

T.C.  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER  
ANABİLİM DALI

**BILATERAL PROBLEMS IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS  
AND  
THEIR EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN TURKEY AND EUROPEAN UNION**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

HÜSEYİN ÇAĞLAR VARLI

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Danışman: Yard. Doç. Dr. YONCA ÖZER

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ONAY SAYFASI

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Onaylayan:

Yrd.Doç. Dr. Yonca ÖZER

Danışman

Yrd.Doç. Dr. Özlem TERZİ


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Yrd.Doç. Dr. E.Münevver CEBECİ

Jüri Üyesi

Onay Tarihi

Prof. Dr. Muzaffer DARTAN



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## **ABSTRACT**

**Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özer**

This study explores the bilateral problems in Greek-Turkish relations and their effects on Turkey's membership process to the European Union (EU). Within this framework, the concept of Europeanization is used as an analytical tool to explain the transformation of Greek-Turkish relations into Turkey-EU relations. Briefly being interested in foreign policy at national and EU-level, this study analyzes the impact of Greece, as a EU member country, on Turkey's candidacy status with particularly reference to the Greek foreign policy's ability to 'upload' its national interests and preferences to the EU-level. Accordingly, the Greek-Turkish relations, depicted by the disputed issues, conflicts and crises which are rooted in political and legal framework, have provided a good example in the argument of this thesis how one of EU member countries influences the accession process of a candidate country.

## ÖZET

**Tez Danışmanı: Yard. Doç. Dr. Yonca Özer**

Bu çalışma, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerindeki ikili sorunları ve bunların Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik sürecindeki etkilerini araştırmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Avrupalılaşıma kavramı, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine dönüşümünü açıklamak için analitik bir araç olarak kullanılmaktadır. Kısaca ulusal ve AB düzeyindeki dış politika ile ilgilenen bu çalışma, bir AB üye ülkesi olan Yunanistan'ın Türkiye'nin adaylık statüsüne etkisini, özellikle Yunan dış politikasının kendi çıkarları ve önceliklerini AB düzeyine 'upload' etme becerisine atıfta bulunarak incelemektedir. Bu nedenle, genel olarak siyasi ve hukuki çerçevelerden kaynaklanan ihtilafli konular, çatışmalar ve krizlerle tasvir edilen Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, bu tezin konusu olan AB üye ülkelerinden birinin bir aday ülkenin katılım sürecini nasıl etkilediğine iyi bir örnek sağlamaktadır.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Justice and Development Party ( <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> )
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy
EEAS	: European External Action Service
EC	: European Community
ECHR	: European Court of Human Rights
ECSC	: European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	: European Defense Community
EEC	: European Economic Community
EP	: European Parliament
EPC	: European Political Cooperation
ESDP	: European Security and Defense Policy
EU	: European Union
FRG	: Federal Republic of Germany
FYROM	: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GMFA	: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
HR	: High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	: New Democracy ( <i>Néa Dimokratía</i> )
nm.	: Nautical Mile
PASOK	: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement ( <i>Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima</i> )
PoCo	: Political Committee
SEA	: Single European Act
TEU	: Treaty of European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	: United Nations
UNCLOS	: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

## INTRODUCTION

As an economic and political union in international politics, the European Union (EU) has impelled its member countries to pursue policies which are decided and regulated by the Union's institutions. This supranational body, however, has generally faced adversities in this framework. Even though the EU had aimed at 'downloading' policies from Brussels it could be seen sometimes obstacles particularly put by the member countries in accordance with their own national interests and preferences. Thus, the 'top-down' perception of Europeanization in the shape of policy projection from the EU-level to the national-level has been concluded unsuccessfully. Despite the success in the fields regarding the economic and social policies, the foreign policy area has been seen as a remarkable experience of this failure. Within this context, the EU member countries have not relinquished their own national policies and they have wanted to 'upload' their priorities and preferences to the EU-level instead of downloading policies from Brussels.

In accordance with the Europeanization, also the EU has pushed the candidate countries toward greater convergence with the Union particularly in terms of policy-making and political outcomes. During the accession process, the candidate country in concern has been shaped by EU along with the existence of the facts such as conditionality and asymmetrical relation. Thus, the candidate country has participated into the accession process with the EU institutions emphasizing the conditionality for membership, and the EU member countries proposing specifically bilateral problems in the light of asymmetrical relation to some extent. However, this top-down perception has generally constructed on the way which would result in the membership of candidate country to the EU.

Within this framework, the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey has provided a good example in the argument how one of EU member states influences the accession process of a candidate country. (This argument can also expand to the Slovenian-Croatian experience in Croatia's membership process during the second half of the 2000s.) Having disputed issues, conflicts and crises rooted in political or legal

framework, the Greek-Turkish relations have generally been on the basis of disagreements throughout years. By the EU membership process, however, these erratic bilateral relations have gained the fact that the resurgent issues between the Greek and Turkish states are uploaded to the EU-level in the shape of Europeanization. Within this framework, particularly Greece, as a member of the Union since 1981, has succeeded to put the bilateral problems with the Turkish state into Turkey's accession process to the Union.

For the Greek state, the bilateral relations with Turkey have always carried immense symbols. As mentioned in the following parts of this study, Turkey has placed larger area than the Greek one in Turkish politics. Contributed by some factors which are rooted in historical experience of these two countries, this Greek situation has caused Greece's alertness against any decisions and policies with regard to Turkey. More importantly, this fact has always been accepted by all Greek politicians and governments, and also within the Greek society. For them, the main important hostile of the Greek state has been Turkey entitled the 'threat from the East'.<sup>1</sup> As the 'occupant' in Cyprus and as the 'revisionist state' in the Aegean Sea, Turkey is still carrying complicated sentiments to Greece despite the existence of rapprochement period in bilateral relations since 1999.

This Greek traditional assumption had also reflected the EU context. Throughout years, Athens had emerged as one of EU's main excuses in relations with Ankara, mainly due to Greek governments' negative attitude towards Turkey's efforts to join the Union while referring to the main disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations. Since the replacement of Costas Simitis to the Greek Prime Ministry in the mid-1990s., these bilateral problems have been installed into the way of Turkey's desire to be a full-member of EU. Uploading these bilateral problems to the EU-level, Athens has assumed that this policy would provide settlement of the main disputed issues in Greek foreign policy particularly with Turkey while also opening the door of EU membership for the Turkish state. Within this framework, Greece did not block the decision on the recognition of candidacy status of Turkey in the Helsinki Summit of December 1999.

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<sup>1</sup> For recent example regarding the fact of Turkish threat within Greek state see "Türkiye Yunanistan'ın En Büyük Düşmanı mı?", Radikal, 21.01.2010 Retrieved from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=975952&Date=24.01.2010&CategoryID=81>

By putting the issues which have never been fully resolved and remained sources of conflicts between the two countries, Athens has given a way to Brussels in the relations with Turkey. Since then, the bottom-up perception of Europeanization in Greek foreign policy with regard to the disputed issues with Turkey has equalled the top-down perception that EU pushes the Turkish state towards greater convergence with the membership conditionality. Within this framework, the Cyprus issue, the Aegean dispute and the Greek minority in Turkey handled in Greek foreign policy as important bilateral problems with Turkey has shaped the important obligations which Turkey has to fulfil as soon as possible in order to be a full-member of EU.

Under these circumstances, this study is divided into three chapters. In the first one, the concept of Europeanization is mentioned by pointing out its different meanings and mechanisms of change. In accordance with explaining the forming of EU foreign policy in institutional and theoretical framework, the Europeanization in foreign policy area is concerned despite the existence of difficulties generally rooted in foreign policy making process at national level. Through enlisting factors that determine national foreign policy, this study eventually tries to give reasons why Europeanization could not be applied in this area completely.

Due to the fact that bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey has provided a good example in the argument how one of EU member countries influences the accession process of a candidate country, in the second chapter, the Greek-Turkish relations is analyzed by particularly focusing on the Greek side. As one of EU member country since 1981, Greece had appeared as the main 'excuse' of EU for Turkey's membership aim. However, this situation changed in the second half of the 1990s, and the Greek state lifted its 'traditional' veto by providing the recognition of Turkey's candidacy status for EU membership. Thus, the main disputed issues in Greek foreign policy with regard to the Turkish state are explained in the light of Greece's official texts and claims. For that reason, the terms in Greek political literature such as 'invasion' or 'occupation' is generally used to refer to the cases in Cyprus or in the Aegean Sea. In contrast to the Turkish ones, also the Greek names of the Aegean islands such as Imbros, Tenedos, Chios and etc. are used to call all the islands lying in the Aegean Sea.

As the main point of this study, in the last chapter, it is actually tried to show how the main disputed issues, which are mentioned in the previous chapter, have become the obstacles in front of Turkey's EU membership process. Within this framework, the EU official texts as well as the Presidency Conclusions of EU Summit, institutional declarations and regular reports released by the European Commission replace the Greek official texts to refer to the cases with Turkey. Thus, the developments regarding the Cyprus issue, the Aegean dispute and the minority issue are analyzed by pointing out the EU attitudes towards Turkey.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **EUROPEANIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY**

### **1.1. THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANIZATION**

The concept of Europeanization has gained popularity among scholars in accordance with the increases in numbers of studies on European integration. Particularly the success in deepening of economic and social integration policies following the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty provided ‘an increased attention to the process whereby EU impacts upon the member states’ (Denca, 2008: 6). To illustrate, Kevin Featherstone pointed out that one hundred sixteen academic articles on Europeanization had been published between 1980 and 2001 (Featherstone, 2003: 4). Despite this gaining popularity in recent years, the exact meaning of the concept has not been precisely defined by scholars. They have generally referred to the term to evaluate its influence over member states’ domestic structures, national policy preferences, interests and identities affected by pressure from developments at the EU-level (Eryilmaz, 2007: 8). The Europeanization is therefore used differently to name a variety of phenomena and process of changes. Indeed, it has gained widespread currency as a fashionable term to show changes within European politics and international relations since the 1990s (Featherstone, 3).

For instance, Johan P. Olsen identified the Europeanization in five possible uses including the case of enlargement, European-level institutionalization, governance, political coherence, and the changes in domestic politics in the light of the European level (Olsen, 2002).<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Featherstone analyzed the term in four main categories which were the historical process, cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, and a policy process (Featherstone, 2003). Moreover, Claudio M. Radaelli agreed on the definition of this term as ‘process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles,

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<sup>2</sup> Johan P. Olsen identified five possible ways entitled a first step towards understanding Europeanization. There are: “Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries (such as in the case of enlargement); Europeanization as the development of institutions of governance at the European-level (European-level institutionalization); Europeanization as the export of European forms of political organization and governance beyond Europe; Europeanization as a political project in support of the construction of a unified and politically strong Europe; Europeanization as the penetration of European-level institutions into national and subnational systems of governance.” (p.334)

ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.’ (Radaelli, 2003; 30). However, it has to be noted that the Europeanization is not only used to describe processes with regard to the EU’s effects on the domestic policies of its member states, but it is also applied to analyze the candidate countries to understand how the EU’s policies affect their politics.<sup>3</sup>

Simon J. Bulmer and Claudio M. Radaelli pointed out four macro-dynamics why the studies on Europeanization have been popular in recent years (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004). Among these reasons, first of all, they underlined the success of institutionalization of the single market through the increases of EU directives, regulations, and jurisprudences which have affected the member states. Second, Bulmer and Radaelli added that the advance of Economic and Monetary Union has created further degree of interdependency among the policies within the EU. Third, since the widening policies carried out at EU-level could generally be linked to more-market driven policies, Bulmer and Radaelli emphasized that the member states have adjusted their national policies to seek comparative advantage within the EU. Finally, Bulmer and Radaelli concerned the enlargement process driven by negotiations that the EU had tried to transfer its policies, norms and rules to its new members in the framework of the Copenhagen criteria identifying accession standards to the Union (*Ibid.*, 2).

Within these many distinguished definitions, the literature has generally showed the Europeanization as ‘influence of the EU’ or ‘domestic impact of the EU’ (Sedelmeier, 2006: 8). On the one hand, Ioakimidis stated that the Europeanization has depended on the ‘expectations, significance and functional role a given member state accords to the European integration process and the EU in particular’ (Ioakimidis, 2000: 73). Within this framework, the national actors have tried to understand this term, and they could change or adapt EU’s policy in favour of their own interests and preferences. Thus, the member states are actively pushing their preferences and policies to the European level for preserving national interests on the EU arena while downloading

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<sup>3</sup> For the studies on EU’s impact on the candidate countries in line with the Europeanization, see Frank Schimmelfening & Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11/4, 2004, pp.669-687



them from Brussels as one of the Union policies (Radaelli, 34). In other words, the Europeanization has two main approaches identifying the interaction between national-level (member states) and supranational-level (European Union); top-down and bottom-up.

The top-down approach depicts the Europeanization as domestic changes created by European integration. In this framework, the scholars have handled the term to concentrate on requirements coming from Brussels with regard to the integration process among member states (Vink, 2002: 6). This approach is seen in many aspects of European integration especially relating to the more-integrated policy areas mostly concerned in the EU's first pillar. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach conceptualizes the Europeanization as the projection of ideas from the national-level to the EU-level. (Major, 2005: 177) These two approaches focus on the member states' role as ascending (decision-making) and descending (implementation) actor in shaping European foreign policy-making in direction of their preferences and interests (Börzel, 2002: 195).

Within the EU, generally the decisions on multiple policy areas are the results of negotiation process where the national governments (member states) are in central position in order to make the Union take certain decisions (Bulmer & Radaelli, 4-5). However, the members have sometimes separate views on European integration and its policies. For instance, Iokamidis concerned this situation and pointed out the fact 'to view the EU as a framework for projecting an international role (i.e. Britain) or maximizing a position of power (i.e. France), and entirely another to regard the EU as an external power source and stimulus for advancing economic, social and political modernization, as in the case of Greece' (Iokamidis, 74). Under these circumstances, Tanja A. Börzel classified the EU member states into three different groups as pace-setting, foot-dragging, and fence-sitting (2002, 194).

Pace-setting countries are actively pushing policies in accordance with their own policy preferences to the European level in order to minimize implementation costs. Then, the countries called the food-draggers try to prevent themselves from costly policy implementation of EU by blocking or delaying these policies. Finally, the fence-sitting countries, in contrast to pushing or blocking policies, try to build tactical coalitions with one of them (*Ibid.*). To illustrate, Börzel examined the attitude of

member states about EU environmental policy. In this framework, she called Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland the pace-setters that could export their policy preferences on the EU-level, while trying to shape Union's policies according to their interests; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland and also Britain the fence-sitting countries, because they tend to build coalitions with pace-setters or foot-draggers according to the importance of the issue in concern; and Portugal, Spain, Greece, and to some extent Italy and Ireland the foot-draggers that opposed the strict rules on common environmental policy since they were industrial latecomers (*Ibid.*).

Like Börzel's study emphasizing the response of member states to the Europeanization, Duncan Liefferink and Andrew Jordan examined the concept for seeing to what extent the mechanisms led to convergence between member states (Liefferink & Jordan, 2002). In their article accounting for the impact of the EU on its members, Liefferink and Jordan used four mechanisms also mentioned in Colin Benett's study that could induce national policies to be convergence as follows;

- Emulation, characterized by 'the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience'
- Elite networking, characterized by 'the existence of shared ideas amongst a relatively coherent and enduring network of elites engaging in regular interaction at the transnational level... Unlike emulation the policy community engages in a shared experience of learning about the problem'
- Harmonization, driven by a recognition of interdependence and characterized by the coincident recognition and resolution of a common problem through the pre-existing structures and processes of an international regime.
- Penetration, in which states are forced to conform to actions taken elsewhere by external actors (*ibid.*, 5).

By the way, Radaelli concerned that the Europeanization has not equalled the convergence well, but it could also produce divergence between countries (Radaelli, 32). He added that the Europeanization should not be confused only with harmonization and political integration due to the different approaches to changes with regard to the Europeanization in member states (*Ibid.*).

## **1.2. EUROPEANIZATION IN FOREIGN POLICY**

Through bibliographical survey exploring the range of different dimensions along which Europeanization has been applied, the analysis of the term in relation to foreign policy cooperation and adaptation has been obliged to take into account the

relative weakness of EU competencies in this area (Featherstone, 12). For instance, Bulmer and Radaelli applied the concept of ‘facilitated coordination’ in foreign policy area where “the policy process is not (or is negligibly) subject to European law; where decisions are subject to unanimity amongst the governments; or where the EU is simply an arena for the exchange of ideas” (Bulmer & Radaelli, 7).

Unlike the more-integrated policies particularly involved in the first pillar, the Europeanization in foreign and security policy had developed outside the institutional treaties until the emergence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the beginning of the 1990s (Featherstone, 10). Although the EU member states have still sought the possibilities of establishing an institutional framework in this area throughout the European historical context, they have not been able to achieve it exactly. Since member states have individually tried to keep their separate ties to the third parties in international politics in the light of maintenance specific regional and global interests, their different foreign policy interests, orientations and traditions have placed as important obstacles to the development of a common foreign policy within the EU (Dinan, 2005: 560).

Accordingly, a common foreign and security policy obviously means the requirement of truly alignment of national and European policies around the same priorities, objectives and preferences. (Maull, 2005: 791) In this framework, the scholars have generally analyzed the question to what extent the existence of European foreign policy in the EU. For instance, Brian White interrogated the possibility of this policy by taking three different views into consideration as follows;

- One view is that European foreign policy already exists although that term may not be used. From this perspective, it is an integral part of the process of European integration that increasingly – particularly since the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union – has foreign, security and defence dimensions to it.

- Second view is that a European foreign policy does not exist but it should. Problems illustrated by the inadequate collective European performance in the succession of crises in the Balkans are taken as clear indication that a common or even a ‘single’ European foreign policy is needed to deal effectively with such issues.

- Third view is that European foreign policy does not exist, it never will and moreover, it never should! Proponents of this view are wedded to the idea that the ability to control foreign and defence policy is a fundamental, defining characteristic of the nation-state. Accepting both the concept and the reality of a European foreign policy would mean nothing less than member states giving up both independence and sovereignty and must lead inexorably to the early demise of the nation-state (White, 2001: 37).

Regarding the foreign and security policy as politically sensitive issues, the EU member states have built the Community/Union foreign and security policy by step-by-step while their initiatives and proposals in this area had to avoid any linkage to mean exact integration (Janning, 2005: 824). Thus, the European integration and also Europeanization have generally taken place ‘voluntarily’ rather than through regulatory and obligatory rules and laws as experienced in the other EU policy areas.

### **1.2.1. Institutional Framework: Forming of European Foreign Policy**

Since the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, it has been several attempts and initiatives in order to provide further integration in the field of foreign and security policy. Within the Community, the first relevant attempt was the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) emerged out of a French proposal in the first half of the 1950s. The main reason behind this attempt was an unacceptable request of the United States in favour of rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), whose neighbours would be discontent of this possibility. Thus, René Pleven, the French Prime Minister, proposed the Plan including the idea of European army instead of the German rearmament. However, ironically, the Plan would be rejected by the French National Assembly the following years (White, 145).

After seven years of declining the Plan, the second French proposal brought on surface as the reflection of the Gaullist view on European integration process. The French President Charles De Gaulle’s foreign policy entitled the ‘Gaullism’ or ‘exceptionalism’ was to restore France’s *grandeur* role in international politics (Treacher, 2001: 24). Within this framework, de Gaulle regarded European integration as an indivisible instrument in order to achieve his goal, and therefore he became an enthusiastic supporter of the 1961 Fouchet Plan (*Ibid.*, 25).<sup>4</sup> Proposing the coordination of foreign policies among the Six, the Plan had foreseen important institutional changes within the Community by envisaging four institutions; a council of heads of government/state or foreign ministers, a permanent secretariat in Paris, four intergovernmental committees in the field of foreign affairs, defence, commerce and

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<sup>4</sup> For the Gaullist foreign policy and its effects on European integration, see; Gordon (1993), Menon (1995)

cultural affairs, and a European Assembly (Urwin, 1991: 105). Nevertheless, the Plan was declined by the other members due to the fear that it could create French hegemony within the Community.

After de Gaulle had withdrawn from the French political arena in 1968, the EC leaders called for member states to coordinate and cooperate in the field of foreign affairs the following year (Dinan, 582). Responding to the FRG's policy of constructing relations with the Soviet bloc countries entitled the *Ostpolitik*, the EC members decided on providing coordination and exchange of information on international issues (*Ibid.*). This decision resulted in the Luxembourg Report of 1970 that formed the European Political Cooperation (EPC) including new institutions such as regular consultation meetings among the member states' heads of state and government, among the members' foreign ministers, the forming of the Political Committee for preparing the foreign ministers' meetings, and the introduction of Working Group composed of midlevel foreign ministry officials (Bretheerton & Vogler, 1999: 174; Dinan, 583).

Owing to the EPC, the habit of working together and cooperating in the field of foreign policy were developed informally, and to some extent the member states began to consider the existence of common European interests (Salmon, 1992: 234). Due to the structure depending on intergovernmental character and voluntarily cooperation together with the outside the treaties, the EPC showed its inability by not responding to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in 1979 (Dinan, 583). This and other crises such as the imposition of martial law in Poland created the London Report of 1981, and two years later the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration designed for the improvement of EPC. Only it gained absolute legal basis by the introduction of Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The third title of this Treaty committed that "the parties to endeavour jointly formulate and implement a European foreign policy, and...the parties agree that the external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation must be consistent" (White, 74).

Nevertheless, the efforts for creating a common foreign policy were peaked by the Maastricht Treaty whose second pillar became the form of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation. In accordance with further cooperation, more importantly, the CFSP replaced the EPC. Also, it introduced two new instruments such as the common position and joint action (Dinan,

586). Under the Council's responsibility, in the post-Maastricht period the EU set out CFSP joint actions in order to contribute to peace and stability in international politics.<sup>5</sup>

Despite some successful implementation, the Yugoslavian crisis undermined the CFSP, and showed its ineffectiveness and incapability in response to such international crises. Together with this shameful experience, it was also seen internal challenges within the EU. Particularly the member state heading the Council Presidency could not ignore its own priorities despite the fact that it should have pursued policies in direction of CFSP (*Ibid.*). For instance, the EU's common interest and position were to be sacrificed by one of its members in 1994 when the Greek Presidency had declined to recognize the new Macedonian state, and instead imposed economic sanction on that country. Accordingly, these were why the EU would agree to enlarge the implementation of CFSP by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This institutional treaty added new instruments into the CFSP as well as the introduction of the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, and the common strategy (White, 161). In this framework, Javier Solana was appointed as the first HR, and under CFSP, the EU adopted its first two common strategies on Russia and Ukraine in 1999 (Dinan, 597).

Preparing institutionally for the next enlargement, the Nice Treaty in 2001 led the EU to be more responsible for implementing the defence-related aspects of policy (Phinnemore, 2007: 41). On the other hand, the Treaty paved the way for Brussels to be the capital of the Union where the following Council meetings would be held (*Ibid.*). Along with this institutional framework in line with strengthening integration in foreign policy area, the debate on future of the EU had begun to be voiced intensively by the European politicians and intellectuals in the post-Nice period. Since the 1990s, the external factors and structural changes in international system have forced EU to speak as a 'single voice' (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 2). In order to respond to the new threats following the collapse of the Cold War such as regional conflicts and international terrorism, the European foreign policy had initiated new capabilities in the framework of CFSP and ESDP including the rapid reaction force and the method of

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<sup>5</sup> South Africa was one of the first places where the CFSP joint actions were exercised. The EU took a role in observing the South African elections. For the CFSP joint actions in the South African case, see; Holland (1995) For the list of principal CFSP joint actions between 1993-1997, see; Bretheerton and Vogler (1999: 184)

civilian crisis management (Eryılmaz, 13).<sup>6</sup> Moreover, in 2003, the EU published the European Security Strategy (ESS), a document identifying new security threats for the Union and instruments to deal with them.<sup>7</sup>

In order to speak as a single voice, the Laeken Summit of December 2001 had concluded with the decision on forming a convention to prepare the Constitutional Treaty (Dinan, 2005: 173). This convention proposed the ‘Draft Treaty for European Constitution’ to the Council at the end of 2003. Melting all existing treaties into a basket and granting EU the legal personality, the Constitutional Treaty introduced two new relevant positions to CFSP; the EU Council President, and the EU Foreign Minister, who would replace the High Representative. According to the Treaty, the Council President and the Foreign Minister would represent the Union in external relations. The EU Foreign Minister, in particular, would be responsible ‘for handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external actions’ (Van Gerven, 2004: 475).

After the disappointing results of the referendums held in France and the Netherlands with regard to the approval of the Treaty, the Constitutional process refreshed at the end of 2007, and new constitutional framework entitled the Lisbon Treaty was proposed to the ratification of member states’ national parliaments.<sup>8</sup> In the foreign policy area, this new institutional treaty introduced the HR for CFSP as the EU Foreign Minister and also the head of ‘European External Action Service’ (EEAS) which would be established in order to assist the Minister’s workings clearly. More importantly, by the introduction of EEAS the delegations of the European Commission on the third countries will be transformed into the EU embassies working closely together with the member states’ own diplomatic missions abroad in those countries (Kriter, 2010b: 34). Having these new institutional changes relating to the foreign policy area the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force in December 2009, and Herman

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<sup>6</sup> For the ESDP actions, see; Ginsberg and Smith (2007) For the one of ESDP actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Nowak (2003), Recchia (2007)

<sup>7</sup> The ‘key threats’ the EU has faced were terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. See Solana (2003)

<sup>8</sup> Except Ireland because of the principle written in its own national constitution.

van Rumpuy became the first EU President while Catherine Ashton was elected as the first EU Foreign Minister.<sup>9</sup>

### **1.2.2. Theoretical Framework: Europeanization of National Foreign Policies**

During the last years there has been some limited numbers of studies analyzing whether the EU member states' foreign policies have changed as a result of their relation with the Union (Chelotti, 2006: 6). In contrast to the studies on Europeanization with regard to the EU's other policy areas, 'via increasing efforts of the EU in foreign policy cooperation throughout the 1990s as well as the Union's highly ambitious Eastern enlargement project led to a revival of scholarly interest in Europeanization of foreign policy' (Eryilmaz, 9). Despite the successful institutional integration in European foreign policy to some extent, the Europeanization in foreign policy area has not equalled the exact integration completely. Instead, it has generally referred to the consequences of process for members and non-member states. (Major, 178) In the field of foreign policy, the non-existence of regulations, directives and other supranational institutions helps the intergovernmental character of European foreign policy keep its position well. More importantly, this character 'makes it difficult to apply the mechanisms and ideas of 'traditional' theories of Europeanization' (Osswald, 2005: 6).

Having coexisted with the Community and Union foreign policy, the national foreign policy has still one of the three distinguished sub-systems of European foreign policy cooperation (White, 2004: 54-55). It 'refers to the separate foreign policies of member states which have continued to exist and indeed to thrive.' (*Ibid.*, 55) Before analyzing national foreign policy, it should be noted what it means. Within this framework, Mark Webber and Michael Smith gave this useful definition as follows;

Foreign policy is composed of the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states, and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of the external relations of national societies. It constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies (Webber & Smith, 2002: 9-10).

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<sup>9</sup> While this study was writing, what the role of EEAS has still being argued within the EU institutions before the establishment of the Service. For details, see, *Kriter*, Mayıs 2010



Main approaches to the study of foreign policy have been the consequences of international relations theories, and therefore, these major theories have been interested in foreign policy analysis as one of sub-field of this literature. As a traditional approach, first of all, the realist assumption had influenced these analyses. Due to the anarchic structure in international politics, the realists claimed that national governments had to pursue foreign policy on behalf of their states (*Ibid.*). In the light of this state-centric view, the language of realism underlying the notions of power and interest had intensively influenced the discussions of foreign policy analysis well (Keohane, 1986: 9). Since states were rational actors, the foreign policy analysis meant a kind of calculation of actions in order to maximize the benefits (Tayfur, 1994: 119). Within this framework, foreign policy analysis was viewed as an aim for national interests which included the terms of independence and security (Webber & Smith, 12).

This realist assumption had also reflected foreign policy agenda of nation-states. Thus, the national agenda mainly involved military-security threats due to the existence of distinct separation between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. Particular in the Cold War context having generally militarized and ideological confrontations, the possibility of war was real, and therefore, foreign policy agenda had to give importance to national security concerns in terms of militarized concepts (Buzan, 1991: 433).

Parallel to the challenges to the realist theory in international relations, the Behaviouralist School criticized the state-centric foreign policy analysis. Narrowing the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign policy making, the ‘Decision Making Approach’ replaced the rational choice of realism (Tayfur, 120). The introduction of Decision Making Approach brought about to analyze foreign policy as a process, not seen a response of nation-states to the anarchic world (White, 49). “Hence, like the abstract state of realism, the concrete decision-maker(s) began to calculate the pluses and minuses of alternative courses of action, and picked up the most appropriate (beneficial) one that would lead to the achievement of desired goal(s)” (Tayfur, 120).

Relating to this process, these changes undermined the traditional approach that states were only important actors in international politics (White, 49). Especially since the emergence of transnationalism on surface, the role of states in foreign policy has been interrogated by the scholars. For instance, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye introduced the complex interdependence, instead of balance of power, to analyze state

behaviour in international relations (Keohane&Nye, 1996). Unlike the state-centric view, accordingly the complex-interdependence proposed three main characteristics; multiple channels, absence of hierarchy among issues, and minor role of military force. First, Keohane and Nye emphasized the importance of informal ties among societies in form of face-to-face and telecommunications as well as the formal meetings and arrangements between governments; second, they insisted that foreign policy agenda did not only involve military issues, but it had also the other issues as well especially in accordance with erasing the distance between domestic and foreign policies; third, Keohane and Nye underlined that the use of military force would not be applied by states to the others due to the existence of complex-interdependence (*Ibid.*, 241-242).

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War helped the foreign policy agenda reevaluate the existed security concerns. For instance, Barry Buzan mentioned that new types of security concerns including military, economic, social, political and cultural security emerged as new challenges on the foreign policy agenda particularly in the post-Cold War area (Buzan, 433). Moreover, Webber and Smith added that the issues such as environment, migration and refugees as well as the promotion of economic prosperity appeared as new immediate items on the agenda (Webber & Smith, 19).

Depending on major approaches to the foreign policy analysis, there are various factors shaping decision-making process in national-level. In his article describing new German foreign policy based on self-confidence rather than the U.S. influence, for instance, Christian Hacke noted the importance of personality of leaders, bureaucracy, political parties, input from intellectuals, and the media in deciding and making foreign policy (Hacke, 2005: 541). Additionally, economic situation, geographical location, historical and cultural ties, and also the international system can be taken into consideration during the process.

About the personality, the decision-maker can draw different lessons from events and incidents, and therefore, behave differently. “The intellectual capacity and talents of handling information, analyzing it and turning it into concrete policies, will all affect the individual in the process of policy decision making” (Tayfur, 131). While analyzing German foreign policy under the coalition government of the Social Democrats and Greens, for instance, Hacke pointed out the personal roles of the Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and the Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in foreign

policy making. He claimed that Schroeder and Fischer did not have good memories about the role of the United States in the post-war period due to the difference of their generations (Schroeder was born in 1944 and Fischer in 1948) than one of previous German leaders. Instead, they were fed by the Vietnam War, which helped anti-American sentiments restore in international public opinion (Hacke, 542).

Despite the fact that national governments are temporary organizations, the leading political party or parties play a significant role in foreign policy making. In this framework, the foreign policy is a kind of governmental activity. Since John Major's conservative government had little credibility in the eyes of the Clinton administration and the EU partners, the following British government under the Prime Ministry of Tony Blair aimed at restoring Britain's role in the relations with Washington and Brussels (Wallace, 2005: 54). After New Labour Party's election victory in 1997, Blair described new principles of British foreign policy as follows;

strong in Europe and strong with the US. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other. Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it (*Ibid.*, 55).

This new British foreign policy overcame the impediments emerged out of Major's government. While Blair's government was putting Britain in the way to the strong cooperation with the United States, also "he has significantly influenced the policy agenda of the European Union, notably in launching the British-French 'St. Malo initiative' on European defence in 1998 and the 'Lisbon Agenda' on economic reform in 2001" (*Ibid.*, 54). As another example for the role of national governments in foreign policy making process, at the Spanish experiment in the Iraq crisis of 2003, the Socialists criticizing intensively Spain's cooperative role in Iraq came to power after the election defeat of José Maria Aznar's moderate party. New Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero changed the priorities of Spanish foreign policy and, instead of participating in the Anglo-Saxon axis, he made the country turn to the EU (Coletta, 2005: 239).

When the decision-makers in foreign policy have decided what the point is favour of national interest or not, they often feel the impression of bureaucracy (Ari, 2004: 181). Unlike the national governments, the role of bureaucracy in the process of

foreign policy making is not temporary, and therefore, the bureaucrats are able to expertise in this field while formulating national foreign policy (Tayfur, 134). Thus, the bureaucrats could influence the individual decision-maker to some extent in foreign policy making process.

Since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the role of public opinion in foreign policy analysis has been taken into account and this one has developed in accordance with the growth of democratization process in international politics (Arı, 183). However, the participation of public opinion in this process may be seen as a problem due to the possibility that the decision-makers could manipulate public in terms of ongoing policy (*Ibid.*). Moreover, particularly for open societies, broadcasting on televisions has always affected public opinion, and therefore, the formulation of foreign policy (Nye Jr., 1999: 25). Because of broadcasting certain issues such as conflicts, disputes and human rights violations, the politicians face the pressure from national and international media in respond to these problems actively (*Ibid.*, 26). In this framework, the Bosnian crisis broken out in the first half of the 1990s could be seen as one of important experiences that showed the role of media in foreign policy deciding and making process. Although the western world, in particular the United States, had not initially been interested in the crisis, the western public attention turned to the Bosnian tragedy by broadcasting deaths and victims on the CNN International particularly in 1994 when the bombs exploded in a marketplace of Sarajevo. For that reason, the studies on the role of media in foreign policy making process have then been evaluated under the so-called 'CNN-effect'. For instance, Joseph Nye Jr. had insisted that the CNN-effect made items on the top of the public agenda (*Ibid.*, 26).

Also, historical and cultural ties have taken important place in formulating foreign policy. For instance, the traditional relationship between the North African countries and France can be evaluated in this framework. Accordingly, together with France's economic interests in this region, its colonial past and linguistic ties have provided that Africa is one of fundamental areas of French foreign policy (Hopmann, 1994: 88). More importantly, the still-existence of French civic culture and liberal values there has contributed to the political life of these countries where generally the Islamic fundamentalism is a huge concern (*Ibid.*). Relating to the changes in international system, the nongovernmental actors have an impact on foreign policy. Due

to these new structures the decision-maker(s) have to take the expanding role of nongovernmental actors into consideration well (Nye Jr., 25). Composing of these all factors, the national interests absolutely become indispensable for all states, and therefore, these states should pursue foreign policy in the light of their national interests. Actually, that is why the EU has faced obstacles to the replacement of 'common interest' instead. It brings about problems for applying Europeanization to the foreign policy area while member states are still want to pursue separate foreign policy in accordance with their own national interests and priorities.

Like the other countries, the EU member states' sensitive approaches to the foreign policy issues have challenged the application of Europeanization in foreign policy area. Throughout the European historical context, it has seen many examples in this framework. Because of having deep-rooted cleavages and tensions among the EU members in relation to the issues in concern, applying Europeanization to the foreign policy area has not been easy as mainly seen the crises in Yugoslavia and Iraq of 2003 (Eryilmaz, 15). During the Yugoslavian crisis broken out in the first half of the 1990s, for instance, Germany had initially pushed EU to play decisive military role whereas Britain, Spain and Greece discouraged the Union to take this kind of measures. As the reflection of its own foreign policy agenda, also the German government had forced the Union to recognize immediately the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in line with emphasizing their shared Catholic and historical ties. On the other hand, the other EU members thought that the possible recognition of these two countries would accelerate volume of tension in disputed areas of the Balkans (Salmon, 1992).

The Iraq crisis of 2003 also added new damages to recent progress within CFSP. While French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had mentioned that they never supported any European military campaign in favour of contribution to the United States, British Prime Minister Tony Blair intensively backed the Bush administration in the light of traditional Anglo-American alliance taking important place in the British foreign policy (Hill, 2004: 153). This disarray between the 'Big Three' reflected the other EU members, and together with Britain, the leaders of member states including Italy, Denmark, Spain and Portugal plus three candidate countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic signed an open letter at the end

of January 2003 that described their exact support for the U.S. involvement in Iraq (Dinan, 2004: 602).

Christopher Hill claimed that these deep-rooted cleavages amongst EU members mostly emerged out of member countries' different geographical and historical experience, or special ties to the other parties (Hill, 155). Seeing the German pressure for the recognition of two former Yugoslavian states and the British support for the U.S. involvement, these factors should not be ignored easily by national decision-makers. Thus, it has created one of important obstacles to the Europeanization of foreign policy in the supranational framework.

The involvement of main actors as the EU institutions, member states, and also the non-state actors in political process has formed another impediment to the Europeanization. Burçin Eryılmaz had underlined that this structure entitled 'complex actor constellation' resulted in the existence of many actors' separate views and demands especially seen in pre-accession period of the candidate countries (Grabbe, quoted in Eryılmaz, 15). Within this framework, Croatia's current membership process could be analyzed how an individual state, Slovenia, had kept its divergent views and demands against the Brussels' intense pressures. Due to the unresolved Slovenian-Croatian border question<sup>10</sup> on the Adriatic since the dissolution of Former Yugoslavia, the Slovenian government used its right of veto to the 10 headlines of the membership negotiations between Croatia and EU in late 2008. Whereas the European Commission said Croatia would eventually be a part of EU at the end of 2010, the Slovenian government seriously insisted that Croatia would not join the Union until the emergence of any settlement to the border question.<sup>11</sup>

As also understood in this case mentioned above, the 'asymmetrical power relations' and 'conditionality' take an important place in EU accession process due to the fact that the candidate countries cannot upload their national interests and priorities to the EU-level (Eryılmaz, 19). These characters therefore should be taken into account in analyzing the effects of Europeanization on candidate states' national foreign policy.

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<sup>10</sup> For the question, see; Kunic (2008)

<sup>11</sup> At the end of meetings between the European Commission, Slovenia and Croatia in favour of the resolution of the border question, in September 2009 the Slovenian government declared that this bilateral problem would not be related to the Croatia's ongoing membership negotiations, and therefore propose the Slovenian Parliament to remove the veto. (Kriter, 2009: 26)

First of all, the asymmetrical power relations have created an opportunity particularly to the small member countries of the EU. In this framework, just as major states are able to upload their own interests to the EU-level, these small countries may have a chance to ‘Europeanize’ their own policy priorities (Denca, 7). Due to the fact that EU foreign policy still depends on bargaining process in the light of intergovernmental character, these small states could affect the Union decisions according to their own size and resources (*Ibid.*). On the other hand, in the light of conditionality, the Europeanization has intensively influenced the candidate state’s policies until its accession to the EU (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2). During the accession process the EU conditionality urges the candidate country to have good neighbourly relations by solving the existing border questions on the basis of international law. Moreover, the EU strengthens the conditionality by reminding the candidates that they would be encountered the postponement or suspending the negotiation process in direction of full-membership (Erdoğan, 2006: 5).




Figure 1.1. The impact on national foreign policy (Osswald, 92).

Since these factors have undermined the Europeanization completely in the field of foreign policy, Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis concerned that the application of Europeanization to the foreign policy has caused the emergence of three different dimensions (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005: 220). The first one emphasized that ‘the EU process, organizational procedures, principles and values have affected the national levels of the decision-making process’ (*Ibid.*). In this downloading framework, it can be said that the European interest becomes national interest, and therefore, the member state in concern has to adjust its foreign policy interests to the EU’s.<sup>12</sup> In other words, the member country may sacrifice its preferences and priorities eventually (see Figure 1.2.). In French context, for instance, Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, took a decision on the suspension of nuclear tests in the Pacific in order to stop intense critics particularly voiced by its EU partners (Gordon, 1993: 174).




Figure 1.2. The adaptation of the foreign policy decision-making process of member states (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 221).

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<sup>12</sup> From the notes of “International Politics of EU-I” lectured by Munevver Cebeci during the fall term of 2007-2008 at the Marmara University.






Figure 1.3. The impact of national foreign policies of EU member states (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 222).

The second dimension referred to the ‘externalization’ or ‘being Europeanized’ of national foreign policies in contrast to the process of EU impact on member states mainly handled in the first one (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 221-222). Depending on intergovernmental character of CFSP, in this dimension, the national foreign policy is ‘actively engaged in transforming and influencing the emergence of a more efficient and effective CFSP, independently of whether this is in line with its traditional narrow national interests or not’ (*Ibid.*, 222). Within this framework, obviously all EU members ‘have learned to value EU foreign policy as beneficiary for their own targets, and they have learned to consider the EU as an acceptable arena in which to take foreign policy decisions’ (Osswald, 8). (See Figure 1.3.) For instance, José I. Torreblanca had examined the EU’s impact on the Spanish foreign policy, and he had stated that EU membership provided excellent opportunities for Spain in direction of exporting fundamental areas of its foreign policy agenda to Brussels (Torreblanca, 2001). Accordingly, Torreblanca had mentioned that Spain initially regarded EU as an instrument for increasing its international status as the spokesman of the Spanish-

speaking world particularly in the Latin America. Then he had added that Spain used the Union in its bilateral relations with Morocco intensively dominated by problems including the territorial claims, situation of Western Sahara and the delimitation of fishery zone near the sea of Sahara (*Ibid.*). Transforming these bilateral problems to the EU-level, Spain gave the way to the European Commission to begin negotiations about the issue of delimitation of fishery zone with Morocco, and these negotiations resulted in the agreements of 1988, 1992, 1995, and last 2005 which decided on drawing borders of the fishery zone between Morocco and EU (Rumelili, 2008: 59).

Tsardanidis and Stavridis added the ‘pendulum effect’ into the dimensions to explain the harmonization between two extreme foreign policy positions within the EU (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 222). (See Figure 1.4.) They mentioned that the pendulum effect ‘can be visualized by contrasting two initially extreme FP positions, usually that one (or more) EU member state(s) and those of the remaining EU states (often including a number of, if not all, EU institutions, such as the Commission or Parliament)’ (*Ibid.*). Obviously that is the fact that some scholars have assumed the EU has some socialization despite the existence of intergovernmental character in European foreign policy (Eryilmaz, 10).<sup>13</sup> This socialization process has emerged out of the Union’s institutional structures such as the EPC, CFSP and also formal/informal meetings between the members in direction of taking the others’ view into account (Irondele, 2001: 15). Within international relations theories, the social constructivism has analyzed this situation as well. Within this framework, Alexander Wendt proposed two claims; the fundamental structure of international politics is social rather than material, and the structure shapes actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1995: 71). Thus, the constructivist assumption threat actors’ interests and preferences as *endogenous* being affected by cooperation. In contrast to the realist one that the structure is made of distribution of material capabilities, the constructivism claims, it is made of social

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<sup>13</sup> Eryilmaz mentioned the comparative studies separately of *Ben Tonra (2001)* and *Michael E. Smith (2000)* which enumerated the effects of the CFSP upon member-states’ national policies. First, Tonra identified three effects; access to more information even of higher quality, unparallel access to international decision-makers, expansion and restructuring of administration and development of positive and dynamic diplomatic culture. On the other hand, Smith classified them as; elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and the increase in public support for EPC/CFSP (Eryilmaz, 10-11)

relationship (*Ibid.*, 73). Marius Osswald had pointed out that this socialization was succeeded within EU by ‘regular contacts between high level diplomats, for example in the Political Committee (PoCo) composed of senior officials from each foreign ministry’ (Osswald, 20). Moreover, Osswald had mentioned that the Council Presidency served this socialization well, because “a country holding the Presidency has to go beyond its own national interest, looking at issues through a broader potentially pan-European lens, and often serving as a moderator between other member states” (*Ibid.*, 22). Accordingly, the constructivist assumption assumes that states have regarded international institutions as arenas where they could be influenced to the extent of internalizing the norms (Ohrgaard, 2004: 35). Wendt had stated that these institutions as a process of internalizing new identities and interests motivated actors’ socialization. (Wendt, 1992: 399) Hence, according to the constructivists, this socialization ‘gradually leads to a convergence of foreign policy actors’ interests and identities’ (Osswald, 8).




Figure 1.4. The pendulum effect (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 223).

Due to the existence of intensively geographical and historical experience and also the asymmetrical power relations the Greek-Turkish case can clearly be illustrated how the one of EU member states could upload its preferences and priorities to the European-level whereas the other one as a country on the membership process has been influenced by the EU under the concern of conditionality in the light of

Europeanization. Concerning the fact that Greece has been one of the EC/EU members since 1981, the Community/Union has already been interested in the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes actively through its direct and indirect interventions (Rumelili, 2007: 113). However, the conclusion of Helsinki Summit of 1999, which put Turkey into the list of candidate countries for full-membership to the EU, has brought about increasing EU's pressures on Turkey. In contrast to the success of Greek foreign policy that uploaded its national interests and priorities to the EU-level in accordance with the bottom-up perception by the conclusion of Helsinki, Turkey has faced the requirements coming from Brussels in the light of top-down perception of Europeanization. This asymmetrical relations in bilateral framework has generally disaffected Turkey's EC/EU process, and resulted in the fact that Greece become a dominant factor in the relations between Turkey and EU which would be tried to analyze the following parts of this study.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY**

Throughout years the relations between the Greek and the Turkish states have witnessed frictions, conflicts and crises. Moreover, these relations have been regarded as ‘one of the great examples of an enduring historic intense conflict’ (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 72). For that reason, it has always referred to the ancient rivalries between these two countries whenever tensions arise in their bilateral relations (*Ibid.*). Due to the fact that this historical adversity between Greece and Turkey constructs psychological and political barriers to the relations, Greek-Turkish relations have generally been called the *sui generis* as Gulden Ayman underlined in her article notably (Ayman, 2000: 285). As well as different and separate views on the main disputed issues in bilateral relations, also “there exists a difference of views as whether these controversies are ‘political’, and therefore to be resolved by ‘negotiation’ (Turkey), or ‘legal’, and therefore to be submitted to ‘adjudication’ (Greece)” (Kozyris, 2001: 102). Under these circumstances, obviously both parties have proposed its own tools rooted in its comparative advantages than the other in order to find any possible resolution to the bilateral disputes. Whereas Greece has used its membership status in the EU particularly since 1981, Turkey has generally emphasized its military power (Ker-Lindsay, 72).

With regard to the main disputed issues, it could be asked what the basic point has heavily influenced Greek-Turkish relations, or which one among the bilateral problems has shaped attitudes of these two ‘rival’ countries. In this context, some scholars have proposed that the Aegean dispute strictly related to the sovereignty rights could be seen as the most disturbing obstacle on the way towards improvement of the relations, whereas the others have pointed out the Cyprus issue as the major confrontation. For instance, Dimitris Tsarouhas highlighted the Cyprus issue as the major problem in Greek-Turkish relations due to the fact that it has seemed to gain complex characters particularly for the last years such as Cyprus’ membership to the EU and Turkey’s candidacy status (Interview with Tsarouhas, 2009). He clearly stated that the non-resolution of the Cyprus issue has hindered stronger cooperation and

collaboration between Athens and Ankara for the other bilateral problems (*Ibid.*). Together with these two issues, the existence and situation of Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece and Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey regulated notably by the Lausanne Peace Treaty could easily be attached to bilateral relations. Parallel to the promotion of protection of minority rights in recent years, the decline in number of these communities' populations and the infringement on their legal rights have been one of the disputed issues voiced specifically by the two sides in the light of Greek-Turkish relations.

As the reflection of these issues particularly on Greek foreign policy, Athens has regarded the Aegean case including only the dispute over delimitation of the continental shelf as the point of friction with Turkey while underlining decisive role of the Cyprus issue in Greek-Turkish relations (GMFA, 2010a). Meanwhile, the Greek state has mentioned problems of Greek minority living in Istanbul, Imbros (*Gökçeada*) and Tenedos (*Bozcaada*), and it has also concerned the status of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul as the other important issues with Turkey (*Ibid.*).

## **2.1. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS**

Throughout their own national history, Greece and Turkey had to struggle each other in order to gain their independences. Despite the fact that it had influenced the bilateral relations, following the 1920-1922 wars particularly the period of peace and cooperation was successfully seen in Greek-Turkish relations (Bahcheli, 2000: 132). First of all, the relations entered into a new phase by signing the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923. On the one hand, this treaty provided the foundation of modern Turkey on the other hand, it created a huge disappointment in contemporary Greek history especially with the decision on deportation of Greek people from Anatolia. With the introduction of the Treaty also the 'Lausanne balance', which would later be pointed out especially with regard to the issues on minorities and the Aegean case, was founded in bilateral relations. The Greek-Turkish relations witnessed a rapprochement process until the mid-1950s despite the problems about immigrants' properties emerged on surface in the first years following the Lausanne. During that period, for instance, the 'Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Mediation and Arbitration' was signed together with other commercial agreements (Hale, 2000: 59), and Eleftherios Venizelos and his Turkish

colleague Ismet Inonu visited Ankara and Athens in line with strengthening bilateral relations. This mutual visits were followed by the signing the Balkan Pact of 1934 in which Greece and Turkey, together with Yugoslavia and Romania, agreed on mutual assistance and settled outstanding issues. Parallel to these breakthrough initiatives in the relations, more importantly Venizelos nominated Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey (whereas Greeks had accused him of erasing the Greek presence on Minor Asia), for the Noble Peace Prize in 1934 (Hatipoğlu, 1997: 168).<sup>14</sup>

Like all countries, Greece and Turkey had been disaffected by the outbreak of the Second World War. However, the Turkish government succeeded to resist the Allies' pressures in favour of participating in the war while Greece was experiencing the Nazi occupation intensively. After the war, these two countries were shaped simultaneously in the light of close cooperation with the 'West' against the 'common threat'. Thus, Greece and Turkey were taken into consideration on the basis of equality, and they were regarded as essential partners for the protection of western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (Hale, 115). Within this framework, the Truman Doctrine, an aid involving 400 million dollars (300 millions to Athens and 100 millions to Ankara), was introduced in 1947. The following year, Greece and Turkey became the countries receiving the Marshall Aid. After four years, the Greek and Turkish states became the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) together. These similarities also reflected on the application to the European Economic Community (EEC) which would be later the European Union. Turkey applied to the EEC on 31 July 1959 after only sixteen days of Greece's application.

By the 1950s, however, Cyprus had begun to damage Greek-Turkish rapprochement process, and emerged as the main issue disaffecting bilateral relations. Particularly, the Cyprus issue flared up in the light of decolonization process and the principle of self-determination triggered Greek wish on the island in favour of 'enosis' which meant the unification of Cyprus with Greece backing to the early nineteenth century (Ayman, 2007: 16). Having responded to the pressures of Greek-Cypriots and also its own public opinion in mainland, the Greek government had submitted the case to the United Nations (UN) in 1954 (Mavroyiannis, 1986), before Turkey became the

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<sup>14</sup> For Turkish translation of the letter which Venizelos proposed Kemal Ataturk to the Noble Prize, see Damla Demirözit (2005: 35-36)

one of parties to the issue especially through British invitation. In order to discuss the Cyprus issue, at the London Conference held in 1955, Britain proposed autonomy to the island whereas Greece insisted on the application of self-determination. On the other hand, Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rustu Zorlu, firstly depicted Turkey's attitude towards the issue by the words as 'if British sovereignty were to end, then the whole island should revert to Turkey' (Hale, 130). Under these contracting views, the Conference had to be concluded unsuccessfully in September of that year because of the shameful events broken out in Istanbul against Greek community which would be called the '6-7<sup>th</sup> September Events' in Greek-Turkish relations.

Then the shifting in British policy towards the admission of the existence of two separate communities on the island which could be applied self-determination reflected on Turkish side by supporting the 'partition' (*Taksim*) in late 1956 (Armaoğlu, 1993: 532). However, Greece was keeping its attitude in favour of 'enosis', and therefore the struggle on the island took the shape of the Greek-Turkish civil war as 'enosis' versus 'partition' (Hale, 132). Due to the fact that any tension in Greek-Turkish relations could disaffect the southern part of western alliance, the confrontation between these two countries tried to be resolved by the intervention of third parties, in particular the United States. As the countries completely depended on western economic and military aids, Greece and Turkey had no chance to resist the American pressures in the Cold War context although the possible resolution would not satisfy both sides exactly (Firat, 2005: 607). Within this framework, the Cyprus issue was resolved by the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959. In accordance with these agreements, the Republic of Cyprus gained its independence in August 1960. Accordingly, this independence did not only serve the Greek-Cypriots but it also provided important guarantees for Turkish-Cypriots in direction of having important privileges which have never recognized any minority communities before (Firat, 1997: 57).

Nevertheless, this new republic faced new problems in relation to the issues involving the ratio of participation into public service, tax-collection, the establishment of Armed Forces and the municipalities the following years (*Ibid.*).<sup>15</sup> Obviously, these

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<sup>15</sup> In order to solve these issues, the Cypriot President Makarios announced the 'thirteen points' on 30 November 1963 in line with a need for changing the 1960 Constitution. However, these points could abolish the balance on the island founded by the 1960 settlement, and it could put Turkish-Cypriots in a



were proofs of the difficulties for living together of these two separate communities in Cyprus. Thus, the crises broke out on the island in 1964 and 1967 and these events exaggerated the Cyprus issue intensively. Since December 1963 the Turkish community on the island had not taken a part in the administration of the Republic of Cyprus, and ‘they formed their own enclaves, to which the majority of the Turkish-Cypriots moved’ (Teophaneous, 2003: 45). On the other hand, Greek-Cypriots, who had seized the power completely on the island between 1964 and 1974, generally talked about the Turkish community as rebels, and therefore they tried to find a way to revise the 1960 Constitution (Kızılyürek, 2008: 36). Parallel to these developments on the island, by the 1960s the international system had entered into *détente* period. However, this new atmosphere did not only affect the relations between the superpowers but also influenced the crises specifically broken out within the blocs (Fırat, 2005: 716). This structure initially resulted in emergence of Greek-Turkish dispute in the western alliance. Within this framework, the Cyprus issue came alive again and became the main problem in the relations between the Greek and the Turkish states. This dispute over the island eventually concluded with the Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974.

Instead of the Cyprus issue, the Aegean dispute replaced the core of Greek-Turkish relations in the second half of the 1970s. As the reflection of issues proposed by Greece and Turkey over sovereignty claims in the Aegean Sea, this dispute had initially brought about the interrogation of delimitation of the continental shelf. Controversy to the Greek policy aiming at keeping status quo in the Aegean Sea, since the 1970s the Turkish state had started its intense efforts for changing the rule over the Aegean (*Ibid.*, 750). Accordingly, Turkey had tried to force Athens to sit the negotiation table for discussing the Aegean issue through creating crises in the Aegean Sea (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, Ankara permitted two research vessels called ‘*Çandarlı*’ and ‘*Hora*’ for exploiting the seabed in the disputed waters in 1974 and 1976. Particularly the last one could create an armed conflict between the two countries.<sup>16</sup> “On the Turkish side, the conflict assumed importance not for economic reasons (the oil resources of the Aegean are thought to be very limited) but out of the fear that claims to seabed resources might

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community only having some minority rights instead of calling the one of the founders of the Republic of Cyprus (Fırat, 2005: 723).

<sup>16</sup> For more information on these events occurred in the second half of the 1970s, see Birand (1979).

some day be converted into claims to sovereignty over the adjacent sea and airspace” (Hale, 160). However, Greece submitted the case to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in August 1976 as a response to this Turkish ‘revisionist’ act. Both institutions only recommended the parties to bring the issue to the bilateral negotiations in accordance with the principles of ICJ. In this context, the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey signed the Bern Declaration in November 1976.<sup>17</sup> Despite the fact that this declaration created an important step for the crisis, then the Cyprus issue and the problems related to national airspaces would exaggerate bilateral relations again (Firat, 757). In March 1978, however, Constantine Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, met his Turkish counterpart Bulent Ecevit, the architect of the Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus, in Montreaux and agreed on beginning bilateral negotiations with Turkey the following month (*Ibid.*). Due to intense opposition voiced by Andreas Papandreou’s Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Greek parliament, Karamanlis had to cancel this arrangement later. On the other hand, Ecevit reacted this new Greek policy by hardening his attitude towards Athens and called Greece the main threat for Turkey instead of searching for cooperation between the parties (*Ibid.*).

In 1980 when the Turkish Armed Forces gained the control of the country, the military regime initially removed Turkish veto on Greece’s readmission to the military structure of NATO. However, this Turkish act did not provide normalization in the relations with Athens. On the Greek side, the PASOK seized the government after the elections in 1981, and new Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou formed his foreign policy generally on the basis of anti-Turkish feelings. During the election campaign Papandreou had promised his supporters to suspend the relations with the EC, to withdraw his country from NATO completely and to close the American bases in Greek soils (Firat, 2008: 104). However, he was not keeping these promises at his prime ministry continuing to the end of 1989. Instead, Papandreou has always pointed out the ‘Turkish threat coming from the East’ as the main reason why his government did not realize these policies (*Ibid.*). This ‘Turkish threat’ specifically came alive again in Greek society in March 1987 when the Turkish government prepared to send the

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<sup>17</sup> See Appendix-1

research ship entitled '*Sismik I*' to the disputed waters of the Aegean. Sparking off almost an armed conflict between the Greek and Turkish states, this crisis was then defused by the Turkish government's announcement that the ship would not sail into the disputed waters (Hale, 168). After the crisis, Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal met in Davos in January 1988 and they agreed on avoiding mutual antagonism such as the 1987 crisis. However, this arrangement called the 'Davos process' was not able to resolve any disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations and "by the end of the 1980s, Greek-Turkish relations had returned to their depressingly familiar situation of mutually suspicious stand-off" (*Ibid.*).

Throughout the 1990s, Greek-Turkish relations had been undermined by other crises. Particularly Ankara had accused the Greek side of 'acting against Turkey in virtually every area vital to its interests: Cyprus, the Aegean, European Union relations, and Kurdish separatism' (Bahcheli, 131). However, the first crisis broke out in the Aegean Sea. As a result of interrogation of sovereignty over Imia (*Kardak*), the uninhabited islets close to Turkish coast, Greece and Turkey almost went to a war. Together with this crisis, the acceptance of Republic of Cyprus as the legal representative of the whole island to the candidacy for EU membership and the possible installation of the S-300 missiles on Cyprus were the developments disaffecting Greek-Turkish relations (*Ibid.*). However, the capture of Ocalan, the leader of the PKK terrorist organisation, in the Greek embassy in Kenya called the 'Ocalan Affair' in bilateral relations contributed the negative atmosphere between Greece and Turkey. For instance, Suleyman Demirel, the Turkish President in that time, showed Turkey's anger by 'urging that Greece be designated a "rogue state" and warned that Turkey would use its right of self-defence if Athens continued to support Kurdish insurgents' (*Ibid.*, 131). To the end of the 1990s, however, the natural disasters in Turkey and later Greece paved a new way for the parties. As an unexpected result of earthquakes in 1999 which was getting Greek and Turkish societies closer, notably the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, initiated a constructive dialogue in bilateral relations (Nicolaidis, 2001: 252). In this context entitled the 'earthquake diplomacy' in Greek-Turkish relations, the bilateral agreements were signed and these led to a new area for close cooperation between Athens and Ankara (*Ibid.*). More

importantly this breakthrough period resulted in the recognition of Turkey's candidacy status for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999.

This rapprochement process in Greek-Turkish relations was also pursued by the New Democracy (ND)'s government headed by Costas Karamanlis which had seized the power in March 2004. Despite this positive atmosphere, both sides have not taken any steps towards the resolution of the main disputed issues between Greece and Turkey. The parties insistently kept their well-known positions towards the issues. In post-Helsinki period, however, these issues have become the obstacles that Turkey has to deal with in order to be a member of EU. Thus, Athens has become a remarkable factor in determining Turkey's EU membership process in accordance with uploading its national interests to the Union level.

## **2.2. MAIN DISPUTED ISSUES IN GREEK FOREIGN POLICY WITH TURKEY**

### **2.2.1. The Cyprus Issue**

For Greece, the Cyprus issue had began to emerge on surface in post-war years. Particularly, Greek public opinion had been interested in the case intensively since 1947.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the Greek community on the island had wanted to be a part of Greece, and as the supporters of Cypriot-Hellenism, they regarded Turkish population on the island as minority community who had no right to hinder the wish of Greek majority in favour of enosis (Kızılyürek, 32). After Turkish side had become the part of the issue by the mid-1950s, however, the Cyprus question was entitled the one of disputes in Greek foreign policy with Turkey. Despite the resolution of the crises on the island by signing three agreements such as the Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Guarantee in 1960 between Greece, Turkey and Britain, the Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus in 1974 rooted in the Treaty of Guarantee has changed the shape of the issue historically. For instance, Glafcos Clerides, the former President of Republic of Cyprus, later always pointed out that this 'invasion' has created all problems on the island (Clerides, 1999). Concerning this Turkish unilateral act as violence to the international law, Clerides has called 'the continued occupation of 37%

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<sup>18</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu linked this increasing Greek interest on the Cyprus issue to the integration of Dodecanese (*Oniki Ada*) with Greece in 1947 (Armaoğlu, 529). Since then, the main aim of Greek foreign policy had been the resolution of the Cyprus issue in direction 'enosis', and therefore Greece had begun to realize this policy through bilateral negotiations with the British government.

of the Mediterranean isle' the main fact which causes 180.000 Cypriots have to leave their homes and properties (*Ibid.*, 16). On the other hand, as the one of other guarantors of the island, Greece has enlisted four parameters influencing the Cyprus issue since 1974 which are the 'invasion' and 'occupation', humanitarian parameter, systematic destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage and settlement of the 'occupied' territory (GMFA, 2010b).

### **2.2.1.1. Turkish 'Invasion' and 'Occupation'**


Due to the fact that Makarios, the President of Republic of Cyprus, had been overthrown by Nicos Sampson backed by the Greek military junta, Turkey intervened to the island in accordance with Treaty of Guarantee in July 1974. Acting under Article 4 of the Treaty, the Turkish government started its 'peace operation' which resulted in controlling approximately 8% of the island's territory. This Turkish unilateral act was initially welcomed in international arena because of internationally unpopular reputation of the Greek junta. Even, this intervention created sympathy and "by aborting Enosis, the Turks appeared to preserve the island's independence" (Bahcheli, 1990: 98). Furthermore, it provided the collapse of the junta and instead restoration of democracy in Greece. Within this framework, Constantine Karamanlis was called to his country to lead nascent Greek democratization process.

On the other hand, the western alliance was scaring any armed conflict between Greece and Turkey broken out in the NATO's southeastern part. Thus, the ceasefire was provided immediately by the intervention of third parties, and both sides were convinced to meet in the conference held in Geneva. Following the first Geneva Conference which had concluded with an agreement on the continuation of ceasefire on the island, the second Conference commenced in 9<sup>th</sup> August with the participation of leaders of Greek and Turkish communities on the island, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş, together with the Greek, Turkish and British delegations.<sup>19</sup> However, this conference ended unsuccessfully in 14<sup>th</sup> August due to the separate views and arguments voiced during the negotiations. "When the Turkish foreign minister, Turan Güneş, put the bizonal and cantonal plans to him on August 13, Clerides asked for a 48-hour recess to consider the proposals" (Hale, 158). The following day Turkey started its

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<sup>19</sup> For details of these negotiations, see Birand (1985)

second advance through the island which resulted in separation of the northern part of the island through a line from Kokkina (*Erenköy*) to Famagusta (*Mağusa*) (*Ibid.*). In other words, the Turkish forces gained the control of 37% of the island. (See Map 2.1.) Controversy to the first one, however, this act created intense reactions against Turkey in international arena. Within this framework, Turkish intervention took the shape of ‘invasion’, and its existence in the northern part of the island became the ‘occupation’ in Cyprus.



Map 2.1. The Map of Cyprus after 1974

In post-1974 period, first of all the Turkish community on the island sought to establish interim administration and autonomous government in their part in accordance with the right of self-determination. Thus, ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ was declared in 1975. However, the UN condemned this unilateral act, and only recognized the Greek Cypriot administration under the name of ‘Republic of Cyprus’. Along with these developments, on the other hand, the intercommunal talks between the two parties

of the island started in Vienna in April 1975 under the auspices of UN (*Ibid.*). As a result of these meetings, firstly in 1977 Denktas and Makarios agreed on seeking to form a new republic on the basis of a bicomunal federal state instead of Republic of the 1960 Constitution (Dodd, 2005: 41). This breakthrough step was later followed by another agreement between Denktas and Spyros Kyprianou<sup>20</sup> in May 1979 which 'yielded a ten-point agreement on procedures for pursuing intercommunal talks on the basis of the 1977 guidelines' (Bahcheli, 114). However, these arrangements deadlocked due to the problem particularly emerged out of the handling of Varosha (*Maraş*). As highly developed and populated area located in northern of the separation line, this district was very sensitive issue to Greek-Cypriots, and therefore they wanted this issue to be settled initially before the negotiations of all disputed issues between the parties. However, Turkish side rejected this proposal strictly.

At the first half of the 1980s, new developments had intensified the Cyprus issue in favour of settlement. During the intercommunal talks resumed in 1980, on the one hand, Turkish-Cypriots proposed the federation having weak powers heavily depended on bicomunal and bizonal federated states in the light of existing two administrations on the island (Firat, 2008: 106). On the other hand, Greek-Cypriots supported bicomunal federation which the central government would have strong power to intervene these two federated states administrated by Greek and Turkish-Cypriots separately (*Ibid.*). Within these different arguments, Kyprianou decided to shift the Cyprus issue from intercommunal talks to the international arena (*Ibid.*). In turn, Turkish-Cypriot community proclaimed 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) in November 1983. However, this unilateral independence declaration brought about the rejection of Greek-Cypriots to participate into the talks with this 'so-called state' placed illegally in the northern part of the island. Moreover, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 541 which 'called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the republic of Cyprus.'<sup>21</sup>

Despite a series of efforts for the resolution to the Cyprus issue such as the 'proximity talks' and the 'Set of Ideas' in the 1990s, the presence of Turkish forces in

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<sup>20</sup> Makarios died on 3 August 1977, and instead Kyprianou represented the Greek Administration.

<sup>21</sup> For the decision, see; <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/453/99/IMG/NR045399.pdf?OpenElement> (03.02.2010)

the northern part of the island has been the main complaint in relation to the dispute the following years. Together with this illegal Turkish existence in Cyprus since 1974, its ‘occupied regime’ in the northern part has been regarded as the main obstacle in front of any settlement on the island by Greece. Athens has voiced these claims as follows;

Thirty-five years after the Turkish invasion, and despite a series of UN resolutions, Turkey continues to refuse to withdraw its occupation troops from Cyprus. Currently, 43,000 Turkish troops are illegally stationed in the northern section of Cyprus, which the UN Secretary General has called one of the most militarized areas in the world.

The international community has repeatedly expressed its views on the Cyprus problem, condemning the invasion and demanding the withdrawal of the occupation forces in a long series of resolutions adopted in international fora such as the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of Commonwealth states (GMFA, 2010b).

#### **2.2.1.2. Humanitarian Parameter**

The Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974 also created important problems in relation to the situation of two communities on the island. As a result of Turkish ‘invasion’, approximately 150.000 Greek-Cypriots had to flee to the southern part of the island in turn almost 40.000 Turkish-Cypriots moved to the northern Cyprus (Dodd, 41). According to the Greek claim, ‘the invasion and occupation forced more than 165.000 Greek-Cypriots out of their home – that is, 25% of the island’s population in 1974 became refugees’ (GMFA, 2010b). Accordingly, this mutual deportation on the island has brought about confrontations between Greek-Cypriots and notably Turkey, not the Turkish community on the island. Concerning the situation of Greek-Cypriot refugees and missing persons, particularly Greece has pointed out Turkey’s responsibility of these events which has also been confirmed in a series of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (Ibid.).

With regard to the humanitarian issues on the island, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has accused Turkey of being responsible for several cases. Initially the Court concluded the Loizidou case in November 2003. As a Greek-Cypriot citizen, Titina Loizidou applied to the ECHR in 1989 against Turkey due to the claim that she had been forced out of her home during Turkey’s ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974. After legal process, the Court recognized Turkey’s liability and decided that the Turkish government paid compensation to Mrs. Loizidou because of blocking her to go home



placed in Kyrenia (*Girne*), the northern part of the island.<sup>22</sup> Following this case, it has seen other Greek-Cypriots' application to the ECHR and their conclusions which found Turkey as responsible for the individual cases. For instance, in December 2006, 'the Court ruled that Turkey was to pay Mrs. Xenides-Arestis 800.000 Euros in pecuniary damage for denying her use and enjoyment of her properties in occupied Famagusta' (*Ibid.*).

Together with these issues particularly related to the properties of Greek-Cypriot community, the persons who disappeared during the Turkish 'invasion' has constructed another pillar of humanitarian parameter in relation to the Cyprus issue for Greece. Athens has accused Turkey of investigating ineffectively the fate of these missing persons (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, Greece has pointed out the judgments of ECHR again. In January 2008, for instance, the Court condemned Turkey 'with its judgment on nine applications of relatives of Greek Cypriot missing persons (case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey)' (*Ibid.*). With this decision, the Court also emphasized Turkey's violation of Article 2, 3 and 5 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights (*Ibid.*).

### **2.2.1.3. Settlement of the 'Occupied Territory'**

The demographic change on the island in post-1974 period has been referred to the one of important problems by Greece and also the Greek-Cypriots administration. Accordingly, Athens and Nicosia have deeply insisted that the illegal Turkish settlement in the northern part of Cyprus is systematically continued by Turkish authorities in favour of supporting its 'occupation' regime on the island (*Ibid.*). Throughout his presidency, for instance, Clerides had accused Turkey of trying to change demographic structure particularly of northern Cyprus by providing new settlers from Anatolia (Clerides, 16). On the other hand, Turkish side always pointed out this immigration to meet the labour shortage in the northern part of islands. However, 'these Anatolian immigrants have been settled in northern Cyprus in villages previously inhabited by Greek-Cypriots' (Bahcheli, 111). Thus, these Anatolian immigrants have aggravated the Cyprus question especially for the Greek side.

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<sup>22</sup> For details of this case, see BBC (2003)

With regard to the number of native Turkish-Cypriots on the island, for example, Andreas Teophaneous, the Greek-Cypriot scholar, calculated the population of northern Cyprus between 180.000 and 200.000 while almost 60.000-80.000 of this population were Turkish-Cypriots not came to the island in post-1974 period (Teophaneous, 49). According to Greek official text, 80.000 native Turkish-Cypriots have been living in the northern part of island despite the fact that approximately 120.000 native Turkish-Cypriots habited there in 1974 (GMFA, 2010b). In order to explain this huge gap in population, it has concerned the existence of problems between native Turkish-Cypriots and Anatolian immigrants in northern Cyprus (Bahcheli, 112). Moreover, Athens has claimed that the native Turkish-Cypriots have to migrate from the island due to unfavourable conditions in the 'occupied territory' (GMFA, 2010b).

As another important issue referred by Greece with regard to the Cyprus issue, Greece and Nicosia claim that since 1974 Turkish authorities have destroyed all things related to Cypriot history and civilization in direction of 'transforming occupied Cyprus into just another Turkish province, through a systematic process of Turkification' (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, the Greek side has concerned the situation of structures placed in the northern part of island in post-1974 period under the headline of systematic destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage in the 'occupied territory' as follows;

In all, of the 275 churches in occupied Cyprus, 75 have been converted into mosques, 141 have been desecrated, 13 have been converted into storage spaces or livestock pens, 3 into icon museums, and 4 – for propaganda purposes – into cultural centres, whilst a further 20 are used by the occupying regime as military depots, barracks, restaurants and military hospitals (*Ibid.*).

### **2.2.2. Aegean Dispute**

Owing to the complex structure, the Aegean dispute includes the claims of sovereignty rights of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Whereas Athens has only regarded the delimitation of the continental shelf as the main issue related to the dispute, the Turkish state has proposed disputed territorial claims including over the limitation of territorial waters, the jurisdiction of airspace, militarization of Greek islands close to the Anatolian coasts together with the delimitation of continental shelf (Ayman, 19). By the 1990s particularly the 'Grey Zones' has also been added into the Aegean dispute by Turkey in relation to the Imia/Kardak crisis broken out in the Aegean Sea which could almost an armed conflict between the parties. Without the continental shelf, however,

all these Turkish proposals with regard to the Aegean dispute have been entitled the issues to undermine Greece's absolute sovereignty in the Aegean by Athens. For years Greece has regarded these Turkish 'allegations' as visible threats to its national sovereignty and legal rights while underlining that Turkey's these objections endanger the stability and order in the region (Kassimeris, 2008b: 166-167).

In addition, Greece has faced difficulties in using its sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea due to the geographical and technical problems such as the existence of many islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, 'where the distance between Greece and Turkey is sometimes as little as one nautical mile' (Strati, 2000: 90). On the other hand, the emergence of the International Law of the Sea has contributed the extension of the dispute intensively. Accordingly, as one of the signatories of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Athens has been enthusiastic supporter of legal framework for the resolution of the Aegean case in contrast to Turkey, who has not been yet a part of the Convention, because of its reservations on some points of the agreement. Instead, Turkish side has generally sought to resolve the Aegean dispute by bilateral negotiations with Athens.

#### **2.2.2.1. Continental Shelf**

Due to the fact that it had brought about almost armed conflicts between Greece and Turkey in 1976 and 1987, the delimitation of continental shelf has been initial sensitive issue related to the Aegean dispute since 1973, when the Turkish government permitted its ships to exploit the seabed in disputed waters (GMFA, 2010c). According to the UNCLOS, the continental shelf is 'the natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance' (UNCLOS, Article 76). Moreover, with regard to the sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Convention states that the coastal state has absolute competences to use its rights independently (*Ibid.*, Article 77). In international law, however, the delimitation of the continental shelf has been the biggest challenge to the coastal states due to the separate views proposed particularly by these states during the negotiations to decide where the median line should be depicted between the parties (Pazarcı, 2005: 80).


Within this context, the dispute over delimitation of the continental shelf between the Greek and Turkish states has rooted in that point, where the median line should be drawn in Aegean Sea. On the one hand, Greece has claimed that the median line should be drawn between its Eastern Aegean islands and the Turkish coasts (Bahcheli, 132). As one of the signatories of the UNCLOS, Athens has repeatedly pointed out Article 121 of the Convention underlining that the islands are able to have own continental shelf as well as territorial waters and exclusive economic zone as a reason behind this attitude. Moreover, the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1969 International Court decision on the delimitation of the North Sea Continental Shelf have been proposed as the international jurisprudences by Athens that ‘clearly stipulate that islands are fully entitled to a continental shelf of their own, despite Turkey’s unsubstantiated claims to the contrary’ (GMFA, 2010c).

On the other hand, Turkey has advocated that the median line should be drawn through the Aegean archipelago instead of between the islands and its coasts (Bahcheli, 132). According to the Turkish thesis, the islands should not have their own continental shelf because they are natural prolongation of the Anatolian land (Gürel, 1993: 72). However, Athens has assumed that this Turkish formula as an aim ‘to acquire continental shelf rights to the west of the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean, which would basically ensnare them in an area under Turkish jurisdiction’ (GMFA, 2010c). Thus, Athens has supported the legal resolution of the dispute notably in accordance with international law including contractual and customary law (*Ibid.*).

#### **2.2.2.2. Territorial Waters**

In international law of the Sea, the territorial waters (or territorial seas) describe a maritime area extending at most 12 nautical miles (nm.) from the baseline of a coastal state. The main problem has emerged on surface for the coastal states with regard to determination of the outer limit of their territorial waters. Like the dispute over delimitation of the continental shelf, this problem has reflected on Greek-Turkish relations as another important challenge related to the Aegean dispute, which is called the limitation of boundaries of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. About the issue, Athens has regarded itself as a country to have legal right rooted in the UNCLOS to extend its territorial waters to 12 nm. in the Aegean Sea (GMFA, 2010d), whereas

Turkey has argued that this Greek application could threaten its national interests. For instance, Aslan Gündüz, the Turkish scholar, stated that ‘Turkey would lose rights to overflight, fishing, navigation, military manoeuvres, scientific researches, and cable lying’ (Gündüz,2001: 90). (See Figure 2.1. & Map 2.2.)



Map 2.2. Territorial Waters in Aegean Sea According to 6nm. and 12 nm.

It has generally admitted that the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 constructed status quo with regard to the limitation of territorial waters in the Aegean by calling the 3 nm. the outer limit of boundaries of both sides’ territorial waters (Kut, 2004: 509). However, Greece later declared the extension of its territorial waters to 6 nm. in 1936. Despite the non-emergence of any Turkish reaction to this Greek unilateral act, for instance, Gündüz concerned that it had shaken the status quo founded by the Lausanne (Gündüz, 89). Also, another Turkish scholar Melek Fırat insistently criticized Turkish side why it had not argued this Greece’s decision which would then disaffect Turkey’s position particularly in post-war years against Greece in the Aegean Sea (Fırat, 2005: 356). Turkey only reminded its territorial waters in 1964 by extending to 6

nm. in the Aegean Sea whereas to 12 nm. in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Since then, Athens has always interrogated this Turkey's dilemma in the application of 12 nm. in its territorial waters. Accordingly, the Greek state has argued why Turkey is against 12 nm. in the Aegean Sea although it has territorial waters extending to 12 nm. in Mediterranean and Black Sea (GMFA, 2010d).




Figure 2.1. The delimitation of the territorial sea in the Aegean according to 6 nm. and 12 nm. (Gürel, 75)

In this context, more importantly Turkey has called the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nm. a *casus belli* since 1995. After the Greek ratification of the UNCLOS on May 1995, the Turkish National Assembly gave the right to the government 'to use all means, including military force, against Greece in such an event' (Strati, 92). Concerning this fact as an obstacle particularly in front of any resolution to the case, Greece has also accused Turkey of infringement upon the Article 2/4 of the UN Charter calling upon all states to refrain themselves from the threat or use of force in their international relations (GMFA, 2010d). Parallel to this claim, Greece has also repeatedly stated its legal rights in direction of extending territorial waters to 12 nm. as follows;

According to international law, both customary and contractual, Greece has the right to extend her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. During ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, our country stated that when and where she shall exercise these rights without this in any way implying that Greece renounces these rights shall depend on national strategy. Article 2 of Law 2321/1995, ratifying the Convention of the Law of the Sea, also provides for Greece to have the inalienable right, by way of application of Article 3 of the ratified Convention, to extend her territorial waters to up to 12 nautical miles at any point in time (*Ibid.*).

### **2.2.2.3. Military Status of Aegean Islands**

Since the 1960s, Greece's militarization of Aegean islands has become one of the issues particularly voiced by Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute. According to Turkish claim, it has seen Greek intense efforts for changing the demilitarized status of these islands regulated by international agreements (Gürel, 69). More importantly, these efforts have intensified after the Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus in 1974. On the other hand, Athens has always claimed that it has legal rights rooted in international treaties for militarising these islands, while underlining that 'the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean do not have uniform military status' (GMFA, 2010e). Applying to the status of the Aegean islands separately, three international agreements are still in force as followed according to Greece;

- For the islands of Limnos and Samothrace, the 1923 Lausanne Treaty on the Straits, replaced by the 1936 Montreux Treaty.
- For the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.
- For the Dodecanese islands, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. (*Ibid.*).

For the first group of islands including Limnos (*Limni*) and Samothrace (*Semandirek*), the Article 4 of the Lausanne Treaty on the Straits had provided demilitarized status of these islands together with the Turkish islands of Imbros (*Gökçeada*) and Tenedos (*Bozcaada*), located in the entrance of the Straits. By the Montreaux Convention of 1936 which re-regulated the status of the Turkish Straits and the islands of Tenedos and Imbros in favour of militarization, Greece has claimed that it gains right to militarize the islands of Limnos and Samothrace due to the Convention replaced the Lausanne Treaty on the Straits completely (Heraclides, 2002: 215). In addition, Athens has pointed out two developments emerged out of following the Convention that recognized its rights to militarize the islands of Limnos and Samothrace. Accordingly, Greece has regarded the letter sent to the Greek Prime

Minister on 6 May 1936 by the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, which underlined the recognition of Greece's right to militarize Limnos and Samothrace, as the first important sign in direction of new regulation on these islands (GMFA, 2010d). Then, the speech of Turkish Foreign Minister, Rustu Aras, at the Turkish National Assembly on the occasion of the ratification of the Montreaux Convention in 1936, has been addressed by Athens to recognize its right to deploy troops on the islands of Limnos and Samothrace (*Ibid.*).

With regard to the second group of islands including Mytilene (*Midilli*), Chios (*Sakız*), Samos (*Sisam*) and Icaria (*Nikarya*), both sides have initially addressed the Article 13 of Lausanne Peace Treaty. However, Greece has denied the existence of any mention in the Treaty to the demilitarized status of the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Icaria in turn the Turkish claim that the Treaty envisages the demilitarized status of these islands (GMFA, 2010e). Instead, Athens has repeatedly claimed that in accordance with Article 13 of the Treaty it commits not to establish naval bases or fortifications on these islands whereas Turkish military aircrafts have violated this article by flying over the islands (*Ibid.*). On the other hand, it is known that Athens has militarized notably these islands close to the Turkish coasts since the 1960s by pointing out Article 51 of the UN Charter emphasizing the principle of self-defence (Kut, 512). In order to support this policy, Greece has particularly stressed the real Turkish threat as seen in the 'invasion' of Cyprus, repeatedly violations of Greek airspace and intensively improvement of Turkish military existence just across on the coast of Aegean (GMFA, 2010e).

For the last group of Aegean islands generally entitled Dodecanese (*Oniki Ada*), Greece has approved the demilitarized status of these islands. However, Turkey has insisted that Athens violates the Paris Treaty, which had ceded Dodecanese under Greek sovereignty in 1947. As a response to this Turkish claim, Greece has mentioned this Turkey's complaint over violation of the Treaty not depended on legal basis due to the fact that Turkish side was not a part of the Paris Treaty in that time. Within this framework, Greece underlines that these Turkish claims over these islands are called *res inter alios acta* which mean that the issues are only relating to the parties according to the international law (Heraclides, 217).





Map 2.3. The Aegean islands

#### 2.2.2.4. National Airspace and F.I.R. Responsibility

Another case between Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute is the delimitation of national airspace. According to the 1944 Chicago Convention in Civil Aviation, the national airspace is an area on the top of the state's territorial land and territorial sea (Pazarcı, 293). Obviously this case in Greek-Turkish relations depends on two issues which are Athens's claim of 10 nm. national airspace and its F.I.R. (Flight Information Region) responsibility (Aydn, 1997: 118-119). As an only country having 10 nm. national airspace whereas 6 nm. territorial waters, Greece has applied the extension of its national airspace to 10 nm. since 1931. (See Figure 2.2.) This dilemma had not been challenged by Turkey until the mid-1970s. However, since then, Turkish side has begun to interrogate the Greek application above the Aegean and 'challenged Greece's exercise of ten-mile wide airspace by periodically sending its aircrafts up to six-miles from the coast of the Greek Aegean islands' (Bahcheli, 144). In turn, Athens has accused Turkey of violating its national airspace by these flights over its islands. Together with these repeatedly claims, in order to advocate its 10 nm. national airspace, Greece has pointed out the regional meetings of 1958 in which Turkey also participated and admitted the 10 nm. set for Greek national airspace (GMFA, 2010d).




Figure 2.2. The Greek Claim of 10 nm. National Airspace (Gürel, 77)

International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has divided airspaces into many responsibility regions entitled the F.I.R. for providing air-traffic services to the airplanes (Pazarıcı, 297). This Organization determined the F.I.R. over the Aegean in 1952, which ‘puts much of the Aegean beyond Turkish national airspace under Greek responsibility’ (Aydın, 119). Although Turkey did not initially argue for this arrangement in that time, since 1974 it has seen Turkey’s intense efforts to change this rule in direction of determining a new F.I.R. that would be drawn in the middle of the Aegean (Heraclides, 219). As a reason behind this attitude, Turkey has claimed that Greece abuses its F.I.R. responsibility in favour of monitoring Turkish aircrafts’ movements over the Aegean (Aydın, 119).

#### **2.2.2.5. Grey Zones**

When the Turkish vessel called ‘*Akat*’ grounded on the Imia islets in December 1995, the crisis broke out in line with questioning of sovereignty over the areas which have not been mentioned in any international agreements (see Map 2.4.). Within this framework, the questioning of sovereignty over such islands, islets and rocks lying in Aegean Sea entitled the ‘Grey Zones’ has raised another important case particularly voiced by Turkey with regard to the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey the following years.<sup>23</sup> However, Greece has insistently interpreted this Turkish thesis as not only a claim over the islets such as the Imia, but also a challenge the Greek legal sovereignty all over Aegean Sea (Raftopoulos, 2000: 141). Thus, Athens has pointed out two international treaties, the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and 1947 Paris Treaty, which settled the issue of sovereignty over the islands in Aegean Sea (GMFA, 2010i). According to Greece, the Article 12 of the Lausanne provided Greek sovereignty clearly over the Eastern Aegean islands except Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit islands (*Tavşan Adaları*).<sup>24</sup> Also, the Greek state has stated that Turkish side renounced all rights over

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<sup>23</sup> Melek Firat emphasized that Turkey’s thesis entitled the ‘Grey Zones’ actually has rooted in Greece’s intense efforts for encouraging habitation on the islets in Aegean Sea. Since the Article 121 of the UNCLOS granted only the islets having population would have continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, she claimed that the Greek government has supported this policy actively (Firat, 2002: 58).

<sup>24</sup> The Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty; The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-14th November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene,

the islands namely mentioned in the text in favour of Italy in accordance with the Article 15 of the Treaty.<sup>25</sup> Then, Athens has underlined that the islands and their adjacent islets, which had been ceded Italy in the Lausanne, were given to Greece in full sovereignty according to the Article 14 of the Paris Treaty in 1947 (Ibid.).<sup>26</sup>

Following the Imia crisis softened by the U.S. efforts, the second crisis immediately emerged out of Gavdos, an island lying in the southwest of Crete, in the light of ‘Grey Zones’ (see Map 2.5). During the planning of NATO exercise area, Turkey argued that Gavdos should not be added into the exercise area due to its disputed status of sovereignty between Greece and Turkey (Kut, 515). Interpreting this Turkish ‘allegation’ as another claim on Greek sovereignty in the Aegean, Greece responded strictly by reminding the Article 4 of the London Peace Treaty of 1913 which Turkish side ceded all sovereignty rights over Crete, and Gavdos in this respect, to the Greek sovereignty (GMFA, 2010i). Actually, Turkish scholar Melek Fırat emphasized that Turkey’s thesis entitled the ‘Grey Zones’ has rooted in Greece’s intense efforts for encouraging habitation on the islets in the Aegean Sea since the entrance of UNCLOS whose Article 121 granted only the islets having populations would have continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (Fırat, 2002: 58).

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Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15. Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.

<sup>25</sup> The Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty:

Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

<sup>26</sup> Article 14 of Paris Treaty:

1. Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter, namely Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos (Kos) and Castellorizo, a well as the adjacent islets.
2. These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.
3. The procedure and the technical conditions governing the transfer of these islands to Greece will be determined by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Greece and arrangements shall be made for the withdrawal of foreign troops not later than 90 days from the coming into force of the present Treaty.



Map 2.4. The Imia (*Kardak*) Islets



Map 2.5. The island of Gavdos

### 2.2.3. Minority Issue

Parallel to the international developments occurred especially in post-1990s, the issues with regard to the minority rights have extended and become one of important problems in international politics (Oran, 2001: 151). Despite this increasing popularity in recent years, it has not concluded yet any international agreements on exact definition of minority in international law. Thus, every state has generally driven specific regulations for describing the situation of their own minority communities through bilateral and multilateral treaties (Sur, 2006: 124). Within this framework, the Lausanne Peace Treaty is a kind of these agreements which has envisaged the minorities and their situations in Turkish territory particularly under the headline of ‘Protection of Minorities’ at its third section (*Ibid.*). According to the Treaty, ‘the issue of minority rights was exclusively associated with non-Muslim citizens, the Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews, who had been granted millet status in Turkish *ancien* regime’ (İçduygu & Soner, 2006: 453). Recognized the minority status by the Lausanne, the Greek minority together with the other non-Muslim communities gained individual rights which were clearly described in the Articles between 37 and 45 of the Treaty.<sup>27</sup>

As the older issue than the other problems between Greece and Turkey, the minority issue has included particularly the disputes over humanitarian norms such as education, property and religious rights of minority communities in both sides. Throughout years these individual issues have always related to Greek-Turkish relations. When the bilateral relations witnessed a rapprochement as well as seen during the period between 1930 and the mid-1950s, Greek and Turkish minorities had ever the best times in their history. On the other hand, they were victims in any tension in the relations such as the experience of 1955 and 1964. For Greek minority in Turkey, this fact was more visible than Turkish community in Greece.

During the negotiations of the Lausanne Treaty, the leaders of Greece and Turkey agreed on the exchange of populations between the parties. In order to form nation-states the following years, these two countries had initially signed the ‘Treaty Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population’ in 30 January 1923 before the Lausanne Conference concluded successfully. In accordance with the mutual

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<sup>27</sup> See Appendix II

deportation, more than a million Greek-Orthodox had to move from their homeland to Greece whereas approximately 400.000 Turkish-Muslims to Turkey (Fırat, 2005: 337). Thus, almost 120.000 Greeks remained in Istanbul together with Imbros (*Gökçeada*) and Tenedos (*Bozcaada*) in turn the existence of Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace numbering nearly the same population. This ratio was later called the ‘Lausanne balance’ in Greek-Turkish relations with regard to the minorities in both sides.

In post-Lausanne, the minority communities in Greece and Turkey were content with their status as the reflection of rapprochement in the relations despite some notable events disaffecting particularly Greek community in Turkey. In accordance with nationalization policy of new Turkish state in economic and cultural areas, Greek minority together with the other non-Muslim communities faced strict policies and restrictions applied by the Turkish government in direction of eliminating non-Muslims from these fields.<sup>28</sup> For instance, in 1926, the government issued the ‘Law on Public Employment’ which conditioned public employment with ‘being Turkish’ instead of ‘being Turkish citizen’ (İçduygu & Soner, 459). Then, the Turkish Civil Code was published in the same year, and it abolished the application of Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty in Turkish territory. At the Second World War, the non-Muslim communities suffered from the application of Property Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) admitted by the Turkish government in order to ameliorate Turkish economy during the World War.

Nevertheless, Greek minority in Turkey exclusively suffered from the incidents broken out at the night of 6-7<sup>th</sup> September 1955. As a reaction to rumours that Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki was bombed, this ‘anti-Greek riot’ particularly occurred in Istanbul and also in Izmir had been encouraged by the Turkish government in that time to show strong Turkish feelings over the Cyprus issue (Bahçeli, 172). According to the Turkish courts established for investigation of these events, 4214 businesses, 1004 houses, 73 churches and 26 schools belonging to the non-Muslim communities were damaged during these shameful incidents (Güven, 2005). After nine years, the Cyprus issue again triggered anti-Greek feelings in Turkey when the conflicts started on the island in 1964. In order to make pressures over Athens, the Turkish government annulled the residence permits of Greek citizens married to Greek minority in Turkey

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<sup>28</sup> For details on the policies particularly towards the non-Muslim communities applied by the Turkish governments between the 1920s and 1950s, see, Okutan, (2004)

by the decision on 16 March 1964, and immediately implied the decision by expelling these persons out of Turkey.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, in the same year, the government banned these expelled Greeks of selling their properties or buying new properties in Turkey.<sup>30</sup>

As a result of these events, the Lausanne balance on the ratio of minorities has changed in favour of declining in number of Greek community in Turkey.<sup>31</sup> According to the Greek state, “today, there are clearly fewer than 5.000 ethnic Greeks left in Turkey” (GMFA, 2010f). This Greek community, however, has four important problems today including foundations, education, the Patriarchate and the religious school in Halki (*Heybeliada*) (Macar, 2006: 84). At the first issue, Greek minority had voiced its problem intensively for years. Although the non-Muslims foundations had acquired real estate in Turkey, then this application was removed by the decision of the Supreme Court and the Council of State in the 1970s (*Ibid.*). Also, these decisions stated that the real estate of these foundations particularly gained from 1936 to that time have been returned to the original owner or transformed to the Treasury (*Ibid.*, 85). The second issue concerned by Greek community in Turkey is problems with regard to the education such as the appointment of Greek-origin teachers to the Greek community schools, schoolbooks, and the more authority of the Turkish deputy headmaster than the headmaster of these schools (*Ibid.*).<sup>32</sup> The third and fourth problems could be linked each other because of consisting religious features. Having generally emphasized with regard to the religious freedom of minority communities in Turkey, the status of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul and also the closure of the Theological Seminary of Halki constitute concerns for Greece in its relations with Turkey. Despite Turkey’s claim on searching for reciprocity in religious issues with the Turkish community in Western Thrace, Athens has intensively voiced its reviews about these issues in recent years. About the Theological Seminary located in Halki (*Heybeliada*),

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<sup>29</sup> The person, who had to leave from the country, had the right to take a bag only including personal objects weighting almost 20 kilograms and 200 Turkish liras equating almost 22 dollars in that period (Demir&Akar, 1999: 72). Herkül Millas claimed that approximately 15.000 Greeks left from Turkey in 1964 (Millas, 2003: 226).

<sup>30</sup> This prohibition was removed in 1989.

<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Turkish minority in Greece has faced important individual problems. For details, see Oran (1991).

<sup>32</sup> The deputy head of these schools is a Muslim representing the Ministry of Education and has more powers than the headmaster.



Greece has concerned the existence of problem in relation to the inability of training new religious priests in the Patriarchate since 1971 when the Turkish state closed down the Seminary in accordance with the law abolishing all private higher education (GMFA, 2010g).<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the dispute over the recognition of status of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul was more sensitive issue in the relations. Within this framework, Greece has listed the problems related to the Patriarchate as follows;

- The non-recognition of the Ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate
- The denial of a legal personality
- The inability to train new clergy
- The non-issuance of residence and work permits for foreign priests (non-Turkish citizens) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
- The handling of property and ownership rights of the Patriarchate and ethnic Greeks
- Management of Greek-Orthodox Cementeries
- Religious freedoms in Turkey and the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (*Ibid.*)

### **2.3. FACTORS AFFECTING GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD TURKEY**

While analysing Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, it should be noted some factors influencing the Greek policy-makers partially. Parallel to the existence of the main disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations, these factors have determined Greece's attitudes and policies particularly on these issues. Emerging out of its historical, political and cultural experience with the Turkish state, these factors could not be neglected by the policy-makers in Greece. Under these circumstances, these factors could be classified into the three subtitles including the image perception, the security perception and the realist assumption.

#### **2.3.1. Image Perception: the 'Other'**

Following the building of nation-states in Greece and Turkey, these two countries had initially driven their citizens in a way to be educated in the light of

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<sup>33</sup>The Theological Seminary of Halki (*Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu*) was founded in 1844 for providing new Orthodox priests.

strengthening national identities (Millas, 2004: 54). Within this framework, the historical image perception was playing a decisive role for uniting ‘us’ against the ‘other’ (*Ibid.*). For the role of ‘other’, Greece had a real candidate due to its historical experience with the Greek society, and therefore the Turkish state has emerged as the national ‘other’ in order to unite all Greeks. Under this circumstance, as Amikam Nacmahi stated, “harsh Greek sentiments toward Turkey are motivated by three historical traumas: the fall of Constantinople (1453), the loss of Asia Minor (1922), and the partition of Cyprus (1974)” (Nachmani, 2002: 95). On the other hand, the calling of these events have fed the Turkish national pride historically. Throughout years, the conquest of Istanbul (1453), the victory against Greece in the Turkish independence war (1922) and the peace intervention of Cyprus (1974) have been still alive in the Turkish society.

For portraying Turks as the ‘other’, first of all, ‘the fall of Constantinople’ had a huge impact upon the Greek society in their history. Accordingly, it symbolized the beginning of the *Tourkokratia* which referred to their slavery under the Turkish administration until the end of the nineteenth century. Despite Turkish claims that Greeks had more privileges than the other non-Muslim communities in the light of millet system, Greek scholars has opposed to this argument by showing the existence of some applications and symbols in public life that always reminded Greeks together with other non-Muslims as lower than the Muslims (Millas, 2003: 214). This trauma in Greek history ended with the emergence of Greek enlightenment in late 18<sup>th</sup> century when the Greek intellectuals had begun to be aware of the inheritors of a civilization respected by the modern world (Clogg, 1997: 41). Within this framework, they began to accuse the *Tourkokratia* of forcing Greeks to forget their glorious history. Controversy to Greeks who were the founders of democracy and modern civilization, Turks were portrayed as barbaric, aggressive and totalitarian (Agnantopoulos, 2005: 15). After the foundation of Greece in 1829, this attitude intensified and new Greek state embraced the Ancient Greek civilization by regarding themselves as the grandchildren of Ancient Greeks, the Hellenes (Clogg, 69).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Within this framework, new Greek state was founded under the name of ‘Hellas’ which means the land of the ‘Hellenes’, and Athens, where had remains of Parthenon and reminded glorious victories of Pericles, was chosen as the capital of the new state. (Clogg, 69)

For the Greek state, the outbreak of World War in 1914 created an opportunity to expand its territories to the areas where particularly Turks had been living together with Greeks. However, this Greek idea called the *Megali Idea*<sup>35</sup> ushered a way to the Catastrophe of Minor Asia in 1922. As a response to the Greek occupation of Izmir, the Turkish national movement emerged on surface, and after three years, this movement erased the two thousands years-old Greek presence in the Anatolian land (Nachmani, 94). This fact resulted in the second trauma in contemporary Greek history. In short term, the mutual deportation following the Greek-Turkish wars brought about economic and social problems particularly seen in Greece (Firat, 2005: 337).<sup>36</sup>

The Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974 contributed the installation of Turkey’s image perception completely as the latest trauma for the Greek state. Reminding the Catastrophe of Minor Asia for Greek society, the results of this ‘invasion’ with regard to the deportation of two communities on the island following the Turkish ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ created decisive impacts upon Greeks and Greek-Cypriots to portray Turkey as the main hostile (Heraclides, 38). For instance, Glafcos Clerides summarized this new situation as “we are getting two young generations, of Greek Cypriots and of Turkish Cypriots, growing up not as compatriots and neighbours but as potential enemies” (Clerides, 17). This image perception has also reflected on Greece well. For example, Theodoros Pangalos, the Greek Foreign Minister during the Ocalan crisis, had said once “We have nothing to do with Turkey. A man can’t discuss things with murders, rapists and thieves” (Nachmani, 97).

Under these circumstances, today the image perception has played a significant role particularly to identify Greece’s attitudes towards the Turkish state. As understood from Pangalos’ words above it has been used as an important instrument for interpreting bilateral relations particularly through some declarations in domestic politics.

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<sup>35</sup> The *Megali Idea* was firstly official spoken by Ioannes Kolettes at the Greek Parliament in 1844. While Kolettes emphasized the modern Greece was the littlest part of Helen world, he claimed that people living in Ioannia, Thessaly, Serez, Adrianopolis, Constantinople, Pontus, Crete and Samos had to right to live under *Hellas*. (Clogg, 65-66) In the light of this ‘big idea’, Greece expanded its territory toward the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1878 and Crete in 1909. Then, during the Balkan Wars, it gained the Aegean islands and Western Thrace.

<sup>36</sup> In social life, the exchange of population created confrontations within the Greek society. The Greeks living in the mainland called the immigrants of the Minor Asia ‘*giarতোব্ৰাফ্ৰিভমোই*’, due to the fact that they were using yoghurt in their meals. On the other hand, these immigrants in particular coming from the cosmopolitan big Ottoman cities such as Izmir and therefore they regarded the Greek habitants in Greece as provincial. (Clogg, 127)

Furthermore, according to Greeks today Turks are not only called the uncompromised, rough, tyrant and aggressive persons, but also they are good skilful diplomats as the dear children of the United States. In turn, the Turkish society generally has built the Greek image on the characteristics such as unreliable, nationalist and naughty child of the European Union (Heraclides, 47).<sup>37</sup>

### **2.3.2. Security Perception: the ‘Threat from the East’**

As mentioned in the main disputed issues between Greece and Turkey, the Turkish ‘occupation’ in Cyprus and its ‘revisionist’ policies in the Aegean Sea caused the emergence of the Turkish threat in Greek security agenda. Accordingly, this threat perception has taken an important place in Greek politics. As a ‘political heritage’, the ‘threat from the East’ has always been at the top of Greece’s national security agenda (Ifantis, 2005: 381). Neither Greek governments nor political leaders could regard any threat more dangerous than the one coming from the Turkish state (Stearns, 1999: 80). Despite rapprochement process in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey since 1999, ‘Ankara remained the main focus of its security and foreign policy concerns’ (Ifantis, 382). In post-Cold War context, ‘this threat perception has been exacerbated by the belief that Turkey could profit from the collapse of the Soviet Union and become a regional hegemony through the creation of an Islamic Arc extending from central Asia to the Balkans’ (Agnantopoulos, 14).

Today, it is known that Turkey’s position in Greek security perception has been bigger than the Greek one in Turkey (Büyükçolak, 2002: 82). For Greece, in terms of size, strategic depth, population and armed forces, the Turkish state is admitted as the side more powerful than Greece (Ayman, 2007: 17). Within these tangible indicators of powers, the Turkish Armed Forces has been regarded as the most visible indicator of Turkish ‘revisionist’ policies (*Ibid.*). Accordingly, Greece has concerned the deployment of the Turkish Armed Forces where the First Army across the Western Thrace, the Second Army across Cyprus and particularly the Aegean Army founded in Izmir as not a part of NATO military command (Büyükçolak, 90). Along with these ‘proofs’ and strong belief that its country is under constant threat, the Greek society has generally supported the governments’ decisions on the defence expenditures at high

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<sup>37</sup> Particularly for the study with regard to the Greek image in the Turkish society, see Millas (2005)

level (Liaropoulos, 2005: 4). The Greeks have been more sensitive to the issues relating Turkey than the other foreign policy concerns due to the fact that traumas and beliefs with regard to the Turks are still alive in minds (Nachmani, 94).<sup>38</sup> Moreover, most of them has assumed that the Turkish state is always ready to attack them, and therefore they have thought, Greece has to be ready against any Turkish revisionist acts (Heraclides, 37). Assuming that the main aim of Turkey is to demolish status quo in bilateral relations founded by the Lausanne (1923), the Montreaux (1936) and the Paris (1947) Treaties, the Greek policy-makers and analysts also concerned the fact that Ankara has pursued revisionist policies towards the ‘West’ (Ayman, 2000: 292). Since the Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974, this threat perception has been backed by all Greek governments. Both of major political parties in Greece, the PASOK and the ND, have kept this assumption in Greek national security agenda clearly.

Under these circumstances, since the aftermath of Turkish ‘invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974, Greek response to this ‘visible’ Turkish threat has constructed on three pillars which are the maintenance of an adequate military balance in order to provide deterrence on the Aegean (internal balancing), the rallying of international support by the diplomatic leverage (external balancing), and addressing the international law as the basis for settlement of the outstanding disputes. (Agnantopoulos, 15-16). At the first one, Athens had adopted a series of intense armament programmes including militarization of the Aegean island close to the Turkish coasts while increasing its defence expenditures throughout the 1980s in order to provide deterrence against Turkey (*Ibid.*). Particularly under the PASOK government this Greek strategy had demonstrated itself through the escalation of the crisis and declarations mainly addressed to the Turkish state. For instance, Andreas Papandreou stated Greek policy as follows;

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be known to friends and foes alike that in case of an attack or invasion against the Greek-Cypriot positions, Greece will not stay out. I have warned that this is a *casus belli* (Papandreou, quoted in Agnantopoulos, 16).

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<sup>38</sup> About the Greek society’s interest on the Turkish state politically, it can be pointed out the rank of the book of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in the five most-sold publications in Greece in July 2010. His publication called “*Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*” was translated into Greek language in May 2010 and following only three months, it became one of the most popular books in Greece. (Kırbaki, 2010a)

This Greece's deterrence policy was seen particularly in the crisis of 1987 when the Turkish ship entitled *Sismik I* was sent to the disputed waters and the crisis of Imia broken out in January 1996 (Heraclides, 171). Athens responded to these crises with a massive mobilization of its army which led to the escalation of the disputes (Agnantopoulos, 17). Furthermore, the Greek state declared the adoption of an Integrated Defence Doctrine with the Republic of Cyprus in 1993. "This new doctrine provided that in the event of a Turkish attack in Cyprus, Greece would come to its defence, if necessary by launching an all-out war against Turkey" (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, Athens and Nicosia engaged in several joint military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea and initiated common armament programmes including the purchase of Russian anti-aircraft missiles called the S-300 (*Ibid.*).

The external balancing replaced the first one by the mid-1990s when Costas Simitis succeeded to the Greek Prime Ministry and also the leadership of the PASOK simultaneously. This strategy obviously depended on two dimensions which were the efforts for establishing closer relations with the Balkan neighbours and seeking to peaceful resolution of the main disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations in the context of international organizations (*Ibid.*, 19). As examining in next chapter, this Greek strategy has concluded successfully for Athens in the framework of Europeanization of the main disputed issue in bilateral relations with Turkey.

At the third one, the Greek strategy has based on the 1976 Greek application to the ICJ in relation to seeking for peaceful settlement of the Aegean dispute involving only the delimitation of continental shelf. (*Ibid.*, 24). Following this failure application for Athens, Greece rejected any kind of negotiations with Turkey particularly under the PASOK government throughout the 1980s. Also, the Greek state had not insisted on the resolution of the dispute in legal framework. With the Davos process in 1988, both parties firstly initiated to discuss bilateral issues with regard to the Aegean case. However, this détente period in Greek-Turkish relations broke down in a short time. After the failure of this process, the bilateral negotiations only restarted with the Madrid

Declaration in July 1997. Within this framework, the Confidence Building Measures<sup>39</sup> between Greece and Turkey was issued the following year. Despite intense bilateral negotiations since then, according to the Greek scholars proposing the third strategy the settlement of outstanding issues with Turkey in the legal framework has been more applicable particularly for the resolution of continental shelf and other disagreements in the Aegean Sea (Heraclides, 224).

### **2.3.3. The Realist Assumption: ‘zero-sum approach’**

It is generally admitted that the ‘zero-sum’ approach has played an active role in describing Greek foreign policy towards Turkey (Büyükçolak, 86). Moreover, this realist assumption is easily attached to Turkey’s relations with the Greek state. Dominating bilateral relations particularly prior to the development occurred in recent years, this assumption pointed out that any gain for Turkey had equalled a loss for Greece (Keridis, 2006: 211). Within this framework, Athens had used the card of Kurdish separatism in the relations with Turkey, while being afraid of any possible Turkish containment as a result of Turkey’s strengthening ties to the new Balkan countries throughout the first half of the 1990s (*Ibid.*). In accordance with the realist assumption emphasizing specifically the role of power in international politics, Greece was driven in a way to pursue its containment policy towards Turkey (Heraclides, 169).<sup>40</sup> Within this context, the key principles laid behind this policy were to have threatening attitude towards Turkey, to refuse any dialogues with Ankara, to achieve exact deterrence, and to be ready in any bilateral case to respond Turkey’s provocations (*Ibid.*). This Greek containment policy had resulted in the improvement of bilateral relations between Greece and Syria during the first half of the 1990s. In turn, Turkey did not welcome this development particularly occurred near its national borders. For instance, Şükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish former ambassador, proposed the two-and-a-half war strategy for Turkey’s national security policy in 1996, while emphasizing visible

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<sup>39</sup> For Turkish translation of the declaration; see, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/Yunanistan\\_Guven\\_artirici\\_onlemler.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/Yunanistan_Guven_artirici_onlemler.pdf) (02.01.2010)

<sup>40</sup> This Greek containment policy had resulted in the improvement of bilateral relations between Greece and Syria during the first half of the 1990s. In turn, Turkey did not welcome this development particularly occurred near its national borders. For instance, Şükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish former ambassador, proposed the two-and-a-half war strategy for Turkey’s national security policy in 1996, while emphasizing visible threats for the Turkish state coming from Greece and its ‘natural’ ally Syria plus the PKK terror attacks.

threats for the Turkish state coming from Greece and its 'natural' ally Syria plus the PKK terror attacks. (Elekdağ, 1996).

In post-1999 period, however, official relations between Greece and Turkey have improved, mainly due to Greece's governments supportive attitude towards Turkey's efforts to join the EU, although various issues have never been fully resolved and remain constant sources of conflict. While erasing realist assumption in bilateral relations to some extent, obviously a liberal paradigm replaced in line with calling for cooperation and engagement between the two countries (Keridis, 211). Instead of 'zero-sum' approach in Greek foreign policy, particularly Athens has started to understand the fact that "Greece has every interest in having a democratic prosperous, stable, peaceful, and European Turkish neighbour and much to lose from instability, nationalism, underdevelopment and adventurism on its borders" (*Ibid.*). Despite this fact has not provided any settlement of the main bilateral issues, it has generally been successful in the issues regarding to the areas entitled the 'low politics'. Thus, it is exactly said that the realist assumption has still dominated Greek relations with Turkey particularly regarding the 'high politics' as seen in the case of Aegean and to some extent the Cyprus issue.



**CHAPTER 3**  
**EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY**  
**AND**  
**THE ISSUE OF TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP**

The current objective of Greek foreign policy today are summarized as promoting peace and security, promoting European Political Union and preserving the United States-Greek strategic partnership (Stephanou, 2009). Among these objectives, the second one is taking important place in order to strengthen Greece's role and its national interests within the European Union. Regarding the only EC/EU member state to deal with territorial disputes, the Greek policy-makers and strategic analysts have entitled Athens a status quo power in its region (Triantaphyllou, 2005: 329). Within this framework, the EU has been regarded as an important guarantor of Greek national interests. This argument had also rooted in Greece's application to the European Community in the second half of the 1970s. Since then, the EC/EU membership has created many advantages in favour of Greek foreign policy well. Accordingly, Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, for instance, listed these advantages in their article as follows;

- as the only way to maintain and consolidate its existing links with the West, be it at the political, economic, cultural or defence levels;
- as a means to go beyond historical dilemmas of the past among West and East, by allowing a *de jure* equality between Greece and all the other (West) European states, including the big ones. Subsequently, the European card could allow a lessening of Greece's dependence, real or perceived, on the USA;
- as a way of strengthening Greece's international bargaining power initially through EPC and later the CFSP;
- as a deterrent to foreign inference in internal and domestic affairs in Greece;
- as a means to secure solidarity from other EU states in its difficult relations with Turkey's hegemonic demands (over the Aegean and in Cyprus);
- finally as a EEC/EPC and later EU/CFSP member state, Greece would add an important *atout* to its foreign policy especially in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, areas which have often acted as *demandeurs* of more European foreign policy action (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 225).

Along with these advantages, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy can be regarded as a strategic tool in order to promote the national interests and preferences

by Greece (Triantaphyllou, 332). As one of the EU members since 1981, Athens has been influenced through adaptation to practices, norms and behaviour. In this context, however, Greece's reputation has been depicted as 'the black sheep of the European Union' because of its economic underperformance and unwillingness to EU foreign policy (Economides, 2005: 471). About Greece's role in European integration, absolutely 'one should still bear mind that in the 1970s and part of the 1980s, Euroscepticism – or even plain anti-European feelings – reigned in large segment of both the elites and public opinion at large' (Frangakis & Papayannides, 2003: 166). While Athens was preparing to be a part of the EC, there had been no consensus between political parties and within the population in Greece (Hibou, 2005: 231). On the one hand, Constantine Karamanlis' New Democracy (ND) had voiced 'Greece belongs to the West', on the other hand, Papandreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) had said 'Greece belongs to the Greeks' (Clogg, 1997: 220). This dilemma also reflected the EC attitude towards Greece's membership process. While the European Council was in favour of Greece's accession as soon as possible, the European Commission had clearly stated that Greece was not able to meet economic requirements in order to be a part of the Community (Hibou, 231).

Concerning the fact that the Greek junta had collapsed in 1974, new Greek democracy initially regarded the EC membership as a process of modernization and a proof of its identity to belong to the 'West'. Within this framework, Ioakimidis called the 'intended Europeanization' to refer to the Greek case also together with Portuguese and Spanish ones in that period, and later would be replaced by the Eastern European countries (Ioakimidis, 75). He underlined that intended Europeanization 'is much broader in the scope of its implications in terms of its territorial and thematic penetration' (*Ibid.*). Particularly in accordance with driving Athens in a way to the EC membership, the role of military in Greece had declined whereas the democratic regime restored in Greek politics. Together with the 'Cyprus fiasco' of the junta, the EC membership process served the main structural change in Greek traditional political life in direction of the civilisation of the political landscape (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006: 413).

In his article examining the literature about the impact of EC/EU membership on Greece, Stelios Stavridis concerned that the initial studies on Europeanization of Greece

had handled many policy areas (Stavridis, 2003: 10). Within these studies, particularly Stavridis mentioned that the study of Kazakos and Ioakimidis which had proposed Greece as a ‘unique case’ among the EC/EU member states (Kazakos & Ioakimidis, quoted in Stavridis, 10). Depending on this study, he listed the reasons as follows why Greece has deserved this brand;

- a peripheral country (geographically, with no common borders with other EC/EU states)
- situated in a turbulent region.
- under an external threat (Turkey)
- a different historical and political development pattern
- a Christian Orthodox religion and culture
- economically weak
- EC accession remained a controversial issue for some time (*Ibid.*, 10-11).

Due to the fact that some of these points have still existed in current times, Greece’s role in European integration is generally seen problematic one. Within this framework, particularly Greece had to deal with problems rooted in foreign policy and economic stabilization in post-Maastricht period (Frangakis & Papayannides, 168). Only Costas Simitis, who had succeeded Andreas Papandreou as the Prime Minister of Greece in 1995, achieved the process of Europeanization of Greece in all areas. With his influence, more importantly Greece has faced remarkable changes in a way that Athens perceived its role as part of the EU. In the field of foreign policy, however, this process called Europeanization has taken the form of projection of national interests and policy preferences onto the European-level (Economides, 472).

### **3.1. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **3.1.1. In the Cold War Context**

Since the forming of modern Greece, it has never pursued an independent foreign policy. In particular this fact had emerged on surface in the Cold War context exactly. Being a part of the western alliance, Greece had to adjust its national interests to the West. The restoration of the Cold War in post-war years had created political, economic, and more importantly, psychological barriers between Greece and especially its Balkan neighbours (Close, 2002: 127). Its reflection on the region was the fact that Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia participated in the Communist bloc whereas Greece and its eastern neighbour Turkey became the members of the western

alliance (Larrabee, 2005: 406). In this Cold War context, for instance, Athens' relations with Albania, one of Greece's northern neighbours, remained badly due to the fact that the Greek government had allowed the British and American forces to use Greek soils for attempts to undermine leading Enver Hoxha's regime there (Close, 126). Furthermore, the situation of Greek inhabitants in Albania was one of important problems in these bilateral relations. Suppressing the Greek minority living in Northern Epirus located in southern part of Albania, Enver Hoxha's communist regime, for example, impelled these Greek inhabitants to change their names into Albanian. On the other hand, these Greek populations had been assumed the main reason behind Greece's territorial claims on northern Epirus by generally referring to the Greek irredentist claims on Albania. Under these circumstances, these two neighbourhood countries did not start bilateral relations until 1971 when the diplomatic relations would be restored 'with the implication that Greek territorial claims would be shelved indefinitely, and that Albanian government would respect the rights of ethnic Greek inhabitants of Albania' (*Ibid.*).

As understood above, this Cold-War antagonism between the Balkan countries was also fed by the 'Great Ideas' placed importantly in Balkan historical literature on the basis of historical clashing nationalism in accordance with territorial claims in Southeastern Europe (Voskopoulos, 2008: 69). Together with ideological fragmentation, this context had easily convinced Greek foreign policy to apply the notion of the 'threat from the North' which emphasized the 'hostile' regimes located across the Greece's northern borders. Thus, Athens tried to construct strong ties to the West in direction of adjusting its national interests to NATO, and in particular to the United States (*Ibid.*). This traditional west-oriented Greek foreign policy would be pursued to some extent until the first half of the 1970s.

Following the outbreak of the Cyprus issue, Athens began to interrogate its dependence on the western alliance in terms of foreign and security policies. As the reflection of intense arguments voiced particularly by the PASOK in the Greek parliament, Greece sought to establish cooperation with its northern neighbours instead of Turkey which had been an only ally in the region (Kassimeris, 2008a: 497). Due to the emergence of contracting interests on surface between the Greek and Turkish states 'NATO's Southern Flank became the alliance's Achilles' heel with the two members

setting aside the alliance's interests and concentrating on their regional conflict" (*Ibid.*). Moreover, Athens improved its relations with the Balkan countries because of gaining supports particularly against Turkey. Within this framework, the new foreign policy later established warm relations with old 'hostile' neighbours in the region.

In order to find an alternative way altering this question concerning relations with the Turkish state, also the EC became an important platform for Greece. With regard to Turkey, it was certainly part of calculation that membership to the EC would provide Greece with safety guarantee as some kind of an umbrella which would allow Greece to feel perhaps less threatened by Turkey (Interview with Tsarouhas, 2009). Under this circumstance, in 1974 when the democratization process restored in Greece under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis, the joining the EC became the main objective of Greek foreign policy. First of all, this aim was along established political goal that would allow Greece to progress and offer opportunities for economic growth and maintain social cohesion, and more importantly it would provide consolidation of democracy in the country (*Ibid.*). In other words, "Karamanlis believed that the EC would be a better long-term vehicle for the defence of vital Greek security interests as well as the provider of safeguards for democracy, and the stimulus for economic growth" (Economides, 474). As a result of Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus, Greece had ruptured its strategic ties with NATO and Karamanlis withdrew his country from military command of the organisation. Within this framework, the desire to westernize (obviously 'Europeanize') its security concern could be seen more appropriate reason behind the EC application (*Ibid.*). Thus, the Greek Prime Minister tried to convince European counterparts and authorities to believe Greece's readiness for membership the following years (Close, 266).

On the other hand, during the Karamanlis' years, Athens took a leading role in promoting cooperation among the Balkan countries with the inter-Balkan summit of 1976 held in Athens despite the still existence of ideological fragmentation (Larrabee, 407). Within This context, Greece has resumed this initiative which would then help removing some barriers in the Balkans (*Ibid.*). Andreas Papandreou, who had seized the power after the election victory of PASOK in 1981, also kept on pursuing this pro-Balkan policy, and even he signed treaties and declarations with some of Balkan neighbours such as Bulgaria and Albania. Moreover, since Greece joined the EC in

1981 it has become the only 'European' country in the Balkans and with gaining this new brand, Greece strengthened its position in the region (*Ibid.*, 408).

### **3.1.2. In Post-Cold War Era: Becoming a Problem in the Region**

The global and regional changes in international politics at the end of the 1980s affected Greece and its foreign policy pursued during that period. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet bloc did not influence the Greek state intensively in particular in terms of security framework. Unlike the other members of the western alliance, Athens did not need to re-formulate its security and defence policies or to search for new missions related *raison d'être* of the NATO despite the one of members of the organisation (Stearns, 80). Due to the existence of the 'threat from the East' since the 1974 Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus, the Greek foreign policy obviously had not been interested in the collapse of the Warsaw Pact which meant the removal of 'threat from the North' *de jure*. Instead, Greece only would lose its position within EC the following years, because the post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries would replace the position of Greece as well as Portugal and Spain receiving economic funds from Brussels (Economides, 478).

Actually, the main event in post-Cold War era which shook Greek foreign policy was the dissolution of Yugoslavia, not the Soviet Union (Stearns, 80). First of all, it had demolished well-positioned Greek foreign policy towards the Balkans designed clearly throughout the 1980s (Larrabee, 408). The new regional environment resulted in Greece's failure in direction of pursuing coherent and effective policies towards the Balkans, and indeed Athens became the part of problem in the region (Ifantis, 381). For the Greek state, initially the dissolution of Yugoslavia had triggered the emergence of an independent Macedonian state having 'irredentist' claims over Greek territories and history (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, Greece assumed that it had to redesign its foreign policy on the new pillars characterized by 'hostility towards the neighbouring states, and a rhetorical, symbolic, nationalistic, formalistic and at times parochial and populist style of policy' (Exadaktylos, 2007: 12).

The Republic of Macedonia had been one of the six federal republics of Tito's Yugoslavia, and in the Cold War context the possible Macedonian threat to the Greek state had been suppressed by the close cooperation between Athens and Belgrade. As a

result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, however, an independent Macedonian state and its initial applications including the use of Vergina Sun<sup>41</sup> to the national flag and the image of the White Tower, actually located in Thessaloniki in Greek Macedonian region, to the currency has created visible threats to Greece (Zahariadis, 1994: 657).<sup>42</sup> In addition, the dispute over the official name of this new republic between these two states caused Greece's reservation on using of the name 'Macedonia' due to the historical and territorial concerns. Under these circumstances, Greece initially blocked the recognition of this state under the name of 'Republic of Macedonia' by EU as the result of its objections concerning the country's name, flag and constitution. Particularly, the Greek objection on the country's name was also a huge impediment to the new republic for joining any other international organizations (Kondonis, 2005: 72). In Greece, especially almost one million Greeks showing national hesitations on these issues participated in meeting occurred in Thessaloniki whose major slogan was 'Macedonia is Greek' (Kut, 2005: 19). As the reflection of this nationalist sentiments on political arena, Greece's major political parties agreed in April 1992 that the word 'Macedonia' would not be accepted in any way as the name of the new republic emerged out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This Greek compromise on the policy pursued towards the Macedonian issue was later hardened by the PASOK replacing the Greek government in 1993, and Andres Papandreou withdrew his country from the UN-sponsored negotiations on the naming dispute in October 1993.

At the UN Security Council in January 1993, however, France, Spain and Britain proposed the name of 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM) in order to conciliate bilateral relations between Athens and Skopje (Firat, 2002: 40). Within this framework, the UN admitted the Macedonian state under the name of FYROM to the membership and Greece was one of the countries to vote in favour of its membership. According to the UN Security Council Resolution, "that name has to be

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<sup>41</sup>The Vergina Sun (or the Star of Vergina) is the name given to a symbol of a star with sixteen rays. It was unearthed in 1977 in the northern Greek region of Macedonia. Since its rediscovery, it has taken on a new function as a political symbol associated with modern Macedonia, and has become the object of political conflict between Greece and its neighbour, the Republic of Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia used it on its national flag between 1991 and 1995, when it agreed to change its flag under Greek pressure. Greece regards it as an official national symbol and has asserted an exclusive right to its official use. For details, see Appendix III.

used by all parties during official meetings and in official documents” (Kondonis, 73). While FYROM was participating in international arena, however, its national flag could not be taken in UN due to the non-removal of Greece’s objection with regard to the country’s flag (Firat, 40).

Furthermore, the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution had created another important issue which isolated Athens from its European partners and interrogated its alliance to the West. Due to the fact that Greek society’s strong feeling in favour of Serbs emerged out of religious and historical ties, the Greek government supported Milosevic’s Serbia and violated the UN trade embargo that implied sanctions on Belgrade during the crisis (Larrabee, 410). This fact arose particularly when Athens voted against NATO air strikes on Serbia in early 1994. Additionally, the Greek government refused the use of its soils for such attacks against the Serbian government. Under these circumstances, it could be said that at the end of 1994 Greek foreign policy was a disaster because of existing weak relations with its Balkan neighbours such as FYROM and to some extent Albania, and tensions with Turkey, EU and the United States (Larrabee, 1999:134). Instead, Greece became known as an only ally of Serbia regarded the main responsible for the crisis in the region (*Ibid.*). This shameful experience of Greek foreign policy between 1991 and 1995 ended with the replacement of Costas Simitis to the Prime Ministry of Greece.

### **3.1.3. Greek ‘Soft Power’ in the Balkans: Reshaping its Region**

Simitis’ primary task was the rehabilitation of Greek foreign policy by the restoration of healthy ties to the Balkan neighbours and EU (Economides, 481). Thus, Greece has overcome the ‘zero-sum approach’ to its neighbours and started to pursue a new foreign policy in direction of ‘seeking to promote its interests in a manner much different than in the past’ (Tsakonas, 2005: 431). Within this framework, more importantly Greece has realized the post-Cold War era to depend on new sorts of power beyond the military, including economic, diplomatic and cultural ones which could be called the ‘soft power’ (*Ibid.*, 432). Hence, Athens has applied more pragmatic and issue-oriented foreign policy while removing rhetorical, symbolic and nationalist style (Liaropoulos, 2008: 30). First of all, this new-designed Greek foreign policy had reflected the bilateral relations with FYROM. In summer 1995, the disagreement



between Athens and Skopje entered into an optimistic phase, and particularly with the U.S. efforts, these two countries signed the Interim Accord in September of that year by underlining the acceptance of each side's separate views on the name issue while emphasizing the parties would keep their own reservations (Kut, 125). "The Interim Accord laid the foundations for institutionalized bilateral relations and the signing of the related memoranda, agreements and protocols, freeing the two countries from their hitherto unproductive bilateral political stance and allowing their political leaders to take initiatives toward a rapprochement" (Kondonis, 71). Following the Accord, the Macedonian national parliament ratified the change of national flag, and in turn Greece recognized FYROM *de jure* (Kut, 125).

The following years Greece was driven in a way to the moderation and cooperation to another neighbour, Albania, where its government was trying to deal with the restoration of legal order after the crisis in 1997 (Exadaktylos, 17). When the crisis broke out in Southern Albania in relation to the series of bankruptcy of stockbrokers, Greece was one of the EU members particularly together with Italy and France which supported intensively financial aids for restoration of order in this country (Kut, 118). Also, Athens helped the Albanian government for reconstruction of the Albanian army after its disintegration in 1997 (Close, 277). Along with these new Greek foreign policy initiatives, then the Kosovo crisis broken out in 1999 provided exact normalization of Greece's relations with its western partners (Economides, 486). Facing the dilemma rooted in Greek society's sympathy for Serbs and the Greek government's desire to rehabilitate the relations with EU and NATO, the Greek prime Minister Simitis experienced a serious test to show new Greek foreign policy. "Simitis balanced out internal demands and international necessity by declining Greek military participation in Operation Allied Forces, but not opposing the operation and granting NATO forces the right of passage and maintenance of logistic routes Greek territory" (*Ibid.*).

Accordingly, since 1995 the new Greek foreign policy has depended on two main objectives; '(1) the transformation of foreign policy into a promotion tool for its national interests in both the EU and Southern Europe; and (2) the creation of a stable, secure and prosperous region around its borders' (Exadaktylos, 8). In accordance with the realization of these objectives, Athens obviously began to support the membership of its neighbours to the EU. Since the membership of these countries would serve its

national interests, Greece began to play an active role within EU, and also became a leading country for reconstruction of the Balkans (*Ibid.*, 17). Aiming at promoting stability in the Southeastern Europe, the Greek government held a meeting in Thessaloniki participated by foreign ministers of the Balkan countries in June 1997, and another meeting of these countries' heads of governments in Crete in November of that year (Close, 277). Furthermore, George Papandreou, the Foreign Minister of Simitis' government, depicted this new policy by underlining Greece's new role especially in its region. At his speech on the General Debate of UN General Assembly in 2000, Papandreou framed this pro-Balkan policy as follows;

Greece's vision for Balkans is one of a region in which democracy finally become the norm; where citizens' aspirations can finally be realized through peaceful and democratic practices; where the rights of minorities are respected; and where governments are accountable, economies are transparent, and politics allow for the fullest participation of all elements of society. (Papandreou, 2001: 5)

In other words, particularly with the impact of Simitis' PASOK government upon Greek politics, Athens started to perceive itself more and more as a European country in the Balkans rather than one of Balkan countries in Europe. Accordingly, on the one hand, it has sought to play more constructive role within EU both regard to economic and social policies, on the other hand, it has tried to construct strong ties to the Balkan neighbours notably in the way to the EU membership (Interview with Tsarouhas, 2009). This policy was also welcomed by the ND government under the leadership of Costas Karamanlis which seized the power in March 2004. Petros Molyviatis, the new Greek government' Foreign Minister, stated this foreign policy assumption at his address to the fifty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly as well;

With the proactive support and involvement of the international community, we are working hard to transform the Balkans into a region of democracy, peace, stability, and prosperity focused on a common European future. We believe that genuinely regional initiatives such as the Southeastern European Cooperation Process constitute the appropriate vehicle to enable the participating countries to coordinate their efforts towards reform, progress, and good neighbourliness (Molyviatis, 2005: 13).

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this policy concluded positively for Athens. Greece did not only ameliorate its bilateral relations with the neighbours, but it also succeeded to repair its image and reputation particularly within EU. Parallel to the success in foreign policy area, more importantly Greece strengthened its economic

position as well. While it was entering into the Euro-zone, Athens also emerged as the main economic actor in the Southeastern Europe .To illustrate the proofs, George Koumoutsakos, who was the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece between 2006 and 2008, listed Greek economic initiatives in its region which has also reflected on today;

- Some 3.500 Greek businesses are active in this region.
- There is no constantly expanding network of Greek banks, which account for 20% of the banking market in the region, including Turkey.
- In less than 10 years, Greek investments in the region have climbed to over €14 billion, creating more than 200.000 jobs.
- Greece ranks first in foreign direct investments in Albania, FYROM and Serbia, and is among the top three investors in Bulgaria and Romania. (Koumoutsakos, 2008: 20)

### **3.2. EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY**

Parallel to the historical framework of Greek foreign policy throughout the years, the impact of EC/EU upon Greek foreign policy particularly in the light of Europeanization could be analyzed while emphasizing Greece's role within the Community/Union and its bilateral relations with the neighbourhood countries. Within this framework, Tsardanidis and Stavridis analyzed Europeanization of Greek foreign policy by classifying the process into three separate periods; 1981-1985, 1985-1995, and 1996 to date (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 225). According to them, the EC membership had forced Greece to pursue foreign policy in the light of familiarization to the Community-level at the first period between 1981 and 1985. In spite of the EC's efforts, however, Greece was one of the member states which had undermined the emergence of a common European policies to the international developments during this period (*Ibid.*, 226). For instance, Athens together with Britain and Denmark was intensively opposed to the Geschner-Colombo proposal emerged out of in the first half of the 1980s. As the reflection of the PASOK's policies in that period, "Greece kept on showing a clear preference for not aligning itself with the reminder of its EPC partners" (*Ibid.*). Although Andreas Papandreou was the Greek Prime Minister who had signed the Accession Treaty with EC, he was an enthusiastic supporter of independent Greece not aligning with the western world completely. Instead, Papandreou and his party, the

PASOK, were depicting Greece as 'a bridge between the West and the Balkans, the Arab world and Africa' (Abacı, 2005: 7).

During the second period between 1985 and 1995, it could be seen some degree of harmonisation in Greek foreign policy towards the Community/Union level. The initial experience of this process was seen in Greek-Israeli relations. Since the 1947 UN Partition Plan with regard to the resolution of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Athens had declined to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel without granting the legitimate rights of Palestinians under the headline of comprehensive solution (Agnantopoulos, 2006: 10). With the membership to the Community, however, the EC had made pressures over Greece to restore its relations with Tel-Aviv. Under these intense pressures particularly from its European partners, Athens finally had to upgrade its diplomatic mission from Diplomatic Representation to Embassy level in 1989 (*Ibid.*). In contrast to this top-down dimension of Europeanization seen during this period, however, Greek foreign policy was able to affect the CFSP in terms of its national cases such as the Cyprus issue, FYROM and the relations with Turkey (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 229). Accordingly, Greek foreign policy succeeded to be 'Europeanized' particularly with regard to these important issues. For instance, although the issue of Macedonia had created tensions between Greece and the other EU members as mentioned before, Greek foreign policy was successful by linking Turkey's Customs Union Agreement with EU to the Cyprus' membership process (*Ibid.*). Athens had seriously insisted that it would veto the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and EU unless the Republic of Cyprus as the whole representative of the island granted a firm a date on the beginning of negotiations with the Union (Dodd, 2000: 158). For that reason, the Customs Union Agreement was approved in Turkey-EU Association Council in March 1995 in relation to the condition on beginning of the accession negotiations with Cyprus (Hale, 255).

Commenced with the replacement of Costas Simitis to the Prime Ministry in January 1996, the third period has witnessed the key issues laid in Greek foreign policy agenda such as the Balkans, Cyprus and Turkey to be converted into EU agenda completely (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 229). On the Cyprus issue, first of all, Greece succeeded to put the Republic of Cyprus as the representative of the whole island into the first enlargement wave of candidate countries including Poland, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, Estonia and Slovenia which would begin the accession negotiations with EU in March 1998. With regard to the Balkan countries, then Athens became a firm proponent of EU enlargement towards the Southeastern Europe. Within this framework, Europeanization 'essentially meant adopting a more benignly active approach towards the Balkans and advocating the region's eventual integration into the structures of the European Union' (Ker-Lindsay, 73). George Voskopoulos pointed out two reasons behind this pro-Balkan Greek policy which were the goal of setting and enhancing interdependence between the countries in the region, and the need to provide stability in the Southeastern Europe for development and investment (Voskopoulos, 2008: 76). On the other hand, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou concerned the EU perspective as a 'fundamental motor' to drive new Greek foreign policy more closer to the neighbours (Triantaphyllou, 339). In the light of these two approaches, Greek foreign policy has obviously adopted its national interests and preferences into the way of candidate countries' membership process well. For instance, Koumoutsakos underlined the importance of 'good neighbourly relates' together with the EU criteria while talking about Greece's full support for the membership of the candidate countries in the region (Koumoutsakos, 19). As the reflection of this policy, the Greek parliament, for instance, ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement between EU and FYROM although it kept reservation on the name dispute with Skopje (Kondonis, 71).

This last period also included bilateral relations with Turkey. As Spyros Economides had concerned, the relations with the Turkish state was 'the clearest manifestation of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy' in this period (Economides, 482). According to Economides, Costas Simitis showed the first signs of this policy with the Imia (*Kardak*) crisis broken out in the Aegean Sea in the initial days of his prime ministry (*Ibid.*). During the crisis, the Greek government pursuing an intense diplomatic campaign achieved to gain the supports of Brussels by proposing Greece's national interests as those of the EU, 'and threats to Greek territory as threats to the territory of the EU' (*Ibid.*). Shifting from bilateral to the European framework, this Greek foreign policy towards its neighbour Turkey was crowned by the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. It could be said that this summit did not only conclude with the admission of Turkey's candidacy status to the EU membership, but it also meant the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy particularly towards Turkey *de jure*. For

example, Kostas Ifantis, the Greek scholar, called this summit ‘the departure point’ for putting Ankara in a context ‘where Greece has been enjoying a comparative advantage’ (Ifantis, 382). In addition, he emphasized that the EU has become a major determinant factor in Greek-Turkish relations exactly since the conclusion of the summit (*Ibid.*).

Recognizing the candidate status of Turkey on equal footing with the other candidates, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 constructed important obligations which have had to be fulfilled by Ankara notably for beginning of the accession negotiations with EU. Within this framework, it could be mentioned that this summit was a milestone in direction of increasing EU pressures on Turkish foreign policy as well as the other political fields. In other words, Turkey has faced the requirements coming from Brussels in the light of top-down dimension of Europeanization since the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit, in contrast to the success of Greek foreign policy which uploaded its national interests and priorities with regard to the Turkish state to the EU-level in accordance with the bottom-up dimension. Thus, the main disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations as enlisted before have obviously become one of the main obstacles in front of Turkey’s accession process. In particular, the Article 4 and 9 of the Presidency Conclusion of the Helsinki Summit exactly stated these obligations as follows;

4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.

9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made

without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

Accordingly, the Helsinki decision proposed two main obligations to Turkey in general; the satisfaction of Copenhagen criteria and the resolution of its border issues by non-emphasizing clearly the relations with Greece (Uğur, 2003: 166). Giving a candidacy status to Turkey, this summit actually provided installation of the Cyprus issue and the Aegean dispute into the core of EU agenda with regard to Turkey. In turn, more importantly the Turkish state had to see that its bilateral problems with Athens have shifted to the relations with Brussels (Güven, 2003: 22). In order to be a full-member of EU consequently, the ball obviously has been in Turkey's court, not the Greek one.

### **3.2.1. The Cyprus Case: The EU membership of the island**

Following the full-membership of Greece to the EC in 1981, Greek-Turkish relations had been converted into the problems generally underlined the relations between Turkey and EC. This process has given the veto-right to Athens for applying it as an instrument to sabotage Turkey's EC process or using as a bargaining power in this framework according to its national interests (Özer, 2010: 2). For instance, Greece had blocked the release of the fourth financial protocol emerged out of the Ankara Agreement which established the association relations between Turkey and EC/EU (*Ibid.*). However, Turkey's application for full-membership to the EC in 1987 served the increase of Greece's this bargaining power against Ankara (Aksu, 2007: 29). Since then, the EC/EU has begun to be a part of the problems in Greek-Turkish relations step by step in accordance with emphasizing them in its official documents clearly.

On the Cyprus issue, Athens has gained the support of its EU partners despite the fact that it initially lacked this power completely. The first sign of this process was seen in the meeting of Turkey-EC Association Council in 1988 where the Turkish side would boycott it because of the existence of the sentence that "the Cyprus issue disaffects the relations between Turkey and EC" in the text of Council's opening speech (Özer, 3). However, this EC's pro-Greek attitude became official by the Presidency Conclusion of the Dublin Summit in June 1990. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the EC firstly stated the importance of Cyprus problem in the relations between Turkey and EC

by adopting the declaration on Cyprus.<sup>43</sup> Since then, the Cyprus issue placed importantly in Greek-Turkish relations have become one of the problems in Turkey-EC relations (*Ibid.*). The Republic of Cyprus encouraged by the conclusion of the Dublin Summit applied to the EC for full-membership as the representative of the whole island on 3 July 1990, almost a week after the summit.

The Turkish state strongly responded this unilateral application by proposing that it had violated the 1960 Cypriot Constitution underlining that ‘the island could not join any organisation to which neither Greece nor Turkey belonged’ (Nachmani, 105). Moreover, Turkey pointed out the 1960 Constitution again which granted the vice-president (as a Turkish-Cypriot) a veto right to use in any cases with regard to the foreign policy decisions (Commission Opinion 1993, Paragraph 8). However, Athens mentioned that these Turkish claims were not binding due to the claim that the Cypriot Constitution had only prohibited unification of the island with Greece, not the international organizations (*Ibid.*). Under these circumstances, the European Commission issued its opinion on the application of the Republic of Cyprus for membership in June 1993. Analyzing the situation on the island briefly since 1974, the Commission welcomed the prospect accession of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with recognizing its government as the only representative of the Cypriots (Commission Opinion, 1993). Additionally, this report entitled the crisis of August 1974 following the Turkish intervention ‘the occupation of part of the territory of Cyprus by the Turkish army’ (*Ibid.*, Paragraph 6). In the conclusion of the report, the European Commission clearly stated that “the Commission is convinced that the result of Cyprus’ accession to the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island together” (*Ibid.*, Paragraph 46). Then, this

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<sup>43</sup> The European Council discussed the Cyprus question in the light of the impasse in the intercommunal dialogue. The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully reaffirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations and bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles that are preventing the pursuit of effective intercommunal talks aimed at finding a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus on the basis of the mission of good offices of the Secretary General, as it was recently reaffirmed by Resolution 649/90 of the Security Council. (EC Presidency Conclusion, 1990)



Commission opinion concerning the membership of Republic of Cyprus was approved by the EU Council in October 1993.

The next step in relation to the Cyprus issue was the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 which put the Republic of Cyprus together with Central and Eastern European countries into the list of candidate states (EU Presidency Conclusion 1997, Paragraph 10). Expelling Turkey out of the enlargement process, the EU Presidency Conclusion of the Summit also established a linkage between Turkey's candidacy status and the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Accordingly, this fact was firstly mentioned as a condition to Turkey in an official document by the EU clearly (Özer, 8). The Article 35 of the Conclusion referred to this case as follows;

The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. (1997)

As a reaction to the EU's decision particularly on opening of accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus as the whole representative of the island, Turkey and TRNC signed an Association Agreement setting up an Association Council with the task of framing measures necessary bring about economic and financial integration and partial integration in matters of security, defence and foreign policy in July 1998. However, the European Commission criticized this Turkish policy in its first Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession issued in 1998 as follows;

The Commission is of the opinion that the measures taken by Turkey are incompatible with international law as expressed in the relevant UN resolutions, to which the European Union fully subscribes... The Commission believes that Turkey, as the Turkish Cypriot community's guarantor, should exploit its special relationship to bring about a just and fair settlement of the Cyprus issue in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, which are based notably on the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-community federation. (1998: 21).

As mentioned before, the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 was a turning point in Turkey's relations with EU. Despite the fact that the resolution of Cyprus issue was not mentioned as a precondition to Turkey's accession process in the conclusion of the Summit, it was the fact that Greece as a member of EU would not ratify the opening

of accession negotiations with the Turkish state without gaining any resolution on the island (Birand, 2005: 445). Thus, Turkey's road to the full-membership process has passed via Athens and Nicosia despite Ankara's desire to keep that issue separate from its accession to the EU (Suvarierol, 2003: 55). Within this framework, EU has expected the Turkish state as a candidate country to take steps towards the peaceful settlement of the dispute (*Ibid.*). For Brussels, 'given its close political ties and dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey has more capacity to make itself heard in Northern Cyprus than any actor' (*Ibid.*, 68). However, Cyprus had been regarded as a valuable bargaining card by Turkey due to any resolution in the light of its unification would not guarantee Turkey's membership to the EU, and being an island only 40 miles away from the Anatolian coast, it had generally been entitled a 'stationary aircraft carrier' with the influence of the Turkish Armed Forces (*Ibid.*, 66). Accordingly, the island had been an important 'hostage' to keep the balance between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean (Birand, 448). That was the fact why taking steps in this sensitive issue have not been easy for the Turkish governments.

Under these circumstances, while preparing Turkey's Association Partnership Document the one of initial issues concerned to Ankara was the Cyprus issue together with the abolishment of death penalty, the broadcasting and education in Kurdish language, the civilization of National Security Council and the properties of foundations (*Ibid.*, 411). As a response to this document, the National Programme was issued by the Turkish government in March 2001, and it included neither commitment nor promise with regard to the Cyprus issue and also the Aegean dispute (Güven, 74). Instead, the Turkish government repeatedly kept its same attitudes towards these issues. Despite the introduction of hopeful reform packages on the way to the EU membership between 1999 and 2002, it could be said that the Turkish side did not play an active role particularly in the Cyprus issue. On the other hand, during his visit to the island, Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission in that time, stated exactly that Cyprus would be a part of the EU despite the non-emergence of any political settlement from the negotiations among the parties on the island started in the following month (Suvarierol, 62). Parallel to these declarations and conclusions on the Cyprus issue, Turkey had begun thinking of alternative policies which could be applied in any case in relation to the accession of Republic of Cyprus to the Union. For instance,

Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister in that time, issued the measures involving the integration of TRNC with Turkey in the fields of foreign affairs, security and defence, economy and finance (Cem, 2004: 247). As seen in post-Luxembourg period before, however, these possible steps had been regarded as threats to undermine Turkey's EU membership process particularly by the EU institutions (Suvarierol, 62).

Within this context, the face-to-face talks started between the leaders of the two communities, Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides, with the participation of Alvaro De Soto, the UN Secretary-General's special advisor on the island in November 2001 (Dodd, 2005: 44). As a result of these meetings held in Turkish and Greek parts of Nicosia, the parties agreed on beginning the round of negotiations in January 2002. Despite the emergence of breakthrough messages on surface the following months, these negotiations concluded unsuccessfully. In April of that year, Günter Verhaugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, accused Denktaş who had been backed intensively by the Turkish government of being responsible for that result (Güven, 123).

As the top-down dimension, the year of 2002 was the resolution time of the dispute on the island, but the Turkish side had been seen as the party not in favour of peaceful settlement. This fact reflected eventually the EU Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 where the Council postponed the decision on beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey to the end of 2004 whereas it affirmed the membership of Cyprus on May 2004 (Presidency Conclusion 2002, Paragraph 3). This conclusion was a great shock particularly for new Turkish government headed by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP). On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 'declared the EU's decision to admit the Greek Cypriot Administration into the Union in the name of the whole island in breach of international law and the 1960 agreements as politically and legally unacceptable' (Kınacıoğlu & Oktay, 2006: 264). However, in Turkish politics, the replacement of AKP has changed Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue the following years (Oğuzlu, 2004: 102). Understanding the importance of good neighbourhood policy for EU membership, Turkey has pursued a new policy generally depicted by Ahmet Davutoğlu on the basis of zero-problems with the neighbours.<sup>44</sup> It has 'modified the traditional

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<sup>44</sup> See, Davutoğlu (2008)

view of Turkey's strategic interests, whereby the new objective is to advance the EU membership bid through supporting a settlement in Cyprus, rather than blocking such a solution' (Benhabib & Isiksel, 2006: 224). Within this framework, new Turkish government began to make intense pressures over Denktas to negotiate the Annan Plan released in November 2002. Consequently, Denktas had to admit participation in the negotiations of the Plan held in The Hague in March 2003. However, then he rejected the Plan again. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession treaty as the representative of the whole island together with other ten candidate countries in Athens the following month. For Greek-Cypriots, this signature meant the end of 'hostage' at the hands of Turkey, and in other words Ankara has taken Brussels into account on the Cyprus issue from that moment instead of Nicosia or Athens (Birand, 446). Additionally, with the Cypriot membership, the recognition of this new member has become the core of Turkey's relations with EU (Özer, 13).

On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded the Loizidou case in November of that year. Within this context, Denktas was convinced by the Turkish government to meet the parties again to discuss the Plan in March 2004. As a result of these negotiations held in Bürgenstoks, the latest version (actually the fifth one) of the UN Plan emerged on surface (Dodd, 45). The parties agreed on holding twin referendums in both sides of the island the following month. For the Turkish state, this meant obviously change of Turkish foreign policy from preserving the status quo to the pursuing a win-win policy on the island. These Turkish efforts for the resolution of the issue in the light of Annan Plan were later applauded in the EU Summit of December 2004 where the European Council decided on beginning of accessions negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.<sup>45</sup>

Held before a week of the Republic of Cyprus' accession to the EU, the referendum actually proved the separation of the island (Birand, 454). Whereas the Annan Plan designing unification of the island on the basis of two federal states was admitted by Turkish-Cypriots, it was simultaneously rejected by Greek-Cypriots<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the result showed divergent views between Athens and Nicosia. Although the Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis tried to persuade Greek-Cypriot

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<sup>45</sup> See, Presidency Conclusion 16-17 December 2004 , Paragraph 22

<sup>46</sup> For details of the plan; see, Dodd (2005)

leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, in direction of accepting the Plan, Papadopoulos pursued a status quo policy and became one of the important factors on the decision of Greek-Cypriot community against the Plan. The following month, in May 2004, Republic of Cyprus became the member of EU together with other candidate countries. Due to the forming of new ‘asymmetrical relation’, which was explained in the first chapter of this study, this fact has created another actor within the EU that Turkey has dealt with particularly during the accession process (Aksu, 34). Indeed, its first sign would appear on the adoption of Additional Protocol towards new ten member countries including notably Cyprus.

At the EU Summit of December 2004, the European Council did not only decide on beginning accession negotiations with the Turkish state in October 2005, but it also linked this point with the extending the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement to the new member states until that time.<sup>47</sup> In accordance with this decision, on 29 July 2005 Ankara extended the Additional Protocol to these member states including the Republic of Cyprus. Together with this decision, however, Turkey published a declaration that this signature has not equalled the recognition of Republic of Cyprus.<sup>48</sup> However, Fuat Aksu, the Turkish scholar, concerned that this Turkish act has constructed on the *de facto* recognition of Republic of Cyprus, and stated that with this declaration Turkey has taken obligation particularly on the issue in relation to free movement of goods whereas it rejects to permit the Greek-Cypriot ships’ access to the Turkish ports (*Ibid.*, 37). As a response to this Turkish declaration, on 21 September 2005 EU approved the counter-declaration underlining that Turkey’s attitude has not been binding to EU.<sup>49</sup> According to the declaration, the Union clearly stated that the negotiation headlines with regard to the implementation of Customs Union would not be opened if Turkey ignored its obligations notably rooted in the adoption of Additional Protocol (Özer, 15). Additionally, the Union underlined that it would evaluate this situation at the end of 2006. Despite the signing of Additional Protocol by the Turkish state, this document has not been ratified by the Turkish National Assembly yet. In turn to intense pressures of

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<sup>47</sup> See, Presidency Conclusion 16-17 December 2004 , Paragraph 19

<sup>48</sup> For the text of Turkey’s declaration; see, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ek-protokol-ve-deklarasyon-metni.tr.mfa> (04.03.2010)

<sup>49</sup> For the text of EU’s counter-declaration; see, [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_5045\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5045_en.htm) (04.03.2010)

EU over the government to bring the Protocol to the Assembly immediately, Ankara has proposed the condition of removing isolation from the Northern Cyprus which has been blocked by Greek-Cypriots for years (*Ibid.*, 16).

The Negotiating Framework Document was approved on 3 October 2005 and EU started accession negotiations with Turkey. However, the Union repeatedly reminded the Turkish state the obligation rooted in the Customs Union Agreement, and with regard to the Cyprus issue, the Union particularly underlined that the resolution of the conflict should be accorded with the UN framework and also the EU principles (Negotiating Framework Document, 2005: Paragraph 6). In January 2006, Turkey initiated the Action Plan in relation to the Cyprus issue. Despite the fact that this Plan included permission the Greek-Cypriot ships and airplanes' access to the Turkish ports in turn to the integration of TRNC into the Customs Union and the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in sport, cultural and social activities, it was rejected by Republic of Cyprus proposing these conditions have been obligations to Turkey as a candidate country (Özer, 17). At the EU Summit of December 2006, then the European Council decided to suspend 8 of 35 headlines of the membership negotiations with Turkey due to lack of progress on the Cyprus issue. Also, the Council stated that it would evaluate the situation at the end of 2009.<sup>50</sup> In that year, EU did not add new headlines into the suspension of negotiations due to the new developments on the island such as the beginning of intercommunal negotiations between the parties commencing under the auspices of UN in September 2008. Despite the intense pressures of Republic of Cyprus in direction of suspension of new six headlines, the Council concluded that suspended eight headlines would be handled at the end of 2010.<sup>51</sup>

### **3.2.2. The Aegean Case: Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders**

Parallel to its enlargement towards new regions, the EU has witnessed a series of conflicts arose on its external boundaries (Rumelili, 2007:105). With regard to the resolution of some of these disputes, 'the EU can employ carrot/stick of granting/withdrawing an offer of membership, candidate or association status, or

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<sup>50</sup> These 8 headlines are free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union and external policies

<sup>51</sup> These 6 headlines are freedom of movement for workers; energy; judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture; foreign, security and defence policy

specific benefits associated with those positions to coerce or induce parties to seek resolution of their disputes' (*Ibid.*, 108). On the other hand, particularly on the border disputes relating the one of EU member states, the asymmetrical relation could provide the non-resolution of the border dispute due to the fact that it has encouraged the member state to pursue more uncompromising position (*Ibid.*). Within this framework, Greek-Turkish border conflict entitled the Aegean dispute has been emerged out of on external borders of EU since Greece's accession to the Union in 1981. Until the Imia crisis broken out in January 1996, however, EU had hesitated to be interested in this border conflict between Athens and Ankara in the Aegean Sea. This Union's neutral policy has changed in favour of its member, Greece, since the Imia crisis rooted in questioning of sovereignty over the two islets in the Aegean Sea.

Following the crisis, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a "Resolution on the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereign Rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union" on 15 February 1996. Accordingly, the Parliament notably concerned the 'dangerous violation' by the Turkish state over the sovereignty rights of Greece, a member state of the Union, and stressed that 'Greece's borders are also part of the external borders of the European Union' (1996: Paragraphs 1 & 3). After few months, at the EU General Affairs Council the fifteen Foreign Ministers of EU member states adopted the declaration with regard to the Imia crisis on 15 July 1996. Proposing the settlement of the dispute on the basis of international law, more importantly this declaration underlined that "the European Union has followed with serious concern the situation that has emerged as a consequence of the issue raised by Turkey concerning the Imia islets" (1996) Particularly in accordance with these two official documents adopted by EU institutions, it should be said that the Union has become a part of the Aegean dispute. Then, this fact was crowned by the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997. According to the conclusion of the Summit, the European Council stated the importance of establishing healthy ties between the Greek and Turkish states with regard to strengthening Turkey's relations with EU, and it addressed the legal process including notably the ICJ for the settlement of disputes between the parties (1997: Paragraph 35).

Despite the non-emergence of any conflicts in relation to the Aegean dispute between 1997 and 1999, the other events such as the S-300 missiles and Ocalan crises

contributed to the negative atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations, and these issues replaced the problems in the Aegean Sea. With the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, however, Athens reminded the Aegean dispute and uploaded it to the Union-level as mentioned before. In accordance with the Article 4 of Helsinki Presidency Conclusion, Ankara faced an obligation in favour of seeking the resolution of the dispute on the basis of peaceful settlement until the end of 2004. In accordance with the Article 4 of Helsinki Presidency Conclusion, Ankara faced another obligation in favour of seeking the resolution of the dispute on the basis of peaceful settlement until the end of 2004. Accordingly, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries started the exploratory negotiations in the form of bilateral meetings participated by the both sides' deputy ministers on the Aegean issues in March 2002.<sup>52</sup>

Parallel to these developments, the Aegean dispute also began to be mentioned in the Regular Reports under the headline of "peaceful settlement of border disputes" in 2001. Analyzing Turkey's progress towards accession year-by-year, these reports for instance welcomed recent developments in Greek-Turkish relations with the regard to the Aegean dispute particularly in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Within this framework, the European Council did not handle this issue at the end of 2004 although it had pointed out the date as the latest day for the settlement of the Aegean dispute. Instead, it restated the importance of peaceful settlement of the dispute by underlining EU's content of recent improvements in Turkey's relations with its neighbours as follows;

20. The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbours and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contact to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view what unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate (EU Presidency Conclusion 2004, Paragraph 20).

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<sup>52</sup> Lastly, on May 4, 2010 the 43<sup>rd</sup> exploratory negotiation was held among the parties. See; [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-94\\_-03-mayis-2010\\_-turkiye-ile-Yunanistan-arasinda-surdurulmekte-olan-temaslar-hk\\_.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-94_-03-mayis-2010_-turkiye-ile-Yunanistan-arasinda-surdurulmekte-olan-temaslar-hk_.tr.mfa)



Behind the Council's decision, also the attitude of the Greek government was effective. The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis did not voice the condition with regard to the settlement of Aegean dispute intensively while the Council was deciding to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.<sup>53</sup> Accordingly, it could be asked why the Greek government did not use its veto right against the Turkish state at this EU Summit. The recent developments such as the exploratory negotiations between these countries and Karamanlis' policy towards Turkey could provide this result to some extent. Moreover, Athens could want to keep its 'carrot/stick' policy for using effectively the following years. For instance, during his speech to the Greek Parliament in October 2005 Karamanlis 'warned the Turkish government that any threat or use of force if Greece extended its territorial waters was incompatible with EU values' (Ker-Lindsay, 74).

The Aegean dispute also reflected on the Negotiating Framework Document. As a guideline of Turkey's accession process, this framework document clearly emphasized that the advancement of accession negotiation has depended on Turkey's progress in fulfilment of requirements such as the commitment to good neighbourly relations. Within this framework, it reminded the Turkish state again its engagement in direction of resolving the border disputes in the light of United Nations Charter and if necessary the ICJ (2005: Paragraph 6). However, the existence of *casus belli* has paved the way for Athens to bring the Aegean dispute to the meetings of EU institutions particularly with regard to Turkey's EU membership process. Lastly, for instance, the EU Parliament Report on Turkey included the necessity for removal of *casus belli* while warning the Turkish state to cut immediately the violation of Greece's national airspace (Kriter, 2010: 14). Within this framework, it could be said that since December 2004 Athens has intensified its pressures over Turkey by linking the Aegean issues with the EU accession process instead of supporting for bringing the case to the ICJ.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Costas Karamanlis was later attacked by Greek politicians because of this decision. Particularly during the debate between Costas Karamanlis and George Papandreou on the Greek television for the forthcoming national elections held in October 2009, one of the issues mentioned importantly was the relations with Turkey. Papandreou particularly criticized the Karamanlis' government for not taking action in the issues with regard to the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea and the violation of Greek airspace by Turkish flights at the EU Summit of December 2004. (Kırbaki, 2009:12).

<sup>54</sup> One of the examples see, "Yunanistan Ege ve Kıbrıs'ın Tartışmalı Hava ve Deniz Sahasını AB Sınırı Yapmakta Israrlı", <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=28994> (13.02.2010)

### 3.2.3. Minority Issue

In contrast to the first two disputed issues in Greek-Turkish relations, which are generally mentioned in the EU Presidency Conclusions, the protection of minority issue has only been stated in the Regular Reports prepared by the European Commission for each candidate countries year-by-year. Within this framework, the protection of minority rights is regarded as one of important obstacles particularly for the candidate countries' accession process although it has not been agreed on a stable policy towards the protection of minority rights within EU (Kalaycı, 2006: 44). At the Union-level, this issue was firstly stated in the Copenhagen criteria which have constituted the rules defining whether a country is eligible to join the EU. However, these membership criteria have only addressed the candidate countries. In order to be a part of the EU, the candidate country in concern must meet three criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 which are political, economic and acceptance of the Community *acquis*. The Presidency Conclusion of the Summit described these obligations for candidate countries clearly as follows;

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (1993: Paragraph 7/iii).

The Treaty of Amsterdam putting these criteria into the EU law, however, excluded specifically the protection of minority rights out of EU's founding treaties (Kalaycı, 44). Thus, it could be said that the protection of minority rights has only been taken into consideration notably in relations with the candidate countries, not one of the EU's member states (Yaşın, 2005). As one of the candidate countries since the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, Turkey therefore has faced the obligations of EU with regard to the protection of minority rights which are importantly underlined in the Regular Reports. These reports have handled the main problems regarding minority issues in Turkey into the topics such as the non-Muslim foundations and the restrictions for non-Muslim communities in their religious and educational rights. Through these

reports particularly the EU has gained an important role in influencing Turkey's national law and rules regarding its minorities.<sup>55</sup>

Describing the situation of minorities in Turkey generally, the Regular Reports have firstly concerned the Greek community specifically in 2003. Accordingly, the European Commission initially mentioned educational problems of Greek community in Turkey. It stated that "Greek schools faced restrictions in recruiting teachers and having teaching materials approved, which adversely affected the teaching of the language" (2003: 39). Together with the issue of dual presidency in the management of minority schools these problems were later mentioned by the following Regular Reports concerning the educational problems encountered by the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

In the 2005 Regular Report, however, the Commission pointed out the dispute over the use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarchate (2005: 31). Emphasizing also the strict conditions with regard to the elections of heads of some religious churches, the report concerned particularly the difficulties in granting and renewal of residence and work permits of non-Turkish Christian clergy. (*Ibid.*). Additionally, the problem on training new clergy in the community was mentioned another Regular Report issued in 2009. Within this framework, the Commission stated the non-existence of private higher education and also opportunities in the public education system for the non-Muslim communities, while notably stressing the still-closure of the Halki Seminary School (2009: 21). Coincidence with these problems, the European Commission has referred to the restrictions for non-Muslim communities such as lack of legal personality and property rights. In the 2007 Regular Report, for instance, the problem with regard to the management of the non-Muslim foundations and the recovery of their properties were pointed out as the other obstacles in front of non-Muslim communities (2007: 17).

Due to the existence of 'Sèvres Syndrome' particularly in Turkish nationalists' mind, the issue of protection of minority rights has generally linked to the calling the minority communities in Turkey the 'internal enemies' which are used by EU. Expelled

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<sup>55</sup> Since the 2000 Regular Report, the European Commission has repeatedly concerned the non-signature of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Turkey.

out of the citizens of Republic of Turkey in these minds, these minority communities have entitled the most dangerous factors threatening the Turkish state. Despite the still existence of this myopic view in Turkish society to some extent, it could be said that the minority communities have gained opportunities to ameliorate their situations particularly with Turkey's candidacy status to the EU. Together with the Regular Reports, also the recommendations particularly voiced by Athens with regard to the situation of Greek minority have influenced Turkey's approach towards its minority communities which are exclusively recognized by the Lausanne Treaty. To link the situation of Greek minority in the Turkish state to Turkey's EU membership process, for instance, Dora Bakoyannis, the Foreign Minister of Greece between 2006 and 2009, stated as follows;

...as a candidate for accession to the EU, it has undertaken the obligation to comply with the principles, criteria and prerequisites, among which an important place is held by respect for religious freedom, and protection of minorities and respect for their rights...Within this framework, Greece – as a member of the European Union, and also due to its special interest – is raising issues concerning the functioning of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Halki Seminary, Istanbul Greeks and their property, Imvros and Tenedos. These issues are being raised by our side as a very serious parameter for further discussion of Turkey's European perspective, and not just as bilateral issue. (Bakoyannis, 2008)<sup>56</sup>

As a result of intense pressures rooted in the Commission's Regular Reports, the "Minority Issues Assessment Board" was set up in January 2004 by the Turkish government. In order to address the problems of non-Muslim minorities in the Turkish territory, this new institutional body is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Education, Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the State responsible for the Directorate General of Foundations. Moreover, the Regulation on the Methods and Principles of the Boards of Non-Muslim Religious Foundations was adopted in the June of the same year. This Regulation has sought to address the problems with regard to the issues threatening the existence of these foundations' properties. On the issue of nature of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul called the Phanar Greek Patriarchate (*Fener Rum Patrikhanesi*), however, on 26 June 2007 the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals (*Yargıtay*) concluded that the Patriarchate as the main representative church of

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<sup>56</sup> "Press Conference of FM Ms. Bakoyannis", Athens, 18 June 2008, Retrieved from; [http://www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/19062008\\_SB1414.htm](http://www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/19062008_SB1414.htm) (05.03.2009)

Greek minority in the Turkish state had no legal reason to introduce itself as the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Hürriyet, 2007). Referring to the Lausanne Treaty, the Court stated that the Patriarchate was subject to the Turkish law (*Ibid.*). Together with the religious framework, this non-recognition of the legal personality has resulted in the non-recognition of its property rights.

In contrast to the situation of the Patriarchate the issue of Halki Seminary School remaining to be closed since 1971 has witnessed breakthrough declarations and speeches voiced particularly by the Turkish government. Within this framework, in recent years, Ankara has seemed willing to reopen the Seminary. To illustrate these proofs, Bulent Arınç, the Turkish Vice-Prime Minister, underlined the government willingness to reopen the Seminary in March 2010 when he met the religious leaders of the non-Muslim communities in Istanbul (Radikal, 2010a). During his visit to Athens in May 2010, more importantly, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeated his government's wish to reopen the Halki Seminary while also emphasizing the use of the title of Ecumenical Patriarchate would not disturb him as a Prime Minister of Turkey (Radikal, 2010b).<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Remarkably, the Prime Ministry Circular relating to the minorities was issued on 14 May 2010 before only a day of Erdoğan's visit to Greece. For the circular see, <http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/05/20100513-17.htm>

## CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Turkey's desire to be a member of EU has enabled the Union to play a decisive role in Greek-Turkish relations. Particularly with the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, I think, this fact was proved *de jure* despite the existence of initial efforts of the Greek state as seen in this framework prior to the Summit. As understood throughout this study, there has been certainly a change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey since the mid-1990s. Despite the fact that the main disputed issues are still alive in its foreign policy agenda, Greece has tried to resolve these conflicts by using its EU membership which symbolizes the comparative advantage of Athens against the Turkish state. Particularly during the last decade Greece sees the importance of Europeanization of its bilateral relations with Turkey. By uploading its national cases to Brussels, Athens has attempted to eliminate its 'traditional' Turkish threat. This Greek policy has successfully concluded particularly in the Cyprus issue. While the Republic of Cyprus was *en route* to the EU membership as the only representative of the whole island, the Greek Prime Minister Simitis, for instance, used the word of 'enosis' only referring to the integration of the island with the EU, not the Greek state.<sup>58</sup> This Greek policy also provided the change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Cyprus issue. Following the end of 2002, Turkey adopted 'win-win' approach instead of strictly preserving status quo on the island.

Parallel to the existence of these bilateral problems in the light of EU factor, the Greek-Turkish relations have witnessed important developments in recent months. For instance, George Papandreou made his first foreign trip to Turkey in October 2009 to attend an informal Balkan countries' ministerial meeting held in Istanbul. As one of the pioneers for rapprochement period between Greece and Turkey notably when he had served as the Greek Foreign Ministers from 1999 to 2004, Papandreou's visit actually refreshed the bilateral relations. In turn, in May 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a landmark visit to Athens where the Greek government has suffered from the debt crisis since the end of 2009.

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<sup>58</sup> Because of Simitis' declaration using the word of 'enosis', there were arguments in Turkish politics with regard to the Cyprus issue. For details see, (Kırbaki, 2003)

In the beginning of 2010, it was discovered that Greece had paid Goldman Sachs and other banks hundreds of millions of dollars in fees since 2001 for arranging transactions that hid the actual level of borrowing. The purpose of these deals made by several subsequent Greek governments was to enable them to spend beyond their means, while hiding the actual deficit from the EU overseers. The government of George Papandreou seizing the power in October 2009 initially estimated the Greek deficit as 12.7%. However, the ratio of this deficit was revised to 13.6% in April 2010 (BBC, 2010). In order to ameliorate this shameful economic situation, Papandreou announced measures in February 2010. Within this framework, the cutting on Greece's defence expenditures has repeatedly been voiced. For instance, Evangelos Venizelos, the current Minister for National Defence in Greece, called for cooperation between Greece and Turkey particularly in economic fields by reducing expenditures in relation to the national defences of both sides (Radikal, 2010d). Under these circumstances, Erdoğan and his Greek counterpart Papandreou chaired the first joint-cabinet meeting between the two states particularly with the participation of Greek and Turkish ministers. At this meeting, the twenty-two bilateral agreements were signed between the parties particularly in terms of in terms of economy and migration.<sup>59</sup>

However, today the 8 headlines of accession negotiations are still suspended due to the Turkey's decisive attitude on non-recognition of Republic of Cyprus as one of the EU member states. As a candidate country, Turkey has repeatedly declared it never recognizes this EU member state. Moreover, this paradox will be again handled at the EU Summit held in December 2010. In the light of past experiences and some EU involvements, also, it is hard to be optimistic regarding the settlement of the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey. Because of existing technical and political impediments as mentioned in the second chapter of this study, the Aegean dispute symbolizes the main conflict area in Greek-Turkish relations. Emerging out of the complexity in the distribution of roles in this crisis, both sides have accused the other of pursuing revisionist policy in the Aegean Sea. Controversy to the Cyprus issue, however, the Aegean dispute has seen more negligible issue by the EU. Together with these two main problems, it could be said that the situation of Greek minority in Turkey

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<sup>59</sup> For details see, Yorgo Kırbaki, "Komşuyla Dostluğa 22 Perçin", Radikal, 15.05.2010, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=996895&CategoryID=81>

has been observed by the Regular Reports prepared by the European Commission. Within this framework, any progress in this issue has always been applauded or criticized by the Union intensively.



## APPENDIX I

### BERN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE (11 November 1976)<sup>60</sup>

1. The two parties agree that the negotiations shall be frank, thoroughgoing and pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual consent with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves.
2. The two parties agree that these negotiations shall by their very nature be strictly confidential.
3. The two parties reserve their respective positions with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf.
4. The two parties undertake not in any circumstances to make use of the provisions of this document, or such proposals as may be made by either side during these negotiations, outside the context of the negotiations themselves.
5. The two parties agree that there shall be no statements or leaks to the press on the contents of the negotiations, unless they decide otherwise by common accord.
6. The two parties undertake to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental shelf that might trouble the negotiations.
7. The two parties each undertake, so far as their bilateral relations are concerned, to refrain from any initiative or act likely to throw discredit on the other.
8. The two parties have agreed to study the practice of States and the international rules on the subject, with a view to eliciting such principles and practical criteria as might be of use in the case of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.
9. To that end, a mixed commission will be set up to be composed of national representatives.
10. The two parties agree to adopt a gradual rhythm in the negotiating process to be followed, after mutual consultation.

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<sup>60</sup> Retrieved from; <http://www.turkishgreek.org/bern.htm> (05.02.2010)

**APPENDIX II**  
**THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE**  
**SECTION III.**  
**PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.<sup>61</sup>**

**ARTICLE 37.**

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

**ARTICLE 38.**

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

**ARTICLE 39.**

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

**ARTICLE 40.**

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<sup>61</sup> Retrieved from: [http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty\\_of\\_Lausanne](http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne) (01.02.2010)

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

#### ARTICLE 41.

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

#### ARTICLE 42.

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

#### ARTICLE 43.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

ARTICLE 44.

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

ARTICLE 45.

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

**APPENDIX III**  
**THE DISPUTE OVER THE FLAG BETWEEN GREECE AND**  
**FYROM**



The Flag with the Vergina Sun rooted in Ancient Greece  
used by the FYROM between 1992-1995



The Flag of Macedonian region of Greece with the Vergina Sun



The current flag of the FYROM

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