

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: THE
CASE OF THE AEGEAN DISPUTE IN TURKEY-GREECE RELATIONS**

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Ufuk ALKAN

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Danışman: Doç. Dr. E. Münevver CEBECİ

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey is evaluated from the viewpoint of rational-choice institutionalism. The main argument of the thesis is that rational instrumentality underlies the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey because Turkey expects full membership of the EU in return for its Europeanization. In this regard, firstly, theoretical framework to account for the influence of the EU on domestic and foreign policy fields in the Member and Candidate States is presented. Also, an overall assessment of the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey is made. Then, Turkey-Greece relations are elaborated with special reference to the Aegean dispute. In this regard, the legal and political aspects of the Aegean dispute and bilateral differences of the two countries over it are studied. In the same vein, the Europeanization of the Aegean dispute at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council despite its high resilience in Turkish and Greek Foreign Policy is underlined. Then, the influence of the EU on the continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece is evaluated. Furthermore, incidents that pushed the two countries for rapprochement in the period before the 1999 Helsinki European Council are mentioned concisely. Thus, the Europeanization of the process of rapprochement between the two countries after Turkey's candidacy was declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council is emphasized. Overall, it is concluded that the Europeanization of TFP is highly contingent on the credibility of the prospect of full membership of the EU.

ÖZET

Bu tez çalışmasında, Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupalılaşması, rasyonel tercih kurumsalcı bakış açısından ele alınmaktadır. Tezin temel argümanı Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupalılaşmasında rasyonel faydacı bir yaklaşımın etkili olduğudur. Nitekim, Avrupalılaşmanın karşılığında Türkiye'nin AB'ye tam üye olması beklenmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ilk olarak, Üye ve Aday Devletlerde iç ve dış politika alanlarının Avrupalılaşmasını açıklamaya yönelik teorik çerçeve sunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupalılaşmasının genel bir incelemesi yapılmaktadır. Daha sonra, Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkileri Ege Sorunu özelinde ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Ege Sorununun hukuki ve politik yanları incelenmekte ve iki ülkenin konuya ilişkin görüş farklılıkları ortaya konmaktadır. Takip eden bölümde, Türk ve Yunan Dış Politikalarında önemli bir mesele olan Ege Sorununun, 1999 yılı Aralık ayında gerçekleştirilen Helsinki Zirvesi'nde Avrupalılaşığı ifade edilmektedir. Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkilerinin uzlaşma yönünde ilerlemesinde AB'nin ne derece etkili olduğu incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, Helsinki Zirvesi'nden önceki dönemde iki ülkeyi uzlaşmaya iten olaylardan kısaca bahsedilmektedir. Böylelikle, iki ülke arasındaki uzlaşma sürecinin, Türkiye'nin adaylığının Helsinki Zirvesi'nde ilan edilmesiyle Avrupalılaşığı ifade edilmektedir. Son olarak, Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupalılaşmasının AB'ye tam üyelik beklentisinin inandırıcılığını yitirmemesine önemli ölçüde bağlı olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACN	Associated Correspondents' Network
AKP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
ANAP	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
APD	Accession Partnership Document
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CCS	Convention on the Continental Shelf
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU
CHP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU
D8	Developing 8
EC	European Community
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EFP	European Foreign Policy
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FIR	Flight Information Region
GFP	Greek Foreign Policy
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
INI	Iraq's Neighbours Initiative
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ND	New Democracy (<i>Néa Dimokratía</i>)
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of Acquis
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (<i>Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima</i>)
PJCC	Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
PKK	Kurdish Workers' Party
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TPAO	Turkish State Petroleum Company (<i>Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı</i>)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute (<i>Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu</i>)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEF	World Economic Forum
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) has been Europeanized notably, especially after the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. Europeanization has become relevant for Turkey after the 1999 Helsinki European Council because accession to the European Union (EU) became a credible objective after its candidacy was declared officially. To achieve full membership of the EU, Turkey is required to transpose the EU's acquis, i.e. to Europeanize its domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements. Before the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Turkey had virtually insignificant incentives for Europeanization, especially after its candidacy was not declared at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council. This means that the EU's influence on TFP increases when the prospect of full membership becomes more credible. In other words, Europeanization penetrates into TFP as long as full membership is a credible objective.

It is a fact that Turkey hopes full membership of the EU through Europeanization. This is illustrative of the conditionality mechanism embedded in the EU's relations with the third countries. In other words, Turkey has to fulfil certain conditions set out by the EU to Europeanize its domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements before accession. Accordingly, the main argument of this thesis is that rational instrumentality underlies the Europeanization of TFP. This means that Turkey expects that it is rewarded full membership of the EU after it has Europeanized sufficiently. Thus, the Europeanization of Turkey is mainly characterized by cost-benefit calculations. Resilience of rational instrumentality in the Europeanization of Turkey is confirmed also mainly by the fact that the process of Europeanization decelerated because full membership to the EU has become a less credible objective for Turkey after accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005 (Özer, 2012: 46). Accordingly, Turkey fails to implement the EU's rules and norms that it adopted (Özer, 2012: 46). Hence, it

may be further argued that the Europeanization of Turkey would not have slowed down if Turkey had been fully socialized into the EU's rules and norms, i.e. if Turkey had internalized these rules and norms. In other words, the process of Europeanization is highly dependent on the credibility of full membership because of rationalist approach of Turkey to Europeanization.

If one considers the European Commission's annual Progress Reports, Turkey should i) ensure that its foreign policy remain in line with Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP); ii) develop the necessary administrative structures to fulfil its obligations under CFSP properly; iii) defend the EU's position on certain foreign policy issues in other international fora; and iv) continue to promote peace, stability and security in its region for the Europeanization of its foreign policy (European Commission, 2004: 155). Therefore, to assess the influence of the EU on TFP, this thesis draws on these four parameters in general and on Turkey's relations with Greece in the context of the Aegean dispute in particular. On the other hand, although the research is mainly on the Europeanization of TFP from the 1999 on, earlier attempts at rapprochement between Turkey and Greece are underlined to substantiate further the influence of the EU on their relations. This means that an overview of the past of Turkey-Greece relations in the context of the Aegean dispute is needed to understand better the Europeanization of their relations.

The influence of the EU on TFP may well be observed in Turkey-Greece relations. As a matter of fact, previously conflict-ridden Turkey-Greece relations have improved significantly after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. For instance, Sönmezoğlu and Ayman argue: "Turkey and Greece appear today both as two neighbouring countries in which the likelihood of waging a destructive war is becoming obsolete due to the existing of a peaceful dialogue" (Sönmezoğlu and Ayman, 2003: 37). The EU has been influential in fostering good neighbourly relations between the two countries through the conditionality mechanism. Actually, the Member States are able to govern the EU's relations with the third countries in line with their interests via conditionality. In other words, the Member States shape conditions that are set out by

the EU for fulfilment by a third country. In the case of Turkey, the conditionality mechanism provided Greece with the opportunity to upload its national interests to the EU level (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 44; Kavakas, 2000: 147; Aydın, 2000: 132; Hale and Avcı, 2002: 47; Economides, 2005: 484). For instance, Greece has been highly influential in the introduction by the EU of referral of border disputes to the ICJ as a condition for fulfilment by Turkey at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Rumelili, 2008: 105). By making referral of border disputes to the ICJ a condition for full membership, Greece expected that the Aegean dispute be resolved in line with its interests.

The Aegean dispute has been at the core of Turkey-Greece relations since the 1970s. It has been a sensitive foreign policy issue for both countries. Therefore, the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece may well be understood through evaluating the influence of the EU on the respective positions of the two countries on the resolution of the Aegean dispute. Both Turkey and Greece have long associated the Aegean dispute with their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For decades, earlier attempts at rapprochement between the two countries failed because sovereign rights are deemed non-negotiable. Thus, resolution of the Aegean dispute requires that TFP and Greek Foreign Policy (GFP) be Europeanized given that such realist considerations are not predominant in a Europeanized foreign policy.

Europeanization is simply referred to throughout the thesis as a process through which domestic and foreign policy fields of the Member and Candidate States—whether supranational or intergovernmental are incrementally adapted to the EU. Nonetheless, different dynamics underlie the Europeanization of the Member and Candidate States. Therefore, the Europeanization of the Member and Candidate States will be handled separately throughout the thesis. Theoretical framework to evaluate the Europeanization of foreign policy in the Member States is based on the insights of sociological institutionalism. From the viewpoint of sociological institutionalism, Europeanization of foreign policy is based on the constructivist idea of mutual constitution of actors and structures, i.e. the Member States of the EU socialize into the

EU's rules and norms which they themselves construct (Checkel, 1998: 328; Gross, 2009: 16). As a matter of fact, they upload their preferences to the EU level to construct these rules and norms. These rules and norms are internalized by the Member States via the process of uploading and downloading to/from the EU level. In other words, they socialize into the EU's rules and norms and become acquainted with their views on certain foreign policy issues through a process which is conducive to norm internalization. Thus, the Member States usually adopt the EU's rules and norms in the field of foreign policy because they view them as appropriate (Shimmelfennig, 2009: 8).

Yet, the Candidate States are not represented in the EU's institutions and decision making processes. Therefore, their adaptation to the EU's rules and norms does not happen through socialization but conditionality. This means that the Candidate States are conditioned by the EU to adapt to its rules and norms in the field of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the Candidate States are not expected to internalize the EU's rules and norms. They may comply with these rules and norms as long as they serve their interests. In other words, their behaviour may change across issues and over time in line with their fixed national interests (Moumoutzis, 2011: 622). For instance, Turkey has not withdrawn its *casus belli* resolution against the probable extension by Greece of the breadth of its territorial seas to twelve nautical miles although their relations have improved considerably. In addition, the Candidate States expect certain gains from complying with the EU's rules and norms. In the case of Turkey, full membership of the EU is expected in return for its Europeanization. Therefore, theoretical framework to evaluate the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey is based on the insights of rational-choice institutionalism. Thus, from the viewpoint of rational-choice institutionalism, Europeanization of foreign policy may be defined as changes in the national foreign policy practices and in the structures of institutions that guide national foreign policy for the purpose of aligning them with practices and structures of CFSP upon the awareness that the core national interests are to be achieved better not individually but collectively in European policymaking.

In addition, it is noted that the Europeanization of domestic policy fields has implications for the Europeanization of foreign policy. For instance, in the case of Turkey, complying with the Copenhagen political criteria resulted in the civilianization of foreign policy (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2009: 3-4; Oğuzlu; 2010: 661; Özcan, 2010: 25). Hence, theoretical framework for the Europeanization of domestic policy fields in the Member and Candidate States is handled concisely, as well.

Therefore, the thesis is important in that it evaluates the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey from the viewpoint of rational-choice institutionalism as well as the relationship between the Europeanization of domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements. In addition, it shows how the Aegean dispute could be Europeanized despite its high resilience in TFP and GFP. As a matter of fact, the Aegean dispute is no longer an issue between Turkey and Greece but Turkey and the EU (Triantaphyllou, 2001: 69; Aybet, 2009: 151).

In this regard, major research questions of this thesis are:

- How does the EU influence domestic and foreign policy fields in the Member and Candidate States?
- How could the Aegean dispute be Europeanized despite its high resilience in TFP and GFP?
- How can one explain the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece in view of the Aegean dispute from the perspective of rational-choice institutionalism?
- Would the process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece have continued if Turkey's candidacy had not been declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council?

In the first chapter, theoretical framework of the thesis is presented. The starting point is the evaluation of the conceptual evolution of the term Europeanization. Different meanings that are attributed to the term are discussed. Then, the Europeanization of domestic policy fields is evaluated separately for the Member and Candidate States with reference to the mechanisms through which Europeanization happens and the intervening variables which either facilitate or inhibit Europeanization. Later on, the Europeanization of foreign policy is discussed separately for the Member and Candidate States from the viewpoint of sociological institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism, respectively. In this regard, the two logics – the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness – of the Europeanization of foreign policy are compared. In addition, a brief evaluation of the relationship between the Europeanization of domestic and foreign policy fields is made. Following that, patterns of the Europeanization of foreign policy some of which are applied to the case of Turkey's relations with Greece are presented. Then, a concise assessment of the influence of the EU on TFP since 1999 is made with special reference to the European Commission's annual Progress Reports on Turkey. In this regard, i) Turkey's alignment with the EU's declarations and Council decisions on foreign policy issues; ii) its relations with its neighbours and broader neighbourhood; iii) its alignment with the EU's position on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and fight against terrorism; iv) its activities to promote the EU's rules and norms in other international organizations; v) its contributions to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP); and vi) changes introduced to its administrative structures responsible for foreign policymaking are mentioned.

In the second chapter, political and legal dimensions of the five components of the Aegean dispute – disagreements over i) the sovereignty of certain islands in the Aegean Sea; ii) the demilitarization of the Eastern Greek islands; iii) the breadth of the territorial seas; iv) the delimitation of the continental shelf; and v) the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands and the operative control of the Flight Information Region (FIR) are discussed in detail. In this regard, crises that broke out between Turkey and Greece because of their bilateral differences over the Aegean and

the failed attempts at rapprochement that were sparked by these crises are discussed. Of importance is the fact that attempts at rapprochement between the two countries generally followed crises. Special reference is made to the contested provisions of the governing Treaties and arguments of both countries on the Aegean dispute. The Europeanization of the Aegean dispute despite its high resilience in TFP and GFP is evaluated, as well.

In the third chapter, the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece is evaluated in detail. The starting point is an overview of Turkey-Greece relations after the 1996 Kardak crisis. In this regard, incidents that influenced relations between the two countries in that period – crisis over the S-300 missiles, Presidency Conclusions of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the capture of Öcalan and the Kosovo crisis are underlined. It is argued that these incidents pushed the two countries for rapprochement. However, the continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece which started just after the March 1999 Kosovo crisis became Europeanized when Greece dropped its veto against Turkey's candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Therefore, the relationship between the process of rapprochement and Europeanization is discussed. It is stressed that the continuing process of rapprochement between the two countries may have failed if Turkey's candidacy had not been declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council.

The thesis concludes that rational instrumentality underlies the Europeanization of TFP. This means that the Europeanization of both domestic and foreign policy fields in Turkey is conditional on the credibility of the prospect of full membership. As a corollary, the Europeanization of Turkey slows down when the prospect of full membership becomes less credible. Yet, whether cooperation between Turkey and Greece would continue when the prospect of full membership further lost credibility is a challenging question.

1. EUROPEANIZATION: CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION

Research on Europeanization gained impetus with the deepening and widening of integration process from the 1990s on (Bulmer, 2007: 46)¹. Initially, deepening of integration process has multiplied the ways the EU could influence its Member States. Consequently, European integration culminated in transforming the very States that had previously initiated the integration process (Caporaso, 2007: 27). This is a process through which the Member States of the EU are increasingly Europeanized. Nonetheless, earlier integration theories are ill-equipped to highlight dynamics that underlie the process of Europeanization. For instance, integration theories like liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism have been primarily concerned with “domestic roots of European integration” and “institution building at the European level”, respectively² (Rosamond, 2000: 50-97). In other words, they have mostly sought to uncover the ways the Member States initiated and consolidated European integration. Conversely, Europeanization seeks to account for the external sources of domestic order in that it attempts to highlight the ways the already initiated and consolidated European integration influences the domestic policy fields of the Member States³ (Vink and

¹ Bulmer and Radaelli state four developments that account for the deepening and widening of integration process, and the subsequent increase in interest in Europeanization. These are “institutionalization of the Single Market”, “advent of EMU [Economic and Monetary Union]”, “emergent pattern of regulatory competition” and “process of enlargement” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 1-2).

² Hix and Goetz note that European integration is composed of two closely related processes which are “the delegation of policy competences to the supranational level to achieve particular policy outcomes” and “the establishment of a new set of political institutions with executive, legislative and judicial powers” (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 3).

³ Europeanization is closely related to neo-institutionalism which has three strands (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 18). These are rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. According to Bulmer, rational choice institutionalism is interested in “the responses of domestic political actors to new opportunities brought about by European integration”; historical institutionalism is concerned with “temporal dimensions of domestic

Graziano, 2008: 3). Hence, Europeanization can be called a tool that was devised to find out and substantiate domestic changes induced by the EU.

Unsurprisingly, domestic changes induced by the EU became most visible initially in the Member States as a consequence of “communitisation of national policy areas in the [then] first pillar of the EU⁴” (Major, 2005: 175). The Member States that have progressively pooled their sovereignty over some domestic policy fields to the EU level have been required to align their domestic policy and institutional arrangements with those introduced by the EU. As a consequence, the research on the Europeanization of the Candidate States and on the Europeanization of intergovernmental policy fields gained impetus belatedly.

Nonetheless, the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern European Countries⁵ (CEECs) became very discernible in the period preceding their accession to adaptation to the EU” and sociological institutionalism deals with “the role of norms, values and rules in adapting to the EU” (Bulmer, 2008: 50). The Europeanization of foreign policy will be explained with reference to the insights of sociological institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism under section 1.2.

⁴ The EU consisted of three pillars after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The first pillar which was also called the European Communities pillar comprised the EC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which expired in 2002 and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Issues related to economic, social and environmental policies were handled in the first pillar. It was the only pillar with a legal personality and mainly supranational character. The second and third pillars lacked legal personality and they were mainly intergovernmental. The second pillar which was also called CFSP pillar was related to foreign policy and military matters. The third pillar which was also called Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) dealt with criminal matters. However, the pillar structure was abolished by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Since then, the EU has an integrated legal personality.

⁵ Excluding Southern Cyprus and Malta, the CEECs are the countries that acceded to the EU either in 2004 or 2007 - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

the EU (Agh, 1999: 840). The need to develop models to account for their Europeanization has become imminent⁶. However, the ways the Candidate States are Europeanized are remarkably different. This is mainly because the relationship between the EU and Candidate States is asymmetrical and the accession process is highly uncertain (Grabbe, 2003: 303; Agné, 2010: 2). It is asymmetrical because the Candidate States have had no role in the shaping of European integration so that they lacked opportunities to upload their policy preferences to the EU level. Also, it is uncertain because there is no guarantee regarding the endpoint of accession negotiations given that a Candidate State may be denied accession to the EU after negotiations on all chapters of the EU's *acquis* are completed. Therefore, mechanisms of Europeanization will be explained separately for the Member and Candidate States below.

In addition, interest in the Europeanization of foreign and security policy increased notably after national foreign policies of the Member States have significantly been transformed through “long and sustained participation in foreign policy making at the European level” (White, 2001: 6). The emphasis on the duration and continuity of participation is an implicit reference to the strength of socialization in Europeanizing foreign policies of the Member States, a point that will be elaborated under section 1.2. However, Europeanization of foreign policy is significantly different from that of domestic policy fields because of intergovernmental nature of the former (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy; 2009: 3).

This chapter offers the theoretical framework on which the thesis is based, together with an overview of Turkey's alignment with CFSP. Actually, the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey is not isolated from the Europeanization in domestic sphere. As a matter of fact, the Europeanization of domestic policy and institutional arrangements may facilitate the Europeanization of foreign policy. In

⁶ It is argued that Europeanization is also relevant for the Candidate States because they face adaptational pressures to the EU, as well (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2010: 30).

addition, the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece cannot be evaluated in isolation from successful projection of Greece of its national interests to the EU level. Therefore, this chapter starts with an overview of the literature on the Europeanization of domestic policy and institutional arrangements in the Member and Candidate States. Then, the literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy will be evaluated in greater detail.

1.1. Defining Europeanization

Harcourt argues: "Europeanization is a multiinstitutional, multiactor, and multiprocess phenomenon" (Harcourt, 2003: 179). As a result, the term Europeanization has acquired different but interrelated meanings to capture the sheer complexity of the process of Europeanization (Bauer *et al.*, 2007: 406). Definitions point to different aspects of the term. While some are inclined to emphasize the bottom-up character of it, others are seemingly more interested in the top-down functioning of the process.

Olsen proposes five popular uses of the term (Olsen, 2002: 923-943). First definition is "changes in external boundaries of the EU" that refers to the EU's increasing of its political reach and expanding of its territorial space through enlargement (Olsen, 2002: 925). It is well-known that enlargement is conditional on the fulfilment of some certain criteria by the Candidate States which account, to a great extent, for their Europeanization.

Secondly, Europeanization is defined as "institution-building at the European level" (Olsen, 2002: 926). Some other authors have a similar view of Europeanization. For instance, for Risse *et al.*, Europeanization is:

the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with the problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 3).

The third definition of Europeanization is “increasing penetration of national systems of governance by the European system of governance” (Olsen, 2002: 927). This definition points to the top-down character of the process of Europeanization because it is mainly concerned with the ways national systems are transformed by the factors originated by the EU. The same view is shared by Ladrech who defined Europeanization earlier as:

an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC [European Community] political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making (Ladrech, 1994)⁷.

Olsen’s fourth point is that Europeanization is about “exporting forms of political organization beyond Europe” (Olsen, 2002: 928). It simply points to the EU’s increasing reach outside the European continent. It is true that the limits of the EU’s territorial space and political reach are not identical. The EU’s political reach transcends its territorial space. Hence, the EU has become relatively potent to induce changes in non-European States via different mechanisms.

Lastly, Europeanization is defined as “political unification of Europe” (Olsen, 2002: 930). In Olsen’s view, this is intimately related to the first four definitions

⁷The research on Europeanization deals predominantly with the influence of the EU on domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements in the Member and Candidate States. This definition is reflective of this trend. A vast majority of authors define Europeanization along similar lines. For instance, Radaelli defined Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli, 2003: 30). For Featherstone, Europeanization “is a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone, 2003: 3). According to Börzel, Europeanization is “a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (Börzel, 1999: 574).

because unifying Europe politically requires, among other things, enlargement to other countries, development of new political institutions at the European level and adaptation of domestic policy fields to them together with exporting European models beyond the European continent (Olsen, 2002: 940)⁸.

The third definition is the most relevant one for the purpose of this thesis. As a matter of fact, the research on the Europeanization of foreign policy is mainly concerned with the influence of the EU on national foreign policies of the Member and Candidate States. Therefore, Europeanization will simply be referred to as a process through which domestic arrangements of the Member and Candidate States in different policy fields – whether supranational or intergovernmental are incrementally adapted to the EU. Nonetheless, the ways Europeanization takes places may be various for the Member and Candidate States.

1.1.1. Mechanisms of Europeanization

Mechanisms of Europeanization are important for understanding how Europeanization takes place. This means that these mechanisms seek to highlight the

⁸ To substantiate the term Europeanization further, some authors introduced some valuable concepts. They mainly seek to explain the multidirectionality of the process of Europeanization, and qualify States in line with their performance in adapting to the EU. The multidirectionality of the process of Europeanization is best captured by the terms uploading and downloading. Downloading is defined as “incorporating European policies into national policy structures” (Börzel, 2002: 196). Uploading means “the active shaping of European policies according to domestic preferences” to which Börzel also refers as “pace-setting” (Börzel, 2002: 197). “Foot-dragging” is “blocking or delaying costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or achieve at least some compensation for implementation costs”, and “fence-sitting” refers to “neither systematically pushing policies nor trying to block them at the European level” (Börzel, 2002: 194).

ways the Member and Candidate States adapt their domestic policy and institutional arrangements to the EU. However, there are certain intervening variables that impact on the extent of Europeanization. This means that certain conditions must prevail for Europeanization.

Evaluating Europeanization in supranational policy fields is relatively easier than in intergovernmental policy fields because the incongruence between domestic and European arrangements can be measured by the presence of certain models for adoption in supranational policy fields. In other words, the models brought about by the EU for adoption by the Member and Candidate States makes comparison between domestic and European policy and institutional arrangements possible.

The Europeanization of the Member and Candidate States are explained via different mechanisms because different dynamics underlie their adaptation to the EU. While legal coercion, i.e. the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU which is superior and directly effective to/over national laws of the Member States and socialization into the EU's rules and norms are important aspects of the Europeanization of the Member States, the conditionality mechanism embedded in the EU's relations with the third countries accounts to a great extent for the Europeanization of the Candidate States (Börzel, 2012: 10).

1.1.1.1. Mechanisms of the Europeanization of the Member States

The Europeanization of the Member States is explained mainly via three mechanisms. These three mechanisms do not exclude but complement each other (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 276). They are “institutional compliance”, “changing domestic opportunity structures” and “framing domestic beliefs and expectations” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 256). Each mechanism has its own underlying dynamics and particularities.

Firstly, Europeanization by ‘institutional compliance’ happens when the EU prescribes a concrete institutional model to which the Member States must adapt their domestic policy and institutional arrangements (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 257). The Member States are required to adapt their domestic policy fields to those prescribed by the EU positively. Since there is a concrete European model for adoption, the incongruence between the European and domestic policy fields is observable. Policies of positive integration⁹ exemplify ‘Europeanization by institutional compliance’.

The analytical tool to measure Europeanization by ‘institutional compliance’ is called “goodness of fit” (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 6). ‘Goodness of fit’ refers to the degree of congruence or incongruence between domestic and European policy and institutional arrangements (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 6). The incongruence between them is called misfit, and there are two kinds of it (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 6-7). “Policy misfit” is misfit between the EU’s rules and regulations and domestic policies whereas “institutional misfit” is misfit between European and domestic institutional structures (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 7). In case there is a misfit, the Member States feel themselves under “adaptational pressure” to adapt their domestic policy and institutional arrangements to those prescribed by the EU (Risse *et al.*, 2001: 7). Therefore, adaptational pressure is the main stimulus behind Europeanization by ‘institutional compliance’. Actually, the Member States become readier for adaptation when there is a higher pressure for adaptation.

Second mechanism is Europeanization by ‘changing domestic structures’ which refers to “the degree European policies contribute to a change in domestic opportunity structures and the distribution of power and resources between actor coalitions” in the Member States (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 268). Redistribution of power and resources between actor coalitions is conducive to differential empowerment of actors. In other words, actors are empowered differentially after power and resources

⁹ Policies of positive integration aim at compensating for the costs originated by the Single Market. In other words, they deal with eliminating externalities or unintended consequences arising from the Single Market (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2).

are redistributed between them. Policies of negative integration exemplify Europeanization by ‘changing domestic structures’.

Nonetheless, ‘goodness of fit’ is not applicable to measure the impact of this mechanism on the Member States given that Europeanization by ‘changing domestic structures’ may occur even when “there is complete congruence between European and domestic policy and institutional arrangements” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 257). This means that a certain degree of misfit is not required for redistributing power and resources between actor coalitions. These policies of negative integration do not dictate in a detailed way what European policy and institutional arrangements must replace the existing domestic ones. They mainly aim at liberalization and deregulation through defining “conditions for the proper functioning of the Single Market” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2). In other words, these policies aim at removing barriers to four freedoms – free movement of services, labour, capital and goods- instead of obliging the Member States to positively introduce new policy and institutional arrangements or adapt the existing domestic ones to a European one. Not the adaptational pressure but ‘regulatory competition’ which may be defined as competition between the Member States of the EU to regulate their domestic policy and institutional arrangements to achieve negative integration is the main factor that drives Europeanization by ‘changing domestic structures’ (Sun and Pelkmans, 1995: 69; Radaelli, 2004: 7).

Thirdly, Europeanization by ‘framing domestic beliefs and expectations’ happens through changing domestic beliefs and expectations with a view to preparing the scope conditions for demanding positive or negative integration policies (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 271). This mechanism deals with the cognitive dimensions of Europeanization.

Socialization is the main mechanism through which Europeanization by ‘framing domestic beliefs and expectations’ occurs. In the context of the EU,

socialization may be defined as a “process of inducting the Member States into the norms and rules of the EU” (Checkel, 2005: 804). Through socialization, the Member States start to believe that the EU’s rules and norms are appropriate for adoption (Shimmelfennig, 2009: 8).

There are some intervening variables that determine the expected degree of change induced by the EU. These variables either facilitate or inhibit the expected degree of change¹⁰. Nonetheless, rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism propose different intervening variables. Intervening variables introduced by rational-choice institutionalism are mainly based on rational instrumentality whereas sociological institutionalism draws on socialization of actors and institutions into the EU’s rules and norms.

Thus, from the viewpoint of rational-choice institutionalism, intervening variables influence the capacity of domestic actors to respond to new opportunities and to eschew constraints generated by Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64). Accordingly, there are two main intervening variables for rational-choice institutionalism. These are “multiple veto points” and “existing formal institutions” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64).

¹⁰ The expected degree and extent of change is related to outcomes of Europeanization. They are the same for the Member and Candidate States. There are four expected outcomes of Europeanization. “Inertia” means lack of change that happens when there is a sharp contrast between European and domestic policy and institutional arrangements (Radaelli, 2003: 36). “Absorption” refers to changes that do not affect the core of domestic policy and institutional arrangements (Radaelli, 2003: 37). “Transformation” is the replacement of domestic policy and institutional arrangements by the European ones in their entirety (Radaelli, 2003, 37). “Retrenchment” refers to being less European (Radaelli, 2003: 37).

‘Multiple veto points’ is that it is more difficult to develop domestic consensus or “winning coalition” necessary for Europeanization when the power is more dispersed across institutions and/or when a high number of actors shape the political decision making in a political system (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64). In other words, it becomes easier to convince domestic actors of the necessity of adapting to the EU when the number of veto points is not very high. Thus, the likelihood of Europeanization is higher when the power and authority to introduce changes necessary for proper adaptation to the EU are not shared by many institutions and actors.

With respect to ‘formal institutions’, it is argued that “they can provide actors with material and ideational resources necessary to exploit European opportunities and thus promote domestic adaptation” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 65). Thus, Europeanization is more likely to happen when ‘formal institutions’ that have a say in political decision making are in favour of introducing changes necessary for Europeanization. Actually, this view is intimately related to the neo-institutionalist idea that institutions are not passive but active entities in that they influence the behaviour of political actors significantly (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937).

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of sociological institutionalism, intervening variables impact on the degree of socialization triggered by Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 65). Accordingly, there are two main intervening variables. These are “norm entrepreneurs” and “a cooperative political culture and other cooperative informal institutions” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67).

‘Norm entrepreneurs’ become mobile at the domestic level to persuade domestic actors to redefine their interests and identities in line with European rules and norms¹¹ (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). In other words, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ acquaint

¹¹ Börzel and Risse argue that norm entrepreneurs are composed of “epistemic communities” and “advocacy or principled issue networks” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). ‘Epistemic communities’ are defined as “networks of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a

domestic actors and institutions with European rules and norms, thus socialize them into common understandings.

With respect to ‘a cooperative culture and other cooperative informal institutions’, it is argued that multiple veto points may be overcome by a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision making culture (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 68). In other words, actors prioritize consensus over vetoing when they are consensus-oriented. Therefore, veto points are likely to inhibit Europeanization in the absence of ‘a cooperative culture and other cooperative informal institutions’.

The aforementioned mechanisms are more prevalent in the case of the Europeanization of domestic policy and institutional arrangements in the Member States. There are different mechanisms devised to account for the Europeanization of domestic policy fields in the Candidate States. By the way, although the aforementioned intervening variables are common for the Member and Candidate States, there are additional intervening variables that influence the Europeanization of domestic policy fields in the Candidate States.

1.1.1.2. Mechanisms of the Europeanization of the Candidate States

There are three mechanisms relevant for the Europeanization of the Candidate States. These mechanisms are “external incentives”, “social learning” and “lesson-drawing” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663). The literature on the

normative agenda” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67). The latter is defined as “networks that are bound together by shared beliefs and values rather than by consensual knowledge who appeal to collectively shared norms and identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider their goals and preferences” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 67).

Europeanization of the Candidate States mainly draws on the accession processes of the CEECs¹².

Firstly, Europeanization by ‘external incentives’ is based on the idea that the Europeanization of the Candidate States happens “through a strategy of conditionality in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the [Candidate States] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663). The strategy of conditionality is mainly based on the provision of rewards if the country concerned fulfils the conditions set out by the EU; and withholding of these rewards in case these conditions are not fulfilled (Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003: 496; Szymanski, 2012: 15). However, rewards may vary. For instance, the EU may offer assistance and institutional ties via trade, cooperation and association agreements or full membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663). It is believed that the promise of full membership to the EU is the most powerful reward in inducing the Europeanization of the Candidate States (Sedelmeier, 2010: 424).

Thus, it is mainly conditionality that pushes the Candidate States for Europeanization (Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003: 495). As a matter of fact, Karen E. Smith defines conditionality as “the linking by a State or international organization, of benefits desired by another State to the fulfilment of certain conditions” (Karen E. Smith, 2003a: 103). Similar to regulatory competition, conditionality changes domestic opportunity structures, as well (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 664)¹³. In

¹² The CEECs countries had to transpose a greater volume of the EU’s *acquis* into their national legislation because of i) the completion of the Single Market in 1992; ii) introduction of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993; iii) the integration of the Schengen area into EU framework in 1997; and iv) the launch of the single currency in 1999 (Grabbe, 2003: 305-306; Héritier, 2005: 204-209). Therefore, the CEECs faced markedly higher adaptational pressure for Europeanization than the countries that acceded to the EU before them.

¹³ Conditionality of the EU consists of several rules and norms. These rules and norms are Article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which states that any European State which respects the EU’s values may apply for full membership of the EU; the Copenhagen criteria which were

addition, cost-benefit calculations become important in this model because the Candidate States adapt to the EU when costs of adaptation do not outweigh expected benefits of rewards (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663). The emphasis on rational instrumentality indicates the relevance of rational-choice institutionalism for this mechanism.

Second mechanism is Europeanization by ‘social learning’. This mechanism is based on the constructivist idea that the EU is a formal organization with a collective identity and common rules and norms, thus domestic adaptation by a Candidate State to the EU is conditional on the degree it regards the EU’s rules and its demands for domestic adaptation as appropriate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 667). Sociological institutionalism is relevant for this mechanism because it is concerned with the influence of rules and norms on Europeanization.

Third mechanism is Europeanization by ‘lesson-drawing’. It happens when the Candidate States adopt the EU’s rules voluntarily irrespective of identifying themselves positively with common rules and norms of the EU or being obliged to adopt them through conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 668). Europeanization by ‘lesson drawing’ occurs when a Candidate State has dissatisfaction with a policy at home and regards an EU policy good enough to improve the situation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 668). This means that the Candidate States adopt the EU’s rules and norms by themselves because they become aware of the fact that these rules or norms may serve their needs and interests better.

decided at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council; the Madrid criterion which was determined at the 1995 Madrid European Council as that the EU’s rules and norms must be implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures after they are adopted and lastly the Helsinki criteria on good neighbourly relations and higher standards for nuclear safety that were adopted at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Açıkmeşe, 2010: 136). It is noteworthy that sufficient compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the launching of accession negotiations (European Council, 1997: Par. 25).

On the other hand, rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism suggest different intervening variables that influence the degree of expected change induced by Europeanization in the Candidate States. While rational instrumentality is at the core of rational-choice institutionalism, sociological-institutionalism is based on the strength of socialization in inducing change.

For rational-choice institutionalism main intervening variables are “clarity of the EU’s demands”, “size and speed of rewards”, “credibility of conditionality”, “veto players and adoption costs” and “supportive formal institutions” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 12-16; Sedelmeier, 2011: 13). Veto players and formal institutions are common for the Member and Candidate states.

‘Clarity of the EU’s demands’ means that rule adoption is more likely when the EU’s demands are clear enough (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 13). Actually, unclearness may inhibit rule adoption, and it may be about the “policy agenda”, “hierarchy of tasks”, “timing”, “whom to satisfy” and “standards and thresholds” (Grabbe, 2003: 319-322). Thus, the Candidate States must know when and in what order to fulfil what they are required to do.

Regarding ‘size and speed of rewards’, it is argued that the Candidate States have more incentives for compliance when they believe that they will certainly be rewarded after they fulfil the EU’s conditions properly (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 13). So that “temporal proximity of rewards” influences the domestic adaptation of a Candidate State to the EU (Sedelmeier, 2011: 13). In addition, size of rewards is also important. For instance, the promise of full membership is considered more powerful than the promise of association or assistance in inducing change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 13).

Another intervening variable is ‘credibility of conditionality’. It is contingent on several factors. ‘Credibility of conditionality’ refers to that it must be clear for the

Candidate States that reception of rewards will certainly be happen after fulfilling the EU's conditions and that such rewards will only be provided to them if they truly meet the conditions (Sedelmeier, 2011: 12). Lack of credibility inhibits the Europeanization of the Candidate States because they are not inclined to fulfil their obligations when they think that they may not be rewarded upon fulfilment.

On the other hand, sociological institutionalism posits some other intervening variables. These are "legitimacy of the EU's demands", "identification with the EU", "positive normative resonance with domestic rules" and "EU-centred epistemic communities" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 22; Sedelmeier, 2011: 13). It is noteworthy that epistemic communities are common for the Member and Candidate States.

'Legitimacy of the EU's demands' is perception by the Candidate States of the EU's demands as legitimate for domestic adaptation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 29). This means that the Candidate States adapt their domestic policy fields to the EU as long as they see the EU's demands for adaptation as legitimate.

Another intervening variable is 'identification with the EU'. It means that the Candidate States are more inclined to adopt the EU's rules and norms when they identify themselves positively with the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 19).

Regarding 'positive normative resonance with domestic rules', it is argued that the presence of a normative conflict between domestic and European policy fields inhibits Europeanization (Sedelmeier, 2011: 16). Thus, rule adoption becomes more likely when the normative congruence between European and domestic policy and institutional arrangements is relatively high (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20). Conversely, rule adoption becomes less probable when there is a sharp normative incongruence between European and domestic policy and institutional arrangements.

Of the aforementioned mechanisms of the Europeanization of the Candidate States, ‘external incentives’ is the most relevant one for the purpose of this thesis because of the fact that socialization is not an important feature of the Europeanization of Turkey. ‘Lesson-drawing’ and ‘social learning’ have the overtones of socialization. Nonetheless, the EU may provide legitimacy to governments that engage in Europeanization (Börzel, 2012: 12). Thus, the EU’s legitimizing of the engagement of governments in EU-induced domestic change may be explained through socialization (Börzel, 2012: 12). In addition, mechanisms of Europeanization have been developed primarily to account for the Europeanization of the supranational policy fields of the Member and Candidate States. Nonetheless, they still may be useful in highlighting the Europeanization of intergovernmental policy fields, particularly in finding out dynamics that have underpinned the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey.

1.2. The Europeanization of Foreign Policy

The 1970 Luxembourg Report which led to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) has initiated a process of consultation on foreign policy matters between the Member States of the EU. After cooperation proved fruitful, the Member States aspired to further coordinate their national foreign policies (Zielonka, 1998: 1; Nuttall, 2000: 272; Giegerich and Wallace, 2010: 433-434). In addition, some structural changes in the international system increased the Member States’ quest for a common foreign and security policy. These structural changes are i) the end of the Cold War; ii) the rise of new security concerns; iii) the emergence of a unipolar world; iv) dissolution of the former Yugoslavia; and v) the security implications of the EU’s enlargement to the Eastern Europe (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 2; Bickerton *et al.*, 2011: 8). The Member States that became aware of the usefulness of cooperation in the field of foreign policy pushed for a common foreign and security policy. Thus, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established CFSP¹⁴. Actually, CFSP is remarkably different from the

¹⁴ The 1992 Maastricht Treaty states: “a common foreign and security policy is hereby established...” (Maastricht Treaty, Article 11).

EU's supranational policy fields. First of all, it is mainly intergovernmental being only politically binding¹⁵. Therefore, employing tools like 'goodness of fit' to assess the Europeanization of foreign policy is rendered useless by the lack of concrete models for adoption and by the lack of the EU's exclusive competences in the field of foreign and security policy. This is why the research on Europeanization has belatedly penetrated into the field of foreign and security policy.

Theoretically, it is believed that cooperation in an intergovernmental policy field is hard to achieve. This is the basic assumption of intergovernmentalism which posits that the Member States will not sacrifice their national interests because decision making in intergovernmental policy fields happens through unanimity (Bickerton *et al.*, 2011: 8-9). Accordingly, any decision or agreement will perfectly reflect the core national interests of the Member States (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Such an assumption means that foreign policies of the Member States will not change because the core national interests of all Member States are represented in these unanimously made decisions and agreements. Conversely, liberal intergovernmentalism and rational-choice institutionalism argue that the final decision or agreement that is reached unanimously

¹⁵ Intergovernmental nature of CFSP is stated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty as "the common foreign and security policy shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by the Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions" (Lisbon Treaty, Article 24.1). Therefore, the only commitment on the part of the Member States is stated as "the Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area" and "they shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations" (Lisbon Treaty, Article 24.3).

at any intergovernmental setting is the lowest common denominator of all Member States (Moravcsik, 1993: 500-501). There may be some mismatch between national and European interests because unanimity provides all Member States the equal chance to contribute to the content of the decision or agreement irrespective of their size and preferences (Moravcsik, 1993: 499-502). Thus, the final decision or agreement would not represent perfectly the interests of the even most powerful Member State. Another argument regarding mismatch between national and European interests is that national interests are not static because they change over time, thus a mismatch may occur over time (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Thus, Europeanization becomes relevant for foreign policy, as well.

The research on the Europeanization of foreign policy mainly deals with the implications of CFSP on national foreign policies, and it seeks to account for the transformation of national interests into European interests and vice versa (Cebeci and Aaltola 2011: 29). Europeanization in the field of foreign and security policy is described as being mainly “voluntary and non-hierarchical” because national foreign policies are Europeanized in the absence of a concrete model for adoption and in the absence of the EU’s exclusive competences (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 7). The Member States are only politically required to align their national foreign policies with CFSP. Non-alignment would incur no legal responsibility on them.

The Europeanization of foreign policy may have different implications on national foreign policies. The most important of these are i) political and bureaucratic adaptation of foreign policy structures and processes to those of the EU; ii) changes in national actors’ values, norms, role conceptions and identities; iii) changes in the actual content of national foreign policies; and iv) overcoming of both domestic and external resistance to change (Tonra, 2000: 225; Manners and Whitman, 2000: 246-9; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 143). Firstly, bureaucratic adaptation is important to implement CFSP properly. Thus, national foreign ministries must have structures compatible with the structures of CFSP. Secondly, Europeanization becomes easier when values, norms and role conceptions and identities of States converge with

European ones. Thirdly, the content of national foreign policies may be far more different from the content of CFSP before Europeanization. Therefore, the Member and Candidate States must incorporate into the content of their national foreign policies the issues in European Foreign Policy (EFP). Last but not least, the legitimizing strength of Europeanization may help national reformers to tackle domestic and external opposition to their reforms. In other words, domestic reformers may justify their reforms with the necessity of adapting to the EU.

However, the logics that underlie these changes in national foreign policies are explicated differently by rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. While rational-choice institutionalism is more relevant for the Europeanization of foreign policy in the Candidate States, sociological institutionalism is for the Europeanization of policy in the Member States.

1.2.1. The Two Logics of the Europeanization of Foreign Policy

Rational-choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism put forward different logics for the Europeanization of foreign policy. However, both approaches deal with the same questions: i) how to understand the relationship between institutions and political behaviour; and ii) how to explain the process through which institutions induce changes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937). In addition, the two logics are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, March and Olsen argue: “political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their anticipations of consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relation between the two is often subtle” (March and Olsen, 1998: 12). Thus, interests and norms are both important in driving foreign policy change, though not equally.

Sociological institutionalism and its logic of appropriateness explain the Europeanization of foreign policy through socialization while rational-choice

institutionalism and its logic of consequences ascribe the Europeanization of foreign policy to cost-benefit calculations. While sociological institutionalism is more relevant for the Member States, rational-choice institutionalism is for the Candidate States.

1.2.1.1. The Europeanization of Foreign Policy from the Viewpoint of Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is based on the constructivist idea of mutual constitution of agents and structures (Checkel, 1998: 328; Gross, 2009: 16). This means that the agents establish the structures to which they later adapt to. With respect to CFSP, sociological institutionalism seeks to account for the ways the Member States adapt their national foreign policies to CFSP that they themselves constituted (Gross, 2009: 16). Thus, there is a circular relationship between actors and structures.

The core tenet of sociological institutionalism is its “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 2004: 2). March and Olsen define the logic of appropriateness as “a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions” (March and Olsen, 2004: 2). This means that actors are not for maximizing their utility through strategically calculating the costs and benefits of their behaviour but following rules and norms that they see as appropriate and legitimate. In their view

...rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation (March and Olsen, 2004: 2).

For sociological institutionalism, institutions are important because actors that are socialized into rules and norms of institutions increasingly begin to see them as legitimate and appropriate. In other words, institutions guide behaviour through

specifying rules that are legitimate and appropriate¹⁶ (March and Olsen, 2004: 5). Institutions socialize actors into their arrangements by offering “moral or cognitive templates and frames of meaning to guide human action”, and they “affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939-947). In a nutshell, actors that are socialized into particular institutional structures internalize the norms associated with them (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948). Thus, norm internalization and socialization are two closely intertwined phenomena¹⁷.

Socialization is at the heart of sociological institutionalism. It is defined by Checkel as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” which leads over time to the relinquishing of the logic of consequences in favour of the logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005: 804). The emphasis on norm internalization means that socialization happens in the absence of material incentives for Europeanization. Namely, norm internalization is a process through which “actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences – in the absence of material incentives” (Checkel, 1999: 548). Thus, actors acquire new interests and preferences through socialization (Hill, 1998: 39). These new interests and preferences are compatible with the rules and norms of the structures of institutions into which they are socialized. They do not expect rewards in return for their adaptation to the rules and norms of these institutional structures.

¹⁶ Rules may serve various purposes. Among other things, they: i) increase the ability to solve policy problems; ii) provide codes of meanings that facilitate interpretation of ambiguous situations; and more importantly iii) provide for the development of a community of rule, based on a common identity and sense of belonging (March and Olsen, 2004: 10-11).

¹⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” and in their view, norms serve mainly two purposes: i) to regularize behaviour; and ii) to produce social order and stability (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891-894).

Norm internalization is conducive to identity reconstruction, namely it facilitates the emergence of a common social identity (Checkel, 1998: 328; Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1066)¹⁸. Strong social identities are important for socialization because individual actors that make up the collectivity are expected to make sacrifices at the expense of their individual interests under a strong common social identity (Kelley, 2004: 428). Thus, interests of collectivity are prioritized over those of individuals. Put differently, socialization which is conducive to the relinquishing of strategic calculation would not occur in the absence of a strong common social identity. In the case of CFSP, such an understanding reflects the assumption that the Member States share a common European identity and therefore European interests are valued over national interests.

Nonetheless, some background conditions are needed for socialization to occur and advance. These background conditions are i) the presence of stable institutions; ii) long, sustained and intense contact between agents; iii) agents from the same professional backgrounds; and iv) isolation from direct political pressures (Checkel, 1999: 549; March and Olsen, 2004: 22; Checkel, 2005: 811). As a corollary, Turkey is not expected to get fully socialized into the EU's rules and norms because its participation in decision making processes of the EU is not long, sustained and intense, and some issues in TFP are overly politicized. In addition, although the EU's structures are stable, Turkey is not represented in them.

For sociological institutionalism, CFSP guides foreign policy behaviour of the Member States through its rules and norms. The Member States are expected to perform certain roles in certain situations on the basis of these rules and norms (Aggestam, 2004: 88). Also, the EU's strong social identity, namely the Member States' identification

¹⁸ Zürn and Checkel define social identities as “shared representations of a collective self” which “depend on collective beliefs that the definition of the group and its membership is shared by all those in the group” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1066).

with the EU is remarkable for CFSP. In this regard, the Europeanization of foreign policy from the viewpoint of sociological institutionalism is defined as

a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making (Tonra, 2000: 229).

In line with this definition, socialization in the context of CFSP can be defined as “a process through which national officials attached to the EU’s institutions in Brussels or that are closely involved in EU policymaking increasingly think in European rather than (solely) in national terms” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 146). However, rational-choice institutionalism offers a different perspective on the Europeanization of foreign policy with its emphasis on rational instrumentality.

1.2.1.2. The Europeanization of Foreign Policy from the Viewpoint of Rational-Choice Institutionalism

Rational-choice institutionalism takes actors as being rational in the sense that actors calculate strategically to maximize their utility in the face of a novel situation (March and Olsen, 2004: 5; Aggestam, 2004: 86). Its main tenet is its logic of consequences which can be defined as a perspective through which rational actors follow rules and norms of a given community as long as these rules and norms serve their interests. Accordingly, in rational-choice institutionalism, actors have fixed interests and therefore they make a choice from between alternative courses of action after strategically calculating the benefits of each. Thus, they decide on the action that serves their interests best (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). Rational instrumentality is at the heart of rational-choice institutionalism.

In sociological institutionalism what actors see as rational or appropriate is socially constructed and interests of actors may vary accordingly whereas in rational-

choice institutionalism, interests are fixed and rational action is the one that serves actors' interests best (Checkel, 1998: 327). Therefore, the constructivist idea of mutual constitution of agents and structures is absent in rational-choice institutionalism. In rational-choice institutionalism, actors do not constitute either institutions or norms and rules associated with them. They instead adhere to already constituted institutions and adopt their pre-defined norms and rules as long as it is rational to do so. In the view of rational-choice institutionalism, institutions do not only provide "moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action" but they also provide actors strategically important information about the present and future behaviour of other actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). Institutions do not impact on the actors' interests because they are fixed. Instead, they alter strategic calculations of actors that they follow to achieve their goals (Héritier, 2005: 202).

As a corollary, institutions are expected to provide material incentives to induce the Europeanization of foreign policy. In that case, norm compliance is not related to norm internalization. Instead, it is awareness on the part of actors that complying with these rules and norms serves their interests best. Hence, in rational-choice institutionalism utmost importance is attributed to the strength of conditionality in inducing norm compliance.

In the context of the EU, rational-choice institutionalism captures to a great extent the Europeanization of foreign policy in the Candidate States. Regarding CFSP, the Candidate States adopt the EU's rules and norms as long as they serve their interests better than the other alternatives (Hill, 1998: 38). Accordingly, the EU offers some rewards when its norms and rules are complied with by the Candidate States. In the context of CFSP, there are three sorts of conditionality that induce the Europeanization of foreign policy. These are "conditionality through political criteria", "conditionality through CFSP acquis" and "conditionality through de facto political criteria" (Aydın and Açıkmüşe, 2009: 268-269). 'Conditionality through political criteria' refers to foreign policy implications of political criteria, e.g. democratization and good neighbourly relations (Aydın and Açıkmüşe, 2009: 267). On the other hand,

‘conditionality through CFSP *acquis*’ means to align national foreign policies with CFSP (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268). Lastly, ‘conditionality through *de facto* political criteria’ refers to the fact that the Candidate States are obliged to comply with some rules and norms that are not part of the EU’s political criteria, e.g. higher standards for nuclear safety that were introduced as part of the EU’s conditionality at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268).

Accordingly, Europeanization of foreign policy from the perspective of rational-choice institutionalism can be defined as changes in the national foreign policy practices and in the structures of institutions that guide national foreign policy for the purpose of aligning them with rules and norms of CFSP upon the awareness that the core national interests are to be achieved better not individually but collectively in European policymaking. Not norm internalization but norm compliance is relevant for the Europeanization of foreign policy through logic of consequences.

Furthermore, there are some intervening variables specific to the Europeanization of foreign policy. Irrespective of the logics that underlie Europeanization, these variables are “ideological hostility to further integration”, “domestic politics” and “international forces and special relationships with the third countries (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). Political elites may be ideologically hostile to integration in foreign and security policy on the pretext that national sovereignty is contingent on an independent national foreign and security policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). Domestically, the public may oppose to a common foreign and security policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). In the international fora, unilateral political or economic relationships with the third countries outside the EU may prejudice the Europeanization of foreign policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 17). It is noteworthy that intervening variables and the logics embedded in the Europeanization of foreign policy determine the patterns of the Europeanization of foreign policy.

1.2.2. Patterns of the Europeanization of Foreign Policy

Patterns of the Europeanization of foreign policy highlight the ways foreign policies of the Member and Candidate States are Europeanized. Therefore, they are helpful in uncovering the extent and degree of the Europeanization of foreign policy. There are different approaches to the Europeanization of foreign policy that complement each other to a great extent.

With respect to the Europeanization of foreign policy, Hill and Wong posit that ideally in a Europeanized foreign policy i) major reference points for political action are the EU's common positions; ii) these common positions are complied with even when they contradict with continuing bilateral relations with third countries or domestic politics; iii) national interests are primarily followed in the context of CFSP; and lastly iv) international activities outside the realm of CFSP are characterized by the EU's rules and norms (Hill and Wong, 2011: 5). However, they add that these criteria embody an ideal type that hardly exists (Hill and Wong, 2011: 5). These criteria are helpful in determining the degree and extent of the Europeanization of foreign policy in a country.

Accordingly, Hill and Wong list seven categories to classify the Member and Candidate States in relation to the degree and extent of the Europeanization of their national foreign policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 5). Thus, a State may be: i) significantly Europeanized; ii) willing to Europeanize; iii) erratic in the degree of Europeanization, either over time or between issue-areas; iv) consistently instrumental in the approach to Europeanization; v) resistant to Europeanization; vi) de-Europeanizing, and lastly, vii) never significantly Europeanized (Hill and Wong, 2011: 5).

Regarding patterns of the Europeanization of foreign policy, Wong introduced three models. These are a top-down process of "policy convergence", a bottom-up process of "national projection" and "identity reconstruction" (Wong, 2005: 141). Each has its own explanatory power.

The most relevant one for the purpose of this thesis is ‘policy convergence’. It means adapting national foreign policies to CFSP (Wong, 2005: 142). It is reflected in increasing importance of European political agenda in national foreign policies and increasing adherence to the objectives of CFSP (Wong, 2005: 142). According to Hill and Wong, to measure the impact of policy convergence on national foreign policies, one should find out whether the country concerned would be likely to adopt the same position on a certain foreign policy issue in the absence of impetus from the EU (Hill and Wong, 2011: 8). It is clear that policy convergence can be employed to assess the impact of the Europeanization on foreign policies of both Member and Candidate States.

Second one is ‘national projection’. It is “bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level” (Wong, 2005: 142). It is marked by attempts to increase national influence in international affairs and attempts to influence foreign policies of the other Member and Candidate States (Wong, 2005: 142). National projection is uncovered via assessing the likelihood of the EU to adopt the same position on a certain foreign policy issue without input from the country concerned (Hill and Wong, 2011: 8). National projection gives the Member States the opportunity to achieve their foreign policy objectives that are not attainable through their national capabilities (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 144; Gross: 2009: 13). However, national projection is not likely to be applicable to assess the impact of Europeanization on national foreign policies of the Candidate States because they do not have any platform to upload their national interests to the EU level. Yet, foreign policy of a Candidate State may be Europeanized as a consequence of national projection by a Member State. For instance, successful national projection/uploading by Greece of its national interests to the EU level accounts, to an important extent, for the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey. By the way, States do not only upload and download to/from the EU level but also “transfer ideas and procedures between themselves without the EU”, and this is called cross-loading (Hill and Wong, 2011: 8). However, cross-loading is not as common as ‘policy convergence’ and ‘national projection’.

Thirdly, ‘identity reconstruction’ is closely related to socialization in the sense that it gradually leads to the development of common rules and norms among political elites as well as transformation of national interests into European interests and vice versa (Wong, 2005: 142; Cebeci and Aaltola 2011: 29). Nas defines identity reconstruction in the context of the EU, i.e. the Europeanization of the identity as “a change of national identities under the influence and interaction with the processes, exchanges, institutions, values and norms engendered by European integration” (Nas, 2012: 24). Nonetheless, the Candidate States are not expected to forge a common European identity before their accession to the EU because socialization requires long, intense and sustained mutual interactions between agents and structures. Hence, identity reconstruction in the context of CFSP is more particular for the Member States (Aggestam, 2004: 87).

Alternatively, Michael Smith proposes four indicators of adaptation of national foreign policies to the EU level (Michael Smith, 2000: 617). These indicators are “elite socialization”, “bureaucratic reorganization”, “constitutional changes and reinterpretations” and “the increase in public support [for CFSP]” (Michael Smith, 2000: 617).

First of all, ‘elite socialization’ is closely related to identity reconstruction. Actually, socialization among political elites is considered an important aspect of the Europeanization of foreign policy. As a consequence of socialization, elites become more conversant with their views on certain foreign policy issues, and they learn to privilege political cooperation to improve their own foreign policy capabilities (Michael Smith, 2000: 619). Elite socialization is more observable in the Europeanization of foreign policy in the Member States due to its emphasis on socialization that is hardly existent in the case of the Candidate States.

The second indicator is ‘bureaucratic adaptation’. It refers to the impact of CFSP on national administrations, especially foreign ministries. Actually, States adapt

their bureaucratic organization to that of CFSP to fulfil their commitments under CFSP properly. These changes may include “the establishment of new national officials”, “the expansion of most national diplomatic services” and “reorientation of national foreign ministries towards Europe” (Michael Smith, 2000: 619). Actually, the political dialogue between the EU and the Member and Candidate States on CFSP matters happens at the Troika level among Foreign Ministers, political directors and European correspondents. Therefore, these positions must have been established in national foreign ministries to start political dialogue with the EU. In addition, bureaucratic reorganization is common for the Member and Candidate States.

With respect to ‘constitutional changes’, it is argued that commitments that have been undertaken under CFSP may contradict with the neutrality of a country and therefore some constitutional changes or reinterpretations of neutrality may be needed (Michael Smith, 2000: 624-625). Constitutional changes and reinterpretations may be common for the Member and Candidate States. Nonetheless, constitutional changes are not introduced solely to reinterpret neutrality. For instance, Turkey had to go through some constitutional changes to civilianize foreign policy.

The last indicator is ‘increase in public support for CFSP’. It simply denotes the public’s support for the forging of a common foreign and security policy (Michael Smith, 2000: 625-626). It is mostly evaluated through data obtained from Eurobarometer and similar surveys (Michael Smith, 2000: 625). And, it is common for the Member and Candidate States.

The last approach that is relevant for this thesis is that of Moumoutzis who introduced a three-step “process tracing” approach applicable to case studies (Moumoutzis, 2011: 621). Moumoutzis argues that ‘process tracing’ approach is helpful in empirically observing whether foreign policy change has happened through socialization or rational instrumentality (Moumoutzis, 2011: 621). In this analysis, some questions are answered in each step. Answers to these questions show whether the

country concerned followed the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness in the course of the Europeanization of foreign policy.

In the first step, the question is “how national foreign policy makers defined the policy problem they intended to address” (Moumoutzis, 2011: 622). According to sociological institutionalism, policy makers change their definition of policy problem, and they “begin to identify violations of substantive EU foreign policy rules and norms by third countries as a foreign policy problem” (Moumoutzis, 2011: 622). For instance, redefinition of a third country that was previously defined as a threat to national sovereignty as a threat to the EU’s rules and norms indicates socialization (Moumoutzis, 2011: 622)¹⁹. In other words, in case there is socialization, violations of the EU’s rules and norms by a third country turns that country into a threat. Nonetheless, the same country may have been defined as a threat with reference to national sovereignty previously. Defining a country as a threat not with reference to national sovereignty but because it violates the EU’s rules and norms points to a switch from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness in foreign policy.

The second step is to identify “the various courses of action that were considered as alternative actions” (Moumoutzis, 2011: 622). The answer to this question does not show the underlying logic of foreign policy change, but the Europeanization of foreign policy (Moumoutzis, 2011: 623). In this regard, the indicators of the Europeanization of foreign policy are i) the national foreign policy makers’ choice of an EU foreign policy practice or procedural norm from between different alternatives; ii) their privileging of diplomatic and economic instruments over the use of force; iii) their use of EU membership conditionality to induce foreign policy change in a Candidate

¹⁹ The model developed by Moumoutzis seems to be an attempt to justify the arguments and position of Greece on its relations with Turkey in the sense that by the ‘third country’ the reference is implicitly made to Turkey. Therefore, the model is not taken uncritically. However, it still has practical utility for constituting the theoretical framework on which the thesis will be based.

State; and lastly iv) their preference for multilateralism to unilateralism (Moumoutzis, 2011: 623). Thus, foreign policy of a State is Europeanized as long as it prefers to follow the EU's rules and norms in its foreign policy; makes recourse to diplomatic and economic instruments instead of military ones; resorts to the strength of EU conditionality to Europeanize foreign policy of a third State and favours approaching foreign policy issues multilaterally.

The last step is to find out “whether national foreign policy makers considered the costs and benefits of each alternative and, if so, what type of costs and benefits they calculated” (Moumoutzis, 2011: 623). The answer to this question shows whether national foreign policy makers followed the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness. According to sociological institutionalism, actors in CFSP act in accordance with the rules and norms they internalized when they face a novel situation (March and Olsen, 2004: 3). In addition, norm internalization requires that actors act appropriately across issues and over time (Moumoutzis, 2011: 623). Therefore, acting appropriately selectively case by case means that norms of CFSP have not been internalized in their entirety. As a matter of fact, rational-choice institutionalism posits that actors calculate strategically costs and benefits of any action before acting, thus their behaviour may change across issues and over time in line with their fixed national interests (Moumoutzis, 2011: 623).

The aforementioned approaches to the Europeanization of foreign policy are relevant for the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey, as well. In the case of Turkey, the logic of consequences is at the forefront of the process of the Europeanization of foreign policy. Cases that indicate the Europeanization of foreign policy other than the country's relations with Greece will be mentioned concisely under Section 1.2.3.

1.2.3. The Europeanization of Foreign Policy in Turkey

Research on the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece interconnects both domestic and foreign policy fields in Turkey and Greece. Therefore, perspectives on the Europeanization of domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements in the Member and Candidate States are equally needed to evaluate foreign policy change in Turkey. Actually, there are many cases that attest to the increasing Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey since 1999.

The European Commission's annual Progress Reports are important in finding out the impact of the Europeanization on TFP²⁰. The European Commission has been regularly issuing Progress Reports on Turkey and other Candidate and potential Candidate States at the end of each year since 1998 on behalf of the EU²¹. Turkey's alignment with CFSP is broadly assessed in these reports. With respect to CFSP, they mainly cover: i) Turkey's alignment with the EU's declarations and Council decisions in the field of CFSP; ii) Turkey's relations with its neighbours and broader neighbourhood in the context of good neighbourly relations; iii) Turkey's alignment with the EU's position on non-proliferation of WMD and fight against terrorism; iv) Turkey's activities to promote the EU's rules and norms in other international organizations; and v) Turkey's contributions to CSDP. The Europeanization of foreign

²⁰ The European Commission committed itself through the Agenda 2000 released in July 1997 to prepare Progress Reports on the progress of each Candidate and potential Candidate State towards accession (European Commission, 1997: 39).

²¹ As put by the EU, these reports on Turkey are based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU which states: "as soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community" (European Commission, 1998: 4).

policy is a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon as reflected by the extensive content of the Progress Reports.

Actually, Turkey's alignment with CFSP *acquis* gained impetus after the 1999 Helsinki European Council when the prospect of full membership became more credible after its candidacy was declared. Before 1999, the prospect of full membership lacked credibility and therefore Turkey was not motivated enough to align itself with CFSP *acquis*. Accordingly, before 1999, TFP had a realist outlook contrary to the EU's idealist approach to foreign policy matters and therefore it dealt predominantly with perceived threats from its neighbours (Emerson and Tocci, 2004: 10; Gözen, 2006: 3; Kirişçi, 2006: 12; Alessandri, 2009: 5). For instance, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) declared in June 1995 that extension of the territorial seas in the Aegean Sea by Greece from six to twelve nautical miles would be a *casus belli*. In addition, in 1996, Turkey and Greece had another conflict over the Kardak rocks. Also, Turkey threatened Syria with military intervention in 1998 as long as the latter continued to support terrorism against Turkey (Terzi, 2010: 111). Furthermore, Turkey's preference for Atlantic alliance through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deal with security matters further stranded the country's relations with Europeanist countries like France and Germany in the same period (Gözen, 2006: 3). More importantly, the EU and Turkey had diverging views on the resolution of the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue. Regarding the Cyprus issue, Turkey desired to continue the status quo, while the EU aimed at reunifying the island (Kazan, 2002: 57-58). Lastly, the 1997 Luxembourg European Council meant further deterioration of Turkey-EU relations because Turkey was excluded from the range of the Candidate States. As a result, Turkey had insignificant incentives for Europeanization between 1997-1999.

The Europeanization of TFP is also related to the country's fulfilment of EU political conditionality. This is because certain issues that are evaluated in the context of the Copenhagen political criteria have had foreign policy implications (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268; Terzi, 2010: 60). The EU has repeatedly called for the civilian oversight of security forces in Turkey as a prerequisite for sufficient compliance with

Copenhagen political criteria (European Commission, 1999: 10; 2000: 14). This is mainly because of the weight that Turkish military had in the making of the country's foreign policy. This was the consequence of the military's overall weight in Turkish politics (Özcan, 2010: 26).

In the view of the EU, "the NSC [National Security Council] demonstrated the major role played by the army in political life" in Turkey (European Commission, 1998: 14). Before 2001, the NSC was composed of the Prime Minister, the chief of the general staff, the Ministers of National Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the commanders of the army, navy and the air force and the general commander of the gendarmerie with the President of the Republic on its head. The EU noted that the NSC was in contrast with the democratic structure of Turkey and therefore it had to be civilianised (European Commission, 1998: 14). Consequently, the first amendments were introduced in 2001 through which the number of civilian members in the NSC was increased from five to nine while the number of military members remained same with Minister of Justice and deputy Prime Ministers becoming new four civilian members. In addition, before 2001, the government was expected to give 'priority consideration' to the recommendations of the NSC. However, after 2001, the recommendations of the NSC are 'evaluated' by the government. Further changes to the functioning and composition of the NSC were introduced in 2003 to further civilianise foreign policy in Turkey. These changes primarily aimed at curtailing the extensive powers of the Secretary General of the NSC. For instance, until 2003, the post of Secretary General was reserved exclusively for a military person, and the Secretary General could monitor the implementation of the NSC's recommendations on behalf of the President of the Republic and Prime Minister. Following the amendments that were introduced in 2003, the Secretariat General became a consultative body of the NSC because it was entitled to prepare the agenda for the NSC meetings. Also, it became possible for a civilian to head the General Secretariat. In addition, before 2003, the NSC meetings were held once every month. Currently, they are held every two months. Following the aforementioned modifications to the composition and functioning of the NSC as well as reforms in other areas, the EU noted in the 2004 Brussels European Council that Turkey

sufficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria (European Commission, 2004: 55). This process has surely curbed the impact of the military in TFP (Oğuzlu, 2008: 16). Apart from Europeanization through Copenhagen political criteria, Turkey is expected to align with the EU's CFSP for its foreign policy to Europeanize.

To align TFP with CFSP, a political dialogue was initiated between Turkey and the EU as early as in 1995 by a resolution of the Turkey-EU Association Council. The resolution introduced twice-yearly meetings of senior officials at Troika level - ministerial level, political directors level and European correspondents level (European Commission, 1998: 51). It also provided for consultations between Turkey and the EU on CFSP matters at the expert level (European Commission, 1998: 51). However, the political dialogue between the EU and Turkey came to an impasse subsequent to the 1997 Luxembourg European Council because Turkey's candidacy was not declared. Nonetheless, the political dialogue has gained impetus after Turkey's candidacy was declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Actually, the EU pays utmost importance to the continuation of the political dialogue between the EU and Candidate States because it is the most important platform to exchange views on CFSP matters. Recently, the EU has noted that the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU has continued satisfactorily (European Commission, 2010: 95; 2011: 105). Turkey and the EU become acquainted with their views on certain foreign policy issues through political dialogue. Hence, the continuation of political dialogue between Turkey and the EU is indispensable for the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey. The EU expects certain achievements from Turkey for its foreign policy to Europeanize, and these expectations are conveyed to Turkey through different channels. For instance, in one of its Progress Reports on Turkey, the EU noted that for the Europeanization of its foreign policy:

Turkey should focus further efforts on ensuring that its foreign policy orientation remains in line with the Union's foreign and security policy, and on finalizing the development of the necessary administrative structures. In particular, Turkey should ensure that its national policies and practice conform to the EU's common positions, should defend these positions in international fora, and should ensure that all sanctions and restrictive measures can be duly implemented. Turkey should also continue to

promote stability and security in its region, namely the Balkans, Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (European Commission, 2004: 155).

Firstly, Turkey is expected to ensure that its foreign policy remains in line with CFSP. This simply means that TFP should be in compliance with the EU's position on certain foreign policy issues. Actually, the EU has noted in several occasions that Turkey has aligned with the EU's statements and declarations in the field of CFSP successfully since 1999 (European Commission, 2009: 87; 2011: 105). However, Turkey's alignment with CFSP has been decreasing since 2008. This is mainly because of the fact that the credibility of full membership has decreased for Turkey, especially after accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005 due to the open-ended nature of the process and the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy and the Prime Minister of Germany Angela Merkel's statements that Turkey should not become an EU member²². While Turkey aligned itself with 98 per cent of the EU's CFSP statements in 2007, it aligned with only 48 per cent of them in 2011 (European Commission, 2007: 74; 2011: 106).

The EU has appreciated Turkey's support for the international campaign on the fight against terrorism and crime (European Commission, 2002: 128; 2003: 124). There is a significant degree of alignment in this area between the EU and the country. In this regard, Turkey ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2002 and the Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in 2003. In addition, it signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in 2006. Nonetheless, Turkey has not still signed the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) though the EU has repeatedly called the country to sign it (European Commission, 2004: 154; 2007: 75).

²² Reasons behind the lack of credibility of full membership of the EU for Turkey will be discussed concisely under Section 3.3.

Turkey is also a party to the most of the regimes for non-proliferation of WMD. Particularly important is the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its additional protocol, ratified by Turkey (European Commission, 2006: 72). In addition, Turkey is progressively aligning its arms control system with EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (European Commission, 2007: 75).

Secondly, Turkey is required to develop the necessary administrative structures to fulfil its obligations under CFSP properly. In this regard, the General Secretariat for EU Affairs was established by TGNA in 2000 for the effective coordination of EU affairs²³. Furthermore, the EU has noted that Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey is able to play an effective role in the EU because its administrative structures are compatible with the structures of CFSP (European Commission, 2005: 127). Actually, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is connected to the Associated Correspondents' Network (ACN) information system through which the EU communicates within CFSP with the Candidate States (European Commission, 2001: 90). In addition, the Deputy Undersecretary for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs performs the functions of political director (European Commission, 2005: 128). Also, there is a European Correspondent and a deputy European Correspondent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (European Commission, 2005: 128).

Thirdly, Turkey is required to defend the EU's position on certain foreign policy issues in other international fora. In this regard, the EU favours Turkey's active involvement in other international fora as long as it serves the realization of the EU's foreign policy goals. In line with that, Turkey actively promotes political cooperation, economic development and regional stability through several international organizations. The EU has underlined that Turkey is most active in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Developing 8 (D8) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (European Commission, 2003: 93; 2005: 128). Furthermore, Turkey has participated in

²³ It was converted to the Ministry of EU Affairs in 2011.

the EU-led police and rule of law missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo (European Commission, 2005: 128).

Fourthly, Turkey should continue to promote stability and security in its region. Actually, Turkey's quest for increased stability and security in its region is primarily reflected in its contributions to the aforementioned EU-led police and rule of law missions. To this end, Turkey promotes the EU's rules and norms in its region through related international organizations. Besides, it seeks to improve its relations with its neighbours with a view to building mutual confidence and multiplying the areas of cooperation. Actually, the EU has put good neighbourly relations as a condition for the Candidate States in the Agenda 2000 and this was also the case for Turkey. The quest for good neighbourliness has been a crucial stimulus in Europeanizing TFP, especially its relations with Greece (European Commission, 2010: 95-96; 2011: 106)²⁴. For instance, the EU welcomed resolution of the boundary problem between Turkey and Bulgaria bilaterally in 1997, and it called for further improvement of its relations with other neighbours (European Commission, 1998: 51). In addition, the EU also hopes Turkey to react in an appropriate way in case its neighbours violate the EU's rules and norms.

²⁴ It is noted that 'good neighbourly relations' which was set as a priority for the first time in the Stability Pact in the context of the 1994-1995 Balladur Plan for the CEECs is not included in the Copenhagen criteria though it constitutes part of the accession criteria that must be met for acceding to the EU (Cebeci, 2004: 210). For instance, in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1994 Essen European Council it was stated that the CEECs had to promote good neighbourly relations. The same was further stressed in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1995 Cannes European Council. In addition, in Agenda 2000, the EU explicitly emphasized the importance of good neighbourliness by stating: "before accession, applicants should make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third countries. Failing this they should agree that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice" (European Commission, 1997: 51).

Actually, the EU promotes regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance to create and continue conditions for peace, security and stability around its neighbourhood²⁵ (Nuttall, 2000: 22-23; Karen E. Smith, 2003: 145; Lucarelli and Manners, 2011: 203). In the view of Dinan, “the EU aims to promote abroad what it seeks at home: stability, security, democracy and sustainable development (Dinan, 2010: 483). Therefore, Turkey is expected to promote the EU’s rules and norms in its broader neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, instability in the EU’s periphery affects the stability and security in the EU and Turkey usually equally given that the periphery of the EU and Turkey is virtually identical.

In line with the aforementioned arguments, Turkey has increasingly sought to improve its relations with its neighbours, especially after 1999. As a matter of fact, significant developments have been recorded in its relations with Greece, Southern Cyprus, Syria, Armenia, Iraq and Iran in the last decade.

Influence of Europeanization on the Cyprus issue is remarkable. The Cyprus issue became Europeanized after the EU paved the way for the accession of Southern Cyprus to the Union at the 1999 Helsinki European Council irrespective of reunification of the island (Aybet, 2009: 151). At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU stated:

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of [Southern] Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors (European Council, 1999a: Par. 9.b).

²⁵ Accordingly, in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, principal objectives of CFSP are specified as: i) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; ii) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; iii) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; iv) to promote international cooperation; and v) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Maastricht Treaty, Article J.1).

Actually, disassociation of accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU from reunification of the island was essentially important for Greece to drop its veto against Turkey's candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Resolution of the Cyprus issue is important for the relations between Turkey and the EU to progress satisfactorily (Kaliber, 2005: 320). As a matter of fact, resolution of the Cyprus issue is one of the issues in the enhanced political dialogue between Turkey and the EU (European Commission, 2001: 13). Resilience of the Cyprus issue for Turkey-EU relations pushed Turkey to support attempts at reunifying the island. Accordingly, Turkey supported the plan of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to reunify the island. This is illustrative of the emergent cooperative culture in Turkey which has developed after formal institutions supportive of EU accession process have become more vocal in the conduct of foreign policy of the country after veto players have become weaker throughout the Europeanization process. In addition to that, the prospect of full membership of the EU has reduced adoption costs that would have accrued to Turkey if the country had engaged in the settlement of the Cyprus issue without such a prospect.

The Annan Plan was submitted for the first time in November 2002. However, it was modified several times. The final version of the Annan Plan was submitted in March 2004. A referendum for the plan took place on 24 April 2004. Meanwhile, negotiations between the EU and Southern Cyprus had already been completed earlier in December 2002. The EU reiterated its preference for reunification in line with the Annan Plan before accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU at the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council:

...accession negotiations have been completed with [Southern] Cyprus, [Southern] Cyprus will be admitted as a new Member State to the European Union. Nevertheless, the European Council confirms its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus. In this context it welcomes the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem ... on the basis of the UN Secretary-General's proposals. The European Council believes that those proposals offer a unique opportunity to reach a settlement in the coming weeks and urges the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity (European Council, 2002: Par. 10).

Turkey's support for the Annan Plan was a major turning point in TFP because the Cyprus issue had been considered a national cause for decades (Ulusoy, 2008: 316; Zucconi, 2009: 29). However, referendum did not result in the reunification of the island because the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan with a 75.8 per cent majority whereas the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of it with a 64.9 per cent majority. Nonetheless, Southern Cyprus could accede to the EU on 1 May 2004 in line with the Paragraph 10 of the Presidency Conclusions of the 2002 Copenhagen European Council.

Apart from that, the EU expected Turkey to apply the Customs Union to the new Member States, including Southern Cyprus. Initially, Turkey announced in May 2004 that it extended the Customs Union to all new Member States except for Southern Cyprus. Then, Turkey included Southern Cyprus in the list in October 2004²⁶. Accordingly, the EU stated at the December 2004 Brussels European Council: "the European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States" (European Council, 2004: Par. 19).

It is noteworthy that Turkey's support for the Annan Plan and extension of the Customs Union to all new Member States, 'exploratory talks' held with Greece on the Aegean dispute since 2002 and the country's sufficient compliance with the

²⁶ On 29 July 2005, Turkey attached a declaration to its decision to extend the Customs Union to all new Member States. In the declaration, it was stated that extension of the Customs Union to Southern Cyprus did not mean recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2005: Par. 4). The EU issued a counter-declaration on 21 September 2005 through which it stated that Turkey must recognize all Member States before its accession to the EU (Council of the European Union, 2005: Par. 5). The EU committed itself to review the situation in 2006. Accordingly, the Council of Ministers of the EU decided on 11 December 2006 to suspend accession negotiations on eight chapters and not to close the other chapters until Turkey apply the Customs Union to all Member States of the EU.

Copenhagen political criteria sufficiently paved the way for the start of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005.

Before 1999, Turkey-Syria relations were stranded over the issues of Syrian support to terrorism and share of the waters of the rivers of Euphrates (Firat) and Tigris (Dicle) between Turkey, Syria and Iraq (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2009: 10). Actually, the two issues were intertwined to a great extent because Syria started to support terrorism against Turkey to prevent the country from building dams over these two rivers (Terzi, 2010: 111). Turkey threatened Syria with military intervention in 1998 as long as the latter continued to support terrorism against Turkey. Actually, the act of Turkey reflected well its realist approach towards foreign policy issues in that period. Subsequently, the two countries signed the Adana Accords in 1998 through which Syria committed itself not to support terrorism against Turkey (Kirişçi, 2006: 19; Müftüler-Baç-Gürsoy, 2009: 16). Consequent on that, relations between the two have improved significantly until recently. For instance, they jointly cleared landmines along Turkey-Syria border, and various agreements were concluded for cooperation in the fields of economy, commerce, tourism, aviation and maritime (European Commission, 2001: 89; 2004: 153). In addition, the two countries lifted the visa requirements towards each other in 2009. Nonetheless, Turkey has fully supported transition to democracy in all countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have experienced the so-called Arab Spring since November 2010. Yet, Turkey's repeated call for transition to democracy in Syria has recently stranded the relations between the two countries to a great extent. Nonetheless, Turkey's stance towards the Arab Spring is in accordance with the EU's because the EU adopted the initiative of the 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean' in March 2011. The new Partnership is built on three elements which are:

- i) democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption; ii) a stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young and lastly iii) sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development, especially support to Small and Medium

Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions (European Commission, 2011a: 3).

With respect to Turkey-Armenia relations, it is well-known that Turkey and Armenia have long been at odds over the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories of Nagorno-Karabagh, and the events of 1915. Actually, the border between the two countries has been closed since 1993 in order to make Armenia retreat from Nagorno-Karabagh. However, the EU has oft-repeated that the border between Turkey and Armenia must be opened (European Commission, 2001: 90; 2006: 72). Relations between the two countries have not improved considerably despite some earlier positive developments. For instance, the two countries signed two protocols for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of bilateral relations in 2009. Thereby, the two countries aimed at establishing mutual dialogue, studying historical archives on the events of 1915, exchanging students, cooperating on scientific and educational matters and preserving Turkish and Armenian cultural heritage in their respective territories (Terzi, 2010: 92). However, they have not been ratified yet mainly because of the fact that issues in Turkey-Armenia relations are overly politicized²⁷.

Regarding Turkey-Iraq relations, Turkey's main concern has been about the loss of Iraqi control over the Northern parts of the country following the first Gulf War in 1991 (Alessandri, 2010: 9). As a matter of fact, Northern parts of Iraq have increasingly become a shelter for terrorism against Turkey subsequent to the war (Sayarı, 2000: 171). Nonetheless, the intervention of the United States of America (USA) in Iraq in 2003 added more to the fears of Turkey because it might have resulted in a further loss of Iraqi control over Iraq's Northern parts (Oğuzlu, 2008: 15; Müftüleri-Baç and Gürsoy; 2009: 12). Therefore, Turkey sought to maintain stability in the region and in Iraq multilaterally through the Iraq's Neighbours Initiative (INI) initiated just before the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. By the INI, Turkey aims at mutual

²⁷ Turkey argued that talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute had to be revived before the two protocols are ratified (Terzi, 2012: 212).

cooperation between the neighbours of Iraq to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorism, improving regional security and strengthening good neighbourly relations (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2009: 13; Terzi, 2010: 116). Actually, the EU has appreciated Turkey's efforts to initiate the INI (European Commission, 2003: 93). In addition, the decision of TGNA in March 2003 not to cooperate with the USA for its intervention in Iraq was compatible with the respective stance of France and Germany on the issue. Furthermore, Turkey started a training program on electoral systems and the proper functioning of democratic institutions for representatives of Iraqi political parties and diplomats in 2005 (European Commission, 2005: 129). In addition, Turkey and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 which paved the way for the signing of a Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a High Level Cooperation Council between the two countries in 2008. Actually, Turkey and the EU share similar views on the need to maintain stability in Iraq given that the EU is also well aware of the would-be effects of a disintegrated Iraq for the regional stability (European Commission, 2006: 3-5). Both Turkey and the EU are highly motivated to keep Iraq territorially integrated. For instance, the EU made operational a civilian CSDP mission in 2005 to strengthen rule of law and to promote human rights in the country (Terzi, 2010: 116).

With respect to Turkey-Iran relations, the two countries have not experienced major strands in their relations in the last decades (Oğuzlu, 2008: 9). Nonetheless, possession by Iran of nuclear energy is an issue of concern for the international community because there are doubts over whether Iran develops its nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On the one hand, the EU agrees that Iran has the right to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Oğuzlu, 2008: 9). Nonetheless, the EU has stressed that mutual confidence must be built between Iran and the international community to tackle the aforementioned doubts (Terzi, 2010: 119). As a matter of fact, the EU engaged in negotiations with Iran on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and a Political Dialogue Agreement in 2002, but they proved futile in 2005 (Terzi, 2010: 119). Relations between Iran and the EU were further stranded in 2006 when the EU had to act in line with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) measures against Iran

(Terzi, 2010: 119). Actually, Turkey and the EU share similar views on the right of Iran to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and they both prefer diplomatic means to build confidence between Iran and the international community. Besides, Turkey aligned itself with EU declarations that have called on Iran to conclude and implement the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (European Commission, 2004: 152).

Concluding Remarks

This chapter attempted to portray the theoretical framework of the thesis, and the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey in general. The starting point has been the evaluation of the conceptual evolution of the term Europeanization with reference to the mechanisms through which Europeanization happens and the intervening variables which either facilitate or inhibit Europeanization. The Europeanization of foreign policy has been discussed separately for the Member and Candidate States from the viewpoint of sociological institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism, respectively. Then, a concise assessment of the influence of the EU on TFP since 1999 has been made with special reference to the European Commission's annual Progress Reports on Turkey.

In this respect, it has been noted that Europeanization is concerned with the external roots of domestic order (Vink and Graziano, 2008: 3). This means that the term Europeanization was invented to account for the changes induced by the EU both in the Member and Candidate States. In addition to that, the asymmetry and uncertainty embedded in the EU's relations with the Candidate States have been underlined to highlight the fact that Europeanization does not take place in the same manner in the Member and Candidate States. In this regard, it has been concluded that the conditionality mechanism of the EU is more relevant for the Europeanization of the Candidate States. Hence, the logic of consequences is more applicable to explain the cases of cost-benefit calculations. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that socialization may be applied to highlight the cases where the Candidate States fail to implement the EU's

rules and norms that they adopted when the prospect of full membership loses credibility (Özer, 2012: 46). This means that Turkey would not have failed to implement the EU's rules and norms after the prospect of full membership has lost credibility if it had internalized these rules and norms. Moreover, it has been pointed out that of the mechanisms and patterns of Europeanization, "external incentives", "policy convergence", "bureaucratic adaptation" and "process tracing" are more relevant for the case of Turkey (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663; Wong, 2005: 141; Michael Smith, 2000: 624-625; Moumoutzis, 2011: 621). Regarding the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey, it has been stated that the process of Europeanization slowed down after the credibility of the prospect of full membership decreased after accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005 (European Commission, 2007: 74; 2011: 106).

On the other hand, the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey is more discernible in the country's relations with Greece because improvement of relations with Greece is intimately related to Turkey's accession to the EU (Jenkins, 2001: 21; Kirişçi; 2006: 18). As a matter of fact, Greece is a Member State of the EU and therefore it has the ability to project its national interests to the EU level. Thus, it can drive the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey in accordance with its national interests. The Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece is highly conditional on the resolution of the Aegean dispute given that it is the most outstanding point of contention between the two countries.

2. THE AEGEAN DISPUTE IN TURKEY-GREECE RELATIONS

The Aegean dispute is at the core of the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece. As a matter of fact, at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Turkey was required to agree to submit the Aegean dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by 2004 in case all other efforts failed²⁸ (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). The EU also assured at the 1999 Helsinki European Council that resolution of the Cyprus issue would not be a prerequisite for the accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU (European Council, 1999a: Par. 9.b). This means that resolution of the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue are the two important components of the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece (Diez, 2002: 154-155; Aksu, 2004: 107; Özer, 2010: 558)²⁹. As a matter of fact, these issues were referred to in the Accession Partnership Documents (APD) of Turkey as essential for the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU since the 2000 Nice European Council (Terzi, 2005: 114). Hence, aspects of the Aegean dispute will be mentioned in great detail throughout this chapter. To that end, arguments of both countries regarding the Aegean dispute and the impact thereof on their previous and continuing attempts at rapprochement will be highlighted. It is a fact that virtually all major attempts at rapprochement between Turkey and Greece were sparked by the crises stemming from their bilateral differences over the Aegean (Heraclides, 2002: 20).

²⁸ Greece recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on the basis of reciprocity in January 1994. However, a compromise should be signed between Turkey and Greece for proceeding to the ICJ because Turkey does not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (Syrigos, 2001: 278). However, Greece excluded "any dispute related to defensive military measures taken by Greece" from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (Syrigos, 2001: 287). Thus, Greece does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ for the dispute over the demilitarization.

²⁹ For the purpose of this thesis, only the Aegean dispute will be handled in this chapter.

According to Ker-Lindsay, the Aegean dispute is “the result of differing interpretations over the rights and consequences of various Treaties” (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 110). Hence, the legal dimension of the Aegean dispute will be evaluated with special reference to the provisions of the governing Treaties that the two countries tend to interpret differently.

The Aegean dispute is composed of disagreements i) over the sovereignty of certain islands and islets in the Aegean Sea; ii) the demilitarization of the Eastern Greek Islands; iii) the breadth of the territorial seas; iv) the delimitation of the continental shelf; and v) the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and the operative control of the FIR (Gündüz, 2001: 81; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 175-176). Nonetheless, Turkey and Greece have not also reached a consensus on the components of the Aegean dispute. For instance, Greece argues that delimitation of the continental shelf, namely “delimitation of the submarine areas between the Anatolian coast and the nearby Greek islands, beyond their six-mile territorial seas” is the only unresolved issue regarding the Aegean (Toluner, 2000: 121). To the contrary, in the view of Turkey, the Aegean dispute encompasses the demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean islands, breadth of the territorial seas, delimitation of the continental shelf, width of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean and the operative control of the FIR and sovereignty over disputed islands (Kut, 2001: 253). In other words, Turkey does not decouple the dispute over delimitation of the continental shelf from the rest of what it sees as integral parts of the Aegean dispute. With respect to how to resolve the dispute, Greece pushes for the referral of the delimitation of the continental shelf to the ICJ whereas Turkey views adjudication as a last resort and therefore it prioritizes negotiations for the entirety of the dispute (Kut, 2001: 266; Kozyris, 2001: 102; Gündüz, 2001: 96-97).

However, the Aegean dispute was not a major issue in Turkey-Greece relations until 1973. Instead, the two countries were at odds over the Cyprus issue before the 1970s (Firat, 2002: 749). Therefore, Turkey did not contest until 1974 the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands, and did not object to the attributing of the

operative control of the FIR to Greece in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (Kut, 2001: 263). The only issue that Turkey objected to in the 1960s was the remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands by Greece (Heraclides, 2010: 79). Yet, the two countries have not experienced a major dispute over remilitarization. Thus, it was in 1973-74 that the two countries began to confront each other because of their bilateral differences over the Aegean. As a corollary, previous attempts at rapprochement that were sparked by their bilateral differences over the Aegean dispute date back to the 1970s. However, these earlier attempts at rapprochement failed mainly because of the fact that the two countries were trying to resolve their bilateral differences without agreeing on what were the points of contention (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 111). They were also inhibited by domestic opposition to the settlement. Governments that engaged in the settlement of the dispute were criticized on different grounds that will be evaluated concisely throughout this chapter.

Emphasizing previous attempts at rapprochement and domestic opposition to the settlement is important because they illustrate how the continuing process of rapprochement differs from its predecessors. It is different because the EU could relatively silence domestic opposition to the settlement and reduce the number of veto players via providing the respective governments of the two countries with arguments to justify their engagement in the settlement of the Aegean dispute (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). In addition, many principles on the settlement of the Aegean dispute have emerged throughout those previous attempts at rapprochement.

Nonetheless, even though Turkey and Greece have improved their relations since 1999, the Aegean dispute has not been resolved in its entirety. The two countries started their 'exploratory talks' over the Aegean dispute in 2002. Yet, details of these talks are not made public. However, it may be argued that 'exploratory talks' are progressing satisfactorily given that the dispute was not referred to the ICJ in 2004 as it was stipulated at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. The EU would have called Turkey to agree to refer the Aegean dispute to the ICJ on the behest of Greece if 'exploratory talks' had not been progressing satisfactorily. As a matter of fact, the EU

confined itself to solely welcoming recent developments in Turkey-Greece relations at the December 2004 Brussels European Council (European Council, 2004: Par. 20).

The dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf is important in that it has resurfaced several times in the past with significant implications on Turkey-Greece relations. More importantly, it is the only issue which both Turkey and Greece regard as a point of contention.

2.1. Dispute over the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

The delimitation of the continental shelf has been an important issue in Turkey-Greece relations since the 1970s. Dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf includes “delimitation of the respective sovereign rights of the two countries in the Aegean seabed and its subsoil” (Heraclides, 2010: 167). Whether the Greek islands off the Turkish coast can generate continental shelves of their own is the most important aspect of the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf (Lagoni, 1989: 148).

In the view of Greece, the delimitation of the continental shelf is the only issue awaiting resolution in the Aegean Sea (Athanasopoulou, 1997: 77; Kut, 2001: 267). However, for Turkey it is only one of several components of the Aegean dispute. Furthermore, Turkey seeks a political solution through bilateral negotiations while Greece is in favour of a judicial one, namely proceeding to the ICJ (Kut, 2001: 266; Kozyris, 2001: 102; Gündüz, 2001: 96-97). The dispute has brought the two countries close to rapprochement for a number of times in the past. Yet, these previous attempts at rapprochement failed for the reasons mainly related to domestic politics.

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS)³⁰ and the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)³¹ are the two important documents for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Continental shelf is defined as:

The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial seas throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance (UNCLOS, Article 76).

Thus, the concept can simply be referred to as “the downward projecting ledge of the continent in the sea” (Gündüz, 1990: 3). Of importance for the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf is whether islands and islets can have continental shelves of their own. Actually, it is stated:

...territorial seas, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory” (UNCLOS, Article 121.1).

Thus, it may be conferred that islands are entitled to have continental shelves of their own. However, “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” (UNCLOS, Article 121.3). This means that an island has its own continental shelf as long as it sustains human habitation or economic life. Nonetheless, the delimitation of the continental shelf of islands may be subjected to further limitations.

³⁰ The CCS came into force in 1964. Greece ratified it in 1972. Turkey has neither signed nor ratified it.

³¹ The UNCLOS entered into force in 1994. Greece ratified it in 1995. Turkey has not either signed or ratified it.

As a matter of fact, an island may be denied to generate a continental shelf with full effect if it is close to the coast of another State (Van Dyke, 2005: 87). In this regard, States with opposite coasts are expected to conclude a bilateral agreement to delimit continental shelves in relation to each other in line with the UNCLOS which states:

Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law ... in order to achieve an equitable solution (UNCLOS, Article 83).

Accordingly, the delimitation of the continental shelf through bilateral agreement has priority over the principle of equidistance in case States have opposite coasts. Principle of equidistance becomes applicable only when States with opposite coasts cannot achieve a bilateral agreement to delimit their continental shelves. Principle of equidistance means “drawing a median line as a boundary between the two shores of the States with opposite coasts” (Heraclides, 2010: 169). In other words, “the boundary [for the delimitation of the continental shelf] is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each state is measured” (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 56). This principle was set out in the CCS as:

in the absence of an agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances³², the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance (CCS, Article 6).

³² By special circumstances, reference may have been made to the size, population and location of an island (Van Dyke, 1989: 174). Thus, an island can be denied to generate a continental shelf with full effect if it is small, is inhabited by a relatively low number of people or it is close to the coast of another State. With respect to the Greek islands off the Turkish coast, it may be argued that the proximity of these islands to the Turkish coast is a special circumstance that should be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf (Kut, 2001:253-254).

When applied to the Aegean Sea, the principle of equidistance would require that the median line be between the Greek islands off the Turkish coast and the Turkish coast. Therefore, Turkey would be left with very little of the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea in case the principle of equidistance was applied.

In the view of Greece, islands in the Aegean Sea should have continental shelves of their own same as the continental land masses in line with Article 121 of the UNCLOS (Versan, 2001: 246). This means that Greece disregards special circumstances prevalent in the Aegean. Furthermore, Greece posits that the principle of equidistance should apply to delimit the continental shelf between the Greek islands off the Turkish coast and the Turkish coast because the two countries could not agree on an agreement for delimitation (Marsh, 1989: 229; Gündüz, 2001: 98).

For Turkey, Greek islands off the Turkish coast do not have continental shelves of their own because they are natural prolongations of the Turkish mainland (Aydın, 1999: 169; Nachmani, 2002: 101-102). Therefore, in the view of Turkey, the concept of natural prolongation and special circumstances should be given primary emphasis in delimiting the continental shelf of the Aegean (Kut, 2001: 266; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 159). With respect to special circumstances, Turkey argues that the principle of equidistance should be applied not between the Greek islands off the Turkish coast and the Turkish coast but between the Greek and Turkish mainland (Heraclides, 2010: 169).

Turkey and Greece have diverging views on the delimitation of the continental shelf. Such intransigence of views had important implications on their political relations, as well.

Dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf broke out in 1973 after Greece explored oil reservoir off the coast of the island of Thassos (Taşöz) in the Northern Aegean (Schmitt, 1996: 34; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 187). Greece granted exploration rights to foreign companies for the exploration of oil reservoir beyond the

island's six-mile-territorial seas (Schmitt, 1996: 34; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 187). Turkey interpreted the act of Greece to initiate exploration activities beyond the island's territorial seas as a 'de facto' delimitation of the continental shelf (Heraclides, 2010: 78). In response, Turkey granted exploration rights to Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO) on 1 November 1973 for the exploration of oil reservoir to the west of Greek islands of Lesbos (Midilli) and Chios (Sakız) which are located in the Eastern Aegean Sea (Kut, 2001: 265). The same day, Turkey published a map in the Official Gazette to the effect of delimiting the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. In the map, continental shelves of the Greek islands situated eastward of the median line that was drawn between the Turkish and Greek mainland were limited to their six-nautical-mile territorial seas (*Resmi Gazete*, 1973). Greece officially protested Turkey for exploration rights granted to TPAO and the map in February 1974. It also reiterated that continental shelf of the Aegean Sea should be delimited between the Greek islands off the Turkish coast and the Turkish coast (Marsh, 1989: 229; Kut, 2001: 266; Gündüz, 2001: 98). In response, Turkey announced that it intended to send its vessel called Çandarlı for exploratory activities into where it regarded as its continental shelf (Schmitt, 1996: 34; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 187-188). The vessel started its six-day seismological survey accompanied by thirty-two Turkish warships in May 1974 (Kut, 2001: 265). Greece reacted to the act of Turkey through diplomatic protests (Schmitt, 1996: 34; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 187-188). However, Turkey continued to issue further exploration rights for the region around the Dodacanese islands (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 20). While Greece kept protesting, relations were further strained when Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus in July 1974 (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 47).

In January 1975, Greece proposed Turkey that the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea be referred to the ICJ (Schmitt, 1996: 35). However, Turkey argued that the issue was of political nature and therefore it required not a judicial but a political solution. Therefore, the two countries decided to seek a political solution through bilateral talks (Schmitt, 1996: 35). Yet, the talks proved fruitless given diverging arguments of the two countries on the issue. In the face of the failure of talks, Turkey declared in February 1976 that it intended to initiate further

exploratory activities in the Aegean Sea (İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 187-188). Consequently, Turkey dispatched its vessel called Sismik-I in August 1976 for seismological survey off the western coasts of the islands of Lemnos (Limni), Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız) and Rhodes (Rodos) for three days (Schmitt, 1996: 36; Kut, 2001: 265). In response to the act of Turkey, Greece made recourse to the UNSC claiming that Turkey prejudiced the maintenance of international peace and security³³ (Schmitt, 1996: 36). Greece also proceeded to the ICJ for an interim measure for the parties to refrain from further exploratory activities in the area and from resort to military measures (Bilge, 1989: 72; Schmitt, 1996: 36). Furthermore, Greece asked the ICJ to delimit the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea (Schmitt, 1996: 36). In September 1976, the ICJ issued its ruling on interim measures requested by Greece. It noted that declaring interim measures was not necessary because rights of Greece had not been substantially prejudiced by the exploratory activities of Turkey (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case on Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, 1976: Par. 47).

Soon afterwards, the two countries engaged in bilateral talks in Bern, Switzerland to improve their relations and subsequently signed the Bern Agreement in November 1976. Thereby, Turkey and Greece committed themselves to refrain from any act relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, and to study State practices and international rules applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf (Bern Agreement, Par. 6 and 8). Thereafter, the two countries embarked on talks over their differences in January 1978 under what was called 'the Montreux Spirit' (Firat, 2002: 757). It was the first major attempt at rapprochement between the two countries since the Aegean dispute broke out in 1973 (Firat, 2002: 757; Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 21). However, talks slowed down mainly because of the criticism cast by the opposition parties in Greece to the settlement of the Aegean dispute. They argued that Greece was giving up its internationally recognized rights by engaging in talks with Turkey (Ker-

³³ Actually, in case international peace and security is threatened by a State, the UNSC is competent to investigate the allegations brought about by a Member State (The UN Charter, Article 35).

Lindsay, 2007: 22)³⁴. Nonetheless, the two countries agreed on a number of principles during their talks. Regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, they decided that “the end result of delimitation was to be based on international law and practice, applied in such a way as to lead to an equitable solution” and that “Turkey would be offered compensation if its continental shelf ended up being meagre” (Heraclides, 2010: 102). In addition, they decided not to declare an exclusive economic zone in the Aegean (Heraclides, 2010: 102). These principles are important because they have directed subsequent talks. For instance, the two countries still do not possess an exclusive economic zone in the Aegean. In addition, recourse to the ICJ as a final course to follow was enshrined in the Presidency Conclusions of the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, as well (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4).

Meanwhile, the ICJ ruled on the request of Greece for delimitation of the continental shelf in December 1978. It ruled that the ICJ was not able to rule on the matter because it had not been referred to it by all parties concerned (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case on Jurisdiction of the Court, 1978: par. 108). Thus, unilateral referral of Greece was turned down. In other words, the ICJ clarified that it could rule on the matter only if Turkey and Greece referred the issue together.

Veto players and domestic politics came to the fore when talks held under the 1976 Bern Agreement were completely suspended in October 1981 after Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) led by the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou came to power in Greece (Gürkan, 1989: 125). The Greek Prime Minister argued that not Greece but Turkey had demands and therefore engagement in bilateral talks would benefit only the latter (Tsakonas, 2010: 45). In addition, the Greek Prime Minister argued that the 1976

³⁴ The Montreux Spirit between Turkey and Greece was initiated in January 1978 under the leadership of the respective governments in Turkey and Greece. New Democracy (ND) led by the Prime Minister Konstantinos G. Karamanlis was in power in Greece until 1981. On the Turkish side, Republican People’s Party (CHP) led by the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was in power until 1979.

Bern Agreement expired because bilateral talks were terminated (Kut, 2001: 265; Aybet, 2009: 153).

Relations between the two countries further deteriorated after the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared its independence in November 1983. This is illustrative of the resilience of the Cyprus issue for Turkey-Greece relations. In response to the independence of TRNC and its recognition by Turkey, Greece adopted a new defence doctrine in December 1984 through which Turkey was called the main external threat to the country's sovereignty (Tsakonas, 2010: 45).

At the domestic stage, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal from Motherland Party (ANAP) was in power in Turkey since November 1983. The new Turkish Prime Minister was known for his willingness for enabling Turkey's accession to the EU and improving relations with Greece (Fırat, 2002a: 109). As a matter of fact, the Turkish Prime Minister took a number of constructive measures such as the abolition of the entry visa for Greek citizens and attempts at increasing trade between the two countries to improve Turkey-Greece relations (Fırat, 2002a: 109; Heraclides, 2010: 118). Yet, the Greek Prime Minister A. Papandreou was not willing to improve relations with Turkey until his re-election. PASOK was re-elected in June 1985. The Greek government had to soften its stance towards Turkey after experiencing another crisis over the continental shelf in 1987, and after getting to know how heavily arms race with Turkey burdened the Greek economy (Larrabee, 2001: 236; Fırat, 2002a: 111). Actually, the 1987 crisis "acted as a catalyst for a brief thaw" in Turkey-Greece relations as in 1976 (Heraclides, 2010: 122).

The second crisis over the continental shelf of the Aegean broke out in March 1987 when Greece intended to introduce legislation for obligatory purchase of a majority stake of a Canadian company which was conducting exploratory activities in the Aegean Sea for oil in line with the exploration rights granted from 1973 on (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 24). In the view of Greece, the company had to be nationalized because

exploratory activities outside of its territorial seas impacted on its relations with Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 25). In response, Turkey pointed to the 1976 Bern Agreement through which the two countries had committed themselves to refrain from any act relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean (Heraclides, 2010: 90). It also reiterated that it would forestall any attempt by Greece to conduct exploratory activities outside of its territorial seas (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 25). However, for Greece, the 1976 Bern Agreement had expired when bilateral talks failed in 1981 (Kut, 2001: 265; Aybet, 2009: 153). Thus, Greece nationalized a majority stake of the company, and directed it to begin exploratory activities in international seas off Thassos (Taşöz). In response, Turkey dispatched its vessel for exploratory activities in the contested areas around the Greek islands of Lemnos (Limni), Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lesbos (Midilli) – beyond their six-mile territorial seas (Van Dyke, 1989: 267). Consequently, the two countries came to the brink of confronting each other, but they did not end up fighting because of pressure from the USA and NATO not to conduct exploratory activities in the contested areas of the Aegean Sea. Hence, Turkey decided to stay in the uncontested areas while Greece declared that it was bound by the 1976 Bern Agreement (Kut, 1998: 520). Eventually, the two countries committed themselves to refrain from such activities over the continental shelf until the issue is resolved.

The second crisis paved the way for what was known as ‘the Davos Process’ initiated in January 1988 following a meeting between the leaders of the two countries at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Although A. Papandreou was known for his earlier opposition to the previous talks with Turkey, the 1987 crisis compelled the Greek Prime Minister to change his stance towards rapprochement with Turkey, especially after getting to know how heavily arms race with Turkey burdened the Greek economy (Larrabee, 2001: 236; Fırat, 2002a: 111). Hence, the 1987 crisis approached the stance of the Greek government to that of the Turkish government.

During the Davos Process, the two countries committed themselves to develop “permanent peaceful relations” (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 74). In addition, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Mesut Yılmaz and Karolos Papoulias signed a

Memorandum of Understanding on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in May 1988³⁵. The Davos Process also paved the way for the lifting of Greek veto against the reactivation of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU that had been suspended following the September 1980 military coup in Turkey (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 49). Greek veto against reactivating the Association Agreement indicates how Greece hoped to use the EU as a leverage against Turkey to achieve its national interests.

Domestic politics and veto players came to the fore again when domestic opposition in Greece criticized the Greek Government for neglecting the Cyprus issue during the Davos Process (Bertrand, 2003: 2). Talks were suspended entirely when the ND under the leadership of the Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis came to power in June 1989. For the Greek Prime Minister, resolution of the Cyprus issue was a prerequisite for the advancement of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 27). However, the Cyprus issue had high resilience in Turkish domestic politics at that time and therefore Turkey was not in a position to concede from its position on the issue.

It is seen that domestic opposition in Greece has been highly influential in the failure of the previous attempts at rapprochement between the two countries (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 124). Although the two countries have not confronted each other seriously over the delimitation of the continental shelf again since 1987, they have not agreed on its resolution either. Nonetheless, it is at the core of the ‘exploratory talks’

³⁵ These CBMs are important in that they constituted one of the three pillars of CBMs that were initiated in October 2000. They mainly concerned national military exercises in the high seas and international airspace (Heraclides, 2010: 125). Thereby, the two countries decided not to prejudice their navigational freedoms and air traffic because of their respective national military exercises (Heraclides, 2010: 125). To achieve that, they decided not to block exercise areas for relatively long periods and not to conduct their exercises during summer period and important national and religious days (Papadopoulos, 2009: 298; Heraclides, 2010: 125).

over the Aegean initiated in 2002. In this regard, the influence of the EU on the continuing process of rapprochement is noteworthy. As a matter of fact, it provided the respective governments of both countries with arguments and incentives to justify their engagement with the settlement of the Aegean dispute against veto players and domestic politics (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). In the case of Turkey, accession to the EU is conditional, among other things, on the improvement of the country's relations with Greece (Jenkins, 2001: 21; Kirişçi, 2006: 18). Thus, full membership of the EU is both an incentive to settle the Aegean dispute and justification against domestic opposition to the settlement and veto players. In the case of Greece, improving relations with Turkey is an important incentive and justification to eschew arms race and overcome domestic opposition to the settlement.

2.2. Dispute over the Demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands

The demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean islands is one of the components of the Aegean dispute³⁶. The main point of contention is whether the two countries are still obliged to keep the islands in the Eastern Aegean demilitarized. Especially, the impact of the 1936 Montreux Convention on the provisions concerning demilitarization of the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention and whether Turkey can invoke provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty despite not being a signatory are contested by the two countries.

Demilitarization of the islands in the Eastern Aegean was not established uniformly (Ronzitti, 1989: 299-301). As a matter of fact, there are three groups of

³⁶ Van Dyke relates that the term 'demilitarized zone' was used for the first time in the 19th century "to refer to an area where no forces of the contending parties could enter, or could enter with only limited weaponry to keep order" (Van Dyke, 2005: 76). The aims of a demilitarized zone are "to ensure that the military forces of the parties are not in proximity with one another" with a view to "putting distance between them to prevent any action that could lead to retaliation, and eventually escalate, renewing whatever conflict existed" (Van Dyke, 2005: 76).

islands in the Eastern Aegean that were demilitarized by separate documents. For instance, islands of Lemnos (Limni) and Samothrace (Semadirek) were demilitarized by the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention whereas islands of Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) were demilitarized by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. In addition, the Dodecanese Islands were demilitarized by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty explicitly provides for the demilitarization of the islands of Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) (Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 13). In the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, modality of the regime of demilitarization was established in a very detailed way:

With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria:

I. No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.

II. Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.

III. The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory (Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 13).

Thus, it is conferred from the aforementioned article that Greece is allowed to deploy military forces in the islands of Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) solely for the purpose of maintaining domestic order. In other words, Greek military forces in these islands are not permitted to be defensive.

The regime of demilitarization of the second group of islands – Greek islands of Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lemnos (Limni) and Turkish islands of Gökçeada, Bozcaada and Rabbit Islands was established by the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention

(Lausanne Straits Convention, Articles 4.3 and 6). Actually, there are no significant differences between demilitarization regimes established by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention. Nonetheless, while the former aims at maintaining peace in the region, the latter is concerned with free and unimpeded passage and navigation through Turkish straits (Adam, 2000: 206). These differences over the aims of the two documents are important in understanding the impact of the 1936 Montreux Convention on the obligations of Turkey and Greece stemming from the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention.

Whether the 1936 Montreux Convention terminated demilitarized status of the Turkish straits and islands in the Aegean Sea while continuing demilitarized status of the Greek islands of Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lemnos (Limni) is contested by both Turkey and Greece. The two countries interpret differently the 1936 Montreux Convention which states that the signatories to the Convention “have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July 1923” (Montreux Convention, Preamble). However, the principal aim of the 1936 Montreux Convention is stated as to “regulate transit and navigation in the Straits... in such a manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States” (Montreux Convention, Preamble). Thus, there is no explicit reference to the demilitarized status of the Greek islands of Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lemnos (Limni) in the 1936 Montreux Convention. As the main concern thereof is to provide security for Turkey and the riparian States of the Black Sea in the face of threatening Italian and German activities before the World War II (WWII), Turkey concludes that the 1936 Montreux Convention unilaterally terminated demilitarized status of the Turkish straits and islands in the Aegean (Schmitt, 1996: 21). In other words, the 1936 Montreux Convention did not terminate demilitarized status of the Greek islands of Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lemnos (Limni). Whether Turkey can invoke the provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty is another aspect of the dispute over demilitarization.

The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty provides for the demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands (Paris Peace Treaty, Article 14.1). Modality of the regime of demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands was established in a detailed way by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which states:

For purposes of the present Treaty, the terms “demilitarization” and “demilitarized” shall be deemed to prohibit, in the territory and territorial seas concerned, all naval, military and military air installations, fortifications and their armaments; artificial military, naval and air obstacles; the basing or the permanent or temporary stationing of military, naval and military air units; military training in any form; and the production of war material. This does not prohibit internal security personnel restricted in number to meeting tasks of an internal character and equipped with weapons which can be carried and operated by one person, and the necessary military training of such personnel (Paris Peace Treaty, Article 14.2).

Thus, it is conferred that Greece is allowed to deploy military forces in the Dodecanese islands solely for the purpose of maintaining domestic order. This means that Greek military forces in these islands are not permitted to be defensive.

To sum up, in the view of Greece, the 1936 Montreux Convention terminated demilitarized status of not only the islands of Samothrace (Semadirek) and Lemnos (Limni) but also the islands of Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) which were demilitarized by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty (Kut, 2001: 258). In addition, Greece argues that fundamental changes in circumstances (*rebus sic stantibus*) have occurred since 1923 and therefore it is no longer obliged to keep these islands demilitarized (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 78). By fundamental changes in circumstances, Greece refers to the Turkey’s militarization of its Aegean coasts and the establishment of the Army of the Aegean in 1975 (Van Dyke, 2005: 74). With respect to the Dodecanese Islands, Greece contends that Turkey cannot invoke the provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty because it is not a signatory to it (Van Dyke, 2005: 80). Furthermore, despite having started remilitarization in the 1960s, Greece seeks to justify its remilitarization of these islands on the grounds of self-defence against the Army of the Aegean which was established in 1975 (Schmitt, 1996: 51). On self-defence, Greece invokes the UN Charter which states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 51).

For Turkey, the 1936 Montreux Convention terminated demilitarized status of only the Turkish straits and the islands of Bozcaada, Gökçeada and Rabbit Islands in the Aegean Sea (Schmitt, 1996: 21). It is a fact that the 1936 Montreux Convention does not refer to the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean although it allows Turkey to remilitarize Turkish straits by stating: “Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits” (Montreux Convention, Protocol). Furthermore, demilitarization of the first group of islands – Lesbos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) was not established by the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention but the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. Therefore, the 1936 Montreux Convention is irrelevant for the obligations stemming from the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. With respect to the reliance of Greece on self-defence, Turkey counter-argues that Article 51 of the UN Charter allows merely for temporary measures for self-defence in case a State faces an armed attack (Van Dyke, 2005: 106). Yet, Greece is not in a position to defend itself because Turkey poses no armed threat to it. In addition, the Army of the Aegean was established after Greece started remilitarization in the 1960s. More importantly, Turkey has not undertaken any responsibility not to militarize its territories in the Aegean region (Stivachtis, 1999: 104). Furthermore, the argument on ‘fundamental changes in circumstances’ is unfounded because according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “a fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary” (Vienna Convention, Article 62.2.a). As the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty establishes a boundary between Turkey and Greece, it cannot be terminated or withdrawn from on the pretext that fundamental changes in circumstances have occurred. With respect to whether it can invoke the provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Turkey argues that if certain benefits are provided explicitly to a third State by a Treaty then the third State should

have the right to invoke its provisions irrespective of being a signatory (Van Dyke, 2005: 82). As a matter of fact, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states:

A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides (Vienna Convention, Article 36).

As the provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty concerns security of Turkey, it is in a position to invoke them. Politically, militarization of the islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea attests to threat perceptions of Greece towards Turkey. In other words, it manifests the mistrust between the two countries.

Greece began to remilitarize islands in the Eastern Aegean in the 1960s intensively contravening the aforementioned articles. Turkey protested remilitarization in 1964, 1969 and 1970 (İnan and Acer, 2004: 131). Greek activities to remilitarize the islands in the Eastern Aegean increased following Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. However, in its diplomatic notes of 1964 and 1969, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece stated that Greece continued to respect all its treaty obligations (Stivachtis, 1999: 103). In addition, Turkey was not the only country that protested remilitarization. As a matter of fact, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) announced its disconformity with remilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands as early as in 1948 when remilitarization was not that intense (Heraclides, 2010: 205).

Dispute over the demilitarization has not been resolved to date. It is a fact that dispute over the demilitarization of the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean is closely related to the tendency of the either side to interpret the governing provisions differently and to disregard certain aspects of them. However, politically, the dispute over the demilitarization has not been highly influential on Turkey-Greece relations. This is mainly because of the fact that neither Turkey nor Greece associates it with its

sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, Greece does not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for the dispute over the demilitarization (Syrigos, 2001: 287). Actually, resolution of the sovereignty and territorial integrity related components of the Aegean dispute would decrease the mistrust between the two countries. Consequently, they would be less prone to perceive threats from each other and therefore militarization would no longer be a point of contention.

2.3. Dispute over the Width of the National Airspace of the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea and the Operative Control of the FIR

Another contentious issue in Turkey-Greece relations is the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Whether the claim of Greece for a ten-nautical-mile national airspace for its islands in the Aegean Sea, contrary to their six-nautical-mile territorial seas, is lawful is at the core of the dispute. Actually, Turkey does not recognize the width between six and ten nautical miles of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. By the way, the Greek national airspace is unique in that it does not correspond to the breadth of its six-nautical-mile territorial seas. Apart from the width of the national airspace, Turkey and Greece are also at odds over the operative control of the FIR. Whether Turkish State aircraft should provide their flight plans and position reports before they enter into the Athinai FIR is at the core of the dispute.

The most relevant document for national airspace is the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. According to the 1944 Chicago Convention, territory of a State is "...the land areas and territorial seas adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State" (Chicago Convention, Article 2). In addition to that, "the contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory" (Chicago Convention, Article 1). It is conferred that the outer limits of the width of the national airspace and the breadth of the territorial seas should be identical because

exclusive sovereignty of a State is limited to the national airspace above its territory. Therefore, national airspace should not extend beyond territory, as territory means the mainland and territorial seas of a State.

In the view of Greece, Turkey has acquiesced to the extension of the Greek national airspace to ten nautical miles because it has not objected to it for almost more than four decades (Marsh, 1989: 227). Furthermore, Greece argues that it has the right to extend the breadth of its territorial seas to twelve-nautical-mile under the UNCLOS and therefore claiming ten-nautical-mile national airspace should be lawful (Heraclides, 2010: 194).

For Turkey, claiming ten-nautical-mile national airspace is not lawful because the width of the national airspace and the breadth of the territorial seas must be identical. In addition, Turkey argues that it has not acquiesced to the ten-nautical-mile national airspace because it became aware of it in 1974 when ICAO announced it to its Member States on the behest of Greece (Marsh, 1989: 227; Heraclides, 2010: 194). Actually, Greece could claim a ten-nautical-mile national airspace for its islands in the Eastern Aegean in case it had ten-nautical-mile territorial seas.

Greece declared its ten-nautical-mile national airspace in 1931. The breadth of the territorial seas of Greece was three nautical miles at that time. Nonetheless, Turkey did not object to the extension of Greek national airspace to ten-nautical-mile until 1974 because it was not aware of it³⁷ (Kut, 2001: 264; Van Dyke, 2005: 85). Since then, Turkey has been challenging the space between six and ten nautical miles regularly with a view to showing that it has not acquiesced to the ten-nautical-mile national airspace for the Greek islands in the Aegean (Kut, 2001: 263; Van Dyke, 2005: 85). Greece considers the challenges by Turkish fighter jets to the space between six and ten nautical miles as violations to its territorial integrity. On the other hand, political

³⁷ It was the United Kingdom (UK) that objected to the act of Greece in 1932 (Heraclides, 2010: 193).

implications of the dispute over the operative control of the FIR broke out in 1974, as well.

FIR is defined as “an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided” (Chicago Convention, Annex 2). According to the 1944 Chicago Convention, “this Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to State aircraft” (Chicago Convention, Article 3.a). However, State aircraft are expected to operate with due regard for the safety of civil aviation (Chicago Convention, Article 3.a). Thus, the regime of the FIR does not apply to State aircraft but civil aircraft although the former should take into account the rules established by ICAO for the safety of civil aviation.

With respect to the FIR, in the view of Greece, although the ICAO has jurisdiction only over civilian aircraft, State aircraft are expected to operate with due regard for the safety of civil aviation and thus cooperate with the FIR system. Therefore, Turkish State aircraft should provide their flight plans and position reports before they enter into the Athinai FIR (Nachmani, 2002: 101).

For Turkey, Greece does not enjoy exclusive sovereign rights over the Athinai FIR but only has the operative control thereof for the safety of air traffic of the civilian aircraft (Bargiacchi, 2000: 216). Therefore, State aircraft are not obliged to issue flight plans and position reports before they enter into the Athinai FIR (Bargiacchi, 2000: 216). Nonetheless, Turkey acknowledges that State aircraft should take into account the safety of civil aviation although they are not obliged to provide flight plans and position reports (Kut, 2001: 264; Heraclides, 2010: 218).

Dispute over the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean and the operative control of the FIR stems from different interpretations of the governing Treaties. As a matter of fact, the two countries interpret provisions of the governing Treaties in line with their national interests. Given their contrasting national

interests, interpretations by the two countries differ considerably. Political implications of the dispute over the width of the national airspace of the Greek islands in the Aegean and the operative control of the FIR are noteworthy.

After the WWII, the ICAO introduced the system of FIR in the face of the increasing rise of air traffic. By the system of FIR, flights are secured and facilitated because planes that pass through the FIR region of a State are required to provide their flight plans and position reports (Bargiacchi, 2000: 214). The ICAO tasked Greece with the air traffic control of the Athinai FIR in 1952 and specified the dividing line between this region and the region of Istanbul FIR “at the median line between the Eastern Aegean Greek Islands and the Turkish coast” (Van Dyke, 2005: 86). The ICAO tasked Turkey with the air traffic control of the Istanbul FIR which extends from the Turkish Aegean coastline to the Eastern Turkish territory. Turkey was also tasked with the air traffic control of the Ankara FIR that encompasses parts of the international airspace of the Black Sea and parts of the international airspace of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dispute over the FIR broke out when Turkey issued Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714 in August 1974 to oblige all aircraft to report their flight plans and position reports to Turkey when crossing the median line in the Aegean Sea between Greek and Turkish mainland (George and Stenhouse, 1989: 85). The timing of the NOTAM 714 coincided with the period between the first and second military intervention by Turkey in Cyprus. By NOTAM 714, Turkey expected to extend the control of Istanbul FIR to almost half of the Aegean Sea (Heraclides, 2010: 81). In response, Greece declared that the Turkish NOTAM was in contravention of the ICAO regulations and therefore it did not have legal force (Schmitt, 1996: 48). Turkey responded by stating “for the aircraft that do not conform to this NOTAM, the authorities decline all responsibility for that which concerns the security of flight” (Schmitt, 1996: 48). Following that, Greece issued NOTAM 1157 through which it noted that the Aegean airspace was a danger zone (Schmitt, 1996: 48). These NOTAMs by Turkey and Greece resulted in the suspension of all international flights over the Aegean for six years.

It is noteworthy that the operative control of the FIR became subject of the talks held from 1978 to 1981 under the so-called Montreux Spirit. The two countries agreed on that the operative control of the FIR would not place sovereign rights and that the Athinai FIR would cooperate with the Istanbul FIR (Heraclides, 2010: 108). Furthermore, Turkey withdrew NOTAM 714 in 1980. In response, Greece cancelled NOTAM 1157. Thereby, international flights over the Aegean Sea started again. Nonetheless, Greece continues to ask Turkish State aircraft to provide their flight plans and position reports before they enter into the Athinai FIR (Van Dyke, 2005: 86). However, Turkey refuses to provide these plans on the grounds that the system of FIR applies only to the civilian aircraft.

2.4. Dispute over the Breadth of the Territorial Seas

Turkey and Greece have considerable differences on the breadth of their territorial seas in the Aegean. Dispute over the breadth of the territorial seas is important in that it has additional implications for delimiting continental shelf and navigational and overflight freedoms of Turkey.

Dispute over the breadth of the territorial seas concerns probable extension by Greece of its current six-nautical-mile territorial seas to twelve nautical miles³⁸. Especially, whether such an extension would apply to the Greek islands off the Turkish coast is contested by the two countries.

The UNCLOS paved the way for the extension of the breadth of the territorial seas to an upper limit of twelve nautical miles (UNCLOS, Article 3). Nonetheless, the right to extend the breadth of the territorial seas to twelve nautical miles has its own

³⁸ The current breadth of the Turkish and Greek territorial seas in the Aegean Sea is six nautical miles. Turkey claimed its six-nautical-mile territorial seas in 1964 after Greece extended the breadth of its territorial seas from three to six nautical miles in 1936.

limitations in case special circumstances prevail. As a matter of fact, the UNCLOS states:

Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial seas beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith (UNCLOS, Article 15).

The emphasis on historic title or other special circumstances is important in that it calls States with opposite coasts to delimit their territorial seas in relation to each other by agreement. In other words, special circumstances should be considered when delimiting the breadth of the territorial seas. As a corollary, twelve-nautical-mile territorial seas is not applied automatically irrespective of prevalent special circumstances. However, the UNCLOS does not specify special circumstances clearly. Nonetheless, it is supposed that the most apparent special circumstance regarding the Aegean Sea is its unique geographical configuration given the proximity of the Greek islands off the Turkish coast to the Turkish coast (Kut, 2001: 262-263; Karl, 1989: 158).

Whether islands off the Turkish coast can generate territorial seas to the detriment of Turkey is the most outstanding aspect of the dispute over the breadth of the territorial seas. With respect to the breadth of the territorial seas of islands, the UNCLOS states: "... the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory" (UNCLOS, Article 121.2). This means that islands are entitled to have territorial seas same as the mainland of a State. However, Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea present special circumstances given their proximity to the Turkish coast. In case they are given twelve-nautical-mile territorial seas, Turkey's navigational and overflight freedoms would be prejudiced significantly.

In the view of Greece, the right to extend the breadth of its territorial seas from six to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean Sea is “absolute” and “unalienable” under the terms of UNCLOS (Heraclides, 2010: 183). In addition, Greece argues that Turkey would benefit from the right of innocent passage in case the Greek territorial seas in the Aegean are extended to twelve nautical miles (Kozyris, 2001: 106; Nachmani, 2002: 100-101).

Turkey argues that the breadth of the territorial seas should be delimited on the basis of a bilateral agreement with Greece given prevalent special circumstances in the Aegean (İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 158). Actually, in case Greece extended the breadth of its territorial seas from six to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean, Turkey’s freedom of high seas and overflight would be prejudiced significantly³⁹. It is noteworthy that the UNCLOS permits extension of the breadth of the territorial seas to twelve nautical miles as long as such an extension does not compromise the interests and security of other States (UNCLOS, Article 7.6). Once the territorial seas of Greece were extended to twelve nautical miles, Turkey would need to pass through the Greek territorial seas to enjoy high seas freedom because the vast majority of the Aegean high seas would turn into the Greek territorial seas (Charney, 1989: 254). Nonetheless, Turkey would benefit from the innocent passage through the Greek territorial seas. Yet, innocent passage through the territorial seas of another State is subjected to suspension in times of war or emergency, and does not allow submarines to pass in a submerged position or planes to overfly (UNCLOS, Articles 17-21). In addition, extension of the Greek territorial seas in the Aegean to twelve nautical miles would entitle Greece to extend its national airspace from ten to twelve-nautical-miles which would further prejudice Turkey’s overflight freedom.

Dispute over the breadth of the territorial seas influenced political relations between Turkey and Greece notably especially after Greece ratified UNCLOS in 1995.

³⁹ High seas freedom of Turkey is its “unimpeded ability to move its ships between the Turkish straits and the Mediterranean” (Van Dyke, 2005: 84).

Nonetheless, relations between the two countries were already tense in the period subsequent to the failure of the Davos Process in 1989. Rapprochement could not be restored even when PASOK led by A. Papandreou returned to power in 1993. Domestically, death of Özal in early 1993 who wholeheartedly advocated rapprochement accounts to some extent for the lack of willingness from the Turkish side for the resumption of rapprochement (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 28). In addition to that, Greece and Southern Cyprus concluded a joint defence pact for the coordination of military strategy, exercises and equipment in November 1993 (*Milliyet*, 1993). The joint defence pact strained relations between the two countries to the extent that Turkey announced that it would provide TRNC with the same level of support (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 28).

Relations further deteriorated in 1994 when Greece blocked final implementation of the Customs Union between the EU (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 28). The prospect of establishing a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU provided Greece with the opportunity to upload its national interests to the EU level. Therefore, Greece agreed to drop its veto conditionally. For Greece, the EU had to commit itself to confirm the eligibility of Southern Cyprus for full membership six months after the July 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which was to review the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Hale, 2000: 237; Veremis, 2001: 44). The EU accepted the condition put forward by Greece, and the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU could be established on 6 March 1995. In response to the commitment of the EU to start accession negotiations with Southern Cyprus, Turkey and TRNC announced in December 1995 an agreement for the integration of the two countries (*Milliyet*, 1995).

Dispute over the breadth of the territorial seas came to the fore when the Greek Parliament ratified the UNCLOS on 23 April 1995. After ratification, Greece announced that it was entitled to extend territorial seas of its mainland and islands from six to twelve nautical miles (Van Dyke, 2005: 83). In response, the TGNA declared that the unilateral extension of the breadth of the territorial seas from six to twelve nautical miles would be a *casus belli*. The *casus belli* was not withdrawn by Turkey despite the

continuing rapprochement and ‘exploratory talks’ between the two countries. It illustrates the realist outlook of TFP in the 1990s. In addition, the fact that it has not been withdrawn yet exemplifies the rational instrumentality that underlies the Europeanization of TFP. In other words, the *casus belli* would have been withdrawn if Turkey had been fully socialized into the EU’s rules and norms.

2.5. Dispute over the Sovereignty of Certain Islands and Islets in the Aegean

Politically, the dispute over the sovereignty of certain islands and islets in the Aegean is important because it has implications for the other aspects of the Aegean dispute. For instance, sovereignty must be precise for the establishment of baselines to delimit the continental shelf and the breadth of the territorial seas (Syrigos, 2001: 284).

The ownership of certain islands and islets in the Aegean Sea has been contested by Turkey and Greece since the mid-90s. The fact that some islands and islets in the Aegean Sea have not been ceded explicitly to the either side by the governing Treaties – treaties through which islands and islets in the Aegean Sea were transferred to the either side – makes the two countries contest inevitably their ownership. In other words, the dispute between Turkey and Greece over the ownership of certain islands and islets stems from the fact that certain small islands and islets were disregarded by these Treaties at the time of their transfer (Van Dyke, 2005: 69).

Another reason behind their differences is the ambiguous language embedded in the governing Treaties (Denk, 1999: 132; Gündüz, 2001: 91). Actually, there are several Treaties in place that paved the way for the transfer of these islands and islets. Certain aspects of these Treaties are noteworthy to understand the nature of the dispute.

The 1913 London Treaty is the first relevant document for the transfer of islands and islets in the Aegean Sea to either Turkey or Greece. The 1913 London

Treaty stipulated the transfer of certain islands in the Aegean Sea from the Ottoman Empire to Greece. The Ottoman Empire renounced all its rights over the island of Crete (Girit) in favour of Greece, and accepted that the then six great powers of Europe – Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia – decide on the future of the islands in the Eastern Aegean, namely Lemnos (Limni), Samothrace (Semadirek), Lesvos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya) (London Treaty, Articles 4-5). Thus, those six great powers of Europe ruled in 1913 that the aforementioned islands in the Eastern Aegean be ceded to Greece and that Gökçeada, Bozcaada and the island of Castellorizo (Meis) in the Mediterranean be left to the Ottoman Empire. The decision was communicated to Greece in 1914 and therefore it is commonly called as the 1914 Decision. The decision of the six great powers of Europe was further confirmed by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty (Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 12).

Thus, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty explicitly recognized the Turkish sovereignty over the islands of Bozcaada, Gökçeada and Rabbit Islands and the Greek sovereignty over the islands of Lemnos (Limni), Samothrace (Semadirek), Lesvos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Ikaria (Ahikerya). In addition to that, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty states: “in the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets lying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State” (Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 6). Hence, those islands and islets that were not ceded to the either side by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and that are situated within three miles of the Turkish coast – then territorial seas of Turkey and Greece had been fixed at three nautical miles in relation to each other – are left to Turkey. As a corollary, it can be argued that those islands and islets that were not ceded explicitly to the either side by the relevant Treaties and that remain in the territorial seas of the either side should belong to the Coastal State (Van Dyke, 2005: 71).

While the aforementioned islands and islets were left to Greece, the Dodecanese Islands and the Mediterranean island of Castellorizo (Meis) were ceded to Italy by Turkey by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty which states:

Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia [İstanbulya], Rhodes [Rodos], Kharki [Herke], Karpathos [Kerpe], Kasos [Çoban], Tilos [İlyaki], Misiros [İncirli], Kalimnos [Kilimli], Leros [Leryoz], Patmos [Batnoz], Lipsos [Lipso], Symi [Sömbeki], and Cos [İstanköy], which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizo [Meis] (Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 15).

The expression 'islets dependent thereon' is noteworthy because it is considerably different from the language used in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty that transferred the same islands from Italy to Greece⁴⁰. In addition to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey and Italy signed the January 1932 Ankara Agreement with a view to resolving the maritime boundary dispute between the then Italian island of Castellorizo (Meis) and the Turkish coast (Denk, 1999: 143; İnan and P. Gözen, 2009: 179-180). The parties to the agreement also decided to set up a joint technical committee with the intention of delimiting the rest of the maritime boundary between the Dodecanese Islands and the Turkish coast (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 76). Consequently, the joint technical committee prepared a nonbinding protocol and submitted it to the parties in December 1932. Thereby, 37 pairs of reference points were fixed to divide the maritime boundary between Turkey and the then Italian Dodecanese Islands (Denk, 1999: 142-143; Athanasopoulos, 2001: 76). The thirtieth point is relevant for the dispute over the Kardak Rocks because it introduced that the maritime boundary north of the island of Kalimnos would be at a median distance between the Kardak Rocks on the Italian side and Çavuş Island on the Turkish side (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 76). Thus, the Kardak Rocks were referred to as belonging to Italy by the nonbinding protocol. It is nonbinding because it has never been ratified by the TGNA contrary to the January 1932 Ankara Agreement that was ratified by the TGNA in January 1933. Therefore,

⁴⁰ The language of both Treaties will be compared below in detail.

irrespective of the January 1932 Ankara Agreement, the protocol of December 1932 is not binding either for Turkey or Italy - and Greece as its successor.

Italian sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands was terminated by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which transferred these islands to Greece by stating:

Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter, namely Stampalia [İstanbulya], Rhodes [Rodos], Kharki [Herke], Karpathos [Kerpe], Kasos [Çoban], Tilos [İlyaki], Misiros [İncirli], Kalimnos [Kilimli], Leros [Leryoz], Patmos [Batnoz], Lipsos [Lipso], Symi [Sömbeki], and Cos [İstanköy] and Castellorizo [Meis], as well as the adjacent islets (Paris Peace Treaty, Article 14.1).

The ambiguity of languages arises from the fact that while Article 15 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty referred to ‘the islets dependent thereon’, Article 14.1 of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty referred to ‘adjacent islets’. Actually, the meanings attributed to the terms ‘adjacency’ and ‘dependency’ are considerably different. Physical adjacency is about distance whereas dependency refers to a relationship, a linkage in terms of being conditioned by another. Thus, it is clear that adjacency is rather an unambiguous term because it refers to geographic contiguity while dependency is abstract, lacking clarity of meaning.

In the view of Greece, the Kardak rocks are ‘dependent’ islands of Kalimnos because they are 5.5 nautical miles from it - and 1.9 nautical miles southeast of the Greek claimed islet of Kalolimnos⁴¹ (Van Dyke, 2005: 69). In addition to that, Greece claims that the December 1932 protocol is an integral part of the January 1932 Ankara Agreement and therefore a separate ratification process is not needed for it (Kurumahmut, 2000: 114; İnan and Acer, 2004: 129). Hence, Greece asserts that the rocks were transferred to Italy by the January 1932 Ankara Agreement. Thus, they

⁴¹ The island of Kalolimnos was not named in any of the Treaties that provided for the transfer of islands in the Aegean from Turkey to Greece. Therefore, it can be regarded as ‘adjacent’ to Kalimnos (Van Dyke, 2005: 69).

belong to Greece because it succeeded to Italy by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Another argument put forward by Greece is that it placed a trigonometric marker on the larger of the rocks and that it included them in environmental activities conducted by the EC in the 1980s which in the view of Greece attest in a way to the Greek sovereignty (Heraclides, 2010: 211).

For Turkey, they belong to Turkey because they are not covered by any of the Treaties that provided for the transfer of islands and islets in the Aegean Sea to the either side and they are within its territorial seas (İnan and Acer, 2004: 130). In addition to that, Turkey claims that the rocks are more 'adjacent' to Turkey because they are only 3.8 nautical miles from the Turkish coast and 2.2 nautical miles from the Çavuş Island (Van Dyke, 2005: 69). Turkey also puts forward that a title deed of the Kardak rocks is registered on the Karakaya village of the city of Muğla (Denk, 1999: 135; İnan and Acer, 2004: 129). Apart from that, Turkey notes that the December 1932 protocol has not been ratified by TGNA and not registered with the League of Nations⁴² (Denk, 1999: 145).

The most known dispute between Turkey and Greece over the ownership of certain islands and islets in the Aegean Sea is over the Kardak rocks⁴³. These rocks are

⁴² According to the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, Treaties had to be registered with the League of Nations to have binding force (Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 18).

⁴³ Another sovereignty related dispute broke out when Turkey questioned the sovereignty of the islets of Gavdos and Gavdopula which are situated south of the island of Crete (Girit). For Turkey, these islets have not been ceded by the Ottoman Empire and Turkey as its successor (Van Dyke, 2005: 70). In the view of Greece, the islets belong to Greece because it has exercised authority over them for decades and they are 'dependent' on or 'adjacent' to the island of Crete (Girit) (Van Dyke, 2005: 70). The dispute broke out when Turkey opposed on 30 May 1996 to the inclusion of Gavdos in a NATO exercise. However, the dispute did not escalate to a crisis because Turkey later withdrew its claim (Athanasopoulou, 1997: 87). It may be argued that Turkey questioned the sovereignty of the two islets to show its disconformity with the

situated in the Eastern Aegean Sea near the Turkish coast. The dispute over the Kardak rocks raised the issue of grey areas in the Aegean (Athanasopoulou, 1997: 86). Grey areas refer to “islets and rocks in the Eastern Aegean whose status as to sovereignty was undetermined” (Heraclides, 2010: 209).

The dispute broke out on 26 December 1995 when the Turkish bulk carrier called *Figen Akat* ran aground on the rocks. The captain of the bulk carrier did not want to be assisted by the Greek authorities saying that the accident had happened in an area under the Turkish sovereignty. Therefore, the bulk carrier was taken to the nearest Turkish port by the Greek ships. On 29 December 1995, Turkey issued a memorandum to Greece through which it stated that the Kardak rocks were indeed under the Turkish sovereignty (Kurumahmut, 2000: 109). Greece opposed to the memorandum and stated that the Kardak Rocks were under the Greek sovereignty (Kurumahmut, 2000: 109; Kut, 2001: 259). Eventually, the issue became public with wide coverage by the media of both countries. Following that, local authorities from Greece and journalists from Turkey arrived in the rocks to place their respective national flags. Later on, Greece ordered a contingent of soldiers to the rocks (*Milliyet*, 1996). On 29 January 1996, Turkey restated the unquestionable Turkish sovereignty over the Kardak rocks (*Milliyet*, 1996). In addition to that, Turkey made clear its readiness to negotiate the regime of the islands and islets in the Aegean Sea together with asking for the withdrawal of the Greek commando force and symbols of sovereignty from the rocks (Raftopoulos, 1997: 431). In the face of the apathy of Greece to withdraw its commando force and symbols of sovereignty, Turkey ordered its naval forces to the area for patrolling. Greece reacted to the act of Turkey through dispatching its additional forces to the area to support its existing commando force (Valvo, 2000: 117). On 31 January 1996, Turkey landed a commando force on the smaller one of the rocks. Nonetheless, the two countries did not end up fighting each other mainly because the USA acted as an intermediary to ease the tension between the two countries (*Milliyet*, 1996).

undetermined status of islands and islets after the dispute over the Kardak Rocks broke out (Kut, 2001: 260-261).

However, Greece blocked the forthcoming meeting of the Turkey-EU Association Council, and did not fulfil its commitment to drop its veto against the releasing of the Fourth Financial Protocol to Turkey in response to the crisis⁴⁴ (Syrigos, 2001: 280). Also, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on 04 March 1996 which stated: "...the islet of Imia [Kardak] belongs to the Dodecanese group of islands... and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory" and "Greece's borders are also part of the external borders of the European Union" (European Parliament, 1996: 1). The resolution of the EP illustrates national projection/uploading by Greece of its national interests to the EU level, as well. In the end, Turkey and Greece agreed on an "agreement of disentanglement" mediated by the USA and withdrew gradually their forces from the rocks (Raftopoulos, 1997: 431). However, the two countries have not still agreed on the ownership of the Kardak Rocks although their "disentanglement" continues.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter attempted to portray the high resilience of the Aegean dispute in TFP and GFP and the influence of domestic politics and veto players on the failure of the previous attempts at rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. To that end, political and legal dimensions of the dispute have been discussed in detail with special reference to the contested provisions of the governing Treaties.

The Europeanization of the Aegean dispute despite its high resilience in foreign policies of the two countries is noteworthy. In this respect, it has been pointed out that resolution of the Aegean dispute is essential for Turkey's accession to the EU as

⁴⁴ In July 1980, The EC committed itself to release the Fourth Financial Protocol for the period of 1982-1986. The Fourth Financial Protocol was suspended by the European Commission when the military closed down all political parties in Turkey in October 1981. However, the Fourth Financial Protocol could not be released even after civilian rule was restored in 1983 because Greece has vetoed it to date.

evidenced by the fact that it was referred to in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). Moreover, previous crises and failed attempts at rapprochement between Turkey and Greece that were sparked by the two countries' bilateral differences over the Aegean have been mentioned to show how the involvement of the EU in the continuing process of rapprochement has impacted on the process.

Nonetheless, the dispute over the Kardak rocks has been the last serious confrontation between the two countries over the Aegean. It may be argued that the dispute over the rocks as well as other incidents that the two countries experienced in their relations thereafter became the stimulus behind the continuing process of rapprochement. The continuing process of rapprochement is important in that it is Europeanized.

3. THE EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH GREECE: AN EVALUATION IN VIEW OF THE AEGEAN DISPUTE

The Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece is significant in that it exemplifies to a great extent the way the EU has influenced TFP, especially after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. It is also illustrative of the logic of consequences in the Europeanization of TFP. It is a fact that conditionality mechanism and rational instrumentality embedded in the EU's relations with the third countries is relevant for the Europeanization of TFP. Nonetheless, it was earlier noted that rational instrumentality and norm internalization are not mutually exclusive (March and Olsen, 1998: 12). Therefore, the logic of appropriateness may be applied to explain some patterns of the Europeanization of TFP although Turkey is not in a position to fully internalize the EU's rules and norms given its candidacy⁴⁵.

It is argued that Turkey has been consistently instrumental in its approach to the Europeanization of its relations with Greece. Therefore, the logic of consequences underlies the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey. Turkey is instrumental in its approach to Europeanization because it expects full membership of the EU in return for Europeanization. Socialization of Turkey into the EU's rules and norms is not likely given that Turkey is not in a position to upload its national interests to the EU level. It only downloads from the EU level. This is mainly because of the fact that Turkey is not represented in the EU's institutions and decision making processes. What the EU obliges Turkey to fulfil before its accession to the EU is decided unanimously by its Member States. This means that the Member States of the EU have the opportunity to shape the conditions set out by the EU for fulfilment by Turkey through conditionality. In other words, they are able to upload their national interests to the EU level.

⁴⁵ Recall Chapter 1.

The influence of the EU on TFP gained impetus after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. This is mainly because of the fact that there was a lack of credibility with respect to the prospect of full membership of Turkey, especially after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council at which Turkey's candidacy was not declared. Thus, in the absence of the carrot of full membership, Turkey believed that it had virtually insignificant incentives for Europeanization.

The policy of Greece to use the EU as a leverage against Turkey, among other things, accounts to some extent for the EU's decision not to declare Turkey's candidacy at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Actually, accession of Greece to the EU in 1981 provided it with the opportunity to use the latter as a weighty leverage against Turkey giving its full membership aspirations⁴⁶ (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 44; Kavakas, 2000: 147; Aydın, 2000: 132; Hale and Avcı, 2002: 47; Economides, 2005: 484). By using the EU as a leverage against Turkey, Greece aimed at forcing the country to concede from its policy towards the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue. Thereby, Greece expected to benefit from the conditionality mechanism embedded in the EU's relations with the third countries. This means that Turkey had to satisfy Greek national interests to advance its relations with the EU. In other words, Greece could veto Turkey's relations with the EU to force the country to satisfy its national interests. For

⁴⁶ Greece applied for associate membership in 1959 and became an associate member of the EU in 1961. It applied for full membership in 1975, after seven years of dictatorship. The EU was particularly concerned with the implications of accession of Greece to the EU on Turkey-Greece relations. In its January 1976 opinion regarding accession of Greece, the European Commission argued that the EU should not be a party to the disputes between Turkey and Greece and therefore bilateral differences between the two countries should be settled through a pre-accession period (European Commission, 1976: 1). However, the opinion of the European Commission was disregarded by the Council of Ministers, and Greece could accede to the EU in 1981 without going through a pre-accession period (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 35). Since then, Greece used the EU as a leverage against Turkey until the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 44; Kavakas, 2000: 147; Aydın, 2000: 132; Hale and Avcı, 2002: 47; Economides, 2005: 484).

instance, Greece was the only Member State that opposed to the referral of Turkey's full membership application to the European Commission for an opinion in 1987, and it blocked final implementation of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1994 for political reasons⁴⁷. In addition, Greece blocked the forthcoming meeting of the Turkey-EU Association Council, and did not fulfil its commitment to drop its veto against the releasing of the Fourth Financial Protocol to Turkey in response to the Kardak crisis that broke out in early 1996. As a matter of fact, in some cases, the EU had to make some assurances in line with the Greek national interests to overcome the Greek veto. As a clear manifestation of its uploading strategy, Greece dropped its veto against the establishment of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in March 1995 conditionally only after the EU committed itself to confirm the eligibility of Southern Cyprus for full membership six months after the July 1996 IGC which was to review the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Hale, 2000: 237; Veremis, 2001: 44).

Meanwhile, while Greece used the EU as a leverage, Turkey referred to its military strength to deter Greece as evidenced by the 1995 *casus belli* resolution of the TGNA (Nachmani, 2002: 96). As a consequence, Greece felt threatened by Turkey whereas Turkey believed that the prospect of its full membership was being blocked by Greece. Therefore, improvement of relations between the two countries seemed mainly contingent on two conditions: i) relinquishing by Greece of the use of the EU as a leverage against Turkey in favour of a more Europeanized foreign policy; and ii)

⁴⁷ Recall that relations between the two countries were already tense in 1987 and in 1994. As a matter of fact, Turkey applied for full membership in April 1987, i.e. one month after the second crisis over the delimitation of the continental shelf broke out. In its 1989 avis on Turkey, the European Commission cited economic and political situation in Turkey and the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue as reasons not to start accession negotiations immediately (European Commission, 1989: Par. 7 and Par. 9). Despite a period of thaw in their relations subsequent to the 'Davos Process' that was initiated in 1988, relations between the two countries were strained again after Greece and Southern Cyprus concluded the joint defence pact in 1993.

relinquishing by Turkey of referral to its military might to balance against Greece in favour of a more Europeanized foreign policy.

In the Europeanization of foreign policy, the EU's rules and norms become guiding principles of national foreign policy. In the case of Turkey, norm internalization is not likely to happen through socialization due to its candidate status. Hence, the EU's rules and norms had to be promoted through conditionality. After experiencing some crises in their relations following the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, Greece concluded that engaging Turkey in EU accession process could be a better choice for the settlement of their bilateral differences. In other words, Greece expected that Europeanization of Turkey through conditionality would pave the way for the improvement of their relations (Triantaphyllou, 2005: 333; Diez *et al.*, 2006: 579; Tsarouhas, 2009: 50). Greece was well aware of the fact that it had a comparative advantage within the EU given its full membership. In other words, Greece was able to project its national interests to the EU level, and induce resolution of its bilateral differences with Turkey in line with its national interests⁴⁸.

The continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece started to become Europeanized when Turkey's candidacy was declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. This means that it became an issue of the EU when bilateral differences between Turkey and Greece were referred to at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Keridis, 2001: 18; Kotzias, 2009: 268). Hence, post-Helsinki process of

⁴⁸ Another view is that Greece dropped its veto against Turkey's candidacy to achieve its goal of acceding to the EMU (Nicolaidis, 2001: 251). Firstly, military expenditures wrought a heavy burden for the Greek economy at a time when the country aimed at achieving full membership to the EMU (Larrabee, 2001: 236; Dokos and Tsakonas, 2003: 18). Given that threat perceptions from Turkey have shaped Greek military expenditures for decades, accession to the EMU was highly dependent on avoiding arms race with Turkey (Dokos and Tsakonas, 2003: 18). Arms race would end when the two countries resolved their bilateral differences.

rapprochement is not new but unique because of the EU's involvement in it. Involvement of the EU rendered the continuing process of rapprochement stronger because it provided the respective governments in both countries with arguments to justify their preference for the settlement of the Aegean dispute against domestic politics and veto players (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). More importantly, accession to the EU became an important carrot for Turkey to reconcile its bilateral differences with Greece (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). In a nutshell, Turkey expects full membership of the EU by reconciling its bilateral differences with Greece whereas Greece hopes to resolve its bilateral differences with Turkey by engaging the country in EU accession process (Triantaphyllou, 2005: 333; Diez *et al.*, 2006: 579; Tsarouhas, 2009: 50).

3.1. Path towards the Continuing Process of Rapprochement

The continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece and the Europeanization of Turkey-Greece relations are separate but interrelated phenomena. While the continuing process of rapprochement started with the letter of the Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem to his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou in March 1999; the Europeanization of Turkey-Greece relations started when Greece dropped its veto against Turkey's candidacy to the EU at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council (Keridis, 2001: 18; Kotzias, 2009: 268).

The continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was sparked on 24 May 1999 when the Turkish Foreign Minister wrote a letter to invite his Greek counterpart to embark on talks to improve their bilateral relations. Actually, it may well have started earlier in 1996 after the crisis over the Kardak rocks broke out. As a matter of fact, Costas Simitis who saw engaging Turkey in EU accession process as a prerequisite for the improvement of relations with Turkey took the leadership of PASOK in January 1996 (Athanassopoulou, 1997: 88). However, rapprochement did not materialize until 1999 mainly because of the intra-party opposition to rapprochement in Greece (Rumelili, 2007: 118). For instance, Cem approached his

Greek counterpart, Theodoros Pangalos from PASOK for rapprochement earlier in 1998. However, the Greek Foreign Minister did not welcome the initiative. Therefore, the continuing process of rapprochement could materialize only with the letter of Cem to G. Papandreou after the March 1999 Kosovo crisis⁴⁹.

The first incident with potential to mar bilateral relations after the 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks took place in January 1997 when Southern Cyprus announced that it was planning to buy S-300 missiles from Russia to defend the new airbase on its soil constructed for the landing of Greek fighter aircraft for refuelling and rearming purposes in line with the joint defence pact concluded in 1993 (Diez, 2002: 146). Turkey reacted noting that it would destroy them through an air strike in case they are placed on Southern Cyprus (*Milliyet*, 1997). However, a crisis was prevented from emerging when Greece and Southern Cyprus decided to install S-300 missiles not on Southern Cyprus but on the Greek island of Crete (Girit). A tentative attempt at improving relations between Turkey and Greece took place subsequently when the President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel and the Prime Minister of Greece, Costas Simitis met in Madrid in July 1997 during a NATO meeting to discuss how to lead their future relations on a peaceful basis (Athanasopoulou, 1997: 93; Kut, 2001: 263). The most tangible outcome of the meeting became a joint declaration which promulgated six basic principles for the future of Turkey-Greece relations. These six basic principles are:

- i) mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighbourly relations;
- ii) respect for each other's sovereignty;
- iii) respect for the principles of international law and international agreements;
- iv) respect for each other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty;
- v) commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and
- vi) a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without the use of force or threat of force (Madrid Declaration, 1997: 1).

⁴⁹ The March 1999 Kosovo Crisis is qualified as the ultimate “triggering event” that enabled the continuing process of rapprochement (Heraclides, 2010: 145).

The joint declaration is important in that it shows how the two countries want to lead their future relations. In other words, it is illustrative of how Turkey and Greece view each other and of what they understand from 'good neighbourly relations'. It is understood from references in the joint declaration to 'respect for other's sovereignty' that the two countries view the Aegean dispute as a sovereignty issue. Actually, it may be argued that the more an issue is associated with sovereignty the more difficult becomes its settlement given that sovereign rights are deemed non-negotiable. Therefore, not realist concerns but the EU's rules and norms should guide foreign policy for Europeanization.

Furthermore, the emphasis on 'respect for each other's legitimate vital interests and concerns in the Aegean' illustrates that both Turkey and Greece view their vital interests prejudiced in the Aegean by the activities of the other side. Both of them view some of what the other side calls its 'vital interests' as illegitimate given the emphasis on the 'legitimacy of vital interests'. For instance, Greece views having a 10-nautical-mile national airspace for its islands in the Aegean as a vital interest. For Turkey, this is illegitimate.

On the other hand, there is also the issue of unilateral acts. It is clear that by 'unilateral acts' the two countries refer to their respective previous activities on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. Actually, the two countries had already committed themselves to refrain from unilateral acts at the 1976 Bern Agreement. This is illustrative of the fact that principles for the settlement of the Aegean dispute emerged throughout years.

Lastly, by referring in the joint declaration to the peaceful settlement of disputes on the basis of 'mutual consent' and 'without use of force or threat of force', the two countries may have meant their previous experiences. Turkey may have referred by 'mutual consent' to the unilateral referral of Greece to the ICJ the delimitation of the

continental shelf in 1976. Greece may have referred to the 1995 casus belli resolution of TGNA by ‘without use of force or threat of force’.

However, the joint declaration was not potent enough to reconcile bilateral differences mainly because of the incidents that ensued. Firstly, relations between Turkey and Greece and the EU deteriorated following the confirmation by the EU of the eligibility of Southern Cyprus for membership in early 1997 as it had promised Greece in 1995 in return for dropping its veto against the Customs Union with Turkey. Relations further deteriorated when the EU declared the candidacy of Southern Cyprus at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council (European Council, 1997: Par. 11). At the same time, Greece continued its veto on the Fourth Financial Protocol during the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Furthermore, while Turkey hoped for candidacy status from the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the EU confined itself to confirm its eligibility for membership mainly because of the country’s problematic relations with Greece and Southern Cyprus and its poor human rights record (European Council, 1997: Par. 31). However, Turkey’s eligibility for full membership had already been confirmed in the 1989 Commission avis on Turkey (European Commission, 1989: Par. 13). The 1997 Luxembourg European Council repeated the obvious and therefore did not satisfy Turkey. Turkey-EU relations were strained to the extent that Turkey threatened the Union with suspending political relations (Hale and Avcı, 2002: 41).

Although Turkey’s candidacy was not declared at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the European Commission issued a European Strategy for Turkey in March 1998 “to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field” (European Union, 1998a: 1). To that end, it is stated in the Strategy that the possibilities afforded by the 1963 Ankara Agreement should be developed, the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey should be intensified, the financial cooperation should be implemented and Turkey’s participation in certain programmes and certain agencies should be assured (European Commission, 1998a: 1). In addition, Turkey was invited to the upcoming Pan-European Meeting (European Commission, 1998a: 1). However, to show its disapproval of not being declared a

candidate and of candidacy of Southern Cyprus to the EU, Turkey did not attend the March 1998 Pan-European Meeting that was held in London, the UK.

Secondly, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999, the leader of the terrorist organization Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) which has been waging separatist terrorist attacks against Turkey since 1984, with a Greek Cypriot passport on his way to the airport in Nairobi, Kenya upon leaving the Greek embassy after being provided with shelter endangered bilateral relations seriously. The Öcalan affair had significant domestic implications both in Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, Simitis was facing a great pressure to resign because of the engagement of the Greek government in such an affair. However, the Greek Prime Minister did not resign but dismissed Pangalos and Ministers of Internal Affairs and Public Order for their involvement in such an affair. Dismissal of the Greek Foreign Minister had particular resonance for Turkey-Greece relations as G. Papandreou, alternate Greek Foreign Minister known for his willingness to improve Turkey-Greece relations became the new Greek Foreign Minister (Öniş, 2003: 171). Domestic implications of the Öcalan affair in Turkey were notable, too. Süleyman Demirel criticized Greece harshly. The Turkish President even pointed to the Turkey's right of self-defence (*Milliyet*, 1999). In response, Greece put its troops on alert along its border with Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 38). Fortunately, the two countries did not end up fighting. Nonetheless, Turkey did not rely on military means but diplomacy, and complained about the act of Greece before the UN via a letter (*Milliyet*, 1999a). On the other hand, rise of G. Papandreou to foreign ministry marked a new beginning in Turkey-Greece relations as both the new Greek Foreign Minister and his Turkish counterpart were willing to foster good neighbourly relations (Öniş, 2003: 171).

Willingness of the two Foreign Ministers for good neighbourly relations converged when the Kosovo crisis broke out in March 1999. The 1999 Kosovo crisis concerned both countries given their geographical proximity to the region (Nachmani, 2002: 116; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 127). Such proximity made them vulnerable to the consequences of the crisis. The 1999 Kosovo crisis is important in that it provided the

two Foreign Ministers with intense contacts on how to cooperate on the consequences of the crisis. These contacts led to a rapport between the two statesmen (Heraclides, 2010: 145). Thereafter, they came to the conclusion that they would better cooperate with each other than confront to resolve their bilateral differences.

The first step came from the Turkish Foreign Minister who wrote a letter to his Greek counterpart on 24 May 1999 to “share some views on ways in which to ameliorate bilateral relations” (Letter from Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, 24 May 1999). In his letter, the Turkish Foreign Minister proposed to conclude an agreement to combat terrorism in addition to developing a plan to reconcile bilateral differences between the two countries through resorting to all peaceful means referred to in the UN Charter (Letter from Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, 24 May 1999). In the letter, it was implied that Greece had to detach itself from supporting terrorism if it desired to improve its relations with Turkey.

Actually, Turkey expected certain benefits from improving its relations with Greece, e.g. to “limit the danger of a crisis in the Aegean” and “put international pressure on Greece to abandon its veto against Turkey’s candidacy to the EU” (Heraclides, 2010: 145). This means that fostering good neighbourly relations was viewed as necessary to prevent future crises from emerging in the Aegean and to overcome the Greek veto against Turkey’s candidacy.

In response to the letter, G. Papandreou called his Turkish counterpart to congratulate his second-term in office as Foreign Minister under the new government in power since May 1999⁵⁰ and asked for some time before an official reply to the letter

⁵⁰ The new government was of a coalition composed of Democratic Left Party (DSP) under Bülent Ecevit, Nationalist Action Party (MHP) under Devlet Bahçeli and ANAP under Mesut Yılmaz.

(*Hürriyet*, 1999a). The June 1999 Cologne European Council convened before G. Papandreu officially replied. Whether Greece would continue its veto against Turkey's candidacy was on the top of the agenda of the 1999 Cologne European Council (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 47). Actually, Turkey expected Greece drop its veto in the face of the recent developments in their relations. However, it soon became clear that Greece was not in a position to drop its veto on the grounds that Turkey had not still agreed to refer the delimitation of the continental shelf to the ICJ (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 48). In the face of the stance of Greece, the EU committed itself to review the prospect of Turkey's candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999: par. 59). Meanwhile, G. Papandreu clarified that Greece would not have opposed to Turkey's candidacy in case it had fulfilled the same criteria applied to all other Candidate States (*Athens News Agency*, 1999). It was the first sign of the fact that Greece no longer wanted to use the EU as a leverage against Turkey to achieve its national interests.

Meanwhile, the Greek Foreign Minister officially replied to the letter of İsmail Cem on 25 June 1999. G. Papandreu invited Turkey to initiate dialogue on issues of low political significance like tourism, environment, culture, organized crime, trade, regional issues and energy transfer lines (Letter from Mr George Papandreu, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, 25 June 1999). Turkey welcomed the letter. Soon afterwards, The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced a meeting between the two Foreign Ministers in New York at a UN Secretary-General sponsored meeting over Kosovo on 30 June 1999 (Bertrand, 2003: 3). The two Foreign Ministers met as scheduled, and agreed to hold meetings for dialogue and sign bilateral agreements on cooperation on the issues specified in the letter of Papandreu (Heraclides, 2010: 146). Accordingly, delegations from the two countries started to hold bilateral talks to foster cooperation on the aforementioned issues of low political significance. Subsequent to the talks between the two

delegations, Foreign Ministers of the two countries signed several bilateral agreements on cooperation⁵¹.

There happened an earthquake measuring 7.4 on Richter scale on 17 August 1999 in İzmit, Turkey. Soon after the disaster, the Greek Foreign Minister called his Turkish counterpart to offer assistance. It was the first call Turkey received (*Athens News Agency*, 1999a). Turkey was particularly in need of specialists in rescuing given the magnitude of the disaster. Thus, the Greek rescue team was dispatched to Turkey together with a number of doctors, nurses, seismologists and fire fighting planes (*Hürriyet*, 1999). On the other hand, Turkey offered its assistance to Greece when an earthquake measuring 5.6 on the Richter scale hit Athens on 7 September 1999. Turkey dispatched its rescue team to Greece. It was the first time that the Turkish rescue team was dispatched abroad (*Milliyet*, 1999b). It is noteworthy that the process of rapprochement was legitimized on the eyes of the public given the mutual sympathy developed after the disasters (Nicolaidis, 2001: 252; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 86).

⁵¹ For instance, five cooperation agreements were signed in November 2001 in areas like culture, environment and academic cooperation. In addition, a cooperation agreement on issues like terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration came into force in July 2001. Another agreement was signed in March 2002 to build a natural gas pipeline to supply natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Greece through Turkey. Construction of the natural gas pipeline was finalized in 2006. For the EU, the construction of the pipeline is a symbolic move as “it is a physical link between the two countries” (European Commission, 2002: 44). Furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of a Joint Disaster Response Unit under the UN was signed in September 2002. Another agreement on double taxation was signed in December 2002. Furthermore, a High Level Cooperation Council was established and further agreements on cooperation in the fields of border controls, diplomatic missions, standardization, investments, forestry, environment, energy and climate change, education, science technology, communication, illegal immigration and culture and tourism were signed between the two countries in May 2010 when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Athens (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 2010: 1)

This is evidenced by the increasing civil-society dialogue between Turkey and Greece⁵² (Rumelili, 2007: 117).

The process of rapprochement acquired a new dimension after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, accession of Turkey was tied, among other things, to the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece. Therefore, the process of rapprochement started to become Europeanized.

3.2. The Europeanization of the Rapprochement

At the 1999 Cologne European Council, the EU committed itself to review the prospect of candidacy of Turkey at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Therefore, the issue of Turkey's candidacy came to the fore as the 1999 Helsinki European Council loomed large on the horizon.

In the meantime, there was an emerging consensus within the Greek Foreign Ministry to drop the Greek veto against Turkey's candidacy. However, Greece hoped a gesture from Turkey in return for dropping its veto (*Athens News Agency*, 1999b). To that end, the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis wrote to his Turkish counterpart, Bülent Ecevit to reiterate the quest of Greece for a gesture (*Athens News Agency*, 1999b). By a gesture, the Greek Prime Minister may have referred to the reopening of the theological school at Heybeliada in Istanbul or to the lifting of the *casus belli* resolution of the TGNA (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 85). On the one side, the Greek government was particularly concerned with a gesture from Turkey because Simitis was afraid of risking victory prospects of PASOK at the upcoming general elections (Ker-

⁵² Civil-society dialogue between Turkey and Greece was limited before 1999. It increased after 1999, and was supported by the EU, as well. In 2002, the EU devised the Civil Society Development Programme to strengthen civil society dialogue (Birden and Rumelili, 2009: 322). The Programme had two components called Local Civic Initiatives and Greek-Turkish Civic Dialogue. The Civil Society Development Programme expired in 2005.

Lindsay, 2007: 95). In other words, in the view of the Greek Prime Minister, a gesture from Turkey would increase the public support for Turkey's candidacy. On the other hand, Greece feared alienating Turkey, and endangering the continuing process of rapprochement and the Europeanization of the country through vetoing its candidacy (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 95). In addition, Greece expected certain benefits from dropping its veto. The first gain would be to make Turkey agree to proceed to the ICJ for the delimitation of the continental shelf (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337; Economides, 2005: 484-485). The second gain would be to guarantee accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU irrespective of the resolution of the Cyprus issue (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337; Economides, 2005: 484-485). Thus, Greece conditioned dropping its veto on assurances from the EU for its cause regarding the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue.

The 1999 Helsinki European Council convened on 10 December 1999. Turkey's candidacy was declared although it did not offer a gesture. Greece did not veto Turkey's candidacy because it could upload its national interests to the EU level through the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council⁵³ (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337; Economides, 2005: 484-485). This means that Greece prioritized improvement of relations with Turkey to the extent of disregarding domestic implications of dropping its veto. Greece must have considered long-term benefits of improved relations with Turkey. As a matter of fact, after Greece lifted its veto, bilateral differences between the two countries turned into an issue of the EU and the accession of the Southern Cyprus to the EU was secured at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Keridis, 2001: 18; Kotzias, 2009: 268).

⁵³ Apart from that, the harsh reaction of Turkey to the Presidency Conclusions of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the rise to power in Germany in 1998 of Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder who favoured Turkey's accession to the EU and the vocal support of the President of the USA Bill Clinton during an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting that was held in November 1999 in Istanbul were also influential in the EU's decision to declare Turkey's candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council.

Greece could upload its interests regarding the Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue into the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337; Economides, 2005: 484-485). Paragraph 4 stated:

The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4).

The EU may have emphasized the equality of all Candidate States in the aforementioned Paragraph to strengthen the credibility of EU membership for Turkey given that Turkey had already felt discriminated when its candidacy was not declared at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Peaceful settlement of border disputes was referred to as one of the EU's values that must be respected to accede to the EU. Thus, the referral of border disputes to the ICJ became a Community principle of the EU with the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Rumelili, 2008: 105). Whether referral of border disputes to the ICJ would be referred to in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council without input from Greece is contested. By the peaceful settlement of border disputes, the EU meant the methods set out in the UN Charter. In the UN Charter, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means are stipulated as means to settle disputes peacefully (UN Charter, Article 33.1).

In the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU reached a compromise between the respective views of Turkey and Greece on how to

resolve the Aegean dispute. As a matter of fact, it was stated that referral of bilateral differences to the ICJ must be preceded by other means to settle bilateral disputes peacefully. However, to prevent the talks from failing, the EU invited the two countries to refer their bilateral differences to the ICJ by 2004. The possibility of referral to the ICJ for adjudication may have made the two countries adhere to bilateral talks more. In other words, the future ruling of the ICJ may not satisfy the either side in case the dispute is referred to the ICJ for adjudication. Therefore, Turkey and Greece may have preferred to continue their talks to resolve the Aegean dispute along their interests.

In addition, Paragraph 9.b enabled accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU irrespective of a final settlement of the Cyprus issue. Paragraph 9.b stated:

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors (European Council, 1999a: Par. 9.b).

The aforementioned Paragraphs illustrate national projection/uploading by Greece to the EU level of its national interests in return for dropping its veto against Turkey's candidacy. On the Aegean dispute, Greece could upload its preference for adjudication. To create time pressure on Turkey, the year 2004 was set as a time limit for negotiations. On the Cyprus issue, Greece could guarantee accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU irrespective of a final settlement.

3.3. Turkey-Greece Relations in the Post-Helsinki Period

The Europeanization of Turkey increased notably after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. As a matter of fact, Turkey had to meet sufficiently the Copenhagen political criteria to qualify for the launching of accession negotiations as stipulated at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). Thus, the prospect of launching accession negotiations was an important incentive for Turkey to

Europeanize its domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements (Özer, 2012: 51). Accordingly, Turkey adopted several measures to align with the Copenhagen political criteria between 2001 and 2004⁵⁴. Meanwhile, the 2002 Copenhagen European Council convened on 12 and 13 December 2002. The 2002 Copenhagen European Council is important in that it increased the credibility of full membership for Turkey. As a matter of fact, it stated:

If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay (European Council, 2002: Par. 19).

Democratization of Turkey was important for the improvement of Turkey-Greece relations, as well. Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria paved the way for the civilianization of foreign policy in Turkey, i.e. the decline of the military's influence in TFP (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2009: 3-4; Oğuzlu; 2010: 661; Özcan, 2010: 25). Thus, the post-Helsinki period witnessed further improvement of relations between Turkey and Greece. Cooperation between the two countries increased notably. For instance, A Task Force on the EU was established upon a suggestion by Greece in January 2000 to assist Turkish officials in EU affairs (Heraclides, 2002: 24). Seminars were organized both in Turkey and Greece on customs administration, financial and agricultural matters, police cooperation and issues related to the transposition of the EU's *acquis* into national legislation in the same period (Heraclides, 2002: 24).

⁵⁴ The first constitutional amendments were introduced in 2001 and the second in 2004. Three harmonization packages were adopted in 2002. Four harmonization packages were adopted in 2003 and two in 2004. They dealt mainly with the shortening of detention periods prior to trials, abolishing capital punishment, eschewing dissolution of political parties, expanding freedom of association and expression, civilianizing NSC, improving the state of human rights and minority rights and strengthening gender equality (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman, 2004: 15). The process of Europeanization decelerated after 2005 because the prospect of full membership lost credibility. Nonetheless, some constitutional amendments were introduced in 2007. Another constitutional amendment was introduced by referendum in 2010.

Furthermore, Turkey participated in Dynamic Mix 2000 exercise of NATO which took place in Greece in May-June 2000. For the first time after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Turkish troops and military aircraft were in Greece (European Commission, 2000: 67).⁵⁵

Tensions between the two countries reduced significantly in the same period (Larrabee, 2001: 237). For instance, in the summer of 2001, a Turkish vessel decided to embark on a seismological survey in the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, but it was cancelled after consultations between G. Papandreou and Cem (Tsarouhas, 2009: 52). In addition, bilateral contacts between the two countries increased. For instance, the Greek Foreign Minister, G. Papandreou paid an official visit to Turkey on 19 January 2000. It was the first time in 38 years that a Greek Foreign Minister officially visited Ankara (*Milliyet*, 2000a). The Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem visited Greece officially one month after his Greek counterpart's visit to Turkey. It was the first time that a Turkish Foreign Minister visited Athens officially in 40 years (*Milliyet*, 2000b).

Furthermore, the two countries have engaged in adopting CBMs since October 2000. They agreed to develop three sorts of CBMs: i) CBMs within the framework of the 1988 Papoulias-Yılmaz Memorandum of Understanding; ii) Tension Reduction Measures; and iii) measures of good neighbourliness (Heraclides, 2002: 24). These

⁵⁵ It is noteworthy that political cooperation sparked economic cooperation between the two countries (Papadopoulos, 2009: 289). According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), Turkey exported goods worth €330m to Greece in 1998 (TÜİK, 1998). These exports amounted to €1.02bn in 2012 (TÜİK, 2012). At the same time, imports from Greece were worth €288m in 1998 (TÜİK, 1998). These imports amounted to €2.46bn in 2012 (TÜİK, 2012). In addition, the number of Greek visitors to Turkey stood at 168.373 in 1998 (TÜİK, 1998a). This number amounted to 702.017 in 2011 (TÜİK, 2011). It is believed that increased economic cooperation between the two countries would strengthen the continuing process of rapprochement (Papadopoulos, 2009: 289).

CBMs are predominantly military in nature. They include, among other things, commitments by the two countries to reduce the number, size and scope of their respective exercises in the high seas of the Aegean Sea; to notify the time schedule of national exercises for the following year; to fly unarmed over the Aegean Sea; to set up a direct telephone line between their Ministries of Foreign Affairs; to implement exchanges between military academies and military hospitals; and to clear landmines along the Maritsa (Meriç) river (Tsakonias, 2001: 165-166; European Commission, 2001: 31; 2003: 53).

It was earlier noted that the continuing process of rapprochement was strengthened in two ways by the EU's involvement in it. Firstly, the carrot of full membership became an important carrot for Turkey to adhere to its commitments (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). Secondly, both governments could capitalize on the EU to justify their preference for rapprochement and settling bilateral differences (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). Therefore, the process of rapprochement did not come to a halt when different political parties came to power in Turkey and Greece. For instance, Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in November 2002 in Turkey. The Europeanization of Turkey and improvement of its relations with Greece continued thereafter because the new government prioritized accession of Turkey to the EU.

On the other hand, the ND led by the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis came to power in March 2004 in Greece. The process of rapprochement continued under the new government, as well. The Turkish Prime Minister officially visited Athens six months after K. Karamanlis came to power. It was the first time that a Turkish Prime Minister visited Athens officially since 1988 (*Sabah*, 2004). It is noteworthy that during the visit of Erdoğan, K. Karamanlis reiterated: "Turkey's continued engagement in EU accession process is Greece's best hope for the normalization of relations" (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 108). The Greek Prime Minister visited Turkey officially in November 2008 for the first time in 49 years (*Radikal*, 2008).

Improvements in Turkey-Greece relations have been referred to in the respective annual Progress Reports of the European Commission on Turkey, APDs and National Programmes for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA) as well as Presidency Conclusions of the European Councils. For instance, in the first NPAA of Turkey which was adopted in 2001, it was assured: “Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue” (NPAA, 2001: Introduction). Thus, Turkey referred to dialogue as the main instrument for the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece. Furthermore, in the APD of Turkey, under Short Term Priorities for Political Dialogue, it is stated that Turkey must:

pursue further efforts to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter including, if necessary, jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations; address any sources of friction with neighbours; and refrain from any threat or action which could adversely affect the process of peaceful settlement of border disputes⁵⁶ (Council of the European Union, 2008: 10).

This means that for the improvement of Turkey-Greece relations: i) the option of proceeding to the ICJ in case bilateral talks fail should not be excluded; ii) bilateral differences between the two countries must be resolved peacefully; and iii) use of force or threat of using force must be avoided⁵⁷.

The year 2004 was important in that it was the time limit set out by the EU at the 1999 Helsinki European Council for bilateral talks over the Aegean. The Aegean dispute has not been resolved to date although ‘exploratory talks’ continue. However, Greece did not push for proceeding to the ICJ in 2004. Greece may have believed that

⁵⁶ The same was stated verbatim in the 2005 Negotiating Framework Document of Turkey (Council of the European Union, 2005a: Par. 6).

⁵⁷ By threat of using force, the EU referred to the 1995 casus belli resolution of the TGNA (European Commission, 2009: 32).

accession to the EU would be a stronger incentive for Turkey than time pressure (Rumelili, 2008: 105). In line with that, at the 2004 Brussels European Council, the EU did not call on Turkey to proceed necessarily to the ICJ but stated:

The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbours and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate (European Council, Par. 20).

Thus, the EU confined itself to welcoming the improvements in Turkey-Greece relations. The December 2004 Brussels European Council is also important in that it paved the way for the launching of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (European Council, 2004: Par. 29). The Europeanization of Turkey slowed down subsequent to the launching of accession negotiations to the extent that the post-2005 period is called “stalled Europeanization” of Turkey (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2010: 42). This is mainly because of the fact that full membership of the EU became a less credible objective for Turkey thereafter.

On the part of Turkey, several reasons underlie the loss of credibility of full membership of the EU. First of all, the emergent negative stance in some of the Member States of the EU, e.g. Austria, France, the Netherlands and Denmark on Turkey's accession and the country's Europeanness caused loss of credibility (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 67; Sedelmeier, 2010: 424). In this regard, Nas argues that the case of the Europeanization of Turkey's identity is different from the cases of the CEECs, Malta, Southern Cyprus and the Western Balkans because of the fact that “Turkey's candidacy and accession to the EU is not justified but contested on the ground of Europeanness” (Nas, 2012: 25). In addition, the public opinion in the EU has been increasingly against

full membership of Turkey on the pretext that Turkey is different culturally and religiously (Özer, 2012: 60). Thus, privileged partnership which is more than association but less than full membership came to the fore as an alternative to Turkey's accession to the EU. Also, accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU in 2004 without a final settlement, and suspension of accession negotiations on the eight chapters of the EU's *acquis* in 2006 because Turkey does not apply the Customs Union to Southern Cyprus resulted in further loss of credibility (Oğuzlu, 2008: 4; Dinan, 2010: 490). Moreover, the ambivalent language of the 2005 Negotiating Framework Document on Turkey's accession reduced credibility of full membership as a reward (Özer, 2012: 60). It states:

These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond (Council of the European Union, 2005a: Par. 9).

Actually, references in the aforementioned Paragraph to anchoring "Turkey in the European structures through the strongest possible bond" and to the "absorption capacity of the Union" have overtones of privileged partnership which is not preferred by Turkey (Council of the European Union, 2005a: Par. 9; Oğuzlu, 2008: 13; Özer, 2012: 61). In addition, slowing down of the process of Europeanization has had ramifications for the Europeanization of TFP, as well. The lack of the credibility of full membership for Turkey decreased the influence of the EU on TFP especially after 2008 (Terzi, 2012: 205). For instance, while Turkey aligned itself with 98 per cent of the EU's CFSP statements in 2007, it aligned with only 48 per cent of them in 2011 (European Commission, 2007: 74; 2011: 106).

Concluding Remarks

This chapter attempted to portray the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey with special reference to the country's relations with Greece in view of the Aegean dispute from the perspective of rational-choice institutionalism. To that end, the Europeanization of the continuing process of rapprochement at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, and Turkey-Greece relations in the post-Helsinki period have been evaluated.

In this respect, it has been argued that rational instrumentality underlies Turkey's quest for fostering good neighbourly relations with Greece, i.e. the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece. Rationalist approach of Turkey is evidenced by the fact that Turkey hoped to overcome the veto of Greece against its candidacy through rapprochement (Heraclides, 2010: 145). However, Turkey continues to foster good neighbourly relations with Greece after the latter dropped its veto. This is mainly because accession of Turkey to the EU was tied, among other things, to the improvement of the country's relations with Greece at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). This means that while Turkey hoped to overcome the veto of Greece against its candidacy through initiating rapprochement, it aims at achieving full membership of the EU through further fostering good neighbourly relations with it.

On the other hand, it has been related that the Europeanization of Turkey has decelerated because the prospect of full membership has lost credibility after accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005. Slowing down of the process of Europeanization may have implications for the continuing process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, as well. Because accession of Turkey was tied, among other things, to the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the loss of credibility of the prospect of full membership may decrease Turkey's quest for fostering good neighbourly relations with Greece.

Actually, because full membership of the EU is valued notably, adoption costs stemming from the Europeanization process have been disregarded to some extent in Turkey, especially when the credibility of the prospect of full membership was high. This means that Turkey had to undergo some adoption costs when fulfilling certain conditions set out by the EU for its accession. This is mainly because Turkey had to engage in the settlement of the issues of high resilience in TFP and introduce reforms on other sensitive issues. While the promise of full membership as a reward in return encourages Turkey to accelerate EU accession process, the decrease in the credibility of the prospect of full membership due to the aforementioned reasons results in the slowing down of the Europeanization process. This may cause Turkey's alienation and impair Turkey's identification with the EU. In addition, Turkey may even start to consider the EU's demands as illegitimate in the longer term if the credibility of the prospect of full membership continues to decrease.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey has been evaluated from the viewpoint of rational-choice institutionalism. The main argument of the thesis has been that rational instrumentality underlies the Europeanization of TFP because Turkey expects that it is rewarded full membership of the EU in return for Europeanization. In other words, Turkey is not expected to get fully socialized into and internalize the EU's rules and norms. Therefore, Turkey's compliance with the EU's rules and norms may vary across issues and over time in line with its fixed interests. Actually, the Candidate States cannot get fully socialized because they do not decide on the EU's rules and norms but they have to adopt them. Thus, it has been concluded that socialization is more relevant for the Member States of the EU because it is easier for them to internalize the rules and norms that they themselves construct.

To substantiate the argument of the thesis further, an overall assessment of the Europeanization of TFP has been made with reference to Turkey's i) alignment with the EU's foreign and security policy; ii) relations with its neighbours and broader neighbourhood; iii) alignment with the EU's position on non-proliferation of WMD and fight against terrorism; iv) activities to promote the EU's rules and norms in other international organizations; v) contributions to the CSDP. In addition to that, changes introduced to the country's administrative structures responsible for foreign policymaking have been discussed with a view to uncovering the influence of the EU on TFP in general.

In this respect, it has been concluded that the Europeanization of TFP increased notably after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. However, the process of Europeanization decelerated after the credibility of the prospect of full membership has decreased after accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005. The relationship between the credibility of the prospect of full membership and the pace of Turkey's Europeanization illustrates the rationalist approach of Turkey to Europeanization. This

means that Turkey's quest for Europeanization decreases when it has the impression that full membership may not be rewarded even after all conditions for accession are met.

Moreover, both legal and political aspects of the Aegean dispute which is an issue of high resilience for both countries have been discussed in detail in the thesis. The Aegean dispute is an important issue in Turkey-EU relations, as well. As a matter of fact, it was stated in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council that it should be resolved peacefully (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). Therefore, Turkey's quest for improving its relations with Greece, especially in the context of the Aegean dispute can be explained by the fact that it was referred to in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council as essential for Turkey's accession to the EU. In other words, the EU set out peaceful resolution of the Aegean dispute as one of the conditions that Turkey has to fulfil before its accession. Hence, full membership of the EU is an important incentive for Turkey to reconcile its bilateral differences with Greece (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130).

In this regard, the main theme of this thesis has been the Europeanization of TFP after the 1999 Helsinki European Council with special reference to Turkey's relations with Greece in view of the Aegean dispute. It is noteworthy that after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, Turkey came to the conclusion that it had to improve its relations with Greece to achieve full membership of the EU given the fact that Greece used the EU as leverage against Turkey until the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 44; Kavakas, 2000: 147; Aydın, 2000: 132; Hale and Avci, 2002: 47; Economides, 2005: 484). Hence, Turkey-Greece relations became Europeanized at the 1999 Helsinki European Council because their bilateral differences were referred to in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: Par. 4). This means that bilateral differences between the two countries turned into an issue of the EU upon the Europeanization of their relations (Triantaphyllou, 2001: 69; Aybet, 2009: 151).

The Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council exemplify well national projection/uploading by Greece of its national interests to the EU level. For instance, Greece could guarantee accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU irrespective of a final settlement and could induce the EU to introduce referral of border disputes to the ICJ as a condition for accession for Turkey (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337; Economides, 2005: 484-485). The relationship between the peaceful resolution of the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue and Turkey's accession to the EU explains the rationality that is embedded in Turkey's quest for fostering good neighbourly relations. In other words, the Europeanization of TFP in the context of the Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue can be explained via the fact that Turkey is required to foster good neighbourly relations and ensure peaceful resolution of the border disputes to accede to the EU.

Furthermore, on the relationship between the continuity of the process of rapprochement and declaration by the EU of Turkey's candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, it has been said that the continuing process of rapprochement between the two countries may have failed if Turkey's candidacy had not been declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. This is mainly because of the fact that Turkey expected to eliminate the veto of Greece against its candidacy through rapprochement (Heraclides, 2010: 145). Therefore, rapprochement with Greece would have meant less to Turkey if its candidacy had not been declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. In the same vein, it can be concluded that the Aegean dispute could be Europeanized despite its high resilience in TFP and GFP owing to the size of expected rewards and gains.

Overall, it has been concluded that rational instrumentality underlies the Europeanization of TFP. This means that the Europeanization of both domestic and foreign policy fields in Turkey is conditional to a great extent on the credibility of the prospect of full membership. As a corollary, the Europeanization of Turkey slows down if the prospect of full membership becomes less credible. Yet, whether cooperation between Turkey and Greece would continue if the prospect of full membership further

lost credibility is a challenging question. As put by Ker-Lindsay, the two countries may prefer to continue cooperation in the absence of a credible full membership prospect if they value tangible benefits that they obtained via cooperation in the last decade and this can especially be the case if Turkey disassociated fostering good neighbourly relations with Greece from accession to the EU (Ker-Lindsay, 2012: 1).

Recently, the two countries seem willing to continue cooperation despite the loss of credibility of the prospect of full membership and the continuing Greek debt crisis that broke out at the end of 2009. As a matter of fact, a High Level Cooperation Council was established and further agreements on cooperation in the fields of border controls, diplomatic missions, standardization, investments, forestry, environment, energy and climate change, education, science technology, communication, illegal immigration and culture and tourism were signed between the two countries when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Athens in May 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 2010: 1). In addition to that, ‘exploratory talks’ between the two countries continue, but they are not made public. The 54th round of ‘exploratory talks’ was held in January 2013 in Greece. It is believed that they progress satisfactorily. If this had not been the case, then Greece would have most probably called on the EU to invite Turkey to agree to referral.

It is still early to answer the question of whether relations between Turkey and Greece would be normalized by the continuing process of rapprochement and Europeanization. This can only be possible if the continuing process of rapprochement further progresses and cooperation between the two countries is no longer limited to the issues of low political significance. In addition, full socialization of Turkey into the EU’s norms and rules subsequent to its accession may facilitate the emergence of a relationship with Greece similar to that between France and Germany that was desecuritized despite their conflict-ridden past. Increased cooperation and interdependence triggered by the EU between France and Germany may this time work for Turkey and Greece.

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