural identity in the long run rather than limiting it to the political sphere. As aforementioned the outcome and even the appropriateness of these policies are, however, contested.

Greece is a critical country in the discussion about the concept of Europe or how the EU membership affects the national identities of its members. As a historically adverse country to the concept of Europe, Greece can be one of the test grounds for the creation of the new Europe. If in the course of membership, Greek society adopts being European as an element of its identity, then Greece would not only Europeanize its identity but also become a success story for the policies of the EU.

ON GREEK IDENTITY

The Greek national identity definitely carries unique traits especially in its relations with the concept of Europe. The duality the Greek society possesses as an Orthodox and European country and the frictions such a duality creates in terms of identity should be carefully analyzed in order to understand the contradicting and love-hate approaches to Europe that has historically existed in Greece. In this chapter the complete history and roots that have forged the Modern Greek identity are analyzed with emphasis given to the role of Europe.

2.1- Ancient Greece

It might be considered unnecessary to elaborate on Ancient Greece in order to discuss the Europeanization of Greek identity, however, for various reasons, it is relevant to the argument. It would be reasonable to argue that Greek identity cannot be fully assessed if the bond between Ancient and Modern Greece is not known. The nature of this bond cannot be accepted as a given, since various opinions do exist and have been contested. However, it is also true that the legacy of this civilization has been one of two major elements of Modern Greek national identity. In fact, it is the main element that links Modern Greeks to Europe as they consider themselves to be the cradle of Western and European Civilization through Ancient Greece. Actually, such a claim in modern times did not originate necessarily from Greeks but the Europeans. In other words the role of Ancient Greece was rediscovered by the Europeans and in a way taught to the Modern Greeks. Europeans also linked Modern Greece to Europe as the descendants of Ancient Greeks. Therefore it is not possible to ignore the role of Ancient Greece in Modern Greek identity.

2.1.1-The Relevance of Ancient Greece Today

Since the emergence of Greek Nationalism in the 18th century, many Greeks consider themselves ethnically, linguistically and culturally descendants of the Ancient Hellenes. A survey conducted in 1999 has shown that over 70% of secondary school students “agreed that all Greeks are descended from the same ancestors and belong to the same family.” (Verney, 2002:12) Thus Ancient Greece is much alive in what Modern Greeks define as their identity. The main purpose of Greek historians in the 19th century had been to prove and actually create this sentiment.

Secondly, Ancient Greece has not been just an issue for the Greek national identity. It has been a significant factor in its relations with the West or in other words ‘Europe’ since the cultural heritage of Ancient Greece or ‘the Hellenes’ was rediscovered in the West following the Renaissance. The admiration Western intellectuals felt for Ancient Greece resulted in great sympathy and direct aid to Modern Greece on many occasions. The support given to Greek independence cannot be fully explained by European politics and strategy but by this admiration, which boosted concern for Modern Greeks. In fact it is possible to see the same attitude in much more recent times. British Foreign Minister speaking in his Parliament just before the ratification of Greek Accession to the EU, described the Greek membership as a payback by Europeans of their cultural and political debt to the three thousand years of Greek heritage. (Clogg, 1992:12) This European enthusiasm can also be regarded as the main source of Greek nationalism since Greek students or merchants visiting the West returned to their homeland with a different consciousness about their own country and people. Among them were the leaders of Greek nationalist movement. In sum, the place Greece locates Europe in its identity cannot be discussed without referring to Ancient Greece.

The aim of this sub-section is not to discuss the history or legacy of Ancient Greece since that would be irrelevant. However, it is crucial to assess the nature of the bond between Modern and Ancient Greece since that is a very significant element of Modern Greek identity and its relation with ‘Europe’. The official Greek stance in this issue has been that Modern Greeks are descendants of Ancient Greeks ethnically and linguistically and culturally. These are what need to be assessed in order to determine

whether we are talking about an imaginary linkage, which is occasionally seen in nationalist literature, or a real one. Let us begin with the ethnic dimension: That is to evaluate whether today's Greeks are in fact relatives of the Hellenes.

2.1.2- The Question of Ethnic Heritage

As it was mentioned above, many Modern Greeks see themselves as descendants of the Hellenes. The significance of this ancestral linkage definitely comes from the immense respect the West and in fact the rest of the world has had for Ancient Greece. It glorifies the Greeks, gives them a privileged status in Europe and in the world as well. However, this phenomenon has been also challenged.

The main counter argument to the generally accepted continuance of the Hellenic race or 'γένος' came from J.P Fallmerayer in mid 19th century who came up with the thesis that Ancient Greeks had no significant ethnic bondage with Modern Greeks.(Kizilyurek, 2002:44) Fallmerayer had put the emphasis on Slavic migration that took place over centuries to areas resided by the Ancient Hellenes. Roudometof emphasizes a social condition, which affected this argument during the Ottoman era:

Prior to the 1850s, social mobility frequently implied acculturation into the ethnies associated with a particular niche in the social division of labor. For example in Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria, class and ethnicity overlapped, resulting in the utilization of the terms 'Serb' and 'Bulgar' to denote the peasantry per se... When Slavs moved into the urban world they generally shifted their identity to Greek...In south Albania and Greece during the late 18th and 19th centuries thousands of Orthodox Albanians and Vlachs became completely Hellenized. (Roudometof 1998:11)

Also considering two thousand years that have gone by, it is quite hard to argue in favor of racial purity in Greece since the times of Aristotle and Socrates. Thus it would not be wrong to classify such claims, as "tenuous...in a region where its very name –Balkan- has become a synonym for ethnic fragmentation". (Verney, 2002:1)

2.1.3- The legacy of the language and culture

Naturally the relation between the peoples of Greece of different ages cannot just be evaluated on racial continuity. In fact, the more essential element to take into consideration is whether the cultural legacy of Ancient Greece is embraced in Modern Greece or not.

Language has probably been the most emphasized factor in this debate by the Greek intellectuals as it is arguably the least vague concept dealt within this context. As much as it is solid and written, the language is also a vital part of any culture. In addition, Greek intellectuals and Phil Hellenes had a decent argument regarding the language, since Ancient and Modern Greek languages are definitely related. However, it is a complicated and philological argument. Before addressing it, I believe it is necessary to give a condensed history of the Greek language.

The Greek language is an Indo-European language. The peoples who spoke various Greek dialects began to arrive in what we call Greece around 20th century B.C. The oldest written Greek was deciphered in 1952, on tablets found in Knossos palace in Crete dating back to 14th century B.C. However, the oldest written materials with the Greek alphabet are the epic works of Homer dating back to 6th century B.C. Although numerous dialects of ancient Greek existed, the political, philosophical, literal and scientific domination of Athens in the 5th century B.C made its dialect -the Attica dialect- ubiquitous in the Hellenic world. In fact, referring to Ancient Greek means, if not mentioned otherwise, referring to Attica dialect.(Millas, 2003:22-26)

The following centuries saw substantial change in the Greek language. By the time of Christ, a common Greek dialect –Koine- had become ‘the lingua franca’ of Eastern Mediterranean, in major cities founded by Alexander the Great. This dialect forms the basis of Modern Greek and it is quite comprehensive for Modern Greeks. It is possible to argue that Modern Greek took its current form by the 15th century, or in other words the end of Byzantine Empire. (Millas, 2003:26-38)

As Millas points out some argue that Ancient Greek is a different language than Modern Greek. (Millas 2003:18) Modern Greeks cannot understand or speak it properly unless they are educated. However, they can read it since the Greek alphabet has not changed over two millennia. The vocabulary and syntax of these languages are also different. These are the facts that support a negative stance in this issue.

On the other hand, those who argue in favor of the unity of the Greek language have some important points as well. As Millas points it out, they regard these differences as two versions of the same language and contend that they are the results of unpreventable changes within the language over time. (Millas, 2003:44) There are supportive facts to this thesis. As mentioned above, the two languages share a common alphabet and they are written exactly within same rules. A substantial vocabulary has persisted within Modern Greek. Thus sometimes, ancient texts become partially comprehensible for the Modern Greek speaker.

In sum, it is not easy to determine the continuance of the Greek language, as various scientific approaches exist. There is serious material to support the unity of the language if relationship is our main criterion. There is no doubt that these two languages are closely related. On the other hand Ancient Greek is quite ‘all Greek’ to Modern Greeks. It is a language with different syntax and vocabulary that Modern Greeks cannot sufficiently understand. As Millas puts it, this debate is usually ideologically driven (Millas, 2003:19) Due to its vagueness, it can be used by both sides to the debate as supporting argument. In sum, it might easily be claimed that the Greek language has a puzzling nature similar to the Greek identity itself.

Language, however, is not the only source of culture. Therefore, a broader evaluation is necessary. In my view, the ambiguity over the language does not exist in terms of culture when we ask if there is a cultural continuance that extends from antiquity to modern ages. Although the intellectuals of emerging Greek nationalism in 17th and 18th centuries were defining their identity with reference to Ancient Greece, the culture of the Hellenes were pretty much non-existent among Greeks.

The culture in Greece has been dominated by Orthodoxy for centuries. As Hirschon explains, even non-religious Greeks attend religious activities as they regard being Greek as same as being Orthodox. (Hirschon, 1999:162) The relation between Orthodoxy and Greekness will be dealt more in detail in sub-section 2.2. Nevertheless for our current purpose let us concentrate on how Orthodoxy interpreted Ancient Greece.

Although Greek was the main language in which the New Testament and the gospels were written in early Christianity, this new religion labeled and condemned Ancient Greece for paganism and indecency from the point of view of Christian ethics. Orthodoxy had also inherited this stance and distanced itself from its legacy. The outcome of this shift had also affected how Greeks identified themselves. As Millas puts it, the Greek speaking peoples began to identify themselves as Christians. (Millas, 2003:162) This opposition persisted along with Byzantium and beyond, until the creation of Greek state. Patriarch Genadios Skholarios who lived in 15th century explains it quite well, originally and ironically in Greek: ‘I am not a Hellene but a Christian.’ (Millas, 2003:134)

Nevertheless, to claim that the Church never referred to or used the Ancient Greek legacy would be unfair. Millas explains that despite the fact the Church had seen itself as an anti-thesis of the Hellenic civilization, this culture had persisted to a certain extent within Orthodox literature. He adds that Orthodox clergy had always studied the language and texts of the ancients and used it as a source of reference. (Millas, 2003:162)

Even if this tradition survived within the Greek Orthodox Church, it would be misleading to presume that the ancient legacy admired in the West, generated similar feelings in the land where it was born. Many Europeans who traveled to Greece especially during the Greek revolution, with awe and feelings of solidarity towards the Hellenes were disappointed with what they found in early 19th century Greece. The Greek kingdom founded in 1832 was, as Kizilyurek describes, “a poor backward and weak country which was far away from the glory of Ancient Greece” (Kizilyurek, 2002:40). As Richard Clogg puts it, the Phil Hellenes realized that Modern Greeks had little in common with the Athenians of Pericles.

In sum, there is sufficient material to suggest a discontinuity of Ancient Greek culture especially after Greeks were converted to Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Church did possess knowledge of the Ancient Greek legacy, however, it did not identify itself or its subjects with the Hellenes. Therefore, although counter-arguments exist, it would be wiser to conclude the existence of a cultural duality between Ancient and Orthodox Greece.

2.1.4- The Question of an Imaginary Relation

Having discussed the different aspects of ancestral relationship between Ancient and Modern Greece, we may attempt a final analysis of the issue. As mentioned before, looking at the issue from various points of view, it is hard to conclude a significant degree of ancestral continuity between the peoples who inhabited Greece in antiquity and modern times. This is quite natural since we are talking about a period no less than two millennia. The ethnic or racial continuity may be regarded as insignificant. In my opinion, more importantly Modern Greece is an Orthodox country. The Orthodox Church for long centuries held

The view which identifies 'us' with the Christians, which considers as belonging to 'our race' all those who place at the world's apex the Virgin or, at a worldly level, the Ecumenical Patriarchate. (Ricks, Magdalino, 1998:4)

The Greeks of 19th century saw Byzantine Emperors as their ancestors and were significantly ignorant about the accomplishments of Ancient Greece.

Perhaps the Greek language symbolizes it the best way. Ancient and Modern Greek languages are related by a common alphabet and common words they have. However, they are still different languages, which have to be learnt separately. Thus, we may conclude that Modern Greece has tenuous roots in Ancient Greece, but it also has a separate identity of its own.

On the other hand one point is crucial. The relation between the peoples of Modern and Ancient Greece might be 'imaginary' as Benedict Anderson would have suggested. Nevertheless, this does not mean that such a relation does not exist. As Millas puts it, the

perception of Modern Greeks who believe in this relation is shaped accordingly. (Millas, 2003:13) Greeks are among the oldest nations who found such a connection to their past well over two centuries ago, with the help of European interest in Ancient Greece. Their belief is still strong today as an element of their identity. Moreover, it is a determining factor of how they perceive Europe and how Europe perceives them.

2.2- THE LEGACY OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

If Ancient Greece represents the European side of Modern Greece, then the Byzantium Empire represents the Orthodox Greece which has come to see Europe as its historical adversary. The legacy of Byzantium is the single greatest historical element of Modern Greek identity and has survived mainly through the role of the Church in Greek society. In this respect, Byzantium must be addressed thoroughly to understand the national identity of Modern Greece.

2.2.1- Romans, Christianity and the Hellenes

Following the golden age of Greek antiquity in 5th and 4th centuries B.C the Hellenes came under the domination of Romans in 2nd century B.C. The Greeks lived under the Roman Empire quite harmoniously for over 5 centuries. During these centuries, however, the Hellenic cultural sphere created by Alexander the Great in Near East did not lose its effect. Hellenism continued to live in places like Syria, Egypt, Anatolia and Southern Italy.

Millas puts down two reasons for cordial relations between Romans and the Hellenic world: Firstly, the two cultures did not have serious conflicts or contradictions; on the contrary they shared a lot in common. Their gods, political systems or cities showed significant correspondence. Secondly, the Romans had respect and sympathy for the

legacy of Ancient Greece. Greek cities often had privileged status within the empire. (Millas, 2003:68) In sum, the Greek identity did not go under major changes during these centuries. However, Ancient Greek language was transformed into Koine or the common Hellenic dialect, which is much closer to Modern Greek.

Probably the greatest shift in Greek identity over a period of more than two thousand years occurred with the emergence of Christianity. As mentioned before, religion, or in other words, Orthodox Christianity has been deeply rooted in Modern Greek identity and culture. In fact, the Orthodoxy was almost synonymous with Greek identity prior to Greek enlightenment in 18th century. Today this statement, although not as strong, is still valid. The single indication of this phenomenon is the name 'Greek Orthodoxy', which is quite unique in the sense that it binds a religious title with a national one. Such 'closeness' makes it necessary to grasp a firm understanding of how Greeks and Orthodox Christianity have been involved historically.

The Greeks, and especially the Greek language, have a distinguished status in the history of early Christianity. First of all, Christianity expanded through Greek, since the Bible was written in Greek and more important than that, Greek was the lingua franca of Near East at that time. Secondly, excluding the Jewish people, Hellenic peoples were the initial followers of the new faith beginning from mid 1st century. Moreover, Hellenes took over the control of the church after the death of first disciples.

The Orthodox Christianity on the other hand, emerged in 4th century in Constantinople under the auspices of Constantine the Great who also founded the New Rome or in other words the Byzantine Empire. As a result during its lifespan this empire always reflected Orthodoxy to political sphere and protected it. Thus, Orthodoxy beyond being a religion also symbolizes the political power for Greeks.

Another key feature of the Orthodox Church has been the fact that it was always under the domination of Greek oriented people and used Greek. As Millas explains this means a tradition, which is alive since the 4th century through various prayers, hymns and other rituals that Greek people continue to hear in their Churches today. (Millas,

2003:131) This phenomenon can be taken as an indication of how deep Orthodoxy is embedded in Greek culture and identity.

2.2.2- The Byzantine Empire the Division of the Christian Church and the Greek Identity

As mentioned before, the Hellenes had generally become Christians by 4th century. The same century saw a development, which carried this phenomenon to a political significance. The Ecumenical Synod gathered in Nikea (Modern Izmit) in 325 by Emperor Constantine backed the Church in its fight against Arianism, a movement that is considered blasphemous by the Church. Millas describes this event as the beginning point of a tradition that placed Emperors as supporters and defenders of the Church. He adds that Constantine initiated the unity of political and religious leadership in the Roman Empire. (Millas, 2003:121) Five years later in 330, Constantine declared Byzantium as his capital, initiating the rivalry between the Orthodox Church and the Church of Rome. After Constantine, the history of Orthodoxy and the Byzantine Empire had become parallel until the end of the empire in 15th century. The Orthodoxy was established and institutionalized under the Byzantine Empire. As an important institution of the empire, it found its identity and created its own cultural sphere. This cultural sphere has arrived until today through Greek language and identity.

After its collapse, Byzantine continued to have the loyalty of the Greek people, representing a golden era during which they had powerful emperors of their own faith. In sum, as Orthodoxy is a symbol of Greek identity beyond being just a faith, the Byzantine Empire has historically been the political reflection of Orthodoxy and therefore Greek identity, in the Greek conscience.

One specific feature in the history of Orthodoxy and Byzantium is highly relevant to our case. How Greeks perceive Europe cannot be accurately judged without referring to the rivalry between Orthodox and Catholic worlds. The split of the two main Churches of

Christianity cannot just be explained in theological terms since it was also affected by politics. Its consequences became serious enough to affect politics afterwards and in the minds of Catholic and Orthodox subjects they can still be seen as negative perceptions of the other sect. The adversity between two sects is the source of negative sentiments and suspicion the Greeks have come to feel towards Europe historically. It is not possible to say quarter of century of EU membership has eradicated these feelings. In order to understand the source and nature of this phenomenon, it seems necessary to scrutinize the history of this rivalry

As mentioned above, the adversity between Eastern and Western Churches have social and political dimensions to it, however, quite naturally on the surface its roots are theological. It would not be wrong to initiate the split back in 330 when Emperor Constantine declared the city Byzantium (modern Istanbul) as his capital Constantinople. The Church in Rome had a historical significance as it was founded by one the disciples of Jesus Christ, St. Peter. On the other hand, the removal of the capital followed by the division of Roman Empire and eventual collapse of the Western half damaged the power of this Church. On the contrary, the Eastern Church gained importance, parallel to Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire. As Millas explains the Roman Church was regarding itself as the leading institution of Christianity due to its historic role. On the other hand the Eastern Church tended not to recognize this claim since it had gained the political power following the shifting of the capital away from Rome. (Millas 2003:125)

Naturally the visible source of conflict was in theological level. The first crisis dates back to 482 when Pope declared the Orthodox Patriarch as blasphemous. The Churches over time disagreed in many theological issues. Probably the most important of these disagreements have been the controversy over the subject known as the ‘filioque (son) clause’. The filioque clause is a disagreement over the Nicene Creed, which is a rather short statement or lay out of the very basic elements of the Christian faith. The Orthodox Church does not accept that the Holy Trinity proceeds from the son as well as the father unlike the Western Church. Secondly the Eastern Greek speaking patriarch did not recognize Papal authority over them. They were of the view that Rome’s authority was only honorary and did not overrule Ecumenical Councils.

Besides such fundamental differences in theological interpretations many matters were subject to quarrel. The prohibition of icons in Churches caused great disturbance among the Latin. The Orthodox did not have or enforced marital ban as did the Latin. The Latin strictly opposed divorce, which was approached loosely in the East and criticized the Eastern Church on other issues. In fact, some of the debates, which were fought fiercely, seem surprisingly unimportant and even absurd. For instance, the debate on whether the bread used in Church services should be with or without ferment seems to be in this category. Hercules Millas reminds us that these might be considered normal since the period we are talking about are the Middle Ages, which were later referred to as 'the dark ages'. (Millas, 2003:127)

Steven Runciman relates this conflict to differences they had in their cultural traditions and perceptions of the world. The Orthodox Church, which was culturally intertwined with Middle Eastern cultures, had a more mystic approach. On the other hand the Roman Church was more rationalistic. (Runciman, 1968:81-111) These theological conflicts in fact, had serious political and social dimensions. With the emergence of Holy Roman-German Empire in 9th century, the Byzantine and the West remained political adversaries until Byzantine collapsed in 15th century. The formal recognition and relations between Eastern and Western Churches terminated in 1054, which is referred to as 'the Great Schism' meaning division. In the following centuries numerous events of mutual brutality and violence occurred. These wars and occupations carved hatred in especially the Orthodox conscience. The West continually attacked Byzantine. The most famous incident was the occupation of Constantinople in 1204 by the 4th Crusaders, which lasted 57 years. A Latin state was formed. The island of Rhodes was conquered in 1309. Similarly, the Latin community of Constantinople was attacked in 1182. The Latin armies committed great massacres in Thessalonica three years later. These acts seem to have carved an effect that has reached the modern ages.

There were several attempts of a rapprochement after 13th century when the Byzantine Empire apprehended the fact that they could not resist hostility both from the Western world and the advancing Seljuk Turks in the east. The last of these attempts took place in 1439 when the Ottoman threat to the very existence of the Empire was imminent. The Orthodox Church accepted the superiority of the Roman Church and a reunion.

However, this treaty created furious anger among the population when heard back in the capital and never took effect. This sentiment finds its echo in the famous words of Grand Duke Loukas Notaras: “I’d rather see the turban of the Turk, than the cone of the Latin.” (Clogg, 1992:19)

In sum, centuries of political and religious rivalry between the Eastern and Western halves of the Roman Empire, left a profound social remark on Greek people through their Orthodox identity, that has not yet vanished even today. Understanding how long lasting and deeply rooted these sentiments have been helps us comprehend the Euroskeptic face of Greece.

2.3- The Emergence of Greek Nationalism

The era beginning from 15th century onwards, when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople and all other areas the Greeks inhabited with the exception of Ionian Islands, until 1821, the year of the Greek Revolution, can be classified as the Ottoman era since almost all Greeks became subjects of this Empire. It is a period of 4 centuries long ‘Turkokratia’ (Turkish rule), which has left its social and cultural legacy in Greece that is still partially present today.

The significance of the Ottoman era for our subject is the fact that Greek nationalism, which put an end to Turkokratia in Greece, emerged under the rule of the Ottomans. The emergence of Greek nationalism is special in the sense that it is one of the earliest ethnic nationalisms to emerge in Europe. In fact, it is the first ethnic nationalism to emerge in the Balkans. It is hard to explain this phenomenon by just the enthusiasm and admiration felt towards Ancient Greece in the West or European politics. The social and economic status of the Greeks within the empire, which provided the necessary environment for such thoughts and sentiments to flourish, must be addressed.

2.3.1- The Greeks in the Ottoman Era

First of all, let us give a general picture of how the Greeks lived under the Ottomans. The Ottomans classified the peoples they governed as 'millets'. The millet system categorized different ethnic or linguistic groups together according to their religion. Thus Greeks along with other Orthodox peoples of all backgrounds constituted the 'Rum Milleti'. The Orthodox Church in this era had in fact, more power and influence over its subjects compared to the Byzantine period. (Clogg, 1992:24) It was also active in the daily life of the Orthodox community. Actually it would not be wrong to say that the Greeks had a significant degree of autonomy in their daily lives.

The relatively autonomous status and religious freedom they had notwithstanding, the Ottoman era for Greeks had its negative aspects. Like all other non-Muslim 'millets' the Greeks had a secondary status within society. This status meant segregation and disadvantage in many aspects of life such as justice, taxes or marriage. The Ottoman attitude towards Greeks were even harsher compared to Armenians and Jews in the first and second centuries of Ottoman domination. The primary reason for this was the resistance Greeks showed against Ottomans unlike other non-Muslim populations. During this phase of the Ottoman rule, considerable numbers of Greeks migrated to the West, forming numerous colonies or communities in Europe. (Zakythinos, 1976 115-131) The most terrorizing issue, however, had always been the child recruitments to the Janissaries. Christian families were obliged to give away their sons to be converted to Islam and trained to be in service of the Empire. These disadvantages were often exacerbated with the harshness of Ottoman authorities.

It is appropriate to evaluate the situation of the Greeks in two other specific spheres: The first crucial sphere is the economic one. The emergence of Greek nationalism was not coincidental. The economic achievements of the Greeks especially in the 17th century are critical in this sense. However, a purely economic explanation would be inadequate. The power of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire also depended on their role in the Ottoman political system. These two issues would give us a clear perception of the

atmosphere, which created a Greek intelligentsia, and merchant class that forged an ethnic identity and spirit of nationalism for the first time in the Balkans.

Let us begin with the involvement of Greek subjects in the Ottoman governmental hierarchy: As D.A Zakythinos explains the Greeks had considerable power in the Ottoman government structure from the early stages of Ottoman dominion. (Zakythinos, 1976:91) However, certain posts the Greeks occupied continuously from 18th century onwards were to have more significant consequences for Greek nationalism.

Following the second siege of Vienna in 1683 started an era in which, as Clogg explains, the once victorious Ottomans could not dictate terms of peace to their rivals, but instead needed diplomacy to avoid the consequences of military failures. (Clogg, 1992:35) The Greek community provided the necessary human resource for these posts. From the end of 17th century until the Greek Revolution in 1821 Greeks were appointed to the posts of Grand Dragoman (interpreter-tercüman in Turkish-) to the Ottoman Court and Grand Dragoman of the Fleet. The Grand Dragoman to the Court was not just an interpreter but, one of the few leading figures in Ottoman foreign policy. Secondly, the Grand Dragoman to the Fleet acted as de facto governors in the Aegean Islands, which have contributed many sailors to the Ottoman fleet.

However, the Greeks in the Empire held two other posts which were probably more beneficial for their community. Beginning from early 18th century Greeks were appointed to the Princedoms (Voyvodalik) of Wallachia and Moldavia by the capital, since locals were not considered trustworthy. These provinces constituted the border with the Russian Empire and had considerable degree of self-government. As Clogg explains, although most of these Princes saw their interest in parallel with the interests of Empire, they advocated Greek culture and their personal staff were effective in carrying the wave of enlightenment to the Balkans from the West. (Clogg, 1992:35). Zakythinos puts it this way:

The political life was a fruitful experience for the Greeks as a whole because it not only brought out the ability of the higher-ranking political and cultural leaders of the nation but also secured for Greeks a leading position in the Ottoman administration and among other subject peoples. We cannot forget that the first wave of the Revolution broke in Moldavia, that Rhigas Velestinli had served under

the Prince of Wallachia, that prominent figures in the Revolutionlike Soutsos, Mourouzi, the Hypsilantis and Mavrocordato came from that particular background. (Zakythinis, 1976:106)

Thus, it is quite convenient to suggest that the position of the Greeks within Ottoman administration were favorable for national sentiments to arise. Nevertheless, the economic power of Greeks during especially the 18th century has played an even more decisive role in this sense. In fact, it would not be a mistake to claim that the single most explanatory factor of the relatively early appearance and success of nationalism among the Greeks compared to other Balkan ethnic groups is the economic power the Greeks had acquired by the second half of 18th century.

The Greeks did not constitute a certain class within the society. Although they were intensely involved in trade and seafaring, there were also many Greek landlords and peasants. However, the most significant involvement of Greeks in economy was in trade. In the Ottoman Empire, trade was in the hands of Non-Muslim communities. This had given the Greeks a great advantage in trade. Secondly, as Zakythinis explains, the changes in world trade routs had made ports such as Izmir and Thessaloniki “great centers of the transit trade”. (Zakythinis, 1976:131) As well as these cities, the trade in Greek Islands also flourished. With the help of the global conjuncture the Greeks proved to be highly successful in trade not only in Ottoman ports but also abroad. As Clogg explains, Greek language became the lingua franca of Balkan Trade while Greek merchants and the Greek fleet had reached all of Mediterranean, Europe, Russia and even India making them one of the major trade fleets of the world as is the case today. (Clogg, 1992:38) They were, in general, exporting raw material as industrial output was low, and importing industrial products of European countries and their colonies. The continental blockade during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars rendered Greek merchants who were willing to take risks even more powerful.

The emergence of a powerful merchant class had a number of consequences. As Clogg puts it, the merchant class carried the theoretical foundations of Greek nationalism to a practical level. (Clogg, 1992:40) Utilizing the wealth they acquired, they founded schools and libraries. In fact, 18th century was notable in terms of increases in publishing in Greek language not only within the Empire but in Europe as well. Following the

publication of first book in Greek in 1526 with financial support from the merchants, a seven hundred percent increase in the publication of Greek books was created between the beginning and the end of the century reaching almost seven-hundred and fifty. Moreover, these books were increasingly secular. The percentage of religious books dropped to 53% from 75% over the century. The number of grammar books had reached over one-hundred in the last quarter of the century. First Greek newspaper was published in Vienna in 1790. (Millas, 2003:164) Thirdly, the merchants financed many Greek students who were going to European universities. These pupils returned with the sense of being Greeks rather than just being Orthodox as they saw how the legacy of Ancient Greeks was affecting Europe and that they were seen as their descendants. Through these students the ideals of enlightenment, romantic nationalism and French Revolution was carried to the Balkans. All these developments had evolved the sense of identity especially among the Greek elite by the end of 18th century.

The merchant class supported the Revolution partially. Revolting against the Ottomans was perilous as it threatened their status quo. However, as Ottoman subjects, they were also facing problems. The Ottoman Empire, as Clogg puts it, troubled the Greek merchants with its negative and chaotic attitude towards capitalization, some of whom in return supported the Greek Revolution. (Clogg, 1992:40) Zakythinos explains:

While the middle class elsewhere, owing to its economic preponderance, was able, directly or indirectly, to bring the power of government under its control and in some degree to take a share of that power, the corresponding class of Greeks remained subject to persecution and at the stage which the conquest had left them. Precisely for this reason the Greek urban class, while following in its own upward course that of its European counterparts, displayed tendencies different from theirs and motives and ideals of its own which were also totally different ideals which strove for attainment of power by a nation, not by a class. (Zakythinos, 1976:139)

Another phenomenon, which requires attention, is the expansion of Greek merchant fleet within same period. Naturally the expansion of this fleet was in parallel with Greek merchandise. Aegean islands of Spetses, Hydra and others built a considerable merchant armada of their own which navigated as far as the oceans. Richard Clogg emphasizes the fact that this armada, which also had a piratical legacy in the past, gave the Greeks great advantage in controlling the seas during the Greek Revolution. (Clogg, 1992:43) In fact,

Korais had written that the Ottomans would have sunk the Greek fleet at birth if only they could have foreseen the future. (Zakythinis, 1976:137)

In sum, it is reasonable to say that the privileged position of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire, their outstanding success in international trade and seafaring enabled them to create an elite which embraced the nationalist and liberal ideas of the West of without delay. Victor Roudomenof emphasizes this fact:

Only literate middle or upper classes could have been exposed to the new ideas and have an adequate comprehension of them. For even if the peasantry did enjoy a tacit understanding of these ideas, the barrier of illiteracy would not have allowed them to articulate it. Therefore any examination of the Enlightenment in Ottoman Balkan society should take notice of the class-based nature of this intellectual movement. This means that the enlightenment's impact on the Ottoman Balkans was mainly among Greek, Grecophone or Hellenized strata. (p.14)

Having discussed the habitat in which Greek nationalism and independence occurred, various approaches to revolution in the Balkans or opposition to it can be evaluated.

2.3.2- The Greek Enlightenment

The conditions mentioned in the previous section enabled the formation of a Greek elite that had formed intense relations with the West and different parts of the world in general. Thus the appearance of Western liberalism and nationalism among the Greeks almost simultaneously should be considered natural. In this section, the intention is to elaborate on what is meant by Greek enlightenment or nationalism theoretically. How these ideas were applied to the Balkans and the reality of the Greek society will be our concern. These ideas and movement constituted one side or face- the European or Western one- of the 'double born soul'. On this ground, it is necessary to know the content of these ideas, which not only founded the Greek state but, had effects that were reaching beyond that stage.

As Kizilyurek explains, the relatively prosperous and democratic environment they witnessed in Europe led Greek intellectuals to juxtapose their own country and the West. (Kizilyurek 2002:30) As mentioned in the foregoing section, the rather chaotic aspects of life within the Ottoman Empire and the respect they received as Hellenes fueled their admiration towards the West. Thus many Greek intellectuals of that time began to see Europe as a model to be replicated.

It would not be wrong to claim that the nature of Greek enlightenment developed within the philosophical background of political movements in Europe. In other words, the initial aims of the French and Greek Revolutions significantly overlapped. The Greek theorists believed in republican ideas, rationalism, and the concepts of citizenship and popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Greek enlightenment had questions of its own emanating from the nature of their own reality.

The Greeks had to import not just a discipline of thought, but also an identity to their country. The Legacy of the Ancient Hellenes for them was more than an ancient heritage. It was invented as a sentimental bridge to their past and identity. However, as mentioned before, as Orthodoxy was the prevailing element of Greek identity, time and effort were necessary for the development of national consciousness.

The history of Greek enlightenment and in a broader sense the emergence of nationalism in Greece is also the history of reinventing Ancient Greece for Modern Greeks. Late 18th century and 19th century saw the creation of an affiliation between the Ancient Hellenes and the Modern Greeks, which soon transformed into a radical phenomenon. The Greek elites in order to embrace the Antiquity even began to change their names, language and religion. Let us first examine the language issue in Greek enlightenment.

The language issue has troubled the Greeks until today. Various opinions or ways of reconciliation have been put forward. The source of the problem dates back to the era when radicals in the 19th century began to advocate the revival of Ancient Greek language, which had not been spoken for two thousand years. On the other hand some intellectuals were in favor of the spoken Greek or ‘dimotika’. The outcome was more or less a moderate solution and ‘katharevousa’ or in other words Modern Greek ‘purified’ with

Ancient words prevailed and as Richard Clogg explains dominated the development of Greek culture and education under the independent state until 1978 when dimotika became the official language. (Clogg 1992:41)

However, the conflict between the elites and the popular culture in Greece was not just limited to the language issue. In addition, the Greek Enlightenment just like in the West had a serious conflict with the Greek Orthodox Church. Concurrently, opposition to the Church also meant a contradiction with the Greek history since Orthodoxy and Greek identity as mentioned before had become significantly synonymous. In other words, Greek enlightenment was in conflict with the Greek history and identity itself. The Greek elites were not reluctant about hiding or opposing this fact. They saw the Byzantine period as dark pages of Greek history and blamed the Church for collaborating with the Ottoman Empire. It is true that the Orthodox Church, which possessed a universal worldview, regarded their ideology as anti-religious and openly opposed the enlightenment ideas. This issue will be analyzed in the next section.

It is probably appropriate to focus on especially two names of great importance who shaped the Greek nationalist thought in that era; namely Korais and Rigas. Through their ideas it is also possible to trace the essence of Greek enlightenment. Rigas Velestinlis (Feraios) as Millas describes (1757-1798) is probably the most important figure of the enlightenment thought in the history of Greece. (Millas, 1994:87) His significance is derived from the fact that beyond being an important theorist, he pursued to realize his theories. The fact that he died for the quest of a revolution within the Ottoman Empire made him an iconic figure for Greek nationalism. In addition Rigas is among the first who worked for Greek nationalistic cause. That has made him a source of inspiration for his followers.

Rigas proves the importance of the Phanariots (Greek elite class that lives mainly in Fener district of Istanbul) for Greek nationalism. Rigas got in touch with liberal ideas when he worked in Istanbul for the Ipsilanti family who were going to bring up leading figures of the Greek Revolution later on. Moreover, he also worked for one of the Princes of Wallachia who used to be of Greek origin at that time as we have mentioned beforehand. These facts explain that the influence of Western liberal thought on a man from rural

Greece was not just a coincidence, but the result of the socio-economic conditions of Greek society in late 18th century.

Rigas wrote numerous poems and articles through which he expressed his ideas. He also translated some works of the European writers. More interestingly Rigas wrote the first constitution for the Ottoman Empire though naturally it was never implemented. Rigas was arrested by the Austrians who were anxious about liberal and revolutionary activities within their own empire and extradited to the Ottomans. He was executed along with a number of his followers in 1798. Just before his capture, Rigas was planning to go to the Balkans to initiate an uprising against the Ottomans.

Despite the fact that Rigas has been considered a heroic figure of Greek nationalism, his views were in a way contradictory to mainstream Greek nationalists. In his constitution, Rigas had described the Ottoman Empire as “the most beautiful state of the world”. (Millas, 2003:174) He attributed the negative traits of the empire to the fact that it was governed under tyranny. He advocated “a democratic regime as in France at that time”. (Millas 2003:174) Various religious and ethnic groups were to live as equal partners under the rule of law and freedom. He described Turkish and other Muslim elements of the empire as fraternal. In other words, Rigas was not in search of an independent Greek national state but a state of “equal citizens” (Millas, 2003:174) regardless of their identities.

Nevertheless, labeling Rigas as a Greek nationalist is not without a base. It must be noted that Rigas suggested Hellenic elements to be prevailing within his state, which he called ‘the Hellenic State’. He proposed Greek to be the official language. However, Millas points out that his usage of the word ‘Hellen’ is a reference to Ancient Greece and its political heritage rather than Greek nationalism. (Millas 1994:105) Today Rigas symbolizes the inspiration originating from of the values of the enlightenment and French Revolution in Greek Nationalist movement.

Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) is the second name to mention. Like Rigas, he represents the spirit of the French Revolution within Greek nationalist movement. Korais was the son of a Greek merchant family and traveled to Europe as a merchant before

settling in Paris just before the French Revolution. He, again, is an example of the Greek elite who grew a national consciousness as a result of being in touch with Europe. However, Korais is quite different than Rigas regarding his opinions on the destiny of Greeks.

Korais believed in an independent Greek state. Unlike Rigas, his views were highly adversary towards the Ottomans. Secondly, advocating the necessity of the development of a Hellenic consciousness, he emphasized education rather than revolution. (Zakythinos, 1976:176) (Roudometof,1998:26) He devoted most of his life on that purpose, exploring and writing on ancient Greek philosophy and education. His theory was that the Greeks could embrace the enlightenment of the ancients and the Europeans if they were educated.

As many of the Greek republicans and nationalists of his era, Korais was keen on embracing Ancient Greece while he denounced the Byzantine Empire as alien to Greek history and responsible for the troubles of the Greek people (Millas, 1994:161). According to Korais the Byzantine could not be favored as monarchies and especially theocratic ones could not be benevolent to the people. For Korais and other Greek liberals, the Byzantine Empire was corrupt, backward, dogmatic and responsible for the advancement of Seljuk and Ottoman Turks. As it will be seen, the legacy of Byzantine was not considered a glorious page of Greek history until the second half of 19th century.

In harmony with his perception of the Byzantine Empire, Korais did not have positive thoughts about the Orthodox Church either. (Millas, 1992:159-162) He regarded his people as being detached from their heritage by the Orthodox Church and Ottoman tyranny. He fiercely criticized the Church for collaborating with the Ottoman tyrants. For Korais and many other Greek nationalists, the Church had disfavored the rights and freedoms of its subjects and saw its interest in parallel with the Ottomans. As it will be mentioned in the next section, it is a fact that the Church initially aligned itself with conservative opposition to the revolutionary and nationalist movements. Korais himself wrote an important article that fiercely attacked the Church and defended Rigas whose ideas had become popular enough to be targeted by the Church.

In sum Rigas and Korais represent the general traits of Greek intellectual stance prior to the revolution in 1821. The Greek enlightenment adopted the republican liberal and secular thoughts of the West and especially the French in the late 18th century. Naturally the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that followed and spread the revolutionary ideas were significant contributions. On the other hand, the Greeks beyond rediscovering, formed a special relation with Ancient Greece in this period as they began to see themselves as their descendants. The admiration and implementation of its legacy for some reached fanatical levels. In compliance with their ideology and love for the Ancient Greeks, the Greek enlightenment was anti-religious and disrespected the Byzantine Empire rather than viewing it as their glorious past.

The underlying reasons of 1821 Revolution probably have other socio-economic and political factors that have to do with the Ottoman Empire as well. As we have discussed in the preceding chapters, most Greeks in fact, did not share a lot in common with their elites. However, the contribution of these elites was crucial. More crucially, the Europhile face of Greece, which has coexisted with its Balkan, Orthodox and euroskeptic face, has its roots back in the Greek enlightenment. Thus it is of essence to understand this period to understand Greece in the modern age.

2.3.3- The Conservative Opposition

The views and teachings of liberals such as Rigas and Korais were not regarded by all as illuminating messages that were to create conscious Greeks who seek liberty. On the contrary many Greeks, including the clergy and segments among the elites saw their deliberations as precarious attempts that could endanger Greek people. In fact, ideas generated by the French Revolution seriously contradicted the universalist stance of the Church, who ruled not only Greeks but all the Orthodox subjects within the empire regardless of their ethnic background. Moreover, for those who had a privileged status within the empire, these attempts could merely mean a perilous adventure. In other words, resistance to the Greek enlightenment within the Greeks had a significant force. Now let us focus on what the conservatives thought about Greek nationalist movement and how they reacted.

The Greek Orthodox Church constituted an important base for criticism against the liberals prior to the revolution. Firstly, at the end of 18th century a counter campaign against the articles of Rigas that were circulating among the public was conducted. The manifestation against Rigas initiated a clash of ideas and propagandas for the coming decades. The Church also took practical steps such as banning the baptizing of its subjects with Ancient Greek names. The most historic act of Church in this regard was the condemnation of the uprising in 1821, which led to the foundation of Modern Greek state. (Millas, 1994:143) On the other hand, the Church was to change its policy radically later on. We will deal with that phenomenon in the following sections. The fierce opposition of the Church arguably stems from a number of reasons.

Firstly, it must be kept in mind that the nationalist movement prior to the revolution was liberal, democratic and most crucially secularist in its nature. Therefore it is natural for the Orthodox Church to have a skeptic stance against a wave of thought that was highly critical of the Church as an institution.

Secondly, the Church had a universal claim. It is contradictory for an institution with subjects from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds to pursue a nationalistic cause. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire in a way with its might provided a shelter against the influence of the West and especially the Catholic Church. As mentioned in the foregoing pages Catholicism was seen as the biggest adversary of Orthodoxy. In addition, again as it was mentioned previously, despite the fact that the Orthodox Church was a universal one and most Orthodox were Slavs, the Greek element had a privileged status within it. The Ottoman Empire with its ‘millet system’ was contributing to the preservation of this status quo. Here is what Zakithinos says about the ‘ecclesiastical hierarchy of Istanbul and a large part of aristocracy which was linked with it’:

...They saw co-operation with the ruling power as a necessity and submission to it as a means of acquiring a dominant influence within it. Over the centuries this class fluctuated between an attempt to achieve some sort of balance in their difficult relationship with the sovereign power and a struggle for supremacy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire; between vigorous opposition to the interventions foreign churches...and their expansionist policy...;and between the universalist traditions of Byzantium and the narrower antagonism of a Greek Church struggling within the Orthodox fold against the superior weight of Slav element within Orthodoxy. (Zakinthinos, 1976:144)

As Zakithinos explains, co-operation with the nationalist movement would endanger these advantages the Ottoman Empire provided. Secondly, as Millas points out many saw the foundation of a Greek state by defeating the Ottomans impossible. Secondly, the other center of Orthodoxy, Russia had been regarding these ideas as dangerous as well. (Millas, 1994:131-132)

It is obvious that the Church considered the influx of national and liberal ideas from the West as dangerous. It may seem strange that the Church was able to state such opposition to its subjects; yet it was able to formulate its views. Millas summarizes the main points of Church's manifestation: The Church claimed that the political systems were a result of divine act and thus they should not be resisted; there should not be disobedience but submission to the rulers; freedom is a utopia and democracy would bring anarchy and misery; therefore loyalty to the Ottomans is necessary as it is the fate of Orthodox peoples. (Millas: 1994:134)

The Church also argued that the Orthodoxy was in good condition within the Empire, against those such as Korais who saw the Ottoman rule as unbearably malevolent; any trouble was to be received with patience and submission for the salvation of the souls. In other words, the Church was able to create a theological framework for its conservative views and blame the liberals and nationalists. The fact that the nationalists could initiate an uprising in 1821 cannot undermine the effectiveness of the Church. Kolokotronis, as a leading figure of the revolution explains in his memoir how the local population turned against the rebels after they were condemned by the Patriarchy in Istanbul. (Millas, 1994:153) We will scrutinize how this phenomenon, the fact that the Church fiercely opposed the nationalist movement was perceived especially by Greek historians after the foundation of Greek state in the next section.

The resistance to nationalism did not just stem from Patriarchal posts. The role of the Phanariots and Greeks that held power within the system must be mentioned. Actually, the Phanariots and the rest of the Greeks, regardless of their socio-economic background, cannot be categorized according to their stance in this issue. Every class or group of Greeks had supporters of the nationalist movement or on the contrary members who were

reluctant to support it. Some Phanariots, with their high level posts and involvement within the Ottoman bureaucratic hierarchy, saw their interest in the unity of the Empire. Similarly, as it was noted before, some merchants saw an involvement with separatist movement as a perilous step that could direct the rage of the Ottomans on them and their wealth.

In sum, nationalism had promised the Greeks the potential of a massive change. Expectedly, change could scare or bring discomfort to some them, as they were integrated in the system and well off. This is how we should perceive the lack of support from some Phanariots and merchants. The more serious adversary the Greek nationalists had with the Orthodox Church, on the other hand, is astonishing given the fact that today Greek Orthodoxy is considered to be a national religion. However, in conformity with the privileges the Church enjoyed within the Ottoman 'millet' system and the anti-religious attitude of the Greek nationalist movement, the Church regarded it as hazardous to its own world view. Nonetheless, the Greek Revolution of 1821 became the first successful nationalist movement in the Balkans.

2.4- Greek Identity and State

The establishment of the Greek state constitutes a milestone for Greek identity. With the new state, Greek nationalism found the necessary instrument to apply the values of the enlightenment and French Revolution to the identity of Greek people. Through this application the Modern Greek identity was eventually forged by the Greek state. However, the ideological differences of 18th and early 19th century were by no means solved. As a result, the formation of the Greek state did not offer a swift and definite solution to the question of national identity.

2.4.1- Building a Nation

The Modern Greek State was founded as a result of an uprising, which began as sporadic disturbances in Peloponnesian Peninsula in March 1821. Despite initial military success during the first years of the uprising, by 1825 the chances of overcoming the Ottoman Empire were deteriorating. The Greek Merchant Fleet was utilized as a powerful sea force in the Aegean Sea. The Ottomans were forced to retreat to their fortresses. The Kleftis of that region as mentioned before had a tradition of irregular warfare as they were used to control the rural areas by the Ottomans. Following the incompetence in ending the uprising, Sultan Mahmud had finalized a deal with his powerful governor in Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha. The arrival of his forces in Greece was obviously leading to the demise of the uprising. However, the European interference prevented that from happening.

Two main explanatory reasons can be given for the involvement of Britain, France and Russia in the Greek Revolution. In fact, their intervention was an infringement of the Metternich System, the principles concluded in the Congress of Vienna in 1815, following Napoleon's defeat. The Great Powers in Europe was in agreement about not to change borders and support nationalistic or liberal revolutionary movements. The first motive for ignoring these principles was the concern that one of them could gain advantage from the situation. Acting together could prevent that. In addition, the uprising was damaging their trade and economic interests in the region.

Secondly, the Greek Revolution became a public issue in the West. As it was discussed previously, the sympathy and admiration towards Greece at that age could not result in anything but joy and excitement when the news of the uprising arrived. Many intellectuals, the most famous being Lord Byron, in fact arrived in Greece to fight along. Furthermore, various news of massacres in places such as Mesolonghi or the Island of Chios, be them true or false, fuelled a further public reaction in the West. The execution of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul created a similar reaction. The image that was perceived in the West was that Christians who seek freedom and liberty were slain. Thus the reactions in the West must be addressed in the foundation of Greek State. The

Ottoman Navy was destroyed in 1827 Navarin Battle by the combined fleet of these three Powers. The eruption of Ottoman-Russian War in 1828 worsened the matter for the Porte and in the same year the Ottomans agreed to the foundation of a Greek Kingdom with the Treaty of Edirne.

The new Greek state was in fact born dependent on the help and support of Western powers. (Clogg: 1992:65) In 1832, Britain, Bavaria, France and Russia did not even include Greece as a signing party to the treaty, which established her as a Kingdom, set out the rules under which King Otto of Bavaria was to be crowned and put Greece under their guarantee. When King Otto arrived in Greece in 1833 a number of serious issues needed to be addressed. King Otto and his Bavarian sect of bureaucrats had to, not only build the state in a backward country but also create the allegiance to the State. The nationalist movement had created a national consciousness among the people to some extent, however it had to be spread widely and enhanced in a region where local sense of belongings were stronger than an idea of a national state. (Clogg, 1992:65)

The foundation of the national state did not mean an end to the conflict between liberal and conservative ideas regarding the identity of the people. As a matter of fact, it fuelled the conflict, since both sides possessed greater means to pursue their ideas compared to the Ottoman period. Since the foundation of the Modern Greek state was mainly an achievement of nationalist and liberal ideas, the Modern Greek state was shaped accordingly. Prevelakis (Prevelakis, 2003) explains that Greek Nationalism was a “civic form of nationalism” at that age which means nationalism was interpreted within the framework of liberalism and the ideals of the French Revolution. The name of the country could be seen as a solid indicator of that trend. As numerous names for the Greek people existed such as the ‘Romaioi’ which in fact meant Romans, Greeks or Hellenes, the name of the new State was a matter of intense quarrel. The liberals advocated for ‘Hellas’ as this was the name Ancient Greeks used. On the other hand, ironically Korais was in favor of ‘Greece’ as this was how the country was called in Europe. However ‘Hellas’ was the winner. Today, Greeks continue to name their countries this way.

Athens, as a dusty village of four thousand inhabitants that lied beneath the Acropolis, as Clogg explains, symbolized the inspiration the young state got from the

Ancient heritage.(Clogg, 1992:69) As a matter of fact, in accordance with same sense of cultural affiliation, the capital during 19th century was decorated with Neo-Classical architecture. Since then buildings such as the National Academy, Library and the University have stood up as the incarnations of this phenomenon. As Prevelakis explains, Administrative divisions were drawn in line with Ancient Greek. An artificial language, the Kathaverousa was chosen as the official language as it was closer to Ancient Greek. (Prevelakis, 2003)

On the other hand Greece swiftly detached from the ideals of French Revolution with the implementation of Monarchy. Moreover, as the 19th century progressed the issue of identity also transformed. The profound influence of Orthodox and Byzantine civilizations on Greek society was no longer widely denied. However, this did not happen at the expense of detachment from antiquity. On the contrary, a new ideology claiming continuity from antiquity forged the duality that Modern Greek identity possesses. In this era the state and religion was once again united. A new historiography was invented and Greece embarked upon an expansionist policy namely the Megali Idea. Before concentrating on these elements, the reasons behind this phenomenon must be explained.

First of all, over emphasis put on Antiquity meant contradicting the realities of Greek people. As mentioned previously, Orthodoxy was the main element of Modern Greek identity. Greece was socially and culturally significantly different than France or Britain; thus the concerns of the Greek elite were not widely shared by the general public. As Prevelakis explains “a total imitation of the West” (Prevelakis, 2003) was not compatible with Greek society and that in fact it created a counter-religious movement.

In addition, as Clogg puts it, the Bavarian bureaucratic elite, which King Otto brought along and the Westernization of the Country created its own reaction. (Clogg, 1992:68-69) The general picture in Greece was not impressive at all at the end of the war. Trade had come to a halt and all the major centers of Greek commerce was still within the Ottoman Empire. The young Kingdom was under the strain of defense expenditures and foreign debts taken from the West. These circumstances combined with the arrival of Bavarians had created a sense of disappointment and anger within the segments of Greek society that had fought for the national cause. The legal or educational reforms were direct

imitations from the West and were triggering reaction in Greek society, which was profoundly different. The sense of frustration and insecurity made Greece much more open to a change in nationalism.

Thirdly, the external developments contributed to the formation of negative feelings in Greek society towards the ideals of the Greek Revolution. As it was mentioned above, the Greek Kingdom was significantly dependent on Britain, France and Russia. The relations with these major powers eventually created frustration and fury within the Greek public. Between 1854 and 1857 during the Crimean War Britain and France put a blockade around Athens to prevent any advancement by Greece against the Ottomans who were fighting Russia along with those two countries. (Clogg, 1992:75) In addition to such interferences and hostile actions as Prevelakis explains the difficulties Greece faced following the independence had also created a sense of “betrayal” (Prevelakis 2003) from those countries in Greece. These events only contributed to the already existent skepticism among Greeks that was felt towards Europe.

Finally, on top of all this conjecture the ideological trends in Europe had significantly changed by mid century. Romanticism and the romantic perception of nationalism that appeared initially in Germany towards mid century also had significant impact on how Greece identifies itself. The leading figures of this movement such as Herder and Vico saw the language as the creator of the mind and the defining criterion of a nation. In accordance with that thought they were emphasizing the role of culture in the very existence of a nation. (Kizilyurek, 2002:35) Thus a nation was redefined as a group of people that shared a common language and culture. Increasingly, the Greek identity was forged with those criteria. In this process the Orthodox Church regained its center position. In addition, the denial and exclusion of Byzantine ceased. A unified history from antiquity to 19th century was accepted. Secondly, the works of Fallmerayer that discredited a bond between Modern and Ancient Greece, urged Greeks to concentrate on ethnic studies. In sum, as in Europe Liberalism and Nationalism was separated in Greece and Nationalism became increasingly ethno-centric. The ideals of French Revolution had defined the nation, nationality and national identity through citizenship. The citizen was to be under Rousseau’s social contract to be a part of the nation. However, Romantic nationalism did not set citizenship as a mean but as an end. One had to fulfill other criteria

language, ethnicity in order to qualify for or acquire citizenship. In Greece, the issues of ethnicity as well as the elements and repercussions of this transformation need closer focus.

2.4.2- The Changing Position of the Church

As previously discussed the Orthodox element has been the most prevailing one in Greek identity since the Byzantine era. On the other hand, as also mentioned, the Orthodox Church was profoundly suspicious and openly critical of the Greek nationalist movements and had opposed the Greek Revolution. The Church in Greece, following the formation of the Greek Kingdom, had declared its detachment from the Patriarchy in Fener in 1833 by a royal directive. (Chrysoloras, 2003) With this directive, the Greek autocephalous Church had become subordinate to the state; at the same time it also achieved the status of the established religion in Greece, which it has preserved until today. However, the Greek Orthodox Church went under a transformation in the coming decades that led to its reconciliation with the State, the autocephalous Church of Greece and Greek Nationalism. In fact, the Church became one of the most important ideological and political agencies of the Greek State; a position that has prevailed until today and has become a key issue following Greek accession to the EU. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the role Church has come to play in Modern Greek identity.

As mentioned earlier the foundation of the Greek Kingdom did not serve the interests of the Greek Orthodox Church, which executed power over the whole of Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the social movement that led to this foundation was openly hostile to the Church. A series of unfavorable events followed Greek independence. First of all, the breaking away of the Church of Greece weakened the Church in Fener. This break away also affected the Church of Greece negatively. In addition, the Church of Greece had its own troubles: “the confiscation of its property, and the suppression of numerous monasteries attest to its social marginalization and subordination” (Carabott, 1997:186) during the first years following independence.

Secondly, the spread of nationalism had not been confined to Greeks in the Balkans. The national awakenings of other Balkan Orthodox nations had led to the independence and nationalization of their own Churches against Fener, which was dominated by the Greeks. The repercussion of those splits thus meant the decay of the universal world view of the Greek Orthodox Church. Challenged by nationalism in the Balkans, the Patriarchy in Istanbul recognized the Church of Greece in 1850. This event symbolizes the beginning of the annexation of the Greek Orthodox Church to Greek nationalism and the birth of Helleno-Christian synthesis, which has persisted in Greece until today. (Kizilyurek, 2002:42)

In other words, the Orthodox Church in Greece “as the only pre-modern institution...became a national religion, meaning a religion which advances a national identity and legitimizes a nationalist project” (Chrysoloras, 2003:13). In return the Church has kept its role as the established religion of Greece and privileges emanating thereof. “Its worldliness was in fact a defensive mechanism, designed to prove that despite its status being challenged and its internal deficiencies, it still had a pivotal and functional social role to perform.” (Carabott, 1997:185)

The historical role of Orthodoxy in Greek history, which was discussed previously and its status in Modern Greek history together give a clear picture of the place religion has in Modern Greek identity. The Orthodoxy has deep cultural roots in the Greek conscience that goes back even to the early periods of the Byzantine Empire. The Church has carried this tradition to modernity. As it was explained in the foregoing paragraphs 19th century saw the nationalization of the Greek Orthodox Church or its attachment to nationalist ideology, thus becoming an inseparable part of Modern Greek identity. This was explained superbly in 1981 by Constantinos Karamanlis who is regarded as the person who carried Greece to the EU: “The nation and Orthodoxy...have become in the Greek conscience virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno-Christian civilization” (Fokas, 2004:8) It will be later discussed whether this phenomenon is in anyway challenged by EU membership.

2.4.3- Paparrigopoulos and Rewriting the Greek History

Another vital element in the transformation of Greek Nationalism was the reconciliation of Ancient Greece with Byzantine period. Doing so, Greek historians came up with a unified Greek history that had continuity from the dawn of the Hellenes until Modern Greece. Although historians such as Spyridon Zambelios or Pavlos Karolidis are a part of this particular historical stance, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos with his voluminous work '*History of the Greek Nation*', first published in 1862, has a distinct place among them. As discussed previously, the general perception of Byzantine was intensely negative among the nationalists of Greek enlightenment. The Byzantine Empire was regarded as a theocratic, dark and backward period that distanced the Greeks from the glory of the Ancients. It was in a way seen as an alien entity to Greek identity. The Greeks were to return to their Hellenic roots in order to catch the European civilization, which had also risen on the legacy of Ancient Greece. However, such an approach to Greek history was in conflict with the reality of Greece and Greek people whose culture could not be defined in any way without the inclusion of Orthodoxy. Secondly, the exclusion of the Byzantine meant a gap of approximately 1500 years. The main aim of Paparrigopoulos was to "depict the survival and continuous existence of the Greek nation" since the time of Pericles and therefore fill that gap. (Magdalino, Ricks, 1998:29) Paparrigopoulos divided the history of the Greeks into 5 main periods: Antiquity, Macedonian, Christian, Medieval and Modern Greece. On the other hand three of the five volumes of his '*History of the Greek Nation*' were devoted to Byzantine period, to which he claimed that the Greeks owed the conservation of their language, religion and nationality. Paparrigopoulos also tried to prove that Pagan culture was incorporated into Christian culture and through the Church tradition was carried to modern age. (Magdalino, Ricks, 1998:28)

By setting a theoretical framework, Paparrigopoulos is probably one of the prime architects of Helleno-Christian unity or synthesis, which has dominated the Greek conscience ever since. This has been the basis of official ideology or history of the State as well. However, his work does not lack criticism. Kizilyurek describes it as a "selective revision" that addresses the needs of the nationalist ideology. (Kizilyurek, 2002:45) Nevertheless, the unity of Greek nation and history along Antiquity, Byzantine and

Modern Greece without doubt has been the prevailing formation of identity in Greece since.

2.4.4- Meghali Idea

It would not be wrong to regard Meghali idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα) or ‘the Great Idea’ as a political and strategic component of Greek Romantic Nationalism. Megali Idea is basically a political project that envisioned the union of all Helleno-Christians under the Greek Kingdom. When it appeared, even as a concept, the majority of Greeks were living outside the Kingdom of Greece, Megali Idea thus aimed the expansion of the Greek state to inhabit the whole community of Greeks. In this respect, it was an irredentist plan to regenerate the Byzantine Empire with the historic ‘Constantinople’ as its capital. The concept of ‘Megali idea’ originated from a speech Ioannis Kolettis made in the Parliament regarding the formulation of the Greek identity in the Constitution that was to be written. In his speech, Kolettis defined ‘the Great Idea’ as a Greek mission to enlighten the East and unite all Greek along this cause. (Kizilyurek, 2002:50) Kolettis speech eventually became the official stance of the state. From 1840s Greece considered itself responsible for not just its citizens but also all Greeks who lived in substantial numbers mainly in the Balkans and Anatolia as well as the Middle East. Through Megali Idea, Greece was to achieve the unity of the nation in space, while the work of Greek historians had achieved it in time. (Kizilyurek, 2002:51) In this respect the Megali Idea had a number of defining repercussions for the Greek identity.

Firstly, this new ideology of the state created a goal that conquered the hearts and minds of Greek citizens which was the rebirth of a glorious past: Namely the Byzantine Empire. The quest for creating a Greater Greece with its capital as ‘Constantinople’ stimulated a national bond, a type of energy in a society where the young state had to consolidate a modern national identity and in favor of local ones. Through the education system and the Church, social concentration had focused on Megali Idea. In an unstable small country with numerous conflicts Megali Idea “certainly provided a unique solution for the canalization of criticism and violence within the country to the outside. The Great

Idea transformed the threatening brigands into national soldiers and gave them a cause.” (Prevelakis, 2003:7) On the other hand, it is expectable that such a major project brings on great difficulties in terms of means to a small country like Greece. In order to achieve foreign support, Greece had become open to the interventions from Western powers. Political parties were differentiated according to their affiliation to a foreign country namely, Britain, France or Russia.

Another crucial element of Megali Idea is that it originates from orientalism. The elements of orientalism were present right from the Kolettis speech in which he advocated that Greece is destined to illuminate ‘the East’ with its rebirth, as it had done so the West with its collapse. Naturally the formulation of the concept within this framework was in accordance with the national pride that derived from the claim to be the descendents of Ancient Greeks. In this respect Greece was embedded in the Western civilization in reverse of the barbaric East. Papanikolaou argued that Greeks were the ones to possess the potential to carry out such a mission with a reference to Alexander the Great who had to spread Hellenic values to the East.

As Kizilyurek argues, the oriental nature of Megali Idea served to legitimize a number of issues. First of all, through an orientalist approach the irredentist face of Megali Idea was justified. Greece was expanding to bring light to the East. Secondly, by replacing Greece in opposition to the East, the Greek intelligentsia provided an excuse for the backwardness of the country. The East (Ottoman Empire) was solely responsible for the detachment of Modern Greece from its Hellenic Ancestors. In other words, Megali Idea had created reconciliation between Greece and its Westernized intelligentsia.

Megali Idea was also exported to the Greek communities abroad in order to realize ‘Greater Greece’. The main tool of the Greek state for this purpose was education. The foundation of the University of Athens in 1837 became the center this educational mission. Greek students arriving here from abroad were returning back as agents of Greek Nationalism (Clogg, 1992:69) In addition, Greece did not limit its efforts within its territory. Schools were opened and supported wherever Greek communities were present. Ottomans had to limit their activities at the end of century (Clogg, 1992:70)

In the final analysis, it cannot be possible to say that Megali Idea was a failure as Greece managed to triple its geographic size in seventy years that followed Kolettis speech especially after the territorial gains in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. When ‘Megali Idea’ came to an end in Izmir in 1922, Greece had reached its current borders except the Dodecanese Islands which reveals a success when compared to the tiny Greek Kingdom in 1830. However, the cost of this expansion was high and the greatest price was paid when a population exchange agreement with Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty brought almost one and a half million refugees to Greece, radically affecting the demographics and therefore many other elements of the country in a couple of years. With this exchange all Greek presence in Anatolia with the exception of Istanbul and Turkey’s Aegean islands were deported to Greece. A Greek scholar describes this phenomenon as the ‘fulfillment of Megali Idea without the land’ (Kizilyurek, 2002:71)

Concluding Remarks

The collapse of the Megali Idea and the arrival of refugees that amounted to a quarter of the population initiated a troubled era for Greece. The mass influx of refugees created a tension within the society as the culture of Anatolian refugees was in a way alien to the locals. The economic burden in a country that had already lost a war was not welcomed as well. The canalization of the tension within the society, however, appeared as a right-left division, which cut deep enough to spark four military interventions and finally a civil war, between 1946 and 1949, right after the end of the Nazi occupation. The same issue was also the cause of a conservative military coup against the rising leftist movement in 1967. When the junta collapsed in 1974, Greece had consumed half a century with military dictatorships and a civil war and remained as one of the laggards of Europe. Having discussed the history of the formation of Modern Greek identity, it is now appropriate to sum up the outcome of this history and underline the elements that composed the official and general perception of national identity today in Greece as a member of the EU.

GREEK IDENTITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Modern Greek identity has not been an easy phenomenon to study and define. The main reason behind that has been the rather precarious nature of it. The ironies, contradictions and the dilemmas Greeks have inherited from their history have made the definition of `Greekness` unstable. The frequent changes that occurred within Greece or in the Balkans affected Greece intensively in general and regarding Greek identity. As a consequence a uniform understanding of Greek identity that stretches over to the foundation of the Greek state is not quite possible to define. Greek identity actually went through numerous adjustments. Depending on how the Greeks felt about their power and security, certain elements were emphasized or neglected. Considering the turbulent history of Greece, it is comprehensible that these events took place quite frequently. In recent decades the EU membership is transforming Greek society in many ways. This process which is described as Europeanization also seriously affects Greek national identity. In this regard Europeanization has become one of the chapters in the history of Greek national identity. Having discussed the historical roots of the Modern Greek identity, this chapter will first elaborate on the contemporary features of Greek national identity. Later on, issues emanating from Greek accession to the European Union or in other words the Europeanization of Greek identity will be discussed.

3.1- MODERN GREEK IDENTITY

It is not easy to define the Modern Greek identity. The main reason is that for the last two centuries internal and external conditions of Greece have affected how Greeks define themselves. As a result the definition of being Greek was subject to change from

time to time. This section evaluates those changes and the reasons behind them and attempts to give a contemporary definition.

3.1.1- In Search of an Identity

Greek identity was first officially described in the first revolutionary constitution of 1822. The constitution proclaimed that Greeks were “those indigenous inhabitants of the domain of Greece who believe in Christ” (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:20) Although the nature of the revolutionary movement was liberal, religion had prevailed language as a criterion. In fact, if identity is understood as a process of “making the self through othering” (Carlsnaes Sjursen White, 2004:228) such an ambivalent definition would after all work in a country that tried to gain its independence from Ottoman Empire. The distinction between Christians and Muslims or in other words, Turks was necessary. The distinction with other Christian Orthodox peoples in the Empire did not seem important at that time.

However, the definition that was based mainly on religion was inadequate in other ways. As Veremis and Koliopoulos explain resting Greek identity on religion and residence could stimulate difficult questions: Would Catholic Greeks or Westerners who had settled in Greece be as Greek as the Orthodox Greeks? They certainly would not be for the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the Church, but not liberals welcomed Turks, who had converted to Christianity in order to escape expulsion. (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis 2003:20)

The fact that a distinction between Greeks and other Orthodox nationalities was not considered important did not actually mean that it was the case. The new Kingdom was not ethnically and linguistically homogenous. Albanians and Vlachs who had actually fought for independence, although probably with non-nationalistic motives, had settled in Greece following the independence. However, their presence did not bother or affect the official stance on Greek identity until the emergence of other nationalities in the Balkans. Moreover, Greek irredentism eventually began to come into conflict with other nationalist

and irredentist projects in the Balkans over the sharing of the lands the Ottomans were retreating.

Nationalism in Greece was under the effect of romanticism “and a growing sense of superiority over the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire, on account of commercial competence, accumulated wealth, superior education and a growing re-Hellenization of the lands lost in the past” (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:22) With this reasoning, Greeks were still affiliating themselves with the domain of `the Rum Milleti`. When Bulgarians seriously challenged the Greek claims over Macedonia, the Bulgarian claim depended on the ubiquity of Slavic language among the Orthodox population in the region. Secondly, the fact that Bulgarians established a national church weakened the status of religion as an identity criterion while changing its nature. With the emergence of various nationalist movements in the Balkans and their detachment from the Greek Orthodox Church, the realm of religion for Greeks was narrowed down to those who adhered to this Church, in other words, the Phanariot Patriarchy.

The existence of non-Greek speakers in Greece and in the Balkan lands to which Greece had claims prevented the formulation of the Greek language as an indication of identity. However, this situation proved the significance of “education for the re-Hellenization of Greeks who had ‘lost’ their mother tongue in the centuries of foreign invasion and rule.” (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:23) As mentioned previously, Greece undertook a serious effort to spread its influence via educational institutions abroad.

Religion and language have always been the key indicators of Greek identity. Nevertheless as discussed, the complex history of the region could devalue both in certain cases. Therefore Greek identity had to be formulated accordingly. In this regard the names and the works of Pappariopoulos school of historians should come up once again. Their “projection of the modern Greek nation as a cultural community consisting of all the linguistic groups and peoples it has incorporated in its long history from antiquity to modern times” became the argument against neighbors who claimed various linguistic or ethnic groups in Greece or in the Balkans as their brethren. (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:15) In other words, Greeks argued that they have had a historic cultural sphere over

the region. This sphere contained various ethnic religious or linguistic groups within its premises. They were regarded as being ‘Hellenized’. In this respect Greeks welcomed any self-identification with Greek identity among those who did not fit in linguistically or ethnically.

3.1.2- The Effect of Security

Modern Greek identity should also be assessed chronologically since the perception of identity was subject to transformation depending especially how secure Greece felt during the course of 19th and 20th century. Perceptions during times of insecurity such as the aftermath of 1919-1922 Greco-Turkish War were “parochial defensive and exclusive...whereas during the years of irredentism state ideology reflected a generosity of spirit towards potential converters and tolerance for ethnic idiosyncrasies” (Bellou,Couloumbis, Kariotis, 2003:16) It was also during 1920s and 1930s that the Greek Communist Party advocated self-determination for the Slavs of Northern Greece and Macedonia. In fact, in 1936 elections the Greek Communist with more than 5 % of the vote held a key position between the left and right parties in the parliament. This situation eventually led to a coup and Metaxas’ dictatorship. During the Greek civil war, loyal and secessionist Slavs were positioned along the Conservative and Communist sides. Similarly, following the Colonels regime (1967-1974), an anti-western sentiment was ubiquitous in Greece due to the probably correct conviction that the Colonels had the support of Western countries.

Similarly, the treatment and the perception of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace depended on the status of Greece’s relations with Turkey. The Turkish community was put under heavier pressure as Greece’s sense of threat from Turkey intensified. As mentioned earlier, the external threats Modern Greece faced in the course of its history defined Modern Greek identity. During 19th century the Orthodox fraternity diminished and other Balkan nations came into existence as rivals to Greece. As a result Greek identity was reinvented as an ethnocentric identity in contrast to relatively liberal and religious characteristics it had previously.

It can be argued that the EU membership is also linked to the Greek sense of security. One of the reasons Konstantin Karamanlis put all his political power into realizing the Greek membership of the European Community was that he considered the EC as a security umbrella especially against Turkey (Clogg, 1992:217). It would be reasonable to argue that today the EU remains as an essential element of Greece's security. Greece changed the elements emphasized in its identity in order to adjust to external threats or to provide stability within society. Therefore it can also be argued that external security has played an important role in how Greek identity is defined. In this respect it is possible to argue that the security the EU has come to provide to Greece can contribute to the europeanization of Greek identity.

3.1.3- Greek Citizenship

Citizenship and criteria set by legislation concerning acquiring citizenship can be of value to understand how a certain national identity is defined. In Greek case, the citizenship law is based on *jus sanguinis* principle. A person who has only tenuous links with Greece can easily become a Greek citizen through an ethnic bond. On the other hand, a person born and raised in Greece by foreign parents would have to put much more effort in acquiring citizenship, despite his or her proficiency with the language, culture etc...(Verney, 2002:13)

In the final analysis Modern Greek identity has always been ethnocentric. The two main assets of this identity are the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek language. The definition given for the Greeks of Anatolia in an early 20th century school book sums it up quite neatly.

Greeks are those who speak Turkish but profess the Christian religion of their ancestors, Greeks are also the Greek speaking Muslims who lost their ancestral religion but kept their ancestral tongue. As far as the inhabitants of Asia Minor, who are Muslims and speak Turkish, are concerned, only reliable historical

evidence or anthropological studies can prove their Greek descent and their distinction from the non-Greek Muslims. (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:16)

When language and religion could not be applied as a criterion of ‘Greekness’ as in the case of Vlachs, Bulgarians, other Slavic speaking groups and Muslims, they were regarded as Hellenized in line with the theories of Papanigopoulos school of history. In this sense Hellenism was accounted as culturally superior, having assimilated different groups that lived within its sphere. These have been the basic features of Greek nationalism and identity. They arguably persist today. Greece refuses to refer to the Turkish speaking Muslim minority in Thrace as a Turkish Minority. However, the EU membership and certain other issues that have come up in recent decades seem to tackle Modern Greek Identity. These will be discussed in the next section.

3.2- Modern Greek Identity in the 21st Century

The Greek accession to the EU has been a historic one for both parties. On the one hand the EU accepted a country, which geographically, economically or socially did not resemble the other eight members at the time of accession. Greece was relatively backward; it was geographically and historically a Balkan country. On the other hand, Greece had joined a European and actually a West European club of that time. As discussed previously, the Greek perception of Europe was a dilemmatic one. Greeks and especially their elites felt European, as the descendants of Ancient Greeks, who were generally regarded in the West as one of the most complementing elements of ‘European civilization’. On the other hand, the nature of Greek identity had always been forged primarily by the Orthodox Church, which saw the West as its historic adversary. The history of Modern Greece had only contributed to such negative feelings about Europe. Greece felt blockaded or left alone numerous times by the West. However, in 1981 “at last, Greece was an integral part of the developed-and by extension ‘civilized’- West, not only on the symbolic but also on the institutional level.” (Malmberg Strath, 2002:45)

Greek national identity has not been out of the reach of the effects of the EU. It could have been expected to have a positive effect on how secure the Greeks feel about

their identity. After all Greece had joined the European Club fully. Its prosperity and investments increased substantially with net transfer of funds from the EU that amounted to 4-5% of net GDP. (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis, 2003:324) Its role in the Balkans was enhanced. Nevertheless, various indicators have supported the fact that portions of Greek society feel insecure about their identity. The Archbishop of Athens was able to mobilize the masses over the exclusion of religion in identity cards. Similarly the fact that an Albanian student is to carry the Greek flag on a national day parade sparks public reactions. In sum, Europeanization must be assessed in terms of identity question in Greece.

3.2.1- The Europeanization of Greece

The EU membership had a profound effect on Greece in many ways. In 1981 Greece was one of the least developed economies of Europe. In addition, Greece was heavily state centered in economy and in public administration. Greece greatly benefited from the reforms it undertook through EC and EU membership. The wealth of Greek society increased significantly, thus changing Greece from an exporter of immigrants to an importer. Again through European funding country's infrastructure was modernized. In sum, Greece narrowed the gap that existed in 1981 between itself and developed countries of Western Europe quite considerably.

The Union is generally seen as providing a stable political environment for a country with a turbulent history; a catalyst for political, economic and social modernization and a valuable alliance...Greeks consider the EU as a protection mechanism against their own bad, collective self and also a kind of insurance against external risks. For some Greeks, The EU has always been considered as a means of changing the internal balance of forces and thus strengthening the political coalition for reform& modernization. (Bellou Couloumbis Kariotis 2003:324-325)

Secondly, the EU membership had further reaching effects in areas such as human and minority rights and even in foreign policy. In the final analysis the transformation of Greek state and society through EC and EU membership had effects great enough to affect

the Greek identity. In this respect it is necessary to elaborate on the Europeanization of Greece in a wider context, in order to comprehend the Europeanization of Greek identity.

3.2.1.1 – The Europeanization of Greek Economy

The development of Greek economy can be related to the national identity in two ways. Firstly, the relation between economic developments emanating from EU membership can have an effect on the perception of “Europe” in Greek society. It can be expected that an era of development and welfare as well as economic integration can eradicate the status of Europe as the “other” within the Greek society. Secondly economic development and the EU membership of Greece with the help of geographic position of the country as a no-man's-land between the EU and the Middle-East, have rendered Greece a society of emigrants. This phenomenon has had serious consequences regarding identity politics in Greece. Both issues will be discussed eventually.

It is possible to categorize the positive effects of EU membership on Greek economy under two main pillars. Firstly, to become a part of the Single Market and the Euro or in other words a part of the EU economic system, Greece undertook numerous reforms. Secondly, Greece has been one the major benefiter of EU’s structural funds to modernize itself.

As Ioakimidis points out at the time of accession to the EC, Greek state had a clear dominant role in every aspect of Greek social and economic life. “At the time of Greece's entry into the EU as a full member, the state was regarded as the greatest entrepreneur and employer, controlling an unspecified number of businesses in practically all areas of economic activity.” (Ioakimidis, 2000:79) Public expenditure’s share in the GNP was almost 50% that same year. In fact, in the first decade of membership certain numbers did not change for the better. In 1992 17% of the working population were employed by the public sector (Ioakimidis, 2000:78) while Public debt had risen from 28% of the GNP in 1981 to 112% in 1986. Greece was also considered to be the most bureaucratized member of the community. In addition “The banking system was actually in the hands of the state, which distributed loans and other banking favours for purely political, clientelistic purposes.” (Ioakimidis, 2000:80)

Starting from 1985 the EC's involvement in the not well managed Greek economy became more intense. The EU's role in reforming Greek economy happened in two main ways:

First, it has fostered a considerable reduction in state economic activities and the gigantic size in general of the Greek state; secondly, it has altered radically the regulatory pattern of the Greek economy, from one tightly controlled by the state into one conforming with the EU's regulatory regime. (Ioakimidis, 2000:81)

In order to achieve the first goal Greece had to cut deficits, expenditure and public employment. However the main milestone in these efforts has been the "convergence criteria" set out by the Maastrich Treaty for members to join the Economic and Monetary Union. Greece carried out a programme to fulfill these criteria beginning from 1993 through which the proportion of public deficit to the GNP fell from 12,5% to 0,9% in 1999. (Ioakimidis, 2000:81) Consequently Greece was able to adopt the Euro in 2002 along with other 10 members.

As mentioned earlier, while Greece carried out these economic reforms, it also received substantial amount of aid through structural and cohesion funds. The total for the 1981-2013 period is over 70 billion Euros (Wallström, 2007). Considering the small size of the Greek population, such a number would mean a serious contribution to the development of the country and it has proven to be so. While in 1981 gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita was about 8500 USD, it has reached almost 31000 USD in 2009 (IMF 2009 World Economic Outlook).. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) rose from 81 to 344 billion USD in the same period (IMF 2009 World Economic Outlook). In the final analysis it can be said that EU membership has carried Greece in to the same league with developed and prosperous economies of the West. On the other hand the obstruction of actual fiscal figures in the years leading to the 2010 debt crisis has been a blow to the image of Greek economy. In this respect, Greece arguably needs fix its image in the Union and worldwide. Therefore it can be concluded that despite enormous development and advancement the europeanization of Greek economy is not yet complete.

3.2.1.2- The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy

One of the main intentions of Konstantin Karamanlis when he made EC membership one of his government's top priorities was to enhance Greek defense and foreign policies as Turkey was also keenly pursuing community membership. For Greeks NATO had been a disappointment for their interests during summer 1974 as the vents in Cyprus unfolded. Kouvoliotis explains:

Greece expected its participation in a politically united Europe to act as a deterrent against expansionist neighbours and as a platform for the 'Europeanisation' of its security problems; moreover, if deterrence failed, the EU 'would certainly help' through political and military support (provision of equipment, for example), economic sanctions against the aggressor, and perhaps even through the dispatch of a future EU/WEU Rapid Reaction Force... It was believed that an EC common security policy would guarantee Greece's territorial integrity. (Kouveliotis, 2009)

In this regard foreign policy has been one of the areas where Greece adjusted itself to the EU with enthusiasm since a united Europe which shares a common foreign and security policy would serve the interests of Greece as a country that perceived itself to be alone and facing threats from its neighbours. Greeks considered that this way an attack on Greece would be an attack on the whole community. Since Turkey was another member of the NATO, the NATO shield could not be effective against Turkey in favor of Greece in bilateral relations between two countries.

In the Greek eyes, enlarging the scope of European integration to incorporate a security and/or defence dimension appeared to be an eminently rational development. The existence of a community of nations sharing the same values and interests and integrating their various policies into collective ones provided the best and most promising environment. (Kouveliotis: 2009)

The second element of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy is that Greece since the 1990's Europeanizes or at least tries to Europeanize its foreign conflicts. The main logic behind this is simple. Since countries with which Greeks have problems are not EU members, Europeanizing the issues would give Greece an advantage over its neighbours. This approach has applied to Turkey both in the Aegean and in Cyprus as well as Macedonia. In the Turkish case, starting from 1999 the Greek policy has been to support Turkey's EU bid. Turkey's aspiration to join the EU can be a key factor in solving the

disputes in the Aegean. Similarly, the accession of the Greek Cypriots to the EU has made the Cyprus problem more European than ever before. Thirdly being a member of the EU is important for Greece as it is for other relatively small nations in the EU as well, in its relations with non-EU parties and especially non-member neighbours in the Balkans such as Macedonia or Albania.

In the final analysis foreign and defense policies are arguably the most europeanized elements of Greece's relations with the EU in juxtaposition to other areas where the country struggles. Greece is among the enthusiasts of a common European foreign and security policy while the EU has difficulties in forging a common stance from all of its members in those two areas. Regarding Foreign and Defense policies Greece embraces the European identity.

3.2.1.3- The Europeanization of Greek Politics

The effects of Europeanization have not been just limited to economics or the foreign policy. Europeanization heavily affects the governance of a country. Naturally, in a highly centralized country as Greece, this meant "loosening Athens's grip on the regions through a process of regional decentralization" (Featherstone, Kazamias, 2001:79) The power of the central authorities are also diffused through an increasing involvement of interest groups and lobbies and the civil society in general both in Athens and Brussels.

Europeanization transformed the nature of Greek politics profoundly as well. The clientele system and catering for the specific interests of electoral groups was no longer sustainable as the means for such relations ceased to be within reach of the government. (Bellou, Couloumbis, Kariotis, 2003:322) The fiscal discipline, deregulation, diffusion of powers and transparency all contributed to the demise of the patronage system in Greece.

3.2.2- Changing Perceptions

In the relations between "Europe" and Greece the question of identity should be assessed from both sides. In other words, while how Greece sees the concept of Europe

after almost three decades of full membership is important, how Europe sees Greece at this point is not irrelevant.

3.2.2.1- The Changing Perception of Europe in Greece

Quite naturally, the EU membership was not welcomed by all in Greece. The left was highly suspicious of the West in general following the Colonels' Regime. "The cultural demarcation between Europhilia and Europhobia seemed to correspond to a clear-cut division between Right and Left." (Malmberg, Strath, 2002:45) Nevertheless, it is not possible to argue that this phenomenon remained in general. Anti-European stance of Papandreu's PASOK radically shifted following its election victory in 1981, while the radical left has remained critical of the membership. Similarly, the public support for the EU has not been stable. When the percentages in Eurobarometer 65 and 58 are examined, interesting results can be seen: In the early 1980s the support for the EC was under 40%. However, parallel to the substantial economic support from the EU and increasing prosperity, the gradual increase of those in favor of the EU reached 75% by early 1990s. It has not fallen below 50% ever since and stood at 53% in 2006. The EU average was 55% the same year. It is worth underlining that the percentage of Greeks who believe that Greece has benefited from EU membership has generally been over the percentage of those who support the EU membership. It has been over 70% for the last years standing at 72% in 2006. The EU average was 18 points lower at 54%. (Eurobarometer 65, 2006)

On the other hand, it is not possible to say that the identification with Europe rate in Greece is as high as the support has been. Attachment to the EU was only 38% in 2002 when the support was 74%. Similarly in 2002, 52% of Greeks agreed that they were only Greeks. For an additional 42% their national identity was prior to the European one. The EU average was 38% and 49% respectively. Only the Finns and British seemed to be more anti-European in terms of how they identified themselves. (Eurobarometer 58, 2002)

Latest developments have shown that public opinion is subject to change as the socio-economic conditions can be conspicuous. The general public demonstrations in 2009 that erupted following the killing of a civilian by the police have indicated that there was a social tension within Greek society even before the debt crisis in 2010. In addition, the Greek society witnessed the unfriendly and obnoxious remarks coming especially from the Germans during the crisis. Although it is hard to make a judgment this early, it is possible to predict that in the coming years which seem to be bringing more economic hardship, the public opinion regarding the EU may be weakened.

As it can be seen that public opinion in short-term can be volatile and cannot reveal everything about Greek national identity and its interaction with the concept of Europe. Identity is a deep rooted trait that does not change within a generation. However, the changes the membership has brought are serious and will continue to interact with the Greek society as well as other European societies.

3.2.2.2- The Changing Perception of Greece in Europe

Assessing the place of Greece within “European identity” also requires how other “Europeans” perceive Greece. Naturally Greece has been highly respected as the cradle of the European civilization. On the other hand, Greece has come to disappoint many Europeans who arrive in the country with romanticized images of Ancient Greece but found a relatively backward Balkan country. Thus it is possible to argue that Greece is stereotyped as a lagger in Europe. The debt crisis in 2010 arguably proved to be of essence in evaluating whether the image of Greece in today’s Europe changed or not.

Although they do not depend on empirical data it is possible to arrive some conclusions. The attitude of the Germans during the debt crisis has provided some material in this context. The German attitude suggests that there is little change towards Greeks in terms of negative stereotypes. Furious at Germany’s share of the Greek bail-out which costs 25 billion Euros, German papers heavily blasted the Greeks as over-indulged. (Connaly: 2010) Sarcastic comments were made about sensitive issues in Greece,

suggesting Greeks to privatize islands or historic monuments. (Inman, Smith, 2010) The sarcastic attitude of the papers along with opinion polls that intensely opposed helping Greece showed that there was no sign of a strong solidarity with the Greeks in this matter (Connaly: 2010) This attitude is also, arguably, problematic in terms of a common European identity.

3.3- Identity and Minorities in Greece

Although the Greek government has traditionally denied its existence as a problem, the minorities in Greece, ethnic or religious, constitute a key issue for Greek identity today. According to the Greek government, only religious minorities exist in Greece today. Greece has been reluctant to officially acknowledge and recognize any other ethnic groups although the Muslim Minorities of Greece are ethnically of Turkish and Slav origin.

3.3.1- Ethnic minorities

The Turkish minority of Western Thrace amounts to one hundred and fifty thousand people, constituting 30% of the local and 1% of the whole Greek population. (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:2) In fact, the Turkish Minority in Thrace was deprived to a serious extent of even the basic social and economic rights, even in the first years of Greek Membership of the EU. (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:3) These violations included, limitations on property gaining and selling due to the classification of minority towns as border regions, limitations on the usage of Turkish as identification especially in civil initiatives, clubs and groups. Similarly, the representation of the minority was rendered impossible with a 3% national threshold in the elections which applies to independent candidates as well. Today only one Turkish member is present within the Greek Parliament as a MP from the ruling New Democracy Party. (T.C Dışişleri Bakanlığı: 2007) However, the surfacing of serious unease and demand for recognition in the region in early 1990s and an increasing vigilance in the EU regarding

human and minority rights urged Greece to improve the conditions of the minority. The respect for minority rights was set out as a criterion for the Central and Eastern Europe countries, which aspired to join the EU. “Greece found itself in an awkward position in European forums: as the EU was asking candidate states to protect minorities, Greece’s record in this respect was far from spotless” (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:13)

It must be admitted though that following former Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ visit in 1991, the condition of the Turkish Minority in Thrace has changed for the better. The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in 2004 referred to his policy towards minority integration and equality “as modern being defined by a ‘European logic’” (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:13) It would be naïve to suggest that the prime reason behind this was not the EU perspective of Greece. However, it is also argued that the issue is dependent on the status of Greek-Turkish relations (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:23) and the improving relations after 1999 should be noted as a serious factor. (T.C Dışişleri Bakanlığı: 2007) Nevertheless, the relative improvement in the conditions of the minority does not mean that problems have disappeared completely. Issues concerning the election of minority’s religious leader and the control of Minority’s foundation properties remain unresolved. The issue of recognition as a Turkish minority remains as the most basic problem of the Minority. The single mobility of the minority in the European level has occurred in this context when the ban on the naming of The Turkish Union of Ksanti was referred to the European Court of Human Rights in 2005. This action was taken following the Supreme Court ruling in Greece which banned the usage of the name ‘Turkish’ since it “referred to another national entity pursuing thus, by its mere naming, the interests of another state into Greece” (Anagnostou Triandafyllidou, 2006:24) The Macedonian minority also faces a lack of recognition. The fierce opposition shown against the name of the bordering former Yugoslav Republic as Macedonia in the early 1990s complements this phenomenon. (Carlsnaes Sjursen, White, 2004:234) In sum, it is reasonable to argue that Greece is sensitive and insecure about the presence of ethnic minorities that have kinship affiliation with its neighbors.

3.3.2- Religious minorities

Furthermore, religious communities other than ‘recognized’ religions, namely Islam and Judaism, are not treated equally in Greece. “Neither the Roman Catholic Church nor the Protestant denominations are recognized. Jehovah’s witnesses constitute the third or fourth largest religious minority in Greece, but their weddings and thus, children were not considered legitimate in many cases.” (Fokas: 2004) The fuss made over the construction of a mosque in Athens for the Olympic games and even a Papal visit is interpreted by Susannah Verney as an indication of suspicion and intolerance towards other religions. (Verney, 2002:13)

3.4- The Role of the Orthodox Church

The rather unfavorable conditions of religious minorities in Greece should not divert the focus on the status of the Orthodox Church in Greece. The role and stance of the Orthodox is central regarding the identity question in contemporary Greece. The Orthodoxy is rendered the prevailing religion in Greece by the constitution. It has legal status as a public law entity. It is subsidized by the state besides its own revenues and properties. In a Le Monde Article this phenomenon spurs the question: “Is this compatible with the existence of a modern state and with participation in the European Union?” (Fokas: 2004) However, due to its immense cross-class appeal, all political sides have come to refrain from being “unequivocally hostile” to the Church. (Chrysoloras: 2003)

It is apparent that the Church is disturbed by the effects of Globalization and Europeanization on Greek identity. The new Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos has been very active in politics after he took the office, which is the highest religious seat in Greece, in 1998. His political discourse can be aptly examined as the Church’s stance on europeanization of Greek identity. To begin with Christodoulos sustains the views of the Church dating back to 19th century when the Church opposed the Greek nationalist movement:

We unfortunately lost the identity that the Church had assigned to us: our racial identity. Against the conqueror we had a religious as well as a racial difference. We were the race (ethnos). We kept our racial identity until around the 17th century when the ideas of the British philosophers about the nation were spread among the Greek intelligentsia... Since then we lost the identity that the Church had given us, we ceased to be a race and we became a nation. (Chrysoloras: 2003)

Christodoulos regards Hellenism as an endangered culture surrounded by numerous enemies: Islam, Vatican, Turkey, the EU and the Greek intellectuals. The Church remains as the last agent, which can protect the national identity as the state falls under the influence of the EU. The discourse of Christodoulos turned into practice when he mobilized the masses against the government plans to exclude religion from identity cards. As Chrysoloras argues, by using the symbol of the Greek Revolution, Ayia Lavra, during his campaign Christodoulos in fact meant that Orthodoxy and Greekness were synonymous and secularization measures actually threatened Greek nationality. The EU membership was potentially versatile as it paves the way for such “corrupting influence of the heterodox.” (Chrysoloras: 2003)

The identity card issue was situated within a discourse that presented religion as an essential defence against the destruction of national cultural identities in the globalizing melting-pot... Europe in particular was represented as lacking in spiritual values and a dangerous source of de-christianization as exemplified by the Treaty of Nice, which was denounced for not including any reference to Christianity as the basis for the European Union. (Chrysoloras: 2003)

It is a valid statement that Orthodoxy is embedded in Greek identity and ‘the other for Greece has primarily been the religious other as well, both the Europeans and Turks. Nevertheless, whatever the views of the Archbishop may be, the religious freedoms in Greece need improvement. Adamandia Pollis identifies the Greek attitude toward religious freedom as a critical deviation from European norms. She concludes that in this respect “Greek integration into the European Community requires a transformation of the notion of Greekness.” (Fokas: 2004) In other words Pollis argues that the Greek notion which sees the religion, nation and state as an unitary entity should change. Such a change would be rightfully acknowledged as the integral part of the Europeanization of Greek identity.

3.5- Migration and Identity

Another phenomenon concerning the Greek identity in the post 1981 era is migration to Greece. The gradual increase in the living standards as well as its relative geographic proximity to countries from which migration originates has made Greece a passage into Europe if not a destination for migration. As a result, the number of immigrants in Greece are thought to amount to approximately 10% of the population, in other words, no less than a million. (Verney, 2002:12) The turmoil in Albania, Greece's neighbor has a significant role in this increase.

The rapid increase in the number of foreigners in Greece, a society, which was a source of migration itself until one or two decades ago, has had its difficulties as well. The public opinion on the presence of immigrants and foreigners seems to have changed quite radically over the last decade. Panagiotopoulou gives striking figures: The number of Greeks who believed that there were too many immigrants almost doubled, increasing from 29% to 57% between 1990 and 1993 (Panagiotopoulou, 1997:7-8). In the same period, the percentage of people who demanded limitations on the rights of foreigners increased from 27 to 35%. Furthermore, in 1993 a quarter of Greeks said they would be bothered by the presence of someone with a different race in their close circle, 30% said the same thing for people with different faith; 28% said they would be bothered by a foreign national. This was the highest percentage in the EU, doubling the EU average. (Panagiotopoulou, 1997:7-8)

The 'flag incident' in 2000 gives a clear picture of the effects of mass migration on Greek identity. The decision by the school board of Nea Mihaniona to allow Odysseas Chenai who was the child of an Albanian immigrant and had the best grades in his school, to carry the Greek flag in a national day parade sparked a nation-wide issue. A circular had made it clear that a Greek, and not necessarily a Greek national, had to carry the flag. The parents threatened a pupil boycott. On the other hand, reactions cross cut the political cleavage in Greece. A former socialist minister declared such a case as 'unthinkable'. On the other hand, the conservative President Stephanopoulos supported the decision quoting

Socrates: “A Greek is anyone who participates in Greek education.” (Verney, 2002:13)
The child eventually carried the flag with the support of Minister of Education.

In the light of all issues that have been discussed in this chapter, a clearer picture of the Europeanization of Greek identity can be seen. The EU can change and in the Greek case it certainly has done so, the political, legal and economic culture of a country. The results of such a change can reach the national identity especially in a country like Greece where the definition of the nationality has been historically vague or debated. The EU membership will arguably Europeanize Greek identity in various ways. Greeks will feel more attached to Europe ever than before. Their cultural and politic stance in the world will change. Their foreign policy will be centered on being a part of the EU. On the other hand other European countries will eventually perceive Greece as being more European. Nonetheless, the core of the Europeanization of identity can be summed up in this sentence:

The standards of the EU will require the abolishment of the ethno-religious definition of Greek identity and replace it with a new definition which will accommodate other ethnic and religious groups in the country.

Concluding Remarks

The level economic prosperity Greece has achieved has proved to be a challenging phenomenon for Greek national identity. Greece, over a period of less than two decades, has found itself to be a multicultural society with a large immigrant population. In this regard Greece has been Europeanized, facing the same problems West European societies have experienced. Under all aforementioned circumstances it would not be inapt to argue that Modern Greek Identity has to somehow adapt to the new conjuncture. The European prospect of Greece demands secularization and further freedoms for religious communities in the country. Furthermore, in today’s Greece those who somehow do not fit into the classic understanding of a Greek constitute over 10% of the inhabitants. In the final analysis, “while it remains to be seen what it will mean to be Greek in the twenty-first century, change is clearly on the way. (Verney 2002:16)

CONCLUSION

It seems reasonable to argue that identity politics will remain a hot topic in the coming years. Identities in Europe are interacting with the forces of Europeanization as well as globalization and immigration. Under these circumstances as Neumann points out “political opposition on the level of nation states, regions and the EU has already begun to take the shape of rallying around essentialized communities that are presented as threatened and hence in need of being secured.” (Neumann, 1999:228) The popularity of far-right politics in Greece can be used as an example. The last few decades have created new social phenomena within Greek society that have challenged the traditional understanding of the Greek national identity. This challenge will arguably transform the Modern Greek identity into a new definition. Actually, whether such a transformation has begun or not is another matter of debate. However, at this point, another question should be asked: What kind of a change can be expected to take place in a society in which at least some aspects of the national identity were forged over a thousand years ago?

The term change involves two dimensions in this case. First of all, Modern Greece historically has had difficulties in accommodating the minorities in Greece within her national identity. Secondly, as discussed thoroughly before, Modern Greek identity has inherited a difficult relationship with Europe. In addition, Greek identity has historically accumulated `others` and based itself on being solitary against surrounding enemies. In the final analysis change means a new perception of the minorities in Greek society and even perhaps a new social contract over the definition of `Greekness`. Secondly, it means a new perception of Europe for the Greeks and how they place their country within this perception. The EU membership and its vast effects in the social, cultural, political, and economic realms are the main sources of this change. Those effects will eventually change or Europeanize the two aspects of the Greek national identity mentioned above. This overall effect is the Europeanization of Greek identity.

Arguably more tangible and relatively more crucial change in the Greek identity will involve the accommodation of minorities. Greece, as an EU member state, has to reform her stance against her minorities. Probably the biggest step in this respect will be coming to terms with the fact that the adamant denial of the Turkish identity of Muslims in Western Thrace is not compatible with the EU norms. In addition to the historically existent minorities in Greece, the intense immigration the country has witnessed over the last two decades deepens the minority issue. As aforementioned, this influx has brought over a million migrants with different ethnic and religious backgrounds settling in Greece and thus creating a new multi-cultural society similar to those of the Western European societies. In other words, the statute of minorities in Greece has become too big an issue to brush under the carpet for Greece as an EU member and host of heavy immigration. Such a situation is primarily an issue of identity in a country where ethnic and religious homogeneity has been core to the national identity. Changes in laws and practices would require an alteration to how the Greek state and society identifies citizens or inhabitants of different ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds. If the ethnic identities of minorities will be recognized, respected and included in the society, such an act would affect the Modern Greek national identity. It would firstly and most importantly mean that ethnicity is no longer the core of Greek identity. It would also mean that the Greek-Orthodox Church is not the official religion of the state and being a member of this church is not a vital part of being regarded as Greek. With such an understanding of Greek identity, incidents like building a mosque in Athens, a student with foreign parents carrying the Greek flag or secularization attempts can no longer be issues that make Greeks restive about their identity.

Resistance to change can harm Greece in two ways: First of all alienating over ten percent of the society can create intense problems relating to the integration of immigrants into the Greek society which is a palatial task for any society. Failing to integrate this considerably populous group could destabilize the Greek society in many ways such as crime, violence or extremism. As it was seen in many West European societies, national identity, in relation to immigration and integration issues, has the potential to agitate a society strongly. It is possible to place the rise of the far right in Greece lately within the framework of this issue. Secondly, Greece cannot continue to deny the ethnic diversity

within the Greek society as a EU member. In other words, the EU standards will have to be taken into account when dealing with any kind of minorities in Greece.

If change is necessary for Greek national identity, a new question comes up: What kind of an understanding of national identity is to replace the traditional sense of identity in Greece? The aforementioned flag incident reveals that the notion of 'Greekness' needs to accommodate members of the society who are not ethnically Greek. A solution to this can be creating a common denominator embracing the whole society. Greek identity can be inclusive on the common ground of citizenship that is also granted to those who chose Greece as their home or grew there regardless of their ancestral background. Probably a more crucial step would be a wider separation of the church and state in Greece. In addition to the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace, a significant percentage of the immigrants in Greece are non-Orthodox. As a result, a considerable segment of the Greek society is today non-Orthodox while the Greek Orthodox Church remains the constitutional religious body of Greece. The controversies over identity cards, building a mosque in Athens and the problems of the Turkish-Muslim minority all indicate that religion is at the heart of identity question in Greece. Secularizing steps such as removing religious indication from identity cards can end religious discrimination. In the final analysis, the status of Orthodoxy officially and in terms of identity is not compatible with the current composition of Greek society and EU membership.

The Greek national identity interacts with the idea of Europe in terms of EU membership and Europeanization. What the concept of Europe meant was abominated by the Greeks for centuries. In fact, for Greeks through religious and political division and animosity that goes back to Byzantine times, Europe constituted the 'other' as much as the Muslims. As discussed before, the dilemma of Modern Greek identity, the fault line that divided the Greeks since the era of Greek enlightenment is about whether Greece is a part of Europe socially, culturally and politically. Same questions were asked among Europeans too, as they saw a country that was much less impressive in many ways in juxtaposition to Ancient Greece, which they regarded as a paragon and the cradle of Western civilization. What can be of interest at this point is whether the EU membership has shifted these views. Since identities have deep roots in history as well as being ever-

changing in nature it is challenging to answer, if possible, these questions. However, some claims can be made.

The intensity of presence and effect the EU has on its citizens' lives surpasses probably any other political entity today. From Erasmus programs to the right to vote in local elections in another member country, the Union's presence carries the potential to affect as deep-rooted and elementary concepts as national identities. As Rumelili explains how this will happen is yet uncertain. "Does the EU replicate the nation state form in terms of externalizing and legitimizing a violent relationship with its 'others' or has it succeeded in constructing a postmodern community where self/other distinctions are blurred not only within the community but also in relation to its outside?" (Rumelili, 2004:45-46) However there will be a change. The question regarding the effect of an 'ever closer Union' on Greek identity should be if Greek membership will change how Europe is perceived in the Greek collective memory. Although Greek national identity is deeply rooted over centuries, the EU membership can erase the negative aspects of the term Europe the Greek collective memory has come to contain. On the other hand, the EU membership can ensure that Modern Greece is regarded as a European country rather than a Balkan one and to be ironic as much as Ancient Greece.

This occurs through the aforementioned policies the EU executes in order to promote a common EU identity as well as Greece's integration to the EU economically culturally and socially. The existence of Greeks working in EU institutions and countries, the fact that many Greek students study abroad, the economic benefits the country has witnessed from membership and many other factors have brought all the levels Greek society closer to Europe. This level of integration can have an abrasive effect on distant feelings Greek society traditionally has had towards the West.

In the final analysis, for Greeks, the Europeanization of Greek identity in its essence means a more positive relationship with the concept of Europe. Actually, this change had begun in the 18th century, however, it had never reached beyond the elites. Secondly, with the economic development that followed the EU membership, Greece is now demographically a West European country with a substantial immigrant population. The traditional tendency to homogenize the country can no longer be sustained. In this

sense Greek identity will have to adapt to a multi-cultural society without violating the EU standards and norms. Although it is difficult to presage the exact processes and outcomes of these issues, the transformation of Greek identity will be an interesting subject in the coming decades.

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