

**T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE OF ISTANBUL:
ITS CURRENT STATUS AND INTERNATIONAL CLAIM WITH
REFERENCE TO TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP PROCESS**

Ph.D Thesis

AYŞE ASLI BİLGE

İstanbul, 2012

**T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE OF ISTANBUL:
ITS CURRENT STATUS AND INTERNATIONAL CLAIM WITH
REFERENCE TO TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP PROCESS**

Ph.D Thesis

AYŞE ASLI BİLGE

SUPERVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. DR. ÇİĞDEM NAS

İstanbul, 2012

T.C.
İSTANBUL
3. İDARE MAHKEMESİ
ESAS NO : 2010/2532

YÜRÜTMENİN DURDURULMASINI

İSTEYEN (DAVACI) : AYŞE ASLI BAYOĞLU
Etiler Çamlık Mevkii, Bıyıklı Mehmet Paşa Sokak
Çamlar Apt. 34/12 Beşiktaş-İstanbul
Beşiktaş/İSTANBUL

KARŞI TARAF (DAVALI) : MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ .
Göztepe /İSTANBUL

VEKİLİ : AV.NIYAZI DEMİRBOĞA (Aynı Yerde)

İSTEMİN ÖZETİ : Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Doktora Programı öğrencisi olan davacının, yapmış olduğu doktora tez savunmasının oyçokluğuyla reddi üzerine okuldan kaydının silinmesine ilişkin 21.09.2010 tarih ve 2010/XII sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının; hukuka aykırı olduğu, tez danışmanı olarak görev yapan öğretim üyelerinin objektif davranmadığı, yaptığı çalışmanın kabul görmemesinin gerekçelerinin anlaşılamadığı ileri sürülerek iptali ve yürütmenin durdurulması istenilmektedir.

SAVUNMA ÖZETİ : Yönetmelik hükümleri uyarınca davacının doktora tezi savunması için öğretim görevlilerinin belirlendiği, jüri olarak görev yapan öğretim görevlileri tarafından davacının çalışmasının yeterli bulunmayarak oyçokluğu ile reddedildiği, yapılan işlemlerin ve davacının kaydının silinmesinin yerinde olduğu, haksız açılan davanın reddi gerektiği savunulmaktadır.

TÜRK MİLLETİ ADINA

Karar veren İstanbul 3. İdare Mahkemesi'nce dava dosyası incelenerek işin gereği görüşüldü:

Dava, Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Doktora Programı öğrencisi olan davacının, yapmış olduğu doktora tez savunmasının oyçokluğuyla reddi üzerine okuldan kaydının silinmesine ilişkin 21.09.2010 tarih ve 2010/XII sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının iptali istemiyle açılmıştır.

Marmara Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği'nin "Doktora Tezinin Sonuçlandırılması" başlıklı 27.maddesinde; " a) Doktora programındaki bir öğrenci, elde ettiği sonuçları ilgili Kurul tarafından kabul edilen kurallara uygun biçimde yazmak ve tezini jüri önünde sözlü olarak savunmak zorundadır. b) Doktora tez jürisi, ilgili Program Başkanı ve Anabilim Dalı Başkanlığının önerisi ve Yönetim Kurulunun onayı ile atanır. Jüri, üçü öğrencinin Tez İzleme komitesinde yer alan öğretim üyeleri ve en az biri başka bir yükseköğretim kurumunun aynı veya yakın ana bilim dalında görevli öğretim üyesi olmak üzere beş kişiden oluşur. c) Jüri üyeleri, söz konusu tezin kendilerine teslim edildiği tarihten itibaren en geç bir ay içinde toplanarak öğrenciyi tez sınavına alır. Tez sınavı, tez çalışmasının sunulması ve bunu izleyen soru-cevap bölümünden oluşur. Sınav süresi en az 75, en çok 120 dakikadır. d) Tez sınavının tamamlanmasından sonra jüri, tez hakkında üyelerce hazırlanmış olan raporları da dikkate alarak, salt çoğunlukla "kabul", "red" veya "düzeltme" kararı verir. Bu karar, ilgili Ana Bilim Dalı Başkanlığınca tez sınavını izleyen üç gün içinde ilgili Enstitüye tutanakla bildirilir. Tezi reddedilen öğrencinin Enstitü ile ilişkisi kesilir. Tezi hakkında düzeltme kararı verilen öğrenci en geç altı ay içinde gereğini yaparak tezini aynı jüri önünde yeniden savunur. Bu savunma sonunda da tezi kabul edilmeyen öğrencinin Enstitü ile ilişkisi kesilir." düzenlemesine yer verilmiştir.

T.C.
İSTANBUL
3. İDARE MAHKEMESİ
ESAS NO : 2010/2532

Dava dosyasının incelenmesinden; 2003 yılında doktora öğrenimine başlayan davacının öğrencisi olduğu Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü, Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Doktora Programı'nda hazırladığı "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of İstanbul:Its Current Status and International Claim With Reference to Turkey's EU Membership Proces" konulu tezin savunmasının 28/12/2009 tarihinde yapıldığı ancak teze ilgili eksiklik olduğu belirtilerek davacıya tezi üzerinde gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmak üzere altı aylık ek süre verildiği, süre sonunda, 21/07/2010 tarihinde yeniden yapılan tez savunmasının oyçokluğu ile reddedildiği, jüri üyelerinin raporları üzerine Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü Yönetim Kurulu'nun, 21/09/2010 tarih ve 2010/XII sayılı kararı ile de davacının okul ile ilişkisinin Yönetmeliğin, 27/d maddesi gereği silindiği, davanın da söz konusu doktora tezinden başarısız sayılarak kayıt silme işleminin iptali istemiyle açıldığı anlaşılmaktadır.

Davacı iddiaları göz önüne alınarak, Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü, Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı doktora öğrencisi olan davacının, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of İstanbul:Its Current Status and International Claim With Reference to Turkey's EU Membership Proces" adlı doktora tezinin, üniversite yönetmelik hükümleri gözetilerek başarılı kabul edilip edilemeyeceği hususunun tespiti amacıyla 04.02.2011 tarihli Mahkememiz ara kararı ile bilirkişi incelemesi yaptırılmasına karar verilerek bilirkişiye teslim edilen ve 15.02.2012 tarihinde Mahkememize ibraz edilen bilirkişi raporunda; "söz konusu tezin, hacim ve öz itibarıyla kapsamlı olduğu, konuya ilişkin ciddi bir kaynak çalışması yapıldığı ve bunlardan yararlandığı, çalışmaya getirilen en temel eleştiri ve reddiyenin her doktora tezinde olması gereken aksine, çalışmanın bir tezi olmadığı, ancak yapılan incelemede bu eleştirinin akim kaldığı ve aksine çalışmanın iç ve dış akademik camiada bu konuda yapılmış olan çalışmalara kayda değer bir katkı sunduğunun görüldüğü, ayrıntılı olarak çalışmanın ilk sürümünde tadil edilmiş ikinci sürümünden daha sarıh görülen, Patrikhanenin "emperyal kurum" özelliğinden hareketle yapılan değerlendirmeler Ortodoks dünyasının başat kurumunun Doğu Roma İmparatorluğu döneminde ihdas edilmesinden günümüze kadar geçirdiği evreleri yeni bir tarihi, içtimai ve siyasi perspektifle ele aldığı, tezin özünde bahsedilen, Patrikhane kurumunun "emperyal" serencamı klasik İmparatorlukların ulus öncesi özelliklerine, ardından kurulan ulus - devletlerin ulusal egemenliklerine ve sonunda Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası egemenlik çerçevesine uyum sağlayarak günümüze kadar geldiği belirtilerek adayın yenilikçi yaklaşımını oluşturan bu okumanın, Patrikhane literatüründe az rastlanan bir siyasi tarih ve din tarihi çözümlemesi ve bu anlamda gerçek anlamda bir tez olduğu, tez hakkında menfi kanaat kullanan jüri üyelerinin diğer eleştirilerine, birkaç istisna dışında, katılmanın mümkün olmadığı, teze yöneltilen eleştirilerin arasında, konuyla ilgili Türkçe kaynaklara yeterince yer verilmediği hususunun yer aldığı ancak, tezin 47 sayfalık Bibliyografya bölümüne bakıldığında; bilimsel eserler, gazete makaleleri ve yargı kararlarını da içeren çok sayıda Türkçe kaynağın yer aldığı görüldüğü, tez sahibinin, ciddi bir kaynak taraması yaptığının anlaşıldığı, bahsedilen eserlerin, esas itibarıyla doğrudan tezin konusuyla ilişkili olup, tez sahibinin bu konuda yaptığı araştırmaya ve edindiği bilgilere ışık tutmakta; tez yazımında bu kaynaklardan yararlandığını gösterdiği, yine tezde vahim yazım hatalarına rastlanmadığı, bilimsel bir eserde intihal iddiası, hukuken vahim sonuçları beraberinde getiren önemli bir iddia olduğu ve bu iddianın ikna edici delillerle ispatlanması gerektiği bu ispat işlemi yapılmaksızın "mahdut alan bilgisi" ışığında "aşıkâr görünen" intihallerin tezin kabul ya da reddi noktasında esas alınmasının isabetli görünmediği, sonuç itibarıyla tezin, içerik itibarıyla bilimsel kriterlere uygun olduğu, tez sahibinin yorum ve değerlendirmeleri, kişisel görüş ve tercihlerini yansıtmakla beraber bilimsel tarafsızlık ve nesnellik sınırları içinde kaldığı ve varılan sonuçlar açısından bilimsel olduğu ve geniş bir kaynakçaya dayandığı kanaatine varıldığı " ifade edildiği bilirkişi raporunun Mahkememiz kararına esas alınabilir nitelikte olduğu görülmüştür.

T.C.
İSTANBUL
3. İDARE MAHKEMESİ
ESAS NO : 2010/2532

Yukarıda yer verilen hususlar ile bilirkişi raporu birlikte değerlendirildiğinde, Marmara Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği'nin belirlediği, bilimsel çalışmalarda bulunması gereken niteliklere uygun olarak hazırlandığı yapılan bilirkişi incelemesi ile ortaya konulan davacıya ait "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of İstanbul:Its Current Status and International Claim With Reference to Turkey's EU Membership Proses" adlı doktora tezinin oyçokluğuyla reddedilmesi sonucu doktora tezinden başarısız sayılarak tesis edilen kayıt silme işleminin de hukuka ve hakkaniyet ilkelerine uyarlık görülmemiştir.

Açıklanan nedenlerle; hukuka aykırılığı açık olan dava konusu işlemin; uygulanması halinde telafisi güç zararlar doğabileceğinden 2577 Sayılı Kanununun 27.maddesi uyarınca teminat alınmaksızın yürütülmesinin durdurulmasına, kararın tebliğinden itibaren 7 gün içerisinde Bölge İdare Mahkemesi'ne itiraz yolu açık olmak üzere 10/04/2012 tarihinde oybirliğiyle karar verildi.

Başkan
SELİM KURÇENLİ
37915

Üye
ERHAN YILMAZ
101800

Üye
EMİN ÖZTÜRK
107215

EY/EK



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My Ph.D process was thorny and painful but also very instructive. At the end, I hope to shed light to the unknown features of my topic.

I am indebted to a number of people and institutions who gave me the possibility to accomplish this thesis.

I wish to thank TÜBİTAK which gave me the financial support for my research abroad. Strasbourg University, MISHA Center provided me with excellent environment that every researcher would dream of. I wish to express gratitude for Prof. Francis Messner to accept me as a fellow there.

I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to Prof. Samim Akgönül who made all Strasbourg process possible. His help and encouragement was with me throughout the thesis. Without his assistance it would be very difficult to finish my work.

I warmly thank Prof. Cemil Oktay, who believed in me and supported me. His wide knowledge and encouraging comments have been of great value for me.

I sincerely thank Professors Cengiz Aktar, Emre Öktem, and Enis Tulça for evaluating my work and giving me the courage to continue my career as a researcher.

I also would like to mention the help provided by Patriarch Bartholomeos, Metropolitan Apostolos Danielidis and Reverend Dositheos Anagnostopoulos who gave me their time generously.

My warmest thanks are for my family, my father, mother, brother and my husband Emre. They believed in me and encouraged me when I found difficult to continue.

And finally my PhD thesis is dedicated to my newborn son Can for bringing joy and luck to my life.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı kuruluşundan bugüne İstanbul Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi'nin siyasi kurum ile ilişkilerini ve siyasetindeki değişimleri takip etmektir. Roma ve Osmanlı İmparatorluklarında bir devamlılık söz konusudur. Dünyevi ve uhrevi alanlarda tam bir uyumdan söz etmek mümkündür. Bu dönemde Patrikhane dil, ve etnik köken ayrımı yapılmaksızın tüm Ortodoksların hamisi ve lideri konumundadır.

Ulus devletlerin kuruluşu sadece imparatorlukları parçalamakla kalmamış, Patrikhane'nin de otoritesini sarsmıştır. Ortodoks halklar kendi kiliselerine sahip çıkmaya yönelirken, Patrikhane de bir azınlık kilisesine indirgenmiştir. Ancak zaman içinde Patrikhane yeni dünya düzenine uyum sağlamakla kalmamış, ulus aşan yeni bir yapılanmayla devlet sınırlarını aşmıştır.

Dolayısıyla Patrikhane başlangıçta emperyal bir kurum olmasına rağmen çağlar içinde yaşadığı farklı dönemlere adapte olmuş ve siyaset kurumuyla farklı şekillerde etkileşim içine girmiştir. Ekümenik sıfatı ulus-devlet sistemine geçilmesiyle birlikte emperyal bir nitelik taşımaktan çıkmış, Patrikhane'nin ulus üstü niteliğini vurguladığı yeni bir referans olmuştur.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde Demir Perde arkasındaki ülkelerde Patrikhane'nin ulusüstü niteliği tekrar keşfedilmiştir. Soğuk Savaşın bitişiyle AB çatısı altında tekrar birleşen Avrupa'da Patrikhane, özgürleşen Ortodoks halkların Moskova'dan bağımsızlaşma çabaları sonucunda tekrar bir çekim alanı oluşturmuştur. Bu dönemde, Kopenhag kriterleri ile somutlaştırılan insan hakları ve azınlık hakları ya da daha geniş bir ele alışla 'Avrupa değerleri' ön plana çıkmış, ayrıca çevre sorunları, dinler arası diyalog gibi konular, değer kazanmıştır. Patrikhane bir din kurumu olarak Avrupa'da hala söyleyecek sözü olduğunu bu konularda AB değerleriyle uyumlu aktif bir tavır alarak göstermiştir. Dolayısıyla dini kurumlara entegrasyon için vazgeçilmez sivil örgütler olarak bakan AB'nin de desteğini almıştır. Ayrıca yine bu dönemde AB'ye üye olmak isteyen Türkiye, Patrikhane ile olan ilişkisini yeniden gözden geçirme durumunda kalmıştır.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to trace back the shift in the politics of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul from its onset to present. There was continuity between the Roman and Ottoman Empires. The temporal and spiritual realms were in harmony. The Patriarchate was the protector and leader of all Orthodox subjects notwithstanding ethnic and linguistic differences.

Nation-state building not only shattered empires but also demolished Patriarchate's authority. While the Orthodox people founded their own national churches; the Patriarchate itself was reduced to a minority church in secular Turkey. Since then, the Patriarchate readjusted itself to fit in the new nation-state system with a transnational framework.

The Patriarchate that had an imperial foundation adapted itself to different ages and redefined its relations with the political institution. Ecumenical title lost its imperial meaning to become a new reference to underline the Patriarchate's supranational stance under the nation-state system.

During the Cold War period, the supranationality of the institution was rediscovered to be a model for the Orthodox churches of the iron curtain. The Patriarchate became attractive for the Orthodox liberalized after the end of the Cold War in an effort of independence from Moscow. During this period, human rights and minority rights or more broadly European values conceptualized in the Kopenhagen criteria came to the fore. Moreover, new issues such as the protection of environment and interfaith dialog were raised. The Patriarchate has been actively involved in these issues in harmony with European values. Therefore has got the endorsement of the EU which regards religious institutions as invaluable civil organizations for integration process. As a result, Turkey had to revise its Patriarchate policy as a part of EU requirements in line with the new role and visibility of the institution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	i
INTRODUCTION.....	1

CHAPTER I

FROM AN IMPERIAL TO A MINORITY CHURCH:

TRANSITION OF THE PATRIARCHATE

I. 1. The Patriarchate under the Roman Empire	14
I. 1. 1. Political Power and the Church	15
I. 1. 2. The Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate over other Orthodox Churches	19
I. 1. 3. Conversion of the Slavs.....	22
I. 2. A Fresh Start under the Ottoman Empire	26
I. 2. 1. The Authority of the Patriarchate over Other Orthodox	31
I. 2. 2. The End of the “Ecumenical” in the Age of Nationalism	35
I. 2. 2. 1. The Foundation of Balkan Orthodox Churches.....	39
I. 2. 2. 1. 1. Greek Independence: First Attack to the Patriarchate	40
I. 2. 2. 1. 2. Serbian Independence	42
I. 2. 2. 1. 3. Romanian Independence	43
I. 2. 2. 1. 4. Developments at the Albanian Orthodox Church	43
I. 2. 2. 1. 5. Foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate	44
I. 2. 2. 2. Conflicts in the Middle Eastern Patriarchates.	48
I. 2. 2. 2. 1. Patriarchate of Alexandria and Ali Paşa	48
I. 2. 2. 2. 2. Patriarchate of Antioch and Greek-Arab Imbroglia	48
I. 2. 2. 2. 3. Patriarchate of Jerusalem: Battlefield of Great Powers	49
I. 2. 2. 3. The Ottoman Reforms and the Patriarchate.....	51
I. 2. 2. 3. 1. The Opening of the Heybeliada Theology School.....	53
I. 2. 2. 3. 2. The <i>Nizamat</i> of the Greek <i>Millet</i>	58
I. 2. 2. 4. Shift in the Traditional Stance of the Patriarchate.....	62
I. 2. 2. 4. 1. The Patriarchate during the Armistice Period.....	66

I. 2. 2. 5. The Orthodox Scene in the World at the End of the World War I	69
I. 2. 2. 2. 5. 1. The Russian Revolution and its Outcomes	70
I. 2. 2. 2. 5. 2. The Challenge of the Living Church.....	71
I. 2. 2. 2. 5. 3. Foundation of the Russian Diaspora Church.....	73
I. 2. 2. 2. 5. 4. New Churches Looking for Independence.....	74
I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 1. The Orthodox Church of Finland	75
I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 2. The Orthodox Church of Poland	75
I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 3. The Orthodox Church of Estonia.....	77
I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 4. The Orthodox Church of Latvia	78
I. 2. 3. 5. 2. Pan-Orthodox Congress of 1923	79
I. 2. 3. 5. 3. Ecumenical Relations Strengthened	80
I. 2. 5. 4. A Breakthrough: Establishment of the Greek Orthodox Diaspora Churches under the Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate	82
I. 3. The Imperial Church Disappears: The Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic	86
I. 3.1. Discussions over the Status of the Patriarchate at Lausanne Peace Conference: Turkish Delegation’s Stance.....	87
I. 3. 1. 1. Allied Delegations Insist on the Ecumenical Character of the Institution.....	91
I. 3. 2. New Status of the Patriarchate Agreed at Lausanne	95
I. 3. 2. 1. Patriarchate’s Protection as a Minority Church.....	97
I. 3. 2. 1. 1. International Minority Protection in the Aftermath of the World War I.....	97
I. 3. 2. 1. 2. Minority Protection Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne.....	100
I. 3. 2. 1. 3. The Status of the Patriarchate Under Turkish Law.....	102
I. 3. 3. Adjustment of the Patriarchate to the Turkish Republic	103
I. 3. 3. 1. Abolition of the Caliphate and its Effects on the Patriarchate.....	106
I. 3. 3. 2. New Civil Code: Last Privileges Lost	110
I. 3. 4. The Greco-Turkish Rapprochement and Its Effects on the Patriarchate.....	111
I. 3. 5. International Spiritual Activities of the Patriarchate under the Republic.....	114
I. 3. 5. 1. Relations with Russian Diaspora	115
I. 3. 5. 2. Agreements with the Greek Orthodox Church	118
I. 3. 5. 2. 1. Jurisdiction of the <i>New Lands</i>	118
I. 3. 5. 2. 2. Status of Mount Athos	119

I. 3. 5. 3. Ecumenical Relations of the Patriarchate	120
Conclusion.....	121

**THE PATRIARCHATE DURING THE COLD WAR:
BETWEEN TWO POLES AND UNDER THE SHADOW OF CYPRUS PROBLEM**

II. 1. The Setting of the Cold War	124
II. 1. 1. Human Rights in a Bipolar World	126
II. 1. 2. The Impact of Religion in the Cold War.....	129
II. 1. 3. The US' War with Communism and the Patriarchate's Role	130
II. 2. Patriarchate Policy of Turkey during the Cold War	132
II. 2. 1. The Election of Patriarch Maximos	134
II. 2. 2. The HTS Changes Status	136
II. 2. 3. Revival of the Patriarchate under the American Patriarch.....	137
II. 2. 3. 1. Athenagoras' First Years in Turkey	139
II. 2. 4. Cyprus Crisis: End of the Honeymoon	142
II. 2. 5. Measures against the Greek Minority	147
II. 2. 5. 1. Reactions from the Religious Leaders.....	152
II. 2. 6. The End of Athenagoras Era: Election of Patriarch Dimitrios	153
II. 3. The Religious Scene after the World War II	154
II. 3. 1. Revival of the Moscow Patriarchate by Stalin as a Foreign Policy Tool.....	155
II. 3. 2. Moscow Patriarchate and the Satellite Churches	156
II. 3. 3. Moscow Undermines the Prerogatives of Fener	157
II. 3. 4. The End of Bulgarian Schism	159
II. 3. 5. The Persecution of the Moscow Patriarchate	160
II. 3. 2. Fener's Efforts to Reconciliation with the Russian Church.....	161
II. 3. 2. 1. Proclamation of the Bulgarian Patriarchate.....	163
II. 3. 3. Ecumenical Relations	164
II. 3. 3. 1. Vatican II Council, its Aftermath and Orthodox Reactions	164
II. 3. 3. 2. Relations with the Oriental Orthodox	168
II. 3. 3. 3. The Pan-Orthodox Rhodes Conferences	170
II. 3. 3. 4. The WCC and the Patriarchate	175

II. 3. 2. 3. The Greek Orthodox Diaspora: Main Support of the Patriarchate	178
Conclusion.....	186

CHAPTER III
THE PATRIARCHATE IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

III. 1. Creating a World on Western Values and the Role of the Patriarchate	188
III. 1. 1. Religion in the New World Order	190
III. 1. 2. The US Approach to Religion and Religious Freedoms	193
III. 1. 2. 1. The US Policy towards the Patriarchate in Post Cold War Period.....	200
III. 1. 2. 2. Turkey’s Reaction to the US Interventions	201
III. 2. The EU Integration: Divided Continent Unites around the Same Values	202
III. 2. 1. The Approach of the EU to Religion and Religious Institutions	207
III. 2. 1. 1. Religion in the EU Documents	212
III. 2. 2. The EU’s Vision of the Patriarchate	215
III. 2. 2. 1. The Patriarchate and the Commission: Good Partners	216
III. 2. 2. 2. The EU Parliament and the Patriarchate.....	218
III. 2. 2. 3. The Representation of the Patriarchate at Brussels	221
III. 3. Turkey and the Patriarchate in the European Integration Process	224
III. 3. 1. The EU Effect on the Policy Change.....	226
III. 3. 1. 1. Patriarchate in the Progress Reports of Turkey	227
III. 3. 2. Discussions over the Patriarchate.....	233
III. 3. 2. 1. Ecumenical Title	234
III. 3. 2. 2. Reopening of the HTS.....	238
III. 3. 2. 2. 1. Official Stance	238
III. 3. 2. 2. 2. Patriarchate’s Views.....	246
III. 3. 2. 2. 3. Academia’s Division over the Reopening of the HTS	248
III. 3. 2. 2. 4. New Formulae to Reopen the HTS	252
III. 3. 2. 2. 5. Training Clergy: The French Example	253
III. 3. 2. 3. The Legal Status of the Patriarchate	254

III. 4. International Challenges and Opportunities on the New Religious Scene.....	259
III. 4. 1. The Russian Challenge	261
III. 4. 1. 1. Granting Autocephaly a Means for Leadership	262
III. 4. 1. 2. Unifying Efforts of the Patriarchate of the Divided Churches.....	264
III. 4. 1. 3. The “Orthodox Unity” Collapses: Rivalry between Moscow and Istanbul .	267
III. 4. 1. 3. 1. Problem of Estonia	270
III. 4. 1. 3. 2. Problems about the Church Situation in the Ukraine.....	271
III. 5. Relations with the Vatican	277
III.6. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and the Patriarchate.....	285
III.7. Relations with the Greek Church	290
Conclusion.....	295
CONCLUSIONS.....	296
BIBLIOGRAPHY	301
ANNEXES.....	354
I. Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate.....	355
II. Tomos of the Polish Orthodox Church.....	358
III. Tomos of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.....	362

INTRODUCTION

Religious institutions are not only designed to meet spiritual needs of the community of believers. They have a social role consisting essentially in binding people together around a common identity. They are also important political actors often working under the wings of the political power, cooperating with distinct groups around common interests. As Ramet puts it bluntly¹:

(R)egardless of what religious organizations may profess to be today, their incunabula were quintessentially political, and churches may, accordingly, be regarded as vestigial political organizations par excellence. Shorn of their governing function and, in recent centuries, increasingly shorn of their monopoly in spheres of socialization (...), the churches have retained their political character by adopting a new countenance as the guardian of discrete interests, even as interest groups.

Increasing trends of secularisation in the course of the past centuries pushed away religious institutions from government. With few exceptions in the world, theocratic regimes are no longer an option for modern states. In the constantly changing political conditions, religious institutions had to readapt themselves in changing church-state relations and world politics. On the international plane, religious institutions, like other non-state actors in world politics, change or adopt discourse and behaviour to adjust to a given international environment. In the case of the Orthodox world, that is divided between national churches, rivalries between the members of the group as it is the case between the Patriarchate and the Russian church, often shape their policies and their coalitions with other churches, depending on the prevailing political conditions.

Like all religious institutions, the Patriarchate of Istanbul² (henceforth the Patriarchate or Fener) is also a political actor by nature. The title ecumenical that the institution uses for centuries adds an extra importance to this role. The title connotes a “universal” nature, notwithstanding the Patriarchate’s essentially ethnic, Greek nature. One

¹ Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Interplay of Religious Policy and nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European Politics*, Duke University Press, 1989, p. 3-41 at p. 4.

² The historical name of the institution is the Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (Oikoumenikó Patriarkheío Kōnstantinouπόλεως), the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The nomination of the Patriarch in the Christian theology is Archbishop of Constantinople and the New Rome and the Ecumenical Patriarch. In Turkish it is referred as Rum Ortodoks Patriklîği or Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi with reference to its location in Istanbul. In English ‘Greek’ is the only word use for the Greeks of Greece, Diaspora and Greek minority in Turkey. However, in Turkish and in Greek, there is a clear distinction between a Greek of Greece (Yunanlı-Eλληνας) and a Greek of Turkey (Rum-Roμιος). We preferred to use Greek instead of *Rum*, providing that in English there is no such word.

major component of the “ecumenicity” of the Patriarchate is its assumed leadership role in the Orthodoxy. This role –that is challenged constantly- turns the Patriarchate to an assertive actor in world politics. In addition to the “ecumenical” we should also add, “transnational” nature of the church, as we will see in the following paragraphs that is being capable of operating beyond the borders of a state. The Patriarchate has a network of ecclesiastical units worldwide situated where the Greek Diaspora has been settled during the past centuries. These regions are mainly in the capitalist countries, making the Patriarchate the representative of the Orthodoxy in the West. The European integration added an extra output to the international position of the church as the Orthodoxy became one of the major Christian denominations, alongside the Roman Catholic Church and Protestantism under the roof of the European Union (EU).

However, this assumption is in total contrast with the church’s position in Turkey. The institution, after living for centuries in total harmony with the political power, has now the status of a minority church in the country. The imperial tradition of identification of the church with the state was broken by the end of the Ottoman Empire. The ethno-religious identification (Turkish and Muslim respectively) of the new nation-state was exclusive towards non-muslims. Moreover, the independence war fought against Greece at the end of the World War I, in the words of Birtek, constituted a “founding myth” for the new Turkish nation-state³. Consequently the Patriarchate was identified with Greek and Ottoman identities that were both refuted.

There are no legal instruments in Turkey, specifically defining the status of the Patriarchate. It is generally acknowledged that its status stems from the founding Treaty of Turkey signed in Lausanne in 1923. Thus Turkey bound itself to a narrow definition of the Patriarchate as a minority institution. In the absence of a definition and recognition of the institution, the church is submitted to the general minority policy applicable to non-Muslim minorities of the Lausanne regime.

As the state refuse to define its relations with the church, it has often limited capacity to have a say over its activities. Throughout the republican period, the church has experienced

³ Faruk Birtek, “Greek Bull in the China Shop of Ottoman ‘Grand Illusion’: Greece in the Making of Modern Turkey” in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragoran (eds.), *Citizenship and Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London; New York: Routledge, 2005 (Social and Historical Studies on Greece and Turkey Series), p. 37-48.

an adjustment process to its new status that resulted in the re-definition of the ecumenicity. Reduced to a small bishopric with few Greek Orthodox remained in Turkey but still first in the Orthodox hierarchy, it emphasised its universality addressing to all Orthodox around the world and built relations in line with international –Western- political expediencies. Turkey, instead of developing a visionary policy of Patriarchate considering its place in Orthodoxy and its transnational links, was marginalized in the policy of the Patriarchate.

The increasing trend of anchoring of the country to the West has an impact on the appraisal of the institution in Turkey. The process of European integration added a new dimension in the church-state relations since the (EU) was increasingly involved in the domestic policy of the country raising the concern about the treatment of the Patriarchate, including the demands for the recognition of its international status.

Transnational v. Ecumenical

One of the errors common to the academic research focusing on the international status and activities of the Patriarchate is the confusion of the “transnational” and “ecumenical” natures of the institution. According to Della Cava, “a transnational religious institution has the structure and capacity to move and circulate ideas, man power and finances across the state system and the capitalist world economy”⁴. Today most religious institutions are transnational actors due to globalization and unprecedented immigration trends. In the words of Thomas, “globalization (...) has contributed to the formation and consolidation of transnational religious groups with linkages in different countries at the national and subnational levels”⁵. Globalization made without a doubt an enormous contribution to the internationalization of the Patriarchate, first by the creation of new Diaspora communities throughout the world but also by opening new ways of communication within and outside Orthodoxy

In Orthodoxy, historical Patriarchates of Antioch and Istanbul, as well as Serbian and Russian churches are typical examples of transnational entities, working across the boundaries

⁴ Ralph Della Cava, “Transnational Religions: The Roman Catholic Church in Brazil and the Orthodox Church in Russia”, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2001, p. 535-550 at p. 536; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, “Introduction” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, The Central Lands*, New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 1-33 at p.1.

⁵ Scott Thomas, “Religion and International Conflict” in Ken Dark (ed.), *Religion and International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2000, p. 1-23 at p. 6.

of their respective states⁶. Fener's transnationality manifest itself in sixty-seven Metropolitans and Archbishops dispersed from Turkey to New Zealand working directly under its spiritual authority⁷. Including thirty-five Metropolitans in New Lands, which are bound to the Church of Greece by a special arrangement⁸, this makes a network of around 100 ecclesiastical units worldwide.

The clergy working for the Patriarchate and the Holy Synod are composed of members working for the Metropolitanates of the aforementioned regions. At the time of writing of the thesis in 2010, nine out of a total of 13 clergy working at the Patriarchate in Istanbul were foreign nationals, eight Greeks and one American⁹. The twelve members of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate are Turkish and foreign nationals¹⁰ albeit this practice is contrary to the *Rum Patrikliği Nizamı* [General Ordinances of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate] and legal practices under the Turkish Republic setting that the Patriarch and Metropolitans shall be Turkish citizens¹¹.

Finances of the Patriarchate is also gives us a transnational picture¹². The church doesn't get any financial help from the Turkish state. A little share of the Patriarchal revenues comes from the *Vakıfs* (Pious Foundations) in Istanbul. The Patriarchate is not a legal entity and doesn't have property registered on its name. The only exception is the Greek Orphanage building at Büyükkada, returned to the Patriarchate with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)¹³ that would directly contribute to the Patriarchate's budget. The *Vakıf* of the Patriarchate which has a legal personality is Agios Georgios Church Foundation (*Aya Yorgi Kilise Vakfı*). This together with other *Vakıfs* of the Churches in Turkey donate a

⁶ Alicja Curanović, "The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate Towards Other Orthodox Churches", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2007, p. 301-318 at p. 302

⁷ See Annex I and official website of the Patriarchate, <http://www.patriarchate.org/patriarchate/hierarchy-of-the-throne> (12 August 2010)

⁸ For the arrangements made with Greece see p. 120-121. For the full list of the new Lands see official website of the Patriarchate, <http://www.patriarchate.org/patriarchate/hierarchy-of-the-throne> (12 August 2010)

⁹ 1st Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 26, 2009.

¹⁰ In a practice unprecedented in history the Patriarchate appointed two Greeks, one American, one British and one New Zealander and one Finnish national to the Holy Synod. See "Patrik'e Yakın Takip" [Close Pursuit to the Patriarchate], *Hürriyet*, 5 May 2004.

¹¹ Cihan Osmanağaoğlu, Cihan Osmanağaoğlu, *1862 Rum Patrikliği Nizamı Çerçevesinde Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, Istanbul: On iki Levha Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 261.

¹² All information about the finances of the Patriarchate is provided by Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, 2nd interview, Istanbul, October 30, 2009.

¹³ ECtHR, *Affaire Fener Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcuménique) c. Turquie*, Application No. 14340/05, Strasbourg, July 8, 2008 (definitive); ECtHR, *Affaire Fener Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcuménique) c. Turquie*, Application No. 14340/05, Strasbourg, June 15, 2010 (equitable satisfaction).

share of their income that they receive from their properties. The revenue of the Patriarchate is accumulated in an account at *Garanti Bankası* (Garanti Bank) in Istanbul.

Greece provides regular aid to the Patriarchate every year according to the “reciprocity” principle that was stipulated in Lausanne Treaty, Art. 45¹⁴. Just like Turkey provides aid to the Western Thrace where a considerable Turkish minority lives, Greece accords an aid to the Patriarchate. However, the Greek aid is not regular and depends on the economic situation of the country. For example, when Greece was invaded by Nazis during the World War II, the aid was interrupted for four years, ruining the institution as well.

Churches under the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate worldwide also donate to the Patriarchate a part of their income. This payment is by no means regular but depends on the revenue of the aforementioned churches. As there is no fixed church tax, the revenue is variable. The real life vein of the Patriarchate is the Greek Diaspora in North America and Australia. Especially the contribution of the donations provided by the “Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate” (Order of St. Andrew)¹⁵ is considerable without which the Patriarchate simply can not survive.

Apart from this, the website of the Patriarchate is prepared in the USA, its journal *Orthodoxia*, printed in Thessaloniki, its clergy trained in the Greek Orthodox theology schools in Greece, USA, France and elsewhere.

While many Orthodox churches may have a claim to transnationality in the increasingly globalized world, “ecumenic” title is a monopoly of the Patriarchate. The word “ecumenic” etimologically derives from Greek word *οικουμένη* (ekumeni) that means world, universe¹⁶. The term was used to denote the “inhabited world”, the world under the influence

¹⁴ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları [Turkey's Political Treaties]*, Vol. I (1920-1945), 3rd ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000, p. 105.

¹⁵ Archons are the honorees of the Patriarchate, who have been selected from among the wealthiest and prestigious members of the laity due to the service to the Church. The order of St. Andrew, comprising the Archons living in America was founded in 1966 under Patriarch Athenagoras, when Archbishop Iakovos conferred the honor upon thirty members of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. The Archons are selected from among the wealthiest and most influential members of the community. The press releases, reports and activities of the Archons are available at Order of St. Andrew the Apostle, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, www.archons.org. (10 August 2010)

¹⁶ οίκος=house, μένω= live; οικουμένη (ikumeni)= world, universe; οικουμενικός-ή-ό= universal, *English Greek-Greek-English Dictionary*, Athens: ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ, 1997.

of the Christian Roman Empire¹⁷. As we will see in the first chapter, the ecumenical title has neither been readily accepted nor promoted in the Christian world. A product of the Roman and Byzantine and then the Ottoman Empires, the Patriarchate a that was a state-church, “could entertain ecumenical pretensions with some plausibility only as long as it was identified with an empire”¹⁸. When the empire came to an end with the advent of the age of nationalism, the Patriarchate was no longer capable to insure the allegiance of the Orthodox under its jurisdiction.

If the Patriarchate is no longer ecumenical in the real sense of the word, what does the title “ecumenical”, so jealously safeguarded by the Patriarchate means?

The Patriarchate has a special status among the Orthodox churches as the senior church, first in the Orthodox hierarchy, “primus inter pares” meaning first among equals. This connotation implies the peculiar foundation of the Orthodoxy as a sisterhood of equal churches. Today, the Orthodox world is a family or group, which has no central organization but rather is a loose confederation in the form of a honeycomb, formed by independent – autocephalous- churches⁵. These ecclesiastical units have the right “on the strictly canonical plain”, ‘the right to elect their own bishop or bishops’⁶. The supreme authority in each church lies with a ‘local’ council of clergy and laymen. There are fourteen autocephalous churches canonically founded, meaning by all other Orthodox churches¹⁹.

By ecumenical council decisions and tradition, these churches have no rights to interfere in each others affairs. From the outset, the Patriarchate was not a supreme authority that has a right to say over the affairs of other Orthodox churches. However, the total fusion of the state and church under the Roman Empire that continued in a sense under the Ottomans gave the Patriarch this –uncanonical authority- over other Orthodox only within the borders of the State. While the Orthodox allows for national divisions as we will explore in the first chapter, the Orthodox scene is filled with nation-churches. Total submission to political

¹⁷ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945*, London, New York: Longman, 1999, p. 6.

¹⁸ Georgios Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 117-136 at p. 127.

¹⁹ In hierarchical order, these are Patriarchates of Istanbul, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Churches of Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Albania, Czech Lands and Slovakia.

authority is a peculiarity of the Orthodox Church from its inception by Emperor Constantine I.

The Patriarchate has prerogatives that are at the foundation of its ecumenical claim. Those prerogatives stem from the decisions of the ecumenical councils or simply by Orthodox tradition. Despite being challenged if not plainly contested by other Orthodox Churches, especially Russian Patriarchate- we may enumerate the main prerogatives as follows²⁰:

1. Equal privileges to Rome (Canon 3 of the second ecumenical council, Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, Canon 36 of the Quinisext Council)
2. The right to hear appeals, if invited regarding disputes between clergy (Canons 9 and 17 of the fourth Ecumenical Council)
3. The right to ordain bishops for areas outside defined canonical boundaries (canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council)
4. The right to establish stavropegial²¹ monasteries even in the territories of other patriarchates (the epanogue, commentaries of Matthew Blastares and Theodore Balsomon)

To these, Stavridis, a prominent theologian from the Patriarchate adds the right of initiative to start any Orthodox correspondence on inter-Orthodox, inter-Christian even international issues; call for pan-Orthodox Synods, preside over them and to specify the place, the time and the manner of their operation; to grant autonomy, autocephaly, and patriarchal status to churches previously under its jurisdiction, with the consent of the Other Orthodox churches, to deliberate on issues of exceptional nature that are the concern of one or more Orthodox churches and are related to faith, ethics, ecclesiastical law, administration, etc. either directly from the Phanar, or through the dispatch of patriarchal exarchs or exarchies among others²².

These rights that are claimed by the Patriarch imply clearly a leadership role in Orthodoxy. The ecumenical claim of the Fener *avant tout* concerns the Orthodox world and then the Christian world at large. While speaking with one voice for the divided Orthodox Churches is a necessity, there is no consensus among the Orthodox on the conferral of that right to the Patriarchate. Division of the churches to mainly national or ethnic units makes the

²⁰ “Prerogatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *OrthodoxWiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Prerogatives_of_the_Ecumenical_Patriarchate (15 August 2010)

²¹ “Stavropegial”, *OrthodoxWiki*, <http://orthodoxwiki.org/Stavropegial> (13 August 2010)

²² Vasil T. Stavrides, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, (tr. & ed. from the Greek original by George Dion Dragas), *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 57-153 at p. 90-91.

Orthodoxy one of the most vivid political scenes of the world. Orthodoxy allows for the foundation of new church units upon ethnic basis. The creation of new ecclesiastical entities are political rather than religious acts.

The Orthodox world therefore is more open to the intervention of the players in world politics since the leadership of Orthodox is claimed both by Russian (by population) and Fener (by prerogatives) Patriarchates. The ecumenical title is prominently a component of the power struggle between those two churches in world politics, since without it the Fener would be reduced to a small church, albeit with a transnational network²³.

To this we should add that the leadership claim of the Patriarchate is bolstered by the West beyond the institutions real capacity to fulfill it, against the claims of a too national, too Russian, too anti- West Moscow Patriarchate. Since the claim of the Russian Empire and its church for a leadership role within Orthodoxy that was sealed with the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1766, the Western alliance did not step backing the Patriarchate against an assertive Moscow Church. Therefore the main axis in the ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate and its backing by Western powers is the Russian Patriarchate. This trend has become most obvious with the bipolar division of the world during the Cold War, when the world was led by the communist Soviet Union from one side and capitalist United States of America on the other. Consequently, both patriarchates were inevitably instrumentalized, played against each other to fulfill specific policy visions.

For over two decades since the Cold War system has been over, the new world order has a multi-polar setup, in addition to unprecedented integration trends in Europe. During this period, the rivalry between the two bastions of Orthodoxy has not been halted. However, new factors have appeared to diversify and bolster the ecumenical stance of the Patriarchate. The creation of the European Union (EU) that envisaged political integration alongside the long time invested economic union, created a supra-national entity in Europe. For the first time in history since the end of the universal Roman Empire, the Orthodox peoples, that were regarded as the “other Europe” came together with other Christian denominations under the

²³ The total population under the jurisdiction of the Fener is estimated around 7. 750.000. See Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi [Greek Patriarchate of Istanbul in the Republican Period]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2003, p. 28.

same roof. With the help of Protestant and Catholic Churches endorsing it as the leader of Orthodoxy against an irreconcilable Moscow, the Patriarchate further increases its influence.

Challenges of the transitional period, the need to find a consensus over the European values and above all the renewed salience of religion and religious institutions all around the world gave a new kiss of life to the Patriarchate. Fener is well represented in Europe, not only by force of Greek insistence on the international importance of the institution. It is represented at the community institutions, it has an office in Brussels. In the person of Bartholomeos, it could respond to the stemming problems of the modern age such as intolerance, lack of dialogue between religions and religious leaders, environmental problems and so on. It should be noted that all these problems were high on the agenda of the EU and other European institutions as well.

Aims of the Study

The problematisation of the “ecumenical” and “transnational” natures of the Patriarchate in relation with the “minority church” position in Turkey is the main aim of this study. This problematisation is effectuated in three parts, first by the analysis of the church-state relations prevailing since the setting up of the church as an imperial institution. It is assumed that the nation-state logic is not compatible with the “imperial” set up of the church. The “ecumenical” and “transnational” characters of the church has been viewed with suspicion in Turkey because it operates in a domain where the state cannot effectively interfere. Second part analyses the salience of the patriarchate in world politics. The point of departure for this analysis is that the Patriarchate was instrumentalized in order to fulfil particular policy expediencies of the West. It is hypothetically assumed that the Patriarchate was identified with its place in the Western alliance, where Turkey has taken its place.

The research aimed to trace the activities of the Patriarchate and examine them within a broader international political context that would provide the motives for change in attitude or action. It is hypothetically assumed that the ecumenical activities were in line with the Western alliance and Turkish interests despite the fact that “ecumenical title” is hotly contested in the country. Also, we must distinct the “ecumenical” and “transnational” characters of the church, for that in fact Turkey objects the transnational but not the

ecumenical nature of the church taking in account state sovereignty. In this context the EU integration adds an extra salience to the analysis because the organization creates in a sense a “new Empire” where the total sovereignty of the states was substituted under a supranational roof with its legal, administrative, political and economic regulations. Under that roof, religious institutions has been regarded as representatives of the segments of society and should be given an attentive ear as a requirement of democracy. In that sense, the Turkish position is constantly challenged by the EU, first by its own ecumenic stance undermining state sovereignty and second by its conditionality principle that gives a right of interference in the affairs that were deemed purely domestic.

The third part concerns the relations between the churches. Religious institutions do not always follow the policies imposed by their respective states or as in the case of the Patriarchate of a bloc where they belong. They are also able to develop their own policies. It is assumed in the thesis that the theory of constant conflict with the Russian church does not reflect the whole reality. The research hypothetically puts forward the assumption that religion has also its own logic, independent from the power struggles in world politics.

Method

Throughout the writing of this thesis, an extensive range of books and articles have been explored to provide knowledge on the subject. The primary sources such as international treaties, recommendations, opinions, reports, declarations of the international organizations, especially those of the UN, CoE, OSCE and the EU; historical documents such as *tomos*²⁴, encyclicals, circulars, declarations of the Fener and related institutions; speeches of the Patriarch and other religious leaders have been used when available. Especially two rare historical documents, the *Tomos* of the Polish Orthodox Church (1924) and the *Tomos* of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church provided to the author have been a major excitement.

The archives of several newspapers especially those of the New York Times and the Times, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet* and *Radikal* newspapers has been extensively explored. The Europaica Bulletin of the Russian Patriarchate and Interfax News Agency provided the author with up-to-date information on contemporary discussions in the Orthodox

²⁴ A tomos is “a small book that contains a major announcement or similar text promulgated by a holy synod such as a grant of autocephaly”, see “Tomos”, *orthodoxwiki*, <http://orthodoxwiki.org/Tomos> (12 August 2010)

world. The official websites of several Orthodox Churches especially that of the Patriarchate of Istanbul offered an extensive area of exploration with a myriad of documents, *inter alia*, Patriarch's addresses all around the world, the institutions contacts with prominent politicians and international organizations, conclusions of the pan-Orthodox and ecumenical meetings.

Interviews were conducted with high ranked officials of the Patriarchate including the Patriarch Bartholomeos I himself. Rev. Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Department responded to the questions of the researcher three times, Met. Apostolos Danielidis, Metropolitan of Moshonisia (Cunda Adası), Head Bishop of Aya Triada Monastery of Heybeliada two times. İnal Batu, a well known retired diplomat, answered questions on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Marc Aoun, Professor of Canon Law, at the University of Strasbourg, France contributed shedding light to theological interpretation of the inter-Orthodox disputes. Mr. Vasiliadis and Mr. Frangopoulos, prominent members of the Greek Orthodox community helped me to understand some aspects of the Orthodox community-state and community-patriarchate relations. Overall, the interviews contributed a great deal to the understanding of the Patriarchate.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured around three chapters. The first chapter aims to draw a picture of the historical set up of the "ecumenical" stance of the church during the two Empires Roman and Ottoman and draws a picture of the foundations of the ecumenical claim of the institution. This chapter further goes on to analyse the transition of the institution in parallel with the passage from an age of the empire to that of the nation- state. The chapter analyses the striking contrast of the Patriarchate's new position as a minority church in Turkey and its growing international importance as a result of the Russian revolution of 1917 that has almost swept the Russian Patriarchate from the scene. The new Diaspora Greek communities founded in the new world contributed to the internationalization of the church in a new ecumenic fashion.

The second chapter analyses the effect of the Cold War on the policy of the Patriarchate. It analyses the change in the Turkish attitudes towards the institution as the integration with the West intensified. During this period the American policy towards the

Patriarchate, shaped by the containment policy, provided the institution with new tracks to explore in an effort to assert its leadership on the Orthodox scene.

The third chapter analyses the impact of the European integration that brought new legal obligations for Turkey that led to a change of policy towards the Patriarchate and new ways of expression for the Patriarchate. The EU integration around a supranational entity coincided with the universal claim of the institution and eased the suspicions of Turkey towards the Patriarchate. This chapter also analyses the patriarchate's Pan-Orthodox relations and with other churches that strengthen its position as one of the centers of Orthodoxy.

CHAPTER I

FROM AN IMPERIAL TO A MINORITY CHURCH: TRANSITION OF THE PATRIARCHATE

The Patriarchate is mainly a product of the Empire. The church was totally subordinated to the political power that used the church to insure the loyalty of its subjects. The ecumenical claim was an outcome of the power conferred by the central authority only within the confines of the state. When the political authority started to crumble, the real ecumenical status of the institution has just disappeared. Increasing demands of different ethnic groups that formed the Greek Orthodox *millet* under the Ottomans were targeting the Patriarchate that imposed its jurisdiction over the Orthodox with the support of the centralizing Empire. The period starting from the last centuries of the Ottoman state that continued until the first decades of the Turkish republic was a period of transition from an imperial institution to a minority church in a national state.

The Patriarchate had to adopt new strategies and to redefine itself. The creation of diaspora communities in the wealthy regions of the West, the power vacuum created by the demise of the Russian church under communist regime, were instrumental in opening the Patriarchate new paths for action. Foundation of Turkey enclosed the institution in a new national secular state that was in an effort to erase the traces of the old empire. The new regime regarded the Patriarchate as a tool of foreign powers and especially of Greece and consequently was not sympathetic to any form of international responsibility and action of the church.

This chapter explores first the responses of the Patriarchate to nationalism under the Ottoman Empire and its consequent abandonment of the traditional imperial policy; redefinition of its status under the Turkish nation-state stemming from the Lausanne Treaty (1923). In the second part of the chapter its international policy and actions stemming from the new conditions in world politics is analysed.

I. 1. The Patriarchate under the Roman Empire

The Patriarchate was born and developed under the Roman Empire. The amalgamation of the political power and the church had already started when in 324 Emperor Constantine I secured the unity of the Roman Empire and simultaneously called for a Council of the scattered Christian churches²⁵. The Nicaea Council of 325 (present day Iznik-Turkey) was the first Synod convened by a Roman Emperor with the participation of the representatives of all Christian churches in the Empire²⁶. The creed of the Nicaea Council was accepted as the foundation of the true faith in the Roman Christian world. It was a move towards a new understanding of the relation between church and politics. According to the teachings of Christ, Christians followed the motto “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21). Under Constantine the line separating clearly the secular and divine realms blurred. Now the emperors were considered as God’s representative in earth and assumed the role of leadership of the church alongside their political power²⁷. Therefore the monotheistic Christian religion gave the emperors the occasion to found a “divine monarchy”²⁸. According to Dvornik, the principle asserting that the emperor was the representative of God on Earth was rooted in Hellenistic political philosophy, and was accepted and adapted by Christian thinkers after the conversion of Constantine²⁹. Consequently, from its outset, religion was directly dependent on the political power, owing its place and legitimacy to the emperor. This is a tradition followed today as most of the Orthodox churches are also confined to a particular nation and framed by the state authority making them directly dependent on the political power.

²⁵ Zernov, p. 39.

²⁶ In the Christian tradition only Councils can take doctrinal decisions. The individual propositions of the Emperors or the patriarchs are listened but they do not automatically become a church law. According to the interpretation of Pope Jules I, a Council is considered ecumenical if all churches accept it. The Orthodox churches consider only the first seven Councils as Ecumenical, the first being that of Nicaea (325) and the last the second Council of Nicaea (787). The Roman church added to the Seven Ecumenical Councils the Synod of 869-870. See Francis Dvornik, “Which Councils are Ecumenical”, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1966, p. 314-328. See also Francis Dvornik, *Konsiller Tarihi: İznik'ten II. Vatikan'a [History of the Councils: From Nicaea to Vatican II]*, Mehmet Aydın (trans), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990, p. 10; Stanley, p. 119.

²⁷ Steven Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, New Zealand: Wright & Carman, 1971, p. 13.

²⁸ Ignacio Ortiz de Urbina, *Nicée et Istanbul*, Paris: Editions de l'Orante, 1963, p. 15

²⁹ Francis Dvornik, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 4.

I.1.1. Political Power and the Church

The history of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul as we know it started with the decision of the Roman Emperor Constantine I to move the seat of his government to Byzantium (330) that will be henceforth called Constantinopolis –the city of Constantine–, the new capital of the Roman Empire³⁰. As the church organization followed the secular administration of the Empire, the Church of the new capital started to rise in ecclesiastical hierarchy³¹. The second ecumenical council convened in Istanbul in 381 (the Council of Constantinople) canonized its place in the ecclesiastical hierarchy³². Canon 3 of the Council defined the place of the see in the Roman Empire. It reads³³

The Bishop of Constantinople shall have the primacy of honor after the Bishop of Rome, because Constantinople is *New Rome*.

The 4th ecumenical council held in Chalcedon (Kadıköy) in 451 guaranteed further rights to the imperial church. Canons 9 and 17 gave the see the right to judge clergy of other churches, in case of an appeal. Thus the city was now assuming a role of supreme arbiter between Orthodox churches. The Canon 28 is the most crucial for the evolution of the See in Istanbul. It confirmed the Canon 3 of the Istanbul Council, which accorded it equal privileges with Rome. Old Rome owed its position to its status as the imperial residence. Therefore Istanbul, now the new capital of the Roman Empire, the *New Rome*, should have the same rights enjoyed by the old Rome³⁴.

In addition, the Canon 28 brought some rights hitherto absent. The bishop of Istanbul would have the right to ordain metropolitans of the dioceses of Pontus, Asia and Thrace together with the bishops of the dioceses among the barbarians³⁵. This last right has

³⁰ Constantine I was the first emperor to convene an Ecumenical council in Nicaea (İznik) in 325 under his presidency. For the evolution of the Patriarchate see Arthur P. Stanley, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, London: John Murray, 1908, p. 119; Nicolas Zernov, *Eastern Christendom: A Study on the Origin and Development of the Eastern Orthodoxy*, New York: Putnam, 1961, p. 39; Adrian Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, London: Catholic Truth Society, 1929, p. 30; Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, London: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 27.

³¹ *ibid*, p. 4-15; Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, p. 21-23.

³² Georg Ostrogorsky, *Bizans Devleti Tarihi [History of the Byzantine Empire]*, (trans. Fikret İşıltan), Ankara: TTK, 1981, p. 49.

³³ John Meyendorff, *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church*, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996, p. 17

³⁴ For Canon 28 see Brian E. Daley, "Position and Patronage in the Early Church: The Original Meaning of 'Primacy of Honor'", *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, October 1993, p. 529-553; Henry Scowcroft Bettenson (ed.), *Documents of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 82-83.

³⁵ Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. I*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, (Series: Translated Text for Historians), 2005, p. 24, 67.

repercussions even today as it has been liberally interpreted by the Patriarchate as the right to exert jurisdiction over Orthodox communities in diaspora³⁶. The intervention of the Emperors was crucial in the empowerment of the capital's church. This had a practical reason, a bishop who would have supreme authority over all Christians of the Empire would be an excellent instrument to unify the empire and exert more effective political control on ecclesiastical affairs³⁷.

The Councils of Nicaea (787) and Istanbul (870) forbade the appointment of clergy by the political authority. However, as the emperor was considered as the head of the church, there were always "exceptions" and the metropolitans as well as the patriarchs were often designated by the political power³⁸. The See was rising due to the emperors' grace and it had to pay in return. There was absolute submission to the Emperor who was also the head of the church³⁹. However, the Patriarch was the second person in the empire after the emperor, doted with extensive authority⁴⁰. The place of the Patriarch was confirmed by the law but the Patriarch could not legislate alone even on religious matters because the emperor was the one who had the right to initiate law, comprising also religious arrangements⁴¹. As the church and state were indivisible, the Patriarch's role was to help the emperor to govern his people. For example, excommunication was a tool often used to defer the rebellions against the Empire⁴².

When Christianity started to spread, the known "world" was politically and culturally unified under the Roman Empire. From the end of the third century the political unity started to crumble. The Empire was first separated into two parts, and Emperor Constantine's decision to found Istanbul as a second imperial city in the East contributed to further division. In the fifth century barbarian invasions interrupted the rule of the Roman Empire in the Western part of the Empire. During the late sixth and seventh centuries, east and west were further isolated from each other by the Avar and Slav invasions of the Balkan Peninsula. Schisms weakened the apostolic sees of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem and Arab

³⁶ See Chapter I, p. 81.

³⁷ Ortiz de Urbina, p. 217

³⁸ Louis Bréhier, *Le Monde Byzantin, Vol. II : Les Institutions de l'Empire Byzantin*, Paris : Albin Michel, 1949, p. 477-478, 507-513; Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 62.

³⁹ Steven Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization*, London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1933, p. 109

⁴⁰ Bréhier, p. 488.

⁴¹ Zernov, p. 54; Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 29.

⁴² Bréhier, p. 493.

conquests separated them from the Roman Empire⁴³. Despite that fact, the Roman Empire carried the idea of the unity. Even under alien rule, the Roman emperor was considered the head of the Orthodox churches⁴⁴.

The sixth century was a period of blossoming for the Patriarchate. During this period, the uncertainty of the previous decades was replaced by a period of confidence. The Hagia Sophia Church was rebuilt, literature and culture blossomed and the codification of the Roman law was completed⁴⁵. Italy was reconquered. However, the unity was not everlasting. The loss of the political power in the West, led to the culmination of the ecclesiastical and political authority in the church's hands⁴⁶. The see of Rome, had become influential from the time of Pope Gregory the Great (590-604) onwards, a development which would continue uninterrupted⁴⁷.

In the sixth century, patriarchs, supported by emperors, start to call themselves 'ecumenical', a title which would become their "official style"⁴⁸. The title was first used by the Patriarch John IV known as 'the Faster' (582-595)⁴⁹. At that time Istanbul was the unquestioned capital of Christian civilization. The limits of the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate were approximately those of the Empire, making of it, the church of the Empire, the *oikumeni*, under the Emperor's rule⁵⁰. Therefore the term implied the territories under the Eastern Roman Empire. Notwithstanding the claim of a universal jurisdiction over the eastern and western parts of the empire, in the true sense of the term, it had only covered the sphere of the Greek dominated Eastern Roman Empire. Even though it connotes an ideal of unity, divisions did not permeate the Patriarchate to exert a universal jurisdiction over all churches of the Empire.

The use of the term met staunch resistance of Rome who forbade the use of this title not even used by the Pope⁵¹. According to Rome, Istanbul could not have even a claim to be

⁴³ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 44-45

⁴⁴ Ostrogorsky, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Timothy Gregory, *Bizans Tarihi*, (trans. Esra Ermert), Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008, p. 125.

⁴⁶ Georg Scheibelreiter, "Church Structure and Organisation" in Paul Fouracre, *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I. c. 500-700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 675-709 at p. 675.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 676.

⁴⁸ Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, p. 43.

⁴⁹ Ostrogorsky claims that the Patriarchates were using this title since the end of the fifth century. See at p. 77.

⁵⁰ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 11

⁵¹ Every, p. 128; Ortiz de Urbina, p. 169.

ecumenical because it was not founded by an apostle. The apostolicity was the sole particularity of Rome over Istanbul. If this obstacle could be overcome two cities would be equal in every respect⁵². Thus to strengthen its place in the church hierarchy, the Byzantines ‘invented’ a tradition of the apostolic foundation of the see of Byzantium by Apostle Andrew, brother of Peter⁵³. The choice of Andrew was not intentional. According to the Christian tradition, he was the first apostle to whom God addressed his invitation to become his disciple. It was him who introduced his brother Peter to Christ⁵⁴. Rome never accepted the ecumenical claim of the patriarchate that was even not founded by the Apostles. Officially, Istanbul was placed 5th in hierarchy after the sees of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem all founded by Apostles.

Rome, the sole apostolic church in the West gradually developed a universal ecclesiastical structure centred on Rome as the See of Peter. Thus Rome was the greatest challenge to the ecumenical claim of the Byzantine Patriarchs. The Rift between the two imperial churches grew Rome never accepted the pentarchic idea and primacy of Istanbul due to its place as the imperial center. According to the Roman primates the see had no apostolic origin and thus could not claim any patriarchal role. Rome, thus, gradually developed and affirmed a universal ecclesiastical structure centred on Rome as the See of Peter. Byzantine imperial and conciliar legislation practically ignored the Roman view, limiting itself to the token recognition of Rome as the first patriarchal see.

The triumph of image-worshiping settled the dispute between Rome and Istanbul for a short period. However, the cleavage between the two realms was too difficult to be filled. There were two opposing political cultures that faced a new challenge with the coronation of Charlemagne by the Pope in 800. This brought the disagreement to its climax, because it put an end to Byzantine ambitions in the West⁵⁵. The creation of a Holy Roman Empire in the West deepened the divisions between the East and West. The political and cultural factors affected the life of the church. As Charlemagne was refused recognition by the Byzantine Emperor, he introduced a charge of heresy against the Byzantine Church. He denounced the

⁵² Dvornik, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew*, p. 161.

⁵³ Raymond Janin, *Les Eglises Orientales et les Rites Orientaux*, Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1997, p. 106.

⁵⁴ Dvornik, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew*, p. 3.

⁵⁵ Meyendorff, *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church*, p. 41.

Greeks for not using the *Filioque* in the Creed⁵⁶. From the start there had been a certain difference of emphasis between east and west about the nature of the church. In the east there were many churches founded by the Apostles, there was a strong sense of equality of all bishops, of the collegial and conciliar nature of the church. The east acknowledged the Pope as the first bishop of the church, but do not recognize its supremacy. In the west, there was only one see claiming apostolic foundation, Rome, so that Rome came to be regarded as the Apostolic see. The west, while it accepted the decisions of the Ecumenical councils, did not play a very active part in the Councils themselves; the church was seen less as a college and more as a monarchy- the monarchy of the Pope⁵⁷.

This belief in the supremacy of the Pope has never been approved by the Eastern Orthodox churches. During the time of Patriarch Photius the schism had begun, and even the reunion was established and was maintained until 1054, the Patriarch Michael Cerularius broke it again, this time for centuries⁵⁸. The crusades, the cruel sack of Istanbul and Frankish rule in Istanbul helped only to intensify hostility. Even the relics of the Apostles were stolen by the crusaders and brought to Rome. The unions brought about by urging political needs at Lyons in 1274 and at Florence in 1439 lasted only a few years⁵⁹.

I.1.2. The Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate over Other Orthodox Churches

The Orthodox Church, like the Empire, considered itself universal. At some points of history the immense territory of the Roman Empire was divided between two emperors that ruled in the east and the west. There was the idea that as there were more than one ruler for the political realm then it was possible to have many equal churches without interrupting the unity. From the early days of the Eastern Roman Empire, there were five patriarchates founded by the apostles, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem that were all equal -at least in theory- to Istanbul, and these churches recognized Rome as first in the church hierarchy but

⁵⁶ The dispute involved the words about the Holy Spirit in the Nicene Creed. Originally the Creed reads: 'I believe... in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and together glorified'. This original form is recited unchanged by the east to this day. But the west introduced an extra phrase 'and from the Son' (in Latin *Filioque*)

⁵⁷ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 47.

⁵⁸ For the history of schism during Photius' time see Francis Dvornik, *The Photian Schism: History and Legend*, Cambridge: CUP, 1948.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

believed in the theory of pentarchy⁶⁰. This principle was not abandoned by the eastern churches even after the great schism of the 11th century between the Eastern and Western churches. This theory was in contrast to the papal claim of universal primacy which is still a topic of controversy between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches⁶¹.

The preservation of the federal principle and also equality between the Eastern churches had historical reasons. The western part of the empire was invaded by “barbarians” that interrupted the Roman rule and destroyed the lay administration. Thus the church in Rome was the sole authority uniting the divided Christians between different mainly Germanic kingdoms. In the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, in contrast with the West, the alien rule never prevailed. Thus the secular life could continue with the emperor at its head⁶². In the east, the emperor was the symbol of unity and therefore there was no need for a monolithic church organization. Whereas the western provinces were all part of the Patriarchate of Rome, in the East there were four patriarchates, all equals⁶³. The Roman was only *primus inter pares*. Today the term is used for the Patriarchate for its historical rank among the Eastern Orthodox churches⁶⁴.

The four canons adopted by the second ecumenical council of Istanbul (553) defined the ecclesiastical provinces and forbade their leaders to interfere with affairs outside their frontiers. The Eastern Church was not centralized like Rome but was based on a federal principle. The federal principle may be explained as the communion of the autocephalous churches. The concept of autocephaly⁶⁵ could be etymologically traced to its Greek meaning⁶⁶, meaning independence and of a self-governing body with its own head (kephali)⁶⁷.

⁶⁰ *Pentarchy* is a Greek word meaning ‘rule by five’. In Christian history, the word applies particularly to the idea of the administration of the entire universal Christendom by the five great Sees or early Patriarchates –i.e. Rome, Istanbul, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. See ‘Pentarchy’, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2009, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9059117> (23 June 2009) See Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 23; Joan Mervyn Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 297-299.

⁶¹ See Hussey, p. 294.

⁶² Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, p. 15.

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 22

⁶⁵ Sabrina P. Ramet, “Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction” in Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.), *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, Vol. I*, Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1988, p. 56.

⁶⁶ In the modern usage of the Orthodox canon law an autocephalous church is that enjoys total canonical and administrative independence and elects its own primates and bishops. The term autocephalous was used in medieval Byzantine law in its literal sense of ‘self-headed’ (Greek: *afkephalos*) or independent, and was applied in church law to independent dioceses that did not depend upon the authority of a provincial metropolitan. Most of the Orthodox autocephalous churches are national, but some extend over the territories of several states. The autocephalous churches are in communion with each

According to the canonical law, every church had the jurisdiction over its diocese and other churches were forbidden to interfere in other churches affairs. In practice however, the political power overlooked the ecclesiastical principles⁶⁸. Therefore at least in principle, the Orthodox churches formed a confederation of independent units with their own administrative organization. However, as religion cannot be discerned from politics, this principle has not always been observed.

The expansion of the Empire endangered the status of the Sees that formed the pentarchy. After the Arab conquests, the patriarchate supported by the Emperors, started to place the ancient patriarchates under its authority. During the tenth century, Byzantine Empire regained the territories previously lost to Arab dynasties and placed a Patriarch to the see of Antioch who agreed to be consecrated in Istanbul⁶⁹. The Byzantine reconquest replaced the Syrians, who mostly spoke Syriac or Arabic (Arabic became the language of the Christians of Antioch of the Greek rite, although the liturgy remained Greek), under the authority of the Greeks⁷⁰. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem also came under the control of the Emperor, as a result of the agreements reached in 1027-8 between the Caliph of Cairo and the Byzantine Emperor. The latter received the right to name the patriarch⁷¹. The Patriarch of Alexandria resided in Istanbul and the clergy of all Patriarchates were recruited in the capital. They were intermediaries between two rulers, the Mamluk sultan and the Roman emperor. Once a patriarch was elected, he was coming to the capital to have the blessing of the Emperor even though the authorization of the Sultan was sufficient for starting his functions⁷².

Another example of the influence of the political power linked with the ecclesiastical power was the case of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. The Church enjoyed a historical claim to autonomy and independence from any Patriarchate –even though it was initially under the

other. Traditionally there is an order of precedence, the Patriarchate being the first in the hierarchy. Autocephalous churches may be created, suppressed and revived according to political and social changes, making the Orthodox church an extremely politicized religious scene. The question of how and by whom new autocephalous churches are to be established is still a matter of debate in Eastern Orthodoxy. See "Autocephalous Church", *Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online. <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9011356> (21 June 2009).

⁶⁷ Christos Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*, Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003, p. 48.

⁶⁸ Jean Richard, "The Eastern Churches" in David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c. 1024-c. 1198, Vol IV, Part I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 564-598 at p. 569.*

⁶⁹ *ibid.* p. 572.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ *ibid.*

⁷² Bréhier, p. 459-460.

jurisdiction of the Antioch Patriarchate-. But in the thirteenth and fourteenth fearing the Latin invaders attempts to subordinate the Orthodox to the Roman church, Cypriot church strengthened its links with the Patriarchate who obtained an unofficial leverage over it⁷³.

Thus being the most powerful of the Eastern Churches, the Patriarchate, run contrary to the federal understanding and claimed that it had universal jurisdiction over all other eastern churches as did the Roman Church. According to Hussey, “in the second half of fourteenth century (Patriarchs) had no hesitation in affirming their authority in terms which seemed to run as contrary to the long-held Orthodox theory of the pentarchy and collegial responsibility as did the papal claim to universal primacy”.⁷⁴

I. 1. 3. Conversion of the Slavs

The Patriarchate under the Eastern Roman Empire was a missionary force and it conducted successful activities that would lead to conversion of the Slavs of the Balkans and Eurasia. From seventh century onwards, the power of the Emperor was under constant strain due to the serious threats to the Empire’s territories⁷⁵. The missionary activities were conducted from the time of Constantine I, within and beyond the borders of the Roman Empire. Geographically it included the areas from the Caspian Sea to the Black and Adriatic Seas, and South of Arabia, North Africa, Ethiopia and Nubia⁷⁶. The second and golden period for missionary activities from Byzantium included the ninth and tenth centuries. In the ninth century the golden age of the Byzantine Empire started. In parallel with the Empire, the Byzantine church entered a blossoming period too. This time the Slavs were the main target of the missionary activities of the Byzantines. The impetus for starting the missionary work was given by Rostislav (847-870) the ruler of Moravia. Moravia was frequently under the pressure of neighbouring nations, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. In order to take the Byzantine Empire at his side, Rostislav sent a delegation to Byzance, asking for clergymen and teachers knowing the Slavic language, in order to teach Moravians the Christian faith⁷⁷.

⁷³ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 25.

⁷⁴ Hussey, p. 294.

⁷⁵ Francis Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs: SS. Constantine-Cyril and Methodius*, New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1970, p. 3.

⁷⁶ Vasil T. Stavridis, “The Missionary Work of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Europe and Elsewhere Based on the Principles of the Saints Cyril and Methodios”, *A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodios of Thyateira and Great Britain*, Athens, 1985, p. 456.

⁷⁷ Ostrogorsky, p. 214-215; Hussey, p. 87-99.

This important mission was conferred to Constantine (Cyrill) and his brother Methodius who would be later known as the ‘Apostoles of the Slavs’ for converting most of the eastern and central Europe during the ninth century. Constantine was the director of the special center for Slavic Studies founded in Istanbul, specialized in the preparation of missionaries and teachers. With the assistance of his brother, he invented the Slavic alphabet into which they translated various ecclesiastical texts. Later a revised version of the alphabet was named Cyrillic after his name⁷⁸.

In the Balkans, Croats were the first ones to be Christianized by Latin missionaries with the Emperor’s consent and they came under direct jurisdiction of Rome⁷⁹. Missionary activities among the Serbs were initiated by Byzantines in the seventh century in close collaboration with Rome⁸⁰. During the early middle ages, the religious allegiance of the Serbs was divided between the two churches. The various Serbian principalities were united ecclesiastically in the early 13th century under the Kingdom of Serbia. The Serbs persuaded the Patriarch to establish the church of Serbia as an autocephalous body, with a Serbian Archbishop. The approval of the request, unified the divided Serbs under Orthodoxy. The status of the Serbian Church grew along in size and prestige with the Kingdom of Serbia. The Archbishopric of Peć (Ipek) correspondingly elevated to the rank of Patriarchate in 1346⁸¹.

Romania is considered a Slavonic church since it was Christianized by Cyrill and Methodius. Three provinces of Romania Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania were partitioned between Roman and Byzantine Churches⁸². The Barbarian invasion and the Bulgarian conquest extinguished Romanian Church for a period, and when the conquerors themselves adopted the new faith in the ninth century, Romanians adopted the eastern (Byzantine) liturgy⁸³.

⁷⁸ Stavridis, “The Missionary Work of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Europe”, p. 456.

⁷⁹ Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs*, p. 5-26.

⁸⁰ John Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today*, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996, p. 27.

⁸¹ Binns, p. 21.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸³ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 148.

In Bulgaria King Boris was baptized in ninth century according to the Byzantine rite⁸⁴. The episode had been an issue of great controversy between Rome and Byzance. King Boris first accepted the ecclesiastical domination of Byzantium then turned to Rome, to negotiate better terms with it⁸⁵. The principal aim of Boris was to create a Bulgarian Patriarchate for the Bulgarians. This request was not accepted by the Byzantine state. His successor Simeon unilaterally elevated the Bulgarian see to the level of Patriarchate in 918 to be recognized by the Patriarch in Istanbul in 927. This was a revolutionary move for the Church because until then only Cyprus had acquired an autocephalous status. Thus for the first time ethnicity was accepted as a basis to found a national church⁸⁶. The Bulgarians appointed their own local patriarch but after the Byzantine reconquest, the national Bulgarian Patriarchate moved to Ohrid to become an Archbishopric, retaining the Bulgarian liturgy⁸⁷. The Patriarchates created in the Balkans faded out with the Turkish conquest of the Balkans in the fourteenth century.

The greatest achievement of the Byzantine church was the conversion of the Russians. Links were established between Istanbul and Kievan Rus by the end of the 10th century⁸⁸. It was Vladimir (984-1015) who became a Christian and forced all his people to be converted to Christianity. He was baptized by the Byzantine church and settled Christianity in its Byzantine form. A hierarchy was set up under the Metropolitan of Kiev, under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The liturgy was in Russian (Church Slavonic)⁸⁹. Most of the clergy of the Russian church first came from Bulgaria. But from the early eleventh century to the early fourteenth the head of the Church, the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia, was a Greek, appointed by the Patriarch. But from the fourteenth century onwards Russian also were appointed, usually alternatively with a Greek. The Russian church became autocephalous in 1448, just before the fall of Istanbul⁹⁰. From that time on the Patriarch of

⁸⁴ For the conversion of the Bulgars see A.P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs*, Cambridge: CUP, 1970, p. 155-165.

⁸⁵ See Vlasto, p. 160-162, Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 152-155.

⁸⁶ Spas T. Raikin, "Nationalism and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church" in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European Politics*, Duke University Press, 1989, p. 352-377 at p. 353; Every, p. 128; Jonathan Shepherd, "Slavs and Bulgars" in Rosamond McKitterick (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. II, c. 700-c. 900*, 1995, p. 228-248 at p. 243; Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955, p. 24-25.

⁸⁷ Richard Frucht, "The Bulgarian Orthodox Church" in Richard Frucht (ed.), *Eastern Europe: Introduction to the People, Lands and Culture, Vol. I*, p. 800; Raikin, p. 353.

⁸⁸ Hussey, 1990, p. 116-119.

⁸⁹ Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, p. 394-395.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*.

Moscow became the only Orthodox see that was under an Orthodox ruler⁹¹. That is the reason why the Russian Church had a claim to be a “Third Rome” when the canonical recognition of Istanbul as New Rome expired when the city was lost to Turks⁹².

Thus, in an earlier period, the Byzantine church with the help of the growing power of the Empire and in collaboration with Rome, achieved the mission of converting the Slavs to Christianity. When the empire was weakened by the Turkish conquests in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Patriarch enjoyed the capacity of the administrative head of a great ecclesiastical province, large areas of which were under Turkish control. In those areas the Byzantine lay officials had been ejected, and the bishop alone was left to administer, as far as was permitted, the affairs of the Emperor’s former subjects⁹³.

In the Balkans the Patriarchate continued the tradition to act on a federal principle. The autonomy that Rome did not give to the new converted churches and the right to use the vernacular was given by Byzance within her sphere. As the Patriarchate, in theory, did not dominate the Eastern churches, it was logical to do so for the new converted churches outside the reach of the Byzantine state. The Byzantine ideal was a series of autocephalous state churches, linked by inter-communion and the faith of the Seven Councils. Even a subject country might retain her church. For example when Basil II conquered Bulgaria, he left the Bulgarian church with its native priests and its Slavonic ritual, he only insisted that its primate should be a Greek⁹⁴.

However, the position of the Orthodox Churches in countries that were not under the political control of the Emperor caused problems. The Balkan Kingdoms, Bulgaria and Serbia, founded their separate political administration. Their rulers recognized the Emperor as a senior monarch, but they obtained their independence were often at war with Roman Empire. They had no intention of submitting to his authority or of allowing their churches to be administered from Istanbul. Both Emperor and Patriarch liked to keep as much control over such churches as long as the political circumstances permitted. The Turkish advance

⁹¹ Binns, p. 19.

⁹² The label “Third Rome” for Moscow was first used in 1492, Norman Davies, *Europe: A History*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 462-463; See Hakan Alkan, *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi: Uluslararası İlişkiler Açısından Bir Yaklaşım*, Ankara: Günce Yayıncılık, 1999, p. 34.

⁹³ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 21

⁹⁴ Every, p. 128

through the Balkans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries altered this position. With the lay monarchies destroyed the local hierarchs could not maintain their pretensions. In order to survive they were obliged to accept the protection of the Patriarchate⁹⁵.

In the case of Russia, the Byzantine hegemony over the church was scattered with the weakening of the Empire. Russians refuted Greek domination over their churches as early as the fifteenth century. The ecumenical claim of the patriarchate over all Orthodox churches was not realistic since the Patriarchate lost its influence over the Slav churches as soon as they could be powerful enough to proclaim independence. Therefore it would be fair to claim that even though the Patriarchate deserved respect as the “mother” of the new Slav churches, its authority was disputed as soon as the political power of the Empire weakened. Moreover the canonical constitution of the Orthodox Church allowed from the beginning the co-existence of autocephalous units. Submission to the authority of one indisputable religious leader did not exist, that made in a sense, conversion of the Byzance’s neighbouring populations possible.

I. 2. A Fresh Start: The Patriarchate under the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman conquest did not destroy the Patriarchate and did not harm its claim for a universal status as the Ottoman state had a claim to be the true heir of the Roman Empire⁹⁶. In fact, the Ottoman Sultans gave the Patriarch privileges unprecedented under the Eastern Roman Empire⁹⁷.

The Orthodox Church was loosing blood with the weakening of the Roman Empire against the advances of the Roman Catholic Church⁹⁸. The capture of Istanbul brought it fresh air, a new start. The rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in the Balkans also took a new shape as the Ottoman state strongly endorsed the Patriarchate along with its strategy to dominate the Balkans. According to Stavrianos, Mehmet II wanted to “perpetuate

⁹⁵ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 21-22

⁹⁶ İsmail Tokalak, *Bizans-Osmanlı Sentezi: Bizans Kültür ve Kurumlarının Osmanlı Üzerindeki Etkisi [The Byzantine-Ottoman Synthesis: The Effect of the Byzantine Culture and Institutions on the Ottoman State]*, İstanbul: Güler Boy Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 277-279.

⁹⁷ İlber Ortaylı, “Süleyman ve Ivan; “Doğu Avrupa 16. Yüzyılının İki Hükümdarı [Suleiman and Ivan, Two Rulers of the 16th Century Eastern Europe” in *Osmanlı’da Milletler ve Diplomasi: Seçme Eserler III*, 3rd ed. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010, p. 133-144 at p. 135; Hidayet Vahapoğlu, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Azınlık ve Yabancı Okulları, [The Foreign and Minority Schools from the Ottomans to the Present]*, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1990, p. 6.

⁹⁸ Seyfi Yıldırım and Adnan Sofuoğlu, *Siyasi Faaliyetleriyle İstanbul Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, Ankara: Köksav, 2010, p. 13.

the rift between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches”⁹⁹. According to Berkes, the conquest of Istanbul saved the Patriarchate from vanishing and beyond the expectations of the institution the Ottomans rendered the institution truly ecumenical¹⁰⁰. İnalçık holds a similar view, “the fact that the Ottomans favored openly the Orthodox church, restoring it everywhere they went to its former position of superiority vis-à-vis the Latin church, is a clear indication of the political intent of their attitude”¹⁰¹.

Rendering truly ecumenical according to Berkes had been possible by the initiation of two new powers for the Patriarchate. Firstly, the Ottomans gave it “religious autonomy separate from the state” and secondly “elevated it to a dominant position over all other Orthodox Churches”¹⁰².

How this could have happened? The centralizing Ottoman policy brought together all Eastern Orthodox of the Empire under the leadership of the Patriarchate. The Orthodox *millet* with the patriarchate at its head, reflected the ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of the empire. In the Ottoman Empire, the Patriarch was recognized as the leader of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan as a consequence of the *Millet* system. The constitutional basis of the Ottoman *millet* system was the Islamic law which recognized the non-Muslim monotheistic believers as the ‘Peoples of the Book’ and accorded them protection under the *zimmi* status¹⁰³. The Muslims and the *zimmis* were divided into religious groups that were called *millets*¹⁰⁴. In

⁹⁹ Stavrianos, p. 103.

¹⁰⁰ Niyazi Berkes, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Ortodoks Kilisesi”, *Yön Dergisi*, 23 Ekim 1964, No. 82, p.16 in *Patrikhane ve Ekümeniklik*, 2nd ed., Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 9-15 at p. 11-12; Yıldırım and sofuoğlu also hold that the conquest saved the Patriarchate from vanishing, p. 13.

¹⁰¹ Halil İnalçık, “The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans”, *Turcica, Revue d’Etudes Turques*, Vol. 20-23, 1991, p. 407-436 at p. 409.

¹⁰² *ibid*, p. 12.

¹⁰³ For the *zimmi* and *millet* concepts see Yavuz Ercan, *Osmanlı Yönetiminde Gayrimüslimler: Kuruluştan Tanzimat’a Kadar Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Hukukî Durumları [Non-Muslims under the Ottoman Rule: Their Social, Economic and Legal Conditions from the Beginning until the Tanzimat]*, Ankara: Turhan, 2001; C. E. Bosworth, “The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, The Central Lands*, New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 37-55; Gülnihal Bozkurt, “İslam Hukukunda Zimmilerin Hukukî Statüleri” [The Legal Status of the *Zimmis* in the Islamic Law], *Kudret Ayter’e Armağan, 9 Eylül Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 3. No. 1-4, p. 115-156; Kemal H. Karpat, “*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, p. 141-169.

¹⁰⁴ Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Garimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukukî Durumu (1839-1914)[The Legal Status of the Non-Muslim Citizens of the Ottoman Empire under the Light of the German-British Documents and Political Developments (1839-1914)]*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996, p. 9-10; İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Millet [Millet in the Ottoman Empire]”, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. IV, p. 32, 1986, p. 996, Bruce Masters, “Christians in a Changing World” in Suraiya N. Faroqi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. III, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-183*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 272-279 at p. 274

this arrangement, the spiritual head of the different religious communities was considered as an intermediary between the government and the community¹⁰⁵. As it was not possible to apply the Islamic code to the non-muslims, the Patriarch was doted with a limited temporal jurisdiction on certain matters alongside with his spiritual responsibility. We should note that the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate was limited in the sense that the Ottoman laws were universally applicable on all subjects of the sultan. As İnalçık asserts, the Patriarch alone had no authority over his Christian flock independent from the Ottoman law¹⁰⁶. According to Mardin, the authority was a monopoly of the state¹⁰⁷.

It also assumed administrative, financial, even judicial responsibilities that were conducted by lay officials under the Roman Empire. The Patriarchate became a state official in a sense, responsible before the Sultan for the fidelity of the Orthodox¹⁰⁸. In the Ottoman administrative structure the place of the Patriarch was defined. He had the rank of Vezir in the Ottoman hierarchy and military protection was assured for the Patriarchate's protection¹⁰⁹. Traditionally each patriarch received a *berat* from the Sultan for his nomination¹¹⁰. The content of the *berats* issued by successive Sultans for the nomination of the Patriarchs were similar in character. In order to understand the rights of the patriarchate over the Greek *Millet*,

¹⁰⁵ Theodore H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, 2nd ed., Brussels: Variorum, 1952, p. 9.

¹⁰⁶ For the universality of the Ottoman law see İnalçık, p. 407-436; Macit Kenanoğlu, *Osmanlı Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek*, [The Ottoman Millet System: Myth and Reality], İstanbul: Klasik, 2004, p. 28-29.

¹⁰⁷ Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset Makaleleri*, Vol. I, Mümtz'er Türk'üne (ed.), 5th ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 1991, p. 39

¹⁰⁸ See Georgiades Arnakis, "The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Sep. 1952, p. 235-250 at p. 237. *Berats* given to the patriarchs were simply bilateral contracts concluded between Christian nations and Islamic governments. According to Papadopoulos, p. 7-10, the *berat* given to the first Patriarch under the Ottomans, Gennadius Scholarius was a "constitutive chart and made the Patriarch *millet başı* or ethnarch". Moreover, the *berat* endowed the Patriarch "with a civil jurisdiction extending over the whole nation of the Christians beside his spiritual jurisdiction". This interpretation is accepted by Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 167-181. It is unclear whether the grant of privileges to the church was simply oral, *i.e.* resulting from the Sultan's conversations with the Patriarch and his oral instructions to his ministers, or confirmed by an official document such as a *berat* or a *ferman*. See Papadopoulos, p. 4. Deno J. Geanakoplos, *A Short History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (330-1990): First Among Equals in the Eastern Orthodox Church*, 2nd ed., Brooklyn: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1990, p. 17. According to İnalçık, as the Sultan issued a *berat* even for the metropolitans there was no reason for not issuing a *berat* for the Patriarch. See İnalçık, p. 407- 436. For the rights and duties of the Patriarchs see also Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, p. 45-47; İsmail H. Danişmend, *İstanbul Fethinin Medeni Kıymeti [The Civic Importance of the Conquest of Istanbul]*, İstanbul, 1953, p. 30-31; Kenanoğlu, p. 96-97.

¹⁰⁹ Selahaddin Tansel, *Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyetleri*, Ankara, 1953, p. 107 cited in Önder Kaya, *Tanzimat'tan Lozan'a Azınlıklar*, İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2004, p. 37; Stavrianos, p. 104.

¹¹⁰ *Berat* means written document in its pristine sense but was used to denote the official document approved by the Sultan for the state officials to begin their duty. See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Berat", *İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Islam], Vol. II, İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1944, p. 523-524; Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, "Berat", *İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Islam], Vol. V, İstanbul: Türk İy Diyanet Vakfı, 1992, p. 472.

we should have a look over their content. A comparative analysis of the existing *berats* reveals the following general arrangements¹¹¹.

1. Respect for the right of free practice of religion, the maintenance of churches and the use of the native language.
2. Conditions and rules of the election of the Patriarch: The Patriarch was elected for life. He could not be dismissed without cause. When the see is vacant the Synod and the metropolitans of the peripheral metropolitanates elect the new patriarch and submitted his name to the Ottoman Sultan for approval.
3. The area of jurisdiction of the Patriarchate: All clergy and other *zimmis* of the same order should recognize him as their Patriarch and turn to him on the matters concerning the patriarchate.
4. The tax regime applicable to the Patriarchate: The Patriarch together with the metropolitans and other servants of the Patriarchate were exempt from taxes.
5. Ecclesiastical duties of the Patriarch and the Synod: The titles such as metropolitan or bishop may only be issued by the Patriarch and the Synod together.
6. The personal status of Orthodox Christians: The Patriarchate had the monopoly to issue marriage licences and divorce decrees. The church held power in family related matters and inheritance law.
7. Judicial competence: The Church had limited judicial capability. It had its own courts to handle disputes among the clergymen. If there is a crime committed, the clergy was tried in the Ottoman criminal courts. The patriarchal courts also handled minor disputes between the community members. However, this may only be possible if the two parties had their consent. The Patriarch had only the competence to demand church promise or to excommunicate. Thus judicial competence did not create a parallel legal system alongside with the Ottoman law.
8. The management of the church property: The immense property of the Patriarchate consisting of churches, monasteries, and institutions of social welfare was held and administered by the patriarch and his bishops. The priests and their congregations had to make yearly payments to collect the honorarium *-peşkeş-* which the bishop pays to the state on his appointment to the office. Apart from the revenue from the church

property the Patriarchate was also collecting church taxes (*tasadduk akçesi, patriklik rüsumu* etc.). From the total revenue of the church the Patriarchate was paying a fix tax to the government (*miri maktu*). If the Patriarch could not pay the fix tax he could not held office¹¹².

9. Privileges: The Patriarch and other clergy had some privileges not accorded to other non-Christians such as the right to carry staff, to ride on horseback and to have a private security.

The Ottoman Empire lasted for 700 years and the system evaluated over time depending on the internal and external conditions. The judicial authority of the Patriarchate was confined to the cases concerning the clergy. The Patriarch could only exert ecclesiastical punishments over lay elements of the community. The real exclusive power of the patriarchate was on the civil matters, such as marriage and divorce. The stipulations of the *berats* demonstrate that the patriarchate and its regional representatives such as the metropolitans, bishops and priests were conferred to exert rights under the ecclesiastical ‘*iltizam*’ system. The basis of the system, according to Kenanoğlu consisted of the payment of *-peşkeş-* and the fixed tax to the state in return of which the church was doted with authority by the central government¹¹³. Therefore this vision presents a departure from previous assertions that the *millets* formed autonomous administrative systems within the Ottoman State.

The Patriarch’s civil authority was extended over all Greek Orthodox peoples in the empire, even though canonically he was only *primus inter pares*¹¹⁴. The Patriarch was responsible before the Sultan. He was the one to be punished if he was unable to insure the loyalty of his multi-ethnic, multi-lingual subjects to the supreme authority, the Sultan. In this duty he was not alone and he governed with the assistance of the Synod¹¹⁵. Even though the stipulations raised in the *berats* do not confirm the claim that the church was ‘a state within a state’ meaning an entity independent from the political power, it was a fact that the Ottoman system allowed a certain degree of parallel administrative structure for religious communities

¹¹² For the taxes collected by the Patriarchate see İnalçık, “The Status of the Patriarchate under the Ottomans”, p. 428.

¹¹³ See Kenanoğlu, p. 60-61

¹¹⁴ Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, Princeton: PUP, 1963, p. 126.

¹¹⁵ Kodjabashis- village notables were known as the ‘Christian Turks’ for being strictly interlocked to the Ottoman administrative system. See Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 2nd. ed., Cambridge: CUP, 1992, p. 28.

integrated in the system¹¹⁶. This was in a sense obligatory since, legal, fiscal and administrative duties of the church could not be effectuated without the organization of the church hierarchy from the Patriarch to the village priest, working like a parallel bureaucracy¹¹⁷.

I. 2. 1. The Authority of the Patriarchate over Other Orthodox

The Orthodox churches that enjoyed autonomy under the Roman Empire found themselves in a subject position with the Ottoman conquest when Mehmet II abolished the Bulgarian and Serbian patriarchates and put them under the authority of the Patriarchate in Istanbul. This created an interesting situation because the Patriarchate, even though it was under Muslim rule, enjoyed greater authority over the fellow Orthodox¹¹⁸. The Patriarchate's jurisdiction assumed a broader geography than during the Byzantine Empire. However, we have to nuance this concept because the subordination of all churches to the Patriarchate was not absolute and varied from period to period. The Balkan churches sometimes retained their own church structure and sometimes lost it in favour of the Patriarchate. First the Balkan churches and then those in Syria, Egypt, Cyprus and Crete came under the same political ruler. Except from the Russian Church, which became first autocephalous in the wake of the Turkish conquest and then an independent Patriarchate in 1589, the most of the Orthodox world was under the Ottoman rule¹¹⁹. While in the Middle East, the churches remained under their respective Patriarchs, the Sultan regarded them all as being under Istanbul. Although the church within the empire was not organized into a single ecclesiastical authority, the Patriarch of Istanbul was vastly more influential than the spiritual chiefs of the other autocephalous Orthodox churches. The Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, historical patriarchates from the outset of the Christianity had territories which were smaller and less wealthy, with only a small flock due to schisms that detached from them a large majority of their flock and the autocephalous church of Cyprus was limited to the island alone¹²⁰.

¹¹⁶ Sugar holds that privileges given by Sultan Mehmet II created a parallel legal system and a 'state within state'. p.47. For a contrary view see İnalcık, "The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans"; Settar F. İksel, "Istanbul Rum Patrikhanesi-I", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish History Documented], Vol. 11, No. 62, 1972, p. 23-29 at p. 28.

¹¹⁷ Sugar, p. 46.

¹¹⁸ Stavrianos, p. 103.

¹¹⁹ Pantazopoulos, p. 27.

¹²⁰ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 126.

According to Ortaylı the Ottoman administration did not recognize administrative powers or supremacy to Istanbul over other patriarchates¹²¹. However, especially during the 18th and 19th centuries the Patriarchates of the East were financially, politically and administratively dependent on the Patriarchate of Istanbul and the election of their prelates was effectuated with the participation of its Synod. Clogg held that the Greek hegemony over these Patriarchates was well established. He asserts that “between 1720 and 1898 the patriarchal throne was occupied by Greek prelates... Moreover this Greek hegemony over the higher reaches of the Orthodox church, (...) over the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, financially dependent on the Ecumenical Patriarch, actually resided in Istanbul and participated in the deliberations of the Holy Synod”¹²². Janin shares the same opinion asserting that “The Phanar took advantage of the Sultan’s protection to exercise a real authority over the Church of Antioch. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nearly all the occupants of the see were of Syrian origin: but in 1724 the See of Antioch was formally reserved to Greeks. Yet the bishops were often selected from among the natives”¹²³. The Patriarchs were nominated by Fener¹²⁴. Again, after the Turkish conquest in 1517 it was prescribed that the Head of the Orthodox Egyptians should live near the Ottoman Sultan, a situation which inevitably favoured Fener vis à vis other patriarchates¹²⁵. According to Maxime of Sardes, the Patriarch of Alexandria was selected by the Patriarchate in Istanbul from 1660 onwards, the same supervision was exerted on the Antioch Patriarchate as well¹²⁶.

Even though Istanbul was only *primus inter pares*, the supreme civil authority of the patriarchate conferred by the sultan over all Orthodox of the Empire was giving it a *de facto* supremacy. The Patriarch lived at the seat of power and was near to the sultan who recognized him as the leader of all Orthodox. It was the Patriarch of Istanbul who could submit the names of the chief prelates of other allegedly autocephalous churches to the Sultan and therefore

¹²¹ Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Millet”, p. 998.

¹²² Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 187.

¹²³ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 68.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹²⁶ Maximos, (Metropolitan of Sardes), *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church, A Study in the History and Canons of the Church*, Thessaloniki, 1976

control their appointment¹²⁷. Moreover, the Patriarchate had the right to convoke a Synod of the Orthodox churches, a right exclusive to his see¹²⁸.

In the Balkans, when the Ottomans conquered Istanbul, Orthodox Slavs were incorporated in the Greek *millet*. However, like the Roman Empire, the Ottomans allowed the Balkan churches to remain, with new arrangements following the political conditions. The Patriarchate of the Serbs at Peć was abolished after the Battle of Kosovo (1459) between Serbia and the Ottoman State and merged in the Archbishopric of Ohrid¹²⁹. Thus in an early period Serbians were made subservient to the Patriarchate. This situation caused dissent among the Serbs from the outset. The Serbian church was revived under the Grand Vezir Sokollu (Sokolović) Ibrahim Paşa, a Serbian *devshirme* himself in 1557. The own brother of the Paşa was appointed to the head of the Serbian church¹³⁰. During the Habsburg-Ottoman wars in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the patriarchate sided with the Austria-Hungarian Empire. But when the latter was forced to withdraw across the Danube, the Patriarchate of the Serbs was left alone. A new Metropolitanate was created at Karlowitz. At this time when the Serbians were discredited, the Greek Phanariots and other Greek elements were increasing their influence¹³¹. In 1755, under great pressure of the Patriarchate, the Peć [Ipek] Patriarchate was transformed into a bishopric to be abolished entirely in 1766¹³².

From that time on the Serbian church was again subordinated to the Patriarchate of Istanbul. The Serbian church was instrumental in preserving a distinct Serbian identity and

¹²⁷ Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, p. 30

¹²⁸ In his history, the influent *tanzimat* (reform period) statesmen and historian Ahmet Cevdet Paşa gave also an account of the place of the Patriarchate. See Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet]*, Vol. 11, Ankara: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1966, p. 116-234

¹²⁹ Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, (trans. Rang'ichi Ng'inja), Texas: Tamu Press, 2003, p. 72.

¹³⁰ Sugar, p. 46; Pantazopoulos, p. 26-34.

¹³¹ Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, London: Hurst and Company, 3rd ed., 2002, p. 103; The Phanariots (Tr. Fenerliler) according to Ortaylı was the Greek-Orthodox aristocracy that had power and prestige in the Ottoman state. They were the main support of the Patriarchate. The group consisted of Greeks alongside Bulgarian, Albanian, Romanian and even of Italian origin. See İlber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlar'da Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum-Ortodoks Kilisesi" [National Churches and the Greek-Orthodox Church in the Balkans during the *Tanzimat* Period] *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi [Millet and Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire]*, p. 25-32 at p. 28; Zeynep Sözen, *Fenerli Beyler, 110 Yılın Öyküsü [Phanariot Notables, An Account of 110 Years]*, Istanbul: Aybay, 2000; Chapter on Phanariots, Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 360-383; Mihail Dimitri Sturdza, *Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce et d'Albanie et de Constantinople*, Paris, 1983.

¹³² See Sugar, p. 46. Nevill Forbes et al., *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Turkey*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915, p. 102-110; Georges Castellan, *A History of the Balkans: From Mohamed to Stalin*, New York, Boulder, 1992, p. 309.

was the intermediary between the State and the Serbian flock of the Sultan. Thus the subordination of all Orthodox on the Ottoman territory to the Patriarchate was broken from time to time, following the Ottoman strategies. If Serbians could obtain freedom for their churches it was in order to keep them at the side of the Ottoman State when the later was in constant rivalry with the Habsburg Empire in the Balkans. Consequently the abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate was a manifestation of the discontent over the Serbian church's endorsement of the Habsburgs against the Ottomans¹³³.

A similar course may be observed with the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian Archbishopric in Ohrid survived until 1766 under the name Archbishopric of Justiniana Prima and All Bulgaria when Sultan Mustafa III, under the pressure of the Patriarchate dissolved it¹³⁴. Until its dissolution the Archbishopric was the representative of the Slavs in the Balkans and retained a certain degree of autonomy but it was under the supervision of the Patriarchate¹³⁵. From the abolition of the archbishopric until the foundation of the Bulgarian exarchate in the second half of the 19th century, Bulgarians went through an immense campaign of Hellenization. The Church Slavonic was replaced by Greek in liturgy, Bulgarian clergy was replaced by Greek ones.

Romania was also an Orthodox territory that was placed under the supervision of the Patriarchate. Wallachia and Moldavia became Ottoman dependent territories in 15th and 16th centuries respectively with a short period of independence. Those two Principalities were accorded a high measure of autonomy. Other Romanian territories came under the Ottoman rule one by one. Until the Karlowitz Treaty of 1699, signed by the Ottoman State and the Habsburgs, the Ottoman suzerainty was absolute in Romania¹³⁶. By the eighteenth century, Phanariot families that were Ottoman elites that owed their very existence and wealth to their allegiance to the Patriarchate and the Ottoman state were given office in Wallachia and Moldavia, a period that would continue until the outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821¹³⁷. Under the Phanariot families that were now very influent not only in two principalities but

¹³³ Daniel Goffman, "Ottoman *Millets* in the Early Seventeenth Century", *New Perspectives on Turkey II*, 1994, p. 133-58 at p. 144-146.

¹³⁴ For the Balkan churches see Dennis P. Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century: Slavic Orthodox Society and Culture Under Ottoman Rule*, Jefferson, North Carolina and London: Mc Farland, 1993, p. 66-73; Thammy Evans, *Macedonia*,

¹³⁵ Stavrianos, p. 104.

¹³⁶ Stavrianos, p. 340.

¹³⁷ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 360-383.

also in the Balkans, local churches were suppressed and Greek clergy replaced the local ones and even the use of the vernacular was forbidden¹³⁸.

A few words should be said about Cyprus. The island was conquered by the Ottomans in 1570-73. After conquest its inhabitants were incorporated in the Orthodox *millet*. The Cypriot Church was independent since the Ephesus Council of 431. Originally a branch of the Antioch patriarchate it had never been under the jurisdiction of Istanbul. The island was inhabited by Orthodox as well as the Catholic. Due to the Latin conquest, the Roman Catholic Church was well rooted¹³⁹. Ironically, considering the status in Cyprus today, the Turkish conquest united the island under the Orthodox banner within the *millet* system¹⁴⁰. Thus the Ottoman conquest reunited the Orthodox Church and contributed to the universal status of the Patriarchate. While the patriarch was the leader of all Orthodox in the Empire in civil matters it was also their indisputable spiritual chief even though the church tradition do not recognize him such an authority over the equal Orthodox churches. In 1832 there were eighty eight metropolitanates and thirty three bishoprics under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate¹⁴¹.

The national movements that started in the Balkans by 18th century however, reversed this process, destroying the ecumenical stance and prestige of the church.

I. 2. 2. The End of the “Ecumenical “ in the Age of Nationalism

At the close of the seventeenth century, the heyday of the Ottoman Empire was near to its end. This was a tragedy for the Patriarchate who would soon loose control over the Ottoman Orthodox. After the American and especially after the French revolutions the nationalism became an imposing reality in Europe. The *millet* system that was based on

¹³⁸ *ibid*, p. 379.

¹³⁹ Cyprus had an autocephalous church since the Council of Ephesus in 431. After the great schism between Rome and Istanbul the island was mainly Greek Orthodox. During the Third Crusade King Richard I of England captured Cyprus (1191), and sold it to Guy de Lusignan who created a dynasty there who ruled the island until the Venetian conquest of the island 1475. For over four centuries before the Ottoman conquest, Cyprus was under the rule of Catholics who tried to convert the Orthodox to Catholics. When the Ottomans seized the island in 1571, the Roman Catholic hierarchy left the island and the Orthodox were incorporated in the Greek Orthodox millet. Thus, the Ottoman conquest saved the Orthodoxy that was weakening on the island. For a concise history of Cyprus under the Latin Rulers see Peter W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Sugar gives an account of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, p. 47; Berkes, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Ortodoks Kilisesi”, p. 13-14.

¹⁴⁰ Sugar, p. 47

¹⁴¹ Kenanoğlu, p. 151. According to Meyendorff, in 1820, there were eighty metropolitan sees and fifty bishoprics in the Balkan peninsula, the Greek islands and Anatolia, Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today*, p. 44. Ortaylı tells us that in 1857 there were one hundred and twelve metropolitanates and fifty-six bishoprics. İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimatın Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878) [Local Administrations after the Tanzimat]*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974, p. 61.

religion should have to be replaced with one considering ethnic allegiances of the subject Orthodox peoples. According to Ortaylı, in the age of nationalism, the clear separation of religious and ethnic groups that lived in a closed system in the cosmopolitan empire was no longer sustainable¹⁴². The rise of the commercial elites that had access to the West adopted the new secular ideology and began to spread the ideas of freedom and independence. During this period, the ethnic conscience started to develop putting language instead of religion as a bond of unity in the Christian *millet*s¹⁴³.

During this period new powers emerged in Europe and old allegiances were abandoned. The discovery of the new trade routes undermined the Middle Eastern ones, trade among the nations expanded, new classes were born out of the old ones and the premises of the industrial revolution had been already on their way. The Ottomans returned empty handed from the second siege of Vienna that resulted in the loss of control over the Balkans. The first retreat in Europe was sealed with the signing of the Karlowitz (Karlofça) Treaty with the Holy League¹⁴⁴ in 1699, making the Habsburg Empire the dominant power in Europe. This Treaty marked the end of the Ottoman offensive in Europe and the beginning of the European counteroffensive. The Ottoman power in Europe started to fall so rapidly that a power vacuum was created in the Near East. Austria and Russia were the first powers to take advantage of the Ottoman decline. By the end of the eighteenth century they conquered the vast territories across the Danube and along the northern shore of the Black Sea¹⁴⁵. Military weakening of the Empire also led to the financial crisis. In the Balkans and the Near East, the erosion of the central authority was filled by the local *ayans*. The anarchy was widespread and the *reaya* was under difficult economic conditions all over the Empire. The ideas of the French revolution spread under these conditions and the seeds of nationalism among the peoples of the Balkans were cultivated¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴² İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, p. 60; See also L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 78.

¹⁴³ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 28.

¹⁴⁴ The League was a coalition of various European powers including the Habsburg Monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Republic of Venice and Peter I of Russia.

¹⁴⁵ Stavrianos, p. 226.

¹⁴⁶ Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 10.

Nationalist movements coincided with the economic boom in Europe. Previously, the non-muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire benefited from the trading rights in Habsburg domains to Ottoman subjects with the Treaty of Karlowitz. The Black Sea trade was expanding thanks to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, the convention of Aynalıkavak of 1779, and the Russian-Ottoman commercial treaty of 1783 that gave a substantial boost to the non-muslims¹⁴⁷. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the trade fell under the monopoly of the chiefly Greek and Armenian merchants¹⁴⁸.

The development of nationalism and the consequent independence movement among the Greeks was largely due to Diaspora merchant communities that provided subventions for the publication of translations, especially of secular nature, financed schools, colleges, and libraries in their native towns and islands, and sponsored the education of Greeks¹⁴⁹. Greek enlightenment that constituted a model for other Balkan nations started towards mid eighteenth century and reached its peak at the beginning of the nineteenth century. During this period new schools were built with the finance and support of the Greek community¹⁵⁰. The Western-style education of the Ottoman Greeks provided both by their own communities and by Western powers, progressed at a much faster pace than that of the Ottoman Muslims. In the Greek case the nationalist feelings had found a material base in the new bourgeois class. Education provided the superstructure for its consolidation. İlber Ortaylı asserts that the Greek language provided the necessary basis for the maintenance of the Greek identity. The Ottoman State allowed the Greek education and language due to the privileged status of the Greek Patriarchate. Sea trade, relations with Italy and central Europe combined with the nascent sympathy of the Greek culture since the *Renaissance*, engendered the national feelings among the Greeks¹⁵¹.

While the seeds of nationalism were cultivated among the Greeks, Slav Orthodox populations of the Balkans followed suit. Nationalism among the Slavs developed around the

¹⁴⁷ Fatma Müge Göçek, "The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalisms" in Fatma Müge Göçek (ed.), *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*, Albany: New York Press, 2002, p. 15-83 at p. 23.

¹⁴⁸ Üner Turgay, 'Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Trabzon: Elements of Ethnic Conflict' in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, p. 287-318 at p. 287.

¹⁴⁹ Göçek, 'The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalisms', p. 24.

¹⁵⁰ Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 43-48.

¹⁵¹ Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878)*, p. 64.

local churches that remained in the Balkans. This Balkan nationalism was directed not only to the Ottoman state but also to the Patriarchate that dominated the Orthodox peoples of the Empire. The Greek clergy culturally oppressed the Slavs and financially exploited them by collecting taxes. The Ottoman response to the decentralization of administration in the Balkans and growing nationalism among the Slavs was quite original: the strengthening of the authority of the Patriarchate. In the course of the eighteenth century, a new move for the centralization of the Patriarchal authority over the all Orthodox churches of the Ottoman Empire started. In 1766-7, upon the request of the Patriarchate, the autocephalous metropolitanates of the Bulgaria and and Serbia were abolished. This move was primarily an attempt to contain the increasing Habsburg influence and Catholic missionary activities on the Ottoman lands. Moreover, according to the political authority, the centralization of the power in the patriarchate's hands would stop the erosion of the Ottoman power in the Balkans. This was a response to the growing Balkan nationalisms that the Ottoman government had difficulties to encounter. Finally, the increasing power of the Russian Empire should be contained¹⁵². However, Russian influence over the Slav Orthodox peoples of the Balkans would be very difficult to resist. The Russian influence over the Slavs of the Balkans, according to Ortaylı was exerted through religion¹⁵³. It exerted pressure for the election of the candidates to the Patriarchal Throne who would support Russian interests. This Russian stance was not unique to the Balkans but extended to the Near East and over the historical patriarchates as well.

In the Balkans the corruption of the Greek dominated church contributed to the disenchantment of the Orthodox who suffered under a dual fiscal oppression both by the Ottoman civil and Greek ecclesiastical authorities. From seventeenth century onwards, the first signs of discernible anti-Greek sentiment among the Orthodox populations of the Empire started to develop¹⁵⁴. Thus nationalism among the Slavs was anti-Turkish as well as anti-Greek. It was above all against the hegemony of the Patriarchate of Istanbul over the Slav churches. Another result was the rise of only the wealthiest Greek clerics to ecclesiastical

¹⁵² S.F. Oreşkova, 'Rusya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasındaki Savaşlar: Sebepleri ve Kimi Tarihi Sonuçları (Wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire: Reasons and Historical Outcomes)' in Gülten Kazgan & Natalya Uçenko (eds.), *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler [Russia and Turkey From Yesterday to Today: Political, Economic and Cultural Relations]*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003, p. 17-32 at p. 27.

¹⁵³ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, p. 67-68.

¹⁵⁴ Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century: Slavic Orthodox Society and Culture Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 70-72

leadership. By the close of the century the Phanariots were firmly entrenched in a monopolistic position as holders of the highest Orthodox ecclesiastical offices, both in Istanbul and in the Ottoman provinces¹⁵⁵. The administration of the Greek dominated church was particularly corrupt in the Balkans to an extent that a British consul from a Greek town reported: “Here, as everywhere else in Turkey, every sort of injustice, malversation of funds, bribery and corruption is openly attributed by the Christians to their clergy”¹⁵⁶.

I. 2. 2. 1. The Foundation of Balkan Orthodox Churches

The ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate in the sense understood during the Byzantine and the Ottoman periods came to an end during the 19th century. The national idea encountered stubborn resistance from traditional elements in Christian population and the Patriarchate¹⁵⁷. The institution had too much to lose from the new secular ideology. In a theologically organised society, the Patriarchate could easily rule as the intermediary authority between its community and the state doted with administrative, legal and limited judicial authority alongside its ecclesiastical duties. Now all these privileges were under question.

It is true that the Orthodox Church has been the only permanent institution in the for the Orthodox peoples of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. While the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires collapsed, the church stood. The Church preserved and transmitted the language, script and learning and a primordial memory as the reservoir of a sense of the past. It contributed to the preservation of the identity of the Balkan peoples. Religion did serve as a barrier between the Muslims and Christians, preventing the possibility of racial and cultural assimilation. The church also served as a common and strengthening bond among the Balkan Christians until the advent of nationalism.¹⁵⁸

Now nationalism adopted this role. This is the fact that led to the mistaken assumption that the church endorsed the nationalist values¹⁵⁹. However, the reality was quite different. Nationalism was a secular ideology and it targeted the multi-ethnic empires as well as

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 67-68.

¹⁵⁶ Cathcart (Preveza) to Bulwer, 20 July 1860 quoted in Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 117.

¹⁵⁷ Tom Gallagher, *Outcast Europe : The Balkans, 1789-1989*, London : Routledge, 2001, p. 31

¹⁵⁸ Stavrianos, p. 149.

¹⁵⁹ Paschalis Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, Hampshire: Variorum, 1996, p. 10.

universal religions. From the outset of the national era, the leadership of the Patriarchate repeatedly and unambiguously made clear its opposition to the secular aspirations of freedom and national independence advocated by the Enlightenment and it issued condemnations of major initiatives of national liberation. As Doğan Avcıoğlu rightly asserts, the “nationalist movement is an ideology of the bourgeois class and not of the church”.¹⁶⁰ Nationalism was in direct contrast with the ecumenical vision of the Patriarchate. According to Ortaylı “The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate in language and dogma was loyal to the Byzantine Middle Ages, it because of this loyalty that instead of adopting a nationalist stand, it preferred loyalty to the Ottoman state that restored it”¹⁶¹.

I. 2. 2. 1. 1. Greek Independence: First Attack to the Patriarchate

The first open pronouncement of the church came upon the bourgeoning of the national idea in the work of the early activists of the Hellenic national identity Adamantios Korais and of Rigas Velestinlis¹⁶². With the increasing threat posed to the Ottoman State by France in the late 18th century, several encyclicals were issued warning against dangerous nationalist ideas propagated by the French¹⁶³. The fear of the Patriarch was not unfolded since the idea of an independent church for an independent Greece was advanced by early nationalist.¹⁶⁴ Extremely anti-national attitude of the church was exposed in the ‘Dhidhaskalia Patriki’ (Paternal Exhortations¹⁶⁵) published in 1798¹⁶⁶. The author was probably Patriarch Gregory V of Istanbul. The Paternal Exhortation held that good Christians should be content to remain under Turkish control¹⁶⁷.

The Church kept its distance from the Greek revolt, considering that it had too much to loose. When the revolt began, the Patriarch immediately issued an excommunication for

¹⁶⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türklerin Tarihi, Vol I, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1978, p. 47.*

¹⁶¹ Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlar’da Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum-Ortodoks Kilisesi”, p. 27.

¹⁶² For a detailed account of Rigas Velestinli and Adamantios Korais life and work see Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, p. 10-80.

¹⁶³ Richard Clogg, “Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence” in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, London & Basingstoke: Mac Millan, 1973, p. 1-40; For an overview see also Richard Clogg, “The ‘Dhidhaskalia Patriki’ (1798): an Orthodox Reaction to French Revolutionary Propaganda”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1969, p. 87-115.

¹⁶⁴ For a detailed analysis see Charles A. Fraaze, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Exhortations is also translated as “Instructions” or “Teachings”.

¹⁶⁶ For the whole text of the ‘Paternal Exhortation’ see Richard Clogg (ed, trans. with an introduction), *The Movement for Greek Independence 1770-1821, A Collection of Documents*, London, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1976, p. 56-64.

¹⁶⁷ Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 179-180

the revolt leaders. Soon afterwards, an open and very violent excommunication was issued signed by the Patriarch, his metropolitans and the Patriarch of Jerusalem residing in Istanbul¹⁶⁸. Ironically it was Patriarch Gregory V who issued the violent pronouncements against nationalism and excommunicated the rebels was hanged in 1821 together with four metropolitans, in order to revenge the Greek revolt¹⁶⁹. The Patriarch was punished with the capital penalty not because of his direct involvement in the resurrection, but because as the leader of the Greeks he could not control them¹⁷⁰. The Greek uprising resulted finally in the creation of an independent Greece in 1829 thanks to the involvement of the Great Powers¹⁷¹. The Patriarchate refused for a long time refused to recognize “martyrs” of the Greek independence war to prove its loyalty to the Ottoman State¹⁷².

In 1833, the Church of Greece proclaimed its independence. The Patriarchate did not recognize the Greek Church until 1850. It is important to note that, the Church of Greece was totally dependent on the Greece government. The Metropolitan of Athens and four members of the Synod were designated by the government. Moreover the state was directly represented by a commissioner who should approve the synod’s decision¹⁷³.

The foundation of a Greek state in 1829 was of major significance for the Patriarchate. Firstly, the Greek revolt, the Patriarchate and the influential Greek elite lost the prestigious place in the eyes of the Ottoman state. Second, the ambition of the new state to acquire new land challenged Ottoman Greeks with a dilemma of either supporting or rejecting the *Megali idea*¹⁷⁴. The Patriarchate that was since then an Ottoman institution in line with the Ottoman policy in the Balkans and elsewhere, now increasingly was threatened by the new secular

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 176. For the full text of the excommunication see Doc. No. 27, p. 344-351.

¹⁶⁹ Ottoman statesmen and historian Ahmet Cevdet Paşa gives a detailed account of the Greek revolt and the Patriarchate of that time. There is only a vague reference in the lines of Cevdet, who claims that the private correspondence of the Patriarch with the Morean insurgents was found at the Patriarchate. The Grand Vezir Benderli Ali Paşa personally interrogated the Patriarch who claimed that he was an old man over 90 and he had nothing to do with the revolt. But the Paşa was not convinced, claiming that if priests and kocabaşıs were aware of the insurrection it would be illogical to believe that the Patriarch was innocent. See Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, p. 217-218

¹⁷⁰ İlber Ortaylı, *Avrupa ve Biz*, Ankara: Turhan, 2001, p. 75. On the execution of the Patriarch, nationalist Greek pioneer Korais wrote: “Oh, that stupid Sultan, he hangs his own friends. He should vest them a kaftan instead!”, quoted in Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 2nd ed., İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 144, footnote no. 10.

¹⁷¹ Münir Yıldırım, *Yunanistan ve Ortodoks Kilisesi*, 2nd ed., Ankara: Aziz Andaç Yayınları, 2005, p. 69.

¹⁷² Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlar’da Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum-Ortodoks Kilisesi”, p. 27.

¹⁷³ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 53.

¹⁷⁴ Megali idea means Great Idea in Greek. The concept consisted of the erection of a Greek-Byzantine empire with İstanbul as its capital. See Oğuz Kalelioğlu, “Türk Yunan İlişkileri ve Megali Idea”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk Tarih Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No. 41, May 2008, p. 105-123 at p. 108.

Hellenist ideology. Now, a second center of attraction appeared in Athens undermining the authority of the Patriarchate as the undisputable leader of all Greeks of the empire.

The Church like the Greek *millet* as a whole increasingly divided between the supporters of the *status quo* and the supporters of Hellenism. The first group including the Patriarchate was for the propagation throughout the Ottoman Empire and the East of Greek education, Greek life and civilization ‘through the protection of the Ottoman State’¹⁷⁵. For the first group, the Ottoman Empire already constituted a Greek state, since economic life was dominated by Greeks and there were many who worked as high rank officials in the Ottoman administration¹⁷⁶. The second group, supported the irredentist policies of the Greek State that were regularly manifested at times of crisis for the Ottoman Empire, e.g. 1839-40, 1854, 1878, culminating in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897¹⁷⁷. During the severe clashes between Greece and the Ottoman state, the Patriarchate insisted on the independence of the Patriarchate from Athens. This stance was retained until the Armistice of Mudros of 1918, when the Patriarchate moved towards the unconditional support of the Greek state.

I. 2. 2. 1. 2. **Serbian Independence**

When the Empire weakened in the Balkans during the eighteenth century and the decentralization became a plausible reality, the Patriarchate with the help of the Phanariots obtained new opportunities to control all Orthodox churches. In this period, the Balkan churches were Hellenized with the replacement of the Church Slavonic with Greek. The Serbians were the most exposed of the Balkan peoples together with the Greeks to the new ideas as the Serban people was divided between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The Habsburg Serbians started the national awakening and spread it among the Serbians of the Ottoman State¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁵ The Phanariots, at least the old generation of them were envisaging the idea of an Empire of the Hellens and Turks. Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlar’da Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi”, p. 27.

¹⁷⁶ Clogg, “The Greek *Millet* in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 197; For example Musurus Paşa, Ambassador of Athens and London, Kalimaki Bey, Ambassador of Vienna, Sava Paşa, Governor of Algeria and later Minister of Public Works and Foreign Affairs were all from Phanariot families. See İlber Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Yunanistan ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu” in *Osmanlı’da Milletler ve Diplomasi*, p. 113-123 at p. 118.

¹⁷⁷ Clogg, “The Greek *Millet* in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 197.

¹⁷⁸ Stavrianos, p. 240-248.

In order to halt the independence movements of the Serbs, the Peć (Ipek) Patriarchate was closed down in 1766 by the Ottomans¹⁷⁹. Together with the Bulgarian and Romanian sees, it became directly dependent on the Patriarchate. After this date, the local clergy was replaced by the Greek prelates who often sided with the central government of Istanbul as envisaged by the state against independence movements of the Serbians¹⁸⁰.

This caused greatest resentment among the Serbs as it is the case with other Balkan peoples. When the Treaty of Edirne (1829) and the following decree of the Sultan (1830) recognized the autonomy of Serbia, Serbians immediately sought for religious independence. They were granted the right of choosing the Metropolitan of Belgrade, and the bishops by the Ottoman Sultan. The metropolitan however, had to go to Istanbul to be consecrated. When the crisis in the Balkans reached its apex at the end of the 1870s, Serbian Orthodox church that was autonomous since 1832 pressed and obtained autocephalous status from the Patriarchate¹⁸¹.

I. 2. 2. 1. 3. **Romanian Independence**

In Romania, the Treaty of Paris (1856) proclaimed the political independence of Wallachia and Moldavia. In 1857 they were united into a single state still subject to the suzerainty of the Ottomans. In 1861, the Ottoman state recognized the unity of the Principalities. Immediately, the new independent government undertook a series of reforms, aimed at curtailing the Patriarchate's influence in Romania. The estates of the Patriarchate were confiscated causing the loss of all revenue coming from the Principalities¹⁸². In 1865, an independent Romanian Church was proclaimed. Romanian Church's Independence was acknowledged by the Fener in 1873 after a long quarrel¹⁸³.

I. 2. 2. 1. 4. **Developments at the Albanian Orthodox Church**

Finally in Albania, the Orthodox Church declared its independence from the Patriarchate in 1922. Already in 1908, the first Albanian Orthodox Church was established

¹⁷⁹ Radmila Radić, "Serbian Christianity" in Ken Parry (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Orthodoxy*, West Sussex: Blackwell (hardcover), 2010, p. 231-248 at p. 234.

¹⁸⁰ For the Serbian uprisings see Stavrianos, p. 244-268.

¹⁸¹ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 146.

¹⁸² Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 149-150.

¹⁸³ Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, p. 328-334.

Boston, US by Bishop Noli¹⁸⁴. This was an outcome of the desire to be independent politically from the Greek influence¹⁸⁵. Despite the fact that the major obstacle before the Albanian independence was the territorial aspirations of the Greeks, this move proves that the Fener was regarded as Greek as the Greek state. Only in 1922, the independence was proclaimed by a Conference gathered in Berat. According to resolutions of the conference, complete independence the Albanian language replaced the Greek in liturgy and four metropolitanates occupied by the Albanian clergy were founded. Also a Synod was elected but instead of four Metropolitans only three metropolitans of Albanian origin were found¹⁸⁶. The Albanian Orthodox Church sought recognition from the Patriarchate, since without the consent of the Fener a new church cannot operate canonically. Patriarch Meletios IV who was not against the independence of the Albanian church changed his mind under the pressure of Greek bishops who lost their place to the Albanians. A group of clergy and laity visited the Fener without obtaining any change of heart. However, in order to prevent a clear cut schism Patriarch Meletios promised that he would reconsider the issue¹⁸⁷.

I. 2. 2. 1. 5. Foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate

The movement of independence that started between Greeks, Serbians and the Romanians spread finally to Bulgaria. This was the greatest blow to the authority of the Patriarchate. Under the Ottomans, Bulgarian church was under the jurisdiction of Fener. But the autocephalous Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrid survived until 1767. During the 19th century schools providing education in Bulgarian were founded everywhere the Bulgarians lived. The language of the liturgy was also another major problem. After the abolishment of the Bulgarian See, Greek was imposed in the liturgy, and Greek prelates replaced the Bulgarians. From the first half of the 19th century, resistance against the Greeks started. In 1820, the claim for the independence of the Bulgarian church was first proclaimed¹⁸⁸. At first

¹⁸⁴ Miranda Vikers, "The Greek Minority in Albania-Current Tensions", *Balkans Series*, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2002, p. 7., www.da.mod.uk/colleges/.../Balkan%20Series%200110%20WEB.pdf (10 March 2010)

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ For details see Angeli Ines Murzaku, "King Zog I and Albanian's Religions. The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Byzantine Catholic Church", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2003, p. 429-452; Edwin Jacques, *The Albanians: An Ethic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present*, North Carolina: McFarland, 1994, p. 376-377; Fitzgerald, p. 72; Owen Pearson, *Albania and King Zog: Independence, Republic and Monarchy, 1908-1939*, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2006, p. 195-196.

¹⁸⁷ For a detailed analysis see Pearson, p. 195-196.

¹⁸⁸ Ivan Zhelev Dimitrov, "Bulgarian Christianity" in Ken Parry (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Orthodoxy*, West Sussex: Blackwell, (hardcover), 2010, p. 47-72 at p. 54.

the aim was to drive out the Greek bishops and replace them with Bulgarians but the movement turned to be a full scale resistance by 1830¹⁸⁹. Istanbul was the center where the movement developed with the support of the government. In 1849, the first Bulgarian “priest house” was founded in the city with the consent of the sultan¹⁹⁰.

The discontent between Bulgarians and the Patriarchate turned to an open ecclesiastical war by 1856. Now the Patriarchate was pressing for the banning of the use of Bulgarian in all churches and in the Bulgarian schools. The start for the construction of a Bulgarian church by an imperial *ferman* in 1858 was an important step toward Bulgarian independence. In 1860, the Bulgarian church in Istanbul cited sultan’s name instead of the Patriarch’s. This was followed by the selection of a Bulgarian prelate to be the head of the Bulgarian church¹⁹¹.

The ecclesiastical struggle that involved the Bulgars and the Greeks was in fact a struggle of the Greek and Bulgarians nationalisms. The main problem was the sharing of the territory for their churches. According to Raikin, “Greeks would not accept any plan that would not push the Bulgarians north of the Balkan. The Bulgarians would not accept any arrangement that would not include Macedonia in their share”¹⁹². Foreign powers were involved in the conflict, partly because the Bulgarians turned to them for support and partly because some of the powers themselves intervened to further their own interests. Russia was the first to come in mind. The Bulgarian church was to a certain extent the creation of Russia and General Ignatieff, Russian ambassador to the Ottoman State. Russia was sympathetic to the Bulgarian aspirations but was also careful about not alienating the Greeks¹⁹³.

The Patriarchate of Istanbul offered the Bulgarians some concessions such as the use of Bulgarian in churches and schools, and the appointment of Bulgarians to few bishoprics. The *Times* reported that “these concessions would enable Russia to inundate the Bulgarians with the Slavenic clergy, who would be devoted to her interests, who would exercise great influence, and soon have in their hands the election of the Patriarchs, and secure her predominance not only in the Bulgarian Church, but also in the Greek Church throughout

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*, p. 54-55.

¹⁹⁰ Osmanağaoğlu, p. 184.

¹⁹¹ Stavrianos, p. 372; Dimitrov, p. 55.

¹⁹² Raikin, p. 354.

¹⁹³ “Foreign Intelligence”, *The Times*, January 18, 1861.

Turkey”¹⁹⁴. This offer was turned down by the Bulgarians who wished to have their own church.

In 1867, a new concession came from the Patriarch Gregory VI, who conceded the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian church whose jurisdiction was to be limited to the territory between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains. The major problem that led the patriarchate to delimitate the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian church was Macedonia. The Patriarchate was afraid of loosing Macedonia to Bulgarians. The Bulgarians on the other hand were insisting on the right of the people of deciding which church they should belong¹⁹⁵. It proved to be impossible to find a conciliatory formula between Greeks and Bulgarians. Thus the final decision was left to the Sultan. In March 1870, Sultan Abdul Aziz promulgated a *ferman* that created the Bulgarian Exarchate or an autocephalic Bulgarian Church whose leader would live in Istanbul, with jurisdiction over all Bulgarians within the confines of the Empire as well as outside, for instance of Southern Russia¹⁹⁶. This meant the detachment of the largest flock of the Patriarchate after the Greeks. The jurisdiction of seventeen dioceses would be transferred immediately to his jurisdiction¹⁹⁷. This was a major blow for Fener’s authority.

The Patriarchate perceived the danger of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical movement. On the territories where the Bulgarians lived they were more numerous than Greeks. An autocephalous Bulgarian church would detach the Patriarchate from its flock over vast territories. Thus the Patriarchate tried with perseverance to suppress the movement. Sultan’s *ferman* however ended Patriarchate’s claim over all dioceses where Bulgarians form the majority of the population. By this *ferman* they obtained ecclesiastical autonomy and the right of creating national schools throughout the greater part of Thrace and far into Macedonia. The area of undisputed Greek influence in Turkey, which had been formerly conterminous with the authority of the Sultan, was thus restricted to Epirus, Thessaly a small part of Macedonia, and the narrow strip of territory between the Rhodope and the Aegean¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Stavrianos, p. 374.

¹⁹⁶ Castellan, p. 311; Raikin, 354.

¹⁹⁷ Stavrianos, p. 374, see also Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans 1804-1945*, London, New York: Longman, 1999, p. 105.

¹⁹⁸ “The Porte and the Hellenic Kingdom”, *The Times*, October 30, 1882.

In 1872, the Patriarch excommunicated the Bulgarian Exarch and all his followers, and declared him guilty, not only of schism, but of the new heresy of *philetism*, which means national feelings in Church matters¹⁹⁹.

The condemnation of *philetism* reads as follows:

The question of what basis *philetism* –that is, discriminating on the basis of different racial origins and language and the claiming or exercising of exclusive rights by persons or groups of persons exclusively of no country or group – can have in secular states lies beyond the scope of our inquiry. But in the Christian Church, which is a spiritual communion, predestined by its Leader and Founder to contain all nations in one brotherhood in Christ, racism is alien and unthinkable.

Neither the excommunication nor the condemnation of *philetism* however, resulted in the abolition of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The sentence was never regarded as legal except by the Greeks. Other Orthodox churches refused to ratify it, and kept friendly relations with the schismatic Bulgarians²⁰⁰. The Bulgarian church became the major instrument for the promotion of Bulgarian national idea in Macedonia and Thrace in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1878 the Berlin Treaty established the almost independent Principality of Bulgaria²⁰¹.

The Russo-Turkish war and the Treaty of San Stefano created a big Bulgaria. In Berlin Congress of 1878 Greeks were active, pointing out the dangers of aggressive panslavism. In Berlin, the big Bulgaria was split once again into a vassal principality and an autonomous province, a portion of Thessaly and Epirus would be ceded to Greece²⁰². In line with the soul of the *ferman* establishing the Bulgarian Church concerned that a strong Bulgaria at the Ottoman side would halt the advancement of Russia towards Istanbul, the Ottoman government made further concessions to Bulgarian church and established further Bulgarian dioceses in Northern Macedonia. This move was opposed by Russia, whose policy

¹⁹⁹ In the semi-official translation quoted below the term ‘phyletism’ is rendered as ‘racism’ which may obscure the real target of the nineteenth century condemnation. See Maximos, Metropolitan of Sardis, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church*, Thessaloniki: 1976, p.303; Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, p. 319-320. See also Pavlowitch, p. 106.

²⁰⁰ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 140.

²⁰¹ Pavlowich, *History of the Balkans 1804-1945*, p. 113.

²⁰² “The Porte and the Hellenic Kingdom”, *The Times*, September 30, 1882.

was to support Orthodox but to prevent any move towards further independence from Russia²⁰³.

All these concessions were met by the Patriarchate by more nationalistic measures such as the prohibition of the Slavic liturgy in the Bulgarian churches. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the Patriarchate was driven out of the Balkans together with the Ottoman state. In the case of Bulgaria, the full-scale schism lasted until 1945 when the Patriarchate of Istanbul recognized the Bulgarian church's autocephalous status.

I. 2. 2. 2. Conflicts in the Middle Eastern Patriarchates

I. 2. 2. 2. 1. Patriarchate of Alexandria and Ali Paşa

In the second half of the nineteenth century, conflicts occurred in the Orthodox churches of the Middle East as well. In Alexandria, under the Ottoman *ayan* Mehmet Ali Paşa (1806-1849). Despite the opposition of Fener, Hierotheus II, supported by the Paşa was appointed patriarch in 1846. After him the Patriarchate succeeded again in getting its candidates appointed up to the end of the nineteenth century. But in 1899, Photius who opposed to the tutelage of Istanbul was elected. It is interesting to note that the Russians supported his candidature in order to keep the Patriarchate out of the Palestine. The opposition of Fener bore no results and the relations strained between the two sees²⁰⁴.

I. 2. 2. 2. 2. Patriarchate of Antioch and the Greek-Arab Imbroglia

In Antioch, the Orthodox Christians also struggled to elect a local Patriarch to diminish the influence of Fener. Local Syrian clergy was supported by Russians. Already in 1898 Greek Patriarch Spyridon, the last in the long line of ethnic Greeks was forced to resign and an Arab, Meletius II (Doumani) was elected²⁰⁵. For one year Fener did not recognize the newly elected patriarch and prevented the Sultan of recognizing him too. But with the involvement of Russia, the patriarch was recognized that caused a major schism between the

²⁰³ *ibid.*

²⁰⁴ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 84.

²⁰⁵ Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969

Orthodox Patriarchates. For ten years the Patriarchs of Istanbul, Jerusalem and Alexandria broke off relations with the See on the ground that the Patriarch was an intruder²⁰⁶.

As a result, the new patriarch dismissed the four Greek bishops. He was succeeded in 1906 by again a native, Gregory IV (Haddad). Fener Phanar accepted the *fait accompli* when there was nothing else to do and established good relations with Antioch again. As a result, many students that would form the Antioch church hierarchy studied at the Halki School of Theology²⁰⁷. However, the election of the native bishops in Antioch opened the door for other eastern patriarchates dominated by Greek hierarchy to be lost to Arabs, supported by Russians.

I. 2. 2. 2. 3. **The Patriarchate of Jerusalem: Battlefield of Great Powers**

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem was the most exposed to Istanbul's control since the Byzance. After the conquest of the holy city by the Ottomans the Patriarchs resided in Istanbul. In the course of the nineteenth century due to the Russian stronghold again this situation had started to change. The Russian ambassadors were actively involved in the election of the prelates. The Russian claim over the Holy Lands had been one of the reasons of the Crimean War in 1853-1856. When Napoleon III claimed the right to be the sovereign authority in the Holy Land, Russia disputed this claim. The Ottomans played the two powers against each other, trying to keep its rights. Under Sultan Abdülmecid, a treaty confirmed France and the Roman Catholic Church as the supreme Christian authority in the Holy land with control over the Christian holy places and possession of keys of the Church of Nativity, previously held by the Patriarchate. This was confirmed again with the Berlin Treaty of 1878²⁰⁸.

The Russian involvement in the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was an outcome of the Great Power rivalry in the Middle East. While France supported the Roman Church, Russia supported the Syrian clergy in the Greek Orthodox Church against the support of the Greeks still powerful in Istanbul. In 1883, the Patriarch Nicodemus of Jerusalem was elected due to the Russian effective pressure on the Bab-ı-Ali. It should be noted that the government was

²⁰⁶ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 68-69.

²⁰⁷ *ibid*, p. 69.

²⁰⁸ Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Garimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914)*, p. 91.

under Grand Vezir Mahmut Nedim Paşa (1871 to 1872 and from 1875-1876), whose sympathy to the Russians under the influence of General Ignatief, the powerful Russian Ambassador before the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-78 earned him the nickname 'Nedimoff'. The Patriarch worked with the Russians to eliminate the Greek elements in the Synod. He sent the Greeks away from Jerusalem under the rubric of 'special duty'. According to the reports the Patriarchate had a great debt to the German banks that would be only paid thanks to a generous donation of a Russian²⁰⁹.

In the following period however, all higher hierarchy of the Church was filled with Greeks with the consent of Sultan Abdul Hamid. When the Revolution of Young Turks restored the constitutional regime in 1908, the fate of the Jerusalem Patriarchate had changed. According to the constitution, local councils were held. Lay elements started to pressure for more administrative powers in the Patriarchate for Syrians, suppressed by Greeks. Patriarch Damianos accepted to make concessions to the Syrians but the Synod, dominated by Greeks resisted. Patriarch Damianos was dismissed by the Synod in 1908²¹⁰. The church was completely divided between two camps. Both sides sent delegations to the Porte. The Synod, telegraphed the Porte, urging the Sultan not to recognize the deposed the patriarch and not to interfere in this 'purely ecclesiastical matter'²¹¹. The deposition of the patriarch was recognized by the Ottoman government, fearing the reaction of the Russians and trying to not alienate the Syrians. The main problem in Jerusalem was the administration of the vast church property. Thus a mixed council to administer the church property was created. This council due to the opposition of the Greeks, could never function properly. Russia offered great financial help to the Patriarchate until the Russian revolution of 1917. According to Janin, when it was deprived of this source the Jerusalem Church experienced a deep financial crisis. To overcome it it had to sell many church property, mainly to Zionist organizations²¹².

Even in Cyprus nationalism created tensions. From 1909 the Church of Cyprus assumed the leadership of the Cypriot nationalist movement that opposed British rule in the name of union with Greece²¹³. As a consequence of these ecclesiastical struggles and the

²⁰⁹ Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 77

²¹⁰ 'The Patriarchate of Jerusalem: Causes of the Conflict', *The Times*, January 7, 1909.

²¹¹ 'The Patriarchate of Jerusalem', *The Times*, January 7, 1909.

²¹² Janin, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, p. 77

²¹³ Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, Hampshire: Variorum, 1996, p. 184.

gradual nationalisation of the regional Orthodox churches, the unity of the ‘Orthodox commonwealth’ under the leadership of Fener was irreparably broken. The community based on the common religious allegiance was now replaced by separate national identities based on language and ethnicity that formed the basis of the nations²¹⁴.

Thus nationalism in the Balkans and the Middle East that resulted in the creation of new national states and autocephalous national churches was the greatest blow to the ecumenical pretensions of the Patriarchate. We may claim that the purely ‘Greek’ nationalism of the Patriarchate during the following period was, interestingly similar to Turkish nationalism, for that it came in a period when there was no other card to play –but nationalism- as all Orthodox Balkan peoples had chosen to follow their independent church structures. The establishment of the national churches undermined the power of the Patriarchate. Just before the Balkan Wars (1912-13) there were eighty-seven metropolitan sees in the Balkans. With the shrinking of the Patriarchate the ‘ecumenical’ Patriarchate would be confined to four metropolitan sees of only Dercos, Imbros, Kadıköy and Prinkipo-Adalar with the end of the Greco-Turkish war²¹⁵.

I. 2. 2. 3. The Ottoman Reforms and the Patriarchate

The authority of the Patriarchate was further restricted in the Ottoman Empire due to the rising force of the bourgeoisie and the reforms aimed at secularizing the system throughout the nineteenth century. Confronted with the prospect of dissolution due to the independence movements, the Ottoman State envisaged the possibility of reforms according to Western principles²¹⁶. The Great Powers were pressing the Ottoman government for reforms that would improve the conditions of the non-Muslims. However, these factors cannot explain the reforms of the nineteenth century. A new factor, the new rising Christian bourgeois class was not hesitating to challenge the church authority and press the state for undertaking reforms that would make the Greeks along with other Christians and Jews, equal

²¹⁴ *ibid.*

²¹⁵ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 45.

²¹⁶ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, Istanbul: YKY, 1997, p. 78; Enver Ziya Karal, “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First Constitutional Assembly, 1876-1877” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, the Central Lands*, p. 387-400 at p. 388.

citizens²¹⁷. Capitalism and liberal ideology is strictly linked to the individual rights and freedoms. Capital accumulation was very difficult in a climate where the basic freedoms and rights -such as the right to property- were absent. Several attempts for the Muslim-Christian equality and the first steps towards the set up of citizenship rights were performed during this period.

During the *Tanzimat*²¹⁸ period relationships between the Ottoman State and the non-Muslims changed. The Hatt-ı Şerif-i Gülhane (*Tanzimat Fermanı*) in 1839 and Hatt-ı Humayun (Islahat Fermanı) in 1856 alongside administrative, legal, military and fiscal reforms had the aim of insuring equality between the subjects of the sultan whatever was their religion²¹⁹. Both edicts were an outcome of Great Power interference in the Ottoman state's affairs that exerted pressure for the rights of Christians²²⁰. The Great Power interference is striking especially for the proclamation of the Hatt-ı Humayun. This edict was a direct outcome of the Crimean War (1853-1856) that was fought between Russia on one side and French, British, Italian and Ottoman States on the other. The Crimean war was a result of the Great Power discontent over the rights on the Ottoman lands²²¹.

The interesting feature of the Crimean War is that it directly called for the proclamation of the Hatt-ı Humayun. The principles of the Hatt were included in the Paris Treaty text in Art. 9 despite the opposition of the Ottoman representative²²². The Art. 9 was an acknowledgement of the *Hatt* rather than its mot-a mot reiteration. It was specifically proclaimed that the communication of the *Hatt* did not give the Powers the right to interfere in

²¹⁷ See Foti and Stefo Benlisoy, "Millet-i Rum'dan Helen Ulusuna (1856-1922) [From Millet'i Rum to the Hellenic Nation]" in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi [The Legacy of Thought Inherited by the Republic: The Accumulation of Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet: Political Thought in Modern Turkey]*, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Vol. I, *Istanbul: İletişim*, 2003, p. 367-376; Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4, July 1954, p. 844-864 at p. 846.

²¹⁸ The term *Tanzimat* derived from a root meaning "order", carries the implication of reorganized or reformed institutions, of fundamental regulations, it has become the equivalent for "reform movement" in the years from the Hatt-ı Şerif to the adoption of the constitution of 1876. For an overview of the Tanzimat period see Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* p. 216; Tanör, p. 75-117.

²¹⁹ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri 1789-1856*, Vol. V, 4th ed., Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1983, p. 248-252.

²²⁰ The Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839 was declared when Mehmet Ali Paşa, Ruler of Egypt was threatening Ottoman State's authority, the Hatt-ı Humayun was proclaimed as a condition of the Ottoman participation in Paris Peace Conference at the end of the Crimean War. The Ottoman state wanted to curtail the foreign interference on the name of Ottoman Christians. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", p. 850; Kaya, p. 67-69; 85.

²²¹ For an overview of the Crimean War see Kaya, p. 83-85.

²²² For the full text of the Treaty see Edouard Gourdon, *Histoire du Congrès du Paris*, Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1857, p. 5-18.

the affairs of the Ottoman state²²³. Despite this consideration, it is clear that the treaty was considered as a source for great power interference on behalf of Christians. According to Giannakakis, “the Treaty of Paris of 1856 proclaimed the privileges of the Christians in Turkey that became a subject of international interest and character”²²⁴.

I. 2. 2. 3. 1. The Opening of the Halki Theology School (HTS)

The founding of a theological academy in 1844 at the Halki island was one of the responses of the patriarchate to nationalism in the Balkans. Education of the clergymen had been a priority of the Patriarchate from the time of the Byzantine Empire. Before the Ottoman rule, a graduate school of theology placed under the authority of the Patriarch aimed at forming clerics and theologians existed alongside the Byzantine imperial school²²⁵. The first document that mentioned the school was the autobiography of an Armenian, Ananias de Chiraq (7th century) who tells us that he travelled with a Byzantine deacon and young clerics who were recruited in Armenia for receiving theological instruction in Istanbul²²⁶. But it is essentially from the 9th century onwards we hear about the Patriarchal School, under the illuminated Patriarch Photius. It was real university with a strong curriculum that did not differ from that of the imperial school except the emphasis on the theology.²²⁷ We know that a school of Slavonic liturgy was founded also in the city in order to propound Byzantine Orthodoxy among the Slavs that was intensified from the 9th century onwards.

Thus in the Byzantine Empire the theological education had a universal outlook in parallel with the universal outlook of the Patriarchate. When the Ottomans conquered the city the Patriarchal Academy was still in existence and the new Patriarch Gennadius Scholarios was one of its last graduates²²⁸. At Thessaloniki, at Mistra and at Trabzon there seem to have been academies which depended on the State for support. These academies disappeared in the

²²³ Gourdon, p. 10.

²²⁴ Basil G. Giannakakis, “International Status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1956, p. 10-26 at p. 18-19. For an overview of the Tanzimat period see Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* p. 216; Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 54-55; Carter Findley, ‘The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy’, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, the Central Lands*, p. 399-369 at p. 342; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire]*, p. 117.

²²⁵ Louis Bréhier, *Le Monde Byzantin, Vol III: L’Effondrement de l’Empire et l’Affaiblissement de l’Idée Monarchique*, Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1950, p. 492.

²²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 493.

²²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 494.

²²⁸ *ibid.*

course of time²²⁹. The vacuum was filled by the higher schools, monasteries, and the ecclesiastical cathedrae and up to a point by the universities of the West²³⁰. By the end of the fifteenth century Venice had become a lively center of Greek culture²³¹. Soon the University of Padua encouraged the study of Greek. A chair of the Greek language was founded there in 1463²³².

From about 1550 onwards, owing to the influence of scholars educated in Italy, there had been attempts to reform the Patriarchal Academy. Higher studies were introduced particularly the study of philosophy. In 1593 Patriarch Jeremias II summoned a Synod that gave a new structure to the academy. Various departments, to include higher philosophy and certain of the sciences as well as theology and literature, were set up, each under a *scholarch* appointed by the patriarch²³³. The Ottoman authorities never interfered with the Patriarchal academy at Istanbul. The first Greek Printing press was provided by the Patriarch Lukaris in the 17th century. He continued to reform the academy. However, the education of the clergy in the provinces was neglected and visitors from the west were horrified by their low standards. In the 19th century, in a framework of the educational revolution among the Greek *millet* a move was taken towards the foundation of a modern theology school. First theology school was founded in 1830 in Poros. Additionally, a theology faculty in Greece opened its doors in 1837, under Athens University²³⁴. This information is necessary in the sense of perceiving the motives of the Patriarchate in urging the opening of a theology school in Istanbul. In 1837 the Greek Church had already declared unilateral autonomy from Fener. Other churches of the Balkans were also struggling for their independence.

Despite the fact that it was deprived of its patriarchate, the church in Russia was the strongest of the Orthodox churches for that Russia had the largest Orthodox population. From the sixteenth century onwards, Russia had the claim of being the ‘Third Rome’ since Istanbul was under Muslim occupation. Now in the Balkans, Russia had claims and endorsed the new Orthodox Balkan churches. Thus the Patriarchate, under the permanent threat from its

²²⁹ Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 208.

²³⁰ Stavridis, p. 96.

²³¹ *ibid.*, p. 210-211.

²³² *ibid.*, p. 212

²³³ *ibid.*, p. 215.

²³⁴ The theology faculty was one of the four departments of Athens University that opened on 1837 to be first University in the Balkans. See the history of the theological faculty in the official website of the Theology School official website, <http://www.theol.uoa.gr/index.php?id=2> (28 July 20010)

Orthodox rivals had desired to assert its universal authority once again with the foundation of a theology school that would instruct the clergy that would come from the Orthodox churches all over the world.

A few words should be said about the general framework of the time. As we have already asserted, the Greek *millet* underwent a serious change during the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. A considerable number of Greeks who were under the Ottoman Empire and in *diaspora* communities all over Europe accumulated huge wealth. Together with the enlightenment spirit of their time the new wealthy bourgeois class invested their fortune in education. The Patriarchate was ruined due to the corruption of the church and the large sums to pay to the government could not finance such a school. Now the bourgeois class was ready to spend its fortune for the benefits of the community.

One other reason of the urging need for a theological academy was the rising force of nationalism. While in the first half of the 19th century the founding of the national churches in the Balkans had already become a reality the Patriarchate was still keeping its traditional universalist stance. Thus what might be in the mind of the Patriarch Germanos IV was to found a school, a supranational base, to educate clergymen, providing homogeneity in theological terms, in order to maintain religious unity amongst the Orthodox communities that had already formed independent nation-states. In this way, it aimed to allow emerging nation states to found their own independent and national churches, while preventing them from upsetting the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate²³⁵. Thus the objective of the school was not to weaken the Ottoman Empire by creating a unified Orthodox basis. It was to protect the Patriarchate who was standing alone as a supranational institution in the age of nationalism. The authority of the church was weakened with the nationalism in the Balkans and the Patriarchate was trying to find a solution to safeguard its authority and maybe reverse the ongoing separation process of the Balkan churches by providing them with the high clergy educated in Istanbul by the Patriarchate. Moreover a unique knowledge center for Orthodoxy would eliminate the danger of diverging interpretation of the Orthodox theology as propagated by the national churches, monasteries and the patriarchate. Finally the need to confront the secular ideology with anti-religious bias such as materialism and socio-

²³⁵ Elçin Macar and Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, *Discussions and Recommendations on the Future of the Halki Seminary*, Istanbul: TESEV, 2009, p. 9.

philosophical systems with vigorous argumentation, finally to confront the proselitization efforts which were being conducted by Catholic and Protestant churches over the Orthodox of the Empire were behind the idea of a theological school²³⁶.

Patriarch Germanos IV started the work for founding of a new theology school in 1842. The place he chose was the old Monastery of Hagia Triada (the Holy Trinity) situated on the Hill of Hope in Heybeliada (Halki) of the Princess Islands. The history of the monastery was unknown but attributed to Patriarch Photius (858-867, 877-886). The edifice as in ruins since it was restored in XVIth century. The monastery was known by its library filled with precious Byzantine manuscripts²³⁷.

After a long restoration period the school opened on 8 October 1844. According to Schlumberger the first year it had more that eighty students²³⁸. During the restoration the power politics were conducted. For example, the construction was halted one time on the complaint of the Orthodox (probably not of Greek origin) who claimed that the Patriarchate was constructing a fortress. Again, the Orthodox went to Rıfat Paşa to complain about the Patriarch who collects 10-12 *kuruş* per capita of all Orthodox to finish the construction. Also the Great Powers were involved in the construction process. British Ambassador Canning for example defended that the Greeks would never be able to manage the school without the help of Russians²³⁹.

The school was designed to meet the needs of the patriarchate by training academically educated priests for the Patriarchate and also for other Orthodox Churches²⁴⁰. This was an expression of the will of the patriarchate to continue its privileged position under the Empire vis-à-vis other Orthodox. Undoubtedly the Patriarchate was aware that the creation of national Orthodox churches undermined its authority. An ecumenic school that would embrace all Orthodox would contribute to the efforts of the Patriarchate to keep the *status quo*, meaning continue to be the undisputed leader of the Orthodox. Education had been

²³⁶See Stavrides, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 96

²³⁷ Gustave Schlumberger, *Les Iles des Princes: Le Palais et l'Eglise des Blachernes la Grande Muraille de Byzance*, 2nd ed. Paris: A. De Boccard, 1925, p. 125- 129. See also H.R.O Tarihçesi, Adalar Kaymakamlığı Bilgi Notu.

²³⁸ Schlumberger, p. 129.

²³⁹ Nejat Gülen, *Heybeliada: Tarihi, Coğrafyası, Yaşamı*, 2nd ed. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985, p. 136.

²⁴⁰ Vasil T. Stavridis, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, (trans. and ed. by George Dragas), Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 57-153 at p. 98.

an important tool for Grecification of the Slav Orthodox in the Balkans, it would be without a doubt wise to apply the same method to theological studies.

The school curriculum changed several times. From 1844 to 1899, the school had seven grades: four high school level and three theological grades. From 1899 to 1923, the high school division was dissolved and the school functioned as an Academy with five grades²⁴¹. In 1853 Turkish was added to the curriculum. As the majority of the students could not speak or write in Greek, the courses were in Hebrew, Arabian and even in Armenian. Very interestingly again in 1847 a Bulgarian chair was founded. It was again Canning, the British ambassador who interfered in the school affairs during the Crimean War of 1855-1856. He criticized the school management severely for conducting the education in Slavonic while British, French and Ottomans were fighting against Russia in Crimea²⁴².

The curriculum containing the Slavonic may appear in contradiction with the stance of the Patriarchate but it was totally consistent with the traditional regard of the institution. From the first time the Slav peoples were converted the Patriarchate allowed them the right to worship and conduct liturgy in their own language and even founded a school of Slavonic in Istanbul. It would be contradictory to church tradition to instruct only Greek in the universal school of the Patriarchate. However, the Patriarch in collaboration with the Ottoman government would impose Greek as the liturgy language over the Slavonic in the decades to come.

The school was ruined in the great earthquake of Istanbul in 1894. The present building of the school owes its current form to the benefactor Pavlos Skilitsis Stefanovik (probably a Slav- Orthodox). During the World War I the school was confiscated by the Government for the Naval Academy. With the Mondros Armistice in 1918 the school was returned to the Patriarchate. However, the same year, 750 German soldiers were installed to the school. After the October revolution in Russia, the Bielorussians and Russians found refuge under its roof. Even though the school administration objected, the Patriarchate approved the sheltering of the refugees in the name of religious brotherhood.

²⁴¹ See the official site of the Patriarchate at <http://www.ec-patr.org/mones/chalki/english.htm>. Retrieved on June 6, 2009.

²⁴² *ibid.*

In the Byzantine as well as in the Ottoman Empires the Patriarchate was empowered by the political authority. From a simple bishopric, the see was transformed to the strongest religious institution in the Roman Empire within a very short period of time. Under the Ottomans, the place of the church was not harmed. Under the Ottomans the Patriarch in Istanbul had become the representative of all Orthodox of the Empire. It acquired political and administrative rights that it did not enjoy during the Byzantine Empire. This ‘universal’ status was only scattered with the weakening of the Ottoman state. The Patriarchate until the end of the Ottoman Empire was an Ottoman institution *par excellence* that acted in conformity with the state interests.

1. 2. 2. 3. 2. *Nizam* of the Greek *Millet*

Tanzimat reforms did not please the Patriarchate that had feared an erosion of his authority. The Patriarch had foreseen the end of its traditional control over the spiritual, economic and legal affairs of the Orthodox *Millet*²⁴³. He was not mistaken. The proclamation of the 1839 Edict was the beginning of the end for the Patriarchate²⁴⁴. As we have mentioned in the previous section, according to *Tanzimat* principles a separate Bulgarian *Millet* and its church were officially recognized by the Sultan. Now the secularisation of the state system brought the church and state at odds over the traditional privileges of the Patriarchate.

The *Nizam* [*General Ordinances*]²⁴⁵ of the Greek *Millet* was an outcome of the *Tanzimat* period reorganization of the *Millets*. It became a major source of disenchantment for the Church that feared to lose control over the community²⁴⁶. The Patriarchate was resisting further lay influence in the administration of *millet* matters. Already in 1847, the Ottoman government urged the Patriarchate to add three lay members to the Synod. But the

²⁴³ Dumont asserts that especially financial interests were jeopardized by the new order. The patriarchate held church taxes and extensive property at its hand. Therefore it did not want lay people to interfere in its affairs. See Paul Dumont, “Tanzimat Dönemi (1839-1878)” in Robert Mantran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi [History of the Ottoman Empire II: XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarından Yıkılışa [History of the Ottoman Empire: From the XIXth Century to the Dissolution]*, (trans. Server Tanilli), 2nd ed., İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1999, p. 59-143 at p. 111.

²⁴⁴ Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlarda Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi” p. 26.

²⁴⁵ The *Nizam* (pl) consisted of eight different nizamname. Osmanağaoğlu, p. 134.

²⁴⁶ Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 217.

Patriarchate refused²⁴⁷. This time the secularisation of the *millet* administration had to be realised as a consequence of the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of 1856²⁴⁸.

The reforms proposed by the Ottoman government resulted in the forming of a council comprised of both bishops and laymen who drew up a series of ‘new canons’, *Nizamat* (General Ordinances) ratified in 1862. The *Nizamat*’s main provisions dealt with the election of Patriarchs, metropolitans, and bishops, the composition and the functions of the Holy Synod and the newly founded permanent mixed council. At the same time, a general council was founded to deal with the election of the Patriarch²⁴⁹. Henceforth, the Patriarch would be assisted by two assemblies, a Synod for purely ecclesiastical matters and a mixed council for affairs such as the cases of marriage, wills and the administration of church property, which are partly ecclesiastical and partly temporal. Twelve metropolitans sat in rote in the Holy Synod. The mixed council was formed by four members of the Synod and eight lay members of the Greek community, elected by them. Both assemblies sit for two years and were then dissolved, after which new ones are elected²⁵⁰.

According to the first part of the *Nizamat* on the election of the Patriarch, each of the twenty-eight metropolitanates under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate shall propose one candidate, personally or by correspondence. The designated names and -if necessary- the names proposed by the lay members of the general council, approved by the Synod, were included in the list of the candidates. This list was then sent to the government that had the right to erase the names of undesirable persons. Three candidates were designated for the final election. The patriarch was then elected with the majority vote of general council. When the Patriarch was elected, he was invited by the Ottoman State and was appointed to his official post by the Sultan himself²⁵¹.

The Patriarchate was responsible to implement the *berat* and was a vehicle of the execution of the Ottoman state’s decisions. He should therefore have indepth knowledge of

²⁴⁷ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 127.

²⁴⁸ Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 194.

²⁴⁹ For a Turkish translation of the *Nizamname* see Murat Bebiroğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Gayrimüslim Nizamnameleri*, İstanbul: Akademi, 2008, p. 81-123. For the composition of the General Council that would elect the Patriarch see Art. 3. p. 88.

²⁵⁰ For a detailed analysis of the *Nizamname* see Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914)*, p. 171-172.

²⁵¹ “Rum Patrikhanesi Nizamnamesi”, Part I, Art 1-13, in Bebiroğlu, p. 83-86.

the traditions, the Ottoman law and should be trusted by the Sultan. The Patriarch must be a national of the Ottoman state since at least from his father²⁵². The members of the mixed council were required to be nationals of the Ottoman State²⁵³. The citizenship prerogative was not specifically mentioned for the members of the Synod. However, In the Part 4 of the *Nizamname*, it was underlined that the selected and appointed bishops shall be Ottoman citizens²⁵⁴. Since the metropolitans and the Patriarch would be elected among the bishops, the members of the Synod would be also Ottoman citizens.

Özel explains that, even though the *Nizamname* of 1862 became void with the change of the legal system of Turkey, in the absence of legal arrangements dealing with the status of the Patriarchate in the Republican period, parts of it -that are not contrary to the new laws and constitution of Turkey are still valid²⁵⁵. The *tezkere* in line with the *Nizamname* held that Patriarch and the members of the Synod shall be Turkish nationals. Despite that fact, a Patriarch of American nationality was elected during the cold war period.

However, the abolition of the administrative, legal and political privileges of the Patriarchate *de facto* nullified the mixed council and the general council. Since the Patriarchate would not interfere in the communal affairs and would conduct only spiritual duties, only clergy should take part in the election of the Patriarch. Turkey did not recognize the right of the metropolitans now outside Turkish frontiers to vote nullifying the relevant provisions of the *Nizamname*. Thus the only provisions that could be considered valid were the provisions stating that the Metropolitans and the members of the Synod as well as the Patriarch should be Turkish citizens (replacing ‘subjects of the Porte’). Also the right of the Turkish government (instead of the Sultan) to approve the election should be safeguarded. This was also the points erected in the *Tezkere*.

Under these conditions, the first Patriarch under the Turkish republic was elected. No candidates were excluded and the election was completed in a peaceful and canonical manner. The election of Gregory VII was not a surprise. The new patriarch had a reputation of caution

²⁵² *ibid*, Part. 2, Art. 1-3, p. 86-87.

²⁵³ *ibid*, Art. 4, Art. 8, p. 107.

²⁵⁴ *ibid*, Part IV, Art. 1. p. 89.

²⁵⁵ Özel, *Fener-Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu*, p. 67-68; For a critical appraisal of Özel’s explanations see Osmanağaoğlu, p. 255.

and moderation. Because he had refrained from displaying any anti Turkish sentiments during the armistice, Gregory was recognized as the best person to be the future Patriarch²⁵⁶.

The end of the privileges of the Patriarchate is closely linked to the modernisation and secularisation of the Ottoman state. Inevitably, the government was centralized and the autonomy recognized hitherto to different communities forming the populations of the empire was restricted. The question of privileges had been a great area of concern for the Patriarchate. In general ordinances there were no essential innovations of a judicial nature. However, the need for secular justice was becoming more visible day by day. The law of 1879 sought to extend the jurisdiction of the state courts at the expense of ecclesiastical prerogative, by establishing a uniform procedure independently of religious custom. The *berat* of 1882 had signs of the secular law interfering into the domain of the church: It spoke of trial of the patriarch and the bishops by Turkish courts and the right of the police to arrest clergy men. Orthodox citizens could apply to the Ottoman courts instead of the patriarchal courts if they desired so²⁵⁷. In the following year the ministry of justice empowered civil courts to deal with cases of inheritance and alimony²⁵⁸. Fearing greater restrictions in the near future, the patriarch protested. Negotiations proved of no avail, as the Porte planned to abolish not only judiciary but also educational privileges²⁵⁹. A new code in 1869 anticipated the government control over the non-muslim *millet* schools including their programme, books and teachers. The education of the Greeks had been an area of great concern for the Ottoman Empire. During the 19th century many schools had been opened on the Ottoman territory. The education was used to propagate Hellenism and often the teachers and books were sent from Greece. The reform of education was not aiming only at the non-muslim education but significantly it tried to control the curriculum of these schools and the content of the education. The Patriarchate strongly reacted to the attempt of control over his flock. The debate resulted in the resignation of the Patriarch Ioakeim III in 1884²⁶⁰. Also the judicial reforms were curtailed. When the Patriarchate decided to closed down all churches on 24

²⁵⁶ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations*, p. 155.

²⁵⁷ Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914)*, p. 172

²⁵⁸ Arnakis, "The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire", p. 249.

²⁵⁹ *ibid.*

²⁶⁰ Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914)*, p. 173.

December 1890 under Patriarch Dionysos, the government had to step back from the restriction policy of the jurisdictional powers of the Patriarchate²⁶¹.

1. 2. 2. 4. Shift in the Traditional Stance of the Patriarchate

Before the *Tanzimat* period, the emergence of an independent Greek state in 1830 had already hampered the authority of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire. For only some three-quarters of a million of the approximately two million Greeks under Ottoman rule were contained within the frontiers of the new Greece, and for much of the first century of its independent existence the entire *raison d'être* of the Greek state was the redemption of the “unredeemed” Greeks of the Ottoman Empire²⁶². The foundation of the national churches transformed the *Millet-i Rum* from a grouping that embraced all Orthodox inhabitants of the empire into one that was largely, but still by no means exclusively, ethnically Greek²⁶³. Under those conditions the patriarchate stance to the challenge of nationalism changed over time. The differentiation took place within the ranks of the Patriarchate. The persecution of the moderate Phanariots after the Greek revolt and independence led the way for more nationalist hierarchy. Moreover the foundation of the Greek Kingdom in 1930 created a new center of attraction for the Hellenists among the Greek population. The elevation of the younger generation of hierarchy who were accustomed with the idea of nationalism from the days of the ecclesiastical fight with the Bulgarian exarchate in Macedonia changed the traditional attitudes of the institution. Thus by the turn of the twentieth century, a whole new mentality shaped by the values of nationalism crept gradually into the politics of the Patriarchate, the condemnation of ‘*phyletism*’ of a few years earlier notwithstanding. The new bishops were among the best trained and ablest men in the hierarchy who openly advocated the subordination of the policies of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire to the directives of Athens²⁶⁴.

This stand represented a radical breakthrough in the tradition of the Patriarchate, which had followed a policy of accommodation with the Ottoman state, knowing well from the long experience of centuries that loyalty to the Ottoman State was the guarantee of the

²⁶¹ *ibid.*

²⁶² Clogg, ‘The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire’, p. 193.

²⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 194

²⁶⁴ Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, Hempshire: Variorum, 1996, p. 30

Patriarchate's traditional privileges. The Patriarchate in order to safeguard its ecumenical stance, under Patriarch Ioakeim III, insisted on the preservation of the Greek millet, a community characterized by religion²⁶⁵. The Patriarchate was as ecumenical as the Empire. This was Ottoman Orthodox ecumenicity. The Patriarchate under Ioakeim III, tried to counter Greek irredentism by emphasising the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate embracing all Orthodox under the Ottoman rule. According to this view, the centre for the Greeks should be the Patriarchate and not the Greek state.

It is interesting to note that the imperial approach to the nation was first of all conveyed symbolically both in the Ottoman and in the Orthodox case by the recovery of symbols which have reference to a classic period of great glory, and by an attempt to activate the traditional symbols and symbolisms as features of a continuity with a great imperial, sacred tradition, of which continuity these authorities alone were the guarantors²⁶⁶. Patriarch Ioakeim III was the Patriarch who popularised the imperial Byzantine symbols. He also sanctified for the first time the martyrs of the Greek War of independence of 1821, hitherto denied by the Patriarchate²⁶⁷. Thus the Patriarchate wanted to reconcile the ecumenical vision of the Patriarchate with the new nationalist Hellenist ideology in order to unite Greeks. In the eyes of the Patriarch if there would be a new empire dominated by Greeks it should be the Patriarchate and not the secular leadership around which the Greeks should unite. The hanging of Patriarch Gregory V later has led to an assessment of the Patriarchate as the cradle of Hellenic agitation. Far from being the source, the Patriarchate tried to adjust it self to the new nationalist era by promoting Byzantine symbols, that would legitimate the status of the Patriarchate as the protector of Greeks and its culture.

The Patriarchate tried to reestablish the authority of the Patriarchate over the orthodox churches now becoming centers of nationalist awakening. In an encyclical issued in 1902, he addressed to the autocephalous Orthodox churches of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Cyprus, Russia, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and he made a call for cooperation. In the encyclical, there was also a reference to the matter 'concerning our present and future

²⁶⁵ Gedeon, *Patriarchal and Synodic Documents on the Bulgarian Matter (1852-1873)*, Istanbul, 1908, cited in Sia Anagnostopoulou, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-State, A Long and Difficult Process: The Greek Case*, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004, p. 40.

²⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 44.

²⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 45.

relations with the two great bodies of Christianity, and the Roman Catholic and that of the Protestants' and the desired union in the present and the future with them, including the Old Catholics²⁶⁸.

With this encyclical the Patriarch tried to assert the Patriarchate's power over the Orthodox churches. Also for the first time a policy of ecumenical rapprochement between different Christian churches had been proclaimed. In 1906, the Patriarchate started the preparations for an Ecumenical Council, apparently to discuss the burning question of Bulgarian schism. The church nationalism, directed to the Bulgarians first and foremost, there were no doubt that the Patriarchate would induce its fellow Churches to adopt an extreme anti-Bulgarian attitude. This would be undesirable for the Turkish government. The support of the Greek bishops of Macedonia to the Greek bands, together with the election of the Synod of a cleric accused of complicity with the bands was difficult to tolerate for the Ottoman government. Under these circumstances, the Bulgarian Exarchate that was prevented from enjoying its rights by the Patriarchate would be more staunchly supported by the Ottoman government.²⁶⁹

While a majority of the lower clergy in the Balkans was already supporting the *Hellenism*, the altogether change of policy was not in course until the end of the First World War. The clergy like the Greek *millet* altogether was divided between two camps. Patriarch Germanos V who was elected Patriarch on 10 February 1913 after the death of Ioachim III did not embrace the irredentist policies of Greece and followed the line of his predecessor. According to Atalay, the new Patriarch was born in Karaman and had been nurtured of the mainly Muslim environment and good relations between communities at his birth place.²⁷⁰ However, during his tenure the supporters of Greek irredentism gained ground at the Patriarchate. Consequently the last 'universalist patriarch' of Istanbul that had been elected with the consent of the Ottoman government was forced to resign in 1918 short before the signing of the Armistice of Mudros.

²⁶⁸ Vasil T. Stavridis, 'The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches', *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1963, p. 9-28.

²⁶⁹ 'The Ecumenical Patriarchate, Future Status and Position', *The Times*, November 20, 1906.

²⁷⁰ Bülent Atalay, *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi'nin Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1908-1923)* [The Phanar Greek Patriarchate's Political Activities (1908-1923)], Istanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001, p. 97.

We should note that, the tremendous changes in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth strained the relations between the Patriarchate and the Ottoman state. The centralization and secularization had alienated the institution inevitably. While all territory in Europe had been lost to the new Balkan states, the population of the empire became more homogenous and Muslim. After the restoration of the constitution in 1908, the Committee of Union of Progress (CUP) leadership had aimed at the transformation of the entire fabric of the society that was deemed necessary to save and rejuvenate the decaying structure. A social revolution which would take Turkey into the modern world was vital for survival. Thus the Patriarchate protested against attempts to install a more rational and sovereign system.²⁷¹ Together with the abolition of the old privileges, anti-imperialism of the new regime, a rational reaction against the Great Power economic and political interventions that turned the empire into a colony, was resented by the Patriarchate. The Great Powers after all were energetically supporting the Patriarchate- since the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774.²⁷² The Berlin Treaty of 1878 that detached most of the European territory of the Ottoman state contained provisions with which the Ottoman state promised the freedom of religion in the country.²⁷³ The involvement of the Great Powers under the pretext of the protection of minorities was deeply resented by the Ottoman rulers. Slowly but steadily, the ideology of the ruling CUP shifted to nationalism in line with the new ethnic composition of the remaining Ottoman territory.

After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the CUP that had took over the government emphasized the nationalism, anti-imperialism and the suppression of the old privileges retained by the different elements in the Ottoman society including the religious leaderships. Both of these elements were alienating for the Patriarchate. Together with the shift to Hellenism to the detriment of status quo within the Greek millet itself the Patriarchate slowly moved towards embracing the policies of the Greek state.

²⁷¹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, London, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 40.

²⁷² The Treaty does not contain any specific stipulations leading to the effective protectorat of the Russian Tsar over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. With this treaty the Ottoman State engaged in the protection and non-intervention in the Greek-Orthodox religion. See Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Alman- İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu, (1839-1914)*, p. 37.

²⁷³ *ibid*, p. 91.

I. 2. 2. 4. 1. Patriarchate during the Armistice Period (1918-1923)

The signing of the Armistice of Mudros between the Ottoman State and the Allied and Associated powers on 30 October 1918 was a turning point for the Patriarchate. The traditional ecumenic vision of the church was abandoned for the unconditional support of the Greek state under the Metropolitan of Prousa (Bursa) and the *locum tenens* of the Patriarchate Dorotheos (12 October 1918-6 March 1921)²⁷⁴.

The Ottoman Greeks were released from their civic responsibilities as Ottoman citizens, and the Patriarchate assumed unilaterally complete sovereignty over the community²⁷⁵. For the first time in history, the Patriarchate refused to communicate directly with the Ottoman government and the Greeks were urged to abstain from municipal, communal and general elections²⁷⁶. The Patriarchate proceeded to abolish the teaching of Turkish in Greek schools. At the same time the resolution of *Enosis* (Union) with Greece was proclaimed in Greek churches²⁷⁷. The Greek occupation of Izmir that started on May 15, 1919 was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the Patriarchate²⁷⁸. In sum, at the end of the World War I, the Patriarchate had already become an ethnic Greek church by carrying the flag of Greek irredentism, associated itself with the Greek State. When the Turkish national movement started the institution was already labeled as the main defender of the Greek claims over Anatolia and Istanbul²⁷⁹.

When Dorotheos died in 1921, the new elected Patriarch Meletios IV (Metaxasis) continued the policy adopted by his predecessor. He was the first (and the last) Patriarch to had previously been Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, with the support of Venizelos²⁸⁰. This was a contradicting period because by the time of the election of Meletios, the hope of the Greeks to take over Anatolia started to fade by the failures against the Turkish national

²⁷⁴ Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 125

²⁷⁵ For the activities of the Patriarchate during the Armistice period see İsmail H. Danişmend, *Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi [The Chronology of the Ottoman History]*, İstanbul, Vol. 4., 1972 ; Bülent Atalay, *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi'nin Siyasi Faaliyetleri 1908-1923 [The Fener Greek Patriarchate's Political Activities (1908-1923)]*, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001, p. 100; Erol Ulubelen, (ed. trans.), *İngiliz Gizli Belgelerinde Türkiye-The British Documents on the Origin of War, 1896-1914-*, İstanbul: Aykaç, 1967.

²⁷⁶ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992, p. 57.

²⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁷⁹ *ibid.*

²⁸⁰ Yıldırım and Sofuoğlu, p. 161-162.

army in the battlefield. Metaxasis became Archbishop of Athens with the support of Venizelos and was supporting him in return. After the victory of the royalist forces in Greece he was removed from office in late 1920. Following his removal, he traveled throughout the United States (USA) and during this time organized the 'Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America' also founding the 'Greek-American Seminary of St. Athanasios'²⁸¹.

The new Patriarch was a Greek national and his election to Fener was contrary to the *Nizamname* setting that the Patriarch should be an Ottoman national. Thus his election to the position of Patriarch drew negative reaction from the Ottoman government, which considered the election illegal²⁸². In a long note to the Allies about Meletios Metaxasis, the Ottoman government made implicit that being a Hellenic subject, former Archbishop of Athens was ineligible for the throne. The government thereby "ordered all Ottoman judicial and administrative authorities to refuse to accept any certificates of birth, deaths, or marriages or other documents issued by the Patriarchate"²⁸³.

The election also created controversy in the Holy Synod of Istanbul. According to the *Times*, "After the election of the Venizelist candidate to the throne seven of the eleven members of the Synod protested against the election of Metaxasis, as being illegal, and announced that they will, as forming the majority of the Holy Synod, take upon themselves the administration of the Patriarchate and will elect a *locum tenens* for that office in conformity with the canon law"²⁸⁴. According to the dissident members, "the election of Meletios was irregularly constituted and acted contrary to the decision to postpone the election, which was taken during the Premiership of Venizelos, and which was confirmed by an assembly of 45 metropolitans and Bishops at Edirne and by the officials of the Patriarchate"²⁸⁵.

²⁸¹ Patrick Viscuso, *A Quest for Reform of the Orthodox Church: The 1923 Pan-Orthodox Congress: An Analysis and Translation of its Acts and Decisions*, Berkeley, CA: InterOrthodox Press, 2003, p. xxi.

²⁸² Yıldırım and sofuoğlu, p. 162.

²⁸³ "The Greek Schism: Porte Refuses Berat to Mgr. Meletios", *The Times*, December 16, 1921.

²⁸⁴ "Election to Ecumenical Throne Disputed", *The Times*, December 14, 1921.

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*

The (royalist) Athens government took the same position against Metaxasis because he was supported by Venizelists²⁸⁶. The government in Athens had influence over a majority of the twelve members of the Synod, who protested the validity of Meletios' election. Despite the dissent of the seven of the twelve members of the synod, it had not been possible to dismiss Metaxasis. The Synod of the Church of Greece issued a sentence of *kathairesis*, implying degradation from spiritual status, sanctioned by the Greek government²⁸⁷. According to Alexandris, "by bringing domestic Greek politics into what after all was a supranational institution, beyond the jurisdiction of the Hellenic government, Greek political leaders undermined the prestigious position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an international religious centre"²⁸⁸. The subservience of Fener to the Greek politics while it had an ecumenic claim was ironical. It was not possible to be Greek nationalist and ecumenical at the same time because the very meaning of the word is denoting an ever embracing religious vision. To reinterpret Alexandris words, the Patriarchate harmed its own claim to be an ecumenical church and reduced itself to an ethnic church at a time when an ethnic Greek church had already existed.

Meletios proved to be even harsher supporter of the *megali idea* than his predecessor Dorotheos. During his tenure, he was actively involved in politics. In his period the church was at the order of the Greek embassy, helping it recruiting Anatolian volunteers and the collecting of extra taxes for financing the Greek army²⁸⁹. Moreover, the Patriarchate developed its own diplomacy, appointing Patriarchal representatives under the name "Grand Ambassador" to London, Paris and Athens. Moreover, it established new Exarchates of the Patriarchate in London and Rome²⁹⁰. The metropolitans appointed to Europe were

²⁸⁶ Between 1910-1913 Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine of Greece disagreed over whether Greece should participate in the World War or not. Venizelos wanted to join the Entente powers, namely Britain France and Russia. King Constantine, was attached to German dynasty by marriage and was a field Marshall in the German army, thus was close to the Central Powers, Germany and Austria Hungary. However, despite this attachment the king advocated neutrality, envisaging that the war could be detrimental for Greece. Venizelos followed the ideal of *Megali idea* (Gr. Great idea) even though the King had no desire for irredentism. It was the King however who did not immediately stopped the Anatolian campaign when Venizelos lost the elections of 1920. For the national schism see Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, p. 83-97

²⁸⁷ "The Patriarchate of Constantinople: Sentence of Degradation", *The Times*, January 13, 1922. On the decision of Athens Synod see Murat Hatipoğlu, *Yunanistan'daki Gelişmelerin Işığında Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı (1821-1922)* [101 Years of Greek-Turkish Relations under the Light of Developments in Greece], Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1988, p. 167. The author claims that the Synod excommunicated Metaxasis which is a false assumption.

²⁸⁸ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, p. 73.

²⁸⁹ For the activities of Patriarch Meletios during the Greek-Turkish War see Atalay, p. 133-142; Yıldırım and Sofuoğlu, p. 164.

²⁹⁰ Atalay, p. 138.

instrumental in disseminating propaganda to Western Europe in order to raise sympathy for Greeks in Anatolia. For example, the Synod's decision concerning a claim that all Greeks were victims of genocide in Anatolia and a call for help addressing to all Christian world was disseminated by Metropolitans abroad²⁹¹.

However, these attempts and further efforts of Meletios to obtain foreign support brought no results. When the end of the World War I for Turkey came when national forces entered in Izmir on September 16, 1922 finishing the Greco-Turkish war, the Patriarchate was left alone. We read in Alexandris that Meletios admitted to Venizelos that "his people had been abandoned to the wrath of nationalist Turks"²⁹². However, that assertion of the Patriarch was unfounded. The Patriarchate in Istanbul was still under the supervision of the Western powers in Istanbul. After the end of the Greco-Turkish war, if Metaxasis was not immediately disposed or imprisoned, it was thanks to the Allied powers, especially the British made great efforts for his protection primarily for not causing panic among the Greeks²⁹³.

I. 2. 2. 5. The Orthodox Scene in the World at the End of the War

The first decades of the twentieth century offered fertile ground for the new international activities for the Patriarchate. It was still recognized as the 'first among equals', but its hegemony shrinking along with the Ottoman Empire as new nation- states and national churches emerged in the Balkans. After the end of the Greco Turkish war and the following exchange of populations the historic metropolitanates in Anatolia disappeared. The Patriarchate became a shadow of the past as it was confined to the Archbishopric of Istanbul, its neighbouring areas, the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos.

However, the Russian Revolution changed this situation dramatically. The Russian Church faced liquidation at the hands of Russia's new Soviet regime. Meanwhile the Church of Istanbul discovered new opportunities to express its leadership in Orthodox affairs at a time

²⁹¹ *ibid.*

²⁹² Alexandris, p. 75.

²⁹³ In a telegram sent soon after the commencement of the Conference in Lausanne, Lord Curzon writes "I see (...) that General Harrington has obtained personal assurance from Refet regarding Patriarch. Should he nevertheless be in danger in future you should not stand too much on technicalities of national status, but should do your utmost to prevent his expulsion or arrest. I agree that if he is actually arrested you should insist on his release. If he wishes to have his own accord facilities should be given but we cannot advise him to do so in view of panic which should ensue", From Curzon to Henderson, December 4, 1922 in *İngiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı [Lausanne Peace Conference in British Documents 1922-1923]*, Vol II, November 20, 1922-April 22, 1923, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1984, p. 362.

when it lost its old territories in the Balkans and eventually in Turkey with the exchange of populations. Despite the fact that the new government in Turkey was determined to limit the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate to the Greek minority in Turkey, this was not an achievable aim due to the new international environment. The Patriarchate retained its international character due to the new developments on the Orthodox scene. The Russian revolution created new Russian diaspora communities with the huge refugee flow that it created. The question of diaspora would become one of the major fields of activity for the Patriarchate of Istanbul under the new conditions. Moreover, during this period the Russian Revolution was not the only reason why the Patriarchate has been involved increasingly more international. Another outstanding development was the organization of the new Greek Orthodox archdioceses all around the world under the jurisdiction of the Fener. Again, the need for leadership in order to effectuate reform of the church, participation in the ecumenical movement contributed to the prestige of the Church despite internal difficulties. Thus even after the foundation of the Turkish republic, while the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate was played down, the extraordinary conditions of the time did not permeate the Patriarchate to live in a nutshell.

I. 2. 2. 5. 1. The Russian Revolution and its Outcomes

The Russian revolution was the primary source of the Orthodox activity worldwide as the Church under the new Bolshevik regime was severely persecuted. Despite its own difficulties, the Fener could assert its leadership in the Orthodox world during this period.

At the beginning of the Russian Revolution, the Russian episcopate prepared for a council, which finally gathered in Moscow in 1917-18. The Russian Orthodox Church lost its patriarchate in 1721, by a decision of Tsar Peter I of Russia²⁹⁴. Now, before the Bolshevik declared their victory, the time seemed ripe for the restoration of the Russian Patriarchate. Indeed, in the preliminary phase of the revolution, the patriarchate was restored and the

²⁹⁴ In 1700, when Patriarch Adrian died, Tsar Peter took no steps towards the appointment of a successor, and in 1718 he declared the Patriarchate to be abolished, and he set up in its place a commission, the Spiritual College or Holy Synod. This was composed of twelve members, three of whom were bishops, and the rest drawn from the heads of monasteries or from the married clergy. See James Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 17

tradition of the election of bishops by both clergy and laity was reestablished²⁹⁵. Soon however, the October Revolution had taken place and Bolshevik forces under the leadership of Lenin held power. The new regime was against the religion and religious institutions as a continuum of the old regime. The religion was instrument of the ruling classes to act as a check on the working classes. Moreover, Bolshevik policy assumed that the church had to be suppressed in order to curtail its ability to influence the masses and act as a counter-revolutionary force²⁹⁶.

The first attack from the regime came in December 1917 when the landed estates and farms of the Church were confiscated, and few days later all Church schools and seminaries were closed. On January 1918 a decree was issued separating the Church and State. The church was not only suppressed but all its property was confiscated and its legal rights were abolished. Freedom of worship was allowed but strained²⁹⁷. A large offensive campaign started against all forms of religion; Priests and nuns were executed or sent to exile, all signs of religion were prohibited and an intensive atheistic propaganda sought to alienate people from religious expression. In May 1922, the newly elected Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow who resisted the new regime was imprisoned and retained until June 1923. When he was released from prison, he changed his attitude towards the Soviet government and he adopted a more conciliatory attitude²⁹⁸.

I. 2. 2. 5. 2. The Challenge of the Living Church

“The Living Church” experience in Russia was one of the challenges that the Patriarchate had to face after the Russian revolution. When Patriarch Tikhon was in prison, a group of clergy from the Russian Patriarchate took over the administration of Patriarchate. They called themselves “the Living Church”, and pledged to give full support to the Soviet government²⁹⁹. Initially, the Living Church was the outcome of the reform policy in the Russian Church. In late 19th and early 20th century, there were calls for the release of the

²⁹⁵ Olivier Clément, *Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeow I*, (trans. Paul Meyendorff), St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, October 1997, p. 13

²⁹⁶ Arthur L. Grail and David Kowalewski, “Church-State Relations in Russia and Nicaragua: Early Revolutionary Years”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1987, p. 92-104 at p. 95; John D. Basil, “Revolutionary Leadership and the Russian Orthodox Church in 1917”, *Church History*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Jun. 1979, p. 189-203 at p. 203.

²⁹⁷ Steven Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1971, p. 84.

²⁹⁸ Zoe Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia After Communism*, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 46; Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, London: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 150.

²⁹⁹ *ibid.*

Church from state control. In early twentieth century the intelligentsia and the workers, particularly, urban dwellers, shifted their attitudes toward the Church. They questioned the church's leadership role and condemned it as an organ of the imperial government. Deeply dissatisfied with the subjugation of the Church to the state, the intelligentsia initiated attempts at Church reform during 1905-1906³⁰⁰. The reformers were also influential in the Council that elected Tikhon. However, after the October revolution, the Soviet leadership endorsed the Renovationists who recognized the Soviet regime. After Patriarch Tikhon was imprisoned, two metropolitans set up a provisional ecclesiastical administration. They purged the hierarchy of bishops hostile to the regime, consecrated their own bishops, declared Tikhon deposed and sent some prelates into exile³⁰¹.

The reforms promoted by renovationists at the Council of the Living Church (April 16-29 1923) included adopting the Gregorian calendar³⁰², conducting the liturgy in the vernacular, promoting married clergy to episcopate, and undermining the place of the icons and other religious symbols in the Orthodox worship. Also the Council decided to “defrock” Patriarch Tikhon. This move along with the deposition of the Patriarch was regarded as uncanonical and too modern for the Orthodox religion³⁰³.

The Living Church claimed to be the legitimate Russian Orthodox Church instead of the Moscow Patriarchate, since it was very difficult for people outside the USSR to obtain reliable information about the religious situation there, several important centres accepted the claims of the Living Church for a time. While Patriarch Tikhon was released from prison, he annulled the decisions of the Council of the Living Church and re-established the authority of

³⁰⁰ Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church*, p. 44. Among the laity who reflected on the church reform was Bulgakov, who was also at the Council who elected Patriarch Tikhon. After the October revolution he fled to France among many other political refugees where he assisted the foundation of St. Serge Theology School which contributed immensely to the development of Orthodox theology.

³⁰¹ Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church*, p. 46.

³⁰² The Gregorian calendar replaced the Julian calendar by the proclamation of Pope Gregory XII in 1582. Within a year the change was adopted by the Italian states, Portugal, Spain, and the German Catholic States. Gradually, other nations adopted the Gregorian calendar: the protestant German states in 1699; England and its colonies in 1752, Sweden in 1753, Japan in 1873, China in 1912, the USSR in 1918, and Greece in 1923. See “Gregorian Calendar”, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. (21 August 2009). As it was introduced by the Roman Catholic Church, the Gregorian calendar was considered as a symbol of Papacy and the Orthodox church continued to use the old Julian Calendar. When the Patriarchate of Istanbul convened a Council to discuss the adoption of the Gregorian calendar this move was met with opposition and created controversy within the Orthodox Church. While the majority of the Orthodox adopted the Gregorian calendar it was labelled ‘Revised Julian calendar’ to prevent further reactions.

³⁰³ Dimitry Pospelovsky, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998, p. 235; Knox, *The Russian Society and the Orthodox Church*, p. 46.

the Patriarchate³⁰⁴. The movement started to lose its influence with the release of Patriarch Tikhon and was stigmatized as an associate of the atheist Soviet Regime.

I. 2. 2. 5. 3. Foundation of the Russian Diaspora Church

The policy of Istanbul towards the Revolution in Russia that almost destroyed the Orthodox Church may be described as ambivalent. After the final defeat of the White Armies –supporters of the *ancient regime*- in Russia, Istanbul experienced a huge refugee flow. The Patriarchate tried to help the refugees and settled them in orphanages, schools, churches belonging to the community³⁰⁵.

Among them there was the hierarchy of the Russian Church who along with military and civil populations escaped from Russia. This group convened the first Council of Russian Bishops in Diaspora in 1920 in Istanbul with the permission of the Patriarchate. On 20 November 1920, Patriarch Tikhon issued a decree authorizing bishops of the Russian church to set up autonomous organizations of their own on a temporal basis, because it was impossible to maintain communication between the churches³⁰⁶. It is not clear if the decree was applicable outside Russia but this was the commencement of the history of the Autocephalous Russian Churches Outside Russia³⁰⁷. On 20 December 1920, in line with Tikhon's decree, Fener granted the Russian clergy limited canonical authority to minister to the refugees in the Archdiocese of Istanbul. Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev, the leader of the exiled bishops, decided to move the organization to Sremski-Karlovci (Karlowitz) in 1921 upon the invitation of the Patriarch of Serbia³⁰⁸. At the first council in the city the same year, the bishops called for the restoration of the Romanov monarchy in Russia. Patriarch Tikhon who had permitted the creation of diaspora churches denounced the statements of the council and formally abolished the administration in a letter dated 22 April (5 May) 1922³⁰⁹. The exiled bishops accepted the decision, but they established a Temporary Episcopal Synod of the Russian Church Abroad in 1922³¹⁰.

³⁰⁴ Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, p. 85.

³⁰⁵ A large number of these refugees found refuge in Heybeliada Theology School for an account see Gülen, p. 141.

³⁰⁶ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 176

³⁰⁷ *ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 45

³⁰⁹ *ibid.*, p. 46

³¹⁰ *ibid.*

It is remarkable that the Council had to leave Istanbul. The decision was taken under the pressure of the Soviet authorities who did not want a source of disturbance to their revolutionary regime. Simultaneously, the occupying Entente forces in Istanbul feared to alienate the new Soviet regime. The Pan-Orthodox Congress called by Patriarch Meletios IV (May 10-June 8, 1923) of Istanbul before the finalization of the Lausanne Conference, was convened simultaneously with the Living Church congress (16-29 April, 1923) and the decisions were in parallel. Nevertheless, no representatives of the Living Church were present, whereas the President of the Karlovci Synod, not recognized by Patriarch Tikhon assisted the proceedings. Moreover, the Congress made a resolution in defense of Patriarch Tikhon, and thus in a way separated itself from the Living Church.

I. 2. 2. 5. 4. New Churches Looking for Independence from Russia

This period of revolution is interestingly similar to the processus experienced after the end of communism in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. While the political framework was not in parallel, the hope of independence was similar. In both cases, the Fener extremely benefited from the *modus vivendi*.

As early as 1903, the Russian Social Democratic Worker's party included in their program the right of self-determination of all nations³¹¹. In the theses written for his lectures delivered on July 9, 10, 11 and 13 1913 in Zurich, Geneva, Lausanne and Berne, Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik fraction of the party, advanced that the articles of the party program on the self-determination of the nations "cannot be interpreted to mean anything but political self-determination, i.e., the right to secede and form a separate state"³¹². According to Lenin this article of the programme was "absolutely essential to the Social Democrats of Russia"³¹³. In the account, he emphasized that two nations, Poland and Finland, for historical and social conditions could secede more easily than others³¹⁴. When Bolsheviks held power as a result of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the subject states thus hoped for their natural right for independence. Indeed in November 1917, the Bolsheviks declared that nations have right

³¹¹ For an overview of several political parties in Russia to the 'national question' and for a general overview of the problem see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 4th ed., 1997

³¹² Vladimir I. Lenin, "Theses on the National Question", *Lenin, Collected Works*, 1977, Moscow, Vol. 19, p. 243-251, <http://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/lenin/works/1913/jun/30.htm>. (May 28, 2010)

³¹³ *ibid.*

³¹⁴ *ibid.*

to self determination. The independence of Finland, Poland and other borderland states were recognized as a result of the program declared before the revolution ³¹⁵.

I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 1. The Orthodox Church of Finland

In Finland, the Orthodox constituted the second largest religious body. At the end of the 19th century the Russian Orthodox Church founded a separate diocese in Finland. After the Russian revolution, Finland became independent and the Orthodox in Finland considered the break up with the Russian church as well³¹⁶. The first address to apply was the Patriarchate of Istanbul. This move was an imperative for a church that aspired for a canonical status in the Orthodox Church. In fact, the unilateral recognition of the Fener was not sufficient to canonize a new autonomous or autocephalous unit in the Orthodox world. This was and still is a prerogative largely contested by the Moscow Patriarchate, claiming that only a Council of the Orthodox churches may provide such a recognition. However, in 1923, in response to the appeal of Finland, Istanbul created the Finnish Orthodox archdiocese as an autonomous Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The Moscow Patriarchate protested this decision and it was not until 1957 that it recognized the Finnish Orthodox Church as a part of the Patriarchate of Istanbul ³¹⁷.

I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 2. The Orthodox Church of Poland

Another interesting example is the Orthodox Church of Poland. There were approximately 3 millions of Orthodox in the country before the Second World War, mainly Ruthenians*, who were under the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarchate. ³¹⁸ Poland declared its independence in 1918 and it was finally recognized by the Soviet Union as a consequence of the Treaty of Riga in 1921. According to the terms of the Treaty signed between Poland, Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Russia ³¹⁹, the former extended its territory to include many Ukrainians and Bielorrussians at the Polish side of the frontier. Thus, the decision of freeing

³¹⁵ Pipes, p. 225.

³¹⁶ For the independence of Finland see "Independence of Finland", *The Times*, July 16, 1917.

³¹⁷ Vlasios Phidas, "The Church of Estonia" in *The Splendour of Orthodoxy 2000 Years, History, Monuments, Art*, Vol. 2, Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 2000, p. 516-518.

* In the pristine sense of the term, Ruthenians are Ukrainians who were formerly Polish or Austrian and Austro-Hungarian subjects. For larger information on Ruthenians see "Ruthenian", *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2010, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514207/Ruthenian>> (June 10, 2010)

³¹⁸ *Religious Life in Poland*, Polish Research and Information Service, New York, 1948, p. 23

³¹⁹ Dennis Hupchick, *Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1995, p. 210-211

the Orthodox Church from the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarchate would mean also lead to the “nationalisation” of the Orthodox church and thus Polification of the Eastern Orthodox minorities. In line with this political vision, in 1922, the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Poland was proclaimed³²⁰. Now, with Patriarch Tikhon in prison and the Russian church persecuted, the time was ripe for the independence³²¹. Upon the request of the Orthodox Church of Poland that was discussed during the Armistice period, the Fener established an autocephalous Polish church with a *tomos* dated 13 November 1924³²². With the *tomos* the Patriarchate recognized the autocephalous status of the Polish church on the condition that the canon law should be respected.³²³ The Patriarchate then unfolded what it means by the breaking of the rules by aiming the Patriarchate of Moscow. It is written in the document that³²⁴

the forced separation of the Kievan metropolia together with its subordinated eparchies in Poland and Lithuania from our see, and its annexation to the Church of Moscow, without seeking the consent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople is against the canon law. By this act, all rights of the Kiev Metropolitanate who had the title of Exarch to the Ecumenical Throne were totally undermined. Now the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland that was annexed to the Patriarchate of Moscow without following the canonical rules, asks the validation of its independence which was (then) given by the Synod. Thus now Poland should follow all the rules.

These words of the Synod was aiming the Russian Patriarchate which annexed the Kievan Metropolitanate (cradle of Russian Orthodoxy and now included both Ukraine and Belarus). Thus like Poland now, Kiev might return to the jurisdiction of Istanbul. Kiev was by far the most important church outside Russia. Many Russians lived in Ukraine and the number of Orthodox Ukrainians turned the see a valuable asset for the jurisdiction of Moscow. However, an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been an ultimate aim for the Ukrainians to assert their separate identity from the Russians throughout the twentieth century. The words of the Istanbul Synod was alarming for the Russian Patriarchate that wanted to maintain its jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Orthodox.

³²⁰ “Orthodox Church in Poland: Independence Declared”, *The Times*, June 17, 1922; Spinka, “Post War Eastern Orthodox Churches”, p. 118

³²¹ “Orthodox Church in Poland: Independence Declared”, *The Times*, June 17, 1922.

³²² The *Tomos* of Independence of the Polish Orthodox Church obtained by the Synod of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, 13 November 1924 (in Greek), p. 89-92. See Annex no. 2. for the original of the Polish *Tomos* delivered to the author by the Patriarchate.

³²³ *ibid*, p. 89

³²⁴ Translation by Yiannis Theokos, *ibid*, p. 89-90.

The *tomos* also set up the Polish Orthodox Church. According to the document The Holy Synod of the Polish Church would consist of all the Metropolitans of Poland under the presidency of the Metropolitan of Warsaw. From now on the Polish Church must announce to the Patriarchate the election of any new Metropolitans and take the Holy Myron* from the Fener, and finally when any problems arise the metropolitan of Warsaw should consult Istanbul³²⁵.

The conditions for the autocephalous status, as declared in the *tomos* were interesting in the sense that an autocephalous church unlike a dependent autonomous one under the jurisdiction of another church is not obliged to consult any other religious body when a new Metropolitan is consecrated. Interestingly enough, the Fener took advantage from the will of independence of the Polish Orthodox to assert its authority over a foreign church's affairs.

I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 3. **The Orthodox Church of Estonia**

Similar developments occurred in the largely Protestant states of the Baltics³²⁶. In 1918, Estonia declared its independence from Russia³²⁷. As a consequence the Orthodox Church in Estonia became an autonomous church under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate³²⁸. However, the Bolshevik persecution of the Orthodox Church and the imprisonment of Patriarch Tikhon caused the breakup of the relations between the two churches. The Estonian Orthodox Church thus decided to apply to Istanbul and obtain autocephalous status. In early July 1922, while Lausanne Conference was coming to an end, a delegate from the Estonian Church, along with the Finnish delegation came to visit Patriarch Meletios at the Fener, asking for autocephalous status³²⁹. The Patriarchate however, denied autocephalus status and the Estonian church became autonomous under the jurisdiction of

* Holy myron, is also called Holy Chrism, a mixture of pure olive oil and several flavours used during the ceremonies. To consecrate the Holy myron and send it to the Orthodox churches is a prerogative of the Patriarchate. However, Romanian and Russian patriarchates are preparing their holy chrism themselves. See Stavridis, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 91.

³²⁵ See Annex No 1, p. 90-91.

³²⁶ For an overview of the political developments in the Baltic states after the World War I see Henrikas Rabinavicius, "The Fate of the Baltic Nations", *Russian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1943, p. 34-44.

³²⁷ *Estonian Declaration of Independence*, 24 February 1918, <http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/> (18 March 2010)

³²⁸ In Estonia the Orthodox are in minority. According to the first census of Estonia (1922) there were 79 % Lutherans vs. 19 % Orthodox in the country. See Vello Salo, "The Catholic in Estonia, 1918-2001", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2002, p. 281-292, at p. 282.

³²⁹ "Patriarch's Departure Delayed", *The Times*, July 9, 1923

Istanbul in July 1923³³⁰. The *tomos* regarding the status of the Finnish and Estonian Orthodox churches were the latest acts of Patriarch Meletios, which delayed his departure from Istanbul also because he was under taking talks with the newly established states previously under Russian jurisdiction³³¹.

I. 2. 2. 5. 4. 4. **The Orthodox Church of Latvia**

In Latvia there was also a significant Orthodox community, consisting largely of Russians³³². The Orthodox religion was generally regarded as the “religion of the tsars”, the first Latvian Bishop had a prominent role in the first independence period of Latvia³³³. Until 1936, the Latvian Orthodox Church operated under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. In October 1934, the Archbishop of the Latvian church was assassinated. The Latvian assembly of Orthodox clergy and laity, supported by the Latvian government, petitioned the Patriarchate of Istanbul to accept the Latvian church under its jurisdiction and provide a new bishop. On 4 February 1936 Patriarch Benjamin (1936-1946) of Istanbul issued a *tomos* accepting the Latvian church and allowed for a new election³³⁴.

Thus the new archbishop of Riga was ratified by the Synod of the Fener. On 29 March 1936 Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateira, Metropolitan Thomas of Princes Islands, Metropolitan Konstantinos of Irinopolis, Metropolitan Alexander of Talinn and Estonia and Archbishop Nikola of Pechory consecrated the bishop elect as Metropolitan Augustin of Riga and Latvia in the Orthodox Cathedral in Riga³³⁵. Thus the Orthodox church of Latvia became autonomous under the jurisdiction of Istanbul. However, within four years, Latvian church was forced to return to the jurisdiction of Moscow. During the Soviet rule in Latvia between 1944-1991 the church activities were strictly controlled and no room for independent action was left³³⁶.

³³⁰ Triin Vakker and Priit Rohtmets, “Estonia: Relations between Christian and Non-Christian Religious Organisations and the State of Religious Freedom”, *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2008, p. 45-53 at p. 46

³³¹ “Patriarch’s Departure Delayed”, *The Times*, July 9, 1923.

³³² In 1925 there were 104,000 Russian and 53,000 Litvanian Orthodox. Erwin Fahlbusch and Geoffrey W. Bromiley, *The Encyclopedia of Christianity*, Vol. 3, Leiden: Eerdmans, 2003, p. 201.

³³³ *ibid.*

³³⁴ The text of the *tomos* in Alexander Cherney, *The Latvian Orthodox Church*, Powys: Stylite Publishing, 1985, p. 46-47 quoted in Keleher, p. 128.

³³⁵ *ibid.*

³³⁶ Fahlbusch & Bromiley, p. 201.

I. 2. 3. 5. 2. The Pan Orthodox Congress of 1923

One of the last international undertakings of the Patriarchate before the foundation of the Turkish Republic was the convening of a Pan-Orthodox Congress upon an encyclical by Patriarch Meletius IV (10 May-8 June 1923)³³⁷. The timing of the congress was interesting at a time when Russian Patriarchate has been undergoing a processus of extinction under the new regime, new national church formations has been challenging the ecumenical status of the Patriarchate and especially when in Lausanne the very existence of the Patriarchate has been discussed. The move of the Patriarchate to convene a Congress was a *tour de force* aiming to show the world and the Turkish government its leadership role for the Orthodox world.

The Congress of 1923 proved controversial and divisive. It was convened when the future of the Patriarchate in Istanbul was in serious doubt. As we have already mentioned, all Orthodox churches were not represented. While claiming to be Pan-Orthodox, it was far from being it. It was attended by delegates from only five Orthodox churches: Istanbul, Serbia, Romania, Cyprus and Greece. The Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem refused to send representatives. Bulgaria was not invited due to ongoing schism. Due to the new the conditions in Russia, no invitation was extended to the Moscow Patriarchate. Two Russian bishops from the Diaspora participate, Archbishop Anastasy (Gribanovski) a member of the Russian Synod at Sremski-Karlovci (Karlowitz) and Archbishop Alexandr Nemolovsky of America³³⁸.

From a theological point of view, the congress brought revolutionary changes such as the correction of the Julian calendar, marriage of priests and deacons after ordination, on second marriage due to death of a widowed priest or deacon among other things³³⁹. This Pan-Orthodox gathering was important because, it was held only only month after the Congress of the Living church and decided almost the same reforms. Thus we may claim that the Patriarchate followed the reforms proposed by the renovationist Russian church but was urging to monopolize any novelty that would be brought about to Orthodox religion.

³³⁷ For a detailed analysis and translation of the minutes of the Congress see Patrick Viscuso.

³³⁸ Viscuso, p. xxii

³³⁹ Stavridis, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 93.

I. 2. 3. 5. 3. Ecumenical Relations Strengthened

The Orthodox Church is often regarded –rightly- as an introversive, highly traditionalist and conservative church. Like all divisions of the monotheist religions the Orthodox believe that their faith represents the true dogma, reality itself. Nevertheless, as the world grew smaller, religious institutions found ways to communicate and tried to make their voice heard in an increasingly secular society. The Patriarchate from the very end followed and participated in the Ecumenical movement together with Protestant churches³⁴⁰.

During the Armistice period the Patriarchate increased its efforts towards ecumenical cooperation with different Protestant denominations in order to make a theological contribution to the Greek irredentism in Turkey. In 1920 “Unto the Churches of Christ everywhere” a Synodical Encyclical of the Fener during the tenure of *locum tenens* Dorotheos was addressed to all Christians³⁴¹. The encyclical called openly for union of different Christian denominations and suggested the creation of a Council of Churches similar to the League of Nations. This encyclical was called later by Willem Visser’t Hooft, the first Secretary General of the World Council of Churches (WCC) “an initiative which was without precedent in church history” that represented the first step towards formation of the WCC³⁴².

This call was without a doubt an expression of call for cooperation of the Protestant, especially Anglican Churches in regard of *Hellenism*. However, it also reflected the general tendency of the time. The foundation of the League of Nations, encouraged the churches that would like to cooperate in order to act together to support the post war efforts for peace and the social and economic development. Simultaneously with the syndocial encyclical, there were many religious formations. One of them was World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches (principal meetings took place in the Hague, 1919, St. Beatenberg, 1920 and Copenhagen 1922)³⁴³. This forum under the leadership of Protestant churches also brought together the Orthodox from Istanbul, Serbia, Romania, Greece and

³⁴⁰ The word ecumenic here refers to ‘pertaining to the relations between and unity of two or more Churches (or of Christians of various confessions) or ‘that quality or attitude which expresses the consciousness of and desire for Christian unity’. See Willem Visser’t Hooft, ‘The Word ‘Ecumenical’-It’s History and Use’ in Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948*, London: SPCK, 1954, p. 735-740 at p. 735.

³⁴¹ The whole text of the encyclical is available in ‘Unto the Churches of Christ Everywhere’, Michael Kinnamon & Brian E. Kope (eds.), *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, p. 11-14.

³⁴² Willem Visser ‘t Hooft, *The Genesis and Formation of the WCC*, Geneva: WCC, 1982, p. 94-97.

³⁴³ *The New International Yearbook*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1926, p. 337.

Bulgaria. However, due to the ambivalence of its objectives, and the parallel evolution of the Life and Work and Faith and Order movements gave the organization few chances to survive the establishment of the WCC³⁴⁴.

In 1920, Faith and Order Movement founded by American Episcopalians invited the Fener to their first preliminary meeting in Geneva. The invitation was accepted, together with the delegations of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Serbia, Romania, Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria. Archbishop Germanos of Seleucia (later Tyateira and all Britain) was leading the team of the Orthodox³⁴⁵. Paralelly the Life and Work movement initiated by a Swedish Archbishop Nathan Soederblom, embraced the encyclical 'Unto the Churches of Christ Everywhere' and again a small group of Orthodox headed by Germanos of Seleucia attended the preliminary meeting at Geneva³⁴⁶.

According to Stavrides, this encyclical in a way was "the constitution for the policy to be followed by the Orthodox Church in the Ecumenical movement"³⁴⁷. The call of the Patriarch was considered by the theologian as the pioneer of the movements of Faith and Order and Life and Work. The Patriarchate instead of insisting on a movement that would work under its leadership gave support to other ecumenical movements that was under formation. Meletios IV followed the line set out by his predecessors. In 1922 the Synod of Istanbul issued a declaration stating that Anglican Orders "possess the same validity as those of the Roman, Old Catholic and Armenian Churches possess, inasmuch as all essentials are found in them which are held indispensable from the Orthodox point of view"³⁴⁸. The will of rapprochement with the Anglican Church was no surprise as the British under the leadership of grechophile Lloyd George were the main supporters of the Greeks. Already in 1920, the Patriarchate sent an official delegation to the Sixth Lambeth Conference, first time in history, which engaged in theological conversations between the two churches.³⁴⁹

The possibility of uniting the Orthodox and Anglican churches was discussed at the 1923 Pan-Orthodox Congress united in Istanbul. The former Anglican Bishop of Oxford,

³⁴⁴ Evangelia A. Varela, 'The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches', *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 155-170 at p. 156

³⁴⁵ *ibid.*

³⁴⁶ *ibid.*

³⁴⁷ Stavrides, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches", p. 10-11.

³⁴⁸ Edward R. Hardy, *Orthodox Statements on Anglican Orders*, New York, London: Morehouse, Gorham, 1946, p. 2

³⁴⁹ 'Lambeth Conference and the Greek Church', *The Times*, April 30, 1920.

Charles Gore was present as a guest along with the pastor Buxton who was accompanying him. In the fifth session of the Congress, Patriarch Meletios gave a speech stating that among the most important questions of concern there was the Union of the Orthodox and Anglican Churches³⁵⁰. The speech gives us also insights about the British involvement in the church affairs. The Patriarch underlined that the Churches of Greece, Romania and Serbia who underwent a great destruction were endorsed by the Anglican Church³⁵¹. In his response to the Patriarch, Gore expressed his desire to see the Orthodox churches divided by fervent nationalism united as soon as possible and suggested the Patriarchate to make peace with the Bulgarian church that was still considered schismatic.³⁵²

However, the Pan-Orthodox meeting did not lead to unification with the Anglicans due to differences between the Orthodox. However, this was considered as a positive step together with the resolution of the calendar question³⁵³. One day before the session, Gore presented the Patriarch two documents: a petition from 5000 Anglican priests in whose opinion there was nothing to prevent union with the Orthodox, and another containing the conditions for union. Gore expressed that “from my part, I do not find it difficult to become Orthodox. However, I have the particular history of my church, a church which did not remain unaffected by the Lutheran and Calvinistic confessions”³⁵⁴.

I. 2. 5. 4. A Breakthrough: Establishment of the Greek Orthodox Diaspora Churches under the Jurisdiction of the Patriarchate

The organization of the Diaspora Greek Orthodox Archdioceses is one of the greatest achievements of Patriarch Meletius IV. The Greek diaspora constitutes today the major strength of the Patriarchate in terms of political power and finances. The organization of the Diaspora communities was a major scene for the activities of the Fener in the first half of the twentieth century.

The diaspora reflects strong national lines. Thus in contrast to the Orthodox canon law, there are many bishops that represent their ethno-linguistic churches. According to

³⁵⁰ “Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Pan-Orthodox Meeting”, Fener, 23 May 1923 in Viscuso, p. 75.

³⁵¹ *ibid.*

³⁵² *ibid.*, p. 76.

³⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 77

³⁵⁴ *ibid.*

Stavrides, an outstanding theologian from the Patriarchate, the arrangements concerning the organization of the diaspora Orthodox communities received three solutions during the stages of its development³⁵⁵:

1. organizing ecclesiastically all Orthodox living outside the boundaries of the local Orthodox churches under the Patriarchate, in accordance with Canon 28 of the fourth Ecumenical Synod of Chalcedon (451).
2. organizing various Orthodox jurisdictions, under their mother (local Orthodox) Churches.
3. organizing indigenous Orthodox Churches.

To settle the ecclesiastical disputes over the jurisdiction over the Diaspora communities, the first attempt came from Patriarch Ioachim who issued a document in 1908, conferring the right of spiritual jurisdiction of the Diaspora to the Church of Greece, given the fact that many were Greek nationals³⁵⁶. Thus in 1908, the theory adopted by Patriarch Ioachim was the second one, organizing Orthodox jurisdictions under their mother churches.

During the 1920s however, this approach would be abandoned for imposing the jurisdiction of the Fener over the Greek diaspora. Up to the end of the First World War, the Russian archdiocese was the only organized Orthodox presence in North America. The same situation prevailed in Western Europe. Previously acting together with Russian émigrés in Britain, Greeks opened their ethnic Greek church in London only in 1838³⁵⁷.

The formal organization of the Greek Orthodox parishes in the US began at a time when the people of Greece were seriously divided between the followers of King Constantine and the premier Venizelos. Following the assumption of power of Venizelos in 1917, Meletios Metaxasis was installed as Archbishop of Athens. On 4 August 1918, the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece resolved to organize the Greek Orthodox parishes in America. Archbishop Meletios himself went to the USA to supervise personally the organization of the parishes. He appointed Bishop Alexander of Rodostolou as the Synodical representative³⁵⁸. However, the political division poisoned this mission. The Royalists regarded both Metaxasis and Rodostolou as Venizelists and denounced to cooperate. After the defeat of Venizelos

³⁵⁵ *ibid.*

³⁵⁶ Stavrides, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 92.

³⁵⁷ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 173.

³⁵⁸ Fitzgerald, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 38.

party at the elections of 1920, Metaxasis was deposed from his post as the Archbishop of Athens as well. He fled to the US and despite the staunch opposition of the newly elected Synod of the Church of Greece, continued to work as he were still the Archbishop. However, Bishop Alexander was loyal to Metaxis and refused to cooperate with the Church of Greece³⁵⁹. Consequently, Meletios called for the first “Congress of Clergy and Laity of the Parishes of America” through an encyclical. The following meeting, held in New York on 13-15 September 1921, was a watershed in the history of the Greek Orthodox Church in America because it gathered together clergy and lay representatives from all the US. The most important decision of the Congress was the founding of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America³⁶⁰.

Less than two months after the establishment of the Archdiocese, Meletios was elected the Patriarch of Istanbul. One of his first moves was to annul the encyclical of 1908 by Patriarch Ioachim that gave up the rights of the diaspora to the church of Greece. Two months later, a new statement on 17 May 1922 canonically established the Orthodox Archdiocese of the North and South America under the jurisdiction of Istanbul³⁶¹. Therefore, ironically, the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Archdiocese of America passed from Meletios (Archbishop of Athens) to Meletios (Patriarch of Istanbul). This would have outstanding importance for Istanbul because by far the Archdiocese is the largest and richest diaspora Greek Orthodox Church that contributes immensely to the international prestige of the Patriarchate. This reflected a new theory for the diaspora churches, an “ecumenical irredentism”. Meletios asserted that the diaspora should be under the Church of Istanbul according to the Canon 28 of the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451).

Thus in a liberal interpretation of the Canon 28 that gives Istanbul the specific right to ordain the bishops Pontus, Asia and Thrace who are “among the barbarian lands”, Meletios IV now asserted that the Patriarchate had the jurisdiction over the Diaspora Greeks on the grounds that “the enactments of the canons and the traditional practice of the Church give the

³⁵⁹George Papaioannou, *The Odyssey of Hellenism in America*, Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1985, p. 208.

³⁶⁰Fitzgerald, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 39.

³⁶¹*ibid.* See also Stavridis, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 92.

most holy and apostolic patriarchal and ecumenical see the spiritual government of Orthodox communities outside of the regular boundaries of each of the Churches of God”³⁶².

Again the same vision of the canon law resulted in the appointment of a Patriarchal Exarch for the Greek Orthodox of Western Europe under the name of Metropolitanate of Thyateira-and later all Britain. Its first hierarch became Germanos Stirinopoulos at that time Rector of the Halki Theological Academy who represented the Patriarchate in in Europe³⁶³. All in all during the period that extends from the end of the World War I until the foundation of the Republic, the Patriarchate was particularly active due to the international conditions that incited the institution to play such a leadership role in the Orthodox world and in the ecumenical movement. Undoubtedly, some of these activities were directly aiming at serving the Greek State’s irredentist policy in Turkey. They were designed to raise a common Christian concern against the Ottoman State. However, this assertion would be inadequate if we do not consider the impact of the Russian Revolution in Russia that allowed Patriarchate to play an active leadership role that would not be possible if the Moscow Patriarchate was not suppressed by the new regime. This active role of the Patriarchate would be considered by the Allied and Turkish delegations in Lausanne that deducted differing consequences for the future status of the Patriarchate at the Lausanne Peace Conference.

³⁶² John H. Ericson, “The Canon 48: Yesterday and Today”, St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, <http://www.svots.edu/Faculty/John-Erickson/articles/canon-28-english.html/>. (August 29, 2008)

³⁶³ Stavridis, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 139.

I. 3. The Imperial Church Disappears: Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic

After the end of the war, an armistice was signed at Mudanya in October 1922 between the Allies and the Turkish Great National Assembly³⁶⁴. The Allies invited representatives of both the Ottoman government in Istanbul and the national assembly in Ankara together to the preparatory works of the Peace Conference that would be convened in Lausanne. This *fait accompli* proved to be unacceptable. In a decision on 28 October 1922, the Assembly separated the Caliphate and Sultanate and altogether abolished the latter. When the Istanbul government abdicated following the decision, the government in Ankara became the sole representative of Turkey³⁶⁵.

At the Peace Conference in Lausanne (20 November 1922-24 July 1923), the status of the Patriarchate in new Turkey under foundation was one of the thorny issues on which the parties had difficulties in finding mutually satisfactory solutions³⁶⁶. Montagna, president of the sub-commission on the exchange of populations revealed that “about twenty meetings had been entirely devoted to the question and even though all parties intervened and expressed their opinions, it was impossible to solve it”³⁶⁷. To find a solution to the problem was very difficult because the parties of the Conference had opinions ontologically different from each other. While the Turkish insisted on the removal of the Patriarchate from Istanbul until the very last moment, Allies were underscoring the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate that should be retained in its traditional seat in Istanbul to effectuate its spiritual authority for remaining Greeks and for all Orthodox of the world.

³⁶⁴ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, p. 69-74.

³⁶⁵ For the discussions at the assembly Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma [The Development of Secularism in Turkey]*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002, p. 504-505; Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk [The Speech]*, Vol. II, 1920-1927, Ankara: TTK, 1984, p. 911-921. .

³⁶⁶ The conference opened on November 20th, 1922. The negotiations were interrupted from February 4th, 1923 to April 23rd, 1923 but finalized on July 24, 1923 with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The parties to the conference were Turkey on the one side and the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the other side.

³⁶⁷ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 317.

I. 3. 1. Discussions at the Lausanne Peace Conference: Turkish Delegation's Stance Concerning the Patriarchate

The issue of Patriarchate was discussed during the Conference under a broader framework of exchange of populations and protection of minorities. The issue was first voiced on 1 December 1922, in a sitting of the Commission on Territorial and Military Questions. Upon the reading of Nansen report on the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, Ismet Paşa, head of the Turkish delegation, maintained that all Greeks of Turkey should be exchanged –without any exceptions-, together with the Patriarchate³⁶⁸. This demand was repeated officially in two applications to the sub-commission on 16 December 1922 and 4 January 1923³⁶⁹. Broadly, the Turkish declarations maintained that Turkey was undergoing a process of secularisation with the separation of the caliphate and state that would not allow any privileges to non-Muslim communities. The mediation of the Patriarchate between the Greek community and the government was no longer necessary. The institution should concern itself with purely spiritual matters and should not be involved in politics³⁷⁰. Moreover, the retention of the Patriarchate would lead to complications due to the political character of the institution. The Patriarchate could transfer its seat to Mount Athos and exercise thence its spiritual influence over the Orthodox world³⁷¹.

The *millet başı* status of the Patriarchate of the Orthodox, a principle applied during the Ottoman Empire would disappear under the new regime. If Turkey was to be a part of the modern world, it should construct a direct relationship between the state and its citizens

³⁶⁸ Atalay, p. 201. Despite the fact that Ismet Paşa endorsed the idea of exchange of populations, it is not clear who first advanced it. In the course of Lausanne Conference Ismet Paşa and Greek Premier Venizelos repeated that the exchange of populations was enforced upon them by inevitable facts. According to Venizelos, it was Fridtjof Nansen, League of Nations Commissioner for Refugees was the one who proposed the compulsory exchange. See Lausanne Conference, p. 206-210. Dr. Nansen refused, holding that it was the representatives of the four Great Powers in Istanbul who first mentioned the exchange of populations, Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomasi ve Göç: Türk Yunan Mübadelesinin Öteki Yüzü [Diplomacy and Immigration: Other Side of the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange]*, Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006; In Academia there are a number of different views, Dimitri Pentzopoulos holds that it seems that Venizelos was behind the idea. See Dimitris Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece*, New Preface by Michael Llewellyn Smith, London: C. Hurst and Co., 2002, p. 67; Alexander Pallis also asserts that the Greek delegation was the first to voice the idea. See Alexander A. Pallis, *Yunanlıların Anadolu Macerası (1925-1922) [The Anatolian Adventure of the Greeks (1915-1922)]*, (trans. Orhan Azizoğlu), 2nd ed., Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997, p. 105. Arı also holds that the Nansen report on the exchange of populations was the origin of the idea. See Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925) [Great Exchange: Compulsory Immigration to Turkey (1923-1925)]*, 2nd ed., Istanbul: Türk Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p. 16-17.

³⁶⁹ For the full text of the Turkish declaration of 16 December 1922 on the removal of the Patriarchate see *Lausanne Conference*, p. 333; For the application of 4 January 1923 see the report of Montana, President of the Sub-Commission on the Exchange of Populations in *Lausanne Conference*, p. 328-337.

³⁷⁰ *ibid*, p. 333.

³⁷¹ Atalay, p. 209-210.

without having to address to a religious institution. The principle of secularism was advanced by the Turkish delegation in order to expel the Patriarchate. This was not a sufficient reason however, given the fact that in Europe there were many states such as the British Empire with a state church but should not be considered as a theocratic regime. If Greeks remained in Istanbul, so was the Patriarchate to effectuate the spiritual needs of the community. This was the point raised by the Allied delegations present at the conference.

The declaration and subsequent request for the removal of the Patriarchate makes clear the disturbance caused in Turkey by the political activities of the Patriarchate in the last years of the Empire on the side of a foreign state that had irredentist policies towards the country. The institution should be expelled from Turkey because according to the declaration “[I]ts past activities will prevent it from adapting itself to the new situation which, by eliminating the political privileges of the Patriarchate and of the organizations dependent on it, will remove all grounds for its continued existence”³⁷². The Turkish side claimed in this primary formula not only abolishing the administrative and political privileges enjoyed by the institution but also expelling it outside Turkey, that would be “beneficiary for the Greek community itself”³⁷³. It is not clear however, why the delegation insisted on the elimination of the temporal powers of the Patriarchate if the institution should be expelled anyway. The delegation was preoccupied with the expulsion of the institution for its political activities rather than its future status under the new Turkish state under formation. The delegation insisted on the removal of the Patriarchate from Turkey even when it accepted the retention of the Greeks of Istanbul in limited numbers³⁷⁴.

The delegation had also the support of Mustafa Kemal and the national assembly. In 25 December 1922, in an interview given to *Le Journal*, M. Kemal held that “it’s impossible to leave the Patriarchate within Turkish territory because the institution had been a nest of conspiracy and betrayal, and did bring bad luck and catastrophe for Christians in Turkey”³⁷⁵. According to Mustafa Kemal, “Turkey had no obligation to find a refuge for it within its

³⁷² *ibid.*

³⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 333.

³⁷⁴ See the report of Montana, President of the Sub-Commission on the Exchange of Populations in *Lausanne Conference*, p. 328-337.

³⁷⁵ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 2, 1923, *Le Journal* January 1st, 1923 in *Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, Cumhuriyet'in 80. Yıl Armağanı*, Vol. 14, 1922-1923, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2004, p. 198

frontiers. The residence of this heath of conspiracy should be Greece³⁷⁶. Mustafa Kemal was clear in his position towards the Patriarchate, its past activities, he regarded, was an enough proof for its future position in new Turkey.

The issue had such an importance for Atatürk that his *Nutuk* (Speech), read at the 15-20 October 1927 at the 2nd Congress of CHP [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People's Party] opens with a reiteration of the Patriarchate's responsibility in "forming bands and manage them, organising meetings and propaganda"³⁷⁷. The same day of the interview the National Assembly fervently debated the future of the non-Muslim minorities and of the Patriarchate. The minutes of the sitting on 25 December 1922, reveals the anti-minority and anti-Patriarchate psychology of the deputies. The speech of one of the prominent members of the Assembly, Tunalı Hilmi Bey from Bolu reads as follows³⁷⁸:

I vehemently oppose to permit the Greeks and the Patriarchate to stay in Istanbul. To allow the Greeks to stay would mean to leave a heath of conspiracy and danger for the country. Those Greeks danced on our wounded chest after the armistice. They tainted everywhere blue and white. (...) Like Greeks we cannot allow the Armenians in Istanbul as well. (...) To allow the Patriarchates to stay whereas the Greeks and Armenians leave, that, we cannot tolerate at all. (...) Those Patriarchates, I don't know Assyrian Catholics, Milki (sic) Patriarchate, I don't know, there are all kinds of them. All those should leave. (...)

Clearly World War I and the subsequent war between Greece and the Ottoman State poisoned the relations between communities who had the tradition to live together before the advent of nationalism. In the words of Tunalı Hilmi Bey, we see the 'othering' of all non-Muslims whether they were involved in a struggle with Turkey or not. The speech reflects the Turkish nationalism under formation. In the words of Ayla Göl, "national identities are socially constructed and collective imagination depends on a dialectical opposition to another identity"³⁷⁹. During this process of imagination, the Greeks became "others" along with other non-Muslim communities. In the words of Partha Chatterjee "the story of nationalist emancipation is necessarily a story of betrayal. Because it could confer only by imposing at the same time a whole set of new controls, it could define a cultural identity for the nation

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷⁷ Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk [The Speech], Vol. II, 1920-1927*, Ankara: TTK, 1984, p. 2.

³⁷⁸ 25 Kanunuevvel 1338 (25 December 1922), 3rd session, *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, 6 Mart 1338 (1922)-27 Şubat 1338 (1923) [TGNA Proceedings of Closed Sessions, 6 March 1922-27 February 1923]*, Vol. 3, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985, p. 1155

³⁷⁹ Ayla Göl, "Imagining the Turkish Nation Through 'Othering' Armenians", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 11, No 1, 2005, p. 121.

only by excluding many from its fold”³⁸⁰. In other words nationalism is constituted through including some groups in the imagination of the nation while some chosen others³⁸¹. The stress put by Hilmi Bey on expulsing all non-muslim minorites gives us a hint about who is to be included in the new nation and who will be not. In a further analysis, the Greco-Turkish war that began with the invasion of İzmir sent shock waves through the Ottoman society and subsequent tragedies served to build a “the founding myth”, the experience that united the Muslims of the remaining empire that would eventually lead to the creation of the Turkish nation-state³⁸².

The uncompromising attitude of the Patriarchate under Meletios Metaxasis was also irritating for the deputies in the Turkish assembly because while the institution was represented (by Archbishop Germanos Strinopoulos of the Archdiocese of Thyateria and Great Britain, Exarch of the Patriarchate to Central and Western Europe that was founded in 1922) on the side of the Greeks, no one from the Patriarchate bothered to contact the Turkish delegation in Lausanne even though it would be obviously a hypocrite act³⁸³. In support of Tunalı Hilmi Bey, İsmail Suphi Soysallı, deputy of Burdur also made an official statement blaming the delegation in Lausanne to be too tolerant on the issues concerning the minorities and the exchange of populations and asked for³⁸⁴:

1. Exchange of the Armenians and Greeks resident in the city without any exceptions.
2. Expulsion of the Greek and Armenian patriarchates and other patriarchates from Istanbul. It is not possible to allow them to stay.
3. The borders of Istanbul are the borders of the municipality. The exchange of populations should contain all Greeks that reside are out of it.

The discontent over the negotiations in Lausanne was to such an extent that the same deputy together with Ahmet Suphi Bey presented another motion asking for the immediate

³⁸⁰ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories* quoted in Fatma Müge Göçek, “Introduction: Narrative, Gender, and Cultural Representation in the Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East”, in F. M. Göçek (ed.), *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, Albany: New York Press, 2002, p. 1.

³⁸¹ *ibid.*

³⁸² Faruk Birtok, “Greek Bull in the China Shop of Ottoman ‘Grand Illusion’: Greece in the Making of Modern Turkey” in Birtok, Faruk and Dragoran, Thalia (eds.), *Citizenship and Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, Social and Historical Studies on Greece and Turkey Series, London; New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 38

³⁸³ *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, p. 1155

³⁸⁴ Translation by the author. The original text reads. “1. Dersaadetteki Rum’lar ve dahi bilaistisna mübadeleye dail olacaklardır. Bunların yerlerinde kalmaları Kabul edilemez. 2. Rum patrikhanesiyle, Ermeni patrikhanesi ve diğer patrikhaneler dahi dersaadetten çıkarılacaktır, bunların ibkası Kabul olunamaz. 3. Şehiremaneti hudutları ağılebiyetle İstanbul vilayeti hudutlarıdır, bu noktaya Hükümetin dikkatini çekerim”. 27 Kanunuevvel 1338, Burdur Mebusu Soysallı İsmail Suphi, *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, p. 1161.

cessation of the Conference and preparation of the army for war³⁸⁵. If those motions were not accepted, it was because independence with a successful termination of the conference was the principal aim of the delegation and the majority of the deputies in Ankara. It is not clear if the delegation took the orders to expel the Patriarchate from the National Assembly –before- the arrival of the delegation to Lausanne. If there was any such intention it was not discussed in the National Assembly as we have the access to the minutes of the closed and open sessions. During an information meeting about the protection of minority clauses of Lausanne before the National Assembly on 2 March, 1923*, Dr. Rıza Nur from the Turkish delegation at Lausanne informed the Assembly as such³⁸⁶:

(T)he question of the Patriarchate. This has become a sublime problem. It caused an enormous dispute. The Great Assembly knows that, here the question of the patriarchate problem did not come to the mind of the Great Assembly even to that of the government. We introduced this problem. Sometimes while we were not expecting anything, would not be useful to us, invented the problem on the purpose to obtain some concessions in return.

While Dr. Nur asserted that the issue was not discussed at the assembly, as we have explored in the previous page the assembly discussed the possibility to expulse the Patriarchs and Mustafa Kemal gave a speech reiterating the same opinion³⁸⁷.

I. 3. 1. 1. Allied Delegations Insist on the Ecumenical Character of the Patriarchate

The proposal for the removal of the Patriarchate from Turkey initiated an allied defense of the international status of the Patriarchate. The British were the main supporters of the institution during the Lausanne Conference. They maintained that the institution was a symbol of the Orthodox religion, and its removal would offend the religious sentiments not only of the Orthodox, but of the whole Christian world³⁸⁸. By the Christian world, the British delegation without a doubt meant Protestant and Orthodox world, since the Catholics were not

³⁸⁵ Signed by Deputy of Burdur Soysallı İsmail Suphi and Deputy of Ertuğrul Ahmet Hamdi, *ibid*.

* The Turkish delegation returned to Ankara after the rupture of the Conference on 4 February 1923.

³⁸⁶ The translation by the author. The text in Turkish reads: “Patrikhane meselesi, buda (sic) ulvi bir mesele oldu. Büyük münakaşatı mucip oldu. Heyeti celile bilir ki burada heyeti celilenin hatta hükümetin aklına bir Patrikhane meselesi gelmemiştir. Bunu biz ihdas ettik. Bazen birşey istemediğimiz halde bize lüzumu olmadığı halde mahsus icat ettik ki, onunla birşey alalım “, 2 March 1339 (1923), 3rd session, *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, 2 Mart 1923-25 Teşrinievvel 1934 [TGNA Proceedings of Closed Sessions, 6 March 1923-25 October 1934]*, Vol. 4, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985, p. 6.

³⁸⁷ See supra.

³⁸⁸ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 333.

involved in any move towards the defense of the Orthodox Patriarchate due to historical enmities.

Greeks also tried to assure a privileged status for the Patriarchate. According to the Greek thesis, the Patriarchate was founded by ecumenical councils and therefore could only be removed by convening an ecumenical council³⁸⁹. The Greek delegation presented to the sub-commission a written declaration detailing the international duties and responsibilities of the institution underlining its ecumenical character³⁹⁰.

Greeks were supported by the representatives of the Orthodox states present in the conference. The Romanian delegation maintained that “(T)he religious conscience of the Romanian people would be wounded if summary methods were employed against the Patriarchate, which had been established at Istanbul for centuries³⁹¹. A similiar view was held by the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croates and Slovenes, who called for attention to the moral importance of the Patriarchate for the Orthodox. According to the delegation³⁹² According to the representative of the Kingdom, if Turkey disrespected the institution it should be ready for its consequences. This was an awkward moment in history since Serbian and Romanian churches fought their independence war also against the Patriarchate³⁹³.

A conciliatory formula that gave an equal sympathy to both Turkish and Allied demands was voiced by the French delegation. According to the French, an independent Patriarch elected according to the church law -and if necessary approved by the Turkish government- would remain in the city and would conduct his duties as the primate of Orthodox Christianity but would keep his distance from the Fener³⁹⁴. There is no mention in the Treaty minutes proving that this proposal was accepted by any of the other delegations but The Times reported that Mr. Ryan from the British delegation also supported the idea, proposing that the Turks shall withdraw their threat to expel the Patriarchate on condition that

³⁸⁹ *ibid.*

³⁹⁰ The unusually detailed text deals with a. The prominent place of the Patriarchate in the Orthodox church; b. The responsibilities of the Patriarch and the Holy Synod; The responsibilities of the Patriarch as the Archbishop of the Greeks of Turkey. For the full text see *Lausanne Conference*, p. 335-336.

³⁹¹ *ibid.*

³⁹² *ibid.*, p. 321

³⁹³ Nikolaos Pantazopoulos, *Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1967, p. 27. The autocephalous status of the Bulgarian church was only recognized in 1945 by the Patriarchate.

³⁹⁴ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 334.

the Patriarch shall “exercise no political or spiritual jurisdiction in Turkey”, and that “his ecclesiastical authority in the city shall be assigned to the head of a new Church, to be created after the pattern set up by Ankara for Asia minor in 1921”³⁹⁵.

This was a proposition that considered different duties of the institution as a minority church and an international institution. If the proposition had been accepted these duties of the Patriarchate would be sharply separated and this separation would create the necessary conditions to eliminate the suspicion of the Turks who feared the international activities of the Patriarchate to become a source of annoyance for the country. Meanwhile, the Greek delegation presented a written, well informed declaration on the ecumenical importance of the Patriarchate in the Ottoman world, its rights and duties³⁹⁶. This declaration held that foundation of an independent Patriarchate in the city -suggested previously by the French- was against the canon law. According to the Church law there could be “one bishop, one city”³⁹⁷. This principle has already been breached by Diaspora communities and by the political divisions in Orthodox churches. But this did not change the fact that more than one bishop meant schism, an uncanonical foundation. For the Fener, this was unacceptable.

According to Greeks it was not possible to degrade it to a mere Archbishopric of the Greeks in Turkey. In the words of Venizelos³⁹⁸:

(t)he Patriarch was in point of fact the Archbishop of Constantinople –of that New Rome, which owing to its prosperity in the 4th and 5th centuries, had been raised to the dignity of an Ecumenical Patriarchate by a decision of all the Christian Churches, including that of Rome. No one in the world could separate these two attributions.

Interestingly, Venizelos also referred Russia, claiming that if they were allowed to participate to the conference, they would speak on behalf of 100,000,000 Orthodox, demanding freedom for the Primate of the Orthodox Church. Moreover not only the Orthodox nations but also the entire world requested for the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Istanbul³⁹⁹. Thus Venizelos, in a similar vein with the other delegations underlined the

³⁹⁵ *The Times*, December 30, 1922.

³⁹⁶ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 335

³⁹⁷ Andrew Louth, “Unity and Diversity in the Church of the Fourth Century” in Everett Ferguson (ed.), *Doctrinal Diversity, Variations in Early Christianity*, Garland, 1999, p. 1-18 at p. 6

³⁹⁸ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 324-325.

³⁹⁹ *ibid*, p. 324.

international character of the Patriarchate that could not be confined to the borders of the new Turkish state under construction.

The allegation of Venizelos that the world was united against the removal of the Patriarchate was not unfounded. We have already mentioned the reaction of the allied delegations against the removal of the See from Istanbul. Lord Curzon himself mentioned that he received thousands of letters from all around the world in support of the Patriarchate. The British were under the pressure of the Anglican church which built excellent relations with the Patriarchate especially since the beginning of the World War I. Before the Great Assembly Rıza Nur also made a similar statement, on the expulsion of the Patriarchate “a frightful row emerged, all the infidel did They threatened us. Romania threatened us to go to war, I don't know America threatened us... All did”⁴⁰⁰.

It is interesting to note that during the Conference the Turkish delegation did not discuss the ecumenical character of the institution, but simply wanted it to effectuate whatever functions it has, elsewhere. Only when the issue jeopardised the conference that the Turkish delegation accepted to change their attitude towards the expulsion of the Patriarchate. The Turkish delegation insisted on the expulsion of the Patriarchate for several reasons: In the first place, the delegation demanded that both the Patriarchate and the minority should leave in order to end the Greek aspirations in Turkey. That would lead to the abandonment of the *Megali Idea* that caused catastrophe for both the Greeks of Anatolia and Muslims under Greek occupation. Moreover, as minorities in general and the Patriarchate in particular had international bonds and constituted a reason for the intervention of the Great Powers in the internal affairs of Turkey, their expulsion would once and for all finish the reason for intervention. The sovereignty of Turkey was assessed from this point of view. Finally, the war time anti-Turkish activities of Patriarch Meletios IV, had been extremely annoying to the Turkish government, and it was only after the promise of Venizelos that the Patriarch would be replaced that İsmet Pasha agreed to withdraw the proposal for the removal of the Patriarchate.

⁴⁰⁰ *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, Vol. IV, p. 6.

1. 3. 2. New Status of the Patriarchate Agreed at Lausanne

The conciliatory formula that the parties could agree was the abolition of the administrative, political and legal privileges the institution enjoyed under the Ottomans. The Patriarch would only exercise his spiritual and ecclesiastical prerogatives without enjoying any sort of political and administrative authority at all⁴⁰¹. The Greek delegation accepted the terms proposed by Lord Curzon, i.e. the Patriarchate would fulfill only spiritual and ecclesiastical functions. The concessions proposed by Venizelos were directed towards meeting the demands of the Turkish delegation and preventing the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Turkey. All privileges of the Patriarchate could be taken away, including the right to intervene in questions relating to the personal status and family law. Only one exception was demanded, that of the marriage “that is regarded as a sacrament by the Orthodox Church, and consequently marriage and its dissolution must be considered as coming within the province of the ecclesiastical authorities alone”⁴⁰².

Finally, İsmet Paşa in a telegram filed to Ankara on 10 January 1923 announced that the delegation has spend great effort to expulse the Patriarchate but this demand had met severe opposition from all delegations and they were left alone. Thus they were forced to withdraw the application. İsmet Paşa underlined that “while the Patriarch in person could not be expelled from Istanbul there was a need to avoid that the Patriarchate become a common Christian cause while there were too many pending issues”⁴⁰³.

In return of the Turkish allowance of the Patriarchate to remain in Turkey, the latter would not take any part in affairs of a political or administrative character, and was to confine itself within the limits of purely religious matters. İsmet Paşa asserted that the solemn declarations and assurances by Allied and Greek delegations, written in the minutes of the Treaty, were accepted as verbal acts for the observation of those conditions⁴⁰⁴. The conditions that would guarantee the status of the Patriarchate were not inserted in the Treaty of Lausanne

⁴⁰¹ See for example the speech of Lord Courzon, where he expressed for the first time the abolition of the privileges of the institution. *Lausanne Conference*, p. 319.

⁴⁰² *ibid*, p. 323.

⁴⁰³ Translation by the author. The original reads “Şahsen Patrik’in İstanbul’dan ihracı mümkün olmamış ise de birçok muallak meseâl arasında bunun bir mes’ele-i unûmiye-i Hıristiyanıye şekliien girmesinden ihtiraz etmek luzûmu da hâsıl olmuş idi”. From İsmet to Heyet-i Vekile Riyasetine, 10 Kanun-i Sani 1339 (10 Ocak 1923) [From İsmet to the Presidency of the National Assembly, 10 January 1923] in Şimşir, p. 362-363.

⁴⁰⁴ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 326-327; “From İsmet Pasha to the National Assembly”, No. 323, January 10, 1923, in Şimşir, p. 363.

or any of its instruments. It was only recorded in the official minutes of the conference⁴⁰⁵. The Turkish delegation did not permit the infiltration of any special mention of the Patriarchate other than general minority protection clauses it was the case for the treaties signed in Europe by the end of the World War I. Thus the Turkish delegation obtained the concessions that they were demanding from the beginning of the Conference in line with the National Pact. As there was no mention of privileges of some specific minority institutions in those treaties, it would be unfair for Turkey to enshrine specific clauses on the Patriarchate in Lausanne Treaty.

When the issue of the Patriarchate was settled, a big step towards was taken in order to finalize the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and the Minority Protection clauses of the Treaty. The Convention on the Exchange of Populations envisaged an exchange of populations on the basis of religion⁴⁰⁶. All Greek-Orthodox of Turkey except from those living in Istanbul and all Muslims of Greece except from those living in the Western Thrace should be exchanged. A special status was later recognized with the Lausanne Peace Treaty (Art. 14) to the Aegean islands of Imbros and Tenedos and exempted their inhabitants from the exchange. Thus the remaining Greek minority would be the inhabitants of Istanbul and the two islands⁴⁰⁷. The exchange reflected the Ottoman *millet* system as it undermined variables such as the language or ethnicity in its assessment of the people subject to the exchange. For example the Turkish speaking Karamanlis were included in the exchange whereas Catholic Greeks were not.

The exchange of populations had disastrous effects on the Patriarchate. With the exchange of the populations, all Greek-Orthodox population of Anatolia left. As a result only the Archbishopric of Istanbul together with four metropolitanates out of forty one survived⁴⁰⁸. The numbers of the Greek Orthodox under the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate was so radically reduced that now it ranked among the smallest of the Orthodox churches⁴⁰⁹. It lost

⁴⁰⁵ Alexandris, "The Expulsion of Constantine VI", *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1981, p. 333-363, at p. 334.

⁴⁰⁶ The Convention was signed on 30 January 1923 before the end of the Lausanne Conference. For the full text see *Lausanne Conference*, p. 817-827.

⁴⁰⁷ For an overview of the exchange of populations see Renée Hirschon (ed.), *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Population Exchange*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003.

⁴⁰⁸ Those are Metropolis of Chalcedon-Kadıköy; Metropolis of Derkoi–Terkos; Metropolis of Imbros and Tenedos-Gökçeada Bozcaada; Metropolis of Princes' Islands (this Metropolis was initiated after the exchange of populations), see Matthew Spinka, "Post-War Eastern Orthodox Churches", *Church History*, Vol. 4., No. 2, June 1935, p. 103-122 at p. 105.

⁴⁰⁹ *ibid.*

its power base, its property financing the institution and its human resources as the most of the clergy came from Anatolia after the loss of the territories in the Balkans.

Minority Protection Clauses of Lausanne and International Protection of Minorities in the Aftermath of the World War I

1. 3. 2. 1. Patriarchate's Protection as a Minority Church

Turkish delegation also made it clear that any mention of the Patriarchate in the treaty text was not welcome. The Turkish delegation refused any special arrangements for new Turkey, insisted on equal treatment with the newly founded states of Europe, and made clear that new Turkey would deny any privileges to the Patriarchate along with other religious institutions that were absent in the previously concluded treaties after the end of the World War I and relevant provisions. İsmet Paşa stated that “the rights of minorities would be confirmed by the Turkish Government on the same basis as those laid down in the Treaties recently concluded in Europe, on the condition that Muslims in neighboring countries should enjoy the same rights” in accordance with the Art. 5 of the *Misak-ı Milli* (The National Pact)⁴¹⁰.

I. 3. 2. 1. 1. International Minority Protection in the Aftermath of the World War I

We shall therefore say few words about the minority protection that was developed as a result of the Great War. After the end of the war, Paris Peace Conference served in part to settle past disputes through a number of peace treaties with the defeated states of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire. The USA President Wilson also urged to set up an all embracing League of Nations which would settle problems “peacefully and democratically before they had got out of hand”⁴¹¹. The Covenant of the League of Nations included no provisions for international co-operation for the protection of minorities, nor was there any proposal to set up a general system to this end. President Wilson drafted a provision requiring new states, as a precondition to their recognition as independent states, to bind

⁴¹⁰ *Lausanne Conference*, p. 209; *Misak-ı Milli* was adopted by the last Ottoman Assembly on 28 January 1920. For further information on *Misak-ı Milli* see İlker Alp, “*Misak-ı Milli*”, *Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış Politikasında Musul* [“*The National Pact: The National Pact and Musul in Turkish Foreign Policy*], Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998, p. 176-246.

⁴¹¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 34.

themselves to give the same equal treatment in law and in fact to “all racial or national minorities” as that accorded to racial or national majority of the people. The proposal was dropped, but the protection of minorities were put under the international guarantee with special minority treaties or contained in special chapters regarding minorities in peace treaties⁴¹².

The model for the new minority treaties or the provisions of the treaties that Ismet Paşa mentioned was the Little Treaty of Versailles or The Polish Minority Treaty signed between Allied and Associated Powers and Poland on 28 June 1919⁴¹³. This treaty guaranteed certain rights to “racial, religious or linguistic minorities” such as free exercise of any creed, equality before law and in particular an equal right to establish, manage and control at their the minority groups’s own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other establishments, with the right to use the minority language and to exercise freely the minority religion⁴¹⁴.

The signatory state accepted that the rights of minorities were an “international concern” and “shall be placed under the League of Nations” and finally “any dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of Justice”⁴¹⁵. The minority treaties primarily contained negative rights of the persons independent of their minority identity, in other words human rights, notwithstanding one’s belonging to an ethnic, linguistic or religious community. Secondly, it brought positive rights that were to apply only to minority groups to compensate their inherent disadvantage.

⁴¹² For an extensive assessment of the League of Nations system see Jennifer Jackson-Preece, *National Minorities and European Nations-State System*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 73- 94; Asbjorn Eide, “The Framework Convention in Historical and Global Perspective” in Mark Weller (ed.), *Oxford Commentaries on International Law: The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 25-47; Inis Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1969, p. 16-30. For the classification of the League of Nations minority protection legal instruments see Erzsébet Szalayné-Sándor, “International Law in the Service of the Protection of Minorities between the Two World Wars”, Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, *Minorities Research* 6, 1998, http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbssegkutatas/mr_06/cikk.php?id=1249#_ftn52 (8 March 2010)

⁴¹³ The full text of the Polish Minorities Treaty, 28 June 1919 is available online at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/12.html> (7 March 2010)

⁴¹⁴ The legal instruments for the protection of minorities are provided in “Documents Relating to the Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations”, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 73, 1929.

⁴¹⁵ See Polish Minorities Treaty, Art. 12; For an overview of the protection of minorities under the League system see Helmer Rosting, “Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1923, p. 641-660 at p. 641..

According to Claude the safeguarding of the second category of rights required that the system of negative equality –protection against discriminatory treatment –be supplemented by a regime of “positive equality” –provisions for the equal opportunity of minorities to “preserve and develop their national culture and consciousness”⁴¹⁶. The advantages provided to the minorities was the core of the system. The rights were designed to develop minority culture, preserve the language not on an individual basis but by institutional rights such as the right to found schools, keep churches, foundations and so on- guaranteed by the international system⁴¹⁷.

According to Preece, the League of Nations system of minority guarantees was the first comprehensive and significant example of European minorities on the international agenda⁴¹⁸. This system with its legal instruments created a legal bound between the state and its minorities and put this relation under international guarantees that belonged previously to the domestic sphere. The major weakness of the system was that while the states that emerged out of the defeated Empires of Europe had to make a pledge to protect their minorities, a similar undertaking was not requested from the Allied of Associated Powers regarding their own minorities⁴¹⁹.

We should add that at the time of the signing of post World War I treaties and relevant legal instruments, there was a general agreement that the protection of minorities was necessary in order to curtail independence movements in line with self determination principle⁴²⁰. However, the scope of rights was not clear and it was not extended, as we have mentioned, to all states of Europe. Thus from the origin the system had a problem in convincing the signatory states that minority rights would be observed throughout Europe and would not be a specificity of the signatory state. As the general protection of minorities was absent, the scope and application of rights differed from one state to another. There were no

⁴¹⁶ P. de Azcátare, *League of Nations and National Minorities*, 1945, p. 82 quoted in Claude, p. 19; Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İctihad, Uygulama [Minorities in Turkey, Concepts, Lausanne, Internal Law, Application]*, İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004, p. 13.

⁴¹⁷ In the history of minority protection the first stipulation of this effect was the Treaty of Oliva signed between Sweden and Poland in 1660. For an overview see Jacques Duparc, *La Protection des Minorités de Race, de Langue et de Religion*, Paris: Dalloz, 1922.

⁴¹⁸ Jennifer Jackson-Preece, “National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, p. 345-364, p. 346.

⁴¹⁹ Alain Fennet, Genevieve Koubi, Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, (eds.), *Le Droit et les Minorités: Analyses et Textes*, 2nd edition, Bruxelles: Etablissement Emile Bruylant, 2000, p.136 ; Gaetano Pentassuglia, *Minorities in International Law*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002, p. 29.

⁴²⁰ Jackson-Preece, “National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in Europe”, p. 346.

global standards, a general legal framework that may constitute a reference point in the application of the minority protection provisions of the League of Nations minority guarantees. The first minority protection clause with a global character would be the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] (1966), Art. 27 stipulating that in those states in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language"⁴²¹

The aforementioned minority treaties contained general provisions for the protection of minorities as a group and contained no mention of a specific religious institutions name. What İsmet Paşa was putting forward was that Turkey was ready to accept only equal treatment in the case of minorities. Thus privileges specified in the treaty text for the Patriarchate was not acceptable to Turkey.

I. 3. 2. 1. 2. Minority Protection Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne

The clauses on the 'Protection of Minorities' was enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne in Articles 37-45. These conditions were not considered in a separate part like in the Sevres Treaty but in a separate section under political clauses in order to show the will to undermine its importance⁴²². The Treaty was in line with the minority treaties signed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The wording of Articles 37-45 of Lausanne Treaty was the same as the Polish Minority Treaties, adapted to Turkey's conditions. With these articles the Turkish government undertook⁴²³

to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order and good morals (Art. 38). Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights with Muslims (Art. 39). Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security and

⁴²¹ The United Nations, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and came in force in March 23, 1976. For the full text see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> (9 August 2010)

⁴²² Baskin Oran, "Lozan'da Azınlıkların Korunması", *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 115, Temmuz 2003, p. 72.

⁴²³ For the full text of the Treaty see Treaty of Peace Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923*, Vol. II, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne (20 July 2010); Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, p.93-147.

in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein (Art. 40) The Turkish government undertakes to take, as regards non-Muslim minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities (Art. 42. para I). The Turkish government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to refuse, fro the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature (Art. 42. para. III).

The treaty stipulations recognized minority institutions that were regarded as necessary for the preservation and development of minority culture, language and minority religion in line with the League of Nations system of collective minority protection. The government pledged to protect these institutions along with individual rights of minorities. These guarantees were under international concern, the treaty openly envisaged that “Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them”⁴²⁴. The international community was engaged in supervising the application of the treaty articles by Art. 44 which reads “Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this section affect non-Muslim nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations”⁴²⁵. Also, the right was recognized to the members of the League to bring to the attention of the organization any breach of rights that were envisaged in the Treaty. Any litiges between Turkey and other signatory states were also of international concern and considered as a dispute of an international character⁴²⁶. The same series of rights were recognized also to Muslim minority in Greece. The respective minorities in Greece and Turkey have become beneficiaries of specific rights emanating from being disadvantageous groups, rights such as founding foundations and schools. However, the Lausanne Treaty did not recognize a collective legal

⁴²⁴ Art 37, Treaty of Peace Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923*, Vol II, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne (20 July 2010).

⁴²⁵ *ibid*, Art. 44, para. I.

⁴²⁶ *ibid*. Art. 44, para II and III.

personality for the minority groups⁴²⁷. The Patriarchate itself doesn't have a legal personality recognized by the Treaty⁴²⁸. It cannot officially represent its community. The lack of legal personality would cause serious problems in the future.

I. 3. 2. 1. 3. The Status of the Patriarchate under Turkish Law

According to Iksel, the status of the Patriarchate according to Lausanne was interpreted as such⁴²⁹:

- a. The Patriarchate was allowed to stay in Turkey unilaterally, not by a treaty stipulation.
- b. The Patriarchate is a Turkish institution. The Patriarch and the employees in the Patriarchate are Turkish. Their ordainment would be effectuated with the government's approval and the government has the duty to supervise them.
- c. The Patriarch and the Patriarchate have no administrative and political rights similar to those enjoyed between 1453-1923. Henceforth the Patriarchate is only responsible for the religious affairs. It cannot represent the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul in its interactions with the Turkish state.
- d. The Patriarchate is under the guarantees of the Lausanne Treaty. The Patriarchate is a church that should be considered under the framework of minority protection of the Treaty.
- e. The Patriarchate and the officials of the Patriarchate shall act under the Turkish law and they are subject to Turkish law.
- e. The religious freedoms and equality of the non-Muslims are guaranteed under the Turkish law, emanating from the principles of the Lausanne Treaty.

These above mentioned points leave little room for further interpretation because the status of the Patriarchate is not specifically defined in the Treaty. It was considered as a church under the protection of Turkey and international law. However, the problem lay in the fact that the Patriarchate was not a simple church. Despite it lost its territory in Turkey and confined to the Archbishopric of Istanbul, despite the extinguishing authority on the Orthodox of the Balkans, it still had canonical supremacy among the Orthodox and it still had territory beyond the Turkish nation state due to the foundation of Metropolitanates abroad and special

⁴²⁷ Art. 40 reads "(non-Muslim minorities) shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein". Soysal, p. 40. Enjoyment of such rights would not be possible without recognizing legal personality to the *vakıfs* (pious foundations) that would manage them. Konstantinos Tsitselikis asserts that the treaty doesn't recognize a legal personality to the minorities except from the election of vakif (pious foundation) boards. See Tsitselikis, "The Minority Protection System in Greece and Turkey: A Legal Overview", Pre-report of the Council of Europe Doc No. 11860, Report on Freedom of Religion and other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece), 21 April 2009.

⁴²⁸ *ibid.*

⁴²⁹ Settar F. İksel, "İstanbul Patrikhanesi II [Istanbul Greek Patriarchate II]", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish History Documented], No. 63, Istanbul, 1972, p. 40-43 at p. 43; Atalay, p. 221; Sibel Özel, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu*, Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008, p. 86-88.

arrangements with Greece. However, this special position of the Patriarchate does not imply that legally it had an extraterritorial that went beyond the jurisdiction of Turkey. The fear from the Patriarchate throughout the republic and its treatment as an alien institution that would better be extinguished than promoted marked the church-state relations.

This stance is remarkable for example in the writings of Ahmet Rüstem, a Turkish diplomat of Polish and British origin. In his article in *Foreign Affairs* he held that the Turkish state had to expulse the Patriarchate sooner or later, because the Patriarchate could not be loyal to the state. Moreover, if the institution represented as it often claimed two hundred million orthodox worldwide, having its seat in a Muslim Turkey with a handful of Orthodox left, constituted no more than a paradox⁴³⁰. According to the writer, the government had the intention to loose the ties between the Patriarchate and the state. The privileges were gone and that situation would detriment its great prestige abroad⁴³¹.

I. 3. 3. The Adjustment of the Patriarchate to the Turkish Republic

The Patriarchate adjusted itself to the new era under the Turkish Republic. After the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty, and in line with Venizelos' pledge, Patriarch Meletios IV left Istanbul in July and sent his resignation from the Mount Athos in September 1923⁴³². It was not an easy process because the Patriarch didn't want to resign at the place. He insisted instead on the removal of the Patriarchate to Mount Athos. During the Pan-Orthodox congress organized by the Patriarchate a mob of 100-200 Greeks attacked the Patriarchate, led by Damianides, a trustee of the Galata district, close to the newly founded Turkish Orthodox Church of Papa Eftim. Before the police arrived, the entered the Fener, despite the protests of the members of the Pan-Orthodox Congress, which was then in a meeting. The Patriarch himself was hustled in order to call him to abdicate. Only after the intervention of the Turkish and French troops the crowd was expelled out of the offices of the Patriarchate⁴³³.

The Greeks were in an urge to reconcile with the new Turkish government, and with the abdication of Meletios they would elect a Patriarch who would be more sympathetic

⁴³⁰ Ahmet Rüstem Bey, "The Future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1925, p. 604-610 at p. 608.

⁴³¹ *ibid.*

⁴³² For the details of Patriarch Meletios IV's removal from office see Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations*, p. 144-150

⁴³³ "Greek Patriarch Attacked: Constantinople Disorder", *The Times*, June 2, 1923.

to the government. After Meletios' resignation Papa Efthim tried to take over the Fener. An hour before the allied forces left Istanbul on October 2, 1923, Papa Efthim, who had visited the Fener on September 22 and again on the 27th, forcibly invaded it, and announced that he intended to remain in the Patriarchate until his demands were satisfied. Those demands were: The deposition of the Patriarch, The expulsion of six of the eight members of the Holy Synod, including the *Locum Tenens* of the Patriarchate, the admission to the Holy Synod of seven members to be nominated by Papa Efthim, the appointment of Papa Efthim as representative of the Fener in Ankara⁴³⁴. The Synod accepted to make concessions, deposed Patriarch Meletios in absentia and declared Efthim as Patriarchal representative to Ankara.⁴³⁵ However, the exaggerated acts of Papa Efthim were not met with sympathy in the governmental circles. Already after the exchange of populations the Turkish Orthodox church lost its power base as the Turkish Orthodox of Anatolia were included in the exchange of populations. When Greece and Turkey built friendly relations in early 1930s, the movement lost all its attraction.

In an effort to reconcile with the Turkish government and to proceed with a new patriarchal election, the Fener issued a statement setting out the principles on which between the patriarchate and the authorities might be conducted. These principles were enumerated as follows⁴³⁶:

1. The Ecumenical Patriarchate abandons its political and administrative character and remains a purely religious institution of a *Pan-Orthodox* nature.
2. Marriage and cognate questions will fall within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
3. Communal education and charitable institutions will be administered by delegates elected by the people according to the regulations concerning minorities. The present mixed council of the Patriarchate will cease to exist as soon as the communal authorities have been constituted.
4. The election of the Patriarch will take place according to the canon law.
5. The relations of the Patriarchate with the government will be as stated by Rıza Nur Bey at the Conference of Lausanne, in parallel with those existing between Church and State in England, France and the USA.
6. The Patriarchate accepts the declaration of Rıza Nur Bey that the Turkish government, while abolishing these privileges of the clergy which are inconsistent with the new democratic regime, will not intervene in clerical decisions or matters of hierarchical organization.

⁴³⁴ "Papa Efthim's Coup", *The Times*, November 11, 1923.

⁴³⁵ For Papa Efthim's actions see Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations*, p. 149-154.

⁴³⁶ Henderson to Curzon, 7 July 1923, FO 371/9123/E76603, cited in Irini Sarioglou, *Turkish Policy Towards Greek Education in Istanbul 1923-1974: Secondary Education and Cultural Identity*, Athens: Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive, 2004, p. 69

The first principle was the most interesting for our thesis. While the Patriarchate was abandoning its political and administrative prerogatives it was underlining its international role. The word ‘pan Orthodox’ refers to the ecumenical stance of the Patriarchate. However, it could be interpreted as the will of the patriarchate to leave behind its perception as a Greek ethnic institution but to embrace a real ‘ecumenical’ character, being the senior church of the all Orthodox worldwide. As we will see the political environment of the time was conform to bear such a role. It was also clear that the Patriarchate was fearing of isolation in Turkey and was underlining its international position in order to break a possible deadlock in the country.

On 18 October 1923, the Synod dispatched a letter to the Hierarchs of the Patriarchate, defining the new form of election. There is to be no mixed council, no electoral assembly as the institution would not interfere in the communal affairs except from exercising its spiritual duties. The election is to be carried out by the Synod of the Metropolitans of the Fener. A *locum tenens* is no longer to be appointed, but the first in rank among the Metropolitans is to preside over the Synod and conduct the election. Hierarchs from abroad shall take part in the election only by sending in a ballot for the selection of the three final candidates. A strict time limit was imposed⁴³⁷. As a result, on December 6, 1923 the authorities sent an official document to the Patriarchate outlining the regulations for the Patriarchal election on the day of the election. Signed by assistant Prefect Fahreddin, the *tezkere* (Prot. No. 1092) from the prefecture decreed⁴³⁸:

To the Holy Synod of the Istanbul Greek Patriarchate

It is necessary, at the time of spiritual and religious elections held in Turkey, for the electors to be Turkish nationals, and to exercise their spiritual functions in Turkey itself during the elections, and for the person elected to have the same qualifications.

This *tezkere* was decisive for the future election of the Patriarchs because it set a legal framework. The decree may be viewed as the first curtailing of the ecumenical pretension of the Patriarchate for that it clearly underscored that the Patriarch and the metropolitans who would elect him should be Turkish citizens. Even though the Patriarchate had jurisdiction over the metropolitanates outside the borders of Turkey, their representatives

⁴³⁷ Chrysostomos Konstantinides (Metropolitan of Ephesus), “The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchs from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to the Present”, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, Nos.1-4, 2000, p. 5-22 at p. 10.

⁴³⁸ *ibid.*

would not be present at the election. Even though the question was not properly handled and solved during the negotiations of Lausanne, the Patriarchate was reduced to the Archbishopric of Istanbul. In other words, *de facto*, the Patriarchate became a religious establishment which has the right to remain in its traditional seat, but to deal solely with the spiritual welfare of its flock, i.e. Greeks of Istanbul and the tiny islands of Tenedos (Bozcaada) and Imbros (Gökçeada). The leadership role of the Patriarchate within the Orthodoxy outside the borders of Turkey that fall under the spiritual jurisdiction of Istanbul would not be recognized by the state.

In parallel with this understanding the government started to call the Patriarch, *başpapaz* (arcpriest). Even the title of Archbishop of Istanbul (Başpiskopos) was not accorded to him. According to Elçin Macar this change had two aims, because the title reminded ecumenicity and it symbolized temporal authority emanating from the place of the patriarch as *milletbaşı*⁴³⁹. This *tezkere* would be the first and the most important document issued for the Patriarchate during the Republic. The Turkish government refused to take any other notice of its existence.

I. 3. 3. 1. Abolition of the Caliphate and its Effects on the Patriarchate

The major problem of the Patriarchate during the short reign of Patriarch Gregory emanated with the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey. On 25 February 1924 the TGNA started to discuss question of secularism, especially the possibility to abolish the caliphate, medreses and the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations⁴⁴⁰. This was a revolutionary period in Turkey, aiming at secularization in education and law. When the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924, a new discussion on the status of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchates and the Jewish Rabbinate started. Mustafa Kemal in an interview with New York Herald on 4 May 1924 stated that⁴⁴¹:

⁴³⁹ Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 125

⁴⁴⁰ Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 515.

⁴⁴¹ *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III (1918-1937) [Speeches and Statements of Atatürk III (1918-1937)]*, Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2nd. ed., 1961, p. 74. This interview was later denied in the journals *Hakimiyet’i Milliye* and *Yeni Gün* and told the public that such an interview was not realized. Prof. Nejat Kaymaz interpreted the denial as such: “The text is very Atatürk and tells us the reality. Atatürk expressed his sincere feelings and made an off the record interview. Maybe Istanbul newspapers published this interview that that had from the reporter. In a similar vein Dr. Doğu Perinçek holds that “I think this interview was given. Maybe it was denied later because it could be deemed contrary to the Lausanne stipulations”. See *Atatürk’ün Bütün Eserleri [All Works of Atatürk]*, Vol. 16, İstanbul: Kaynak, 2005, p. 255.

With the Caliphate, the Orthodox, Armenian Patriarchates and the Rabbinate should be abolished as well. Bearing in mind that these institutions were agents of the foreign powers... We ask for how long the United Kingdom, France, the US or any other nation would tolerate that kind of situation?

However, the discussions on the abolition of the Patriarchate had no results and the Patriarchate remained in Turkey.

Another major crisis, during the first years of the Turkish republic erupted when Constantinos Araboglou was elected Patriarch on 17 December 1924 after the death of Patriarch Gregory VII. The new patriarch had no 'établi' status according to the conditions of the exchange of populations. He came to Istanbul after 1918 and he was already warned by the Turkish government about his exchangeability. But he was elected anyway by the Patriarchate probably to resolve the "etablis" question. Already the probability to include the Fener employees in the exchange alarmed the Patriarchate which referred to the question in a letter to Greek foreign minister⁴⁴².

The issue was referred to the Mixed Commission for the exchange of populations on the request of the Turkish government. However, the commission refrained from giving a definite decision. On the statement delivered on 28 January, the Commission accepted the official exchangeability of the Patriarch but found that it was beyond its competence to take a decision regarding the case⁴⁴³. This decision was considered as a positive evaluation of the exchangeability of the Patriarch by the Turkish government and Araboglu was forcibly expelled within two days following the commission's decision. The expulsion generated strong reactions in Athens. On 1 February the Greek legation in Ankara addressed a note to the Turkish government in which it protested the attack on the head of the Orthodox Church and the liberties of the Greek minority. In conclusion it proposed that in virtue of the Art. 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague⁴⁴⁴.

On February 4, the Turkish Prime Minister, Fethi Okyar delivered a speech in the Turkish National Assembly. He declared to the deputies that in Lausanne the delegations were

⁴⁴² Alexandris, "The Expulsion of Constantine VI", p. 336.

⁴⁴³ This resolution was based on the draft formula drawn by the legal subcommission on 7 January. The full text in Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question, The Last Phase: A Study in Greek Turkish Diplomacy*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968, p. 98.

⁴⁴⁴ Alexandris, "The Expulsion of Constantine VI", p. 348.

told that the issue of the patriarchate was not inserted in the Treaty. “It could not be otherwise since Turkey would not accept a document or an international engagement relative to a question of a purely domestic nature”⁴⁴⁵. The Turkish government felt that the Holy Synod, knowing the position of Constantine VI and being, in addition, notified of his ineligible status, had deliberately elected him Patriarch to hinder the normal resumption of Greek Turkish relations. This move was considered against the agreement reached at Lausanne in return for the retention of the Patriarchate in Turkey. The pivotal role played by the Turkish mistrust of the Fener in Ankara’s decision to expel Constantine was expressed in the article of A. Rüstem at the Foreign Affairs. He asserted that Greece had still irredentist aims on Turkey so that it insisted so staunchly on its retention in Turkey with the support of the Allied delegations. The seat of the Patriarchate in Istanbul was serving as a Greek agent in the city and keeping the hope to revive the Greek influence in the heart of Turkey⁴⁴⁶.

The Greek government tried to internationalize the issue by referring to the League of Nations⁴⁴⁷. On 11 February 1925, the Greek Prime Minister Michalakopoulos addressed a letter to the League in which in virtue of Article II, para 2, of the Covenant, requested that the question of the expulsion of the Ecumenical Patriarch from Istanbul be placed on the agenda of the Council. The Greek government stated that the measure taken against the Patriarch by the Turkish authorities constitutes a serious infringement of the Lausanne agreements regarding the Patriarchate, an infringement of the Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, and of the Mixed Commission’s decision of January 28th, 1925, and further, that it is contrary to the undertaking given on October 31st, 1924, at Brussels by Turkey loyally to carry out all decisions that might be adopted by the majority of the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations⁴⁴⁸.

The Turkish government on the other hand, in a letter by Foreign Minister Şükrü Kaya, dated March 1st 1925 requested the Council not to consider the Greek Government’s application. It denied having failed to respect the powers conferred upon the Mixed Commission by the Convention of Lausanne. Furthermore, it asserted that it had not failed to

⁴⁴⁵ Harry J. Psomiades, *Eastern Question, the Last Phase*, p. 99.

⁴⁴⁶ Ahmet Rüstem Bey, p. 607.

⁴⁴⁷ Alexandris, “The Expulsion of Constantine VI”, p. 351.

⁴⁴⁸ “Expulsion of the Ecumenical Patriarch from Istanbul”, appeal by the Greek Government under Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Covenant, Telegram from the Greek Government to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, submitted to the Council on March 14th, 1925, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Annex 756 a, C.57.M.30.1925. VII, p. 579.

conform to the declarations made at Lausanne by its representative Ismet Pasha, when he withdrew his demand that the Patriarchate should be removed from Istanbul. The letter is interesting, in the sense that it cast no doubt about the legal status of the Patriarchate as have been viewed by the Turkish government. The letter reads⁴⁴⁹:

The Patriarchate is a Turkish domestic institution, the constitution and the administration of which are governed by Turkish laws and regulations, and there are no provisions whatever in any treaty on which a contrary view could be based, there is, moreover, no clause giving one or several foreign powers the right to intervene in the constitution or administration of this institution, furthermore, notwithstanding the assertions contained in the Greek Government's telegram, neither the Treaty of Lausanne nor the agreements, conventions, declarations, protocols and letters signed at that place contain the slightest allusion to the Patriarchate.

Moreover, the Turkish government contested the Greek government's move as an "attempt to confer an international character upon the Patriarchate" and to "interfere in Turkey's internal affairs"⁴⁵⁰. The Council was called to consider the issue of the Patriarchate and the affair Constantine separately⁴⁵¹. The Turkish government made it clear that it would not let any foreign power interfere on an issue that it considered as 'purely domestic' and it would not step back from the expulsion of the Patriarch even though the exchange of the church prelates might lead to the extinction of the Patriarchate. It is interesting also to note that the Turkish government also underlined that the aim of the move was not to condemn the Patriarchate to death because "no one thinks that it is threatening"⁴⁵².

The Council decided to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) for an advisory opinion. At the same time, it expressed the hope that it would be possible for the question at issue to be settled by private negotiations between the two governments⁴⁵³. At the end of the episode, two governments found a conciliatory formula. The Patriarch resigned and the Turkish government withdrew its application to the Commission on the exchange of

⁴⁴⁹ "Expulsion of the Œcumenical Patriarch from Istanbul". Letter from the Turkish Government to the Secretary-General of the League, submitted to the Council on March 14th 1925, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Annex 756 b, C.160.1925.VII, 1925, p. 580

⁴⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁵² Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations*, p. 166.

⁴⁵³ *ibid.*

populations on the exchangeability of the prelates from the Patriarchate. Greece also withdrew its application to the Court⁴⁵⁴.

According to Alexandris, the withdrawal of the Greek appeal to the League had far reaching implications. The Patriarchate was represented as a purely Turkish institution and this was not contrasted by any of the western powers. Greece too was to blame because it withdrew its application to the League, therefore missed the chance to obtain the opinion of the PCIJ on the issue of the international position of the Patriarchate⁴⁵⁵. Thus the Archbishop of Nicaea (Iznik), Basil Georgiadis a non-exchangeable, Turkish national prelate was elected the new Patriarch on 13 June 1923 with the approval of the Turkish government. Soon after the election, George Exindaris and Tevfik Rüştü Aras agreed on a formula which recognized as non-exchangeable eleven senior clerics of the Patriarchate⁴⁵⁶.

I. 3. 3. 2. New Civil Code: Last Privileges Lost

State-church relations strained again in 1926 with the adoption of the new civil code. During the Lausanne Conference when Venizelos accepted the abolishment of all privileges of the Patriarchate, he insisted that the sole prerogative that the institution should keep was the right on the enactment of marriages and divorces of the Orthodox. In parallel with Venizelos' terms of compromise, the Lausanne Treaty, Art. 42, para I predicted that "(T)he Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities"⁴⁵⁷ Three years after signing of the Treaty, Turkish government abolished the old Ottoman *Mecelle* and adopted the Western (Swiss) Civil Code as part of the secular reforms on 17 February 1926⁴⁵⁸. Declarations were obtained from the representatives of the Jewish and Armenian Communities, accepting the new civil code. In the case of the Greek community, which was more numerous, the Turkish

⁴⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵⁵ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations*, p. 167.

⁴⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 168.

⁴⁵⁷ Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Art. 42, Para I.

⁴⁵⁸ The family law in the Ottoman Empire had a religious character. The law applicable in family matters was not the 'pure' Sharia but its extended version, *Fıkıh* that contained case-law and *ulema's* interpretations. In the Tanzimat period a commission was formed under the presidency of Ahmet Cedet Paşa to write the *Mecelle* (Codex) but the commission was dismissed before drafting a volume concerning the family law. A Regulation on the family law was adopted in 1917 but after the foundation of the Republic they were replaced by the new Civil Code adapted from the Swiss Code was published in Official Gazette on 4 April 1926. See Mehmet Ünal, "Medeni Kanununun Kabulünden Önce Türk Aile Hukuku ile İlgili Gelişmeler ve Özellikle 1917 Tarihli Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi", *AÜHF*, V. 34, No. 1-4, 1977, p. 195-231.

government had more difficulties. As a consequence of various measures from the government by May 1926 the Turkish Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat declared the renouncement of Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities of Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty⁴⁵⁹. The Greek government submitted the question to the League of Nations. The fact that the League of the Nations was a guarantor in the minority treaties did not only mean that the signing state cannot change the stipulations of the Treaty. It also implied that minorities living under the jurisdiction of the signing states cannot renounce their rights stemming from the treaty⁴⁶⁰.

However, the adoption of the new civil code was one of the precepts of the ‘classless, privilegeless, united mass’* that the new government of the republic opted for. Under these conditions, a parallel legal system for the non-Muslim minorities was not acceptable. Under the new regime, all were equal before the law as a consequence of which extra rights for the minorities is not only useless but also dangerous.

I. 3. 4. Greco-Turkish Rapprochement and its Effects on the Patriarchate

In the post Lausanne Period, Turkey and Greece were occupied with building nation-states, Greece was one step ahead of Turkey while the national movements among the Greeks started as early as the 18th century, resulting in the foundation of a Greek State in 1930. The exchange of populations provided both states with more -but by no means totally-homogenous populations by religious criteria. Soon after Lausanne, both countries, made a sincere try to improve the relations between them in 1930s. The first signals of the rapprochement were given as soon as Venizelos returns to power in 1928. In a long speech given to the Greek parliament on 17 June 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos urged the ratification of the Ankara Convention.

⁴⁵⁹ Rifat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)* [Jews of Turkey during the First Years of the Republic: An Adventure of Turkification], 5th ed., Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2005, p. 90; Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yokoluş Süreci* [Greeks of Turkey : From the Age of the Nation-State to the Age of Globalization : The Vanishment of a Minority] , Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2007, p.

⁴⁶⁰ Jacob Robinson, Oscar Karbach et al. Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?, New York: Antin press Inc., 1943, p. 81,cited in Bali, p. 95.

* Tr. Sınıfsız, imtiyazsız, kaynaşmış bir kütle.

In so doing, he analysed the dominant political tendencies of both countries as follows⁴⁶¹:

Turkey herself –new Turkey- is the greatest enemy of the idea of the Ottoman Empire. New Turkey does not wish to hear anything about an Ottoman Empire. She proceeds with the development of a homogeneous Turkish national state. But we also, since the catastrophe of Asia Minor, and since almost all of our nationals from Turkey have come over to Greek territory, are occupied with a similar task.

The fact that both political leaderships were busy completing ‘a similar task’, nationalization of the polity, within their respective domains provided the objective basis of *rapprochement* between the two countries in the 1930s. Moreover there was a need to settle several bilateral problems and the *établis* question that was not completely clarified in the Convention on the Exchange of Populations. Common fears concerning the Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ policy of Mussolini in the 1930s also led both countries to act together. Turkey was also concerned about the enlargement of the influence circle of the Soviets. Greece, from her part was concerned about the Bulgarian irredentism. Thus both countries were aware that cooperation between countries was more than necessary⁴⁶².

The legalisation of the above desires from the two governments came with the Agreement of Ankara, signed on 10 June 1930 between Turkish foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras and The Greek Ambassador to Ankara Spiridon Polihroniadis. With the Agreement economic and political problems stemming from the exchange of populations and the question of *établis* were resolved. Under the Agreement, Turkey recognized all Greek Orthodox who were actually present in Istanbul as Turkish citizens regardless of their arrival in the city or the place of birth. During the visit of Venizelos to Ankara two governments signed three additional treaties that would open a new era for both governments. Two governments signed three documents before the visit of Venizelos of 17-31 Octobre 1930: A Convention of Friendship, Neutrality and Arbitration; an Accord on the Residence, Commerce and Travelling and of Maritime Navigation and one Protocol on the Limitation of

⁴⁶¹ Official translation of Venizelos’ speech is attached to Robert Skinner’s dispatch sent from Athens to the U. S Secretary of State, Washington, dated 20 June 1930. Document no. 767.68115/136, *Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political Relations of Turkey, Greece and the Balkan States, 1930-1939*, cited in Ayhan Aktar, “Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The Turkish Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered” in Renée Hirschon (ed), p. 81.

⁴⁶² For a concise analysis of the *rapprochement* under Atatürk and Venizelos see Damla Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol: Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye Yunanistan İlişkileri* [The Path from War to Peace: The Turkish-Greek Relations in the Atatürk-Venizelos Period], Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2007.

Maritime Armament⁴⁶³. Thus, two countries led by two charismatic personages undertook an immense effort to reconstruct their countries devastated by the disastrous wars throughout the previous century. The period under examination may be considered as the first attempt after the creation of the Turkish Republic when the two nations cooperated closely in an attempt to create a peaceful co-existence in line with interests in the southern Balkan and eastern Mediterranean region.

The clergy at the Patriarchate benefited from the lifting of the restrictions. The Patriarch received the document from the commission on the exchange of populations acknowledging his *établis* status. According to the official Turkish census of 1935, there were 125,046 *établis* Greek Orthodox of whom 17,642 were Hellenic Nationals⁴⁶⁴. The forced *rapprochement* of the two countries had its reflection in the Patriarchate policy of Turkey. In October 1930, when Venizelos came to Turkey to sign the Ankara Treaties, he also paid a visit to the Patriarchate with the consent of the Turkish government⁴⁶⁵. Moreover, Venizelos got the guarantee from the Turkish government to control the Turkish Orthodox Church of Papa Efthim. In return, Venizelos pledged to expulse the refugee *ulema* based in the Western Thrace and propagate against the new Turkish government⁴⁶⁶. In the troubled pre-war years, Greece and Turkey together with Romania and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact (1934). The aim was to use the Pact as a hedge against increasingly revisionist Bulgaria and Italia. This pact was a peculiar example of regional cooperation because it was not signed under the guarantorship of any major power⁴⁶⁷. That fact proved the fragile political situation in Greece and Turkey, two minor countries that had to support each other in the instable Balkan Region. The new steps were followed by further openings for the Patriarchate as the government proved to be more understanding about its requests such as the control of the Turkish Orthodox Church.

⁴⁶³ İsmail Soysal, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz (1919-1999) [A Guide for Turkish Foreign Policy Research]*, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 46. See also "Traité d'Amitié, de Neutralité, de Conciliation et de l'Arbitrage" in İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları [Political Treaties of Turkey]*, Vol. I (1920-1945), 3rd. ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000, p. 401.

⁴⁶⁴ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations*, p. 178.

⁴⁶⁵ Ömer Sami Coşar, "Patrikhane Dosyası", *Hürriyet*, August 16, 1976.

⁴⁶⁶ Harry J. Psomiades, "Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic, The First Ten Years", *Balkan Studies*, No. 2, 1961, p. 47-70 at p. 70

⁴⁶⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, "The Balkan Pact and its Implications for the Balkan States, 1930-1934", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1994, p. 123-144; Ekavi Anastassopoulou, *Turkey, Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 9-10.

I. 3. 5. International Spiritual Activities of the Patriarchate under the Republic

After an over active period in the last years of the Empire, the Patriarchate entered a period of relative calm with the republic. However, the series of events that started with the suppression of the Russian Patriarchate gave the chance to the Fener to continue to play an important role concerning the Orthodox affairs continued in the new period.

After Patriarch Tikhon's death in April 1925, Metropolitan Sergius held power as deputy *locum tenens*. He avoided meddling in politics in order to keep the church from state control. Despite that fact, he couldn't avoid being arrested in 1926. Then he moved to a policy of complete cooperation with the Soviet authorities. In July 1927 he issued a statement announcing his full support of the Soviet regime. The declaration stated that joys and sorrows of the USSR were those of the Russian Church and ordered his bishops, and the Russian diaspora churches to submit to the state⁴⁶⁸. The policy of reconciliation that Sergius adopted provoked common opposition in Russia and among the refugee churches under construction. Members of the Russian church remained deeply divided over this policy. As a result, religion went underground in Russia. According to the numbers provided by Walters, Sergius' concessions and his apparent will to cooperate with the Soviet authorities had no positive advantages for the Church. The closure of all sorts of religious institutions and the intimidation of clergy continued during the 1930s. By 1939 the Russian Orthodox Church barely existed as an institution. Only about 2000 churches remained open, as compared with a pre-Revolutionary total of 46,000 and only four bishops were not imprisoned. Thousands of clergy and lay people were in the labor camps⁴⁶⁹.

Istanbul recognized the Living Church in spring 1924. Patriarch Gregory VII urged Patriarch Tikhon to resign "for the sake of peace", and considered that whichever faction the Soviet government was prepared to accept should be recognized by the church⁴⁷⁰. This decision is striking in its clear call for obedience to the new regime in Russia. Since the first ecumenical council conveyed by Emperor Constantinos in 325, political and religious leaders

⁴⁶⁸ For the text of Metropolitan Sergius' 'act of loyalty' see Matthew Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 161-165.

⁴⁶⁹ Philip Walters, "The Russian Church and the Soviet State", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 483, Religion and State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power, 1986, p. 135-145 at p. 139.

⁴⁷⁰ Serge Keleher, "Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus Istanbul", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, p. 125-137 at p.126

walked hand in hand in order to insure the total obedience of the population. But what if the population who took over the power from the monarchs was totally religion-less? This was not the first time when the church found itself in a difficult position. In the migration period and Muslim invasions, churches had to live under alien rule. But this new era where the secularism, national states and Marxist-Leninist ideology prevailed in a large number of Orthodox countries, there would be less space for the religion to manoeuvre. The only way was to go underground, like in Russia or to try to cooperate with the new system.

Fener's recognition of the Living Church was strongly contested by Patriarch Tikhon, in an uncompromising tone, undermining its quest for primacy in Orthodoxy. In his response of 6 June 1924, he wrote to Patriarch Gregory VII⁴⁷¹:

In no small measure we were shocked and surprised that the Head of the Church of Constantinople, without any prior consultation with us, the legitimate representative and Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, would interfere in the internal life and affairs of the Autocephalous Russian Church. The Holy Councils recognized the primacy of honor alone as the prerogative of the Patriarch of Constantinople and did not, nor do not recognize any primacy of authority.

Even though the recognition was withdrawn soon afterwards, Istanbul's recognition of the Living Church, poisoned relations between the two patriarchates and "the matter has never been forgotten"⁴⁷².

I. 3. 5. 1. Relations with Russian Diaspora

One of the most important problems that awaited a solution was the Russian Diaspora. That issue and the Patriarchate's responses to it created further tensions between Moscow and Istanbul. The defeat of the White Russian armies against the Red Army threw many dissidents to diaspora. The 'Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia' settled in Serbia claimed that it should exert jurisdiction over the other Russian Orthodox diaspora churches. This group supported the refoundation of the overthrown monarchy in Russia, as a consequence of which Patriarch Tikhon of Russia had to order for its dissolution under strong pressure of Soviet political power. Upon the decree, the Synod of

⁴⁷¹ Archbishop Gregory Afonsky, "The Canonical Status of the Patriarch of Istanbul in the Orthodox Church", <http://www.Orthodoxytoday.org/articles-2009/Alfonsky-The-Canonical-Status-Of-The-Patriarch-Of-Istanbul-In-The-Orthodox-Church.php>. (May 6, 2009)

⁴⁷² Keleher, p. 126

Bishops was dissolve to be recreated soon afterwards under a different form.⁴⁷³ In 1927, the new *locum tenens* Sergius⁴⁷⁴ made a declaration that we mentioned above, submitting the church to communist power. But what is significant for our subject about the diaspora is that in the declaration he asked for the diaspora churches to write “a written promise of their complete loyalty to the Soviet government”⁴⁷⁵. The Russian bishops abroad in Karlovci denied the declaration as a consequence of which Sergius stated that all acts of the Karlovci Synod were null and void⁴⁷⁶.

At the same time the Russian refugees in Paris also settled their own churches with Metropolitan Eulogius at his head and its centre at Paris. The Russian Orthodox Church in France also had difficulties in accepting the aforementioned declaration. Eulogius was appointed by Patriarch Tikhon as Patriarchal Exarch to Western Europe⁴⁷⁷. The Metropolitanate was particularly influential because many Russian refugees and among them intellectual elite came to Paris. Metropolitan Eulogius organized the Saint Serge Theological Seminary (1925) and founded a printing house that elevated Paris into a centre of attraction for all Orthodox. In parallel with the animated cultural, social and political life in Paris at the time, Paris became the prominent intellectual meeting-place and a centre of production for the Russian Diaspora⁴⁷⁸. Metropolitan Eulogius maintained relations with the Moscow Patriarchate for as long as possible, but by 1930 this became impossible. He was deposed by Sergius on the pretext of attending a church service in London⁴⁷⁹. Thus relations between the two centers broke.

After consultations within the diocese Eulogius decided to appeal to the Fener and went personally to Istanbul to present his case to Patriarch Photios II. The Patriarch accepted the appeal of Eulogius, on 17 February 1931 the patriarch issued a *tomos* accepting the Russian archdiocese in France and naming Eulogius patriarchal exarch for Western Europe. This was stated to be a temporary measure, until such time as normal church life and

⁴⁷³ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 176.

⁴⁷⁴ Sergius was *locum tenens* thus was not an elected Patriarch because Soviet authorities did not allow a Patriarchal election.

⁴⁷⁵ For the full text of the 1926 and 1927 declarations by Sergius see Matthew Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 157-165.

⁴⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴⁷⁷ For an overview of the Paris congregation see Timothy L. Smith, “Refugee Orthodox Congregations in Western Europe 1945-1948”, *Church History*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Sep. 1969, p. 312-326 at p. 314.

⁴⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ Spinka, “Post-War Eastern Orthodox Churches”, p. 114; Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 153.

administration were restored in Russia⁴⁸⁰. This episode shows the vulnerability of the relations between the Orthodox churches. The fragmented nature of the Orthodoxy -in contrast to the unity of the Catholic world- extremely politicize the churches and set them as rivals against each other when the conditions were ripe.

During the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1944, and under pressure from the Soviet government, the Orthodox Church in Estonia came back under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate. Many members of the church left the country and established an Estonian Orthodox Church in exile, while maintaining ties with Istanbul. Thus two opposing groups appeared within the Estonian Orthodox Church⁴⁸¹. Istanbul never accepted this Russian move to force Estonia under its jurisdiction continued to recognize the Estonian church in exile as the legitimate successor to the Estonian Orthodox Church. Only in 1978 Istanbul recognized Moscow's jurisdiction over the Estonian church. According to Webster, this move was a "fraternal concession to a sister church, then unable to act freely"⁴⁸².

In the Balkans waters started to calm down by the end of the World War I. Serbian and Romanian Churches asked and obtained Patriarchal status from the Patriarchate in 1922 and 1925 respectively. The Bulgarian Church that we extensively analysed previously was considered schismatic and ignored by Istanbul until 1945⁴⁸³.

Only in Albania, by 1929, a new attempt of independence came under the pressure of the Italian government who were deeply involved in Albanian politics. Obviously this was a political move as the Italians under the leadership of Mussolini wanted to curtail Greek influence in Albania⁴⁸⁴. The request of independence of the Orthodox Church was affirmed by King Zog of Albania. The missing fourth bishop to form a Synod was consecrated with the help of the Serbian Patriarchate. Also new Serbophile bishops were consecrated⁴⁸⁵. Thus Albania became a scene of not only Greek-Albanian duel but also a Serbian-Greek conflict. The Patriarchate was struggling to hold its jurisdiction in Albania, the last castle in the

⁴⁸⁰ Keleher, p. 128

⁴⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁸² Alexander Webster, "Split Decision: The Orthodox Crash over Estonia", *Christian Century*, 5 June 1996.

⁴⁸³ Vasilis Stavridis, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate", *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1969, p. 198-225, at p. 221.

⁴⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p. 307.

⁴⁸⁵ "Albanian Orthodox Church: Action by the Fener", *The Times*, March 15, 1929, Spinka, "Post War Eastern Orthodox Churches", p. 121; Angeli I. Murzaku, *Returning Home to Rome: The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata in Albania*, Rome: Analekta Kryptoferris, 2009, p. 153.

Balkans and had no intention to leave the scene to the Serbian Patriarchate. The response of the Fener was violent. In February 1929, the Patriarchate of Istanbul deposed the bishops irregularly consecrated in Albania, protested to the Serbian church against the participation of a Serbian bishop in this consecration and asked for a punishment⁴⁸⁶. The Albanian government did not take a step back. In March 1929 the Albanian Government expelled the Greek metropolitan of Koritsa, who was acting as Patriarchal Exarch in Albania. Due to the existence of a large Greek minority in Southern Albania, Greece was very interested in the fate of the Orthodox Church in Albania. The Patriarchate was under the pressure of the Greek government and the public opinion to defeat the independence movement in Albania. Thus only in 1937 the Patriarchate recognized the autocephalous status of the Albanian Orthodox Church⁴⁸⁷.

I. 3. 5. 2. Agreements with the Greek Orthodox Church

I. 3. 5. 2. 1. The Jurisdiction of the New Lands

After the enlargement of Greece by Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 there arose the problem of ecclesiastical status of the new lands (i.e. Northern Greece and the some islands in the Aegean hitherto directly dependent upon the Patriarchate⁴⁸⁸). During the reign of Basil III (13 July 1925-29 September 1929), a new settlement was agreed with the Church of Greece over the Patriarchate's jurisdiction in the "New Lands". According to the Patriarchal and Synodical Act of 1928, the Patriarchate maintained its jurisdiction over the territories that remained in Greek borders but these rights were conferred to the Church of Greece and be subject to a different canonical order⁴⁸⁹. By this law "all the Metropolitan sees in the new provinces recognize as their administrative authority the Holy Synod of Athens, to which their administration is entrusted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate"⁴⁹⁰. Thus canonically the sees in the new lands were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate and they were allowed to vote (this right would be null by the *Valilik tezkeresi* of 1923 that we mentioned above) but also

⁴⁸⁶ William Miller, "The Changing Role of the Orthodox Church", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1930, p. 274-281 at p. 275.

⁴⁸⁷ For a survey of Albanian politics and society see Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A Modern History*, New York: I.B. Tauris, Revised ed., 2001, p. 135.

⁴⁸⁸ For the full list of new territories see the official website of the Patriarchate

<http://www.patriarchate.org/patriarchate/hierarchy-of-the-throne> (10 August 2010)

⁴⁸⁹ Miller, p. 275; Philippos K. Spyropoulos and Theodore Fortsakis, *Constitutional Law in Greece*, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 264.

⁴⁹⁰ *ibid*

they were a part of the church of Greece. Thus in a sense the new territories had been an organic, vital link between the Churches of Istanbul and Athens even though these were fell apart by the drawing of the frontiers⁴⁹¹.

I. 3. 5. 2. 2. Status of Mount Athos

Another arrangement with Greece was about the legal status of the monasteries of the Mount Athos*. The status of the international federation of monasteries in the Mount Athos was decided by a series of international treaties. Already in 1912, the Greek army invaded the region, detaching it from the Ottoman Empire. In the 1925, Constitution of Greece recognized the Mount Athos as a self governing part of the Greek state, under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate⁴⁹². Thereupon, the Charter of the Mount Athos, decided in 1924 by the Synod of the Mounth Athos was legalised by a legislative decree of 16 Sptember 1926⁴⁹³. In the regulation that laid down the administration of the monasteries the Patriarch of Istanbul had jurisdiction over not only Greek but also Russian, Serbian, Albanian monasteries and their non-Greek residents. But with the new Charter and the following regulation, the monks of

⁴⁹¹ Konstantinides, p. 15.

* Mount Athos (Gr. Aghion Oros; Tr. Aynaroz) is a federation of international monasteries. Since the time of the Roman Empire, the region held a special status, without interference. Under the Ottomans, great religious liberty was recognized to the monasteries. In 1912, the region became a Greek territory. The treaty of seves of 10 Aout 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne recognized Greek sovereignty over the region. See Raymond Goy, *Du Droit Interne au Droit Internationale: Le Facteur Religieux et l'Exigence des Droits de l'Homme*, Rouen: Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 1998, p. 247.

⁴⁹² Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, p. 227. Spyropoulos and Fortsakis, p. 270. For the full text of the constitution see ibid, p. 360-361. The provisions on the status of Mount Athos is repeated in all constitutions of Greece with few changes. In the present constitution (1975), Chapter 3, Art. 105 deals with the regime of Mount Athos. It reads:

1. The Athos peninsula extending beyond Megali Vigla and constituting the region of Aghion Oros shall, in accordance with its ancient privileged status, be a self-governed part of the Greek State, whose sovereignty thereon shall remain intact. Spiritually, Aghion Oros shall come under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. All persons leading a monastic life thereon acquire Greek citizenship without further formalities, upon admission as novices or monks.
2. Aghion Oros shall be governed, according to its regime, by its twenty Holy Monasteries among which the entire Athos peninsula is divided; the territory of the peninsula shall be exempt from expropriation. The administration of Aghion Oros shall be exercised by representatives of the Holy Monasteries constituting the Holy Community. No change whatsoever shall be permitted in the administrative system or in the number of Monasteries of Aghion Oros, or in their hierarchical order or in their position to their subordinate dependencies. Heterodox or schismatic persons shall be prohibited from dwelling thereon.
3. The determination in detail of the regimes of the Aghion Oros entities and the manner of operation thereof is effected by the Charter of Aghion Oros which, with the cooperation of the State representative, shall be drawn up and voted by the twenty Holy Monasteries and ratified by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Parliament of the Hellenes.
4. Faithful observance of the regimes of the Aghion Oros entities shall in the spiritual field be under the supreme supervision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and, in the administrative, under the supervision of the State, which shall also be exclusively responsible for safeguarding public order and security.
5. The afore-mentioned powers of the State shall be exercised through a governor whose rights and duties shall be determined by law.

The law shall likewise determine the judicial power exercised by the monastic authorities and the Holy Community, as well as the customs and taxation privileges of Aghion Oros.

⁴⁹³ Spyropoulos and Fortsakis, p. 270.

month Athos become Greek nationals⁴⁹⁴. Thus the clergy are under the spiritual guidance of the Patriarchate but under the legal protection of the Greek state.

I. 3. 5. 3. Ecumenical Relations of the Patriarchate

Good relations built between the Anglican and Orthodox churches since the first decade of the twentieth century were confirmed in Istanbul. In 1925 the Patriarchate was represented by Metropolitan Germanos in the commemoration of the 1600th anniversary of the first Ecumenical Synod of Nicaea that was held in London in 1925⁴⁹⁵. According to Stavridis, factors that influenced these relations were the following: “church-state relations in the Patriarchate, the supranational character of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from a geographical point of view, the manner of operation prevailing in the Patriarchate, the presence of outstanding personalities and the preparation of worthy personnel, the right of the Patriarchate to take initiatives within the structure of the Orthodox churches”⁴⁹⁶.

The Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic followed the path opened by the predecessors and was actively involved in ecumenical activities under the leadership of Germanos of Thyateira who presided the Patriarchal delegation until his death in 1951. The main reason under the involvement of the Patriarchate in ecumenic undertakings was the effort of the Patriarchate to gain ground on the international scene where the Russian church was practically absent and was represented only by its members living abroad. Moreover, the precarious position of the Patriarchate within Turkey led the church to seek support from the West, as illustrated in the Lausanne negotiations where especially the Anglican Church, had been active in defending the rights of the Patriarchate. The Orthodox delegates also participated in the two world conferences of the Movement of Life and Work and second of Faith and Order that would constitute the ground for the creation of the WCC in 1948. The first gathering of the Life and Work held in Stockholm (1925) and the second in Oxford (1937) Istanbul, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Serbia, Romania, Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria were fully represented⁴⁹⁷.

⁴⁹⁴ William Miller, “Holy Mountain”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Jan. 1928, p. 329-332 at p. 331

⁴⁹⁵ Vasil Stavrides, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 80.

⁴⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴⁹⁷ Varella, p. 158

They were also present in the First World Conference of Faith and Order in Lausanne (1927) and the second conference of Faith and Order in Edinburg (1937).⁴⁹⁸ According to Stavrides all representatives of the other Orthodox churches accepted the leadership of Germanos of Thyateira and acted as a well integrated body.⁴⁹⁹ However, Russia was not represented, which made impossible for the Orthodox churches to decide upon issues that would have influence on all Orthodox churches. These two movements would fusion in 1938 at Utrecht to a fellowship of churches to form, in ten years the WCC, to the work of which the Patriarchate had contributed from the very beginning.

The support for the ecumenical movement is one of the particularities of the Patriarchate among the Orthodox Churches that were not always supportive for the cooperation with other Christian denominations. During the war with Greece, the policy of *rapprochement* with the Protestant and Anglican orders was undertaken. The work under the ecumenical movement contributed to the prestige of the Patriarchate as a reformist, outspoken church that was readily considered as the leader of the Orthodox world even though its leadership position was not endorsed by all Orthodox churches especially by Russia. Therefore the ecumenical movement and the Patriarchate's participation strengthened the Patriarchate's position in the West, especially in protestant countries.

Conclusion

The transition period from the empire to the nation-state has been extremely difficult for the Patriarchate which tried to adjust its position to the new pressing conditions. Nationalist movements cost the Patriarchate its prestigious position, its leadership role among the Orthodox conferred by the Ottoman State. By the end of the Ottoman Empire the imperial ecumenicity came to an end given the fact that the 'ecumenical status' is directly related to the state power without which the church could not impose its jurisdiction over other Orthodox.

The Patriarchate was a loyal Ottoman institution until the last years of the Empire and worked harmoniously as one of the elements in the Ottoman administrative system embracing in a leadership status all Orthodox of the Empire. Only under extensive pression of the nationalist movements in the Balkans and growing influence of the Hellenic ideology in

⁴⁹⁸ Stavridis, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches", p. 12

⁴⁹⁹ *ibid.*

Greece the Patriarchate abandoned this policy. The last years of the Patriarchate were also noteworthy because, the institution altered its weakening position over the Orthodox of the Balkans by giving a hand to the new Orthodox nations that sought for ecclesiastical independence from Russia. The setting up of new Diaspora communities under the jurisdiction of the Fener contributed to the “new ecumenicity” of the Patriarchate, that was different from the one enjoyed under the Empire. The leadership role played in the relations in the ecumenical movement, good relations built with Protestant churches contributed to the acknowledgement of the Patriarchate as the leader of the Orthodox world again. This was only possible by the elimination of the Moscow Patriarchate from the religious scene and the search of leadership between the scattered Orthodox churches.

The Patriarchate activities subservient to Greek aims in Turkey were the founding myth of the state-church relations under the Republic. The institution was not welcome on the Turkish soil because it was not only seen too “Greek” but also maybe too Ottoman for fitting in the secular, nationalist scheme that was drawn by the new regime. The international activities were followed by scepticism and the institution was confined to the status of a “minority church” despite the fact that it was still an international institution.

CHAPTER II

THE PATRIARCHATE DURING THE COLD WAR: BETWEEN TWO POLES AND UNDER THE SHADOW OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

The end of the World War II opened the scene for a world characterized by two antagonistic poles in international politics. The United Nations (UN) united nearly all nations of the world proving to be as inadequate to maintain peace and security without the Great Power involvement. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance was sealed with a concern over security, immediate economic recovery and was tainted with a liberal discourse of fundamental rights and freedoms together with the rule of law and democracy.

Giving an account of the Patriarchate's status in Turkey and explore its international activities throughout the Cold War period is not an easy task, given the fact that the perception of the patriarchate within and outside the borders of Turkey was marked with ebbs and flows. The revival of the Russian Patriarchate by Stalin's initiative is the most important reason for the endorsement of the Fener by especially the U.S but a growing concern over the religion as a part of Cold War strategies also played a part. This period shows highly contradicting aspects in Turkey. While Turkey and the patriarchate were at the same side of the line dividing the two worlds, the advent of the Cyprus crisis by the mid-1950s poisoned the relations between the institution and the state. While a large bulk of the Greek population left Turkey during this period, the Patriarchate disproportionately grew in importance. With or without the support of Turkey, even with or without a flock in the country, the Patriarchate developed its own strategies to bring together the Orthodox churches divided by the ideology and participated in the movements of the churches to end the division in the spiritual realm.

II. 1. The Setting of the Cold War

After the end of the World War II, the international scene was divided into two camps that reflected conflicting ideologies. While the US became the undisputed leader of the capitalist alliance, the Soviet Union's success in defeating the Nazis was rewarded with the annexation of several occupied countries into Soviet states and the creation of satellite states in Eastern and Central Europe with socialist economies. Moreover, in central Europe the conditions were still precarious. In Italy war time communist resistance met with great sympathy and the communist party almost won the elections, to be defeated with the active involvement of the Roman Catholic Church⁵⁰⁰. In France communist and socialists formed the majority in the first National assembly. Finally a civil war between the right wing government supporters and communists started immediately after the war (1946-1949) in Greece. Only with British and American help the right wing was able to form a government in the country⁵⁰¹. In 1945, the USSR refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship without substantial concessions from Turkey. Before such a treaty could be negotiated, the Soviets wanted the surrender of the districts of Kars and Ardahan, belonging to Turkey since 1921. Also the Montreux Straits Convention was questioned, to give more control to the Soviet Union. Even though the country managed to evade being a part in the war now it was under strong threat of a revisionist Soviet Union⁵⁰². The decolonization process further complicated the problem, since the Soviet Union was willing to endorse new nationalist regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The main problem of the American and British alliance after the end of the War was the expansion of communism in Europe. When Britain weakened by the war years,

⁵⁰⁰ Peter, C. Kent, *The Lonely War of the Pope Pious XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the division of Europe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002.

⁵⁰¹ For the details of the political conditions of Greece at the time see Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, p. 130-141; David H. Close, *The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950*, London: Routledge 1993. John S. Koliopoulos & Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece: A History Since 1821*, WestSussex: Blackwell, 2009, p. 57-153

⁵⁰² In 1947 Britain declared that due to economic difficulties it could not continue to endorse Greece and Turkey. The U.S, fearing to lose Greece and Turkey to Soviet Union declared the "Truman Doctrine", an official aid programme to both nations. In his congressional address of March 1947, Truman underlined that he was well aware of the U.S new role in international politics. The UN being an ineffective organization the U.S had a responsibility to protect and maintain peace. He asserted, "This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States". If America did not provide aid to Greece and Turkey, "in this fateful hour" the effect would be on global proportions. See Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2006, p. 61-80. For details see G.S. Harris "The USSR and Turkey" in Ivo Lederer and Wayne Vucinich (eds.), *The USSR and the Middle East: The Post World War II Era*, California: Hoover Institution Publications, 1974, p. 25-28.

denounced aid to Greece and Turkey, the US had to reconsider its non-interventionist foreign policy. In his speech before the Congress on March 12, 1947, the US President Harry Truman declared that the US, must support democracy worldwide and fight against communism. This was followed by the announcement of a substantial aid, economic and military to Greece and Turkey to help ‘free peoples’ resist totalitarianism⁵⁰³.

The announcement of the Marshall Plan the same year, a substantial economic aid program from the USA, further divided Europe as the USSR and its satellites refused to accept it. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC- Later Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development/OECD-1948) was responsible for the fair distribution of the Marshall aid in those states accepting the American aid⁵⁰⁴. Simultaneously Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), a Soviet dominated organization, was founded as “communism’s answer to the Truman doctrine”⁵⁰⁵. This was the beginning of the Cold War.

The post war period in Europe was also marked with an early suspicion of Germany. The Dunkirk Treaty (1947) signed between the Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom had the main aim to resist a possible German irredentism. However already in one year the Brussels Treaty “was less specific about the potential aggressor”⁵⁰⁶. In fact after the foundation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) the steps of the Western Europeans to insure their own security were undermined. The US dominated Europe that was inadequate and politically divided to defend itself. The impact of the Cold War on the international relations in Europe was noteworthy. Due to the security concerns and economic necessity, together with the encouragement of the US, the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

⁵⁰³ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih, 1918-1994*, 2nd ed., Ankara: İmge Yayinevi, 1991, p. 202-204; Melvyn P. Leffler, “From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War”, *Diplomatic History*, IV, Fall 1983, p. 247-254; The Truman doctrine was formed along the lines defined in George F. Kennan in 1946 in his ‘long telegram’ to Washington from Moscow where he served as deputy head of the US mission to Moscow. Kennan expressed the same opinions in his article “Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in *Foreign Affairs* (1947) under the pseudonym “X” The basic idea expressed by Kennan was that “the main element of any United States policy toward the USSR must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies”, see X, “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Jul. 1947, p. 566-582.

⁵⁰⁴ For a substantial analysis of the U.S Cold War strategies and the Marshall Plan see Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1953*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Nicolaus Mills, *Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming to Age as a Superpower*, New Jersey: Wiley, 2008.

⁵⁰⁵ See for example Maxwell Adereth, *The French Communist Party: A Critical History, 1920-1984*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 226

⁵⁰⁶ Mark Mazover, *The Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage Books, 1998, p. 244; Karen E. Hudson, *From the Dunkirk Treaty to Schuman Plan: Britain, France and the European Idea 1947-1953*, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison Press, 1992, p. 41-47.

was founded in 1951. The main aim was to pool the valuable resources of coal and steel that created so much tension between France and Germany in the past. Those two countries were accompanied by Italy and Benelux States, staunch supporters of integration in Europe. The failure of an attempt to create a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community that would go along with it in 1954, demonstrated the reliance of the Europeans to the Atlantic Alliance for the security in Europe⁵⁰⁷.

In 1957 the same core countries signed in Rome the Treaty establishing the ‘European Economic Community’, an entirely unprecedented form of international organization. The Preamble of the Rome Treaty declared that the signatory states were “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union” but the treaty envisioned economic integration accompanied by a certain extent of common legal system⁵⁰⁸. The idea of a federal Europe was defended by several significant political figures in the inter-war years but it fell victim to the sovereignty jealously safeguarded by the nation-states and it was left into oblivion with the end of the war⁵⁰⁹. Increasingly the EEC transformed into a political project in Europe following the ‘spillover’ principle that broadly envisaged that one step leads to more integration. But it was only by the end of the Cold War European integration adopted a clear vision of political unity.

II. 1. 1. Human Rights in the Bipolar World

In the immediate post war era the human rights has become one of the major topics in Europe. Inadequacy of nation-states to protect their citizens from the Nazi aggressors and large scale human rights abuses led to a general skepticism of politics and exaltation of the individual rights bolstering the setting up an effective international system. A new belief in democracy that would go hand in hand with individual freedoms swept Europe. The necessity to create an effective system of international law that would be able to curtail state

⁵⁰⁷ For a British view of the EDC see Alan Milward, *The United Kingdom and the European Community, Vol. I: The Rise and Fall of the National Strategy, 1945-1963*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 78-125; For a general view see Michelle Cini, *European Union Politics*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 20-21.

⁵⁰⁸ “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community”, Rome, 25 March 1957, <http://www.ena.lu/> (10 May 2010)

⁵⁰⁹ In his much quoted Zurich Speech of 19 September 1946, Churchill defended a “United States of Europe” that finally led to the foundation of the United Europe movement. See Walter Lippens and Wilfried Loth, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 46.; Pierre Renouvin, *L’Idée de Fédération Européenne dans la Pensée Politique du XIXe Siècle*, Oxford, 1949, Brigitte Laffan and Sonia Mazey, “European Integration: The European Union, Reaching an Equilibrium?” in Jermy John Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, 2nd. ed, p. 31-52 at p. 37-39.

sovereignty over the individuals raised. According to Quincy Wright, “effective international organization is not possible unless it protects basic human rights against encroachment by national states”⁵¹⁰. Until then there were no effective measures against the states that breached human rights of their own citizens. Unless the state was limited in its actions there would be no effective human rights protection.

The Charter of the UN founded in 1945 did not curtail the state sovereignty. Previously, the League of Nations created a system of collective protection of rights reflected in the minority treaties. By contrast with this understanding, the charter exalted individual rights against the collective rights recognized to minorities. The Charter brought a new understanding of human rights but its clauses were elementary until new legal instruments were adopted by the UN and other international organizations with a machinery of enforcement as well as supervision and implementation.⁵¹¹

The Charter of the United Nations proposed a new world built on the following principles written in Article 1⁵¹²:

to maintain international peace and justice, to develop friendly relations among nations, to take into account the principles of sovereign equality and self-determination of peoples, and the achievement of international co-operation to resolve problems of economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, including the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Therefore the UN Charter envisaged international cooperation for the protection of human rights⁵¹³. The human rights system established under the UN was founded on the belief of equality and non-discrimination in the treatment of individuals⁵¹⁴. The post war approach to the human rights and minority rights reflected liberal thinking. According to Kymlicka it seemed a “natural extension of the way the religious minorities were

⁵¹⁰ Quincy Wright, *The World's Destiny and the United States: A Conference of Experts in International Relations*, World's Citizen Association, 1943, p. 102-105.

⁵¹¹ Asbjorn Eide, “The Framework Convention in Historical and Global Perspective” in Mark Weller (ed.), *Oxford Commentaries on International Law: The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 25-47 at p. 25.

⁵¹² “Charter of the UN”, 26 June 1945, para. 1., in A. Leroy Bennett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, Annex II, New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002, p. 472-497.

⁵¹³ *ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ For an account of the Human Rights in the United Nations see Louis Henkin, “The United Nations and Human Rights”, *International Organization*, Vol. 19, No.3, The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects, Summer 1965, p. 504-517.

protected”⁵¹⁵. The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948 did not mention any specific rights to minorities. The minority problem being a delicate issue, it was difficult to find standards to apply to each state. In other words, the UN put the state sovereignty before the right of religious, ethnic, linguistic groups to proclaim their identity and to have specific rights. This approach reflected state’s reluctance in conferring sovereignty in an internal problem.

In the western side of the Iron Curtain that was brutally separating Europe, Council of Europe [CoE (5 May 1949)] signed the rules that ‘free’ Europe should adopt. The CoE as it was stated in its statute aimed at achieving social and economic development with the unity of all “like-minded countries”⁵¹⁶. The members of the Council were among the Atlantic-Alliance of the US that had capitalist economics and democratic political systems which respect human rights and individual freedoms. Interestingly the statute of the Council made allusions to the spiritual and moral values. It states that the “spiritual and moral values are the common heritage of (...) peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which for the basis of all genuine democracy”⁵¹⁷. In the Statute of the Council, human rights feature as one of the means of achieving “greater unity” and democracy (Article 1, para. b)⁵¹⁸.

Throughout the Cold War the CoE was become a major source of standard setting texts in Europe even though it had few means to impose its rules to the member states⁵¹⁹. The first of the text of the CoE, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CPHRFF) which was open to signature in 1950 and came into force in 1953 has become one of the major achievements of the organization⁵²⁰. While the Convention did not add much to the human rights protection system in Europe, the enforcement mechanism was new. A Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg was founded to oversee the Convention with a right

⁵¹⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 4

⁵¹⁶ “Statute of the Council of Europe”, *European Treaty Series No. 1*, 5 May 1949.

⁵¹⁷ *ibid.*

⁵¹⁸ *ibid.*

⁵¹⁹ Florence Benoit-Rohmer and Heinrich Klebes, *Le Droit du Conseil de l’Europe : Vers un Espace Juridique Paneuropéen*, Strasbourg : Le Conseil de l’Europe, 2005, p. 95; Jean Petaux, *Democracy and Human Rights for Europe, :The Council of Europe’s Contribution*, Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 2009, p. 14.

⁵²⁰ See the Full text of the Convention, “Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14”, *European Treaty Series No. 5*, Rome, 4 November 1950.

to sanction the violation of human rights⁵²¹. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR and the Commission was optional. The old Art. 25 (mandatory no, was amended by Art. 34) gave the states and individuals right to petition the European Commission of Human Rights and old Art. 46 (now mandatory as amended by new Art. 32) gave the rights to “hear and try cases already reported upon by the Commission (the Commission’s functions were merged into the Court in 1999)”⁵²². Thus for the first time in history the human rights were under the guarantee of a supranational Court. It was an unusual practice but over the span of years, states adopted one by one the optional clauses, allowing their citizens to apply to the court. This was a major achievement in European history of human rights protection.

II. 1. 2. The Impact of Religion in the Cold War

However, the Cold War had important effects on the churches. During the war period many religious institutions in Europe were discredited for supporting fascism and cooperation with Nazis⁵²³. However, the predominance of Cold-War anti-communism, the domination of the Christian democrat parties in Europe. The individual liberties and democratic regimes were under the strain of the Cold War animosities. With the communists left out of the governments by the end of 1940s, Europe witnessed the domination of Christian democrat parties that were sympathetic to the church. Despite the above mentioned stress on individual liberties and democratic development, the Cold War overshadowed the democratic systems. In the Eastern Europe and the countries annexed to the Soviet Union the resistance was suppressed by force⁵²⁴. In that ambience, the churches in the west relied on a discourse more suitable with the new human rights regime proclaimed by the international relations and tried to play a part in its realization. Moreover, the division of the continent with an Iron Curtain* separated one from the other unnaturally and put the religious minorities in a precarious

⁵²¹Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay and Anthony W. Bradley, *European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 19

⁵²² *ibid.*

⁵²³ See for example Matthew D. Hockenos, *A Church Divided: German Protestants confront the Nazi Past*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004; the discussion on the Catholic Church’s attitude towards the Nazis and the Holocaust is very polarized. There are a great number of works blaming the church to collaborate such as John Cornwell, *Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, London: Penguin Books, 2008. This work incited much criticism. See David G. Dalin, *The Myth of Hitler’s Pope: How Pope Pius XII Rescued Jews from the Nazis*, Washington: Regnery, 2005; Roth and Ritner, adopted a more impartial stance relying on the documentary evidence. John K. Roth and Carol Ritner *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust*, New York: Continuum, 2004.

⁵²⁴ Mazower, p. 265.

* Winston Churchill used the term for the first time in his speech ‘Sinews of Peace’ delivered in Westminster College, London on March 5th 1946 to symbolize the ideological and psychological divide between the socialist and capitalist blocs. The speech is available online at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Sinews_of_Peace. (26 May 2010).

position. The very characteristic of the international relations of the Western churches during this era was not only to fight with communism at large. They also tried to cooperate - sometimes with but not necessarily depending upon the political authority- in order to end the division of the political scene. While the treatment of the religious institutions differed from one regime to an other, -some were almost annihilated like in Albania, some were tolerated on the condition of cooperating with the political regime like in Bulgaria and Romania-, the churches under the communist regimes were generally deprived of the freedoms enjoyed by the churches in the West. In most of the times they became the puppets of the political regimes but also they wanted to make their voice heard under great pressure at home. The Patriarchate as the senior church of Ortodoxy that had a dual role in the Cold War era acting in the name of western values to fight communism but also to reconcile both sides of the antagonistic camps. Necessarily the international actions of the Patriarchate and its treatment in Turkey reflected that philosophy.

II. 1. 3. The US' War with Communism and the Patriarchate's Role

The Cold War containment policy was also a religious war. At the U.S.A with, -a predominantly Protestant, conservative population, the salience of the religion was considerable. The religious discourse in personal and political life was abundant. The leaders of the nation did not abstain -with an exception of Kennedy- to underline their religiosity, and considered their country to back moral values in the world⁵²⁵. Thus the struggle against communism was put as the war of between the good and the evil and between the religious and the atheist. As the 'enemy' was the communist that undermined the religious component of the politics, the U.S emphasized the freedom of religion which included the appraisal of democracy and freedom. Thus the ideologically the capitalist economy with its liberal values was morally superior than materialist communism⁵²⁶. The religious component required the endorsement of the religious leaders throughout the world in order to enable them to join the fight against communism. When the U.S shifted its policy of non-intervention to liberal

⁵²⁵ Patrick Allitt, *Religion in America since 1945*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 67; 230; Timothy Beal, *Religion in America: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 4.

⁵²⁶ Dianne Kirby, "Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti-Communist Front, The Archbishop of Canterbury and the 1948 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2001, p. 35-70 at p. 37; For an account of the Truman's cold-war policy and the place of the religion in that war see Edwards-Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2006.

internationalism under the Truman administration, the aim was to mobilize the world public opinion with the help of the religious leaders against the communist evil⁵²⁷. The anti-communism was already endorsed and disseminated by Pope Pius XII. When the Italian communist party lost the elections of 1946, the role played by the Vatican as an active participant was not disregarded by the American government⁵²⁸.

Myron C. Taylor, had originally been appointed as Roosevelt's personal representative to the Pope at the beginning of the war, continued his work in Vatican under Truman administration in order to convince the Pope to cooperate with the American government⁵²⁹. In August 1947, a widely publicized exchange of letters took place between the President and the Pope in which, each party pledged for a lasting peace built on Christian principles. Truman acknowledged Pius XII as a central figure in the western alliance.⁵³⁰ On the insistence of the Protestant leaders who feared too much exaltation for the Vatican at the expense of other religions, Myron Taylor's post was adjusted to "the personal representative of the President to the religious leaders of the world" rather than solely to the Pope⁵³¹.

However, the Holy See was not in sympathy with the policy of containment which separated Catholic Europeans of the west from Catholic Europeans of the East that resulted in extensive persecution of the church in Eastern Europe. In 1948 and 1949, when communist rulers initiated the restriction and persecution of the east European church, the Holy See found that it received no help and little sympathy from policy makers in Washington. In fact, Pius XII started by the end of the 40s his own anti-communist war, using excommunication as a weapon to adjust its position in Eastern Europe⁵³². The American government was aware of the advances made by the Russian Patriarchate supported by the Soviet regime in order to undermine the position of the Fener within the Orthodox realm. Thus, as we will see in the election of the first 'American' Patriarch of Istanbul, the US government was actively involved within the confines of the strategy of containment of the communist danger. Within the confines of this mission, Myron Taylor also visited Patriarch Athenagoras, the Archbishop

⁵²⁷ *ibid.*

⁵²⁸ Peter C. Kent, *The Lonely War of the Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, p. 135-137.

⁵²⁹ "Taylor to Pius XII", *The New York Times*, 29 August 1947.

⁵³⁰ *ibid.*

⁵³¹ Kirby, "Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti-Communist Front", p. 43.

⁵³² Peter C. Kent, "The Lonely Cold War of Pius XII" in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War*, Hapshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 67-76, at p. 68

of Greece and delegates from the Vatican⁵³³. During the Cold War period, the US actively supported the Patriarchate, attributing it a special importance as the only church which could curtail the Russian Patriarchate's influence in the Orthodox world. However, this wouldn't be an easy task, given the fact that Russian Patriarchate represented the most populated and richest of the Orthodox nations. Now that many of the Orthodox churches were under communist regimes, the leverage of the Russian Church would be more powerful.

II. 2. The Patriarchate Policy of Turkey during the Cold War

At the end of the World War II, the Patriarchate was under the direction of Patriarch Benjamin Christodoulou. His tenure was an insignificant one, with the exception of the end of the long quarrel with the Bulgarian Church with the recognition of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church autocephalous in 1945 within precise territorial limits⁵³⁴. Also, the Albanian Orthodox Church was recognized by the Patriarchate in 1937. The decisions were strategic, bearing the fact that continuous isolation of the Bulgarian and Albanian churches would permit the Russian church to penetrate in the church affairs of these countries already under the protectorate of Russia. While the Soviets started to assert themselves in the affairs of the Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the weak leadership of the aged Patriarch had become an issue of great concern.

While bipolar world was forming, Greece and Turkey took their place in the same Euro-Atlantic camp. The Patriarchate of Istanbul benefited greatly from the positive atmosphere in Turkey after the guaranteeing of the Marshall aid and good relations with Greece, together with the simultaneous NATO membership of the both countries. The two countries had become regional powers with the Truman doctrine and started to join their forces in order to contain Soviet and Bulgarian threat. From the first years of 1950, political, military but also cultural cooperation took place between the two countries⁵³⁵.

During the immediate post war years, the relations between Greece and Turkey assumed a cordial character by the fact that both countries aligned themselves within the

⁵³³ *The Times*, June 25, 1949.

⁵³⁴ For the original of the tomos recognizing the Bulgarian autocephalous church see Annex III. Document provided to the author by the Patriarchate. Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 153.

⁵³⁵ Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yokoluş Süreci [Greeks of Turkey: From the Age of the Nation-State to the Age of Globalization : The Vanishment of a Minority]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2007, p. 168.

Western camp. Being perfectly aware that the Soviet policy had changed towards the Russian church that was revived on the condition of supporting Russian claims abroad, a revision of the status of the Patriarchate in Istanbul had been considered. The proposals of the Russian patriarchate over the Fener's status were viewed –rightly- as an attempt to establish a Russian ecclesiastical base in Istanbul, very well situated between the Balkans and the Middle East, where now the USSR was an influential power. At this stage the Turkish government felt that not only it had to tolerate the presence of the Patriarchate in Istanbul but also there was a need to rejuvenate it. The Patriarchate should not be a pretext of Russian intervention in the country.

Conscious of the fragile international position of the Patriarchate, Greek ecclesiastical and political circles demanded a 'major revitalization' of the Fener. Alarmed by Soviet aims, they approached the British and American governments alerting them to the seriousness of the situation. Alexander Pallis, a member of the Greek embassy in London, drew the attention of the British government by these words⁵³⁶:

the plight of the Ecumenical Patriarch now that his province is reduced in practice to the city of Constantinople... Even in Constantinople the community has steadily declined until it numbers only about 80.000. No doubt the Patriarchate has lost not only the contributions of the faithful but also the revenues formerly derived from properties all over Turkey. The Holy Synod consists of the Patriarch and twelve members, a far greater number of bishops than the reduced Greek community of Istanbul can hope to produce or support.

He went on to underline that the Patriarchate has a "canonical importance" as the head of the whole Orthodox Church whose disappearance would provoke communist penetration in other Orthodox churches. Finally he went on to underline that "at this critical juncture of history, it was vital to the Turkish interests to strengthen the international position of the Fener"⁵³⁷. Elaborating this thesis, Germanos Strinopoulos, Archbishop of Thyateira and the Exarch of Central and Western Europe under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, enumerated a series of measures that aimed to revitalize the Patriarchate. He proposed that all restrictions imposed upon the Patriarchate by the Turkish government impeding the fulfillment of the Patriarchate's 'historic mission' as the leader of

⁵³⁶ Text of this interview in Edmonds to McDermott, London, 6 February 1945, FO 371/48349/R3009 cited in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 239.

⁵³⁷ *ibid.*

the Orthodox churches, should be eliminated. The Patriarchate should only be acquiescent to the laws concerning public order. The thesis elaborated by Germanos envisaged international protection which would have transformed the Fener into “a powerful bastion against Soviet penetration” according to Germanos, providing an international definition of the status of the Patriarchate would not conflict with Turkish interests, on the contrary, Turkey would “acquire in a strengthened Patriarchate a potent ally against a danger threatening both parties”⁵³⁸. The Archbishop-regent Damaskinos made further suggestions in a conversation with the archbishop of York on 20 April 1945 concerning the transfer of the high-ranking Greek clerics to the Patriarchate with a permanent service and their endowment with Turkish nationality in addition to the invitation of the young Greeks to study theology at the Halki school with the permission of the Turkish government to fill the ranks of the Patriarchate⁵³⁹.

Already in 1945, fearing that the number of Greeks resident in Turkey would not permeate to fill the ranks of the patriarchate’s hierarchy, the Orthodox clergy reflected about reconsidering the status of the Patriarchate. The British were governed by the Labour Party and the majority of the population had sympathy for the Soviets given the fact of the Russian resistance during the war. The British government was reluctant to openly contest Soviet ecclesiastical policies. However, they suggested informally to the Turkish government to bolster Fener’s status in order to counter Soviet demands on the Straits and Istanbul⁵⁴⁰.

II. 2. 1. The Election of Patriarch Maximos

Under these conditions, after the death of Patriarch Benjamin, Maximos Vaportzis, Metropolitan of Chalcedon, rejected by Turkish authorities at the previous elections of 1936 was elected to the Patriarchal throne on 21 February 1946. His election was fully canonical and there were no exclusions, nor any particular actions by the Turkish authorities. On the contrary, the prefect declared to the patriarchal delegation on visit that the hierarchs at the Fener were free to elect “whoever they wished”⁵⁴¹.

⁵³⁸ Archbishop Germanos to the Archbishop of Canterbury, London, 9 December 1945, FO 371/58860/R2589 cited in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 240

⁵³⁹ The minutes of the interview in British Chancery to Southern Depart., Athens, 13 June 1945, FO 371/48349/R10615 in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 240.

⁵⁴⁰ British Chancery to the Southern Department, Ankara, 3 April 1945, FO 371/48349/R6606, cited in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 241

⁵⁴¹ Konstantinides, p. 17.

The new Patriarch was young man and he was expected to reign for long years and bring dynamism to the Fener⁵⁴². However, soon after he was elected, he became target of several criticism varying between being pro-soviet, communist and mentally ill⁵⁴³. Alain Juster claims that Maximos Vaportzis fell victim of a mental disease that would prevent the leadership of the Patriarchate in such a critical period.⁵⁴⁴ According to Alexandris, the Patriarch suffered “periodical fits of morbid melancholia, which appear to have been due to hereditary causes”⁵⁴⁵. On the contrary, Gaston Zamarini defends that “since his enthronement, he hasn’t veiled his sympathy for the communist insurgents of Greece who crossed the streets of the villages with his and Patriarch Alexis I of Moscow’s photos in their hands and proclaimed that these two prelates were favorable to their cause”⁵⁴⁶. It seems that mental illness was a more just reason for the retirement of the Patriarch. The short reign of Patriarch Maximos gave us the premises of a new era for the Patriarchate in Turkey and on the international scene. The official policy towards the institution was to ignore its international status and minimize such a role. However, after the end of the World War II, the Soviets appeared as a greatest danger for Turkey’s territorial integrity. Now, notwithstanding the traditional suspicion towards the Patriarchate, the Turkish government came in line with the US and Greek governments which insist on the bolstering of the ecumenical role of the Patriarchate.

The non-intervention of the Turkish government in the election of Maximos, who was regarded as a powerful candidate was the first indication of the change of heart of the Turkish government. Under the Maximos’ patriarchate, the government also took positive steps in order to ameliorate the conditions of the Greek minority. In 1946, the transition to the multi-party system relieved the minorities in general as the votes of the minority members counted on policy considerations. As a result of the good Turkish-Greek relations, Turkish government proved to be more sensible to the community’s problems. Consequently, many problems of the Greek minority institutions were solved without any difficulties. In June 1946, Ankara promised to the new Greek ambassador Skepheris, a new law for the regulation

⁵⁴² Olivier Clément, *Dialogues avec le Patriarche Athénagoras*, Paris: Fayard, 1969, p. 85.

⁵⁴³ Benlisoy and Macar, p. 53.

⁵⁴⁴ Alain Juster, “İstanbul Ortodoks Patrikhanesi, Yunanistan ve Türkiye [Istanbul Orthodox Patriarchate, Greece and Turkey]” in Semih Vaner (ed.), *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı [Turco-Greek Dispute]*, Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990, p. 49-58 at p. 55.

⁵⁴⁵ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 243-244

⁵⁴⁶ Gaston Zamarini, *Papes et Patriarches*, Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1962, p. 61.

of the administrative committees of the foundations permitting free elections; since 1930 these committees were administered by the minority members designated by the government (tek müteveli heyetler)⁵⁴⁷. Secondly, Turkish government agreed to abolish a law imposing a tax on sporting and similar associations had been applied to the churches and non-paying minority hospitals⁵⁴⁸. Again, Greeks and Turks agreed to share the ownership of two Greek schools in Heybeliada. While the Greek commercial college was retained, the HTS would be let to the Patriarchate. Meanwhile, the two historical chapels were to be classed as national monuments. Finally, the teaching of the Greek language in the Greek schools in the islands of Imbros and Tenedos was approved⁵⁴⁹.

II. 2. 2. The HTS Changes Status

In line with the international political scene that we mentioned above the Patriarchate applied to the MNE in 1947, with the request to turn the HTS to a Higher Theology Institution and also to appoint foreign teachers and students. The request was evaluated by an inter-ministry commission. The response was interesting in the sense that it sheds light to the future discussions of the school. The commission did not allow the seminary to be an institution of higher education on the grounds that “it was not necessary for a school which has only 16 students of Turkish nationality”,⁵⁵⁰.

It was also decided that only foreign teachers from Greece were to be accepted in line with the reciprocity clause and the request for granting visas for students that apply from abroad was rejected on the grounds that Turkish legal procedures do not allow it⁵⁵¹. It is interesting to note that the request was made when the Theological seminaries were reopened one by one in the USSR and when the Holy Cross seminary of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America has become a theology faculty in 1947. It was certainly evaluated by the Patriarchate of Istanbul that while the Archdiocese under its jurisdiction became a faculty, the ‘mother church’ had to have an institution of higher education, and it had to compete with

⁵⁴⁷ Samim Akgönül, *Le Patriarcat Grec Orthodoxe: De l’Isolement à l’Internationalisation de 1923 à nos Jours*, Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005, p. 74.

⁵⁴⁸ This was the mukataa taxation payable to the Department of Evkaf (Pious Foundations), Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 242.

⁵⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁵⁰ Moreover, the founding of the universities and independent faculties is a state monopoly, according to the Law No. 4936. If the necessity arises in the future, an Orthodox chair to the Theology Faculty may be founded. See Emre Özyılmaz, *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu*, Ankara: Tamga Yay., 2000, p. 86.

⁵⁵¹ Özel, *The Heybeliada Seminary and the Patriarchate*, p. 24.

the Russian theological faculties. Moreover, the request for the application of the foreign students implied a bitter truth for the Patriarchate: At the time of the application there were only 16 local students studying at the school. While the Thrace and Anatolia provided the traditional clergy recruitment base for the Patriarchate, the latter was deprived from it with the exchange of populations. Only foreign students could populate the school⁵⁵². The Patriarchate needed more clergy for the religious services of the Greek minority in Turkey but also for the denominations of the Patriarchate abroad. While the institution entered a covert war with the Russian Patriarchate, the education of the clergy has become more important than ever. The election of the Patriarch Athenagoras together with the victory election of the Democrat Party in 1950 would solve this problem.

II. 2. 3. Revival of the Patriarchate under the ‘American Patriarch’

The election of a new Patriarch was not left to the synod of the Patriarchate but was considered in the policy circles of Turkey, Greece and the U.S.A. The name of Athenagoras, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America was the only one suitable to all three⁵⁵³. The majority of the metropolitans in Istanbul objected the election of Athenagoras, claiming that he was not “one of them”⁵⁵⁴. However, by October 19 1948, the *New York Times* gave the news: “Maximos V quits as Orthodox head. Archbishop Athenagoras is expected to assume post”⁵⁵⁵. One month later Archbishop Athenagoras was elevated to the throne⁵⁵⁶. The election of Athenagoras was uncanonical since the metropolitans were not allowed to present their candidacy to the throne. This was because the sole candidate was Athenagoras, acceptable to the three governments. It was stated clearly and unequivocally in all quarters and reported worldwide in the press, and also was officially proclaimed by the prefect to the Fener hierarchs that “none of you” would be elected⁵⁵⁷. Thus with the consent of the Turkish government, the rules for the election of the patriarch were undermined and for the first time in history, an American national was elected patriarch. He

⁵⁵² Emrullah Yalçın, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nun Yeniden Açılması[Reopening of the Halki Theology School]”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No. 41, 2008, p. 125-158 at p. 128

⁵⁵³ Athenagoras was born Aristocles Spyrou in Ioannina (Yanya) in Epirus, then Ottoman Empire on March 25, 1886. He attended the Halki School of Theology. He was raised to the episcopacy as the Metropolitan of Corfu in 1922. On August 30, 1930 he was ordained by Patriarch Photius as Archbishop of the North and South America.

⁵⁵⁴ “Object to American Patriarch”, *Christian Century*, 10 November 1948.

⁵⁵⁵ “Maximos V Quits as Orthodox Head”, *The New York Times*, October 19, 1948.

⁵⁵⁶ “Athenagoras to Head the Greek Church”, *The New York Times*, November 2, 1948.

⁵⁵⁷ Konstantinides, p. 17.

was given the document of *laissez passer*, at the Turkish embassy in Paris. This document was handled to the Patriarch by Oğuz Gökmen, who made the interesting comment: “Americans have a naïve vision of politics. They sincerely believe that, by controlling the Patriarchate of Fener, they could control the whole Orthodox world, including Russian people”⁵⁵⁸.

Athenagoras arrived to Istanbul on 26 January 1949, with the personal plane of the US President Harry Truman. The US was trying to bring together Turkey and Greece in line with the policy of containment on the very moment when a communist take over of the government occurred in Yugoslavia and when the civil war in Greece finally came to an end. More broadly, it was expected that its traditional prestige would permit the Patriarchate of Istanbul to balance, in the Orthodox world, the influence of the Patriarchate of Moscow⁵⁵⁹. This move was a clear intervention in the church affairs. The US government expected that with “its jurisdiction over the great masses of Orthodox believers, the Fener could also claim spiritual leadership over Russian Orthodox”⁵⁶⁰. This assertion was unfolded since the Orthodox Church is not organized like the Roman Catholic Church with a supreme head, the Pope. The Patriarchate of Istanbul had no jurisdiction over the Russian Orthodox let alone all Orthodox around the world. It could only claim rights within the territory under its jurisdiction. However, it was considered as one of the two centers of Orthodoxy together with the Russian church. While the Russian church is representing the most populous and richest of the Orthodox churches, it is only fifth within the church hierarchy and it is considered as a national ‘Russian’ church, even though neither its flock nor the territory under its jurisdiction is not exclusively Russian. At the other pole, resides the Greek Orthodox Church of Istanbul that canonically, occupies the first rank in the hierarchy, and retain some prerogatives –like summoning Pan-Orthodox gatherings- that implies a certain degree of leadership role within Orthodoxy. Moreover, as the Fener does not represent a ‘nation’ and is situated within Turkey, it could easily represent a ‘neutral territory’ to which the Orthodox could identify. During the Cold War, Istanbul Patriarchate would benefit from these advantages.

⁵⁵⁸ Oğuz Gökmen, *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye-Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları*, Istanbul: ub, 1999, p. 122.

⁵⁵⁹ Clément, *Dialogues avec le Patriarche Athénagoras*, p. 86.

⁵⁶⁰ “At Enthronment in Istanbul He Aslo Urges Unity”, *The New York Times*, January 28, 1949.

II. 2. 3. 1. Athenagoras' First Years in Turkey

When Athenagoras was enthroned in 1949, Moscow and Istanbul represented two opposing poles in the Cold War. After 1945, the Russian Church did not recognize the *tomos*' that gave autonomy of the Orthodox churches of the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia and the Russian émigré church in Paris. The latter, recognized the authority of the Russian church before the death of Eulogius in 1946. However, an assembly in Paris rejected this decision and on the contrary to Russian Church's efforts to elect a loyal bishop, confirmed their loyalty to the Patriarchate of Istanbul⁵⁶¹.

He had important roles in the Cold War. He should unite the Orthodox around his patriarchate in order to curtail Moscow's influence without alienating the Russian Patriarchate. The exemplary role of the Patriarchate who lived happily in Turkey, a member of the Western bloc would provide the moral support of the Orthodox churches in the communist bloc. The unification of the Orthodox then would be an appreciated result of containment policy in Europe. Moreover, this would provide a chance to shatter the communist regimes from within. The American leadership in line with Truman administration's expectations from the Patriarchate wanted the Fener to build bridges with the Vatican and an active involvement in the WCC was also endorsed.

The new Patriarch made clear from the very beginning that he wanted the Patriarchate to become a symbol of the Greek-Turkish (and American) friendship. He took from the very start steps to build confidence between the institution and the Turkish government and public opinion. The first step that he took at the airport in Istanbul was revealing: Athenagoras replied in Turkish to the welcome speech in Greek of the representatives from the Patriarchate⁵⁶². From the airport "he drove straight to the Taksim square where he placed upon Republic monument a wreath of flowers brought from the garden of the White House"⁵⁶³. During the patriarchal sermon on his enthronement on 27 January 1949, he expressed "his devotion to President İsmet İnönü and to the Turkish people as a whole"⁵⁶⁴. In his highly political inaugural speech which reflected the 'mission' of the

⁵⁶¹ Smith, p. 315-316.

⁵⁶² Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 246.

⁵⁶³ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ "New Oecumenical Patriarch: Enthronement at the Fener", *The Times*, January 28, 1949.

Patriarchate in the Cold War period, the Patriarch called for the “divine assistance in assuming his duties in this particularly critical hour when humanity was passing through a troubled period of its history” and he expressed his “gratitude and attachment to the USA which did so much to help all suffering countries”⁵⁶⁵. He also made implicit his desire to cooperate with all Greek Orthodox Churches, all Christians in general and with Muslims, because “the revival of religious feeling was the only means by which humanity could overcome its present difficulties”⁵⁶⁶.

By these words, the new Patriarch clearly aimed at communism, which is the natural enemy of the church life. His words about unity of the religions coincided with the newly formulated Truman doctrine on religious cooperation which targeted at forming a religious bloc against Soviet advances. Not surprisingly, the enthronement ceremony of the Patriarch was boycotted by the embassy officials and church representatives of the USSR and her satellite countries.

A month after his arrival in Turkey, the Patriarch met with President İnönü to whom he delivered a personal message from President Truman. He then had private meetings with Premier Şemsi Günaltay and the Minister of Interior Emin Erişirgil⁵⁶⁷. In the following days, he ordered that the Patriarchate, like other official institutions of Turkey, be decorated on Sundays by a Turkish flag. He had exchange visits with Hamdi Akseki, the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and he visited many Ottoman Turkish holy places and historical monuments and did not hesitate even to pray in a mosque⁵⁶⁸. He stressed the loyalty of Greeks to the Turkish state. Commenting on the situation in Istanbul, Athenagoras said: “We the Orthodox Greeks, are loyal citizens of Turkey. All we ask is compliance with the constitution. We know that we live in our country for three thousand years”⁵⁶⁹. He thus endeavored to unite the Greek minority and the Turks⁵⁷⁰. Finally, soon after his arrival in Turkey he abandoned his American citizenship⁵⁷¹. Apparently this attitude of Athenagoras had a positive effect not only on political circles in Ankara but also on the Turkish public

⁵⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁷ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 247

⁵⁶⁸ C.L Sulzberger, “Wider Ties Sought by Greek Church”, *The New York Times*, March 25, 1950.

⁵⁶⁹ Clément, *Dialogues avec le Patriarche Athénagoras*, p. 54-55

⁵⁷⁰ Suat Bilge, “Fener Greek Patriarchate”, *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 3, No. 1, March-May 1998, p. 29.

⁵⁷¹ C. L Sulzberger, “Wider Ties Sought by Greek Church”, *The New York Times*, March 25, 1950.

opinion. According to the account of Athenagoras himself, in the streets, Turks frequently stopped him to kiss his hand and respectfully address him as *Patrik Baba* (father-patriarch)⁵⁷².

The same series of events, however, were interpreted very differently from a nationalist point of view. According to Şahin, “the adverse activities of Athenagoras were very striking. At his arrival, he made a very intriguing move by giving Truman’s letter to the President as if it was an Ambassador’s letter of recommendation”⁵⁷³ Moreover, “the fact that the Patriarch worked for the unification of the Eastern and Western Churches, against the stipulations of Lausanne, is a matter that worth more attention. (Thus the Patriarch in its own benefit and to Turkey’s expense a strategic and tactical front)”⁵⁷⁴. This view merits closer focus. While Greece, Turkey and the US were brought together by the Cold War antagonism, the Patriarchate was viewed by the public opinion and academic circles alike as a ‘foreign institution’ which has always worked against the interests of Turkey. This regard reflects to what extent, Turkey was blinded with nationalism that undermines the international political environment. Within this context, even the theological activities of the institution that aimed at bringing together different denominations of Christianity could be viewed as ‘harmful activities’ against Turkey, a country which –in theory and practice- was placed at the same side of the power balance with the Fener. However, with the optimism raised by the allocation of the Marshall aid to Turkey, until the advent of Cyprus problem in mid 1950s, successive governments appreciated the place of the Orthodox Church of Istanbul in this power balance and had been tolerant for the Patriarchate.

The first five years under the Democrat Party (DP) were the golden years of the Patriarchate. With a special permission, the Patriarch visited the Hagia Sophia, being the first Patriarch since 1453 to enter in the monument. The restrictions upon the Greek minority schools were eased and academic standards were improved with the Greek-Turkish cultural agreement signed on 20 April 1951⁵⁷⁵. First time in the history of the republic, new minority schools were founded⁵⁷⁶. In 1951, the HTS acquired a new status and a new name, ‘*Rum*

⁵⁷² Olivier Clément, *Dialogues avec le Patriarch Athénagoras*, p. 99

⁵⁷³ Şahin, p. 282.

⁵⁷⁴ *ibid*, p. 283.

⁵⁷⁵ Sarioglou, *Turkish Policy towards Greek Education in Istanbul 1923-1974*, p. 158-159

⁵⁷⁶ See the list of the Greek schools and the years of their foundation in Süleyman Büyükkarcı, *Türkiye’de Rum Okulları*, Konya: Yelken, 2003, p. 621. These schools were Feriköy mixed primary school and Langa primary school both established in 1957.

Rahipler Okulu (Greek Priests' School) legalized with a regulation, under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education (MNE), that would henceforth comprise three years of high school and four years of theology speciality section⁵⁷⁷. In 1952 August, with an additional protocol to the Regulation, the school was allowed to register foreign students.⁵⁷⁸ Thus, in the academic year of 1951, this college had twenty five teachers –five of them Turkish- and seventy students of whom forty-seven were foreign nationals⁵⁷⁹. The Patriarch built good relations with Premier Menderes. In 1952, Menderes visited the Patriarchate. He would be the first and the last Turkish Premier ever to visit the institution. Likewise many prominent international figures paid visits to the Patriarchate. For example King Paul and Queen Frederika of Greece met the Patriarch on 13 June 1952⁵⁸⁰. Reflecting good relations with Greece and new tolerant vision of the Turkish government, patriarchal officials were allowed to travel freely and regularly abroad. This means that the Patriarchate could enhance its position on the international scene face to an assertive Moscow Patriarchate. The Patriarchal press was revived. In addition to *Orthodoxia* (1926-1923) a new patriarchal weekly, *Apostolos Andreas* started to publish weekly news in 1951 until its closure in 1964⁵⁸¹.

II. 2. 4. Cyprus Crisis: End of the Honeymoon

After 10 years of euphoria, the emergence of the Cyprus question in 1955 contributed to the progressive deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations, which were complicated further by numerous bilateral differences reflecting the political, economic, and strategic interests of the two countries. It is not in the scope of this thesis to give the details of the Cyprus problem, one of the most complicated political conflicts ever experienced. From 1955, the Cypriot Greeks moved for independence from British mandate, and eventually realize *Enosis* –Union- with Greece. The change of the *status quo* on the island, had been a

⁵⁷⁷ See *Heybeliada Rum Rahipler Okulu Öğretim Yönetmeliği [Halki Greek Priests' School Education Regulation]*, İstanbul: Vasil Vasiliadis Matbaası, 1953, MNE, Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi [Education and Instruction Center], No. 2/111, September 25, 1951.

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid.* "Heybeliada Rum Rahipler Okulu Öğretim Yönetmeliği'ne Ek [Addition to the Halki Greek Priests' School Education Regulation]", August 20, 1952, no. 190, İstanbul Directorate of National Education, September 10, 1952, sent to the Priest's School by the Section of Private Schools, letter no. 3/105830.

⁵⁷⁹ There were 29 Greeks, 16 İstanbul Greeks with Turkish nationality, 6 Ethiopians, 5 Cypriots, 2 British, 6 Imbriots and 1 Tenediot with Turkish nationality, 2 Syrians, 1 Egyptian, 1 South African and 1 Lebanese see *Orthodoxia*, 26 (1951) 396-400 cited in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of İstanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 249.

⁵⁸⁰ "Greek King and Queen in İstanbul", *The Times*, June 14, 1952.

⁵⁸¹ Stavrides, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 117.

major concern for the Turkish government, and a press campaign in order to inform the public opinion started before the London Conference of 27 August 1955⁵⁸².

The Patriarchate had become under great pressure from the Turkish press which wanted the Patriarchate to intervene in Cyprus and to oblige Archbishop Makarios⁵⁸³ of the Cypriot Orthodox Church to stop the movement towards *Enosis*. However, the Patriarch Athenagoras expressed that religion and politics should be kept separated, and that Greek and Cyprus Churches are autocephalous, thus not under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate⁵⁸⁴. This pressure was in direct contrast with the agreement made at Lausanne that allowed the Patriarchate to remain in Turkey only on the condition to keep away from politics. However, during the Cyprus crisis the Patriarch in person and the institution as a whole were forced to involve in politics.

On the night of 6 September 1955, violent rioting started in Istanbul targeting the Greeks and other non-Muslim citizens after the pro-government paper *Istanbul Express* released the news of a supposed explosion in Atatürk's house in Thessalonica (*Selanik*). When news was heard, thousands of people gathered, shouting 'Cyprus is Turkish! Will remain Turkish!'. The mob started to attack and loot every non-Muslim property they could reach, including shops, houses, churches, synagogues and even cemeteries⁵⁸⁵. In about four hours, thousands of shops and houses were seriously damaged, seventy-three churches were burned down and two Rum cemeteries were completely destroyed⁵⁸⁶.

The well organized character of the riots implied that there was government involvement. In 1960, five years after the riots, the ruling DP was overthrown by a military coup and its leaders were tried by a military court. One of the cases of the trials dealt with the 6-7 September night. The trials concluded with the execution of three members of the DP,

⁵⁸² For an account of the Cyprus problem see Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye, Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler*, İstanbul: Der, 2000, Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960), Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*, İstanbul: Kaynak, 1985; Michel Bozdemir, *Les Clés de la Méditerranée Orientale: Turquie, Grèce et Chypre*, Paris: FEDN, 1989.

⁵⁸³ Makarios III, was born Mihail Christodoulou Mouskos in 1913. He had been Archbishop and primate of the Cypriot Orthodox Church in 1950 and first and fourth President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1974 and 1974-1977). He studied in Athens and Boston Universities. It is a common (voluntary) mistake in Turkey to assert that he was a graduate of HTS but he has never been to Heybeliada in his life.

⁵⁸⁴ Foti Benlisoy, "6/7 Eylül Olayları Öncesinde Basında Rumlar", *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 81, 2000, p. 28-38.

⁵⁸⁵ For a concise history of the 6-7 September see Dilek Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005. The exact official numbers of the damage are: 5538 shops and houses (3584 belonging to Greeks), seventy-three churches, one synagogue, eight Greek sacred fountains and two monasteries.

⁵⁸⁶ See Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, p. 175-224.

including Prime Minister Adnan Menderes⁵⁸⁷. The 6-7 September 1955 events was a beginning of the end for the Greek community in Istanbul even though the immigration towards Greece and elsewhere did not immediately start following that night. The Patriarchate and the prominent members of the community convinced the Greeks to stay in the country⁵⁸⁸. A part of the damages were compensated, apologies were made by the government. However, we may deduce that violent events that caused unprecedented material damages inflicted psychological effects on the minority and presented a watershed that prepared the immigration. According to Patriarch Bartholomeos, “the plane of Athenagoras started to fall that night”⁵⁸⁹.

During 1956 and 1957, the press was occupied with an endless interest on the future of Cyprus. Almost every day, news about the developments about the Cyprus problem decorated the press. From these news, we understand how badly the Cyprus crisis harmed the Greek-Turkish relations. Greece was defending the right of ‘self determination’ for Cypriot people that would lead to *enosis* with Greece. Turkey however, proclaimed it would only accept *taksim* (partition) of the island. For Turkey any change of the *status quo* concerning the island would inevitably lead to a reconsideration of the Lausanne treaty⁵⁹⁰.

It is interesting to note that, in the Turkish newspapers often the terms were confused, insinuating that Greeks, Cypriot and Greeks of Turkey (Rums) were all the same. For example, Makarios was often addressed as Greek head-priest (Yunan Paşpapaz), while he is neither Greek (Yunanlı) but Greek Cypriot (Kıbrıslı Rum) nor a head-priest but archbishop. Allusions to the Orthodox Church as a source of disturbance for the Turkish nation were abundant. For example, in his open letter to Makarios in *Cumhuriyet*, Hasan Âli Yücel, says: “Papaz Efendi, I do observe you for a long time, you, who are a suitable representative of the Greek-Orthodox Church that has traditionally been the source of the Greek nationalism”⁵⁹¹. The harshest critic during this period came from the leading scholar Niyazi Berkes, a Cypriot himself. In a series of articles published in *Yön* [Direction], he advocated that the Patriarchate was unable and unwilling to bring the Cypriot Church in line

⁵⁸⁷ Ali Tuna Kuyucu, “Ethno-Religious ‘Unmixing’ of Turkey: 6-7 September Riots as a Case in Turkish Nationalism”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p. 361-380 at page 362.

⁵⁸⁸ Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, p. 220-221.

⁵⁸⁹ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos I.

⁵⁹⁰ See for example *Cumhuriyet*, March 4, 1956, for Köprülü’s interview on Cyprus, *Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1956.

⁵⁹¹ *Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 1956.

despite its claim of ecumenicity. An obsolete institution, an ‘Orthodox Caliphate’, it had no rights to exist in the secular Republic of Turkey⁵⁹².

In a highly inflammable atmosphere the Patriarchate was under constant pressure⁵⁹³. During this period, the officials of the Patriarchate, including the patriarch himself could not freely travel abroad and the government imposed visa restrictions on the visitors of the Patriarchate. One year after the riots, the government had forbidden the export of the Patriarchal periodical and the patriarch was advised not to leave the Fener. When Patriarch asked for passports from the Turkish authorities for two of his representatives, he received no reply and it therefore became impossible for them to attend the meeting of the Central Committee of the WCC at Yale in July 1956. Four years later when the trials of the Menderes regime were held, delegates from the Patriarchate asked once again for passports from the Turkish authorities in order to attend another visit of the WCC. Their demand was again refused by the Turkish government⁵⁹⁴. Meanwhile, the removal of the Patriarchate came once again to the fore. George Allen, the American Ambassador to Athens, was also of the opinion that “due to Turkish nationalism the Patriarchate’s position might become untenable and thus (the Patriarch) had better consider moving, for example, to the island of Rhodes”⁵⁹⁵.

Another interesting note is that despite the growing understanding towards the patriarchate from the World War II up to 1955, the CHP and Democrat Party (DP) governments did not provide the necessary permission for the restoration of the Patriarchal building that had been burned down in a fire in 1941. The rapprochement period after the signing of the Cypriot independence largely contributed to the international activities of the Patriarchate that we will analyze in the section that follow. We may assume however, with the signing of the London and Zurich Treaties in 1959 and 1960 that recognize the

⁵⁹² The first article of the series appeared on October 23, 1964 and finished in December 18, 1964. See Niyazi Berkes, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Ortodoks Kilisesi [The Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox Church]”, *Yön[Direction]*, 23 October 1964, No. 82, p. 16; “Osmanlı Ülkesi, Hristiyan Mezhepleri Arasında Çıkan Çatışmalara Sahne Oluyor [The Ottoman Land becomes a Scene of conflicts between of the Christian Denominations]”, 30 October 1964, No. 83, p. 16; “Atatürk Türkiye’si’nde Ekümenik Patriklik [Ecumenical Patriarchate in Atatürk’s Turkey]”, *Yön*, 6 November 1964, No. 84, p. 84; “Panortodoks Kongresi [Panorthodox Congress]”, *Yön*, 18 December 1964, No. 90, p. 11. For a collection of the articles see Niyazi Berkes, *Patrikhane ve Ekümeniklik*, 2nd ed., Istanbul: Kaynak, 2005.

⁵⁹³ The flag was handed to Dr. Fazıl Küçük, communal leader of the Turkish Cypriots on 9 September 1957 during the meeting held for the anniversary of the Ottoman take over of the island. See, *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 1957. After the arrest and banishment of Makarios, the British government on the island organized attacks on the churches and announced that churches were like arsenals where an important amount of arms were hidden. *Cumhuriyet*, March 16, 1956.

⁵⁹⁴ Sarioglou, *Turkish Policy towards Greek Education in Istanbul 1923-1974*, p. 187.

⁵⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 177.

independence of Cyprus, a new crisis was postponed. After the signing of London Agreement in 1959, Zeki Kunalalp and Dimitris Bitsios came together to prepare a bilateral report in order to offer solutions to the disagreements between Greece and Turkey. Several stipulations of the report were about the Patriarchate. The two parties suggested that, “the Patriarch and his metropolitans should freely travel abroad in order to execute the ecumenical mission and receive visitors from other churches, in conformity with the visa regime applicable to foreign nationals by the Turkish state. The patriarch, whatever its source should be free of any kind of allusion”⁵⁹⁶. Moreover the report suggested that “measures in order to effectuate the restoration necessary for the Patriarchal building and the reparation of seven churches should be undertaken immediately”.⁵⁹⁷

Thus a series of confidence building measures concerning also the Patriarchate was suggested by the two diplomats. From the stipulations concerning the Patriarchate, we read that in spite of the good relations under the DP government (with a parenthesis of the 6-7 September events) there were many remaining problems. After the coup d'état of 1960, a new, more liberal and democratic constitution had been adopted that contributed to the building of cordial relations with Greece and with the Greek community in Turkey. In Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios of the Cypriot Church had been elected as president of the Republic. The election of a clergyman for the presidency of the republic seems at odds with the secular understanding of politics. However, we should remember that the Orthodox Church was the only remaining power on the island, a colony since centuries, the Greeks-Cypriots could identify with⁵⁹⁸. Under the Ottoman *millet* system, the religious head of the community was also the Ethnarch- Milletbaşı, representing its community.

The crisis of 1963 that erupted with the decision of President Makarios to change the Cyprus constitution signalled the commencement of a bad period for the Patriarchate as well. In 1963 and 1964 the crisis gradually internationalized. The US government was deeply troubled by the escalating tension between Greece and Turkey, -two NATO members- and deeply concerned about the failure of an early NATO plan, the inadequacy of the UN

⁵⁹⁶ In the French version of the report, the Patriarchate is referred as the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The ‘religious mission’ in the Turkish translation of the text is ‘Ecumenical mission’ in its original. Thus Greek and Turkish diplomats agreed on the measures but did not use a common terminology.

⁵⁹⁷ Zeki Kunalalp, *İkili Rapor-Rapport des Deux*, Istanbul: Isis, 1997, p. 40-43.

⁵⁹⁸ Gilles Bertrand, *Le Conflit Helleno-Turc: Nouvelles Donnes et Nouveaux Acteurs dans le Systeme Postbipolaire et à l'Age de la Globalisation*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larouse, 2003, p. 121.

peacekeeping forces to halt the bloodshed and an imminent Turkish intervention on the island. The involvement of the Soviet leader Khrushchev, who warned the guarantor powers and the USA about a potential NATO intervention in Cyprus and expressed that “The USSR would help Cyprus defend her freedom and independence if a foreign armed invasion of the island took place” made the concern even more palpable⁵⁹⁹. In 1964, the USA President Lyndon Johnson warned Turkey of the consequences of any unilateral action against Cyprus. On June 5 1964, Johnson sent a letter to İnönü, in which he expressed that Turkish military intervention would lead to a clash with Greece. It would cause violent repercussions in the UN and wreck any hope of UN assistance in settling the crisis. The letter continued “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have any obligation to protect Turkey against the USSR if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without full consent and understanding of its NATO allies”⁶⁰⁰ Not surprisingly, the letter deterred Turkey from taking any action in Cyprus, however, Turkish American relations were irreparably hampered.

II. 2. 5. Measures against the Greek Minority

While the crisis escalated, the Turkish government decided to reconsider the 1930 Agreement on Establishment, Commerce and Navigation signed between Atatürk and Venizelos that recognized equal rights to the Greek nationals who resided in Turkey. Turkey was determined to convince Greece to act in Cyprus at all costs. On March 16, 1964, the abolition of the treaty, would result in the expulsion of 11.000 Greek nationals, that were followed by 30.000 Greeks of Turkish nationality that were bound to Greek nationals with familial ties⁶⁰¹. In 1963, fourteen students of the HTS were expelled from the school on the request of the government because their high school diplomas were not equivalent to Turkish

⁵⁹⁹ See *The New York Times*, August 16, 1964; “Developments Relating to the Situation in Cyprus” doc.IV, no. 102 in *American Foreign Policy Current Documents*, Washington D.C: Department of State Publications, 1967, p. 564- For an overview of the US involvement in the Cyprus dispute see Aslı Bilge, *The US Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus (1945-1974): A Strategy for Partition?*, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Salford, U.K, 2000.

⁶⁰⁰ The crisis was evaluated in the Memoirs of Johnson Government’s under Secretary of State George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York: Norton & Company, 1982, p. 338-351, see also Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1987, p. 348-361.

⁶⁰¹ For details of the expulsions see Rıdvan Akar and Hülya Demir, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi Yayınları, 1994. See *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1964.

ones. The government also required that at least 50 percent of its students should be Turkish nationals⁶⁰².

In April 1964, Patriarchate's publishing house was closed down on the grounds that the publishing activity infringed the Treaty of Lausanne⁶⁰³. The pressure on the patriarchate were followed by new restrictive measures upon the Greek institutions. During this period harsh inspection was conducted on all Greek minority schools. In the words of Mr. Dimitris Frangopoulos, the retired principal of the Zografyon elementary school and lyceum, during this period, the inspectors came almost every day without declaring a reason, and he recalls that once the inspector looked in the boiler of the central heating system to see if the administration was hiding any forbidden material⁶⁰⁴. In 1964, Greek primary and secondary schools were obliged to accept the appointment of Turkish vice-principals recruited by the MNE. The same year, the Greek orphanage on the island of Büyükada belonging to the Patriarchate was closed down⁶⁰⁵. Thus the government, together with the expulsion of the Greek nationals, took harsh measures in order put pressure on the Greek government to convince Makarios to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

An investigation of the Patriarchate started on 28 April 1964 and led to the annulations of the property rights of the Patriarchate of the ownership of the cathedral of St. George at the Fener. The Patriarchate had no legal personality and the estate was declared to be without recognized legal ownership. This was the first time that the property rights of the Patriarchate were clearly questioned. Following this move the foreign representations were banned from visiting the Patriarchate. Also, the use of Greek names of the Anatolian Metropolitanates –non existing since the exchange of populations- were prohibited⁶⁰⁶.

The Cyprus problem continued to poison the relations between Turkey and Greece. The press not only transmitted the latest developments in Cyprus but the plight of the Western Thrace Turks found often place on the newspaper columns. In 16 April 1965, the spokesperson of the MFA made a declaration stating that “(T)he Greek-Turkish relations rest on the balance founded at Lausanne. The Cyprus problem, the Turks living in the

⁶⁰² Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, p.284.

⁶⁰³ “More Pressure by Turkey on Greek Minority”, *The Times*, April 13, 1964.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview with Dimitris Frangopoulos, Istanbul, March 17, 2007.

⁶⁰⁵ Sarioglou, *Turkish Policy towards Greek Education in Istanbul 1923-1974*, p. 199

⁶⁰⁶ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 300.

Dodecanese, Istanbul Greeks and Patriarchate have been considered in the framework of that equilibrium”⁶⁰⁷. Thus from a responsible, the public opinion learnt that the Patriarchate was considered within the framework of the ‘reciprocity’ clause between Greece and Turkey determined in the Lausanne Treaty.

During this period, dramatic decline of the Greek minority in Turkey was palpable. According to the official census’ the numbers were as follows⁶⁰⁸.

Date of census	Greek-speaking	Greek Orthodox
1935	108,725	125,046
1945	88,680	103,839
1955	80,000	86,655
1960	65,000	106,611
1965	48,096	76,122

Upon the Constitutional Court’s cancellation of some articles of Law no. 625, dated June 8th 1965 concerning Private Institutions of Higher Education, the theology division of the HTS was dissolved by service of a ‘confidential’ letter written by the Regional Director of the MNE to be valid as of July 9th 1971 (ref: Özel Öğretim Kurumları 101787, date August 12, 1971)⁶⁰⁹. Patriarch Athenagoras applied to Prime Minister Nihat Erim on 1 June 1971, asserting that the school started operating long before the Law on Private Higher Education, it was a vocational school and it could not be admitted as an institution of higher education.

The petition of the Patriarchate to the state council was rejected on the grounds that the Patriarchate had “no legal personality, and the right to file suit or run a school”⁶¹⁰. From

⁶⁰⁷ *Milliyet*, April 17, 1965.

⁶⁰⁸ The difference between the Greek-speaking and Greek-Orthodox is due to two factors. There were many Muslim immigrants who came from Greece and who spoke only Turkish. There was also Karamanlides-Karamanlı who were Turcophone but Greek Orthodox. In the last census of 1965, we see a great number who claim that they were Turcophones. In a considerably small span of time the Greek-speaking Turkish declared themselves to speak only Turkish.

⁶⁰⁹ Petition, numbered 801 and dated August 28 2003, of the Greek Patriarch, Prime Minister Erdoğan, cited in Macar and Gökaçtı, p. 10.

⁶¹⁰ *ibid.*

1960 onwards, no founder of the school was designated to represent the school. That meant that it was unable to carry out even the day to day activities.

The closure of the school launched a discussion that continues to date. According to the Regulation of the Greek Priests School, the theology department consisted of 4 years and accepted high school graduates that were between 17 and 22 years of age (Art. 54). Again according to the regulation, the graduates of the theology department would be considered as having completed one year of vocational training after high school (Art 3).⁶¹¹ Thus, the status of the school, was *sui generis* from the very beginning. It started to give 4 full years of theology training like a university department, but the diploma of the department was not considered as equivalent to a university diploma by the Turkish government, and was considered as a one year vocational training after high school. According to Sibel Özel, with this status, the HTS was clearly in the position of a school of higher education.⁶¹² According to the author, the HTS is a school of higher education within the scope of the Constitutional Court decision that led to the closure of private schools of higher education and there is no reason for it to be subjected to a different treatment⁶¹³.

However, it is possible to view the problem from another point of view. The school has been functioning without interruption from 1844 onwards. Even under its new status, it was not considered fully as an institution of higher education. The Lausanne Treaty recognizes an ‘equal right’ to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein” (Art. 40). In Turkey, only the state has the monopoly of establishing schools for military and religious education. There are thousands of imam and preachers schools at the secondary school level and many theology faculties. Those schools are giving theology education following the Sunni (Hanefi) Islam doctrine, religion of the majority of Turkish citizens. In a more liberal interpretation we may claim that equality, is not appropriate for guaranteeing equal rights of minorities. In the case of the HTS, the institution was the unique school doted with training of clergy in Turkey. With the Greek minority dwindling in

⁶¹¹ *Rum Rahipler Okulu Yönetmeliği*, p. 5 and p. 16

⁶¹² Özel, *The Heybeliada Seminary and the Patriarchate*, p. 29.

⁶¹³ *ibid*, p. 30.

a rapid pace, if the school had not been allowed to accept foreign students it was clear that the Patriarchate would be unable to find necessary clergy for conducting its services in Turkey. For example, in academic year 1968 (after the ban on foreign students), the number of the graduates was only 4.

The Patriarchate was also accused of hostile acts against the Turkish Orthodox Church recognized by the government and to act contrary to the clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish constitution⁶¹⁴. Clearly, the intensified activities of the Patriarchate bolstered by the Vatican's new reform process and a new opening of the Russian Church that consequently led to the Pan-Orthodox Rhodes meetings in the first half of the 1960s disturbed the authorities. Reflecting a highly critical approach to these meetings, considered as the ecumenic *tour de force* of the Patriarchate is reflected in Niyazi Berkes' article in *Yön*. The author cynically congratulated Patriarch Athenagoras to recover from his "grave illness during the Cyprus events" and criticized Athenagoras to unite the Orthodox under a Byzantine banner⁶¹⁵.

The Cyprus crisis had marked a strategic turning point for the Fener, as the request for 'union' of the island with Greece was staunchly refused by the British and Turkish governments. The Patriarchate did not endorse Archbishop Makarios' plead. When the latter was arrested and banished in Seychelles by the British government, this was protested strongly in Greece⁶¹⁶. What is very interesting for our subject is that upon the arrest of Makarios, the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece made an appeal to all Orthodox churches but especially to Moscow Patriarchate in order provide support against the British government⁶¹⁷. This had been an unpleasant development for the Fener, as it has been under constant pressure in Turkey over the Cyprus issue and the call of the Greek Synod meant acknowledgement of the power of the Russian church.

Despite the fact that the Patriarchate was facing strong criticism in Turkey due to the escalation of the Cyprus crisis, the period starting in the second half of the 1950s until the

⁶¹⁴ "Oppressions against the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Greek Orthodox Minority in Turkey Increase", September 29, 1965 in *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 1189-1192.

⁶¹⁵ Niyazi Berkes, "Panortodoks Kongresi [Panorthodox Congress]", *Yön*, 18 December 1964, No. 90, p. 11 in Niyazi Berkes, *Patrikhane ve Ekiümeniklik*, 2nd ed, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2005, p. 39-47.

⁶¹⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1956.

⁶¹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1956.

death of Patriarch Athenagoras was fruitful for the institution. While the Greek minority started to emigrate to foreign countries, the prestige of the institution went on the rather opposite way and the visibility of the patriarchate increased after the second half of the 1950s. During his tenure (1948-1972) the international activities of the Patriarchate were devoted to two specific aims: the strengthening of links between the different Orthodox churches, especially through the Rhodes conferences, and the promotion of world wide Christian unity. His initiatives in this second sphere, and especially his attempts at *rapprochement* with Rome, were sharply attacked by more conservative Orthodox in Greece and elsewhere⁶¹⁸.

II. 2. 5. 1. Reactions from the Religious Leaders

The isolation of Fener, and restrictions imposed upon it provoked a reaction from the Christian churches. In 16 April 1964, WCC made an appeal to the Turkish government to “respect generally accepted principles of religious freedom” in its relation with the Patriarchate.⁶¹⁹ The WCC also sent a letter to the President of the US Lyndon Johnson in order to warn the US government about the violations of the rights of the Patriarchate.⁶²⁰ A telegram forwarded by the US Protestant leaders expressed deep concern about the measures taken against the Patriarchate, urged Ankara to “preserve the Patriarchate inviolate” and to view “the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in both its ecclesiastical freedom allowing it to perform its functions” The leaders of the Anglican church also sent an appeal to the Turkish government stating that “the injury to the Patriarch himself will give great distress to the Churches in all our different countries. Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America sent a memorandum to the President Lyndon Johnson of the US to complain about the pressure exerted on the Patriarchate by Turkish authorities.⁶²¹

On September 14, 1964, *The New York Times* published an article expressing that “Eastern Orthodox Christians over the world are voicing increased concern over recurrent rumors that, because of the Cyprus crisis, Turkey may abolish the Patriarchate”⁶²² The Archdiocese of North And South America published a declaration stating that “there is no

⁶¹⁸ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 129.

⁶¹⁹ “World Council of Churches’ Plea to Turkish Government”, *The Times*, April 20, 1964.

⁶²⁰ Signed by Franklin Clark Fry, chairman of the World Council of Churches’ Policy Committee and the General Secretary Dr. Visser’t Hooft. Cited in Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 301.

⁶²¹ *ibid.*

⁶²² “Fate of Orthodox Patriarch in Turkey Uncertain”, *The New York Times*, September 14, 1964.

freedom of religion in Turkey; and the country had violated its membership in the UN, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the Paris Treaty of 1856 and the Berlin Treaty of 1878.⁶²³ Following this article, in an open letter to *the New York Times*, Franklin Clark Fry, President of the Lutheran Church of America wrote that “not only Eastern Orthodox Christians, but people of other confessions around the world feel “concern over recurrent rumors” that the Patriarchate at Istanbul may be in jeopardy”. Referring to the WCC action, Fry said went on further to say “that it is essential for the welfare of Orthodoxy and indeed for the ecumenical movement as a whole that the Patriarchate shall have full freedom to perform its ecclesiastical functions”. The letter concluded that “if the spiritual welfare of the Patriarchate as an institution is impaired, the entire Christian cause will suffer”⁶²⁴. Faced with unanimous international reaction, on 20 April, in a telegram transmitted by the Turkish ambassador in Washington, Turgut Menemencioğlu, to the director of the commission on international affairs of the WCC, Dr. Frederick Nolde, Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave an assurance that “both the Patriarchate and the person of the Patriarch shall remain fully inviolate”⁶²⁵.

II. 4. The End of Athenagoras Era: Election of Patriarch Dimitrios

Patriarch Athenagoras died on July 7, 1972. Towards the end of his office, during the spring of 1970, a second *tezkere*, in the form of a memorandum was handed to the Patriarchate, indicating to the Hierarchy at the Fener the manner in which the government wished the next patriarchal election to be carried out. The memorandum stipulated in 9 points the details of the election: it appointed a committee of tellers consisting of three Hierarchs, defined the remaining procedures concerning the submission of a list of candidates and the anticipated government processing of it, set a time limit for the election, beyond which the Government could choose a Patriarch of its own volition, and finally spoke of the necessary presence of a Turkish notary at all the phases of the election and at the ceremony of the regular, canonical voting, who would sign the acts of the election in order to certify its exactness.⁶²⁶

⁶²³ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 301.

⁶²⁴ “Concern for Patriarch’s Fate”, *The The New York Times*, September 26, 1964.

⁶²⁵ *ibid.*

⁶²⁶ Konstantinides, p. 19

The hierarchy of the Patriarchate reacted to the presence of a notary during the election, asserting that the election was a purely spiritual matter. Consequently, during the election of Patriarch Dimitrios⁶²⁷ (16 July 1972–October 1991) no use of the memorandum was made⁶²⁸. Dimitrios was a consensus Patriarch who was elected as a consequence of the rejection of four candidates before him by the government. According to Mihalis Vasiliadis, the editor and owner of the *Apoyevmatini* Newspaper, he was a very gentle person who dedicated his life to pious activities but he had few leadership attributes.⁶²⁹ The first years of his office were dominated by silence, due to the Cyprus intervention of Turkey in 1974⁶³⁰. During his tenure, the Greek minority nearly disappeared in Turkey not only to the political consequences of the intervention (there were nearly no direct attack towards the minority), but also because of the anarchy in Turkey and the end of the military Junta in Greece and the entry of the country in the European Economic Community in early 1980s⁶³¹.

II. 3. The Religious Scene in Europe after the World War II

As we have mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the revival of the Fener during the Cold War was almost exclusively due to concerns of the West to contain Soviet expansion and counter an aggressive Moscow Patriarchate which became a tool of Soviet foreign policy. The ecclesiastical wars between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Fener were manipulated by opposing camps. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate was extensively supported by the West, this had been a period when it lost many gains that it had earned after the World War I. However, the re-persecution of the Moscow Patriarchate in the 1960s and the parallel difficulties encountered by Fener in Turkey, as well as the challenges and opportunities offered by the undertakings of other Christian denominations also opened new paths for cooperation.

⁶²⁷ Patriarch Demetrios I was born Demetrios Papadopoulos in Istanbul on September 8, 1914. He finished Theological School of Halki. He served in the church of Feriköy for long years until he was ordained Metropolitan of Imbros and Tenedos. For his biography see “Demetrius I (Papadopoulos) of Constantinople”, *OrthodoxWiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Demetrius_I_of_Constantinople, (10 August 2010)

⁶²⁸ Konstantinides, p. 19

⁶²⁹ Interview with Mihalis Vasiliadis, Istanbul, April 10, 2007.

⁶³⁰ Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 226.

⁶³¹ Méropi Anastasiadou and Paul Dumont, *Une Mémoire pour la Ville: La Communauté Grecque d'Istanbul en 2003*, Istanbul: Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2003, p. 12, see also Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, p. 317-320

II. 3. 1. Revival of the Moscow Patriarchate under Stalin as a Soviet Foreign Policy Tool

During the World War II, the Soviets annexed Eastern Poland, the Baltic Republics, Moldavia and parts of Finland. In 1940, Latvian and Estonian Metropolitans that obtained autonomy from Istanbul were forced to return to the Moscow Patriarchate⁶³². When Hitler broke the German-Soviet Pact and started an attack to the Soviet territories the once mighty Russian church barely existed. The communist regime in the Soviet Union was clear about proclaiming that ‘militant atheism’ was a part of the ideology. Along with this vision, all property of the church and capital investments were nationalized under 1918 decree of the Council of People’s Commissars entitled “on the Separation of the Church from State and Schools from the Church”⁶³³. The Patriarch was not elected since the death of Patriarch Tikhon in 1925 and Metropolitan Sergius was acting as *locum tenens*. In 1935 the Holy Synod ceased functioning because it was unable to elect new clergy for its ranks. In 1939, the episcopacy of the Russian Orthodox Church comprised two metropolitans and two archbishops. Also, after the closure of the advanced theological studies program in Leningrad in 1928, the church lost the ability to train new clergy⁶³⁴.

The destiny of the Church that seemed so dark changed radically with the World War II. Sergius, June 22, 1941, the very day of the German attack, addressed sermon praising patriotism under alien attack⁶³⁵. Two days after the sermon, Stalin opened the Soviet radio and press to Metropolitan Sergius. The response of Sergius to Stalin’s invitation marked not only the beginning of the popular resistance to Hitler but also it inaugurated a revival of the Church life. During the war the church was very active in issuing patriotic appeals and collecting donations for the war effort⁶³⁶.

The invaded territories under the Nazis were also experiencing religious revival. Germans used religion as a propaganda tool to gather the help of the people against the

⁶³² Pospelovskiy, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, p. 274

⁶³³ Gerhard Simon, *Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R.*, California: University of California Press, 1974, p. 64-65.

⁶³⁴ Tatiana Alexandrovna Chumachenko, *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy From World War II to the Khrushchev Years*, (ed. and trans. by Edward E. Roslov), New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 3

⁶³⁵ Pospelovskiy, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, p. 269;

⁶³⁶ For a concise history of the Stalin’s policy towards the Orthodox Church during the war and the church activities see Steven Meritt Miner, *Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007; Paul B. Anderson, “The Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Jan 1961, p. 299-311, at p. 302.

Soviets. Under the German line, the church life was revived, the churches were reopened and the religious sermons were followed by the majority of population⁶³⁷. This policy obliged the regime to moderate its anti-religious attack, not only in the newly annexed territories, but to some extent in the original Soviet territories. In September 1943, Stalin gave permission for Patriarchal election. Sergius became the second Patriarch of the Russian church after the revolution. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was set up to deal directly with the church hierarchy, churches began to be reopened, the number of clergy grew steadily, theological schools and monasteries began to function again, and the church was allowed to publish an official journal. In return of these concessions, the church was expected to endorse the war effort⁶³⁸.

II. 3. 2. Moscow Patriarchate and the Satellite Churches

After the end war, the government continued the same policy, and now the church was called upon to consolidate its influence over the Orthodox churches in the Eastern European countries, which were then falling under Soviet control⁶³⁹. The church became an organ of the state, following the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet state all around the world, including the Middle East. By 1944 the Russian church received the Soviet permission to re-establish its influence in the Orthodox world, and since the historical objective of the Moscow Patriarchate –primacy in the Orthodox world –coincided with the political aims of the Soviet state, the extension and consolidation of its influence and control over the Orthodox countries and minorities by means of ecclesiastical relations, the Church was supported at home and abroad⁶⁴⁰. While the church and state were separated by the Soviet constitution, this became a delusion. Although the freedoms garanted to the Church were very limited, and it remained persecuted and disadvantaged, its position in 1946 was very different from its position in 1930s. By 1946 the Russian Orthodox Church had the power to become

⁶³⁷ For an overview of the church revival under German occupation see Vasili Ivanovich Alexeev, *The Great Revival: The Russian Church Under German Occupation*, Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing, 1976.

⁶³⁸ Walters, p. 139

⁶³⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁴⁰ Spinka, "Post-War Eastern Orthodox Churches", p. 121.

involved in Soviet foreign policy objectives, whereas during the 1920s and 1930s, the clergy were severely persecuted⁶⁴¹.

The policy of cooperation of the church strengthened Soviet power in the Orthodox satellite countries, especially when it comes to oppose Western democracies and Roman Catholicism. In return the Soviets provided aid to the Russian church in his ambition to assume leadership of all Eastern Orthodox Churches. The new policy of the Soviet state expressed itself in the internationalization of the patriarchate after many years of isolation. In 1943, Stalin agreed to welcome an official delegation under the Archbishop of York to bring greetings from the Church of England to Metropolitan Sergius and the Orthodox Church in Moscow. This visit was a beginning after two decades isolation. During the war years, clergy from the Russian church were sent abroad –to Sofia, Tehran, Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria. These visits had the aim to strengthen the ties between Orthodox churches and assert the leadership of Moscow⁶⁴². The omission of Istanbul from these visits was remarkable. As a matter of tradition, the heads of the autocephalous churches make their first visit to the Fener, first in the church hierarchy. However, Sergius never set foot to Istanbul. This implied the undermining of the place of the Fener as *primus inter pares*. The Patriarchate of Moscow opted clearly for uniting the Orthodox under the Soviet influence and the leadership role of the Fener was seriously challenged.

II. 3. 3. Moscow Undermines the Prerogatives of the Fener

The occasion of the National Council of the Russian Church in 1945 testified to the growing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. This council included the leaders of churches from Alexandria, Antioch, and Georgia, representatives of the Patriarchates of Istanbul and Jerusalem, and delegations from the Serbian and Romanian churches. The agenda of the council that met from January 31 to February 2, 1945, consisted of two items: acceptance of the “Regulation for Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church” and selection of a patriarch of Moscow and all Russia to replace Patriarch Sergius who died on

⁶⁴¹ Anna Dickinson, “Domestic and Foreign Policy Considerations and the Origins of Post-war Soviet Church-State Relations, 1941-61” in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 23-36 at p. 23.

⁶⁴² Anderson, p. 306.

May 15, 1944⁶⁴³. The Regulation clearly set up the control of the church by the government. The government's authorization was required before a synod of bishops can be summoned and the patriarch would communicate with the Council of Affairs of the Orthodox Church of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Council under the control of the Council of Ministers was a governmental body with ramifications throughout the USSR⁶⁴⁴.

In January 1947, the Archbishop of Leningrad visited the patriarchs of Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch⁶⁴⁵. In an obvious effort to gain primacy among the Orthodox churches, during the Middle East tour the Russian prelate called for a pan-Orthodox council. When the Russian church assumed this initiative, a prerogative of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, the latter vigorously protested and the plan was dropped⁶⁴⁶. Russian Church directly aimed at undermining the authority of the Fener. The journal of the Moscow Patriarchate published a series of articles during the 1940s accusing the Fener of disregarding the canons regulating interchurch relations and attacked the Patriarch for his activity among the Russian Orthodox in diaspora.⁶⁴⁷ In one year, however, a test of strength came when the Moscow Patriarch issued a call for a conference of the heads or representatives of Orthodox Churches. The occasion was the 500th anniversary of the autocephalicity of the Russian Church in 1448, that is to say, its declaration of independence from Istanbul and therefore of parity with it. The Moscow Patriarchate's intention to assert a right to leadership equal to that of Istanbul in the Orthodox world was scarcely veiled. Istanbul reacted vigorously, making clear its stand that only the Patriarch of Istanbul had the right to summon an all-Orthodox meeting. This position was confirmed when the Patriarchate's delegates announced in Moscow that they had come only for the celebration and refused to participate in the conference⁶⁴⁸.

The Conference adopted a series of resolutions supporting the Russian foreign policy. It was the beginning of the anti-Western peace movement as an antidote of the WCC

⁶⁴³ Chumachenko, p. 39.

⁶⁴⁴ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 143.

⁶⁴⁵ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 244

⁶⁴⁶ Harry J. Psodomiades, "Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 11, no. 4, Fall 1957, p. 371-381, at p. 371.

⁶⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁴⁸ Anderson, p. 308.

in the inaugural assembly of which the Russian church refused to participate the same year. The declaration at the outset of the conference was highly anti-Western⁶⁴⁹:

The Western capitalists and imperialist world present the danger of a new war of untold horrors... We deeply grieve over the fact that instead of hearing the voice of peace and Christian love from the stronghold of Catholicism –the Vatican- and from the nest of Protestantism –America- we hear words of blessing invoked in favor of a new war and hymns of praise to the atom bomb and other similar inventions intended for the extermination of human lives.

The Patriarchate of Moscow was prone to undermine the status of the Fener, especially in the countries under the communist influence. When the Fener would be weakened, the Russian patriarchate would be the dominant force in Orthodoxy. The Russian and communist press in other countries advanced that since Istanbul was no longer powerful, it would be better to choose a patriarch with the participation of all Orthodox churches. This patriarch should reside in Istanbul, be assisted by a pan-Orthodox Holy Synod and enjoy extra-territorial privileges like the Vatican⁶⁵⁰. Thus the new Patriarch of Istanbul could be a Russian, Greek or Bulgarian according to the choice of the Orthodox churches. As the Russian church was the most powerful of all and the Soviet Union dominated a majority of the Orthodox churches it would be no surprise that the new patriarch would be a Russian. This proposition was unacceptable not only for the Patriarchate but also for Turkey. Clearly, Russian church wanted to provoke the Fener and Turkey alike, most probably in order to provoke the US.

II. 3. 4. The End of Bulgarian Schism

As a result of the World War II, Bulgaria has fell to the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. In this new episode for Bulgaria, the Russian Church was actively involved in the lifting of the schism. The Moscow Patriarchate promised to mediate between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate and to this end the deputation of the exarchate was moved from Istanbul to Sofia. The Bulgarian Holy Synod sent a delegation to Istanbul doted with authority to conduct negotiations and sign the outcoming documents. As a result of talks

⁶⁴⁹ “Actes de la Conférence de l’Eglise Orthodoxe” cited in Harry J. Psomiades, “Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East”, p. 377.

⁶⁵⁰ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 238.

between the Exarchate and the Patriarchate a “Portocol on the Abolition of the Anomaly which has existed for Years in the Body of the Holy Orthodox Church” was signed on 19 February 1945⁶⁵¹. On 22 February 1945 a *tomos* recognizing the autocephalous status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was issued by the Patriarchate. The *tomos* reads⁶⁵²:

The Church of the God-guarded Bulgarian State, a Church with deep spiritually bonds with the Christ’s Big Holy Church of Constantinople, a Church that has been depended within the centuries directly on the Holy Apostolic and Patriarchical Ecomenical Throne, has asked through many letters to be counted among the other Orthodox Autocephalous Churches.

Taken that into account, as well as the long route of the Bulgarian Church, our affectionate attitude and the fact that the Big Church has nurtured the Bulgarian Nation, we accepted their request.

With the Blessing of the Holy Spirit, we bless the autocephalous constitution of the Holy Bulgarian Church considering it our spiritual soulmate and recognising it independent and autocephalous with its possessing rights, like the rest of the Orthodox Autocephalous Churches. (...)

The *tomos* acknowledged the autocephalous status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church with the signatures of Patriarch Benjamin and the members of the Holy Synod of Istanbul. The *tomos* did not precise however, the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church over the Bulgarians living outside the borders of Bulgaria. This issue was previously handled with the above mentioned Protocol. The wording of the protocol is rather ambigious but with this protocol and the *tomos*, it was considered that the jurisdiction of the Church of Bulgaria was confined to Bulgarian state borders only⁶⁵³.

II. 3. 5. The Persecution of the Moscow Patriarchate

Up to his death in 1953, Stalin maintained the post-war *status quo*. The last eight years of his rule (1945-1953) were the most favorable period for the Russian Church during the whole communist era⁶⁵⁴. However, we observe that under Khrushchev, a new wave of persecutions for the Russian church, started, intensifying in 1959⁶⁵⁵. The Russian church which became a loyal ally of the Soviet government in international affairs abroad, was

⁶⁵¹ Dimitrov, p. 64.

⁶⁵² Translation from the original document by Constantina Kazacou. For the original *tomos* of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 22 February 1945, see Annex III.

⁶⁵³ Dimitrov, p. 65.

⁶⁵⁴ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 157.

⁶⁵⁵ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 143

treated inside Russia as a ‘vestige of capitalism’ and the government-controlled press was continually proclaiming that materialism is incompatible with “religious prejudices”⁶⁵⁶

Between 1964-1988 was a calm period concerning the church-state affairs in the USSR. The state continued to supervise the church activities closely, through the KGB and in other ways. This implied the cooperation of the church officials with the communist regime. A new dissident group started to voice their grievances within the Russian church, influenced by the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The act accorded primary importance to human rights including religious freedom. The most prominent critic of the Moscow Patriarchate during this period was Alexander Soljenitzin, the banned writer, who wrote an open ‘Lenten Letter’ to Patriarch Pimen in which he attacked the Russian church for allegedly conniving at the destruction of the Christian faith in the USSR⁶⁵⁷. However, the Soviet State reacted severely and from 1976 onwards many leading Orthodox members had been silenced.

II. 3. 6. Fener’s Efforts to Reconciliation with the Russian Church

Despite the fact that after the beginning of the Cyprus problem, the Turkish government had not been cooperative and tolerant, the period under the rule of Athenagoras had witness intensification of the international activities of the Patriarchate. This period was marked by the rivalry between Moscow and the Fener for the leadership of Orthodoxy. Being in two opposing camps that divided the world into two poles, one led by the US and the other by the USSR any prospect of discussing common problems seemed difficult. However, external factors pushed the Orthodox to come together and cooperate –to a certain extent– under the Cold War circumstances. During this period, the call for unity from the Vatican and the creation of the WCC had been the major stimulus provoking the prospect of the Orthodox unity as well. After his enthronement, the first undertaking of Patriarch Athenagoras was to write a long and friendly letter to Patriarch Alexy I of Moscow in order to announce him his investiture. However, the reply of Moscow was short and cool. He expressed the hope that there would be friendly relations between them and they “might jointly solve all misunderstood questions which, unfortunately, have not been settled”⁶⁵⁸. The enthronement of Athenagoras had not been viewed positively, and considerable disapproval had been voiced in

⁶⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁵⁷ “Solzhenitshyn upbraids Patriarch of Moscow”, *The Times*, March 23, 1972.

⁶⁵⁸ John S. Curtis, *The Russian Church and the USSR*, Boston: Little Brown, 1953, p. 315.

Russia and satellite nations on the charge that the new Patriarch was a “tool of American imperialism”⁶⁵⁹.

The Soviets were very suspicious about the American involvement in the election of the Patriarch. A counter propaganda for Istanbul throne and the Patriarch himself had been launched connecting imperialism and the election of the ‘American Patriarch’. The opposition emanating from Moscow asserted that “in order to spread their influence in the Near East, the American warmongers have tried to secure for themselves a further religious center –the Istanbul Patriarchy”⁶⁶⁰. The Patriarch was presented as “a man known for his pro-fascist sympathies and connections with the ruling circles of the US, Greece and Turkey, was elected Patriarch of Istanbul under pressure from the USA”⁶⁶¹. The official journal of the Moscow Patriarch continuously attacked the Fener, declaring that Moscow was the real center of Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical status was superficial⁶⁶².

In the first months of his election for the post, it was not clear whether the Orthodox churches behind the Iron Curtain would recognize investiture of Athenagoras or not. There was growing suspicions that Moscow would use its influence to contest Athenagoras’ election or ignore it. The crisis was solved in May 1949, when the Patriarch made public that he had received letters from high ranking Orthodox prelates in all countries behind the Iron Curtain - except Yugoslavia- indicating the acceptance of his position. The letters were in the form of fraternal greetings on the Orthodox Easter⁶⁶³.

The new Patriarch encountered the challenge of the Russian Patriarchate from the very start of his investiture. The Orthodox Church was divided into two poles due to the Cold War. Besides the Russian and satellite country churches, Antioch and Alexandria depended on the Soviet aid for survival, Jerusalem refused the aid only with strong backing of Istanbul. When Israel proclaimed its independence the situation became more precarious. Without presenting itself for a political cause, Athenagoras made a statement asking the “UN guarantee of eternal rights of the Holy Brotherhood of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem

⁶⁵⁹ “Athanagoras (sic) is accepted”, *The New York Times*, May 6, 1949.

⁶⁶⁰ M. Shun, “American Imperialism and Church Organization”, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1951, cited in Harry J. Psomiades, *Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East*, p. 378.

⁶⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶⁶² *ibid.*

⁶⁶³ “Athanagoras (sic) is accepted”, *The New York Times*, May 6, 1949.

concerning its holy shrines⁶⁶⁴. In the 1950s, Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus got closer to the USSR, raising concerns about the fall of the Cypriot church as well into the communist's hands. The duty of Athenagoras looked very difficult. He was trying to assert the primacy of Istanbul without further alienating the Russian church.

While the relations between the West and the Soviet states were strained and the Patriarchate of Athenagoras was criticized by the Moscow Patriarchate, the two churches had not eliminated the official communication. According to Athenagoras, Fener was “in constant touch with all branches of the church” and he “constantly exchange letters with the Patriarch of Moscow”⁶⁶⁵. He also asserted that “our dogma is the same and the liturgical style varies only in that we use the old Greek language and they adhere to the old Slavonic. We keep out of political affairs and have no religious differences with the Russian Church”⁶⁶⁶. Thus instead of marginalizing the Russian Church and the Orthodox churches of the Iron curtain, the way of constant dialogue had been chosen, despite all difficulties. Through this way, the Patriarchate was hoping to have an influence on the Orthodox populations of the communist states.

II. 3. 7. Proclamation of the Bulgarian Patriarchate

In 1953, a small crisis broke, when the Bulgarian Exarchate, recognized as an autocephalous church by Istanbul in 1945 in an effort to curtail the Soviet influence on marginalized Bulgarian church, proclaimed itself a Patriarchate. The crisis was announced by 1950, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Church adopted a new statute which paved the way for the restoration of the Patriarchate. In 1953, the Bulgarian Exarchate convened a Council of the Church, inviting all Orthodox churches. The meeting became a *tour de force* of the Orthodox churches behind the Iron Curtain as high rank representatives of the Orthodox Churches of Russia, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia were present.

Patriarch Athenagoras immediately disclosed “that the free Orthodox Churches would refuse to recognize the action of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in elevating itself to

⁶⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ C. L Sulzberger, “Wider Ties Sought by Greek Church”, *The New York Times*, March 25, 1950

⁶⁶⁶ *ibid.*

the status of a Patriarchate⁶⁶⁷. But the Patriarchate soon changed his mind and in 1945 Fener issued the *Tomos* recognizing the Bulgarian Autonomous Orthodox Church⁶⁶⁸. Then, a Bulgarian request that the Metropolitan of Sofia should be raised to the rank of Patriarch of Bulgaria has been received sympathetically by the Patriarch, who promised that he would consider the request⁶⁶⁹. Only in 1961 the Fener recognized Bulgarian Church as a Patriarchate. From this year, Athenagoras tried to improve relations with Bulgarians. However, the press charged him with “communist intrigue” even though the aim was quite the opposite. On 27 April 1965, the Turkish ambassador in Paris declared that: “The Patriarchate may stay in Turkey as long as it remains a national religious institution whose activities are strictly and modestly confined within the frontiers of the country”⁶⁷⁰.

II. 3. 3. Ecumenical Relations

During the Cold War the Patriarchate was actively involved in building good relations with other Christian denominations. As we will see in this section, despite being deeply divided, the religious institutions also made serious efforts in uniting the Christian worldwide to voice a united stance against the artificial divisions of the Cold War.

II. 3. 3. 1. Vatican II Council, its Aftermath and the Orthodox Reactions

The “ecumenical activities” during the Cold war period were bolstered by the call for unity of the newly elected Pope John XXIII, crowned in October 28 1958. The new Pope unlike his predecessor Pope Pius XII was willing to cooperate with the other Christian denominations and called for the Vatican II, ecumenical council. Together with the new wave of persecution of the Russian church by the Soviet President Krushchev of the Russian Patriarchate, the call of the Pope gave the opportunity to the Fener to assert its leadership role within the Orthodox Church. Behind the troubles making cooperation so “imperative” of course was communism and the idea of containing it. A worldwide movement to unite

⁶⁶⁷ “Patriarch Assails Sofia Church Vote”, *The New York Times*, May 24, 1953.

⁶⁶⁸ For the original of the *Tomos* of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 22 February 1945 see Annex III.

⁶⁶⁹ *The Times*, January 27, 1945.

⁶⁷⁰ *Le Monde*, April 27, 1965.

Christians would, if nothing else, do tremendous good, in strengthening religious morale and purpose in the Iron curtain countries”⁶⁷¹.

Before the election of Athenagoras no official relations between the two churches existed. Proselytism of the Roman Catholic church often disturbed the Patriarchate. In the catalogue of topics of the meeting at the Mount Athos in 1930, the relations between the two churches were characterized as relations of resistance and defense.⁶⁷² When Athenagoras was installed, he sent a “letter of regards and respect” to Pius XII. He did not receive a reply. This omission caused Athenagoras to comment bitterly: “It is a tragedy that religion cannot make peace within its own family. How can the spiritual face conflict with the materialistic world when it cannot agree within itself? Religion is behaving in criminal fashion. It is at war inside Christendom”⁶⁷³.

The omission of the Pope, resided in the deeply rooted antagonism between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. When Cardinal Pacelli, before he became Pope Pius XII, visited New York, he expressed that he believed all creeds should unite in a common struggle against communism and atheism. But as Pius XII, the Pope preferred to avoid this delicate issue. The reasons were explained in some detail by his Acting Secretary of State, Monsignor Montini, Cardinal of Milan. According to Montini: “it was impossible for the Roman Catholic Church to combine with other religions in such an undertaking because it firmly considered itself the only “true” church”⁶⁷⁴.

Therefore for the “true church” it was impossible to cooperate with other Christian denominations that were considered as schismatic. With the Orthodox Church the prospective of cooperation let alone union was even more difficult. Since the Great Schism of 1054, that was itself a result of a long and complicated process, provoked by cultural, political, and economic factors but above all fundamental theological differences.⁶⁷⁵ Despite that fact some small steps were taken in 1952, when Patriarch Athenagoras, for the first time in history,

⁶⁷¹ Jay Walz, “Pope’s Try for Unity Faces Ancient Splits: Eastern Church is Receptive but Differences are Deep”, *The New York Times*, February 1, 1959.

⁶⁷² Stavridis, “A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 122.

⁶⁷³ C. L. Sulzberger, “Political Implications of Pope John’s Move”, *The New York Times*, January 28, 1959.

⁶⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁷⁵ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 44.

made an official visit to the headquarters of the papal legate in Istanbul who returned the visit in the same day⁶⁷⁶.

After the death of Pope Pius XXII however, the new Pope, John XXIII, immediately made public his intention to cooperate with other Christian churches, in the framework of the general fight against communism. In his first Christmas message broadcast to the world, Pope urged all Christians to “unite against the threat of atheism and materialism from the far side of the Iron Curtain”⁶⁷⁷. The same Christmas the Pope sent a greetings letter to Patriarch Athenagoras, who replied it with a greetings letter for the New Year⁶⁷⁸. In his message, the Pope made an appeal for cooperation and an eventual union of the two churches. In his reply, the Patriarch welcomed the idea of cooperation between all Christian churches for the guidance of peoples “in these difficult times” and that this initiative of the Church of Rome should take a practical form and be inspired by a spirit of equality, justice, spiritual freedom and mutual respect⁶⁷⁹.

The major excitement came with the first encyclical of the Pope. In the document, Pope John XXIII appealed to the world’s statesmen to “try every approach that might lead to international unity and peace” interpreted as a papal hope for the continuum of East-West talks⁶⁸⁰. The encyclical confirmed previous pronouncements by Pope John that he considered one of his foremost tasks to convene an ecumenical council, or general conference of Roman Catholic churchmen, to seek reunion with Christians “who are separated from the Apostolic See of Rome”⁶⁸¹. Moreover with an open allusion to the work of the WCC –in the work of which the Roman catholic church have not participated- the encyclical went on the underline that “congresses have been held by nearly all those who, although in union neither with us nor with each other, call themselves Christians, with a view to uniting themselves”⁶⁸².

The overtures of the Pope, and the call for an ecumenical council (Vatican II) raised the issue of unity of the Orthodox churches first that were organized as separate autocephalous units, reflecting the national divisions. The Patriarch of Istanbul was only the

⁶⁷⁶ Stavridis, A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, p. 122.

⁶⁷⁷ “Pope Bids Christians to Unite Christians Against Communist Threat”, *The New York Times*, December 24, 1958.

⁶⁷⁸ “Proposed Union of Churches”, *The Times*, January 7, 1959.

⁶⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁸⁰ Paul Hofmann, “Pope, in First Encyclical Asks Fullest Peace Effort”, *The New York Times*, July 3, 1959

⁶⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁶⁸² *ibid.*

primus inter pares deprived of any leadership role similar to the Pope who is the indisputable head of the Catholic Church. The Patriarch made it known that the Eastern Orthodox Church would take part in the ecumenical council called by Pope John XXIII only if the entire Christian world was invited to send representatives⁶⁸³. Already according to the Orthodox canons, the Fener could not impose the reestablishment of the relations with the Vatican, let alone a decision for unity with the Roman Catholics. Any such move would create one other “Uniate” church, and Moscow would assume the leadership of Orthodoxy immediately.

The question therefore was: How to convince the Orthodox to participate to the meeting at Rome? However, as an Orthodox diplomat held: “The mood of today is not right for long discussions on theological disputes. But these troubled times do make more cooperation among all Christians imperative. If the Roman Catholic Church wants wider cooperation some method to achieve it can surely be found”⁶⁸⁴.

At the Second Vatican Council (1963-1965), the Vatican became more attuned to the need for dialogue with the other Christian churches and especially with the Orthodox church. The decree on ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council reads as follows⁶⁸⁵:

The restoration of unity among all Christians is one of the principal concerns of the Second Vatican Council. Christ the Lord founded one church and one church only... Certainly, such division openly contradicts the will of Christ, scandalizes the world and damages that most holy cause, the preaching of the Gospel to every creature.

Collaboration between the two churches grew more during the tenure of Paul IV (1963-1978), and regular correspondence was exchanged between them. The meeting of Paul VI with Athenagoras in Jerusalem in January 1964 has gone down as a great historical event. According to Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, the Patriarch deeply desired ever since 1949, when he ascended to the Throne, to meet personally with the Pontiff of Rome. This desire was often expressed and was repeated to Pope John XXIII. It was again expressed personally by the Patriarch in the Church of St.

⁶⁸³ John Wicklein, “Orthodox Church Notes Pope’s Call”, *The New York Times*, April 23, 1959.

⁶⁸⁴ Paul Hofmann, “Pope, in First Encyclical Asks Fullest Peace Effort”, *The New York Times*, July 3, 1959.

⁶⁸⁵ “Decree on Ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council, 1964” in Michael Kinnamon & Brian E. Cope, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans Publishing, 1997, p. 27-35 at p. 27.

Nocolas at Cibali on December 6, the day after it was announced that Pope Paul IV would make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land⁶⁸⁶.

The establishment of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity helped for the promotion of good relations. A notable follow up of this historic meeting was the visit to the Fener (from 2 through 4 April 1965) of Augustine Cardinal Bea, president of the secretariat (and of the pontifical council since 1989). The other notable event in the relations of the two Churches, is the lifting of anathemas of 1054 “from the memory and the midst of the Church) both in Rome and in the Fener on the 7th of December 1965.⁶⁸⁷ The joint declaration did not end the schism but showed a desire for greater reconciliation between the two churches. The pinnacle of these developments was the exchange of visits on the highest level, i.e. the visit of Pope Paul VI to the Patriarchate and the return visit of Patriarch Athenagoras to Rome in 1967. Roman Catholics were officially invited to come as observers to the Pan-Orthodox Conference in Rhodes, to the Mount Athos celebration of its first thousand years in 1964, and to a commemoration in Thessalonica in 1966 of the work of Cyril and Methodius. The return from the Rome of the relics of several saints to churches in Jerusalem, Patras, Crete, and Chios also contributed to the development of good will⁶⁸⁸.

II. 3. 3. 2. Relations with the Oriental Orthodox

In November 1959, the patriarch started a one month long tour of the Middle East to meet with Orthodox leaders and to discuss the proposal of the Catholic church for the participation in Vatican II. The Middle East was an important region in the containment strategy. We have already mentioned that USSR had a palpable prestige and financial support over the governments of the Arab countries. It is interesting to note that this Middle East tour coincided with a fragile moment in the region. The USSR felt threatened by the signing of the Bagdat Pact in 1955 between Turkey, Pakistan, Irak, Iran and United Kingdom, modeled upon NATO for insuring security in the Southern border of the USSR. The USSR severely reacted together with Egypt, Syria and the Saudi Arabia⁶⁸⁹. In 1956, the Suez crisis that broke

⁶⁸⁶ “Protocol No. 10, January 14, 1964”, *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 791.

⁶⁸⁷ “Formal Cause of the Great Schism to be Ended”, *The Times*, November 16, 1965.

⁶⁸⁸ Vasil T. Stavridis, “The Orthodox Churches in the Ecumenical Movement 1948-1968”, in Harold E. Fey (ed.), *The Ecumenical Advance: A History of the Ecumenical Movement Vol. 2 1948-1968*, London: S.P.C.K, 1970, 289-309, p. 294.

⁶⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1956.

with the nationalization of the Suez Channel by Egyptian President Nasser curtailed the power of the British and French in the region, used by the USSR to infiltrate in the Middle East⁶⁹⁰. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt adopted a position of ‘positive neutrality’ and accepted aid from the Soviets. At the same time Syria concluded two important treaties with the USSR, providing cooperation on military, scientific and cultural matters with Syria. The Soviets provided substantial military aid to both countries, in order to replace the arms used at the Arab-Israeli wars⁶⁹¹. Thus together with the Suez Crisis, there was enough evidence to accuse both Syrian and Egyptian governments of being communism sympathizers⁶⁹².

In an effort to control the Middle East, President Eisenhower of the USA proclaimed the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, pledging American economic aid from the US military forces if the country was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. The doctrine aimed at intimidating the USSR. A similar purpose was served by the Baghdad Pact, even though the US refrained from becoming a formal member. Thus the US promised to supply arms to nations willing to oppose the Russians and was committed to back them with American forces.⁶⁹³ Thus both USSR and the US were present in the area, confronting for wider influence. The visit of the Patriarch had an overwhelming importance in the containment strategy. During the visit of the Middle East, the possibility of uniting the Orthodox churches has been investigated. The Patriarch, maintained that a union of Orthodox churches is the first step in any movement toward union of all Christian churches⁶⁹⁴. Apart from the Patriarchs of the Orthodox churches of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, he met with leaders of the Maronite, Assyrian, Armenian and Protestant churches in the region, underlining the ecumenical role of the Fener⁶⁹⁵.

The Patriarch was determined to end the schism with the Eastern Orthodox Churches. He visited the Syro-Jacobite Patriarch Ignatios-Iakovos III in Damascus and the latter returned this visit at Istanbul in 1963. The meeting was fruitful for the establishment of

⁶⁹⁰ Rose McDermott, *Risk Taking in International Politics*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2001, p. 135-137.

⁶⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁶⁹² *Cumhuriyet*, July 31, 1957.

⁶⁹³ Dana Adams Schmidt, “Choices are Difficult for Meeting Aggressive Moves by Russians”, *The New York Times*, October 20, 1957.

⁶⁹⁴ “Patriarch Seeks Orthodox Unity”, *The New York Times*, 17 December 1957.

⁶⁹⁵ “Patriarch Seeks Orthodox Unity”, *The New York Times*, 17 December 1957.

good relations between two churches. Students from the Syro-Jacobite Churches of India and Syria were welcomed at the Theological School of Halki⁶⁹⁶.

II. 3. 3. 3. Pan-Orthodox Rhodes Conferences

During the Middle Eastern visit, the Patriarch proposed a formal meeting of the Orthodox Church at Rhodes, in order to discuss common problems of Orthodoxy and the ecumenical relations proposed by Rome. In fact, the desire for a Council was voiced for a period of time. Interestingly, the work of the WCC played a prominent part here. At the great gatherings of the WCC, the Orthodox delegates have often found it difficult to speak with one voice. In August 1959 gathering of the WCC at Rhodes, hosted by the Patriarchate, the council's general secretary put forward the idea of a federated church of all Christian denominations to the Eastern Orthodox church⁶⁹⁷. The unity of the Orthodox Church was also had been felt by the pan-Orthodox youth movements, especially the Syndesmos, the international youth organization founded in 1953⁶⁹⁸.

The first pan-Orthodox conference, held in Rhodes on 24-31 September 1961, had been a major achievement of the Fener during the Cold War period. This meeting had been an historic occasion that brought together more than 60 prelates from 12 principal Eastern Orthodox churches, as well as observers from Oriental Monophysit, Anglican, Roman Catholic and WCC's observers⁶⁹⁹. This was an achievement because under the leadership of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, it affirmed the unity of the Orthodoxy even under different regimes, in a period when the call for the union of the Christians was promoted by the Protestant and Catholic churches. It also made a major step towards closer cooperation with the Anglican church and set in motion, the process for a reunion with the Oriental Churches which seceded after the Council of Chalcedon in 451.

⁶⁹⁶ Stavridis, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 120.

⁶⁹⁷ "Patriarch Seeks Orthodox Unity", *The New York Times*, December 17, 1957.

⁶⁹⁸ The Patriarchate has been the spiritual supporter of the International Orthodox Youth Movement Syndesmos (1953) which held general assemblies at the Ecumenical Institute in Bossey (1948), Servas near Paris in France (1953), Bier in France (1954), Kefissia of Athens in Greece (19-23 September 1956), Thessaloniki in Greece (4-7 Sep. 1958), Beirut in Lebanon (Sept. 1961), Kuopio in Finland (30 July-6 August 1964), Rattvik in Sweden (21-27 July 1968), Boston in the USA (18-24 July 1971), Valamo in Finland 7-10 August 1980, Kastelli of Crete in Greece (14-19 August 1983), Effingham in England (17-24 August 1986), Boston in the USA (26-30 June 1989). See Stavrides, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", p. 111.

⁶⁹⁹ "Orthodox Churches Strive for Unity", *The Times*, September 25, 1961.

However, to demonstrate the unity of Orthodoxy had not been an easy task. This was attained at the cost of great secrecy and compromise, since it was agreed at the outset that unanimity in all decisions was psychologically essential. When differences in political outlook appeared, the conference was forced into unscheduled closed sessions. Inevitably two antagonistic groups emerged. One was under the Russian and Romanian delegations; the other consisted of the Greek speaking churches led by the Fener and the Church of Greece. Inevitably, the Fener was anxious about preserving its primacy of honor and the Church of Greece was openly anti-communist and ultra-conservative⁷⁰⁰. The delegations of the Russian and Romanian churches had been especially motivated in defending the communist regime, disillusioning the Fener and the Church of Greece.

The Fener feared that the Moscow Patriarchate, which has the largest Orthodox flock, would undermine its primacy of honor. However, the Russian delegation made a most formal pledge to the conference confirming that Moscow fully recognized and accepted the 15 century old canons conferring the primacy of the Fener. However, the delegations made clear that the primacy was disputable. According to a leading Romanian prelate: “This is a canon laid down by the Forth Ecumenical .Synod. It could easily be reversed by another. But no one desires to do that now. We agree that Istanbul should have the honors of seniority. “. The major preoccupation of the Russian led group concentrated their efforts on removing an item on methods of combating atheism from the draft agenda for the Pro-Synod which it is hoped will prepare the way for an Orthodox Ecumenical Council. By the end of the conference the draft proposition made by the Patriarchate was affirmed with minor changes, affirming the leadership role of Istanbul within Orthodoxy⁷⁰¹.

The practical achievement of the Rhodes conference was the decision to speed up the process for a reunion between the Orthodox and the Oriental Churches -the Armenians, Ethiopians and Copts, and Jacobites. This prompt rapprochement was agreed at a private meeting between Orthodox leaders and observers from these Churches. The decision to set up a commission in Istanbul to study monophysitism was taken. Unofficial consultations with the non-Chalcedonian churches were held in Aarhus (Denmark) in 1964 and in Bristol (England) in 1967, attended by leading theologians from both sides. In Aarhus Conference, a joint

⁷⁰⁰ “First Steps towards Orthodox Unity”, *The Times*, October 11, 1961.

⁷⁰¹ “Anglican Offer to Orthodox Church”, *The Times*, September 26, 1961.

statement was published saying: “We recognize each other the one Orthodox faith of the Church. Fifteen centuries of alienation have not led us astray from the faith of our fathers.. We see the need to move together”⁷⁰². There were further meetings in Geneva (1970) and Addis Ababa(1971). These four unofficial conversations during 1964-71 were followed up by the convening of an official Joint Commission representing the two church families. The doctrinal agreements reached at the unofficial consultations were reaffirmed, and it was recommended that each side should now revoke all anathemas and condemnations issued in the past against the other.⁷⁰³

There was unanimity in the desire for Orthodox cooperation with the Anglicans, and this made clear to the Anglican observers at Rhodes, but attitude was different towards the Roman Catholics. The relevant items on agenda for the pro-Synod clearly reflected this.⁷⁰⁴ However, until reaching that point, several problems occurred. Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese of the Americas was to be the representative of the Fener at the Vatican II council. However, he returned to America after conferring with the Patriarch in Istanbul on October 10, 1962. According to Iakovos, Rome’s handling of the invitations to send observers to the Council had been the principal reason not to send observers⁷⁰⁵.

When the Orthodox met in Rhodes, they decided that the Fener would negotiate with the Vatican concerning the sending of observers. This was done, so that a common decision could be reached and a mission of Pan-Orthodox delegates could be formed. Athenagoras made it known to Pope John XXIII that he, as the Ecumenical Patriarch, would receive and transmit the invitations to the Orthodox churches in accordance with this agreement. Instead, according to Iakovos’ account, the Vatican began sending special representatives to the Patriarchs of the East (Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Moscow) and to the other autocephalous Orthodox churches asking their leaders to participate in the Council of Rome. The tactic, disclosed “the purpose of the Vatican, which was apparently aimed at disturbing Orthodox unity and undermining the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch”.⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰² Stavridis, “The Orthodox Churches in the Ecumenical Movement 1948-1968”, p. 293.

⁷⁰³ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 312.

⁷⁰⁴ “Orthodox Church Declares Unity”, *The Times*, October 2, 1961.

⁷⁰⁵ “Iakovos Scores Vatican Tactics”, *The New York Times*, November 4, 1962.

⁷⁰⁶ *ibid.*

As a result only Moscow accepted the invitation of Pope John XXIII to represent the Orthodox church. According to Iakovos, this move was clearly of a political nature”⁷⁰⁷ This episode clearly showed the disunity within the Orthodoxy once again. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate of Istanbul was the pioneer for better relations with the Vatican, it wished that the negotiations for unity between Catholics and Orthodox should be conducted under the auspices of the Fener or nothing else.

In September 1963, twenty four senior prelates from 10 eastern Orthodox churches met again in Rhodes, upon the call of the Fener, to discuss the opening of theological talks with the Roman Catholic church, participation in the second session of the Vatican II Council. The Orthodox Church had been divided over the issue. It was impossible to reach a consensus during the Rhodes I conference in 1961. Russians decided to send representatives to Vatican and the Greeks were not represented. As the second session of the Vatican II would be open, there should be a way of speaking with one voice.⁷⁰⁸ From the outset, the Fener was in favor of participation. However, the Greek Church refused any possibility of communication with Rome. In line with this position the Greek Church was absent in the meeting because it felt that all contact with the Roman Catholics was futile⁷⁰⁹.

From the Patriarchate’s point of view, being absent from the second session of the Vatican II would be harmful for its prestige, confirming that the Russian Church is representing the Orthodoxy. In the Rhodes meeting of 1963, the Orthodox churches, except from Greece- unanimously made an agreement to make an initiative for the “equal dialogue” with Rome and the decision that each patriarchate was free to send observers to the Vatican II council if it wanted to do so⁷¹⁰. Moscow and Georgia were present at the first and second sessions (1962-1963). To the third session observers from Istanbul and Alexandria were added, and in the final session the Patriarchates of Serbia and Bulgaria also sent observers.⁷¹¹

A third meeting was held in Rhodes in late November 1964, with the participation of 14 Orthodox churches including Greece to discuss the opening of talks with the Vatican. While the Fener was for the opening of talks without delay, the Russian and Eastern European

⁷⁰⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁰⁸ “Relations with Rome”, *The Times*, September 17, 1963.

⁷⁰⁹ “Orthodox Talks on Church Unity”, *The Times*, September 27, 1963

⁷¹⁰ “Orthodox Patriarch’s Hope of Christian Front”, *The Times*, October 8, 1963.

⁷¹¹ Stavridis “The Orthodox Churches in the Ecumenical Movement 1948-1968”, p. 294.

delegations opted for the end of the Vatican II council, to see whether there would be any mention of “fight with communism” on the final decisions. Thus the Orthodox unity was maintained at a high price.⁷¹² The Patriarchate began to send official observers to the Vatican II Council from its third session (1964).

The most important result of these gatherings was to bring together the Orthodox churches, including Russian and Eastern Europeans. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political developments and wars had made it very difficult for the representatives of the regional Orthodox churches to meet together and to address common concerns. These conferences provided the opportunity for bishops and theologians from the various regional churches to meet one another and to begin to develop a consensus on critical issues affecting the entire church. Two themes received greatest attention in these conferences. First representatives resolved to begin the process of convening a Great and Holy Council, which would someday gather together Orthodox bishops and theologians from throughout the world. The term ecumenical council was carefully avoided. But in the minds of many, this gathering would certainly have the potential of being received as one. In order to prepare for this council, the conferences eventually settled upon ten topics, which would be examined in preconciliar meetings.

Second the conferences approved the presence of the Orthodox Church in ecumenical dialogue designed to restore the visible unity of Christians. This decision led directly to greater Orthodox involvement in the WCC. It also led to the establishment of bilateral theological consultations between the Orthodox and oriental Orthodox churches, the Anglican Church, the Reformed Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Lutheran Church.⁷¹³

In addition to their formal canonical and administrative relationships within the Orthodox fold, both Moscow and the Fener are now showing increasing interest in relations with other confessions. As lately as 1948 the Moscow Patriarchate had denounced the WCC, yet now it has entered fully in the Council’s work.⁷¹⁴ Finally the Pan-Orthodox Unity was undermined by the differences of opinion between the different branches of the Orthodox

⁷¹² “Talks with Rome Postponed for at Least Two Years”, *The Times*, November 16 1964.

⁷¹³ Fitzgerald, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History*, p. 90.

⁷¹⁴ Anderson, “The Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia”, p. 308.

Church about the “Unity” between Orthodox and Roman Catholics. On the lifting of anathemas between the Orthodox and Catholic churches in 1965, Metropolitan Philaret of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia published an open letter to Patriarch Athenagoras, underlining his church’s categorical protest with reference to Fener’s solemn declaration with the Pope of Rome in regard to the removal of the sentence of excommunication” and “no union with Roman Church is possible until it renounces its new doctrine (infallibility of the Pope), and no communion in prayer can be restored with it without a decision of all churches.⁷¹⁵ A similar protest came from the community of Monks on the Mount Athos, after the meeting of the Athenagoras and Pope in Jerusalem, monasteries lifted Athenagoras’ name from the liturgy and protested against any kind of “Unity talk” between the two churches.⁷¹⁶ As we have already mentioned the Church of Greece was also against any move towards unity, and it also objected the lifting of anathemas.

The Orthodox Unity was promoted under Patriarch Dimitrios as well. In 1976, the preparations for a pan-Orthodox Synod started in Geneva with the contribution of all –except from Georgia- autocephalous Orthodox churches.⁷¹⁷

II. 6. 3. The WCC and the Patriarchate

The Patriarchate was involved in the Ecumenical movement from its outset and received an unconditional support from the Christian churches in the times of trouble. In the formative years of the Council (1937-1948), the Patriarchate participated actively in the proceedings, represented by Germanos of Thyateira who was appointed one of the five vice-presidents of the Provisional Committee⁷¹⁸. The first Assembly of the WCC met in Amsterdam in 1948 Amsterdam, Metropolitan of Thyateira Germanos being one of the five presidents. An invitation was sent to the Russian Patriarchate who declared that it would consider it⁷¹⁹.

⁷¹⁵ Metropolitan Philaret, President of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, “A Protest to Patriarch Athenagoras on the Lifting of Anathemas of 1054”, December 2, 1965 available online at http://www.Orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/philaret_lifting.aspx. 27 September 2008)

⁷¹⁶ “Paul’s Pilgrimage: Meeting with Athenagoras”, *The New York Times*, January 9, 1964.

⁷¹⁷ “Bishops Prepare Orthodox Church Synod”, *The Times*, November 22, 1976.

⁷¹⁸ Stavridis, “The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches”, p. 15.

⁷¹⁹ *ibid.*

The WCC was an effort in bringing together separately organized movements, largely dominated by the Protestant churches such as “faith and order” and “life and work” under operation since the early 1920s. The WCC was an amalgamation of these movements⁷²⁰. At the inauguration of the Amsterdam Assembly on August 23 1948, all major Christian denominations, except from Catholics were present⁷²¹.

Even before the beginning of the World War II, the forces were united to form a religious organization that would strictly follow the separation of the church and state, thus would bypass political conflicts. The Cold War division of the world, led to the perception of the WCC as an offspring of the Western alliance. This perception was reasonable to a certain extent. At the very outset, the American policy circles promoted the advent of the WCC as a part of the containment policy of communism. The American government together with the British were actively involved in the work of the preparatory committee of the WCC. In the conduct of American foreign policy, the cooperation of all religions against the communist danger had a prominent place. The creation of the WCC that brought together Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox Churches was an important step in order to construct a religious front in the fight with the communism⁷²². The WCC, was thus under the close investigation of the US. The leaders of the WCC did not want to mingle in politics and jeopardise the WCC from its outset⁷²³. In the Assembly of Amsterdam the Fener was represented with thirteen delegates⁷²⁴. Only delegates of the Patriarchate, the Church of Greece and Cyprus were present and the Russian church abstained together with the other churches of the Eastern bloc⁷²⁵.

Thus the participation in the WCC underlined the division of the Orthodox, with the Greek speaking Istanbul, Greece and Cyprus having their place in the Western Camp and the Slav Orthodox churches together with the historic patriarchates gathering around Russian

⁷²⁰ M.M. Thomas, “Search for Wholeness and Unity” in Michael Kinnamon & Brian E. Cope, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, p. 43-47 at p. 44

⁷²¹ *The New York Times*, August 24, 1948

⁷²² Dianne Kirby, “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 35, Jul. 2000, p. 385-412, at p. 389-390

⁷²³ *ibid*, p. 42.

⁷²⁴ Vasil T. Stavridis, “Orthodoxy in the Ecumenical Movement”, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 20, no. 1-2, Spring Fall 1975, p. 71-80 at p.75.

⁷²⁵ J. A. Hebly, “The State, the Church and the Oikoumene: The Russian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches, 1948-1985” in Sabrina Ramet (ed.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, 1992, p. 105-124 at p. 107-108; Willem Visser’t Hooft, *Memoirs*, London: SCM Press, 1973, p. 206.

Patriarchate. At the very start of the inaugural Assembly, Visser't Hooft, warned against partisanship and underlined that: "Our task is to prove in word and deed that we serve the Lord whose realm certainly includes politics but whose saving purpose cuts across all political alignments and embraces men of all parties and all lands"⁷²⁶. Subsequently the Assembly's final report made an allusion to the division of the world into two opposing blocs, posing a threat for everybody⁷²⁷:

The final report also advised that "The Christian church should reject the ideologies of both communism and laissez faire capitalism and should draw men from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives"⁷²⁸.

The WCC despite the insistence of the American leadership succeeded in not taking sides in the Cold War at the Amsterdam Council. This position strengthened the hand of the Patriarchate that was anxious of representing whole Orthodoxy. Already in 1949, the Secretary General of the WCC issued a report, calling the Orthodox churches of the Iron curtain the ecumenic assembly⁷²⁹. As the sole representative of the Orthodox, the Patriarchate founded its liaison office at the headquarters of the WCC in Geneva with its first director the Bishop Iakovos (Later Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America and one of the presidents of the WCC (1959-1966). In 1966, Ecumenical Patriarchal Foundation at Chambésy-Geneva erected a center for Orthodox studies. The aims of the Orthodox centre were "to provide the non-Orthodox Christians a better understanding of Orthodox liturgy, doctrine and tradition and vice versa, to develop ecumenical spirit, to form a discussion platform between various churches, and establish a permanent residence for the Patriarchal delegation at the WCC"⁷³⁰.

In 1952, the Patriarchate issued an encyclical calling all Orthodox to participate the work of the WCC under certain conditions. Among them was "common action of all Orthodox churches and study of the ecumenical problems by permanent Synodical

⁷²⁶ Visser't Hooft, *The Task of the World Council of Churches*, Pamphlet of a Report Presented on behalf of the Provisional Committee at Amsterdam, 22 August-4 September 1948.

⁷²⁷ "The Church and Disorder in Society", *Official Report of the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, Amsterdam, 1948.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁹ "Report of the General Secretary", *Ecumenical Review*, No. 1, Aug. 1949, p. 57-70.

⁷³⁰ *The Times*, June 30, 1966; Willem Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs*, London: SCM Press, 1973, p. 206.

committees”⁷³¹. In 1952, the Patriarchate of Antioch joined the Council. In 1954, the Russian church and its satellites changed their attitude towards the ecumenical movement⁷³². The efforts of the Patriarchate were important during the process which led to the formal membership of the Iron Curtain countries in the 1961 New Delhi Assembly of the Council. According to the present Patriarch Bartholomeos, it was the Patriarchate that convinced the Orthodox churches to join the Council⁷³³. The Orthodox churches of Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland also joined the WCC in subsequent years. This meant that all the regional autocephalous and autonomous Orthodox churches were members of the WCC by 1966⁷³⁴.

III. 3. 2. 3. The Greek Orthodox Diaspora: Main Support of the Patriarchate

During the reign of Athenagoras I, one archbishopric had been of utmost importance for the continuation of the international activities of the Patriarchate: The Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese of the North and South America under Archbishop Iakovos (1959-1996).⁷³⁵ Archbishop Iakovos, had been the principal advisor of Patriarch Athenagoras. When he was Metropolitan of Melita (Malta), he served as the personal representative of the Patriarch to the WCC (1954-1959). The he served nine years as one of the co-presidents of the WCC. He was an active churchman who made Orthodoxy one of the publicly recognized religions in the US. According to Timothy Ware, he has done more than any other single person to make Orthodoxy known and respected by the American public at large.⁷³⁶

He was involved in the civil right movement in the US, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, that contributed also to the developing of the ecumenical movement in the US.⁷³⁷ His most dramatic action may have been marching with the Rev. Martin Luther King in 1965 in

⁷³¹ Vasil T. Stavridis, “Orthodoxy in the Ecumenical Movement”, p. 73

⁷³² Willem Visser’t Hooft, *Has the Ecumenical Movement a Future?*, Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1974, p. 80

⁷³³ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos.

⁷³⁴ Fitzgerald, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 91.

⁷³⁵ Archbishop Iakovos was born Dimitrios Coucouzis in Gökçeada-Imbros in 1911. At age 16, he was admitted to the Halki Theological School. He graduated in 1934 and was named an archdeacon. Five years later, he moved to the US and taught at the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary. In 1940, he was elevated to priest and took the name Iakovos. He served first in Hartford and later in New York. In World War II, he worked in Boston as dean of the Cathedral of the Annunciation and also attended the Harvard Divinity School, from which he earned a graduate degree in 1945. He became a US citizen in 1950. In the 1950s, he was also bishop of Melita (Malta), part of the Archdiocese of Central and Western Europe, and a representative of the Patriarchate at the headquarters of the World Council of Churches in Geneva. He was promoted to metropolitan in 1956 and three years later became archbishop of North and South America.

⁷³⁶ Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 182.

⁷³⁷ Fitzgerald, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 225.

Selma, Ala. This presence was captured on the cover of the *Life* Magazine that showed Dr. King side by side with Archbishop Iakovos.⁷³⁸ The archbishop became a regular visitor to the White House and a recognized voice on issues like the Vietnam War and abortion⁷³⁹. The Archbishop is a controversial personality in Turkey for the efforts he consecrated for ending the persecution of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority at large in an effort of retaliation to the Turkish Cypriot plight in Cyprus.

According to Süreyya Şahin, “one of the successes” of Athenagoras was to ordain one of the most intellectual and shrewd Metropolitan Iakovos to America and Canada, and organize 1,300,000 Greeks according to his own interest. Because the votes of the Greeks were important, in the case they elected the senators that would serve the Greek cause (?), they would gain a lot –and that has been realized”⁷⁴⁰. It is true that the Archbishop had been very involved in politics, and successfully lobbied against Turkey for informing the American public opinion about the persecution of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority especially during the 1960s. Before exploring this, let us analyze the activities of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese inside and outside the frontiers of the US during the Cold War.

The idea of unity of the Orthodox Christians in America came to the fore during the Archbishopric of Athenagoras in the US. During this period the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russo-Carpathian Orthodox Church came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese. A new phase in the development of greater cooperation among the Orthodox in America began in 1960. The Standing Conference of the Canonical Orthodox Bishops of America (SCOBA) that brought together the leaders of the Orthodox communities in America on a regular basis came into existence under the leadership of Archbishop Iakovos. At his invitation, the representatives of eleven jurisdictions met on 15 March 1960 at the headquarters of the Greek Orthodox diocese in New York City.⁷⁴¹ At the fifth meeting of the eleven presiding bishops a formal constitution for SCOBA was approved. Although the conference did not contain representatives from every jurisdiction, it was far more representative than earlier federation⁷⁴². The SCOBA experience had not resulted in the

⁷³⁸ *Life*, March 26, 1965.

⁷³⁹ “Archbishop Iakovos, Major Ecumenical Force, Dies”, *The New York Times*, April 12, 2005.

⁷⁴⁰ Şahin, p. 283.

⁷⁴¹ Fitzgerald, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 88.

⁷⁴² *ibid.*, p. 89.

unification of all Orthodox denominations in America. However, a measure of cooperation was accomplished through the creation of joint undertakings such as the ecumenical relations commission, the religious education publishing commission etc. Archbishop Iakovos expressed his expectation from the SCOBA as such: “If this cooperation continues with the same sincerity (...) perhaps it will have as its result one day the blessing of the mother churches to change the standing conference into a pan-Orthodox provincial Synod under the aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Such a provincial Synod will contribute immeasurably to the perpetuation and growth of Orthodoxy in the US”⁷⁴³.

However, the recognition of the Alexy I, the Patriarch of Russian church the autocephaly of the Russian Metropolia in 1970 had been a major blow for any prospect of unification.⁷⁴⁴ Archbishop Iakovos, in his address of 1970, explained that the work of the SCOBA under his leadership, had been evaluated as preliminary work towards a united, autocephalous Orthodox Church of America. However, he said: “(The autocephalous American Orthodox church) was never my pursuit; it was the pursuit of other Orthodox Churches. This pursuit resulted in the creation of the Russian Autocephalous Church. My own pursuit was the unification of all the Orthodox Churches under the Church of Istanbul (...) We followed this line at the Standing Conference of the Orthodox bishops in America until 1970, when we found ourselves in a lamentable situation brought about by the establishment of the Autocephalous Russian Orthodox Church in America”⁷⁴⁵. The autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church of America has never been recognized by the Fener, even though it did not break its ties with it.

One of the achievements of the SCOBA, had been the promotion of the ecumenical activities. As early as 1962, special prayers for Christian unity had been recited in all churches of the Eastern Orthodox faith at the request of the SCOBA.⁷⁴⁶ Moreover the SCOBA entered into formal dialogue with the Roman Catholic church.⁷⁴⁷ This move was in line with the opening process of the Roman Catholic church to other Christian denominations that had already started with Pope John XXIII.

⁷⁴³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴⁴ Pospelovskiy, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, p. 331.

⁷⁴⁵ An address delivered by Archbishop Iakovos, March 31, 1971, “Upon the Completion of my Twelfth Year (April 1, 1959-March 31, 1971)” in *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 771.

⁷⁴⁶ George Dugan, “Orthodox Church Invoke Unity”, *The New York Times*, March 17, 1962.

⁷⁴⁷ George Dugan, “Orthodox Church in America Set Talk with Rome”, *The New York Times*, June 28, 1966.

From the beginning of his career as the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, Iakovos worked as the special emissary of Athenagoras I for reconciliation with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1959, shortly after being named archbishop, Iakovos met Pope John XXIII in Rome, the first meeting of an Orthodox leader and a pope in 350 years. The encounter set the stage for the historical meeting between Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras in 1964, Jerusalem⁷⁴⁸. The encounters were not always smooth, as Iakovos criticized Rome for its attitude towards the Patriarchate several times. The archbishop was especially critical for the postponing of the unity talks between two churches.⁷⁴⁹ He also condemned the Catholic Church's endeavor during the Vatican II council, as an attempt at undermining the Ecumenical position of the Fener and to divide the Orthodox unity⁷⁵⁰. He was not fast to praise any move of the Vatican towards unity. For example he declared that his church had "very little reason to react enthusiastically" to Pope Paul VI's first encyclical.⁷⁵¹ Which he considered a step back from Pope John XXIII's ecumenical openings. However, he praised the project of Pope Paul VI's plan to build a permanent study center of comparative theology in Jerusalem to promote Christian unity and improve relations with non-Christian faiths⁷⁵².

Iakovos was active in the US, cooperating with the Catholic church to praise the unity⁷⁵³. He even went a step further proposing to the Roman Catholic prelates that leading theologians of the two faiths in the US confer on ways of resolving the differences that have split these two Christian faiths.⁷⁵⁴ He had been the first Orthodox prelate ever to preach at a Roman Catholic service at a R.C service in St. Patrick's Cathedral⁷⁵⁵. This move attracted the criticism of Metropolitan Philaret, who, in an open letter, similar to the one he wrote to Athenagoras 4 years ago upon the lifting of anathemas, where he said "you are uniting with the heterodox not in truth but in indifference to it"⁷⁵⁶.

⁷⁴⁸ "Archbishop Iakovos, Major Ecumenical Force, Dies", *The New York Times*, April 12, 2005.

⁷⁴⁹ George Dugan, "Orthodox Criticize Rome", *The New York Times*, October 22, 1959.

⁷⁵⁰ John Wicklein, "Iakovos Scores Vatican Tactics" *The New York Times*, November 4, 1962.

⁷⁵¹ "Orthodox Leader Iakovos Cool to Pope Paul's First Encyclical", *The New York Times*, August 15, 1964.

⁷⁵² "Iakovos Praises Project of Pope", *The New York Times*, September 19, 1964.

⁷⁵³ *The New York Times*, January 20, 1964.

⁷⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, January 14, 1964.

⁷⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, January 20, 1969.

⁷⁵⁶ "Open letter of Metropolitan Philaret to Archbishop Iakovos", text available online at http://www.Orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/philaret_iakovos.aspx, (25 December 2009).

During 1960s and 1970s, Archbishop Iakovos had been an effective lobbying force in the US for the Cypriot cause and for the defense of the rights of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey. In 1964, the Archbishop started a campaign, announced in an encyclical, which made the following “urgent recommendations” to his flock⁷⁵⁷:

- a. that you immediately take the initiative to assure that the senators and congressmen of your state are literally flooded with thousands of messages and, if possible, telegrams of protest, regarding the acts perpetrated by the Turks, under the sleeping eyes of our government and that of our allies, against our brothers in Cyprus and Turkey.
- b. that you promote a campaign of enlightenment to properly inform the American press, public opinion and religious leaders of your community and area, through your personal letters and copies of the articles from the *New York Times* (8 August-12 August 1964).
- c. that you immediately plan a program of assistance and relief (...) in behalf of the victims of Turkish barbarism in Cyprus, as well as those from among our brothers residing in Turkey (...).

Apart from the “enlightenment measures” of the American public opinion, the Archbishop also raised a fund in order to help the Greek-Cypriot victims of the Turkish air attacks in Cyprus and those Greek minority members in Turkey who were expelled with only 22\$.⁷⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that, the Soviet offer for assistance to Cyprus, seems to be behind the efforts of Iakovos to provide help for the Greek-Cypriots. He asserted, “the Cyprus dispute has unfortunately caused, as you well know, intense suffering to innocent people; I appeal to you, my dear Orthodox Christians to come to their assistance (....). It is not permissible for us to leave the Communists the task of protesting the burning of children⁷⁵⁹. This position was remarkable, as Makarios had shown publicized intention in drawing the USSR into the problem⁷⁶⁰. As the President of Cyprus came closer to the USSR in order to keep Turkey away from the island and aligned himself with the Nasser government in Egypt⁷⁶¹, Iakovos tried to keep the communist influence away from the island.

During 1965, Iakovos continued its campaign against Turkish government’ move towards isolating the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey. From the words of the

⁷⁵⁷ Prot. No. 125, August 13, 1964 in *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 1167-1168.

⁷⁵⁸ *ibid.* p. 1170

⁷⁵⁹ August 27, 1964, *ibid.* p. 1169-70

⁷⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, August 11, 1964;

⁷⁶¹ President Nasser of Egypt and Makarios concluded bilateral agreements providing Egyptian military aid to Cyprus, See *The Times*, September 1, 1964.

Archbishop in an encyclical published in March 1965, we understand that, Athenagoras informed him about the recent situation in Turkey and probably asked him his help in order to provide assistance for the end of Turkish government' pressures over the institution and the community. The Archbishop asserted "the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America has been periodically making this information available as it is received, since it is most difficult and even hazardous for the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I to make it known. The spiritual leader of World Orthodoxy is in effect a prisoner in his own See"⁷⁶².

This standpoint, was expressed in the *New York Times* editorial which read "The Patriarchate a Hostage: The Turkish threat to expel all Greek nationals from Turkey and to control and even deport the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch is clearly a political move. The potential victims of this blackmail are the Greeks living in Turkey, who are innocent of any involvement in the Cyprus conflict. To this day the Patriarchate has been a Christian island in a Moslem Sea... and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Patriarch is being held to ransom"⁷⁶³.

In order to create sensitivity about the patriarchate, the Archbishop tried every single way. In April 1966, he appealed to President Johnson, other government officials, and to leading Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish leaders, to urge Turkey to end a campaign "in violation of international principles of law and morality". As a consequence of Iakovos' request, the World and US National Councils of Churches and Vatican Radio have been among those who have appealed to Turkey to permit freedom of action by the Patriarchate. When Pope Paul VI visited New York in October he granted a private audience to Archbishop Iakovos. Archbishop Iakovos explained: "I feel very moved that the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church showed such deep concern at the present-day sad situation confronting the Ecumenical Patriarchate and our Greek Orthodox brethren in Turkey, and of his desire to help his Holiness Athenagoras and his flock in their present trials"⁷⁶⁴.

The same year, the Archbishop was in the black list of the Turkish government. On February 6, 1966, while visiting the Fener, the Turkish police barred him from celebrating the

⁷⁶² "Oppressions against Ecumenical Patriarchate and Greek Orthodox Minority in Turkey Increase", September 29, 1965 in *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 1189-1192

⁷⁶³ *The New York Times*, April 21 1965

⁷⁶⁴ "Turks Bar Archbishop Iakovos from celebrating Divine Liturgy by Religious News Service, February 10 in *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America*, p. 1199

divine liturgy at the St. George church within the Patriarchal compound for not being a Turkish national⁷⁶⁵. This was the first time that the police interfered in a purely religious ceremony. This move had received an unprecedented reaction from the US religious communities⁷⁶⁶.

The National Council of Churches, a federation of most of the major protestant and Eastern Orthodox churches in the US voiced a “deep sense of shock” over what it described as “Turkish harassment and oppression of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul”⁷⁶⁷. The council voiced: “Its gradual isolation from the world religious community, confiscation of its church properties by a spurious “Turkish Orthodox church” with governmental approval, shutting down of the patriarchal orphanage and press, systematic expulsion of its faithful –all point to a program of intimidation calculated to render this historic center ineffectual”⁷⁶⁸.

The Council singled out the prevention of Iakovos from directing a religious ceremony in Istanbul, stating “though only an incident we cannot view it as an incident in isolation, but are compelled to read it as a page in a lengthy narrative of harassment and oppression that grows daily more disquieting, raising the prospect of a tragic conclusion. Though we deplore the unwarranted personal affront to a loved and respected colleague, we view it in reality as an affront to the whole religious community, raising the question whether fundamental religious liberty is equally fundamental to the political philosophy of the Turkish government”⁷⁶⁹. The statement concluded that the future of the Patriarchate is in danger since Turkish actions imply a continuing and growing threat to its survival in Turkey, where its life has been inviolate since the beginnings of the Christian era⁷⁷⁰.

In April the same year, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America financed an encyclical called “ An Expression of Ecumenical Concern”, signed by 17 religious leaders in America, expressing “growing anxiety for the safety and future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul and the Greek Church in its historical setting in what is now Istanbul”,

⁷⁶⁵ *The New York Times*, Feb 11, 1966.

⁷⁶⁶ *ibid*

⁷⁶⁷ “Curbs on Church by Turks Decried”, *The New York Times*, February 26, 1966.

⁷⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁷⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁷⁰ *ibid.*

calling urgent attention to the “disquieting facts”, urging them upon the conscience of all Americans and ask them to protest by every lawful and reasonable means these violations of the sacred principles upon which civilized society is founded”⁷⁷¹.

These undertakings, did not make Iakovos, dear in Turkey, however, he was not barred from the country immediately, as he visited the Fener for the last time in 1968, before assisting to the meeting of WCC⁷⁷². When he wanted to join Patriarch Athenagoras’ funerals in 1972, he was not granted visa to enter the country⁷⁷³. When Iakovos’ candidacy to the throne of Istanbul was leaked, the Turkish government vetoed candidacy of the Archbishop, Foreign ministry spokesman asserted that “he was unacceptable because of his US citizenship, noting that Lausanne Treaty allowed only Turkish subjects”⁷⁷⁴.

⁷⁷¹ *The New York Times*, April 10, 1966.

⁷⁷² *The New York Times*, August 3, 1968.

⁷⁷³ *The New York Times*, July 10, 1972.

⁷⁷⁴ *The New York Times*, July 9, 1972.

Conclusion

The Cold War is a significant period in the modern history of the Patriarchate. Driven in the bipolar conflict at the side of the Western Alliance, the institution was instrumentalised to be a part of the US policy of containment. The extensive support of the USA on behalf of the Patriarchate that was endorsed in an earlier period by Turkey, has given the institution the opportunity to diversify its international undertakings. Nevertheless, the leadership role desired by the institution was extensively challenged by the Moscow Patriarchate during this period.

Ironically, when Fener was most supported by Turkey and the Western Alliance, it was weakened by an aggressive and assertive Russian Patriarchate. The Orthodox churches that sought refuge under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate after the end of the Great War were forcibly annexed to Moscow as a part of Stalin's policy. Moreover, the Balkan Orthodox churches, with the exception of the Greek Orthodox Church, were now under communist regimes, forming a consistent Eastern Slav bloc against the pretensions of Fener. The Soviet aid and endorsement to the Middle Eastern churches further isolated the Patriarchate in the Orthodox world.

We shall nuance however this antagonistic vision of church politics. Just like the Vatican that deplored the division of the European continent by an artificial Iron Curtain, the Patriarchate tried to unite the Orthodox that were unable to talk in one voice. This was especially important at a time when the Catholic Church itself underwent an important reform period with the Vatican II Council and the ecumenical movement developed its own theological responses to the bi-polar division of the world. It is interesting to note that, starting from mid 1950s, the Patriarchate entered a difficult period in Turkey under the shadow of the Cyprus problem when the Russian Patriarchate has been going through a new persecution campaign in the Soviet Union. In this new era the Patriarchate could play a leadership role, reconcile the Orthodox Church with other Christian denominations and give an image of unity under its leadership.

CHAPTER III

THE PATRIARCHATE IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

In the post Cold War period, the Patriarchate was revitalized as the centre of the Orthodox world once again. Its visibility in the international scene increased and its activities intensified. In Turkey, the Patriarchate that was prone to silent diplomacy rather than vocal opposition as a part of the Orthodox tradition has become more active in claiming rights for itself and for the Greek minority.

Why has the Patriarchate so clearly come to the fore? This chapter is examining various reasons stemming from the change in the international scene that left a free space for the Patriarchate to express itself more overtly. In the post cold war Europe the salience of religion has been deeply felt in the conflicts that erupted in the power vacuum created by the end of the old animosities. In the Western media and in the academy resurgence of religion has been one of the popular topics. In an increasingly globalizing, multi polar world not only the Patriarchate but all religious institutions adopted themselves to the new social realities, worked as effective actors helping the integration in Europe. The unification process in Europe included not only the post Soviet-zone states but also Turkey. The Western democratic-liberal vision of religious liberties that developed as a part of emerging human rights and minority right regime forced the states wishing to be a part of this system to take necessary measures.

The Patriarchate was not alone in changing its policy but acts as a part of a wider picture that affects all religious institutions globally. Our focus being Europe, we will examine the impact of the European integration on the policy of the Patriarchate. The European integration is a two way process. So that Turkey being a candidate for accession to the EU its perception of the Patriarchate should be tuned in line with the EU's.

III. 1. Creating a World on Western Values and the Role of the Patriarchate

The end of the 1980s marked a new beginning for the world politics. The first steps towards the end of the Cold War were taken after Gorbachev held power in USSR in mid 1980s. Given the difficult economic situation in the Soviet zone, Gorbachev soon gave signs of a new policy that envisaged a new foreign policy, democratization and transition to market economy⁷⁷⁵. A dynamic liberal economy should be followed with the democratization of the political system. In the USSR and the Eastern Europe, soon the governments had to allow for democratic elections where the communist governments lost one by one, in some instances they were removed from office by force.

In 1989 the Berlin wall fell to the surprise of many, followed by the demise of other communist regimes in Romania, Bulgaria and elsewhere in the CEES [Central and eastern European States]. In 1991 the USSR itself was dissolved. The dramatic events at the end of the 1980s that resulted in the collapse of the communist regimes took the world by surprise and revealed a considerable policy void in the post-Soviet zone. The end of the Cold War necessitated a new look of politics as the traditional Cold War division of the world came to an end. According to Norman Davis, “the shape of Europe has been strongly influenced by the ‘Allied Scheme’”⁷⁷⁶. This is a view of Europe and of the broader international system that is derived from the superiority of the Allies since the end of the World War I. It consists of the existence of ‘Western values’ and practices (democracy, the rule of law and the operation of a free market economy) and has the claim to found the basis of international order, good government and economic progress⁷⁷⁷.

The doctrine of containment was replaced by the strategy of enlargement of the world’s market economies with the superstructure accompanying it. The elements of this superstructure would be democracy, rule of law and respect for human (and eventually minority) rights. Thus the rivalry had come to an end and was replaced by integration around the above cited values. Early in the 1990s, the US and then the EU moved to integrate the ex-communist states in the Western alliance. First the US adopted a strategy to accept the CEES

⁷⁷⁵ Jeffrey Gedmin, *The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of the East Germany*, Washington: AEI Press, 1992, p. 15; Charles W. Kegler, JR. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, 5th ed., New York: St. Martin Press, 1996, p. 68

⁷⁷⁶ Davies, p. 39-40.

⁷⁷⁷ *ibid*

in NATO alliance within the Partnership for Peace Program. Amid protestations of the Russian Federation this initiative offered common security framework replacing the old NATO-Warsaw Pact system. The political and economic components of the integration, *i.e.*, the opening of the Eastern European markets to the West in parallel with democratization of the regimes was necessary

The Paris Charter signed by all 35 member states of the CSCE (later OSCE) outlined commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and economic liberalism⁷⁷⁸. The West has been active in offering help to shape legal and institutional arrangements in countries of the former communist bloc. The new governments in CEES started to undertake reforms for the transition to democratic political systems and market economies they envisaged the membership of NATO and the EU as a breakthrough in their journey “back to Europe”⁷⁷⁹. Apart from those two continental institutions, the CSCE-OSCE that we mentioned above and the CoE were also instrumental in the integration of the ex- communist states in the democratic and liberal world that were artificially separated for nearly half a century. The enlargement strategy comprised also Turkey, a long-term ally of the Western bloc, isolated from Europe since to the intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Starting from the mid-1980s, the country headed towards re-integration in the world economy and rapidly undertook reforms that would accompany the economic liberalization.

Along with the end of the Cold War, new security threats appeared. The end of the bipolar ideological, military, and political competition with Soviet communism opened the Pandora’s box. The US President Clinton detailed them in a September 1994 address to the UN⁷⁸⁰:

The dangers we face are less stark and more diffuse than those of the Cold War, but they are still formidable –the ethnic conflicts that drive more millions from their homes; the despots ready to repress their own people or conquer their neighbors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the terrorist wielding their deadly arms; the criminal syndicates selling those arms and drugs or infiltrating the very institutions of a fragile democracy, a global economy that offers great promise but also deep insecurity and, in many places, declining opportunity, diseases like AIDS

⁷⁷⁸ “Paris Charter for a New Europe”, CSCE, Paris, 1990, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf (12 June 2010)

⁷⁷⁹ For an overview of the CEES integration to the EU see, Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hugues, *Back to Europe, Central and Eastern European States and the EU*, Oxon: Routledge, 1998.

⁷⁸⁰ Cited in Kegler and Wittkopf, p. 71

that threaten to decimate nations, the combined dangers of population explosion and economic decline...; a global and local environment threats that demand that sustainable development becomes a part of the lives of people all around the world; and finally, within many of our nations, high rates of drug abuse and crime and family breakdown with all their terrible consequences (...).

These new dangers had a transnational character that would be impossible to overcome without an active cooperation of the nation states. Environmental issues, ethnic conflicts, terrorism did not concern only one state but are trans-national problems. In this chaotic environment where rivalry had to be replaced by a spirit of cooperation, the religion and religious leaders had a role to play. The volume and scope of the immediate dangers demanded international answers.

III. 1. 1. Religion in the New World Order

In the age of globalization, religion resurrected as a central force that should be considered seriously by the policy makers. The new role of religion was presented first by Samuel Huntington, who in his influential article published in *Foreign Affairs*, asserted that in the post cold war period the main conflict in international relations would be the “clash between civilizations”⁷⁸¹. He claimed that the “western ideas of individualism, human rights, equality, democracy, (...), the separation of church and state” were not conform to Islamic and Orthodox cultures among others⁷⁸². Even though Huntington’s theory was criticized by many, it should be accepted that his underlying assumptions such as the growing importance of culture and forces of globalization made some resonance in the post Cold War period.

Even before the outbreak of revolutions in the Eastern bloc, religion had become a considerable force in world politics. In Poland, Solidarity movement encouraged by a Polish Pope sparked a revolt finally removed the communist regime. In Latin America, Catholic activists’ role in the Sandinista revolution was considerable. In Philippines the cooperation of the Catholic Church with the opposition overthrew the Marcos regime. In Iran an Islamic revolution deposed the Shah⁷⁸³. The idea of incompatibility of Orthodoxy and Islam with the Western ideals and division of the new Europe into civilized and non-civilized worlds had without a doubt marked in shaping the new map of Europe. This was evident in the EU’s

⁷⁸¹ Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, p. 22-49 at p. 22.

⁷⁸² *ibid.*, p. 40-41; For a similar view see Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993, xxiii

⁷⁸³ José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994, p. 3.

reluctance to include Romania and Bulgaria into the enlargement strategy of Europe together with Turkey. Moreover Russia's autocratic regime and aggressive religious policy towards safeguarding its traditional backyard raised concerns about the compatibility of the Orthodoxy with the western ideals. However, at the end, the shape of Europe was not drawn along the lines determined by Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis. Bulgaria and Romania were admitted in the EU by 2007 and admission prospective was opened for the South Eastern Balkans. On the other hand Turkey, a country with overwhelmingly Muslim population was admitted in the enlargement process of Europe.

The religious revival in the power vacuum left by the east-west rivalry was named by Gilles Kepel as *La Revanche de Dieu*, a response to modernist theories that exalted the secular way of life⁷⁸⁴. As the twentieth century came to a close, religion was continuing to have salience in world politics. The relevance of religion has been evident in former communist states as well. Ten of the European states were overwhelmingly Orthodox and apart from Greece they were all ex-communist states. Filling the vacuum left by the collapse of ideology, religious revival swept through these countries⁷⁸⁵. Among other things, religious institutions, personalities, and ideas have become forces for democratization across a wide variety of traditions and societies⁷⁸⁶. Religion also continued to play a large, even growing role in international affairs. Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts in Europe and the former USSR underscored the religion as a factor that could contribute to violence and instability⁷⁸⁷.

III. 1. 2. The US Approach to Religion and Religious Freedoms

The politics of religion has affected the USA foreign policy and policy objectives⁷⁸⁸. The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), signed into law in October 1998 in the USA predicted the creation of an office of International Religious Freedom in the State Department, had the defined mission of "promoting religious freedom as a core objective of

⁷⁸⁴ See Gilles Kepel, *La Revanche de Dieu, Chrétiens, Juifs et Musulmanes à la Reconquête du Monde*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991.

⁷⁸⁵ James H. Billington, "The Case for Orthodoxy", *New Republic*, 30 May 1994, p. 26; Suzanne Massie, "Back to the Future", *Boston Globe*, 28 March 1993, p. 72.

⁷⁸⁶ Elizabeth Prodromou, "Christianity and Democracy: Ambivalent Orthodox", *Journal of Democracy*, No. 2, April 2004, p. 62-75 at p. 62

⁷⁸⁷ Andrew J. Bacevich and Elizabeth Prodromou, "God is Not Neutral: Religion and US Foreign Policy after 9/11", *Orbis*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Winter 2004, p. 43-54, at p. 44

⁷⁸⁸ Julie Mertus, *Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S Foreign Policy*, 2nd, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004, p. 186. Brian Hehir, "Experts: Religion Affects Foreign Policy", *Washington Times*, Feb. 5, 2003.

USA foreign policy”⁷⁸⁹. Headed by an ambassador-at-large and nine independent members, the office prepares and publishes yearly country reports on International Religious Freedom, asking the President to take palpable action in the case of violation of Human Rights and Religious Freedoms in a third country⁷⁹⁰. IRFA also established a separate Commission on International Religious Freedom from a wide variety of faith traditions existing in the USA. The Commission was effective in forcing the State department to be more sensible to the religious freedoms⁷⁹¹.

However, the aims and scope of the IRFA raises concerns about the aims of the US. The duty of the IRFA is declared as follows⁷⁹²:

To express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries on account of religion; to authorize United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries (..)

Thus IRFA is certainly a tool to legitimize the US interventions in foreign countries on the pretext of religious rights violations. Moreover, due to the role of the Christian lobbying groups and the Evangelical Church that were extremely effective in the drawing up process, the outcoming IRFA favored clearly persecuted Christians, rather than adopting an objective stance vis a vis all persecuted religious groups⁷⁹³. Elsewhere the IRFA was assessed as an outcome of resurgent conservative Christian political activism enshrined into law⁷⁹⁴.

In line with the IRFA of 1998, the US State Department started to issue yearly reports on international religious freedom to supplement the human rights reports of the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor under the US State Department. Since 2001, reports included demands on the ecumenical title of the Patriarch, the reopening of the Halki

⁷⁸⁹ For an overview of the law and its criticism see T. Jeremy Gunn, “A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the Religious Freedom Act of 1998”, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 2000, p. 84-866, <http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2000/3/gun.pdf> (20 July 2010)

⁷⁹⁰ Mertus, p. 186.

⁷⁹¹ Bacevich and Prodromou, “God is Not Neutral: Religion and US Foreign Policy after 9/11”, p. 45; Mertus, p. 186.

⁷⁹² United States of America, *Congressional Record.: Proceedings and Debates of the 105th Congress, Session II*, Vol. 144-Part 19, October 19, 1998 to December 19, 1998, Washington: United States Government Printing Service, 1998, p. 27204.

⁷⁹³ Laurie Cozad, “The United States Imposition of Religious Freedom: The International Religious Freedom Act and India”, *India Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2005, p. 59-83 at p. 62-66..

⁷⁹⁴ Eugene V. Gallagher and W. Michael Ashcraft (eds.), *Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America*, Greenwood Press, 2006, p. 101.

Seminary, the lack of legal status, the election practice of the Patriarchs, requiring that only Turkish citizens can be Patriarchs with similar wording⁷⁹⁵.

III. 6. The US Policy towards the Patriarchate in the Post Cold War Period

The US policy towards the Patriarchate after the end of the Cold War has not changed much over time. A strategy adopted by the USA foreign policy department was to support the dissidents in Russia and Eastern Europe through religion. Given the fact that Orthodoxy is the dominant religion in Russia, Caucassia and the Balkans, the Patriarchate in Istanbul would be a good candidate to propagate Western ideals. Istanbul was regarded as a good instrument thanks to its historical ecumenical title and its position as *primus inter pares* among the eastern Orthodox churches. Istanbul in addition to its historical primacy was not a national church. Thus, the churches of the Eastern Orthodoxy could more easily identify themselves with it. Therefore, it would be a good intermediary for standing against the growing influence of the Russian church in the post Cold War period.

In 1987, Patriarch Dimitrios visited the USSR, meeting with prelates there, including the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Pimen. On 19 August 1987, Dimitrios I and Patriarch Pimen jointly celebrated the Divine Liturgy for the feast of the transfiguration. It was the first visit of a Patriarch of Istanbul to Russia in almost four hundred years⁷⁹⁶. This visit was of utmost importance for both churches. In the words of Garrard, “it symbolized a *perestroika* in faith” for the former even before the dismemberment of the USSR at the beginning of the 1990s and for the Fener it represented a new international role that it would be the beneficiary since then⁷⁹⁷.

It is not very difficult to assume that the visit of Patriarch Dimitrios to the USSR was endorsed by the US, who took very seriously the role of religion in providing political opposition with powerful symbols against the established order. This assertion was proven in

⁷⁹⁵ See for example, “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2002”, *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13986.htm> (18 February 2008); “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2004”, *US Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, www.State.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35489.htm (5 August 2010); “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2009”, *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/130299.htm>, (5 august 2010)

⁷⁹⁶ Carol Garrard, *Russian Orthodox Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 1

⁷⁹⁷ For the details of the visit see *The New York Times*, August 19, 1987; Yishai Eldar and Thomas Idinopoulos, “A New Vision for Eastern Orthodoxy?”, *Christian Century*, November 11, 1987, p. 995.

the Islamic revolution against the Shah, the Catholic Church's support for the Solidarity Worker's Union in Poland against Polish government and the role of the Catholic Bishops in the downfall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines⁷⁹⁸. The Orthodox Church could also have a similar effect on overthrowing communism that was already badly harmed by the new openings to the West. Moreover, in the decade that followed the fall of the Berlin wall, if there would be a united Orthodox Church the center would be preferably Istanbul not Moscow.

A similar role was also confined to the Vatican. As early as the 1988, the Vatican started to hold talks with the Vatican on the issue of the Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates), the USSR's largest underground church. The first official talks over the Ukrainian Catholics, whose existence has been denied by the Soviet authorities for 42 years was announced. Russian Orthodox Church had been regaining its strength since Gorbachev took power in 1985. The religious freedoms in the USSR had been a part of the US strategy towards the USSR. President Reagan had already visited the USSR and made remarks on the 'religious freedom' to the Soviet authorities⁷⁹⁹.

Following the visit to Russia, The Patriarch, made an unprecedented visit to the US on July 2-29 1990 together with a delegation that included five metropolitans [one was Metropolitan Bartholomeos of Chalcedon (Kadıköy) who succeeded Patriarch Dimitrios in 1991]. This was the first visit of a Patriarch of the Istanbul throne to the USA. His visit had a special significance because he was viewed as the leader of the Orthodox world. Patriarch Dimitrios was saluted as the Ecumenical patriarch and he was welcomed by a state ceremony⁸⁰⁰.

The activities of the Patriarchate intensified with the election of Bartholomeos I at a relatively young age in September 22, 1991⁸⁰¹. Since his election the Patriarch concentrated

⁷⁹⁸ Emile F. Sahliyah, *Religious Resurgence in the Contemporary World*, New York: SUNY Press, 1990, p. 5

⁷⁹⁹ *The New York Times*, June 5, 1988

⁸⁰⁰ For the visit of Patriarch Dimitrios see Nikki Stephanopoulos and Robert Stephanopoulos (eds.), *Dimitrios in the USA*, New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 1991; Thomas Fitzgerald, "The Visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the United States", *Ecumenical Trends*, Vol. 19, No. 7, 1991, p. 103-105.

⁸⁰¹ The new Patriarch was born Dimitris Archondonis in Gökçeada in 1940. He was the Metropolitan of Chalcedon when he was elected to the Patriarchal throne. The Turkish government, in contrast to the election of his predecessor Dimitrios, did not interfere in the list of the candidates. He was elected due to his excellent résumé and his intellectual capacities. A graduate from the Halki School of Theology, he was awarded by the Patriarchate for study abroad. He enrolled first at the Oriental Institute of the Gregorian University in Rome, then at the Bossey Institute in Switzerland, a school run by the World

his efforts in promoting his place as the senior church in Eastern Orthodoxy trying to impose its authority over other Orthodox churches. The reconciliation of the divided Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener had become a priority. Moreover, faced with criticism from the theorists like Huntington that the Orthodoxy is the religion of the non-civilized Europe, incompatible with Western ideals, led Bartholomeos to produce solutions for the contemporary world. Moreover, the will of the ex-communist states to declare their church's independence in parallel with their country's independence created new opportunities but also challenges to the Patriarchate. The challenge came from the Moscow Patriarchate who had a claim of supremacy over Istanbul since the city fell to the Muslim hands. The war in Yugoslavia was another constraint for the Orthodox world since in the Balkans, national and religious identities were knitted together⁸⁰². Finally, encouraged by the EU process of Turkey, the Patriarchate became more vocal in claiming rights that it considered violated.

Moreover, the strong Greek presence in the country is one of the reasons of the US support for the Patriarchate. The number of the Orthodox in the USA is about five millions, divided between more than a dozen different churches. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America is the largest of the Orthodox churches in the US with 2 million members. If all Orthodox were united in one church they would constitute the fifth largest Christian denomination in the country, after Catholics, Southern Baptists, United Methodists and the evangelical Lutherans. Thus the potential votes of the Orthodox play a significant role in the elections⁸⁰³. Moreover, the Greek Orthodox diaspora in America is a wealthy community that has important resources that constitutes a very important lobbying force.

When Patriarch Dimitrios visited the USA in 1991, the press largely covered the event. The media underlined the position of the Patriarchate of Istanbul as the *primus inter*

Council of Churches, and finally at the University of Munich in Germany. He received his doctorate from the Oriental Institute of the Gregorian University. After his graduation from the Pontifical institute he returned to Istanbul where he was ordained as the deputy dean of the Halki school of theology until its closure in 1971 and immediately with the election of Patriarch Dimitrios he held the office of the private patriarchal office. He assisted Patriarch Dimitrios during his tenure and accompanied him in various critical journeys abroad including Patriarch Demetrios I's unprecedented US visit. For the life of Patriarch Bartholomeos see Olivier Clément, *Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I*, 1997.

⁸⁰² Philip W. Barker, *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be for Us*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 144-184; Leo Suryadinata, *Globalisation and Nationalism: East and West*, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2000, p. 18.

⁸⁰³ Suat Bilge, "Fener Greek Patriarchate", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, March-May 1998, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume3/March-May1998/THEFENERGREEKPATRIARCHATE.PDF>.

pares. According to the press, this position would help in the reshaping of the Eastern Bloc⁸⁰⁴. Already before the end of the visit to the US the Patriarch invited the Orthodox leaders to Geneva in order to discuss the future of Orthodoxy in Russia and Europe in the post-communist era⁸⁰⁵. During his visit, the Patriarch met with the US President George Bush. Bush warmly welcomed the Patriarch, telling him “you brought here your ecumenical vision, meaning hope. This is the hope of your 250 millions of spiritual children’s –many of them were under religious repression- and all of us” hope. We celebrate the rise of hope, especially of those who listen to you in Eastern Europe.⁸⁰⁶ Thus the importance of the Patriarch was due to its role in the Orthodox world as the senior church. However, the US had overestimated the Patriarchate. The Orthodoxy is organized as a federation of independent churches and any of them may claim supremacy. Thus it is impossible to envision an ‘Eastern Pope’ similar to Pope in the Catholic world.

The growing activities of the Patriarchate were not welcomed in Turkey whose official position towards the Patriarchate is to maintain that the institution is the church of the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey. The ex-foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz declared that the *Eyüp Kaymakamı* (Eyüp Prefect) should call the Patriarch to inform him about his activities in the USA⁸⁰⁷. The international activities of the institution and the international welcome of its head as the ‘Ecumenical Patriarch’ was alarming for Turkey that had the reflex of equating the problem of the Patriarchate with the problems of the Turks of Western Greece emanating from the interpretation of the reciprocity clause of the Lausanne Treaty. Now, with the international pressure intensifying due to the integration process of Turkey within Europe, this question had become one of the foreign policy dilemmas of the country.

The US fully supported the Patriarchate under Bartholomeos as well. As early as 1994 in the middle of the war in Bosnia, in a letter sent to Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, the US President Bill Clinton placed the issue of patriarchate on the agenda. Right before his visit to Greece, the president of the US asked the re-evaluation of its status and its working conditions⁸⁰⁸. According to the US president, the tense relations between Greece and

⁸⁰⁴ *The New York Post*, July 13, 1990.

⁸⁰⁵ *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1990

⁸⁰⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, July 14, 1990

⁸⁰⁷ *Güneş*, July 13, 1990, cited in Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 235.

⁸⁰⁸ *Milliyet*, April 27, 1994.

Turkey would be overcome if Turkey had taken some symbolic steps. “One of these symbolic steps may be the relief of the institution from its distressful predicament”⁸⁰⁹. Thus Clinton saw the Patriarchate as a prerogative for the elimination of the problems between two countries as well. Looking at the global picture, the US was largely aware that the turmoil in the Balkans could not be solved without the effective cooperation of the two more powerful states in the region. The patriarchate should play the role of mediator or a bridge between those irreconcilable neighbours. But to play such a role was difficult for the Patriarch who held in an interview that he “did everything he could for the Greek-Turkish friendship” despite the fact that he often found himself “under two fires”⁸¹⁰. He thus made a reference to Greek and Turkish nationalists who regarded him as a traitor and foreigner respectively. This would be especially clear in the Patriarchate’s conflicts with the Greek Church that we will later explore in length.

In this picture the reopening of the HTS had a prominent place. In 1996, Hillary Clinton paid a visit to the Patriarchate in Fener and made public that she would be very happy the day the HTS would be open⁸¹¹. The issue had become an official US policy. In the human rights reports issued since 1994, the US Department of State made clear that it sees the issue of the closure of the school as a breach of religious rights. In the reports, the institution is referred to as the ‘ecumenical patriarchate’⁸¹². However, despite the pressure of the US, the school could not be opened. This issue had become a major foreign policy challenge for Turkey.

In 1997, Patriarch Bartholomeos was invited to the US. Like his predecessor Dimitrios, he received a high measure of official claim. A portion of the East 79th Street in Manhattan was named in his honour. He also received the Congressional Gold Medal, accorded to prominent personalities in history⁸¹³. In his official contacts in the US, the Patriarch was welcomed as the ‘ecumenical patriarch’. In a dinner given for him by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright the Patriarch said: “Part of our mission is to reach out beyond the

⁸⁰⁹ For the text of the letter see Uğur Yıldırım, *Dünden Bugüne Patrikhane*, Istanbul: Analiz, 2004, p. 142

⁸¹⁰ “Patrik Bartholomeos: Türk-Yunan Dostluğu İçin Elimden Geleni Yapıyorum [Patriarch Bartholomeos: I do my Best for Greek-Turkish Friendship]”, *Milliyet*, 25 January 2010.

⁸¹¹ *Sabah*, March 30, 1996.

⁸¹² See for example, US Department of State, *Turkey Human Rights Practices*, February 1995,

<http://www.hri.org/docs/USSD-Rights/94/Turkey94.html> (22 March 2010); US Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Turkey, February 25, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119109.htm> (3 January 2010)

⁸¹³ *The New York Times*, October 25, 1997.

borders of our faith and tradition, as many of you reach out beyond the borders of your countries in order to preach and to teach peace”⁸¹⁴. The US made clear again their vision of the Patriarchate: Madeleine Albright said that the Orthodox churches must play a key role, a spiritual role, in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe, after the collapse of Communist governments there⁸¹⁵. The Patriarch also met with the vice-president Al Gore and met President Clinton and Hillary Clinton at the White House. They discussed areas of mutual interest, including the importance of religious tolerance, interfaith cooperation and protection of environment⁸¹⁶. In March 2002, during the second visit of Patriarch Bartholomeos to the US, George W. Bush and the Patriarch had a private meeting at the White House. This time the topic of the discussion was the future role that the Patriarchate in “advancing communication and understanding between religions in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist strike”. In that context, the Patriarch asked Bush for American support in securing freedom of action, so that the Patriarchate can fulfil its spiritual, religious and cultural mission. In that context, the Patriarch also asked for support for the reopening of the HTS.⁸¹⁷

Finally, President Obama in his visit to Turkey, had a private meeting with the Patriarch and in his speech before the Turkish national assembly on April 6, 2009, reaffirmed the need for Turkey to allow the reopening of the school. He asserted that⁸¹⁸

Freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthens the state, which is why steps like reopening the Halki seminary will send such an important signal inside Turkey and beyond. An enduring commitment to the rule of law is the only way to achieve the security that comes from justice for all people.

Thus the US states was highly involved in defending the rights of the Patriarchate at the highest possible level.

In May 11, 2007, the Congress of the US Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to Turkish Premier Erdoğan to underline three major aspects of the Turkish government policy that threaten the Patriarchate. The letter reads⁸¹⁹:

⁸¹⁴ *ibid.*

⁸¹⁵ *ibid*

⁸¹⁶ *US Newswire*, October 22, 1997

⁸¹⁷ *Hürriyet*, March 11, 2002

⁸¹⁸ *Hürriyet*, April 7, 2009

the first of these is your longstanding unwillingness to recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate as ecumenical –that is trans-national. (...) Second, we are deeply concerned by your continued involvement in the process of selecting the Ecumenical Patriarch and by your continued insistence that he be a Turkish citizen. These practices clearly reflect your policy of viewing the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a strictly Turkish institution, when, in fact, it provides spiritual and moral guidance for millions of believers worldwide (..) Third, your expropriations of lands belonging to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as a result of a policy in which the state takes possession of lands not being directly used by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of lands of those who emigrated or died without heirs, is very worrisome to us.

In the shaping of the US policy, the effective lobbying force of the Archbishopric of the America cannot be underestimated. The Archons, a group of most powerful and wealthy members of the Greek Orthodox community in the US, were active in mobilizing the public opinion and the policy circles in the US. Especially in the second half of the 2000, the group started “Religious Freedom Project for the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, an initiative that had political, legal and societal components.

In 2005, upon the initiative of ‘Religious Freedom Project’ of the Archons, the Helsinki Commission ⁸²⁰ had a briefing on “The Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey: A Victim of Systematic Expropriation”⁸²¹. The president of the National Council of the Archons, Mr. Limberakis, along with Archbishop Dimitrios of America, Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, Rabbi Arthur Schneider of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, former Congressmen Bob Edgar participants of the briefing where Turkey was called to comply with the OSCE commitments.

One major component of the project was the adoption of religious freedom resolutions in support of the Patriarchate in every USA state legislature. Since its beginning 28 states adopted such resolutions⁸²². It is important to note that, while the resolutions urged Turkey to recognize the ill treatment and to change the treatment towards the Patriarchate, they also linked the situation to the EU membership perspective of the country. Thus the EU conditionality clause is put by the American policy circles as an effective force to lead Turkey to change its attitude against the Patriarchate. The National Council of the Archons

⁸¹⁹ Letter to His Excellency Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Congress of the US Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, May 11, 2007, http://www.archons.org/pdf/issues/Fgn_Aff_Comm_letter_to_Tk_PM.pdf (26 July 2009)

⁸²⁰ The Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), created in 1976 to monitor and support compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE commitments.

⁸²¹ The text of the report available at www.csce.gov.

⁸²² See for example Senate Joint Resolution No. 11, State of New Jersey, 212th legislature, available online at <http://www.archons.org/pdf/resolutions/newjersey-senate.pdf> (10 June 2009)

established a legal committee in 2005, and a paper prepared by the Yale Law School, was released⁸²³. The report asserts that the Turkish government interferes with the Patriarchate's freedom of religion and discriminates against Turkey's Orthodox minority. Its treatment of the Patriarchate and the Orthodox minority violates its obligations under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 in addition to obligations under international human rights law⁸²⁴. This report echoed in Turkey. Sibel Özel in a response to the report wrote that "the Patriarchate is not an institution described in the Lausanne Treaty. Therefore Turkey has no international legal obligations in regard to the Patriarchate"⁸²⁵.

An other document prepared by Cornell Law School and its well known human rights professor Muna B. Ndulo offered an analysis of the Patriarchate's application to the ECHR for the orphanage of Büyükada⁸²⁶. The Archons also were effective in directly building connections with the EU bureaucrats. In 2006, a group representing the Archons and the Archdiocese of America visited Brussels, and Strasbourg, calling the EU parliament and commission representatives to take further steps to live up "Turkey's religious discriminatory policies towards the Patriarchate"⁸²⁷. The delegation also met Turkish ambassadors in Brussels and Vienna, discussing about the possibilities of openings concerning the Patriarchate. The Archons also visited Turkey annually, meeting with the Turkish leaders⁸²⁸. Despite the positive atmosphere of these meetings however, including one with the President of the Republic Abdullah Gül, Minister of National Education Hüseyin Çelik and Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu, no results could be obtained about the reopening of the HTS, the major demand of the group.

⁸²³ Maria Burnett, Maria Pulzetti and Sean Young, Turkey's Compliance with Its Obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian Minority", The Allard Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, A Paper Prepared at the Request of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, February 3, 2005.

⁸²⁴ *ibid.*

⁸²⁵ Translation by the author. Sibel Özel, "Lozan Anlaşması ve Azınlık Hukuku Çerçevesinde Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin Hukuki Konumu", p. 47.

⁸²⁶ Christine K. Gau, Steven N. Jones, Sharon F. Linzey and Ralph H. Mamiva, *Analysis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Application to the European Court of Human Rights*, Cornell Law School Student Research Project under the Guidance of Professor Muna B. Ndulo, A Paper Prepared at the Request of the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul, December 12, 2005

⁸²⁷ <http://www.archons.org/pdf/newsletter/2006-spring.pdf> (18 June 2009)

⁸²⁸ "Ecumenical Patriarchate Leaders Meet Turkish Officials", <http://www.wfn.org/2004/02/msg00159.html> (18 June 2009)

III. 1. 2. 2. Turkey's Reaction to the US Interventions

A major crisis broke during the visit of the Archons to Ankara in 2004. The source of the crisis was the title 'Ecumenical' written on the invitation cards on behalf of Patriarch Bartholomeos, who was the honorary patron of the dinner that would be held at the residence of Ambassador Edelman. The AKP deputy Atilla Başoğlu, together with 100 MPs sent a letter of protestation to the Ambassador⁸²⁹. The secretary for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ali Tuygan has contacted Eric Edelman and requested him to be more aware of the sensitivities of Turkey, adding that it would not be appropriate to use a title which is not officially recognized by the Turkish Republic and requested Edelman to respect Turkey's laws and regulations. Upon this request, Edelman replied "many of the Americans and Europeans as well as people around the world, view the Patriarchate as ecumenical. The US has always used this title for the Patriarch and there is nothing new in our position in this issue. People, who do not wish to come, may not attend the dinner"⁸³⁰. Upon this, the office of the Prime Minister on the request of the MFA issued a circular ordering public institutions not to attend the dinner. Also around one hundred assembly members wrote a protest letter to Edelman⁸³¹. The involvement of the US in the Patriarchate issue to such an extent fuelled the mistrust towards the US that reached its pinpoint with the invasion of Iraq. The nationalists, together with a portion of the Islamists, consider the close attention attributed to the Patriarchate by the US as a part of the strategy for the completion of Western plans for the eventual partition of Turkey⁸³².

⁸²⁹ *Milliyet*, November 26, 2004

⁸³⁰ "Ekümeniklik Siyasi Değil", *Radikal*, December 2, 2004.

⁸³¹ *Sabah*, December 1 and 2, 2004

⁸³² Robert Pollock, "The Sick Man of Europe, Again", *The Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 2005

III. 2. The EU Integration: Divided Continent Unites around Same Values

In the post Cold War era the CoE and the OSCE were effective in promoting democracy, rule of law and the protection of human rights and minority rights in Europe. Those two international organizations set out a number of standards and developed monitoring strategies in order to complete the European integration. In an expanding Europe, the conflicts stemming from ethnic, religious, linguistic differences, long time suppressed by the Cold War animosities resurfaced. Thus, we see in the work of international organizations a reconciliatory effort between different cultures and traditions alongside the promotion of human rights and minority rights as part of the developing international law. At the same time, these institutions gave attentive ear to the religious institutions and their leaders as a part of the ideal of democratic states. Thus the Patriarchate came to the scope of the European organizations and especially of the EU after the end of the cold war not only because it was considered as an Orthodox church with a western outlook that could conciliate the Orthodox with European values but also because with Turkey's integration processus to Europe it became an object of interest as a minority Christian church under the scope of the Copenhagen criteria.

The EU was founded as an Economic Community by the Rome Treaty of 1957⁸³³. The Union's interest in religion and religious leaders is quite recent, as a natural consequence of the growing political integration in the post cold war era. Already in the preamble of the Single European Act, the first steps of the political integration were to be observed. The new vision was determined as the creation of a European Union in accordance with the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 19 June 1983⁸³⁴. The promotion of democracy "on the basis of fundamental recognized in the constitutions and laws of the member states, in the CPHRFF and the European Social Charter" were also placed in the preamble⁸³⁵. The need to "speak with one voice" to "display the principles of democracy and compliance with law and with human rights to which they are attached" were furthered as a precondition to contribute to

⁸³³ The Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957, <http://www.eurotreaties.com/rometreaty.pdf> (10 August 2010)

⁸³⁴ The SEA, *Official Journal of the Euroean Communities*, L 169, 29 June 1987, para 1, <http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/SEA/Single%20European%20Act.pdf> (28 January 2010)

⁸³⁵ *ibid*, para. 3.

international security and peace⁸³⁶. Thus the SEA paved the way for the EU, and made a clear reference to the values of the union. Fundamental rights and freedoms were not displayed as a competence of the EC but rather considered stemming from the constitutional traditions of the members states. The rights were advanced as a precondition for peace and shed light to the Copenhagen criteria that would be declared in few years.

In 1993, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) known also as Maastricht Treaty transformed the EC to the EU, an economic and political union. With its competence now extending to a wide range of policy areas, the Union now could act as an important actor that would have an important impact on the policy choices of its members and accession states. The preamble of the TEU contained insights why the European integration was furthered after two decades of stagnation. The signatory states recalled “the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future of Europe” and confirmed their “attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”⁸³⁷. The Treaty of Maastricht is an important milestone in the evaluation of the European integration that envisaged obedience to a common set of values and law⁸³⁸. Those values were inspired by the work of the international organizations and the constitutional traditions of the Member States in the field of the protection of fundamental rights as the common principles of the Community. Moreover, Article J. 1 (now Article 11) underlined the human rights in the objectives of the common foreign policy of the Union⁸³⁹:

- a. to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Objectives of the Paris Charter.
- b. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law.

⁸³⁶ *ibid*, para 5; Samantha Power and Graham Allison, *Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact*, New York: St. Martin Press, 2000, p. 98.

⁸³⁷ Treaty on the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 191, 29 July 1992, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>, (20 April 2010)

⁸³⁸ *ibid*. Art. F, para 2.

⁸³⁹ *ibid*

Thus by quoting the principles of two major documents of the OSCE, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, the EU underlined the principles that would shape its external relations⁸⁴⁰.

The European values declared in the EU Treaty became a precondition in the recognition of new states after the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the second wave of European Agreements with the CEES and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, and most significantly it was enshrined in the Copenhagen European Presidency Conclusions as criteria for accession in 1993⁸⁴¹. The Copenhagen Council decided that the associated countries in Eastern and Central Europe “shall become members of the European Union”⁸⁴². However, the condition for accession was along with a working market economy, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”⁸⁴³. An interesting feature of the Copenhagen criteria is that the EU included ‘minority’ protection as a necessary arrangement for the accession in the EU. The EU had nowhere in its Treaties any allusion to the minority rights. Thus a higher standard was expected from the new candidates than the member states⁸⁴⁴. As there was no agreement on the minority protection between the member states, it was not clear to which standards the accession states should comply. The Copenhagen Criteria became a part of the EU acquis communautaire with the Amsterdam treaty⁸⁴⁵. Interestingly enough ‘the protection of and respect for minorities’ was eliminated due to the discord of the member states on the issue of minorities⁸⁴⁶.

⁸⁴⁰ see Guido Sewellnus, “‘Much Ado about Nothing?’: Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Constitutionalism Web-Papers, , *Conweb*, No.5, 2001, <http://les1.man.ac.uk.conweb> (28 November 2007)

⁸⁴¹ Resolution of December 16, 1991, under the titles "Guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" and the Resolution of December 17, 1991, under the titles "Common Position for the Recognition of the Yugoslav Republics" the EU made explicit its will to recognize them on the condition that they would be established on a democratic basis, accept the relevant international responsibilities, and enter into negotiations in good faith. The terms and conditions included the respect to the provision of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter especially in regard to the just state, democracy, and human rights. Furthermore, the new states should respect the rights of ethnicities, ethnic groups, and minorities according to the framework of obligations set by the OSCE. For an overview see Roland Rich, “Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 36-65 at p. 42-44.

⁸⁴² “Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council”, *European Council*, Copenhagen, June 22-23 1993, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (28 March 2010)

⁸⁴³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴⁴ Hughes and Sasse, p. 10.

⁸⁴⁵ Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities and Related Acts, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 340, 10 November 1997.

⁸⁴⁶ While the EU puts forward the signing of the international treaties it has no right of enforcement on the member states. For example There are a number of EU member states that did not sign or ratify the CoE Framework Convention on the

The latest stage of the developing human rights concerns in the EU is its Charter of Fundamental Rights. As a response to an evolving framework on the human rights, the Cologne European Council of 1999 decided the preparation of a ‘European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ that might be “integrated into the treaties”⁸⁴⁷. The proposed charter was proclaimed on the occasion of the Nice European Council in December 2000⁸⁴⁸. The drafting of such a Charter was important for the EU, the champion of Human Rights that has not its own catalogue of rights to refer to. According to Williams, such a Charter would “make clear the nature and scope of recognized rights providing a degree of coherence where little existed before”⁸⁴⁹. The process of drafting the Charter was significant itself. For the first time in the EU integration history a Convention drawing together the national parliaments, EU institutions and the civil society came together, to voice their propositions and prepare the text in a transparent environment⁸⁵⁰. The same system inspired the work of the Convention for drafting a Constitution for Europe. The Charter has not become a legally binding document until the Lisbon Treaty came into force. However, it assumed a central role in the drafting of the Constitution⁸⁵¹. The text of the Charter contained a catalogue of human rights accumulated in the past thirty years of the EU integration. Rather general in its wording the Charter does not contain any reference to minority rights except from prohibition of discrimination (Art. 21)⁸⁵².

The establishment of a new ‘Convention’ in 2002 to consider a prospective Constitution for the EU also has turned around the question of the inclusion of the Charter in

Protection of National Minorities that transforms the commitments of the OSCE Copenhagen document into a legally binding text.

⁸⁴⁷ “Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council”, *European Council*, Annex IV, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/mandates.html (11 August 2010).

⁸⁴⁸ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C364/1, 18 December 2000.

⁸⁴⁹ Andrew Williams, *EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony*, Oxford: OUP, 2004, p. 2.

⁸⁵⁰ Gráinne de Búrca, “Drafting the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights”, *European Law Review*, Vol. 26, No.2, p. 126-138; The composition of the Convention consisted of the presidency, representatives of the heads of state and government, the national governments, EP, Commission, governments of the accession candidate countries, national parliaments of the accession candidate countries, governments of the accession candidate countries, national parliaments of the candidate countries for accession and observers. See European Convention, <http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN> (29 March 2018).

⁸⁵¹ Gráinne de Búrca and Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, “European Constitutionalism and the Charter of Fundamental Rights” in Steve Peers and Angela Ward eds.), *The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy*, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 3-34.

⁸⁵² “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, 2000/C, 364/01, *Official Journal of the European Union* (18 December 2000)

the EC legal system⁸⁵³. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been placed in the Constitutional Treaty as a separate Part II. Therefore the Charter would be a part of the *acquis communautaire* if the Dutch and the French votes had not said ‘no’ in referendums⁸⁵⁴. The beginning of the Constitution contains a list of values with amendments to the existing treaties. Title I, Art. 2 reads⁸⁵⁵:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination and equality between men and women prevail.

Thus ‘European values once again were enshrined in the *acquis communautaire* of the EU for the member states and the accession candidates. The EU Constitution that had an important symbolic importance for the integration process was rejected in Dutch and French referendums but the Lisbon Treaty that was a slightly amended version of the Constitution was adopted in 2009. With the Lisbon Treaty the EU integration took a further step as the Union now acquired legal personality. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was not placed in the Treaty as it was the case with the Constitution but a clear reference to it was made. Art. 6 reads⁸⁵⁶:

The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.

Thus even though the Lisbon Treaty did not contain the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty text, it adopted in the *acquis communautaire* by this reference.

⁸⁵³ See European Council, “Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union”, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, p. 20-26,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf (10 June 2010)

⁸⁵⁴ The people of France and the Netherlands rejected the text of the Constitution on 29 May and 1 June respectively.

⁸⁵⁵ For the amended text of Art. 2 see “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe”, *Official Journal of the EU*, C. 310, Vol. 47, 16 December 2004, p. 11,

<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0011:0040:EN:PDF> (21 June 2010)

⁸⁵⁶ “Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community”, Lisbon, 13 December 2007, *Official Journal of the EU*, C 306, Vol. 50, 17 December 2007, p. 13.

III. 1. 3. 1. The Approach of the EU to Religion and Religious Institutions

Until the end of the Cold War that led to its own transformation to a political union, the EU like all secular international organizations has been ‘church blind’, meaning that it considered the questions relating to the religion irrelevant to the functioning of the Community⁸⁵⁷. However, the expansion to its competence to a number of new policy areas that affected almost all aspects of its citizens, made it impossible for the EU to ignore the ‘religious factor’. On the international scene, the new role of the Union as a ‘Soft power’⁸⁵⁸, its willingness in disseminating the values that were considered essential to its founding in the European continent, the turmoil in the Balkans, and the role of the religion in these conflicts has become a major reason for the renewed interest in the religion. Moreover, the increasing competence of the Union in human rights and minority rights, religious freedoms, an inseparable part of fundamental rights justified the EU policy on religion. In this equation, the EU looked forward for reconciliation of the faiths in an increasingly multi-cultural, multi-religious space that it had to deal after its enlargement with the CEES that have large Orthodox populations. In addition, the inclusion of Turkey in the accession process that was regarded as ‘culturally’ different from the rest of Europe brought the question of ‘religion’ in EU policy more palpable. Thus in contrast to the main postulate since the foundation of the social sciences by influential authors such as Comte, Marx and Weber who claimed that more the societies modernize less would be the importance of religion, this has not been the case⁸⁵⁹.

Moreover, the religious institutions were transnational actors in world politics and this juxtaposed with the logic of the EU, a transnational entity itself. As Rudolph rightly asserts, “the churches are among the oldest of the transnationals, having long claimed a role equivalent to or transcending the political -before ‘nation’ or ‘state’ were even articulated

⁸⁵⁷ David Herbert, *Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Religion in Contemporary World*, Aldershot Hunts, Ashgate, 2003, p. 255.

⁸⁵⁸ The concept of “soft power” was first coined by Nye in the sense of the ability to affect others to obtain what one wants through attraction rather than coercion. See Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1991; This concept was further developed by the same author in his book *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004. This concept was used for the Patriarchate in Prodromos Yannas’ article “The Soft Power of the Patriarchate”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. I, Winter 2009, p. 77-93.

⁸⁵⁹ Jonathan Fox, “World Separation of Religion and State into the 21st Century”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2006, p. 537-557 at p. 537; Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and The Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p. 10-11; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4; Wilfried Spohn, “Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective”, *Current Sociology*, May/July 2003, Vol. 51, No. 3-4, p. 265-286; Peter Berger, *The Desecularization of the World, Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.

concepts”⁸⁶⁰. The emergence of the churches in Europe is not new phenomenon. They have acted as effective unifying forces since the end of the World War II, as we have explored in the second chapter. The logic of the church is transnational like the EU itself. According to Léo Moulin, the spirit of the church from the very beginning is a cosmopolitan spirit⁸⁶¹. Moreover, different denominations occasionally came together in a common effort to fight communism and bring the believers in both sides of the Iron Curtain together. The premises of peace and cooperation adopted by the churches, their adherence to the human rights were in parallel with the EU aims⁸⁶².

The globalization and EU integration added a new salience of the religion. The separation of church and state has been realized when the territorial national churches fell under the control of the state from the 16th century onwards according to the *cuius regio eius religio* principle. The processes of globalization undermined this principle as it undermines the principle of territoriality. According to Casanova, “the universalization and globalization of human rights deterritorializes their state-based jurisdiction, i. e., the human person is the carrier of inalienable rights, and freedom of conscience is the most sacred of these personal rights”⁸⁶³. Thus already the development of international law and supranational rules and institutions as it is the case for the EU, undermined the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the states. Moreover, globalization helped to expand the ethnic and diaspora communities throughout the world⁸⁶⁴. Thus the religious institutions became more and more transnational. In such an environment religions found a free space to act through the national boundaries, adopt themselves to the changing world context and social environment and tried to answer to the emerging problems such as the destruction of environment and tried to produce responses to the globalization⁸⁶⁵.

⁸⁶⁰ Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Religious Concomitants of Transnationalism: From a Universal Church to a Universal Religiosity?” in John D. Carlson and Eric C. Owens, *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003, p. 139-153.

⁸⁶¹ Léo Moulin, *Le Monde Vivant des Religions*, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1964, p. 245.

⁸⁶² Kristoff Talin, “L’Europe de Bruxelles en Ligne de Mire: les Virtuoses du Catholicisme au Cœur de la Modernité Politique”, *Social Compass*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2001, p. 249-262, p. 249.

⁸⁶³ José Casanova, “Religion, the New Millenium, and Globalization”, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 4, Special Issue: Religion and Globalization at the Turn of the Millenium, Winter, 2001, p. 415-441. p. 425.

⁸⁶⁴ Thomas, p. 30.

⁸⁶⁵ Some authors defend that religious resurrection is a part of globalization. The globalization made our world smaller where one can interact, coalesce without the permission of the state. This phenomenon dissolve the frontiers and weaken the nation-state. For an assessment of the relationship between globalization and religion, see Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A*

Religious institutions were accepted by the EU as transnational civil society actors that should be considered in policy making. The discernable effect of the transformation of the religious institutions is the fact that they started to refuse to be responsible of the spiritual needs of people but to modernize in order to respond to the challenges of globalization and the market economy when the European sphere was integrating in a speedy fashion. In the words of Casanova⁸⁶⁶,

religions throughout the world are entering the public sphere and the arena of political contestation not only to defend their traditional turf, as they have done in the past, but also to participate in the very struggles to define and set the modern boundaries between the private and public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and morality, between individual and society, between family, civil society, and state, between nations, states, civilizations, and the world system.

Moreover, the European integration, contributed to the foundation of a ‘single market of religion’, where the exchange of spiritual goods will prove as beneficial to the religious life of the continent as the exchange of commodities⁸⁶⁷. This prevision has been approved by the churches EU endorsed attempt to cooperate and exchange ideas, contributing to the ecumenic idea. The construction of Europe forced the Churches to organize to weight on the decision making process of the EU. Reflecting on the modern problems such as the migration, bioethics, protection of the environment, social exclusion the churches wanted to bring their theological reflection on the burning issues that affects an expanding Europe. Brussels based religious organisms thus went beyond their usual territorial basis as the European Union itself is not a mere intergovernmental organization but also has supranational policy making system⁸⁶⁸.

Throughout the 1990s and especially 2000s dialogue with civil society has become a priority for the legitimisation of the EU itself⁸⁶⁹. Indeed, just like the EU itself, with the multiplication of the ways of communication, churches are coming together to speak at Brussels to determine joint positions. The heart of the EU is reflecting the diversity of Europe in a microcosm where different components of the societies including the churches meet and

Critical Introduction, Basingtone: Palgrave, 2000; Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, London: Sage, 1994; Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in The Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

⁸⁶⁶ José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994, p. 6.

⁸⁶⁷ Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 201.

⁸⁶⁸ Berengere Massignon, “Les Relations des Organismes Européens Religieux et Humanistes avec les Institutions de l’Union Européenne: Logiques Nationales et Confessionnelles et Dynamiques d’Europeanisation”, p. 24; François Foret, “Religion: a Solution or a Problem for the legitimization of the European Union?”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 37-50.

⁸⁶⁹ François Foret, “Religion: A Solution or a Problem for the Legitimation of the European Union”, p. 38.

discuss with each other. In Brussels the common culture of negotiation and compromise has been developing also at the religious level⁸⁷⁰. The CoE preceded the EU in gathering together the European Churches. Conference of European Churches (CEC), founded in 1959, with the participation of Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox churches and the Council of European Episcopal Conferences (CEES) was founded in 1971, uniting Episcopal conferences of Europe⁸⁷¹. Under the EU auspices, the COMECE (Commission of Bishop's Conferences) started working in 1980, uniting the churches of the EC member states⁸⁷². This initiative owed a great deal to the initiative of some bishops on the request of European functionaries⁸⁷³.

In the early 1950s, Robert Schuman said that the ECSC 'needs a soul'⁸⁷⁴. In early 1990s, this idea was recalled by the EU Commission's President Jacques Delors in an address to the religious leaders. In his much quoted speech he said⁸⁷⁵:

We are now entering a fascinating time... a time when the debate on the meaning of European construction becomes a major political force... If in the next ten years we haven't managed to give a soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. This is why I want to revive the intellectual and spiritual debate on Europe. I invite the churches to participate actively in it. The debate must be free and open. We don't want to control it; it is a democratic process, not to be monopolized by technocrats. I would like to create a meeting place, a space for free discussion open to men and women of spirituality, to believers and non-believers, scientist and artists.

Delors envisaged a more active role to the religious leaders as representatives of their particular cultures in the construction of the Europe of the 21st century. This was considered as a part of the democratization that the EU supported, where all parties in the society should

⁸⁷⁰ Marc Abélès et Irene Bellier, "La Commission Européenne: du Compromis Culturel à la Culture Politique du Compromis", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 46eme année, No. 3, 1996, p. 431-456.

⁸⁷¹ Helmut Steindl, "Le Conseil des Conférences Episcopales d'Europe (CEEE)" in Gilbert Vincent and Jean-Paul Willaime, *Religions et Transformations d'Europe*, Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1993, 285-291. Bérengère Massignon, "Les Relations des Organismes Européens Religieux et Humanistes avec les Institutions de l'Union Européenne: Logiques Nationales et Confessionnelles et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation" in *Croyances Religieuses, Morales Ethiques dans le Processus de Construction Européenne*, Raport Presented by the Commissariat Général du Plan Institut Universitaire de Florence, May 2002, p. 23-40 at p. 25, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/024000363/index.shtml> (12 June 2010)

⁸⁷² For the activities of the COMECE see the official website at <http://www.comece.org/content/site/en/whoweare/historyofcomece/index.html> (20 March 2010)

⁸⁷³ Noel Treanor, *The Development of Relations Between the Churches and the European Union: A Laboratory for the Future*, Bonn, 22 January 2000, p. 2.

⁸⁷⁴ Cited in Carin Laudrup, "A European Battlefield: Does the EU have a Soul?: Is Religion in or out of Place in the European Union?", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 51-63 at p. 52.

⁸⁷⁵ Jacques Delors quoted in Lucian L. Leustean and John T.S Madeley, "Religion, Politics and Law in the European Union: An Introduction", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2009, p. 3-18 at p. 6.

voice their demands and critics. The aim was to give the European integration a sense more profound than it was enjoyed since then in the eyes of the public opinion⁸⁷⁶. In that aim the EU institutions but the Commission in particular tried to found ways of dialogue with the churches. Thus an initiative of dialogue with churches and communities of conviction started simultaneously.

Commission's initiative under the name 'To Give a Soul for Europe' was not an isolated move. It followed the CoE's Recommendation (1086) 'on the situation of the Church and Freedom of Religion in Eastern Europe' (1988), Recommendation (1202) on 'Religious Tolerance in a Democratic Society' (1993) and 'Recommendation (1222) on 'The Fight against Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance' (1993) and Report on 'Religion and Democracy' among many others. The recommendations and reports considered religion's role in the conflicts of the post-Cold War Europe and suggested to the governments to promote religious education, to 'favour the cultural and social expression of the religions' and "to promote better relations with and between other religions"⁸⁷⁷. The OSCE process also paved the way for the setting up the rules of the religious policy in the EU. Already in 1975, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act opened a new era for the end of the Cold War hostilities and a new understanding for rights. Under Principle VII of the Act participating states pledged for "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion"⁸⁷⁸. After 1975 the CSCE/OSCE adopted several resolutions among them Resolution 730 (1980) and 787 (1982), calling for the end of the restriction of religious freedoms in the participating countries⁸⁷⁹. The follow up conferences furthered the religious rights question. For example the concluding document of the Vienna follow up meeting (1986-1989) brought

⁸⁷⁶ Wojtek Kalinowski, "Les Institutions Communautaires et 'l'Âme de L'Europe' la Memoire Religieuse en Jeu dans la Construction Européenne" in *Croyances Religieuses, Morales Ethiques dans le Processus de Construction Européenne*, Report Presented by the Commissariat Général du Plan Institut Universitaire de Florence, May 2002, p. 41-52 at p. 41, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/024000363/index.shtml> (12 June 2010)

⁸⁷⁷ "Recommendation on the Situation of the Church and Freedom of Religion in Eastern Europe", CoE, No. 1086, 6 October 1988, <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA88/erec1086.htm> (27 March 2010); "Recommendation on the Religious Tolerance in a Democratic Society", Parliamentary Assembly, No. 1202, 2 February 1993, <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1202.htm> (27 March 2010); "Religion and Democracy", Parliamentary Assembly, *Report of the CoE, Commission of Culture and Education*, Doc. No. 8270, 27 November 1998, <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc98/EDOC8270.htm> (27 March 2010)

⁸⁷⁸ CSCE Final Act, Helsinki 1975, p. 6, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf (27 March 2010)

⁸⁷⁹ "Recommendation on the Situation of the Church and Freedom of Religion in Eastern Europe", para. 1.

in addition to a large catalogue of human rights extensive religious rights that should be provided by the participant states⁸⁸⁰.

III. 2.1.1. Religion in the EU Documents

In the Amsterdam Treaty, a ‘Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non-Confessional Organizations’ was annexed to the Treaty. According to the declaration that contained only two lines states that “the European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations”⁸⁸¹. While there was no sign to find a place for the religious organizations in the *acquis* of the Community, the declaration has shown a willingness to recognize the place of the religious institutions in public life of the EU.

The second reference to Religion in the EU documents was in the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance (2001). The document makes clear the approach of the EU to the churches as representatives of the people. It reads⁸⁸²:

Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs. Churches and religious communities have a particular contribution to make. The organisations which make up civil society mobilise people and support, for instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination. The Union has encouraged the development of civil society in the applicant countries, as part of their preparation for membership.

⁸⁸⁰ The document states *inter alia*, that states will take necessary measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion; grant upon their request to communities of believers, recognition of the status provided for them in their respective countries; respect the right of these religious communities to establish and maintain accessible places of worship or assembly; organize themselves according to their own hierarchical and institutional structure; select, appoint and replace their personnel in accordance with their respective requirements and standards as well as with any freely accepted arrangement between them and their State, solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions; engage in consultations with religious faiths, institutions and organizations in order to achieve a better understanding of the requirements of religious freedom; -respect the right of everyone to give and receive religious education in the language of his choice, whether individually or in association with others; in this respect, *inter alia*, the liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions; allow the training of religious personnel in appropriate institutions; allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce, import and disseminate religious publications and materials; favourably consider the interest of religious communities to participate in public dialogue, including through the mass media; the exercise of the above mentioned rights relating to the freedom of religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are provided by law and consistent with their obligations under international law and with their international commitments. They will ensure in their laws and regulations and in their application the full and effective exercise of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. Concluding document of the Vienna Meeting of the OSCE, 1989, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1986/11/4224_en.pdf (20 May 2010)

⁸⁸¹ Amsterdam Treaty, Declaration No. 11.

⁸⁸² Commission of the EU, “Governance, A White Paper”, Brussels, 25 July 2001, p. 14, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/en.pdf (22 May 2010).

These lines reflected the liberal ideology prevailing in the EU. The end of the communist systems in Europe weakened the left wing political movements and parties that monopolised the discourse of ‘discrimination’ and ‘exclusion’. Now the church emerging as the defender of the excluded and discriminated, would lead to the consequences but not to the reasons of such a phenomenon.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has reiterated the religion as such⁸⁸³:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

This article was nearly a *mot-à mot* adoption of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights of the UN, Art. 18⁸⁸⁴. Thus the EU made a clear reference to the document of the UN.

The salience of the religious institutions became clear when the Churches participated in the discussions over the future of the EU on the occasion of the Constitutional Treaty⁸⁸⁵. The Roman Catholic Church was especially active in the discussion of whether or not the preamble of the European Constitution shall refer to Christianity as common heritage of Europeans⁸⁸⁶. The Orthodox Church also contributed to the discussion. The representatives of the Orthodox churches gathered in Crete declared that “the Constitutional Treaty should “include explicit reference to Europe’s Christian heritage by means of which the principles and values of the biblical and Graeco-Roman tradition were perpetuated, which with

⁸⁸³ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, C364, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, Art. 10 para 1, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (25 June 2010)

⁸⁸⁴ The United Nations, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, Art. 18, para 1. reads: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching”.

⁸⁸⁵ For an analysis of the debates during the preparation of the Constitutional Treaty see François Foret, “Religion: A Solution or a Problem for the Legitimation of the European Union”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2009, p. 37-50.

⁸⁸⁶ François Foret and Peter Schlesinger, “Political Roof or Sacred Canopy: Religion and EU Constitution”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006, p. 59-81 at p. 74; Danielle Hervieu-Léger, “The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion”, May 2003, p.1, Liz Blunt, “Pope Presses the EU on Constitution”, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3029456.stm>, (26 March 2010)

subsequent cultural elements constitute the foundations on which the modern European construct is founded”⁸⁸⁷.

The declaration made a clear reference to the human rights and religious freedom that “must be safeguarded not only as an individual human right but also as the right of traditional churches and religions of Europe”⁸⁸⁸. The text also included references to biotechnology and the institution of marriage and the marriage and family constituting a response of the Orthodox to the modern issues as human cloning and same-sex marriages⁸⁸⁹. Thus the Orthodox Churches followed the Roman Catholics in fighting secularization in the European zone and tried to preserve their identity through reference to religion. The preamble has not contained reference to Christianity but the claim of the churches to a special status as the carriers of the historical heritage of Europe was responded in the Constitutional Treaty, Art. 52, establishing an ‘open, transparent and regular dialogue’ between them and the European institutions⁸⁹⁰.

The Treaty of Lisbon adopted the idea of Delors and established the idea of a dialogue between European institutions and religions, churches and communities of conviction⁸⁹¹. The Art 8 B-2 reads “the institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society”⁸⁹². The same wording was used for the churches and non-confessional organizations in the Constitutional Treaty, but this time ‘civil society’ –including the churches- replaced the Art. 52⁸⁹³. The Churches has been considered as civil society actors among many others and consider themselves as such thus abandoning their traditional privileged relation with the state to oppose its policies and actions⁸⁹⁴.

⁸⁸⁷ “Conclusions of the Inter-Orthodox Consultation on the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union”, Herakleion, Crete, 18-19 March 2003, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/print/14/10.aspx#4> (4 July 2010)

⁸⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁹⁰ Constitutional Treaty, “Status of Churches and non-Confessional Organizations”, Art. I-52,

⁸⁹¹ Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C115, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 9 May 2008,

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF> (25 June 2010)

⁸⁹² Lisbon Treaty, Art. 8 B 1-2, p. 15.

⁸⁹³ According to the EU definition civil society includes also “organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities”, See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, “The Role and Contribution of Civil Society Organisations in the Building of Europe”, *Official Journal of the EU*, C329, 17 November 1999, p. 30.

⁸⁹⁴ Kalinowski, p. 44.

II. 2. 2. The EU's Vision of the Patriarchate

The transformation of the EC to the Union thus acquiring a political character, the adaptation period of the EU itself to the new world order after the end of the bipolar world, the regional conflicts that broke out in Europe and impotence of the EU in resolving them, the integration process of the ex-communist states, all contributed to the ascension of the religion in European politics. Thus, already by being a religious institution, the Patriarchate got closer to the focus of the Union. Also the Orthodox population of the CEES, divided between national churches and suffering from ethnic nationalism was also a factor that incited the EU to find a solution to the division. The prospective of enlargement to the Orthodox states was to dramatically transform the EU into a multi-religious space. Thus the EU reconsidered the Orthodox Church as an important contributor to the integration process. These points were confirmed by Dositheos Anagnostopoulos who asserted that the EU recognized the importance of the Patriarchate since it began working on the Constitution and it realized the religious diversity of Europe. According to Anagnostopoulos, “The EU suddenly discovered that the Orthodox world is not limited to Russia alone, there are other religious institutions and these had an important role in the *rapprochement* of the religions in Europe”⁸⁹⁵. Moreover the sensitivity of the Patriarch for the environment constituted an important reason why the EU, who shares the same concerns, endorsed the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate was also warmly welcomed by the Muslim world during several visits of the Patriarch to the Muslim countries. Consequently, according to Anagnostopoulos, the Europeans arrived at a conclusion that as a widely respected institution that “can contribute to the world peace”⁸⁹⁶.

The Patriarchate was in the eyes of the EU an ideal alternative that has the capacity to set back the influence of the Moscow patriarchate in the newly independent states and, despite its Greek ethnic base was not a national church like the Orthodox Church of Greece. In a Europe of new ethnic and religious differences, the ecumenical vision of the Patriarchate was in parallel with the vision of the EU, which is itself a supranational institution.

⁸⁹⁵ Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, October 26, 2009.

⁸⁹⁶ *ibid*

III. 2. 2. 1. The Patriarchate and the Commission: Good Partners

In December 2001 upon the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US, the Patriarch and the Commission President Romano Prodi invited a conference that would unite prominent religious leaders of Christian, Muslim and Jewish worlds. The title of the conference was ‘the Peace of God in the World’ and it was held in Brussels under the joint auspices of the Patriarchate and the EU⁸⁹⁷. The conferees signed the Brussels declaration, which, among other things, stated that “it is the responsibility of religious leaders to prevent religious fervour from being used for purposes that are alien to its role”⁸⁹⁸.

The EU Commission sponsored the 2005 “Peace and Tolerance II Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia” meeting organized by the Patriarchate in Istanbul. The message of José Manuel Barroso, the President of the Commission since 2004 to the conference illustrates well why the EU sponsors inter-religious dialogue⁸⁹⁹:

The political changes in Europe and other parts of the world in recent years have been remarkable both in their speed and scale. This global transformation has challenged ideological alignments and longstanding alliances but it has also reinforced the interdependence of nations and regions and the rapprochement between cultures and peoples. Leaders are at the centre of an on-going dialogue to achieve mutual security, reduce tension and confrontation and increase solidarity. (...) Religious communities and spiritual leaders of the three monotheistic religions bear great responsibility in this process of transformation and rapprochement. Conflict, instability and poverty affect us all. Europe will continue to address these issues, to promote stability and peace, not only on humanitarian grounds but also because regional conflicts undermine our efforts to achieve our wider objectives of security and prosperity across the continent of Europe.

⁸⁹⁷ For the full text of “The Peace of God in the World, Towards Peaceful Coexistence and Collaboration Among the Three Monotheistic Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam”, *the Brussels Declaration*, December 20, 2001 see <http://www.Orthodoxa.org/GB/patriarchate/documents/BrusselsDeclaration.htm> (7 December 2008)

⁸⁹⁸ “Religious Heads Condemn Terror”, *CNN.com/world*, December 20, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/12/20/brussels.interfaith/index.html> (10 August 2010)

⁸⁹⁹ Message of José Manuel Barroso, President of the EU Commission on the Occasion of the Conference Peace and Tolerance II, Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Istanbul, Turkey 7-9 November 2005, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=588&tla=en>. (5 June 2009)

In 2005, Commission President Barroso launched an initiative of regular meetings with the representatives of the three monotheist religions. In 2007, the regular meetings started to involve the president of three EU institutions⁹⁰⁰.

Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, the interfaith dialogue was sponsored by the EU. Commission Presidents Romano Prodi and then José Manuel Barroso proved to be very sensitive to the idea of inter-religious dialogue. During this period, the EU co-sponsored several activities with the Fener. In December 2001 upon the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US, the Patriarch and the Commission President Romano Prodi invited a conference that would unite prominent religious leaders of Christian, Muslim and Jewish worlds⁹⁰¹, in 2005, the EU sponsored again the 2005 ‘Peace and Tolerance II- Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia’ in Istanbul. The message of José Manuel Barroso to the conference illustrates well why the EU sponsors inter-religious dialogue⁹⁰²:

The political changes in Europe and other parts of the world in recent years have been remarkable both in their speed and scale. This global transformation has challenged ideological alignments and longstanding alliances but it has also reinforced the interdependence of nations and regions and the rapprochement between cultures and peoples. Leaders are at the centre of an on-going dialogue to achieve mutual security, reduce tension and confrontation and increase solidarity. (...) Religious communities and spiritual leaders of the three monotheistic religions bear great responsibility in this process of transformation and rapprochement. Conflict, instability and poverty affect us all. Europe will continue to address these issues, to promote stability and peace, not only on humanitarian grounds but also because regional conflicts undermine our efforts to achieve our wider objectives of security and prosperity across the continent of Europe.

In both of the occasions religious leaders made a call of peace and repeated that religion cannot be a cause of conflict. The same year Barroso launched an initiative of regular meetings with the representatives of the three monotheist religions⁹⁰³. The EU was so eager to

⁹⁰⁰ See the official site of the EU for the second meeting involving the Presidents of Three Institutions, “Presidents of Commission, Council and Parliament Discuss Climate Change and Reconciliation with European Faith Leaders”, *Europa Press Releases*, 5 May 2008, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/676&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, (26 May 2009)

⁹⁰¹ For the full text of “The Peace of God in the World, Towards Peaceful Coexistence and Collaboration Among the Three Monotheistic Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam”, *the Brussels Declaration*, December 20, 2001, <http://www.Orthodoxa.org/GB/patriarchate/documents/BrusselsDeclaration.htm> (5 November 2007)

⁹⁰² Message of José Manuel Barroso, the President of the EU Commission on the occasion of the Conference Peace and Tolerance II, Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Istanbul, Turkey 7-9 November 2005, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=588&tla=en> (5 June 2009)

⁹⁰³ The European Union official website,

cooperate with the Patriarchate because it was a part of its developing policy of cooperation with the civil society actors including the churches. The Patriarchate had also many advantages. It resides in a city where three monotheist religions have lived side by side for centuries. The Patriarch himself is a Turkish citizen, native in Turkish and Greek. Its church has the tradition to live with the Jews and Muslims. Thus the Patriarchate was a perfect candidate for the EU.

The EU sponsored and was actively involved in the ecologic activities of the Fener. Ecological Seminars organized by the Patriarchate in September 1995 (Revelation and the Environment), in September 1997 (Black Sea in Crisis), and in October 1999 (River of Life) were organized under the joint auspices of the EU Commission. Thus in the 1990s the EU had contributed greatly to the international prestige of the Patriarchate.

III. 2.2. 2. 2. The Patriarchate and the EU Parliament

Another important reason of the EU interest in the Patriarchate was the insistence of Greece to inject the issues concerning the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey in the integration process of Turkey into the EU. Greek government made explicit that problems of the Greek minority in Turkey including the Patriarchate is not subject to bilateral relations between two countries but concerns the EU membership of Turkey. The Greek government succeeded in implanting the issues concerning the Patriarchate in the conditionality clause of Turkey's accession. A good example is the resolution adopted by the Parliament in 1996. Upon the attack on the Patriarchate on 30 September 1996 by the extreme wing organization 'Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' and concerned about the purposes of State Minister Ahmet Cemil Tunç from the Islamist Refah Parti who urged the reconversion of Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque⁹⁰⁴, the Parliament issued a resolution that expressed the "importance of the 'Patriarch of Constantinople' for millions of Orthodox Christians throughout the world" and called calls for the immediate reopening of theological college of Halki, which is directly linked with the Patriarchate⁹⁰⁵.

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/676&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (15 June 2010)

⁹⁰⁴ *Sabah*, August 15, 1996. The Minister of Culture Ismail Kahraman from Refah Parti asserted that the reconversion of the museum was out of question.

⁹⁰⁵ The European Parliament, *Resolution on Violations of Religious Freedom in Turkey*, October 24, 1996

The tone and wording of the resolution led to reactions in Turkey: The Parliament used four times ‘Ecumenical Patriarchate’ and two times ‘Constantinople’ instead of Istanbul. During the 1990s, the EU concentrated its efforts on the reopening of the Halki Theology School, the end of confiscation of the Greek properties and the recognition of the legal status of the Patriarchate. However, the EU had limited –if not at all- effect on the improvement of the conditions of the Patriarchate. The EP has been a staunch supporter of the institution. In 1994, the Patriarch was invited to address the EU Parliament in Strasbourg⁹⁰⁶. The first invitation was an indication of the will of the EU to find a solution to the war in Yugoslavia through soft diplomacy. The Patriarch made clear that religion cannot be a foundation for wars⁹⁰⁷. In 2008, the Patriarch was again invited to address the EPP by its president H. G Pöttering on the occasion of The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue⁹⁰⁸. The EU process provided a platform for different segments in the society of the member and candidate states to express themselves. In a similar vein, the Patriarchate could also express its proper problems before the European institutions. However, in parallel with criticisms, the institution in the person of the Patriarch also promoted the membership prospective of Turkey. Before the EP, the Patriarch declared⁹⁰⁹:

From our country, Turkey, we perceive both a welcome to a new economic and trading partner, but also feel the hesitation that comes from embracing, as an equal, a country that is predominantly Muslim. And yet Europe is filled with millions of Muslims who have come here from all sorts of backgrounds and causations; just as Europe still be filled with Jews, had it not been for the horrors of the Second World War. Indeed, it is not only non-Christians that Europe must encounter, but Christians who do not fit into the categories of Catholic or Protestant (...) One of the vital roles of our Ecumenical Patriarchate is to assist in the process of growth and expansion that is taking place in traditional Orthodox countries, by holding fast as the canonical norm for the worldwide Orthodox church, over a quarter of a billion people around the globe.

The words of the Patriarch were important in the sense that it called not only for the inclusion of the Muslims in the EU membership process but also the inclusion of the Orthodox who had been until then the ‘others’ in the Eastern Europe despite the fact that they are Christians. Different from the Catholics and the Protestants in liturgy, tradition but also by

⁹⁰⁶ Bartholomeos I, “Address to the Plenary of the European Parliament”, Strasbourg, April 19, 1994.

⁹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

⁹⁰⁸ Bartholomeos I, “Address to the Plenary of the European Parliament”, September 24, 2008, <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=23305> (25 February 2009)

⁹⁰⁹ *ibid.*

culture and history, the Orthodox should become a part of the unification process of Europe on an equal footing with other religious groups.

The EP also built close relations with the Patriarchate through ‘Dialogues’ between a coalition of the European Peoples Party [(EPP) Christian Democrats] and European Democrats [(ED) Conservatives] and the Orthodox Church. The EPP-ED that has played a leading role in the Western European scene since the World War II, form the largest group also in the EP⁹¹⁰. The dialogue started on the demand of Patriarch Bartholomeos and came together in Fener on 27-28 April 1996 with an agenda ‘Dialogue on moral values of concern to humanity: The spiritual dimension of Europe’⁹¹¹. The Turkish public opinion was informed about the dialogue between the Orthodox representatives of the European churches and the EPP-ED group during the Istanbul meeting in 2005. The press largely covered the meeting due to a dispute between then ruling *AKP* [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [Justice and Development Party] vice-president Şaban Dişli and Patriarch Bartholomeos over the use of the ‘ecumenical title’⁹¹².

These meetings constituted an international platform for the Patriarchate to underline its international importance and to including the EU to resolve its problems with the state. For the EPP-ED group the meetings were also important since the European enlargement included Orthodox countries. The political union had also religious repercussions. The Christian Democrats and the Conservative Parties historically adopted Christian religion whether in the public policy or in international relations. Just like different Christian denominations moved to work together in order to contribute to the new European realities the EPP-ED group as the largest representative of to people’s Europe endorsed the cultural dialogue between different cultures and traditions. The group met since the outset of the initiative eleven times.

About the international role of the Patriarchate the EP parliamentarians had been clear: They were assessing the issue from a perspective of religious freedoms and human rights. Camiel Eurlings, the rapporteur of the much discussed EP report on Turkey in 2006,

⁹¹⁰ Emiel Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union, (1945/1995)*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997, Stasis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.

⁹¹¹ For the history and context of the dialogues see “Dialogues between the Orthodox Church the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament”, <http://stream.epp-ed.eu/Activities/docs/year2008/dialogues-en.pdf>. (17 July 2009)

⁹¹² *Sabah*, October 21, 2005

asserted that “The Patriarchate should be free to define itself as ecumenical”⁹¹³. Moreover, according to H.G. Pöttering, President of the EPP-ED group Eurlings, “if Turkey fails not open the HTS, Islamophobia would rise in Europe”. According to Pöttering the “Ecumenical Patriarchate represents Europe. The representation of Turkey here is important for the expectations of Turkey on the international arena”⁹¹⁴.

III.4.3. Representation of the Patriarchate at Brussels

The place of Orthodoxy in the EU integration thus in the church associations was weak until the 2004-2007 enlargement of Europe. No Orthodox country was a part of the EU until the entry of Greece in 1981 that made the Orthodox Church a marginal part in the religious map of the EU. In the 2004 enlargement of the EU only Cyprus was –partially- Orthodox. However, the CEES countries that joined the Union were from the influence zone of the USSR and had substantial Orthodox minorities. Moreover, Finland that joined the EU in 1995 accepted the Orthodoxy had a legal position in the country as a state church alongside with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland⁹¹⁵. The admission of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 the Orthodoxy has strengthened its place as a European Church⁹¹⁶.

When Delors initiated dialogue with the representatives of the religions of Europe, he also wanted to integrate the Orthodox in the process. The Protestant and Roman Catholic churches have been already present in Brussels. When the opening of an Orthodox representation came to the fore, the EU wanted to take counselling and address to one center on the issues concerning Orthodoxy. The Patriarchate which is first in the Orthodox hierarchy was regarded by the EU as the right address⁹¹⁷. The EU following the first speech of Patriarch Bartholomeos to the European Parliament⁹¹⁸ asked the Patriarchate to open an office in Brussels. The proposal was discussed and accepted at the Synod⁹¹⁹.

⁹¹³ *Akşam*, October 21, 2005

⁹¹⁴ *ibid.*

⁹¹⁵ For the Finnish Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate see Frederic P. Miller, Agnes Vendome and John McBrewster, *Finnish Orthodox Church*, Hungary: VDM Publishing House, 2009.

⁹¹⁶ Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 53

⁹¹⁷ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 30, 2009.

⁹¹⁸ See Patriarch Bartholomeos, “Address to the Plenary of the European Parliament”, Strasbourg, April 19, 1994.

⁹¹⁹ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

The personal diplomacy of Patriarch Bartholomeos who was able to build good relations with Commission President Delors, and with other EU institutions has certainly had an impact on the EU's request to the Patriarchate. According to Massignon, the Patriarch Bartholomeos engaged personally in opening the representation and visited Delors in 1993⁹²⁰. The representation of the Orthodox in Brussels was important at a time a full scale war, involving the Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims was ongoing in once was Yugoslavia and Orthodox States of the CEES were waiting for accession to the EU.

The Patriarchate asserts that the office has no political but an advisory role unlike the Vatican's representation to Brussels, and "the institution was represented officially at the EU by Turkey"⁹²¹. Nevertheless, the opening of the representation of the Patriarchate was not met with enthusiasm in Ankara. The Patriarch was called by the Governorship of Istanbul and was questioned about the representation⁹²². But Ankara⁹²³ did not consistently oppose the opening of a Patriarchal office at the EU. In contrast with Macar's claim with reference to *Yeni Asya* that the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a declaration in which it asserted that that "the patriarchate has no legal personality and cannot open the representation", the official of the Patriarchate holds that no further news was received from the government⁹²⁴. Turkey was informed, the Turkish ambassador to the EU was engaged in investigating the issue and it was "decided that there would be no problem"⁹²⁵

The representation was finally opened in 1995 under "the name 'Office of the Orthodox Church to the EU'"⁹²⁶. The office is headed by the Metropolitan Emmanuel of France. The financial resources of the Patriarchate are not adequate to support a large staff in the office. Metropolitan Emmanuel resides in France, coming to Brussels occasionally. The total staff of the office is only 3⁹²⁷. However, the representation has an important role in order

⁹²⁰ Bérengère Massignon, "Les Représentations Orthodoxes Auprès de l'Union Européenne: Entre Concurrence Inter-Orthodoxe et Dynamiques de l'Europeanisation", *Balkanologie*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, December 2005, p. 265- 287 at p. 269.

⁹²¹ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

⁹²² In his interview with Elçin Macar, the Patriarch held that "the deputy governor told him not to open the representation", 1 August 1998, quoted by Macar, p. 244. However, Rev. Dositheos held that he was not told "not to open the representation" but rather "it would be better if you'd not open (it)" See 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

⁹²³ The Governorship of Istanbul invites the Patriarchate not on its own initiative but upon a request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Interior in Ankara.

⁹²⁴ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

⁹²⁵ *ibid.*

⁹²⁶ Massignon, "Les Représentations Orthodoxes Auprès de l'Union Européenne: Entre Concurrence Inter-Orthodoxe et Dynamiques de l'Europeanisation", p. 269.

⁹²⁷ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

to build steady relations with the EU institutions, not only for defending the rights of the Patriarchate on the European level but also as a lobbying force for Turkey's EU membership bid.

The name of the representation clearly indicated that the Patriarchate has the claim to represent the Orthodoxy in Brussels. This idea is challenged by other Orthodox especially by Greek and Russian Churches⁹²⁸. The Patriarchate and the Greek Church made an accord in 1998 to cooperate for a joint representation. However, the Greek Church launched the representation in 2003 without informing the Patriarch. The Patriarchate protested this move whereas Archbishop Hristodoulos has made it clear that the Patriarchate of Istanbul has no right to represent all Orthodoxy let alone being an intermediary in its relations with the EU institutions⁹²⁹. The Russian Patriarchate opened its own representation to Brussels in 2002 as a sign of direct challenge to the Fener. The representation was headed by Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev⁹³⁰ and had the aim to represent not only the Moscow Patriarchate but also the Russian Church in the "post-Soviet Space" and Diaspora.⁹³¹ The Russian Representation has been increasingly influential in Brussels, publishing the 'Europaica Bulletin' a trilingual (English, French, German) biweekly journal since November 2002. The intention of the bulletin was 'to present and interpret the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church on the matters related to the process of European integration, as well as on other contemporary issues'⁹³².

⁹²⁸ Both churches accelerated their initiatives in order to open their own representations in Brussels. See Massignon, "Les Représentations Orthodoxes Auprès de l'Union Européenne: Entre Concurrence Inter-Orthodoxe et Dynamiques de l'Europeanisation", p. 270; 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos.

⁹²⁹ See for example "Letter by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate to Mr. Wim van Velzen, Vice-President of the EPP (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats", *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 31, 19 January 2004, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/31.aspx#4> (27 June 2010)

⁹³⁰ Hilarion Alfeyev is a young and outspoken member of the Russian Church well known for his sharp criticism of the Patriarchate of Istanbul. He completed his theological studies in Moscow then completed his PhD degree in Oxford University under the supervision of well known church historian Kallistos (Timothy) Ware. In addition he also held a doctorate of theology from the St. Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris. Due to his ability in foreign languages and intellectual capacities he was appointed as Secretary for Inter-Christian Affairs of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. He served as an Assistant Bishop of the Diocese of Sourouz in Great Britain until his nomination to Brussels representation. In addition to his post in Brussels he's been appointed Bishop of Vienna and Austria, as well as temporary administrator of the Diocese of Budapest and Hungary. See the biography of Hilarion at Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev, <http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/biography> (20 June 2010)

⁹³¹ Hilarion Alfeyev, "Why Does the Russian Orthodox Church need a Representation in Europe?", *Europaica Bulletin*, No.1, November 26, 2002, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/22.aspx> (2 July 2010)

⁹³² Editorial, *Europaica Bulletin*, No.1, November 26, 2002, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/22.aspx> (2 July 2010)

The Russian church is highly implicated in the European affairs even though Russia is not a part of the integration strategy. However, the faith of the Orthodox in the post-soviet zone, the will to assert the leadership of Orthodox in the relations with other Christian denominations and also with the European institutions. The participation of the Orthodox churches in the European public sphere is nevertheless a good sign towards the 'Europeanization' of the discourse and acts of the Orthodox.

III. 3. Turkey and the Patriarchate in the EU Integration Process

In the second half of the 1980s, the Patriarchate was a dwindling institution. In 1980, Greek minority had already lost a substantial part of its members. It is impossible to say precisely how many Greeks there were in Turkey in 1980s because censuses contained no questions on ethnicity or religion after 1965. But a statistic of the pupils in Greek minority schools may give an idea. In the school year 1951-1952, 5.424 students were enrolled in Greek schools. In the school year 1974-75 the number fell to 2012. In 1980 the number was only 811. During the 1980s the number of students in Greek schools fell continuously. In 1995 there were only 306 pupils in all Greek schools.⁹³³ The collapse in numbers of Greeks in Istanbul after the 1974 period is striking, without any overt attack towards Greeks. Cyprus crisis, anarchy, military coup, economic and political instability in Turkey in contrast to successful transition to democracy and membership of the EC in Greece, made the latter a better place to live for the Greek minority⁹³⁴.

The isolation of the Patriarchate at home was also bound to the isolation of Turkey. While Turkey was struggling with internal instability, it was regularly condemned by the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe for human rights violations. In the second half of the 1980s however, the will of integration of Turkey in the western alliance again and the changing conditions in the world politics had placed the Patriarchate again in the domestic and international agenda. In Turkey three years after the military coup, a civilian government under the leadership of Turgut Özal came to power. Özal was a convinced liberal, near to the American policy circles and he was determined to change the foreign policy of Turkey to make it more compatible with the country's economic needs. While the new

⁹³³ School statistics delivered to the author by Dimitris Frangopoulos, former principal of Zografion Elementary and High School, Istanbul., March 17, 2007.

⁹³⁴ Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, p. 332-333.

government was trying to integrate Turkey in the western alliance, the Cold War was nearing its end in line with Gorbachev reforms. It was time to determine new roles to play in foreign policy in Turkey. Özal regarded Cyprus and other thorny issues with Greece as a major obstacle for developing better relations with the West aware that modernization of Turkey depended on integration with Europe. As a part of the liberalization policy of Turkey on 14 April 1987 an application for EC membership was submitted by the government of Turgut Özal⁹³⁵. Simultaneously the Özal government recognized the right of individual application to Turkish nationals to the ECHR. The multiplying cases against Turkey would be one of the reasons the country had to undertake reforms within the Turkish reform process for EU membership.

The EC process of Turkey was blocked by Greece who overtly contested the Turkish application to the EC. Greece made it plain that it expects a favorable settlement in Cyprus before it will endorse Turkey's bid for membership. The Davos process that started between Turkey and Greece in 1988 was the fruit of an attempt of Turkey to anchor in the EC. Turkish politicians made remarks concerning the impact of the process for Turkey's bid for EC membership⁹³⁶. The press supported the Davos process, celebrating it as a first step on a long, thorny way⁹³⁷. A concrete result of the will of being a part of the Western family manifested itself in a renewed interest in the Patriarchate. The Özal government who built good relations with the US did not want any problems that would harm this relationship. The first step had been the meeting of Özal with Archbishop Iakovos of America. Özal issued the permission for Iakovos who was declared *persona non grata* and banned from Turkey. This was followed by Iakovos's first visit to Turkey in 1 September 1985. During this visit the Archbishop asserted that he was willing to mediate between Greece and Turkey.⁹³⁸ In return of the mediation efforts, Archbishop Iakovos asked the permission of restoration of the central wooden building of the Patriarchate destructed completely in a fire in 1941. When Iakovos met Turgut Özal for the first time during the Premier's visit to the US this problem was

⁹³⁵ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations", London School of Economics and Political Science Hellenic Observatory 1st PhD Symposium on Modern Greece, Symposium Paper, 21 June 2003.

⁹³⁶ Ali Bozer, Minister of EC Affairs: "Davos AT ile ilişkimizi etkileyecek [Davos will Affect our Relations with the EC]", *Cumhuriyet*, February 14, 1988.

⁹³⁷ Mehmet Ali Birand, "Artık iş bundan sonra başlıyor [The Real Job begins Now]", *Milliyet*, February 2, 1988, Altan Öymen, "Davos'ta Hiçbir Şey Olmadı Demek Yanlıştır [It is Wrong to Say Nothing Has Happened at Davos]", *Milliyet*, February 2, 1988.

⁹³⁸ *Hürriyet*, September 2, 1985.

launched by the Archbishop and had met positive echo from Özal. In October 1985, Iakovos said at a meeting of the archdiocesan Council in Manhattan that he received assurances about the reconstruction when he met with Özal⁹³⁹. Despite some bureaucratic problems the necessary permissions were provided with the involvement of the US government and even the WCC for the restoration of the Patriarchate in 1987⁹⁴⁰. In the period after the obtainment of the permission, meetings between Iakovos and the Turkish government intensified. The Archbishop acted as a mediator between the Greek and Turkish governments to improve the relationships longtime neglected especially under the extremely anti-Turkish Papandreu government. When Özal and Papandreu finally met in Davos, Iakovos asserted that he was “the architect of the Davos summit”⁹⁴¹

The last step in Turkey was the reception of Patriarch Dimitrios by Turkish president Turgut Özal in 15 December 1989. After the reception of Patriarch Athenagoras by Celal Bayar in 1952 this was the first encounter of a Patriarch with a Turkish president in 37 years⁹⁴². This reception was due to several factors. Özal had already met with Archbishop Iakovos that represented the Patriarchate in America several times during the Davos process. Thus meeting with a prelate was not a taboo with him. Secondly, meeting with the Patriarchate would probably ease the tension between Greece and Turkey and comfort the European institutions who were not satisfied with the minority rights protection in Turkey. Özal also was aware of the new role of the Patriarchate while the Cold War was coming to an end. The return to religion in these countries where the Orthodoxy is the main denomination would open new doors for the Patriarchate. Turkey that was increasingly interested in the Post-Soviet zone should not be left aside of this new process.

III. 3. 1. The EU Effect in the Policy Change

Until the end of the 1990s, the EU had little –if not at all- effective in changing the perspective of Turkey towards the Patriarchate. The EU was considering the issue within the general framework of religious rights and minority rights protection in the country. The

⁹³⁹ *The New York Times*, October 26, 1985.

⁹⁴⁰ Şahin, p. 310; *Hürriyet*, July 19, 1986; “Primate Acting to Ease Greek-Turkish Hostility”, *The New York Times*, December 11, 1987, For more details see George Lemopoulos (ed.), *The Ecumenical Movement, The Churches and the World Council of Churches*, Bialystok: Orthdruk Orthodox Printing House, 1996.

⁹⁴¹ *Hürriyet*, February 16, 1988.

⁹⁴² Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 232.

Turkish application was already rejected by the EC in 1989. When the EU moved to integrate the post communist CEES, the rules for the admission were set in the Copenhagen criteria that we mentioned above. The EU failed to include Turkey in the enlargement process until 1999. Basically the shortcomings of Turkey identified by the EU were the “overwhelming statist and nationalist doctrine of the Turkish state that engendered domestic political practices” that was conflicting the ‘European values’ such as the protection of human rights, rule of law and a working democracy. The remains of the military coups that interrupted democracy four times (1960, 1971, 1980 and indirectly in 1997), such as the coup constitution, the national security council, state control over all aspects of religious life, human rights violations and insufficient minority protection were the major concerns of the EU⁹⁴³.

In 1997 Luxembourg Council, the EU did not recognize the candidate status to Turkey. Whereas a general membership perspective was already included in the Association agreement of 1964 (Art. 28), the conditionality regime under the 1993 Copenhagen criteria was not concretized since 1999.

III. 3. 1. 1. The Patriarchate in the Progress Reports of Turkey

However, according to the Cardiff Council decisions a progress report on Turkey was issued in 1998. Already in 1989, the Commission opinion on Turkey’s application for membership of the community examined the political situation in the country. The opinion stated that successive reforms had resulted in “a parliamentary democracy closer to Community models”. The opinion noted however, that “although there have been developments in recent years in the human rights situation, and in respect for the identity of minorities, these have not reached yet the level required in a democracy⁹⁴⁴”.

The Helsinki European Council (1999) gave Turkey accession country status. Thus the Copenhagen criteria have become a part of the democratic transition of the country. Steps towards democratic change had begun before Helsinki Council, but since then the reform

⁹⁴³ Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, “Cost, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, p. 495-518 at p. 506.

⁹⁴⁴ Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, “AT’yle İlişkiler [Relations with the EC]” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. II: 1980-2001 [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Present: Concepts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol. II, 1980-2001]*, 2nd ed., İstanbul: İletişim, 2002, p. 83-101 at p. 100.

process became more institutionalized and consistent⁹⁴⁵. Many of the democratic changes concerned the human rights. The reform process led to the democratization of the country linked to the country's EU integration process. Like other candidates, Turkey has received annual Commission Progress reports which review the domestic regulations in parallel with the criteria.

With the recognition of Turkey's candidacy, Turkey also received its first Accession Partnership in March 2001. The Accession Partnership set out a list of short and medium term priorities. Turkey had to undertake reforms in order to have candidature for EU membership in the second half of the 1990s, and when it became a candidate, it had to adopt sweeping political reforms in order to fulfil the EU's accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin. The EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated the Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey⁹⁴⁶.

The EU's main tool for inducing national political change is its conditionality for membership. After the 1999 Helsinki summit, the issue of the Patriarchate came to the fore as the EU included the demands of the Patriarchate in the integration process of the EU. The progress reports since 1999 has become increasingly detailed and assertive on the problem of human rights and minority rights. In 2000, after one year Turkey received its first report, the closure of Halki Seminary was enshrined in the report under the Human Rights and Minority Rights provisions⁹⁴⁷. The increasing concern of minority rights in Europe since the end of the Cold War was discernible in the Commission's growing sensibility year by year. The EU considered the closure of the seminary violation of the religious rights of the Greek minority.

The approach of the EU towards the issue reflects the liberal-democratic political systems of the member states that have been founded on the separation of church and state⁹⁴⁸.

⁹⁴⁵ Natalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p. 73-83, at p. 74.

⁹⁴⁶ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p. 17-31 at p. 18.

⁹⁴⁷ Commission of the European Communities, "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession", 8 November 2000, p. 18.

⁹⁴⁸ The EU member states have variable degrees of secularism. According to Robbers, the first category contained states where the religious institution has a legal status of a state church. Britain, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, and Malta are in the first category. The second group contained legal systems where there is a strict separation of the church and state. France, with the exception of three departments of the East, the Netherlands and Ireland. The third type is marked by separation of state and church but many tasks are conducted jointly while the state and church are constantly in relation. Belgium, Poland, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Germany are in this category. See Gerhard Robbers, "Données

The religious freedom including the right to train clergy is considered as a part of religious rights. According to Audi, “a liberal democratic society conceived as a free society, must protect religious liberty, this is at least a strong *prima facie* reason for its avoiding the establishment or promotion of any particular religion”⁹⁴⁹. Turkish understanding of secularism that consists of an extensive state control over the religion has never been openly criticised but it was considered at odds with European practices. According to Stepan, in the Western European democracies “a democratically negotiated freedom of religion from state interference and all of them allow religious groups freedom not only to worship privately but to organize groups in civil society and political society”⁹⁵⁰. The practices of the states differ from country to country in the EU zone but even in France where the harshest separation of Church and State occurred in the 18th century different Christian denominations control their religious education free of state interference. For example, St. Serge Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris works under the spiritual authority of the Fener. It does not receive any financial help from the state, depends on the donations but it is free to choose the curriculum or conditions of admission for its students⁹⁵¹.

Since 1998, the EU monitors Turkey’s progress towards accession and issues regular reports. Until 2001, there was no specific mention of the Patriarchate in the reports. In 2001, the progress report criticised the lack of legal status of the churches in addition to the HTS question⁹⁵². The progress report underlined that “Christian churches continue to face difficulties, in particular with respect to ownership of property. (...) The lack of recognition of the legal status of various churches creates a number of constraints, including access to Turkey by ecclesiastic personnel”⁹⁵³. The legal personality question has also been important for the EU that follows the practices of the OSCE and the CoE. It is noteworthy that the same year, both organisations worked on the church-state relations and religious freedom. The OSCE document states that “if a participating state chooses to impose local or national

Sociologiques et Historiques” in Gerhard Robbers (ed), *Etat et Eglises au sein de l’Union Européenne*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997, p. 625-638 at p. 627-628. For the legal status of the churches in the European states see Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, October 2000, p. 37-57 at p. 41.

⁹⁴⁹ Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square: the Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate*, Maryland: Rowman and LittleField, 1997, p. 2.

⁹⁵⁰ Stepan, p. 42.

⁹⁵¹ Electronic correspondence with Tatiana Bonneville, St Serge Orthodox Theological Institute, Chargée de Mission, 10 March 2010.

⁹⁵² Commission of the European Communities, “Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, November 13, 2001, p. 27.

⁹⁵³ *ibid.*

registration requirements, such requirements should not become a precondition for the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set out in OSCE documents”⁹⁵⁴. Thus the state is not obliged to recognize a legal status to the church but should ensure the enjoyment of rights of freedoms. The CoE from its part organized a Seminar where the participant churches underscored the “need to grant religious believers and representatives the right to freedom of association through the establishment of a legal entity (...)”⁹⁵⁵. Thus both documents have a liberal approach. While the religious association laws are important to acquire legal personality, religious groups/organisations should not be forced to register. In the case of the Patriarchate, the Turkish state does not recognize an opportunity to the Patriarchate to register as such. The lack of legal personality causes the expropriation that drains the financial sources of the institution.

The progress report of 2003 was a watershed for the Patriarchate. The Commission for the first time included the recognition of the ‘Ecumenical’ character of the Patriarchate as a precondition of the accession of Turkey in the EU⁹⁵⁶. The report underlined that the Patriarch was not free to use publicly its ‘Ecumenical title’, giving as an example the 2003 prohibition of the Turkish authorities of the officials to attend a lecture delivered by Patriarch Bartholomeos I because the invitation “referred to the Patriarch as Ecumenical”⁹⁵⁷. Thus since 2003, legalization of the ecumenical title of the Patriarchate by Turkey became a component of the conditionality clause for Turkey. Together with the opening of the HTS this issue had been one of the challenges that the county had to deal in its relations with Europe. The insertion of the problem of “title” in the progress report of the Commission might be an outcome of the discussions over the religion during the Constitutional Convention. The Churches were involved in the open discussion about the reference to Christianity in the Constitution preamble. The Commission, taking into consideration the growing importance of the churches in the European public sphere have made a “gesture” to the Patriarchate.

⁹⁵⁴ OSCE Seminar on “Freedom of Religion or Belief in the OSCE Region: Challenges to Law and Practice”, Hague, 26 June 2001, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2001/06/1523_en.pdf (12 April 2010)

⁹⁵⁵ CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Conclusions of the Seminar Concerning Church-State Relations in the Light of the Exercise of the Right to Freedom of Religion, Strasbourg, 10-11 December 2001, <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=981163&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBC2F2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864> (10 April 2010)

⁹⁵⁶ Commission of the European Communities, “2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, Brussels, 8 November 2003, p. 35

⁹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

However a more important reason of the inclusion of the “ecumenic” title in the progress report is the Greek government’s decision to support the Patriarchate. According to the Greek press, the Greek government briefed the Foreign Office to endorse Fener on the international place and to promote Bartholomeos as the leader of world Orthodoxy⁹⁵⁸. This move as we will see in the following pages was an outcome of Greek Church-State conflict that sparked with the reform process undertaken by the Greek government in order to comply with the EU standards. In order to contain pretensions of an anti-western, anti-reformist Archbishop Hristodoulos, the chose to endorse Bartholomes. Therefore, Greeks started to lobby at the EU on behalf of Bartholomeos.

The progress reports of 2004 and 2005 reiterated the problematic issues such as the continuing closure of the HTS, the difficulties encountered by the foreign clergy and the ban on the use of the ecumenical title. In addition to the 2004 report, the Commission criticised the bombed attack to the Patriarchal building⁹⁵⁹. In 2006, additionally, the Commission suggested that Turkey should provide opportunities for private higher education for non-Muslim communities⁹⁶⁰. In 2007, the Commission Report made reference to the Turkish Court of Cassations ruling upon a case against the Patriarchate. The report reads⁹⁶¹:

In June 2007, the Court of Cassation ruled on a case against the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Court acquitted the accused. However, it also concluded that there is no basis in Turkish legislation providing that the Patriarchate is ecumenical; that the patriarchate is a religious institution which has no legal personality; that persons who participate and are elected in religious elections held in the Patriarchate should be Turkish citizens and be employed in Turkey at the time of the elections. This decision potentially creates further difficulties to the Patriarchate and to other non-Muslim religious communities in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under the ECHR.

The Commission assessed further that the “environment as regards freedom of religion has not been conducive to the full respect of this right in practice”⁹⁶². The Commission was not alone in criticising the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Cassation that we will further explore in the following sections. This issue had much echo in Europe in

⁹⁵⁸ Curanović, p. 310.

⁹⁵⁹ Commission of the European Communities, “2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, Brussels, 6 October 2004, p. 44; EU Commission, “Turkey 2005 Progress Report”, Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 31.

⁹⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2006 Regular Report”, Brussels, 8 November 2006, p. 16.

⁹⁶¹ Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”, Brussels, 6 November 2007, p. 17.

⁹⁶² *ibid.*

2007 and was considered as a major breach of the rights of the Patriarchate. Greece was especially active in order to raise consciousness against Turkey that does not recognize the ‘ecumenical title’ of the institution. In 2008, the wording of the progress report has not much changed. Again, the legal personality issue, problems stemming from the closure of Halki, difficulties encountered by foreign clergy to obtain work permits, and the prohibition of the use of ‘Ecumenical title’ were reiterated. However, this time, the stance of Premier Erdoğan who asserted that use of the title “ecumenical” should not be a matter on which the State should rule has met with enthusiasm at the Commission.⁹⁶³

The 2008 report recited the general difficulties encountered by religious minorities and repeated the concerns over the use of the ecumenical title of the Patriarch, difficulties stemming from the lack of the patriarchate’s legal personality and the difficulties in training clergy⁹⁶⁴. The report also mentioned Turkish Premier Erdoğan’s statement “the title ecumenical was not a problem on which state should rule” and considered this a positive development⁹⁶⁵.

Finally in 2009, the Commission found that there was some progress in the patriarchate-state relations given the fact that the government issued work permits for the foreign clergy⁹⁶⁶. The report also asserts that Turkish law prohibits for foreign nationals to participate and being elected in religious elections. The Commission suggests that “Turkish and foreign nationals should be treated equally as regards their ability to exercise their right to freedom of religion by participating in the life of organised religious communities in accordance with the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR⁹⁶⁷”.

The Commission is not clear why this issue should be viewed as a part of “religious freedom “. While foreign nationals may vote in a religious election which is not a concern of the state. But election of foreign nationals to posts in Turkey, is a concern of the country because depending on its domestic law, a state may agree or not on issuing visas and work permits to foreign nationals. The suggestion of the EU is without substance and implies a

⁹⁶³ Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”, Brussels, 5 November 2008, p. 19.

⁹⁶⁴ Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, Brussels, 5 November 2008, p.19.

⁹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶⁶ Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2009 Progress Report”, Brussels, 14 October 2009, p. 21.

⁹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

extra-territorial status for the Patriarchate rather than promoting “religious freedoms”⁹⁶⁸. The EU is certainly not convincing as it applies strictest visa regime for foreigners to the point of being criticised as “fortress Europe”⁹⁶⁹. The EU also has a problem to convince Turkey in adopting the ‘European standards’ for that it is hardly possible to discern the standards in EU member countries. There is no regulation at the EU level that can force Turkey to recognize the ‘ecumenical title’ of the Patriarchate. It seems that the Commission has adopted a gradual insertion of the rights that it deemed necessary for the accomplishment of religious freedoms. Moreover, starting from the beginning of the new millennium the EU adopted a stricter adherence to the human rights in general including the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that paved the way for the Constitutional Treaty. Moreover, the envisaged enlargement of the EU with the CEES that have substantial Orthodox populations forced the Commission to be closely interested to the requests of the Patriarchate.

III. 3. 2. Discussions over the Patriarchate

Since mid 1990s, Turkey has been going through a democratization process that would bring the country in line with the requirements of the EU. These included, constitutional reforms, amendments for liberalization and democratization and civilianization of the country⁹⁷⁰. Until very recently little progress was experienced on the way of solving the main grievances of the Patriarchate that may be enumerated as follows:

1. The recognition of the ecumenical status of the Patriarchate
2. Reopening of the HTS
Difficulties in finding clergy endowed with Turkish citizenship to be elected Patriarch and Metropolitans.
3. Lack of legal standing that led to the confiscation of the Patriarchate’s property.

Let us now examine the steps taken in Turkey for every single article of the Patriarchate’s demands:

⁹⁶⁸ For a legal overview see Özel, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu*, p. 113-114.

⁹⁶⁹ See for example Hans-Jörg Albrecht, “Fortress Europe: Controlling Illegal Immigration”, *Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Justice*, 2002, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2001, p. 1-22.

⁹⁷⁰ See for example Serap Yazıcı, “The Impact of the EU on the Liberalisation and Democratization Process in Turkey” in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2001, p. 91-102.

III. 3. 2. 1. Discussions over the Ecumenical Title of the Patriarchate

After the end of the Cold War the Patriarchate intensified its international activities and insisted on using the ecumenical title on the international platforms. That was no problem internationally as the Orthodox Church and the world at large recognized and has been already using the ecumenical title of the Patriarchate. However, this created problems in Turkey that does not recognize the title fearing that it would give the Patriarchate an ‘extra-territorial’ status that would undermine the Turkish law. It is claimed that the international activities of the Patriarchate would not be noticed had he not started to use the ecumenical title⁹⁷¹. On the contrary, the title came to the fore on many occasions under Patriarch Bartholomeos because he was active, travelled and was invited to many international platforms compared to his predecessors. Moreover, the Patriarchate received many high level personalities who addressed and saluted him as the Ecumenical Patriarch.

There is a great difference between the Turkish and the Patriarchate’s perspectives over the role and responsibilities of the institution. According to Rev. Anagnostopulos:⁹⁷²

The Russian Patriarchate and others views Istanbul as a centre of coordination. The Patriarchate is not a monochrat sovereign like the Papacy. This means that when the Patriarch engages in dialogues with the Protestant or Catholic Churches, it informs other Orthodox churches. Those churches can talk to Rome or to the Protestants. But the coordination, which is the meaning of the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate, belongs to Istanbul. They see it this way. They have no religious differences but administrative differences. Even the administrative differences are solved in here, Istanbul.

According to the Patriarchate, the actual meaning of the ecumenical is mainly a role of coordination between the independent churches that form the broader Orthodox world. The rights of the Patriarchate do not imply an absolute supremacy or undisputable hierarchical supremacy over other Orthodox churches.

In Turkey, the structure of the Orthodox world, divided between autocephalous churches is not fully understood. The official approach on the Turkish side can be described as ambivalent at best. There is no unanimity among the ruling elite of Turkey concerning the title of the Patriarchate. Especially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is divided

⁹⁷¹ Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler-II [Relations with Greece-II]” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. II*, p. 440-480 at p. 450

⁹⁷² 1st Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopulos.

between those who defend that the Ecumenicity of the Patriarchate does not concern Turkey and consider it purely an Orthodox affair, and those who indicate the dangers of such a title. There is also confusion and contrast among the government circles as we have witnessed during the last five years of the AKP government.

İnal Batu, a retired diplomat defends that Turkey shouldn't care whether the Patriarchate is called ecumenical or not. From an instrumentalist point of view, the diplomat advances that the institution is an asset and advantage for Turkey⁹⁷³. For Batu “this issue together with the reopening of the HTS are among the acute problems of the Turkish diplomacy, unresolved for years due to the impotence of the Turkish politicians. Due to the reciprocity clause of the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish governments had been reluctant in solving these problems when Greece was restricting the rights of Turkish minority in Western Thrace”⁹⁷⁴ Şükrü Elekdağ, retired diplomat and member of the parliament finds that if Turkey accepts the ecumenical title of the Patriarch Fener may become an independent religious authority. According to Elekdağ, “such an empowered Patriarchate would be at the service of the Greek State”⁹⁷⁵. Halil İnalçık, one of the prominent Ottoman historians voiced his concern about the ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate, claiming that the Patriarchate was not ecumenical even under the Ottomans and the claim only serves to Greek aspirations in Turkey for that “every Greek lives with the megali idea”⁹⁷⁶.

The ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate involved the judiciary as well. The Court of Cassation, in rejecting an appeal brought by members of the Synod of the Patriarchate against a decision of a local court surrounding the case of priest Konstantin Kostoff from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Turkey, reasoned that the patriarchate “has only religious powers as the church of the Greek minority in Turkey” and affirmed that “there is no legal foundation of the ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate”⁹⁷⁷. This ruling had large echo at the

⁹⁷³ Interview with Inal Batu.

⁹⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁹⁷⁵ *Milliyet*, July 5, 1990.

⁹⁷⁶ İnalçık'tan Ekümenik Uyarısı [Ecumenical Warning from Halil İnalçık], *Star*, March 02, 2008.

⁹⁷⁷ Yargıtay 4. Ceza Dairesi [Court of Appeals, 4th Criminal Division], Merits.2005/10694, Decision No. 2007/5603, Date. 13 June 2007, *İstanbul Barosu Dergisi*, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2007, p. 2848; A conflict arose including some members of the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate in Turkey and the Patriarchate that escalated with the dismissal of Konstantin Kostoff, head priest of the Bulgarians by Patriarch Bartholomeos I for his refusal to commemorate the name of the Patriarch in liturgy. The original documents of all imbroglio are exposed in a book written by an old member of the Bulgarian Exarchate Foundation's executive committee, who was the main intruder of the conflict. See Bojidar Çipof, *Patrikhane ile Mücadelem: Bulgar Eksarhlığı Vakfı'nda 15 Yıl*, İstanbul: Bojidar Çipof Kitapları, 2010, p. 459-645.

European Union with the concentrated efforts of Greece. A joint communiqué was issued on 23 July 2007 by Wilfred Martens President of European People's Party and Dora Bakoyannis, Foreign Minister of Greece, on "Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate"⁹⁷⁸. The report criticised the Court's decision in a hardly diplomatic manner. The report held that the decision "intervenes in issues of purely religious nature and, in an attempt to minimize the religious role of the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, rules on the ecclesiastical title of the Ecumenical Patriarch, who has been the head of the Orthodox Church worldwide since the 6th century AD"⁹⁷⁹. The communiqué called Turkey to recognize the institutions international character.

The Patriarch himself, tried to make clear the institution's stance over the ecumenical title in a number of interviews and declarations in Turkey. He asserts that all the world recognizes the Patriarchate as ecumenical, its official title. According to Bartholomeos, Fener has metropolitanates all around the world and his spiritual leadership extends to all Orthodox. This is "an historical title, not invented by the actual Patriarch so there is no question of giving it up"⁹⁸⁰. According to the Patriarch in a secular state there should be no interference in the internal affairs of Orthodoxy. He also asserts: 'We do not have a dream of being a state. Even though they proposed to me I would say no', also adding that a Vatican like state is against the Orthodox tradition and canon law⁹⁸¹.

The Patriarch tried to refute claims that if it becomes ecumenic, a Vatican-style state will be founded at the Fener. The sharp difference between the visions of the Patriarchate and the Vatican is clear. The Pope's authority is supreme and undisputable. As the head of the Catholic Church and the head of the state of Vatican City, the Pope's authority is political and spiritual. This status considers the possibility of the Fener to form a new independent, international state, and to establish rights and authority in world affairs following the path

⁹⁷⁸ "Joint Communiqué regarding Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate", *Joint Communiqué by Mr Wilfried Martens, President of the European People's Party and Ms Dora Bakoyannis, Foreign Minister of Greece on Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, Brussels 23 July 2007, http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/230707_McC1219.htm (10 August 2010)

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁸⁰ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, *Sabah*, November 19, 2006; Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos; "The Patriarchate is Ecumenical", *Hürriyet*, 30 June, 2006.

⁹⁸¹ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, *Sabah*, November 19, 2006; Speech of Patriarch Bartholomeos at the 9th Annual International Meeting Among the Orthodox Church and the EPP-ED, *Hürriyet*, October 30, 2005.

established by the Vatican. However, the Fener does not have the characteristics to establish a similar state that would find international acceptance and authority enjoyed by the Vatican.

The Vatican was recognized as a state by Italy, with the Lateran Treaty of June 1929⁹⁸². The Treaty contained provisions with which Italy recognized the sovereignty of the Holy See in international relations (Art. 2) and recognized “full possession and exclusive and absolute power and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican”.⁹⁸³ In international law, recognition of an entity as a state before the ‘parent state’ express its consent could be considered a violation of the territorial integrity of the parent.⁹⁸⁴ Thus the consent of Turkey to recognize a religion-state in the Fener would be necessary in order to recognize the Fener as a state, even if every other condition for statehood is accomplished. That makes the claim that the Patriarchate become like the Vatican is an argument of little substance. Moreover, the Catholic Church developed over the centuries as a highly organized institution, hierarchically structured, with one supreme leader, the Pope, to whom all other members of the Church owe obedience. No other religion can make this statement as persuasively as the Catholic Church⁹⁸⁵.

Orthodox churches are autocephalous run by their respective Synods. The Patriarch may safeguard Orthodox unity through the convening of a pan-Orthodox Synod but cannot impose his will on the other three older (Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem) and newer patriarchates (Moscow, Romania, Serbia, Georgia, Bulgaria) and the autocephalous churches. In short, the Patriarch of Istanbul is first among equals but has no power to interfere in the internal affairs of other churches. The Orthodox churches lack a centralized administration and a well defined religious supreme centre. That makes claim to international personality and recognition necessary for the statehood for the Patriarchate. A religion-state of Fener is impossible in the sense that it cannot represent all Orthodoxy and Orthodox states, led by Russia would object to any attempt to such recognition.

⁹⁸² Philip Bernardini, “The Lateran Concordat with Italy”, *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, April 1930, p. 19-27; André Géraud, “The Lateran Treaties: A Step in Vatican Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1929, p. 571-584.

⁹⁸³ Lateran Treaty, cited in Bernardini, p. 20.

⁹⁸⁴ Matthew N. Bathon, “The Atypical International Status of the Holy See”, *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 34, 2001, p. 597-632, at p. 628

⁹⁸⁵ *ibid*

References to any possibility of a Vatican-like existence is refuted by the Turkish Premier Erdoğan. Upon the questions of his party's members over Patriarchate's buying of property in the old Istanbul area, he replied: "Anyone who buy terrain and houses cannot build a state. Do you think that is so easy? A child's toy?"⁹⁸⁶. The official stance over the ecumenical status of the Patriarchate has been changing. During the same meeting, Erdoğan, this time upon a question over the 'ecumenical title' of the Patriarch, he replied, "Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror did not interfere in the ecumenicity of the Patriarch. He had self confidence. So we have."⁹⁸⁷ During the visit of the Greek Premier Karamanlis who requested the recognition of the ecumenical title of the Patriarch, Turkish premier Erdoğan asserted: "This issue concerns only the Christian Orthodox world"⁹⁸⁸. Ali Babacan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time furthered this assertion, adding: "when we look at the issue from a broader perspective, considering the position of Turkey and Istanbul, we have to look at the issue form a different angle"⁹⁸⁹.

These two perspectives imply a change in the official position towards the Patriarchate. This meant that the understanding calculating that every step of the institution was a part of a bigger conspiracy theory aimed against the integrity of the country was replaced by a broader perspective considering the role played by the institution in the Christian world. It is possible to assert that this change had been enforced by the multiple demands of the USA and the EU for the Patriarchate. However, more important than this, the democratization process of the country that led to a more favorable environment for free expression also led to a change in the Turkish official position.

III. 3. 2. 2. Reopening of the HTS

III. 3. 2. 1. Official Stance

The reopening of the HTS became one of the major foreign policy problems of Turkey in the post Cold War era. We have already mentioned above that Turkey had to encounter extensive pressure from the EU and the US during this period for the reopening of the school since the end of the 1990s. The weight of the EU was important in the consideration of the

⁹⁸⁶ *Hürriyet*, September 27, 2007

⁹⁸⁷ *ibid.*

⁹⁸⁸ *Sabah*, January 24, 2008.

⁹⁸⁹ *TRT News*, January 25, 2008.

reopening of the school. The problem however, is to find a formula that would not contradict the demands of the Patriarchate and would be conform to the constitution and laws of the country.

First news about the reopening of the school, came right before the Luxembourg Council of 1997 that would consider the candidature of Turkey to the EU together with other countries of the Eastern and Central European States, Malta and Cyprus. Before the summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a suggestion to the government asserting that “the issue of the theology school unnecessarily harms the image of Turkey abroad. Its reopening would be good for our foreign relations”⁹⁹⁰. Upon the suggestion, the issue was considered at the MGK (Council of National Security). What is interesting was that the reopening of the school had been viewed as “throwing an olive branch to Greece”, for that it would not object the membership prospective of Turkey⁹⁹¹. Therefore the Patriarchate was identified with Greece even though the institution is Greek by ethnicity but Turkish in law.

Turkey was denied the candidature status at EU Luxembourg summit in 1997, and successive crisis’ with Greece brought two countries at the edge of a war at the end of the 1990. Still, Patriarchal circles dispatched that President Demirel privately supported the move⁹⁹². According to a fact sheet issued by the Archons of the Patriarchate, Demirel gave assurances to Bill Clinton in November 1999⁹⁹³. Thus the government started to reflect on a formula. However, there were many difficulties stemming from the existing laws whether the school was considered providing a high school or university diploma⁹⁹⁴. First step was taken upon the government and the National Security Council’s demand by YÖK (Council of Higher Education) that decided to found a ‘Department of Culture of World Religions’ in Istanbul University, on a meeting on September 21, 1999⁹⁹⁵.

The decision was a fait accompli, taken without demanding the avis of the university or the theology faculty, let alone the avis of the religious leaders. The decision was not held at

⁹⁹⁰ *Hürriyet*, November 28, 1997.

⁹⁹¹ *Hürriyet*, November 27, 1997.

⁹⁹² “Historic Seminary in Halki is Ready but Empty”, *The New York Times*, August 7, 2000.

⁹⁹³ “Call to Action, The Imperiled Future of an Essential Religious Institution in Istanbul Turkey, Explanatory Documents”, *Order of St. Andrew the Apostle, Archons of the Patriarchate*, www.archons.org, p. 40

⁹⁹⁴ For a legal overview of the regulations and laws impeding the reopening of the Seminary see Özel, *The Heybeliada Seminary and the Patriarchate*, p. 31-37

⁹⁹⁵ Interview with Zekeriya Beyaz, *Hürriyet*, January 1, 2000.

the university senate. The Dean of the Theology Faculty appointed Prof. Zekeriya Beyaz as the head of the department⁹⁹⁶. In the founding statute of the department there was no reference to the Greek Orthodox Theology School. According to Beyaz, “our university is Muslim, Turkey is Muslim but the university will give the education about Christianity to Christian citizens, and Judaism to Jewish citizens”⁹⁹⁷. Thus the government envisaged to give religious instructions to the members of the world religions, within the auspices of the Muslim theology faculty, with muslim professors. Religious leaders had not replied affirmatively to the call of Beyaz upon this formula. However, we should note that this attempt had been used since then as an argument for the good will of the government towards the reopening of the HTS and the uncooperativeness of the Patriarchate. For example, in a fact sheet on the Greek minority in Turkey prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is asserted: ‘We approach the reopening of the HTS in terms of religious freedom. In this vein, we understand the need of the Greek Orthodox Community to train its clergy. We proposed the reopening of the HTS under the aegis of one of the state universities in Istanbul in 1971 and in 1999. So far, we haven’t received a positive signal in this regard. In other words, our two proposals to overcome the current legal hurdle were rejected by the Patriarchate’⁹⁹⁸.

In February 24, 2004, *Hürriyet* published the original of a secret circular issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, signed by Ömer Dinçer, undersecretary of the Prime Minister (Date 05.01.2004-No. B.02.0.GIB/465-01/03530), disbanding the ‘Azınlıklar Tali Kurulu’ (Minority Subcommittee) that was founded on a regulation by the Office of the Prime Minister, with a regulation dated 07.11.1962/ No. 28-4869 on the ‘control of the minorities for the security of the country’. The new regulation, founded a new body, called *Azınlık Sorunlarını Değerlendirme Kurulu* (The Council of Assesment of the Minority’s Problems) composed of the representatives of the State Ministry, Directorate General of Foundations-DGF, the Foreign Ministry and the MNE⁹⁹⁹. According to *Milliyet*, the reopening of the school had been impeded by the Minority Subcommittee According to the document of the Minority Subcommittee, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a circular (Date 19.04.2000, No.

⁹⁹⁶ See interview with Şinasi Gündüz, Dean of the Theology Faculty, Head of Department of the History of Religions at Istanbul University, *Zaman*, June 7, 2009.

⁹⁹⁷ Interview with Zekeriya Beyaz. *Hürriyet*, January 1, 2000.

⁹⁹⁸ *Greek Orthodox Minority in Turkey*, March 2008, Fact sheet sent to the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2008,

http://www.teviana.at/v1/0_public/TRK/documents/GREEKORTHODOXMINORITYINTURKEY.pdf (9 June 2009)

⁹⁹⁹ “İşte o Gizli Karar” [Here is the Secret Decision], *Hürriyet*, February 2, 2004

B.02.0GIB/465-02-03/00983), urging for the opening of the HTS within the ‘Department of the World Religions Culture’. However, as a result of a meeting of the Commission, an avis was issued, declaring that the opening of the HTS within the mentioned department was not possible because it would imply a change in ‘our national policy’ and the ‘political document on national security’ and that the issue should be assessed at the MGK¹⁰⁰⁰.

With the government of the AKP, a somewhat more sympathetic approach had been developed towards the request of the Patriarchate to reopen the school. In 2003, Patriarch Bartholomeos visited Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, right after the signing of the 7th harmonization package for the EU, to ask the reopening of the school. Gül has reportedly conveyed warm messages that was interpreted as a “visa for the theology school”¹⁰⁰¹. The Patriarch also visited Premier Erdoğan with the lawyer of the Patriarchate Kezban Hatemi. Despite being sympathetic to the reopening of the school, Erdoğan reminded the ‘reciprocity clause’ to the Patriarch and said that “Greece has to take some steps too”¹⁰⁰². But Erdoğan, during his visit to the Western Thrace, replied to Mufti Mehmet Emin Aga who stated his opposition to reopening of the school, “No harm will come to anybody from education”¹⁰⁰³. Bartholomeos also visited the Minister of National Education Hüseyin Çelik who asserted that “Freedom of education on christian theology is a necessity of the democratic foundation of the Turkish Republic”¹⁰⁰⁴.

The AKP leadership comes from an Islamist background and is sympathetic to the requests of the religious communities for that the same would be applicable to the Muslims as well. The insistence of the US and the EU on the reopening of the school had given a chance for the party to assert that they want freedom of religion for all, and not only for the Muslim voters of the party. On the other hand, being pragmatic politicians, with strong economic ties with the Western world, the AKP consider the power and weight of the institution on the international scene. However, as the decision of the reopening of the school would raise nationalistic reactions in Turkey and there is a highest chance that the opposition would bring the issue before the constitutional court, the AKP is reluctant to take radical steps to solve the

¹⁰⁰⁰ The date on the document is 09.05.2000. The original of the document published in *Milliyet*, April 27, 2009

¹⁰⁰¹ *Yeni Şafak*, August 9, 2003

¹⁰⁰² *Radikal*, 28.08.2003

¹⁰⁰³ *Zaman*, August 10, 2003

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Hürriyet*, October 30, 2003

problem. The fear for nationalist reaction led the leadership of AKP to underscore the reciprocity clause of Lausanne. However, the approach from the reciprocity perspective was from the very beginning condemned to failure. Before the publication of the plan, Athens replied at the Ministerial level “that the issue of Heybeliada has nothing to do with reciprocity. This problem has to be solved within the frame of the EU *acquis communautaire*”¹⁰⁰⁵.

Right before the 2004 EU summit and the visit of Erdoğan to the US, the efforts of the Patriarch bear some fruit. The Foreign Ministry together with the President of YÖK Erdoğan Teziç, with the consent of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, agreed for a new formula that would give way to the reopening of the school. The precondition for the reopening of the school was the allowance of Greece of more Turkish teachers in Celal Bayar Lyceum in Komotini (Gümülcine) in Western Thrace¹⁰⁰⁶. Erdoğan Teziç, President of YÖK, said ‘The school, like its status before closure, will give an associate degree programme. The last decision will be taken by the Council of Ministers and the problem would be solved. The school cannot be attached to a university or a theology faculty. If you take the school within a university, you would legalise religious clothing, meaning head scarf at the universities. This school has a *sui generis*, special situation¹⁰⁰⁷. He also asserted during a meeting with a Patriarch that “the school was not related to YÖK, it was just a vocational school and there were no legal objections for the re-opening of the school”¹⁰⁰⁸.

There was another point in the plan that needs to be analysed further. The plan suggests a 2 years program. But the theology section of the Heybeliada Seminary was providing education of 3+1 years before being closed. Thus, if the plan had been adopted, there would be a degradation of the education at the seminary. If the Patriarchate had refused the offer, it would be accused by rejecting the offer. If it did accept, it would provide a poor education to the higher clergy of the future. An other interesting development about the HTS was the request of the Foreign Ministry to government and the MGK (National Security Council) to discard the mentions about the Theology School in the Political Document on National Security (Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi) that was considered as the “hidden

¹⁰⁰⁵ “Atina Heybeli Jestinde Yok”, *Radikal*, November 12, 2003

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Radikal*, July 9, 2004

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Radikal*, June 20, 2004

¹⁰⁰⁸ Interview with Bartholomeos, *Milliyet*, December 5, 2005.

constitution” of Turkey as a threat to National Security. The diplomatic sources asserted that “Fener Patriarchate cannot be a threat for Turkey. The reopening of the school will be a political decision of the government¹⁰⁰⁹. Thus a change in the official stance of the state towards the Patriarchate had been suggested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The suggestion of the MFA was adopted for the new term and the terms concerning the Theology school were excluded from the new text of the political document¹⁰¹⁰.

It is also important to note that, the Ministry, as well as the President of the YÖK Teziç, asserted that the re-opening of the school was a “political decision” and not a legal procedure. Thus it is possible to assert that the failure of the reopening of the school had been an outcome of a political impotence rather than legal obstacles. The political will of the AKP government is disputable. We have already mentioned that Premier Erdoğan, reminded the reciprocity condition in order to open the school.

In summer 2009, Turkish media started to report that another attempt at opening the school had been started. However, the issue was held in the Council of Ministers several times, and the political decision was taken in order to open the school for the school year 2009-2010, and before the EU Progress report of 2009¹⁰¹¹. The inclination of the government had been that a political would be sufficient for the reopening of the school without any change in the constitution and existing laws¹⁰¹². In June 2009 the Turkish Culture Minister Ertuğrul Günay suggested that the Turkish government was willing to reopen the Greek-Orthodox seminary on the island of Heybeliada, saying “I believe that the school will be open soon. The seminary does not currently fit into our university system, but another formula will be work out. There are no political problems, we work on technicalities. The school was open, and it was closed during the Cyprus embroglio”¹⁰¹³.

Thus the closing of the school was considered as a political decision due to the Cyprus problem. Following this statement, Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s chief negotiator with the EU,

¹⁰⁰⁹ “Ruhban Tehdit Değil”, *Radikal*, November 28, 2004

¹⁰¹⁰ “Ruhban Okulu için MGK Hazır” [The Council of National Security is ready for the Theology School], *Radikal*, June 4, 2005.

¹⁰¹¹ “Ruhban Okulu Eğitim Yılına Yetişir” [Theology School will be Open until the School Semester], *Hürriyet*, June 15, 2009.

¹⁰¹² *ibid.*

¹⁰¹³ “Kültür Bakanı Günay: Ruhban Okulunu Açacağız” [Minister of Culture: We Will Open the Theology School], *Radikal*, June 28, 2009.

acknowledged that Turkey should open the seminary “in order to introduce services to meet the needs of Turkish citizens”, noting that Greek Orthodox community is of Turkish citizenry, and so the reopening of the seminary was an internal political issue for Turkey and he personally considered the issue as a human rights problem. However, he also asserted that Greece should take similar steps in order to solve the problems of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, thus relating the problem of the reopening of the school to the reciprocity clause of Lausanne¹⁰¹⁴. Patriarch Kyrill of Moscow, in his visit to Turkey said that the Halki Seminary would be opened soon. The Patriarchate does not know about the processus, more than information that they hear that the government was about to examine again the issue but no one called them for information or cooperation yet¹⁰¹⁵.

The hope that the school may be reopened shortly stem from a report prepared for Minister of Education Nimet Çubukçu. A report was drawn up by Ministry bureaucrats, aimed solely to brief Çubukçu, and the suggestions within the report are not fresh. The report focuses on two separate options for reopening the Halki seminary. According to the first option, the high school section of the seminary would be under the authority of the Education Ministry, while the senior high school or academy, would function under the authority of the YÖK. Both moves under the first option necessitate the enactment of legislation. The second option in the report envisions opening the seminary within the body of a foundation. The MNE, also considers that the seminary at the time functioned under the Directorate General for Private Education Institutions and that the seminary was closed because it was a senior high school¹⁰¹⁶.

It is not possible to reopen the entire seminary under the MNE, the report asserts, noting that only the high school part can function under the Education Ministry provided that necessary amendments on the Law for Private Education are made since private education institutions cannot open religious and military schools under the existing law¹⁰¹⁷. Yet having those amendments may bring the same opportunity of opening private high schools to various other religious communities and orders, which is the source of concern. On the other hand, an

¹⁰¹⁴ *NTV* News, June 29, 2009

¹⁰¹⁵ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos and Metropolitan Apostolos Danielidis, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

¹⁰¹⁶ “Ruhban Okulu Açılıyor!” [Theology School Opens!], *Vatan*, 28 June 2009.

¹⁰¹⁷ MEB Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu [Ministry of National Education, Law on Institutions of Private Education], No. 5580, Date 8.2.2007, Part II, Foreign Schools and Minority Schools, Art. 3, para. c, , *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 14 February 2007, http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/26434_0.html. (12 August 2010)

amendment which would apply only to the Halki seminary is also problematic because it would be in violation of the principle of equality within the Constitution.

The Education Ministry's plan for the senior high school, or academy, of the Halki seminary to function under the authority of YÖK also requires amendments in the law regulating YÖK¹⁰¹⁸. Similar debates had been undertaken in the 2004 move of the government and the parties could not agree as the lectures to be provided at the Halki Seminary are not in compliance with the goals and principles of universities¹⁰¹⁹. The Patriarchate does not wish to fall under the scope of YÖK asserting that the school should function under its previous statute before the closing, as a vocational school for priests, under the supervision of the MNE, and the curriculum should be determined by the Patriarchate under its supervision. If the school is considered as an institution of higher education, the dress code for universities within the law regulating YÖK would be another problematic point, as was discussed in the past because lecturers and students at the seminary would be clerics wearing traditional clothes. Thus there should be some necessary legal arrangements in order to provide the school a certain degree of autonomy as for the police and military schools. However, the government fears the reaction of the nationalist opposition parties that asserted upon the news considering the reopening of the Seminary, negative avis, in the past. Moreover, if the school was to be reopened the opposition parties would definitely bring the issue before the Constitutional Court which would be a blow for the authority of the government. All in all, the re-opening of the school had been a subject to many confrontations, political negotiations and legal objections.

While the discussions over a workable solution to reopen the school, the Council of Europe made a contribution to the problem, suggesting that the HTS might be open as a Department of the Faculty of Galatasaray University¹⁰²⁰. This suggestion prepared by French member of the Parliamentarian Assembly Michel Hunault, has the marks of the French

¹⁰¹⁸ Yavuz Ercan, "No Easy Formula for Resolving Halki Seminary Issue", *Today's Zaman*, June 30, 2009.

¹⁰¹⁹ 8. Yükseköğretim Kanunu [8th. Law on Higher Education] , No. 2547, Resmi Gazete [Official Journal], 6, 11, 1981, Art. 4 reads that the aim of higher education is to educate students as the citizens devoted to Atatürk nationalism directed by the reforms and principles of Atatürk, who bear the national, moral, humane and cultural values of the Turkish nation, who feel the honor and dignity of being a Turk, who are aware of their duties and responsibilities towards the State of the Turkish Republic and who take action for these.

¹⁰²⁰ Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1704 (2010), "Freedom of Religion and other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece)", 27 January 2010.

experience on the Orthodox education. As we have mentioned before, in Paris, Academie Orthodoxe St. Serge, a theology faculty under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarchate works under the French law. St. Serge Orthodox Theological Institute is a private establishment of higher education, recognized by France and functioning under the Academy of Paris. The school has Bachelors of Art, Masters and Doctoral degrees¹⁰²¹.

III. 3. 2. 2. Patriarchate's Views on the Opening of the HTS

While the deadlock over the reopening of the school could not be overcome, the Patriarchate started to give signs of change. The will for cooperation came from the Patriarchate's spokesperson Rev. Dositheos who asserted that the Patriarchate was ready to discuss the possible options for the reopening of the school that meant that they would not insist on the reopening of the school under its previous statute. Because, he asserted "the Patriarchate wants to educate priests"¹⁰²². The Patriarchate wants the school to be opened as soon as possible without being able to produce working solutions. According to Patriarch Bartholomeos¹⁰²³:

the need for training clergy is very urgent. We have a dwindling community here. It is difficult to find the youth wanting to be priests already. Those who were sent to the theological academy in Thessaloniki by the Patriarchate do not come back, clergy in Turkey is very elderly, and the Patriarchate has difficulties in filling the ecclesiastical ranks. When the last generation of clergy will die, the Patriarchate may fade away. The re-opening of the school has nothing to do with the question of ecumenical status. We want to train clergy in Turkey, if few students come from the regions under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate this doesn't mean that the Patriarchate tries to assert its ecumenical status. All Orthodox churches around the world have their theological schools, even the tiny Orthodox Church of Finland, and the Patriarchate doesn't, the worst being that it had once and it was shut down by the government which is unconceivable.

The Patriarch also asserts that they do not want any extra-territorial status and autonomy from the government control as it is often claimed. The school was a minority vocational school and it should not be closed at the first place. According to the Patriarch, the

¹⁰²¹ "St. Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute (Paris, France)", *OrthodoxWiki*, [http://orthodoxwiki.org/St._Sergius_Orthodox_Theological_Institute_\(Paris,_France\)](http://orthodoxwiki.org/St._Sergius_Orthodox_Theological_Institute_(Paris,_France)) (13 August 2010); See the official website of the Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge, http://www.saint-serge.net/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=1 (13 August 2010)

¹⁰²² Ayça Örer, "Heybeliada Çözülmüştür" [Heybeliada Problem has been Solved], Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, *Taraf*, July 10, 2009.

¹⁰²³ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, July 15, 2009.

school has always been under the supervision of the government under different laws and they have no desire to change this status¹⁰²⁴. The Patriarch also went on to say that ex Minister of National Education Hüseyin Çelik visited the Patriarchate, said that ‘if I were the one to decide, the school would be open tomorrow’.¹⁰²⁵

According to Metropolitan Apostolos Danielidis, the principal of the school, the government wants to open the school and has already offered several choices, including the school being opened under a university. However, says the Metropolitan: “we are training Orthodox priests, we have rules. For example women cannot be educated in our seminary. If it is the YÖK that is in charge how are we going to have a say on the persons that would be admitted to the school?”¹⁰²⁶.

In brief Greek Patriarchate wants to educate its own clergymen in line with its own curriculum, under the supervision of the state by reopening the HTS. It stipulates that potential students would come from Turkey and from regions under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The main request of the Patriarch is to open the Seminary closed in 1971 under the statute determined in 1951. The statute would be a ‘private school’ affiliated with the Ministry of National Education¹⁰²⁷. However, reopening the school under its previous status seems impossible under the present law. If the institution is considered a minority high school, the HTS cannot accept foreign students because in Turkey only Turkish nationals have access to minority schools¹⁰²⁸. The school under the MNE would be a private institution of education. Under the present law private institutions cannot open schools providing military, police and religious instruction-education¹⁰²⁹. Therefore, reopening of the school under its previous status doesn’t seem plausible and the Patriarchate should reconsider its position on the status and conditions of the reopening of the HTS.

¹⁰²⁴ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, July 15, 2009.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁶ Interview with Apostolos Danielidis, , Heybeliada, August 13, 2008.

¹⁰²⁷ Macar and Gökaçtı, p. 27

¹⁰²⁸ MEB Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu [Ministry of National Education, Law on Institutions of Private Education], No. 5580, Date 8.2.2007, Part II, Foreign Schools and Minority Schools, Art. 5, para. c/1, , *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 14 February 2007, http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/26434_0.html.

¹⁰²⁹ *ibid.*, Part II, Art. 3.

The claim that the Patriarchate doesn't desire the state supervision is totally refuted by the Patriarchate. According to Rev. Dositheos¹⁰³⁰

Some people claim that the Patriarchate doesn't desire the state control. This is not true. The school has always been under the state supervision. We do not care whether it is the YÖK or the MNE that would supervise the school. Whichever is the institution that will supervise the school, we do accept. Supervision is desirable. We are submitted to the Turkish Republic's law. If it is not the YÖK which will supervise the school, I don't know who will. But our desire was...The school to be open like in the past, admissible for citizens of Turkey and foreigners, only men, Christians –as it will be a vocational school for priests it would be unnecessary to admit Muslims and Jews, they cannot become priests-, if the school can function in the monastery, and foreign teachers, acceptable for the Ministry of National Education of course can work there, we do accept the supervision of the YÖK or MNE.

The Patriarchate is willing to reopen the school that it views as a major problem of the institution. However, there is no unity in the Patriarchate about how to open the school and under which conditions. While some clergy, including Patriarch prefers the reopening of the school under its previous status, *i.e.* a vocational school under the MNE, some started to voice different opinions. According to Rev. Dositheos, it is possible to find a conciliatory formula if representatives from the Patriarchate goes to Ankara and discuss the options for the reopening of the school. He asserts that the re-opening of the school under its status in 1971 seems absurd. Different options, including the foundation of a theology faculty that would teach the Orthodox theology of the east has been discussed between the prominent members of the Greek minority and the clergy¹⁰³¹.

III. 3. 2. 2. 3. Academia's Division over the Opening of the HTS

The academia is also divided over the issue of the opening of the HTS. One group is assessing the issue within a framework of minority rights and religious rights of the Greek Orthodox whereas the second group is concerned that reopening of the school would breach the principle of equality between the minority and majority, would lead to a reassessment of the country's law, bolster Patriarchate's ecumenical pretensions and create major problems in

¹⁰³⁰ 1st Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, October 26, 2009.

¹⁰³¹ *ibid.*

regard of the Islamic groups that would want to found their own private schools to train their own imams.

From a perspective of the first group, Macar holds that training of the clergy is the major problem of the Christians in Turkey. While in Islam there is no need for clergy, in Christianity it is not possible to worship without them¹⁰³². A secular state should not train clergy. Each religious community should train their own clergy with their own funds, their own curriculum under the supervision and control of the state. State's training of the clergymen is contrary to the principle of secularism¹⁰³³. In a book co-authored with M. Ali Gökaçtı, he asserted that issue should be assessed independent from the struggle between Islamist and extremely secular groups in Turkey. There is a need to abstain from the nationalist discourse, that assess the issue as "immunity demanded" by the EU and the U.S. The prevention of the training of the clergy is discriminatory towards minorities. If the intervention of international community is undesirable, this conflict should come to an end. Legal status of the religious communities and their Patriarchates should be defined in order to find a solution to the problem. As vocational religious high schools already exist in Turkey, Christians should have equally their schools to train their clergy for one or two years after high school. The closure of the HTS constitutes a violation of the Lausanne Treaty. Art. 40 that guarantees equal rights for the minorities in founding all kinds of religious, social, or educational institutions¹⁰³⁴. The school was closed under a disputable law that was unrelated to the HTS. The school should be opened as a Patriarchal seminary under its status prior to its , with a right to admit foreign students¹⁰³⁵.

In a similar vein Selim Deringil asserts that "the 1982 Constitution recognizes the freedom of religion, everyday new Imam Hatip schools are opened. How one can contradict the theology school? (...) Education of students that would come from Greece and the island may only be a source pride for Turkey"¹⁰³⁶

¹⁰³² Elçin Macar, "Dünden Bugüne Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Sorunu [Problem of Heybeliada Theology School from the Past until Today]", *Gündem*, December 2003, p. 57

¹⁰³³ *ibid.*

¹⁰³⁴ Elçin Macar, "Çözüm Gibi Çözüm Şart", [www. bianet.org](http://www.bianet.org) (28 May 2008)

¹⁰³⁵ Macar and Gökaçtı, p. 28-29.

¹⁰³⁶ Selim Deringil, "Fener Patrikliğine Sahip Çıkalım" [Let's Look After the Fener Patriarchate], *Milliyet*, March 17, 1995.

On the other hand, there are many authors who staunchly oppose the reopening of the Patriarchate. According to Sibel Özel, the opening of the HTS is a “symbol of the ecumenical pretensions of the Patriarchate” and should be assessed from a purely legal perspective¹⁰³⁷. She asserts that¹⁰³⁸:

the closure of the Heybeliada Seminary is lawful and its reopening is possible only on condition that it is lawful. The Seminary cannot function as an international theological school, meaning with an extra-territorial status, independent of Turkish laws. The State of Turkish Republic shall handle the matter on a legal ground and shall make evaluations around the framework of legal principles whatever exterior pressures are exerted.

The legal framework under which the issue should be assessed is provided by the Turkish Constitution, YÖK Law, Law on National Education, principles of international law and the Lausanne Treaty. Each of the aforementioned legal instruments works against the reopening of the school¹⁰³⁹. Art. 24 of the Turkish Turkish constitution para. 3 envisages that “religious and moral education and instruction is provided under the supervision of the state”¹⁰⁴⁰. Thus an independent theology school from the state control is unacceptable¹⁰⁴¹. However, it is not clear in that assertion why the authors claim that the Patriarchate wants to open an independent school, as far as the Patriarch and spokesperson of the Patriarchate, made clear that the Patriarchate does not desire to open a school independent from the state control. Moreover the school functioned lawfully until its closure in 1971. This suggestion has been made by Macar and never by the Patriarchate.

An other major point raised by various authors is the incompatibility of the requests of the Patriarchate with the Lausanne Treaty. According to Özel, “the Art. 40 brings negative rights, meaning the right of equal treatment like other citizens. The Art. 40 does not assert that minorities can found pious, religious, social institutions or schools. What is important is that

¹⁰³⁷ Özel, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu*, p. 14.

¹⁰³⁸ Özel, *The Heybeliada Seminary and the Patriarchate*, p. 65-68. For a similar perspective see Salim Gökçen, “Fener Rum Patrikhanesi’nin Hukuki Statüsü ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nu Açtırma Girişimleri”.

¹⁰³⁹ Emruhan Yalçın, *Son Haçlı Kalesi*, Ankara: Elips, 2009, p. 127; Özel, p. 142; Salim Gökçen, “Fener Rum Patrikhanesi’nin Hukuki Statüsü ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nu Açtırma Girişimleri”, *Türk Yunan İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Görüşler*,

http://www.turk_yunan.gen.tr/turkce/makaleler/heybeliada.htm (28 May 2009).

¹⁰⁴⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey], Law No. 2709, Date. 7 December 1982, *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 9. 11. 1982-17863 (Mükerrer-Concurrent).

¹⁰⁴¹

the minority should have equal rights with the majority. The key word is “equal treatment” and “equal rights”¹⁰⁴².

We should note that “equality” as a driving principle of the protection of minorities is not a sufficient concept by itself. Minorities are inherently disadvantaged because they are subordinated to a legal framework designed for majority needs. In the words of Uçarlar, “the state makes a national law, which is ostensibly equally valid for all citizens living in the national territory although (...) it is designed in compatibility with the majority concerns”¹⁰⁴³.

Taking into account of the need for supplementary measures in order to protect the identity of minorities, international legal instruments were developed by the UN, Council of Europe and the OSCE to set-up minimum standards for minority protection. Whereas domestic law varies from one state to another, the work of these institutions constitutes a major reference point. International legal instruments prohibit discrimination and place on an equal footing every individual notwithstanding he or she belongs to the majority or minority group¹⁰⁴⁴. But as Benoit Rohmer observes, “principle of non-discrimination is not in itself sufficient to preserve the identity and specific characteristics of minority groups”¹⁰⁴⁵. States should take some extra measures in order to help the minority to preserve and develop its identity. In general international treaties are jealously safeguarding state’s interests, recognition of collective rights to minorities are regarded as destructive for state sovereignty¹⁰⁴⁶. Despite that fact, several legal instruments were developed in order to force the states to undertake necessary measures in order to help the minority to preserve a specific culture, language, religion etc.¹⁰⁴⁷.

¹⁰⁴² Sibel Özel, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu*, p. 150-151.

¹⁰⁴³ Nesrin Uçarlar, *Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey*, Lund: Lund University, 2009, p. 46.

¹⁰⁴⁴ See for example UN Declaration Art. 2 and 7.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Florence Benoit-Rohmer, *The Minority Question in Europe: Texts and Commentary*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1996, p. 16.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Helen O’Nions, *Minority Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, p. 269.

¹⁰⁴⁷ See for example Coouncil of Europe, “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, 1.2.1995, Art. 4.2 and 5.1, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm> (12 August 2010); UNESCO, Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Art. 5.c, 14 December 1960, http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/DISCRI_E.PDF (15 August 2010).

III. 3. 2. 2. 4. New Formulae to Reopen the HTS

Among the discussions about the Patriarchate, a timely proposition came from Hasan Celal Güzel, for the reopening of the school. Güzel asserts that the school can be reopened within a private foundation university according to the 1982 Constitution that allowed the private universities. The Patriarchate has no legal entity but it has foundations like Aya Triada and Agios Georgios¹⁰⁴⁸. Therefore the school may be founded by the foundations that have a legal personality. This option seems plausible as foreign students can apply to such a university and be selected according to the requirements of the faculty. The main problem in this suggestion is that under the YÖK law, all students that want to enter a university, be it a state or private one, should undertake the examination organized by YÖK. In this system, the foundation cannot make a discrimination according to the religion or sex of the candidate. Only with a special arrangement, as it is the case for the arts faculties that organize their own examination, supplementary to the examination of the YÖK, the Patriarchate may interfere in the selection of the candidates.

Ayhan Aktar also contributes to the suggestion of Güzel, asserting that as according to the YÖK law, a university has to have at least two faculties, one of them may be Faculty of Orthodox Theology that would give education in Greek language and the other Science and Literature, probably giving education in English language. According to the YÖK regulations, foreign students can apply to study at this university and foreign professors also can work according to the laws applicable to everybody. For the Science and Literature section, students may be admitted with the ÖSS (student selection examination). Thus women and students from all religions may be enroll in the faculty, if special arrangements are not undertaken. It would be a Theology Faculty for everyone¹⁰⁴⁹.

The centralized admission system is to be applicable for the theology students as well, thus Muslim students from Turkey and elsewhere would be admitted to the department in order to study Orthodox theology. According to the YÖK law, foundations may open

¹⁰⁴⁸ Hasan Celal Güzel, "Ruhban Okulu Nasıl Açılabilir?" [How to Open the Theology School?], *Radikal*, 10 April 2009.

¹⁰⁴⁹ "Ruhban Okulu Nasıl Açılabilir?" [How to Open the Theology School?], *Taraf*, April 13, 2009

vocational schools, if necessary¹⁰⁵⁰. Thus at the university of the foundation, the Patriarchate may also open a school for training clergy, under the supervision of the YÖK.

This would be an outstanding opening for the Patriarchate, which in the past had been a pioneer for revolutionary moves among conservative Orthodox Churches. A move in that direction may also be taken with the cooperation of Greece as a symbol of the friendship between two countries. A similar faculty of theology could be built in Western Thrace, again with the cooperation of the two countries. This kind of an undertaking would also end the isolation of the Patriarchate in Turkey. Thus, cooperation of the Patriarchate, government and the opposition parties is essential for the building of the confidence between them.

III. 3. 2. 2. 5. Training Clergy: The French Example

In Europe, as we have mentioned in the introduction, there are various approaches to church-state relations, making it impossible to talk about one standard European *laicity*. In the case of training clergy, practices also change following the traditions, history, constitution and politics of the country. However, as Turkey models largely its laicity from the example of French, which resides on the control of the state over religion rather than state indifference to religious practices and education, it would be fair to look at the practices of clergy training in France.

In France, due to the separation of church and state under the 1905 Act, the training of religious personnel follows fairly complex rules that varies according to religion.

For Catholics, each diocese chooses candidates after two a cycles study in the "seminars". These seminars, which are from 2 to 4 years depending on the region, prepare candidates for the priesthood with an alternation of practice and theological courses, including an internship. These are not "schools" as such. Consequently, they are not under the control of the Ministry of National Education pedagogically but administratively. Currently, there are 20 "seminars" that include approximately 800 candidates to the priesthood¹⁰⁵¹.

¹⁰⁵⁰ YÖK Law 2547, additional Art. 2.

¹⁰⁵¹ "Comment Devenir Pretre?", *Catholique Diocese de Nanterre*, http://catholique-snanterre.cef.fr/faq/pretres_formation.htm#entrer (13 August 2010)

The training of Orthodox priests in principle is provided in a seminary or a religious academy, Orthodox high rank clergy are often trained in Russia, in the United States or in Greece. St. Sergius Institute in Paris is the only training site in Western Europe for the future Orthodox priests. As we have already mentioned this Institute is a private school financed by the Orthodox community in France¹⁰⁵².

For Muslim imams, they are overwhelmingly trained and sent by Muslim countries especially the Maghreb countries and Turkey from where the majority of French Muslims are originated. Over the past ten years the French government encourages the opening of training seminars for imams in France to train imams according to French republican values. There is already a training program within the Catholic University of Paris. Strasbourg was also chosen for such training since the University of Strasbourg hosts since 2009 a Master of Islamic Studies¹⁰⁵³.

III. 3. 2. 3. The Legal Status of the Patriarchate

In the post Cold War period, the lack of a legal personality of the Patriarchate has been one of the main difficulties of the institution in Turkey. Under the Turkish Republic the church was not recognized as a legal entity. Thus the state has ignored the institution. The only undertaking of the state towards the patriarchate was the Istanbul governor's circular sent to the Patriarchate in 1923, urging that the elected Patriarch should be a Turkish citizen. Moreover, the metropolitans that were now beyond the borders of new Turkey were exempted from the elections. According to Alain Juster the legal void concerning the conditions of existence of the Patriarchate totally submitted the institution to the Turkish government. However "the geographic limitation of the activities of the Patriarchate and the real role of the institution in the Orthodox world were not in parallel"¹⁰⁵⁴.

A recent undertaking of the Patriarchate resumes the whole confusion over this issue. In 2004, the Patriarchate appointed six foreign clergy coming from the Metropolitanates to the

¹⁰⁵² Grigorios Papatomas, "La Formation du Clergé au sein de l'Église Orthodoxe" in Francis Messner and Anne-Laure Zwilling, *La Formation des Cadres Religieux en France: une Affaire d'Etat*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010 (forthcoming)

¹⁰⁵³ Samim Akgönül, "Imams en France ou Imams de France: Attentes de Formation, Réalités du Terrain" in Francis Messner and Anne-Laure Zwilling (eds.), *La Formation des Cadres Religieux en France: une Affaire d'Etat*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010 (forthcoming)

¹⁰⁵⁴ Juster, p. 53.

Holy Synod of the Patriarchate¹⁰⁵⁵. According to the Patriarchate, “the Greek community is too small and the clergy limited while some members of the Synod were very old and some very ill. Thus to exercise its responsibilities properly, the Patriarchate has undertaken the necessary arrangements. We feel deeply upset by the misinterpretation and politicization of this issue by some people”¹⁰⁵⁶.

According to the Patriarch, the appointment of the foreign clergy at the Holy Synod in Istanbul was an outcome of a democratic process, “because those metropolitanates under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate would not like to be under the orders of the Patriarchate only but to assist to the decision making process”¹⁰⁵⁷. However, this posed a problem in Turkey, as if foreign nationals become metropolitans, the new Patriarch may be a foreigner as well. This was a main concern because if a foreign national is elected to the Patriarchate which is not legally possible, this would poison relations between Turkey and the Patriarchate, would involve the US and the EU and the state of the new Patriarch”¹⁰⁵⁸. As the Patriarchate does not have legal personality, it cannot be the employer of the foreign clergy and request for work permits. Thus the foreign members of the Holy Synod come to Turkey every month, like tourist, stay for a few days and go back to their countries. The problem is more acute for the foreign nationals working at the Patriarchate. Among the 13 clergy working for the Patriarchate, 9 are foreign nationals (8 Greeks and 1 American). They also were obliged to stay in Turkey with tourist visas and had to travel every three months. The Patriarch made 19 demands to the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of National Education but had no reply until November 2008. Then the Patriarchate was informed that the clergy would be endowed with residence permits, but not the work permits. The Turkish government tolerates the “illegal” employees of the institution¹⁰⁵⁹.

The lack of legal status had been protested by the Patriarchate in the international platforms and had been also criticized in the US Department of State’s Religious Freedom Reports and the EU’s progress reports for Turkey. According to Yuda Reyna, if the religious communities are accepted as legal entities, the Patriarch or the Chief Rabbi would be able to

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Hürriyet*, March 5, 2004.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Hürriyet*, March 9, 2004. The half of the 12 members of the Synod change every six months.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, June 15, 2009, Heybeliada

¹⁰⁵⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁹ 1st Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 26, 2009.

represent their respective institutions and the community-state relations would be under a legal status. The problem to find clergy with Turkish nationality for the future election of a Patriarch has been solved by a decision of the Turkish government to neutralize the foreign metropolitans of the Patriarchate in 2010. At the time of the writing 15 out of a 30 clergy that applied for Turkish nationality were given a day for interview. This move was highly acclaimed by the Patriarchate that considered the decision even “more important than the opening of the HTS for the survival of the Patriarchate”¹⁰⁶⁰.

Another issue concerning the legal status of the Patriarchate was the expropriation of the immovable properties of the institution. As the Patriarchate has no legal personality it cannot acquire property thus is exposed to the claims of the state and state institutions over its property¹⁰⁶¹. The recognition of the legal personality of the Patriarchate has been one of the priorities of the EU reiterated in the progress reports that we have mentioned above.

The case law of the ECtHR has been illuminating for the EU. The Court in a number of cases stressed that freedom of religion is not only an individual right but also a collective right enjoyed together with the other members of the group. The court held that “one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be seen not only in the light of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6”¹⁰⁶².

The right to legal status has been reiterated by the OSCE and the CoE. In 2003 the OSCE office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights together with the Venice Commission prepared guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion and Belief. The section B, Point 8 reads¹⁰⁶³:

¹⁰⁶⁰ Yorgo Kurbaki, “Rum Metropolitlere T.C Kimliği Çağrısı [Call to Turkish Identity Cards for Greek Metropolitans]”, *Hürriyet*, 13 November 2009; Yorgo Kurbaki, “Patrikhane’de Bayram Havası [Joy at the Patriarchate]”, *Hürriyet*, 22 May 2010;

¹⁰⁶¹ For the expropriations affecting the Patriarchate see and Dilek Kurban and Kezban Hatemi, *The Story of an Alien(ation): The Real Estate Ownership Problems of Non-Muslim Foundations and Communities in Turkey*, Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2009; Yuda Reyna and Ester Moreno Zonana, *Son Yasal Düzenlemeler Göre Cemaat Vakıfları [Community Foundations According to the Latest Legal Arrangements]*, Istanbul: Gözlem, 2003; Baskın Oran, “Vakıflar Yasası [Law on Foundations]”, *Radikal*, 18-19-20 February 2008.

¹⁰⁶² ECHR, *The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova*, Application No. 45701, 13 December 2001; See also *Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece*, 10 July 1998; *Canea Catholic Church v. Greece*, 16 December 1997.

¹⁰⁶³ OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines for legislative reviews of Laws affecting religion and belief. CDL-AD, 2004

Right to association. OSCE Commitments have long recognized the importance of the right to acquire and maintain legal personality. Because some religious groups object in principle to state chartering requirements, a State should not impose sanctions or limitations on religious groups that elect not to register. However, in the contemporary legal setting, most religious communities prefer to obtain legal personality in order to carry out the full range of their activities in a convenient and efficient way. Because of the typical importance of legal personality, a series of decisions of the ECHR recognized that access to such a status is one of the most important aspects of the right to association, and that the right to association extends to religious associations. Undue restrictions on the right to legal personality are, accordingly, inconsistent with both the right to association and freedom of religion or belief.

The legal status has been reiterated also in the reports and resolutions of the CoE. The ‘Hunault Report’ on ‘Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Greece’ held, that Turkey should recognize the legal personality of the Fener along with other churches on the grounds that “the absence of legal personality which affects all the communities concerned having direct effects in term of ownership rights and property management”¹⁰⁶⁴. The Third Report on Turkey of ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) stated that “religious minorities have no clearly defined legal status and this is holding up of the new legal provisions”¹⁰⁶⁵. The legal status problem was reiterated in ‘The Resolution 1704 on Freedom of Religion and other Human rights for non-Muslim minorities’ examining the state of religious minorities in Greece and Turkey¹⁰⁶⁶. The report held that the legal personality of the Patriarchate is still problematic¹⁰⁶⁷. The report concluded that Turkey should undertake an open dialogue with non-Muslim minorities and “consultative bodies should have a clear legal status”¹⁰⁶⁸.

Thus the EU and the CoE have been very active in promoting the recognition of the legal personality of the Patriarchate that causes much distress for Turkey on the international plane as well. The rulings of the ECtHR has been a major step for the question of legal status of the Patriarchate. The institution applied to the Court on the grounds of a violation of rights

¹⁰⁶⁴ “Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Greece”, Michel Hunault (rapporteur), Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Art. 19.2., Doc. 11860, 21 April 2009, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “Third Report on Turkey”, *Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance*, Doc. CRI (2005), 15 February 2005.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Report by Thomas Hammerberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, following his visit to Turkey on 28 June-3 July 2009, Strasbourg, 1 October 2009.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *ibid.* para. 87.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *ibid.* para. 158.

stemming from the Art. 6 and 14 of the ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol I concerning property rights¹⁰⁶⁹. The Patriarchate held that Turkey violated its right by registering the Orphanage on the name of the Foundation, managed by the DGF since Turkey and defended its ownership rights¹⁰⁷⁰. The government on the contrary defended that the property belonged to the foundation and not to the Patriarchate, therefore it was not among the “property” protected by Art. 1 of the Protocol No.1. In addition the Turkish government underlined that the legal regime applicable to the property should have to be analyzed under the light of the Civil Code and by taking consideration of the particularities of the Ottoman law. In its defense Turkey maintained that there is a *sui generis* regime¹⁰⁷¹. By making a reference to the millet system under the Ottomans, the government held that as religious authorities were representing their community, properties were registered under their name, especially because pious foundations had no legal personality under the Ottoman regime. Therefore the Orphanage was registered under Patriarchate’s name instead of the foundations. As under the Ottomans, the property was linked to the foundation, a foundation to take care of the property was founded. The foundation was designed to meet the needs of an Orphanage for Boys. It shall only be used for Orphanage for Boys¹⁰⁷². After the proclamation of the republic the Patriarchate had no privilege to represent the community. Thus the registration of the Orphanage building on the name of the Patriarchate is void. In the 1936 declaration, it is the foundation and not the Patriarchate that declared that the property was its possession. Patriarchate on behalf of the Greek Orthodox community had only a supervisory role on the property¹⁰⁷³.

However, the defense of the government was not appreciated by the ECtHR that gave its first judgment on 8 July 2008, ruling that Turkey violated the Art 1. of the Protocol I

¹⁰⁶⁹ ECtHR, “Affaire Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcumenique) c. Turkey”, Application No. 14340/05, 8 September 2008, para. 1 and 2 (HUDOC Database). Art. 1 of the Protocol reads: “Every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law”. Convention on the Protection Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocoles No. 11 and 14 , *European Treaty Series*, No. 5, Rome, November 4, 1950.

¹⁰⁷⁰ For the details see ECtHR, “Affaire Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcumenique) c. Turkey”, Application No. 14340/05, 8 September 2008, para. 1 and 2 (HUDOC Database), para. 47-54.

¹⁰⁷¹ *ibid.*, para. 55-59.

¹⁰⁷² *ibid.* para 55.

¹⁰⁷³ *ibid.* para. 57.

by taking over the orphanage building, violation on the grounds of Art. 6 and 14 of the Convention were not deemed necessary¹⁰⁷⁴.

This decision was important in the sense that for the first time, the Patriarchate that has no legal personality in Turkey will have the right to possess and manage property without the mediation of a foundation that has legal personality. In its final ruling the Court decided to a friendly settlement ordering Turkey to register the Orphanage on the name of the Patriarchate within three months and a symbolic amount for expenses and taxes of the building¹⁰⁷⁵. The return of the property is expected vividly at the Patriarchate, not only because the institution is often in acute shortage of money to the point of not being able to pay the salaries of its employees but also, it would be more “independent” from its benefactors¹⁰⁷⁶.

The ECtHR thus ordered to register the building at the land of registry on the name of the Patriarchate. That decision, together with the recommendation of the EU, OCSC and the CoE forces Turkey to take steps its reconsider its legal practices for the legal personality.

III. 4. International Challenges and Opportunities on the New Religious Scene

In the meantime, starting from the end of the 1980s, Russia and CEES experienced the religious revival where religion had been discouraged and repressed by the communist system. Although the constitution of the USSR guaranteed freedom of worship, there is little question that religion was repressed if not completely suppressed during the years of Socialist rule. This was also valuable in the CEES, even though the harshness of the policies have changed from country to country and over the periods. A research effectuated in early 1990s, exposes the resurrection of the religion in post communist bloc¹⁰⁷⁷. As the political life was reformed at a rapid pace, this reformation led to a significantly different legislation from what existed prior to 1989. In order to bring the religious freedom in line enjoyed in Western

¹⁰⁷⁴ For the history of the seizure of the property see *ibid*, para. 8-2.; Dilek Kurban and Kezban Hatemi, *The Story of an Alien(ation): Real Estate Ownership Problems of Non-Muslim Foundations and Communities in Turkey*, Istanbul: TESEV, 2009, p. 17-18.

¹⁰⁷⁵ ECtHR, “Affaire Rum Patriklığı (Patriarchat Œcumenique) c. Turkey”, Final Ruling, Equitable Satisfaction, Application No. 14340/05, 15 June 2010, Conclusion, para. 1 and 2 (HUDOC Database)

¹⁰⁷⁶ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 30, 2009.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Andrew Greeley, “A Religious Revival in Russia?” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1994, p. 253-252.

Europe and the USA, most countries had to undertake new legislative reforms concerning religion. Freedom of religion and conscience was restored and enshrined in the new Constitutions throughout the post communist sphere in line with the principles of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18¹⁰⁷⁸ as well as Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECPHRFF)¹⁰⁷⁹. In the USSR, the move towards religious freedom had started before the demise of the communist system. The Gorbachev government, responding to gradually building pressures from international organizations in favour of religious freedom introduced the first substantial legal changes since the early 1920s, when the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs imposed atheism as the country's official and only religious dogma. Despite the fact that the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev was playing the religious card as part of its liberal policy, the new law on Freedom of Religion, was a significant victory for the Russian Orthodox Church, which gained freedom to teach religious doctrine throughout the country and celebrate liturgical services without harassment from state officials¹⁰⁸⁰. In fact the law's articles protected these rights to all religious denominations in Russia. This liberal attitude was followed after the demise of the USSR in late 1991. Russian federal constitution separated all churches from state control and forbade the establishment of any official church or compulsory religion. The Constitution also guaranteed unrestricted freedom of religion and conscience as well as the right to propagate one's belief¹⁰⁸¹.

The new governments had been active in undertaking necessary measures for registering different religious denominations in their countries in order to give them legal recognition. Moreover, new theological faculties under different universities were opened.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Art. 18 reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance", UN, *Declaration of Human Rights*, 18 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> (28 April 2010). See for example an overview of the religious freedom in Estonia and Baltic States, Ringo Ringvee, "Religious Freedom and Legislation in Post-Soviet Estonia", *Brighton Young University Law Review*, 2001, No. 2. p. 631-642, <http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2001/2/rin11.pdf> (28 July 2010); For new legislation in Bulgaria see Atanas Krusteff, "An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom", *Brigham Young University Law Review*, Vol. 2001, No. 2, p. 575-593, <http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2001/2/kru7.pdf> (28 July 2010), For Romania see Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turdescu, "The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratization", p. 1467-1488; For Russia, John D. Basil, "Church-State Relations in Russia: Orthodoxy and Federation Law, 1990-2004", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 151-164.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Art. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Council of Europe, *European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, 4 June 1950, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.html> (25 March 2010)

¹⁰⁸⁰ Basil, p. 152.

¹⁰⁸¹ *ibid.*

The religious freedom however, raised concerns about the West's involvement in the internal affairs of the Eastern bloc. For example in Russia the church hierarchy itself opened a campaign against religious rivals, some of which were presumably contributing to the national confusion by weakening this primary institutional bastion of stability among the east Slavs. The proselytizing activity of many new church organizations with close ties to Western Europe and the US was singled out as a danger to Russia. Protestant missionaries, and catholic priests received warmly in the early 1990s, now came under suspicion. In 1996 Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad (now Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia) delivered a scathing attack against the activity of western missionaries in Russia during a speech to the WCC. In addition, direct action by the government was now recommended against the Roman Catholic Church, which came under sharp criticism from the Moscow Patriarchate after Pope Jean Paul II elevated two apostolic vicariates in Russia to diocesan rank¹⁰⁸². Among the many regional governments in the federation, calls for restrictive legal action against foreign missionaries also became strong¹⁰⁸³.

III. 8. 1. The Russian Challenge

During the Cold War period, the Russian church took control of the Baltic Orthodox churches and the Eastern European churches were dominated by the clergy close to the communist government circles. The Moscow Patriarchate was not representing only Russians but was a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet government. Now with the Soviet Empire dissolving, the church had difficulties in redefining its borders. The Russian Orthodox Church moved to a phase of defending the Russian interests in the near abroad¹⁰⁸⁴. In this aim, the Moscow Patriarchate often fell in deep disputes with the national Orthodox churches that now wanted ecclesiastical independence in parallel with their political independence from Moscow¹⁰⁸⁵. Russia considered the neighbouring countries such as Bielorussia, Ukraine and

¹⁰⁸² John Witte and Michel Bordeaux (eds.), *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books, 1999, p. 72-76.

¹⁰⁸³ Marat Shterin, "Church-State Relationships and Religious Legislation in Russia in the 1990s" in Matti Kotiranta (ed.), *Religious Transition in Russia*, Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2000, p. 218-250 at p. 238-239.

¹⁰⁸⁴ See for example "Russia's Concern for Russians in the Near Abroad", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol 23, No. 2, June 1995, p. 450-452.

¹⁰⁸⁵ The deepest conflict emerged when the Estonian Orthodox Church applied to the Fener in order to be canonically recognized under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine is still "an open question" that causes much concern for the Russian Patriarchate. Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

Moldova as apart of the Russian Orthodox identity¹⁰⁸⁶. The identification of the Russian nation with the Orthodox religion together with the absence of a Western style church-state separation raised concerns about the Moscow patriarchate¹⁰⁸⁷.

In the Orthodox world, Russian church, one of the two power centres of the Orthodoxy, was identified with the Russian national identity and had become a model for nationalist, expansionist, and anti-Western model due to the extremist fraction in the Russian church. In Yugoslavia, Serbian nationalists that caused atrocities were strongly identified with the Serbian Orthodoxy¹⁰⁸⁸. In a striking contrast, the Patriarchate of Istanbul has been viewed as an ally for the West, as the model of an ideal Orthodoxy compatible with democracy due to its universal vision, its readiness to respond to contemporary problems, its role of a bridge between civilizations –Orthodox, Islamic and Catholic-Protestant due to its canonically affirmed position as *primus inter pares* and its ecumenic activities. Moreover, the Patriarchate was not a national church. It was situated in Istanbul, surrounded by a Muslim population but had been considered as the senior partner within the Orthodox Church that could provide a guiding and coordinating role as it did after the World War I and in the 1960s in recent history.

III. 8. 2. Garanting Autocephaly: A Means for Leadership

The great bulk of the international activities of the Patriarchate fell, naturally, within the Orthodox world. In the turmoil of the post Cold War, the leadership for the Orthodox appeared plausible for the Patriarchate. In an international atmosphere similar to that after the Russian revolution in 1917, the newly independent states sought for the blessing of the Patriarchate for creating their national churches. Right after the end of communism, the patriarchate moved to ‘reinstall’ churches that were either shut down or came under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate behind the Iron Curtain. The autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church was recognized in 1990, although it canonically enjoyed autonomy since the 5th century. The autocephaly of the Czech and Slovak Orthodox Church

¹⁰⁸⁶ John B. Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism after 1988”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990, p. 292-306 at p. 294.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Zoe Knox, “The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 4, June 2003, p. 575-596.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Ralph Della Cava, “Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia: An Overview of the Factions in the Russian Orthodox Church in the Spring of 1996”, *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, Vol. 38, No. 3, July-September 1997, p. 387-414 at p. 388; Barker, p. 145.

granted by Moscow in 1951, but was ignored by the Patriarchate, was recognized in 1998. The autocephaly of the church of Estonia was recognized in 1996 that caused serious rift with Moscow. In 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada and in 1995 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, Australia and Western Europe came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate¹⁰⁸⁹.

The recognitions were in line with the Patriarchate's claim that without the consent of the Fener no church can become canonically an autonomous or autocephalous church. Thus the patriarchate does not recognize the status granted by Moscow, or Serbia automatically, jealously safeguarding this right for itself. An illustrating example is the Russian Orthodox Church in America. Despite the fact that the Metropolitanate was granted the autocephalous status by the Russian Patriarch in 1970, it is still not recognized by the Patriarchate and is not considered among the autocephalous churches. This right is largely criticized by the Russian church.

Another interesting case was that of the Albanian Orthodox Church. The institution was severely persecuted by the atheist Enver Hodja regime. When the repression of the church was lifted in 1991, the Synod of the Patriarchate appointed Anastasios Yannoulatos, a prominent theologian, Emeritus Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Theology of the National University of Athens for 20 years, Archbishop of Irinoupolis in Kenya, a Greek national, to be Patriarchal Exarch for the Albanian church¹⁰⁹⁰. In one year Atanasios was enthroned as the Archbishop of Tirana and all Albania together with three other Greek bishops for the remaining dioceses in the country. However, this move was objected by the Albanian government from the outset. The Albanian government refused to recognize the appointment of Greek nationals, claiming that they should be Albanian nationals¹⁰⁹¹.

Meanwhile, Archbishop Anastasios started a seminary 'Resurrection of Christ Theological Academy' in 1992¹⁰⁹². The school was designed to train clergy in Albania, for that due to the extremely harsh anti-religious policies since 1967 under the Enver Hodja

¹⁰⁸⁹ Demetrius Kiminas, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate: A History of Its Metropolitans with Annotated Hierarch Catalogs, Orthodox Christianity, Vol. I*, California: The Borgo Press, 2009.

¹⁰⁹⁰ See his biography in Anastasios Yannoulatos, *Facing the World: Orthodox Christian Essays on Global Concerns*, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003.

¹⁰⁹¹ For an up to date history of the post-communist revival of the church in Albania see Jim Forest and James H. Forest, *The Resurrection of the Church in Albania: Voices of the Orthodox Christians*, Geneva: WCC Publications, 2002.

¹⁰⁹² Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

regime, no trained clergy remained in the country¹⁰⁹³. This was the first instance for the patriarchate to restore its influence in the Balkans after the demise of the communist regimes.

However, the ordainment of an ethnic Greek to the Patriarchal throne together with two Greek metropolitans had been illustrating to show us how church and politics had been interwoven in the post Cold War era. In line with disputes between Greece and Albania over the Greek minority in Albania, the position of Archbishop Anastasios as head of the Albanian Orthodox Church came under constant threat¹⁰⁹⁴. The Albanian Parliament passed a draft law considering freedom of religion but underlining that presidents of the religious communities should be of Albanian nationality, this clause was considered also in the new Albanian constitution. This was assessed as directly aiming Archbishop Anastasios¹⁰⁹⁵. But the referendum for the new constitution was rejected. In 1998, the Patriarchate, the Orthodox Church of Albania and the Albanian government agreed on a formula for forming the Synod of Albania. Two of Greek bishops ordained by the Patriarchate resigned, while one stayed in office. Instead of the Greek bishops, Albanian bishops were elected¹⁰⁹⁶.

III. 4. 3. Unifying Efforts of the Patriarchate of the Divided Orthodox

Upon his enthronement on September 1991, Patriarch Bartholomeos moved towards bringing together the Orthodox churches around his leadership. The first serious undertaking to discuss on the opportunities for cooperation was initiated by a series of summits, institutionalized under the name Synaxis¹⁰⁹⁷. The call for an orthodox meeting was considered according to the tradition, a prerogative of the Fener. The aim in this undertaking was not only to give a message of unity in the power vacuum created by the end of the communist regimes but also to designate common strategies for the new era. The leadership role of the

¹⁰⁹³ According to Archbishop Anastasios, there were 300 to 400 Orthodox priests before the World War II. In 1995 there were only 11 left, all of them more than 70 years of age. See Interview with Archbishop Anastasios in *Albania: The Greek Minority*, Vol. 7. No. 4, New York: Human Rights Watch Helsinki, 1995, p. 18; Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, *Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania*, New York: *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki*, 1996, p. 122-126.

¹⁰⁹⁴ For the background of the Greek-Albanian dispute see Robert Austin, “*Albanian-Greek Relations: Confrontation Continues*”, RFE/RL Research Report, Munich, August 4, 1993.

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Albania: The Greek Minority*, p. 18-19.

¹⁰⁹⁶ “The Orthodox Church of Albania”, *CNEWA-Papal Agency for Humanitarian and Pastoral Support*, <http://www.cnewa.org/ecc-bodypg-us.aspx?eccpageID=25&IndexView=toc> (7 December 2009)

¹⁰⁹⁷ Synaxis (Greek: Σύναξις) means gathering, assembly, reunion. In Eastern Christianity, a Synaxis is an assembly for liturgical purposes, generally through the celebration of Vespers, Matins, Little Hours, and the Divine Liturgy. A Synaxis is also a group of churchmen –especially in the Orthodox Church– who would otherwise compose a Synod but lack an officiating Patriarch. See Adrian Fortescue, “Synaxis”, *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14383a.htm> (19 November 2008)

Patriarchate was underscored with this initiative and surprisingly, at the beginning of the 1990s, almost all orthodox churches, including Russia accepted the leadership of the Patriarchate. In May 1992, the first *Synaxis* was convened in Istanbul on the “Sunday of Orthodoxy”¹⁰⁹⁸.

The meeting brought together the Patriarchs of Istanbul, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Moscow, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Churches of Greece, Poland, Czech and Slovak Lands and Finland. The Church of Cyprus was represented by the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Patriarchate of Georgia was represented by the Patriarchate of Istanbul. The message of the *Synaxis* called for the Orthodox unity when it was much needed in the turmoil of the post Cold War period¹⁰⁹⁹. The Roman Catholic Church and to a certain extent Protestant missionaries were condemned for their proselytizing activities in the Orthodox lands. The Orthodox adopted a conservative position criticizing the reform movements in the WCC such as the ordainment of the women to priesthood. The EU was celebrated and the primates called for the inclusion of the Orthodox in the integration process. The destruction of environment was condemned and finally, sympathy was offered to the victims of the Serbo-Croat confrontation in Yugoslavia¹¹⁰⁰.

From all the points enumerated above that we will turn later, the condemnation of the ‘Serbo-Croate’ conflict is the most interesting. In Yugoslavia, the Serbo-Croate conflict had already involved the Muslim Bosnians two months before the signing of the declaration by the primates of the Orthodox Church. There is no mention however of the Muslims that were involved in the crisis. The message in its entirety reads as follows¹¹⁰¹:

We are deeply saddened by the fratricidal confrontations between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and for all its victims. We think that what is required from the ecclesiastical leaders of the Roman Catholic Church and from all of us is particular attention, pastoral responsibility, and wisdom from God, in order that the exploitation of religious sentiment for political and national reasons may be avoided.

Thus the religious leaders of both Slav nations were called to stop the blood in order to avoid the exploitation of the religion for political or national reasons. It was not a secret

¹⁰⁹⁸ The Sunday of the Triumph of Orthodoxy is celebrated the last Sunday of the Great Lent. It is to commemorate the victory of the supporters of the icons against the iconoclasts (icon-breakers) See “Sunday of Orthodoxy”, *OrthodoxWiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Sunday_of_Orthodoxy, (26 March 2010)

¹⁰⁹⁹ “Message of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches gathered in *Synaxis* at the Phanar”, Istanbul, March 15, 1992.

¹¹⁰⁰ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009,

¹¹⁰¹ *ibid*

though that in the war at Yugoslavia that involved Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, the Orthodox countries together with their churches sided with the Orthodox Serbians.¹¹⁰² The position of the Patriarch in Turkey got harder when the Bosnian Muslims were involved in war as early as March 1992 and subjected to atrocities by Serbians in the period 1993-1995. In Turkey, the Patriarch was called to condemn the actions of the Serbs regularly to which he did not respond positively. The reason of this omission was probably the fear of being marginalized in the Orthodox world of which the Patriarchate was trying to take the lead. The condemnation would strengthen the hand of the Russian Patriarchate which was historically close to the Serbian Patriarchate.

In 1993, Patriarch Bartholomeos paid a visit to the Serbian Patriarchate in Belgrade. While the Orthodox world including Russia and Greece supported Orthodox Serbians during the successive wars in Yugoslavia, the visit of the Patriarch was assumed in Turkey as a clear support for the Serbs. The Patriarch underlines that the visit to the Serbian Patriarchate was not organized in that aim. The newly elected Patriarch had already paid visits to the Patriarchates in the canonical order and according to the church tradition it was now the turn of Serbia and he could not escape it¹¹⁰³. Even though the Patriarch did not side openly with the Serbs, he could not distance himself from them either. In an answer to a journalist who asked him if the Serbian Patriarch Pavle (Paul) was not slow to condemn the attitude of the Serbian authorities, Bartholomeos asserted¹¹⁰⁴:

Patriarch Paul of Belgrade (...) showed his disaccord with the government and his church did not hesitate to distance itself from the regime. But you have also to recognize that the responsibility of Serbia in this war is not unique, it should be shared by occidental powers who for political, economic and religious interests went too fast in recognizing many independent countries and favored the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In Turkey the visit of the Patriarch was not covered largely. However, in the press conference at the airport in Istanbul the member of the National Assembly's Human Rights Committee Mehmet Özkan asked the Patriarch to "warn the Serbian priests to halt the atrocities" to which the Patriarch replied that he did not "agree with the word 'atrocities',

¹¹⁰² See for example Robert Service, *Russia: Experiment with a People*, London: Macmillan, 2002, p. 172-173; Fatih Tayfur, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: the Cases of Greece and Spain*, Aldershot Hunts: Ashgate, 2003, p. 129.

¹¹⁰³ *ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁴ "Un Entretien avec le Patriarche Orthodoxe de Constantinople : Bartholomee Ier : 'Nous Condemnons l'Exploitation de la Religion à des Fins Nationalistes'", *Le Monde*, April 20, 1994.

there is a war in Yugoslavia for which both sides were guilty¹¹⁰⁵. Thus the Patriarch was forced to take a position while at the same time it was expected not to mingle in politics. The visit of the Patriarch was condemned in a joint declaration from Prof. Haluk Kabaalioglu and Prof. İnci Engigün¹¹⁰⁶. The visit together with the gathering of the Orthodox leaders in the Fener every year raised the concerns of an Orthodox axis in Turkey.

III. 4. 1. 3. The “Orthodox Unity” Collapses: Rivalry Between Istanbul and Moscow

While there were discussions over the ‘Orthodox axis’, the image of unity of the Orthodox, given in the joint messages at the *Synaxis* collapsed soon. When the second *Synaxis* gathered on the invitation of the Patriarchate, the tension between Istanbul and Moscow -the two centers of Orthodoxy- was already clear. The Russian Patriarchate protested the *Synaxis* of the Patmos Island in 1995 on the grounds of the problem of Estonia. In 2008 the last *Synaxis* gathered in Istanbul on the occasion of the birth of St. Paul (that year was celebrated as the Pauline Year) with the participation of late Russian Patriarch Alexy II, his last visit abroad before his death. The Pan-Orthodox Unity was urged by Patriarch Bartholomeos once again during the visit of the new Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia. He asserted¹¹⁰⁷:

Everyone (...) expecting us to lead them (...) by our example, in the way of reconciliation and love that is so imperative today. This is why it is crucial that we demonstrate an unswerving readiness above all to promote in every way our Pan-Orthodox unity (...) The structure of our Church into Patriarchates and Autocephalous Churches in no way implies that we constitute Churches and not a Church. (...) the Orthodox Church does not have at its disposal a primacy of authority, however, it also does not lack a coordinating body, which does not impose but rather expresses the unanimity of our local Churches.

This body of course that would coordinate the Orthodox churches was the Patriarchate of Istanbul despite the fact that its supremacy was only honorary and does not imply any jurisdiction over other Orthodox churches. Interestingly enough, while Istanbul and Moscow gave the image of unity in Istanbul during the first foreign visit of Patriarch Kirill – every autocephalous church had to pay its first visit abroad to Istanbul which has the first rank in church hierarchy-, no one recalled that Kirill when he was the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad was the sharpest critic to Istanbul. According to the Patriarch, “under the

¹¹⁰⁵ Cited in Şahin, p. 326.

¹¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁷ Address of Patriarch Bartholomeos during the visit of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia, Fener, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=1098&tla=en>, July 5, 2009 (9 September 2009)

aggressive foreign policy of Moscow during Patriarch Alexy's tenure there were Kirill's signature"¹¹⁰⁸.

In the post –Cold War period, Moscow and Istanbul Patriarchates emerged as rivals within the Orthodox world. In fact, the rivalry between two patriarchates was not new but historical. After the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans in 1453, the Russian church remained for almost 400 years, the only Orthodox Church in a state ruled by a monarch of the Orthodox faith. After the fall of Istanbul (New Rome), Moscow claimed to be the 'Third Rome' –the guide, guardian and representative of the whole Orthodox. The two Patriarchates represented two different cultures and traditions. Istanbul is the bastion of the Byzantine, Greek tradition whereas Moscow represents the Slav culture¹¹⁰⁹. The Russian Church represents the most populous Orthodox nation, but in the canonical hierarchy, it comes the fifth after the historical patriarchates whereas the Patriarchate is at the top of the hierarchy. The interpretation of this ranking is a point of discord between the two churches. From the point of view of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, Istanbul does not have the right to govern other local churches. Only under special circumstances, when a church cannot act independently Istanbul entitled, even obliged, to help other churches and is allowed to stand in defence of the existing canon law on its own initiative; but it must not violate the rights of others¹¹¹⁰. The ecumenical character of the Patriarchate was contested by Moscow, even though they use the title, arguing that it was a "remnant of the Byzantine bygone glory"¹¹¹¹. The ranking of the Patriarchate at the top of the Orthodox hierarchy was accorded because of the political centrality of the *City* at the time. Now these conditions simply do not exist. The Russian Patriarchate argued that "untraditional perception of the role and importance of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, "in no way connected with the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church" and "(we) do not think that the Patriarch of Istanbul is invested with powers as far as other local Orthodox Churches are concerned. We think there is no such a centre to which (the

¹¹⁰⁸ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

¹¹⁰⁹ Curanović, p. 306.

¹¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹¹ *ibid.*

Orthodox Churches) can appeal. Only the pan Orthodox council could play the part of this centre”¹¹¹².

As the newly independent states of the Soviet Union built their own nation-states, they looked for the blessing of Istanbul for their independent churches. Canonically, autocephaly can be granted only with the consent of Istanbul. Even if its customary in the Orthodox world to declare independence from the mother church, as was the case for the Serbian, Romanian, Greek churches without the consent of Istanbul, they are not considered canonical with the consent of all, and especially the Patriarchate’s consent. For example the Bulgarian church that proclaimed independence from the Patriarchate in the 1870s, was not recognized, even by Russia, until 1945, when it obtained a *tomos* of recognition from the Patriarchate. Again the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, is not considered fully canonical because it could not obtain the approval of the Patriarchate¹¹¹³.

In addition it cannot establish hegemony like Moscow because its power centre is in Istanbul and not in any of the Orthodox countries. It has the international prestige and the support of the West. Istanbul, proving to be sympathetic to these claims was accused by the Moscow Church of “trying to become the centre of pan-Orthodox power”¹¹¹⁴. The inter-patriarchal rivalry concentrated on three issues: jurisdiction, mediation in Orthodox disputes, and representing Orthodoxy in international arena. The Moscow Patriarchate under the leadership of Patriarch Alexy II, became a main support of ethnic Russians and historic Russian interests in Estonia, Ukraine, and the rest of “near abroad” of the former USSR. The Orthodox vision of the Moscow church, compared to Istanbul, is more traditionalist, nationalist, even, reactionary¹¹¹⁵. Nationalist awakening in the newly independent countries has drawn the Russian church into conflicts with them. The examples of Ukraine and Estonia are illustrative of the rivalry between Moscow and Istanbul.

¹¹¹² Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “Moscow Patriarchate is against Constantinople’s Attempts to Intervene in Other Orthodox Churches’ Affairs”, *Interfax*, November 22, 2006, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=2290> (10 August 2010).

¹¹¹³ Interview with Marc Aoun.

¹¹¹⁴ “Talks to overcome differences between Moscow, Constantinople Patriarchates Continue”, *Hellenic Resources Network*, March 3, 1996, www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1996/96-03-30.ana.html (30 September 2008).

¹¹¹⁵ Alexander Webster., “Split Decision: The Orthodox Clash over Estonia”, *Christian Century*, June 5 1996.

III. 4. 4. 1. 1. The Problem of Estonia

At the end of the World War I Finland, Estonia and Latvia founded their autonomous churches under the jurisdiction of Fener. After World War II, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian autonomies were again contested. Under the Soviet occupation, Moscow took over these churches' jurisdiction. Some members of the Estonian church established an Estonian Orthodox Church in Exile, which continued to maintain ties with Istanbul. Thus two opposing groups appeared in the Estonian Orthodox church. Estonia regained its independence in 1991, and in 1993 the exile church, now called Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (known officially in English as the Orthodox Church of Estonia) was registered and recognized as the legal successor of the church of the Russian Empire¹¹¹⁶. The same year, 54 of the 83 Orthodox parishes in Estonia formally requested to join the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Istanbul. These 54 parishes, majority in number, represent the minority of the Orthodox believers in the country, and include the majority of ethnic Estonians¹¹¹⁷.

The request for autonomy was supported by Patriarch Bartholomeos, who claimed that it was Stalin who forced Estonian church to come under the jurisdiction of Moscow. Therefore after the independence they had the right to separate from the Russian Church. On the issue of the separation of the churches, bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Istanbul severed. Istanbul sent a letter "to the Orthodox Communities in Estonia" in which the Patriarchate expressed its desire to "reactivate" the Autonomous Estonian Apostolic Church on the basis of the tome or decision of the Patriarch of Istanbul in 1923¹¹¹⁸. A delegation from the Fener visited Estonia. The same year the *tomos* of 1924 was reactivated. Finally, Istanbul announced the creation of the Autonomous Estonian Apostolic Church by appointing Archbishop John of Helsinki its temporary advisor¹¹¹⁹. However, this move was interpreted as a challenge to the authority of the Russian Patriarchate which was even not consulted on this issue.

¹¹¹⁶ Triin Vakker and Pritt Rohtmets, "Estonia: Relations between Christian and Non-Christian Religious Organisations and the State of Religious Freedom", *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2008, p. 45-53.

¹¹¹⁷ Andrew Evans, "Forced Miracles: The Russian Orthodox Church and Post Soviet International Relations", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002, p. 33-43 at page 36.

¹¹¹⁸ See Webster, "Split Decision: The Orthodox Clash over Estonia".

¹¹¹⁹ *ibid.*

In an official statement the Russian Patriarchate accused Istanbul of “violating all basic canonical rules existing in the Orthodox world by invasion into the territory of another local Orthodox Church”¹¹²⁰. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church later announced a formal suspension of Eucharistic and canonical relations with the Patriarchate and with the Orthodox Church of Finland. Patriarch Alexy II, deliberately moved to exclude, for the first time ever, reference to the Patriarch’s name during the mass¹¹²¹. After long and difficult negotiations conducted in Zurich, Moscow and Istanbul reached a compromise. Meanwhile, a change happened in the situation of the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate as Estonian state recognized its legal personality in 2002. Thus legally there happened to be two Orthodox churches in Estonia¹¹²². However, this complicated the property issue. This problem was addressed by the two patriarchates during their negotiations in April 2003 in Moscow and in July 2003 in Istanbul. Among other things an argument asserted that “the Estonian government, according to Istanbul”, did not allow parishes of the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate to have their property owned for a certain long period of time¹¹²³.

III. 4. 4. 1. 2. Problems about the Church Situation in the Ukraine

Ukraine has become the major battlefield between Moscow and Istanbul in the post Cold War period over the subject of jurisdiction, and consequently the primacy within the Orthodox world. This issue is poisoning the union of the Orthodox world and bears the danger of a major schism. Ukrainian church was under the jurisdiction of Istanbul until 1686. Moscow dominated the church in Ukraine since that date, interrupted with brief trials of independence that were suppressed immediately. The authority of the Patriarchate Moscow started to crumble in late 1980s, when Gorbachev liberalized churches in the USSR.

Ukraine is by far the most important country for Russia in its near abroad. An important Russian ethnic mass is located in Ukraine out of a population of 48 million¹¹²⁴.

¹¹²⁰ “The Orthodox Church in Estonia: Chronology of a Divided Community”, *Syndesmos*, 23 February 1996.

¹¹²¹ “Talks to overcome differences between Moscow, Constantinople Patriarchates Continue”. *Hellenic Resources Network*, available online at www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1996/96-03-30.ana.html (25 January 2008)

¹¹²² Ringo Ringvee, “Religious Freedom and Legislation in Post-Soviet Estonia”, *Brighton Young University Law Review*, 2001, No. 2. p. 631-642

¹¹²³ “Estonian Church Problem in the Light of Negotiations between Moscow and Constantinople on 26 March 2008 in Zurich. Statement by Communication Service of Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations”, *Interfax*, May 27, 2008, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/print.php?act=documents&id=126> (29 May 2008)

¹¹²⁴ According to the results of the 2001 survey 8 million Russians live in Ukraine. This number represents 17 % of the population.

Ukraine is also an important actor for the security of Russia and Europe and has a great economic potential with its resources¹¹²⁵. The Ukraine represents the biggest Orthodox population after Russia. Modern day Ukraine covers the central parts of old “Kievan Rus” which became the cradle of Orthodox Christianity in Russia with the baptism of the people of Kiev in 988. For this reason, claims the Moscow Patriarchate, Orthodox Ukraine is an inseparable part of the Russian Church¹¹²⁶. Moreover, two thirds of the parishes belonging to the Russian patriarchate are located in Ukraine¹¹²⁷.

For Istanbul, a say over the Orthodox in Ukraine would be an essential for its prestige and authority as the leader of all Orthodox in the world. Even though Ukrainians turn to Istanbul for a blessing for their national Ukrainian Orthodox Church, this is a delicate issue for Istanbul. The large mass of the Orthodox in the country are under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to the canonical rules there can be no more than one canonical church over a territory. Thus a hasty decision for recognition may create a major schism between two major churches of the Orthodox world. Thus the Istanbul tries to conduct a wise foreign policy that avoids any decision that would alienate Moscow.

Even before Ukrainian independence in 1991 there were already three large church organizations competing on the political and religious stage in Ukraine. The largest was the local autonomous Russian Orthodox Church that changed its name and became the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church- under the jurisdiction of Moscow (UOC-MP). The second was the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGOC) also known as Uniate Church¹¹²⁸. This church had believers especially in Western Ukraine -the Galicia and Transcarpathia regions. The third church was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). The UAOC was a resurrection of the UAOC founded in 1921 in Kiev, during the brief independence period of Ukraine. This church had received the *tomos* of the Patriarch of Istanbul recognizing it as an autocephalous entity. However, after the creation of the USSR this church was suppressed with a brief experience of independence during the Nazi

¹¹²⁵ Ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994, p. 261-283 at p. 262.

¹¹²⁶ Gerd Stricker, “On a Delicate Mission: Pope Jean Paul II in Ukraine”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 216-225 at p. 216.

¹¹²⁷ Taras Kuzion, “In Search of Unity and Autocephaly : Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1997, p. 393-415 at p. 415.

¹¹²⁸ Myroslaw Tataryn, “Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models for Orthodoxy”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 155-172 at p. 161.

occupation of Ukraine of World War II. After the Gorbachev reforms, the church was recognized by the state and initially administered by Patriarch Mstyslav who lived in the USA¹¹²⁹.

The first president of the independent Ukraine Kravchuk, supported the creation of a pure Ukrainian church for the totally independent Ukrainian nation. The first address was the autonomous UOC–MP. However, the claim for independence was rejected severely by the Moscow patriarchate. Meanwhile the section of the Ukrainian clergy gathered around the Kiev metropolitan Filaret who supported autocephaly. During the absence of Patriarch Mstyslav, Filaret became increasingly active inside the UAOC. In November 1992 patriarch Mstyslav of the UAOC broke off relations with Filaret, which led to a split in the UAOC. The secessionists established their own organization: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP)¹¹³⁰.

Both churches have a national Ukrainian identity and are steering a course which conflicts sharply with that of the Moscow patriarchate. They declared that Russia may no longer consider itself to be the sole heir of the historic Kievan Rus. Ukraine “has suffered too long under “Russian imperialist mentality” that used “ecclesiastical means to support the ‘Russification’ of Ukraine by the tsars and the Soviet regime in the past, and of helping to continue this ‘Russification’ today”¹¹³¹. The relations between Istanbul and Moscow patriarchates soured when the newly independent Ukraine’s turned to Istanbul for recognition. Since the UOC-MP was the only canonical church in Ukraine, the two ‘pure Ukrainian’ churches had no solution but to seek the blessing of Istanbul.

President Kravchuk made a personal appeal to the Patriarch Bartholomeos for recognition of Ukrainian ecclesiastical autocephaly but had no positive response¹¹³². Leonid Kuchma, elected president in July 1994, adopted a more neutral policy¹¹³³. In 1995, the Moscow patriarchate was alarmed by Bartholomeos’ decision to take under its jurisdiction two Orthodox Churches located outside the country: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of North and South America and

¹¹²⁹ *ibid*

¹¹³⁰ Curanović, p. 304.

¹¹³¹ Stricker, p. 217.

¹¹³² Tataryn, p. 162.

¹¹³³ *ibid*, p. 163

Diaspora. The Moscow patriarchate also reacted negatively to meetings between the Patriarch and Ukrainian politicians connected with the UOC-KP, nor did the visit of Bartholomeos in 1997 contribute to an improvement in inter-church relations. At the end of the 1990s, the UOC-MP was still the more powerful institution in Ukraine. According to figures dated 1 January 1999, the UOC-MP had 7911 parishes, 6568 priests and 105 monasteries; the UOC-KP has 2178 parishes, 1743 priests and 17 monasteries, and the UAOC has 1022 parishes, 543 priests and 2 monasteries. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has 3198 parishes, 2161 priests and 73 monasteries¹¹³⁴. In August 2000, President Kuchma changed his policy of neutrality and took the step of requesting autonomy for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Bishop's Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. His request fell on deaf ears. The council issued a special decree expressing hope for the establishment of unity among all Orthodox believers in Ukraine under the jurisdiction of the UOC-MP. The Moscow patriarchate has stressed several times that this unity can be achieved only on a strictly canonical basis; in other words, through the repentance of the UAOC and the UOC-KP and their reunification with the Mother Church¹¹³⁵.

Victor Bondarenko, head of the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs visited Patriarch Bartholomeos and invited him to play a more active role in the creation of a single local Ukrainian church. Patriarch Bartholomeos declined to make any hasty decisions, but supported the idea itself. At the request of the UAOC he gave his blessing to the head of the Ukrainian dioceses of the Istanbul patriarchate in the diaspora, metropolitan Konstantin, to preside over a local council of the UAOC, held on 14-15 September 2000, and, most importantly, to concelebrate with the bishops of the UAOC. The UAOC was received into communion with Istanbul "as a precedent", before formal recognition of canonicity has been made. A letter was sent to Patriarch Bartholomeos on 18 September 2000, asking the establishment of a permanent commission in Kiev to promote discussions and negotiate agreements amongst all interested parties, including the UAOC, the UOC-KP, the UOC-MP and representatives of president Kuchma, patriarch Bartholomeos and patriarch Alexy II of Moscow¹¹³⁶. Later, the agreement on establishing a joint commission, which will deal with

¹¹³⁴ Statistics from the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs cited in Nikolai Mitrokhin, "Aspects of the Religious Situation in Ukraine", *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001. p. 173-196.

¹¹³⁵ Geraldine Fagan and Aleksandr Shchipkov, "'Rome is Not our Father, but Neither is Moscow our Mother': Will there be a Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church?", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 197-205, at p. 199.

¹¹³⁶ *ibid*, p. 202.

the problems of creating United Local Church in Ukraine, was signed in Istanbul by the representatives of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the UOC-KP. This move was severely protested by the Moscow patriarchate which saw the move as an uncanonical interference to the internal affairs of the local churches. However, for Istanbul, this agreement was a success for the role of mediator between Orthodox churches.

Moscow supports reunification of the Orthodox churches only under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. If the Ukrainian Orthodox Church becomes autocephalous without the consent of Moscow, the latter will cede its base to the Istanbul. However, if the Istanbul unite and recognize both UOC-KP and UAOC, may not found the canonical rules at its side because there cannot be two canonical churches in one territory. This process of the coming together of Ukraine's Orthodox Churches and their eventual autocephaly is unlikely to happen without further conflict between Kiev and Moscow and between Moscow and Istanbul.

Mistrust between the two patriarchates has increased since the Orange revolution. After his victory Victor Yushenko, supported by the uncanonical churches, announced the creation of a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church as one of the priorities of his policy. The new president ordered that steps be taken to bring about dialogue between the jurisdictions. As soon as he took the power, the new president of Ukraine Victor Yushenko, addressed a letter to Patriarch Bartholomeos, inviting him personally to his inauguration as President. In the letter, the president stated: "We also appreciate your readiness to take part in adjustment of problems inside the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Our people want to have the United Ukrainian Orthodox Church in their State"¹¹³⁷. The Moscow Patriarchate had viewed Yushenko's plan as another intrigue on the part of the government in Kiev to collaborate with the Istanbul in the aim of insuring full autonomy from Russia. The fears of the Russian Orthodox Church were enhanced by the positive attitude of Bartholomeos towards Yushenko¹¹³⁸. The Moscow Patriarchate had been very concerned about the intentions of the President about the creation of a united church. Several visits paid to Patriarch Bartholomeos by the Ukrainian politicians, asking him his personal interference alarmed Moscow as well. The presidential secretariat

¹¹³⁷ "Letter of His Excellency Victor Yushenko, President of Ukraine to His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I", January 21, 2005, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=383&tla=en> (28 January 2006)

¹¹³⁸ "Ukrainian Orthodox Church Chancellor against Interference of the State into Church Affairs and 'Backstage Deals' with Constantinople", *Interfax*, March, 10, 2006, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=1145> (12 August 2010)

officials launched an initiative to open church representations of the patriarchate of Istanbul in Ukraine without consultation with the Ukrainian Church. Also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA's representatives (under the jurisdiction of Istanbul) visit to Ukraine without consulting the UOC-MP was considered as 'backstage deals' by Moscow. The silence of the Istanbul even after "letters of inquiry" from the Moscow Patriarchate increased suspicions for a new Estonia. These concerns were well grounded, President Yuschenko expressed his desire to be independent from the Moscow Patriarchate. During a meeting with a delegation of the Patriarchate of Istanbul in Kiev, he declared, "Ukrainian state and Ukrainian believers that we must make an agreement and seek unity with the Mother Church of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Ukraine has been moving along that way"¹¹³⁹.

Also during the celebrations of the 1020th anniversary of Russia's Baptism in Kiev on July 25-27, 2008. Patriarch Bartholomeos was invited to preside over the ceremony, disregarding Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and all Russia, because Kiev was baptized by Byzantine bishops. This visit was highly criticised in Russia. Before the arrival of the Patriarch in Ukraine, the Russian News Agency Interfax launched a series of articles highly critical of Bartholomeos. According to the articles the Patriarch's decision to visit Ukraine behind Alexy II's back was "a hostile act against Russia"¹¹⁴⁰. Despite criticisms Patriarch Bartholomeos accepted the invitation¹¹⁴¹.

Having evaluated the invitations of the Church, Nation and the Ukrainian people, and in honoring their feelings, the Mother Church –as the one who originally guided the Ukrainian people into baptism –decided to respond to the aforementioned invitations through the sending of a patriarchal delegation under the personal leadership of His All Holiness.

The tension was eased with the participation of both Patriarchs in the ceremony. Nevertheless, during the event Ukrainian leaders gave preference to Patriarch of Istanbul in course of celebrations and demonstrated open disregard even on the protocol level to the Patriarch of Moscow. In an effort to conciliate with the Moscow Patriarchate, Bartholomeos

¹¹³⁹ "Yuschenko Invites Constantinople Patriarch to Join Kievan Baptism", *Interfax*, May 21, 2008, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4697> (12 August 2010).

¹¹⁴⁰ "Patriarch Bartholomeos Intention to Visit Ukraine Behind Alexy II's Back is a Hostile Act to Russia, A Historian Believes", *Interfax*, July 4, 2008, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4896> (12 August 2010)

¹¹⁴¹ "Bartholomeos Kazandı [Bartholomeos Has Won]", *Yenişafak*, June 26, 2008.

was very prudent over the church issue in the Ukraine. In his speech during the ceremony, he stressed the necessity for a unified church in Ukraine. He said:

Concern about the protection and restoration of the ecclesiastical unity is our common duty, which outweighs any political or ecclesiastical forces of the Ukrainian people in general have a common duty to use the gift sent by God as much as possible within acceptable limits (...) for the restoration of the unifying role that the Orthodox Church has played in the Ukrainian nation's conscience.

He added that “the existing division destroys not only spiritual unity but also civilian unity of the Ukrainian people and is fraught with obvious problematic implications for Ukraine's future”¹¹⁴².

The Ukrainian church problem is obviously a political rather than a ecclesiastical. Interestingly enough, the split of the church with the contribution of the Istanbul in Estonia could be realized despite the crisis between the two churches. However, Ukraine is much more an important country and Russia is jealously safeguarding its power zone in Ukraine. For Ukraine the jurisdiction of Istanbul represents the detachment from Russia but also rapprochement with the West. In a similar fashion Estonia preferred the jurisdiction of the Istanbul which represent a more open, democratic and ecumenic interpretation of the faith.

III. 5. Relations with the Vatican

The relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Patriarchate of Istanbul are marked with a long period of hostility since the definite separation of the two branches of Christianity as early as the eleventh century. The Cold War period American strategy in order to contain communism contributed much to a period of *rapprochement* only in sixties and mutual understanding reached its apogee for a decade between 1980 and 1990. However, the sudden change in the political conditions after the collapse of the Soviet system exposed the already fragile mutual relations with new challenges to encounter. The logic behind the activities of the Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic Churches lay in the fact that religion is rarely outside the reach of the politics. Despite the periods of crisis, the changing conditions in the world political system astonishingly push the two churches to cooperation despite the fact that Vatican was in rivalry with the Russian church. During this period, Vatican openly

¹¹⁴² “Ecumenical Patriarch Calls for Unification of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine”, *The New York Times*, July 26, 2008.

demonstrated that it preferred to conduct its relations with the Orthodox world through Istanbul¹¹⁴³. The period of reconciliation under Patriarch Dimitrios had been very promising for the theological dialogue on international level. However, this was to come to an abrupt end after political changes in Eastern Europe and in Russia at the end of the 1980s. With the proclamation of the liberalization policies of Perestroika and Glasnost by the last President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, state suppression of the religion was eased. As early as the 1988, the Vatican, hoping to exploit changes in the USSR that have expanded religious freedoms had substantially increased its material assistance to the Russian Orthodox Church. Encounters of the Papal delegations with the Russian Orthodox leaders led to the agreements that permitted the Vatican to send bibles to the USSR and to assist Russian Orthodox bishops in the reorganization of their seminaries¹¹⁴⁴. During this period thousands of missionaries entered in Russia and the Ukraine¹¹⁴⁵. This assistance however, has brought new tensions and conflicts between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Even though Istanbul was not directly affected by the proselytism of the Vatican, its quest for the leadership of the Orthodox world brought it at odds with the Catholic Church. This policy led the Patriarchate to sign together with other Orthodox churches the “message of the Orthodox prelates” at the first *synaxis* in 1992, condemning the missionary activities of the Vatican in the Orthodox countries¹¹⁴⁶.

The main target of the Vatican has been the Greek Catholics of the Eastern Rite (Uniates), heirs of the Union of Brest of 1596, which the hierarchy of Kyev Metropolia established with the See of Rome. The Vatican strategy for the Uniate churches had been the cause of a serious rift between Catholics and Orthodox. The Orthodox were deeply disturbed by the reinforcing objectives of the papacy to reassert its full authority over the churches of the region, and of these churches’ efforts to rebuild and anchor themselves to Europe through the Vatican. Indeed, during the last forty years or more, autocratic state rule had strictly set the terms by which the religions and their faithful in Central and East Europe were permitted to “prevail”¹¹⁴⁷. Now, with the new “liberal” understanding, “competition for souls was now a

¹¹⁴³ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

¹¹⁴⁴ Roberto Suro, “Vatican Reaches out to Russian Orthodox Church”, *The New York Times*, December 14, 1988.

¹¹⁴⁵ Zoe Knox, “Post Soviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991-2001”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2004, p. 87-113, at p. 89.

¹¹⁴⁶ “Message of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches Gathered in Synaxis at the Fener”, Istanbul, March 15, 1992.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ralph Della Cava, “Thinking about Current Vatican Policy in Central and East Europe and the Utility of the ‘Brazilian Paradigm’”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, May 1993, p. 257-281 at p. 260.

reality”¹¹⁴⁸. The Orthodox adamantly protest the rapidity of Catholic “inroads” throughout the former USSR (albeit these have been largely diplomatic, such as posting an apostolic delegate in Novosibirsk)¹¹⁴⁹. When the severe religious repression of the Stalinist era was finally lifted, the Uniate churches of Romania and Ukraine which were forcibly dissolved and “reunited” with their respective Orthodox churches (in 1946 and 1948) started to claim their property and ecclesiastical belongings given to the Orthodox.¹¹⁵⁰ At the beginning violence was also used in seizing of Orthodox churches¹¹⁵¹. The “Uniatism” was declared by the Orthodox a dangerous form of proselytism and source of divisions.

The problems of the Orthodox Church with the Vatican were not confined only to the problem of Uniatism. The Vatican made some strategic mistakes during the Yugoslav crisis as well. For example, acting as the president of a sovereign European State –the Holy See- Pope Jean Paul II, has been the second state –after Germany- who recognized the independence of the Catholic Slovenia and Croatia. The recognition reversed earlier indications that the Vatican would await diplomatic cover from European governments, underscoring Pope John Paul’s desire to show strong support for the predominantly Roman Catholic republics.¹¹⁵² The move of the Vatican alienated not only the Serbians but also other Orthodox countries such as Greece, Romania and above all Russia.

Jean Paul II has been the first Pope to visit Romania a predominantly Orthodox country in 1999. The papal visit was evaluated very positively as a sign of the approval of the place in the European club, much needed during their thorny transition period to democracy and liberal economy¹¹⁵³. However, the visit seriously amplified the rift between the Orthodox churches. In the case of Romania, the government opened its airspace to NATO forces during the Kosovo war to bomb its neighbouring Serbs. This angered the Russian led local Orthodox churches¹¹⁵⁴. The later papal visits to Georgia, Bulgaria and Ukraine were not welcomed by

¹¹⁴⁸ *ibid.* p. 267

¹¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁰ For a detailed analysis of Communist religious policies in the early postwar period see Robert Tobias, *Communist-Christian Encounter in East Europe*, Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956 and John M. Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Jul 1980, p. 283-308 at p. 286.

¹¹⁵¹ By the end of 1991, about 600 churches were taken over from the Orthodox in Western Ukraine.

¹¹⁵² Alan Cowell, “Vatican Formally Recognizes Independence of Croatia and Slovenia”, *The New York Times*, January 14, 1992.

¹¹⁵³ Alessandra Stanley, “Crisis in the Balkans: Romania; Pope’s visit Adds to Hope of a Future with the West”, *The New York Times*, May 10, 1999.

¹¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*

Russia. The Russian Patriarchate staunchly protested Pope's visit to Ukraine and accused the Vatican again for missionary efforts¹¹⁵⁵.

During the troubled times the Vatican tried to solidify its relations with the Patriarchate in Istanbul, recognizing it as a supreme authority within the Orthodox church. According to Patriarch Bartholomeos, Vatican was clearly biased towards Istanbul. The Roman Catholic Church wanted to conduct its relations with the Orthodox world on the intermediary of Istanbul¹¹⁵⁶. When Bartholomeos became Patriarch in 1991, Vatican hoped for greater support from Istanbul. The new Patriarch was a known face in the Holy See. He was awarded a scholarship from the Patriarchate in 1963 to study at the Pontifical Oriental Institute at Rome. Moreover he served as a patriarchate liaison with the Vatican. He was fluent in Latin and Italian and he was educated on the Catholic ecclesiology.

From the beginning of the 1990s, the Vatican had the tendency to see Istanbul as the top of the hierarchy in the Orthodox world. However, this manoeuvre was highly contested by Moscow. In both 2006 and 2007, Bishop Hilarion of Vienna and Austria (also head of the representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the EU) underlined "a crucial difficulty and major lacuna in Orthodox ecclesiology (...) most acutely felt after the end of the Cold War"¹¹⁵⁷. According to the Bishop there was "no consensus on primacy in general let alone primacy allegedly exercised by Fener. In the face of such a lacuna, Bishop Hilarion argued that the Orthodox participants are not "authorized to "invent" an ecclesiastical model for the Orthodox Church similar to the one existing the Roman Catholic Church in order that the Patriarch of Constantinople could occupy a place like the one the Pope occupies in the Church of Rome"¹¹⁵⁸. According to Hilarion, this dialogue would be possible only if an 'Eastern Pope' was not imposed on the Orthodox Church. To institute such a change in the Orthodox tradition the decision of a Pan-Orthodox council is required that would have the consent of all local Orthodox churches. Until then no one can act according to that model¹¹⁵⁹. Such a

¹¹⁵⁵ Stricker, p. 215-225.

¹¹⁵⁶ Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, , Heybeliada, July 15, 2009

¹¹⁵⁷ "Bishop Hilarion Voices his Protest to Cardinal Kasper against Procedure at the Orthodox Catholic Dialogue", *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 106, October 4, 2006, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/106.aspx#3> (September 30, 2008)

¹¹⁵⁸ *ibid*

¹¹⁵⁹ "Moscow Patriarchate's Representative Urges the Vatican not to Impose the Ecumenical Patriarch as an 'Eastern Pope' on the Orthodox World", *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 106, October 4, 2006, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/106.aspx#2> (27 November 2007)

consensus, he asserts, should take place first “within Orthodoxy and after it, if possible, between Orthodoxy and Catholicism”¹¹⁶⁰.

Such a consensus does not exist on the role of the Patriarch in general within the Orthodox world. Instead, there is a very considerable divergence of understanding of what primacy is in general, and what any particular ‘primacy’ exercised by Istanbul may legitimately entail. As Hilarion said some Orthodox “rather regard this primacy as purely honorable, while others give certain coordinating functions to the Patriarch of Constantinople and see him as highest court”¹¹⁶¹.

Istanbul was willing to have cordial relations with the Vatican in the post Cold War era. It was not directly threatened by the problem of proselytism and the issue of the Greek Catholic Church-known as Uniates in the Orthodox world. However, it had no choice but to side with the Orthodox if it wished to represent Orthodoxy. When in December, 1991, John Paul II convoked the Synod of European Bishops, the Orthodox delegates invited to this meeting barely participated. To explain the reason for their absence, Fener sent his representative Metropolitan Spyridon, to voice the concern of the Orthodox churches¹¹⁶²:

The impression is now widespread among the Orthodox that [the Catholic Church] is distancing itself from the rules of the Second Vatican Council and that the territory of the countries, after the fall of the Communist regimes, are being considered by our brother Catholics as *terra missionis*.

Similar concern was expressed by the Russian and Greek Orthodox Churches. The latter even applied to the Greek government asking to break its diplomatic relationship with the Holy See¹¹⁶³.

In Romania and Russia, the Vatican restored Uniate churches and appointed bishops, causing large protestations from the respective Orthodox churches¹¹⁶⁴. In 1993, the Orthodox and Catholic Joint Commission met to sign Balamand Document on “Uniatism, Method of

¹¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹⁶¹ *ibid.*

¹¹⁶² Walter Sawatsky, “Slavic Evangelicals in Mission within the Commonwealth of Independent States: Inter-Church Mission Dialogue-Orthodox, Catholic and Evangelical”, *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2004, p. 195- 204 at p. 200.

¹¹⁶³ Dimitry Kharlamov, “Vatican II on Ecumenism and the Orthodox Churches”, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2-3, Spring Summer 2001, p. 184.

¹¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*

Union in the Past, and the Present Search for Full Communion”¹¹⁶⁵. The document held that “Uniatism is rejected because it opposed to the common tradition of our churches”¹¹⁶⁶. The declaration has not put an end to the dispute, the Russian Church continued to complain about the proselytism activities of the Catholic Church in Russia and on the territories of the other Orthodox countries¹¹⁶⁷.

The Patriarch had an ambivalent position towards the Vatican. While he was a strong supporter of ecumenism and unity with the Catholic Church, he did not restrain himself to openly criticize the Vatican policy and condemn the unity. In 1995, Pope John Paul II issued an encyclical, “Light of the East” which calls for the unity of all Christians by the year 2000. This encyclical could not convince the Patriarchate who said “our heart is opposed to the spectre of an everlasting separation. Our heart requires that we seek again our common foundations, and the original starting point that we share (...) the manner in which we exist has become ontologically different”¹¹⁶⁸.

The Holy See’s recognition of the Catholic states of Yugoslavia and later the rift caused by the papal visits to ex-communists states put any move towards unity at stake. The work of the Joint Committee was disturbed with long ruptures. The first rupture occurred between 1993 to 2000 and the second from 2000 to 2006. When the Committee finally met in 2000 at Maryland USA, at the beginning of his address the Pope Jean Paul II expressed his happiness at the resumption of dialogue following years of “serious internal and external difficulties”¹¹⁶⁹. The Pope from his part expressed hope for eliminating the remaining differences and re-establish full communion¹¹⁷⁰. However, the meeting was far from being successful. The discord on the “Uniate” churches was too deep to be resolved easily¹¹⁷¹. Thus in Maryland, the work of the Joint Committee was interrupted once again until 2006. According to the account of Patriarch Bartholomeos, Istanbul worked hard in order to rebuild

¹¹⁶⁵ For a full overview of the Balamand Document see Ronald Robertson, “Catholic-Orthodox Dialogue”, *Orthodox News*, <http://www.rcab.org/EandI/catholic-Orthodoxnews.html> (28 March 2009)

¹¹⁶⁶ *ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁷ See for example “Russian Patriarch Renewed Complaints on Catholic ‘Proselytism’”, *Directions to Orthodoxy*, December 5, 2006, http://directionstoOrthodoxy.org/mod/news/view.php?article_id=198 (6 May 2009)

¹¹⁶⁸ “Address of Patriarch Bartholomeos”, delivered at the University of Georgetown, Washington, 21 October 1997, http://evlogite.com/?page_id=16 (20 June 2010).

¹¹⁶⁹ “Catholic Orthodox Dialogue Resume”, *Christian Network*, <http://habitusnetwork.org/churches-news/catholic-ortodox-diaogue-resume.html> (16 June 2008)

¹¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹⁷¹ Chris Herlinger, “‘Thorny Issue’ Proves to be an Obstacle for Orthodox-Catholic Commissions”, *Christian Century*, July 1, 2001.

relations between Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Vatican acknowledged the role of Istanbul and had assumed that without this mediation there would be impossible to resume the relations¹¹⁷².

In 2001, desperate to reconcile with the Moscow Patriarchate, the Vatican strategy envisaged to reach the Greek core of the Orthodox Church. The Pope this time visited Greece, despite the protests of Greek zealots¹¹⁷³. At that time relations between the Greek Church and the Fener were far from being cordial and the Patriarch should have been disappointed to see the church of Greece being placed at the heart of the Greek Orthodoxy. However, Bartholomeos reportedly welcomed the papal pilgrimage with “great joy” and he said he hoped Jean Paul’s visit would “contribute to dialogue and a spirit of brotherhood”¹¹⁷⁴. The trip to Greece was a success for the Orthodox. The historical apology of the Pope for the sack of Istanbul and atrocities committed by the crusaders eased the strained relations¹¹⁷⁵.

The real breakthrough for the relations between the Fener and the Vatican came in 2004. One year before the reconciliation, a crisis over the Uniates in Ukraine broke. The Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine had acclaimed their religious leader to be a “Patriarch” and asked for Papal recognition and elevation. This move was initially welcomed by the Vatican¹¹⁷⁶. However, restoration of a Patriarchate was protested by Moscow and supported by other Orthodox Churches. On 29 November 2003, Patriarch Bartholomeos wrote a letter to Pope Jean Paul II stating that if the Vatican recognize the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Catholic-Orthodox relations would “return to a climate of hostility”¹¹⁷⁷. This crisis was deferred when Vatican step back. Recognizing the Fener as the leader of the Orthodox, the Vatican returned to Fener relics of two Christian saints taken in 1204 by the crusaders as a sign of good will¹¹⁷⁸.

¹¹⁷² Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

¹¹⁷³ Michael Howard, “Greek Priests Revolt as Church Backs Pope’s Visit”, *The Guardian*, 20 March 2001.

¹¹⁷⁴ Jonathan Luxmoore, “Leading Catholic Priest Urges Pope to Delay Controversial Visit to Greece”, *Christianity Today*, 04.01.2001.

¹¹⁷⁵ Paul Woods, “Applause Greets Apology From Pope”, *The Independent*, 5 May 2001.

¹¹⁷⁶ “Patriarch of Istanbul Presses Pope not to Recognize Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate”, *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 72, No.7, 15 February 2004, <http://www.scribd.com/The-Ukrainian-Weekly-200407/d/12815807> (10 August 2010)

¹¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁸ “Vatican Returns Relics to Orthodox Church”, *CNBC News*, November 27, 2007, <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2004/11/27/vatican-Orthodox041127.html> (14 July 2008)

When Benedict XVI was elected Pope in 2005, relations between the Fener and Vatican improved considerably. The visit of the Pope to the Patriarchate in Fener was without any doubt the most popular event of the relations between the two churches. The visit had an unfortunate timing, falling right after the controversial 12 September 2006 lecture of the Pope at the University of Regensburg which angered the Muslim world. Moreover, the new Pope was known as a strong opponent of Turkey's EU membership bid. When he was Cardinal Ratzinger he had stated that Turkey's membership of the EU would cause a "loss of wealth and culture"¹¹⁷⁹. However the Pope came to Turkey in November 2006, in an attempt to end the rift between the two churches and to discuss the possibility of unification¹¹⁸⁰.

The architect of this happy ending was without any doubt Patriarch Bartholomeos. The exchange of visits has contributed to a rapprochement of the two churches and the examination of the open issues. Just two months before Pope Benedict had come to Istanbul, the official international dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church had resumed for the first time since 2000¹¹⁸¹. The timing of the visit of the Pope was interesting, falling before the meeting in Ravenna between Catholic and Orthodox churches on the possibility of unity of the churches. The meeting was to discuss 'papal primacy' claimed by the Vatican. Thus the Vatican wanted to find support for its primacy. The meeting took place in Ravenna and "agreed that the Pope has primacy over all bishops but disagreed over just what authority that primacy gives him"¹¹⁸².

The rapprochement between the Vatican and the Patriarchate in Istanbul reflects the political realities of the post Cold War. Both churches were willing to extend their influence in the power vacuum created by the fall of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s. However, they both were challenged by the Russian Orthodox Church that soon emerged as a powerful

¹¹⁷⁹ Stephania Bianchi, "EU Greets Ratzinger's Election, Turkey Concerned", *IPS News*, April 20, 2005, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=28386> (3 March 2009)

¹¹⁸⁰ "Pope Benedict Recommits Church to Working Towards Unification", *Catholic News Agency*, November 30, 2006, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope_benedict_recommits_church_to_working_towards_reunification_with_orthodox/ (28 January 2008)

¹¹⁸¹ For the letter of Demetrios, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in America see "More than an Easter in Common", *The New York Times*, April, 8, 2007.

¹¹⁸² "Vatican-Orthodox Agree Pope has Primacy, but Schism Remains", *International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 2007. For the full text of the Ravenna Document see 'Ecclesiastical and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church: Ecclesial Communion, Conciliatory and Authority', *Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church*, 8-14 October 2007, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_Orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20071013_documento-ravenna_en.html (10 August 2010)

institution with a claim of universality, supported by and in turn supporting the Russian government. The Vatican and the Fener needed each other in order to fight the “natural enemy of the church”, atheism and secularism. In an increasingly secular Europe, the Vatican tried hopelessly to include reference to the Christian roots of Europe in the constitutional treaty. It was also vocal to prevent EU countries to allow same-sex marriages. Istanbul was a logical choice for the Vatican, a church which has disputed ‘spiritual authority’ over the Orthodox but had no real supporting flock. Therefore, the Holy See increased efforts towards the veneration of the Patriarchate as the sole authority in the Orthodox world. However, the Moscow Patriarchate made clear that it is not willing to recognize this spiritual authority. Under these circumstances, the rapprochement and the apparent will to unite the East and Western Branches of the Christianity may have only a symbolic importance for the ecumenical movement.

III. 6. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and the Patriarchate

The official visit of Bartholomeos to the US for the first time in 1997 was not a coincidence. It was a demonstration of power after the forced demission of Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, Iakovas in 1996. Iakovas was a prominent figure in the Greek Orthodox Church during his long tenure from 1959 to 1996. His name was pronounced for the throne of the Patriarchate after Dimitrios I’s death in 1991. However, being an American citizen (born in the Turkish island of Gökçeada like Bartholomeos) and known as an anti-Turkish –he conducted a successful campaign to rally against the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974- his candidature was not approved by the Turkish government. It was a known secret that Bartholomeos would like to appoint someone he would feel comfortable with. However, Istanbul did show no signs of contention until 1995.

In the US, the Greek Orthodox Church claims jurisdiction over 2 million members with an additional 600,000 in Canada and Latin America. It is the largest and most influential group among the estimated four million eastern Orthodox Christians in the US¹¹⁸³. The

¹¹⁸³ According to the Patriarch the number of the adherents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese in America is 2.000.000. Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009. According to the recent research from Hartford Institute for Religion Research the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese claims 1,954,500 members versus 440,000 actual adherents. The first number is from the yearbook of American and Canadian

diaspora churches are divided along ethnic lines many still governed from their countries of origin. Those churches are often presided by clerics who were not born in the US, even do not speak English. The need for a change for the new generations who did not feel themselves attached to their country of origin expected for a more American Orthodox Church that would be closer to their everyday life reality. For example the Orthodox laity group advocated for greater democracy in the church life and adaptation to the American culture. Also the dependence of the church to the mother church was occasionally disputed among the new generation of Orthodox Americans. In order to respond to these problems Iakovas made appeal to the leaders of the Orthodox churches in America who met in Ligonier, Western Pennsylvania in 1994¹¹⁸⁴.

The archbishops who gathered together were mainly the members of SCOBA (Standing Conference of canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas) founded in 1960 in order to create and foster ties of unity among Orthodox Churches.¹¹⁸⁵ At the end of the meeting, the assembled American Orthodox bishops came together, expressing their essential unity and denouncing the notion of constituting a “diaspora”¹¹⁸⁶. However, Istanbul was alarmed by this leadership, fearing that Iakovas might be elected the first Patriarch of America and its church would be autocephalous, thus not under the control of the Istanbul. This would be a major blow for its authority and ecumenical stance. The Patriarchate held that¹¹⁸⁷:

The Church in the US is too young and too divided to be autocephalous. (Its) connection with the Ecumenical Patriarchate gives the Orthodox Church in America authenticity, history, continuity, and tradition. The ecumenical patriarch helps it keep its bearings in the New World. Its connection to Istanbul is an anchor. Without it, it will be assimilated.

Faced with severe objection of Istanbul, Archbishop Iakovas had to resign¹¹⁸⁸. In his place the Patriarchate of Istanbul appointed Spyridon who was holding the office of

Churches, National Council of Churches, 2000. Thus there is a discrepancy caused by the common practice of equating Church membership with the total number of representatives of a corresponding ethnic group including second and third American generations of the original immigrants, independent of these persons actual relationship to the Orthodox Church. The results of the research are available online at http://hrr.hartsem.edu/research/quick_question17.html

¹¹⁸⁴ Peter Steinfeld, “Greek Orthodox Church is Poised for Change”, *The New York Times*, July 5, 1996.

¹¹⁸⁵ For further information see the official website of SCOBA, <http://www.scoba.us/> (10 August 2010)

¹¹⁸⁶ Antiochian Christian Orthodox Archdiocese of North America, <http://www.antiochian.org/1088> (10 August 2010)

¹¹⁸⁷ Whit Mason, “Constantinople’s Last Hurrah: Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2001, p. 55-64 at p. 63.

¹¹⁸⁸ Patriarch Bartholomeos asserted that he did not force Iakovas to resign. If he had not resigned he could stay at his office until his death. Instead, he gave his resignation to the Patriarch in August 1995 when they two met in their native Gökçeada.

metropolitan of Italy. He was the first American born bishop ever to hold the post. In making the appointment, Bartholomew was clear about his intentions: “You bear many qualifications, the crowning qualification is your unlimited fidelity and devotion to this venerable Ecumenical throne”¹¹⁸⁹. As an additional precaution, the Archdiocese of America was divided into four. With Spiridon, new metropolitans were appointed to Toronto for Canada, to Buenos Aires for South America and to Mexico for Central America and Porto Rico¹¹⁹⁰. This move had the aim of dividing this Archdiocese and make it more dependent from Istanbul. In this new structure every metropolitan would be directly responsible before the Patriarchate. More importantly, finances of each would be dependent on Istanbul. This move towards curtailing the possibility of the unity of the Orthodox Church in the US was clearly in contrast with the vision of Istanbul proclaimed in the first US visit of the Patriarch Dimitrios. While the church proclaimed unity of the Diaspora church in the US in 1990, now it moved towards suppressing the desire of unification prompted by Archbishop Iakovos under his leadership.

During his three year tenure, Archbishop Spyridon’s authoritarian approach to church administration alienated many Greek Americans and bishops of the American Orthodox Church and divided the Greek-Orthodox¹¹⁹¹. First, the high clergy of the Dioceses of Denver, Boston, Pittsburg, Boston, San Fransisco and Chicago, challenged the authority of the Archbishop by sending him a letter in 1998 that reads¹¹⁹²:

(W)e, the bishops, feel that we bear the responsibility before the mother church and the Archdiocese of America (which is the largest and most powerful province of the throne) to speak out when we anticipate danger. The flock of America is being continuously estranged from the Ecumenical Patriarchate

Following the letter, five metropolitans went to Istanbul to ask the removal of Spyridon from the leadership of the Archdiocese¹¹⁹³. The dissatisfaction was also widespread also among the members of the OCL (Orthodox Christian Laity) and the newly founded

The letter was discussed in the Holy Synod and was accepted. Iakovos asked the Patriarch to stay one more year in office. So he did. Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos.

¹¹⁸⁹ Mason, p. 62.

¹¹⁹⁰ Georgios Papageorgiou, “Signs for Change for American Orthodoxy”, *Christian Century*, August, 14, 1996.

¹¹⁹¹ Pamela Schaeffer, “Movement Grows for removal of Greek-Orthodox Leader: analysis of Archbishop Spyridon’s Leadership”, *National Catholic Reporter*, 12 February 1999,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_15_35/ai_53924384/ (28 July 2010); ; Mason, p. 63; For a detailed analysis of the reactions to archbishop Spyridon see George A. Kourvetaris, “The Greek-Orthodox Church in the United States: (Private) Crisis or Transition?” in Victor Roudemedof, Alexander Agadjanian and Jerry Pankhurst (eds.), *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces Twenty-First Century*, Oxford: Altamita Press, 2005, p. 245-275 at p. 245; 247--.

¹¹⁹² Letter to Spyridon, *Hellenic Chronicle*, 14 October 1998, cited in Kourvetaris, p. 247.

¹¹⁹³ Schaeffer, para.3.

GOAL (Greek Orthodox American Leadership)¹¹⁹⁴. The opposition of the lay members of the Archdiocese was extremely important in the sense that they were providing large sums of money for the American Greek Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate. The controversy led to the resignation of Archbishop Spyridon and appointment of Archbishop Dimitrios on 18 September 1999 by the Patriarchate¹¹⁹⁵.

The crisis was important in the sense that it surfaced the discontent in the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America where a movement towards further autonomy from Istanbul was growing. While the Archbishops are directly appointed from Istanbul, the development of the Archdiocese, the richest of the regions under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate with its specific liberal culture, makes the indisputed authority of the Patriarch non-sustainable. However, Fener is jealously safeguarding its rights in America, using authoritarian tactics when necessary in order to keep the Archdiocese within its spiritual authority. In a sense, the history is recurring given the fact that the Patriarchate has always found difficult to recognize the autocephalous status of the Churches under its authority.

A new crisis in America occurred when in 2002, a new charter was drawn in order to replace the existing charter of 1977. At first the Archdiocese under strong influence of the OCL proposed many provisions that would lead the Archdiocese towards autonomy¹¹⁹⁶. However, these proposals were staunchly rejected by Istanbul. Among the proposed changes, was the elevation of the US dioceses to the status of Metropolises. The Metropolitans would select their Archbishops among three candidates¹¹⁹⁷. However these provisions frightened the Patriarchate that consider the future prospective of autonomy of the Archdiocese.

Finally, the Archdiocese and the Patriarchate have concluded a joint statement announcing “agreement (...) on all points”¹¹⁹⁸. But the agreement undermined key propositions made by the Archdiocese which was seeking for more autonomy. Thus Fener remained the sole authority in designating the Archbishops and Metropolitans though the Archdiocese would have only an advisory role. Only one proposal was accepted, all cities of

¹¹⁹⁴ Korvetaris, p. 252-253; Schaeffer, para. 6;

¹¹⁹⁵ Robert Herschbach, “Which Way Orthodoxy?”, *Hellenic Communication Service*, <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/charter.html> (28 October 2008)

¹¹⁹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁹⁷ *ibid*.

¹¹⁹⁸ Robert Herschbach, “Phanar Agree to Disagree on Church Autonomy”, <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/phanar.html> (5 June 2008)

the diocese were elevated to the status of Metropolitanates¹¹⁹⁹. However, it is interesting to note that the Metropolitanans are commemorating the name of the Patriarch and not of the Archbishop of America¹²⁰⁰. Thus a tighter control of the Metropolitanans in America was insured.

The Orthodox-Christian Laity group expressed its discontent over the Charter claiming that it would impede the work towards independence of the Archdiocese and it would curtail the weight of the laity. The charter was adopted by Patriarch Bartholomeos and Archbishop Dimitrios without consulting them¹²⁰¹. According to the 1977 Charter, in order to be valid the draft charter should be first approved by the clergy-laity congress and then sent to Istanbul to wait for further action. This is the tradition applied for the four previous charters. This time, however, the Charter was approved without the consent of the Clergy Laity Congress¹²⁰². Even though the Archdiocese is under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, it is clear that it is on its way to autonomy. Whether the Orthodox Greeks in America would opt for a church only for Greeks or would unite with other Orthodox in the continent to form one of the major Christian denominations that could have an impact in American policy is a question that would be answered in time. It seems clear that whether with its consent or not the Patriarchate will inevitably lose its most important region which is its financial life vein¹²⁰³.

¹¹⁹⁹ Robert Herschbach, "Phanar Agree to Disagree on Church Autonomy", <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/phanar.html> (5 June 2008)

¹²⁰⁰ George Matsoukas, "The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America: Fragmented", *Hellenic Communication Service*, <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/fragmentedchurch.html> (29 September 2008)

¹²⁰¹ *Los Angeles Times*, 29 June 2002.

¹²⁰² Matsoukas, para. 7-10.

¹²⁰³ 2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos. Rev. Anagnostopoulos held that without the donations provided by the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, the Patriarchate could not survive.

III.7. Relations with the Greek Church

In the post Cold War period, the relations with the two bastion churches of the Greek Orthodoxy were far from being cordial. Even though the perception in Turkey prevails that Greece, Greek Church and the Patriarchate in Istanbul form a monolithic whole, this proved not to be true for many respects. First of all, Greek Church is autocephalous. This means that it is not under the jurisdiction of Istanbul. Nevertheless, the patriarchate has jurisdiction over the dioceses of Dodecanese islands, semi-autonomous church of Crete, Month Athos and the “New Lands”¹²⁰⁴. Second, the Church of Greece is a national institution. It has an ethnic, Hellenic base whereas the Patriarchate in Istanbul has an ecumenical claim. Finally, the Greek Church desire to have a say over the diaspora Greeks as they are part of the “Greek nation” who emigrated abroad.

The rivalry between two churches surfaced with the enthronement of Hristodoulos as the archbishop of Athens and all Greece in 1998. From the early days of his tenure, the new Archbishop adopted an aggressive nationalist stance and challenged openly the authority of the Fener. The nationalist stance of the Greek Church especially concerning the problems in the Balkans as illustrated during the war in Bosnia in the 1990s and the Macedonian issue raised concerns for Istanbul. The endorsement of the Greek government of the Patriarchate especially since the second half of the 1990s was not welcomed by the Greek Church. The westernization process in Greece in order to come in line with the EU expectations as well as the rapprochement process with Turkey incited the Greek government to support the Patriarch Bartholomeos against conservative and nationalistic Archbishop Hristodoulos¹²⁰⁵. In contrast to a reactionary Archbishop of Greece, Patriarch Bartholomeos asserted that “The Orthodox should obey the state wherever they live”¹²⁰⁶. This attitude of the Patriarch was in line with the Orthodox Church tradition of always obeying the state¹²⁰⁷. Which was peculiar however, was the stance of Archbishop Hristodoulos’ attitude towards the Greek State. As a state

¹²⁰⁴ For a complete list see Alban Doudelet, “Les Grecs Orthodoxes”, Belgique: Brepols, 1996, p. 140-145.

¹²⁰⁵ For an excellent account of the church-state relations under Christodoulos see Elizabeth Prodromou, “Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Greece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period”, *Social Compass*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2004, p. 471-485; For the Greek Church’s objections and activities against the EU reforms concerning for example the elimination of the mention of religion on the identity cards see George Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2003, p. 117-136 at p. 123-124.

¹²⁰⁶ “Kavga Kızışıyor” [The Quarrel is Getting Hot], *Sabah*, 30 May 2001.

¹²⁰⁷ Mavrogordatos, p. 124.

church, the Archbishop was expected to subordinate to the state instead of developing alternatives to the state policy.

The papal visit to Greece on May 4, 2001 was a good illustration of this point. Archbishop Hristodoulos criticised severely Greek President Stephanopoulos' official invitation to the Pope, head of state of Vatican. The Church of Greece seemed one of the more conservative Orthodox churches, and its Synod resisted overtures from the Vatican for years. In striking contrast Patriarch Bartholomeos welcomed the visit¹²⁰⁸. During the tenure of Archbishop Hristodoulos, the Greek church cooperated with the Moscow Patriarchate against the 'expansionism' of Istanbul because, it itself had problems on the jurisdiction over dioceses under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate¹²⁰⁹. The Archbishop had a very hostile attitude towards the Patriarchate because he claimed that it was Greek Church and not the Fener that represented Hellenism around the world¹²¹⁰.

The rivalry between two churches had been made public for the first time during the visit of Bartholomeos to Athens in June 1999. His visit was a political success because the political circles in Athens welcomed him cordially. In a striking contrast, the church of Greece was chilly to Bartholomeos, making clear that its international prestige was not welcomed there. In October 1999, Hristodoulos ordained to parishes depending from him not to pronounce the patriarch's name during the liturgy. Upon this hostile attitude, Bartholomeos addressed a warning letter to the Holy Synod of Athens.

An unprecedented crisis between the two churches broke out when the metropolitan Panteleimon of Thessaloniki deceased in 2003. Thessaloniki was a part of the "New Lands" that recognized as their administrative authority the Holy Synod in Athens, to which their administration is entrusted by the Patriarchate, his canonical rights being preserved. In return, the metropolitans of the new provinces have to mention the Patriarch's name in the liturgy¹²¹¹. For the first time since 1928, Istanbul asked the church of Greece that the list of the candidates for the diocese of Thessalonica should be submitted to the Patriarchate for

¹²⁰⁸ Alessandra Stanley, "Pontif Asks God to Forgive Sins Against the Orthodox", *The New York Times*, 4 May 2001; The Patriarch said that the Pope's visit would contribute to easing the tensions between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. See *Christianity Today*, April 2001, www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/aprilweb.../4-2-55.0.html (6 November 2009).

¹²⁰⁹ Curanović, p. 310.

¹²¹⁰ 3rd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, November 2, 2009.

¹²¹¹ Miller, "The Changing Role of the Orthodox Church", p. 274-281

approval. The Church of Greece refused, arguing that the law of 1977, that regulated the relations between the church and the state and confined the election of the bishops to the Synod of the Church in Greece only¹²¹². The Synod of Greek Church responded by appointing metropolitans to three vacant metropolitanates on the New Lands without the consent of the Patriarchate. This caused a great reaction in the Istanbul. In response to this act of the Greek Church, an extraordinary Synod gathered. As a result of the meeting the Patriarchate suspended communion with the Archbishop¹²¹³. Besides other measures, the Holy Synod also warned Athens that in case of canonical anomaly, it can reconsider the accord of 1928¹²¹⁴.

The resolution of the long and well publicized embroglio was facilitated by the intervention of the Greek state, through the good offices of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs under the *Nea Demokratia* government in May 2004¹²¹⁵. The Ministry facilitated a minimalist compromise, including Hristodoulos' apology to the patriarchal Synod for his disregard of ecclesiastical procedure, as a condition for the Patriarchate's re-establishment of communion with the leader of the Church of Greece; a public apology by the Patriarch for the spiritual hardship caused to those bishops who had been elected to the vacancies in the New Lands; and an agreement that the Church of Greece would abide by the 1928 Act regarding procedural requirements for Episcopal appointments in the New Lands¹²¹⁶. On 4 June 2004, the enlarged Synod of the bishops of Istanbul lifted the sanctions of the Archbishop Hristodoulos and three metropolitans¹²¹⁷.

This episode shows Patriarch Bartholomeos' determination to safeguard its rights over the Orthodox churches in Europe. The timing of the decision is very interesting, falling to the wake of the enlargement of the EU with the CEES. With that move, the Patriarch

¹²¹² "Relations Difficiles avec Istanbul", *Association Catholique de l'Aide à l'Eglise en Detresse*, www.aed.france.org/observatoire/pays.php?id=23&dossier=270 (28 October 2008)

¹²¹³ In some resources this measure is misleadingly called the "excommunication of Archbishop". However, this measure can be called "minor excommunication", interview with Marc Aoun, researcher at the CNRS, expert on canonical law, Strasbourg, 7 August 2008. See also Prodromou, "Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Grece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period", p. 474; Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople broke Eucharistic Communion with Archbishop Christodoulos", Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate", 19 February 2004, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/print/19/2/64.aspx> (13 August 2010)

¹²¹⁴ For the review of the problem see <http://Orthodoxeurope.org/page/19/2/63>. Turkish newspapers also covered the issue. See for example Stelyo Berberakis, "Hristodulos Şimdilik Saygda Kusur Etmeyecek" [Hristodoulos will Show Respect for Now], *Sabah*, 2 May 2004.

¹²¹⁵ Prodromou, "Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Grece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period", p. 474.

¹²¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹²¹⁷ *Radikal*, June 5, 2004

wanted to show his authority within the church hierarchy and strengthen its authority in the eyes of the new member states –with a large Orthodox population- of the European Union. In other words, notwithstanding the jurisdictional dispute that was apparently the reason of the dispute, the will to weight in Europe that was becoming more “Orthodox” with the EU enlargement. Hristodoulos rejection of giving in to Fener jurisdiction over the New Lands should be interpreted as an inter-church rivalry in order to represent Orthodoxy. In the world of Prodromou, the conflict “must be interpreted as part of a strategic assault on Bartholomeos’ efforts since the end of the Cold War in Europe to relocate and consolidate the gravitational center of Orthodox Christianity in the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople¹²¹⁸.

Patriarch Bartholomeos and Archbishop Hristodoulos supported different camps on the in the case of the EU as well. In 2000, when the Simitis government decided to lift the mention of religious affiliation on identity cards in line with the harmonisation process with the EU legislation, the church reacted severely. Nearly 3 million signatures were collected for a petition and demonstrations were staged against the government’s plan¹²¹⁹. However, all these campaigns could not prevent the government to lift the religion mention on identity cards. The progressive laicisation of the Greek society, despite the fact that the church and the state are not clearly separated, were at the source of the discontent of the Greek Church. Moreover, Istanbul sided with the Greek government, asserting that the Orthodox shall respect the law of the country where they live. The response of the Greek church was severe. The Metropolitan of Pireus Kalimikos stated that “the Patriarchate has no right to interfere in the affairs of the Church of Greece. The Patriarchate is in a country where the religion is different and it has no community”¹²²⁰.

The reactions of the Archbishop towards the EU had been irritating for the Greek government as well. While Istanbul was organizing conferences for the interfaith dialogue, stressing that the EU was not a Christian club, praising human rights and giving speeches against racism, Archbishop Hristodoulos defined the EU as a “Catholic Club”, and had shocked the European community by attacking secularism, roman Catholicism, the Turks, the

¹²¹⁸ Prodromou, “Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Grece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period”, p. 474

¹²¹⁹ Jane Little, “Religious Row Blazes over Greek Identity”, *BBC News*, 15 March 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1222101.stm>, Retrieved 27 March 2008

¹²²⁰ Ta Nea, 30 October 2000 cited in Akgonul, *Le Patriarcat Grec Orthodoxe*, p. 148.

Americans, the Jews, the left-wing intelligentsia, even non-Orthodox Greeks¹²²¹. Moreover, he had been a vocal critic of NATO's 1999 bombing campaign against the Serbs in Kosovo and he provided funds and relief to Orthodox Serbia¹²²².

The deepest cleavage between the two churches had been on the issue of Turkey. The Patriarch endorsed the membership prospective of Turkey which he believed would contribute to the resolution of the problems his institution encounters¹²²³. In a striking contrast Archbishop of Athens criticised the EU for not incorporating a mention for Christianity in its constitution. Fearing that the Orthodoxy would melt in the European melting pot, he commented that "for Greeks, to be an Orthodox Christian is a defining attribute of their identity. For us Europeans, this is our Christian identity"¹²²⁴.

Moreover, he criticised the Greek-Turkish rapprochement after 1999 and the Greek government's support for Turkey's membership. He created a diplomatic scandal in 2003, when he described Turks as "barbarians who should not be allowed to join the EU". Nevertheless, this latest outburst angered the Greek Government, drawing an immediate response from the foreign minister, distancing itself from the remarks and saying that the Greek government wanted the EU to be extended to include Turkey¹²²⁵. Obviously his nationalist views on the EU, Turks and the Greek-Turkish relations were at odds with Bartholomeos' moderate approach to Greek-Turkish relations.

Until the death of Archbishop Hristodoulos, two churches had been witnessed several crisis periods. The outspokenness and nationalism of Hristodoulos together with his eagerness to get involved with politics fuelled the popularity of the Patriarch Bartholomeos in Greece and on the international plane. The election of Archbishop Geronimos restored friendly relations between the two patriarchates. During the visit of Archbishop Geronimos to the Patriarchate in 2008, tensions were eased. Both sides agreed on the status quo in the New Lands. In addition, the Athens representation of the Patriarchate will have the status of "Exarchate". The Brussels offices of Greek Church and Fener will be united under the

¹²²¹ "Archbishop Hristodoulos", *The Sunday Times*, January 29, 2008.

¹²²² Anthee Carassava, "The Greek Orthodox Leader Dies at 69", *The New York Times*, January 29, 2008.

¹²²³ See for example the speech of the Patriarch given at the Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe 27.01.2007

¹²²⁴ Daniel Payne, *The Clash of Civilisations: The Church of Greece, the European Union and the Question of Human Rights, Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2003, p. 261-271. at p. 265.

¹²²⁵ Richard Galpin, "Greek Orthodox Leader Brands Turks 'Barbarians'", BBC News, December 5, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3292835.stm> (14 June 2010)

administration of Istanbul. The Greek Church will provide clerics that will work in European churches under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate¹²²⁶.

Conclusion

What was the role of the Patriarchate in the post cold war period? The Patriarchate emerged after years of silence as the centre of world Orthodoxy. In an environment when the bipolar system was replaced by pluralism, the Patriarchate like other religious actors became more active in defending the integration around shared values. Under an active Patriarch, the institution imposed itself as an important actor of the emerging global civil society. The churches took their part in the integration process as defenders of the values such as human rights, minority rights, democracy and rule of law. The inclusion of Turkey in the EU integration process added a new dimension to the relations between the state and the church. The EU integration added a new dimension to the ecumenical claim of the Patriarchate. The institution finds the supranational stance of the organization conform to its vision. While the Patriarch helped to integrate the Orthodox religion in the cultural picture of Europe, the EU from its part contributed to the development of democracy in Turkey and defended the rights claimed by the Patriarch. Another important aspect of the church's activities in the post cold war period was its relations with the Russian Patriarchate.

¹²²⁶ Yorgo Kırbağı, "Rum Patriği Bartholomeos ile Yunan Kilisesinin Yeni Lideri Barış Anlaşması Yaptı [The Greek Patriarch Bartholomeos and the New Leader of the Greek Church Made a Peace Agreement]", *Hürriyet*, May 13, 2008.

CONCLUSIONS

Ecumenical and transnational characters all together make the Patriarchate an international player in world politics. Deprived of its privileges that it enjoyed under the two empires the institution still has the vision of itself as an imperial organization. The title “ecumenical” now is different from what it was in the past. Under the two empires ecumenicity derived from the political power and imposed upon only the Orthodox, as contrary to what the word implies, that were united together under the same political authority. Now, the Church deprived of its flock at home and a supportive political authority, reinvents its universality. The new empire imagined by the Patriarchate consists of its network of ecclesiastical units worldwide and its contested role of leadership of the Orthodox world.

Despite the long history of accommodation of the church with the state under the Ottomans, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic the Patriarchate has been identified not only with Greek irredentism but also with Western imperialism. Shaped by the Turkish suspicion of a highly hostile Patriarchate during the final years of the Empire and especially due to its role in the Greco-Turkish war, it was placed in Lausanne in a straightjacket tailored for the Greek minority. The institution was allowed to stay in Turkey as a “Turkish institution” under the tight supervision of the state. Considered as a residue of an obsolete Empire that the new leadership wanted to erase from memories as soon as possible, the Patriarchate was consigned to oblivion at the margins of a society that had no regard for it.

The Patriarchate had the tradition of total subordination to the state. However, this tradition was now broken as Turkey was now a secular, national state of Turks. Marginalized, the Patriarchate had to find new paths to enjoy the power it was accustomed to have under the empires. Its legal status as a minority church was not in conformity with its international set up and its ecumenical claim. This has been done with the help of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance during the Republic. It assumed the role of a peculiar role of a “Western” Orthodox church due to the transnational networks that it has. Thanks to the role tailored for it, a rival and container of the Moscow Patriarchate, it could enjoy the prestige, if not an actual power that it was striving for. Despite the fact that it lost all remnants of its glorious past under the rulers

that praised it to enforce their political authority, now the Patriarchate was endorsed extensively by the West, beyond its actual power and capabilities. The ecumenical title is mainly a challenge to the Russian Patriarchate, asserting a leadership role within Orthodoxy. This fact has become more clear when the Vatican saluted the Patriarchate as ecumenical as a strategy of praising the place of the Fener against an all assertive, uncompromising Russian Church. In other words, if the Moscow Patriarchate had not existed the Patriarchate of Istanbul would be deprived of the support that it enjoys now as a component part of the Western strategy. Therefore, the rivalry between the Russian Church and the Patriarchate is the main axis around which the Church plays. This rivalry is an outcome of the policy consideration of the Western alliance and of Russia.

Already from the end of the World War I, several factors contributed to the strengthening of the Patriarchate even though it was at the brink of destruction at home after the Greek defeat in Anatolia. The foundation of the Diaspora Greek communities abroad brought a new fresh air to the Orthodox scene. It was the canons skilfully exploited for practical political needs conferred the right to the Patriarchate not to the Church of Greece, the jurisdiction over the newly established Greek Orthodox dioceses. The Diaspora communities supported the Patriarchate not only financially but also provided it with a network all around the world that would add to its symbolic importance as the centre of Orthodoxy.

Another important development in the course of the Great War had an unprecedented impact on the foreign policy of the Patriarchate. The Russian October revolution of 1917, brought the Bolsheviks to the power replacing the Tsar's regime in Russia. Now with the right of national self determination recognized by Lenin, it was time for the subject nations to declare independence from Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate itself was suppressed by the new rulers of Russia who founded an officially atheistic regime. The absence of Russia left a void in the Orthodox world for nearly 30 years. Thus the Patriarchate undertook the task to unite the Orthodox around the Fener, this task being its primary source of life.

In the accomplishment of this duty, the weakness of the Patriarchate has become its strength. A minority church in Turkey, deprived of its wealth in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, it had not much to offer. In addition it was not a national church, endorsed by a

wealthy state but it was isolated in Turkey. In this duty, the canons were at its side. First among equals in the hierarchy, it assumed the right to canonize new churches. Even though the canons envisages the consent of all churches to canonize a new church, the Patriarchate has not abstained to distort them. This right was used willingly for the churches that wanted to detach themselves from the Russian influence. Recognizing the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate almost had no risks for the smaller churches. In the post period following the Russian Revolution, the West showed its unconditional support of the Patriarchate in the Lausanne Conference, regarding it as a part of the foreign policy against the expansion of communism in Europe even before the start of the Cold War. The endorsement enjoyed by the Patriarchate was also an outcome of the excellent relations built with Anglican and Protestant churches under the banner of the ecumenical movement inspired by the foundation of the League of Nations.

In the Cold War period signals of reconciliation with the political authority started. The government and the Patriarchate were in the same boat and doted with an eminent duty, fight with communism. The democratisation of Turkey further contributed to the improvement of the relations cause under the crashing presence of the USA. The international significance of the Patriarchate grew in parallel with the increasing integration of Turkey to the West. The church rose again with the state. The place of the church in the eyes of the West increased with the growing importance of Turkey.

A rejuvenating Moscow Patriarchate challenged Fener in every front during the Cold War. Curiously, instead of abandoning the Orthodox behind the Iron Curtain, the Patriarchate inspired by the ecumenical movement and the work of the Vatican to which it participated since the beginning, worked for uniting the Orthodox again. Even though they might have severe problems in the past, these churches were finally members of the same ecclesiastical family who had to support each other in difficult times. The rivalry between the Russian and Istanbul Patriarchates were interrupted by periods of mutual understanding, as it is the case for example in the 1960s when both were persecuted at home. The Rhodes meetings, the Patriarchate's mediation for the participation of the Russian Church in the ecumenical movement is a rare example for unity.

What is striking in the context of the Cold War is that the relation of the state to the outside world, the level of integration had a direct impact on the church-state relations. The more Turkey integrated to the West its policy towards the Patriarchate has changed from suspicion to a milder approach of cooperation. The Turkish government regarded the Patriarchate a way to build better relations with the West.

Turkey has been regarding officially the Patriarchate as a minority church even though this vision contradicts with the factual data proving that the institution is more than a minority church and is a transnational entity. Even though, ironically the ecumenical stance of the patriarchate is contested, it is in fact the transnational character of the church and not its ecumenical claim that causes problems. The demands of the Patriarchate to reopen its theology school as an international school for example is a question stemming from the “transnationality” of the institution and not of its ecumenical claim. The Patriarchate wants to educate the priests that are from a myriad of nationalities and who would work for the Patriarchate in the Metropolitanates and archdioceses all around the world. This has nothing to do with its contested role as a centre of world Orthodoxy. Again, the legal problems stemming from the will of the patriarchate to employ foreign clergy, again from the regions under its jurisdiction, the right to vote of the Metropolitanans in the Patriarchal elections and even the possibility of electing a foreign national as the patriarch is a consequence of the transnational set up of the church. These problems might be solved between the state and the church if a formulae meeting the reality of the Patriarchate and the concerns of the state that fears an erosion of its sovereign authority was found. The Patriarch *de facto* appointed foreign clergy to the Synod of Istanbul and the Turkish government allowed for metropolitans of the Patriarchate to apply for Turkish nationality, to guarantee that the future Patriarch would be a Turkish national, as an act of good will. However, when the legal recognition of the institution that would allow it to be a regular employer that could hire foreign nationals, apply for work permits and nationality for them, those are only temporary measures, that would change from one government to an other.

The ecumenical claim of the institution concerns mainly the Orthodox world and the leadership role of the institution, bolstered by the western support has been vividly contested by the Russian Patriarchate. There are no plausible arguments to prove that the leadership role

of the Patriarchate would be against Turkish interests. In fact, Turkey and the Patriarchate have always been at the same, Western side of the international power balance. There is no plausible data, proving that the ecumenical claim of the institution works against the state interests. Instead, the contestation of the title incites foreign intervention on behalf of the institution that is undesirable for Turkey at best. Whereas Turkey has no legal obligations to recognize the title of the Patriarchate as such it has also no reason to contest it.

During the EU integration of Turkey, the country had to face criticism for its opposition to the “ecumenical” claim from the EU institutions. The European integration process of Turkey has added a new dimension to the relations between the institution and the Turkish state. What was the EU’s impact on the relations between the state and the church is quite hard to answer. The liberalisation process of Turkey went hand in hand with its integration in the European system. As the EU integration goes on a par with the globalisation process we may claim that, the visibility of the religious leaders all around the world grew. Religious liberties are regarded as one of the most important rights in the new order. The religious leaders have adjusted themselves to the new conditions adopting the burning questions of environment, racism, human rights, discrimination, social inequalities as a part of the problems that requires theological responses.

The global civil society consists also of the religious representatives who try to approach the contemporary issues from their theological angle. The integration process in Europe needs further help from the religious personalities because the thesis of ‘clash of civilisation’ put forward the irreconcilability of certain religions with the Western values. The Orthodox Church tries to respond to the challenges by its own means. As it was the case for the previous periods, the Patriarchate adopts an ecumenical vision that is in parallel with the EU’s agenda. In return the EU is sensitive about the violation of rights that it considers the basis of the political union of the peoples of Europe. In this context cooperation with the Patriarchate is at the best interest of Turkey.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abélès, Marc and Irene Bellier, “La Commission Européenne: du Compromis Culturel à la Culture Politique du Compromis”, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 46eme année, No. 3, 1996.
- Adereth, Maxwell, *The French Communist Party: A Critical History, 1920-1984*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 226
- Afonsky, Gregory, Archbishop, “The Canonical Status of the Patriarch of Constantinople in the Orthodox Church” available online at <http://www.Orthodoxytoday.org/articles-2009/Alfonsky-The-Canonical-Status-Of-The-Patriarch-Of-Constantinople-In-The-Orthodox-Church.php>. Retrieved May 6, 2009.
- Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet]*, Vol. 11, Ankara: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1966.
- Ahmet Rüstem Bey, “The Future of the Œcumenical Patriarchate”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1925, p. 604-610.
- Akar, Rıdvan and Hülya Demir, *Istanbul'un Son Sürgünleri [The Last Exiled of Istanbul]*, Istanbul: İletişim, 1994.
- Akgönül, Samim, *Le Patriarcat Grec Orthodoxe: De l'Isolément à l'Internationalisation de 1923 à nos Jours*, Paris: Masionneuve & Larose, 2005.
- _____, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yokoluş Süreci [Greeks of Turkey: From the Age of the Nation-State to the Age of Globalization : Vanishment of a Minority]*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2007.
- _____, (ed.), *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities Law, Religion and Politics*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008.
- _____, “Imams en France ou Imams de France: Attentes de Formation, Réalités du Terrain” in Francis Messner and Anne-Laure Zwilling (eds.), *La Formation des Cadres Religieux en France: une Affaire d'Etat*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010 (forthcoming)
- Akıman, Nazmi, “Turkish-Greek Relations: From Uneasy Coexistence to Better Relations? A Retired Ambassador Takes Stock”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Summer 2002, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 22-32.
- Albrecht, Hans-Jörg, “Fortress Europe: Controlling Illegal Immigration”, *Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Justice*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2001.
- Alexandris, Alexis, “The Expulsion of Constantine VI”, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1981, p. 333-363.

- _____, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992.
- Alexeev, Vasili I., *The Great Revival: The Russian Church Under German Occupation*, Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing, 1976.
- Alfeyev, Hilarion, “Why Does the Russian Orthodox Church need a Representation in Europe?”, *Europaeca Bulletin*, No.1, November 26, 2002.
- Allitt, Patrick, *Religion in America since 1945*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- Alkan, Hakan, *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi: Uluslararası İlişkiler Açısından Bir Yaklaşım*, Ankara: Günce Yayıncılık, 1999.
- _____, *Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye Patrikhaneleri I: Fener Rum Patrikhanesi & Türk Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, İstanbul: Kutup Yıldızı, 2003.
- Alp, İlker, “Misak-ı Milli”, *Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış Politikasında Musul* [“*The National Pact: The National Pact and Musul in Turkish Foreign Policy*], Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998.
- American Foreign Policy Current Documents*, Washington D.C: Department of State Publications, 1967.
- Anagnostakis, Ilias and Balta, Evangelia, *La Découverte de la Cappadoce*, İstanbul: Eren, 1994.
- Anastasiadou, Méropi and Paul Dumont, *Une Mémoire pour la Ville: La Communauté Grecque d’Istanbul en 2003*, İstanbul: Institut Français d’Etudes Anatoliennes, 2003.
- Anastassopoulou, Ekavi, *Turkey, Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, London: Routledge, 1999.
- Anagnostopoulou, Sia, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-State, A Long and Difficult Process: The Greek Case*, İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004.
- Anderson, Paul B., “The Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Jan 1961, p. 299-311.
- Anhegger, Robert, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Hristiyanlar ve İç Tartışmaları II [Christians in the Ottoman State and their Inner Disputes]”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 9, November 1987, p. 17-19.
- Archons of the Patriarchate, *Call to Action, The Imperiled Future of an Essential Religious Institution in Istanbul Turkey, Explanatory Documents*, Order of St. Andrew the Apostle, Archons of the Patriarchate, www.archons.org, p. 40 (19 June 2008)
- Arı, Kemal, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)[Great Exchange: Compulsory Immigration to Turkey (1923-1925)]*, 2nd. ed., İstanbul: Türk Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000

- Arnakis, Georgiades, “The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 24, no.3, Sep 1952, p. 235-250.
- Atalay, Bülent, *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi'nin Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1908-1923)* [The Fener Greek Patriarchate's Political Activities (1908-1923)], Istanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001.
- Atatürk, Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk [The Speech], Vol. II, 1920-1927*, Ankara: TTK, 1984.
- Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III (1918-1937) [Speeches and Statements of Atatürk III (1918-1937)], Ankara: Türk Inkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2nd. ed., 1961.
- Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri* [All Works of Atatürk], *Cumhuriyet'in 80. Yıl Armağanı*, Vol. 14, 1922-1923, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2001.
- Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri [All Works of Atatürk]*, Vol. 16, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2005.
- Association Catholique de l'Aide à l'Eglise en Détresse*, “Relations Difficiles avec Istanbul”, *Association Catholique de l'Aide à l'Eglise en Detresse*, www.aed.france.org/observatoire/pays.php?id=23&dossier=270 (28 October 2008)
- Audi, Robert and Nicolas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square: the Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate*, Maryland: Rowman and LittleField, 1997.
- Austin, Robert, “Albanian-Greek Relations: Confrontation Continues”, RFE/RL Research Report, Munich, August 4, 1993.
- Avcioğlu, Doğan, *Türklerin Tarihi*, Vol I [History of the Turks], Istanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1978.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. and Elizabeth Prodromou, “God is Not Neutral: Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy after 9/11”, *Orbis*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Winter 2004, p. 43-54.
- Bailey, Betty Jane and Martin Bailey, *Who are the Christians in the Middle East*, Michigan: W.M.B. Eerdmans, 2003.
- Bali, Rıfat N., *Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)* [Jews of Turkey during the First Years of the Republic: An Adventure of Turkification], 5th ed., Istanbul: İletişim, 2005.
- Ball, George, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York: Norton & Company, 1982.
- Balkır, Canan and Allan M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, London, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993.
- Barker, Philip W., *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be for Us*, London: Routledge, 2009.
- Barnett, Hilaire, *Constitutional and Administrative Law* 4th ed., London: Cavendish, 2002.

- Barroso, José Manuel, Message of the President of the EU Commission on the Occasion of the Conference Peace and Tolerance II, Dialogue and Cooperation in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Istanbul, Turkey 7-9 November 2005, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=588&tla=en>, (28 August 2008)
- Bartholomeos I, Patriarch, “Address to the Plenary of the European Parliament”, Strasbourg, April 19, 1994.
- _____, “Address at the University of Georgetown”, Washington, 21 October 1997, http://evlogeite.com/?page_id=16 (20 June 2010).
- _____, “Address at the Synaxis of the Heads of Orthodox Churches in Phanar”, October 10, 2008.
- _____, “Address at the London School of Economics organized by the London Hellenic Society on the role of religion in a changing Europe”, November 3, 2005, <http://www.ecpatr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=583&tla=en> (5 October 2008)
- _____, “Address to the Plenary of the European Parliament”, September 24, 2008, <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=23305> (25 February 2009)
- _____, “Address during the visit of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia”, Fener, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=1098&tla=en>, July 5, 2009 (9 September 2009)
- Basil, John, D. “Revolutionary Leadership and the Russian Orthodox Church in 1917”, *Church History*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Jun. 1979, p. 189-203.
- _____, “Church-State Relations in Russia: Orthodoxy and Federation Law, 1990-2004”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2005, p. 151-164.
- Baş, Mustafa, *Türk Ortodoks Patrikhanesi [Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate]*, Ankara: Aziz Andaç Yay., 2005.
- Bathon, Matthew N., “The Atypical International Status of the Holy See”, *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 34, 2001, p. 597-632
- Baykal, Sanem and Tuğrul Arat, “AB’yle İlişkiler [Relations with the EU]” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar [Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents and Comments since the War of Independence]*, Vol. II: 1980-2001, 2nd ed. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2002, p. 326-365.
- Beal, Timothy, *Religion in America: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Bebiroğlu, Murat, *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Gayrimüslim Nizamnameleri [Non-Muslim General Ordinances under the Ottoman Empire]*, Istanbul: Akademi, 2008.

- Belarus News, “Geopolitic Diary: Belarus” Problem with Polish Priests”, *Belarus News*, <http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/092007/161.html>, [21 September 2007].
- Benlisoy, Yorgo and Elçin Macar, *Fener Patrikhanesi* [Patriarchate of Fener], Ankara: Ayraç, 1996.
- Benlisoy, Foti, “6/7 Eylül Olayları Öncesinde Basında Rumlar [Greeks in the Press before the 6/7 September Events]”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 81, 2000, p. 28-38.
- Benlisoy, Foti and Stefo Benlisoy, “Millet-i Rum’dan Helen Ulusuna (1856-1922) [From Millet-i Rum to the Hellen Nation]” in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [The Legacy of Thought Inherited by the Republic: The Accumulation of Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet [Reforms and Constitutional Monarchy], Political Thought in Modern Turkey], Vol. I, İstanbul: İletişim, 2003, p. 367-376.
- Benlisoy, Stefo, “Kilise İhtilafı: Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Gelgitinde Azınlık Siyasetine Bir Örnek” [Church Controversy: An Example of the Minority Policy in the the Ebb and Flow of the Greek-Turkish Relations], *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, Spring-Summer 2008, No. 7, p. 101-127.
- Benoît-Rohmer, Florence and Heinrich Klebes, *Le Droit du Conseil de l’Europe : Vers un Espace Juridique Paneuropéen*, Strasbourg : Le Conseil de l’Europe, 2005.
- Berberakis, Stelyo, “Hristodulos Şimdilik Saygıda Kusur Etmeyecek” [Hristodoulos will Show Respect for Now], *Sabah*, 2 May 2004.
- Berger, Peter, *The Desecularization of the World, Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.
- Berkes, Niyazi, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma [The Development of Secularism in Turkey]*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002.
- _____, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, London: Hurst & Company, 1998.
- _____, *Patrikhane ve Ekümeniklik*, 2nd ed., İstanbul: Kaynak, 2005.
- _____, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Ortodoks Kilisesi [The Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox Church]”, *Yön [Direction]*, 23 October 1964, No. 82, p. 16.
- _____, “Osmanlı Ülkesi, Hristiyan Mezhepleri Arasında Çıkan Çatışmalara Sahne Oluyor [The Ottoman Land becomes a Scene to the Conflicts between the Christian Denominations]”, *Yön [Direction]*, 30 October 1964, No. 83, p. 16.
- _____, “Atatürk Türkiye’sinde Ekümenik Patriklik [Ecumenical Patriarchate in Atatürk’s Turkey]”, *Yön [Direction]*, 6 November 1964, No. 84, p. 84.

- _____, “Panortodoks Kongresi [Pan-Orthodox Congress]”, *Yön [Direction]*, 18 December 1964, No. 90, p. 11 in Niyazi Berkes, *Patrikhane ve Ekümeniklik*, 2nd ed, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2005, p. 39-47.
- Bernardini, Philip, “The Lateran Concordat with Italy”, *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, April 1930.
- Bertrand, Gilles, *Le Conflit Helleno-Turc: Nouvelles Donnes et Nouveaux Acteurs dans le Système Post-bipolaire et à l’Age de la Globalisation*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003.
- Beyer, Peter, *Religion and Globalization*, London: Sage, 1994.
- Bianchi, Stephania, “EU Greets Ratzinger’s Election, Turkey Concerned”, IPS News, April 20, 2005, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=28386> (3 March 2009)
- Bilge, Aslı, *The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus (1945-1974): A Strategy for Partition?*, University of Salford, U.K, 2000., Unpublished Master’s Thesis.
- Bilge, Suat, “Fener Greek Patriarchate”, *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 3, No. 1, March-May 1998.
- Billington, James, H., “The Case for Orthodoxy”, *New Republic*, 30 May 1994.
- Binns, John, *An Introduction to the Christian Orthodox Churches*, Cambridge: CUP, 2002.
- Birand, M. Ali, “Artık İş Bundan Sonra Başlıyor”, *Milliyet*, February 2, 1988.
- Birtek, Faruk, “Greek Bull in the China Shop of Ottoman “Grand Illusion”: Greece in the Making of Modern Turkey” in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragoran (eds.), *Citizenship and Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London; New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 37-48.
- Blunt, Liz, “Pope Presses the EU on Constitution”, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3029456.stm> (29 June 2003)
- Boojamra, John L., *The Church and Social Reform: The Policies of the Patriarch Athanasios of Constantinople*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1993.
- Bosworth, C. E., “The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, The Central Lands*, New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 37-55.
- Bozer, Ali, Minister of EC Affairs: “Davos AT ile ilişkimizi etkileyecek”, *Cumhuriyet*, February 14, 1988.
- Bozkurt, Gülnihal, *Alman- İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu, (1839-1914)* [The Legal

Status of the Non-Muslim Citizens of the Ottoman Empire under the Light of the German-British Documents and Political Developments (1839-1914], Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.

Bozkurt, Gülnihal, “İslam Hukukunda Zimmilerin Hukuki Statüleri [The Legal Status of the *Zimmis* in the Islamic Law]”, *Kudret Ayıter’e Armağan, 9 Eylül Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 3. No. 1-4, p. 115-156.

Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1987, p. 348-361.

Braude, Benjamin and Bernard Lewis, “Introduction” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, The Central Lands*, New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 1-33.

Braun, Janice, “Divisions in Eastern Orthodoxy Today”, *East-West Church Ministry Report*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1997, <http://www.eastwestreport.org/articles/ew05201.htm> (26 May 2009).

Bremmer, Ian, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994, p. 261-283

Bréhier, Louis, *Le Monde Byzantin, Vol. II, Institutions de l’Empire Byzantin*, Paris : Albin Michel, 1948.

_____, *Le Monde Byzantin, Vol III: L’Effondrement de l’Empire et l’Affaiblissement de l’Idée Monarchique*, Paris : Albin Michel, 1950.

Brown, L. Carl, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games*, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984.

Brussels Declaration, “The Peace of God in the World, Towards Peaceful Coexistence and Collaboration Among the Three Monotheistic Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam”, December 20, 2001.

Bulaç, Ali, “Papa ve Patrik [The Pope and the Patriarch]”, *Zaman*, November 29, 2006.

Burnett, Maria, Maria Pulzetti and Sean Young, “Turkey’s Compliance with Its Obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian Minority”, The Allard Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, A Paper Prepared at the Request of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, February 3, 2005.

Butler, Rohan and J.P.T. Bury (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Vol. XIII, The Near and Middle East, January 1920-March 1921*, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963.

Büyükkarcı, Süleyman, *Türkiye’de Rum Okulları [Greek Schools in Turkey]*, Konya: Yelken, 2003.

- Byrnes, Timothy A. and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Carassava, Anthee, “The Greek Orthodox Leader Dies at 69”, *The New York Times*, January 29, 2008.
- Casanova, José, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994.
- _____, “Religion, the New Millenium, and Globalization”, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 4, Speical Issue: Religion and Globalization at the Turn of the Millenium, Winter, 2001.
- Castellan, Georges, *A History of the Balkans: From Mohamed to Stalin*, New York, Boulder, 1992.
- Catholic News Agency, “Pope Benedict Recommits Church to Working Towards Unification”, *Catholic News Agency*, November 30, 2006, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope_benedict_recommits_church_to_working_towards_reunification_with_orthodox/ (28 January 2008)
- “Comment Devenir Pretre?”, *Catholique Diocese de Nanterre*, http://catholique-snanterre.cef.fr/faq/pretres_formation.htm#entrer (13 August 2010)
- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 364/01, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 18 December 2000.
- Charter of the UN in A. Leroy Benett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, Annex II, 7th ed., New Jersey: Pearson Education 2002, p.472-497.
- Cherney, Alexander, *The Latvian Orhodox Church*, Powys: Stylite Publishing, 1985.
- Chumachenko, Tatiana, A., *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy From World War II to the Khruschev Years*, (ed. and trans. by Edward E. Roslov), New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- Churchill, Winston, “Sinews of Peace”, London: Westminster College, 5 March 1946, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Sinews_of_Peace (26 May 2010)
- Christian Century, “Object to American Patriarch”, *Christian Century*, 10 November 1948.
- _____, August, 14, 1996.
- _____, “Between East and West”, *Christian Century*, May 11, 1997, Vol. 114, No. 31, p. 998.
- Christianity Today*, April 2001, www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/aprilweb.../4-2-55.0.html (6 November 2009).

Christian Network, “Catholic Orthodox Dialogue Resume”, *Christian Network*, <http://habitusnetwork.org/churches-news/catholic-ortodox-diaogue-resume.html> (16 June 2008)

Cini, Michel, *European Union Politics*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Clark, Ian, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in The Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Claude, Inis, *National Minorities: An International Problem*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1969.

Clément, Olivier, *Dialogues avec le Patriarche Athénagoras*, Paris: Fayard, 1969.

_____, *Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I*, (trans. Paul Meyendorff), New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997.

Clogg, Richard, “The ‘Dhidhaskalia Patriki’ (1798): an Orthodox Reaction to French Revolutionary Propaganda”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1969, p. 87-115.

_____, “Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence” in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, London & Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1973, p. 1-40.

_____, (ed., trans. with an introduction), *The Movement for Greek Independence 1770-1821, A Collection of Documents*, London, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1976.

_____, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, the Central Lands*, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 185-207.

_____, *A Concise History of Greece*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: CUP, 1992.

_____, “Anadolu Hıristiyan Karındaşlarımız: The Turkish Speaking Greeks of Asia Minor” in *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Hampshire: Variorum, 1996, p. 65-91.

CNBC News, “Vatican Returns Relics to Orthodox Church”, *CNBC News*, <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2004/11/27/vatican-Orthodox041127.html> (14 July 2008)

CNN.com/World, “Religious Heads Condemn Terror”, *CNN.com/world*, December 20, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/12/20/brussels.interfaith/index.html> (10 August 2010)

“Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents, October, 1920, p. 356-360.

Coşar, Ömer Sami, “Patrikhane Dosyası”, *Hürriyet*, August 16, 1976.

Coufoudakis, Van, “Greek Turkish Relations 1973-1983: The View from Athens”, *International Security*, Spring 1985, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 185-217.

Council of Europe, “Statute of the Council of Europe”, *European Treaty Series No. 1*, 5 May 1949.

_____, “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, 1.2.1995, Art. 4.2 and 5.1, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm> (12 August 2010)

_____, “Recommendation on the Situation of the Church and Freedom of Religion in Eastern Europe”, CoE, No. 1086, 6 October 1988.

_____, “Recommendation on the Religious Tolerance in a Democratic Society”, *Parliamentary Assembly, No. 1202*, 2 February 1993.

_____, “Religion and Democracy”, *Parliamentary Assembly, Commission of Culture and Education*, Doc. No. 8270, 27 November 1998.

_____, “Conclusions of the Seminar Concerning Church-State Relations in the Light of the Exercise of the Right to Freedom of Religion”, *Commissioner for Human Rights, Strasbourg*, 10-11 December 2001.

_____, “Draft Opinion on Implications of a Legally-Binding Charter of Fundamental Rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe”, *European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)*, No. 256, 6 October, 2003.

_____, “Third Report on Turkey”, *Council of Europe, ECRI [European Commission against Racism and Intolerance]*, Doc. CRI (2005), 15 February 2005.

_____, “Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Greece”, Michel Hunault (rapporteur), *Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights*, Art. 19.2., Doc. 11860, 21 April 2009.

_____, Report by Thomas Hammerberg, *Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE*, following his visit to Turkey on 28 June-3 July 2009, Strasbourg, 1 October 2009.

_____, “Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to Use the Adjective ‘Ecumenical’”, *European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice*

Commission), Opinion No. 535/2009, CDL-AD (2010)005, Strasbourg, 15 March 2010.

_____, “Freedom of Religion and other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece), *Parliamentary Assembly*, Resolution 1704 (2010), 27 January 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b6fd1382.html> (30 July 2010)

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S Helsinki Commission, “The Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey: A Victim of Systematic Expropriation”, <http://csce.gov>. (16 March 2005)

Commission of the European Communities, “Governance, A White Paper”, Brussels, 25 July 2001.

_____, “Agenda 2000”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Strengthening the Union and Preparing the 2004 Enlargement”, 1999.

_____, “1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 4 November 1998.

_____, “2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 8 November 2000.

_____, “2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 13 November 2001.

_____, “2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 9 October 2002.

_____, “2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 8 November 2003.

_____, “2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 6 October 2004.

_____, “Turkey 2005 Progress Report”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 9 November 2005.

_____, “Turkey 2006 Regular Report”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 8 November 2006.

_____, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 6 November 2007.

_____, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 5 November 2008.

_____, “Turkey 2009 Progress Report”, *Commission of the European Communities*, Brussels, 14 October 2009.

Communiqué of the Fourth Preconciliary Pan-Orthodox Conference, Chambésy 6-12 June 2009, http://www.Orthodoxie.com/files/Communique_Clature.pdf

“Conclusions of the Inter-Orthodox Consultation on the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union”, Herakleion, Crete, 18-19 March 2003, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/print/14/10.aspx#4> (4 July 2010)

Cowell, Alan, “Vatican Formally Recognizes Independence of Croatia and Slovenia”, *The New York Times*, January 14, 1992.

Cornwell, John, *Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, London: Penguin Books, 2008.

Cozad, Laurie, “The United States Imposition of Religious Freedom: The International Religious Freedom Act and India”, *India Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2005, p. 59-83

Cracraft, James, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Craig, Paul, P. and Gràinne de Burca, *The EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, 4th ed., Oxford: OUP, 2008.

CSCE, “Paris Charter for a New Europe”, CSCE, Paris, 1990.

Cumhuriyet, March 4, 1956.

Cumhuriyet, March 4, 1956

Cumhuriyet, March 10, 1956.

Cumhuriyet, March 11, 1956.

Cumhuriyet, March 14, 1956

Cumhuriyet, March 16, 1956.

“Fuat Köprülü ile Röportaj [Interview with Fuat Köprülü]”, *Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1956.

Cumhuriyet, April 22, 1964.

Curanović, Alicja, “The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate Towards Other Orthodox Churches”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2007, p. 301-318.

Curtis, John S., *The Russian Church and the Soviet Union*, Boston: Little Brown, 1953.

Curzon to Henderson, December 4, 1922 in *İngiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı [Lausanne Peace Conference in British Documents 1922-1923]*, Vol II, November 20, 1922-April 22, 1923, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1984, p. 362.

Çelik, Mehmet, “Fener Patrikhanesinin Ökumeniklik İddiası Kutsal Kilise Kanunlarına ve Tarihi Gerçeklere Aykırıdır [The Claim of Ecumenicity of the Fener Patriarchate is Contrary to the Canon Law and Historical Facts]”, *Hatay Folklor Araştırmalar Derneği III. Hatay Tarih ve Folklor Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, Antakya, Antakya: Kültür Bilgi İşlem Merkezi, 10-11 June 1994.

_____, *Türkiye'nin Fener Patrikhanesi Meselesi* [Turkey's Problem of the Fener Patriarchate], İstanbul: Akademi Yayınları, 1998.

Çipof, Bojidar, *Patrikhane ile Mücadelem: Bulgar Exharklığı Vakfi'nda 15 Yıl [My Struggle with the Patriarchate: 15 Years in the Foundation of Bulgarian Exarchate]*, İstanbul: Bojidar Çipof Kitapları, 2010.

Daley, Brian E., “Position and Patronage in the Early Church: The Original Meaning of ‘Primacy of Honor’”, *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, October 1993, p. 529-553.

Dalin, David G., *The Myth of Hitler's Pope: How Pope Pius XII Rescued Jews from the Nazis*, Washington: Regnery, 2005.

Danişmend, İsmail, H., *Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi* [The Chronology of the Ottoman History], Vol. 4, İstanbul, 1972.

Danişmend, İsmail, H., *İstanbul Fethinin Medeni Kıymeti* [The Civic Importance of the Conquest of İstanbul], İstanbul: Halk Basımevi, 1953.

Davie, Grace, *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Davies, Norman, *Europe: A History*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Davison, Roderic, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century”, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4, July 1954, p. 844-864.

- _____, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- _____, “The *Millets* as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol I, The Central Lands*, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 319-337.
- De Búrca, Gráinne, “Drafting the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights”, *European Law Review*, Vol 26, No.2, pp. 126-138.
- _____ and Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, “European Constitutionalism and the Charter of Fundamental Rights” in Steve Peers and Angela Ward eds.), *The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy*, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004
- Della Cava, Ralph, “Thinking about Current Vatican Policy in Central and East Europe and the Utility of the ‘Brazilian Paradigm’”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 25. No. 2, May 1993, p. 257-281 at p. 260.
- _____, “Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia: An Overview of the Factions in the Russian Orthodox Church in the Spring of 1996”, *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, Vol. 38, No. 3, July-September 1997, p. 387-414.
- _____, “Transnational Religions: The Roman Catholic Church in Brazil & the Orthodox Church in Russia”, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2001, p. 535-550.
- Demirözü, Damla, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol: Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye Yunanistan İlişkileri* [The Path from War to Peace: The Turkish-Greek Relations in the Atatürk-Venizelos Period], Istanbul: İletişim, 2007.
- Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, “Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople broke Eucharistic Communion with Archbishop Christodoulos”, *Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate*, 19 February 2004, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/print/19/2/64.aspx> (13 August 2010)
- Deringil, Selim, “Fener Patrikliğine Sahip Çıkalım” [Let’s Look After the Fener Patriarchate], *Milliyet*, March 17, 1995.
- Dickinson, Anna, “Domestic and Foreign Policy Considerations and the Origins of Post-war Soviet Church-State Relations, 1941-6” in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold war*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 23-36 at p. 23.
- Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, “Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish “Threat” During the 1987 Aegean Crisis”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, No. 25, 2007, p. 99-127.

- Dimitrov, Ivan, Zhelev, “Bulgarian Christianity” in Ken Parry (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Orthodoxy*, West Sussex: Blackwell (hardcover), 2010, p. 47-72.
- Dinan, Desmond, “From the Common Market to the Single Market” in Klaus Larres (ed.), *A Companion to Europe since 1945*, West Sussex: Blackwell, 2009, p. 133-150.
- Directions to Orthodoxy, “Russian Patriarch Renewed Complaints on Catholic ‘Proselytism’”, *Directions to Orthodoxy*, December 5, 2006, http://directionstoOrthodoxy.org/mod/news/view.php?article_id=198 (6 May 2009)
- Doudelet, Alban, “Les Grecs Orthodoxes”, Belgique: Brepols, 1996.
- Dugan, George, “Orthodox Criticize Rome”, *The New York Times*, October 22, 1959.
- _____, “Orthodox Church Invoke Unity”, *The New York Times*, March 17, 1962.
- _____, “Orthodox Church in America Set Talk with Rome”, *The New York Times*, June 28, 1966.
- Dumont, Paul, “Tanzimat Dönemi (1839-1878)” in Robert Mantran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi [History of the Ottoman Empire II: XIX. Yüzyılın Başlarından Yıkılışa [History of the Ottoman Empire: From the XIXth Century to the Dissolution]*, (trans. Server Tanilli), 2nd ed., Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1999, p. 59-143.
- Dunlop, John B., “The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism after 1988”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990, p. 292-306
- Duparc, Jacques, *La Protection des Minorités de Race, de Langue et de Religion*, Paris : Dalloz, 1922.
- Dura, George, “EU Membership gives Romania New Opportunities in its Relations with Moldova”, *Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova, EuroJournal*, No. 1, 2007, available online at www.ceeol.com. Retrieved March 30, 2008.
- Dvornik, Francis, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
- _____, “Which Councils are Oecumenical”, *Journal of Oecumenical Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1966, p. 314-328.
- _____, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs: SS. Constantine-Cyril and Methodius*, New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1970.
- _____, *Konsiller Tarihi: İznik’ten II. Vatikan’a* [History of the Councils from Nicaea to Vatican II], Mehmet Aydın (trans.), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990.

ECtHR, *Affaire Fener Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcuménique) c. Turquie*, Application No. 14340/05, Strasbourg, July 8, 2008.

_____, *Affaire Fener Rum Patrikliği (Patriarchat Œcuménique) c. Turquie*, Application No. 14340/05, Strasbourg, June 15, 2010 (equitable satisfaction).

Ecumenical Review, “Report of the General Secretary”, *Ecumenical Review*, No. 1, Aug. 1949, p. 57-70.

Edbury, Peter W., *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Edwards Spalding, Elizabeth, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2006.

Eide, Asbjorn, “The Framework Convention in Historical and Global Perspective” in Mark Weller (ed.), *Oxford Commentaries on International Law: The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 25-47.

Eldar, Yishai and Thomas Idinopoulos, “A New Vision for Eastern Orthodoxy?”, *Christian Century*, November 11, 1987, p. 995.

Elekdağ, Şükrü, “Patrikhane’nin Statüsü [The Status of the Patriarchate]”, *Milliyet*, December 3, 1995.

Encyclopædia Britannica, “Gregorian Calendar”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2010*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, (21 August 2009).

_____, “Ruthenian”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2010*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, (10 June 2010).

_____, “Constantinople, Council of”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2009*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online (5 May 2009)

_____, “Autocephalous church”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2009*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online (21 June 2009)

_____, “Pentarchy”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2009*, *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* (23 June 2009)

_____, “Iconoclastic Controversy”, *Encyclopædia Britannica 2009*, *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* (21 March 2009)

Englezakis, Benedict, *Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus 4th-20th centuries*, Hampshire: Variorum, 1995.

European Council, “Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council”, *European Council*, Annex IV, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/mandates.html (11 August 2010).

- _____, “Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union”, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001.
- _____, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (28 March 2010)
- European Economic and Social Committee, “Opinion on the Role and Contribution of Civil Society Organisations in the Building of Europe”, *Official Journal of the EU*, C329, 17 November 1999, p. 30.
- European Parliament, *Resolution on Violations of Religious Freedom in Turkey*, October 24, 1996.
- Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America Relating to its Thought and Activity the First Fifty Years (1922-1972), Constantelos, Demetrios (ed.), Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1976.
- EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament, *Dialogues between the Orthodox Church the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament*, <http://stream.epp-ed.eu/Activities/docs/year2008/dialogues-en.pdf> (17 May 2009).
- European Parliament, Resolution on Violations of Religious Freedom in Turkey, October 24, 1996, <http://www.orthodoxa.org/GB/patriarchate/documents/BrusselsDeclaration.htm> (18 November 2007)
- Estonia, *Estonian Declaration of Independence*, 24 February 1918, <http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/> (18 March 2010)
- Eralp, Atila (ed.), *Türkiye ve Avrupa [Turkey and Europe]*, Ankara: İmge, 1997.
- Ercan, Yavuz, *Osmanlı Yönetiminde Gayrimüslimler: Kuruluştan Tanzimat'a Kadar Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Hukuki Durumları [Non-Muslims under the Ottoman Rule: Their Social, Economic and Legal Conditions from the Beginning until the Tanzimat]*, Ankara: Turhan, 2001.
- Ercan, Yavuz, “No Easy Formula for Resolving Halki Seminary Issue”, *Today's Zaman*, June 30, 2009.
- Erhan, Çağrı (ed), *American Documents on Greek Occupation of Anatolia*, Ankara: SAM Papers, 1999.
- Erhan, Çağrı and Tuğrul Arat, “AET ile İlişkiler” [Relations with the EEC] in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Vol. I, 1919-1980 [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Present: Concepts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol. I, 1919-1980]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, p. 813-828.

- Erhan, Çağrı and Tuğrul Arat, “AT’yle İlişkiler [Relations with the EC]” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. II: 1980-2001* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Present: Concepts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol. II, 1980-2001], 2nd ed., İstanbul: İletişim, 2002, p. 83-101.
- Ericson, John H., “The Canon 48: Yesterday and Today”, St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, <http://www.svots.edu/Faculty/John-Erickson/articles/canon-28-english.html/> (29 August 2008)
- Eton, William, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire*, Farnborough: Gregg, 1972.
- Europa Press Releases*, “Presidents of Commission, Council and Parliament Discuss Climate Change and Reconciliation with European Faith Leaders”, *Europa Press Releases*, 5 May 2008,
- Europaica Bulletin, Editorial, *Europaica Bulletin*, No.1, November 26, 2002, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/22.aspx> (2 July 2010)
- _____, “Letter by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate to Mr. Wim van Velzen, Vice-President of the EPP (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats” , *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 31, 19 January 2004, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/31.aspx#4> (27 June 2010)
- _____, “Moscow Patriarchate’s Representative Urges the Vatican not to Impose the Ecumenical Patriarch as an “Eastern Pope” on the Orthodox World”, *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 106, October 4, 2006, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/106.aspx#2> (27 November 2007)
- _____, “Bishop Hilarion Voices his Protest to Cardinal Kasper against Procedure at the Orthodox Catholic Dialogue”, *Europaica Bulletin*, No. 106, October 4, 2006, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/106.aspx#3> (30 September 2008)
- Evans, Andrew, “Forced Miracles: The Russian Orthodox Church and Post Soviet International Relations”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002, p. 33-43.
- Every, George, *The Byzantine Patriarchate*, London: SPCK, 1962.
- Fagan, Geraldine and Alexandr Shchipkov, ““Rome is Not our Father, but Neither is Moscow our Mother”: Will there be a Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church?”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 197-205.
- Fahlbursch, Erwin and Bromiley, Geoffrey, W. *The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol. 3*, Leiden: Eerdmans, 2003.
- Faroqhi, Suraiya N., (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

- Fennet, Alain, Geneviève Koubi and Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, *Le Droit et les Minorités: Analyses et Textes*, 2nd ed., Bruxelles: Etablissement Emile Bruylant, 2000.
- Firat, Melek, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler-II [Relations with Greece-II]” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. II, 1980-2001*, 2nd ed., Istanbul: İletişim, 2002, p. 440-480.
- Fitzgerald, Thomas E., *The Orthodox Church (Denominations in America)*, Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing, 1995.
- _____, “The Visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the United States”, *Ecumenical Trends*, Vol. 19, No. 7, 1991, p. 103-105.
- _____, *Historic Decision for the Church: The Fourth Pre-Conciliar Conference Approves New Episcopal Assembly for North America*, <https://www.trustedpartner.com/docs/library/000139/Chambesy%20Preconciliar%20Decision%20-%20FitzGerald.pdf>. (26 August 2009)
- _____, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History*, Greenwood, 2004.
- Forbes, Nevill et al, *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Turkey*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915.
- Forest, Jim and James H. Forest, *The Resurrection of the Church in Albania: Voices of the Orthodox Christians*, Geneva: WCC Publications, 2002.
- Foret, François “Religion: a Solution or a Problem for the Legitimization of the European Union?”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2009, p. 37-50.
- _____ and Peter Schlesinger, “Political Roof or Sacred Canopy: Religion and EU Constitution”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006.
- Fortescue, Adrian , *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, London: Catholic Truth Society, 1929.
- _____, “Synaxis”, 1912, *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, New York: Robert Appleton Company, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14383a.htm> (19 November 2008)
- Fox, Jonathan, “World Separation of Religion and State into the 21st Century”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2006.
- Fraaze, Charles, A., *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe, 1 February 1995, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm> (12 August 2010)
- Frucht, Richard, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church” in Richard Frucht (ed.), *Eastern Europe: Introduction to the People, Lands and Culture, Vol. I*, p. 800.

- Galpin, Richard, "Greek Orthodox Leader Brands Turks 'Barbarians'", BBC News, December 5, 2003.
- Gallagher, Tom, *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989*, London: Routledge, 2001.
- Garrard, Carol, *Russian Orthodox Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Gau, Christine K., et al., *Analysis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Application to the European Court of Human Rights*, Cornell Law School Student Research project under the Guidance of Professor Muna B. Ndulo, A Paper Prepared at the Request of the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, December 12, 2005
- Geanakoplos, Deno J., *Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in Middle Ages and Renaissance*, New York: Archon Books, 1976.
- _____, *A Short History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (330-1990): First Among Equals in the Eastern Orthodox Church*, 2nd ed., Brooklyn: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1990.
- Gedmin, Jeffrey, *The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of the East Germany*, Washington: AEI Press, 1992.
- Géraud, André, "The Lateran Treaties: A Step in Vatican Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1929.
- Giannakakis, Basil G., "International Status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1956, p. 10-26
- Gibb, Hamilton and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West I*, Part 2, London, 1957.
- Giddens, Anthony, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.
- Gilbert, Martin, *Winston S. Churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears*, London: Churchill Press, 2007.
- Goffman, Daniel, "Ottoman Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century", *New Perspectives on Turkey II*, 1994, p. 133-58.
- Goy, Raymond, *Du Droit Interne au Droit Internationale: Le Facteur Religieux et l'Exigence des Droits de l'Homme*, Rouen: Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 1998.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge, "The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalisms" in Fatma Müge Göçek (ed.), *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*, Albany: New York Press, 2002, p. 15-83.
- Gökçen, Salim, "Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin Hukuki Statüsü ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nu Açtırma Girişimleri", *Türk Yunan İlişkileri: Sorunlar, Görüşler*,

http://www.turk_yunan.gen.tr/turkce/makaleler/heybeliada.htm (28 May 2009)

- Gökmen, Oğuz, *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye-Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları [The Foreign Office Once upon a Time: Memoirs of a Retired Diplomat]*, Istanbul, 1999.
- Göl, Ayla, “Imagining the Turkish Nation Through “Othering” Armenians”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol 11, No 1, 2005, p
- Gönlübol, Mehmet et al.. “Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye [Common Market and Turkey]” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1990 [Turkish Foreign Policy with Facts]*, Vol. I, 8th ed., Ankara: Siyasal Yayınevi, 1993, pp.480-484.
- Gourdon, Edouard, *Histoire du Congrès du Paris*, Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1857.
- Grabbe, Heather and Kirsty Hugues, *Back to Europe, Central and Eastern European States and the EU*, Oxon: Routledge, 1998
- Grail, Arthur L. and David Kowalewski, “Church-State Relations in Russia and Nicaragua: Early Revolutionary Years”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1987, p. 92-104.
- Greek Orthodox Minority in Turkey*, March 2008, Fact sheet sent to the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2008, http://www.tcviyana.at/v1/0_public/TRK/documents/GREEKORTHODOXMINORITYINTURKEY.pdf (10 August 20010)
- Greeley, Andrew, “A Religious Revival in Russia?”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1994, p. 253-252.
- Gregory, Timothy E., *Bizans Tarihi*, (trans. Esra Ermert), Istanbul: YKY, 2008.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N., “The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations”, London School of Economics and Political Science Hellenic Observatory 1st PhD Symposium on Modern Greece, Symposium Paper, 21 June 2003.
- Gunn, T. Jeremy, “A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the Religious Freedom Act of 1998”, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 2000.
- Gülen, Nejat, *Heybeliada: Tarihi, Coğrafyası, Yaşamı [Halki: Its History, Geography and Life]*, 2nd ed, Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985.
- Gürel, Şükrü Sina, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960), Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika [Colonialism, Nationalism and International Politics]*, Istanbul: Kaynak, 1985.
- Güven, Dilek, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları [6-7 September Events in the Context of Minority Policies and Strategies]*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005.

- Güzel, Hasan Celal, “Ruhban Okulu Nasıl Açılabilir? [How to Open the Theology School?]”, *Radikal*, April 10, 2009.
- Hardy, Edward, R., *Orthodox Statements on Anglican Orders*, New York, London: Morehouse, Gorham, 1946.
- Harris, G.S., “The Soviet Union and Turkey” in Ivo Lederer and Wayne Vucinich (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post World War II Era*, California: Hoover Institution Publications, 1974.
- Hatipoğlu, Murat, *Yunanistan’daki Gelişmelerin Işığında Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı (1821-1922)* [101 Years of Greek-Turkish Relations under the Light of Developments in Greece], Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1988.
- Hatzivasileiou, Evanthis, *Eleftherios Venizelos, The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans 1928-1931*, Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1999.
- Hebly, J. A., “The State, the Church and the Oikoumene: The Russian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches, 1948-1985” in Sabrina Ramet (ed.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, 1992, p. 105-124.
- Hehir, Brian, ‘Experts: Religion Affects Foreign Policy’, *Washington Times*, Feb. 5, 2003.
- Held, Heinz J., “Orthodox Participation in the WCC: A Brief History”, *The Ecumenical Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2003, p. 295-312.
- Hellenic Resources Network, “Talks to overcome differences between Moscow, Constantinople Patriarchates Continue”, *Hellenic Resources Network*, March 3, 1996, www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1996/96-03-30.ana.html (30 September 2008)
- Henkin, Louis, “The United Nations and Human Rights”, *International Organization*, Vol. 19, No.3, The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects, Summer 1965, p. 504-517.
- Herlinger, Chris, “‘Thorny Issue’ Proves to be an Obstacle for Orthodox-Catholic Commissions”, *Christian Century*, July 1, 2001.
- Herschbach, Robert, “Phanar Agree to Disagree on Church Autonomy”, *Hellenic Communication Service*, <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/phanar.html> (5 June 2008)
- Hervieu-Léger, Danielle, *The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion*, May 2003.
- Hirschon, Renée (ed.), *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Population Exchange*, London: Berghahn Books, 2003.
- History of the Theology School of Athens University, Athens University Official Website, <http://www.theol.uoa.gr/index.php?id=2> (28 July 20010)

- Hobsbawm, Eric, *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*, New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
- Hockenos, Matthew, *A Church Divided: German Protestants confront the Nazi Past*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Hoffman, Paul, "John XXIII's Appeal to Statesmen of World is Regarded as Approval of East West Negotiation", *New York Times*, July 3, 1959.
- _____, "Pope, in First Encyclical Asks Fullest Peace Effort", *New York Times*, July 3 1959.
- Hogan, Michael J., *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1953*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Hopwood, Derek, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Howard, Michael, 'Greek Priests Revolt as Church backs Pope's visit', *The Guardian*, 20 March 2001.
- Hudson, Karen E., *From the Dunkirk Treaty to Schuman Plan: Britain, France and the European Idea 1947-1953*, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison Press, 1992, p. 41-47.
- Hughes, James and Gwendolyn Sasse, "Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEEC's", *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol. I, No. 1, 2003, p. 7, http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf (27 November 2007)
- Huntington, Samuel, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- _____, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, p. 22-49.
- Hupchick, Dennis P., *Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1995
- _____, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century: Slavic Orthodox society and Culture Under Ottoman Rule*, Jefferson, North Carolina and London: Mc Farland, 1993.
- _____, *The Balkans*, New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2002.
- Hussey, Mervyn, J., *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, foreword and Supplement by Andrew Louth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Hürriyet*, September 2, 1985.

_____, July 19, 1986.

_____, February 16, 1988.

_____, November 28, 1997.

_____, November 27, 1997

_____, Interview with Zekeriya Beyaz, *Hürriyet*, January 1, 2000.

_____, “Patrik’e Yakın Takip [Close Pursuit to the Patriarch]”, *Hürriyet*, 5 May 2004.

_____, “Farklı Yorumlar Bizi Üzdü” [Different Commentaries has upsetten us], *Hürriyet*, March 9, 2004.

_____, “Ruhban Okulu Eğitim Yılına Yetişir” [Theology School will be Open until the School Semester]’, *Hürriyet*, June 15, 2009

Hürriyet, “İşte o Gizli Karar [Here is the Secret Decision]”, *Hürriyet*, February 2, 2004.

_____”Ruhban Okulu Eğitim Yılına Yetişir [Theology School will be Open until the School Semester]”, *Hürriyet*, June 15, 2009.

İçimizdeki Hançer: Vatanseverin El Kitabı Serisi: 3 [Dagger within us: Manual of the Patriot Series:3], Ankara: ATO Publishing available online at http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/files/hizmetlerimiz/yayinlarimiz/fener_rum.pdf, (18 December 2009)

İksel, Settar, F., “Istanbul Rum Patrikhanesi-I [Istanbul Greek Patriarchate-I]”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish History Documented], Vol. 11, No. 62, 1972, p. 23-29.

_____, “Istanbul Rum Patrikhanesi II [Istanbul Greek Patriarchate-II]”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish History Documented], Vol. 11, No. 63, Istanbul, 1972, p. 40-43.

İnalçık, Halil, “The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Under the Ottomans”, *Turcica, Revue d’Etudes Turques*, Vol. 20-23, 1991, p. 407-436.

Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge, http://www.saint-serge.net/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=1 (13 August 2010)

Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge, http://www.saint-serge.net/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=1 (13 August 2010)

Interfax, “Yuschenko Invites Constantinople Patriarch to Join Kievan Baptism”, *Interfax*, May 21, 2008, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4697> (12 August 2010).

- _____, “Ukrainian Orthodox Church Chancellor against Interference of the State into Church Affairs and ‘Backstage Deals’ with Constantinople”, *Interfax*, March, 10, 2006, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=1145> (12 August 2010)
- _____, Metropolitan Kyrill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “Moscow Patriarchate is against Constantinople’s attempts to Intervene in Other Orthodox Churches’ Affairs”, *Interfax*, November 22, 2006, November 22, 2006, <http://www.interfaxreligion.com/?act=news&div=2290> (10 August 2010).
- _____, “Patriarch Bartholomeos Intention to Visit Ukraine Behind Alexy II’s Back is a Hostile Act to Russia, A Historian Believes”, *Interfax*, July 28, 2008, <http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=4896> (12 August 2010)
- _____, “Estonian Church Problem in the Light of Negotiations between Moscow and Constantinople on 26 March 2008 in Zurich. Statement by Communication Service of Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations”, *Interfax*, May 27, 2008, <http://www.interfaxreligion.com/print.php?act=documents&id=126> (29 May 2008)
- International Herald Tribune, “Vatican-Orthodox Agree Pope has Primacy, but Schism Remains”, *International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 2007.
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, *The United Nations*, 16 December 1966, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> (9 August 2010)
- Jackson-Preece, Jennifer, *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- _____, Jennifer, Jackson-Preece, “National Minority Rights Versus State Sovereignty in Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations?”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, p. 345-364.
- Jacoby, David, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States in Greece” in David Abulafia (ed), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. V, c.1198-c.1300, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 525-568.
- Jacques, Edwin, *The Albanians: An Ethic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present*, North Carolina: McFarland, 1994.
- Janin, Raymond, *The Separated Eastern Churches*, London: Sands & Co., 1933.
- _____, *Les Eglises Orientales et les Rites Orientaux*, Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1997.
- Janis, Mark W., Richard S. Kay and Anthony W. Bradley, *European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008
- Jenkins, Philip, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

- “Joint Communiqué regarding Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate”“, *Wilfried Martens, President of the European People’s Party and Dora Bakoyannis, Foreign Minister of Greece*, Brussels, July 23, 2007, http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/230707_McC1219.htm (10 August 2010)
- Juster, Alain, “Istanbul Ortodoks Patrikhanesi, Yunanistan ve Türkiye [Istanbul Orthodox Patriarchate, Greece and Turkey]”, in Semih Vaner (ed.), *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı [Turco-Greek Dispute]*, Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990, p. 49-58.
- Kalelioğlu, Oğuz, “Türk Yunan İlişkileri ve Megali Idea”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk Tarih Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No. 41, May 2008, p. 105-123.
- Kalinowski, Wojtek, “Les Institutions Communautaires et ‘l’Ame de L’Europe’ la Memoire Religieuse en Jeu dans la Construction Européenne” in *Croyances Religieuses, Morales Ethiques dans le Processus de Construction Européenne*, Raport Presented by the Comissariat Général du Plan Institut Universitaire de Florence, May 2002.
- Kalyvas, Stasis N., *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Karacan, Ali Naci, *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa [Lausanne Conference and Ismet Pasha]*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1943.
- Karal, Enver Ziya, “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First Constitutitonal Assembly, 1876-1877”, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, the Central Lands*, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 387-400.
- _____, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri 1789-1856*, Vol. V, 4th ed., Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1983.
- Kaplan, Robert, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993.
- Karpat, Kemal, H., “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post Ottoman Era” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, the Central Lands*, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 141-169.
- Kaya, Önder, *Tanzimat’tan Lozan’a Azınlıklar*, Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2004.
- Kegler, Charles W. & Wittkopf, Eugene R., *American Foreign Policy*, 5th ed., New York: St. Martin Press, 1996.
- Keleher, Serge, “Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus Constantinople”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, p. 125-137.

- Kemper, Crosby, *Winston Churchill: Resolution, Defiance, Magnamity, Good Will*, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1995.
- Kenanoğlu, Macit, *Osmanlı Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek* [The Ottoman Millet System: Myth and Reality], Istanbul: Klasik, 2004.
- Kent, Peter, C., *The Lonely War of the Pope Pious XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002.
- _____, "The Lonely Cold War of Pius XII" in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 67-76.
- Kepel, Gilles, *La Revanche de Dieu, Chrétiens, Juifs et Musulmanes à la Reconquête du Monde*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991.
- Keridis, Dimitris, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization", NATO Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, June 1999, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/keridis.pdf> (26 June 2008)
- Kharlamov, Dimitry, "Vatican II on Ecumenism and the Orthodox Churches", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2-3, Spring Summer 2001.
- Kırbaki, Yorgo, "Rum Patriği Bartholomeos ile Yunan Kilisesinin Yeni Lideri Barış Anlaşması Yaptı [The Greek Patriarch Bartholomeos and the New Leader of the Greek Church Made a Peace Agreement]", *Hürriyet*, May 13, 2008.
- _____, "Rum Metropolitlere T.C Kimliği Çağrısı [Call to Turkish Identity Cards for Greek Metropolitanans]", *Hürriyet*, 13 November 2009; Yorgo Kırbaki, "Patrikhane'de Bayram Havası [Joy at the Patriarchate]", *Hürriyet*, 22 May 2010.
- Kiminas, Demetrius, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate: A History of Its Metropolitanans with Annotated Hierarch Catalogs, Orthodox Christianity, Vol. I*, California: The Borgo Press, 2009.
- Kirby, Dianne, "Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 35, Jul. 2000, p. 385-412.
- _____, "Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti-Communist Front, The Archbishop of Canterbury and the 1948 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2001, p. 35-70.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political thought of South-Eastern Europe*, Aldershot: Variorum, 1994.
- _____, "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans" in *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, Hampshire: Variorum, 1996, p.149-192.

Knox, Zoe, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia After Communism*, London: Routledge, 2004.

_____, “Post Soviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991-2001”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2004, p. 87-113.

_____, “The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 4, June 2003.

Konstantinides, Chrysostomos (Metropolitan of Ephesus), “The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchs from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to the Present”, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 5-22.

Kotzias, Konstantinos, “The Myth of an Orthodox Block”, *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 278, No. No. 1625, June 2001, p. 338-343.

Kourvetaris, George A., “The Greek-Orthodox Church in the United States: (Private) Crisis or Transition?” in Victor Roudemedof, Alexander Agadjanian and Jerry Pankhurst (eds.), *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces Twenty-First Century*, Oxford: Altamita Press, 2005, p. 245-275.

Kramer, John, M., “The Vatican’s ‘Ostpolitik’”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Jul 1980, p. 283-308.

Krusteff, Atanas, “An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom”, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, Vol. 2001, No. 2, 2001, p. 575-593, <http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2001/2/kru7.pdf>, (28 July 2010).

Kuneralp, Zeki, *İkili Rapor-Rapport des Deux*, Istanbul: Isis, 1997.

Kurban, Dilek and Kezban Hatemi, *The Story of an Alien(ation): Real Estate Ownership Problems of Non-Muslim Foundations and Communities in Turkey*, Istanbul: TESEV, 2009.

Kuyucu, Ali Tuna, “Ethno-religious ‘unmixing’ of Turkey: 6-7 September Riots as a Case in Turkish Nationalism”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p. 361-380.

Kuzion, Taras, “In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1997, p. 393-415.

Kütükoğlu, Mübahat S., “Berat”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Islam]*, Vol. V, Istanbul: Türk iye Diyanet Vakfı, 1992, p. 472.

Kymlicka, Will, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

- Laffan, Brigitte and Sonia Mazey, "European Integration: The European Union, Reaching an Equilibrium?" in Jeremy J. Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2001, p. 31-52.
- Lamberts, Emiel, (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union, (1945/1995)*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997.
- Laudrup, Carin, "A European Battlefield: Does the EU Have a Soul?: Is Religion in or out of Place in the European Union?", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1-2, 2009, p. 51-63.
- Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, (1922-1923): Records and Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, London: H.M's Stationary Office, 1923.
- Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, *Albania: Greek Minority*, Vol. 7. No. 4, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995.
- Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, *Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania*, New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996.
- Leffler, Melvyn P., "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War", *Diplomatic History*, IV, Fall 1983, p. 247-254.
- Lemopoulos, George (ed.), *The Ecumenical Movement and the World Council of Churches*, Bialystok: Orthdruk Orthodox Printing House, 1996.
- Lenin, Vladimir I. , "Theses on the National Question", *Lenin, Collected Works*, 1977, Moscow, Vol. 19, p. 243-251, <http://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/lenin/works/1913/jun/30.htm> (May 28, 2010)
- Leustean, Lucian N., "Constructing Communism in the Romanian People's Republic: Orthodoxy and State, 1948-49", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2007, p. 303-329.
- Leustean, Lucian, L. and John T. S Madeley, "Religion, Politics and Law in the European Union: An Introduction", *Religion, State and Society*, Vo. 37, No. 1, 2009, p. 3-18.
- Lipgens, Walter and Wilfried Loth, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- Little, Jane, "Religious Row Blazes over Greek Identity", *BBC News*, 15 March 2001. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1222101.stm> (27 March 2008)
- Louth, Andrew, "Unity and Diversity in the Church of the Fourth Century" in Everett Ferguson (ed.), *Doctrinal Diversity, Variations in Early Christianity*, Garland, 1999, p. 1-18.

- Luxmoore, Jonathan, ‘Leading Catholic Priest Urges Pope to Delay Controversial Visit to Greece’, *Christianity Today*, 04.01.2001.
- Macar, Elçin, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi [Greek Patriarchate of İstanbul in the Republican Period]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.
- _____, “Dünden Bugüne Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Sorunu [Problem of Heybeliada Theology School from the Past until Today]”, *Gündem*, December 2003.
- _____, “Çözüm Gibi Çözüm Şart”, www. bianet.org, July 13, 2004. (28 May 2008)
- _____, and Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nu Geleceği Üzerine , Tartışmalar ve Öneriler*, İstanbul: TESEV, 2005. (Also available in English- *Discussions and Recommendations on the Future of the Halki Seminary*, İstanbul: TESEV, 2006)
- MacGoldrick, Dominic, “The European Union After Amsterdam: An Organization with General Human Rights Competence” in David O’Keefe and Patrick M. Tworney (eds.), *Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty*, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000.
- Mardin, Şerif, *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset Makaleleri [Articles on Society and Politics in Turkey]*, Vol. I, Mümtz’er Türk’üne (ed.), 5th ed. İstanbul: İletişim, 1991.
- Mason, Whit, “Constantinople’s Last Hurrah: Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2001, p. 55-64.
- Massie, Suzanne, “Back to the Future”, *Boston Globe*, 28 March 1993.
- Massignon, Bérengère, “Les Relations des Organismes Européens Religieux et Humanistes avec les Institutions de l’Union Européenne: Logiques Nationales et Confessionnelles et Dynamiques d’Europeanisation”. *Croyances Religieuses, Morales Ethiques dans le Processus de Construction Européenne*, Raport Presented by the Comissariat Général du Plan Institut Universitaire de Florence, May 2002.
- _____, “Les Représentations Orthodoxes Auprès de l’Union Européenne: Entre Concurrence Inter-Orthodoxe et Dynamiques de l’Europeanisation”, *Balkanologie*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, December 2005, p. 265-287.
- Masters, Bruce, “Christians in a Changing World” in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. III, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-183*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 272-279.
- Maximos, Metropolitan of Sardis, *The Oecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church*, Thessaloniki: 1976.
- Maxime de Sardes, *Le Patriarcat Œcuménique dans l’Eglise Orthodoxe: Étude Historique et Canonique*, (trad. Jacques Touraille), Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1975.

- Mavrogordatos, George, "Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case", *West European Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2003, p. 117-136
- Mazover, Mark, *The Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage Books, 1998.
- MEB Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu [Ministry of National Education, Law on Institutions of Private Education], No. 5580, Date 8.2.2007, Part II, Foreign Schools and Minority Schools, *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 14 February 2007, http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/26434_0.html (10 August 2010).
- Meray, Seha L., *Lozan Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler, (1922-1923)[Lausanne Conference: Proceedings, Documents]* (foreword by İsmet İnönü), İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1993.
- Meritt- Miner, Steven, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
- Mertus, Julie, *Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S Foreign Policy*, 2nd, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004.
- Meyendorff, John, *The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today*, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996.
- _____, *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church*, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001.
- Millas, Herkül, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, 2nd. ed., İstanbul: İletişim, 1999.
- Miller, Frederic P., Agnes Vendome and John McBrewster, *Finnish Orthodox Church*, Hungary: VDM Publishing House, 2009.
- Miller, William, "Holy Mountain", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Jan. 1928, p. 329-332.
- _____, "The Changing Role of the Orthodox Church", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1930, p. 274-281.
- Milliyet*, April 21, 1964.
- Milliyet*, April 22, 1964.
- Milliyet*, April 17, 1965.
- Mills, Nicolaus, *Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming to Age as a Superpower*, New Jersey: Wiley, 2008.
- Milward, Alan, *The United Kingdom and the European Community, Vol. I: The Rise and Fall of the National Strategy, 1945-1963*, London: Routledge, 2002.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Orthodox Minority in Turkey*, MFA Fact Sheet, http://www.tcviyana.at/v1/0_public/TRK/documents/GREEKORTHODOXMINORITYINTURKEY.pdf (9 June 2009)

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (MNE), *Heybeliada Rum Rahipler Okulu Öğretim Yönetmeliği [Halki Greek Priests' School Education Regulation]*, İstanbul: Vasil Vasiliadis Matbaası, 1953, MNE, Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi [Education and Instruction Center], No. 2/111, September 25, 1951.

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı İstanbul Müdürlüğü, [MNE Directorate of National Education of İstanbul], *Heybeliada Rum Rahipler Okulu Öğretim Yönetmeliği'ne Ek [Addition to the Halki Greek Priests' School Education Regulation]*, August 20, 1952, no. 190, Directorate of National Education of İstanbul, September 10, 1952.

Meritt Miner, Steven, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

“Message of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches gathered in Synaxis at the Phanar”, İstanbul, March 15, 1992.

Milliyet, April 27, 2009

Mitrokhin, Nikolai, “Aspects of the Religious Situation in Ukraine”, *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001. p. 173-196.

Monde (le), “Un Entretien avec le Patriarche Orthodoxe de Constantinople : Bartholomee Ier : “Nous Condemnons l'Exploitation de la Religion à des Fins Nationalistes”, *Le Monde*, April 20, 1994.

_____, April 27, 1965.

Motsakas, George, “The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America: Fragmented”, *Hellenic Communication Service*, <http://www.helleniccomserve.com/fragmentedchurch.html> (29 September 2008)

Moulin, Léo, *Le Monde Vivant des Religions*, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1964.

Mumcu, Ahmet, *Tarih Açısından Türk Devriminin Temelleri ve Gelişimi [The Turkish Revolution and its Development from a Historical Perspective]*, 13th ed., İstanbul: İnkilâp Yayınevi, 2000.

Murzaku, Angeli, I., “King Zog I and Albanian's Religions. The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Byzantine Catholic Church”, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2003, p. 429-452.

_____, *Returning Home to Rome: The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata in Albania*, Rome: Analekta Kryptoferis, 2009.

Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p.17-31.

Mylonas, Christos, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*, Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003.

Nationalities Papers, "Russia's Concern for Russians in the Near Abroad", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol 23, No. 2, June 1995, p. 450-452.

Neuwahl, Nanette, "The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward in the Protection of Human Rights" in Nanette Neuwahl and Allan Rosas (eds.), *The Human Rights in the European Union*, The Hague, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1995, p. 1-22.

New International Yearbook, New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1926.

New York Times, "Taylor to Pius XII", *The New York Times*, 29 August 1947.

_____, "Taylor to End Tour on Christian Unity", *The New York Times*, 11 May 1948.

_____, "Maximos V Quits as Orthodox Head", *The New York Times*, October 19, 1948.

_____, "Athenagoras to Head the Greek Church", *The New York Times*, November 2, 1948.

_____, "At Enthronment in Istanbul He Also Urges Unity", *New York Times*, January 28, 1949.

_____, "Athanagoras (sic) is accepted", *New York Times*, May 6, 1949.

_____, "Patriarch Assails Sofia Church Vote", *New York Times*, May 24, 1953.

_____, "Pope Bids Christians to Unite Christians Against Communist Threat", *The New York Times*, December 24, 1958.

_____, "Iakovos Scores Vatican Tactics", *The New York Times*, November 4, 1962.

_____, "Paul's Pilgrimage: Meeting with Athenagoras", *The New York Times*, January 9, 1964.

_____, "Orthodox Leader Iakovos Cool to Pope Paul's First Encyclical", *The New York Times*, August 15, 1964.

_____, "Fate of Orthodox Patriarch in Turkey Uncertain", *The New York Times*, September 14, 1964.

_____, “Iakovos Praises Project of Pope”, *The New York Times*, September 19, 1964.

_____, “Concern for Patriarch’s Fate”

The New York Times, September 26, 1964.

New York Times, August 16, 1964.

_____, “Curbs on Church by Turks Decried”, *The New York Times*, February 26, 1966.

_____, “Primate Acting to Ease Greek-Turkish Hostility”, *The New York Times*, December 11, 1987

_____, April 10, 1966.

_____, August 3, 1968.

_____, July 10, 1972.

_____, *New York Times*, July 9, 1972.

_____, October 26, 1985.

_____, August 19, 1987.

“Historic Seminary in Halki is Ready but Empty”, *The New York Times*, August 7, 2000
New York Times, 4 May 2001.

_____, “Archbishop Iakovos, Major Ecumenical Force, Dies”, *New York Times*, April 12, 2005.

_____, “More than an Easter in Common”, *The New York Times*, April, 8, 2007.

_____, “Ecumenical Patriarch Calls for Unification of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine”, *The New York Times*, July 26, 2008.

Nichol, Donald M., *The Last Centuries of Byzantium*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: CUP, 1994.

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Nye, Joseph, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1991.

_____, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Obelensky, Dimitri, *Byzantium and the Slavs*, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2006.

Official Journal of the League of Nations, “Expulsion of the Ecumenical Patriarch from Constantinople”, Appeal by the Greek Government Under Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Covenant, Telegram from the Greek Government to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, submitted to the Council on March 14th, 1925, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Annex 756 a, C.57.M.30.1925. VII, p. 579.

_____, “Expulsion of the Ecumenical Patriarch from Constantinople”, Letter from the Turkish Government to the Secretary-General of the League, submitted to the Council on March 14th 1925, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Annex 756 b, C.160.1925.VII, 1925, p. 580.

_____, “Documents Relating to the Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations”, Special Supplement No. 73, *Official Journal*, 1929.

O’Nions, Helen, *Minority Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007.

Oran, Baskın, “Lozan’da Azınlıkların Korunması”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 115, Temmuz 2003.

_____, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihad, Uygulama [Minorities in Turkey, Concepts, Lausanne, Internal Law, Application]*, İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004.

_____, “Vakıflar Yasası (I) [Foundations Law- I], *Radikal*, February 2, 2008.

Oreškova, S.F., “Rusya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasındaki Savaşlar: Sebepleri ve Kimi Tarihi Sonuçları [Wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire: Their Roots and Some Historical Consequences]” in Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Uçenko (eds.), *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler [Turkey and Russia from Yesterday to Today: Political, Economic and Cultural Relations]*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003, p. 17-32.

Ortaylı, İlber, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878) [Local Administrations after the Tanzimat]*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974.

_____, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Millet [Millet in the Ottoman Empire]”, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to Cumhuriyet]*, Vol. IV, 1986, p. 996-1001.

_____, “Balkanlar’da Milliyetçilik [Nationalism in the Balkans]”, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, [Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to Cumhuriyet]*, Vol. IV, 1986, p. 1026-1031

_____, *Avrupa ve Biz [Europe and Us]*, Ankara: Turhan, 2001.

_____, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire]*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

_____, “Süleyman ve Ivan; Doğu Avrupa 16. Yüzyılının İki Hükümdarı [Suleiman and Ivan, Two Rulers of the 16th Century Eastern Europe]” in *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi: Seçme Eserler III [Milletts and Diplomacy in the Ottoman State: Selected Works III]*, 3rd ed. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010, p. 133-144.

_____, “Tanzimat Döneminde Balkanlar'da Ulusal Kiliseler ve Rum-Ortodoks Kilisesi” [National Churches and the Greek-Orthodox Church in the Balkans during the *Tanzimat* Period] in *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi: Seçme Eserler III [Milletts and Diplomacy in the Ottoman State: Selected Works III]*, 3rd ed. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010, p. 25-32.

_____, “Tanzimat Döneminde Yunanistan ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu” in *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi, Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi: Seçme Eserler III [Milletts and Diplomacy in the Ottoman State: Selected Works III]*, 3rd ed. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010, p. 113-123.

OrthodoxWiki, “Sunday of Orthodoxy”, *OrthodoxWiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Sunday_of_Orthodoxy (26 March 2010)

_____, “Demetrius I (Papadopoulos) of Constantinople”, *OrthodoxWiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Demetrius_I_of_Constantinople, (10 August 2010).

_____, “Tomos”, *orthodoxwiki*, <http://orthodoxwiki.org/Tomos> (12 August 2010)

_____, “Prerogatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, *Orthodox Wiki*, http://orthodoxwiki.org/Prerogatives_of_the_Ecumenical_Patriarchate (15 August 2010)

_____, “Stavropegial”, *OrthodoxWiki*, <http://orthodoxwiki.org/Stavropegial> (13 August 2010)

_____, “St. Sergius Orthodox Theological Institute (Paris, France)”, *OrthodoxWiki*, [http://orthodoxwiki.org/St._Sergius_Orthodox_Theological_Institute_\(Paris,_France\)](http://orthodoxwiki.org/St._Sergius_Orthodox_Theological_Institute_(Paris,_France)) (13 August 2010)

Ortiz de Urbina, Ignacio, *Nicée et Constantinople*, Paris: Editions de l'Orante, 1963.

OSCE, “Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting”, 1989.

OSCE, “Seminar on Freedom of Religion or Belief in the OSCE Region: Challenges to Law and Practice”, Hague, 26 June 2001.

Osmanağaoğlu, Cihan, *1862 Rum Patrikliği Nizamı Çerçevesinde Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, İstanbul: On iki Levha Yayıncılık, 2010.

Ostrogorsky, Georg, *Bizans Devleti Tarihi* [History of the Byzantine State], (trans. Fikret Işıltan), Ankara: TTK, 1981.

Oxford English Dictionary, “ortho”, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

- _____, “doxy” in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- _____, *heretic*, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Öymen, Altan, “Davos’ta Hiçbir Şey Olmadı Demek Yanlıştır [It is Wrong to Say Nothing Has Happened in Davos]”, *Milliyet*, February 2, 1988.
- Örer, Ayça, “Heybeliada Çözülmüştür” [Heybeliada Problem has been Solved], Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, *Taraf*, July 10, 2009.
- Özel, Sibel, *The Heybeliada Seminary and the Patriarchate: The Issue of the Heybeliada (Halki) Seminary and the Legal Explication of the Fener-Greek Patriarchate’s Claim to Ecumenical Status*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bar Association Publishing, 2008.
- _____, *Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu [Fener Greek Patriarchate and the Theology School]*, Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008.
- _____, *Lozan Antlaşması ve Azınlık Hukuku Çerçevesinde Fener Rum Patrikhanesinin Hukuki Konumu* [The Legal Status of the Patriarchate according to Lausanne Treaty and Minority Law], *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol.14, No:1, 2006, p. 39-65.
- Özyılmaz, Emre, *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu* [The Halki Theology School], Ankara: Tamga Yayınları, 2000.
- Pallis, Alexander A., *Yunanlıların Anadolu Macerası (1925-1922) [The Anatolian Adventure of the Greeks (1915-1922)]*, (trans. Orhan Azizoglu) 2nd ed., Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997.
- Pantazopoulos, Nikolaos, *Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1967.
- Papadopoulos, Theodore H., *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, Brussels: Variorum, 2nd ed., 1952.
- Papathomas, Grigorios, “La Formation du Clergé au sein de l’Église Orthodoxe” in Francis Messner and Anne-Laure Zwillling, *La Formation des Cadres Religieux en France: une Affaire d’Etat*, Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010 (forthcoming).
- Papal Agency for Humanitarian and Pastoral Support, “Orthodox Church of Albania”, <http://www.cnewa.org/ecc-bodypg-us.aspx?eccpageID=25&IndexView=toc> (7 December 2009)

- Papageorgiou, Georgios, "Signs for Change for American Orthodoxy", *Christian Century*, August, 14, 1996.
- "Paternal Exhortation" (1798), in Richard Clogg (ed., trans., with an introduction), *The Movement for Greek Independence 1770-1821, A Collection of Documents*, London, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1976, p. 56-64.
- Patriarchate of Constantinople, *Tomos of Independence of Polish Orthodox Church*, 24 November 2004.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K., *A History of the Balkans 1804-1945*, London, New York: Longman, 1999.
- Payne, Daniel, *The Clash of Civilisations : The Church of Greece, the European Union and the Question of Human Rights, Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2003.
- Pearson, Owen, *Albania and King Zog: Independence, Republic and Monarchy, 1908-1939*, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2006..
- Pentassuglia, Gaetano, *Minorities in International Law, Minority Issues Handbook*, Brussels: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002.
- Pentzopoulos, Dimitris, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece*, New Preface by Michael Llewellyn Smith, London: C. Hurst and Co., 2002
- Petaux, Jean, *Democracy and Human Rights for Europe, :The Council of Europe's Contribution*, Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 2009, p. 14.
- Phidas, Vlasios, "The Church of Estonia" in *The Splendour of Orthodoxy 2000 Years, History, Monuments, Art*, Vol. II, Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 2000.
- Pipes, Richard, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, 4th ed. , Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Philaret, Metropolitan, President of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, "A Protest to Patriarch Athenagoras on the Lifting of Anathemas of 1054, December 2, 1965. available online at http://www.Orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/philaret_lifting.aspx. Retrieved September 27, 2008.
- Photius of Triaditsa, "The 79th Anniversary of the Pan-Orthodox Congress, Part I of II", *Orthodox Christian Information Center*, available online at http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/photii_1.aspx. Retrieved November 9, 2008.
- Pollock, Robert, "The Sick Man of Europe, Again", *The Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 2005.

- Pospelovsky, Dimitry, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998.
- Power, Samantha and Graham Allison, *Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact*, New York: St. Martin Press, 2000,
- Price, Richard and Michael Gaddis, *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. I*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, (Series: Translated Text for Historians), 2005.
- Prodromou, Elizabeth, "Paradigms, Power and Identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and Regionalizing Europe", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1996, p.125-154.
- _____, "Christianity and Democracy: Ambivalent Orthodox", *Journal of Democracy*, No. 2, April 2004, p. 62-75.
- _____, "Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Greece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period", *Social Compass*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2004, p. 471-485.
- Psomiades, Harry J., "Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 11, no. 4, Fall 1957, p. 371-381.
- _____, "Ecumenical Patriarchate Under the Turkish Republic, The First Ten Years", *Balkan Studies*, No. 2, 1961, p. 47-70.
- _____, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek Turkish Diplomacy*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968.
- Quataert, Donald, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Rabinavicius, Henrikas, "The Fate of the Baltic Nations", *Russian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1943, p. 34-44.
- Radić, Radmila, "Serbian Christianity" in Ken Parry (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Orthodoxy*, West Sussex: Blackwell (hardcover), 2010, p. 231-248.
- Radikal*, June 5, 2004
- Radikal, "Ruhban Okulu için MGK Hazır" [The Council of National Security is Ready for the Theology School], *Radikal*, June 4, 2005.
- _____, "Kültür Bakanı Günay: Ruhban Okulunu Açacağız" [Minister of Culture: We Will Open the Theology School], *Radikal*, June 28, 2009.
- Raikin, Spas T., "Nationalism and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church" in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European Politics*, Duke University Press, 1989, p. 352-377

- Ramet, Sabrina P., "Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction" in Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.), *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, Vol. I*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1988, p. 3-19.
- Ravenna Document, 'Ecclesiastical and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church: Ecclesial Communion, Conciliatory and Authority", *Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church*, 8-14 October 2007, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_Orthodox_docs/r_c_pc_chrstuni_doc_20071013_documento-ravenna_en.html (10 August 2010)
- Religious Life in Poland*, Polish Research and Information Service, New York, 1948.
- Report of the General Secretary, *Ecumenical Review*, No. 1, Aug. 1949, p. 57-70.
- Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities*, United Nations, Doc. E/CN.4/358, 1950.
- Renouvin, Pierre, *L'Idée de Fédération Européenne dans la Pensée Politique du XIXe Siècle*, Oxford, 1949.
- Reyna, Yuda and Ester Moreno-Zonana, *Son Yasal Düzenlemelere Göre Cemaat Vakıfları [Community Foundations According to the Latest Legal Arrangements]*, Istanbul: Gözlem, 2003.
- Rich, Roland, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 36-65.
- Richard, Jean, "The Eastern Churches" in David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c. 1024-c. 1198*, Vol IV, Part I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 564-598.
- Richardson, Jeremy, *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, 3rd ed., London: Routledge, 2006.
- Ringvee, Ringo, "Religious Freedom and Legislation in Post-Soviet Estonia", *Brighton Young University Law Review*, 2001, No. 2. p. 631-642.
- Robbers, Gerhard, "Données Sociologiques et Historiques" in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), *Etat et Eglises au sein de l'Union Européenne*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997.
- Robertson, Ronald, "Catholic-Orthodox Dialogue", *Orthodox News*, <http://www.rcab.org/EandI/catholic-Orthodoxnews.html> (26 October 2008).
- Roman Catholic Church, "Decree on Ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council, 1964" in Michael Kinnamon & Brian E. Cope, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans Publishing, 1997, p. 27-35.

- Roosting, Helmer, "Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1923, p. 641-660.
- Roth, John K. and Carol Ritner *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust*, New York: Continuum, 2004.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs (SIA)*, Vol. II, 1925.
- Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber, 'Religious Concomitants of Transnationalism: From a Universal Church to a Universal Religiosity?' in John D. Carlson and Eric C. Owens, *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003.
- Runciman, Steven, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955.
- _____, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- _____, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1971.
- Sabah, "Kavga Kızışıyor" [The Quarrel is Getting Hot], *Sabah*, 30 May 2001.
- _____, January 24, 2008.
- Sahliyah, Emile F., *Religious Resurgence in the Contemporary World*, New York: SUNY Press, 1990.
- Salo, Vello, "The Catholic in Estonia, 1918-2001", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2002, p. 281-292
- Sander, Oral, *Siyasi Tarih, 1918-1994*, 2nd ed., Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1991.
- Sarioglou, Irini, *Turkish Policy towards Greek Education in Istanbul 1923-1974: Secondary Education and Cultural Identity*, Athens: Hellenic Literary and Historical Archives, 2004.
- Sasse, Gwendolyn, "Minority Rights and EU Enlargement: Normative Overstretch of Effective Conditionality?" in Gabriel N. Toggenburg (ed.), *Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward*, EURAC Research, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2004, p. 59-84.
- Sawatsky, Walter, "Slavic Evangelicals in Mission within the Commonwealth of Independent States: Inter-Church Mission Dialogue-Orthodox, Catholic and Evangelical", *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2004, p. 195-204.
- Sazak, Derya, Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos, *Milliyet*, December 5, 2005

- Schaff, Philip, *Nicene and Post Nicene Christianity: History of the Christian Church Vol. III.*, Kessinger Publishing, Montana, 2004
- Schaeffer, Pamela, “Movement Grows for removal of Greek-Orthodox leader: Analysis of Archbishop Spyridon’s Leadership”, *National Catholic Reporter*, 12 February 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_15_35/ai_53924384/ (28 July 2010)
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan & Knobel, Heiko, “Cost, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, p. 495-518.
- Schlumberger, Gustave, *Les Iles des Princes: Le Palais et l’Eglise des Blachernes la Grande Muraille de Byzance*, 2nd. ed., Paris: A. De Boccard, 1925.
- Schmidt, Dana, “Choices are Difficult for Meeting Aggressive Moves by Russians”, *The New York Times*, October 20, 1957.
- Scholte, Jan Aart, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Basingtone: Palgrave, 2000.
- Scowcroft- Bettenson, Henry (ed.), *Documents of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Scwellnus, Guido, ““Much Ado about Nothing?”: Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, *Constitutionalism Web-Papers*, , *Conweb*, No.5, 2001, <http://les1.man.ac.uk.conweb> (28 November 2007)
- Senate of New Jersey, Senate Joint Resolution No. 11, *State of New Jersey*, 212th Legislature, <http://www.archons.org/pdf/resolutions/newjersey-senate.pdf> (12 May 2010)
- Service, Robert, *Russia: Experiment with a People*, London: Macmillan, 2002.
- Shepherd, Jonathan, “Slavs and Bulgars” in Rosamond McKitterick (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. II, c. 700-c. 900*, 1995, p. 228-248.
- Shterin, Marat, “Church-State Relationships and Religious Legislation in Russia in the 1990s” in Matti Kotiranta (ed.), *Religious Transition in Russia*, Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2000, p. 218-250 at p. 238-239.
- Shuibhne, Niamh N., *EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Culture Citizenship and Fundamental Rights*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004.
- Simon, Gerhard, *Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R*, California: University of California Press, 1974.
- Single European Act, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 169, 29 June 1987.
- Smith, Timothy L., “Refugee Orthodox Congregations in Western Europe 1945-1948”, *Church History*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Sep. 1969, p. 312-326.

- Soysal, Ismail, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz (1919-1999) [A Guide for Turkish Foreign Policy Research]*, Istanbul: Eren, 1993.
- _____, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları [Turkey's Political Treaties]*, Vol. I (1920-1945), 3rd ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.
- Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, *Türkiye, Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler [Turco-Greek Relations and Great Powers]*, Istanbul: Der, 2000.
- Sözen, Zeynep, *Fenerli Beyler, 110 Yılın Öyküsü [Phanariot Notables, An Account of 110 Years]*, Istanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 2000.
- Spyropoulos, P.C. and Theodore Fortsakis, *Constitutional Law in Greece*, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law Int., 2009
- Spinka, Matthew, "Post-War Eastern Orthodox Churches", *Church History*, Vol. 4., No. 2, June 1935, p. 103-122.
- _____, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York: ub, 1956.
- Spohn, Wilfried, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective", *Current Sociology*, May/July 2003.
- Stan, Lavinia and Lucian Turdescu, "The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratisation", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 8, Dec. 2000, p. 1467-1488.
- _____, "Church-state conflict in Moldova: the Bessarabian Metropolitanate", *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2003, p. 443-465.
- Stanley, Alessandra, 'Crisis in the Balkans: Romania; Pope's visit Adds to Hope of a Future With the West', *The New York Times*, May 10, 1999.
- _____, "Pontif Asks God to Forgive Sins Against the Orthodox", *The New York Times*, 4 May 2001
- Stanley, Arthur, P., *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, London: John Murray, 1908.
- Star, İncik'tan Ekümenik Uyarısı [Ecumenical Warning from Halil İncik], *Star*, March 02, 2008.
- Stricker, Gerd, "On a Delicate Mission, Pope Jean Paul in Ukraine", *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 215-225
- Sugar, Peter, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.
- Stavrianos, Stavros, L., *The Balkans since 1453*, 3rd ed., London : Hurst and Company, 2002.

- Stavridis, Vasilis, T., "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1963, p. 9-28.
- _____, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate", *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1969, p. 198-225.
- _____, "The Orthodox Churches in the Ecumenical Movement 1948-1968" in Harold E. Fey (ed.), *The Ecumenical Advance: A History of the Ecumenical Movement Vol. II 1948-1968*, London: S.P.C.K., 1970, p. 289-309.
- _____, "Orthodoxy in the Ecumenical Movement", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 20, no. 1-2, Spring Fall 1975, p. 71-80.
- _____, "The Missionary Work of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Europe and Elsewhere Based on the Principles of the Saints Cyril and Methodios", A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodios of Thyateira and Great Britain, Athens, 1985.
- _____, "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate" (tr. & ed. by George Dragas), *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 57-153.
- Steindl, Helmut, "Le Conseil des Conférences Episcopales d'Europe (CEECE)" in Gilbert Vincent and Jean-Paul Willaime, *Religions et Transformations d'Europe*, Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1993.
- Steinfels, Peter, "Greek Orthodox Church is Poised for Change", *The New York Times*, July 5, 1996.
- Stepan, Alfred, "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations'", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, October 2000.
- Stepaniants, Marietta, "Ethno-Religious Identity in Modern Russia: Orthodoxy and Islam Compared" in Juliet Johnson, Marietta Stepaniants and Benjamin Forest (eds.), *Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam*, London: Ashgate, 2005, p. 26-38 at p. 28
- Stephanopoulos, Nikki and Robert Stephanopoulos (eds.), *Dimitrios in the USA*, New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 1991.
- Stricker, Gerd, "On a Delicate Mission: Pope Jean Paul II in Ukraine", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 216-225.
- Sturdza, Mihail, D., *Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce et d'Albanie et de Constantinople*, Paris, 1983.
- Sulzberger, C.L., "Wider Ties Sought by Greek Church", *New York Times*, 25 March 1950.
- _____, "Political Implications of Pope John's Move", *The New York Times*, January 28, 1959.

- Suro, Roberto, "Vatican Reaches out to Russian Orthodox Church", *The New York Times*, 14. 12. 1988.
- Suryadinata, Léo, *Globalisation and Nationalism: East and West*, Singapore: Institute of SouthEast Asian Studies, 2000.
- Syndesmos, "The Orthodox Church in Estonia: Chronology of a Divided Community", *Syndesmos*, February 23, 1996.
- Szalayné-Sándor, Erzsébet, "International Law in the Service of the Protection of Minorities between the Two World Wars", Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, Minorities Research 6, 1998,
http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbssegkutatas/mr_06/cikk.php?id=1249#_ftn52, (8 March 2010)
- Szporluk, Roman (ed.), *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States in Eurasia*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
- Şahin, Süreyya, *Fener Patrikhanesi ve Türkiye* [The Fener Patriarchate and Turkey], Istanbul: Ötüken, 2nd ed., 1990.
- Şimşir, Bilal (ed.), *Lozan Telegrafları (1922-1923)[Telegramms from Lausanne]*, Vol. II, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1990.
- Talin, Kristoff, "L'Europe de Bruxelles en Ligne de Mire: les Virtuoses du Catholicisme au Cœur de la Modernité Politique", *Social Compass*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2001.
- Tanör, Bülent, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, Istanbul: YKY, 1997.
- Tansel, Selahaddin, *Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyetleri*, Ankara, 1953
- Tataryn, Myroslaw, "Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models for Orthodoxy", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2001, p. 155-172.
- Tayfur, Fatih, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: the Cases of Greece and Spain*, Aldershot Hunts: Ashgate, 2003.
- TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları* [Turkish Great National Assembly Proceedings of Closed Sessions], Vol. 3, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985.
- Tekeli, İlhan and İlkin, Selim, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* [Turkey and The European Community], Vol. I, Ankara: Ümit, 1993. [*Turkey and the European Community*], Vol. I, Ankara: Ümit, 1993.
- Thomas, Scott M., *The Global Resurgence of Religion and The Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

- _____, “Religion and International Conflict” in Ken Dark (ed.), *Religion and International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2000, p. 1-23
- Thomas, M.M, “Search for Wholeness & Unity” in Michael Kinnamon and Brian E. Cope, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans Publishing, 1997, p. 43-47.
- Times, The Patriarchate of Jerusalem: Causes of the Conflict”, *The Times*, January 7, 1909.
- _____, “Independence of Finland”, *The Times*, July 16, 1917.
- _____, “Lambeth Conference and the Greek Church”, *The Times*, April 30, 1920.
- _____, “The Greek Schism: Porte Refuses Berat to Mgr. Meletios”, *The Times*, December 16, 1921.
- _____, “Election to Ecumenical Throne Disputed”, *The Times*, December 14, 1921.
- _____, “The Patriarchate of Constantinople: Sentence of Degradation”, *The Times*, January 13, 1922.
- _____, “Orthodox Church in Poland: Independence Declared”, *The Times*, June 17, 1922.
- _____, “Greek Patriarch Attacked: Constantinople Disorder”, *The Times*, June 2, 1923.
- _____, “Patriarch’s Departure Delayed”, *The Times*, July 9, 1923.
- _____, “Papa Efthim’s Coup”, *The Times*, November 11, 1923.
- _____, “New and Old Style Calendars”, *The Times*, January 28, 1924.
- _____, “Albanian Orthodox Church: Action by the Phanar”, *The Times*, March 15, 1929.
- _____, “New Oecumenical Patriarch: Enthronment at the Phanar”, *The Times*, January 28, 1949.
- _____, “Greek King and Queen in Istanbul”, *The Times*, June 14, 1952.
- _____, “Patriarch Seeks Orthodox Unity”, *The New York Times*, December 17, 1957.
- _____, “Proposed Union of Churches”, *The Times*, January 7, 1959.
- _____, “Orthodox Churches Strive for Unity”, *The Times*, September 25, 1961.
- _____, “Anglican Offer to Orthodox Church”, *The Times*, September 26, 1961.
- _____, “Orthodox Church Declares Unity”, *The Times*, October 2, 1961.
- _____, “First Steps towards Orthodox Unity”, *The Times*, October 11, 1961.

- _____, “Relations with Rome”, *The Times*, September 17, 1963.
- _____, “Orthodox Talks on Church Unity”, *The Times*, September 27, 1963.
- _____, “Orthodox Patriarch’s Hope of Christian Front”, *The Times*, October 8, 1963.
- _____, “More Pressure by Turkey on Greek Minority”, *The Times*, April 13, 1964.
- _____, “World Council of Churches” Plea to Turkish Government”, *The Times*, April 20, 1964.
- _____, “Greece Accuses Turks of Breaking Treaty”, *The Times*, April 21, 1964.
- _____, “Talks with Rome Postponed for at Least Two Years”, *The Times*, November 16 1964
- _____, “Patriarchate Inspected by Turks”, *The Times*, April 23, 1965.
- _____, “Formal Cause of the Great Schism to be Ended”, *The Times*, November 16, 1965.
- _____, “Solzhenitshyn upbraids Patriarch of Moscow”, *The Times*, March 23, 1972.
- _____, “New Patriarch to Press for Unity with Rome”, *The Times*, August 7, 1972.
- _____, “Bishops Prepare Orthodox Church Synod”, *The Times*, November 22, 1976.
- Tobias, Robert, *Communist-Christian Encounter in East Europe*, Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956.
- Tocci, Natalie, “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform”, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p. 73-83.
- Todorovna, Maria, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans” in Carl L. Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 45-77.
- Tokalak, İsmail, *Bizans-Osmanlı Sentezi: Bizans Kültür ve Kurumlarının Osmanlı Üzerindeki Etkisi [The Byzantine-Ottoman Synthesis: The Effect of the Byzantine Culture and Institutions on the Ottoman State]*, Istanbul: Güler Boy Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 277-279.
- Tomos of Polish Orthodox Church, 13 November 1924.
- Tomos of Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 22 February 1945.
- Treanor, Noel, *The Development of Relations Between the Churches and the European Union: A Laboratory for the Future*, Bonn, 22 January 2000.
- Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957, <http://www.eurotreaties.com/rometreaty.pdf> (10 August 2010)

- Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C. 310, 16 December 2004.
- Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities and Related Acts, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C. 340, 10 November 1997.
- Treaty of Lisbon, Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Lisbon, 13 December 2007, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 306, 17 December 2007.
- Treaty on the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C. 191, 29 July 1992.
- Treaty of Peace Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923*, Vol II, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne (24 May 2010)
- Treaty of Peace with Poland [Polish Minorities Treaty], Versailles, June 1919, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/12.html> (7 March 2010)
TRT News, January 25, 2008.
- Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, 'The Minority Protection System in Greece and Turkey: A Legal Overview', Pre-report of the Council of Europe, Doc No. 11860, Report on Freedom of Religion and other Human Rights for non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece), 21 April 2009.
- Turgay, Üner, "Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Trabzon: Elements of Ethnic Conflict" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. I, The Central Lands*, New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, p. 287-318.
- Türkeş, Mustafa, "The Balkan Pact and its Implications for the Balkan States, 1930-1934", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1994, p. 123-144.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey], Law No. 2709, Date. 7 December 1982, *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 9. 11. 1982-17863 (Mükerrer-Concurrent)
- Ulubelen, Erol (ed. trans.), *İngiliz Gizli Belgelerinde Türkiye [The British Documents on the Origin of War, 1896-1914]*, His Majesty's Stationary Office London, 1927 Istanbul: Aykaç, 1967.
- Ukrainian Weekly, "Patriarch of Istanbul Presses Pope not to Recognize Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 72, No.7, 15 February 2004, <http://www.scribd.com/The-Ukrainian-Weekly-200407/d/12815807> (10 August 2010).

- “Unto the Churches of Christ Everywhere” in Michael Kinnamon and Brian E. Kope (eds.), *Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997, p. 11-14.
- Uçarlar, Nesrin, *Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey*, Lund: Lund University, 2009, p. 46.
- Ünal, Mehmet, “Medeni Kanununun Kabulünden Önce Türk Aile Hukuku ile İlgili Gelişmeler ve Özellikle 1917 Tarihli Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi”, *AÜHFD*, V. 34, No. 1-4, 1977, p. 195-231.
- UNESCO, Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Art. 5.c, 14 December 1960, http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/DISCRI_E.PDF (15 August 2010)
- United States of America, *Congressional Record*,: *Proceedings and Debates of the 105th Congress, Session II*, Vol. 144-Part 19, October 19, 1998 to December 19, 1998, Washington: United States Government Printing Service, 1998.
- US Department of State, “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2002”, *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13986.htm> (18 February 2008)
- _____, “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2004”, *US Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, www.State.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35489.htm (5 August 2010)
- _____, “Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2009”, *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/130299.htm> (5 August 2010)
- Usul, George R., “From Political Freedom to Religious Independence: The Romanian Orthodox Church, 1877 to 1925” in Stephen Fischer-Galati, Radu R. Florescu and George E. Usul (eds.), *Romania between East and West: Historical Essays in Memory of Constantin C. Giurescu*, Boulder, 1982.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, “Berat”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Islam], Vol. II, Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1944, p. 523-524.
- X, “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Jul. 1947, p. 566-582.
- Vahapoğlu, Hidayet, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Azınlık ve Yabancı Okulları*, [The Foreign and Minority Schools from the Ottomans to the Present], Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1990.
- Vakker, Triin and Priit Rohtmets, “Estonia: Relations between Christian and Non-Christian Religious Organisations and the State of Religious Freedom”, *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2008, p. 45-53.

Varella, Evangelia A., The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1-4, 2000, p. 155-170.

Vatan, "Ruhban Okulu Açılıyor!" [Theology School Opens!], *Vatan*, 28 June 2009.

Velikonja, Mitja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, (trans. Rang'ichi Ng'inja), Texas: Tamu Press, 2003.

Ayhan Aktar, "Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The Turkish Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered" in Hirschon, Renée (ed) , *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, Studies in Forced Immigration, Vol 12, New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004, p. 81.

Vermeersch, Peter, "EU Enlargement and Minority Policies in Eastern and Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland", *Journal of Ethnopolitic and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol 1. No. 1, 2003, p. 9, http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Vermeersch.pdf (4 June 2009)

Vickers, Miranda, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, London: Hurst, 1998.

_____, "The Greek Minority in Albania-Current Tensions", *Balkans Series*, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2002, p. 7., www.da.mod.uk/colleges/.../Balkan%20Series%200110%20WEB.pdf, (10 March 2010)

Viscuso, Patrick, *A Quest for Reform of the Orthodox Church, The 1923 Pan-Orthodox Congress: An Analysis and Translation of Its Acts and Decisions*, Berkeley: InterOrthodox Press, 2006.

Visser't Hooft, Willem, *The Task of the World Council of Churches*, Pamphlet of a Report presented on Behalf of the Provisional Committee at Amsterdam, 22 August-4 September 1948.

_____, "The Word "Ecumenical"-Its History and Use" in Ruth Rouse & Stephen Charles Neill (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948*, London: S.P.C.K, 1954, p. 735-740.

_____, *Memoirs*, London: SCM Press, 1973

_____, *Has the Ecumenical Movement a Future?*, Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1974.

_____, *Genesis and Formation of the World Council of Churches*, Geneva, 1982.

Vlasto, A. P., *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs*, Cambridge: CUP, 1970.

- Walters, Philip, "The Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox State", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 483, January 1986, (Religion and the State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power), p. 135-145.
- Walz, Jay, "Pope's Try for Unity Faces Ancient Splits: Eastern Church is Receptive but Differences are Deep", *New York Times*, February 1, 1959.
- Ware, Kallistos, "Old Calendarists" in Richard Clogg (ed.), *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, London: Hurst and Company, 2002, p. 1-23.
- Ware, Timothy, *The Orthodox Church*, London: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Webster, Alexander, "Split Decision: The Orthodox Crash over Estonia", *Christian Century*, 5 June 1996.
- Weller, Mark (ed.), *Oxford Commentaries on International Law: The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005.
- Weigel, George, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 27.
- Weissbrodt, David and Dela Vega, Connie, *International Human Rights Law: An Introduction*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
- Wicklein, John, "Orthodox Church Notes Pope's Call", *New York Times*, April 23, 1959.
- Willaime, Jean-Paul, "European Integration, *Laïcité* and Religion", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 23-35 at p. 24;
- Williams, Andrew, *EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony*, Oxford: OUP, 2004.
- Witte, John and Bordeaux, Michel (eds.), *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books, 1999.
- Woods, Paul, "Applause Greets Apology From Pope", *The Independent*, 5 May 2001.
- World Council of Churches, "The Church and Disorder in Society", *Official Report of the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, Amsterdam, 1948.
- Wright, Quincy, *The World's Destiny and the United States: A Conference of Experts in International Relations*, Worlds Citizen Association, 1943.
- Wright, Quincy, *The World's Destiny and the United States: A Conference of Experts in International Relations*, Worlds Citizen Association, 1943.
- Wright, Jane, "The OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1996, p. 190-205.

- Yalçın, Emruhan, *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada*, Ankara: Elips, 2009.
- Yalçın, Emruhan, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu”nun Yeniden Açılması [Reopening of the Halki Theology School]”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No. 41, 2008, p. 125-158.
- Yannas, Prodromos, “The Soft Power of the Patriarchate”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. I, Winter 2009, p. 77-93.
- Yannoulatos, Anastasios, *Facing the World: Orthodox Christian Essays on Global Concerns*, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003.
- Yargıtay 4. Ceza Dairesi [Court of Appeals, 4th Criminal Division], Case No.2005/10694, Decision No. 2007/5603, Date. 13 June 2007, *İstanbul Barosu Dergisi*, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2007, p. 2848.
- Yazıcı, Serap, “The Impact of the EU on the Liberalisation and Democratization Process in Turkey” in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2001, p. 91-102.
- Yenişafak, “Bartholomeos Kazandı [Bartholomeos Has Won]”, *Yenişafak*, June 26, 2008.
- Yıldırım, Onur, *Diplomasi ve Göç: Türk Yunan Mübadelesinin Öteki Yüzü [Diplomacy and Immigration: Other Side of the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange]*, Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006.
- Yıldırım, Uğur, *Dünden Bugüne Patrikhane*, Istanbul: Analiz, 2004.
- Yıldırım, Münir, *Yunanistan ve Ortodoks Kilisesi*, 2nd ed., Ankara: Aziz Andaç Yayınları, 2005.
- Yıldırım, Seyfi and Adnan Sofuoğlu, *Siyasi Faaliyetleriyle İstanbul Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi*, Ankara: Köksav, 2010.
- Yıldırım, Uğur, *Dünden Bugüne Patrikhane* [Patriarchate from Yesterday to Today], Istanbul: Analiz, 2004.
- Yuschenko, Victor, “Letter of His Excellency Victor Yuschenko, President of Ukraine to His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I”, January 21, 2005, <http://www.ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=383&tla=en> (28 January 2006)
- Yükseköğretim Kanunu (YÖK Kanunu) [8th. Law on Higher Education] , No. 2547, *Resmi Gazete [Official Journal]*, 6, 11, 1981.
- Zaman, Interview with Şinasi Gündüz, Dean of the Theology Faculty, Head of Department of the History of Religions at Istanbul University, *Zaman*, June 7, 2009.
- Zamarini, Gaston, *Papes et Patriarches*, Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1962.

Zernov, Nicolas, *Eastern Christendom: A Study on the Origin and Development of the Eastern Orthodoxy*, New York: Putnam, 1961.

Zürcher, Eric, J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co, 1997.

Interviews

Interview with Patriarch Bartholomeos I, Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

Interview with Dimitris Frangopoulos, Former Principal of Zografion Elementary and High School, Istanbul., March 17, 2007.

Interview with Mihalis Vasiliadis, Journalist and Editor of Apoyevmatini, Feriköy, April 8, 2009.

1st Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 26, 2009.

2nd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, October 30, 2009.

3rd Interview with Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, Head of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Patriarchate, Istanbul, November 2, 2009.

1st Interview with Apostolos Danielidis, Metropolitan of Moshonisia (Cunda Adası), Bishop of Aya Triada Monastery of Halki (Heybeliada), Heybeliada, 15 August 2007, Heybeliada.

2nd Interview with Apostolos Danielidis, Metropolitan of Moshonisia (Cunda Adası), Head Bishop of Aya Triada Monastery of Halki (Heybeliada), Heybeliada, July 15, 2009.

Interview with Inal Batu, Retired Diplomat and Member of the Parliament, Istanbul, June 6, 2009.

Interview with Marc Aoun, Researcher at the CNRS (Centre de Recherches en Sciences Sociales), Expert on canon law, Strasbourg, August 7, 2008.

Electronic correspondence with Tatiana Bonneville, St Serge Orthodox Theological Institute, Chargée de Mission, 10 March 2010.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I : JURISDICTION OF THE PATRIARCHATE

In Turkey the Archdiocese of Constantinople (Istanbul) comprises districts of Stavrodromion (Beyoglu), Tataoula (Kurtuluş), Bosphorus (Boğaz), Hypsomatheia (Samatya) and Istanbul (Fener).

Metropolitanates of Turkey

- Metropolitanate of Chalcedon (Kadikoy),
- Metropolitanate of Derkon (Terkos)
- Metropolitanate of Imvros and Tenedos (Gökceada and Bozcada)
- Metropolitanate of Prinkiponese (Adalar).

Outside Turkey the Patriarchate has direct jurisdiction over

The semi-autonomous Archdiocese of Crete

- Metropolitanate of Gortini and Arcadia
- Metropolitanate of Rethimno and Aulopotampos
- Metropolitanate of Kidonia and Apokoronon
- Metropolitanate of Lambi, Sivrito, and Sfakia
- Metropolitanate of Ierapitni and Sitia
- Metropolitanate of Petra and Hersonissos
- Metropolitanate of Kissamos and Selinos

Five Metropolitanates of the Dodecanese islands

- Metropolitanate of Rhodes
- Metropolitanate of Kos and Nisiros
- Metropolitanate of Leros-Kalimnos and Astipalea
- Metropolitanate of Karpathos and Kasos
- Metropolitanate of Simi

The Archdiocese of America

- Direct Archdiocesan District (New York)
- Metropolitanate of Chicago
- Metropolitanate of San Fransisco

- Metropolitanate of Pittsburg
- Metropolitanate of Boston
- Metropolitanate of Denver
- Metropolitanate of Atlanta
- Metropolitanate of Detroit
- Metropolitanate of New Jersey

The Archdiocese of Australia

The Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain and Ireland

The Metropolitanate of France

The Metropolitanate of Germany

The Metropolitanate of Austria and Hungary

The Metropolitanate of Sweden and all Scandinavia (Norway, Denmark)

The Metropolitanate of Switzerland

The Metropolitanate of Italy and Malta

Archdiocese of New Zealand

The Metropolitanate of Toronto

The Ukrainian Diocese of Canada

The Metropolitanate of Buenos Aires (Argentina, South America)

The Metropolitanate of Mexico (Central America)

The Metropolitanate of Hong Kong (India, Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia)

The Metropolitanate of Korea (Exarchate of Japan)

The Patriarchal Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Parishes in Western Europe (Paris)

Thirtysix Metropolitanates of the “New lands” in Northern Greece and some of the Aegean islands.

Patriarchal and Stavropegial Monasteries outside Turkey

- The monastery of Saint John the evangelist and the exarchate of Patmos in Greece
- The monastic community of Mount Athos
- The Monastery of St. Anastasia Pharmakolitria, Halkidiki, Greece
- The Monastery of St. John the Forerunner, Essex, great Britain
- The Monastery of the entry of the Virgin Mary Alabama, U.S.A.
- The Monastery of St. Irene Chrysovalantou, New York, U.S.A

Patriarchal Foundations

- Institute for Patristic Studies in Thessaloniki
- Orthodox Center in Chambesy
- Institution for orthodox Missionary Work in the Far East
- Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute, Berkley, CA
- Institute for Post-Graduate Studies of Orthodox Theology in Chambesy
- Foundation for the patronage of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Athens

τὸν ἄνω καὶ τὸν ὑποκάτω, ὅσα οἱ δεῖται καὶ ἰσοὶ νεώτεροι καὶ
 ἢ τοῖς τῆς Ἁγίας Ὀρθόδοξης Ἐκκλησίας διαμεγεθύνοντες, καὶ ὅσους μνημο-
 νεύει, καὶ τῶν τοῖς τοῖς Διαβόχοις τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ Οἰκουμένου
 Πατριάρχου καὶ τῶν ἰσοῦν Ἀρχιεπισκόπων Πατριάρχων καὶ Ἐπισκοπῶν τῶν
 Ἐπισκοπῶν τῶν Ἁγίων Ὀρθόδοξων Ἀποστολικῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν, ὁρίσαντες ἅμα ὁ-
 τῶς καὶ ἢ ἐν Ἡερωσίᾳ ἀδελφῆ Ἁγίας Ἀποστολικῆς Ὀρθόδοξης Ἐκκλησίας γε-
 βῆναι τὸ Ἅγιον Ἄνω καὶ τῆς καὶ ἡμεῖς Ἁγίας Μεγαλῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ
 Ἐκκλησίας. |

Ὡς οὖν ἐπισημαίνοντες ὅσους ἀποκειμένους περὶ ἰσχυρίων ἢ ἐπισκοπῶν
 γενικῶς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς φύσεως, ἐφερχομένων τῶν ὁρίων τῆς δια-
 οδοσίας τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους Ἀποστολικῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν, ὁ Ἐπισκοπῶν Μελ-
 ποπολίτης Βερσοβίας καὶ αἰῶνος Ἡερωσίας ἀσπυδύνηται ἀπὸ τῶν καὶ
 ἡμεῖς Ἀρχιεπισκόπων Οἰκουμένου ὀνόματι, εἰ δὲ ἢ ἡ-
 ρωνία μετὰ αἰῶνος Ἐκκλησιαστικῆς Ὀρθόδοξης τῶν ὁρθόδοξων τῶν ἰ-
 σῶν τῆς Ἁγίας, καὶ ἰσῶν οὕτως τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἐκκλη-
 σιῶν γνήμων καὶ ἀντιγνήμων.

Ταῦτα οὕτως ἐξέταται καὶ ὑποδείχεται καὶ ἐπισημαίνονται ἐπὶ ἡμῶν ὑπερ-
 δύνει, εἰς μόνον ἀπερριζωμένην, βεβαιώσεται καὶ εἰς τὸν ἀποστόλο
 Πατριάρχου ἡμῶν καὶ ἱεροδότη Ἰωάννη, καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μὲν καὶ
 ὑποκαταστάτων ἐν τῷ ἑκάστῳ τῆς καὶ ἡμεῖς Μεγαλῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἐ-
 κκλησίας, ἐν ἰσῶ δὲ καὶ ἀπερριζωμένῳ ἀσπυδύνηται καὶ ἀντιγνήμων
 τῶν Ἐπισκοπῶν Μελποπολίτη Βερσοβίας καὶ αἰῶνος Ἡερωσίας, τῶν
 ἐν Χριστῷ ἀγαθῶν ἡμῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ συγγενῶν ὑπὲρ Διο-
 νυσίου, τῶν καὶ Ἐπισκοπῶν τῆς Ἐπισκοπῆς ἱεροδότη τῆς Ἁγίας Ὀρθό-
 δοξης Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Ἡερωσίας.

Κύριος δὲ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οἱ ἀγγελοὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου καὶ
 Μεγαλῆ καὶ Ἁγίου Ἀρχιεπισκόπου Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν, ἀν-
 τὶστοιχοὶ εἶσθε τῶν οὕτως ἐπισημαίνοντες ἐπισημαίνοντες Ὀρθόδοξον
 Ἀποστολικὸν Ἐκκλησιαστικὸν τῆς Ἡερωσίας καὶ ἀποστόλο καὶ ἀν-
 τὶστοιχοὶ εἶσθε τῶν οὕτως τῶν Ἁγίων Ἀποστόλων ὀνόματος, ἀ-
 γήμων τῶν καὶ ἡμῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀντιγνήμων

τὸν ἄνω καὶ τὸν
 ὑποκάτω ὀνο-
 μαζοῦνται
 ἀπὸ τῆς Ἁγίας
 Ἐκκλησίας
 ἡμεῖς

διατάξουν, οὐδ' ἐληφνένοναι τὰ συνομοσπονδία περὶ ἀγῆρους
 εὐμνησιακῆν ἀντιλήψεις τοῦ Μνησποσπίου Κλειβου-φέρουτος
 τῶν λίγων Ἐφεσίων τοῦ Διουσιμενίου Ἰσθίου, ἢ Μελριόλνις ἡμῶν
 μετὰ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς Σερωαίων Μνησποσπίων καὶ ὑπερίματων
 ἐν Ἀγίῳ Πνεύματι εἰσακτῶν ἡμῶν εἰσεργῶν καὶ συγγελοσπονδῶν
 ἐρωμεν ἀποφύως ἀποδέξασθαι τὸ ἀπὸς ἡμᾶς εὐλῆμα τῆς ἐν Κορ-
 νία Ἀγίας Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὴν περὶ ἡμῶν χορηγήσασαι
 εὐχολογίαν καὶ ὑπάραι ἀπὸς τὴν ἀντιλήψασαι καὶ εἰνεφέπνλον
 ὀργεῖνωσαι αὐτῆς.

Ὅθεν καὶ συνοδικῶς ἐν Ἀγίῳ Πνεύματι ἀποφασισθέντες, εἰνεμ-
 ρίσαμεν τὴν ἀντιλήψασαι ὀργεῖνωσαι καὶ οὐλοσαι τῆς ἐν Κορ-
 νία Ἀγίας Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας, ἐσπεροσύντες ὅπως αὐτῆς, Πνευμα-
 τικῆς ἡμῶν Ἀδελφῆς ὑπερίμασσαι, διοικῆ ἔφετῆς καὶ διεσῆ τὰ
 κατ' αὐτῆς ἀνεφεπνίως καὶ ἀντιλήψασαι, καλεῖ τὴν λαῖον καὶ
 τὰ ὑπερίμασσαι διευκρίνασσαι καὶ τῶν γουσιῶν Ἀγίων Ὀρθο-
 δόξων ἀντιλήψασαι Ἐκκλησιῶν, ὡς ὑπερίμασσαι αὐτῆς διοικῆ καὶ
 εὐμνησιακῆν ἐπέαν γυροφύσασαι τὴν ἐν τῶν κανονικῶν ἐν Κο-
 ρνία Ὀρθοδόξων Ἀρχιερέων εἰνεπλεφμένῃν Σερίν Γίνουσαν, ἔχουσαν
 Ἰεροσέρον τὸν καλεῖ καὶ τὸν Σερωαίων Μνησποσπίων Βερσοβί-
 ας καὶ τῶν Κορνίας.

Περὶ διαλήψασαι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἐνδεφῆ τῆς κανονικῆς ἐνὸς μετὰ
 τῶν κατ' ἡμᾶς Ἀγίων Ἀποστολοσπονδῶν καὶ Παιριερακῶν Διουσι-
 μενίου Ἰσθίου καὶ τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων ἀντιλήψασαι Ἐκκλησιῶν
 ὑπομνησίουμεν τὸ κατῆμα, ὅπως ὁ εὐκρίστος Σερωαίων Μνη-
 σποσπίων Βερσοβίας καὶ τῶν Κορνίας εἰνεπλεφμένῃ, καλεῖ τὴν λαῖ-
 ον τῆς Ἀγίας Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας, τὴν εὐχολογῆ καὶ ἀνεφῆσσαι ἀ-
 τῶν δι' ἐρεποσπινίων γυροφύσασαι τῆ κατ' ἡμᾶς ἐν Μερίν τοῦ Χρι-
 στοῦ Ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῶν εὐκρίστων Ὀρθοδόξων ἀντιλήψασαι
 Ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ τὴν νερομωμένῃν περὶ τῆς ἐν τῶν εἰσεργῶν ἡμῶν
 εὐχολογῶν καὶ διαβεβαῖωσσαι περὶ τῆς καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς κατῆμα
 μένης αὐτῆς Ἀγίας Ἐκκλησίας ἀποφασισθέντες ἐληφνένοναι τὸν Ὀρθοδόξον

ωαων των Αγίων αδελφων ορθοδωξων ανθρωπων ευ
γνωτων.

Εν ελευθωρια αυτου υαλει μνην Νοεμβριον (19').

Εορτη της Η.
+ Ο Νικητης Βασιλευς

+ Μηνιακωσιον

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

fo xaxou dora Wang

αὐτὴν ἀνεξαρχίως καὶ ἀδικαιολογῶς, κατὰ τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὰ μυστηριακά
διευκρινήματα καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ὁδοδοξῶν Ἀκουσεβίαν Εὐκλήσιον ἀναρχοῦντα εἰς
ἐπιτοκίαν αὐτῆς εὐδησιατικὴν ἀσπίδιν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχιεπισκοπῆς ἀσφαλισμένην ἔχειν εὐ-
νοσον καὶ ὄχνησιν ἑστέροις τοῖς κατὰ κατὸν Μαμασειώτατος Κωνσταντίνου Σό-
φια καὶ Ἐξάρχου πατρὸς Βουλγαρίας.

Τοῖς τῶν δὲ καὶ εἰδὼς τῆς σωματικῆς καὶ πνευματικῆς ἐπίτη-
τος μετὰ τοῦ κατ' ἡμᾶς Ἀρισταίου Ἀποσεβίου καὶ Καταραχίου διευκρινή-
μοῦ δόξου καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὁδοδοξῶν Ἀκουσεβίαν Εὐκλήσιον ὁ εὐαίσθητος Μα-
μασειώτατος Κωνσταντίνος Σόφια καὶ Ἐξάρχου πατρὸς Βουλγαρίας ἐκ τῶ κα-
θήκων, κατὰ τοὺς ἀνέμαθον μετῆσαντα πνευματικῆς δόξου καὶ μυστηριακά
δεσμῶν, ἀταγίλῃ δι' ἐπιτοκίαν ἰσομοιάσει τῆ τε κατ' ἡμᾶς μεγάλης
τοῦ Χριστοῦ Εὐκλήσια καὶ πατρὸς καὶ λογικῶν ὁδοδοξῶν Ἀκουσεβίαν
Εὐκλήσιον τὴν εὐκλήσιον καὶ ἀνάστην αὐτοῦ, παρακόμῃσιν ἅμα τὴν ἀδελ-
φικὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ δευτέρωσιν ἕξι τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς εὐνοσον-
μικῆς αὐτοῦ Εὐκλήσιας ἀσφαλιστικῶς περιέσει τῆς ὁδοδοξῆς πίστεως καὶ
εὐσεβείας καὶ πατρὸς ὅσα ἴδη καὶ πατρὸς καὶ ἡ μαμασειώτης
Ἄρια ὁδοδοξῆς Εὐκλήσιας τὰ εἰς δευτέρωσιν, μημητοῦσιν εἰ τῆς διου-
χοῦ τοῦ ὁδοδοξῶν τοῦ διευκρινήμοῦ Καταραχίου καὶ τῶν λογικῶν Κατα-
ραχίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑστέροις τῶν ὁδοδοξῶν Ἀκουσεβίαν Εὐκλήσιον,
ἀναφέρουσιν τε πατρὸς τοῦ κατ' ἡμᾶς Ἀρισταίου Καταραχίου διευκ-
ρινήμοῦ δόξου καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ εὐκλήσιον καὶ λαμβάνει τὴν ἐμμοσον πρέμῃ
καὶ ἀνάληψιν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν λογικῶν Ἄριαν ἀδελφικὴν Εὐκλήσιον ἐν
γενικῆν Εὐκλήσιαστικῶν σημειῶν, τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως καὶ ὁ-
μολογίας δευτέρωσιν.

ταῦτα ὁδοδοξῶντα καὶ ὁδοδοξῶντα ἐφ' ἡμῶν κατὰ τὴν ὁδο-
δοξῆν ἀνεβίαν τῆς κβ' φεβρουαρίου εἰσετάως ἔτος ἀσφαλιστικῶν
καὶ μυστηριακῶν βιβλίων ἐν μόνιμον παραφιλίαν καὶ διὰ τοῦ πα-
τρὸς Καταραχίου ἡμῶν καὶ εὐνοσον τοῦ, παρασευδόμενος καὶ
ἐπιτοκίαν εἰς τὴν κβ' φεβρουαρίου τῆς κατ' ἡμᾶς Ἄρια τοῦ Χριστοῦ μεγάλης
Εὐκλήσιας, εἰ ἴσο δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλιστικῶν ἀδελφικῶν καὶ εὐκλή-
σιων τοῦ Μαμασειώτατος Κωνσταντίνου Σόφια καὶ Ἐξάρχου πα-
τρὸς Βουλγαρίας.

